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Highlights So What? Key geopolitical risks remain unresolved and most of the improvements are transitory. Maintain a cautious tactical stance toward risk assets. Why? U.S.-China relations remain the preeminent geopolitical risk to investors and President Trump remains a wild card on trade. Japan’s rising assertiveness in the region will also produce clashes with the Koreas and possibly also with China. USMCA ratification is not a red herring for investors. We expect USMCA will pass by year’s end but our conviction level is low. Trump’s threat to withdraw from NAFTA cannot be entirely ruled out. Remain long JPY-USD and overweight Thailand relative to EM equities. Feature Chart 1U.S. And Chinese Policy Growing More Simulative U.S. And Chinese Policy Growing More Simulative U.S. And Chinese Policy Growing More Simulative We maintain our cautious tactical stance toward risk assets despite improvements to the cyclical macro outlook. American and Chinese monetary and fiscal policy are growing more stimulative on the margin – an encouraging sign for the global economy and risk assets. We have frequently predicted this combination as a positive factor for the second half of the year and 2020. With the Federal Reserve likely to deliver a 25 basis point interest rate cut on July 31, the market is pricing in positive policy developments (Chart 1). Yet in the U.S., long-term fiscal and regulatory policies are increasingly uncertain as the Democratic Party primary and 2020 election heat up. And in China, the trade war continues to drag on the effectiveness of the government’s stimulus drive. President Trump remains a wild card on trade: the resumption of U.S.-China talks is precarious and will be accompanied by heightened uncertainty surrounding Mexico, Canada, Japan, and Europe in the near term. Even the USMCA’s ratification is not guaranteed, as we discuss below. Even more pressing are the dramatic events taking place in East Asia: Hong Kong, Japan, the Koreas, Taiwan, and the South and East China Seas. These events each entail near-term uncertainty amid the ongoing slowdown in trade and manufacturing. Our long-running theme of geopolitical risk rotation from the Middle East to East Asia has come to fruition, albeit at the moment geopolitical risk is rising in both regions due to the simultaneous showdown between Iran and the United States and United Kingdom. The market recognizes that geopolitical risks are unresolved, according to this month’s update of our currency- and equity-derived GeoRisk Indicators. This is in keeping with the above points. We regard most of the improvements as transitory – especially the drop in risk in the U.K., where Boris Johnson is now officially prime minister. We are therefore sticking with our cautious trade recommendations despite our agreement with the BCA House View that the cyclical outlook is improving and is positive for global risk assets on a 12-month horizon. What Is Happening To East Asian Stability? A raft of crises has struck East Asia, a region known for political stability and ease of doing business throughout the twenty-first century after its successful recovery from the financial crisis of 1997. The thawing of Asia’s frozen post-WWII conflicts is a paradigm shift with significant long-term consequences for investors. The fundamental drivers are as follows: China’s rise is not peaceful: President Xi Jinping has reasserted Communist Party control while pursuing mercantilist trade policy and aggressive foreign policy. The populations of Hong Kong and Taiwan have reacted negatively to Beijing’s tightening grip, exposing the difficulty of resolving serious political disagreements given unclear constitutional frameworks. Recent protests in Hong Kong are even larger than those in 2014 and 1989 (Table 1). Table 1Hong Kong: Recent Protests The Largest Ever East Asia Risks And The USMCA – GeoRisk Indicators Update: July 26, 2019 East Asia Risks And The USMCA – GeoRisk Indicators Update: July 26, 2019 America’s “pivot” is not peaceful: The United States is determined to respond to China’s rise, but political polarization has prevented a coherent strategy. The Democrats took a gradual, multilateral path emphasizing the Trans-Pacific Partnership while the Republicans have taken an abrupt, unilateral path emphasizing sweeping tariffs. Underlying trade policy is the increased use of “hard power” by both parties – freedom of navigation operations, weapons sales, and alliance-maintenance. America is threatening the strategic containment of China, which China will resist through alliances and relations with Russia and others. Japan’s resurgence is not peaceful: Japan’s “lost decades” culminated in the crises and disasters of 2008-11. Since then, Japan’s institutional ruling party – the Liberal Democrats – have embraced a more proactive vision of Japan in which the country casts off the shackles of its WWII settlement. They set about reflating the economy and “normalizing” the country’s strategic and military posture. The result is rising tension with China and the Koreas. Korean “reunion” is not peaceful: North Korea has seen a successful power transition to Kim Jong Un, who is attempting economic reforms to prolong the regime. South Korea has witnessed a collapse among political conservatives and a new push to make peace with the North and improve relations with China. The prospect of peace – or eventual reunification – increases political risk in both Korean regimes and provokes quarrels between erstwhile allies: the North and China, and the South and Japan. Southeast Asia’s rise is not peaceful: Southeast Asia is the prime beneficiary in a world where supply chains move out of China, due to China’s internal development and American trade policy. But it also suffers when China encroaches on its territory or reacts negatively to American overtures. Higher expectations from the U.S. will increase the political risk to Taiwan, South Korea, Vietnam, and the Philippines. This is the critical context for the mass protests in Hong Kong and the miniature trade war between Japan and South Korea, and other regional risks. Which conflicts are market-relevant? How will they play out? The U.S.-China Conflict The most important dynamic is the strategic conflict between the U.S. and China. Its pace and intensity have ramifications for all the other states in the region. Because the Trump administration is seeking a trade agreement with China, it has held off from unduly antagonizing China over Hong Kong and Taiwan. President Trump has not fanned the flames of unrest in Hong Kong and has maintained only a gradual pace of improvements in the Taiwan relationship.1 But if the trade war escalates dramatically, Beijing will face greater economic pressure, growing more sensitive about dissent within Greater China, and Washington may take more provocative actions. Saber-rattling could ensue, as nearly occurred in October 2018. Currently events are moving in a more market-positive direction. Next week, the U.S. and China are expected to resume face-to-face trade negotiations between principal negotiators for the first time since May. China is reportedly preparing to purchase more farm goods – part of the Osaka G20 ceasefire – while the Trump administration has met with U.S. tech companies and is expected to allow Chinese telecoms firm Huawei to continue purchasing American components (at least those not clearly impacting national security). We are upgrading the odds of a trade agreement by November 2020 to 40% from 32% in mid-June. With this resumption of talks, we are upgrading the odds of a trade agreement by November 2020 to 40%, from 32% in mid-June (Diagram 1). Of this 40%, we still give only a 5% chance to a durable, long-term deal that resolves underlying technological and strategic disputes. The remaining 35% goes to a tenuous deal that enables President Trump to declare victory prior to the election and allows President Xi Jinping to staunch the bleeding in the manufacturing sector. Diagram 1U.S.-China Trade War Decision Tree (Updated July 26, 2019) East Asia Risks And The USMCA – GeoRisk Indicators Update: July 26, 2019 East Asia Risks And The USMCA – GeoRisk Indicators Update: July 26, 2019 Note that these odds still leave a 60% chance for an escalation of the trade war by November 2020. Our conviction level is low when it comes to the two moderate scenarios. Ultimately, Presidents Trump and Xi can agree to a trade agreement at the drop of a hat – no one can stop Xi from ordering large imports from the U.S. or Trump from rolling back tariffs. Our conviction level is much higher in assigning only a 5% chance of a grand compromise and a 36% chance of a cold war-style escalation of tensions. We doubt that China will offer any structural concessions deeper than what they have already offered (new foreign investment law, financial sector opening) prior to finding out who wins the U.S. election in 2020. Beijing is stabilizing the economy even though tariffs have gone up. As long as this remains the case, why would it implement additional painful reforms? This would set a precedent of caving to tariff coercion – and yet Trump could renege on a deal anytime, and the Democrats might take over in 2020 anyway. The one exception might be North Korea, where China could do more to bring about a diplomatic agreement favorable to President Trump as part of an overall deal before November 2020 – and this could excuse China from structural concessions affecting its internal economy. The takeaway is that U.S.-China trade issues are still far from resolved and have a high probability of failure – and this will be a source of strategic tension within the region over the next 16 months, particularly with regard to Taiwan, the Koreas, and the South China Sea. Hong Kong And Taiwan Chart 2 August can be a crucial time period for policy changes as Chinese leaders often meet at the seaside resort of Beidaihe to strategize. This year they need to focus on handling the unrest in Hong Kong, and the Taiwanese election in January, as well as the trade war with the United States. Protests in Hong Kong have continued, driven by underlying socio-economic factors as well as Beijing’s encroachment on traditional political liberties. Even the groups that are least sympathetic to the protesters – political moderates, the elderly, low-income groups, and the least educated – are more or less divided over the controversial extradition bill that prompted the unrest (Chart 2). This reveals that the political establishment is weak on this issue. Chief Executive Carrie Lam is clinging to power, as Beijing does not want to give the impression that popular dissent is a viable mechanism for removing leaders. But she has become closely associated with the extradition bill and will likely have to go in order to satiate the protesters and begin the process of healing. As long as Beijing refrains from rolling in the military and using outright force to crush the Hong Kong protests, the unrest should gradually die down, as the political establishment will draw support for its concessions while the general public will grow weary of the protests – especially as violence spreads. Hong Kong has no alternative to Beijing’s sovereignty. The scene of action will soon turn to Taiwan, where the January 2020 election has the potential to spark the next flashpoint in Xi Jinping’s struggle to consolidate power in Greater China. Chart 3 A large majority of Taiwanese people supports the Hong Kong protests – even most supporters of the pro-mainland Kuomintang (KMT) (Chart 3). This dynamic is now affecting the Taiwanese election slated for January 2020. The relatively pro-mainland KMT has been polling neck-and-neck with the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which has struggled to gain traction throughout its term given diplomatic and economic headwinds stemming from the mainland. Similarly, while popular feeling is still largely in favor of eventual independence, pro-unification feeling has regained momentum in an apparent rebuke to the pro-independence ruling party (Chart 4). However, the events in Hong Kong have changed things by energizing the democratic and mainland-skeptic elements in Taiwan. President Tsai Ing-wen is now taking a slight lead in the presidential head-to-head opinion polls despite a long period of lackluster polling (Chart 5). Chart 4 Chart 5 A close election increases the risk that policymakers and activists in Taiwan, mainland China, the United States, and elsewhere will take actions attempting to influence the election outcome. Beijing will presumably heed the lesson of the 1996 election and avoid anything too aggressive so as not to drive voters into the arms of the DPP. However, with Hong Kong boiling, and with Beijing having already conducted intimidating military drills encircling Taiwan in recent years, there is a chance that past lessons will be forgotten. The United States could also play a disruptive role, especially if trade talks deteriorate. If the KMT wins, then anti-Beijing activists will eventually begin gearing up for protests themselves, which in subsequent years could overshadow the Sunflower Movement of 2013. If the DPP prevails, Beijing may resort to tougher tactics in the coming years due to its fear of the province’s political direction and the DPP’s policies. In sum, while the Hong Kong saga is far from over and has negative long-run implications for domestic and foreign investors, Taiwan is the greater risk because it has the potential not only to suffer individually but also to become the epicenter of a larger geopolitical confrontation between China and the U.S. and its allies. This would present a more systemic challenge to global investors. Japan And “Peak Abe” Chart 6 Japan’s House of Councillors election on July 21 confirmed our view that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has reached the peak of his influence. Abe is still popular and is likely to remain so through the Tokyo summer Olympics next year (Chart 6). But make no mistake, the loss of his two-thirds supermajority in the upper house shows that he has moved beyond the high tide of his influence. Having retained a majority in the upper house, and a supermajority in the much more powerful lower house (House of Representatives), Abe’s government still has the ability to pass regular legislation (Chart 7). If he needs to drive through a bill delaying the consumption tax hike on October 1 due to a deterioration in the global economic and political environment, he can still do so with relative ease. While the Hong Kong saga is far from over ... Taiwan is the greater risk. Chart 7 Clearly, the election loss will not impact Abe’s ability to negotiate a trade deal with the United States, which we expect to happen quickly – even before a China deal – albeit with some risk of tariffs on autos in the interim. Chart 8 The problem is that Abe’s final and greatest aim is to revise Japan’s American-written, pacifist constitution for the first time. This requires a two-thirds vote in both houses and a majority vote in a popular referendum. While Abe can still probably cobble together enough votes in the upper house, the election result makes it less certain – and the dent in popular support implies that the national referendum is less likely to pass. Constitutional revision was always going to be a close vote anyway (Chart 8). If Abe falls short of a majority in that referendum, then he will become a lame duck and markets will have to price in greater policy uncertainty. Even if he succeeds – which is still our low-conviction baseline view – then he will have reached the pinnacle of his career and there will be nowhere to go but down. His tenure as party leader expires in September 2021 and the race to succeed him is already under way. Hence, some degree of uncertainty should begin creeping in immediately. Abe’s departure will leave the Liberal Democrats in charge – and hence Japanese policy continuity will be largely preserved. But the entire arc of events, from now through the constitutional revision process to Abe’s succession, will raise fundamental questions about whether Abe’s post-2012 reflation drive can be sustained. We have a high conviction view that it will be, but Japanese assets will challenge that view. What of the miniature trade war between Japan and South Korea? On July 4, Japan imposed export restrictions on goods critical to South Korea’s semiconductor industry in retaliation for a South Korean court ruling that would set a precedent requiring Japanese companies such as Mitsubishi and Nippon Steel to pay reparations for the use of forced Korean labor during Japanese rule from 1910-45. Chart 9Japan Has A Stronger Hand In The Mini Trade War Japan Has A Stronger Hand In The Mini Trade War Japan Has A Stronger Hand In The Mini Trade War Japan has the stronger hand in this dispute from an economic point of view (Chart 9). While the unusually heavy-handed Japanese trade measures partly reveal the influence of President Trump, who has given a license for U.S. allies to weaponize trade, it also reflects Japan’s growing assertiveness. Abe’s government may have believed that a surge of nationalism would help in the upper house election. And the constitutional referendum will be another reason to stir nationalism and a recurring source of tension with both Koreas (as well as with China). Therefore, Japanese-Korean tensions and punitive economic measures could persist well into 2020. Bottom Line: U.S.