Latin America

Highlights Over the short term – 1-2 years – the pick-up in re-infection rates in Asia and LatAm states with large-scale deployments of Sinopharm and Sinovac COVID-19 vaccines will re-focus attention on demand-side risks to the global recovery (Chart of the Week). The UAE-Saudi impasse re extending the return of additional volumes of OPEC 2.0 spare capacity to the oil market over 2H21 will be short-lived.  The UAE's official baseline production will be increased to 3.8mm b/d from 3.2mm b/d presently, and its output in 2H21 will be adjusted accordingly.  Over the medium term – 3-5 years out – the risk to the expansion of metal supplies needed for renewables and electric vehicles (EVs) will rise, as left-of-center governments increase taxes and royalties, and carbon prices move higher. Rising metals costs will redound to the benefit of oil and gas producers, and accelerate R+D in carbon- and GHG-reduction technologies. Longer-term – 5-10 years out – the active discouragement of investment in hydrocarbons will contribute to energy shortages. In anticipation of continued upside volatility in commodity prices and share values of oil, gas and metals producers, we remain long the S&P GSCI and COMT ETF, and long equities of producers and traders via the PICK ETF. Feature Our conversations with clients almost invariably leads us to considering the risks to our long-standing bullish views for energy and metals. This week, we reprise some of the highlights of these conversations. In the short term, our bullish call on oil is underpinned by the assumption of continued expansion in vaccinations, which we believe will lead to global economic re-opening and increased mobility, as the world emerges from the devastation of COVID-19. This expectation is once again under scrutiny. On the supply side, the very public negotiations undertaken by the UAE and the leaders of OPEC 2.0 – the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – over re-basing the UAE's production reminds investors there is substantial spare capacity from the coalition available for the market over the short term. The slow news cycle going into the US Independence Day holiday certainly was a fortuitous time to make such a point. Chart of the WeekWorrisome Uptick Of COVID-19 Cases Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views KSA-UAE Supply-Side Worries The abrupt end to this week's OPEC 2.0 meeting was unsettling to markets. Shortly after the meeting ended – without being concluded – officials from the Biden administration in the US spoke with officials from KSA and the UAE, presumably to encourage resolution of outstanding issues and to get more oil into the market to keep crude oil prices below $80/bbl (Chart 2). We're confident the KSA-UAE impasse re extending the return of additional volumes of spare capacity to the oil market over 2H21 will be short-lived. The UAE's official baseline production number (i.e., its October 2018 output level) will be increased to 3.8mm b/d from 3.2mm b/d presently, and its output in 2H21 will be adjusted accordingly. Coupled with a likely return of Iranian export volumes in 4Q21, this will bring prices down into the mid- to high-$60/bbl range we are forecasting. Chart 2US Pushing For Resolution of KSA-UAE Spat US Pushing For Resolution of KSA-UAE Spat US Pushing For Resolution of KSA-UAE Spat Longer term, markets are worried this incident is a harbinger of a breakdown in OPEC 2.0's so-far-successful production-management strategy, which has lifted oil prices 200% since their March 2020 nadir. At present, the producer coalition has ~ 6-7mm b/d of spare capacity, which resulted from its strategy to keep the level of supply below demand. A breakdown in this discipline – in extremis, another price war of the sort seen in March 2020 or from 2014-2016 – could plunge oil markets into a price collapse that re-visits sub-$40/bbl levels. In our view, economics – specifically the cold economic reality of the price elasticity of supply – continues to work for the OPEC 2.0 coalition: Higher revenues are realized by members of the group as long as relatively small production cuts produce larger revenue gains – e.g., a 5% (or less) cut in production that produces a 20% (or more) increase in price trumps a 20% increase in production that reduces prices by 50%. Besides, none of the members of the coalition possess the wherewithal to endure another shock-and-awe display from KSA similar to the one following the breakdown of the March 2020 OPEC 2.0 meeting. We also continue to expect US shale-oil producers to be disciplined by capital markets, and to retain a focus on providing competitive returns to their shareholders, which will limit supply growth to that which maintains profitability. Until we see actual evidence of a breakdown in the coalition's willingness to maintain its production-management strategy, we will continue to assume it remains operative. Worrisome COVID-19 Re-Infection Trends Reports of increased re-infection rates in Latin American and Asia-Pacific states providing Chinese Sinopharm and Sinovac COVID-19 vaccines will re-focus attention on demand-side risks to the global recovery. Conclusive data on the efficacy of these vaccines is not available at present, based on reporting from Health Policy Watch (HPW).1 The vast majority of these vaccines were purchased in Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region, where ~ 80% of the 759mm doses of the two Chinese vaccines were sold, according to HPW's reporting. This will draw the attention of markets to this risk (Chart 3). Of particular concern are the increases in re-infection rates in the Seychelles and Chile, where the majority of populations in both countries were inoculated with one of the Chinese vaccines. Re-infections in Indonesia also are drawing attention, where more than 350 healthcare workers were re-infected after receiving the Sinovac vaccination.2 The risk of renewed global lockdowns remains small, but if these experiences are repeated globally with adverse health consequences, this assessment could be challenged. Chart 3COVID-19 Returning In High-Vaccination States Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views Transition Risks To A Low-Carbon Economy Over the medium- to long-terms, our metals views are premised on the expectation the build-out of the global EV fleet and renewable electricity generation – including its supporting grids – will require massive increases in the supply of copper, aluminum, nickel, and tin, not to mention iron ore and steel. This surge in demand will be occurring as governments rush headlong into unplanned and unsynchronized wind-downs of investment in the hydrocarbon fuels that power modern economies.3 The big risk here is new metal supplies will not be delivered fast enough to build all of the renewable generation, EVs and their supporting grids and infrastructures to cover the loss of hydrocarbons phased out by policy, legal and boardroom challenges. Such a turn of events would re-invigorate oil and gas production. Renewable energy and electric vehicles are the sine qua non of the drive to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. However, the rising price of base metals will add to already high costs of rebuilding power grids to make them suitable for green energy. Given miners’ reluctance to invest in new mines, we do not expect metals prices to drop anytime soon. According to Wood Mackenzie, in 2019 the cost of shifting just the US power grid to renewable energy over the next 10 years will amount to $4.5 trillion.4 Given these cost and supply barriers, fossil fuels will need to be used for longer than the IEA outlined in its recent and controversial report on transitioning to a net-zero economy.5 To ensure that fossil fuels can be used while countries work to achieve their net zero goals, carbon capture utilization and storage (CCUS) technology will need to be developed and made cheaper. The main barrier to entry for CCUS technology is its high cost (Chart 4). However, like renewable energy, the more it is deployed and invested in, the cheaper it will become, following the trend seen in the development of renewable energy and EVs, which were aided by large-scale subsidies from governments to encourage the development of the technology. These cost reductions are already visible: In its 2019 report, the Global CCS Institute noted the cost of implementing CCS technology initially used in 2014 had fallen by 35% three years later. Chart 4CCUS Can Be Expensive Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views Metals Mines' Long Lead Times In 2020 the total amount of discovered copper reserves in the world stood at ~ 870mm MT (Chart 5), according to the US Geological Service (USGS). As of 2017, the total identified and undiscovered amount of reserves was ~ 5.6 billion MT.6 The World Bank recently estimated additional demand for copper would amount to ~ 20mm MT p.a. by 2050 (Chart 6).7 Glencore’s recently retired CEO Ivan Glasenberg last month said that by 2050, miners will need to produce around 60mm MT p.a. of copper to keep up with demand for countries’ net zero initiatives.8 Even with this higher estimate, if miners focus on exploration and can tap into undiscovered reserves, supply will cover demand for the renewable energy buildout. Chart 5Copper Reserves Are Abundant Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views Chart 6Call On Base Metals Supply Will Be Massive Out To 2050 Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views While recent legislative developments in Chile and Peru, which together constitute ~ 34% of total discovered copper reserves, could lead to significantly higher costs as left-of-center governments re-write these states' constitutions, geological factors would not be the main constraint to copper supply for the renewables energy buildout: Even if copper mining companies were to move out of these two countries, there still is about 570 million MT in discovered copper reserves, and nearly ten times that amount in undiscovered reserves. As we have written in the past, capital expenditure restraint is the principal reason the supply side of copper markets – and base metals generally – is challenged (Chart 7). Unlike in the previous commodity boom, this time mining companies are focusing on providing returns to shareholders, instead of funding the development of new mines (Chart 8). Chart 7Copper Prices Remains Parsimonious Copper Prices Remains Parsimonious Copper Prices Remains Parsimonious Chart 8Shareholder Interests Predominate Metals Agendas Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views Of course, it is likely metals miners, like oil producers, are waiting to see actual demand for copper and other base metals pick up before ramping capex. Sharp increases in forecasted demand is not compelling for miners, at this point. This means metals prices could stay elevated for an extended period, given the 10-15-year lead times for copper mines (Chart 9). For example, the Kamoa-Kakula mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) now being brought on line took roughly 24 years of exploration and development work, before it started producing copper. Technological breakthroughs that increase brownfield projects’ productivity, or significant increases in the amount of recycled copper as a percent of total copper supply would address some of the price pressures arising from the long lead times associated with the development of new copper supply. Another scenario with a non-trivial probability that threatens the viability of metals investing is a breakthrough – or breakthroughs – in CCUS technology, which allows oil and gas producers to remove enough carbon from their fuels to allow firms using these fuels to achieve their net-zero carbon goals. Chart 9Long Lead Times For Mine Development Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views Investment Implications Short-term supply-demand issues affecting the oil market at present are transitory, and do not signal a shift in the fundamentals supporting our bullish call on oil. Our thesis based on continued production discipline remains intact. That said, we will continue to subject it to rigorous scrutiny on a continual basis. Our average Brent forecast for 2021 remains $66.50/bbl, with 2H21 prices averaging $70/bbl. For 2022 and 2023 we continue to expect prices to average $74 and $81/bbl, respectively (Chart 10). WTI will trade $2-$3/bbl lower. Our metals view has become slightly more nuanced, thanks to our client conversations. One of the unintended consequences of the unplanned and uncoordinated rush to a net-zero carbon future will be an improvement in the competitive position of oil and gas as transportation fuels and electric-generation fuels going forward. This will be driven by rising costs of developing and delivering the metals supplies needed to effect the net-zero transition. We expect markets will provide incentives to CCUS technologies and efforts to decarbonize oil and gas fuels, which will contribute to the global effort to arrest rising temperatures. This suggests the rush to sell these assets – which is underway at present – could be premature.9 In the extreme, this could be a true counterbalance to the metals story, if it plays out. Chart 10Our Oil Price View Remains Intact Our Oil Price View Remains Intact Our Oil Price View Remains Intact     Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish The monthly OPEC 2.0 meeting ended without any action to increase monthly supplies, following the UAE's bid to increase its baseline reference production – determined based on October 2018 production levels – to 3.8mm b/d, up from 3.2mm b/d. S&P Global Platts reported the UAE's Energy Minister, Suhail al-Mazrouei, advanced a proposal to raise its monthly production level under the coalition's overall output deal, while KSA's energy minister, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, insisted the UAE follow OPEC 2.0 procedures in seeking an output increase. We do not expect this issue to become a protracted standoff between these states. The disagreement between the ministers is procedural to substantive. Remarks by bin Salman last month – to wit, KSA has a role in containing inflation globally – and his earlier assertions that production policy of OPEC 2.0 would be driven by actual oil demand, as opposed to forecasted oil demand, suggest the Kingdom is not aiming for higher oil prices per se. Base Metals: Bullish Spot benchmark iron ore (62 Fe) prices traded above $222/MT this week in China on the back of stronger steel demand, according to mining.com (Chart 11). Market participants are anticipating further steel-production restrictions and appear to be trying to get out in front of them. Precious Metals: Bullish The USD rally eased this week, allowing gold prices to stabilize following the June Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting. In the two weeks since the FOMC, our gold composite indicator shows that gold started entering oversold territory (Chart 12). We believe gold prices will start correcting upwards, expecting investor bargain-hunting to pick up after the price drop. The mixed US jobs report, which showed the unemployment rate ticked up more than expected, implies that interest rates are not going to be raised soon. Our colleagues at BCA Research's US Bond Strategy (USBS) expect rates to increase only by end-2022.10 This, along with slightly higher odds of a potential COVID-19 resurgence, will support gold prices in the near-term. Ags/Softs: Neutral The USDA's Crop Progress report for the week ended 4 July 2021 showed 64% of the US corn crop was in good to excellent condition, down from the 71% reported for the comparable 2020 date. The Department reported 59% of the bean crop was in good to excellent shape vs 71% the year earlier. Chart 11 BENCHMARK IRON ORE 62% FE, CFR CHINA (TSI) GOING DOWN BENCHMARK IRON ORE 62% FE, CFR CHINA (TSI) GOING DOWN Chart 12 Sentiment Supports Oil Prices Sentiment Supports Oil Prices     Footnotes 1     Please see Are Chinese COVID Vaccines Underperforming? A Dearth of Real-Life Studies Leaves Unanswered Questions, published by Health Policy Watch, June 18, 2021. 