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Dear clients, This week we are sending you a Research Note on balance of payments across the G10, authored by my colleague Kelly Zhong. With unprecedented monetary and fiscal stimulus, balance-of-payment dynamics will become an even more important driver of currencies over the next few years. That said, while the US current account is in deficit, the short dollar narrative is beginning to capture investor imagination, suggesting the call is rapidly becoming consensus. We are in the consensus camp, but are going short GBP today, as a bet on a short-term reversal. As for cable, the recent rally has gotten ahead of potential volatility in the coming months, even though it is cheap. Finally, we are lowering our target on the short gold/silver trade to 65, but tightening the stop-loss to 75. I hope you find the report insightful. Chester Ntonifor, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy Highlights COVID-19 has turned the world upside down this year, and severely impaired global trade. Global trade values plunged by 5% quarter-on-quarter in the first quarter, and are forecasted to have slumped by 27% in the second quarter. Most countries have also seen negative foreign direct investment (FDI) growth in the first few months of 2020. Global FDI inflows are forecasted to fall by 40% this year and drop by an additional 5-10% next. While all countries have been hit by COVID-19, the economic damage appears particularly pronounced in countries heavily reliant on foreign funding. Feature COVID-19 has turned the world upside down in 2020. The global economy headed into recession following a decade-long expansion. While many economies are starting to ease restriction measures, the possibility of a second wave remains a big downside risk to the global economy. If history is any guide, the Spanish flu during the early 1900s came in three waves, the second of which brought the most severe damage. Undoubtedly, international trade has been under severe pressure this year. Global trade volumes plunged by 5% in the first quarter, and are expected to be down 27% in the second quarter from their levels in the final three months of 2019. Moreover, the path of recovery remains uncertain as the pandemic continues to disrupt global supply chains and weaken consumer confidence. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), it may take until late 2021/early 2022 for global trade to recover to pre-pandemic levels (Chart 1). As reinvested earnings make up more than half of total FDI, squeezed earnings this year will have a direct impact on FDI in the aftermath of COVID-19.  Global FDI inflows rebounded in 2019, reaching a total of $1.5 trillion, as the effect of the 2017 US tax reforms waned and US repatriation declined. This year, however, most countries have seen negative FDI growth rates in the first few months in 2020. According to UNCTAD, global FDI inflows are forecast to plunge by 40%, bringing total FDI inflows below the US$1 trillion level for the first time since 2005 (Chart 2). Unfortunately, as reinvested earnings make up more than half of total FDI, squeezed earnings this year will have a direct impact on FDI in the aftermath of COVID-19. Typically, FDI flows bottom only six to 18 months after the end of a recession. FDI inflows are forecast to decline further by another 5-10% in 2021. Chart 1Steep Decline In Trade Volumes In 1H'20 Steep Decline In Trade Volumes In 1H'20 Steep Decline In Trade Volumes In 1H'20 Chart 2Global FDI Projected To Fall Through 2021 Global FDI Projected To Fall Through 2021 Global FDI Projected To Fall Through 2021 While all economies have been hit by COVID-19, the impact varies by region. Emerging market countries, particularly those linked to commodities and manufacturing-intensive industries, appear to be have been hit harder by the crisis. This makes sense, given trade is much more volatile than services or consumption. Chart 3 shows that while exports make up less than 30% of GDP in the US, they amount to over 130% of GDP in Thailand and Malaysia, and over 300% of GDP in Singapore and Hong Kong. Chart 3Reliance On Trade Differ Across Countries Balance Of Payments Beyond COVID-19 Balance Of Payments Beyond COVID-19 Going forward, the recoveries might be uneven as well. Prior to COVID-19, global trade flows were already facing many challenges, including trade disputes, geopolitical tensions and rising protectionism. COVID-19 may have just supercharged two megatrends: Technology and Innovation: The pool of investments concentrated on exploiting raw materials and cheap labor is shrinking, while those promoting technology and ESG are becoming crucial. De-globalization: Policymakers in many countries are promoting more regulation and intervention, especially in key industries related to national security and health care. This suggests COVID-19 might represent a tipping point, making balance of payments all the more important for currencies, as investors become more discerning between countries and sectors with a high return on capital and those without. The euro area, Switzerland, Australia and Sweden sport the best basic balance surpluses.  In this report, we look at the balance-of-payment dynamics in the G10. The most important measure for us is the basic balance, which takes the sum of the current account and net long-term capital inflows. Our rationale is that these tend to measure the underlying competitiveness of a currency more accurately than other balance of payment measures. On this basis, the euro area, Switzerland, Australia and Sweden sport the best basic balance surpluses. The US is the worst (Chart 4). Below, we visit some of key drivers behind these trends. Chart 4Basic Balances Across G10 Balance Of Payments Beyond COVID-19 Balance Of Payments Beyond COVID-19 United States Chart 5US Balance Of Payments US Balance Of Payments US Balance Of Payments The US basic balance is deteriorating again (Chart 5). The key driver has been a decline in foreign direct investment. If this trend continues, this could further undermine the US currency. The US remains the world’s largest FDI recipient, attracting US$261 billion in 2019, which is almost double the size of FDI inflows into the second largest FDI recipient – China – with US$141 billion of inflows last year. However, cross-border flows have since fallen off a cliff after the waning effect of the one-time tax dividend introduced at the end of 2017. The lack of mega-M&A deals has also been a contributing factor. The trends in the trade balance have been flat, despite a push by the Trump Administration to reduce the US trade deficit and rejuvenate the US economy. The most recent second-quarter data show a deterioration from -2.3% of GDP to -2.8%. The trade deficit with China did drop by 21% to $345 billion in 2019, however, US companies quickly found alternatives from countries that are not affected by newly imposed tariffs, particularly from Southeast Asia: The US trade deficit with Vietnam jumped by 30%, or $16.3 billion, in 2019. More recently, exports have plunged much faster than imports, further widening the US trade deficit. On portfolio flows, the most recent TIC data show that US Treasurys continued to be shunned by foreigners in May. In short, the US balance-of-payment dynamics are consistent with our bearish dollar view. Euro Area Chart 6Euro Area Balance Of Payments Euro Area Balance Of Payments Euro Area Balance Of Payments A rising basic balance surplus has been one of the key pillars underpinning a bullish euro thesis. Of course, an apex in globalization will hurt this thesis, but the starting point for the euro area is much better than many of its trading partners. The trade surplus in the euro area was not spared from COVID-19 – it plunged to €9.4 billion in May from €20.7 billion the same month last year, as the pandemic hit global demand and disrupted supply chains. Exports tumbled by 29.5% year-on-year to €143.3 billion while imports declined by 26.7% to €133.9 billion. Even in this dire scenario, the trade surplus still remains a “healthy” 1.8% of GDP, buffeting the current account (Chart 6). Foreign direct investment inflows have regained some ground in recent years, with the improvement accelerating in recent months. FDI inflows surged by 18% in 2019, reaching US$429 billion. Outflows also rose by 13% in 2019, led by a large increase in investment by multinationals based in the Netherlands and Germany. Going forward, FDI is sure to drop, but this will not be a European-centric problem. Portfolio flows have started to reverse, but have not been the key driver of the basic balance. This is because ever since the European Central Bank introduced negative interest rates in 2014, portfolio outflows have been persisted. This also makes sense since Europeans need to recycle their excess savings abroad. In sum, despite the headwinds to global trade and investment, the basic balance remains at a healthy 2.9% of GDP, which bodes well for the euro. Japan Chart 7Japan Balance Of Payments Japan Balance Of Payments Japan Balance Of Payments A key pillar for the basic balance in Japan has been the current account balance, which has been buffeted over the years by income receipts from Japan’s large investment positions abroad. Going forward, this could make the yen very attractive in a world less reliant on global trade. Japanese exports tumbled by 26.2% year-on-year in June, led by lower sales in transport equipment, motor vehicles and manufactured goods. However, the slowing export trend was well in place before the pandemic. Exports had been declining for 18 consecutive months before COVID-19 dealt the final blow. Imports also fell by 14% year-on-year in June, led by lower energy prices. On the service side of the income equation, foreign visitors to Japan dropped by 99.9% from over 2.5 million in January to less than 2,000 in May. That equates to about 2% of the Japanese population. Despite all this, Japan still sports a healthy current account surplus, at 4% of GDP (Chart 7). In 2019, Japan remained the largest investor in the world, heavily recycling its current account surplus. FDI outflows from Japanese multinationals surged by 58% to a record US$227 billion, including US$104 billion in cross-border M&A deals. Notable mentions include Takeda acquiring Shire (Ireland) for US$60 billion, and SoftBank Group acquiring a stake in WeWork (the US) for US$6 billion. In terms of portfolio investments, foreign bond purchases have eased of late as global interest rates approach zero. Higher real rates are now being found in safe-haven currencies like the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen, which is supportive for the yen. Overall, the basic balance in Japan is at nil, in perfect balance between domestic savings and external investments. United Kingdom Chart 8UK Balance Of Payments UK Balance Of Payments UK Balance Of Payments The key development in the UK’s balance-of-payment dynamics is that a cheap pound combined with the pandemic appear to have stemmed the decline in the trade balance. The UK has run a current account deficit each year since 1983. This has kept the basic balance mostly negative (Chart 8). That could change if the marginal improvement in trade is durable and meaningful. The current account deficit further widened to £21.1 billion, or 3.8% of GDP, in the first quarter, of which the goods trade balance was more volatile than usual. Since May, the goods trade balance has been slowly recovering to £2.8 billion, but has been offset by the services trade deficit. The primary income deficit also widened in the first quarter as offshore businesses rushed to preserve cash buffers. Foreign direct investment in the UK has been improving of late, currently sitting at 3.7% of GDP. This is encouraging, given the steep post-Brexit drop. Going forward, we continue to favor the British pound over the long term due to its cheap valuation. However, we are going short today, as a play on a tactical dollar bounce. More on this next week.       Canada Chart 9Canada Balance Of Payments Canada Balance Of Payments Canada Balance Of Payments The Canadian basic balance has been flat for over a decade, as the persistent current account deficit has continuously been financed by FDI inflows and portfolio investment (Chart 9). This is a vote of confidence by investors over longer-term returns on Canadian assets. Canada is one of the largest exporters of crude oil, meaning the fall in resource prices generated a big dent in export incomes. However, the country is slowly on a recovery path. Exports increased 6.7% month-on-month in May, helping narrow the trade deficit to C$0.7 billion. More importantly, a positive net international investment position means that positive income flows into Canada are buffeting the current account balance. In 2019, Canada was the 10th largest FDI recipient in the world, with FDI inflows increasing to US$50 billion. Today, the basic balance stands at a surplus of 1% of GDP.               Australia Chart 10Australia Balance Of Payments Australia Balance Of Payments Australia Balance Of Payments Australia’s trade balance has been rapidly improving since the 2016 bottom, and has been the primary driver of an improving basic balance. While exports fell as the pandemic hit a nadir, imports fell more deeply. This allowed the trade surplus to widen in the first six months of the year compared to last year. Australia has long had a current account deficit, as import requirements to help drive investment opportunities were not met by domestic savings. With those projects now bearing fruit, the funding requirement has greatly eased. This has buffeted the current account balance, which turned positive for the first time last year following a 35-year-long deficit, and continues to rocket higher (Chart 10). Going forward, Australia’s trade balance and current account balance are likely to continue increasing as Australia has a comparative advantage in exports of resources, especially LNG, which is consistent with the ESG megatrend. Australia is also introducing major reforms to its foreign investment framework to protect national interests and local assets from acquisitions. Meanwhile, net portfolio investment remains negative, suggesting the current account surplus is being recycled abroad. In short, we believe the Aussie dollar has a large amount of running room, based on its healthy basic balance surplus of 4% of GDP. New Zealand Chart 11New Zealand Balance Of Payments New Zealand Balance Of Payments New Zealand Balance Of Payments Compared to its antipodean neighbour, the New Zealand basic balance has been flat for many years, but has seen recent improvement (Chart 11). The trade balance was boosted by goods exports, which were up NZ$261 million, while imports were down NZ$352 million in the first quarter of this year. The rise in goods exports was led by an increase in fruit (mainly kiwifruit), milk, powder, butter and cheese. More recently, due to the ease of lockdown measures, exports increased by 2.2% year-on-year in June while imports marginally rose by 0.2%, further enhancing New Zealand’s trade balance. The primary income deficit widened to NZ$2.2 billion in the first quarter due to less earnings on foreign investment. Moreover, the secondary income deficit also widened, driven by a smaller inflow of non-resident withholding tax. Despite this, the current account deficit narrowed to NZ$1.6 billion in the first quarter, or 2% of GDP, the smallest deficit since 2016.  New Zealand received $5.4 billion in FDI flows in 2019, rising from only $2 billion in 2018. Most FDI inflows arrived from Canada, Australia, Hong Kong and Japan. Impressively, according to the World Bank’s 2020 Doing Business Report, New Zealand ranked first out of 190 countries due to its openness and business-friendly economy, low levels of corruption, good protection of property rights, political stability and favorable tax policies. Portfolio investment inflows also increased by NZ$11.8 billion.  The improvement in the backdrop of New Zealand’s basic balance will allow it to outperform the US dollar. As a tactical trade, however, we are short the kiwi versus the CAD. The basis is that relative terms of trade favor the CAD for now. Switzerland Chart 12Switzerland Balance Of Payments Switzerland Balance Of Payments Switzerland Balance Of Payments Switzerland’s basic balance is almost always in surplus, driven by a structural uptrend in the trade balance (Chart 12). This has allowed the trade-weighted Swiss franc to outperform on a structural basis. We expect this trend to continue. As a country consistently running high surpluses, Switzerland also tends to invest more in foreign assets. Over the years, these smart investments have helped buffet the current account. Overall, in the first three months of this year, the current account balance stood at CHF 17.4 billion, or 11.2% of GDP. In terms of the net international investment position, both stocks of assets and liabilities fell by CHF 110 billion and CHF 42 billion, respectively in the first quarter, due to falling equity prices globally. The net international investment position fell by CHF 67 billion to CHF 745 billion in the January-March period. That said, Switzerland continued to deploy capital abroad in the first quarter, which should help buffet the current account going forward. The positive balance-of-payment backdrop has created a headache for the Swiss National Bank. As such, the SNB will likely continue to intervene in the foreign exchange markets to calm appreciation in the franc. We believe the franc will continue to outperform the USD in the near term, but underperform the euro.  Norway Chart 13Norway Balance Of Payments Norway Balance Of Payments Norway Balance Of Payments Norway has a very open economy, with trade representing over 70% of GDP, and it has been hit quite hard by COVID-19 this year. The trade surplus started to plunge sharply due to falling energy prices at the beginning of the lockdown (Chart 13). More recently, Norway posted its first trade deficit in May since last September, which carried over to June, as exports fell more than imports. Thanks to increases in income receipts from abroad, the current account balance remained flat at NOK 66.1 billion in the first quarter. With persistent current account surpluses, Norway has long been a capital exporter. However, the FDI outflow and inflow gap is gradually closing. In 2019, net FDI was -3.5% of GDP. In the first quarter of this year, it was -3.3%. Portfolio outflows have also softened over the years, as the current account balance has narrowed. There was, however, a trend change in the first three months of this year - Norway’s purchases of foreign bonds, surged as investors switched to safer assets. Ultimately, we remain NOK bulls due to its cheap valuation. As economies gradually reopen and ease lockdown measures, the recovery in energy prices will push the Norwegian krone back toward its fair value.     Sweden Chart 14Sweden Balance Of Payments Sweden Balance Of Payments Sweden Balance Of Payments Sweden maintained its trade surplus with the rest of the world throughout the first few months of 2020 (Chart 14). Imports fell more than exports amid the pandemic. The goods trade balance almost doubled from the fourth quarter of 2019 to SEK 68.8 billion in the first quarter of 2020. The primary income surplus also increased by SEK 10 billion to SEK 42.2, further strengthening the current account and bringing the total current account surplus to SEK 80.6 billion, or 4% of GDP. Both FDI inflows and outflows have been increasing in Sweden, but the net number was slightly negative. In the first quarter of 2020, FDI inflows rose by SEK 51.6 billion while FDI outflows increased by SEK 100.6 billion. In terms of portfolio investment, Swedish investors reduced their portfolio investment abroad by SEK 141 billion in the first quarter, while foreigners decreased their portfolio investment in Sweden by SEK 45.8 billion. In conclusion, the Swedish krona remains one of our favorite longs due to its increasing basic balance surplus (4% of GDP) and its cheap valuation. We are long the Nordic basket (NOK and SEK) against both the euro and the US dollar. Kelly Zhong Research Analyst kellyz@bcaresearch.com Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes   Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades
