Sorry, you need to enable JavaScript to visit this website.
Skip to main content
Skip to main content

Interactive Media & Services

Highlights The regulatory or "stroke of pen" risk is rising on FAANG stocks - Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix, and Google; The U.S. anti-trust regulatory framework was designed to curb anti-competitive actions but has evolved to focus mostly on consumer welfare and prices; A shift toward the original regulatory regime would threaten the FAANGs, particularly Google and Amazon; A trade war hit to tech earnings could be the catalyst for a more general selloff today - but this is not our base case; For now, the market will view regulatory risk as noise and tech stocks will likely enter a blow-off phase; We remain neutral, preferring S&P software and hardware while underweighting semiconductors. Feature "I don't know what Twitter is up to." Rep. Devin Nunes (R-California), Chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, July 29, 2018 "I have stated my concerns with Amazon long before the Election. Unlike others, they pay little or no taxes to state & local governments, use our Postal System as their Delivery Boy (causing tremendous loss to the U.S.), and are putting many thousands of retailers out of business." President Donald J. Trump, March 29, 2018 "If we will not endure a king as a political power, we should not endure a king over the production, transportation, and sale of any of the necessities of life. If we would not submit to an emperor, we should not submit to an autocrat of trade, with power to prevent competition and to fix the price of any commodity." Senator John Sherman, 1890 Social media companies have had a terrible week, with Twitter falling 21% on July 27th and Facebook 19% on July 26th. Facebook posted weaker than expected earnings, but investors appeared to be particularly concerned with a miss in monthly active users. The shortfall in active users may have been affected by the new EU privacy rules, which came into force in May. Twitter's fall from grace came even though its revenues were up 24% on the year, with a record profit of $100 million. However, its effort to delete "bots" and suspicious user accounts brought its user total down to 335 million, from 336 million, prompting fears that the platform was slowing down. Twitter's and Facebook's enormous price volatility, despite decent earnings figures, reveals that investors are jittery about the performance of technology stocks, epitomized by the so-called FAANGs - Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix, and Google. They are right to be, given that there are three broad risks to these companies: The next big thing: Before Facebook, there was MySpace. It is not inconceivable that new platforms - for instance, ones that emphasize privacy or that redistribute a portion of advertising revenue with users - could replace current market leaders. Revenue model: Although they are perceived to be cutting-edge technology companies, social media firms generate vast amount of their revenue through advertising. Facebook and Google have captured 25% of global media advertising revenues.1 At some point, Internet companies will reach a ceiling on this revenue as the attrition rate of local newspapers slows, as foreign markets introduce local alternatives (RenRen or Weibo in China, VKontakte in Russia), and as non-tariff barriers to trade begin impacting their international expansion (China's Internet Security Law). Regulation: Finally, regulatory pressure could grow for a number of reasons. First, European concerns regarding user privacy could migrate to the U.S. where a majority of voters already believe that tech companies need greater oversight (Chart 1). In fact, Americans now see tech companies as having as pernicious an influence as energy companies (Chart 2). Second, the U.S. approach to anti-trust problems could evolve away from the current paradigm that focuses on delivering lower prices to consumers. Third, President Trump and his conservative allies could target social media companies with perceived liberal bias for purely political reasons. Chart 1Majority Of Americans Want Tech Regulated Is The Stock Rally Long In The FAANG? Is The Stock Rally Long In The FAANG? Chart 2Tech And Energy Companies Now In Same Boat Is The Stock Rally Long In The FAANG? Is The Stock Rally Long In The FAANG? We have no particular insight into the competitive landscape of social media, web browsing, and Internet retail industries, so we will leave the first two threats to the experts in the field. Instead, we will focus in this report on the third threat, the "stroke of pen" regulatory risk. From Standard Oil To The Chicago School - America's Anti-Trust Framework Today's anti-trust regulatory framework has significantly deviated from the original intent behind the 1890 Sherman Act. As Lina M. Khan argues in "Amazon's Antitrust Paradox," "Congress enacted antitrust laws to rein in the power of industrial trusts, the large business organizations that had emerged in the late nineteenth century. Responding to a fear of concentrated power, antitrust sought to distribute it."2 Railroad construction in the late nineteenth century, largely financed by the