-China relations remain the preeminent geopolitical risk to investors, especially if the Taiwan election becomes a lightning rod. Japan’s rising assertiveness in the region will also produce clashes with the Koreas and possibly also with China. We are playing these risks by remaining long JPY-USD and overweight Thailand relative to EM equities, as Thailand is more insulated than other East Asian economies to trade and China risks. Keep An Eye On The USMCA Last week we highlighted U.S. budget negotiations and argued that the result would be greater fiscal accommodation. The results of the just-announced budget deal are depicted in Chart 10. One side effect is an increased likelihood of eventual tariffs on Mexico if the latter fails to staunch the influx of immigrants across the U.S. southern border, since President Trump has largely failed to secure funding for his proposed border wall. Chart 10 Meanwhile, the administration’s legislative and trade focus will turn toward ratifying the U.S.-Mexico-Canada trade agreement (USMCA). There is an increased likelihood of eventual U.S. tariffs on Mexico ... since President Trump has largely failed to secure funding for his proposed border wall.  Ratification is not a red herring for investors, since Trump could give notice of withdrawal from NAFTA in order to hasten USMCA approval, which would induce volatility. Moreover, successful ratification could embolden him to take a strong hand in his other trade disputes, while failure could urge him to concede to a quick deal with China. Chart 11Trade Uncertainty Supports The Dollar Trade Uncertainty Supports The Dollar Trade Uncertainty Supports The Dollar Further, trade policy uncertainty in the Trump era has correlated with a rising trade-weighted dollar (Chart 11), so there is a direct channel for trade tensions (or the lack thereof) to influence the global economy at a time when it badly needs a softer dollar – in addition to the negative effects of trade wars on sentiment. The signing of the USMCA trade agreement by American, Mexican, and Canadian leaders last November effectively shifted negotiations from the international stage to the domestic stage. Last month Mexico became the first to ratify the deal. The delay in the U.S. and Canada reflects their more challenging domestic political environments ahead of elections, especially in the United States. Ratification in the U.S. has been stalled by Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi, who is locked in stalemate with the Trump administration. She is holding off on giving the green light to present the agreement to Congress until Democrats’ concerns are addressed (Diagram 2). Trump, meanwhile, is threatening to withdraw from NAFTA – a declaration that cannot be entirely ruled out, even though we highly doubt he would actually withdraw at the end of the six-month waiting period. Diagram 2Pelosi Is Stalling USMCA Ratification Process East Asia Risks And The USMCA – GeoRisk Indicators Update: July 26, 2019 East Asia Risks And The USMCA – GeoRisk Indicators Update: July 26, 2019 Republicans are looking to secure the USMCA’s passage before the 2020 campaign goes into full force in order to claim victory on one of Trump’s key 2016 campaign promises. The administration’s May 30 submission of the draft Statement of Administrative Action (SAA) to Congress initiated a 30-day waiting period that must pass before the administration can submit the text to Congress. But the administration is unlikely to put the final bill to Congress before ensuring that House Democrats are ready to cooperate.2 House democrats are in a position of maximum leverage and are using the process to their political advantage. House Democrats are in a position of maximum leverage – since they do not need the deal to become law – and are using the process to their political advantage. If the bill is to be ratified through the “fast action” Trade Protection Authority (TPA), which forbids amendments and limits debate in Congress, then now is their only chance to make amendments to the text, which was written without their input. Even in the Democrat-controlled House, there is probably enough support for the USMCA to secure its passage. There are 51 House Democrats who were elected in districts that Trump won or that Republicans held in 2018, and are inclined to pass the deal. Moreover 21 House Democrats have been identified from districts that rely heavily on trade with Canada and Mexico (Chart 12).3 If these Democrats vote along with all 197 Republicans in favor of the bill, it will pass the House. This is a rough calculation, but it shows that passage is achievable. Chart 12 Chart 13 What is more, there is a case to be made for bipartisan support for USMCA. Trump’s trade agenda has some latent sympathy among moderate Democrats, and Democrats within Trump districts, unlike his border wall. Democrats will appear obstructionist if they oppose the bill. Unlike trade with China, American voters are not skeptical of trade with Canada – and the group that thinks Mexico is unfair on trade falls short of a majority (Chart 13). Since enough Democrats have a compelling self-interest in securing the deal, and since Trump and the GOP obviously want it to pass, we expect it to pass eventually. The question is whether it can be done by year’s end. Once the bill is presented to Congress and passes through the TPA process, it will become law within 90 days. Assuming that the bill is presented to the House in early September, when Congress reconvenes after its summer recess, the bill could be ratified before year-end. Otherwise, without the expedited TPA process, the bill will no longer be protected against amendment and filibuster, leaving the timeline of ratification vulnerable to extensive delay. The above timeline may be too late for Canada’s Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, who faces general elections on October 21. The ratification process has already been initiated, as Trudeau would benefit from wrapping up the entire affair prior to the national vote.4 However, the process most recently has been stalled in order to move in tandem with the U.S., so that parliament does not ratify an agreement that the U.S. fails to pass. Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Chrystia Freeland has indicated that parliament is not likely to be recalled for a vote unless there is progress down south. This leaves the Canadian ratification process at the mercy of progress in the U.S. – and ultimately Speaker Pelosi’s decision. The current government faces few hurdles in getting the bill passed (Chart 14). The next step is a final reading in the House where the bill will either be adopted or rejected. If it is approved, the bill will then proceed to the Senate where it will undergo a similar process. If the bill is passed in the same form in the House and Senate, it will become law. Chart 14 Chart 15...But Trudeau's Party Is At Risk ...But Trudeau's Party Is At Risk ...But Trudeau's Party Is At Risk Failure to ratify the deal before the election means it will be set aside and reintroduced in the next parliament. The Liberal Party is by no means guaranteed to win a majority in the election – our base case has Trudeau forming the next government, but the race is close (Chart 15). A Conservative-led parliament would be likely to pass the bill, but it would likely be delayed to 2021 at that point due to American politics. We suspect that Trudeau will eventually stop delaying and push for Canadian ratification. This would pressure Pelosi and the Democrats to go ahead and ratify, when they are otherwise inclined to reopen negotiations or otherwise delay until after November 2020. If this gambit succeeded, Trudeau would have forced total ratification prior to October 21, which would give him a badly needed boost in the election. He can always go through the frustration of re-ratifying the deal in his second term if the Democrats insist on changes, but not if he does not survive for a second term – so it is worth going forward at home and trying to pressure Pelosi into ratification in September or early October. Bottom Line: In light of Canada’s October election and the U.S. 2020 election cycle, USMCA faces a tight schedule. A delay into next year risks undermining the ratification effort, as we enter a period of hyper-partisan politics amid the 2020 presidential campaigns. This makes the third quarter a sweet spot for USMCA ratification. While we ultimately expect that it will make it through, each passing day raises the odds against it. GeoRisk Indicators Update: July 26, 2019 All ten GeoRisk indicators can be found in the Appendix, with full annotation. Below are the most noteworthy developments this month. U.K.: As expected, Boris Johnson sealed the Conservative party leadership contest. This was largely priced in by the markets and as such did not result in a big shift in our risk indicator. Johnson has stated that he is willing to exit the EU without a deal and it is undeniable that the odds of a no-deal Brexit have increased. Nevertheless, the odds of an election are also rising as Johnson may galvanize Brexit support under the Conservative Party even as Bremain forces are divided between the rising Liberal Democrats and a Labour Party hobbled by Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership. The odds that Johnson is willing to risk his newly cemented position on a snap election – having seen what happened in June 2017 – seem overstated to us, but we place the odds at about 21%. As for a no-deal exit, opinion polling still suggests that the median British voter prefers a soft exit or remaining in the EU. This imposes constraints on Johnson, as he may ultimately be forced to try to push through a plan similar to Theresa May’s, but rebranded with minimal EU concessions to make it more acceptable – or risk a no-confidence vote and potential loss of control. We maintain that GBP will stay weak, gilts will remain well-bid, and risk-off tendencies will be reinforced. France: Our French indicator points toward a significant increase in political risk over the last month. President Macron’s government has recently unveiled the pension system overhaul that he promised during the 2017 campaign. The reform, which is due to take effect in 2025, encourages citizens to work longer, as their full pension will come at the age of 64 – two years later than under current regulations. French reform efforts have historically prompted significant social unrest. Both the 1995 Juppé Plan and the 2006 labor reforms were scrapped as a result of unrest, and the 2010 pension reform strikes forced the government to cut the most controversial parts of the bill. Labor unions have already called for strikes against the current bill in September. However, no pain, no gain. Unrest is a sign that ambitious reforms are being enacted, and Macron’s showdown with protesters thus far is no more dramatic than the unrest faced by the most significant European reform efforts. The 1984-85 U.K. miners’ strike led to over 10,000 arrested and significant violence, but resulted in the closures of most collieries, weakening of trade union power, and allowed the Thatcher government to consolidate its liberal economic program. German labor reforms in the early 2000s led to strikes, but marked a turning point in unemployment and GDP trends (Chart 16), and succeeded in increasing wages and pushing people back into the labor force (Chart 17). And the 2011 Spanish reforms under PM Rajoy led to the rise of Indignados, student protesters occupying public spaces, but ultimately helped kick-start Spain’s recovery. Investors should therefore not fear unrest, and we expect any related uncertainty to abate in the medium term. Chart 16Hartz IV Reforms Were Also Accompanied By Unrest... Hartz IV Reforms Were Also Accompanied By Unrest... Hartz IV Reforms Were Also Accompanied By Unrest... Chart 17...But Were Ultimately Favorable ...But Were Ultimately Favorable ...But Were Ultimately Favorable Note that Macron is doubling down on reforms after the experience of the Yellow Vest protests, just as his favorability has rebounded to pre-protest levels. While Macron’s approval is nearly the lowest compared to other French presidents at this point in their terms (Chart 18), he does not face an election until 2022, so he has the ability to trudge on in hopes that his reform efforts will bear fruit by that time. Chart 18 Spain: Our Spanish indicator is showing signs of increasing tensions as Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez attempts to form a government. After ousting Mariano Rajoy in a vote of no confidence in June 2018, Sanchez struggled to govern with an 84-seat minority in Congress. The Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party’s (PSOE) proposed budget plan was voted down in Congress in February, forcing Sanchez to call a snap election for April 28 in which PSOE secured 123 seats. The PSOE leader failed the first investiture vote on July 23 – and the rerun on July 25 – with less votes in his favor than his predecessor Mariano Rajoy received during the 2015-2016 government formation crisis (Chart 19). In the first investiture vote, Sanchez secured 124 votes out of the 176 he needed to be sworn in as prime minister. This led to a second round of voting in which Sanchez needed a simple majority, which he failed to do with 124 affirmative, 155 opposing votes, and 67 abstentions. Going forward, Sanchez has two months to obtain the confidence of Congress, otherwise the King may dissolve the government, leading to a snap election. Chart 19 Chart 20 The Spanish government is more fragmented today than at any point during the last 30 years (Chart 20). Even if Pedro Sanchez’s PSOE were to successfully negotiate a deal with Podemos and its partner parties, the coalition would still require support from nationalist parties such as Republican Left of Catalonia or Basque Nationalist Party to govern. These will likely require major concessions relating to the handling of Catalonian independence, which, if rejected by PSOE, will result in yet another gridlocked government. The next two months will see a significant increase in political risk, and we assign a non-negligible chance to another election in November, the fourth in four years. Turkey: Investors should avoid becoming complacent on the back of the stream of encouraging news following the Turkey-Russia missile defense system deal. Our indicator is signaling that the market is pricing a decrease in