Highlights Global Bond Yields: The growing divide between falling negative real bond yields and rising inflation expectations in the US and other major developed economies may be a sign of investors pricing in slower long-run potential economic growth in the aftermath of the COVID-19 recession – and, thus, lower equilibrium real interest rates. Stay overweight inflation-linked bonds versus nominal equivalents. Currency-hedged spread product: A broad ranking of currency-hedged global spread product yields, adjusted for volatility and credit quality, shows that the most attractive yields (hedged into USD, EUR, GBP and JPY) are on offer in emerging market USD-denominated investment grade corporates and high-yield company debt in the US and UK. Feature Global bond yields are testing the downside of the narrow trading ranges that have persisted since May. As of last Friday, the yield on the Bloomberg Barclays Global Treasury index was at 0.41%, only 3 basis points (bps) above the 2020 low seen back in March. The 10-year US Treasury yield closed yesterday at 0.56%, only 6bps above the year-to-date low. Chart of the Week A Massive Shock To Growth ... And Interest Rates A Massive Shock To Growth ... And Interest Rates Concerns about global growth, with the number of new COVID-19 cases still surging in the US and new breakouts occurring in countries like Spain and Australia, would seem to be the logical culprit for the decline in yields. The first reads on global GDP data for the 2nd quarter released last week were historically miserable, with declines of -33% (annualized) in the US and -10% in the euro area (non-annualized). That represents a very deep hole of lost output, literally wiping out several years of growth. Even with the sharp improvements seen recently in cyclical indicators like global manufacturing PMIs, especially in China and Europe, a return to pre-pandemic levels of global economic output is many years away. Central banks will have no choice but to keep policy rates near 0% for at last the next couple of years, as is the current forward guidance provided by the Fed, ECB and others. Lower global bond yields may simply be reflecting the reality that it will take a long time to heal the economic wounds from the pandemic. However, there may be a more insidious reason why bond yields are falling. Investors may be permanently marking down their expectations for long-term potential economic growth, and equilibrium interest rates, in response to the devastation caused by the COVID-19 recession. Last week, Fitch Ratings lowered its estimates for long-term potential GDP growth, used to determine sovereign credit ratings, by 0.5 percentage points for the US (now 1.4%), 0.5 percentage points for the euro area (now 0.7%) and 0.7 percentage points in the UK (now 0.7%).1 These are declines similar in magnitude to the plunge in the OECD’s potential growth rate estimates seen after the 2009 Great Recession (Chart of the Week). Bond yields in the US and Europe witnessed a fundamental repricing in response, with nominal 5-year yields, 5-years forward breaking 200bps below the 4-6% range that prevailed in the US and Europe during the decade prior to the Great Recession. A similar re-rating of global bond yields to structurally lower levels may now be happening, with investors now believing that central banks will have difficulty raising rates much (if at all) in the future - even after the pandemic has ended. The Message From Declining Negative Real Bond Yields Chart 2The Real Rate/Breakevens Divergence Continues The Real Rate/Breakevens Divergence Continues The Real Rate/Breakevens Divergence Continues The typical signals about economic growth from government bond yields are now less clear because of the aggressive policy responses to the COVID-19 crisis. 0% policy rates, dovish forward guidance on the timing of any future rate increases, large scale asset purchases (QE), and more extreme measures like yield curve control to peg bond yields, have all acted to suppress the level and volatility of nominal global bond yields. Within those calm nominal yields, however, the dynamic that has been in place since May - rising inflation breakevens and falling real bond yields – is growing in intensity. The 10-year US TIPS real yield is now at a new all-time low of -1.02%, while the 10-year TIPS breakeven is now up to 1.58%, the highest since February before the pandemic began to roil financial markets (Chart 2). Similar trends are evident in most other major developed economy bond markets, with the gap between falling real yields and widening breakevens growing at a notably faster pace in Canada and Australia. More often than not, longer-term real yields tend to move in the same direction as inflation expectations when economic growth is improving. The former responds to faster economic activity, often with an associated pick up in private sector credit demand. At the same time, rising inflation expectations discount higher economic resource utilization (i.e. lower unemployment) and confidence that inflation will start to pick up. A deeply negative correlation between longer-term real yields and inflation expectations is unusual, but not unprecedented. A deeply negative correlation between longer-term real yields and inflation expectations is unusual, but not unprecedented. In Chart 3, we show the range of rolling three-year correlations between 10-year inflation-linked (real) government bond yields and 10-year inflation breakevens in the US, Germany, France, Italy, the UK, Japan, Canada and Australia for the post-crisis period. The triangles in the chart are the latest three-year correlation, while the diamonds are a more recent measure showing the 13-week correlation. There are a few key takeaways from this chart: Chart 3Negative Real Yield/Breakevens Correlations Are Not Unprecedented Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? All countries shown have experienced a sustained period of negative correlation between real yields and inflation breakevens; The correlation has mostly been positive in Australia and has always been negative in Japan; Most importantly, the deeply negative correlations seen over the past three months – with rising breakevens all but fully offsetting falling real yields – are at or below the range of historical experience for all countries shown. Chart 4TIPS Yields May Stay Negative For Some Time TIPS Yields May Stay Negative For Some Time TIPS Yields May Stay Negative For Some Time In the current virus-stricken world, where many businesses that have closed during the pandemic may never reopen, there will be abundant spare global economic capacity for several years. In the US, measures of spare capacity like the unemployment gap (the unemployment rate minus the full-employment NAIRU rate) have been a reliable leading directional indicator of the long-run correlation between real TIPS yields and TIPS breakevens over the past decade (Chart 4). The surge in US unemployment seen since the spring, which has pushed the jobless rate into double-digit territory, suggests that the current deeply negative correlation between US real yields and inflation breakevens can persist over the next 6-12 months. Given the large increases in unemployment seen in other countries, the negative correlations between real yields and inflation breakevens should also continue outside the US. As for inflation expectations, those remain correlated in the short-run to changes in oil prices and exchange rates in all countries. On that front, there is still some room for breakevens to widen to reach the fair value levels implied by our models.2 A good conceptual way to think about inflation breakevens on a more fundamental level, however, is as a “vote of confidence” in a central bank’s monetary policy stance. If investors perceive policy settings to be too tight, markets will price in slower growth and lower inflation expectations, and vice versa. Every developed market central bank is now setting policy rates near or below 0% - and promising to keep them there until at least the end of 2022. Thus, the trend of rising global inflation breakevens can continue as a reflection of very dovish central banks that will be more tolerant of increases in inflation and not tighten policy pre-emptively. Currently, real 10-year inflation-linked bond yields are below the New York Fed’s estimates of the neutral real short-term rate, or “r-star”, in the US and the UK (Chart 5), as well as in the euro area and Canada (Chart 6).3 In the US and euro area, real yields have followed the broad trend of r-star, but the gap between the two is relatively moderate with r-star estimated to be only 0.5% in the US and 0.2% in the euro zone (where the ECB is setting a negative nominal interest rate on European bank deposits at the central bank – a policy choice that the Fed has been very reluctant to consider). Chart 5Negative Real Bond Yields Are Below R* In The US & UK ... Negative Real Bond Yields Are Below R* In The US & UK ... Negative Real Bond Yields Are Below R* In The US & UK ... Chart 6... As Well As In The Euro Area & Canada ... As Well As In The Euro Area & Canada ... As Well As In The Euro Area & Canada A more interesting study is in the UK where 10yr inflation-linked Gilt yields have fallen below -2.5%, but without the Bank of England implementing any negative nominal policy rates. In the UK, inflation expectations have been relatively high – running in the 2.5-3% range prior to the COVID-19 recession – as the Bank of England has consistently kept overnight interest rates below actual CPI inflation since the 2008 financial crisis. Thus, nominal Gilt yields have stayed relatively low for longer, as real yields and inflation expectations have remained negatively correlated for a long period with the Bank of England maintaining a consistently negative real policy rate. Chart 7Spillovers From Negative TIPS Yields Into Other Assets Spillovers From Negative TIPS Yields Into Other Assets Spillovers From Negative TIPS Yields Into Other Assets If the Fed were to do the same in the US, keeping the funds rate very low even as inflation rises, then a similar dynamic could take place where real TIPS yields continue to fall and TIPS breakevens continue to rise as the market prices in a sustained negative real fed funds rate. That may already be happening, with Fed Chair Jerome Powell hinting last week that the Fed is in the process of completing its inflation strategy review – with a shift towards rate hikes occurring only after realized inflation has sustainably increased to the Fed’s 2% target. A forecast of inflation heading to 2% because of falling unemployment will no longer be enough.4 Other factors may be at work depressing real bond yields while boosting inflation expectations, such as the massive QE bond buying programs of the Fed, ECB and other central banks. Yet even QE programs are essentially an aggressive form of forward guidance designed to drive down longer-term bond yields by lowering expectations of future interest rates. In sum, it is increasingly likely that the current phase of negative global real bond yields may become longer lasting if markets believe that equilibrium real policy rates are now negative. Bond investors will expect central banks to sit on their hands and do nothing in that environment, even if inflation starts to increase. This not only has implications for bond markets, but other asset classes as well based on what is happening in the US. The steady decline in the in the 10-year US TIPS yield has boosted the valuation of assets that typically have been considered inflation hedges, like equities and gold (Chart 7). The fall in TIPS yields also suggests that more weakness in the US dollar is likely to come over the next 6-12 months – another reflationary factor that should help lift global inflation expectations and boost the attractiveness of inflation-linked bonds. The current phase of negative global real bond yields may become longer lasting if markets believe that equilibrium real policy rates are now negative. Bottom Line: The growing divide between falling negative real bond yields and rising inflation expectations in the US and other major developed economies may be a sign of investors pricing in slower long-run potential economic growth in the aftermath of the COVID-19 recession – and, thus, lower equilibrium real interest rates. Stay overweight inflation-linked bonds versus nominal equivalents. Searching For Value In Global Spread Product Last week, we looked at the impact of currency hedging on the attractiveness of government bond yields across the developed markets.5 We concluded that US Treasuries still offered superior yields to most other countries’ sovereign bonds, even with the US dollar in a weakening trend and after hedging out currency risk. We also presented a cursory look at the relative attractiveness of the major global spread product categories in that report, but without factoring in any considerations on the relative credit quality or volatility between sectors. This week, we will look at the relative value of global spread products hedged into USD, GBP, EUR and JPY, but after controlling for those credit and volatility risks. We conducted a similar analysis in early 2018,6 ranking the currency-hedged yields for a wide variety of global spread products by the ratio of yields to trailing volatility. This time, instead of looking at the just that simple valuation metric, we use regression models to make a judgment on how under- or over-valued spread products are relative to their “fair value”. To recap the methodology of this analysis, we take the Bloomberg Barclays index yield-to-maturity (YTM) for each spread product category, hedged into the four currencies used in this analysis, and divide it by the annualized trailing volatility of those yields over both short-term (1-year) and long-term (3-year) windows. In order to hedge the yields into each currency, we used the annualized differentials between spot and 3-month forward exchange rates, which is the all-in cost of hedging. We then compare those currency-hedged, volatility-adjusted yields to two measures of risk: the index credit rating and duration times spread (DTS) for each spread product. Table 1 summarizes the attractiveness of each product when hedged into different currencies. The rank is based on the average of four different valuation measures.7 The higher the rank, the more attractive the sector is in terms of yield relative to risk measures such as both short-term and long-term volatilities, credit ratings, and DTS. Table 1Ranking Currency-Hedged, Risk-Adjusted Global Spread Product Yields Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? A few interesting points come from the table: Emerging market (EM) USD-denominated investment grade (IG) corporate debt ranks at or near the top of the rankings, for all currencies; the opposite holds true for EM USD-denominated sovereign bonds Almost all European spread products rank poorly for non-euro denominated investors US & UK high-yield (HY) rank highly for all currencies US real estate related assets (MBS and CMBS) also rank well for all investor groups In general, US products are more attractive than European credit sectors. This is mainly because US spread products offer higher yields than European ones even after accounting for volatility and the weakening US dollar. Almost all European spread products rank poorly for non-euro denominated investors. Chart 8 shows the unhedged YTM on the x-axis and the option-adjusted spread (OAS) on the y-axis (Table 2 contains the abbreviations used in this chart and all remaining charts in this report). Unsurprisingly, the YTM and OAS follow a very tight linear relationship. However, when yields are hedged into different currencies and risk measures are factored in, the result changes. Chart 8Global Spread Product Yields & Spreads Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? Charts 9A to 12B show the details of spread product analysis with different currency hedges and risk factors. To limit the number of charts shown, we show only currency-hedged yields adjusted by long-term trailing volatility (the rankings do not change significantly when using a shorter-term volatility measure). The y-axis in all charts shows the volatility-adjusted yields, while the x-axis shows credit ratings and DTS. Sectors that are close to upper-right in each chart are more attractive (undervalued), while spread products that are close to bottom-left are less attractive (overvalued). Chart 9AGlobal Spread Product Yields, Hedged Into USD, Adjusted For Credit Quality Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? Chart 9BGlobal Spread Product Yields, Hedged Into USD, Adjusted For Duration-Times-Spread Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? Chart 10AGlobal Spread Product Yields, Hedged Into EUR, Adjusted For Credit Quality Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? Chart 10BGlobal Spread Product Yields, Hedged Into EUR, Adjusted For Duration-Times-Spread Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? Chart 11AGlobal Spread Product Yields, Hedged Into GBP, Adjusted For Credit Quality Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? Chart 11BGlobal Spread Product Yields, Hedged Into GBP, Adjusted For Duration-Times-Spread Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? Chart 12AGlobal Spread Product Yields, Hedged Into JPY, Adjusted For Credit Quality Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? Chart 12BGlobal Spread Product Yields, Hedged Into JPY, Adjusted For Duration-Times-Spread Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? Table 2Global Spread Products In Our Analysis Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? An interesting result is that when comparing the three major high-yield products (US-HY, EMU-HY and UK-HY), US-HY is the most attractive in USD terms, but UK-HY is more attractive when hedged into GBP, EUR, and JPY. Another observation is that higher quality bonds such as government-related and agency debt in the US and euro area are overvalued and less attractive given how low their yields are, regardless of their low volatility. The results from this analysis may differ from our current recommendations. For example, we currently only have a neutral recommendation on EM corporates, but based on this analysis, EM corporates offer the most attractive return in USD terms. This analysis is purely based on YTM and traditional risk factors without considering other concerns that could make EM assets riskier such as the spread of COVID-19 in major EM countries. However, these rankings do line up with our major spread product call of overweighting US IG and HY corporate debt versus euro area equivalents. Based on this analysis, EM corporates offer the most attractive return in USD terms.  Bottom Line: A broad ranking of currency-hedged global spread product yields, adjusted for volatility and credit quality, shows that the most attractive yields (hedged into USD, EUR, GBP and JPY) are on offer in emerging market USD-denominated investment grade corporates and high-yield company debt in the US and UK.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Ray Park, CFA Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1https://www.fitchratings.com/research/sovereigns/coronavirus-impact-on-gdp-will-be-felt-for-years-to-come-27-07-2020 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "How To Play The Revival Of Global Inflation Expectations", dated June 23, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresarch.com. 3 We use the French 10-year inflation-linked bond as the proxy for the entire euro area, as this is the oldest inflation-linked bond market in the region and thus has the most data history. 4https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-weighs-abandoning-pre-emptive-rate-moves-to-curb-inflation-11596360600?mod=hp_lead_pos6 5 Please see BCA Research Weekly Report, “What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors”, dated July 28, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresarch.com. 6 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Policymakers Are Now Selling Put Options On Volatility, Not Asset Prices", dated March 6, 2018, available at gfis.bcareseach.com. 7 Hedged YTM/Short-term trailing volatility vs. Credit Rating; Hedged YTM/Long-term trailing volatility vs. Credit Rating; Hedged YTM/Long-term trailing volatility vs. Duration; Hedged YTM/Long-term trailing volatility vs. Duration. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? Are Bond Markets Throwing In The Towel On Long-Term Growth? Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Japan’s large share of GDP dedicated to manufacturing in general, and automobile production in particular, continues to represent a handicap to this economy for now. In June, Japan’s exports fell 26.2%, despite a modest contraction in exports to China of…
Highlights Butterflies & Yield Curve Models: With bond market volatility now back to the subdued levels seen prior to the COVID-19 market turbulence earlier in 2020, it is a good time to update our global yield curve valuation models to look for attractive butterfly trade ideas. Valuations: The models generally indicate that flattener trades offer better value across all countries. Our medium-term strategic bias, however, is towards steeper yield curves with policy rates on hold and depressed global inflation expectations likely to continue drifting higher over the latter half of the year. Yield Curve Trades: We are initiating the first set of yield curve trades within our rebooted Tactical Trade Overlay: going long a 7-year bullet vs. a 5-year/10-year barbell in the US; long a 2-year/30-year barbell vs. a 5-year bullet in France; long a 5-year/30-year barbell vs. a 10-year bullet in Italy; and long a 3-year/20-year barbell vs. a 10-year bullet in the UK. Feature In a Special Report published back in February of this year, we dusted off our model-based framework to find value in trades focused on the shape of government bond yield curves.1 By comparing the market-implied short-term interest rate expectations extracted from our curve models to our own macro views, we are able to come up with actionable buy or sell signals across the yield curve in nine developed markets: the US, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the UK, Japan, Canada, and Australia. Table 1Most Attractive Butterfly Trades Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Given the extreme market turbulence around the time we published that report, as the full scope of the COVID-19 pandemic was becoming evident, we chose not to recommend any curve trades from our models until global volatility subsided to acceptable levels. The vigorous action from central banks to manipulate bond yields since then - quantitative easing, aggressive forward guidance, outright yield curve control in Japan and Australia, and other unconventional monetary policy measures - introduced another layer of difficulty in implementing successful curve trades using models estimated in more normal times. With global bond market volatility now back down to pre-COVID levels, we feel that the time is right to use our curve models to help identify opportunities. Specifically, we are implementing new recommended yield curve trades in the US, France, Italy, and the UK. Table 1 shows the most attractive butterfly trades across all the markets covered in this analysis. Note that three of the four trades we are initiating include very long-dated bonds where yields are less susceptible to direct central bank influence. The only exception is our US long 7-year bullet vs. 5-year/10-year barbell trade, the reasoning for which we outline later in this report. Three of the four trades we are initiating include very long-dated bonds where yields are less susceptible to direct central bank influence. The only exception is our US long 7-year bullet vs. 5-year/10-year barbell trade. Before delving into our analysis proper, a quick note: in the interest of brevity, we will limit ourselves to a simple explanation of butterfly strategies and our yield curve models in this report. For those interested in a deeper explanation of the curve modeling framework, please refer to our February 25, 2020 Special Report. A Recap On Butterflies And An Update On Our Yield Curve Models A butterfly fixed income strategy involves two main components: a barbell (a weighted combination of long-term and short-term bonds) and a bullet (a medium-term bond that sits within the yield curve segment selected in the barbell). To implement a butterfly strategy, a bond investor would go long (short) the barbell while simultaneously going short (long) the bullet. By weighting the combination of the long- and short-term bonds in the butterfly such that the weighted sum of their duration equals the duration of the medium-term bond in the bullet, we achieve immunization to parallel shifts in the yield curve. At the same time, due to the relatively higher duration of the longer-term component of the butterfly, we get exposure to specific changes in the slope of the yield curve. In general, the barbell will outperform the bullet