Inflation Protected

Highlights Chart 1Rate Hikes Lagging Wage Growth Rate Hikes Lagging Wage Growth Rate Hikes Lagging Wage Growth Last Friday's GDP report showed that the U.S. economy grew a meagre 0.7% (annualized) in the first quarter of 2017, well below levels necessary to sustain an uptrend in inflation. However, our forward looking indicators still point to U.S. growth of around 2% during the next few quarters. It is likely that faulty seasonal adjustments suppressed Q1 GDP growth. Q1 growth has averaged -0.1% during the past 10 years, while Q2 growth has averaged more than 2%. Q2 growth has also exceeded Q1 growth in 8 of the last 10 years. For its part, the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index has provided an average return of close to 1% during the past 10 Q1s and an average return of 0.4% during the past 10 Q2s. Treasury returns have been greater in the first quarter than in the second quarter in 6 out of the past 10 years. Investors would be wise to ignore Q1 GDP and stay focused on the uptrends in wage growth and inflation that are likely to persist (Chart 1). With the market priced for only 38 bps of rate hikes between now and the end of the year, there is scope for the Fed to send a hawkish surprise. Stay at below-benchmark duration and short January 2018 Fed Funds Futures. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 23 basis points in April. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 2 bps on the month and, at 116 bps, it remains well below its historical average (134 bps). While supportive monetary policy will ensure excess returns consistent with carry, investors should not bank on further spread compression as spreads have already discounted a substantial improvement in leverage (Chart 2). In a recent report,1 we noted that net leverage (defined as: total debt minus cash, as a percent of EBITD) is positively correlated with spreads, and also that it has never reversed its uptrend unless prompted by a recession. In other words, the corporate sector never voluntarily undertakes deleveraging, it only starts to pay down debt when forced by a severe economic contraction. We conclude that debt growth will likely continue to outpace profit growth (panel 4), even as profits rebound over the course of this year. If our anticipated timeline plays out, we will be looking to scale back on credit risk in 2018, when inflationary pressures are more pronounced and the Fed steps up the pace of tightening. Energy related sectors still appear cheap after adjusting for differences in credit rating and duration (Table 3). Further, our commodity strategists expect OPEC production cuts will be extended through to the end of the year, and that $60/bbl remains a reasonable target for oil prices. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Time Of The Season Time Of The Season Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* Time Of The Season Time Of The Season High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 62 basis points in April. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 12 bps on the month and, at 371 bps, it is currently 27 bps above its 2017-low. Wider junk spreads in recent months appear to be largely related to flight-to-safety flows driven by elevated global political uncertainty. We find it notable that spreads tightened following the market-friendly result of the first round of the French election. While political uncertainty remains, we view current spreads as attractive on a 6-12 month horizon. In a recent report,2 we tested a strategy of "buying dips" in the junk bond market and found that it produced favorable results in a low-inflation environment. With the St. Louis Fed's Price Pressures Measure still suggesting only a 6% chance of PCE inflation above 2.5% during the next 12 months, we think this strategy will continue to work. Moody's recorded 21 defaults in Q1 (globally) down from 41 in the first quarter of 2016, with the improvement attributable to recovery in the commodity sectors. While commodity sectors still accounted for half of the defaults in Q1, Moody's predicts that the retail sector will soon assume the mantle of "most troubled sector." According to Moody's, nearly 14% of retail issuers are trading at distressed levels. Moody's still expects the U.S. speculative grade default rate to be 3% for the next 12 months, down from 4.7% for the prior 12 months. Based on this forecast we calculate the High-Yield default-adjusted spread to be 207 bps (Chart 3), a level consistent with positive excess returns on a 12-month horizon more than 70% of the time. MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 2 basis points in April. The conventional 30-year MBS yield fell 10 bps on the month, driven by an 11 bps decline in the rate component. The compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) rose by 2 bps, but this was partially offset by a 1 bp tightening in the option-adjusted spread (OAS). Since the middle of last year the MBS OAS has widened alongside rising net issuance, but this has been offset by a falling option cost (Chart 4). This is exactly the price behavior we would expect to see in an environment where mortgage rates are moving higher and the market is starting to discount the Fed's eventual exit from the MBS market. Higher mortgage rates suppress refinancings, and this will ensure that the option cost component of spreads remains low. However, higher mortgage rates are also unlikely to halt the uptrend in net MBS issuance, since the main constraint on housing demand this cycle has been insufficient household savings, not un-affordable mortgage payments.3 This means that OAS still have room to widen alongside greater net issuance. The winding down of the Fed's mortgage portfolio - a process that is likely to begin later this year - will only add to the supply that the market needs to absorb. How will the opposing forces of low option cost and widening OAS net out? The option cost component of spreads is already close to its all-time low, while the OAS is still 16 bps below its pre-crisis mean. We think it is unlikely that a lower option cost can fully offset OAS widening. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 2 basis points in April, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 75 bps. The high-beta Sovereign and Foreign Agency sectors outperformed by 8 bps and 1 bp, respectively. Meanwhile, the low-beta Domestic Agency and Supranational sectors outperformed by 7 bps each. Local Authorities underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 23 bps. Since the beginning of the year, excess returns from the Sovereign sector have been supported by a weakening U.S. dollar (Chart 5). Mexican debt, in particular, has benefited from a 10% appreciation of the peso relative to the U.S. dollar (panel 3). A stronger peso obviously makes Mexico's USD-denominated debt easier to service and has led to year-to-date excess returns of 402 bps for Mexican sovereign debt relative to U.S. Treasuries. Mexican debt accounts for 21% of the Sovereign index. Our Emerging Markets Strategy service thinks that Mexico's central bank could deliver another 50 bps of rate hikes, because inflation is above target, but also maintains that further rate hikes will soon start to squeeze consumer spending.4 Conversely, the Fed has scope to hike rates much further. Sovereigns no longer appear expensive on our model, relative to domestic U.S. corporate sectors. But we still expect them to underperform as the dollar resumes its bull market. Local authorities and Foreign Agencies still offer lucrative spreads on our model, and we remain overweight those spaces within an overall underweight allocation to the Government-Related index. Municipal Bonds: Neutral Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 12 basis points in April (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio was flat on the month, but has fallen 15% since peaking shortly after the U.S. election (Chart 6). The sparse details of the Trump administration's proposed tax reform plan, released last week, did not include any specific mention of the municipal bond tax exemption, but did call for the elimination of "targeted tax breaks" leaving some to wonder if the tax exemption is in play. It is too soon to tell whether repealing the tax exemption will be part of the final tax reform plan, although its repeal would be at odds with the President's stated desire to spur infrastructure spending. For this reason, we suspect the tax exemption will ultimately survive. Assuming the tax exemption survives, the proposed repeal of the Alternative Minimum Tax and of the state & local government income tax deduction should both increase demand for tax-exempt municipal bonds. However, this positive impact will be offset by lower tax rates. All in all, it is too soon to know how this will all shake out, but the considerable uncertainty makes us reluctant to take strong directional bets in the municipal bond market for now. Meanwhile, Muni mutual fund inflows have totaled more than $9 billion since the beginning of the year, while total issuance is at a 12-month low. Strong inflows and low supply likely explain why yield ratios are testing the low-end of their post-crisis trading range. Treasury Curve: Favor 5-Year Bullet Over 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve shifted lower in April, with the 2/10 slope flattening by 12 basis points and the 5/30 slope steepening by 6 bps. The 5-year Treasury yield declined 12 bps on the month, while the 10-year yield fell 11 bps. The 2-year yield actually ticked 1 bp higher. Significant outperformance in the 5-year part of the curve means that our recommendation to favor the 5-year bullet over a duration-matched 2/10 barbell has returned 27 bps since inception on December 20, 2016. This 5-year bullet over duration-matched 2/10 barbell trade is designed to profit from 2/10 curve steepening, which has not yet materialized. Instead, the trade has performed well because the 2/5/10 butterfly spread has moved much closer to our estimate of fair value (Chart 7). The 5-year bullet still looks moderately cheap on the curve, but no longer offers an exceptional valuation cushion. For our trade to outperform from here we will likely need to see some 2/10 curve steepening. We continue to hold the 5-year bullet over duration-matched 2/10 barbell trade, because we still expect the 2/10 slope to steepen. This steepening will be driven by wider long-maturity TIPS breakevens which should eventually catch up to leading pipeline inflation measures (see next page). In a recent report,5 we outlined the main drivers of the slope of the yield curve on a cyclical horizon and concluded that wider breakevens can cause the nominal curve to steepen even with the Fed in the midst of hiking rates. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 25 basis points in April. The 10-year TIPS breakeven rate declined 5 bps on the month and, at 1.92%, it remains well below its pre-crisis trading range of 2.4% to 2.5%. Our Financial Model of TIPS breakevens - which models the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate using the stock-to-bond total return ratio, the price of oil and the trade-weighted dollar - attributes the recent decline in breakevens to weakness in the stock-bond ratio and the fact that the 10-year breakeven rate was already quite elevated compared to fair value (Chart 8). Both core and trimmed mean PCE inflation dropped sharply in March, and are now running at 1.6% and 1.8% year-over-year, respectively (bottom panel). This decline is likely to reverse in the coming months. Crucially, pipeline inflation measures, such as the ISM prices paid index, are holding firm at high levels (panel 4). We remain overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries on the view that growth will be strong enough to keep measures of core inflation on a steady upward trajectory, eventually converging with the Fed's 2% inflation target. In that environment, TIPS breakevens should eventually return to their pre-crisis range. In last week's report,6 we considered the possibility that TIPS breakevens might not return to their pre-crisis trading range, even if measures of core inflation remain strong. The most likely reason relates to structural rigidities in the repo market that have made it more costly to arbitrage the difference between real and nominal rates. For now, we consider this simply a risk to our overweight view. ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 11 basis points in April, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +33 bps. Aaa-rated issuers outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 10 bps on the month, while non-Aaa issues outperformed by 13 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS tightened 1 bp on the month, and remains well below its average pre-crisis level. Banks are now tightening lending standards on both auto loans and credit cards. While we do not expect this recent development to have much of an impact on consumer spending,7 it is usually an indication that there is growing concern about ABS collateral credit quality. This concern is echoed by the fact that net losses on auto loans are trending sharply higher (Chart 9). Credit card charge-offs remain subdued for now - and we continue to recommend that investors favor Aaa-rated credit cards over Aaa-rated auto loans - but even in the credit card space quality concerns are starting to mount. Capital One reported a 20% drop in earnings in Q1 versus the same quarter in 2016, and noted that it has been tightening underwriting standards against a back-drop of credit card loans growing faster than income. We remain overweight ABS for now, as the securities still offer attractive spreads compared to other high-quality spread product, but we are closely monitoring credit quality metrics for signs of rising stress. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 3 basis points in April, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +19 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS widened 1 bp on the month, and is fast approaching its average pre-crisis level. Apartment and office building prices are growing strongly, but as in the corporate space, the retail sector is a major drag (Chart 10). Tighter lending standards and falling demand also suggest that credit stress is starting to mount, but while office and retail delinquencies are rising multi-family delinquencies remain low (panel 5). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 3 basis points in April, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +19 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Agency CMBS widened 1 bp on the month, and currently sits at 54 bps. The option-adjusted spread on Agency CMBS looks attractive compared to other high-quality spread product: Agency MBS = 35 bps, Aaa consumer ABS = 46 bps, Agency bonds = 17 bps and Supranationals = 20 bps. We continue to recommend an overweight position in Agency CMBS. Treasury Valuation Chart 11Treasury Fair Value Models Treasury Fair Value Models Treasury Fair Value Models The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (which is based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) places fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.59% (Chart 11). Our 3-factor version of the model, which also includes the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, places fair value at 2.43%. The lower fair value results from the large spike in the uncertainty index last November, which has only been partially unwound (bottom panel). Large spikes in uncertainty that do not coincide with deterioration in other economic indicators tend to mean revert fairly quickly. So we are inclined to view the fair value reading from our 2-factor model as more indicative of true fair value at the moment. It should also be noted that the fair value readings from both the 2-factor and 3-factor models are calculated using FLASH PMI estimates for April. These estimates will be revised later today when the actual PMI data are released. For further details on our Treasury models please refer to the U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Models", dated October 11, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com At the time of publication the 10-year Treasury yield was 2.32%. 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Payback Period In Corporate Bonds", dated April 11, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Keep Buying Dips", dated March 28, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Keep Buying Dips", dated March 28, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "A Time To Be Contrarian", dated April 5, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Yield Curve On A Cyclical Horizon", dated March 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Will Breakevens Ever Recover?", dated April 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Odds Of March", dated February 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)

Highlights Duration: The market is now priced for only 30 bps of rate hikes between now and the end of the year, despite little evidence that growth is actually slowing. Stay at below-benchmark duration and remain short the January 2018 Fed Funds Futures contract. TIPS: Although we still expect TIPS breakevens to widen as inflation rises, this week we review possible arguments for why breakevens might have shifted to a permanently lower post-crisis equilibrium. Remain overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries. Corporate Valuation: Our Default-Adjusted Spread remains at reasonably attractive levels, suggesting that corporate spreads will tighten in the coming months if the economic recovery remains on track. Remain overweight corporate bonds within U.S. fixed income portfolios. Feature Chart 1Yields Lower Since March FOMC Yields Lower Since March FOMC Yields Lower Since March FOMC In last week's report we argued that recent bond market strength was caused by a politically-induced flight-to-quality. In particular, we noted that the term structure of implied equity volatility had inverted - investors were paying more to hedge equity positions over a 1-month horizon than over a 3-month horizon. But political tensions have eased somewhat during the past week. President Trump promised to unveil his administration's tax reform plan this Wednesday, and the first round of the French election resulted in centrist candidate Emmanuel Macron securing a significant advantage over far-right candidate Marine Le Pen. As a consequence, 1-month implied equity vol fell back below 3-month vol, and the bond rally ebbed with the 10-year Treasury yield edging up to 2.29% from 2.17% at this time last week. Nonetheless, bond yields are still far below the levels seen following the last FOMC meeting in mid-March. Since that meeting, the 10-year Treasury yield has fallen 27 bps, split between a 12 bps decline in the real yield and a 15 bps drop in the cost of inflation compensation (Chart 1). Real Yields Are Too Low As shown in the top panel of Chart 1, the 10-year real yield is tightly linked to the number of rate hikes discounted in the overnight index swap curve during the next 12 months. Further, the drop in both of these series since mid-March occurred alongside a string of economic data disappointments, as evidenced by the sharp fall in the Economic Surprise Index (Chart 2). Our assessment, however, is that the mean reversion in the surprise index represents excessively optimistic expectations rather than a trend change in the pace of U.S. growth. Chart 2Disappointments Are Discounted Disappointments Are Discounted Disappointments Are Discounted To test this theory, we looked at the New York Fed's Nowcast for Q1 GDP growth and noted that it has been revised lower from 2.96% (as of March 24) to 2.65% (as of April 20). We observed that the data releases responsible for the bulk of the downward revision were: Real consumer spending Retail sales and food services Import & Export growth Housing starts As can be seen in Chart 3, with the exception of real consumer spending, all of the other data disappointments represent small corrections from elevated levels. As for real consumer spending, we noted last week that the recent weakness is probably explained by problems with Q1 seasonal adjustments.1 Taking a step back, U.S. growth still appears to be on solid footing. The BCA Beige Book Monitor, introduced last week by our U.S. Investment Strategy service,2 scans the Federal Reserve's Beige Book3 for the words "strong" and "weak" (and their derivatives like stronger, weakened, etc...). The Monitor is the number of "strong" words less the number of "weak" words, and it has been