tensions, and President Trump has stated that sanctions will not be immediate. Nevertheless, we would be wary. Congress is taking a much tougher stance on the issue than President Trump: The U.S. administration already excluded Turkey from the F-35 stealth fighter jet program; Senators Scott (R) and Young (R) introduced a resolution calling for sanctions; Senator Menendez (D) stated that merely removing Turkey from the F-35 program would not be enough; The new Defense Secretary nominee Mark Esper said that he was disappointed with Turkey’s “drift from the West”; And U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo expressed confidence that President Trump would impose sanctions. Under CAATSA, a law that targets companies doing business with Russia, the U.S. must impose sanctions on Turkey over the missile deal, but does not have a timeline to do so. The sanctions required are formidable, and the U.S. has already imposed sanctions on China for a similar violation. If President Trump is not going forward with sanctions now, he still could proceed later if Turkey does not improve U.S. relations in some other way. From Turkey’s side, Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu threatened retaliation if the U.S. were to impose sanctions. Turkey is also facing increasing tensions domestically. Erdogan suffered a stinging rebuke in the re-run of the Istanbul mayoral election. This defeat has left Erdogan even more insecure and unpredictable than before. On July 6, he fired central bank governor Murat Cetinkaya using a presidential decree, which calls the central bank’s independence into question. He may reshuffle his cabinet, which could make matters worse if the appointments are not market-friendly. As domestic tensions continue to escalate, and when the U.S. announces sanctions, we expect the lira to take yet another hit and add to Turkey’s economic woes. Diagram 3Brazil: Pension Reform Timeline East Asia Risks And The USMCA – GeoRisk Indicators Update: July 26, 2019 East Asia Risks And The USMCA – GeoRisk Indicators Update: July 26, 2019 Chart 21Brazil Faces A Fiscal Deficit Despite Pension Reform Brazil Faces A Fiscal Deficit Despite Pension Reform Brazil Faces A Fiscal Deficit Despite Pension Reform Brazil: Brazilian risks are likely to remain elevated as the country faces crunch-time over the controversial pension reform on which its fiscal sustainability depends. Although the Lower House voted overwhelmingly in support of the reform on July 11, the bill needs to make it through another Lower House vote slated for August 6. The bill will then proceed to at least two more rounds of voting in the Senate (by end-September at the earliest), with a three-fifths majority required in each round before being enshrined in Brazil’s constitution (Diagram 3). The whole process will likely be delayed by amendments and negotiations. The estimated savings of the bill in its current form are about 0.9 trillion reals, down from the 1.236 trillion reals originally targeted, which risks undermining the effort to close the fiscal deficit. Our colleagues at BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy still forecast a primary fiscal deficit in four years’ time (Chart 21).5   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Ekaterina Shtrevensky, Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 For instance, the U.S.’s latest $2.2 billion arms package does not include F-16 fighter jets to Taiwan, and F-35s have entirely been ruled out. The Trump administration sent Paul Ryan, rather than a high-level cabinet member, to inaugurate the new office building of the American Institute in Taiwan for the 40th anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act. At the same time, the Trump administration is threatening a more substantial upgrade of relations through more frequent arms sales, the Taiwan Travel Act (2018), and the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (2018). 2 The risk is that history repeats itself. In 2007, then President George W. Bush sent the free-trade agreement with Colombia to Congress prior to securing Pelosi’s approval. She halted the fast-track timeline and the standoff lasted nearly five years. 3 Please see Gary Clyde Hufbauer, “USMCA Needs Democratic Votes: Will They Come Around?” Peterson Institute For International Economics, May 15, 2019, available at piie.com. 4 Bill C-100, as it is known, has already received its second reading in the House of Commons and has been referred to the Standing Committee on International Trade. 5 Please see BCA Research’s Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled “On Chinese Banks And Brazil,” dated July 18, 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. Appendix Image Image Image Image Image Image Image Image Image Image Image Geopolitical Calendar  
Highlights Analysis on Brazil is available below. If banks in China are forced by regulators to properly recognize and provision for non-performing assets, large banks would become substantially undercapitalized while many small- and medium-sized banks (SMBs) would have little equity capital left. That would hammer their ability to finance the economy. Provided on aggregate SMBs have actually outgrown larger ones in terms of balance sheet size, the precarious state of the former’s financial health has become a matter of macro significance. The principal danger to shareholders of mainland banks is equity dilution. We reiterate our long U.S. banks/short Chinese bank shares trade, and within the latter our long large/short SMB stocks position. Feature Chinese Banks: A Value Trap Chart I-1Chinese Bank Share Prices Are On Edge Chinese Bank Share Prices Are On Edge Chinese Bank Share Prices Are On Edge Banks are crucial to financing the private sector as well as all levels of government in China. Not only do banks originate a substantial share of credit, but also they account for 82% of purchases of government bonds. That is why today we revisit the fundamentals of the Chinese banking sector. Besides, their equity valuations appear very cheap, and many investors are tempted to buy their shares. Chinese banks’ financial ratios look healthy and valuations appear extremely cheap because they have not recognized and provisioned for non-performing assets. By expanding their balance sheets enormously and not provisioning for bad assets, their profits have mushroomed. Banks have retained a share of these profits, boosting their capital. Yet, their share prices have been flat over the past 10 years. Recently, investable bank stocks have been lingering around their December lows. Another gap down could be lurking around the corner (Chart I-1). We highlight their poor financial health in the section below, where we perform stress tests for both large as well as small and medium sized banks (SMB). The principal danger to shareholders is equity dilution that will continue occurring among mainland banks (Chart I-2). Our bearish view on Chinese bank stocks has not been contingent on a systematic financial crisis but on inevitable and substantial equity dilution. Investment conclusions: Absolute return investors should stay clear of Chinese bank stocks – they are the ultimate value trap. For relative value traders, we reiterate our long U.S. banks/short Chinese bank shares trade, and within the latter our long large/short SMB stocks position (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Beware Of Equity Dilution Beware Of Equity Dilution Beware Of Equity Dilution Chart I-3Our Trades On Chinese Banks Our Trades On Chinese Banks Our Trades On Chinese Banks   Large Versus Small And Medium Banks China’s banking system consists of five large banks (Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China, and Bank of Communications) and about 3150 small- and medium-sized banks (SMBs). All five large banks are publically listed but the central government still holds about 70-80% of their equity. About 36 of the SMBs are also listed but the central authorities in Beijing have a stake in some of the medium-sized banks. Notably, the central government has no equity in any of the small banks. In recent years, SMBs have been playing a greater role in sustaining the credit boom: First, on aggregate SMBs have actually outgrown the five large banks in terms of balance sheet size. The former’s risk-weighted assets1 (RWAs) of RMB 73 trillion exceeds the RMB 65 trillion of large banks (Chart I-4). Recently, investable bank stocks have been lingering around their December lows. Another gap down could be lurking around the corner. The value of RWAs emphasizes banks’ claims on enterprises, non-bank financial institutions and households over holdings of government bonds. Hence, RWAs of banks are a more pertinent measure of non-government financing than total assets. Second, over the past 12 months large banks and SMBs have accounted for 40% and 60% of the rise in the aggregate banking system’s RWAs, respectively (Chart I-5). Therefore, further credit acceleration will be difficult to engineer if – as we discuss below – SMBs begin retrenching under regulatory pressures and amid tighter market financing in the wake of the Baoshang bank failure. Chart I-4SMBs Have Outgrown Large Ones SMBs Have Outgrown Large Ones SMBs Have Outgrown Large Ones Chart I-5SMBs Have Contributed Enormously To The Credit Boom SMBs Have Contributed Enormously To The Credit Boom SMBs Have Contributed Enormously To The Credit Boom   Finally, there has so far been no deleveraging among SMBs. Large banks’ RWAs-to-nominal GDP ratio has been in decline since 2014, but the same ratio for SMBs has not dropped at all (Chart I-6). This chart corroborates that the credit boom between 2015 and 2017 was driven by SMBs, rather than by large banks. In fact, SMBs along with shadow banking are what primarily drove the credit boom that occurred over the past decade. This confirms the thesis that the unprecedented credit bubble has spiraled beyond the central authorities’ control. While China’s entire banking system is in poor health, SMBs are in considerably worse shape than large ones. In particular: SMBs have much more assets classified as equity and other investments than large banks (Chart I-7). Equity and other investments stands for non-standard credit assets that are typically much riskier than loans and corporate bonds. This is the principal reason why in our stress test we use higher ratios of non-performing assets for SMBs than for large banks. Chart I-6No Deleveraging Among SMBs No Deleveraging Among SMBs No Deleveraging Among SMBs Chart I-7SMBs Exposure To Non-StandarD Credit Assets Is Huge SMBs Exposure To Non-StandarD Credit Assets Is Huge SMBs Exposure To Non-StandarD Credit Assets Is Huge Chart I-8Large Banks Versus SMBs Large Banks Versus SMBs Large Banks Versus SMBs Big banks are better capitalized than SMBs. The capital adequacy ratio among big banks is higher compared with the other banks (Chart I-8, top panel). Similarly, the ratio of non-performing loans (NPL) to total loans is considerably lower for large banks than for SMBs (Chart I-8, bottom panel). On the liquidity side, SMBs are more dependent on the wholesale funding market than their larger peers. Interbank transactions account for 10% of SMBs own liabilities. On the other hand, big banks are the main lenders in the interbank market. Bottom Line: SMBs have become more important than large ones in providing financing to companies and households. Yet these SMBs are much more vulnerable. A Stress Test We conducted separate stress tests on large banks and SMBs. Our findings are not optimistic. Some 71% of equity of SMBs will be wiped out if 14% of their RWAs turn sour (Table I-1). 43% of large banks’ equity will be impaired if 12% of their RWAs become non-performing (Table I-2). Chart I- Chart I- The reason we use RWAs rather than loans is because banks have been accumulating claims on enterprises, non-bank financial institutions and households beyond their loan books. Hence, RWAs better captures all credit assets. We use a higher impairment rate for SMBs than for large banks because the former have substantially more non-standard credit assets. Typically, the quality of non-standard credit assets is inferior to those of corporate bonds or loans. We used the following assumptions in our stress tests: For large banks, we assumed non-performing assets (NPAs) ratios of 10% in the optimistic scenario, 12% (baseline), and 14% (pessimistic) (Table I-2). For SMBs, we employed NPAs ratios of 12% (optimistic), 14% (baseline), and 16% (pessimistic) (Table I-1). The magnitude and duration of China’s current credit boom has considerably surpassed that of the 1990s, when Chinese banks held over 25% of non-performing loans (Chart I-9). Therefore, our stress test assumption that the NPAs ratio will rise above 10% is reasonable. Chart I-9China's Credit Booms In Perspective China's Credit Booms In Perspective China's Credit Booms In Perspective We applied a 30% recovery rate on NPAs. The recovery rate on Chinese banks’ NPLs from 2001 to 2005 was 20%. This occurred amid much stronger economic growth. Thus, an assumption of a 30% recovery rate today is realistic. Finally, we calculated overvaluations assuming the fair price-to-book value ratio for all banks is 1. How has it been possible for banks in China to continue expanding their balance sheets aggressively despite such moribund financial health? Banks can operate and expand their balance sheets with zero or even negative de facto equity capital, so long as they obtain liquidity from other banks or the central bank. This is how many Chinese SMBs have been operating in recent years. Barring institutional and regulatory constraints, banks theoretically can expand their balance sheets indefinitely by creating loans and deposits “out of thin air.” We have deliberated extensively in past reports that banks do not intermediate savings or deposits into loans and credit. Rather, they create deposits when they make a loan to or buy an asset from a non-bank entity. Loans and deposits are nothing other than accounting entries on banks’ books. It is regulators’ and shareholders’ forbearance – or lack of it – that allows banks to, or prevents banks from, expanding their balance sheets. Although Chinese authorities have been easing both monetary and fiscal policies, they have not completely abandoned their regulatory tightening efforts on banks and shadow banking, or their plans to curb leverage and speculation in the real estate market. For example, in April bank regulators released draft rules on how banks should classify all types of assets and provision for them. Over the past several years, many banks have transformed their bad loans into non-loan assets to disguise the true level of their non-performing loans (NPLs). The new regulation, if and when it is adopted and properly executed, will force banks to recognize NPAs and increase their provisions. Although Chinese authorities have been easing both monetary and fiscal policies, they have not completely abandoned their regulatory tightening efforts on banks and shadow banking, or their plans to curb leverage and speculation in the real estate market. Ultimately, this will substantially impair banks’ capital and dampen their ability to originate new credit – both in the form of making loans and buying securities. Consequently, the credit impulse will relapse and the business cycle recovery will be delayed. Bottom Line: If banks in China are forced by regulators to properly recognize and provision for NPAs, large banks would become substantially undercapitalized while many SMBs would have little equity capital left. That would hammer their ability to finance the economy. Investment Ramifications Given the increased importance of SMBs in China, the precarious state of their financial health has become a matter of macro significance. Even if regulators partially reinforce recognition of provisions for NPAs, aggregate credit growth will decelerate. A simple simulation to illustrate this point: If SMBs RWAs growth were to decelerate from 11% currently to 8%, large banks’ RWA annual growth would need to surge from 8% now to 16% for all banks’ RWA growth to accelerate from the current 9.5% to 12%. The latter is probably what is required to promote an economic recovery. Such a ramp-up in large banks’ RWAs is unlikely, given they would also be facing stricter regulatory requirements. The key point is that the positive effects of monetary and fiscal easing continue to be hampered by regulatory tightening on the credit system. The latter will delay a business cycle recovery in China. For now, although the credit plus fiscal spending impulse has picked up, economic growth has not yet revived (Chart I-10, top two panels). The reason has been a declining marginal propensity to spend among households and companies (Chart I-10, bottom two panels). We have discussed this issue at great length in past reports. Consistently, nominal industrial output, car sales and smartphone sales as well as total imports are either very weak or are in outright contraction (Chart I-11). All series in Chart I-11 and I-12 include June data. Chart I-10Stimulus Versus Marginal Propensity To Spend Stimulus Versus Marginal Propensity To Spend Stimulus Versus Marginal Propensity To Spend Chart I-11Chinese Economy: No Recovery So Far Chinese Economy: No Recovery So Far Chinese Economy: No Recovery So Far   Chart I-12Chinese Corporate EPS: The Outlook Is Downbeat Chinese Corporate EPS: The Outlook Is Downbeat Chinese Corporate EPS: The Outlook Is Downbeat Importantly, Chinese corporate per-share earnings in RMB are contracting for the MSCI investable universe and will soon be contracting for A-share companies as well (Chart I-12). We maintain our negative outlook for EM risk assets and China-plays globally due to our downbeat view on China’s credit cycle. This differs from BCA’s House View, which is positive on global/Chinese growth.