2     According to HPW, the World Health Organization's Emergency Use Listing for these two vaccines "were unique in that unlike the Pfizer, AstraZeneca, Moderna, and Jonhson & Johonson vaccines that it had also approved, neither had undergone review and approval by a strict national or regional regulatory authority such as the US Food and Drug Administration or the European Medicines Agency. Nor have Phase 3 results of the Sinopharm and Sinovac trials been published in a peer-reviewed medical journal.  More to the point, post-approval, any large-scale tracking of the efficacy of the Sinovac and Sinopharm vaccine rollouts by WHO or national authorities seems to be missing." 3    Please see A Perfect Energy Storm On The Way, which we published on June 3, 2021 for additional discussion.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4    Please refer to The Price of a Fully Renewable US Grid: $4.5 Trillion, published by greentechmedia 28 June 2019. 5    Please refer to the IEA's Net Zero By 2050, published in May 2021. 6    Please refer to USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries, 2021. 7     Please refer to Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition, published by the World Bank. 8    Please refer to Copper supply needs to double by 2050, Glencore CEO says, published by reuters.com on June 22, 2021. 9    Please see the FT's excellent coverage of this trend in A $140bn asset sale: the investors cashing in on Big Oil’s push to net zero published on July 6, 2021. 10   Please refer to Watch Employment, Not Inflation, published by the USBS on June 15, 2021.   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades Image

Please note: There will be no Strategy Report next week, July 15. Our next publication will be a Thematic: Charts That Matter, on July 22. Highlights For any country with local currency public debt, the ultimate constraints to lower debt burden and service debt are the magnitude of inflation overshoot and/or currency depreciation that authorities are willing to tolerate. What makes Brazil’s public debt untenable is not the level of debt but the very high domestic interest rates. Growing odds of Lula’s victory in the next presidential election in October 2022 entail an eventual shift to more pro-growth fiscal and monetary policies in Brazil. The upshot of these policies will be higher inflation and chronic currency depreciation. Brazilian share prices will likely rally on the back of high nominal growth over the coming years. Yet, currency depreciation will dampen equity returns for international investors. Absolute-return investors with a medium- and long-term horizon should consider going long stocks and shorting the BRL. Feature One of the structural challenges Brazil faces is the public debt overhang. Fiscal and monetary authorities have responded by periodically embarking on fiscal and monetary austerity. Yet, such austerity depresses nominal growth and has in fact worsened public debt dynamics. Can Brazil break out of the vicious circle that has held the economy in check for the past several years? We suspect that authorities will ultimately move away from fiscal and monetary tightening despite the large public debt overhang. Abandoning fiscal and monetary austerity will boost growth. However, these policies will entail higher inflation and currency depreciation. Such a macro shift warrants the following long-term investment strategy in Brazil: going long stocks and shorting the real. Policymakers’ Ultimate Constraint For any country with local currency public debt, the ultimate constraints to lower debt burden and service debt are the magnitude of inflation overshoot and/or currency depreciation that authorities are willing to tolerate. In Brazil, such a policy trade-off is pertinent because productivity-boosting structural reforms – that could lift its potential GDP growth rate – are not realistic in the foreseeable future. We discuss the political landscape and economic policies in detail below. Chart 1Sufficient Fiscal Tightening To Stabilize Public Debt Is Not Politically Feasible Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? As we have written previously, any country with predominantly local currency public debt can stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio by either (1) running continuous sizable primary surpluses or (2) having nominal GDP growth consistently above the interest rate on government debt. The former is politically unfeasible in Brazil because it requires such substantial fiscal tightening that no government can deliver (Chart 1). The second criteria of having nominal GDP to grow meaningfully above government borrowing costs cannot be achieved in Brazil without major government stimulus to boost nominal GDP while also capping local bond yields. Although the nation’s nominal GDP growth has recently improved at about 6.5-7%, its underlying trend is still below government borrowing costs in local currency at 8% (Chart 2). Chart 2Brazil Needs Higher Nominal GDP Growth And Lower Domestic Bond Yields Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? If and as the central bank (BCB) continues to hike policy rate, government effective borrowing costs will rise. The basis is that in recent years, the government has drastically increased the share of short-term local currency debt. Consequently, as the BCB raises the SELIC rate and as the government has to roll over maturing short-term bonds, its borrowing costs will rise. Chart 3Various Measures Of Public Debt Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? On the whole, we consider that in the medium and long run, Brazil’s nominal GDP growth will need to hover at higher levels (say, 9-10%) for it to meaningfully exceed government borrowing costs of 8%. This is the only politically feasible option to achieve public debt sustainability in Brazil. Yet, this entails persistent inflation of 7-8%. Provided that Brazil’s labor force growth will be 0.5% in the coming years, and if we assume underlying productivity growth of 1.5%, the potential (real) GDP growth is probably around 2%. Hence, to achieve nominal GDP growth of 9-10%, inflation should average 7-8%. This is only possible if fiscal and monetary policies become very stimulative. Why does Brazil need to stabilize the public debt-to-GDP ratio? The reason is that the latter is at levels where debt servicing consumes 4% of GDP or 26% of federal government spending. A higher debt-to-GDP ratio will devour more resources. With fiscal spending straightjacketed by the Fiscal Responsibility Law, rising debt servicing will curb non-interest government spending and, thus, economic growth. There are different measures of the nation’s public debt. The Brazilian central bank’s measure stands at 87% of GDP while the IMF’s measure stands at 97% of GDP. The difference is that the IMF includes all government securities held by the central bank while the BCB excludes non-repo government securities held by the BCB from its public debt calculation (please see Chart 3 and Box 1 for more information and analysis). BOX 1 What Is The Correct Measure Of Brazil’s Public Debt? The key difference between the IMF and BCB calculations of Brazil’s public debt is the way these account for government securities held by the central bank. The BCB’s measure of public debt includes its holdings of government securities used in repo operations – they amount to 15% of GDP – but excludes the ones for non-repo operations – equivalent to 10% of GDP. The IMF measure includes all government securities held by the central bank (Chart 3). Each of these two measures has its pros and cons. We will not get into technical details as to which one is superior because from a big picture perspective the precise level of public debt and how to measure it are not significant. We have three considerations concerning this point: The reason why Brazil needs to reduce the public debt-to-GDP ratio is that interest payments on public debt consume 4% of GDP or 26% of federal government spending. This is hurting Brazil’s development. The government needs to divert spending to other programs to lift the nation’s growth trajectory. “High public debt” is a relative concept and this metric should be compared with the identical measures of other countries. Given the Brazilian central bank’s large holdings of government bonds, it makes sense to compare Brazil with the US and Japan where their respective central banks also own large shares of government bonds and notes. As Chart 3 reveals, if one were to exclude the central bank’s holdings of government securities from public debt, the public debt-to-GDP ratio would be 70% in Brazil, 105% in the US and 125% in Japan. Finally, if investor concern is public debt monetization by the central bank and commercial banks, the focal point of analysis should be the level of and trend in broad money supply not the level of public debt. Chart 4 suggests that broad money supply as a share of GDP in Brazil is somewhat elevated but not very high compared with other nations. Bottom Line: What makes Brazil’s public debt untenable is not the level of debt but the very high domestic interest rates. Brazil needs much lower interest rates – potentially via financial repression – to ensure public debt sustainability. In turn, financial repression/suppression of interest rates will cause considerable currency deprecation. Chart 4Broad Money Supply-to-GDP Ratios: A Cross Country Perspective Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? Yet, whether the level of public debt is 87% of GDP or 97% does not really matter. If neither of the above two criteria of public debt sustainability is satisfied, the government debt-to-GDP ratio will continue rising with negative ramifications for growth in Brazil. Chart 5Brazil: Broad Money (M4) Growth And Impulse Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? While Brazil needs higher nominal growth, local bond yields must also be capped well below nominal GDP growth. If local and foreign creditors are reluctant to finance the government at yields lower than nominal GDP growth, the central bank and/or commercial banks could fill in the gap and purchase domestic bonds. In doing so, the central bank and commercial banks would create more deposits/money supply and, thereby, ceteris paribus exert downward pressure on the exchange rate. As we have argued in previous reports, in any country, when the central bank and commercial banks purchase securities from non-banks, they create money/deposits “out of thin air.” Hence, national savings are not a constraint for the central bank and for commercial banks to finance the government and bring down government bond yields. The primary indicator to monitor whether Brazil is beginning to run more stimulative policies is the M4, the broadest measure of money supply in Brazil. It reflects the monetary and fiscal policy stance as well as captures debt monetization. Chart 5 illustrates Brazil’s M4 annual growth rate (the top panel) and its impulse – calculated as the second derivative (the bottom panel). The M4 impulse reflects how stimulative both monetary and fiscal policies are at any point in time. The spike in the M4 impulse last year reflected large fiscal stimulus and aggressive monetary easing by the central bank. Chart 6Brazil Is Going Through Large Fiscal Tightening Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? For now, the M4 impulse will continue falling because monetary policy is tightening and the fiscal thrust is estimated by the IMF to be -5% of GDP this year and -1% in 2022 (Chart 6). Bottom Line: The only chance for Brazil to stabilize public debt dynamics is to run loose monetary and fiscal policies. In short, Brazil needs to inflate its way out of public debt. The outcome will be currency depreciation yet strong nominal growth that will produce higher share prices in local currency terms. Former president Lula’s PT (Workers’ Party) and its economic policies put Brazil’s government finances on an unsustainable trajectory ten years ago. Ironically, it could be Lula’s comeback as president that could address the issue of public debt and stabilize public finances. Lula’s Comeback Chart 7Lula Is Massively Beating Bolsonaro In Polls Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? Odds of former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva running and winning the presidential elections next year have greatly increased in recent months. His presidency will have considerable ramifications for macro-economic policies, the economy and financial markets in the medium-to-long term. The rulings of the Supreme Federal Court have legally paved the way for Lula to participate in the 2022 October presidential elections. While there are still charges pending against Lula, the odds of a full trial and conviction against the ex-president within the next 15 months are negligible. According to the latest June polls from local company IPEC, voting intentions for the first round of elections show Lula mustering over twice as many votes as Bolsonaro, and miles away from the crowded centrist camp (Chart 7). President Bolsonaro’s disapproval rating has reached an all-time high since the beginning of his term. The government’s failure to handle the COVID-19 pandemic effectively has been put in the spotlight due to an ongoing inquiry by Congress, which is being broadcast daily on public television. Further, last