in a flattening yield curve environment, and vice-versa. Chart of the WeekButterfly Spreads & Yield Curves Butterfly Spreads & Yield Curves Butterfly Spreads & Yield Curves To actually decide how, and on which parts of the yield curve, to implement our butterfly strategies, we make use of our yield curve models. These models rely on the positive relationship typically observed between the butterfly spread and the slope of the yield curve. When the curve steepens, the butterfly spread widens, and vice-versa (Chart of the Week). This has to do with mean reversion: as the curve steepens, it increases the odds that the curve will flatten in the future since it cannot steepen indefinitely. Consequently, investors will ask for greater compensation to enter a curve steepener trade when the curve is already steepening. As a result, we can create simplified models of the yield curve by regressing any butterfly spread on its corresponding curve slope. Deviations from these fair value models indicate which butterfly strategies are cheap or expensive. However, the model output does not by itself constitute a buy or sell signal and must be integrated with our macro view on the slope of the curve. For example, a butterfly strategy with an expensive bullet implies that there is already a certain amount of steepening discounted in the yield curve. If the yield curve flattens, or even steepens by an amount smaller than what is discounted in the yield curve over the investment horizon, the barbell will outperform, as expected. However, if we see more steepening than is discounted in the yield curve, the bullet will outperform, even though it was already at relatively expensive levels. Therefore, it is crucial to integrate our macro view on how much the curve will steepen or flatten over the investment horizon into our curve trade selection framework. In recent reports, we have emphasized our high-conviction view that global inflation expectations will drift higher in the coming months, driven by reflationary fiscal and monetary policy and a continued rebound in global commodity prices (most notably, oil).2 However, a rise in inflation expectations does not necessarily translate to a “one-to-one” rise in nominal yields if it is offset by a compression in real bond yields. To disentangle this, we look at the 3-year rolling betas of nominal 10-year government bond yields to the corresponding 10-year breakeven inflation rates using inflation-linked bonds (Chart 2). The data suggest a currently weaker relationship between inflation expectations and nominal yields, with all betas well below their post-crisis maxima. Our overall macro bias is towards a global steepening in yield curves, but given our strong belief in a rebound in inflation expectations, we would be more willing to enter steepener trades in higher-beta regions such as Germany, Canada, the US, and Australia where it is more likely that a rise in inflation expectations will translate to higher nominal yields. Conversely, we are less hesitant to enter flatteners in the lower-beta regions such as the UK, France, Italy, and Japan. Chart 2The Link Between Nominal Yields And Inflation Expectations Has Weakened Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies When we said earlier this year that we were “dusting off” our yield curve models, that was not just a figure of speech. The models date back originally to 2002, meaning that they are old enough to vote—perhaps even for a popular rapper. Even though we have been refining and updating it along the way, one of our concerns was that this model was estimated for a pre-crisis sample period before near-zero rates became ubiquitous in developed markets. Our overall macro bias is towards a global steepening in yield curves, but given our strong belief in a rebound in inflation expectations, we would be more willing to enter steepener trades in higher-beta regions such as Germany, Canada, the US, and Australia. To test that the curve relationships within our models are maintained when global central banks are pinning policy rates near 0%, we have re-estimated all the regressions for the post-financial crisis period from 2009 to 2017 when most central banks kept rates near the zero bound. Chart 3 shows the results for the representative 2-year, 5-year and 10-year portions of the yield curve. On the whole, the coefficients are weaker but still positive with the exception of Japan, where many years of zero rates and quantitative easing have caused the 2-year/5-year/10-year butterfly spread to become largely unmoored from the 2-year/10-year slope. Chart 3Looking For Structural Shifts In Our Yield Curve Models Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Therefore, we still see value in our curve modeling approach, even in the current environment where central banks are likely to be on hold for a period measured in years, not months. Bottom Line: Butterfly strategies are an effective way to position for changes in the slope of the yield curve without exposure to shifts in the curve. Our current strategic bias is to expect steepening of developed market yield curves through rising longer-term inflation expectations, but our global yield curve models indicate better value in most flattening trades. Thus, we need to be extremely selective in recommending trades based on the results of our yield curve models. Yield Curve Models And Trades By Region In the remaining pages of this report, we present the current read-outs from of our yield curve models for each of the major developed markets. More specifically, we provide the deviations from fair value for different combinations of bullets and barbells and highlight the most attractive butterfly strategy. The deviations from fair value shown in Tables 2-10 are standardized to facilitate comparisons between the different butterfly combinations. In addition, for each country we provide a quick assessment of the performance of these butterfly strategies over time by applying a simple mechanical trading rule. Every month, we enter the most attractive butterfly strategy, i.e. the one with the highest absolute standardized deviation from its model fair value. The overall message from the models is that barbells appear attractive relative to bullets across all the countries shown. However, we will only initiate trades in cases where the model output and our macro outlook complement each other. US Looking solely at our model output, US Treasury curve flatteners appear most attractive, with the long 3-year/30-year barbell vs. 5-year bullet trade displaying the greatest deviation from fair value with a residual of -1.55 (Table 2). However, we are inclined to agree with our colleagues at BCA Research US Bond Strategy on how to interpret Treasury curve valuation in the current environment. They argue that even though steepeners in the US are currently expensive, valuations can become even more overstretched with the Fed signaling no rate increases for at least the next two years and the market priced for an extended period of near-zero rates.3 Table 2US: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Our fundamental bias is towards US Treasury curve steepening, with the Fed locking down the front end of the curve and rising inflation expectations putting upward pressure on longer-term yields. Thus, we are entering into the long 7-year bullet vs. 5/10 barbell trade which has a small but positive model residual of +0.17. That represents a better valuation starting point than the other US butterfly spreads, and is therefore a more efficient and profitable way to position for steepeners becoming even more expensive going forward. As highlighted earlier, nominal yields in the US are also more sensitive to rising inflation expectations—another reason to enter into a curve steepener. The specific securities used to execute this trade, as well as the weights for the barbell component used to the make both legs of the trade duration-equivalent, can be found on Page 27 within our Tactical Trade Overlay table. Nominal yields in the US are also more sensitive to rising inflation expectations—another reason to enter into a curve steepener.  The 7-year bullet appears just 1bp cheap according to our model and would only underperform its counterpart given a flattening in the 5-year/10-year Treasury slope greater than 22bps, which we believe is unlikely given the reasons outlined above (Chart 4A). Chart 4AUS 5/7/10 Spread Fair Value Model US 5/7/10 Spread Fair Value Model US 5/7/10 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 4BUS Butterfly Strategy Performance US Butterfly Strategy Performance US Butterfly Strategy Performance Following the mechanical trading rule has delivered steady returns with only a few periods of negative year-over-year returns (Chart 4B). Germany The most attractively valued butterfly combination on the German yield curve is going long the 1-year/30-year barbell and shorting the 5-year bullet, which is almost one standard deviation above its model-implied fair value, with a standardized residual of -0.97 (Table 3). Table 3Germany: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies The 5-year bullet appears 29bps expensive according to our model and would only outperform its counterpart given a steepening in the 1-year/30-year German curve slope greater than 50bps (Chart 5A). Chart 5AGermany 1/5/30 Spread Fair Value Model Germany 1/5/30 Spread Fair Value Model Germany 1/5/30 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 5BGermany Butterfly Strategy Performance Germany Butterfly Strategy Performance Germany Butterfly Strategy Performance Following the mechanical trading rule has been quite profitable, delivering consistently positive year-over-year returns for all but the initial period of our sample (Chart 5B). France The most attractively valued butterfly combination on the French OAT yield curve is going long the 2-year/30-year barbell and shorting the 5-year bullet (Table 4). This combination is a little less than one standard deviation over its model-implied fair value with a standardized residual of -0.84. Nominal yields in France are also relatively less correlated with inflation expectations, which makes this a prime candidate for a flattener trade. The specific securities used to execute this trade, as well as the weights for the barbell component used to the make both legs of the trade duration-equivalent, can be found on Page 27 within our Tactical Trade Overlay table. Table 4France: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies The 5-year bullet appears 21bps expensive according to our model and would only outperform its counterpart given a steepening in the 2-year/30-year French curve slope greater than 48bps (Chart 6A). Chart 6AFrance 2/5/30 Spread Fair Value Model France 2/5/30 Spread Fair Value Model France 2/5/30 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 6BFrance Butterfly Strategy Performance France Butterfly Strategy Performance France Butterfly Strategy Performance As with Germany, following the mechanical trading rule in the French OAT market has also been profitable, with only three periods of negative year-over-year returns in our sample period (Chart 6B). Italy And Spain In Italy, the most attractively valued butterfly combination is going long the 5-year/30-year barbell and shorting the 10-year bullet – a combination with a standardized residual of -0.79 (Table 5). In Spain, going long the 3-year/30-year barbell and short the 5-year bullet seems most attractive with a standardized residual of -0.83 (Table 6). Of the two peripheral euro area countries, we are choosing to put on a trade in the relatively larger and more liquid Italian government bond market. As with France, Italian nominal yields also display a relatively low beta to inflation breakevens. The specific securities used to execute this trade, as well as the weights for the barbell component used to the make both legs of the trade duration-equivalent, can be found on Page 27 within our Tactical Trade Overlay table. Table 5Italy: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Table 6Spain: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies In Italy, the 10-year bullet appears 22bps expensive according to our model and would only outperform its counterpart given a steepening in the 5-year/30-year Italian curve slope greater than 153bps (Chart 7A). Following the mechanical trading rule in Italy has yielded strong excess returns, with only one very short period of negative year-over-year returns in our sample period (Chart 7B).  As with Italy, following the mechanical trading rule in Spain has yielded some of the strongest excess returns on a cumulative and year-over-year basis. Chart 7AItaly 5/10/30 Spread Fair Value Model Italy 5/10/30 Spread Fair Value Model Italy 5/10/30 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 7BItaly Butterfly Strategy Performance Italy Butterfly Strategy Performance Italy Butterfly Strategy Performance In Spain, the 5-year bullet appears 14bps expensive according to our model and would only outperform its counterpart given a steepening in the 3-year/30-year Spanish curve slope greater than 47bps (Chart 8A). As with Italy, following the mechanical trading rule in Spain has yielded some of the strongest excess returns on a cumulative and year-over-year basis (Chart 8B). Chart 8ASpain 3/5/30 Spread Fair Value Model Spain 3/5/30 Spread Fair Value Model Spain 3/5/30 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 8BSpain Butterfly Strategy Performance Spain Butterfly Strategy Performance Spain Butterfly Strategy Performance UK On the UK Gilt yield curve, the most attractive butterfly combination is holding a 3-year/20-year barbell versus a 10-year bullet, which currently displays a standardized residual of -1.08 (Table 7). As with France and Italy, not only is this flattener trade attractively valued, the UK is also one of the countries where inflation breakevens are relatively less correlated with nominal yields, making this another excellent candidate for our Tactical Trade Overlay. The specific securities used to execute this trade, as well as the weights for the barbell component used to the make both legs of the trade duration-equivalent, can be found on Page 27. Table 7UK: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies The 10-year bullet appears 13bps expensive according to our model and would only outperform its counterpart given a steepening in the 3-year/20-year Gilt curve slope greater than 52bps (Chart 9A). Chart 9AUK 3/10/20 Spread Fair Value Model UK 3/10/20 Spread Fair Value Model UK 3/10/20 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 9BUK Butterfly Strategy Performance UK Butterfly Strategy Performance UK Butterfly Strategy Performance Following the mechanical trading rule in the UK has produced consistent returns on a year-over-year basis (Chart 9B). Canada The most attractively valued butterfly combination on the Canadian yield curve is favoring the 5-year/30-year barbell versus the 7-year bullet, which currently displays a standardized residual of -1.41 (Table 8). Table 8Canada: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies The 7-year bullet appears 7bps expensive according to our model and would only outperform its counterpart given a steepening in the 5-year/30-year Canadian curve slope greater than 42bps (Chart 10A). Chart 10ACanada 5/7/30 Spread Fair Value Model Canada 5/7/30 Spread Fair Value Model Canada 5/7/30 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 10BCanada Butterfly Strategy Performance Canada Butterfly Strategy Performance Canada Butterfly Strategy Performance Following the mechanical trading rule in Canada has historically been a good strategy, but we do note two periods of minor losses in 2013 and 2019 (Chart 10B). Japan The most attractively valued butterfly combination on the JGB yield curve is the 5-year/20-year barbell versus the 7-year bullet, which currently has a standardized residual of -1.03 (Table 9). As we noted earlier, however, valuations in the JGB market are likely distorted due to the Bank of Japan’s long-running programs of quantitative easing, zero policy rates and Yield Curve Control that aims to keep the 10-year JGB yield around 0%. Table 9Japan: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies The 7-year bullet appears 6bps expensive according to our model and would only outperform its counterpart given a steepening in the 5-year/20-year Japan curve slope greater than 23bps (Chart 11A). Following our mechanical trading rule has produced decent returns, especially given the dormant nature of the JGB market, with only a couple minor periods without positive year-over-year returns. Chart 11AJapan 5/7/20 Spread Fair Value Model Japan 5/7/20 Spread Fair Value Model Japan 5/7/20 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 11BJapan Butterfly Strategy Performance Japan Butterfly Strategy Performance Japan Butterfly Strategy Performance Following our mechanical trading rule has produced decent returns, especially given the dormant nature of the JGB market, with only a couple minor periods without positive year-over-year returns (Chart 11B). Australia The most attractively valued butterfly combination on the Australian yield curve is going long the 2-year/10-year barbell versus the 7-year bullet, displaying a standardized residual of -1.73 (Table 10). Table 10Australia: Butterfly Strategy Valuation: Standardized Residuals Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies The 7-year bullet appears 15bps expensive according to our model and would only outperform its counterpart given a steepening in the 2-year/10-year Australian curve slope greater than 101bps (Chart 12A). Chart 12AAustralia 2/7/10 Spread Fair Value Model Australia 2/7/10 Spread Fair Value Model Australia 2/7/10 Spread Fair Value Model Chart 12BAustralia Butterfly Strategy Performance Australia Butterfly Strategy Performance Australia Butterfly Strategy Performance Compared to the other markets in our analysis, following the mechanical trading rule in Australia has not produced stellar returns (Chart 12B). However, excess returns on a year-over-year basis have been positive barring two periods.   Shakti Sharma Research Associate ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "Global Yield Curve Trades: Follow The Butterflies", dated February 25, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "How To Play The Revival Of Global Inflation Expectations", dated June 23, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Take A Look At High-Yield Technology Bonds", dated June 23, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies Global Yield Curve Trades: Netting Returns With Butterflies ​​​​​​​ Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights Our intermediate-term timing models suggest the US dollar is broadly overvalued.  We are maintaining a modest procyclical currency stance (long NOK, GBP and SEK), but also have a portfolio hedge (short USD/JPY). Go long a basket of petrocurrencies versus the euro. Stay short the gold/silver ratio. Feature Our fundamental intermediate-term timing models (FITM) are one of the toolkits we use in currency management. These simple models enable us to time shifts in developed-market currencies using two key variables. Real Interest Rate Differentials: G10 currencies tend to move with their real rate differentials. Under interest rate parity, if one country is expected to have high interest rates versus another, its currency will rise today so as to gradually depreciate in the future and nullify the interest rate advantage. Risk factor: The ebb and flow of risk aversion affects the path of currencies, as it does their domestic capital markets. Procyclical currencies tend to perform better during risk-on periods. We use high-yield spreads and/or commodity prices as a gauge for risk. For all countries, the variables are highly statistically significant and of the expected signs. These models help us understand in which direction fundamentals are pushing the currencies we look at. These models are more useful as timing indicators on a three-to-nine month basis, as their error terms revert to zero quickly. For the most part, our models have worked like a charm. On a risk adjusted-return basis, a dynamic hedging strategy based on our models has outperformed all static hedging strategies for all investors with six different home currencies since 2001.1  The US Dollar Chart I-1USD Is Overvalued By 4.4% USD Is Overvalued By 4.4% USD Is Overvalued By 4.4% The dollar is a sell, according to the model, with a fair value that is falling much faster than the DXY index itself. Going forward, the Federal Reserve’s dovish stance should keep real interest rate differentials moving against the dollar. This will especially be the case if the authorities move to some form of yield curve control. The wildcard is how risk aversion gyrates as we navigate the volatile summer months, especially given rising geopolitical tensions and the potential for an equity market correction (Chart I-1). One of the factors holding up the dollar is that US domestic growth has been relatively strong, with the Citigroup economic surprise index at the highest level since the inception of the series. For the dollar to decline meaningfully, these positive surprises will need to be repeated abroad. On the data front this week, pending home sales rose 44.3% month-on-month in May, following a 21.8% decline the previous month. House prices are rebounding, to the tune of 4%. The ISM manufacturing index broke out to 52.6 in June from 43.1 the prior month. Job gains for the month of June came in at 4.8 million versus expectations of 3.23 million, pushing the unemployment rate down to 11.1%. These strong numbers provide a high hurdle that non-US growth will need to overcome in order for dollar weakness to continue. The Euro Chart I-2EUR/USD Is Undervalued By 3.8% EUR/USD Is Undervalued By 3.8% EUR/USD Is Undervalued By 3.8% The euro is not excessively undervalued versus the US dollar (Chart I-2). Usually, strong buy signals for the euro have been triggered at a discount of about 10% or so relative to the greenback. That said, the euro can still bounce towards 1.16, or about 3%-4% higher, to bring it back to fair value. The biggest catalyst for the euro remains that interest rate differentials with the US are quite wide and can continue to mean revert. The Treasury-bund spread peaked at 2.8%, and has since lost around 1.7%. Yet, a gap of 100 basis points remains wide by historical standards. On the data front, the CPI numbers from the euro area this week were quite instructive. German inflation came in at +0.8% versus a decline of -0.3% in Spain. In a general sense, inflation in Germany has been outperforming that in the periphery for a few months now, which is a sea-change from the historical trend in eurozone inflation, where both the core and periphery have seen CPI tied at the hip. If rising competitiveness in the periphery is a key driver, then the fair value of the Spanish “peseta” is rapidly catching up to that of the German “Deutsche mark,” which is positive for the euro. The Yen Chart I-3USD/JPY Is Overvalued By 10.3% USD/JPY Is Overvalued By 10.3% USD/JPY Is Overvalued By 10.3% The yen’s fair value has benefited tremendously from the plunge in global bond yields, making rock-bottom Japanese rates relatively attractive from a momentum standpoint (Chart I-3). This has pushed the yen to undervalued levels, supporting our tactically short USD/JPY position. The data out of Japan this week suggest that deflationary forces remain quite strong, which will continue to boost real rates and support the yen. The jobs-to-applicants ratio, a key barometer of labor market health, plunged to 1.20 in May from a cycle high of 1.63. Industrial production fell 25.9% year-on-year in May, the worst since the financial crisis. Meanwhile, the second quarter all-important Tankan survey suggests small businesses will continue to bear the brunt of the economic slowdown.  