an excellent coincident indicator of GDP growth since the mid-1990s (Chart 4). At present, the Beige Book Monitor is sending a robust signal for U.S. growth. Similarly, despite supposed weakness in housing starts and trade data, our preferred leading indicators point to continued strength in both the residential investment and net export components of GDP (Chart 4, bottom 2 panels). Chart 3What Weak Data? What Weak Data? What Weak Data? Chart 4Growth Still Looks Strong Growth Still Looks Strong Growth Still Looks Strong Bottom Line: The market is now priced for only 30 bps of rate hikes between now and the end of the year, despite little evidence that growth is actually slowing. We still expect the Fed will lift rates by at least 50 bps between now and the end of the year. Stay at below-benchmark duration and remain short the January 2018 Fed Funds Futures contract. TIPS Breakevens: How Far From Fair Value? As was mentioned above, the cost of 10-year inflation compensation has also declined since mid-March alongside some weakness in the headline non-seasonally adjusted Consumer Price Index (see Chart 1). Our Financial Model of TIPS Breakevens - which models the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate using the stock-to-bond total return ratio, the price of oil and the trade-weighted dollar - attributes the recent decline to weakness in the stock-to-bond ratio and the fact that the 10-year breakeven rate was already quite elevated compared to our model's fair value (Chart 5). The 10-year breakeven rate is still somewhat wide compared to our model's fair value, but much less so. We remain overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries on the view that growth will be strong enough to keep measures of core inflation on a steady upward trajectory, eventually converging with the Fed's 2% inflation target. The fair value reading from our TIPS Financial Model should also trend gradually higher in this environment. Historically, core PCE inflation anchored around the Fed's 2% inflation target has corresponded with a 5y5y TIPS breakeven inflation rate in the range of 2.4% to 2.5% (current value 1.89%) and a 5y5y CPI swap rate between 2.8% and 2.9% (current value = 2.31%) (Chart 6). These remain our target levels for TIPS breakevens and CPI swaps, respectively. Chart 5TIPS Financial Model TIPS Financial Model TIPS Financial Model Chart 6Still Below Target Still Below Target Still Below Target However, we must also consider the possibility that these target ranges, based on the mid-2000s, may no longer be applicable. Put differently, it is possible that the market for inflation protection underwent a structural shift following the financial crisis and the appropriate level for long-maturity TIPS breakeven rates when core PCE is anchored around 2% might now be lower. A Structurally Lower Inflation Risk Premium? It is common to think of the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate as: TIPS Breakeven Inflation = Inflation Expectations + Inflation Risk Premium The inflation risk premium is the extra return required by nominal bond investors to bear the risk that future inflation will differ from expected inflation. In theory, this premium can be influenced by uncertainty about the inflation outlook, but also by structural factors that make it more or less attractive to include TIPS in a portfolio. For example, any asset that is negatively correlated with equities is more valuable as a hedge in the context of an overall portfolio and investors should demand less of a risk premium to hold that asset. As one recent Fed paper4 noted, the correlation between long-maturity TIPS breakeven rates and equities has shifted from being negative in the 1980s to being sharply positive in recent years. This means that TIPS have become less valuable as a hedge against equity positions. All else equal, this should increase the yield that investors demand to hold TIPS and thus lower the TIPS breakeven inflation rate. We acknowledge the strong positive correlation between equities and TIPS breakevens, but are inclined to view it as more of a cyclical phenomenon. Chart 7 shows that the correlation between inflation expectations5 and equities was negative when inflation was above the Fed's 2% target in the 1980s and also that the correlation becomes more positive when the Fed eases and more negative when the Fed tightens (Chart 7, bottom panel). Chart 7Correlation Between Breakevens & Equities Is Cyclical Correlation Between Breakevens & Equities Is Cyclical Correlation Between Breakevens & Equities Is Cyclical In other words, when inflation is low the Fed has an incentive to maintain an accommodative monetary policy. It does not react strongly when inflation rises, and this supports increases in both inflation expectations and equity prices. However, when inflation becomes too high, the correlation between inflation expectations and equity prices shifts because higher inflation now signals a more rapid pace of Fed tightening which tends to depress equities. It therefore seems likely that the correlation between TIPS breakevens and equity prices will weaken as inflation rises and the Fed tightens policy. So we do not view this as a compelling reason for why TIPS breakevens might be permanently lower. Structural Limits To Arbitrage? A potentially more interesting line of argument comes from a 2010 paper by Fleckenstein, Longstaff and Lustig.6 In this paper, the authors document a persistent arbitrage opportunity between TIPS and nominal Treasury bonds. Investors can earn risk-free returns using inflation swaps and TIPS to replicate the cash flows from a nominal Treasury bond. The authors also find that this arbitrage opportunity biases TIPS breakeven rates lower, and that this bias worsens in times of increased financial market volatility. Chart 8Repo Market Less Efficient Repo Market Less Efficient Repo Market Less Efficient Specifically, the authors demonstrate that the size of the downward bias in TIPS breakevens increases as repo market fails trend higher. The rationale being that repo fails occur when market participants are unable to acquire specific Treasury collateral. This is taken as a signal that the supply of government bonds is constrained, which makes it more difficult to take advantage of the arbitrage between TIPS and nominal Treasuries. Interestingly, repo fails have been trending higher since the financial crisis as repo market activity has been reduced by strict post-crisis regulations (Chart 8). The case has been made that new regulations - specifically the Supplementary Leverage Ratio which forces dealer banks to set aside a fixed amount of capital for any assets they hold, regardless of riskiness - have caused dealers to shy away from low margin businesses such as making markets in repo.7 It is conceivable that reduced activity in the repo market has resulted in less available collateral and increased fails. If this is the new state of affairs, then it is possible that TIPS breakevens will be permanently lower in the post-crisis world because lack of liquidity in the repo market has reduced the attractiveness of arbitraging the difference between nominal and real yields. So far, we are reluctant to draw any sweeping conclusions from this analysis. In fact, if the Fed believes that the fair value for long-maturity TIPS breakevens is between 2.4% and 2.5%, then does the "limits to arbitrage" argument even matter? Also, Manmohan Singh of the IMF has argued that the act of the Fed unwinding its balance sheet would free up balance sheet space for dealer banks, mitigating some of the regulatory burden and leading to a more efficient repo market.8 If this is correct, then repo fails could decline as the Fed starts to let its balance sheet run down, a process that is likely to start later this year. For now, we consider the theory of a permanently lower equilibrium for TIPS breakevens a risk to our view that merits further research in the coming weeks. Corporate Bond Valuation Update With the release of the Moody's Default Report for March we were able to update our High-Yield Default-Adjusted Spread (Chart 9). Our Default-Adjusted Spread is equal to the average option-adjusted spread from the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield index less a 12-month forecast of default losses. That 12-month forecast is based on Moody's baseline forecast for the speculative grade default rate and our own forecast of the recovery rate. Chart 9Default-Adjusted Spread Default-Adjusted Spread Default-Adjusted Spread Moody's data show that the speculative grade default rate was 4.7% for the 12 months ending in March, and the baseline forecast calls for it to fall to 3% during the next 12 months. Using this forecast we calculate that the current Default-Adjusted Spread is 228 bps. Our analysis shows that excess returns for both Investment Grade and High-Yield corporate bonds are usually positive unless the Default-Adjusted Spread is below 100 bps. The relationship between excess returns and the Default-Adjusted Spread for both Investment Grade and High-Yield corporates is shown graphically in Charts 10 & 11 and also in Tables 1 & 2. Chart 1012-Month Excess Investment Grade Returns ##br##Vs. Ex-Ante Default-Adjusted Spread (2003 - Present) Will Breakevens Ever Recover? Will Breakevens Ever Recover? Chart 1112-Month Excess High-Yield Returns Versus Ex-Ante ##br##Default-Adjusted Spread (2003-Present) Will Breakevens Ever Recover? Will Breakevens Ever Recover? Table 112-Month Investment Grade Excess Returns & Ex-Ante Default-Adjusted Spread Will Breakevens Ever Recover? Will Breakevens Ever Recover? Table 212-Month High-Yield Excess Returns & Ex-Ante Default-Adjusted Spread Will Breakevens Ever Recover? Will Breakevens Ever Recover? Given our relatively optimistic outlook for U.S. growth, we tend to view current valuation levels as attractive and see scope for spread tightening during the next few months. However, the weakening state of corporate balance sheets means spreads are at risk once inflation starts to bite and monetary policy turns less accommodative, possibly as early as next year.9 Bottom Line: Our Default-Adjusted Spread remains at reasonably attractive levels, suggesting that corporate spreads will tighten in the coming months if the economic recovery remains on track. Remain overweight corporate bonds within U.S. fixed income portfolios. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Fade The Flight To Safety", dated April 18, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Great Debate Continues", dated April 17, 2017, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 3 According to the Fed, the Beige Book provides "an up-to-date depiction of regional economic conditions based on anecdotal information gathered from a diverse range of business and community contacts." 4 Chen, Andrew Y., Eric C. Engstrom, and Olesya V. Grishchenko (2016). "Has the inflation risk premium fallen? Is it now negative?," FEDS Notes. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, April 4, 2016, http://dx.doi.org/10.17016/2380-7172.1720 5 In order to benefit from more back-data, in Chart 7 we use the Cleveland Fed's measure of inflation expectations rather than TIPS breakeven rates. Details about the Cleveland Fed's methodology can be found here: https://www.clevelandfed.org/en/our-research/indicators-and-data/inflation-expectations.aspx 6 Fleckenstein, Matthias, Francis A. Longstaff, and Hanno Lustig (2010). "Why Does the Treasury Issue TIPS? The TIPS-Treasury Bond Puzzle", NBER Working Paper No. 16358. September 2010. JEL No. E6,G12,G14. http://www.nber.org/papers/w16358 7 https://www.forbes.com/sites/lbsbusinessstrategyreview/2016/03/11/why-are-big-banks-offering-less-liquidity-to-bond-markets/#64286f5729de 8 https://ftalphaville.ft.com/2017/04/24/2187716/guest-post-why-shrinking-the-fed-balance-sheet-may-have-an-easing-effect/ 9 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Payback Period In Corporate Bonds", dated April 11, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights High Conviction Views: The global cyclical backdrop remains negative for government bond markets, and the recent declines in yields will not be sustained. We continue to recommend a below-benchmark overall duration stance, favoring U.S. corporate debt with underweight exposures to U.S. Treasuries and Italian government debt, as our highest conviction views. Medium Conviction Views: Staying overweight global inflation protection, French government bonds versus Germany, and Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) versus the rest of the developed bond markets, while remaining underweight U.S. Mortgage Backed Securities, are recommendations that we hold with a more moderate conviction level. Euro Area Bond Distortions: The ECB's negative interest rate and asset purchase programs have created significant distortions in the German bond yield curve that are not as evident in the Euro Area swap rate curve, especially at shorter maturities. ECB tapering will be the trigger for a reversal of these trends. Feature Chart of the WeekWhy Are Yields Falling? Why Are Yields Falling? Why Are Yields Falling? After publishing two Special Reports in the past two weeks, this Weekly Report is our first opportunity to comment on the markets in April. We find it somewhat surprising that government bonds in the developed world have rallied as much as they have since the most recent peak last month, with the benchmark 10-year U.S. Treasury and German Bund seeing yield declines of -29bps and -22bps, respectively. Most of the move in Treasuries has been in the real yield component, while Bunds have seen a more even split between declines in real yields and inflation expectations. This has occurred despite minimal changes in actual growth or inflation pressures in either the U.S. or Europe (Chart of the Week). The price action in the Treasury market after last week's U.S. Payrolls report is a sign that the bond backdrop remains bearish. Yields initially fell all the way to 2.26% after the March increase in jobs fell short of expectations, before subsequently rebounding sharply to end the day at 2.38%. While intraday yield reversals on Payrolls Fridays are as typical as the sun setting in the west, a 12bp swing is one of the larger ones in recent memory (perhaps because investors eventually noticed the weather-related distortions in the data or, more importantly, that the U.S. unemployment rate had fallen to 4.5%). We continue to favor a pro-growth bias for bond investors, staying below-benchmark on overall duration and selectively overweight on corporate credit (favoring the U.S.). Ranking Our Current Market Views, By Conviction We have seen little in the economic data over the past few weeks to change our main strategic market views and portfolio recommendations. We summarize our main opinions below, ranked in order of our conviction level: Highest conviction views: Below-benchmark on overall portfolio duration exposure (for dedicated bond investors). Global bond yields have more room to rise alongside solid economic growth, tightening labor markets, inflation expectations drifting higher and central banks moving to slightly less accommodative monetary policies, on the margin. While the sharp upward momentum in coincident bond indicators like the global ZEW sentiment index has cooled of late, the solid upturn in the BCA Global Leading Economic Indicator continues to point to future upward pressure on real yields (Chart 2). The recent pullback in yields also appears to have run too far versus the trend in global data surprises, which remain elevated (bottom panel). One factor that we see having a potentially huge negative impact on global bond markets is the European Central Bank (ECB) announcing a move to a less accommodative policy stance later this year. A taper of asset purchases starting in 2018 is the more likely outcome than any hike in policy interest rates, which we see as more of a story for 2019. This should help push longer-dated bond yields higher within the Euro Area, and drag up global bond yields more generally. Underweight U.S. Treasuries. We still expect the Fed to deliver at least two more hikes this year, and there is still room for U.S. inflation expectations to rise further and put bear-steepening pressure on the Treasury curve. Our two-factor model for the benchmark 10-year Treasury yield, which uses the global purchasing managers index (PMI) and investor sentiment towards the U.S. dollar as the explanatory variables, indicates that yields are now about 18bps below fair value. From a technical perspective, the Treasury market no longer appears as oversold as it did after the rapid run-up in yields following last November's U.S. elections. The large short positions indicated by the J.P. Morgan duration survey and the Commitment of Traders report for Treasury futures have largely been unwound, while price momentum has flipped into positive territory (Chart 3). This removes one of the largest impediments to a renewed decline in Treasury prices, and we expect that the 10-year yield to rise to the upper end of the recent 2.30%-2.60% trading range in the next couple of months, before eventually breaking out on the way to the 2.80%-3% area by year-end. Chart 2Maintain A Defensive Duration Posture Maintain A Defensive Duration Posture Maintain A Defensive Duration Posture Chart 3Stay Underweight U.S. Treasuries Stay Underweight U.S. Treasuries Stay Underweight U.S. Treasuries Underweight Italian government bonds, versus both Germany and Spain. Italian government debt continues to suffer from the toxic combination of sluggish growth and weak domestic banks. The OECD leading economic indicator for Italy is declining, in contrast to the stable-to-rising trends in Germany and Spain (Chart 4). Meanwhile, the 5-year credit default swaps (CDS) for the major banks in Italy remain elevated around 400bps, in sharp contrast to the declining CDS in Germany and Spain which are now at 100bps. It is no coincidence that the widening trend in Italy-Germany and Italy-Spain spreads began around the same time last year that Italian bank CDS started to disengage from the rest of Europe (bottom panel). Markets understand that the undercapitalized Italian banking system will need government assistance at some point, which will add to the Italian government's already huge debt/GDP ratio of 133%. Political uncertainty in Italy, with parliamentary elections due by the spring of 2018 and populist parties like the anti-euro Five-Star Alliance holding up well in the polls, will also ensure that the risk premium on Italian bonds stays wide both in absolute terms and relative to other Peripheral European markets. Overweight U.S. corporate bonds, versus both U.S. Treasuries and Euro Area equivalents. The positive case for U.S. corporate debt is built upon two factors - the cyclical decline in default risk and the marginal improvement in balance sheet metrics. The latest estimates from Moody's are calling for a decline in the U.S. speculative grade corporate default rate to 3.1% this year. This leaves our measure of default-adjusted spreads in U.S. high-yield at levels that our colleagues at our sister publication, U.S. Bond Strategy, have shown to have a high probability of delivering positive excess returns over Treasuries in the next 12 months.1 Add to that the recent change in trend of our U.S. Corporate Health Monitor (CHM), which appears largely driven by some more positive numbers coming from lower-rated issuers in the Energy space given the recovery in oil prices, and the optimistic case for U.S. corporate debt is compelling. This is in contrast to our Euro Area CHM, which shows that the improving trend in balance sheet metrics has stalled of late (Chart 5, top panel). Chart 4Stay Underweight Italy Stay Underweight Italy Stay Underweight Italy Chart 5Stay Overweight U.S. Corporates vs Europe Stay Overweight U.S. Corporates vs Europe Stay Overweight U.S. Corporates vs Europe The difference between the U.S. and European CHMs has proven to be a good directional indicator for the relative return performance between the two markets, and is currently pointing to continued outperformance of both U.S. investment grade and high-yield debt versus European equivalents (bottom two panels). The threat of an ECB taper also hangs over the Euro Area investment grade corporate bond market, given the large buying of that debt by the central bank over the past year that has helped dampen both yields and spreads. Chart 6Stay Overweight Inflation Protection Stay Overweight Inflation Protection Stay Overweight Inflation Protection Medium-conviction views: Overweight inflation protection (both inflation-linked bonds and CPI swaps) in the U.S., Euro Area and