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Lin Xiang, Research Analyst linx@bcaresearch.com Brazil: Buy The Rumor, Sell The News? Having surged on the back of Congress’s initial approval of the social security reform, Brazilian financial markets are attempting to break above important technical resistance levels both in absolute and relative terms (Chart II-1 and Chart II-2). If the Bovespa decisively breaks above these technical resistance lines, it would mean it is in a structural bull market. A failure to break out will lead to a sizable setback. Chart II-1Are Brazilian Equities Poised For A Breakout In Absolute Terms… Are Markets Poised For A Breakout In Absolute Terms... Are Markets Poised For A Breakout In Absolute Terms... Chart II-2…And Relative Terms? ...And Relative Terms? ...And Relative Terms?     We upgraded Brazilian equity and fixed-income markets right after the first round of presidential elections on October 7, but then downgraded them in early April. In retrospect, the downgrade was a miscalculation. Presently, investor confidence in Brazil is very high, sentiment is very bullish and markets are overbought. Faced with the choice of chasing the market higher or waiting, we are opting for the latter. Pension Reform: Necessary But Not Sufficient Chart II-3Public Debt-To-GDP Ratio Will Rise Further Public Debt-To-GDP Ratio Will Rise Further Public Debt-To-GDP Ratio Will Rise Further The nation’s pension bill is a very positive and much-needed step in the structural reform process. However, in its current form, it is insufficient to make public debt dynamics sustainable – i.e., halt the rise in the government debt-to-GDP ratio (Chart II-3). Table II-1 illustrates the savings from the social security reform adopted in the lower house. As estimated by the Independent Fiscal Institute, an advisory think-tank of the Senate, the reform would bring only BRL 744 billion of savings over the next decade. Is this sufficient to stabilize the public debt-to-GDP ratio? Chart II- One way these reforms could contain the rise in the public debt-to-GDP ratio is if the savings generated significantly exceed the primary fiscal deficits over the next several years – i.e., the government runs continuous robust primary fiscal surpluses. Yet, the pension bill falls short of achieving this goal. The estimated savings in the first four years will likely be around BRL 130 billion. This amounts to annual savings of BRL 33 billion. Chart II-4 demonstrates that savings from the reform are too small to flip the government’s (often optimistic) projected primary fiscal deficit into a surplus in the forecast period. One way these reforms could contain the rise in the public debt-to-GDP ratio is if the savings generated significantly exceed the primary fiscal deficits over the next several years. Another scenario for stabilizing the public debt-to-GDP ratio is for interest rates to drop meaningfully below nominal GDP growth. Having plummeted amid very benign global and domestic backdrops, local currency bond yields still remain about 100 basis points above current nominal GDP growth (Chart II-5). It remains to be seen whether local currency borrowing costs will drop and stay below nominal GDP in the years to come. Chart II-4Primary Fiscal Balance Will Remain Negative Despite Pension Reform Primary Fiscal Balance Will Remain Negative Despite Pension Reform Primary Fiscal Balance Will Remain Negative Despite Pension Reform Chart II-5Borrowing Costs Remain Above Nominal GDP Growth Borrowing Costs Remain Above Nominal GDP Growth Borrowing Costs Remain Above Nominal GDP Growth   Overall, the pension reform in current form does not guarantee public debt sustainability in Brazil: It is simply insufficient to get the government to run recurring primary fiscal surpluses. Another prerequisite – nominal GDP growth exceeding local bond yields over next several years – is contingent on further reforms as well as on a substantial improvement in confidence among investors, companies and households. It Is All About Confidence The sustainability of public debt, economic growth and financial markets are interlinked, with the common thread being confidence. In a virtuous cycle, financial markets typically rally while the currency stays firm. Subdued inflation will allow the central bank to rapidly reduce interest rates. This will help boost confidence among businesses and consumers, buoying the economy. In turn, lower policy rates could sustain the stampede into domestic bonds, pushing government borrowing costs below rising nominal GDP growth. At that point, the country’s public debt dynamics will become sustainable, the risk premium will continue to fall, and the nation’s financial markets will be in a secular bull market. On the contrary, a vicious cycle is possible if there is a negative external or internal shock that prompts the Brazilian real to depreciate by more than 10%. On the contrary, a vicious cycle is possible if there is a negative external or internal shock that prompts the Brazilian real to depreciate by more than 10%. In this case, the central bank cannot slash interest rates. On the contrary, government bond yields – which are presently at record lows – could or will likely rise (Chart II-6 and Chart II-7). These events will hurt confidence and suppress nominal GDP growth below borrowing costs. This could aggravate investors’ anxiety over Brazil’s public debt, leading them to demand a higher risk premium. As a result, a vicious cycle could unfold. Chart II-6Government Bond Yields Are At Historical Lows Government Bond Yields Are At Historical Lows Government Bond Yields Are At Historical Lows Chart II-7Credit Spreads Are Very Tight Credit Spreads Are Very Tight Credit Spreads Are Very Tight   Chart II-8Commodity Prices And The BRL: Positive Correlation Commodity Prices And The BRL: Positive Correlation Commodity Prices And The BRL: Positive Correlation To be clear, we are not presently forecasting the onset of a vicious cycle. Nevertheless, given our negative view on EM risk assets and currencies, we expect a pullback in the Brazilian real and risk assets in the near term. The U.S. dollar is about to rally, as we discussed in detail in last week’s report. Commodities prices will tumble as China’s growth downshift persists. Given that the Brazilian real is a high-beta currency and is often positively correlated with commodities prices (Chart II-8), it could depreciate quite a bit. Patience is especially warranted in the case of Brazilian equities because share prices have decoupled from corporate profits and the business cycle. Stock prices have surged despite plummeting net EPS revisions and contracting profits of non-financial and non-resource companies (Chart II-9) and relapsing economic growth (Chart II-10). Clearly, the rally has been driven by expanding equity multiples due to progress on the social security reform. Chart II-9Stock Prices Are Diverging From Corporate Profits Stock Prices Are Diverging From Corporate Profits Stock Prices Are Diverging From Corporate Profits Chart II-10Domestic Demand Has Stalled Domestic Demand Has Stalled Domestic Demand Has Stalled   Bottom Line: A lot of good news has been priced into Brazilian financial markets. For now, the risk-reward profile is not attractive: investors should wait for a better entry point. This is true for both absolute return investors and dedicated EM equity and fixed-income managers. Andrija Vesic, Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Risk-weighted asset is a bank's assets or off-balance sheet exposures, weighted according to risk. It is used in determining the capital requirement or Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) for a financial institution. Usually, different classes of assets have different risk weights associated with them.   Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations Chart II-
Highlights Bad news is still looming in the trade war. Public opinion polling in the U.S. gives President Trump more leeway to push the envelope on tariffs and sanctions against China than the consensus recognizes. Trump’s tendency to push the envelope is forcing China into a corner in which structural concessions become too risky. Unrest in Hong Kong reveals the city-state’s political woes as well as the tail-risk of a geopolitical incident in Taiwan. Tariffs on Mexico are still possible. Close long MXN/BRL. Maintain tactical safe-haven plays. Feature Judging by the S&P 500, the Federal Reserve has cut interest rates and the G20 summit between Presidents Donald Trump and Xi Jinping has been a success (Chart 1). Chart 1Trade War? Who Cares! Trade War? Who Cares! Trade War? Who Cares! The problem is that there is not yet a compelling, positive, political catalyst on the trade front. And the Fed has an incentive to wait until after the June 28-29 G20 to make its decision on any cut. At least in the case of the December 1 G20 summit in Buenos Aires there was significant diplomatic preparation ahead of time. That is not yet the case for the summit in Osaka, Japan. And even Buenos Aires ended up being a flop given the subsequent tariff escalation. We are maintaining our tactical safe-haven recommendations – long gold, Swiss bonds, and Japanese yen – until we see a clearer pathway for the risk-on phase to resume amid a summer loaded with fair-probability geopolitical risks: Trump’s aggressive foreign policy, the Democratic primary, China’s domestic policy, the U.S. immigration crisis, and Brexit. Beyond this near-term caution, we agree with BCA’s House View in remaining overweight equities on a cyclical basis (12 months). China’s economic stimulus is likely to pick up further this summer and it still has the capacity to deliver positive surprises. Preparing For The G20 Over the course of this year we have argued for a 50% chance and then 40% chance that the U.S. and China would conclude a trade deal by the G20 summit. However, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross and other administration officials, including Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, have recently indicated that the best case at the G20 is for the leaders to have dinner and agree to a new timetable that aims to close the negotiations in the coming months. The Trump-Xi summit itself remains unconfirmed as we go to press. This suggests that we were too optimistic about even a barebones trade deal at the G20. We are now extending our time frame to the November 2020 election -- the only deadline that really matters. Diagram 1 presents a cogent and conservative decision tree that results in a 41% chance of a major, Cold War-style escalation in tensions; a 27% chance of a minor escalation that is contained but without a final trade agreement; and a 28% chance of a tenuous or short-term deal. It gives only a 4% chance of a “grand compromise” that initiates a new phase of re-engagement between the two economies. These outcomes clearly represent a large downside risk given where equities are positioned today. Diagram 1Trade War Decision Tree (Updated June 13, 2019) Another Phony G20? And A Word On Hong Kong Another Phony G20? And A Word On Hong Kong Why such gloom when the two sides may be on the brink of a new tariff ceasefire? First, delaying the talks beyond the G20 is disadvantageous for Trump and will make him angry sooner or later. The Trump administration, unlike its predecessors, has made a point of opposing China’s traditional playbook of drawing out negotiations. China benefits in talks over the long run because it gains economic and strategic leverage. This has been the case in every major round of dialogue since the 1980s and it is specifically the case today, as China gradually stimulates its way out of the slowdown that afflicted it at the time of the last G20 (Chart 2). Chart 2China's Bargaining Leverage To Improve On Stimulus China's Bargaining Leverage To Improve On Stimulus China's Bargaining Leverage To Improve On Stimulus Trump would not have called a ceasefire on Dec. 1, 2018 if the stock market had held up amid Fed rate hikes and the Sept. 24 implementation of the 10% tariff on $200 billion. This year the U.S. equity market has bounced back and the Fed has paused, but China’s economy has not yet fully recovered. This gives Trump an advantage that may not last if the talks extend through the rest of the year. And this reasoning explains why Trump raised the tariff rate and blacklisted China’s tech companies in May – to try to clinch a deal by the end of June. He is also threatening to impose tariffs on the remaining $300 billion worth of imports if Xi snubs him in Osaka. If the G20 fails to produce progress, we would bet that Trump will proceed with a sweeping tariff on the remaining $300 billion worth of Chinese imports, whether immediately after the summit or at some later point when he decides that the Chinese are indeed playing for time. How can we be confident of this? After all, Trump’s approval rating has fallen since he escalated the trade war in May and it remains well beneath the average post-World War II presidents at this stage in their first terms, including President Obama’s rating in the summer of 2011 (Chart 3). Recent opinion polls suggest that voters are getting wise to the negative impact of tariffs on their pocketbooks. The financial and political constraints on Trump are not very pressing. Chart 3 We are confident because the financial and political constraints on Trump are not very pressing, at least not at the moment. First, the stock market has risen despite the tariff hikes, so Trump is likely emboldened. Second, Trump is less constrained in the use of tariffs than in other areas. He is bogged down with a Democratic Congress, investigations, and scandals at home. He cannot pursue policy through legislation – he shifted to the threat of tariffs on Mexico because he could not build his border wall. By turbo-charging his trade policy and foreign policy – against China, Iran, Mexico, Russia, most recently Germany … basically everyone except North Korea – he creates the option of turning 2020 into a “foreign policy election” rather than an election