week the Supreme Court authorized a criminal investigation into the government for allegations of corruption and irregularities in the procurement of vaccines from India’s Covaxin. It is uncertain as to whether these trials will lead to impeachment procedures given House leader Arthur Lira’s support for Bolsonaro. Nevertheless, odds are that the investigation will cement popular opinion against the current president. There is growing evidence that Lula is positioning himself as a mainstream moderate candidate. This will give him an advantage against Bolsonaro as centrist voters will likely abandon Bolsonaro and support Lula in the upcoming presidential elections. Lula has been meeting with political leaders from the center left and center right, trying to garner support from various corners of the political spectrum that have become disillusioned with Bolsonaro. It seems Lula is attempting to position next year’s presidential elections as a matter of Bolsonaro versus the rest of the country. Most notably, Lula has secured the support of longtime rival, ex-President Fernando Cardoso. This is particularly noteworthy for two reasons: First, Cardoso represents the ultimate economic orthodoxy and pragmatism in Brazil. Second, Cardoso expressed his support for his former political arch-rival Lula in the nation’s most important economic newspaper, Valor Economico. Another important source of support for Lula will likely be the business community. The corporate establishment dropped their backing of Bolsonaro over his mishandling of the pandemic. Further, his failure to combat corruption and his inflammatory rhetoric against democratic institutions have disturbed businesspeople and investors. Anecdotal evidence shows that behind closed doors the business elite is discussing supporting Lula for several reasons. First, banks and large conglomerates had positive relations with the ex-President during the 2000s. Second, even though Lula will not pass structural economic reforms or support privatization, his behavior is at least predictable. Chart 8Brazil: Real Income Per Capita Has Plunged Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? Although Lula is the most prominent member of the Workers’ Party (PT), not all voters necessarily associate him with the corruption that prevailed during the PT’s rule. Not only low-income but also middle-income households associate Lula’s presidency with rising per capita income. Neither Michel Temer’s centrist government nor Jair Bolsonaro’s right and conservative government were able to deliver rising income per capita (Chart 8). In short, centrist voters might favor Lula over Bolsonaro’s disarray. Economic Policy During Lula’s Potential Presidency Lula will not likely run on a purely socialist platform. By vying to gather support from centrist political parties and centrist voters, it is very likely that Lula’s election platform and third term will be marked by pragmatism rather than ideology. We believe fiscal policy during Lula’s presidency will be expansionary. Known as a ferocious political dealmaker, Lula will probably succeed in persuading Congress to dismantle the fiscal spending cap that limits government expenditure growth to last year’s consumer price inflation. This will allow the government to stimulate the economy via fiscal policy. Chart 9Brazil: The Economy Is Recovering But Not Surging Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? Regarding monetary policy, Lula will likely build a consensus across the political spectrum for an accommodative monetary policy. The latter is required to both boost growth and to cap government borrowing costs. A shrewd political operator, Lula will likely convince Congress to change the central bank’s singular mandate of targeting inflation to include targeting economic growth and employment. The US Federal Reserve’s dual mandate might be used as a justification for the change. Bottom Line: The Brazilian population is shattered by extremely poor economic conditions and will favor the presidential candidate who promises more stimulative macro policies. Lula will appeal to such popular sentiment. Following an election win, he will work with various political parties to promote legislation enabling easier fiscal and monetary policies. In short, Lula’s policies will boost nominal GDP growth while capping government borrowing costs. This is needed to stabilize the nation’s public debt-to-GDP ratio. However, the collateral damage of these policies will be the exchange rate: the currency will depreciate meaningfully in such a scenario. A Word About Business Cycle Incoming economic data suggest the economy is recovering. However, year-on-year growth rates appear very strong partially due to a low base effect from the lockdowns a year ago. In Chart 9, we show two-year growth rates, that are annualized, for key business cycle variables. The message is that the recovery is progressing but muted. Further, the BCB has justified its rate hikes by fast rising core and headline inflation. Nevertheless, high inflation readings are also partially the result of very low prints last year from the economic lockdowns. Chart 10 removes the base effect showing a 24-month rate of change and it reveals that core measures of inflation actually remain tame. In addition, lending rates in real terms remain high. This entails that the monetary authorities are risking over-tightening and impeding the recovery. Interestingly, our marginal propensity to spend proxy is forecasting a relapse in economic growth (Chart 11). Chart 10Brazil: Core Inflation Is At The Low End Of BCB's Target Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? Chart 11Is Brazil's Business Cycle About To Peak? Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? Chart 12Households' Debt Servicing And Importance Of Fiscal Spending Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? Importantly, the household debt-service ratio is very high, which means successive rate hikes could dampen consumption (Chart 12, top panel). In fact, there has been little improvement in the unemployment rate and household nominal disposable income and wages. Finally, the fiscal thrust is estimated by the IMF to be -5% of GDP this year and -1% in 2022 (please refer to Chart 6 above). Given government spending (excluding interest payments) accounts for 24% of GDP (Chart 12, bottom panel), fiscal tightening is a major risk to the economy over the next 18 months. Bottom Line: A combination of tightening fiscal and monetary policies will cap the economic recovery. By failing to deliver strong growth this year and next year, the government risks handing the election to ex-President Lula da Silva. While Bolsonaro will likely push to relax fiscal policy leading up to the election, our hunch is that it will be too little too late to help facilitate his reelection. Investment Conclusions Growing odds of Lula’s victory in the next presidential election in October 2022 entail a shift to more pro-growth fiscal and monetary policies in Brazil. The upshot of these policies will be higher inflation (say, core CPI above 6%) and chronic currency depreciation. Chart 13Brazilian Stock Prices, Valuations And EPS Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? Brazilian share prices will likely rally on the back of high nominal growth over the coming years. Yet, currency depreciation will dampen equity returns for international investors. Absolute-return investors with a medium- and long-term horizon should consider going long stocks and shorting the BRL. Our favored segment of the equity market is Brazilian small cap stocks and exporters. The former will benefit from high nominal growth while the latter from a cheapened exchange rate. For EM portfolio managers, our recommended strategy is as follows: While still underweighting Brazil within an EM equity portfolio, we are putting this bourse on an upgrade watch list. We intend to use the potential underperformance by Brazilian stocks in the coming months to upgrade this stock market. This equity market’s valuation is close to its fair value according to our cyclically-adjusted P/E ratio (Chart 13). Relative to the EM equity benchmark, Brazilian share prices might be forming a bottom (Chart 14). We are upgrading Brazilian sovereign credit to overweight relative to the EM sovereign credit benchmark. Brazil’s foreign currency debt stands at only 11% of GDP and the government does not have a problem servicing its foreign currency debt even if the currency depreciates. For local currency bonds, we recommend patience before upgrading. As financial markets start pricing in the fact of Lula’s presidency, the real will likely drop and domestic bond yields might rise. Finally, we continue shorting BRL as a part of our EM currency basket versus the US dollar. The real will likely have a setback in the coming months due to the US dollar’s rebound, a selloff in commodities prices driven by China’s slowdown and disappointing political news flow in Brazil. Concerning currency valuation, Chart 15 shows the real’s real effective exchange rate. The upshot is that it is not cheap. Chart 14Brazil Versus EM: Relative Share Prices Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? Chart 15The Brazilian Real Is Not Cheap Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle? Can Brazil Break Out Of A Vicious Circle?   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Juan Egaña Research Analyst juane@bcaresearch.com Footnotes

Note: An update on Peru is available on page 10. Highlights The longer it takes the Colombian government to drastically expand fiscal policy and increase social benefits, the higher the risk that next year’s presidential election will result in a win for the left. The government will be slow or reluctant to act and, hence, odds of a left-wing government in one year’s time is increasing. We are not forecasting that radical left-wing candidate Gustavo Petro will win next year’s presidential elections. Our point is that rising odds of a victory will be sufficient to undermine Colombia’s financial markets as the nation’s macro risk premium widens. We are downgrading Colombian equities from neutral to underweight and local currency bonds and sovereign credit from overweight to neutral relative to their respective EM benchmarks. Short the Colombian peso versus the US dollar. Feature Colombia has entered a critical moment in its history. The country was once seen as a beacon of political stability, fiscal orthodoxy, and market friendly policies. However, recent large-scale protests have raised the question as to whether Colombia will move toward the left, as has occurred in Mexico, Argentina and more recently in Peru with the election of Pedro Castillo. The nationwide protests in Colombia were triggered by the government’s attempt to raise taxes amidst a recession. What’s more, these protests are a manifestation of deep-rooted popular anger about poor social security benefits, income inequality and unaffordability of education and health care for a large chunk of the population. Further, angst relating to organized crime and government corruption has boiled over as the government has failed to address these systemic issues. In a nutshell, years of market-friendly conservative policies have widened the gap between “haves” and “have nots”. The recent recession has only exaggerated this income disparity and has unleashed public anger toward the government. Critically, social transfers in Colombia amid the pandemic were among the lowest in the world (Chart 1). Chart 1Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? The main risk to the nation’s financial markets is not that President Duque drastically increases fiscal spending to calm down protests, but rather the rising odds of a left-wing victory in the May 2022 presidential elections. Unfortunately, the current government’s reluctance to let go of traditional economic conservatism could eventually backfire and inadvertently swing the country to the far left.  As a result, we are downgrading our stance on Colombian equities from neutral to underweight and are downgrading local and sovereign bonds from overweight to neutral in their respective EM portfolios. Underlying Motives For Popular Discontent There are fundamental grounds for Colombia’s popular discontent. This year’s protests against President Duque echo the sentiment of previous demonstrations that occurred in 2019 and 2020: weak income growth, high income inequality, low government support for social programs, and unsuccessful policies to reduce corruption and organized crime. These issues have not been resolved even as Colombia emerged as one of the most successful economies in the region. In essence, wealth and development have not been felt by the entire population. According to the Gini coefficient, Colombia is the most unequal country among Latin American and OECD nations, even after accounting for taxes and transfers (Chart 2). Colombia suffers from a stubbornly high official unemployment rate which has seldom fallen below double-digit levels in the past two decades (Chart 3). Chart 2Colombia Is One Of The Most Unequal Countries In The World Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? Chart 3Colombia’s Unemployment: High And No Improvement Yet Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming?   Government cash transfers and spending on pensions and education remain among the lowest of developed and developing nations (Chart 4). Voters are frustrated with the government’s failure to tackle crime and insurgent paramilitary groups, especially given that Duque ran on an anti-crime platform. According to data from Transparency International, Colombian’s perception of government corruption has risen dramatically since 2018 (Chart 5). Chart 4The Government’s Social Spending In Colombia Is Small Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? Chart 5Corruption Perception Has Been Rising Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming?   