Japan. In the U.S., the breakeven inflation rate on 10-year TIPS looks a bit too wide relative to our shorter-term model based on financial variables. However, underlying U.S. inflation pressures remain strong (Chart 6, top panel), particularly given the evidence that conditions in the labor market are getting progressively tighter. We expect inflation expectations to eventually rise back to levels consistent with the Fed's 2% inflation target on headline PCE inflation (which is around 2.5% on 10-year TIPS breakevens that are priced off the CPI index). The reflation story is somewhat less compelling in Europe and Japan, although CPI swaps are now at levels consistent with the underlying trends in realized inflation in both regions (bottom two panels). We continue to view long positions in CPI swaps in Europe and Japan as having a positive risk/reward skew given the tightening labor market in the former and the yen-negative monetary policies in the latter. Long France government bonds (10yr OATs) versus Germany (10yr Bunds). This is purely a call on the upcoming French election, which our political strategists believe will not end in a victory for the populist Marine Le Pen. While Le Pen has seen a recent bump in support heading into the first round of voting on April 23rd, her strong anti-euro position will eventually prove to be her undoing in the run-off election on May 7th (Chart 7). We first made this recommendation back in early February, and even though France-Germany spreads have been volatile since then as both Le Pen and the far-left candidate Jean-Luc Melenchon have seen a pickup in their poll numbers, the yield differentials are essentially at the same levels.2 We take this as a sign that the market believes current spreads are enough to compensate for the likely probability that either candidate could win the French presidency. Overweight JGBs Vs. the Global Treasury index. The argument here is a simple one - in an environment where there is cyclical upward pressure on global bond yields, favor the lowest-beta bond market (Chart 8). Persistently low inflation will prevent the Bank of Japan (BoJ) from making any changes to its current hyper-accommodative policies this year, especially the 0% cap on the benchmark 10-year JGB yield.3 The lack of yield limits the prospects for JGBs on a total return basis, but relative to other government bond markets, JGBs should outperform over the next 6-12 months as non-Japanese yields rise further. Chart 7Stay Overweight France Vs Germany Stay Overweight France Vs Germany Stay Overweight France Vs Germany Chart 8Stay Overweight Low-Beta JGBs Stay Overweight Low-Beta JGBs Stay Overweight Low-Beta JGBs Underweight U.S. Agency Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS). Investors should remain underweight U.S. MBS, as spreads remain tight by historical standards. Our colleagues at U.S. Bond Strategy note that nominal MBS spreads have been flat in recent weeks as the option cost, which is the compensation for expected prepayments, has tightened to offset a widening in the option-adjusted spread (OAS).4 Chart 9Stay Underweight U.S. MBS Stay Underweight U.S. MBS Stay Underweight U.S. MBS We tend to think of the OAS as being influenced by trends in net issuance while the option cost is linked to mortgage prepayments (Chart 9). Looking ahead, the supply of MBS should increase further when the Fed starts to shrink its balance sheet later this year (as was mentioned in the minutes of the March FOMC meeting that were released last week), leading to a wider OAS. At the same time, refinancing applications should stay low as Treasury yields and mortgage rates rise. This will keep downward pressure on the option cost component of spreads. But with the option cost already near its historical lows, it is unlikely to completely offset the widening in OAS going forward. We see little value in U.S. MBS at current spread levels. Bottom Line: The global cyclical backdrop remains negative for government bond markets, and the recent declines in yields will not be sustained. We continue to recommend a below-benchmark overall duration stance, favoring U.S. corporate debt with underweight exposures to U.S. Treasuries and Italian government debt, as our highest conviction views. Staying overweight global inflation protection, French government bonds versus Germany, and Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) versus the rest of the developed bond markets, while remaining underweight U.S. Mortgage Backed Securities, are recommendations that we hold with a more moderate conviction level. How Much Has The ECB Distorted The European Bond Market? Last week, Benoit Coeure of the ECB Executive Board gave a speech entitled "Bond Scarcity and the ECB Asset Purchase Program."5 That title piqued our interest, as that exact topic has come up in several of our conversations with clients this year. In his speech, Coeure discussed how the huge rally at the short-end of the German government bond curve over the past year has been at odds with what has occurred in the Euro swap curve, where interest rates are much higher for shorter-maturity swaps. Typically, German yields and Euro swap rates move in tandem, with the only differences being a function of technical factors like fixed-rate corporate debt issuance or government bond repo rates - and, on occasion, shifts in the perceived health of Euro Area banks that are the counterparties to any interest rate swap. The latter has become much less of an issue in recent years given the regulatory changes to the swap market, where trading has moved to centralized exchanges to reduce counterparty risks. In this environment, the difference between German bond yields and Euro swap rates, a.k.a the swap spread, should be relatively modest. Yet as can be seen in Chart 10, there has been a notable divergence at the shorter-maturity portions of the respective yield curves, where swap rates are rising but bond yields remain subdued. We can also see the divergences in the slopes of the relative yield curves, with the Euro Area swap curve much flatter than the German bond curve, particularly at longer maturities (Chart 11). Chart 10Large Distortions At The Front End Of The German Curve Large Distortions At The Front End Of The German Curve Large Distortions At The Front End Of The German Curve Chart 11Euro Area Swap Curves Are Generally Flatter Euro Area Swap Curves Are Generally Flatter Euro Area Swap Curves Are Generally Flatter Coeure argued that part of this distortion can be attributed to ECB asset purchases, especially after the decision taken last December to allow bond buying at yields below the -0.4% ECB deposit rate. This created a more favorable demand/supply balance for German debt, especially given the dearth of short-dated issuance. In addition, Coeure noted that there have been substantial safe-haven flows into shorter-dated German bonds (including treasury bills) by non-Euro Area entities. Some of this demand comes from large institutional investors like sovereign wealth funds and currency reserve managers, who are worried about political risks in France and Italy, and about the general rising trend in global bond yields, and are thus seeking the safety of low duration German debt. But some of the demand for short-dated German paper also comes from non-Euro Area banks, who have excess liquidity that needs to be parked in Euros but do not have access to the ECB deposit facility for the excess reserves of Euro Area banks. We can see this in Chart 12, which shows ECB data for the relative government bond ownership trends for Germany, France and Italy. The data is broken into holdings for bonds with maturities of one year or less (short-term) and bonds with maturities greater than one year (long-term). It is clear that the non-Euro area buyers own a much larger share of short-term German paper, around 90%, than in France and Italy, while Euro Area entities own nearly 80% of long-term bonds in all three countries. Coeure is correct in pointing out that there is an excess demand condition for short-dated core European debt, exacerbated by foreigners who need Euro-denominated safe assets - particularly GERMAN safe assets, if those investors are at all worried about redenomination risks given the rise of anti-euro populist parties in Europe.6 It is clear that the economic messages sent by looking at the German bond and Euro swap curves are very different. The flatter swap curve is more consistent with a steadily growing Euro Area economy where economic slack is being steadily absorbed and inflation pressures are building (albeit slowly). Also, the sovereign spread differentials within Europe do not look as problematic using swaps as the reference rate rather than German bonds. That is the case in France, where spreads versus swaps look in line with the averages of the past few years (Chart 13). This contrasts with the yield differentials versus Germany, which have reportedly gone up as investors have priced in a higher sovereign risk premium before the French presidential election. Chart 12French Bond Valuations Look More Subdued vs Swaps The Song Remains The Same The Song Remains The Same Chart 13French Bond Valuations Look More Subdued vs Swaps French Bond Valuations Look More Subdued vs Swaps French Bond Valuations Look More Subdued vs Swaps The story is a little different for Italy, where bond spreads versus both German bonds and Euro Area swaps have risen for all but the shortest maturities (Chart 14). This could be consistent with an interpretation that Italy's banking sector woes will add to the nation's longer-term fiscal stresses (as discussed earlier in this report), but not in a way that raises immediate default risks (which is why the 2-year Italy vs swap spread is well-behaved). Regardless of the "bias of interpretation", one thing that is clear is that the ECB's extraordinary monetary policies have created distortions in Euro Area bond markets. These may start to unwind, though, if the ECB begins to signal a shift towards a tapering of asset purchases next year, as we expect. The distortions in Euro area government bond yields (and, by association, swap spreads) have occurred alongside both the cuts in ECB policy rates into negative territory and the expansion of its balance sheet to purchase government bonds (Chart 15). As the ECB moves incrementally towards less accommodative monetary policy, we would expect to see front-end Euro swap spreads narrow in absolute terms and relative to longer-tenor spreads, and the German bond curve to flatten toward levels seen in the swap curve. Chart 14Only Short-Dated Italian Bond Valuations Look More Subdued vs Swaps Only Short-Dated Italian Bond Valuations Look More Subdued vs Swaps Only Short-Dated Italian Bond Valuations Look More Subdued vs Swaps Chart 15ECB Policies Have Caused The Distortions In Euro Swap Spreads ECB Policies Have Caused The Distortions In Euro Swap Spreads ECB Policies Have Caused The Distortions In Euro Swap Spreads Bottom Line: The ECB's negative interest rate and asset purchase programs have created significant distortions in the German bond yield curve that are not as evident in the Euro Area swap rate curve, especially at shorter maturities. ECB tapering will be the trigger for a reversal of these trends. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Buy The Back-Up In Junk Spreads", dated March 14, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Our Views On French Government Bonds", dated February 7, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Staying Behind The Curve, For Now", dated March 21, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Payback Period In Corporate Bonds", dated April 11, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/sp170403_1.en.html 6 Coeure noted that, at the time that the ECB began its asset purchase program in March 2015, the share of German bonds of less than TWO years maturity held by foreigners was 70%, but that rose to 90% by the 3rd quarter of 2016. The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index The Song Remains The Same The Song Remains The Same Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Chart 1Is Inflation Heating Up? Is Inflation Heating Up? Is Inflation Heating Up? In past reports we have argued that as long as inflation (and inflation expectations) are below the Fed's target, then the "reflation trade" will remain in vogue. In other words, with inflation still too low, the Fed has an incentive to back away from its hawkish rhetoric whenever risk assets sell off and financial conditions tighten. But with inflation heating up - the last two monthly increases in core PCE are close to the highest seen in this recovery (Chart 1) - will the Fed become less responsive? Not yet! Year-over-year core PCE is still only 1.75% (the Fed's target is 2%) and the cost of inflation protection embedded in long-dated TIPS remains too low (panel 2). In fact, the uptrend in TIPS breakevens lost some of its momentum last month alongside wider credit spreads and the S&P 500's first monthly decline since October. In this environment, we are inclined to add credit risk as spreads widen and believe a "buy the dips" strategy will work until inflation pressures are more pronounced. On a 6-12 month horizon we continue to recommend: below-benchmark duration, overweight spread product, curve steepeners and TIPS breakeven wideners. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 15 basis points in March. The index option-adjusted spread widened 3 bps on the month and, at 118 bps, it remains well below its historical average (134 bps). While supportive monetary policy will ensure excess returns consistent with carry, investors should not bank on further spread compression as spreads have already discounted a substantial improvement in leverage (Chart 2). In fact, leverage showed a marked increase in Q4 2016 even though spreads moved tighter. The measure of gross leverage (total debt divided by EBITD) shown in Chart 2 increased in the fourth quarter even though total debt grew at an annualized rate of only 0.3%. However, EBITD actually contracted at an annualized rate of 7% in Q4 causing leverage to rise. The quarterly decline in EBITD looks anomalous, and the year-over-year trend is improving (panel 4). In fact, we would not be surprised to see leverage stabilize this year as profits rebound.1 But similarly, we also expect that the recent plunge in debt growth will reverse. Historically, it has been very rare for leverage to fall unless prompted by a recession. We will take up this issue in more detail in next week's report. Energy related sectors still appear cheap after adjusting for differences in credit rating and duration (Table 3), and we remain overweight. This week we also downgrade the Retailers and Packaging sectors, which have become expensive, and upgrade Cable & Satellite, which appears cheap. Table 3A Reflation Window Still Open Reflation Window Still Open Table 3B Reflation Window Still Open Reflation Window Still Open High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 25 basis points in March. The index option-adjusted spread widened 20 bps on the month and, at 383 bps, it is currently 136 bps below its historical average. Given the favorable policy back-drop described on page 1, we view the recent widening in junk spreads (Chart 3) as an opportunity to increase exposure to the sector. In fact, in a recent report2 we tested a strategy of "buying dips" in the junk bond market in different inflationary regimes. The strategy involved buying the High-Yield index whenever spreads widened by 20 bps or more in a month and then holding that position for 3 months. We defined the different inflationary regimes based on the St. Louis Fed's Price Pressures Measure (PPM).3 We found that our "buy the dips" strategy yielded positive excess returns 65% of the time in a very low inflation regime (PPM < 15%), 59% of the time in a low inflation regime (15% < PPM < 30%), 44% of the time in a moderate inflation regime (30% < PPM < 50%) and only 25% of the time in a high inflation regime (50% < PPM < 70%). Currently, the reading from the PPM is 13%. MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 4 basis points in March. The conventional 30-year MBS yield rose 6 bps on the month, driven entirely by a 6 bps increase in the rate component. The compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) declined by 6 bps, but this was exactly offset by a 6 bps widening in the option-adjusted spread. As a result, the zero-volatility spread was flat on the month. The option-adjusted spread represents expected excess returns to MBS assuming that prepayments fall in line with expectations. On this basis, MBS look more attractive than they have for some time (Chart 4). However, net MBS issuance also surged in Q4 2016 (panel 4) and should remain robust this year despite higher mortgage rates.4 Interest rates have not been a deterrent to mortgage demand since the financial crisis. The limiting factors have been a lack of household savings and restrictive bank lending standards. Both of these headwinds continue to gradually fade. The option-adjusted spread still appears too low relative to issuance. Nominal MBS spreads are linked to rate volatility (bottom panel), and volatility should increase as the fed funds rate moves further off its zero-bound.5 The wind-down of the Fed's MBS portfolio - which we expect will begin in 2018 - should also pressure implied volatility higher as the private sector is forced to absorb the increased supply, some of which will be convexity-hedged. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 22 basis points in March. The high-beta Sovereign and Foreign Agency sectors outperformed by 71 bps and 41 bps, respectively. Meanwhile, the low-beta Domestic Agency and Supranational sectors outperformed by 9 bps and 15 bps, respectively. Local Authorities underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 17 bps. The performance of Sovereigns has been stellar this year, as the sector has benefited from a 3% depreciation in the trade-weighted dollar (Chart 5). However, the downtrend in the dollar looks more like a temporary reversal than an end to the bull market. With U.S. growth on a strong footing, there is still scope for global interest rate differentials to move in favor of the dollar. Potential fiscal policy measures - such as lower tax rates and a border-adjusted corporate tax - would also lead to a stronger dollar, if enacted. As such, we do not believe the current outperformance of Sovereigns can be sustained. We continue to recommend overweight allocations to Foreign Agencies and Local Authorities, alongside underweight allocations to the rest of the Government-Related index. Municipal Bonds: Neutral Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 24 basis points in March (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio declined 2% on the month and remains firmly anchored below its post-crisis average. This year's decline in M/T yield ratios has been concentrated at the short-end of the curve (Chart 6), and long maturities now offer a significant valuation advantage. This week we recommend favoring the long-end of the Aaa Muni curve (10-year maturities and beyond) versus the short-end (maturities up to 5 years). Overall, M/T yield ratios appear fairly valued on a tactical basis. While fund inflows have ebbed in recent weeks (panel 4), this has occurred alongside a plunge in gross issuance (bottom panel). The more concerning near-term risk for Munis is that yield ratios have already discounted a substantial improvement in state & local government net borrowing (panel 3). However, we expect net borrowing to decline during the next couple of quarters on the back of rising tax revenues. State & local government tax receipts decelerated throughout most of 2015 and 2016 alongside falling personal income growth and disappointing retail sales. However, both income growth and retail sales have moved higher in recent months, and this should soon translate into accelerating tax receipts and lower net borrowing. Longer term, significant risks remain for the Muni market.6 Chief among them is that state & local government budgets now finally look healthy enough to increase investment spending. Not to mention the significant uncertainty surrounding the potential for lower federal tax rates and plans to invest in infrastructure. Treasury Curve: Favor 5-Year Bullet Over 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve underwent a small parallel shift upward in March, roughly split between a bear-steepening leading up to the FOMC meeting on March 15 and a bull-flattening from the meeting until the end of the month. Overall, the 2/10 Treasury slope flattened 1 basis point on the