about the economy or social policy. A strong economy has not enabled him to break through his ceiling in public opinion thus far and he will lose a social policy election easily (see health care). The risk of his aggressive foreign policy is that it triggers an international crisis. But that would likely benefit him in the polls, given the natural inclination to defend America against foreign enemies. See George W. Bush, 2004 (Chart 4). Third, popular opposition to Trump’s trade war is not clear-cut – voters are ambivalent. In the past we have shown that President Trump’s 2020 run still depends on his ability to increase voter turnout among whites, specifically white males, low-income whites, and whites without college degrees. Recent polls suggest that voters have turned against tariffs and the trade war – namely the Quinnipiac and Monmouth University polls released in late May after the latest tariff hike. But it is essential to dig beneath the surface. These polls reveal that the key voting groups look more favorably than the rest of the country upon Trump’s policies on both trade and China (Chart 5). Chart 4 Chart 5 These voters’ assessment of Trump’s performance overall, across a range of policies, is not disapproving, despite all of the unorthodox and disruptive decisions that Trump has made in his presidency thus far (Chart 6). Chart 6 American voters are neither as enthusiastic about free trade nor as appalled by protectionism as the headline polling suggests. For instance, take the Monmouth University poll, which asked very specific questions about trade, tariffs, and retaliation. If we combine the group of voters who are clearly protectionist with those who are “not sure” or think the answer “depends,” the results do not suggest that Trump is heavily constrained (Table 1). Table 1Americans Are Not As Pro-Free Trade As It Seems Another Phony G20? And A Word On Hong Kong Another Phony G20? And A Word On Hong Kong In swing counties 51% of voters think that free trade is either a bad idea or are undecided. And even 57% percent of voters in counties that voted for Hillary Clinton by more than a 10% margin are in favor of tariffs or unsure. And a majority of voters in the most relevant categories – independents, moderates, non-college graduates, low-income earners – believe that Trump’s tariffs will bring manufacturing back, a highly relevant point for an election that will likely swing on the Rust Belt yet again. This includes Clinton’s most secure districts (Chart 7)! Chart 7 The point is not that Trump lacks political constraints on the trade war – after all, these voters are on the borderline in many cases and concerned about all-out trade war with China. Rather, his aggressive trade tactics enable him to reconnect with and energize his voter base at a time when his other signature policies are tied down. This is critical because his reelection prospects, which we have pegged at 55%, are in great peril, at least judging by his lag in the head-to-head polling against the top Democrats in swing states. Bottom Line: Going forward, Trump has more room to push the envelope than investors realize. A failed G20 summit poses the risk of another selloff in global equities. We are maintaining our tactical safe-haven trades.   What About Xi Jinping’s Constraints? Xi is president for life and must be attentive to long-term ramifications. Chart 8Xi Jinping's Immediate Constraint Xi Jinping's Immediate Constraint Xi Jinping's Immediate Constraint If Trump is tempted to continue pushing the envelope, will President Xi back down? While not constrained by the stock market or elections, he does face the prospect of instability in the manufacturing sector and large-scale unemployment (Chart 8), which Beijing has not had to deal with for 20 years. The point is not to claim that laid-off Chinese workers will turn around and protest against their own country in the face of gunboat diplomacy by capitalist imperialists – on the 70th anniversary of the regime, no less. Rather, Xi is president for life and must be attentive to the long-term ramifications of a disruptive transition in the excessively large manufacturing sector. This would cause economic and, yes, ultimately socio-political problems for him down the road. If Trump continues to move toward his 2016 campaign pledge of a 45% tariff on all Chinese imports, as the 2020 election approaches, China’s leaders have far less incentive to put their careers (and lives) on the line to produce structural concessions. A tariff covering all Chinese goods is an absolutist position that China can only address by doubling down on its demand for full tariff rollback. Yet Trump needs to retain some tariffs to enforce the implementation of any agreement. Thus slapping tariffs on all Chinese imports is almost, but not quite, an irreversible step. This is captured in Diagram 1 via the 29% chance that tensions are contained even if a deal falls through. Tensions are even less likely to be contained if the Trump administration follows through on its threats against China’s tech sector. On August 19, the Commerce Department will decide whether to renew the license for U.S. companies to sell key components to Huawei and other blacklisted companies. If the administration denies the license – and moves further ahead with export controls on emerging and foundational technologies – then Beijing faces an outright technological blockade. It will retaliate against U.S. companies – a process already beginning1 – and will likely act on other threats such as a rare earths embargo. In this case strategic tensions will escalate dramatically, including saber-rattling in the air, in cyberspace, or on the high seas. At the moment political frictions in Hong Kong are exacerbating U.S.-China distrust. Bottom Line: Since President Xi’s constraints are longer-term, he has the ability to deny structural concessions to Trump. But Trump’s ability to push the trade war further and further risks forcing China to a point of no return. There is not a clear basis for the geopolitical risk affecting the global trade and growth outlook to fall. Hong Kong: A New Front In The U.S.-China Struggle The large-scale protests that have erupted in Hong Kong – first on April 28 and most recently on June 9 –are important for several reasons: they highlight the immense geopolitical pressure in East Asia emanating from China’s “New Era” under Xi Jinping; they are rapidly becoming entangled in U.S.-China tensions, particularly over technological acquisition; and they foreshadow the political instability on the horizon in Taiwan. Tensions have been rising between Hong Kong and mainland China since the Great Recession and the shock to capitalist financial centers around the world. The tensions are symptomatic of the dramatic change in China over the past decade; the decline of the post-Cold War status quo; and the broader decline of the western world order (e.g. the British Empire). After all, the West is lacking tools to preserve the rights and privileges that Hong Kong was supposed to be guaranteed when the transfer of sovereignty occurred in 1997. More immediately, the current protests are part of a process going back to 2012 in which the disaffected and marginalized parts of Hong Kong society began speaking up against the political establishment. This emerged because of high income inequality (Chart 9), shortcomings in quality of life, excessive property prices (Chart 10), and the mainland’s reassertion of Communist Party rule and encroachments on Hong Kong’s autonomy. Chart 9 Chart 10Another Source Of Hong Kong's Unrest Another Source Of Hong Kong's Unrest Another Source Of Hong Kong's Unrest A simple comparison with Singapore, the other major East Asian city-state, shows that Hong Kong has trailed in GDP per capita and wage gains, while property price inflation has soared ahead (Chart 11). These structural economic factors contributed to the emergence of the “Occupy Central” protests in 2014, which were smaller than today’s protests but signaled the abrupt shift in the political sphere toward disenchantment and activism. Chart 11Why Hong Kong Is Not As Quiet As Singapore Why Hong Kong Is Not As Quiet As Singapore Why Hong Kong Is Not As Quiet As Singapore The 2016 elections for the Legislative Council (LegCo) resulted in a fiasco by which a number of pro-democracy activists, known as “localists,” were squeezed out of the legislature through a combination of juvenile mistakes and heavy-handed intervention by Beijing and the pro-mainland Hong Kong authorities (Chart 12 A&B). Beijing exploited the occasion to extend its legal writ over Hong Kong society and curb some of the city’s freedoms.2 The democratic opposition and dissidents have been sidelined or repressed — and now they face the prospect of being extradited, given that the LegCo is highly likely to pass the “Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters” bill that sparked the protests this year. Chart 12 Chart 12 The exclusion of the localists from power runs the risk of radicalizing them and increasing disaffection, making mass protests likely to recur both in the near term and in future. Hong Kongers are losing confidence in the “One Country, Two Systems” arrangement (Chart 13). They are similarly becoming more disillusioned with mainland China, adding fuel to the fire over time (Chart 14). However, in the specific case of the city-state, there is no alternative to Beijing’s ultimate say – and the older generations will continue to support the political establishment. Chart 13 Chart 14 Nevertheless Hong Kong’s discontents will become entangled in the broader Cold War emerging between the U.S. and China. Beijing is accusing the protesters of being lackeys of foreign powers. The U.S. Congress, on both sides of the aisle, is threatening to declare that Hong Kong is no longer sufficiently autonomous from Beijing and therefore no longer eligible for special privileges. Hong Kong faces rising political dependency on China and the potential for special relations with the United States to decline. Chart 15 Part of Washington’s concern lies with Beijing’s aggressive technological acquisition program. Hong Kong has been able to import advanced dual-use technology products from the United States without Beijing’s restrictions. This is not apparent from the proportion of exports but it is important on the technological level (Chart 15). It introduces a backdoor for China to acquire these goods and has prompted a rethink in Washington. Hong Kong is also accused of facilitating the circumventing of sanctions on U.S. enemies. It thus faces rising political dependency on China and the potential for special relations with the United States to decline. These pressures also highlight why we view Taiwan as a potential “Black Swan.” Similar political fissures are emerging as Beijing expands its economic and military dominance over Taiwan. Of course, the political backlash against Beijing has recently been receding in Taiwanese opinion, due to the fact that the nominally pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party has lost most of the momentum it gained after the large-scale “Sunflower” student protests of 2014 (Chart 16). But there are still several reasons that the January 2020 election could become a geopolitical flashpoint: namely the developments in Hong Kong, China’s handling of them, Beijing’s tensions with Washington, and the Trump administration’s temptation to achieve some key goals with the Tsai Ing-wen administration before it leaves office (including arms sales). Even if the Taiwanese political winds shift to become less confrontational toward Beijing after January, the time between now and then is ripe for an “incident” of some kind. Beyond that, the pro-independence opposition will begin activating and marching against the next government if it proves obsequious to the mainland. Chart 16Taiwan: Pro-Mainland Forces Revive Taiwan: Pro-Mainland Forces Revive Taiwan: Pro-Mainland Forces Revive Chart 17 Over the long run, Taiwan is far more autonomous than Hong Kong, harder for Beijing to control, and much more attractive for Beijing’s enemies to defend – namely the U.S. and Japan. Moreover, as the tech conflict with Washington heats up, Taiwan becomes vital for China’s technological self-sufficiency, putting it at higher risk (Chart 17). Beijing will also frown upon the role of Taiwanese companies like FoxConn for taking early steps to diversify the supply chain away from China. This regional strategic reality is not conducive to U.S.-China trade negotiations. And even aside from the U.S., Beijing’s growing power generates resistance from its periphery. This is true of Chinese ally North Korea, which is trying to broaden its options, as well as a historic enemy like Vietnam. Other countries at a bit more of a distance are trying to accommodate both Beijing and Washington, but are increasingly seeing their regimes vacillate based on their orientation toward China – this is true of Thailand in 2014, the Philippines in 2015, South Korea in 2017, and Malaysia in 2018. These changes inject economic policy uncertainty on the country level. Over the long run we see Southeast Asia as a beneficiary of the relocation of supply chains out of China. But at the moment, with the trade war escalating and unresolved and with China taking a heavier hand, we are only recommending holding relatively insulated countries like Thailand. Bottom Line: Our theme of U.S.-China conflict is intertwined with our theme of geopolitical risk rotation to East Asia. States that have domestic-oriented economies, limited exposure to China, or greater U.S. support – including Japan, Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, and Malaysia – face less geopolitical risk than those heavily exposed to China (Taiwan) or that lack U.S. security guarantees (Hong Kong, Vietnam). Investment Recommendations In addition to our safe-haven tactical trades – long spot gold, long Swiss bonds, and long JPY-USD – we are maintaining our long recommendation for a basket of companies in the MVIS global rare earth and strategic metals index. The basket includes companies not based in mainland China that have seen their stock prices appreciate this year yet have a P/E ratio under 35 (Chart 18). Chart 18Go Long Rare Earth Firms Ex-China Go Long Rare Earth Firms Ex-China Go Long Rare Earth Firms Ex-China We remain short the CNY-USD on the expectation that trade tensions will encourage Beijing to use depreciation as a countervailing tool, despite our expectation of increasing fiscal-and-credit stimulus. Over the long run, we would observe that trade escalation between the U.S. and China bodes poorly for China’s long-term productivity and efficiency. The basis for a reduction in trade tensions is a recommitment to the liberal structural reform agenda that Chinese state economists outlined at the beginning of Xi Jinping’s term in 2012-13. The current trajectory of “the New Long March,” in which Beijing pursues personalized power and uses stimulus to improve self-sufficiency and import-substitution, goes the opposite direction. It is not a pathway for innovation, openness, and technological progress. A simple comparison of China’s long-term equity total return highlights the market’s lack of enthusiasm about the current administration’s approach (Chart 19). The contexts were different, but the earlier outperformance grew from painful structural reforms and a grand compromise with the United States in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Chart 19The Market Wants Reforms And Trade Deal The Market Wants Reforms And Trade Deal The Market Wants Reforms And Trade Deal We are closing our long MXN / short BRL trade for a gain of 4.6%. This trade has bounced back from the U.S.-Mexico deal to avert tariffs. The agreement was not entirely hollow compared to earlier agreements: it calls for Mexico to accelerate the deployment of the National Guard to stem the flow of refugees from Guatemala and central America and expand the Migrant Protection Protocols across the southern border. Trump’s reversal – under Senate pressure, entirely unlike the China dynamic – gave the peso a boost, benefiting our trade. However, one of the fundamental reasons for this trade – the improvement in Mexico’s relative current account balance – has now rolled over (Chart 20) and the tariff threat will reemerge if Mexico proves unable or unwilling to stem the inflow of asylum seekers into the United States (Chart 21). Chart 20Peso Has Outperformed The Real Peso Has Outperformed The Real Peso Has Outperformed The Real Chart 21   As we go to press, the attacks on tankers in Oman highlight our view that oil prices will witness policy-induced volatility and a rising geopolitical risk premium as “fire and fury” shifts to the U.S. and Iran in the near-term. Our expectation of increasing Chinese stimulus helps underpin the constructive view on oil and energy-producing emerging markets.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The American Chamber of Commerce in China and Shanghai released a survey on May 22, 2019 revealing that while 53% of companies have not yet experienced “non-tariff” retaliation by Chinese authorities, 47% had experienced it: 20.1% through increased inspections; 19.7% through slower customs clearance; 14.2% through slow license approvals; another 14.2% through bureaucratic and regulatory complications; and smaller numbers dealing with problems associated with American employees’ visas, increased difficulty closing investment deals, products rejected by customs, and rejections of licenses and applications. 2 We noted at the time, “Mainland forces will bring down the hammer on the pro-independence movement. The election of a new chief executive will appear to reinforce the status quo but in reality Beijing will tighten its legal, political, and security grip. Large protests are likely; political uncertainty will remain high.” See BCA Geopolitical Strategy, “Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now,” December 14, 2016, available at www.bcaresearch.com.