With most of the increase in the Bank of Japan’s balance sheet coming from USD swaps with the Fed rather than asset purchases, it suggests little ammunition or appetite for more stimulus. Fiscal policy remains the wild card that could help lift domestic demand.   The British Pound Chart I-4GBP/USD Is Undervalued By 5.9% GBP/USD Is Undervalued By 5.9% GBP/USD Is Undervalued By 5.9% Our model shows the pound as only slightly undervalued, putting our long cable position at risk. The drop in UK real rates since the Brexit referendum has prevented our model from flagging the pound as being much cheaper. Given the potential for added volatility this summer, we are looking to book modest profits on long cable (Chart I-4). Data out of the UK remains grim. Mortgage approvals fell to 9.3K in May, well below expectations. Consumer credit is falling much faster than during the depths of the financial crisis, suggesting all the BoE’s liquidity measures are still not filtering down to certain pockets of the economy. Meanwhile, the trend in the trade balance suggests that the pound has not yet started to reflate the economy.   The Canadian Dollar Chart I-5USD/CAD Is Overvalued By 8.1% USD/CAD Is Overvalued By 8.1% USD/CAD Is Overvalued By 8.1% The Canadian dollar is undervalued by about 8% (Chart I-5). Going forward, movements in the Canadian dollar will be largely dictated by interest rate differentials and crude oil prices, which remain supportive for now. We are going long a petrocurrency basket today, one that includes the Canadian dollar. Canadian data have been slowly improving, with housing starts up 20.2% month-on-month in May and existing home sales up 56.9% month-on-month. House prices have also remained resilient. More importantly, foreign investors have used the plunge in oil prices to deploy some fresh capital into Canadian assets. International security transactions in April stood at C$49 billion, the highest on record, and will likely continue to improve as oil prices recover.   The Swiss Franc Chart I-6USD/CHF Is Undervalued By 20.6% USD/CHF Is Undervalued By 20.6% USD/CHF Is Undervalued By 20.6% Our models suggest the Swiss franc is tactically at risk (Chart I-6). The main reason is that the franc has remained strong, despite the pickup in risk sentiment since March. Even if strength in the franc is sniffing market turbulence ahead, the yen remains a better and cheaper hedge. The Swiss National Bank continues to intervene in the foreign exchange market, but this week’s data shows that growth in sight deposits is rolling over. This is happening at a time when the economy remains weak. The June PMI came in at 41.9, well below expectations. Deflation has returned to Switzerland, with the CPI print for June at -1.3%, in line with the May number. While this is boosting real rates, the strength in the franc is an unnecessary headache for the SNB, especially against the euro.    The Australian Dollar Chart I-7AUD/USD Is Undervalued By 7.3% AUD/USD Is Undervalued By 7.3% AUD/USD Is Undervalued By 7.3% Despite the 20% rally in the Aussie dollar since March, it still remains 7%-8% cheap, according to our FITM (Chart I-7). Typical reflation indicators such as commodity prices and industrial share prices are showing nascent upturns. This suggests that so far, policy stimulus in China has been sufficient to lift commodity demand. Meanwhile, 10-year Aussie government bonds sport a positive spread vis-à-vis 10-year Treasurys. Recent data in Australia have been holding up. The private sector is slowly releveraging, the CBA manufacturing PMI went to 51.2 in June, and the trade balance continues to sport a healthy surplus, at A$8 billion for the month of May. Meanwhile, LNG is a long-term winner from China’s shift away from coal and will continue to benefit Australian terms of trade. We are currently in an LNG glut due to Covid-19, but should electricity generation in China, Japan, and other Asean countries recover to pre-crisis peaks, this will ease the glut. The New Zealand Dollar Chart I-8NZD/USD Is Overvalued By 4.9% NZD/USD Is Overvalued By 4.9% NZD/USD Is Overvalued By 4.9% Unlike the AUD, our FITM for the NZD is in expensive territory. This favors long positions in AUD/NZD (Chart I-8). The New Zealand economy will certainly benefit from having put Covid-19 mostly behind it. Both the ANZ business confidence and activity outlook indices continue to rebound strongly from their lows, with the final print for June released this week. However, the hit to tourism will still impact national income. Meanwhile, the adjustment to housing, especially given the ban to foreign purchases, will continue to constrain domestic spending, relative to its antipodean neighbor. In terms of trading, long CAD/NZD and AUD/NZD remain attractive positions. The Norwegian Krone Chart I-9USD/NOK Is Overvalued By 16.9% USD/NOK Is Overvalued By 16.9% USD/NOK Is Overvalued By 16.9% Our fundamental model for the Norwegian krone shows it as squarely undervalued. This favors long NOK positions, which we have implemented via multiple crosses in our bulletins (Chart I-9). The Norwegian economy remains closely tied to oil, and the negative oil print in April probably marked a structural bottom in prices. With inflation near the central bank’s target and our expectation for oil prices to grind higher, the Norwegian currency will likely fare better than a lot of its G10 peers. In terms of data, the unemployment rate ticked higher in April, but at 4.8%, it remains much lower than other developed economies. Our bet is that once the global economy stabilizes, the Norges Bank might find itself ahead of the pack, in any hiking cycle. The Swedish Krona Chart I-10USD/SEK Is Overvalued By 10.6% USD/SEK Is Overvalued By 10.6% USD/SEK Is Overvalued By 10.6% Like its Scandinavian counterpart, the Swedish krona is also quite cheap and is one of our favorite longs at the moment (Chart I-10). Meanwhile, since the Fed extended its USD swap lines, SEK has lagged the bounce in AUD, NZD, and NOK, suggesting some measure of catch up is due. The export-driven Swedish economy was hit hard by Covid-19, despite no widespread lockdowns being implemented. As such, the Riksbank expanded its QE program this week, boosting asset purchases from SEK 300 billion to SEK 500 billion, until June 2021. In September, it will start purchasing corporate bonds in addition to government, municipal, and mortgage bonds. While the repo rate was left unchanged at zero, interest rates on the standing loan facility were slashed 10 basis points and on weekly extraordinary loans by 20 basis points. These measures should provide sufficient liquidity to allow Sweden to recover as economies open up across the globe.     Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy / Global Asset Allocation Strategy Special Report titled, "Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? – A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors (Part II)", dated October 13, 2017.   Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades
Highlights The cyclical rally in stocks is not over, but the S&P 500 will churn between 2800 and 3200 this summer. Supportive policy, robust household balance sheets and budding economic growth have put a floor under global bourses. Political risk, demanding valuations and COVID-related headlines are creating potent headwinds in the near term that must be resolved. During the ongoing flat but volatile performance of equities, investors should build short positions against government bonds and the dollar. Deep cyclicals, banks and Japanese equities offer opportunities to generate alpha. In the long term, structurally rising inflation will ensure that stocks outperform bonds, but commodities will beat them both. Feature Institutional investors still despise the equity market rebound that began on March 23. Relative to history, professional investors are heavily overweight cash, bonds and defensive sectors but they are underweight equities as an asset class and cyclical sectors specifically. Furthermore, the beta of global macro hedge funds to the stock market is in the bottom of its distribution, which indicates the funds’ low net exposure to equities. The attitude of market participants is understandable given that the economy is in tatters. According to the New York Fed Weekly Economic Index, Q2 GDP in the US will contract by 8.4% compared with last year. Industrial production is still 15.9% below its pre-pandemic high and the US unemployment rate stands at either 13.3% or 16.4%, depending how the BLS accounts for furloughed employees. Moreover, deflationary forces are building, which hurts profits. Despite these discouraging economic reports, the S&P 500 is trading only 7.9% below its February 19 all-time high and is displaying a demanding forward P/E ratio of 21.4. Stocks will continue to churn over the summer with little direction. Financial markets are forward looking and the collapse of risk asset prices in March forewarned of an economic calamity. Stimulus, liquidity conditions and an eventual recovery are creating strong tailwinds for stocks. However, demanding valuations, rising political risks and overbought short-term technicals argue for a correction. These forces will probably balance out each other in the coming months. Investors must be nimble. Buying beta is not enough; finding cheap assets levered to the nascent recovery will be a source of excess returns. Bonds are vulnerable to the recovery and purchasing deep cyclicals at the expense of defensives makes increasing sense. Japanese stocks offer another attractive opportunity. Five Pillars Behind Stocks… Our BCA Equity Scorecard remains in bullish territory despite the conflict between the sorry state of the global economy and the violence of the equity rally since late March (Chart I-1). Five forces support share prices. Chart I-1The Rally Is Underpinned The Rally Is Underpinned The Rally Is Underpinned The first pillar is extraordinarily accommodative liquidity conditions created by global central banks, which have aggressively slashed policy rates and allowed real interest rates to collapse. Additionally, forward guidance indicates that policy will remain easy for the foreseeable future. For example, the Federal Reserve does not anticipate tightening policy through 2022 and the Bank of Japan expects to stand pat until at least 2023. In response, the yield curve in advanced economies has started to steepen, which indicates that the policy easing is having a positive impact on the world’s economic outlook (Chart I-2). Various liquidity measures demonstrate the gush of high-powered money in the financial and economic system in the wake of monetary policy easing. Our US Financial Liquidity Index and dollar-based liquidity measure have skyrocketed. Historically, these two indicators forecast the direction of growth and the stock market (Chart I-3). Chart I-2The Yield Curve Likes What It Sees The Yield Curve Likes What It Sees The Yield Curve Likes What It Sees Chart I-3Exploding Liquidity Conditions Exploding Liquidity Conditions Exploding Liquidity Conditions   The second pillar is the greatest fiscal easing since World War II. The US government has increased spending by $2.9 trillion since March. House Democrats have passed an additional $3 trillion plan. Senate Republicans will not ratify the entire proposal, but our Geopolitical Strategy service expects them to concede to $2 trillion.1 Meanwhile, the White House is offering a further $1 trillion infrastructure program over five years. Details of the infrastructure plan are murky, but its existence confirms that fiscal profligacy is the new mantra in Washington and the federal deficit could reach 23% of GDP this year. Chart I-4Loosest Fiscal Policy Since WWII July 2020 July 2020 The list of new fiscal measures worldwide is long; the key point is that governments are injecting funds to lessen the COVID-19 recession pain on their respective populations and small businesses (Chart I-4). Excluding loans guarantees, even tight-fisted Germany has rolled out EUR 0.44 trillion in relief programs, amounting to 12.9% of GDP. Japan has announced JPY 63.5 trillion of “fresh water” stimulus so far, representing 11.4% of GDP. Loan guarantees administered by various governments along with the Fed’s Primary and Secondary Market Credit Facilities also limit how high business bankruptcies will climb. As we discussed last month, it is unlikely that countries will return to the level of spending and budget deficits that prevailed prior to COVID-19, even if the intensity of fiscal support declines from its current extreme.2 Voters in the West and emerging markets are fed up with the Washington Consensus of limited state intervention. Consequently, the median voter has pivoted to the left on economic matters, especially in Anglo-Saxon nations (Chart I-5).3 The fiscal laxity consistent with economic populism and dirigisme will boost aggregate demand for many years. The third supporting pillar is the private sector’s response to monetary and fiscal easing unleashed by global policymakers. Unlike in 2008, the amount of loans and commercial papers issued by US businesses is climbing, which indicates stronger market access than during the Great Financial Crisis (GFC). A consequence of the large uptick in credit growth has been an explosion in banking deposits. Given the surge in private-sector liquidity – not just base money – broad money creation has eclipsed that of the GFC (Chart I-6). Part of this money will seek higher returns than the -0.97% real short rate available to investors in the US (or -0.9% in Europe), a process that will bid up risk assets. Chart I-5The US Population's Shift To The Left July 2020 July 2020 Chart I-6The Private Sector's Liquidity Is Improving The Private Sector's Liquidity Is Improving The Private Sector's Liquidity Is Improving   The financial health of the US household sector is the fourth pillar buttressing stocks. Households entered the recession with debt equal to 99.4% of disposable income, the lowest share in 19 years. Moreover, debt servicing only represents 9.7% of disposable income, the lowest percentage of the past four decades. Along with generous support from the US government, the resilience created by strong balance sheets explains why delinquency rates remain muted despite a surge in unemployment (Table I-1).4 Moreover, the decline in household net worth pales in comparison with the GFC (Chart I-7). Hence, the wealth effect will not have the same deleterious impact on consumption as it did after 2008. In the wake of large fiscal transfers, the savings rate explosion to an all-time high of 32.9% is a blessing. The surge in savings is applying a powerful brake on 67.7% of the US economy, but its eventual decline will fuel a quick consumption recovery, a positive trend absent after the GFC. Table I-1Consumer Borrowers Are Hanging In There July 2020 July 2020 Chart I-7Smaller Hit To Net Worth Than The GFC Smaller Hit To Net Worth Than The GFC Smaller Hit To Net Worth Than The GFC     The final pillar is the path of the global business cycle. Important predictors of the US economy have improved. The June Philly Fed and Empire State surveys are gaining ground, thanks to their rebounding new orders and employment components. The Conference Board’s LEI is also climbing, even when its financial constituents are excluded.  Residential activity, which also leads the US business cycle, is sending positive signals. According to the June NAHB Housing market index, homebuilder confidence is quickly recouping lost ground and building permits are bottoming. These two series suggest that the contribution of housing to GDP growth will only expand. Household spending is showing promising growth as the economy re-opens. In May, US auto sales jumped 44.1% higher and retail sales (excluding autos) soared by 12.4%. Additionally, the retail sales control group5 has already recovered to its pre-pandemic levels. The healing labor market and the bounce in consumer confidence have fueled this record performance because they will prompt a normalization in the savings rate. Progress is also evident outside the US. The expectations component of the German IFO survey is rebounding vigorously, a good omen for European industrial production (Chart I-8). Similarly, the continued climb in China’s credit and fiscal impulse suggests that global industrial production will move higher. Finally, EM carry trades are recovering, which indicates that liquidity is seeping into corners of the global economy that contribute the most to capex (Chart I-9). Chart I-8European Hopes European Hopes European Hopes Chart I-9Positive Signals For Global Manufacturers Positive Signals For Global Manufacturers Positive Signals For Global Manufacturers     Against this backdrop, there is an increasing probability that analysts will upgrade their 2020 EPS estimates. The odds of upward revisions to 2021 and 2022 estimates (especially outside of the tech and healthcare sectors) are much more significant, especially because the historical pattern of deep recessions followed by sharp rebounds should repeat itself (Chart I-10). A strong recovery will ultimately foster risk-taking. Mechanically, higher expected cash flows and lower risk premia will remain tailwinds behind stocks. Chart I-10The Deeper The Fall, The Faster The Rebound July 2020 July 2020 … And Three Reasons To Worry The five pillars shoring up stocks face three powerful factors working at cross purposes against share prices. The first hurdle against stocks is that in aggregate, the S&P 500 is already discounting the coming economic recovery. In the US, the 12-month forward P/E ratio bounced from a low of 13.4 on March 23 to the current 21.4. Bidding up multiples to such heights in a short timeframe opens up the potential for investor disappointments with economic activity or earnings. Equally concerning, the global expectations component of the German ZEW survey has returned to near-record highs. The ZEW is a survey of financial professionals largely influenced by the performance of equities. In order for stocks to continue to rise, they will need an even greater global economic rebound than implied by the ZEW (Chart I-11). Chart I-11Stocks Already Know That IP Will Jump Back Stocks Already Know That IP Will Jump Back Stocks Already Know That IP Will Jump Back Political risk poses a second hurdle against stocks. As intense as it is today, policy uncertainty will not likely abate this summer, which will put upward pressure on the equity risk premium. According to BCA Research’s Geopolitical strategy service, the combination of elevated share prices and President Trump’s low approval rating will increase the prospect of erratic moves by the White House. A pitfall particularly under-appreciated by risk assets is a new round of tariffs in the Sino-US trade war.6 Another hazard is an escalation of tensions with the European Union. US domestic politics are also problematic. Fiscal stimulus has been a pillar for the market. However, as the economy recovers, politicians could let down their guard and resist passing new measures on the docket. This danger is self-limiting. If legislators delay voting on proposed laws, then the resulting drop in the market will put greater pressure on policymakers to continue to support the economy. Either way, this tug-of-war could easily cause some painful bouts of market volatility. Chart I-12How Long Will Stocks Ignore Politics? How Long Will Stocks Ignore Politics? How Long Will Stocks Ignore Politics? In recent months, the equity risk premium could ignore rising political risk as long as financial liquidity was expanding at an accelerating pace (Chart I-12). However, the bulk of monetary easing is over because the Fed, the ECB and the global central banks have already expended most of their ammunition. Moreover, the ECB, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan and the Swiss National Bank have agreed to slow the pace at which they tap the Fed’s dollar swap line from daily to three times a week. This indicates that the private sector’s extreme appetite for liquidity has been satiated by the increase in base money since March 19. Thus, the expansion of liquidity will decelerate, even if its level remains plentiful. Overlooking political uncertainty will become harder after the second derivative of liquidity turns negative. The third hurdle against the stock market is the evolution of COVID-19. A second wave of infection has started in many countries and it will only continue to escalate as economies re-open, loosen social distancing rules and test more potential cases. Investors will be rattled by headlines such as the resumption of lockdowns in Beijing and mounting new cases in the southern US.  