Bottom Line: Even though Colombia’s GDP growth has been solid, especially relative to its Latin American peers, the benefits have not been widely distributed across all social groups. The severe recession has highlighted Colombia’s challenges and unleashed popular anger toward the government. When Too Much Economic Orthodoxy Backfires Colombia’s right-wing government has provoked massive public discontent due to its insistence on tightening fiscal policy during the worst recession in the country’s history. In essence, the government tried to pass a tax reform bill which would raise taxes on utilities, consumer goods, and business income at the height of the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic and amid a massive nominal and real GDP contraction (Chart 6). Chart 6Colombia: The First Nominal GDP Contraction On Record Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? What followed were not only protests but also a broad-based backlash against the government from all corners, including political parties. President Duque has become isolated and is quickly turning into a lame duck president. Duque’s economic policies, his failure to reduce violence from insurgent paramilitary groups in recent years, and his own militant response to protests have made him lose the confidence of voters. Moreover , his failure to control the political upheaval from the outset has made him lose the confidence of international investors. Going forward, the major risk to financial markets will be rising odds that a left-wing candidate might win next year’s presidential elections. Chart 7 illustrates that leftist Gustavo Petro leads other potential contenders by a wide margin. Petro is a former member of a guerilla organization and was the frontrunner in the 2018 presidential election. Chart 7Growing Risks Of A Left-Wing Presidency In 2022 Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? If he were to win, it would mark a major pivot from an orthodox/conservative approach to a considerably leftist model of economic policy. Some of his proposals include nationalizing mining companies, de-investing from fossil fuels, government confiscation of land for agriculture, reducing central bank independence, and import substitution policies for the industrial sector.  In order to reduce Petro’s odds of winning the election, the current government must splurge on public spending and dramatically reform the country’s social security policies to appease a wide portion of the population. Nevertheless, we believe the government’s response will be too little, too late. Not only is the government reluctant to open the fiscal taps, but it also has no intention of revamping social security, health care and education policies. In fact, talks with protesters have yet to go anywhere after more than a month of a national strike. The current government’s failure to address Colombians’ concerns may boost the popularity of left-wing politicians. As a result, the market could soon start pricing in rising odds of a left-wing presidency in Colombia. This is negative for financial assets. Bottom Line: Investors will soon start realizing that there is a risk that a left-wing government could upend Colombia’s structural backdrop in a year’s time. To reiterate, we are not forecasting that radical left-wing presidential candidate Gustavo Petro will win next year’s presidential elections. Rather, our point is that rising odds of his victory will be sufficient to undermine Colombia’s financial markets as the nation’s macro risk premium widens. Implications For Financial Markets 1. Downgrade equities from neutral to underweight within an EM equity portfolio. A lingering pandemic, dwindling consumer and business confidence, and a broken monetary policy transmission mechanism are major headwinds for the economy and for corporate profits: Various sectors of the economy are struggling to recover, and our proxy for the marginal propensity to spend is suggesting that the economy will underwhelm (Chart 8). Nominal income growth is very weak. One of the reasons is very low inflation – core CPI measures remain below the central bank’s target range (Chart 9). Chart 8Growth Will Surprise To The Downside Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? Chart 9Colombia: Inflation Is Nowhere To Be Seen Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming?   Commercial banks are not expanding credit and will not do so any time soon. Credit growth is negative, and provisions and non-performing loans will continue rising, reaching historical highs (Chart 10). Given that banks make up a large part of Colombia’s bourse, this will weigh heavily on Colombian equity indexes. Notably, lending rates are higher than warranted by economic conditions. This will make it very difficult for borrowers to service debt. While the central bank (Banrep) has cut rates to a historical low of 1.75%, the nominal prime lending rate is at 8.1% and real (deflated by core inflation) lending rates remain elevated at 6% (Chart 11).  Rolling economic lockdowns will impede the economic normalization process. Colombia is still suffering from a deadly second wave of COVID-19 infections. New daily cases and deaths are at all-time highs, and the country’s vaccination drive is falling behind most DM countries and large regional peers. This will further cap economic growth. Chart 10Bank Credit Is Very Weak Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? Chart 11Colombian Lending Rates Are Elevated Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming?     2. Short the Colombian peso versus the US dollar. The basis is that the current account deficit remains wide at 3.8% of GDP while foreign capital inflows – both FDI and portfolio flows – will wane due to political volatility and rising odds of a left-wing government next year (Chart 12).  3. Downgrade Local Currency Bonds and Sovereign Credit to Neutral Domestic Bonds: While local yields seem quite attractive, currency depreciation risks are too high. The yield curve is incredibly steep and swap rates are pricing in about 75 basis points in rate hikes over the next 12 months (Chart 13). Yet, economic conditions warrant lower not higher interest rates. This makes long-term bond yields attractive, barring the election of a left-wing government next year. Chart 12Balance Of Payments Will Weigh On The Currency Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? Chart 13Colombian Local Bonds: Value Or A Value Trap? Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming?   Despite very attractive yields and low inflation, the risk-reward tradeoff of overweighting Colombian local bonds is no longer attractive. We are also closing the position of receiving 10-year swap rates. Sovereign credit: The nation’s sovereign credit spreads will widen if and as international agencies downgrade Colombia’s rating. The nation’s sovereign credit spreads are tight because its governments have been known for orthodox macroeconomic policies and prudent debt management. With political pressures for more social spending, sharply rising public debt and growing odds of a left-wing victory in the next presidential elections, sovereign credit might be repriced.  We will monitor the situation and if the government fails to appease protesters with higher fiscal spending, we will downgrade our allocation to local currency bonds and sovereign credit further to underweight within their respective EM benchmarks. A Word On The Peruvian Elections The election of left-wing candidate Pedro Castillo in Peru is all but confirmed. While right-wing presidential candidate Keiko Fujimori is alleging signs of fraud and is demanding a recount of hundreds of thousands of votes, it is unlikely that this will change the outcome of the election. Fujimori lost the popular vote by an even smaller margin in 2016 but conceded victory after days of uncertainty. Chart 14Peruvian Stocks Are On The Edge Of A Breakdown Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? Nevertheless, next week will prove to be volatile as the electoral tribunal makes a decision on Fujimori’s appeal. We expect uprisings from voters on both sides: Castillo supporters will defend his triumph and Fujimori supporters will voice their anger at what they perceive to be an unfair election. We continue to recommend an underweight allocation on Peruvian equities within an EM-dedicated equity portfolio. In the short term, Peruvian share prices will suffer from socio-political volatility. In the medium to long term, Castillo’s populist and anti-market policies will undermine business and investor confidence. Chart 14 shows that Peruvian equities have reached critical levels, displaying a tapering wedge technical profile. If they relapse further, it would qualify as a major breakdown. A significant gap down is likely to follow. We also recommend investors maintain a neutral allocation to Peruvian local bonds and downgrade sovereign credit to underweight. While public debt remains low at 22.6% of GDP, an overhaul of orthodox macroeconomic policies requires a re-rating of Peruvian sovereign credit. Juan Egaña Research Analyst juane@bcaresearch.com

The election of left-wing candidate Pedro Castillo in Peru is all but confirmed. While right-wing presidential candidate Keiko Fujimori is alleging signs of fraud and is demanding a recount of hundreds of thousands of votes, it is unlikely that this will change the outcome of the election. Fujimori lost the popular vote by an even smaller margin in 2016 but conceded victory after days of uncertainty. Chart 14Peruvian Stocks Are On The Edge Of A Breakdown Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? Colombia: Is A Political Shift To The Left Coming? Nevertheless, next week will prove to be volatile as the electoral tribunal makes a decision on Fujimori’s appeal. We expect uprisings from voters on both sides: Castillo supporters will defend his triumph and Fujimori supporters will voice their anger at what they perceive to be an unfair election. We continue to recommend an underweight allocation on Peruvian equities within an EM-dedicated equity portfolio. In the short term, Peruvian share prices will suffer from socio-political volatility. In the medium to long term, Castillo’s populist and anti-market policies will undermine business and investor confidence. Chart 14 shows that Peruvian equities have reached critical levels, displaying a tapering wedge technical profile. If they relapse further, it would qualify as a major breakdown. A significant gap down is likely to follow. We also recommend investors maintain a neutral allocation to Peruvian local bonds and downgrade sovereign credit to underweight. While public debt remains low at 22.6% of GDP, an overhaul of orthodox macroeconomic policies requires a re-rating of Peruvian sovereign credit. Juan Egaña Research Analyst juane@bcaresearch.com

Highlights Geopolitical risk is trickling back into financial markets. China’s fiscal-and-credit impulse collapsed again. The Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index is ticking back up after the sharp drop from 2020. All of our proprietary GeoRisk Indicators are elevated or rising. Geopolitical risk often rises during bull markets – the Geopolitical Risk Index can even spike without triggering a bear market or recession. Nevertheless a rise in geopolitical risk is positive for the US dollar, which happens to stand at a critical technical point. The macroeconomic backdrop for the dollar is becoming less bearish given China’s impending slowdown. President Biden’s trip to Europe and summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin will underscore a foreign policy of forming a democratic alliance to confront Russia and China, confirming the secular trend of rising geopolitical risk. Shift to a defensive tactical position. Feature Back in March 2017 we wrote a report, “Donald Trump Is Who We Thought He Was,” in which we reaffirmed our 2016 view that President Trump would succeed in steering the US in the direction of fiscal largesse and trade protectionism. Now it is time for us to do the same with President Biden. Our forecast for Biden rested on the same points: the US would pursue fiscal profligacy and mercantilist trade policy. The recognition of a consistent national policy despite extreme partisan divisions is a testament to the usefulness of macro analysis and the geopolitical method. Trump stole the Democrats’ thunder with his anti-austerity and anti-free trade message. Biden stole it back. It was the median voter in the Rust Belt who was calling the shots all along (after all, Biden would still have won the election without Arizona and Georgia). We did make some qualifications, of course. Biden would maintain a hawkish line on China and Russia but he would reject Trump’s aggressive foreign and trade policy when it came to US allies.1 Biden would restore President Obama’s policy on Iran and immigration but not Russia, where there would be no “diplomatic reset.” And Biden’s fiscal profligacy, unlike Trump’s, would come with tax hikes on corporations and the wealthy … even though they would fall far short of offsetting the new spending. This is what brings us to this week’s report: New developments are confirming this view of the Biden administration. Geopolitical Risk And Bull Markets Chart 1Global Geopolitical Risk And The Dollar Global Geopolitical Risk And The Dollar Global Geopolitical Risk And The Dollar In recent weeks Biden has adopted a hawkish policy on China, lowered tensions with Europe, and sought to restore President Obama’s policy of détente with Iran. The jury is still out on relations with Russia – Biden will meet with Putin on June 16 – but we do not expect a 2009-style “reset” that increases engagement. Still, it is too soon to declare a “Biden doctrine” of foreign policy because Biden has not yet faced a major foreign crisis. A major test is coming soon. Biden’s decision to double down on hawkish policy toward China will bring ramifications. His possible deal with Iran faces a range of enemies, including within Iran. His reduction in tensions with Russia is not settled yet. While the specific source and timing of his first major foreign policy crisis is impossible predict, structural tensions are rebuilding. An aggregate of our 13 market-based GeoRisk indicators suggests that global political risk is skyrocketing once again. A sharp spike in the indicator, which is happening now, usually correlates with a dollar rally (Chart 1). This indicator is mean-reverting since it measures the deviation of emerging market currencies, or developed market equity markets, from underlying macroeconomic fundamentals. The implication is positive for the dollar, although the correlation is not always positive. Looking at both the DXY’s level and its rate of change shows periods when the global risk indicator fell yet the dollar stayed strong – and vice versa. The big increase in the indicator over the past week stems mostly from Germany, South Korea, Brazil, and Australia, though all 13 of the indicators are now either elevated or rising, including the China/Taiwan indicators. Some of the increase is due to base effects. As global exports recover, currencies and equities that we monitor are staying weaker than one would expect. This causes the relevant BCA GeoRisk indicator to rise. Base effects from the weak economy in June 2020 will fall out in coming weeks. But the aggregate shows that all of the indicators are either high or rising and, on a country by country level, they are now in established uptrends even aside from base effects. Chart 2Global Policy Uncertainty Revives Global