month and the 5/30 slope ended the month 1 bp steeper. Our recommended position long the 5-year bullet and short the 2/10 barbell - designed to profit from a steeper yield curve - returned +3 bps in March and is up 7 bps since inception on December 20. In addition, we also entered a short January 2018 fed funds futures trade on March 21.7 The performance of this trade has so far been flat. In a recent report,7 we identified the main cyclical drivers of the slope of the yield curve as: The fed funds rate (higher fed funds rate = flatter curve) Inflation expectations (higher inflation expectations = steeper curve) Interest rate volatility (higher volatility = steeper curve) Unit labor costs (higher unit labor costs = flatter curve) We concluded that even though the Fed is in the process of lifting the funds rate, the yield curve likely has room to steepen as long-maturity TIPS breakevens recover to levels more consistent with the Fed's inflation target (Chart 7). In addition, interest rate volatility has likely bottomed for the cycle and the uptrend in unit labor costs could level-off if productivity growth continues to rebound. The recent decline in bullish sentiment toward the dollar has also not yet been matched by a steeper 5/30 slope (bottom panel). TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 6 basis points in March. The 10-year TIPS breakeven rate declined 5 bps on the month and, at 1.97%, it remains well below its pre-crisis trading range of 2.4% to 2.5%. While the catalyst for the recent softening in TIPS outperformance seems to be the hawkish re-rating of Fed rate hike expectations, the uptrend in TIPS breakevens was probably due for a pause in any case. Breakevens had become stretched relative to our TIPS Financial Model - based on the dollar, oil prices and the stock-to-bond total return ratio. However, measures of pipeline inflation pressure - such as the ISM prices paid survey (Chart 8) - still point toward wider breakevens and, as was noted on the front page of this report, recent core inflation prints have been quite strong. All in all, growth appears strong enough that core inflation should continue its gradual uptrend and, more importantly, the Fed will be keen to accommodate an increase in both realized core inflation and TIPS breakevens, which remain below target. This means that in the absence of a material growth slowdown, long-maturity TIPS breakevens should continue to trend higher until they reach the 2.4% to 2.5% range that historically has been consistent with the Fed's inflation target. In a baseline scenario where the unemployment rate is 4.7% at the end of the year and the dollar remains flat, our Phillips curve model8 predicts that year-over-year core PCE inflation will be 2.02% at the end of this year. ABS: Maximum Overweight Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 17 basis points in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +22 bps. Aaa-rated issues outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 16 bps on the month, and non-Aaa issues outperformed by 26 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS tightened 5 bps on the month. At 48 bps, the spread remains well below its average pre-crisis level (Chart 9). Banks are now tightening lending standards on both auto loans and credit cards. While we do not expect this recent development to have much of an impact on consumer spending, it is usually an indication that there is growing concern about ABS collateral credit quality. As such, this week we scale back our recommended allocation to ABS from maximum overweight (5 out of 5) to overweight (4 out of 5). While credit card charge-offs remain well below pre-crisis levels, net losses on auto loans have started to trend higher (bottom panel). We continue to favor Aaa-rated credit cards over Aaa-rated auto loans, despite the modest spread advantage in autos (panel 3). Further, the spread advantage in Aaa consumer ABS relative to other high-quality spread product is becoming less compelling. Aaa ABS now only provide a 12 bps option-adjusted spread cushion relative to conventional 30-year Agency MBS and offer a slightly lower spread than Agency CMBS. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-agency commercial mortgage-backed securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 10 basis points in March, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +16 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS widened 4 bps on the month, but remains below its average pre-crisis level. Commercial real estate prices are still growing strongly, and prices in both major and non-major markets have re-gained their pre-crisis peaks (Chart 10). However, lending standards are tightening and, more recently, loan demand has rolled over (panel 4). This suggests that credit risk is starting to increase in commercial real estate, as do CMBS delinquencies which have put in a bottom (panel 5). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 14 basis points in March, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +16 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Agency CMBS tightened 2 bps on the month, and currently sits at 53 bps. The option-adjusted spread on Agency CMBS looks attractive compared to other high-quality spread product: Agency MBS = 36 bps, Aaa consumer ABS = 48 bps, Agency bonds = 18 bps and Supranationals = 22 bps. We continue to recommend an overweight position in Agency CMBS. Treasury Valuation Chart 11Treasury Fair Value Models Treasury Fair Value Models Treasury Fair Value Models The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (which is based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) places fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.54% (Chart 11). Our 3-factor version of the model, which also incorporates the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, places fair value at 2.28%. The lower fair value results from the large spike in the uncertainty index last November, which has only been partially unwound (bottom panel). Large spikes in uncertainty that do not coincide with deterioration in other economic indicators tend to mean revert fairly quickly. So we are inclined to view the fair value reading from our 2-factor model as more indicative of true fair value at the moment. For further details on our Treasury models please refer to the U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Model", dated October 11, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com At the time of publication the 10-year Treasury yield was 2.35%. 1 For further detail on the medium-term profit outlook please see The Bank Credit Analyst, February 207, dated January 26, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Keep Buying Dips", dated March 8, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 A composite of 104 economic indicators designed to capture the probability of PCE inflation exceeding 2.5% during the subsequent 12 months. https://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/economic-synopses/2015/11/06/introducing-the-st-louis-fed-price-pressures-measure 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Keep Buying Dips", dated March 28, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Road To Higher Vol Is Paved With Uncertainty", dated February 14, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Trading The Municipal Credit Cycle", dated October 18, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Yield Curve On A Cyclical Horizon", dated March 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Odds Of March", dated February 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)

Highlights Monetary Policy: The Fed will lift rates this week, but will likely leave its median forecast for three hikes this year unchanged. With inflation still below target the Fed has an incentive to take it easy. Curve steepeners, TIPS breakeven wideners and overweight spread product positions will benefit. Duration: The growth outlook is improving and the 10-year Treasury yield could soon move higher, breaking out of its recent trading range. An already elevated economic surprise index should not be a deterrent. High-Yield: Junk spreads have widened even though default rate indicators continue to show improvement. With valuations now looking more attractive, we upgrade high-yield from neutral to overweight. Feature Chart 1How Much Hawkishness ##br##Can Markets Take? How Much Hawkishness Can Markets Take? How Much Hawkishness Can Markets Take? In early November, just prior to the U.S. election, money markets were still only discounting one rate hike before the end of 2017. The Fed has already raised rates once since then and the market is now almost priced for another three hikes before year-end (Chart 1). Encouragingly, financial markets digested the shift up to two 2017 rate hikes without much of a hiccup - the yield curve steepened, TIPS breakevens widened and junk spreads tightened - but the journey from two to three hikes has not gone down quite as easily (Chart 1, bottom panel). The yield curve has now started to flatten, breakevens have leveled off and junk spreads have edged wider. The worry is that a further shift in expectations - from three to four hikes in 2017 - might cause markets to choke. Fed Will Take It Slow Markets are already priced for a rate hike at this week's FOMC meeting along with no change to the Fed's median forecast for three hikes in 2017. As such, we would not expect much of a market reaction if that outcome is delivered. If the Fed were to increase its median forecast from three to four hikes in 2017, then we would anticipate at least some tightening of financial conditions. In other words, we would expect the yield curve to flatten, TIPS breakevens to narrow, the dollar to strengthen and credit spreads to widen. As we have written several times,1 with core inflation and TIPS breakevens still below target, the Fed must ensure that the economic recovery continues. It will therefore be quick to back away from any nascent hawkishness if financial conditions start to tighten. With markets already showing some signs of stress, we expect the Fed to err on the side of caution this week. This means the Fed will lift rates, but also leave the median forecast of three 2017 rate hikes unchanged. This notion that the Fed should be lifting rates, but only very slowly, is confirmed by our Fed Monitor (Chart 2). The Fed Monitor is a composite of 32 indicators that track the evolution of U.S. economic growth, inflation pressures and financial market conditions. Historically, a positive reading from the monitor has coincided with rate hikes, and vice versa. Chart 2BCA Fed Monitor Suggests A Slow Pace Of Rate Hikes BCA Fed Monitor Suggests A Slow Pace Of Rate Hikes BCA Fed Monitor Suggests A Slow Pace Of Rate Hikes The Fed Monitor just recently moved above zero, suggesting that only modestly tighter monetary policy is required. As an aside, we view the strongly positive readings from the Fed Monitor in 2011 and 2012 as anomalous and an artifact of the zero-lower-bound on interest rates. Since interest rates could not be lowered as much as would have been necessary (according to the Fed Monitor) in 2009, they also could not be raised as quickly as the monitor suggested in 2011. With the base effects from the financial crisis now out of the data, the Fed Monitor should go back to providing a useful signal about the future course of monetary policy. Chart 3BCA Fed Monitor Components BCA Fed Monitor Components BCA Fed Monitor Components We gain further insight from splitting the Fed Monitor into its three key components: growth, inflation and financial conditions (Chart 3). The growth component has accelerated strongly into positive territory but the inflation component still suggests that an easy policy stance is required. Financial conditions are also consistent with modest Fed tightening but have ticked down in recent weeks as the market has discounted a more rapid pace of hikes. Judging from the prior two cycles, an acceleration of the inflation component will be necessary for the Fed to deliver on its current expected path of rate hikes. While the Fed has sometimes started to lift rates with the inflation component below zero, that component has always surged into positive territory soon after hikes began (Chart 3, panel 2). While economic growth is accelerating, below-target inflation means that the Fed must continue to nurture the economic recovery. Investors should position for a steeper curve, wider TIPS breakevens and tighter credit spreads until inflationary pressures are more pronounced. This means at least until long-maturity TIPS breakevens reach the 2.4% to 2.5% range and core PCE inflation is firmly anchored around 2%. Bottom Line: The Fed will lift rates this week, but will likely leave its median forecast for three hikes this year unchanged. With inflation still below target the Fed has an incentive to take it easy. Curve steepeners, TIPS breakeven wideners and overweight spread product positions will benefit. Consolidation Complete? The 10-year Treasury yield has been stuck in a tight range below 2.6% since mid-December (Chart 4), but recent trends in the economic data suggest that it could be on the verge of breaking through this key resistance level. Economic surprises are positively correlated with changes in the 10-year Treasury yield and currently appear extended (Chart 4, bottom panel). While not a mean-reverting series by construction, economic surprises tend to follow a mean reverting pattern because investors revise their expectations higher as the economic data outperform. Eventually, expectations are bound to become excessive and the series will mean revert. However, we have found that economic surprises are usually first reflected in Treasury yields. In fact, changes in the 10-year Treasury yield tend to lead the economic surprise index by several weeks. This means that stagnant yields during the past few months have already foreshadowed a reversal in the surprise index. In other words, some mean reversion in economic surprises is already in the price and should not prevent yields from rising in the coming weeks. More important is that economic growth should be sustainably above trend on a 6-12 month horizon. This will continue to put upward pressure on inflation and ensure that the Fed remains in a rate hike cycle. Judging from recent data, not only is growth sustainably above trend, but it is probably even accelerating. Last week's February employment report showed that nonfarm payrolls rose by 235k, the second consecutive month of gains above 200k. The rate of change of employment growth is now threatening to reverse the downtrend that started in early 2015, and aggregate hours worked have accelerated suggesting that GDP growth will be strong in Q1 (Chart 5). Chart 410-Year Yield Facing Resistance 10-Year Yield Facing Resistance 10-Year Yield Facing Resistance Chart 5Labor Market Points To Stronger Growth... Labor Market Points To Stronger Growth... Labor Market Points To Stronger Growth... Financial conditions are also supportive of a further acceleration in growth. We found that the financial conditions component of our Fed Monitor provides a strong indication of near-term trends in GDP growth (Chart 6). This highlights that growth should be strong during the next few months but also that the Fed must respond to any tightening in financial conditions if it wants growth to remain robust. Chart 6...So Do Financial Conditions ...So Do Financial Conditions ...So Do Financial Conditions Bottom Line: The growth outlook is improving and the 10-year Treasury yield could soon move higher, breaking out of its recent trading range. An already elevated economic surprise index should not be a deterrent. The Value Is Back In High-Yield One of our key themes for 2017 is that the uptrend in the high-yield default rate is due for a pause.2 With the first quarter of the year nearly complete, all the indicators that make up our Default Rate Model are showing noticeable improvement (Chart 7). Chart 7Default Rate Indicators Are Showing Improvement Default Rate Indicators Are Showing Improvement Default Rate Indicators Are Showing Improvement Interest coverage remains elevated A strong Manufacturing PMI points to a rebound in after-tax cash flow Lending standards have rolled over and are now just barely in "net tightening" territory An improving sales/inventory ratio portends a return to positive industrial production growth Job cut announcements have fallen back to 2011 levels on a trailing 12-month basis Meantime, even though the default outlook continues to improve, junk spreads have actually widened during the past couple of weeks. The average option-adjusted spread on the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield index has widened from a low of 344 basis points up to 378 bps (Chart 8). Some of that spread increase is likely attributable to declining oil prices, as energy sector credits have indeed underperformed the overall index. However, the underperformance of the energy sector also started before the sharp drop in oil prices (Chart 8, bottom panel). In any event, our commodity strategists are not expecting the current decline in oil prices to persist and their estimates show that the oil market has recently shifted from an environment of excess supply to one of excess demand. U.S. crude oil inventories are poised to decline later this month and the OPEC / non-OPEC production deal negotiated by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Russia at the end of last year should be met with high compliance.3 If this view is correct, then the energy sector will not drag overall junk spreads wider in the months ahead. The combination of wider junk spreads and an improving default outlook has led to an increase in our preferred gauge of value for high-yield bonds - the default-adjusted spread (Chart 9). The default-adjusted spread is calculated by subtracting an ex-ante estimate of default losses from the average spread on the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield index. Chart 8Energy Contributed To Junk Sell-Off Energy Contributed To Junk Sell-Off Energy Contributed To Junk Sell-Off Chart 9Some Value Returns To High-Yield Some Value Returns To High-Yield Some Value Returns To High-Yield To arrive at an estimate of default losses we use the Moody's baseline forecast for the default rate and our own forecast for the recovery rate based on the historical relationship between recoveries and defaults. With the release of February's default report, the Moody's baseline default rate forecast fell to 3.14% for the next 12 months. Based on this forecast we estimate that the recovery rate will be 44%. Combining the default and recovery rate forecasts gives an estimate for default losses of 3.14% x (1- 0.44) = 176 bps for the next 12 months. Since the average option-adjusted spread of the Bloomberg Barclays High-Yield index is currently 378 bps, we calculate the default-adjusted spread to be: 378 bps - 176 bps = 202 bps. A default-adjusted spread of 202 bps is 60 bps higher than the reading of 142 bps that prevailed just last week. This 60 bps spread advantage makes a considerable difference in terms of projected excess returns. Chart 10 shows the relationship between 12-month excess returns and the starting default-adjusted spread. We observe a reasonably strong correlation and note that, using a linear regression, an extra 60 bps of spread translates to an extra +251 bps of excess return on average over a 12-month period. Chart 1012-Month Excess High-Yield Returns Vs. ##br##Ex-Ante Default-Adjusted Spread (2002 - Present) Buy The Back-Up In Junk Spreads Buy The Back-Up In Junk Spreads Table 1 provides more detail in terms of what excess returns have historically been associated with different levels of the default-adjusted spread. We see that when the default-adjusted is between 100 bps and 150 bps, high-yield bonds earn positive excess returns 64% of the time over the following 12 months. When the default-adjusted spread is between 200 bps and 250 bps, high-yield earns a positive 12-month excess return 71% of the time. Table 112-Month High-Yield Excess Returns & Ex-Ante Default-Adjusted Spread Buy The Back-Up In Junk Spreads Buy The Back-Up In Junk Spreads Given our upbeat assessment of the trend in defaults and a wider junk spread than we have seen in a while, we think it is a good time to upgrade high-yield from neutral to overweight. The key near-term risk to this view is that the Fed will be more hawkish than we anticipate at this week's meeting. If the Fed's median forecast is revised up to four hikes in 2017, then it is possible that the recent bout of junk spread widening will have a bit further to run. However, given still-low inflation readings, the Fed would eventually be forced to back away from its hawkish rhetoric and support renewed spread tightening. In our view, the main risk to upgrading junk this week is that we are a bit too early. Bottom Line: Junk spreads have widened even though default rate indicators continue to show improvement. With valuations now looking more attractive, we upgrade high-yield from neutral to overweight. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Inflation: More Fire Than Ice, But Don't Sound The Alarm", dated January 24, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Fed's Pre-Emptive Hike Will Hit Gold, Not Oil", dated March 9, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights Chart 1Keep A Close Eye On Financial Conditions Keep A Close Eye On Financial Conditions Keep A Close Eye On Financial Conditions The market's rate hike expectations moved sharply higher during the past two weeks as a string of Fed speeches, including one by Chair Yellen, all but confirmed a March rate hike. The market is now priced for 75 basis points of hikes during the next 12 months, compared to 50 bps at the end of January. At least so far, broad indicators of financial conditions have not tightened in response to this re-rating of the Fed (Chart 1). However, there are some preliminary indications that the reflation trade is fraying at the edges. The trade-weighted dollar has appreciated +0.2% since the end of January, the 2/10 Treasury slope has flattened 9 bps and the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate has declined 1 bp. The Fed is currently testing the markets with hawkish rhetoric but, with inflation and TIPS breakevens still below target, will ultimately support the reflation trade if it comes under threat. In this environment investors with 6-12 month investment horizons should maintain below-benchmark duration, remain overweight spread product and continue to position for a steeper curve and wider TIPS breakevens. Feature Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade: Overweight Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 48 basis points in February. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 6 bps on the month and, at 112 bps, it remains well below its historical average (134 bps). Our research1 shows that when core PCE inflation is between 1.5% and 2%2 investment grade corporate bonds produce an average monthly excess return of close to zero. A 90% confidence interval places monthly excess returns between -19 bps and +17 bps with inflation in this range and excess returns do not turn decisively negative until core PCE is above 2%. Given the Fed's desire to nurture a continued recovery in inflation, we are not worried about significant spread widening until inflation is sustainably above 2%. In the meantime we expect corporate bond excess returns to be low, but positive. While supportive monetary policy should ensure excess returns consistent with carry, investors should not bank on further spread compression as corporate spreads have already discounted a substantial improvement in leverage (Chart 2). Energy related sectors still appear cheap after adjusting for differences in credit rating and duration (Table 3), and our commodity strategists expect oil prices to remain firm even in the face of a stronger U.S. dollar. This week we upgrade the Wireless and Packaging sectors from underweight to neutral and downgrade the Consumer Cyclical Services sector from neutral to underweight. The former two sectors now appear cheap on our model, while the latter has become expensive. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* How Much Can Markets Take? How Much Can Markets Take? Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* How Much Can Markets Take? How Much Can Markets Take? High-Yield: Neutral Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 112 basis points in February. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 25 bps on the month and, at 349 bps, it is currently 170 bps below its historical average. One of our key investment themes3 for this year is that the uptrend in defaults is likely to reverse (Chart 3), mostly due to recovery in the energy sector. However, still-poor corporate health and tightening monetary policy will lead to a resumption of the uptrend in 2018 and beyond. Despite the positive outlook for defaults, we retain only a neutral allocation to High-Yield because of very tight valuations. The index option-adjusted spread is now within a hair of the average level of 340 bps that prevailed during the 2004 - 2006 Fed tightening cycle, when indicators of corporate balance sheet health were in much better shape. In fact, the index spread is now only 116 bps wider than its all-time low of 233 bps, reached in 2007. Our preferred measure of High-Yield valuation is the default-adjusted spread - the average spread of the junk index less our forecast of 12-month default losses. At present, the default-adjusted spread is 142 bps. Historically, a default-adjusted spread between 100 bps and 150 bps is consistent with positive excess returns during the subsequent 12 months 64% of the time. It is only when the default-adjusted spread falls below 100 bps that positive excess returns become unlikely. Junk has provided positive excess returns over a 12-month horizon only 13% of the time when the starting default-adjusted spread is between 50 bps and 100 bps. MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 3 basis points in February. The conventional 30-year MBS yield fell 5 bps on the month, driven by a 7 bps decline in the rate component. The compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) increased by 1 bp, as did the option-adjusted spread. MBS spreads remain extremely tight relative both to history and Aaa-rated credit, although they have begun to widen somewhat relative to credit in recent weeks (Chart 4). More distressing is that the nominal MBS spread appears too tight relative to interest rate volatility (bottom panel). As we noted in a recent report,4 the long-run trend in interest rate volatility tends to be driven by uncertainty about the macroeconomic and political environment. In fact, rate volatility can be modeled using forecaster disagreement about GDP growth and T-bill rates. While the Fed's policy of forward guidance and a fed funds rate pinned at zero limited the amount of forecaster disagreement in recent years, this disagreement will re-emerge the further the fed funds rate moves off its lower bound. Another medium-term risk for MBS comes from the Fed ending the reinvestment of its MBS portfolio. As we described in a recent Special Report,5 the Fed is likely to allow its MBS portfolio to shrink at some point in 2018, putting further upward pressure on MBS spreads. Government Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview The government-related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 30 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +51 bps. The high-beta Sovereign and Foreign Agency sectors outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 90 bps and 59 bps, respectively. Meanwhile, the low-beta Domestic Agency and Supranational sectors each outperformed by 4 bps. Local Authorities returned 24 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries. Sovereigns have outperformed Baa-rated corporate bonds year-to-date, a trend consistent with the rise in commodity prices and a trade-weighted dollar that has weakened by 1.5% (Chart 5). However, the dollar has started to appreciate in recent weeks and probably has further upside in the medium-term, especially if the Fed maintains its hawkish posture. Historically, it has been very rare for Sovereigns to outperform U.S. corporate bonds when the dollar is appreciating. After adjusting for credit rating and duration, the Foreign Agency and Local Authority sectors continue to appear cheap relative to U.S. corporate credit. In contrast, Sovereigns, Supranationals and Domestic Agencies all appear expensive. We continue to recommend overweight allocations to Foreign Agencies and Local Authorities, alongside underweight allocations to the rest of the government-related index. In a television interview last month Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin confirmed that GSE reform is still a priority for the new administration but that tax reform is much higher on the agenda. This means that agency spreads will likely remain insulated from any "reform risk" until next year at the earliest. Municipal Bonds: Neutral Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 13 basis points in February (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio has fallen 4% since the end of January and remains firmly anchored below its post-crisis average. The decline in the average M/T yield ratio was concentrated in short maturities, while ratios at the long-end of the curve actually rose (Chart 6). Accelerating fund flows and falling issuance will continue to support yield ratios in the near term. In fact, our tactical yield ratio model - based on issuance, fund flows and ratings migration - shows that yield ratios are presently very close to fair value. Although the average M/T yield ratio still appears expensive if we include the global economic policy uncertainty index as an additional explanatory variable.6 One risk to Munis is that yield ratios have already discounted a substantial reduction in state and local government net borrowing in Q1 (panel 3). While we expect this improvement will materialize in the next few quarters, net borrowing is biased upward beyond this year based on the lagged relationship between corporate sector and state and local government health.7 Treasury Curve: Favor 5-Year Bullet Over 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve has bear-flattened since the end of January as the market revised its Fed rate hike expectations sharply higher. Both the 2/10 and 5/30 Treasury slopes have flattened by 9 basis points since January 31. As such, our recommended position long the 5-year bullet and short the 2/10 barbell - designed to profit from a steeper yield curve - has returned -26 bps since the end of January, although it has returned close to 0 bps since it was initiated on December 20.8 As was stated on the front page of this report, the Fed's increasingly hawkish rhetoric has already caused the uptrend in TIPS breakevens to pause and the nominal Treasury slope to flatten (Chart 7). With inflation still below target these trends are not sustainable from the point of view of Fed policymakers. If the trend of decreasing TIPS breakevens and a flattening curve persists, we would expect the Fed to back away from its hawkish rhetoric. This dynamic will support a steeper yield curve at least until core PCE inflation is back to the Fed's 2% target and long-dated TIPS breakevens are anchored in a range between 2.4% and 2.5% (a range that is typically consistent with core PCE inflation at 2%). The persistent attractiveness of the 5-year bullet relative to the rest of the curve makes a position long the 5-year bullet and short a duration-matched 2/10 barbell the most attractive way to position for a steeper yield curve (panel 3). The carry buffer in the 5-year helps mitigate some of the risk of curve flattening. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 18 basis points in February. The 10-year TIPS breakeven rate declined 3 bps on the month and, at 2.04%, it remains well below its pre-crisis trading range of 2.4% to 2.5%. While the catalyst for the recent softening in TIPS outperformance seems to be the hawkish re-rating of Fed rate hike expectations, the uptrend in TIPS breakevens was probably due for a pause in any case. Breakevens had become stretched relative to our TIPS Financial Model - based on the dollar, oil prices and the stock-to-bond total return ratio (Chart 8). Diffusion indexes for both PCE and CPI inflation have also shifted into negative territory, suggesting that realized inflation readings will soften during the next couple of months. On a cyclical horizon, however, the Fed will be keen to allow breakevens to rise toward levels more consistent with its inflation target and will quickly adopt a more dovish stance if breakevens fall significantly. This "Fed put" should remain in place at least until core PCE inflation is firmly anchored around 2% and long-dated TIPS breakevens return to a range between 2.4% and 2.5%. As we detailed in a recent report,9 while accelerating wage growth will ensure that inflation remains in a long-run uptrend, the impact from wages will be mitigated by deflating import prices meaning that the uptrend will be slow. We continue to expect that year-over-year core PCE inflation will not attain the Fed's 2% target until the end of this year. ABS: Maximum Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities performed in-line with the duration-equivalent Treasury index in February. Aaa-rated issues underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 2 basis points, while non-Aaa issues outperformed by 12 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened 3 bps on the month. At 50 bps, the spread remains well below its average pre-crisis level. Banks are now tightening lending standards on both auto loans and credit cards (Chart 9). While we do not think this will have much of an impact on consumer spending,10 it is usually an indication that there is growing concern about ABS collateral credit quality. While credit card charge-offs remain well below their pre-crisis levels, net losses on auto loans have in fact started to trend higher (bottom panel). We continue to recommend Aaa-rated credit cards over Aaa-rated auto loans, despite the spread advantage in autos. We will closely monitor the evolving credit quality situation, but for now continue to view consumer ABS as a very attractive alternative to other short-duration Aaa-rated spread product such as MBS and Agency bonds. The main reason being the sizeable spread advantage that has persisted in ABS for some time. At present, Aaa-rated consumer ABS offer an option-adjusted spread of 50 bps, compared to 31 bps for 30-year conventional Agency MBS and 18 bps for Agency bonds. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 34 basis points in February. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS widened 7 bps on the month, but remains below its average pre-crisis level (Chart 10). Rising CMBS delinquency rates and tightening commercial real estate lending standards make us cautious on non-agency CMBS. This caution has only intensified now that spreads are firmly entrenched below their pre-crisis average. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 20 basis points in February. The index option-adjusted spread for Agency CMBS widened 5 bps on the month, and currently sits at 53 bps. The spread offered on Agency CMBS is similar to what is offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS (50 bps) and greater than what is offered by conventional 30-year MBS (31 bps) for a similar amount of spread volatility. We continue to recommend an overweight position in Agency CMBS. Treasury Valuation Chart 11Treasury Fair Value Models Treasury Fair Value Models Treasury Fair Value Models The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (which is based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) places fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.42% (Chart 11). Our 3-factor version of the model, which also incorporates the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, places fair value at 2.21%. The lower fair value results from the large spike in the uncertainty index last November, which has only been partially unwound (bottom panel). Large spikes in uncertainty that do not coincide with deterioration in other economic indicators tend to mean revert fairly quickly. So we would be inclined to view the fair value reading from our 2-factor model as more indicative of true fair value at the moment. For further details on our Treasury models please refer to the U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Model", dated October 11, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com At the time of publication the 10-year Treasury yield was 2.49%. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Inflation: More Fire Than Ice, But Don't Sound The Alarm", dated January 24, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Year-over-year core PCE inflation is currently 1.74%. 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Road To Higher Vol Is Paved With Uncertainty", dated February 14, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "The Way Forward For The Fed's Balance Sheet", dated February 28, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 For further details on the model please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 For further details on the linkage between corporate sector health and state & local government health please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Trading The Municipal Credit Cycle", dated October 18, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Inflation: More Fire Than Ice, But Don't Sound The Alarm", dated January 24, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Odds Of March", dated February 21, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon) Current Recommendation

Highlights Chart 1Strong Growth & An Easy Fed Strong Growth & An Easy Fed Strong Growth & An Easy Fed More than a month has passed since the Fed's latest rate hike and, at least so far, the economy is displaying no ill effects. While the economic data continue to surprise to the upside, Fed rate hike expectations have moderated since mid-December (Chart 1). The combination of accelerating growth and accommodative monetary policy sets the stage for further outperformance in spread product. This message was underscored by last Friday's employment report which showed robust payroll gains of +227k alongside a slight deceleration in wage growth. This is consistent with an environment where growth remains above trend but the recovery in inflation proceeds more gradually. Against this back-drop we favor overweight positions in spread product and TIPS relative to nominal Treasuries, while also positioning for a bear-steepening of the Treasury curve. While we would not rule out a near-term correction in risk assets, due to extended positioning and elevated policy uncertainty, we would view any correction as a buying opportunity given the supportive growth and monetary policy back-drop. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 5 basis points in January (Chart 2). The index option-adjusted spread tightened 2 bps on the month and, at 121 bps, it remains well below its historical average (134 bps). In a recent report1 we examined historical excess returns to corporate bonds given different levels of core PCE inflation. We found that excess returns are best when year-over-year core PCE is below 1.5%. This should not be surprising since an environment of low inflation is most likely to coincide with extremely accommodative monetary policy. When inflation is between 1.5% and 2% (year-over-year core PCE is currently 1.7%), average monthly excess returns are close to zero and a 90% confidence interval places them between -19 bps and +17 bps. Excess returns do not turn decisively negative until core PCE is above 2%. Given the Fed's desire to nurture a continued recovery in inflation, we expect corporate bond excess returns to be low, but positive. The Technology sector is relatively defensive and is close to neutrally valued according to our model (Table 3). In addition, our Geopolitical Strategy service has observed that many of the firms in this sector carry significant exposure to China, a risk as U.S. protectionism ramps up.2 We therefore downgrade our position in Technology from overweight to neutral, and upgrade our positions in Wirelines, Media & Entertainment and Other Utilities from underweight to neutral. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Cue The Reflation Trade Cue The Reflation Trade Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* Cue The Reflation Trade Cue The Reflation Trade High-Yield: Neutral Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 124 basis points in January. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 21 bps on the month and, at 376 bps, it is currently 144 bps below its historical average. As we highlighted in our year-end Special Report,3 the uptrend in defaults is likely to reverse this year, mostly due to recovery in the energy sector. However, still-poor corporate health and tightening monetary policy will lead to a resumption of the uptrend in 2018 and beyond. Given the improving default outlook, last week we upgraded high-yield from underweight to neutral. Still-tight valuation is the reason we maintain a neutral allocation as opposed to overweight. Our estimate of the default-adjusted high-yield spread - the average spread of the junk index less our forecast of 12-month default losses - is currently 152 bps (Chart 3). This is close to one standard deviation below its long-run average. Historically, we have found that a default-adjusted spread between 150 bps and 200 bps is consistent with positive 12-month excess returns 65% of the time, but with an average 12-month excess return of -164 bps. With the spread in this range a 90% confidence interval places 12-month excess returns between -500 bps and +171 bps. MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 24 basis points in January. The conventional 30-year MBS yield rose 5 bps in January, driven by a 7 bps widening of the option-adjusted spread. The rate component of the yield held flat, while the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) declined by 2 bps. MBS spreads remain extremely tight, relative both to history and Aaa-rated credit. Historically, the option-adjusted spread is correlated with net MBS issuance and robust issuance will eventually lead this spread wider. At least so far, net MBS issuance shows no sign of slowing down. While refinancing applications declined alongside the recent spike in Treasury yields, purchase applications have remained resilient (Chart 4). The Fed ceasing the reinvestment of its MBS portfolio would also significantly add to MBS supply. As we explained in a recent report,4 we expect the Fed will not start to wind down its balance sheet until 2018. However, if growth is stronger than we expect there is a chance the process could begin near the end of this year. In that same report we also observed that nominal MBS spreads are very low relative to both the slope of the yield curve and implied rate volatility. This poses a risk to MBS in the near-term. Government-Related: Cut To Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview Government-Related Market Overview The government-related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 21 basis points in January. Sovereign bonds outperformed by 75 bps, while Foreign and Domestic Agency bonds outperformed by 6 bps and 14 bps, respectively. Local Authorities outperformed by 34 bps and Supranationals outperformed by 2 bps. This week we downgrade the government-related sector from overweight to underweight, although we recommend maintaining an overweight allocation to both the Foreign Agency and Local Authority sectors. Sovereigns are not attractive compared to corporate credit, according to our model, and will struggle to outperform if the dollar remains in a bull market, as we expect it will. A stronger dollar increases the cost of debt servicing from the perspective on non-U.S. issuers. Foreign Agencies and Local Authorities both appear attractive relative to corporate credit, after adjusting for differences in credit rating and duration. Foreign Agencies in particular will perform well if oil prices continue to trend higher. Supranationals offer very little spread, and are best thought of as a hedge in spread widening environments. Domestic Agency debt can also be thought of in this vein, but with the added risk that spreads start to widen if any progress is made toward GSE reform. While any concrete movement on GSE reform is still a long way off, the new administration has brought the topic back into the headlines and this has led to some increased volatility in Domestic Agency spreads in recent weeks (Chart 5). Municipal Bonds: Upgrade To Neutral Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 40 basis points in January (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio fell 2% in January and currently sits just below its post-crisis average. Even though net state & local government borrowing edged higher in Q4, issuance has rolled over in recent weeks and fund flows have sharply reversed course (Chart 6). As a result, our tactical yield ratio model - based on issuance, fund flows and ratings migration - shows that yield ratios are very close to fair value. Although the average M/T ratio still appears expensive if we include the global economic policy uncertainty index as an additional explanatory variable.5 While we remain cautious on the long-term prospects for state & local government health, we expect that improving trends in fund flows and issuance will support yield ratios for the next several months. Eventually we expect that increased state & local government investment will lead to higher issuance, but this will take some time to play out. In the meantime it will be crucial to monitor the federal government's progress on tax reform, particularly if there appears to be any appetite for removing municipal bonds' tax exempt status. Our sense is that the tax exemption will remain in place due to the administration's stated preference for increased infrastructure spending. But that outcome is highly uncertain. Treasury Curve: Favor 5-Year Bullet Over 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview After a volatile end to last year, the Treasury curve was relatively unchanged in January. The 2/10 slope steepened by 1 basis point on the month and the 5/30 slope steepened by 2 bps. In previous reports we detailed how the combination of accelerating economic growth and still-accommodative Fed policy will cause the Treasury curve to bear-steepen this year. This steepening will be driven by a continued, but gradual, recovery in long-dated TIPS breakeven inflation back to pre-crisis levels (2.4% to 2.5%). Once inflation expectations return to pre-crisis levels, it is possible that the Fed will shift to a monetary policy that is focused more on tamping out inflation than supporting growth. At that point the curve will shift from a bear-steepening to a bear-flattening regime. However, as we posited in a recent report,6 it could take until the end of this year before TIPS breakevens return to pre-crisis levels and core inflation returns to the Fed's target. To position for a steeper Treasury curve, we recommend that investors favor the 5-year bullet versus a duration-equivalent 2/10 barbell. Not only will the bullet outperform the barbell as the curve steepens, but the 5-year bullet is currently very cheap relative to the 2/10 slope (Chart 7). This trade has so far returned +29 bps since initiation on December 20. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 58 basis points in January. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate increased 10 bps on the month and, at 2.05%, it remains well below its pre-crisis range of 2.4% to 2.5%. The Fed will be keen to allow TIPS breakevens to rise toward levels more consistent with its inflation target, and will quickly adopt a more dovish policy stance if breakevens fall. This "Fed put" is a key reason why we remain overweight TIPS relative to nominal Treasuries, although we expect the uptrend in breakevens will moderate during the next few months. As we detailed in a recent report,7 while accelerating wage growth will ensure that inflation remains in an uptrend, the impact from wages will be mitigated by deflating import prices. Diffusion indexes for both PCE and CPI have also rolled over recently, suggesting that inflation readings will soften during the next couple of months. The anchor from slowly rising inflation will prevent TIPS breakevens from increasing too quickly, and breakevens are also too high compared to the reading from our TIPS Financial model - based on the dollar, oil prices and the stock-to-bond total return ratio (Chart 8). At the moment, only pipeline measures of inflationary pressure such as the ISM prices paid index (panel 4) suggest that breakevens will move rapidly higher in the near term. Remain overweight TIPS but expect the uptrend in breakevens to moderate in the months ahead. ABS: Maximum Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 6 basis points in January. Aaa-rated issues outperformed by 5 bps while non-Aaa issues outperformed by 17 bps. Credit card issues outperformed by 8 bps and auto loans outperformed by 5 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS tightened 3 bps on the month. At 51 bps, the spread remains well below its average pre-crisis level. As was noted in the Appendix to our year-end Special Report,8 consumer ABS provided better volatility-adjusted excess returns than all fixed income sectors except Baa-rated corporates and Caa-rated high-yield in 2016. With ABS spreads still elevated relative to other similarly risky fixed income sectors, we expect this risk-adjusted performance to continue. The spread on Aaa-rated credit card ABS tightened 4 bps in January, and now sits at 49 bps. Meanwhile, the spread on Aaa-rated auto loan ABS tightened 1 bp on the month, and now sits at 54 bps. In early November we recommended favoring Aaa-rated credit cards relative to Aaa-rated auto loans. Collateral credit quality between credit cards and auto loans is clearly diverging in favor of credit cards (Chart 9, bottom panel), and in early November, our measure of the volatility adjusted breakeven spread (days-to-breakeven) was displaying no discernible valuation advantage in autos. Since November, however, autos have started to look more attractive (Chart 9, panel 3). If auto loan spreads continue to widen relative to credit cards we may soon shift back into autos. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Non-agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 60 basis points in January. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS tightened 6 bps on the month, and is now close to one standard deviation below its pre-crisis mean (Chart 10). Rising CMBS delinquency rates and tightening commercial real estate lending standards make us cautious on non-agency CMBS. This caution has only intensified now that spreads are at their tightest levels since prior to the financial crisis. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 22 basis points in January. The index option-adjusted spread for Agency CMBS tightened 4 bps on the month, and currently sits at 51 bps. The spread offered from Agency CMBS is similar to what is offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS (52 bps) and greater than what is offered by conventional 30-year MBS (30 bps) for a similar amount of spread volatility. We continue to recommend an overweight position in Agency CMBS. Treasury Valuation Chart 11Global PMI Model Global PMI Model Global PMI Model The current reading from our 2-factor Global PMI model (which includes the global PMI and dollar sentiment) places fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.44% (Chart 11). Our 3-factor version of the model, which also incorporates the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, places fair value at 2.08%. The lower fair value is the result of a large spike in the uncertainty index in November that has yet to unwind (bottom panel). Large spikes in uncertainty that do not coincide with deterioration in other economic indicators tend to mean revert fairly quickly. So we would be inclined to view the fair value reading from our 2-factor model as more indicative of true fair value at the moment. It is for this reason that we recently moved back to a below-benchmark duration stance.9 For further details on our Global PMI models please refer to the U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Model", dated October 11, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. At the time of publication the 10-year Treasury yield was 2.44%. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Inflation: More Fire Than Ice, But Don't Sound The Alarm", dated January 24, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin", dated January 18, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Is It Time To Cut Duration?", dated January 17, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 For further details on the model please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Inflation: More Fire Than Ice, But Don't Sound The Alarm", dated January 24, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Inflation: More Fire Than Ice, But Don't Sound The Alarm", dated January 24, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes for 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar Watching: Another Update", dated January 31, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)

Highlights Inflation: Inflation will trend higher this year, but at a measured pace. The impact of a tight labor market and accelerating wage growth will be mitigated by deflating import prices. Even if the economic recovery remains on track, year-over-year core PCE inflation is likely to still be below the Fed's 2% target by the end of this year. Yield Curve: With core inflation still low, the Fed will be quick to back away from its rate hike plans if there is any indication that inflation might reverse its uptrend. This supports a bear-steepening of the yield curve and the continued outperformance of TIPS versus nominal Treasuries. Spread Product: Excess returns to spread product are not likely to turn deeply negative until core PCE inflation is above 2% and Fed policy becomes more focused on halting inflation than supporting the recovery. We retain a neutral allocation to spread product in our portfolio. Feature Chart 1A Sustainable Recovery A Sustainable Recovery A Sustainable Recovery After seven years of false starts and disappointments, a durable recovery in inflation is finally under way (Chart 1). The key difference between the current uptrend and prior episodes of rising inflation - such as those witnessed in 2011 and 2014 - is that this time around most labor market indicators suggest the economy is very close to full employment. For this reason the recovery in core inflation is likely to persist, and will eventually settle at a level close to the Fed's 2% target for core PCE. That being said, it is still far too soon for investors to worry about inflation, particularly as it relates to the performance of risk assets. The remainder of this report discusses why the recovery in inflation is likely to be slow moving, and also how the inflation outlook impacts our major fixed income investment calls. Some Near-Term Headwinds There are two reasons why year-over-year measures of core inflation are likely to moderate during the next three months. First, diffusion indexes for both CPI and PCE inflation have recently dipped below the zero line (Chart 2), meaning that more components of each index have decelerating prices than have accelerating prices. Historically, rising year-over-year core inflation has been associated with diffusion indexes above zero. Second, January and February of last year saw incredibly large price increases in both core CPI and core PCE (Chart 3). This means that gains in January and February of this year will also have to be very strong to overcome the large base effect and cause the year-over-year growth rates to move higher. Chart 2Diffusion Indexes Point To Deceleration Diffusion Indexes Point To Deceleration Diffusion Indexes Point To Deceleration Chart 3A Large Base Effect In Jan & Feb A Large Base Effect In Jan & Feb A Large Base Effect In Jan & Feb Now these are only very short term arguments. The base effects will be out of the way by March and diffusion indexes can reverse course very quickly. However, they do suggest that inflation readings are likely to be relatively weak during the next few months. This will be critical for the near-term path of monetary policy and, in our view, makes it likely that the Fed will keep rates steady until the June FOMC meeting. The Phillips Curve Chart 4A Phillips Curve Model Of Inflation A Phillips Curve Model Of Inflation A Phillips Curve Model Of Inflation Turning to the longer run outlook for inflation, we employ a Phillips curve model of core PCE inflation based on one that Janet Yellen referred to in a speech from September 2015.1 In this framework, the year-over-year change in core PCE inflation is modeled using: Lagged core inflation Inflation expectations (from the Survey of Professional Forecasters) Non-oil import price inflation relative to core PCE inflation Resource utilization (calculated as the difference between the unemployment rate and the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO) estimate of the natural rate of unemployment) The model does an excellent job capturing changes in core PCE inflation since 1990 (Chart 4), and is also useful because it gives us a glimpse of the mental framework that Fed policymakers apply to the task of inflation forecasting. Most importantly, the model allows us to generate inflation forecasts given estimates for inflation expectations, the unemployment rate and the U.S. dollar (which closely tracks relative import prices). For example, in a base case scenario where we assume that inflation expectations and the dollar remain flat, but that the unemployment rate declines from its current level of 4.7% to 4.5% by the end of this year, the model predicts year-over-year core PCE inflation will rise from its current level of 1.65% to 1.87% by November, still below the Fed's 2% target. If we keep the same forecast for a steadily declining unemployment rate but also incorporate a 5% increase in the value of the trade-weighted U.S. dollar, then core PCE inflation is projected to rise to 1.76% by November. The stronger dollar means that import prices exert a bit more of a drag. Conversely, if we keep the same unemployment assumption but assume that the U.S. dollar depreciates by 5%, then core PCE inflation is projected to reach 1.98% by November. In this scenario import prices actually provide a slight boost to core inflation. Overall, to create a scenario where core inflation reaches the Fed's target before the end of this year we need to make a fairly optimistic assumption about the unemployment rate and also incorporate a substantial dollar depreciation. In our view, it is more likely that the dollar remains under mild upward pressure this year as the U.S. economy continues to de-couple from the rest of the world. Fiscal policy remains the wildcard, as any protectionist measures implemented by the new U.S. government could lead to import price shocks. Although at first blush any watering-down of trade deals, imposition of tariffs, or protectionist tweaks to the tax code would seem likely to send import prices higher, much depends on how much of the adjustment to the new trade policy occurs through the exchange rate or through prices. This is incredibly hard to determine until the details of any protectionist trade measures are known. Our Global Investment Strategy service explored the potential ramifications of one such trade proposal - a border-adjusted corporate tax - in a Special Report published last week.2 A Bottom-Up Perspective An alternative to the Phillips curve approach is to split core inflation into its major sub-components: shelter, core goods and core services excluding shelter. We can then examine each sub-component separately and identify different macro drivers for each (Chart 5). Shelter has been the strongest contributor to core inflation so far in this recovery and can be modeled using home prices, the rental vacancy rate and household formation (Chart 5, panel 1). Based on these relationships, we expect shelter inflation will remain elevated for quite some time, while our model suggests it is even likely to move a bit higher during the next few months. After briefly seeming like it might rebound earlier last year, the rental vacancy rate has since fallen to new lows while home price appreciation continues at a steady rate of just above 4% per year (Chart 6). Further, the vacancy rate should remain under downward pressure and home prices under upward pressure as long as household formation continues to outpace home construction. The top panel of Chart 6 shows that the difference between housing starts and household formation closely tracks the rental vacancy rate. The vacancy rate rose throughout the 1990s and early 2000s as housing starts outpaced the creation of new households, but starts have not been sufficiently robust so far in this recovery. In addition, housing inventory as a percent of households is near the lows of the early 1990s (Chart 6, bottom panel). This inventory calculation includes the "shadow inventory" from foreclosed homes which has almost normalized back to pre-crisis levels, in any case. Chart 5The Components Of Core CPI The Components Of Core CPI The Components Of Core CPI Chart 6Drivers Of Shelter Inflation Drivers Of Shelter Inflation Drivers Of Shelter Inflation We expect