Dear Client, Tomorrow we will publish a debate piece on China shedding more light on the ongoing discussions at BCA on this topic. This report will articulate the conceptual and analytical differences between my colleague, Peter Berezin, and I relating to our respective outlooks on China’s credit cycle. Peter believes that the credit boom in China is a natural outcome of a high household “savings” rate. I maintain that household “savings” have no bearing on credit growth, debt or bank deposit levels. Rather, China’s credit and money excesses are pernicious and will precipitate negative macro outcomes. I hope you will find this report valuable and interesting. Today we are publishing analysis and market strategy updates on Russia and Chile. Best regards, Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist   Russia: A Fiscal And Monetary Fortress Underpins A Low-Beta Status Russian financial markets and the ruble have entered a low-beta paradigm. A combination of ultra-conservative fiscal and monetary policies over the past four years will help Russian equities, local bonds as well as sovereign and corporate credit to continue outperforming their respective EM benchmarks.   First, both the overall and primary fiscal surpluses now stand at over 3% of GDP (Chart I-1). The authorities have sufficient fiscal leeway to undertake substantial fiscal easing. They have announced a major fiscal spending program, which is planned to be in the order of $390 billion or 25% of GDP, over the next six years. Chart I-1Fiscal Balance Is In Large Surplus Fiscal Balance Is In Large Surplus Fiscal Balance Is In Large Surplus Importantly, government non-interest expenditures have dropped to 15.5% of GDP from 18% in 2016. Therefore, it makes perfect sense to ease fiscal policy materially to counteract the impact of lower commodities prices on the economy. What’s more, gross public debt is at 13% of GDP – out of which the foreign component is only 4% of GDP – and remains the lowest in the EM space. A fiscal fortress, as well as the potential for significant fiscal stimulus amid the current EM selloff, will help the Russian currency, local bonds and sovereign and corporate credit markets behave as a lower beta play within the EM universe. Second, there is scope for the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) to cut interest rates. Both nominal and real interest rates have remained high, particularly lending rates (Chart I-2). Furthermore, growth has been mediocre and inflation is likely to fall again (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Russian Real Interest Rates Are High Russian Real Interest Rates Are High Russian Real Interest Rates Are High Chart I-3Russia: Growth Has Been Weakening Prior To Oil Price Decline Russia: Growth Has Been Weakening Prior To Oil Price Decline Russia: Growth Has Been Weakening Prior To Oil Price Decline   Although overwhelming evidence warrants lower interest rates in Russia, it is not clear if the ultra-conservative Central Bank Governor Elvira Nabiullina will resort to rate reductions as oil prices and EM assets continue selling off – as we expect. Even if Governor Elvira Nabiullina delivers rate cuts, they will be delayed and small. Hence, real rates will remain high, helping the ruble outperform other EM currencies. Provided the central bank remains behind the curve, odds are that the yield curve will probably invert as long-term bond yields drop below the policy rate (Chart I-4). In short, a conservative central bank will provide a friendly environment for fixed-income and currency investors. Third, the Russian ruble will depreciate only modestly despite the ongoing carnage in oil prices due to high foreign exchange reserves and a positive balance of payments. The current account surplus stands at 7.5% of GDP, or $115 billion. Both the central bank and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) have been buying foreign currency. In particular, based on the fiscal rule, the MoF buys U.S. dollars when oil prices are above $40/barrel and sells U.S. dollars when the oil price is below that level. As such, policymakers have created a counter-cyclical ballast to counteract any negative shocks. A fiscal fortress, as well as the potential for significant fiscal stimulus amid the current EM selloff, will help the Russian currency, local bonds and sovereign and corporate credit markets behave as a lower beta play within the EM universe. Remarkably, the monetary authorities have siphoned out the additional liquidity that has been injected as part of their foreign currency purchases. In fact, the CRB’s net liquidity injections have been negative. This is in contrast to what has been happening in many other EMs. These prudent macro policies will limit the downside in the ruble versus the dollar and the euro. Chart I-4Russia: Yield Curve Will Probably Invert Russia: Yield Curve Will probably Invert Russia: Yield Curve Will probably Invert Chart I-5Cash Flow From Operations: Russia Versus EM Cash Flow From Operations: Russia Versus EM Cash Flow From Operations: Russia Versus EM Finally, rising profits in the non-financial corporate sector and balance sheet improvements justify Russian equity outperformance relative to EM. Specifically, Russian firms’ cash flows from operation have been diverging from EM, suggesting the former is in better financial health than its EM counterparts (Chart I-5). Bottom Line: Even though we expect oil prices to drop further,1 investors should continue to overweight Russian equities, sovereign and corporate credit and local currency bonds relative to their respective EM benchmarks (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Continue Overweighting Russian Stocks And Bonds Continue Overweighting Russian Stocks And Bonds Continue Overweighting Russian Stocks And Bonds To express our positive view on the ruble, we have been recommending a long RUB / short COP trade since May 31, 2018. This position has generated a 10.8% gain, and remains intact. Andrija Vesic, Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com   Chile: Heading Into A Recession? Our recommended strategy2 for Chile has been to (1) receive three-year swap rates, (2) favor local bonds versus stocks for domestic investors, (3) short the peso versus the U.S. dollar, and (4) overweight Chilean equities within an EM equity portfolio. Chart II-1Chile's Central Bank Is Behind The Curve Chile's Central Bank Is Behind The Curve Chile's Central Bank Is Behind The Curve The first three strategies have played out nicely as the economy has slowed, rate expectations have dropped and the peso has plunged (Chart II-1). Yet the Chilean bourse has recently substantially underperformed the EM benchmark, challenging our overweight equity stance. At the moment, we recommend staying with these recommendations, as the growth slowdown in Chile has much further to run and the central bank will cut rates substantially: Our proxy for marginal propensity to spend among both households and companies – which leads the business cycle by six months – has been falling (Chart II-2). The outcome is that growth conditions will worsen, and a recession is probable. There are already segments of the economy – retail sales volumes, car sales, non-mining exports and mining output, to name a few – that are contracting (Chart II-3). Chart II-2More Growth Retrenchment In The Next 6 Months More Growth Retrenchment In The Next 6 Months More Growth Retrenchment In The Next 6 Months Chart II-3Chilean Economy: Certain Segments Are Contracting Chilean Economy: Certain Segments Are Contracting Chilean Economy: Certain Segments Are Contracting   Shockwaves from the global slump in general and China’s slowdown in particular are taking a toll on this open economy. Copper prices are breaking down, and Chile’s industrial pulp and paper prices are falling in dollar terms (Chart II-4). Bank loan growth as well as employment growth have not yet decelerated. The latter are typically lagging indicators in Chile. Therefore, as weakening growth erodes business and consumer confidence, credit growth as well as hiring and wages will retrench. Finally, both core consumer prices and service inflation rates are at the lower end of the central bank’s inflation target band. It is a matter of time before the growth deterioration leads to even lower inflation. We argued in our last analysis on Chile3 that large net immigration has boosted labor supply and is hence disinflationary. This, along with forthcoming hiring cutbacks, will depress wages and lead to lower inflation. Overall, Chile’s central bank is well behind the curve. A major rate reduction cycle is in the cards, as both growth and inflation will undershoot the Chilean central bank’s targets. Chart II-4Chile: Industrial Paper And Pulp Prices Are Deflating Chile: Industrial Paper And Pulp Prices Are Deflating Chile: Industrial Paper And Pulp Prices Are Deflating Chart II-5The Chilean Peso Is Not Cheap The Chilean Peso Is Not Cheap The Chilean Peso Is Not Cheap Lower interest rates, shrinking exports and a large current account deficit will weigh on the exchange rate. In addition, Chilean companies have large amounts of foreign currency debt ($75 billion or 26% of GDP), and peso depreciation is forcing them to hedge their foreign currency liabilities. This will heighten selling pressure on the peso. Notably, the currency is not yet cheap and bear markets usually do not end until valuations become cheap (Chart II-5). That said, the main reasons to continue overweighting Chilean equities within an EM universe are potential monetary and fiscal easing in Chile that many other EM are not in a position to do amid their own ongoing currency depreciation. Besides, this bourse’s relative equity performance versus the EM benchmark is already very oversold and is likely to rebound as the EM stock index drops more than Chilean share prices. The main reasons to continue overweighting Chilean equities within an EM universe are potential monetary and fiscal easing in Chile that many other EM are not in a position to do. Our recommended strategy remains intact: Fixed-income investors should continue receiving three-year swap rates; Local investors should overweight domestic bonds versus stocks; Currency traders should maintain the short CLP / long U.S. dollar trade; Dedicated EM equity portfolio managers should maintain an overweight in this bourse versus the EM benchmark. One trade we are closing is our short copper / long CLP, which has returned a 1.6% gain since its initiation on September 6, 2017. The original motive for this trade was to express our negative view on copper. While we believe copper prices have more downside, the peso could undershoot, which tips the balances in favor of closing this trade. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Juan Egaña, Research Associate juane@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      The Emerging Markets Strategy team’s negative view on oil prices is different from the BCA house view which is bullish on oil. 2      Please see "Chile: Stay Overweight Equities, Receive Rates," dated May 31, 2018 and "Chile: Favor Bonds Over Stocks," dated February 7, 2019. 3      Please see "Chile: Favor Bonds Over Stocks," dated February 7, 2019. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
"Tariff Man" Is On Fire "Tariff Man" Is On Fire While the media has zeroed in on the newly announced tariffs on Mexico late last week, tariffs on Indian imports and the narrowly avoided Australia trade war front barely made the news. This heightened policy uncertainty has taken investors aback. Worrisomely, the recent May update of the “Baker, Bloom, and Davis” categorical trade policy uncertainty index surged, which bodes ill for the overall market (trade policy uncertainty shown inverted, top panel). Similarly, we updated the article count that mention “trade war” using Bloomberg data and the message is similar: the opening up of new trade war fronts will continue to weigh on the broad market (trade war article count shown inverted, bottom panel). Bottom Line: Refrain from trying to catch a falling knife, a tactically cautious equity market stance is still warranted.
Investor surveys show that the majority of investors’ top concerns are political or geopolitical in nature. Yet there is limited research devoted to quantifying these risks. The most prominent techniques involve tallying word counts of key terms that appear…