Policy Uncertainty Revives Global Policy Uncertainty Revives Meanwhile the global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index is recovering across the world after the drop in uncertainty following the COVID-19 crisis (Chart 2). Policy uncertainty is also linked to the dollar and this indicator shows that it is rising on a secular basis. The Geopolitical Risk Index, maintained by Matteo Iacoviello and a group of academics affiliated with the Policy Uncertainty Index, is also in a secular uptrend, although cyclically it has not recovered from the post-COVID drop-off. It is sensitive to traditional, war-linked geopolitical risk as reported in newspapers. By contrast our proprietary indicators are sensitive to market perceptions of any kind of risk, not just political, both domestic and international. A comparison of the Geopolitical Risk Index with the S&P 500 over the past century shows that a geopolitical crisis may occur at the beginning of a business cycle but it may not be linked with a recession or bear market. Risk can rise, even extravagantly, during economic expansions without causing major pullbacks. But a crisis event certainly can trigger a recession or bear market, particularly if it is tied to the global oil supply, as in the early 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s (Chart 3). Chart 3Secular Rise In Geopolitical Risk Soon To Reassert Itself Secular Rise In Geopolitical Risk Soon To Reassert Itself Secular Rise In Geopolitical Risk Soon To Reassert Itself While geopolitical risk is normally positive for the dollar, the macroeconomic backdrop is negative. The dollar’s attempt to recover earlier this year faltered. This underlying cyclical bearish dollar trend is due to global economic recovery – which will continue – and extravagant American monetary expansion and budget deficits. This is why we have preferred gold – it is a hedge against both geopolitical risk and inflation expectations. Tactically this year we have refrained from betting against the dollar except when building up some safe-haven positions like Japanese yen. Over the medium and long term we expect geopolitical risk to put a floor under the greenback. The bottom line is that the US dollar is at a critical technical crossroads where it could break out or break down. Macro factors suggest a breakdown but the recovery of global policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk suggests the opposite. We remain neutral. A final quantitative indicator of the recovery of geopolitical risk is the performance of global aerospace and defense stocks (Chart 4). Defense shares are rising in absolute and relative terms. Chart 4Another Sign Of Geopolitical Risk: Defense Stocks Outperform As Virus Ebbs And Military Spending Surges Another Sign Of Geopolitical Risk: Defense Stocks Outperform As Virus Ebbs And Military Spending Surges Another Sign Of Geopolitical Risk: Defense Stocks Outperform As Virus Ebbs And Military Spending Surges Can The WWII Peace Be Prolonged? Qualitative assessments of geopolitical risk are necessary to explain why risk is on a secular upswing – why drops in the quantitative indicators are temporary and the troughs keep getting higher. Great nations are returning to aggressive competition after a period of relative peace and prosperity. Over the past two decades Russia and China took advantage of America’s preoccupations with the Middle East, the financial crisis, and domestic partisanship in order to build up their global influence. The result is a world in which authority is contested. The current crisis is not merely about the end of the post-Cold War international order. It is much scarier than that. It is about the decay of the post-WWII international order and the return of the centuries-long struggle for global supremacy among Great Powers. The US and European political establishments fear the collapse of the WWII settlement in the face of eroding legitimacy at home and rising challenges from abroad. The 1945 peace settlement gave rise to both a Cold War and a diplomatic system, including the United Nations Security Council, for resolving differences among the great powers. It also gave rise to European integration and various institutions of American “liberal hegemony.” It is this system of managing great power struggle, and not the post-Cold War system of American domination, that lies in danger of unraveling. This is evident from the following points: American preeminence only lasted fifteen years, or at best until the 2008 Georgia war and global financial crisis. The US has been an incoherent wild card for at least 13 years now, almost as long as it was said to be the global empire. Russian antagonism with the West never really ended. In retrospect the 1990s were a hiatus rather than a conclusion of this conflict. China’s geopolitical rise has thawed the frozen conflicts in Asia from the 1940s-50s – i.e. the Chinese civil war, the Hong Kong and Taiwan Strait predicaments, the Korean conflict, Japanese pacifism, and regional battles for political influence and territory. Europe’s inward focus and difficulty projecting power have been a constant, as has its tendency to act as a constraint on America. Only now is Europe getting closer to full independence (which helped trigger Brexit). Geopolitical pressures will remain historically elevated for the foreseeable future because the underlying problem is whether great power struggle can be contained and major wars can be prevented. Specifically the question is whether the US can accommodate China’s rise – and whether China can continue to channel its domestic ambitions into productive uses (i.e. not attempts to create a Greater Chinese and then East Asian empire). The Great Recession killed off the “East Asia miracle” phase of China’s growth. Potential GDP is declining, which undermines social stability and threatens the Communist Party’s legitimacy. The renminbi is on a downtrend that began with the Xi Jinping era. The sharp rally during the COVID crisis is over, as both domestic and international pressures are rising again (Chart 5). Chart 5Biden Administration Review Of China Policy: More China Bashing Biden Administration Review Of China Policy: More China Bashing Biden Administration Review Of China Policy: More China Bashing While the data for China’s domestic labor protests is limited in extent, we can use it as a proxy for domestic instability in lieu of official statistics that were tellingly discontinued back in 2005. The slowdown in credit growth and the cyclical sectors of the economy suggest that domestic political risk is underrated in the lead up to the 2022 leadership rotation (Chart 6). Chart 6China's Domestic Political Risk Will Rise China's Domestic Political Risk Will Rise China's Domestic Political Risk Will Rise Chart 7Steer Clear Of Taiwan Strait Steer Clear Of Taiwan Strait Steer Clear Of Taiwan Strait The increasing focus on China’s access to key industrial and technological inputs, the tensions over the Taiwan Strait, and the formation of a Russo-Chinese bloc that is excluded from the West all suggest that the risk to global stability is grave and historic. It is reminiscent of the global power struggles of the seventeenth through early twentieth centuries. The outperformance of Taiwanese equities from 2019-20 reflects strong global demand for advanced semiconductors but the global response to this geopolitical bottleneck is to boost production at home and replace Taiwan. Therefore Taiwan’s comparative advantage will erode even as geopolitical risk rises (Chart 7). The drop in geopolitical tensions during COVID-19 is over, as highlighted above. With the US, EU, and other countries launching probes into whether the virus emerged from a laboratory leak in China – contrary to what their publics were told last year – it is likely that a period of national recriminations has begun. There is a substantial risk of nationalism, xenophobia, and jingoism emerging along with new sources of instability. An Alliance Of Democracies The Biden administration’s attempt to restore liberal hegemony across the world requires a period of alliance refurbishment with the Europeans. That is the purpose of his current trip to the UK, Belgium, and Switzerland. But diplomacy only goes so far. The structural factor that has changed is the willingness of the West to utilize government in the economic sphere, i.e. fiscal proactivity. Infrastructure spending and industrial policy, at the service of national security as well as demand-side stimulus, are the order of the day. This revolution in economic policy – a return to Big Government in the West – poses a threat to the authoritarian powers, which have benefited in recent decades by using central strategic planning to take advantage of the West’s democratic and laissez-faire governance. If the West restores a degree of central government – and central coordination via NATO and other institutions – then Beijing and Moscow will face greater pressure on their economies and fewer strategic options. About 16 American allies fall short of the 2% of GDP target for annual defense spending – ranging from Italy to Canada to Germany to Japan. However, recent trends show that defense spending did indeed increase during the Trump administration (Chart 8). Chart 8NATO Boosts Defense Spending Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was The European Union as a whole has added $50 billion to the annual total over the past five years. A discernible rise in defense spending is taking place even in Germany (Chart 9). The same point could be made for Japan, which is significantly boosting defense spending (as a share of output) after decades of saying it would do so without following through. A major reason for the American political establishment’s rejection of President Trump was the risk he posed to the trans-Atlantic alliance. A decline in NATO and US-EU ties would dramatically undermine European security and ultimately American security. Hence Biden is adopting the Trump administration’s hawkish approach to trade with China but winding down the trade war with Europe (Chart 10). Chart 9Europe Spending More On Guns Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Chart 10US Ends Trade War With Europe? Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was A multilateral deal aimed at setting a floor in global corporate taxes rates is intended to prevent the US and Europe from undercutting each other – and to ensure governments have sufficient funding to maintain social spending and reduce income inequality (Chart 11). Inequality is seen as having vitiated sociopolitical stability and trust in government in the democracies. Chart 11‘Global’ Corporate Tax Deal Shows Return Of Big Government, Attempt To Reduce Inequality In The West Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Risks To Biden’s Diplomacy It is possible that Biden’s attempt to restore US alliances will go nowhere over the course of his four-year term in office. The Europeans may well remain risk averse despite their initial signals of willingness to work with Biden to tackle China’s and Russia’s challenges to the western system. The Germans flatly rejected both Biden and Trump on the Nord Stream II natural gas pipeline linkage with Russia, which is virtually complete and which strengthens the foundation of Russo-German engagement (more on this below). The US’s lack of international reliability – given the potential of another partisan reversal in four years – makes it very hard for countries to make any sacrifices on behalf of US initiatives. The US’s profound domestic divisions have only slightly abated since the crises of 2020 and could easily flare up again. A major outbreak of domestic instability could distract Biden from the foreign policy game.2 However, American incapacity is a risk, not our base case, over the coming years. We expect the US economic stimulus to stabilize the country enough that the internal political crisis will be contained and the US will continue to play a global role. The “Civil War Lite” has mostly concluded, excepting one or two aftershocks, and the US is entering into a “Reconstruction Lite” era. The implication is negative for China and Russia, as they will now have to confront an America that, if not wholly unified, is at least recovering. Congress’s impending passage of the Innovation and Competition Act – notably through regular legislative order and bipartisan compromise – is case in point. The Senate has already passed this approximately $250 billion smorgasbord of industrial policy, supply chain resilience, and alliance refurbishment. It will allot around $50 billion to the domestic semiconductor industry almost immediately as well as $17 billion to DARPA, $81 billion for federal research and development through the National Science Foundation, which includes $29 billion for education in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, and other initiatives (Table 1). Table 1Peak Polarization: US Congress Passes Bipartisan ‘Innovation And Competition Act’ To Counter China Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was With the combination of foreign competition, the political establishment’s need to distract from domestic divisions, and the benefit of debt monetization courtesy of the Federal Reserve, the US is likely to achieve some notable successes in pushing back against China and Russia. On the diplomatic front, the US will meet with some success because the European and Asian allies do not wish to see the US embrace nationalism and isolationism. They have their own interests in deterring Russia and China. Lack Of Engagement With Russia Russian leadership has dealt with the country’s structural weaknesses by adopting aggressive foreign policy. At some point either the weaknesses or the foreign policy will create a crisis that will undermine the current regime – after all, Russia has greatly lagged the West in economic development and quality of life (Chart 12). But President Putin has been successful at improving the country’s wealth and status from its miserably low base in the 1990s and this has preserved sociopolitical stability so far. Chart 12Russia's Domestic Political Risk Russia's Domestic Political Risk Russia's Domestic Political Risk It is debatable whether US policy toward Russia ever really changed under President Trump, but there has certainly not been a change in strategy from Russia. Thus investors should expect US-Russia antagonism to continue after Biden’s summit with Putin even if there is an ostensible improvement. The fundamental purpose of Putin’s strategy has been to salvage the Russian empire after the Soviet collapse, ensure that all world powers recognize Russia’s veto power over major global policies and initiatives, and establish a strong strategic position for the coming decades as Russia’s demographic decline takes its toll. A key component of the strategy has been to increase economic self-sufficiency and reduce exposure to US sanctions. Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2014, Putin has rapidly increased Russia’s foreign exchange reserves so as to buffer against shocks (Chart 13). Chart 13Russia Fortified Against US Sanctions Russia Fortified Against US Sanctions Russia Fortified Against US Sanctions Putin has also reduced Russia’s reliance on the US dollar to about 22% (Chart 14), primarily by substituting the euro and gold. Russia will not be willing or able to purge US dollars from its system entirely but it has been able to limit America’s ability to hurt Russia by constricting access to dollars and the dollar-based global financial architecture. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov highlighted this process ahead of the Biden-Putin summit by declaring that the National Wealth Fund will divest of its remaining $40 billion of its US dollar holdings. Chart 14Russia Diversifies From USD Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was In general this year, Russia is highlighting its various advantages: its resilience against US sanctions, its ability to re-invade Ukraine, its ability to escalate its military presence in Belarus and the Black Sea, and its ability to conduct or condone cyberattacks on vital American food and fuel supplies (Chart 15). Meanwhile the US is suffering from deep political divisions at home and strategic incoherence abroad and these are only starting to be mended by domestic economic stimulus and alliance refurbishment. Chart 15Cyber Security Stocks Recover Cyber Security Stocks Recover Cyber Security Stocks Recover Europe’s risk-aversion when it comes to strategic confrontation with Russia, and the lack of stability in US-Russia relations, means that investors should not chase Russian currency or financial assets amid the cyclical commodity rally. Investors should also expect risk premiums to remain high in developing European economies relative to their developed counterparts. This is true despite the fact that developed market Europe’s outperformance relative to emerging Europe recently peaked and rolled over. From a technical perspective this outperformance looks to subside but geopolitical tensions can easily escalate in the near term, particularly in advance of the Russian and German elections in September (Chart 16). Chart 16Developed Markets In Europe Will Outperform Emerging Europe Unless Russian Geopolitical Risk Abates Developed Markets In Europe Will Outperform Emerging Europe Unless Russian Geopolitical Risk Abates Developed Markets In Europe Will Outperform Emerging Europe Unless Russian Geopolitical Risk Abates Developed Europe trades in line with EUR-RUB and these pair trades all correspond closely to geopolitical tensions with Russia (Chart 17). A notable exception is the UK, whose stock market looks attractive relative to eastern Europe and is much more secure from any geopolitical crisis in this region (Chart 17, bottom panel). The pound is particularly attractive against the Czech koruna, as Russo-Czech tensions have heated up in advance of October’s legislative election there (Chart 18). Chart 17Long UK Versus Eastern Europe Long UK Versus Eastern Europe Long UK Versus Eastern Europe Chart 18Long GBP Versus CZK Long GBP Versus CZK Long GBP Versus CZK Meanwhile Russia and China have grown closer together out of strategic necessity. Germany’s Election And Stance Toward Russia Germany’s position on Russia is now critical. The decision to complete the Nord Stream II pipeline against American wishes either means that the Biden administration can be safely ignored – since it prizes multilateralism and alliances above all things and is therefore toothless when opposed – or it means that German will aim to compensate the Americans in some other area of strategic concern. Washington is clearly attempting to rally the Germans to its side with regard to putting pressure on China over its trade practices and human rights. This could be the avenue for the US and Germany to tighten their bond despite the new milestone in German-Russia relations. The US may call on Germany to stand up for eastern Europe against Russian aggression but on that front Berlin will continue to disappoint. It has no desire to be drawn into a new Cold War given that the last one resulted in the partition of Germany. The implication is negative for China on one hand and eastern Europe on the other. Germany’s federal election on September 26 will be important because it will determine who will succeed Chancellor Angela Merkel, both in Germany and on the European and global stage. The ruling Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is hoping to ride Merkel’s coattails to another term in charge of the government. But they are likely to rule alongside the Greens, who have surged in opinion polls in recent years. The state election in Saxony-Anhalt over the weekend saw the CDU win 37% of the popular vote, better than any recent result, while Germany’s second major party, the Social Democrats, continued their decline (Table 2). The far-right Alternative for Germany won 21% of the vote, a downshift from 2016, while the Greens won 6% of the vote, a slight improvement from 2016. All parties underperformed opinion polling except the CDU (Chart 19). Table 2Saxony-Anhalt Election Results Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Chart 19Germany: Conservatives Outperform In Final State Election Before Federal Vote, But Face Challenges Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Chart 20Germany: Greens Will Outperform in 2021 Vote Germany: Greens Will Outperform in 2021 Vote Germany: Greens Will Outperform in 2021 Vote The implication is still not excellent for the CDU. Saxony-Anhalt is a middling German state, a CDU stronghold, and a state with a popular CDU leader. So it is not representative of the national campaign ahead of September. The latest nationwide opinion polling puts the CDU at around 25% support. They are neck-and-neck with the Greens. The country’s left- and right-leaning ideological blocs are also evenly balanced in opinion polls (Chart 20). A potential concern for the CDU is that the Free Democratic Party is ticking up in national polls, which gives them the potential to steal conservative votes. Betting markets are manifestly underrating the chance that Annalena Baerbock and the Greens take over the chancellorship (Charts 21A and 21B). We still give a subjective 35% chance that the Greens will lead the next German government without the CDU, a 30% that the Greens will lead with the CDU, and a 25% chance that the CDU retains power but forms a coalition with the Greens. A coalition government would moderate the Greens’ ambitious agenda of raising taxes on carbon emissions, wealth, the financial sector, and Big Tech. The CDU has already shifted in a pro-environmental, fiscally proactive direction. Chart 21AGerman Greens Will Recover Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Chart 21BGerman Greens Still Underrated Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was No matter what the German election will support fiscal spending and European solidarity, which is positive for the euro and regional equities over the next 12 to 24 months. However, the Greens would pursue a more confrontational stance toward Russia, a petro-state whose special relations with the German establishment have impeded the transition to carbon neutrality. Latin America’s Troubles A final aspect of Biden’s agenda deserves some attention: immigration and the Mexican border. Obviously this one of the areas where Biden starkly differs from Trump, unlike on Europe and China, as mentioned above. Vice President Kamala Harris recently came back from a trip to Guatemala and Mexico that received negative media attention. Harris has been put in charge of managing the border crisis, the surge in immigrant arrivals over 2020-21, both to give her some foreign policy experience and to manage the public outcry. Despite telling immigrants explicitly “Do not come,” Harris has no power to deter the influx at a time when the US economy is fired up on historic economic stimulus and the Democratic Party has cut back on all manner of border and immigration enforcement. From a macro perspective the real story is the collapse of political and geopolitical risk in Mexico. From 2016-20 Mexico faced a protectionist onslaught from the Trump administration and then a left-wing supermajority in Congress. But these structural risks have dissipated with the USMCA trade deal and the inability of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador to follow through with anti-market reforms, as we highlighted in reports in October and April. The midterm election deprived the ruling MORENA party of its single-party majority in the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of the legislature (Chart 22). AMLO is now politically constrained – he will not be able to revive state control over the energy and power sectors. Chart 22Mexican Midterm Election Constrained Left-Wing Populism, Political Risk Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Chart 23Buy Mexico (And Canada) On US Stimulus Buy Mexico (And Canada) On US Stimulus Buy Mexico (And Canada) On US Stimulus American monetary and fiscal stimulus, and the supply-chain shift away from China, also provide tailwinds for Mexico. In short, the Mexican election adds the final piece to one of our key themes stemming from the Biden administration, US populism, and US-China tensions: favor Mexico and Canada (Chart 23). A further implication is that Mexico should outperform Brazil in the equity space. Brazil is closely linked to China’s credit cycle and metals prices, which are slated to turn down as a result of Chinese policy tightening. Mexico is linked to the US economy and oil prices (Chart 24). While our trade stopped out at -5% last week we still favor the underlying view. Brazilian political risk and unsustainable debt dynamics will continue to weigh on the currency and equities until political change is cemented in the 2022 election and the new government is then forced by financial market riots into undertaking structural reforms. Chart 24Brazil's Troubles Not Truly Over - Mexico Will Outperform Brazil's Troubles Not Truly Over - Mexico Will Outperform Brazil's Troubles Not Truly Over - Mexico Will Outperform Elsewhere in Latin America, the rise of a militant left-wing populist to the presidency in a contested election in Peru, and the ongoing social unrest in Colombia and Chile, are less significant than the abrupt slowdown in China’s credit growth (Charts 25A and 25B). According to our COVID-19 Social Stability Index, investors should favor Mexico. Turkey, the Philippines, South Africa, Colombia, and Brazil are the most likely to see substantial social instability according to this ranking system (Table 3). Chart 25AMexico To Outperform Latin America Mexico To Outperform Latin America Mexico To Outperform Latin America Chart 25BChina’s Slowdown Will Hit South America China's Slowdown Will Hit South America China's Slowdown Will Hit South America Table 3Post-COVID Emerging Market Social Unrest Only Just Beginning Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Investment Takeaways Close long emerging markets relative to developed markets for a loss of 6.8% – this is a strategic trade that we will revisit but it faces challenges in the near term due to China’s slowdown (Chart 26). Go long Mexican equities relative to emerging markets on a strategic time frame. Our long Mexico / short Brazil trade hit the stop loss at 5% but the technical profile and investment thesis are still sound over the short and medium term. Chart 26China Slowdown, Geopolitical Risk Will Weigh On Emerging Markets China Slowdown, Geopolitical Risk Will Weigh On Emerging Markets China Slowdown, Geopolitical Risk Will Weigh On Emerging Markets Chart 27Relative Uncertainty And Safe Havens Relative Uncertainty And Safe Havens Relative Uncertainty And Safe Havens China’s sharp fiscal-and-credit slowdown suggests that investors should reduce risk exposure, take a defensive tactical positioning, and wait for China’s policy tightening to be priced before buying risky assets. Our geopolitical method suggests the dollar will rise, while macro fundamentals are becoming less dollar-bearish due to China. We are neutral for now and will reassess for our third quarter forecast later this month. If US policy uncertainty falls relative to global uncertainty then the EUR-USD will also fall and safe-haven assets like Swiss bonds will gain a bid (Chart 27). Gold is an excellent haven amid medium-term geopolitical and inflation risks but we recommend closing our long silver trade for a gain of 4.5%. Disfavor emerging Europe relative to developed Europe, where heavy discounts can persist due to geopolitical risk premiums. We will reassess after the Russian Duma election in September. Go long GBP-CZK. Close the Euro “laggards” trade. Go long an equal-weighted basket of euros and US dollars relative to the Chinese renminbi. Short the TWD-USD on a strategic basis. Prefer South Korea to Taiwan – while the semiconductor splurge favors Taiwan, investors should diversify away from the island that lies at the epicenter of global geopolitical risk. Close long defense relative to cyber stocks for a gain of 9.8%. This was a geopolitical “back to work” trade but the cyber rebound is now significant enough to warrant closing this trade.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Trump’s policy toward Russia is an excellent example of geopolitical constraints. Despite any personal preferences in favor of closer ties with Russia, Trump and his administration ultimately reaffirmed Article 5 of NATO, authorized the sale of lethal weapons to Ukraine, and deployed US troops to Poland and the Czech Republic. 2 As just one example, given the controversial and contested US election of 2020, it is possible that a major terrorist attack could occur. Neither wing of America’s ideological fringes has a monopoly on fanaticism and violence. Meanwhile foreign powers stand to benefit from US civil strife. A truly disruptive sequence of events in the US in the coming years could lead to greater political instability in the US and a period in which global powers would be able to do what they want without having to deal with Biden’s attempt to regroup with Europe and restore some semblance of a global police force. The US would fall behind in foreign affairs, leaving power vacuums in various regions that would see new sources of political and geopolitical risk crop up. Then the US would struggle to catch up, with another set of destabilizing consequences.