municipal debt of farm-belt states, evolved from a shrewd capex investment in a new technology to a mania. To boost sagging profits, railroad barons fixed their prices to reduce competition. State anti-trust laws that emerged out of this era, the so-called "Granger laws," sought to curb monopolistic behavior by giving states control over railroad operations. These state laws ultimately coalesced into federal legislation, the 1890 Sherman Act. No trust had a larger impact on the U.S. legal and regulatory infrastructure than the case of Standard Oil in the early twentieth century.3 Although the company faced criticism in the immediate aftermath of the 1880s recession - particularly from the famous muckraking journalist Henry Demarest Lloyd - the dam broke for Standard Oil when the oil-price bubble popped in Kansas in 1904. A Standard Oil subsidiary - the Prairie Oil and Gas Company - decided to purchase oil by a specific gravity test, forcing some of the Kansas oil from the market. At the time, the oil boom in Kansas had turned many into stockholders in some prospecting company. When oil prices fell, so did the fortunes of these locals. The shock of the price collapse radicalized Kansas politics at the turn of the twentieth century. An idea for a state-owned oil refinery picked up steam in the state despite being labeled socialist. Ultimately, Kansas' delegation in the U.S. House of Representatives requested that the Secretary of Commerce investigate the causes of the low price of crude oil in the state. After several disastrous performances of Standard Oil executives on witness stands and in testimony, the federal government filed a petition against the company in November 1906. A large fine followed in August 1907. The 1890 Sherman Act and subsequent anti-trust policies were grounded in the theory of economic structuralism. "This view holds that a market dominated by a very small number of large companies is likely to be less competitive than a market populated with many small- and medium-sized companies." Through the 1960s, courts blocked mergers - both horizontal and vertical - and policed markets not only for size, or effect on consumer welfare, but also for conflicts of interest.4 In the 1970s and 1980s, however, the Chicago School approach gained prominence. The Chicago School rested on "faith in the efficiency of markets, propelled by profit-maximizing actors."5 While economic structuralists believed that the structure of an industry leads to market outcomes, Chicago School saw structure as the outcome of market dynamics, which themselves are sacrosanct. Chicago School adherents focused primarily on price dynamics and consumer welfare, ignoring how economic structures could create barriers to entry and thus uncompetitive markets. The most influential economist behind the Chicago School was Robert Bork, who asserted in his highly influential The Antitrust Paradox that the "only legitimate goal of antitrust is the maximization of consumer welfare."6 That said, his definition of consumer welfare was incredibly broad and revealed a clear corporate, if not a pro-monopoly, bias.7 The influential Chicago School ultimately impacted the Supreme Court, which declared in 1979 that "Congress designed the Sherman Act as a 'consumer welfare prescription.'"8 The Reagan Administration subsequently rewrote the 1968 merger guidelines to shift the focus purely to consumer welfare in the form of preventing monopolistic price increases and output restrictions. The government also stopped bringing anti-trust cases under the 1936 Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibits price discrimination by retailers among producers and vice versa. Bottom Line: The U.S. anti-trust regulatory framework was designed to curb broad anti-competitive actions of trusts. As Lina Khan discusses in her seminal article, these actions "include not only cost but also product quality, variety, and innovation."9 However, through subsequent regulatory evolution, the Chicago School has taken hold of the U.S. anti-trust process, solely focusing on consumer welfare and prices. We can draw two immediate conclusions from this historical overview of U.S. anti-trust policy. First, the laws on the books have not changed since World War Two. Despite the laws remaining the same, the theory of how to apply them in courts of law has dramatically changed, as economic structuralism gave way to the Chicago School's focus on prices and consumer welfare. If President Reagan and the courts could change how these laws are administered in the 1980s, then so can subsequent administrations and courts in the future. Second, a long period of slow growth, income inequality, and economic volatility - such as the 1870s-80s - can produce a political impetus for anti-trust policy. This was certainly the case for Standard Oil in 1911, which became a nation-wide boogeyman despite most of its transgressions occurring in the farm belt states. While the U.S. has not experienced a recession in almost a decade, it will eventually - and besides, income inequality is a prominent theme once again and a potential source of consumer discontent.10 A narrative could emerge - particularly if politically expedient - that growth has been unequally