that shelter inflation will remain elevated at least until housing construction starts to outpace the creation of new households, but will moderate once that supply response starts to emerge. Chart 7Atlanta Fed Wage Growth Tracker* ##br##Versus Unemployment Rate Inflation: More Fire Than Ice, But Don't Sound The Alarm Inflation: More Fire Than Ice, But Don't Sound The Alarm Core goods inflation (Chart 5, panel 2) has been, and will continue to be, the major source of deflation in this cycle. A large fraction of core goods are imported and, as such, core goods inflation tends to follow the trend in the U.S. dollar. The bull market in the U.S. dollar will continue to keep a lid on core goods prices, and will limit how quickly inflation can rise. Any meaningful increase in inflation this year is likely to come from the core services excluding shelter component, which historically tends to track fluctuations in wage growth (Chart 5, bottom panel). As we have previously highlighted, the labor market is close to full employment and the relationship between the unemployment rate and wage growth remains strong (Chart 7). In this environment, even modest further declines in the unemployment rate should exert meaningful upward pressure on wages. Bottom Line: Inflation will trend higher this year, but at a measured pace. The impact of a tight labor market and accelerating wage growth will be mitigated by deflating import prices. Even if the economic recovery remains on track, year-over-year core PCE inflation is likely to still be below the Fed's 2% target by the end of this year. Investment Implications Duration & TIPS Chart 8Leading Inflation Indicators & Breakevens Leading Inflation Indicators & Breakevens Leading Inflation Indicators & Breakevens Long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates still have upside, although the rate of increase is unlikely to maintain its current rapid pace. As core inflation converges with the Fed's target so should long-dated measures of inflation expectations such as TIPS breakevens. Historically, core PCE inflation close to 2% has coincided with long-dated TIPS breakevens in a range between 2.4% and 2.5%. With the 10-year breakeven currently at 2.05%, we expect it has another 35 to 45 basis points of upside. Measures of pipeline inflation pressure, such as producer prices and the prices paid and supplier deliveries components of the ISM manufacturing survey also point to rising breakevens (Chart 8). We continue to recommend an overweight allocation to TIPS versus nominal Treasury securities. With rate hike expectations still relatively depressed,3 real yields do not have much downside. Rising breakevens should therefore also pressure long-dated nominal yields higher in the months ahead. While we currently recommend a benchmark duration stance, we are actively looking for an opportunity to shift to below-benchmark duration, as was discussed in last week's report.4 Yield Curve As breakevens and nominal yields move higher the yield curve should also steepen (Chart 9). The strong positive correlation between the slope of the yield curve and TIPS breakevens is the result of the impact of Fed policy on both variables. Chart 9Wider Breakevens Correlated With A Steeper Yield Curve Inflation: More Fire Than Ice, But Don't Sound The Alarm Inflation: More Fire Than Ice, But Don't Sound The Alarm Fed policy tends to be accommodative in the early stages of a recovery, and this causes the yield curve to steepen and breakevens to widen as investors logically expect that easy money will cause both growth and inflation to move higher. In contrast, the yield curve tends to flatten and breakevens tend to fall later in the recovery once Fed policy turns more restrictive. Chart 105-Year Bullet Still Cheap 5-Year Bullet Still Cheap 5-Year Bullet Still Cheap Given that core inflation and TIPS breakevens both remain below the Fed's targets, it is too soon to expect a shift toward restrictive Fed policy. In other words, the Fed will be quick to back away from its rate hike plans if there is any indication that breakevens or inflation might reverse their uptrends. It is only once core inflation and TIPS breakevens have returned to the Fed's targets that the stated purpose of Fed policy will shift from supporting the recovery to snuffing out inflation. To profit from a steeper yield curve we entered a long 5-year bullet short duration-matched 2/10 barbell trade on December 20. So far this trade has returned 14 bps, and the 5-year bullet continues to look very cheap on the curve (Chart 10). Spread Product In prior research we considered the performance of spread product throughout the four phases of the Fed cycle (Chart 11).5 We define the four phases of the Fed cycle as follows: Phase I represents the early stage of the withdrawal of monetary stimulus. This phase begins with the first hike of a new tightening cycle and ends when the fed funds rate crosses above its equilibrium level. Phase II represents the late stage of the tightening cycle, when the Fed hikes its target rate above equilibrium in an effort to slow the economy. Phase III represents the early stage of the easing cycle. It begins with the first rate cut from the peak and lasts until the Fed cuts its target rate below equilibrium. Phase IV represents the late stage of the easing cycle. It encompasses both the period when the fed funds rate descends to its cycle trough and the subsequent adjustment period when the Fed remains on hold in an effort to kick start an economic recovery. Chart 11Stylized Fed Cycle Inflation: More Fire Than Ice, But Don't Sound The Alarm Inflation: More Fire Than Ice, But Don't Sound The Alarm Using a very simple estimate of the equilibrium fed funds rate based on potential GDP and a long-run moving average of the funds rate itself, we have found that excess returns to investment grade corporate bonds are highest in phase IV and phase I, when the fed funds rate is below equilibrium (Table 1). However, the key problem with this analysis is that it is very difficult to estimate the equilibrium fed funds rate in real time. As stated above, the estimate used in Table 1 incorporates the CBO's estimate of potential GDP which is frequently revised after the fact. So while we are confident that we are currently in phase I of the Fed cycle, the challenge becomes looking for other indicators that might warn us about the transition from phase I to phase II, where excess returns are much worse. We have found that core PCE inflation is one such indicator. We calculated average monthly excess returns to investment grade corporate bonds when year-over-year core PCE inflation is below 1.5%, between 1.5% and 2%, and between 2% and 2.5% (Table 2). Table 1Investment Grade Corporate Bond Excess Returns* Under The Four Phases##br## Of The Fed Cycle (August 1988 To Present) Inflation: More Fire Than Ice, But Don't Sound The Alarm Inflation: More Fire Than Ice, But Don't Sound The Alarm Table 2Investment Grade Corporate Bond Excess Returns* Under Different Ranges##br## For Year-Over-Year Core** PCE (August 1988 To Present) Inflation: More Fire Than Ice, But Don't Sound The Alarm Inflation: More Fire Than Ice, But Don't Sound The Alarm The results show that the highest returns occur when inflation is below 1.5%. This should not be surprising since an environment of low inflation is most likely to coincide with phase IV of the Fed cycle. We found mixed results for when inflation is between 1.5% and 2%. In this environment average monthly excess returns are close to zero and a 90% confidence interval places them between -19 bps and +17 bps. This environment likely encompasses phase I of the Fed cycle and the transition into phase II. It is not until core PCE inflation is above 2% that excess returns turn decisively negative. Monthly excess returns average -13 bps in this environment, with a 90% confidence interval of -35 bps to +10 bps. With inflation likely to remain between 1.5% and 2% for the balance of the year, it is too soon to turn all-out bearish on spread product. For the moment we recommend a neutral allocation, but with an underweight allocation to high-yield bonds where valuations are exceedingly tight. Given that inflation is low and Fed policy is accommodative, we would be quick to upgrade both investment grade and high-yield corporates on any near-term sell off. The current uncertainty surrounding fiscal policy also complicates the outlook for spread product. On the one hand, it raises the risk of a near-term sell off if it appears as though some of the more stimulative aspects of Trump's agenda will not be implemented. On the other hand, in addition to headline-grabbing promises of increased infrastructure spending, there are many other policy details that could also have significant market implications. One example would be the elimination of the tax deductibility of corporate interest expenses. Such a provision is currently included in the Republican's plan for corporate tax reform, and would severely diminish supply in the corporate bond market if it is implemented. Bottom Line: Excess returns to spread product are not likely to turn deeply negative until core PCE inflation is above 2% and Fed policy becomes more focused on halting inflation than supporting the recovery. We retain a neutral allocation to spread product in our portfolio. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20150924a.htm 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue For 2017", dated January 20, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 3 The overnight index swap curve is priced for 54 basis points of rate hikes during the next twelve months. 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Is It Time To Cut Duration?", dated January 17, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy / U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Bonds And The Fed Funds Rate Cycle", dated May 27, 2014, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights Chart 1Upside Risks & Uncertainty Upside Risks & Uncertainty Upside Risks & Uncertainty The evidence of economic acceleration continues to pile up and we maintain our view that bond yields will be higher than current forwards by the end of 2017. In the near-term, however, the bond market has been too quick to discount a more positive growth outlook, especially considering still-elevated levels of economic policy uncertainty. Our cautious optimism is echoed by the readings from our global PMI models and also by the Fed. The minutes from December's FOMC meeting revealed that more participants saw upside risks to growth and inflation than saw downside risks, but also that this improved economic forecast was judged to be more uncertain than any Fed forecast since 2013 (Chart 1). We remain bond bears on a 12-month horizon, but advocate a benchmark duration stance in the near term. A period of flat bond yields is the most likely outcome until elevated uncertainty levels revert to a more normal range (see the global economic policy uncertainty index). Feature Investment Grade: Neutral Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 82 basis points in December and by 478 basis points in 2016. The index option-adjusted spread tightened 6 bps on the month and 42 bps on the year. At 122 bps, the spread is currently well below its historical average (134 bps). Corporate spreads have tightened substantially since last February despite elevated gross leverage (Chart 2).1 As we pointed out in our end-of-year Special Report titled "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017",2 it is very rare for spreads to tighten when leverage is in an uptrend. While a rebound in profit growth will likely cause the uptrend in leverage to abate this year, spreads have already moved to discount a significant reversal. Although valuations are by no means attractive, accelerating economic growth and still-accommodative Fed policy will keep spreads at tight levels during the first half of this year. This sweet spot will persist at least until TIPS breakeven inflation rates return to pre-crisis levels, which would likely presage a hawkish shift in Fed policy. Energy sector debt returned 12.5% in excess of duration-equivalent Treasuries in 2016, compared to excess returns of under 5% for the overall corporate index. Despite this large outperformance, energy credits still appear attractive according to our model (Table 3), and should continue to outperform into the New Year. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation##br## And Recommended Allocation* Cautious Optimism Cautious Optimism Table 3BCorporate Sector##br## Risk Vs. Reward* Cautious Optimism Cautious Optimism High-Yield: Underweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield Market Overview High-yield outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 188 basis points in December and by 1539 basis points in 2016. The index option-adjusted spread narrowed 46 bps on the month and 251 bps on the year. At 383 bps, it is currently 137 bps below its historical average. As we highlighted in our year-end Special Report,3 the uptrend in defaults is likely to reverse this year, mostly due to recovery in the energy sector. However, still-poor corporate health and tightening monetary policy will lead to a resumption of the uptrend in 2018 and beyond. Given the improving default backdrop, we are actively looking to upgrade our allocation to high-yield debt. However, valuations do not present a sufficiently compelling opportunity at the moment. Our estimate of the default-adjusted high-yield spread - the average spread of the junk index less our forecast of 12-month default losses - is below 150 bps (Chart 3). This is close to one standard deviation below the long-run average. Historically, we have found that a default-adjusted spread between 100 bps and 200 bps is consistent with positive 12-month excess returns 65% of the time, but with an average 12-month excess return of close to zero. With the spread in this range, a 90% confidence interval would place 12-month excess returns between -3% and +4%. MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 6 basis points in December, but underperformed by 11 bps in 2016. The conventional 30-year MBS yield rose 5 bps in December, completely driven by a 5 bps increase in the rate component. The compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) and option-adjusted spread were both flat on the month. In 2016, the conventional 30-year MBS yield rose 6 bps. This was driven by a 12 bps increase in the rate component that was partially offset by a 9 bps decline in the option-adjusted spread. The option cost increased 3 bps on the year. Our underweight in MBS is predicated upon very low option-adjusted spreads, relative both to history and other comparable spread product (Chart 4). Historically, the option-adjusted spread is correlated with net MBS issuance and eventually we expect rising net issuance to lead the option-adjusted spread wider. Importantly, purchase applications have remained firm in the face of higher mortgage rates even though refinancings have collapsed (bottom panel). Another tail risk for the MBS market is the possibility that the Fed ceases the reinvestment of its mortgage portfolio. While we do not expect this to occur in 2017, with two rate hikes now in the bank the fed funds rate is approaching levels where the Fed might begin to consider it. A new Fed Chair in early 2018 might also be more inclined to wind down the balance sheet. Government Related: Overweight Chart 5Government Related Market Overview Government Related Market Overview Government Related Market Overview The government-related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 27 basis points in December. Foreign Agency and Sovereign bonds outperformed by 84 bps and 83 bps respectively, while Local Authorities outperformed by 22 bps. Domestic Agency bonds and Supranationals were a drag on performance during the month, underperforming the Treasury benchmark by 10 bps and 7 bps respectively. The government-related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury benchmark by 150 bps in 2016. The best performing sub-sectors for the year were Sovereigns (outperformed by 322 bps), Local Authorities (outperformed by 286 bps) and Foreign Agencies (outperformed by 258 bps). Domestic Agency bonds outperformed Treasuries by 38 bps, while Supranationals underperformed by 11 bps. Foreign Agency bonds and Local Authority bonds continue to appear attractive relative to U.S. corporate credit, after adjusting for credit rating and duration. We recommend focusing our government related allocation in these two sectors. In contrast, Sovereigns and Supranationals both appear expensive relative to U.S. corporate credit, and we recommend avoiding these sectors. Spreads on Domestic Agency debt have room to tighten in the near-term (Chart 5). Spreads widened to the top of their recent range last month on rumors that the new government could seek to speed up the process of GSE reform. We view these concerns as premature. This week we also remove our recommendation to favor callable agencies over bullets. Bullets have tended to outperform when the 2/5 Treasury slope steepens (bottom panel). We expect the 2/5 curve to be biased steeper in the first half of this year. Municipal Bonds: Underweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 134 basis points in December, but underperformed the index by 103 basis points in 2016 (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio fell 8% in December, but increased 13% during 2016. At present the average M/T ratio is 98%, only slightly below its post-crisis average (Chart 6). Although M/T ratios moved higher last year, trends in issuance and fund flows suggest they are still too low. As we noted in our year-end Special Report,4 our tactical model of the M/T yield ratio - based on issuance, fund flows, ratings changes and economic policy uncertainty - pegs current fair value for the average M/T yield ratio at 112%. Further, as was also highlighted in our year-end report, the municipal credit cycle is likely to take a turn for the worse in late 2017, with muni downgrades starting to outpace upgrades. This analysis is based on indicators of state & local government budget health that tend to follow our indicators of corporate sector health with a two year lag. Just last month Moody's downgraded $1.6 billion worth of the City of Dallas' general obligation debt from Aa3 to A1. The downgrade was justified based on the city's poorly funded public safety pension plan. Attention will increasingly turn to underfunded public pensions when state & local government budget health starts to deteriorate later this year. Treasury Curve: Favor 5-Year Bullet Over 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve shifted higher and flattened in December. The 2/10 slope flattened by 1 basis point on the month and the 5/30 slope flattened 6 bps. For 2016 as a whole, the Treasury curve bear-steepened out to the 10-year maturity. The 2/10 slope steepened 4 bps and the 5/30 slope flattened 12 bps. In our year-end Special Report,5 we detailed how the combination of accelerating economic growth and still-accommodative Fed policy will cause the Treasury curve to bear-steepen in the first half of 2017. This steepening will be driven by continued, but gradual, recovery in long-dated TIPS breakeven inflation back to pre-crisis levels (2.4% to 2.5%). Once inflation expectations return to pre-crisis levels, it is possible that the Fed will shift to a monetary policy that is focused more on tamping out inflation than supporting growth. At that point the curve will shift from a bear-steepening to a bear-flattening regime. A steepening curve environment will cause bullet trades to outperform barbells. On top of that, the 5-year bullet is currently extremely cheap on the curve (Chart 7). For these reasons we recommended entering a long 5-year bullet, short 2/10 barbell trade on December 20. This trade has already returned 8 bps since initiation, even though the 2/10 slope has flattened 10 bps during this period. A resumption of curve steepening will cause our long 5-year bullet, short 2/10 barbell trade to perform even better in the months ahead. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 6 basis points in December, and by 331 bps in 2016. The 10-year TIPS breakeven rate increased by 1 bp in December and by 41 bps in 2016. At present it sits at 1.96%, still well below the 2.4% to 2.5% range that is consistent with the Fed's 2% inflation target. As we explained in our year-end Special Report,6 the Fed will be keen to allow TIPS breakevens to rise toward levels more consistent with its inflation target, and will quickly back away from a hawkish policy stance should breakevens fall. But while breakevens will continue to trend higher, the rate of increase should moderate to be more in line with the shallow uptrend in realized inflation. It is difficult for the Fed to drive long-dated inflation expectations higher while it is in the midst of a tightening cycle. For this reason, trends in actual inflation will be a more important determinant of TIPS breakevens than in the past. And while there are indications that the uptrend in realized inflation will persist, notably recent accelerations in wage growth and survey measures of prices paid (Chart 8). There is currently no indication that core and trimmed mean inflation are breaking out to the upside (bottom panel). We remain overweight TIPS relative to nominal Treasuries on the expectation that long-dated breakevens reach the 2.4% to 2.5% range in the second half of 2017, and that core PCE inflation reaches the Fed's 2% target by the end of the year. ABS: Maximum Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 17 basis points in December but outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 94 bps in 2016. Aaa-rated ABS underperformed Treasuries by 21 bps in December but outperformed by 75 bps in 2016, while non-Aaa ABS outperformed the benchmark by 13 bps in December and by 257 bps in 2016. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened by 11 bps in December, but tightened by 10 bps in 2016. Further, the spread differential between Aaa-rated auto ABS and Aaa-rated credit card ABS narrowed substantially in 2016. The option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated auto loan ABS has tightened by 20 bps since the end of 2015, while the option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated credit card ABS has tightened by 10 bps. We have previously noted that, after adjusting for spread volatility, Aaa-rated auto loan ABS no longer offer an attractive opportunity relative to Aaa-rated credit cards (Chart 9). We continue to favor Aaa-rated credit cards over Aaa-rated auto loans, given the low spread differential and divergences in collateral credit quality (bottom panel). As was noted in the Appendix to our year-end Special Report,7 consumer ABS provided better volatility-adjusted excess returns than all fixed income sectors except for Baa-rated corporates and Caa-rated high-yield in 2016. With spreads still elevated relative to other similarly risky fixed income sectors, we expect this risk-adjusted performance to continue. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Agency CMBS: Overweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview CMBS Market Overview Agency CMBS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 40 basis points in December, but outperformed by 117 bps in 2016. The index option-adjusted spread for Agency CMBS widened 10 bps in December but tightened 6 bps in 2016. Agency CMBS still offer 50 bps of option-adjusted spread. This is similar to what is offered by Aaa-rated consumer ABS (51 bps) and greater than what is offered by conventional 30-year MBS (26 bps) for a similar amount of spread volatility. We continue to recommend an overweight position in Agency CMBS. Non-agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 19 basis points in December, but outperformed by 313 bps in 2016. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS widened 7 bps in December but tightened 48 bps in 2016. It has recently moved well below its average pre-crisis level (Chart 10). Rising CMBS delinquency rates and tightening commercial real estate lending standards make us cautious on non-agency CMBS. This caution has only intensified now that spreads are at their tightest levels since prior to the financial crisis. Treasury Valuation Chart 11Global PMI Model Global PMI Model Global PMI Model The current reading from our 2-factor Global PMI model (which includes the global PMI and dollar sentiment) places fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.31% (Chart 11). Our 3-factor version of the model, which also incorporates the global economic policy uncertainty index, places fair value at 2.02%. The lower fair value is the result of a large spike in the global economic policy uncertainty index in November that barely reversed in December (bottom panel). Large spikes in uncertainty that do not coincide with deterioration in other economic indicators tend to mean revert fairly quickly. So we would be inclined to view the fair value reading from our 2-factor model as more indicative of true fair value at the moment. However, unusually high uncertainty is one reason we are reluctant to adopt a below benchmark duration stance for the time being even though we expect yields to be higher in 12 months. At the time of publication the 10-year Treasury yield was 2.37% For further details on our Global PMI models please refer to the U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Model", dated October 11, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Monetary Conditions And Rate Expectations The BCA Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) combines changes in the fed funds rate with changes in the trade-weighted dollar using a 10:1 ratio. Historically, economic downturns have been preceded by a break in this index above its equilibrium level - calculated using the Congressional Budget Office's estimate of potential GDP growth (Chart 12). With the MCI having just reached this estimate of equilibrium, the shaded region in Chart 13 shows the expected path of the federal funds rate assuming that the MCI remains at its equilibrium level. The upper-end of the shaded region corresponds to a scenario where the trade-weighted dollar depreciates by 2% per year and the lower-end of the shaded region corresponds to a scenario where the dollar appreciates by 2% per year. The thick line through the middle of the region corresponds to a flat dollar. Chart 12Monetary Conditions Vs. Equilibrium Monetary Conditions Vs. Equilibrium Monetary Conditions Vs. Equilibrium Chart 13Fed Funds Rate Scenarios Fed Funds Rate Scenarios Fed Funds Rate Scenarios As can be seen in Chart 13, both the market and Fed are discounting a move in the MCI above its equilibrium level. This would be consistent with behavior witnessed in past cycles when the MCI broke above its equilibrium level several years before the next recession. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Alex Wang, Research Analyst alexw@bcaresearch.com 1 Defined as total debt divided by EBITD. 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Seven Fixed Income Themes For 2017", dated December 20, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)

Highlights The economy is near full employment, but betting on significant inflation is premature. Market-based inflation expectations have risen substantially in recent weeks but these moves are not corroborated by survey measures of inflation expectations. Consumer inflation expectations are very well anchored due to ongoing deflation in many frequently purchased goods and services. We are on high alert for a near-term equity pullback, with Chinese liquidity tightening as a potential catalyst. Feature Chart 1Market-Based Inflation ##br##Expectations Breaking Out Market-Based Inflation Expectations Breaking Out Market-Based Inflation Expectations Breaking Out After years of focusing on deflation, the possibility of inflation has made a comeback on investors' radars. The shift makes sense, given that the labor market is now operating near full employment. The December payroll report showed that payrolls increased by 156,000, slightly lower than the 3-month average of 165,000. But, average hourly earnings increased by 0.4%, suggesting that slightly weaker employment growth is not due to sluggish demand, and reflects a smaller available pool of workers. However, as we explain below, the potential for a major inflation surge is low in 2017 and is premature as an investment theme. We are on high alert for a near-term pullback to the equity bull market, given that valuation and sentiment are stretched. But as we outline, the threat to the equity market is less likely to be domestic inflation than an external event, such as the fallout from tightening liquidity in China (similar to what occurred in mid-2015 and early 2016). In the past few weeks, one-year inflation expectations have moved to their highest level since mid-2014, when oil prices were above $110/bbl. Long-run inflation expectations have also spiked since the U.S. election (Chart 1). The extent to which this trend is judged sustainable, and provides an accurate forecast for general inflation, has important investment implications. Our view is that, although TIPS could move a bit higher, the market move should not be interpreted as a harbinger for a broad-based inflation acceleration. Policymakers consider a range of inflation expectations measures, but in recent years, market-based measures have garnered a lot of attention. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven rate in particular is often viewed as the market's assessment of whether the Fed can successfully achieve its inflation target. According to the Minutes of the December FOMC meeting, the recent rise in market-based inflation expectations was discussed at length. On this basis, the rise in TIPS is important as it could have a significant role in setting monetary policy. Beyond that, we have argued for some time that a major challenge for firms this cycle will be to raise selling prices, i.e. a lack of pricing power will restrain profit margins and, ultimately, earnings growth. If the recent pick-up in market-based inflation expectations heralds a more robust rise in actual inflation, then profits could positively surprise this year. The Rise In TIPS Is Partially Energy-Driven... Since 2010, there has been a strong correlation between oil prices and TIPS (Chart 2). The correlation has somewhat confounded policymakers.1 In theory, any oil price shock, even if it is considered to be permanent, should not exert any lasting impact on long-dated forward measures of inflation expectations. The reason is that as long as the Fed is committed to its 2% inflation target, then the market should expect that monetary policy will prevent a one-time shock to oil prices from having any permanent effect on the overall inflation rate. This is why, in theory, the 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven rate is a good indicator for policymakers. Chart 2Oil Prices And Breakevens Oil Prices And Breakevens Oil Prices And Breakevens As our fixed income team explained in a report last year,2 the main reason for the tight correlation between TIPS and oil prices stems from the market perception that monetary policy has been constrained. Prior to the financial crisis, oil prices rose from below $40 in 2003 to $140 in 2008. During that time, long-dated breakevens remained stable. One possible explanation for this lack of correlation is that the Fed tightened policy during this period, offsetting the inflationary impact from higher oil prices. But in 2015-2016, when oil prices fell from above $100 to below $40, breakevens plunged alongside. If the market perceives monetary policy to be constrained by the zero lower bound, then it could be the case that the cost of inflation compensation is highly sensitive to falling oil prices because the market perceives that the Fed has no ability to offset the deflationary shock. In other words, the 5-year/5-year TIPS breakeven rate has fallen because the zero lower bound is challenging the credibility of the Fed's inflation target. Our U.S. fixed income team forecasted that breakevens will head higher once oil prices move up and that the correlation between oil prices and breakevens will eventually weaken as the fed funds rate moves further away from the zero lower bound. The bottom line is that TIPS are most likely being unduly affected by energy price movements. ..And Only Thinly Corroborated By Alternative Inflation Indicators Despite our bias that the recent moves in market-based inflation expectations are exaggerated, TIPS are not the only gauge sending a more inflationary signal. This week's ISM manufacturing and non-manufacturing surveys both reported an uptick in prices paid (Chart 3). According to the manufacturing survey, 18 out of 21 recorded inputs were up in price over the past month. However, the bulk of these are commodities that have gone up in price alongside other financial market prices, and it is not clear the extent that the price rise is physical demand-driven, or financial demand-driven. In the non-manufacturing survey, the price rise was not quite as broad-based, but is nonetheless suggestive of upward price pressure. The NFIB small business survey also hinted at higher prices, although much more modestly than the ISM surveys (Chart 3). The Atlanta Fed's Business Inflation Expectations Survey has not broken out of the range that has held since 2011. There was no change in inflation expectations from the most recent survey of professional forecasters. Meanwhile, as we noted last week, consumers are not at all worried about inflation. In fact, according to the Conference Board survey, consumer inflation expectations are at a new cyclical low! At least part of the reason that consumers do not expect more inflation is likely due to their experience with frequently-purchased items. Table 1 shows inflation rates for selected high-frequency spending items, which account for about 30% of the total CPI basket. The table makes it easy to understand why perceptions about inflation are low: almost half of the items in the table are in deflation and only two are above the Fed's target of 2%. It may not matter that a good or service accounts for a small share of spending: if its price is going up/down at a steady pace, then there will be an impact on perceptions about inflation. Currently, very low or negative rates of inflation among frequently purchased items are likely pulling down consumers' perceptions of broad-based inflation. In this sense, one could argue that inflation expectations are very well-anchored. Chart 3Survey-Based Inflation ##br##Expectations More Mixed Survery-Based Inflation Expectations More Mixed Survery-Based Inflation Expectations More Mixed Table 1Inflation Rates For Selected ##br## High-Frequency Spending Items Inflation In 2017: An Idle Threat Inflation In 2017: An Idle Threat Actual Inflation Will Stay Subdued In 2017... Chart 4Only Mild Uptrend Likely In 2017 Only Mild Uptrend Likely In 2017 Only Mild Uptrend Likely In 2017 For many years, we have deconstructed core CPI and core PCE into their three major components to better understand and forecast the trend in consumer price inflation (Chart 4). Performing this exercise today continues to give a fairly benign forecast for inflation. Shelter, the largest component of core CPI, is mostly determined by rental vacancies which appear to be stabilizing just as market rents are rolling over. Our model suggests that shelter will not drive inflation higher in 2017. Core goods inflation (25% of core CPI) will also remain very low and possibly stay in deflationary territory. This component of inflation is most tightly correlated with the trade-weighted dollar (Chart 4, panel 3), and so will stay depressed as long as the bull market in the dollar remains intact. Wage growth is most tightly correlated with service sector inflation excluding shelter and medical care (Chart 4, bottom panel). This component, which accounts for 25% of core CPI, is the most likely source of inflation pressure now that wages are beginning to rise. But as we wrote in a Special Report on November 28, 2016, any wage inflation and pass-through is likely to be very gradual based on several structural headwinds at play this cycle. All in all, core PCE may converge on the Fed's target of 2% in the second half of 2017, but an inflation overshoot should not be a major driver of investment decision-making over the next six - twelve months. ...And Don't Blame Government Spending For Higher Inflation When It Does Come One missing ingredient from the above analysis is the likelihood that the political environment will become inflationary. This subject has been thoroughly covered by the financial press. Our own view has been that upcoming policies may not turn out to be particularly inflationary, at least not this year. For example, Trump's fiscal package may not boost aggregate demand by as much as the more optimistic estimates suggest. There simply are not enough marquee "shovel-ready" projects around that can make use of the public-private partnership structure that Trump's plan envisions in 2017. As for proposed personal tax cuts, the impact is likely to be modest, given that the benefits are tilted towards higher income groups that tend to save much of their earnings. Likewise, corporate tax cuts will have only an incremental effect on business capex, given that many companies are already flush with cash and effective tax rates are well below statutory levels. Our benign view about the impact of government spending on inflation is shared by researchers at the St Louis Federal Reserve. In a recent paper,3 researchers looked at periods when the central bank was not working to offset the potentially inflationary effects of fiscal policy, e.g. between 1959 and 1979, when the Fed followed a policy in which it accommodated increases in inflation. They found almost no effect of government spending on inflation. For example, a 10 percent increase in government spending during that period led to an 8 basis point decline in inflation. Note that this period covers years of when the economy was operating at full employment and below. As the researchers point out, this does not imply that countercyclical government spending is ineffective at boosting output, but it simply demonstrates that empirical evidence of inflation related to government spending is thin. The bottom line is that we view the likelihood of significant inflation pressure as low in 2017. The implication is that under this scenario, the Fed can afford to adjust their "dots" gradually, diminishing the risk for stocks and bonds of an aggressive adjustment to the policy backdrop. Equity Correction: Will China Be A Contributing Factor? Chart 5Is China Liquidity Tightening##br## A Repeat Threat To U.S. Equities? Is China Liquidity Tightening A Repeat Threat To U.S. Equities? Is China Liquidity Tightening A Repeat Threat To U.S. Equities? Over the past few weeks, we have argued that the odds of a meaningful equity correction are running high, given the aggressive rise in bond yields and exaggerated move in sentiment relative to only minor upside surprises in economic and earnings growth. We are still on high alert for this outcome and believe that one possible trigger is tighter liquidity conditions in China, which are aimed at supporting the renminbi. Indeed, just like the start of 2016, the Chinese renminbi is kicking off 2017 on a weak note. Chinese policymakers are again tightening rules to limit capital outflows: earlier this week, they adjusted the FX basket used to set the CNY's official daily fix. The new FX basket will include 24 currencies (up from 13). Consequently, the weight of the U.S. dollar drops from 26.4% to 22.4%. This will make it easier for the authorities to target a relatively stable renminbi versus the basket even as USD/CNY pushes higher. These attempts to support the renminbi is leading to tighter liquidity conditions and higher interbank interest rates. In Hong Kong, 3-month CNH Hibor has spiked to 10%. In the past, a combination of a weaker renminbi and rising interbank rates has spelled trouble for U.S. and global equities (Chart 5). There is no guarantee that history will repeat itself and one big difference with the sharp market sell-offs in mid-2015 and early 2016 is that the Chinese economy is not as weak as it was then. The PMIs released this week were generally firm. Overall, we are positive on equities and negative on bonds on a 12-month horizon but still see the risk of a correction to the Trump trade as elevated. Thus, investors should continue to stick close to benchmark tactically, looking to implement positions after a pullback in stock prices. Like in 2015 and early 2016, China could provide the trigger to that pullback if the authorities give up on capital controls and allow a sharp depreciation of the RMB. Lenka Martinek, Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy lenka@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.stlouisfed.org/~/media/Files/PDFs/Bullard/remarks/Bullard-N… 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report "A Tale Of Two Rallies", dated March 29, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2016/may/how-does-government-…