Highlights US labor-market disappointments notwithstanding, the global recovery being propelled by real GDP growth in the world's major economies is on track to be the strongest in 80 years. This growth will fuel commodity demand, which increasingly confronts tighter supply.  Higher commodity prices will ensue, and feed through to realized and expected inflation.  Manufacturers will continue to see higher input and output prices. Our modeling suggests the USD will weaken to end-2023; however, most of the move already has occurred.  Real US rates will remain subdued, as the Fed looks through PCE inflation rates above its 2% target and continues to focus on its full-employment mandate (Chart of the Week). Given these supportive inflation fundamentals, we remain long gold with a price target of $2,000/oz for this year.  We are upgrading silver to a strategic position, expecting a $30/oz price by year-end.  We remain long the S&P GSCI Dynamic Roll Index ETF (COMT) and the S&P GSCI, expecting tight supply-demand balances to steepen backwardations in forward curves, and long the Global Metals & Mining Producers ETF (PICK). Global economic policy uncertainty will remain elevated until broader vaccine distributions reduce lockdown risks. Feature The recovery of the global economy catalyzed by massive monetary accommodation and fiscal stimulus is on track to be the strongest in the past 80 years, according to the World Bank.1 The Bank revised its growth expectation for real GDP this year sharply higher – to 5.6% from its January estimate of 4.1%. For 2022, the rate of global real GDP growth is expected to slow to 4.3%, which is still significantly higher than the average 3% growth of 2018-19. DM economies are expected to grow at a 4% rate this year – double the average 2018-19 rate – while EM growth is expected to come in at 6% this year vs a 4.2% average for 2018-19. The big drivers of growth this year will be China, where the Bank expects an unleashing of pent-up demand to push real GDP up by 8.5%, and the US, where massive fiscal and monetary support will lift real GDP 6.8%. The Bank expects other DM economies will contribute to this growth, as well. Growth in EM economies will be supported by stronger demand and higher commodity prices, in the Bank's forecast. Commodity demand is recovering faster than commodity supply in the wake of this big-economy GDP recovery. As a result, manufacturers globally are seeing significant increases in input and output prices (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekUS Real Rates Continue To Languish Gold, Silver, Indexes Favored As Inflation Looms Gold, Silver, Indexes Favored As Inflation Looms Chart 2Global Manufacturers' Prices Moving Higher Gold, Silver, Indexes Favored As Inflation Looms Gold, Silver, Indexes Favored As Inflation Looms These price increases at the manufacturing level reflect the higher-price environment in global commodity markets, particularly in industrial commodities – i.e., bulks like iron ore and steel; base metals like copper and aluminum; and oil prices, which touch most processes involved in getting materials out of the ground and into factories before they make their way to consumers, who then drive to stores to pick up goods or have them delivered. Chart 3Commodity Price Increases Reflected in CPI Inflation Expectations Commodity Price Increases Reflected in CPI Inflation Expectations Commodity Price Increases Reflected in CPI Inflation Expectations These price pressures are being picked up in 5y5y CPI swaps markets, which are cointegrated with commodity prices (Chart 3). This also is showing up in shorter-tenor inflation gauges – monthly CPI and 2y CPI swaps. Oil prices, in particular, will be critical to the evolution of 5-year/5-year (5y5y) CPI swap rates, which are closely followed by fixed-income markets (Chart 4). Chart 4Oil Prices Are Key To 5Y5Y CPI Swap Rates Oil Prices Are Key To 5Y5Y CPI Swap Rates Oil Prices Are Key To 5Y5Y CPI Swap Rates Higher Gold Prices Expected CPI inflation expectations drive 5-year and 10-year real rates, which are important explanatory variables for gold prices (Chart 5).2 In addition, the massive monetary and fiscal policy out of the US also is driving expectations for a lower USD: Currency debasement fears are higher than they otherwise would be, given all the liquidity and stimulus sloshing around global markets, which also is bullish for gold (Chart 6). Chart 5Weaker Real Rates Bullish For Gold Weaker Real Rates Bullish For Gold Weaker Real Rates Bullish For Gold Chart 6Weaker USD Supports Gold Weaker USD Supports Gold Weaker USD Supports Gold All of these effects, particularly the inflationary impacts, are summarized in our fair-value gold model (Chart 7). At the beginning of 2021, our fair-value gold model indicated price would be closer to $2,005/oz, which was well above the actual gold price in January. Gold prices have remained below the fair value model since the beginning of 2021. The model explains gold prices using real rates, TWIB, US CPI and global economic policy uncertainty. Based on our modeling, we expect these variables to continue to be supportive of gold, bolstering our view the yellow metal will reach $2000/ oz this year. Unlike industrial commodities, gold prices are sensitive to speculative positioning and technical indicators. Our gold composite indicator shows that gold prices may be reflecting bullish sentiment. This sentiment likely reflects increasing inflation expectations, which we use as an explanatory variable for gold prices. The fact that gold is moving higher on sentiment is corroborated by the latest data point from Marketvane’s gold bullish consensus, which reported 72% of the traders expect prices to rise further (Chart 8). Chart 7BCAs Gold Fair-Value Model Supports 00/oz View BCAs Gold Fair-Value Model Supports $2000/oz View BCAs Gold Fair-Value Model Supports $2000/oz View Chart 8Sentiment Supports Oil Prices Sentiment Supports Oil Prices Sentiment Supports Oil Prices Investment Implications The massive monetary and fiscal stimulus that saw the global economy through the worst of the economic devastation of the COVID-19 pandemic is now bubbling through the real economy, and will, if the World Bank's assessment proves out, result in the strongest real GDP growth in 80 years. Liquidity remains abundant and interest rates – real and nominal – remain low. In its latest Global Economic Prospects, the Bank notes, " The literature generally suggests that monetary easing, both conventional and unconventional, typically boosts aggregate demand and inflation with a lag of 1-3 years …" The evidence for this is stronger for DM economies than EM; however, as the experience in China shows, scale matters. If the Bank's assessment is correct, the inflationary impulse from this stimulus should be apparent now – and it is – and will endure for another year or two. This stimulus has catalyzed organic growth and will continue to do so for years, particularly in economies pouring massive resources into renewable-energy generation and the infrastructure required to support it, a topic we have been writing about for some time.3 We remain long gold with a price target of $2,000/oz for this year. We are long silver on a tactical basis, but given our growth expectations, are upgrading this to a strategic position, expecting a $30/oz price by year-end. As we have noted in the past, silver is sensitive to all of the financial factors we consider when assessing gold markets, and it has a strong industrial component that accounts for more than half of its demand.4 Supportive fundamentals remain in place, with total supply (mine output and recycling) falling, demand rising and balances tightening (Chart 9). Worth noting is silver's supply is constrained because of underinvestment in copper production at the mine level, where silver is a by-product. On the demand side, continued recovery of industrial and consumer demand will keep silver prices well supported. In terms of broad commodity exposure, we remain long the S&P GSCI Dynamic Roll Index ETF (COMT) and the S&P GSCI, expecting tight supply-demand balances to continue to draw down inventories – particularly in energy and metals markets – which will lead to steeper backwardations in forward curves. Backwardation is the source of roll-yields for long commodity index investments. Investors initially have a long exposure in deferred commodity futures contracts, which are then liquidated and re-established when these contracts become more prompt (i.e., closer to delivery). If the futures' forward curves are backwardated, investors essentially are buying the deferred contracts at a lower price than the price at which the position likely is liquidated. We also remain long the Global Metals & Mining Producers ETF (PICK), an equity vehicle that spans miners and traders; the longer discounting horizon of equity markets suits our view on metals. Chart 9Upgrading Silver To Strategic Position Gold, Silver, Indexes Favored As Inflation Looms Gold, Silver, Indexes Favored As Inflation Looms Chart 10Wider Vaccine Distribution Will Support Gold Demand Gold, Silver, Indexes Favored As Inflation Looms Gold, Silver, Indexes Favored As Inflation Looms Global economic policy uncertainty will remain elevated until broader vaccine distributions reduce lockdown risks. We expect the wider distribution of vaccines will become increasingly apparent during 2H21 and in 2022. This will be bullish for physical gold demand – particularly in China and India – which will add support for our gold position (Chart 10).       Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish The US EIA expects Brent crude oil prices to fall to $60/bbl next year, given its call higher production from OPEC 2.0 and the US shales will outpace demand growth. The EIA expects global oil demand will average just under 98mm this year, or 5.4mm b/d above 2020 levels. For next year, the EIA is forecasting demand will grow 3.6mm b/d, averaging 101.3mm b/d. This is slightly less than the demand growth we expect next year – 101.65mm b/d. We are expecting 2022 Brent prices to average $73/bbl, and $78/bbl in 2023. We will be updating our oil balances and price forecasts in next week's publication. Base Metals: Bullish Pedro Castillo, the socialist candidate in Peru's presidential election, held on to a razor-thin lead in balloting as we went to press. Markets have been focused on the outcome of this election, as Castillo has campaigned on increasing taxes and royalties for mining companies operating in Peru, which accounts for ~10% of global copper production. The election results are likely to be contested by opposition candidate rival Keiko Fujimori, who has made unsubstantiated claims of fraud, according to reuters.com. Copper prices traded on either side of $4.50/lb on the CME/COMEX market as the election drama was unfolding (Chart 11). Precious Metals: Bullish As economies around the world reopen and growth rebounds, car manufacturing will revive. Stricter emissions regulations mean the demand for autocatalysts – hence platinum and palladium – will rise with the recovery in automobile production. Platinum is also used in the production of green hydrogen, making it an important metal for the shift to renewable energy. On the supply side, most platinum shafts in South Africa are back to pre-COVID-19 levels, according to Johnson Matthey, the metals refiner. As a result, supply from the world’s largest platinum producer will rebound by 40%, resulting in a surplus. South Africa accounts for ~ 70% of global platinum supply. The fact that an overwhelming majority of platinum comes from a nation which has had periodic electricity outages – the most recent one occurring a little more than a week ago – could pose a supply-side risk to this metal. This could introduce upside volatility to prices (Chart 12). Ags/Softs: Neutral As of 6 June, 90% of the US corn crop had emerged vs a five-year average of 82%; 72% of the crop was reported to be in good to excellent condition vs 75% at this time last year. Chart 11 Political Risk in Chile and Peru Could Bolster Copper Prices Political Risk in Chile and Peru Could Bolster Copper Prices Chart 12 Platinum Prices Going Up Platinum Prices Going Up Footnotes 1     Please see World Bank's Global Economic Prospects update, published June 8, 2021. 2     In fact, US Treasury Inflation-Indexed securities include the CPI-U as a factor in yield determination.  3    For our latest installment of this epic evolution, please see A Perfect Energy Storm On The Way, which we published last week.  It is available at ces.bcareserch.com. 4    Please see Higher Inflation Expectations Battle Lower Risk Premia In Gold Markets, which we published February 4, 2021. It is available at ces.bcareserch.com.     Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades Higher Inflation On The Way Higher Inflation On The Way