distributed between the old economy and the twenty-first century technology leaders. Will FAANGs Be De-FAANGed? At BCA Research, we are neither regulatory nor policy experts. As such, we do not have insight into current regulatory activity involving social media companies, Google, or Amazon. The preceding section merely illustrates that the federal government's approach to the anti-trust process could change. Indeed, the Obama administration signaled that its approach could become more active. One quantitative approach that investors can use to assess the risk of anti-trust legislation is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). It is the most commonly accepted measure of market concentration, used by the Department of Justice in assessing whether a particular market is controlled by a single firm.11 Chart 3 shows our reconstruction of the HHI for the present-day era, with three examples from the past. Chart 3Market Concentration By Industry And Eras Is The Stock Rally Long In The FAANG? Is The Stock Rally Long In The FAANG? The 1911 refined petroleum sector harkens back to the aforementioned Standard Oil case; The 2001 Internet browser market refers to the United States v. Microsoft Corp that led to the June 2000 decision (later reversed on appeal) to break-up the software giant; The 1983 telecommunication sector illustrates the HHI for the telecom market at the time of the AT&T divestiture. The data is clear: of the five FAANG companies, only Google reaches a concerning level on the HHI measure. This has already made it a target of European authorities. On the other hand, competition within both streaming (Netflix, Amazon) and social networks (Facebook) appears relatively healthy. However, social networks could be at risk of European-style privacy protections. The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which came into force on May 2018, imposes considerable compliance burdens on any company handling user data. California has already signed its own version of the law - the Consumer Privacy Act - which will go into effect in January 2020. These laws give consumers the right to know what information companies are collecting about them and what companies that data is being shared with. They also allow consumers to ask technology companies to delete their data or not to sell it. While tech companies are likely to fight the new California law, we believe the writing is on the wall. The EU is by some measures the largest consumer market on the planet. California is certainly the largest U.S. market. It is unlikely that the momentum behind consumer protection will change, especially with the EU and California taking the lead. Given that advertising revenue is crucial to the business model of social media companies and Google, a significant uptick in privacy regulation could hurt their bottom line. On the other hand, as we discuss below, the new regulatory rules create massive barriers to entry for small firms looking to replace the tech giants. Furthermore, many of the targeted social media companies have run afoul of President Trump in particular and the broader conservative movement in general. As such, privacy advocates - who tend to lean left - and conservatives, who feel that their commentators are being silenced by Silicon Valley, could form a classic "bootleggers and abolitionists" coalition against the FAANGs (Chart 4). Finally, there is the question of Amazon. We do not construct an HHI for Amazon's place in the retail market because E-commerce only accounts for about 9.5% of total U.S. retail sales (Chart 5). Amazon has been leading the charge, but it still accounts for just under half of that 9.5% total figure (Chart 6). Chart 4Conservatives Distrust Tech Companies Is The Stock Rally Long In The FAANG? Is The Stock Rally Long In The FAANG? Chart 5E-Commerce: Steady Increase In Market Share E-Commerce: Steady Increase In Market Share E-Commerce: Steady Increase In Market Share Chart 6Amazon Dominates Is The Stock Rally Long In The FAANG? Is The Stock Rally Long In The FAANG? Amazon's strength is that, in the current anti-trust framework, it conforms fully to the "consumer welfare" priorities elucidated by the Chicago School. Amazon, by and large, lowers prices for consumers. However, several of its practices could be seen as predatory in the more expansive, economic structuralist, approach.12 In addition, President Trump has reserved most of his Twitter scorn on the firm, particularly because CEO Jeff Bezos owns the liberal-leaning Washington Post. Bottom Line: Investors are correct to fret that the "stroke of pen" risk is rising when it comes to FAANG companies. Google scores considerably higher than either Standard Oil or Microsoft on the Department of Justice HHI. Social media companies are already under the microscope by conservative legislators and voters, who perceive them to be biased. Liberals, on the other hand, support toughened-up privacy rules that could undermine the business model of social media companies. Amazon's market dominance is overstated. However, several of its business practices could come under greater scrutiny if any administration should revert back to the original reading of the 1890 Sherman Law. Technology Stocks