Chart I-13A Different Wave A Different Wave A Different Wave BCA’s base case is that a second wave of infections will not result in large-scale lockdowns that paralyzed the global economy in Q1 and Q2. Importantly, the number of new deaths is lagging the spread of recorded new infections (Chart 1-13). This dichotomy highlights better testing, our improved understanding of the disease and our greater capacity to protect vulnerable individuals. A Summer Of Discontent The S&P 500 and global equities will face a summer of directionless gyrations with elevated volatility. Before we can escape this pattern, the technical froth that has engulfed the market must dissipate. Our Tactical Strength Indicator is massively overbought and is consistent with a period of consolidation. (Chart I-14). The same is true of short-term breadth. The proportion of NYSE stocks trading above their 10-week moving average is close to its highest level in the past 20 years, which indicates that meaningful equity gains are doubtful in the coming months. (Chart I-14, bottom panel). A correction should not morph into a renewed bear market because the pillars behind stocks are too strong. Nonetheless, the S&P 500 may retest the 2800-2900 zone during the summer. On the upside, it will be capped near 3200 during that same period. A resolution of the political risks surrounding the market is needed to settle the churning pattern. Another factor will be the progressive normalization of our tactical indicators after an extended period of sideways trading. Finally, continued progress on the treatment of COVID-19 (not necessarily a vaccine) and the formulation of a coherent health policy for the fall will create the impetus for higher share prices later this year. How To Profit When Stocks Churn A strategy most likely to generate the highest reward-to-risk ratio will be to focus on assets and sectors that have not yet fully priced in the upcoming global economic recovery, unlike the broad stock market. The bond market fits within this strategy. G-7 and US yields remain extremely expensive (Chart I-15). Additionally, according to our Composite Technical Indicator, Treasuries are losing momentum (see Section III, page 41). This valuation and technical backdrop renders government bonds vulnerable to both a strong economy and an upward reassessment of the outlook for inflation. Chart I-14A Needed Digestive Break A Needed Digestive Break A Needed Digestive Break Chart I-15Bonds Are Pricey... Bonds Are Pricey... Bonds Are Pricey...   Cyclical dynamics also paint a poor outlook for bonds. Globally, the supply of government securities is swelling by approximately $6 trillion, which will slowly lift depressed term premia. Moreover, there has been a sharp incline in excess liquidity as approximated by the gap between our US Financial Liquidity Index and the rate of change of the US LEI. Such a development has led yields higher since the GFC (Chart I-16). Finally, the diffusion index of fifteen Swedish economic variables has started to recover, an indicator that often signals higher yields (Chart I-17). Sweden is an excellent bellwether for the global business cycle because it is a small, open economy where shipments of industrial and intermediate goods account for 55% of exports. Chart I-16...And Vulnerable To Excess Liquidity ...And Vulnerable To Excess Liquidity ...And Vulnerable To Excess Liquidity Chart I-17Sweden's Message Sweden's Message Sweden's Message   The FX market also offers reasonably priced vehicles to bet on the burgeoning global cyclical upswing. Balance-of-payments dynamics are increasingly bearish for the US dollar. A fall in the household savings rate will widen the current account deficit because the fiscal balance remains deeply negative. Meanwhile, US real interest rate differentials are narrowing, thus the capital account surplus will likely recede. The resulting balance-of-payment deficit will accentuate selling pressures on the USD created by a pick-up in global industrial activity (Chart I-18). AUD/CHF offers another attractive opportunity. The AUD trades near a record low relative to the CHF, yet this cross will benefit from a rebound in global nominal GDP growth (Chart I-19). Moreover, Australia managed the COVID-19 crisis very well and it can proceed quickly with its re-opening. Meanwhile, the expensiveness of the CHF versus the EUR will continue to foster deflationary pressures in Switzerland. This contrast ensures that the Swiss National Bank remains more dovish than the Reserve Bank of Australia. Chart I-18Bearish Dollar Backdrop Bearish Dollar Backdrop Bearish Dollar Backdrop Chart I-19AUD/CHF As A Bet On The Recovery AUD/CHF As A Bet On The Recovery AUD/CHF As A Bet On The Recovery   Within equities, deep cyclical stocks remain attractive relative to defensive ones. The same acceleration in our excess liquidity proxy that warned of a fall in bond prices indicates that the cyclicals-to-defensives ratio should appreciate. This ratio also benefits meaningfully when the dollar depreciates. A weaker dollar is synonymous with stronger global industrial production. It also eases deflationary pressures and boosts the price of commodities, which increases pricing power for industrial, material and energy stocks. Finally, the cyclical-to-defensives ratio rises when the silver-to-gold ratio turns up. An outperformance of silver has been an important signal that reflation is starting to improve the global economic outlook (Chart I-20).7 Chart I-20Cyclicals Have Not Priced In The Recovery Cyclicals Have Not Priced In The Recovery Cyclicals Have Not Priced In The Recovery Banks also offer attractive opportunities. Investors have clobbered banks because they expect prodigious non-performing loans (NPL) due to the threats to private-sector balance sheets from the deepest recession in nine decades. However, NPLs are not expanding by as much as anticipated thanks to the ample support by global monetary and fiscal authorities. Moreover, banks were conservative and built loss reserves ahead of the crisis. In this context, the extreme valuation discount embedded in banks relative to the S&P 500 seems exaggerated (Chart I-21). Additionally, the gap between the expected growth rate of banks’ long-term earnings and that of the broad market is wider than at any other point in the past 15 years. Investors have also bid up the price of protection against bank shares (Chart I-22). Therefore, despite near-term risks induced by the Fed’s Stress Test, banks are a cheap contrarian bet on a global recovery. Chart I-21Banks Are Cheap Banks Are Cheap Banks Are Cheap Chart I-22Banks As A Contrarian Bet Banks As A Contrarian Bet Banks As A Contrarian Bet     Investors should continue to favor foreign versus US equities, which is consistent with our positive outlook on banks and deep cyclical stocks, as well as our negative disposition toward the dollar. Foreign stocks outperform US ones when the dollar depreciates because the former overweight cyclical equities and financials (Chart I-23). Moreover, foreign stocks trade at discounts to US equities and embed significantly lower expected cash flow growth, which suggests that they would offer investors upside from the impending global economic recovery. Chart I-23Favor Foreign Stocks Favor Foreign Stocks Favor Foreign Stocks EM stocks fit within this context. Both EM FX and equities trade at a valuation discount consistent with an upcoming rally (Chart I-24). Moreover, cheap valuations increase the likelihood that a depreciating US dollar will boost EM currencies by easing global financial conditions. Moreover, the momentum of EM equities relative to global ones is forming a positive divergence with the price ratio, which is consistent with liquidity making its way into these markets (Chart I-25). Our Emerging Markets Strategy team is more worried about EM stocks than we are because EM bourses would be unlikely to participate as much as US ones in a mania driven by retail investors.8 Chart I-24Attractive EM Valuations Attractive EM Valuations Attractive EM Valuations Chart I-25EM: A Coiled-Spring Bet On A Weaker Dollar? EM: A Coiled-Spring Bet On A Weaker Dollar? EM: A Coiled-Spring Bet On A Weaker Dollar?   Chart I-26Japanese Stocks As A Trade Japanese Stocks As A Trade Japanese Stocks As A Trade Finally, an opportunity to overweight Japanese equities has emerged. The Nikkei has collapsed in conjunction with a meltdown in Japanese industrial production. However, Japanese earnings should recover faster than in the rest of the world. Japan has efficiently handled its COVID-19 outbreak with fewer lockdowns. Moreover, Japan’s earnings per share (EPS) are highly levered to both the global business cycle and China’s economic fluctuations. Consequently, if we expect global activity to recover and China’s credit and fiscal impulse to continue to improve, then we also anticipate that Japan’s EPS will outperform the MSCI All-Country World Index (Chart I-26). Additionally, on a price-to-cash flow basis, Japanese equities trade at a deep-enough discount to global stocks to foreshadow an upcoming period of outperformance. Bottom Line: Equities will be tossed about for the coming quarter or two, buffeted between five tailwinds and three headwinds. While the S&P is expected to gyrate between 2800 and 3200 this summer, investors can seek alpha by selling bonds, selling the dollar and buying AUD/CHF, and favoring deep cyclical stocks as well as banks at the expense of defensives. As a corollary, foreign equities, especially Japanese ones, have a window to outperform the US. EM stocks could also generate excess returns, but they are a more uncertain bet. Exploring Long-Term Risks We explore some investment implications linked to our theme of structurally rising inflation, which will cause lower real long-term portfolio returns than in the previous four decades. Populism and the ossification of the supply-side of the economy will push inflation up this cycle toward an average of 3% to 5%.9  Chart I-27S&P 500 Long-Term Perspective S&P 500 Long-Term Perspective S&P 500 Long-Term Perspective Adjusted for inflation, the 10-year cumulative average return for stocks stands at 12.4%, which is an elevated reading. The strength of the past performance increases the probability that a period of mean reversion is near (Chart I-27). The end of the debt supercycle raises the likelihood that an era of low real returns will materialize. Non-financial debt accounts for 258.7% of GDP, a level only topped at the depth of the Great Depression when nominal GDP collapsed by 46% from its 1929 peak. Meanwhile, yields are at record lows (Chart I-28). Such a combination suggests that there is little way forward to boost debt by enough to enhance growth, especially when each additional dollar of debt generates a diminishing amount of output. Chart I-28The End Of The Debt Super Cycle The End Of The Debt Super Cycle The End Of The Debt Super Cycle Chart I-29Little Room To Cut Taxes Little Room To Cut Taxes Little Room To Cut Taxes Populist governments will remain profligate and play an expanding role in the economy instead of accepting the necessary increase in savings required to reduce debt and create a more robust economy. However, effective personal and corporate tax rates are already very low in the US (Chart I-29). Therefore, the only way to offer fiscal support would be to increase government spending. Growth will become less vigorous as the government’s share of GDP increases (Chart I-30). Moreover, monetary policy will likely remain lax, which boosts the chance of stagflation developing.   Chart I-30The Bigger The Government, The Lower The Growth July 2020 July 2020 Elevated stock multiples are a problem for long-term investors. The S&P 500’s Shiller P/E ratio stands at 29.1, and its price-to-sales ratio is at 2.2. If bond yields remain minimal, then low discount rates can rationalize those extreme multiples. However, if inflation moves above 4%, especially when real output is not expanding robustly, then multiples will mean-revert and equities will generate subpar real returns. Chart I-31Profit Margins: From Tailwind To Headwind? Profit Margins: From Tailwind To Headwind? Profit Margins: From Tailwind To Headwind? Profit margins pose an additional problem for stocks. The decline in unit labor costs relative to selling prices has allowed abnormally wide domestic EBITDA margins to persist (Chart I-31). However, inflation, populism, greater government involvement in the economy and lower efficiency of supply chains will conspire to undo this extraordinary level of profitability. In other words, while the share of national income taken up by wages will expand, profits will account for a progressively smaller slice of output. (Chart I-31, bottom panel). Lower profit margins will push down RoE and accentuate the decline in multiples while also hurting projected long-term cash flows. Chart I-32Elevated Household Exposure To Stocks Elevated Household Exposure To Stocks Elevated Household Exposure To Stocks Finally, from a structural perspective, households are already aggressively overweighting equities. Stocks comprise 54% of US households’ discretionary portfolios. US households held more shares only in 1968 and 2000, two years that marked the beginning of painful drops in real stock prices (Chart I-32). US stocks are most vulnerable to the increase of inflation. Not only are they much more expensive than their global counterparts, but as the Section II special report written by Matt Gertken highlights, the growing nationalism spreading around the world hurts the global order built by and around the US during the past 70 years. With this system of influence diminished, US firms will not be able to command their current valuation premium. Despite low expected real rates of return, equities will still outperform bonds in the coming decade (Table I-2). Even though stocks are more volatile than bonds, stocks have not significantly outperformed bonds during the past 35 years. This was possible because inflation fell from its peak in the early 1980s. However, bonds are unlikely to once again generate higher risk-adjusted returns than equities if inflation bottoms. Moreover, bonds are more expensive than stocks (Chart I-33). A structural bear market in bonds would hurt risk-parity strategies and end the incredible strength in growth stocks. Table I-2Rising Inflation Flatters Stocks Over Bonds July 2020 July 2020 The outperformance of stocks over bonds will be of little solace to investors if equities generate poor real returns. Instead, investors should explore commodities, an asset class that benefits from rising inflation, especially given the combination of strong government spending and too-accommodative monetary policy. Moreover, after a decade of weak capex in natural resource extraction, the supply of commodities will expand slowly. Hence, our base case this cycle is for a weakening in the stock-to-gold ratio (Chart I-34). The stock-to-industrial commodities ratio will also fall from its heady levels. As a result, the energy, materials and industrial sectors are attractive on a long-term basis beyond the next six to 12 months. Chart I-33Bonds Look Worse Than Stocks... Bonds Look Worse Than Stocks... Bonds Look Worse Than Stocks... Chart I-34...But Gold Looks The Best ...But Gold Looks The Best ...But Gold Looks The Best   Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst June 25, 2020 Next Report: July 30, 2020   II. Nationalism And Globalization After COVID-19 Economic shocks in recent decades have led to surges in nationalism and the COVID-19 crisis is unlikely to be different. Nationalism adds to the structural challenges facing globalization, which is already in retreat. Investors face at least a 35% chance that President Trump will be reelected and energize a nationalist and protectionist agenda that is globally disruptive. China is also indulging in nationalism as trend growth slows, raising the probability of a clash with the US even if Trump does not win. US-China economic decoupling will present opportunities as well as risks – primarily for India and Southeast Asia. Since the Great Recession, investors have watched the US dollar and US equities outperform their peers in the face of a destabilizing world order (Chart II-1). Chart II-1US Outperformance Amid Global Disorder US Outperformance Amid Global Disorder US Outperformance Amid Global Disorder Global and American economic policy uncertainty has surged to the highest levels on record. Investors face political and geopolitical power struggles, trade wars, a global pandemic and recession, and social unrest.  How will these risks shape up in the wake of COVID-19? First, massive monetary and fiscal stimulus ensure a global recovery but they also remove some of the economic limitations on countries that are witnessing a surge in nationalism.  Second, nationalism creates a precarious environment for globalization – namely the wave of “hyper-globalization” since 2000. Nationalism and de-globalization do not depend on the United States alone but rather have shifted to the East, which means that geopolitical risks will remain elevated even if the US presidential election sees a restoration of the more dovish Democratic Party.  Economic Shocks Fuel Nationalism’s Revival Nationalism is the idea that the political state should be made up of a single ethnic or cultural community. While many disasters have resulted from this idea, it is responsible for the modern nation-state and it has enabled democracies to take shape across Europe, the Americas, and beyond. Industrialization is also more feasible under nationalism because cultural conformity helps labor competitiveness.10  At the end of the Cold War, transnational communist ideology collapsed and democratic liberalism grew complacent. Each successive economic shock or major crisis has led to a surge in nationalism to fill the ideological gaps that were exposed. Chart II-2The Resurgence Of Russian Nationalism July 2020 July 2020 Chart II-3USA: From Nationalism To Anti-Nationalism July 2020 July 2020   For instance, various nationalists and populists emerged from the financial crises of the late 1990s. Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to restore Russia to greatness in its own and other peoples’ eyes (Chart II-2). Not every Russian adventure has mattered for investors, but taken together they have undermined the stability of the global system and raised barriers to exchange. The invasion of Crimea in 2014 and the interference in the US election in 2016 helped to fuel the rise in policy uncertainty, risk premiums in Russian assets, and safe havens over the past decade. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States created a surge in American nationalism (Chart II-3). This surge has since collapsed, but while it lasted the US destabilized the Middle East and provided Russia and China with the opportunity to pursue a nationalist path of their own. Investors who went long oil and short the US dollar at this time could have done worse. The 2008 crisis spawned new waves of nationalist feeling in countries such as China, Japan, the UK, and India (Chart II-4). Conservatives of the majority cultural group rose to power, including in China, where provincial grassroots members of the elite reasserted the Communist Party’s centrality. Japan and India became excellent equity investment opportunities in their respective spheres, while the UK and China saw their currencies weaken.  The rising number of wars and conflicts across the world since 2008 reflects the shift toward nationalism, whether among minority groups seeking autonomy or nation-states seeking living space (Chart II-5). Chart II-4Nationalist Trends Since The Great Recession July 2020 July 2020 Chart II-5World Conflicts Rise After Major Crises July 2020 July 2020   COVID-19 is the latest economic shock that will feed a new round of nationalism. At least 750 million people are extremely vulnerable across the world, mostly concentrated in the shatter belt from Libya to Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, and India.11 Instability will generate emigration and conflict. Once again the global oil supply will be at risk from Middle Eastern instability and the dollar will eventually fall due to gargantuan budget and trade deficits. Today’s shock will differ, however, in the way it knocks against globalization, a process that has already begun to slow. Specifically, this crisis threatens to generate instability in East Asia – the workshop of the world – due to the strategic conflict between the US and China. This conflict will play out in the form of “proxy battles” in Greater China and the East Asian periphery. The dollar’s recent weakness is a telling sign of the future to come. In the short run, however, political and geopolitical risks are acute and will support safe havens. Globalization In Retreat Nationalism is not necessarily at odds with globalization. Historically there are many cases in which nationalism undergirds a foreign policy that favors trade and eschews military intervention. This is the default setting of maritime powers such as the British and Dutch. Prior to WWII it was the American setting, and after WWII it was the Japanese. Over the past thirty years, however, the rise of nationalism has generally worked against global trade, peace, and order. That’s because after WWII most of the world accepted internationalist ideals and institutions promoted by the United States that encouraged free markets and free trade. Serious challenges to that US-led system are necessarily challenges to global trade. This is true even if they originate in the United States. Globalization has occurred in waves continuously since the sixteenth century. It is not a light matter to suggest that it is experiencing a reversal. Yet the best historical evidence suggests that global imports, as a share of global output, have hit a major top (Chart II-6).12 The line in this chart will fall further in 2020. American household deleveraging, China’s secular slowdown, and the 2014 drop in oil and commodities have had a pervasive impact on the export contribution to global growth.   Chart II-6Globalization Hits A Major Top Globalization Hits A Major Top Globalization Hits A Major Top Chart II-7Both Goods And Services Face Headwinds Both Goods And Services Face Headwinds Both Goods And Services Face Headwinds The next upswing of the business cycle will prompt an increase in trade in 2021. Global fiscal stimulus this year amounts to 8% of GDP and counting. But will the import-to-GDP ratio surpass previous highs? Probably not anytime soon. It is impossible to recreate America’s consumption boom and China’s production boom of the 1980s-2000s with public debt alone. Global trend growth is slowing. Isn’t globalization proceeding in services, if not goods? The world is more interconnected than ever, with nearly half of the population using the Internet – almost 30% in Sub-Saharan Africa. One in every two people uses a smartphone. Eventually the pandemic will be mitigated and global travel will resume. Nevertheless, the global services trade is also facing headwinds. And it requires even more political will to break down barriers for services than it does for goods (Chart II-7). The desire of nations to control and patrol cyberspace has resulted in separate Internets for authoritarian states like Russia and China. Even democracies are turning to censorship and content controls to protect their ideologies.  