Highlights Political and corporate climate activism will increase the cost of developing the resources required to produce and deliver energy going forward – e.g., oil and gas wells; pipelines; copper mines, and refineries. Over the short run, the fastest way for investor-owned companies (IOCs) to address accelerated reductions in CO2 emissions imposed by courts and boards is to walk away from the assets producing them, which could be disruptive over the medium term. Longer term, state-owned companies (SOCs) not facing the constraints of IOCs likely will be required to provide an increasing share of the resources needed to produce and distribute energy. The real difficulty will come in the medium term. Capex for critical metals like copper languishes, just as the call on these metals steadily increases over the next 30 years (Chart of the Week). The evolution to a low-carbon future has not been thought through at the global policy level. A real strategy must address underinvestment in base metals and incentivize the development of technology via a carbon tax – not emissions trading schemes – so firms can innovate to avoid it. We remain long energy and metals exposures.1 Feature And you may ask yourself, "Well … how did I get here?" David Byrne, Once In A Lifetime Energy markets – broadly defined – are radically transforming from week to week. The latest iteration of these markets' evolution is catalyzed by climate activists, who are finding increasing success in court and on corporate boards – sometimes backed by major institutional investors – and forcing oil and gas producers to accelerate CO2 emission-reduction programs.2 Climate activists' arguments are finding increasing purchase because they have merit: Years of stiff-arming investors seeking clarity on the oil and gas producers' decarbonization agendas, coupled with a pronounced failure to provide returns in excess of their cost of capital, have given activists all of the ammo needed to argue their points. Chart of the WeekCall On Metals For Energy Will Increase A Perfect Energy Storm On The Way A Perfect Energy Storm On The Way This activism is not limited to the courts or boardrooms. Voters in democratic societies with contested elections also are seeking redress for failures of their governments to effectively channel mineral wealth back into society on an equitable basis, and to protect their environments and the habitats of indigenous populations. This voter activism is especially apparent in Chile and Peru, where elections and constitutional conventions likely will result in higher taxes and royalties on metals IOCs operating in these states, which will increase production costs and ultimately be passed on to consumers.3 These states account for ~ 40% of world copper output. IOCs Walk Away Earlier this week, Exxon walked away from an early-stage offshore oil development project in Ghana.4 This followed the unfavorable court rulings and boardroom setbacks experienced by Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron and Exxon recently (referenced in fn. 2). While the company had no comment on its abrupt departure, its action shows how IOCs can exercise their option to put a project back to its host government, thus illustrating one of the most readily available alternatives for energy IOCs to meet court- or board-mandated CO2 emissions targets. If these investments qualify as write-offs, the burden will be borne by taxpayers. As climate activism increases, state-owned companies (SOCs) not facing the constraints of IOCs likely will be required to provide an increasing share of the resources – particularly oil and gas – needed to produce and distribute energy going forward. This is not an unalloyed benefit, as the SOCs still face stranded-asset risks, if they invest in longer-lived assets that are obviated by a successful renewables + grid buildout globally. That is a cost that will have to be compensated, when the SOCs work up their capex allocations. Still, if legal and investor activism significantly accelerates IOCs' capex reductions in oil and gas projects, the SOCs – particularly those in OPEC 2.0 – will be able to expand their position as the dominant supplier in the global oil market, and could perhaps increase their influence on price levels and forward-curve dynamics (Chart 2).5 Chart 2OPEC 2.0s Could Expand If Investor Activism Increases OPEC 2.0s Could Expand If Investor Activism Increases OPEC 2.0s Could Expand If Investor Activism Increases Higher Call On Metals At present, there is a lot of talk about the need to invest in renewable electricity generation and the grid structure supporting it, but very little in the way of planning for this transition. Other than repeated assertions of its necessity, little is being said regarding how exactly this strategy will be executed given the magnitude of the supply increase in metals required. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the refined copper market, which has been in a physical deficit – i.e., production minus consumption is negative – for the last 6 years (Chart 3). Physical copper markets in China, which consumes more than 50% of refined output, remain extremely tight, as can be seen in the ongoing weakness of treating charges and refining charges (TC/RC) for the past year (Chart 4). These charges are inversely correlated to prices – when TC/RCs are low, it means there is surplus refining capacity for copper – unrefined metal is scarce, which drives down demand for these services. Chart 3Coppers Physical Deficit Likely Persist Coppers Physical Deficit Likely Persist Coppers Physical Deficit Likely Persist Chart 4Chinas Refined Copper Supply Remains Tight Chinas Refined Copper Supply Remains Tight Chinas Refined Copper Supply Remains Tight Theoretically, high prices will incentivize higher levels of production. However, after the last decade’s ill-timed investment in new mine discoveries and expansions, mining companies have become more wary with their investments, and are using earnings to pay dividends and reduce debt. This leads us to believe that mining companies will not invest in new mine discoveries but will use capital expenditure to expand brownfield projects to meet rising demand. In the last decade, as copper demand rose, capex for copper rose from 2010-2012, and fell from 2013-2016 (Chart 5). During this time, the copper ore grade was on a declining trend. This implies that the new copper brought online was being mined from lower-grade ore, due to the expansion of existing projects(Chart 6). Chart 5Copper Capex Growth Remains Weak A Perfect Energy Storm On The Way A Perfect Energy Storm On The Way Chart 6Copper Ore-Quality Declines Persist Through Capex Cycle A Perfect Energy Storm On The Way A Perfect Energy Storm On The Way Capex directed at keeping ore production above consumption will not be sufficient to avoid major depletions of ore supplies beginning in 2024, according to Wood Mackenzie. The consultancy foresees a cumulative deficit of ~ 16mm MT by 2040. Plugging this gap will require $325-$500 billion of investment in the copper mining sector.6 The Case For A Carbon Tax The low-carbon future remains something of a will-o'-the-wisp – seen off in the future but not really developed in the present. Most striking in discussions of the low-carbon transition is the assumption of resource availability – particularly bases metals –in, e.g., the IEA's Net Zero by 2050, A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector, published last month. In the IEA's document, further investment in hydrocarbons is not required beyond 2025. The copper, aluminum, steel, etc., required to build the generation and supporting grid infrastructure will be available and callable as needed to build all the renewable generation the world requires. The document is agnostic between carbon trading and carbon taxes as a way to price carbon and incentivize the technology that would allow firms and households to avoid a direct cost on carbon. A real strategy must address the fact that most of the world will continue to rely on fossil fuels for decades, as development goals are pursued. Underinvestment in base metals and its implications for the buildout of generation and grids has to be a priority if these assets are to be built. Given the 5-10-year lead times base metals mines require to come online, it is obvious that beyond the middle of this decade, the physical reality of demand exceeding supply will assert itself. A good start would be a global effort to impose and collect carbon taxes uniformly across states.7 This would need to be augmented with a carbon club, which restricts admission and trading privileges  to those states adopting such a scheme. Harmonizing the multiple emissions trading schemes worldwide will be a decades-long effort that is unlikely to succeed. Such schemes also can be gamed by larger players, producing pricing distortions. A hard and fast tax that is enforced in all of the members of such a carbon club would immediately focus attention on the technology required to avoid paying it – mobilizing capital, innovation and entrepreneurial drive to make it a reality. This would support carbon-capture, use and storage technologies as well, thus extending the life of existing energy resources as the next generation of metals-based resources is built out. In addition, a carbon tax raises revenue for governments, which can be used for a variety of public policies, including reducing other taxes to reduce the overall burden of taxation. Lastly, a tax eliminates the potential for short-term price volatility in the pricing of carbon – as long as households and firms know what confronts them they can plan around it.  Tax revenues also can be used to reduce the regressive nature of such levies. Investment Implications The lack of a coherent policy framework that addresses the very real constraints on the transition to a low-carbon economy makes the likelihood of a volatile, years-long evolution foreordained. We believe this will create numerous investment opportunities as underinvestment in hydrocarbons and base metals production predisposes oil, natural gas and base metals prices to move higher in the face of strong and rising demand. We remain long commodity index exposure – the S&P GSCI and GSCI Commodity Dynamic Roll Strategy ETF (COMT), which is optimized to take advantage of the most backwardated commodity forward curves in the index. These positions were up 5.3% and 7.2% since inception on December 7, 2017 and March 12, 2021, respectively, at Tuesday's close. We also remain long the MSCI Global Metals & Mining Producers ETF (PICK), which is up 33.9% since it was put on December 10, 2020. Expecting continued volatility in metals – copper in particular – we will look for opportunities to re-establish positions in COMEX/CME Copper after being stopped out with gains. A trailing stop was elected on our long Dec21 copper position established September 10, 2020, which was closed out with a 48.2% gain on May 21, 2021. Our long calendar 2022 vs short calendar 2023 COMEX copper backwardation trade established April 22, 2021, was closed out on May 20, 2021, leaving us with a return of 305%.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish OPEC 2.0 offered no surprises to markets this week, as it remained committed to returning just over 2mm b/d of production to the market over the May-July period, 70% of which comes from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), according to Platts. While Iran's return to the market is not a given in OPEC 2.0's geometry, we have given better than even odds it will return to the market beginning in 3Q21 and restore most of the 1.4mm b/d not being produced at present to the market over the course of the following year. OPEC itself expects demand to increase 6mm b/d this year, somewhat above our expectation of 5.3mm b/d. Stronger demand could raise Brent prices above our average $63/bbl forecast for this year (Chart 7). Brent was trading above $71/bbl as we went to press. Base Metals: Bullish BHP declared operations at its Escondida and Spence mines were running at normal rates despite a strike by some 200 operations specialists. BHP is employing so-called substitute workers to conduct operation, according to reuters.com, which also reported separate unions at both mines are considering strike actions in the near future. Precious Metals: Bullish The Fed’s reluctance to increase nominal interest rates despite indications of higher inflation will reduce real rates, which will support higher gold prices (Chart 8). We agree with our colleagues at BCA Research's US Bond Strategy that the Fed is waiting for the US labor market to reach levels consistent with its assessment of maximum employment before it makes its initial rate hike in this interest-rate cycle. Subsequent rate changes, however, will be based on realized inflation and inflation expectations. In our opinion, the Fed is following this ultra-accommodative monetary policy approach to break the US liquidity trap, brought about by a rise in precautionary savings due to the pandemic. In addition, we continue to expect USD weakness, which also will support gold and precious metals prices. We remain long gold, expecting prices to clear $2,000/oz this year. Ags/Softs: Neutral Corn prices fell more than 2% Wednesday, following the release of USDA estimates showing 95% of the corn crop was planted by 31 May 2021, well over the 87% five-year average. This was in line with expectations. However, the Department's assessment that 76% of the crop was in good-to-excellent condition exceeded market expectations. Chart 7 By 2023 Brent Trades to $80/bbl By 2023 Brent Trades to $80/bbl Chart 8 Gold Prices Going Up Gold Prices Going Up Footnotes 1     Please see Trade Tables below. 2     Please see OPEC, Russia seen gaining more power with Shell Dutch ruling and EXCLUSIVE BlackRock backs 3 dissidents to shake up Exxon board -sources published by reuters.com June 1, 2021 and May 25, 2021. 3    Please see Chile's govt in shock loss as voters pick independents to draft constitution published by reuters.com May 17, 2021, and Peru’s elite in panic at prospect of hard-left victory in presidential election published by ft.com June 1, 2021.  Peru has seen significant capital flight on the back of these fears.  See also Results from Chile’s May 2021 elections published by IHS Markit May 21, 2021 re a higher likelihood of tax increases for the mining sector.  The risk of nationalization is de minimis, according to IHS. 4    Please see Exxon walks away from stake in deepwater Ghana block published by worldoil.com June 1, 2021. 5    Please see OPEC 2.0's Production Strategy In Focus, which we published on May 20, 2021, for a recap our how we model OPEC 2.0's strategy.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6    Please see Will a lack of supply growth come back to bite the copper industry?, published by Wood Mackenzie on March 23, 2021. 7     Please see The Challenges and Prospects for Carbon Pricing in Europe published by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies last month for a discussion of carbon taxes vs. emissions trading schemes.     Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades Higher Inflation On The Way Higher Inflation On The Way