Have Brought The S&P 500 Up; Could They Bring It Down? It is now a well-worn understanding that the reason why the S&P 500 has performed well is largely due to the performance of a few (enormous) technology stocks (see Chart 7 and Table 1) who have seen both earnings and valuation multiples expand amid one of the longest economic growth phases in history. The preceding section certainly suggests that frothy valuations and the rising regulatory impetus imply that future upside potential is swamped by downside risk. Chart 7FAANG Stocks + Microsoft Have##br## Dramatically Outperformed... FAANG Stocks + Microsoft Have Dramatically Outperformed... FAANG Stocks + Microsoft Have Dramatically Outperformed... Table 1...Generating 50% Of The##br## 2018 S&P 500 Return! Is The Stock Rally Long In The FAANG? Is The Stock Rally Long In The FAANG? If this negative scenario is what actually plays out in the market, the implications could be more severe than in the past. Indexed fund inflows have replaced actively managed fund outflows, as our colleagues in BCA's Global ETF Strategy recently pointed out (Chart 8).13 Considering the rise of these few technology stocks and their increasing weight in the S&P 500 and, necessarily, in the majority of ETFs, more people than ever before are invested in technology stocks, whether they know it or not. Accordingly, the performance of these stocks has become material to the household balance sheet, which is a driver of consumption and, hence, the economy. Thus, it may not be hyperbole to say the economy depends to some extent on Amazon maintaining a high valuation multiple. Chart 8ETF Inflows Offset Actively Managed Outflows ETF Inflows Offset Actively Managed Outflows ETF Inflows Offset Actively Managed Outflows Adding some weight to this thesis is the mounting concern over a global trade war. The technology sector in general is by far the most international (as defined by foreign-sourced revenues) of GICS 1 sectors. More specifically, the top three semiconductor & semiconductor equipment companies (INTC, NVDA & TXN), which collectively represent more than 50% of the weight of that index, generate on average only 17% of their revenues in the U.S. Moreover, the more dangerous and lasting trade risk emanates from the U.S.-China showdown, which centers on the technology sector. Should the worst trade outcomes occur, it is not unreasonable to see impaired technology earnings being the catalyst for a more general sell-off. We recommend underweight positions in both the S&P semiconductors and S&P semiconductor equipment indexes. We Think Not Despite the foregoing, we think a more likely scenario is actually a blow-off phase where technology stocks accelerate rather than decline in an increasingly restrictive regulatory environment. In a recent report analyzing sector performance in the last stages of the bull market, we noted that across seven iterations dating back to the 1960's, the information technology sector delivered a median 14% outperformance relative to the S&P 500 (Table 2).14 And, while returns in these stocks have been excellent this year, their gains seem modest compared to the performance in the 1999-2000 iteration. Table 2Tech Stocks Are Strong Late Cycle Performers Is The Stock Rally Long In The FAANG? Is The Stock Rally Long In The FAANG? Underpinning our expectations is the recent stock reactions to regulatory actions. Beginning with Facebook, in the week of March 26, 2018, the firm was hit with severely negative headlines. First, the Cambridge Analytica scandal pointed out that the firm may be caught on the wrong side of EU GDPR rules, followed by the firm being investigated for an EU antitrust suit for the online ad market; the stock fell 15% from the week prior. However, within two months, the stock had fully recovered and a further two months later the stock was up 18% from its starting point. Recently the stock has fallen significantly on the back of very weak guidance; the company noted that revenue growth would decelerate and operating margins would fall to the mid-30% range from the current mid-40% range. It is not unreasonable to think management may be sandbagging earnings growth to defray some of the elevated regulatory scrutiny into its outrageous profitability. Google too has seen negative regulatory headlines, having been hit with a $5 billion fine in the EU for abusing the dominance of the Android mobile operating system in July this year. The stock responded by closing higher and then rose a further 10% in the following two weeks. Overall, we think the market views regulatory risk as noise. For now. But What About The Earnings? Do They Matter? While the earnings implications of yet-to-be-proposed regulatory changes are unknowable, we believe even the pursuit of an answer is a red herring. As shown by Chart 9, the market does not appear to care about next year's earnings as valuation multiples have little consistency with either themselves or the broad market. The implication is that near-term earnings are of relatively little importance, at least compared to the long-term growth outlook. Chart 9Tech Valuations Are Meaningless Tech Valuations Are Meaningless Tech Valuations Are Meaningless Further, these companies are a