Political demands to protect workers and industries are gaining ground. Policymakers in China and Russia have already shifted back toward import substitution; now the US and EU are joining them, at least when it comes to strategic sectors (health, defense). Nationalists and populists across the emerging world will follow their lead. Regional and wealth inequalities are driving populations to be more skeptical of globalization. GDP per capita has not grown as fast as GDP itself, a simple indication of how globalization does not benefit everyone equally even though it increases growth overall (Chart II-8). Inequality is a factor not only because of relatively well-off workers in the developed world who resent losing their job or earning less than their neighbors. Inequality is also rife in the developing world where opportunities to work, earn higher wages, borrow, enter markets, and innovate are lacking. Over the past decade, emerging countries like Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, and South Africa have seen growing skepticism about whether foreign openness creates jobs or lifts wages.13  Immigration is probably the clearest indication of the break from globalization. The United States and especially the European Union have faced an influx of refugees and immigrants across their southern borders and have resorted to hard-nosed tactics to put a stop to it (Chart II-9). Chart II-8Global Inequality Fuels Protectionism July 2020 July 2020 Chart II-9US And EU Crack Down On Immigration July 2020 July 2020   There is zero chance that these tough tactics will come to an end anytime soon in Europe, where the political establishment has discovered a winning combination with voters by promoting European integration yet tightening control of borders. This combination has kept populists at bay in France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Germany. A degree of nationalism has been co-opted by the transnational European project. In the US, extreme polarization could cause a major change in immigration policy, depending on the election later this year. But note that the Obama administration was relatively hawkish on the border and the next president will face sky-high unemployment, which discourages flinging open the gates.  Reduced immigration will weigh on potential GDP growth and drive up the wage bill for domestic corporations. If nationalism continues to rise and to hinder the movement of people, goods, capital, and ideas, then it will reduce the market’s expectations of future earnings. American Nationalism Still A Risk  The United States is experiencing a “Civil War Lite” that may take anywhere from one-to-five years to resolve. The November 3 presidential election will have a major impact on the direction of nationalism and globalization over the coming presidential term. If President Trump is reelected – which we peg at 35% odds – then American nationalism and protectionism will gain a new lease on life. Other nations will follow the US’s lead. If Trump fails, then nationalism will likely be driven by external forces, but protectionism will persist in some form. Chart II-10Trump Is Not Yet Down For The Count July 2020 July 2020 Investors should not write Trump off. If the election were held today, Trump would lose, but the election is still four months away. His national approval rating has troughed at a higher level than previous troughs. His disapproval rating has spiked but has not yet cleared its early 2019 peak (Chart II-10).14 This is despite an unprecedented deluge of bad news: universal condemnation from Democrats and the media, high-profile defections from fellow Republicans and cabinet members, stunning defeats at the Supreme Court, and scathing rebukes from top US army officers. If Trump’s odds are 35% then this translates to a 35% chance that the United States will continue pursuing globally disruptive “America First” foreign and trade policies in the 2020-24 period.    First Trump will attempt to pass a Reciprocal Trade Act to equalize tariffs with all trading partners. Assuming Democrats block it in the House of Representatives, he will still have sweeping executive authority to levy tariffs. He will launch the next round in the trade war with China to secure a “Phase Two” trade deal, which will be tougher because it will be focused on structural reforms. He could also open new fronts against the European Union, Mexico, and other trade surplus countries. By contrast, these risks will melt away if Biden is elected. Biden would restore the Obama administration’s approach of trade favoritism toward strategic allies and partners, such as Europe and the members of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, but only occasional use of tariffs. Biden would work with international organizations like the World Trade Organization. His foreign policy would also open up trade with pariah states like Iran, reducing the tail-risk of a war to almost zero.  Biden would be tougher on China than Presidents Obama or Bill Clinton, as the consensus in Washington is now hawkish and Biden would need to keep the blue-collar voters he won back from Trump. He may keep Trump’s tariffs in place as negotiating leverage. But he is less likely to expand these tariffs – and there is zero chance he will use them against Europe. At the same time, it will take a year or more to court the allies and put together a “coalition of the willing” to pressure China on structural reforms and liberalization. China would get a reprieve – and so would financial markets. Thus investors have a roughly 65% chance of seeing US policy “normalize” into an internationalist (not nationalist) approach that reduces the US contribution to trade policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk over the next few years at minimum. But there are still four months to go before the election; these odds can change, and equity market volatility will come first. Moreover a mellower US would still need to react to nationalism in Asia. European Nationalism Not A Risk (Yet) Chart II-11English Versus Scottish Nationalism English Versus Scottish Nationalism English Versus Scottish Nationalism European nationalism has reemerged in recent years but has greatly disappointed the prophets of doom who expected it to lead to the breakup of the European Union. The southern European states suffered the most from COVID-19 but many of them have made their decision regarding nationalism and the supra-national EU. Greece underwent a depression yet remained in the union. Italians could easily elect the right-wing anti-establishment League to head a government in the not-too-distant future. But there is no appetite for an Italian exit. Brexit is the grand exception. If Trump wins, then the UK and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson will be seen as the vanguard of the revival of nationalism in the West. If Trump loses, English nationalism will appear an isolated case that is constrained by its own logic given the response of Scottish nationalism (Chart II-11). The trend in the British Isles would become increasingly remote from the trends in continental Europe and the United States. The majority of Europeans identify both as Europeans and as their home nationality, including majorities in countries like Greece, Italy, France, and Austria where visions of life outside the union are the most robust (Chart II-12). Even the Catalonians are focused on options other than independence, which has fallen to 36% support. Eastern European nationalists play a careful balancing game of posturing against Brussels yet never drifting so far as to let Russia devour them. Chart II-12European Nationalism Is Limited (For Now) European Nationalism Is Limited (For Now) European Nationalism Is Limited (For Now) Europeans have embraced the EU as a multi-ethnic confederation that requires dual allegiances and prioritizes the European project. COVID-19 has so far reinforced this trend, showing solidarity as the predominant force, and much more promptly than during the 2011 crisis. It will take a different kind of crisis to reverse this trend of deeper integration. European nationalists would benefit from another economic crash, a new refugee wave from the Middle East, or conflict with Turkish nationalism. The latter is already burning brightly and will eventually flame out, but not before causing a regional crisis of some kind. European policymakers are containing nationalism by co-opting some of its demands. The EU is taking steps to guard against globalization, particularly on immigration and Chinese mercantilism. The lack of nationalist uprisings in Europe do not overthrow the contention that globalization is slowing down. Europe can become more integrated at home while maintaining the higher barriers against globalization that it has always maintained relative to the UK and United States. Chinese Nationalism The Biggest Risk The nationalist risk to globalization is most significant in East Asia and the Pacific, where Chinese nationalism continues the ascent that began with the Great Recession. China’s slowdown in growth rates has weakened the Communist Party’s confidence in the long-term viability of single-party rule. The result has been a shift in the party line to promote ideology and quality of life improvements to compensate for slower income gains. Xi Jinping’s governing philosophy consists of nationalist territorial gains, promoting “the China Dream” for the middle class, and projecting ambitious goals of global influence by 2035 and 2049. The result has been a clash between mainland Chinese and peripheral Chinese territories – especially Hong Kong and Taiwan (Chart II-13). The turn away from Chinese identity in these areas runs up against their economic interest. It is largely a reaction to the surge in mainland nationalist sentiment, which cannot be observed directly due to the absence of reliable opinion polling. Chart II-13AChinese Nationalism On The Mainland, Anti-Nationalism In Periphery July 2020 July 2020 Chart II-13BChinese Nationalism On The Mainland, Anti-Nationalism In Periphery July 2020 July 2020   The conflict over identity in Greater China is perhaps the world’s greatest geopolitical risk. While Hong Kong has no conceivable alternative to Beijing’s supremacy, Taiwan does. The US is interested in reviving its technological and defense relationship with Taiwan now that it seeks to counterbalance China. Chart II-14Taiwan: Epicenter Of US-China Cold War July 2020 July 2020 Beijing may be faced with a technology cordon imposed by the United States, and yet have the option of circumventing this cordon via Taiwan’s advanced semiconductor manufacturing. Taiwan’s “Silicon Shield” used to be its security guarantee. Now that the US is tightening export controls and sanctions on China, Beijing has a greater need to confiscate that shield. This makes Taiwan the epicenter of the US-China struggle, as we have highlighted since 2016. The risk of a fourth Taiwan Strait crisis is as pertinent in the short run as it is over the long run, given that the US and China have already intensified their saber-rattling in the Strait (Chart II-14), including in the wake of COVID-19 specifically. China’s secular slowdown is prompting it to encroach on the borders of all of its neighbors simultaneously, creating a nascent balance-of-power alliance ranging from India to Australia to Japan. If China fails to curb its nationalism, then eventually US political polarization will decline as the country unites in the face of a peer competitor. If American divisions persist, they could drive the US to instigate conflict with China. Thus a failure of either side to restrain itself is a major geopolitical risk. The US and China ultimately face mutually assured destruction in the event of conflict, but they can have a clash in the near term before they learn their limits. The Cold War provides many occasions of such a learning process – from the Berlin airlift to the Cuban missile crisis. Such crises typically present buying opportunities for financial markets, but the consequences could be more far reaching if the Asian manufacturing supply chain is permanently damaged or if the shifting of supply chains out of China is too rapid. Globalization will also suffer as a result of currency wars. The US has not been successful in driving the dollar down, a key demand of the US-China trade war. It is much harder to force China to reform its labor and wage policies than it is to force it to appreciate its currency. But unlike Japan in 1985, China will not commit to unilateral appreciation for fear of American economic sabotage.   Punitive measures will remain an American tool. Contrary to popular belief, the US is not attempting to eliminate its trade deficit. It is attempting to reduce overreliance on China. Status quo globalization is intolerable for US strategy. But autarky is intolerable for US corporations. The compromise is globalization-ex-China, i.e., economic decoupling. Investment Implications Chart II-15Favor International Stocks As Growth Revives Favor International Stocks As Growth Revives Favor International Stocks As Growth Revives US stock market’s capitalization now makes up 58% of global capitalization (Chart II-15), reflecting the strength and innovation of American companies as well as a worldwide flight to safety during a decade of rising policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk. The revival of global growth amid this year’s gargantuan stimulus will prompt a major rotation out of US equities and into international and emerging market equities over the long run. As mentioned, the US greenback would also trend downward. However, there will be little clarity on the pace of nationalism and the fate of globalization until the US election is decided. Moreover the fate of globalization does not depend entirely on the United States. It mostly depends on countries in the east – Russia, China, and India, all of which are increasingly nationalistic.  A miscalculation over Taiwan, North Korea, the East China Sea, the South China Sea, trade, or technology could ignite into tariffs, sanctions, boycotts, embargoes, saber-rattling, proxy battles, and potentially even direct conflict. These risks are elevated in the short run but will persist in the long run. As the US decouples from China it will have to deepen relations with other trading partners. The trade deficit will not go away but will be redistributed to Asian allies. Southeast Asian nations and India – whose own nationalism has created a shift in favor of economic development – will be the long-run beneficiaries. Matt Gertken  Vice President Geopolitical Strategist   III. Indicators And Reference Charts We continue to favor stocks at the expense of bonds, a view held since our April issue. Global fiscal and monetary conditions remain highly accommodative. Now that the global economy is starting to recover as lockdowns ease, another tailwind for stocks has emerged. Nonetheless, last month we warned that the S&P 500 was entering a consolidation phase and that a pattern of volatile ups and downs would ensue. The combination of tactically overbought markets, elevated geopolitical risk, and a looming second wave of infections continues to sustain this short-term view. Hence, the S&P 500 is likely to churn between 2088 and 3200 over the coming months. On a cyclical basis, the same factors that made us willing buyers of stocks since late March remain broadly in place. Stocks are becoming increasingly expensive, but monetary conditions are extremely accommodative. Our Speculation Indicator continues to send a benign signal, which indicates that from a cyclical perspective, the market is not especially vulnerable. Finally, our Revealed Preference Indicator is flashing a strong buy signal. Tactically, equities must still digest the heady gains made since March 23. We have had five 5% or more corrections since March 23. More of them are in the cards. Both our Tactical Strength Indicator and the share of NYSE stocks trading above their 10-week moving averages point to a pullback of 5% to 10%. Moreover, while it remains extremely stimulative, our Monetary Indicator is not rising anymore, which increases the probability that traders start to pay more attention to geopolitical risks. According to our Bond Valuation Index, Treasurys are significantly more overvalued than equities. Additionally, our Composite Technical Indicator is losing momentum. This backdrop is dangerous for bonds, especially when sentiment towards this asset class is as high as it is today and economic growth is turning the corner. Finally, we expect the yield curve to steepen, especially for very long maturities where the Fed is less active. In a similar vein, inflation breakeven rates are a clean vehicle to bet on higher yields. Since we last published, the dollar has broken down. The greenback is expensive and its counter-cyclicality is a major handicap during a global economic recovery. Additionally, the US twin deficits are increasingly problematic. The fiscal deficit remains exceptionally wide and the re-opening of the US economy will pull down the household savings rate. The current account deficit is therefore bound to widen. The continued low level of real interest rates will complicate financing this deficit and to equilibrate the funding of US liabilities, the dollar will depreciate. The widening in the current account deficit also means that the large increase in money supply by the Fed will leak out of the US economy. This process will accentuate the dollar’s negative impulse. Technically, the accelerating downward momentum in our Dollar Composite Technical Indicator also warns of additional downside for the USD. Commodities continue to gain traction. The rapid move up in the Baltic Dry index suggests that more gains are in store for natural resource prices, especially as our momentum indicator is gaining strength. Moreover, the commodity advance/decline line remains in an uptrend. A global economic recovery, a weakening dollar, and falling real interest rates (driven by easy policy) indicate that fundamental factors – not just technical ones – are also increasingly commodity bullish. Tactically, if stocks churn, as we expect, commodities will likely do so as well. However, this move should also be seen as a consolidation of previous gains. Finally, gold remains strong, lifted by accommodative monetary conditions and a weak dollar. However, the yellow metal is now trading at a significant premium to its short-term fundamentals. Gold too is likely to trade in a volatile sideways pattern, especially if bond yields rise. EQUITIES: Chart III-1US Equity Indicators US Equity Indicators US Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3US Equity Sentiment Indicators US Equity Sentiment Indicators US Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5US Stock Market Valuation US Stock Market Valuation US Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6US Earnings US Earnings US Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance July 2020 July 2020 Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance July 2020 July 2020   FIXED INCOME:   Chart III-9US Treasurys And Valuations July 2020 July 2020 Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected US Bond Yields Selected US Bond Yields Selected US Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16US Dollar And PPP US Dollar And PPP US Dollar And PPP Chart III-17US Dollar And Indicator US Dollar And Indicator US Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18US Dollar Fundamentals US Dollar Fundamentals US Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28US And Global Macro Backdrop US And Global Macro Backdrop US And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29US Macro Snapshot US Macro Snapshot US Macro Snapshot Chart III-30US Growth Outlook US Growth Outlook US Growth Outlook Chart III-31US Cyclical Spending US Cyclical Spending US Cyclical Spending Chart III-32US Labor Market US Labor Market US Labor Market Chart III-33US Consumption US Consumption US Consumption Chart III-34US Housing US Housing US Housing Chart III-35US Debt And Deleveraging US Debt And Deleveraging US Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36US Financial Conditions US Financial Conditions US Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China   Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1  Please see Geopolitical Strategy "Social Unrest Can Still Cause Volatility," dated June 5, 2020, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2  Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "June 2020," dated May 28, 2020, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 3  Please see Geopolitical Strategy "Introducing: The Median Voter Theory," dated June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 4  Please see US Investment Strategy "So Far, So Good (How Markets Learned To Stop Worrying And Love Washington, DC)," dated June 8, 2020, available at usis.bcaresearch.com 5  The control group excludes auto and gas stations, and building materials. 6  Please see Geopolitical Strategy "Geopolitics Is The Next Shoe To Drop," dated April 10, 2020, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 7  Gold and silver are precious metals that benefit from lower interest rates and a weak dollar. However, a much larger proportion of the demand for silver comes from industrial processes. Thus, silver outperforms gold when an economic recovery is imminent. 8  Please see Emerging Markets Strategy "A FOMO-Driven Mania?," dated June 4, 2020, and Emerging Markets Strategy "EM: Follow The Momentum," dated June 18, 2020, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 9  Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "June 2020," dated May 28, 2020, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 10  Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). 11  Neli Esipova, Julie Ray, and Ying Han, “750 Million Struggling To Meet Basic Needs With No Safety Net,” Gallup News, June 16, 2020.  12  Christopher Chase-Dunn et al, “The Development of World-Systems,” Sociology of Development 1 (2015), pp. 149-172; and Chase-Dunn, Yukio Kawano, Benjamin Brewer, “Trade globalization since 1795: waves of integration in the world-system,” American Sociological Review 65 (2000), pp. 77-95.  13  Bruce Stokes, “Americans, Like Many In Other Advanced Economies, Not Convinced Of Trade’s Benefits,” September 26, 2018. 14  In other words, the mishandling of COVID-19 and the historic George Floyd protests of June 2020 have not taken as great of a toll on Trump’s national approval, thus far, as the Ukraine scandal last October, the government shutdown in January-February 2019, the near-failure to pass tax cuts in December 2017, or the Charlottesville incident in August 2017. This is surprising and points once more to Trump’s very solid political base, which could serve as a springboard for a comeback over the next four months.