collection of businesses that are not necessarily cohesive. For example, Facebook includes Instagram, WhatsApp and Oculus while Amazon Web Service is a non-retail business that delivers half of Amazon's profit. A reasonable case could be made that breaking up these companies into their components could actually unlock considerable value. Lastly, new regulation, particularly with respect to privacy and data protection, is likely to create significant barriers for new entrants as compliance costs will be relatively more onerous for those companies with fewer resources. Thus, incoming privacy legislation may neuter the impact of any anti-trust legislation. Be Wary With Technology But For The Right Reasons We fully expect more regulation to remain a significant part of the conversation with respect to FAANG stocks and further expect that conversation to promote higher than normal volatility in the sector. However, we also expect the market to mostly look through this risk; buying the dip has thus far been the right approach to headline risk in technology. We think there are better reasons to remain cautious with technology. As noted above, they are heavily international and a strengthening U.S. dollar will be a headwind to 2019 earnings to a greater extent than to the broad market (please see our June 4th Weekly Report for more details). Supporting the dollar, BCA expects higher interest rates in 2018 on the back of rising inflation. Overall, we prefer old tech (S&P software and S&P technology hardware, storage & peripherals, both which are high-conviction overweights) that is levered to our synchronized global capex upcycle theme. It also boasts high cash flow and low valuations. We are less sanguine about technology early cyclicals (S&P semiconductors and S&P semiconductor equipment) which we rate as underweight. Net, we think risks are balanced in the tech sector and maintain a neutral recommendation for the S&P information technology sector. BCA Geopolitical Strategy Housekeeping In light of several announcements regarding China's efforts to ease up on economic policy, we are closing several of our trades: Short China-exposed S&P 500 Companies versus U.S. financials and telecoms - opened on May 30 for a 7.13% gain; Long DXY - opened on January 31 for a 5.85% gain; Short GBP/USD - opened on February 14 for a 6.21% gain; Long Indian equities / short Brazilian equities - opened on March 6 for a 27.54% gain. Long French industrial equities / short German industrial equities - opened on May 16 for a 2.21% gain. We still believe that Chinese structural reforms will continue, weighing on domestic and global growth. In the face of ongoing U.S. fiscal stimulus, the interplay between the two major economies will therefore continue to produce a dollar-bullish environment. However, the dollar's stretched positioning and the Chinese reflation narrative could hurt the greenback while reflating global risk assets in the near term. We will therefore look for an opportunity to reassert our negative EM view. Over the next two weeks, our reports will focus on Chinese stimulus and ongoing structural reforms. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Chris Bowes, Associate Editor U.S. Equity Strategy chrisb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see WARC, "Mobile is the world's second-largest ad medium," dated November 30, 2017, available at warc.com. 2 Please see Lina M. Khan, "Amazon's Antitrust Paradox," The Yale Law Journal 126:710 (2017). 3 Please see Steven L. Piott, The Anti-Monopoly Persuasion (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1985). 4 Khan 718. 5 Khan 719. 6 Please see Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself (New York: Free Press, 1978). 7 By Bork's broad definition of "consumer welfare," even Jeff Bezos is a consumer whose rights have to be protected by anti-trust policy. "Those who continue to buy after a monopoly is formed pay more for the same output, and that shifts income from them to the monopoly and its owners, who are also consumers. This is not dead-weight loss due to restriction of output but merely a shift in income between two classes of consumers. The consumer welfare model, which views consumers as a collectivity, does not take this income effect into account," Bork, 32, our emphasis. 8 Please see Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 342 (1979). 9 Khan 737. 10 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Populism Blues: How And Why Social Instability Is Coming To America," dated June 9, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see The U.S. Department of Justice, "Herfindahl-Hirschman Index," available at justice.gov. 12 Please see Olivia LaVecchia and Stacy Mitchell, "Amazon's Stranglehold: How the Company's Tightening Grip Is Stifling Competition, Eroding Jobs, and Threatening Communities," Institute for Local Self-Reliance, dated November 2016, available at ilsr.org. 13 Please see BCA Global ETF Strategy Special Report, "Do ETF Flows Lead Currencies?" dated April 18, 2018, available at etf.bcaresearch.com. 14 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, "Portfolio Positioning For A Late Cycle Surge," dated May 22, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.