BCA Research's Foreign Exchange Strategy service believes that the JPY offers a “heads I win, tails I do not lose too much” opportunity. Real interest rates are already higher in Japan than in the US. As such, the starting point for yen long positions is…
Highlights Historically, when global growth picks up, the yen weakens. But this is less likely in an environment where global yields remain anchored at low levels. Meanwhile, there is rising risk that consumption in Japan will remain muted. This will limit any pickup in domestic inflation. A modest rise in real rates will lead to a self-reinforcing upward spiral for the yen. That said, cheap yen valuations will buffet Japanese exports. Go short USD/JPY with an initial target of 100. Feature Chart I-1Higher Volatility, Higher Yen An Update On The Yen An Update On The Yen The powerful bounce in global markets since the March lows is at risk of a bigger technical correction. As we enter the volatile summer months, it may only require a small shift in market sentiment to trigger this reversal. The yen has tended to strengthen when market volatility rises (Chart I-1). Should this happen, it will provide the necessary catalyst for established long yen positions. On the other hand, if risk sentiment stays ebullient, the yen will surely weaken on its crosses but can still strengthen vis-à-vis the dollar. This places short USD/JPY bets in an enviable “heads I win, tails I do not lose too much” position. Growth And Monetary Policy Like most other economies, Japan entered a recession in the first quarter of this year, with GDP contracting at a 2.2% annualized pace. For the private sector, this is the worst growth rate since the Fukushima crisis in 2011. This is particularly significant, since the structural growth rate of the economy has fallen below interest rates. Going back to Japan’s lost decades, where private sector GDP growth averaged well below nominal rates (due to the zero bound), it is particularly imperative that Japan exits this liquidity trap in fast order (Chart I-2). A strong yen back then, on the back of deficient domestic demand, led to a self-fulfilling deflationary spiral. Chart I-2The Story Of Japan In One Chart The Story Of Japan In One Chart The Story Of Japan In One Chart The Bank of Japan began to acknowledge this problem with the end of the Heisei era1  last year. For example, with the BoJ owning almost 50% of outstanding JGBs, the supply side puts a serious limitation on how much more stimulus the BoJ can provide. The yen has become extremely sensitive to shifts in the relative balance sheets between the Federal Reserve and the BoJ. If the BoJ continues to purchase securities at the current pace, then the rate of expansion in its balance sheet will severely lag behind the Fed, and could trigger a knee-jerk rally in the yen (Chart I-3). Chart I-3The Yen And QE The Yen And QE The Yen And QE Inflation And The 2% Target The US is a much more closed economy than Japan, and has not been able to maintain a 2% inflation rate since the Global Financial Crisis. This makes the BoJ’s target of 2% a pipe dream for any timeline in the near future. There are three key variables the authorities pay attention to for inflation: Core CPI, the GDP deflator and the output gap. All three indicators point towards deflationary pressures, with the recent slowdown in the global economy exacerbating the trend. In fact, since the financial crisis, prices in Japan have only been able to really rise during a tax hike (Chart I-4). Always forgotten is that the overarching theme for prices in Japan is a rapidly falling (and ageing) population, leading to deficient demand. The overarching theme for prices in Japan is a rapidly falling (and ageing) population, leading to deficient demand. More importantly, almost 50% of the Japanese consumption basket is in tradeable goods, meaning domestic inflation is as much driven by the influence of the BoJ as it is by globalization. Even for domestically-driven prices, an ageing demographic that has a strong preference for falling prices is a powerful conflicting force. For example, over the years, a strong voting lobby has been able to advocate for lower telecom prices, which makes it difficult for the BoJ to re-anchor inflation expectations upward (Chart I-5). Chart I-4Japan CPI At A Glance Japan CPI At A Glance Japan CPI At A Glance Chart I-5Strong Deflationary Pressures In Japan Strong Deflationary Pressures In Japan Strong Deflationary Pressures In Japan Meanwhile, the BoJ understands that it needs domestic banks to expand the credit intermediation process if any inflation is to take hold. Unfortunately, the yield curve control strategy and negative interest rates have been anathema for Japanese net interest margins and share prices (Chart I-6). This puts the BoJ in a precarious balance between trying to stimulate the economy further and biting the hand that will feed a pickup in inflation. Chart I-6Point Of No Return For Japanese Banks? Point Of No Return For Japanese Banks? Point Of No Return For Japanese Banks? Japanese Consumption And Fiscal Policy The consumption tax hike last year delivered a severe punch to aggregate demand in Japan. COVID-19 has dealt a fatal blow. In prior episodes of the tax hikes, it took around three to four quarters for growth to eventually bottom. This suggests that a protracted slowdown in Japanese consumption is a fait accompli (Chart I-7). Foreign and domestic machinery orders are slowing, employment growth has gone from over 2% to free fall and the availability of jobs relative to applicants has reversed a decade-long rising trend. The Abe government has passed an additional 117 trillion yen of fiscal stimulus. With overall fiscal announcements near 40% of GDP, could this fully plug the spending gap? Not quite. The consumption tax hike last year delivered a severe punch to aggregate demand in Japan.  First, as is usually the case with Japanese stimulus announcements, the timeframe is uncertain for when the funds will be deployed. It could be one year or ten years. Chart I-7A V-Shaped Recovery Might Stall A V-Shaped Recovery Might Stall A V-Shaped Recovery Might Stall Chart I-8More Jobs, More Savings More Jobs, More Savings More Jobs, More Savings Second, Japanese consumption has been quite weak for some time. Despite relatively robust economic conditions since the Fukushima disaster, Japanese consumption has trended downward. The reason is that government spending triggered a rise in private savings, because of expectations of higher taxes. In other words, the savings ratio for workers has surged. If consumers were not willing to spend prior to COVID-19 due to Ricardian equivalence,2  they are unlikely to do so with much higher fiscal deficits (Chart I-8). Some of the government’s outlays will certainly go a long way to boosting aggregate demand, since the fiscal multiplier tends to be much larger in a liquidity trap. This will especially be the case for increased social security spending such as child education, construction activity or the move towards promoting cashless transactions (with a tax rebate). However, there are important near-term offsets. In particular, the postponement of the Olympics will continue to be a drag on Japanese construction activity, and the labor (and income) dividend from immigration has practically vanished. The important tourism industry that faced sudden death will only recover slowly. This suggests a much more protracted recovery in many nuggets of Japanese activity. The Yen As A Safe Haven Real interest rates are already higher in Japan, well before any of the above factors began to meaningfully generate a deflationary impulse. As such, the starting point for yen long positions is already favorable (Chart I-9). Real interest rates are already higher in Japan, well before any of the above factors began to meaningfully generate a deflationary impulse. With global growth bottoming, a continued rise in global equity markets is a key risk to our scenario. However, if inflows into Japan accelerate on cheap equity valuations, the propensity of investors to hedge these purchases will be much less today, given how cheap the yen has become. This is especially important since in an era of rising budget deficits, balance of payments dynamics can resurface as the key driver of currencies. This suggests the negative yen/Nikkei correlation will continue to weaken, as has been the case in recent quarters. Chart I-9Real Rates And The Yen Real Rates And The Yen Real Rates And The Yen Chart I-10USD/JPY And DXY Are Positively Correlated USD/JPY And DXY Are Positively Correlated USD/JPY And DXY Are Positively Correlated As a low-beta currency, our contention is that the yen will surely weaken on its crosses, but could strengthen versus the dollar. The yen rises versus the dollar not only during recessions, but during most episodes of broad dollar weakness (Chart I-10). This places short USD/JPY trades in an envious “heads I win, tails I do not lose too much” position.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The Heisei era refers to the period of Japanese history corresponding to the reign of Emperor Akihito from 8 January 8th, 1989 until his abdication on April 30th, 2019. 2 Ricardian equivalence suggests in simple terms that public sector dissaving will encourage private sector savings. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have been robust: Nonfarm payrolls increased by 2.5 million in May after declining by a record 20.7 million in April. This was better than expectations of an 8 million job loss. The unemployment rate fell from 14.7% to 13.3%. The NFIB business optimism index increased from 90.9 to 94.4 in May. Headline consumer price inflation fell from 0.3% to 0.1% year-on-year in May. Core inflation fell from 1.4% to 1.2%. Initial jobless claims increased by 1542K for the week ended June 5th. The DXY index fell by 1.3% this week. On Wednesday, the Fed left interest rates unchanged, with a signal that rates might not be increased before the end of 2022. The Fed also stated that it will maintain the current pace of Treasuries and mortgage-backed securities purchases, at minimum. Report Links: DXY: False Breakdown Or Cyclical Bear Market? - June 5, 2020 Cycles And The US Dollar - May 15, 2020 Capitulation? - April 3, 2020 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been improving: The Sentix investor confidence index improved from -41.8 to -24.8 in June. Employment increased by 0.4% year-on-year in Q1. GDP contracted by 3.1% year-on-year in Q1. The euro appreciated by 1.2% against the US dollar this week. At an online seminar held this week, Isabel Schnabel, member of the executive board of the ECB, noted that "evidence is increasingly pointing towards a protracted impact of the crisis on both demand and supply conditions in the euro area and beyond" and that the current PEPP remains appropriate in de aling with the global recession. Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been negative: The coincident index fell from 88.8 to 81.5 in April. The leading economic index also decreased from 85.1 to 76.2. The current account surplus shrank from ¥1971 billion to ¥262.7 billion in April. Annualized GDP fell by 2.2% year-on-year in Q1. Machine tool orders plunged by 52.8% year-on-year in May, following a 48.3% decrease the previous month. The Japanese yen appreciated by 2.6% against the US dollar this week. According to a Bloomberg survey, the majority of economists believe that the BoJ has done enough to cushion the economy, and expect the BoJ to leave current monetary policy unchanged next week. We continue to recommend the yen as a safe-haven hedge, especially given a possible second wave of COVID-19. Report Links: The Near-Term Bull Case For The Dollar - February 28, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the UK have been positive: Halifax house prices increased by 2.6% year-on-year in May. Retail sales surged by 7.9% year-on-year in May, up from 5.7% the previous month. GfK consumer confidence was little changed at -36 in May. The British pound rose by 1% against the US dollar this week. On Wednesday, BoE governor Andrew Bailey noted that easing lockdown restrictions has been fueling a recovery in the UK, which could be faster than previously anticipated. Our long GBP/USD and short EUR/GBP positions are 4% and 0.2% in the money, respectively. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been mixed: The NAB business confidence index increased from -45 to -20 in May. The business conditions index also ticked up from -34 to -24. The Westpac consumer confidence index increased from 88.1 to 93.7 in June. Home loans declined by 4.8% month-on-month in April, down from a 0.3% increase the previous month. That said, expectations were for a fall of 10%. AUD/USD was flat this week. While the RBA has other options in its policy toolkit to combat the global recession, negative interest rates is still on the table and hasn't been totally ruled out. We remain positive on the Australian dollar both against the US dollar and the New Zealand dollar due to cheap valuations and increasing Chinese stimulus. Report Links: On AUD And CNY - January 17, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been mixed: Manufacturing sales declined by 1.7% quarter-on-quarter in Q1, down from a 2.8% increase the previous quarter. ANZ business confidence increased from -41.8 to -33 in June. The activity outlook index also ticked up from -38.7 to -29.1. The New Zealand dollar appreciated by 0.8% against the US dollar this week. RBNZ's Deputy Governor Geoff Bascand said that house prices in New Zealand could fall by 9-10% or even worse. Besides disrupting exports and imports for a trade-reliant country like New Zealand, the global health crisis is also likely to further reduce immigration to New Zealand, curbing housing demand. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been positive: The unemployment rate ticked up from 13% to 13.7% in May, versus expectations of a rise to 15%, but this was due to a  rise in the participation rate from 59.8% to 61.4%. Average hourly wages increased by 10% year-on-year in May. Net employment increased by 289.6K, up from a 1994K job loss the previous month. Housing starts increased by 193.5K in May, up from 166.5K the previous month.  The Canadian dollar fell by 0.2% against the US dollar this week. The labor market has seen some recovery in May with the gradual easing of COVID-19 restrictions and re-opening of the economy. Employment rebounded and absences from work dropped. Notably, Quebec accounts for nearly 80% of overall employment gains in May. Report Links: More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 The Loonie: Upside Versus The Dollar, But Downside At The Crosses Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 There was scant data out of Switzerland this week: FX reserves increased from CHF 801 billion to CHF 816 billion in May.  The unemployment rate increased from 3.1% to 3.4% in May, lower than the expected 3.7%. The Swiss franc appreciated by 2.3% against the US dollar this week, reflecting a flight back to safety amid concerns over political risks and a second wave of COVID-19. While the euro has been strong recently and EUR/CHF touched 1.09, the franc has lost most of those gains. We are lifting our limit buy on EUR/CHF to 1.055 on expectations we are in a run-of-the-mill correction.  Report Links: On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Currency Market Signals From Gold, Equities And Flows - January 31, 2020 Portfolio Tweaks Before The Chinese New Year - January 24, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been mixed: Manufacturing output shrank by 1.6% month-on-month in April.  PPI fell by 17.5% year-on-year in May. Headline consumer prices increased by 1.3% year-on-year in May, up from 0.8% the previous month. Core inflation also increased from 2.8% to 3% in May. The Norwegian krone fell by 1.5% against the US dollar this week. The recent OPEC meeting over the weekend concluded that all members agreed to the extension to curb oil production. We believe that oil prices will continue to recover, and recommend to stay long the Norwegian krone. Report Links: A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Building A Protector Currency Portfolio - February 7, 2020 On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been mixed: Household consumption plunged by 10% year-on-year in April. The current account surplus increased from SEK 43.2 billion to SEK 80.6 billion in Q1. Headline consumer prices recovered from a 0.4% year-on-year decline to flat in May. The Swedish krona increased by 0.6% against the US dollar this week. Sweden is benefitting economically from a less stringent Covid-19 agenda. With very cheap valuations, we remain short EUR/SEK and USD/SEK. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades
Highlights In this Weekly Report, we present our semi-annual chartbook of the BCA Central Bank Monitors. All of the Monitors are now below the zero line, indicating the need for continued easy global monetary policy to help mitigate the COVID-19 recession (Chart of the Week). Central bankers have already responded in an intense and rapid fashion to the crisis, delivering a series of rate cuts, increased asset purchase programs and measures to support bank lending to businesses suffering under quarantines. All of these vehicles have helped trigger a powerful rally in global bond markets that helped revitalize risk assets as well. After the coordinated global easing response of the past few months, the optimal policy choices now differ from country to country. This creates opportunities to benefit from country allocation decisions even in a world of puny government bond yields. The overall signal from our Central Bank Monitors is still bond bullish, however – at least over the next few months until there is evidence of how fast global growth is rebounding from the COVID-19 lockdowns. An Overview Of The BCA Central Bank Monitors Chart of the WeekUltra-Accommodative Monetary Policies Are Still Required Ultra-Accommodative Monetary Policies Are Still Required Ultra-Accommodative Monetary Policies Are Still Required Chart 2A Bond-Bullish Message From Our CB Monitors A Bond-Bullish Message From Our CB Monitors A Bond-Bullish Message From Our CB Monitors The BCA Central Bank Monitors are composite indicators designed to measure the cyclical growth and inflation pressures that can influence future monetary policy decisions. The economic data series used to construct the Monitors are not the same for every country, but the list of indicators generally measure the same things (i.e. manufacturing cycles, domestic demand strength, commodity prices, labor market conditions, exchange rates, etc). The data series are standardized and combined to form the Monitors. Readings above the zero line for each Monitor indicate pressures for central banks to raise interest rates, and vice versa. Through the nexus between growth, inflation, and market expectations of future interest rate changes, the Monitors do exhibit broad correlations to government bond yields in the Developed Markets (Chart 2). All of the Monitors are indicating intense pressure to maintain very easy monetary policies in response to the global COVID-19 recession. While the bad economic and inflation news is largely discounted in the depressed level of bond yields worldwide, there are still opportunities to position country allocations within a government bond portfolio based on the message from our Monitors (overweighting the US, the UK and Canada, underweighting Germany and Japan). All of the Monitors are indicating intense pressure to maintain very easy monetary policies in response to the global COVID-19 recession.  In each BCA Central Bank Monitor Chartbook, we include a new chart for each country that we have not shown previously. In this edition, we show the components of the Monitors, grouped into those focusing on economic growth and inflation, plotted alongside our estimate of the appropriate level of central bank policy interest rates derived using a Taylor Rule. Fed Monitor: Policy Must Stay Accommodative Our Fed Monitor has collapsed below the zero line to recessionary levels (Chart 3A) in response to the coronavirus crisis. The Fed has already delivered a series of aggressive policy responses since March to help support an economy ravaged by the virus, including: interest rate cuts; quantitative easing (QE), including buying corporate and municipal debt; and setting up lending schemes for small businesses. The lockdown of almost the entire country has helped “flatten the curve” of the spread of COVID-19, but at a painful economic cost. The unemployment rate rose to 14.7% in April, the highest level since the Great Depression, and is expected to peak at levels above 20%. The result is unsurprising: a massive increase in spare economic capacity with a threat of deflation as headline CPI inflation plummeted to 0.3% in April (Chart 3B). Chart 3AUS: Fed Monitor US: Fed Monitor US: Fed Monitor Chart 3BUS Realized Inflation Flirting With 0% US Realized Inflation Flirting With 0% US Realized Inflation Flirting With 0% Within the components of our Fed Monitor, weakening growth has been the main driver of the decline (Chart 3C). Our Taylor Rule estimate suggests a deeply negative fed funds rate is “appropriate”, although the Fed is likely to pursue other avenues of easing like yield curve control before ever attempting a sub-0% policy rate. Chart 3CNegative Rates Are 'Required' In The US, But The Fed Has Other Options Negative Rates Are 'Required' In The US, But The Fed Has Other Options Negative Rates Are 'Required' In The US, But The Fed Has Other Options The fall in US Treasury yields over the past few months has been in line with the decline in our Fed Monitor (Chart 3D). While the US economy is slowly awakening from lockdowns, consumer and business confidence are likely to remain fragile given the numerous risks from a second wave of COVID-19, worsening US-China relations and, more recently, social unrest. Thus, we continue to recommend an overweight strategic allocation to the US within global government bond portfolios. The fall in US Treasury yields over the past few months has been in line with the decline in our Fed Monitor Chart 3DTreasury Yields Fully Reflect Pressure For More Fed Easing Treasury Yields Fully Reflect Pressure For More Fed Easing Treasury Yields Fully Reflect Pressure For More Fed Easing BoE Monitor: Negative Rates On The Horizon? Our Bank of England (BoE) Monitor has collapsed to the lowest level in its history on the back of the severe COVID-19 recession (Chart 4A). The BoE already cut the Bank Rate to 0.1% in March, ramped up asset purchases, and introduced a Term Funding scheme to support business lending. Any additional easing from here might entail negative policy rates, which markets are already discounting. The UK unemployment rate is expected to peak around 8%, with the BoE projecting the economy to shrink by -14% this year, which would be the worst recession in modern history. Inflation has dropped sharply on the back of the dual collapse of energy prices and economic growth, ending a period of currency-fueled inflation increases (Chart 4B). Chart 4AUK: BoE Monitor UK: BoE Monitor UK: BoE Monitor Chart 4BUK Realized Inflation Is Slowing Rapidly UK Realized Inflation Is Slowing Rapidly UK Realized Inflation Is Slowing Rapidly The components of our BoE Monitor fully reflect the dire economic situation (Chart 4C), with weak growth – led by sharp falls in business confidence – driving the collapse of the Monitor more than falling inflation pressures. Our Taylor Rule estimate of the policy rate is not yet calling for negative rates, but that is because we are using the New York Fed’s estimate of r* as the neutral real rate, which is a relatively high 1.4% (by comparison, r* in the US is estimated to be 0.5%). Chart 4CNegative Rates Are Not Yet Required In The UK Negative Rates Are Not Yet Required In The UK Negative Rates Are Not Yet Required In The UK The sharp fall in the BoE Monitor suggests that Gilt yields will remain under downward pressure in the coming months (Chart 4D). New BoE Governor Andrew Bailey has stated that a move to negative rates is not imminent, but markets will continue to flirt with the notion of sub-0% interest rates until the economy and inflation stabilize. We maintain an overweight stance on UK Gilts. Chart 4DBoE Monitor Suggests Continued Downward Pressure On Gilt Yields BoE Monitor Suggests Continued Downward Pressure On Gilt Yields BoE Monitor Suggests Continued Downward Pressure On Gilt Yields ECB Monitor: Continued Monetary Support Is Needed Our European Central Bank (ECB) Monitor is now well below the zero line, signaling a strong need for easier monetary policy to fight the COVID-19 downturn (Chart 5A). The ECB has delivered multiple measures to ease monetary conditions, including a new €750bn bond-buying vehicle and liquidity operations to help banks maintain lending to European businesses.​​​​​​​​​​​​​​ The recession has hit the region hard, with real GDP declining by -3.8% in Q1, the sharpest fall since records began in 1995. Unemployment rates have climbed higher, although to much lower levels than seen in the US thanks to more generous government labor support programs that have helped to limit layoffs. The sharp downturn has resulted in both a surge in spare economic capacity and plunge in headline inflation to 0.3% in April (Chart 5B). Chart 5AEuro Area: ECB Monitor Euro Area: ECB Monitor Euro Area: ECB Monitor Chart 5BEurope Is On The Edge Of Deflation Europe Is On The Edge Of Deflation Europe Is On The Edge Of Deflation Within the individual components of our ECB Monitor, both weaker growth and near-0% inflation have both contributed to the Monitor’s decline (Chart 5C). Our Taylor Rule measure shows that the ECB’s current stance of having policy rates modestly below 0% is appropriate. Chart 5CThe ECB Needs To Keep Its Foot On The Monetary Accelerator The ECB Needs To Keep Its Foot On The Monetary Accelerator The ECB Needs To Keep Its Foot On The Monetary Accelerator Despite the ECB’s easing measures, and in contrast to the message from our ECB Monitor, the downward momentum in core European bond yields has been fading (Chart 5D). With the ECB reluctant to push policy rates deeper into negative territory, and with reliable cyclical indicators like the German ZEW and IFO surveys showing signs that euro area growth is starting to recover from the lockdowns, the case for even lower core European yields in the coming months is not strong. We maintain our recommended underweight stance on German and French government bonds. We maintain our recommended underweight stance on German and French government bonds. Chart 5DNo Pressure For Higher German Bund Yields No Pressure For Higher German Bund Yields No Pressure For Higher German Bund Yields BoJ Monitor: What More Can Be Done? Our Bank of Japan (BoJ) Monitor has fallen further below zero, indicating easier policy is required (Chart 6A). The BoJ has already introduced additional easing measures in the past couple of months: extending forward guidance (inflation is projected to remain below the BoJ’s 2% target for the next three years), increasing asset purchases and enhancing loan programs to small and medium sized companies. New cases of COVID-19 have slowed sharply in Japan, prompting an end to the national state of emergency last week. Importantly, the virus did not hit Japan's labor market as severely as in other developed countries. The unemployment rate did reach a two-year high in April, but is still only 2.6% (Chart 6B). Fiscal stimulus and measures to protect job losses have played a major role in preventing a bigger spike in joblessness. Even with those measures, growth remains weak and realized inflation is heading back towards deflation. Chart 6AJapan: BoJ Monitor Japan: BoJ Monitor Japan: BoJ Monitor Chart 6BJapan Nearing Deflation Once Again Japan Nearing Deflation Once Again Japan Nearing Deflation Once Again Looking at the components of our BoJ Monitor, contracting growth, more than weakening inflation pressures, is the bigger driver of the fall in the Monitor below zero (Chart 6C). However, our Taylor Rule estimate does not suggest that the current level of the policy rate is out of line. Chart 6CBoJ Needs More Easing (Somehow) Until The Economy Revives BoJ Needs More Easing (Somehow) Until The Economy Revives BoJ Needs More Easing (Somehow) Until The Economy Revives The BoJ’s current combined policies of negative rates, QE and yield curve control are keeping JGB yields at near-0% levels. Those policies are also suppressing yield volatility and preventing an even bigger fall in JGB yields (with larger capital gains) as suggested by our BoJ Monitor (Chart 6D). We continue to recommend a maximum underweight in Japanese government bonds in a yield-starved world. Chart 6DJGB Yields Will Be Anchored For Some Time JGB Yields Will Be Anchored For Some Time JGB Yields Will Be Anchored For Some Time BoC Monitor: Deflationary Pressures Intensifying Our Bank of Canada (BoC) Monitor has collapsed into “easier policy required” territory, reaching levels last seen during the 2009 recession (Chart 7A). The central bank has already introduced several easing measures to help boost the virus-stricken economy, including cutting the Bank Rate to a mere 0.25% and starting a QE program to buy government bonds for the first time ever. Before the COVID-19 outbreak, some softening of the economy was already underway. Now, after the imposition of nationwide lockdowns to limit the spread of the virus, the unemployment rate has spiked to 13% - a level last seen in the early 1980s. The result is a massive deflationary output gap has opened up (Chart 7B), with realized headline CPI inflation printing at -0.2% in April. Chart 7ACanada: BoC Monitor Canada: BoC Monitor Canada: BoC Monitor Chart 7BOutright Headline CPI Deflation In Canada Outright Headline CPI Deflation In Canada Outright Headline CPI Deflation In Canada The fall in our BoC Monitor has been driven by both collapsing economic growth and weakening inflation pressures (Chart 7C). Our Taylor Rule estimate suggests that one of new BoC Governor Tiff Macklem’s first policy decisions may need to be a move to negative interest rates. Macklem and other BoC officials have not played up the possibility of cutting rates below 0%. However, the fact that the BoC provided no economic growth forecasts in the most recent Monetary Policy Report highlights the extreme uncertainties surrounding the economic impact from COVID-19 – even with the Canadian government providing a large fiscal response to the pandemic. Chart 7CBoC Monitor Plunging Due To High Unemployment & Low Inflation BoC Monitor Plunging Due To High Unemployment & Low Inflation BoC Monitor Plunging Due To High Unemployment & Low Inflation We upgraded our recommended stance on Canadian government debt to overweight back in March, and the collapse of the BoC Monitor suggests continued downward pressure on Canadian yields (Chart 7D). Stay overweight. The collapse of the BoC Monitor suggests continued downward pressure on Canadian yields.  Chart 7DCanadian Yield Momentum In Line With The BoC Monitor Canadian Yield Momentum In Line With The BoC Monitor Canadian Yield Momentum In Line With The BoC Monitor RBA Monitor: Rate Cutting Cycle Is Done Due to a slump in export demand and a weakening housing market, our Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) monitor has been consistently calling for rate cuts since April 2018 (Chart 8A). Australia began its easing cycle early, having delivered a total of 125bps of stimulus since June 2019, with the two most recent cuts coming directly in response to the COVID-19 crisis. As in other developed markets, the unemployment gap in Australia has widened dramatically, owing to job losses concentrated in tourism, entertainment, and dining out (Chart 8B). Although inflation briefly breached the low end of the RBA’s 2-3% target band in Q1, this will not be a lasting development. The RBA sees headline CPI deflating by -1% year-on-year in Q2/2020 and, even as far as 2022, only sees it growing at 1.5%. Chart 8AAustralia: RBA Monitor Australia: RBA Monitor Australia: RBA Monitor Chart 8BInflation Will Remain Stuck Below RBA 2-3% Target Inflation Will Remain Stuck Below RBA 2-3% Target Inflation Will Remain Stuck Below RBA 2-3% Target Although both the growth and inflation components of our RBA Monitor are below zero, the former drove the most recent decline (Chart 8C) led by consumer confidence almost touching the 2008 lows. The RBA has already responded by cutting rates to near 0%, well below the Taylor Rule implied estimate, and initiating yield curve control with a cap on 3-year government bond yields at 0.25%. Chart 8CNo Pressure For The RBA To Go To Negative Rates No Pressure For The RBA To Go To Negative Rates No Pressure For The RBA To Go To Negative Rates Overall, Australian bond yields have accurately priced in the dovish signal from our RBA Monitor (Chart 8D). With COVID-19 relatively well contained in Australia, there is less pressure on the RBA to ease further. Governor Lowe has also ruled out negative rates, which will put a floor under yields. Owing to these factors, we confidently reiterate our neutral stance on Australian government debt within global fixed income portfolios. Australian bond yields have accurately priced in the dovish signal from our RBA Monitor. Chart 8DAustralian Bond Yields Are Unlikely To Move Much Lower Australian Bond Yields Are Unlikely To Move Much Lower Australian Bond Yields Are Unlikely To Move Much Lower RBNZ Monitor: Cause For Concern After a resurgence late last year, our Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) Monitor has declined to a level slightly below zero (Chart 9A). The RBNZ responded to the pandemic by delivering a massive -75bps cut in March, but has since left the policy rate untouched, preferring to deliver further stimulus by doubling the size of its QE program. Forward guidance is signaling that the policy rate will remain at 0.25% until 2021, but the central bank has not ruled out negative rates in the future. ​​​​​​​Although the actual unemployment numbers do not yet capture the impact of the pandemic, both consensus and RBNZ forecasts call for a blowout in the unemployment gap (Chart 9B). The RBNZ expects the steady improvement in inflation seen up to Q1/2020 to be wiped out, with headline CPI projected to remain below the 1-3% target range until mid-2022. Chart 9ANew Zealand: RBNZ Monitor New Zealand: RBNZ Monitor New Zealand: RBNZ Monitor Chart 9BRealized NZ Inflation Was Drifting Higher, Pre-Virus Realized NZ Inflation Was Drifting Higher, Pre-Virus Realized NZ Inflation Was Drifting Higher, Pre-Virus Surprisingly, the inflation component of our RBNZ Monitor is actually calling for tighter monetary policy, owing to significant strength in the housing market (Chart 9C). However, this trend is likely to reverse - the RBNZ foresees a -9% decline in house prices over the remainder of 2020. Meanwhile, growth components such as consumer confidence and employment will remain depressed, holding down our RBNZ monitor. Chart 9CGrowth, Now Inflation, Has Driven The RBNZ Monitor Lower Growth, Now Inflation, Has Driven The RBNZ Monitor Lower Growth, Now Inflation, Has Driven The RBNZ Monitor Lower Overall, the momentum in New Zealand bond yields seems to have overshot the message from our RBNZ Monitor (Chart 9D). However, with so much uncertainty about business investment and cash flows from key sectors such as tourism and education, it is too early to bet on an improvement in yields. We therefore maintain a neutral recommendation on NZ sovereign debt. Chart 9DNZ Bond Yields Are Unlikely To Move Lower NZ Bond Yields Are Unlikely To Move Lower NZ Bond Yields Are Unlikely To Move Lower Riksbank Monitor: Worries For The Coronavirus Mavericks Amid the global pandemic, our Riksbank Monitor has collapsed to all-time lows (Chart 10A). In its April monetary policy decision, the Riksbank opted for continued asset purchases and liquidity measures to support bank lending to companies over a move to negative rates. One of the primary concerns for the Riksbank is headline CPI inflation, which fell into mild deflation (-0.4% year-over-year) in April on the back of lower energy prices and weaker domestic demand (Chart 10B). This could spill over into a lasting decline in long-term inflation expectations if the economy does not quickly improve. Chart 10ASweden: Riksbank Monitor Sweden: Riksbank Monitor Sweden: Riksbank Monitor Chart 10BSwedish Realized Inflation Back To 0% Swedish Realized Inflation Back To 0% Swedish Realized Inflation Back To 0% Both the growth and inflation components of our Riksbank Monitor are calling for further easing, with the growth component now at post-crisis lows (Chart 10C). The collapse on the growth side can be attributed to historic falls in retail confidence, the manufacturing PMI and employment while the inflation component remains depressed due to low headline numbers and inflation expectations. Chart 10CThe Riksbank Hates Negative Rates, But Could Still Need Them If The Economy Worsens The Riksbank Hates Negative Rates, But Could Still Need Them If The Economy Worsens The Riksbank Hates Negative Rates, But Could Still Need Them If The Economy Worsens The sharp downward move in our Riksbank Monitor suggests Swedish bond yields should remain under downward pressure in the coming months (Chart 10D). The key factor for yields will be the effect of the relatively lax measures implemented by Sweden to combat the pandemic. Sweden saw positive GDP growth in Q1/2020 due to fewer restrictions on the economy. However, infection and mortality rates are much higher in Sweden than in neighboring countries and, as a result, Denmark and Norway excluded Sweden from their open border agreement. Continued restrictions of the sort are bearish for growth – and bullish for bonds – in this trade-dependent economy. Chart 10DSwedish Bond Yields Will Remain Under Downward Pressure Swedish Bond Yields Will Remain Under Downward Pressure Swedish Bond Yields Will Remain Under Downward Pressure   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, CFA Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com ​​​​​​​Shakti Sharma Research Associate ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index BCA Central Bank Monitor Chartbook: Collapse BCA Central Bank Monitor Chartbook: Collapse ​​​​​​​ Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
In April, Japanese exports contracted nearly 22% year-on-year. This was the poorest reading since the Great Financial Crisis, and it was also worse than the August 1986 number that followed a 71% appreciation in the yen. Clearly, Japan’s economy is suffering…