Analysis on the Philippines and Argentina are below. Highlights Analysis on the Philippines starts on page 9 and Argentina on page 12. Relative return on capital for non-financial corporations points to continuous EM equity underperformance versus the U.S. and probably versus other DMs as well. Taking into consideration the poor corporate profitability, EM equity valuations are not attractive in absolute or relative terms. The rationale for continuous U.S. dollar appreciation is a superior return on capital in the U.S. relative to the rest of the world. Short the Korean won and the Philippines peso versus the U.S. dollar. Feature In general, the most important drivers of relative equity performance between emerging and developed markets are corporate profitability and exchange rates. The outlook for corporate earnings and profitability at the current juncture is poor for EM in both absolute terms and versus the U.S. Further, the U.S. dollar is in the process of breaking out. As this breakout transpires, EM equities will continue to underperform their U.S. and probably DM counterparts. The most important drivers of relative equity performance between emerging and developed markets are corporate profitability and exchange rates. Corporate Profitability Chart I-1Relative Corporate Profitability And Share Prices: EM Versus U.S. Relative Corporate Profitability And Share Prices: EM Versus U.S. Relative Corporate Profitability And Share Prices: EM Versus U.S. Chart I-1 shows relative share prices in common currency terms along with the average of relative return on equity (RoE) and return on assets (RoA) for non-financial companies in EM and the U.S. This chart portends that in the medium- and long term, relative RoE and RoA explain relative equity prices in common currency terms reasonably well. Importantly, both RoE and RoA are ratios and are therefore not impacted by exchange rates. Consequently, it is reasonable to use RoE and RoA to gauge both share prices and exchange rates. Critically, relative RoE and RoA are not impacted by currency movements either. Further, we use EBITDA to calculate these profitability ratios for both EM and the U.S. As a result, they are not influenced by last year’s U.S. tax cuts as well as by corporate depreciation and one-off adjustments (Chart I-2). What’s more, we use data for non-financial companies because profitability measures for financial companies, especially banks, are contingent on their recognition of bad loans and provisioning. If banks lend a lot but do not provision, their profitability becomes unjustifiably inflated. Chart I-2Non-Financials Corporate Profitability: EM And U.S. Non-Financials Corporate Profitability: EM And U.S. Non-Financials Corporate Profitability: EM And U.S. Going forward, the outlook for EM versus DM share price performance largely hinges on currency market dynamics. If the dollar experiences a broad-based upsurge, which appears to be emerging, EM will likely underperform not only the U.S., but DM ex-U.S. as well. The rationale is that currency depreciation will be more positive for equity markets in Europe, Japan, Canada and Australia than for EM bourses. The former group does not have U.S. dollar debt, while currency weakness will boost the profits of their non-financial companies. Meanwhile, many EM companies are sitting on U.S. dollar debt, and as such currency depreciation is toxic for them. Bottom Line: Relative RoE and RoA for non-financials point to continuous EM underperformance versus the U.S. Profitability And Equity Valuations Is it possible that EM corporate profitability is currently improving, and valuations are already discounting a lot of the negatives? Shouldn’t relative corporate profitability be compared with relative equity valuations between EM and the U.S.? For now, there are no signs that EM corporate profitability is improving. On the contrary, our best indicator for EM EPS in dollar terms points to continuous profit contraction until the end of this year (Chart I-3). As EM EPS shrinks, RoE and RoA will also decline. Stabilization and potential improvement in China’s growth could benefit EM corporate revenues and profits toward year-end. However, to date, China’s imports from EM and the rest of the world continue to contract. China’s credit and fiscal spending impulse leads its manufacturing PMI's import sub-component by nine months and predicts a bottoming around August (Chart I-4). Chart I-3EM EPS Is ##br##Contracting EM EPS Is Contracting EM EPS Is Contracting Chart I-4Chinese Imports Will Stabilize Around August Chinese Imports Will Stabilize Around August Chinese Imports Will Stabilize Around August Notably, the continued deterioration in EM top and bottom lines implies that EM ex-financials’ RoE and RoA will roll over at their 2008 lows -- reached at the nadir of the global recession (Chart I-5). Investors should elect the multiples they want to pay for companies that cannot deliver RoE and RoA above their 2008 lows. Chart I-5EM Corporate Profitability And Multiples EM Corporate Profitability And Multiples EM Corporate Profitability And Multiples Taking into consideration such historically low RoE and RoA, EM equity valuations do not appear cheap. The bottom panel of Chart I-5 illustrates that, stripping out the 10% of sub-sectors with the highest and lowest multiples, EM equity multiples are at their historical mean. As to U.S. corporate profits, the key risks are a strong dollar and a potential profit margin squeeze. Nevertheless, a rising dollar is an even bigger risk to EM equities than it is to U.S. equity prices. U.S. share prices always outperform EM equities in common currency terms when the greenback is appreciating. Bottom Line: After adjusting for corporate profitability, EM equity valuations are not attractive in absolute or relative terms. Return On Capital Drives Exchange Rates The U.S. dollar is attempting to break out, and odds are that it will succeed. This will again challenge EM risk assets, as the latter typically perform poorly when the greenback appreciates. The rationale for continuous U.S. dollar appreciation is the superior return on capital in the U.S. relative to the rest of the world. Currency markets are often driven by relative return on capital.1 Chart I-6 shows the average of U.S. non-financials’ RoE and RoA relative to the same measure for DM ex-U.S. Broadly, the long-term trends in the narrow trade-weighted dollar have tracked the relative corporate profitability ratios between non-financial companies in the U.S. and other DMs. Relative return on capital at the moment suggests an upleg in the greenback. Chart I-6Relative Return On Capital And U.S. Dollar Relative Return On Capital And U.S. Dollar Relative Return On Capital And U.S. Dollar The thesis that exchange rate gyrations are steered by the relative trajectory of return on capital is especially true in EM. As exhibited in Chart I-7, relative RoE and RoA between EM- and U.S.-listed non-financial companies foreshadows EM exchange rate movements reasonably well, and points to further EM currency depreciation. Chart I-7Relative Return On Capital And EM Currencies Relative Return On Capital And EM Currencies Relative Return On Capital And EM Currencies While interest rate differentials also correlate with exchange rates in DM, the former often reflect a relative return-on-capital differential. For example, when an economy performs well amid rising interest rates, it implies that its potential growth and potential return on capital are sufficiently high. Typically, the currency of that country will tend to appreciate. By contrast, when an economy struggles amid rising interest rates, it is a sign that its potential growth and potential return on capital are poor, and that the current level of interest rates is unsustainably high. In this scenario, the exchange rate will most likely depreciate despite rising interest rates. In a nutshell, return on capital is an important driver of exchange rates. Chart I-8Interest Rates Do Not Drive EM Currencies Interest Rates Do Not Drive EM Currencies Interest Rates Do Not Drive EM Currencies In developing countries, the interest rate differential with the U.S. cannot be used to forecast exchange rates. As can be seen from Chart I-8, high-yielding currencies such as the ZAR and BRL have often been negatively correlated with their respective interest rate spread over U.S. rates. Crucially, in the case of high-yielding EM currencies, exchange rate swings often steer interest rates. When these currencies depreciate, both their interest rates and their spread over U.S. rates rise. In contrast, appreciation of high-yielding EM currencies prompt interest rates in their respective economies to drop, and their spread with U.S. rates to narrow. Bottom Line: U.S. relative return on capital is ascending versus both EM and other DM, heralding further dollar appreciation. Investment Observations And Conclusions The snapshot of the above analysis is that the relative return on capital explains both relative share price performance and exchange rates. Chart I-9 demonstrates that EM relative equity performance tracks the trajectory of EM relative EPS versus the U.S. in both common and local currency terms. Chart I-9EM Versus U.S.: EPS And Stock Prices EM Versus U.S.: EPS And Stock Prices EM Versus U.S.: EPS And Stock Prices It is tempting to bet on a mean reversal in EM relative equity performance against the U.S. However, our indicators do not point to such a reversal in EM underperformance for now. In short, we continue to recommend underweighting EM stocks versus DM in general and versus the U.S. in particular. Finally, the U.S. dollar is poised to stage a meaningful rally. Last week, we showed that currency volatility has dropped to historic lows. Typically, this occurs before a major market move (Chart I-10). Our view has been one of dollar appreciation, and recent market actions vindicate this stance. In our Special Report on Korea published on February 28, we flagged a tapering wedge pattern in the KRW/USD exchange rate and recommended going long the KRW on a breakout, or short on a breakdown. The won seems to have broken down, so we now recommend shorting the KRW versus the U.S. dollar (Chart I-11). In the meantime, we are taking profits on our short KRW/long equal-weighted basket of the U.S. dollar and JPY trade. This trade has generated a 3.9% gain since its initiation on February 14, 2018. Chart I-10The Dollar Is On Verge Of Major Move The Dollar Is On Verge Of Major Move The Dollar Is On Verge Of Major Move Chart I-11The Korean Won Is Breaking Down The Korean Won Is Breaking Down The Korean Won Is Breaking Down ​​​​​​To play EM exchange rate depreciation, we continue to recommend shorting the following basket of EM currencies against the U.S. dollar: ZAR, CLP, IDR, MYR, PHP and KRW. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   The Philippines: Dovish Central Bank Amid Rising Inflation = Currency Plunge Philippine stocks have outperformed the EM benchmark lately and have risen in absolute terms due to the sharp drop in U.S. rates (Chart II-1). Chart II-1Philippine Stocks Relative Performance Philippine Stocks Relative Performance Philippine Stocks Relative Performance Yet, investors have been ignoring the buildup in genuine inflationary pressures in the economy. Consequently, the latter will carry negative repercussions for Philippine financial markets. In particular, unit labor costs are on the cusp of rising precariously. For instance, the minimum wage in Metro Manila increased by 5% in 2019 – the highest largest hike in six years. Meanwhile, President Rodrigo Duterte issued an executive order raising salaries for government workers and military personnel. Worryingly, President Duterte is also attempting to pass a bill to abolish contractual labor. The latter is a very favorable form of hiring for employers. President Duterte made the successful passing of this bill a top priority and has been urging Congress to fast-track it. In the meantime, President Dueterte issued an executive order banning companies from hiring certain types of contract-based employment. This policy is already starting to take a toll on companies. For instance, Murata Manufacturing, a Japanese electronics parts maker, saw its labor costs surge by 20% in the Philippines as it was ordered to convert 400 of its contract employees to full-time workers. Higher labor costs will push up inflation and/or squeeze companies’ profit margins. Investors have been ignoring the buildup in genuine inflationary pressures in the economy. In the meantime, the Philippines’ fiscal policy remains extremely stimulative. Government expenditures are currently growing at an 18% rate annually. This is despite the fact that the fiscal deficit is widening sharply (Chart II-2, top panel). Chart II-2The Philippines: A Large Twin Deficit The Philippines: A Large Twin Deficit The Philippines: A Large Twin Deficit Consequently, higher wages and fiscal spending will keep domestic demand robust, worsening the Philippines’ current account deficit (Chart II-2, bottom panel). The latter is a form of hidden inflation as it gauges the level of excess demand relative to the productive capacity of the economy. Crucially, given president Duterte’s reluctance to cut government spending, it will be up to monetary policy to solely contain inflation. Yet the independence of Philippine’s central bank – Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas or BSP – is questionable: In March, president Duterete appointed his former budget secretary Benjamin Diokno as the new governor of the central bank. Therefore, the BSP will continue to err on the side of easy monetary policy and will further fall behind the curve. In particular, the BSP might justify staying on hold by the fact that headline and core inflation are now falling. However, that might prove to be a temporary development. Muted headline and core consumer inflation mainly reflect the crash in oil prices late last year. In particular, core inflation dipped because prices of items sensitive to oil prices – such as transportation costs and electricity – fell. The recent spike in oil prices will push inflation higher in the coming months. Crucially, the Philippines inflation problem is genuine in nature because it emanates from higher wages, rising unit labor costs and credit and fiscal stimulus-driven demand excesses. Genuine inflation coupled with a central bank that is behind the curve is a disastrous recipe for the currency. We recommend shorting the peso versus the U.S. dollar. A plunging Philippine peso will cause local bond yields to rise, hurting the stock market. While the central bank could choose to defend the currency by selling foreign exchange reserves, such policy will shrink the banking system liquidity – excess reserves at the BSP – which will result in higher interbank rates. On the whole, the BSP is facing the Impossible Trinity dilemma: given the nation has an open capital account, it cannot control both interest rates and the exchange rate simultaneously. Commercial banks and property stocks – which make up 15% and 29% of the Philippines MSCI market cap – will sell off hard as the currency depreciates and interest rates come under upward pressure. We continue to recommend shorting property stocks. The previous rise in interest rates is already hurting interest-rate sensitive sectors in the Philippines as credit growth is slowing sharply – albeit from a high level (Chart II-3). Commercial banks will in turn face rising NPLs and will be forced to raise provisions markedly. Both NPLs and provisions are currently too low in light of the relentless credit boom of the past several years. Finally, commercial banks have been lowering their provisions to boost their profits (Chart II-4, top panel). This means provisions will have to rise aggressively and bank earnings will contract severely. This will come on top of low net interest income margins (Chart II-4, bottom panel). Chart II-3Philippine Real Estate Stocks Are Ignoring Slowing Credit Growth Philippine Real Estate Stocks Are Ignoring Slowing Credit Growth Philippine Real Estate Stocks Are Ignoring Slowing Credit Growth Chart II-4Weak Profitability Ahead For Commercial Banks Weak Profitability Ahead For Commercial Banks Weak Profitability Ahead For Commercial Banks Bottom Line: We are initiating a new trade: short the PHP against the U.S. dollar. Equity investors should continue underweighting Philippine stocks relative to the EM benchmark, and within this bourse short property stocks. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com   Argentina: A Point Of No Return? The Argentine peso remains vulnerable due to deficient external funding and public debt sustainability concerns. A lack of external funding and a depreciating peso are causing rising inflation and interest rates. The latter are spurring a downfall in the economy diminishing incumbent President Mauricio Macri’s re-election chances. Chart III-1A Point Of No Return? A Point Of No Return? A Point Of No Return? Importantly, a depreciating peso, as well as high and rising external and domestic borrowing costs are making public debt unsustainable. All of these dynamics are feeding into plunging investor confidence creating a powerful negative feedback loop. Argentina may have reached a point of no return (Chart III-1). The odds that the authorities can stabilize financial markets are rapidly diminishing. Foreign currency-denominated public debt currently stands at $250 billion, and the country’s foreign debt service obligations for 2019 alone are $40 billion. We estimate the country will require an additional $10 billion of external funding this year (Table III-1). Chart III- Given worsening investor sentiment, both the public and private sectors will not be able to raise external funding. As icing on the proverbial cake, potential U.S. dollar appreciation and portfolio outflows out of EM will reinforce the turmoil in Argentine markets. Argentina may have reached a point of no return. The odds that the authorities can stabilize financial markets are rapidly diminishing. Hence, without the IMF’s authorization for the central bank to use a large share of its foreign currency reserves to defend the exchange rate, the peso will continue to fall. How much more downside could there be in Argentina’s financial markets and economy? When compared with the major financial crises, bank share prices could drop much more. For example, Argentine banks stocks plunged by 95% in U.S. dollar terms during the nation’s 2001-2002 crisis (Chart III-2, top panel). During the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, bank equities in Korea and Thailand on average dropped by 95% in dollar terms (Chart III-2, bottom panel). Chart III-2History Suggests More Downside In Argentine Equities History Suggests More Downside In Argentine Equities History Suggests More Downside In Argentine Equities Chart III- By comparison, since their peak in January 2018, Argentine banks are down 66% in dollar terms. Hence, more downside should not come as a surprise. As to currency depreciation, the peso’s real effective exchange rate has so far depreciated by 36% and remains undervalued by one standard deviation (Chart III-3). This compares with median and mean of 52% devaluations during previous crises in Argentina (Table III-2). Thus, more downside is likely in the currency in both real and nominal terms. The contraction in economic activity in this recession has so far been 6.5% (Table III-2). This is on par with median and mean contractions of 7% during previous crises but economic activity can undershoot this time. Chart III-3The Currency Can Get Cheaper The Currency Can Get Cheaper The Currency Can Get Cheaper Bottom Line: Investors should continue to avoid Argentine financial markets, as the downside could still be substantial. Do not catch a falling knife.   Andrija Vesic, Research Analyst AndrijaV@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 We herein use the term return on capital in a broader sense. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights So what? Quantifying geopolitical risk just got easier. Why?   In this report we introduce 10 proprietary, market-based indicators of country-level political and geopolitical risk. Featured countries include France, U.K., Germany, Italy, Spain, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, and Brazil. Other countries, and refinements to these beta-version indicators, will come in due time. We remain committed to qualitative, constraint-based analysis. Our GeoRisk Indicators will help us determine how the market is pricing key risks, so we can decide whether they are understated or overstated. Feature For the past three months we have been tracking a “Witches’ Brew” of political risks that threaten the late-cycle bull market. Some of these risks have abated for the time being: the Fed is on pause, China’s stimulus has surprised to the upside, and Brexit has been delayed. Other risks we have flagged, however, are heating up: Iran And Oil Market Volatility: Surprisingly the Trump administration has chosen not to extend oil sanction waivers on Iran from May 2, putting 1.3 million barrels per day of oil on schedule to be removed from international markets by an unspecified time.  It remains to be seen how rapidly and resolutely the administration will enforce the sanctions on specific allies and partners (Japan, India, Turkey) as well as rivals (China, others). Because the decision coincides with rising production risks from renewed fighting in Libya and regime failure in Venezuela, we expect President Trump to phase in the new enforcement over a period of months, particularly on China and India. But official rhetoric is draconian. Hence the potential for full and immediate enforcement is greater than we thought. In the short term, individual political leaders, and very powerful nations like the United States, can ignore material economic and political constraints. Since the Trump administration’s decision exemplifies this point, geopolitical tail risks will get fatter this year and next. Global oil price volatility and equity market volatility will increase with sanction enforcement actions and retaliation. We would think that Trump’s odds of reelection will marginally suffer, though for now still above 50%, as any full-fledged confrontation with Iran will raise the chances of an oil price-induced recession. U.S.-EU Trade War: Neither the Trump administration nor the U.S. has a compelling interest in imposing Section 232 tariffs on imports of autos and auto parts. Nevertheless the risk of some tariffs remains high – we put it at 35% – because President Trump is legally unconstrained. The decision is technically due by May 18 but Economic Council Director Larry Kudlow has said Trump may adjust the deadline and decide later. Later would make sense given the economic and financial risks of the administration’s decision to ramp up the pressure on Iran.1 But the risk that tariffs will pile onto a weak German and European economy will hang over investors’ heads. U.S.-China Talks Not A Game Changer: The ostensible demand that China cease Iranian oil imports immediately and the stalling of U.S. diplomacy with North Korea are not conducive to concluding a trade deal in May. We have highlighted many times that strategic tensions will persist even if Beijing and Washington quarantine these issues to agree to a short-term trade truce. The June 28-29 G20 meeting in Japan remains the likeliest date for a summit between Presidents Trump and Xi Jinping, but even this timeframe could be too optimistic. Continued uncertainty or a weak deal will fail to satisfy financial markets expecting a very positive outcome.   With a 70% chance that U.S. tariffs on China will not increase this year and, contingent on a U.S.-China deal, only a 35% chance that the U.S. slaps tariffs on German cars, we sound optimistic to some clients. But the Trump administration’s decision on Iran is highly market-relevant and portends greater volatility. We expect to see a geopolitical risk premium creep higher into oil markets as well as a greater risk of “Black Swan” events in strategically critical or oil-producing parts of the Middle East. There is limited research devoted to quantifying geopolitical risk. We are late in the business cycle and President Trump has emphatically decided to increase rather than decrease geopolitical risk. Quantifying Geopolitical Risk Geopolitical analysis has taken a bigger role in investors’ decision-making over the last decade. Surveys show that geopolitical risks rank among global investors’ top concerns overall. In the oft-cited Bank of America Merrill Lynch survey, geopolitical and related issues have dominated the “top tail risk” responses for the past half-decade (Chart 1). In other surveys, the most worrisome short-term risks are mostly political or geopolitical in nature, ranking above socio-economic and environmental risks (Chart 2). Chart 1 Chart 2 Despite this high level of concern, there is limited research devoted to quantifying geopolitical risk. Isolating and measuring the range of risks under this umbrella term remains a challenge. As such, for many investors, geopolitics remains an ad hoc, exogenous factor that is often mentioned but rarely incorporated into portfolio construction. For the past four decades the predominant ways of measuring political or geopolitical risk have been qualitative or semi-qualitative. The Delphi technique, developed on the basis of low-quality data sets in social sciences, relies on pooled expert opinions.2 Independently selected experts are asked to provide risk assessments and their responses are then interpreted by analysts to create a measure of risk. Another semi-qualitative method of measuring geopolitical risk ranks countries according to a set of political and socio-economic variables. These variables – such as governance, political and social stability, corruption, law and order, or formal and informal policies – are extremely important but inherently difficult to quantify.3 These results are useful but suffer from dependency on expert opinion, data quality, and institutional biases. More importantly, these methods are slow to react to breaking events in a rapidly changing world. The same goes for bottom-up assessments using political intelligence. The weakness of these methods is that it is highly unlikely that they will produce statistically significant estimates of risk. The odds of getting a “silver bullet” insight from a “key insider” are decent for simple political systems, but not in the complex jurisdictions that host the vast majority of global, liquid investments. Quantitative approaches to measuring geopolitical risk have since become more widespread. The most prominent method is based on quantifying the occurrence of words related to political and geopolitical tensions that appear in international newspapers. These word-counts typically include terms like “terrorism,” “crisis,” “war,” “military action,” etc. As a result, the indices reflect incidents of physical violence or other “Black Swan” events that may not have direct relevance to financial markets. Moreover, while news-based indices accurately capture dramatic one-time peaks at the time of a crisis, they are largely flat aside from these, as they rely on popular topics rather than underlying structural trends (Chart 3). They fail to capture geopolitical developments associated with electoral cycles, protest movements, paradigm shifts in economic policy, or other policy changes.4 Notice, for instance, that the fall of the Soviet Union in late 1991 and the resulting chaos in Russia and many other parts of the emerging world hardly register in Chart 3. Chart 3News-Based Indices Only Capture Crisis Peaks, Not Geopolitical Developments News-Based Indices Only Capture Crisis Peaks, Not Geopolitical Developments News-Based Indices Only Capture Crisis Peaks, Not Geopolitical Developments Introducing BCA’s GeoRisk Indicators The past 70 years have taught BCA Research to listen and respect the market. Why would we suddenly follow the media instead? Most quantitative geopolitical indicators begin with the premise that journalists and the news-reading public have accurately emphasized the most relevant risks and uncertainties. They proceed to quantify the terms of these assessments with increasingly sophisticated methods. This approach solves only part of the puzzle. News-based indices ... fail to capture geopolitical developments associated with underlying policy changes. At BCA Geopolitical Strategy, we aim to generate geopolitical alpha.5 This means identifying where financial media and markets overstate or understate geopolitical risks. We do not primarily aim to predict events or crises. As such, traditional news-based indicators that capture only major events, even those ex post facto, are of little relevance to our analysis. What is needed is a better way to quantify how the market is calculating risks. We start with a simple premise: the market is the greatest machine ever created for gauging the wisdom of the crowd. Furthermore, it puts its money where its predictions are, unlike other methods of geopolitical risk quantification which have no “value at risk.” Chart 4USD/RUB Captures Geopolitical Risk In Russia... USD/RUB Captures Geopolitical Risk In Russia... USD/RUB Captures Geopolitical Risk In Russia... To this end, we have introduced market-based indicators over the years that rely on currency movements, which are often the simplest and most immediate means of capturing the process of pricing risk. In 2015, for instance, we introduced an indicator that measures Russia’s geopolitical risk premium (Chart 4). It is constructed using the de-trended residual from a regression of USD/RUB against USD/NOK and Russian CPI relative to U.S. CPI. We can show empirically that it captures geopolitical risk priced into the ruble, as the indicator increases following critical incidents. These include the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine in 2014; the warnings that Russia aimed to stage a “spring offensive” in Ukraine in 2015; Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War later that year; and the poisoning of former intelligence agent Sergei Skripal in the U.K. in 2018 and subsequent tensions. Using similar methods, we created a proxy to capture geopolitical risk in Taiwan, based on USD/JPY and USD/KRW exchange rates and relative Taiwanese/American inflation (Chart 5). The indicator tracks well with previous cross-strait crises. It jumped upon Taiwan’s election of President Tsai Ing-wen and her pro-independence government in January 2016 – and this was well before any tensions actually flared. It even registered a small increase upon her controversial phone call congratulating Donald Trump upon winning the U.S. election. Chart 5...And USD/TWD Captures Geopolitical Risk In Taiwan ...And USD/TWD Captures Geopolitical Risk In Taiwan ...And USD/TWD Captures Geopolitical Risk In Taiwan This year we have expanded on this work, constructing a set of ten standardized GeoRisk Indicators for five developed economies and five emerging economies: U.K., France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Russia, Turkey, Brazil, Korea, and Taiwan. Indicators for the U.S., China, and others will be rolled out in a future report. These indicators attempt to capture risk premiums priced into the various currencies – except for Euro Area countries, where the risk is embedded in equity prices. In each case, we look at whether the relevant assets are decreasing in value at a faster rate than implied by key explanatory variables. The explanatory variables consist of (1) an asset that moves together with the dependent variable while not responding to domestic geopolitical risks, and (2) a variable to capture the state of the economy. This set of indicators differs from our earlier indicators in the following ways: We aim to create a simple methodology that we can apply consistently to all countries, both in the DM and EM universes. We therefore omitted using regression models that can prove to be quite whimsical. Instead, we simply looked at the deviation of the dependent variable from the explanatory variables, all in expanding standardized terms, to create the GeoRisk proxy. We wanted an indicator that would immediately respond to priced-in risks, so we opted for a daily frequency rather than the weekly frequency we used in our initial work. To get as accurate of a signal as possible, we use point-in-time data. Since economic data tends to be released with a one-to-two-month lag, we lagged the economic independent variable to correspond to its release date. All ten indicators are shown in the Appendix. Across all countries, they track well with both short-term events and long-term trends in geopolitical risk. In the case of France, for example, the indicator steadily climbs during the period of domestic tensions and protests in the early 2000s; as the European debt crisis flares up; again during the rise of the anti-establishment Front National and the Russian military intervention in Ukraine; and finally during the U.S. trade tariffs and Yellow Vest protests (Chart 6). Our GeoRisk indicators isolate risks that either originate internally or otherwise affect the country more so than others. Similarly, in Germany, there is a general increase in perceived risk as Chancellor Gerhard Schröder implements structural reforms in the early 2000s; another increase leading up to the leadership change as Angela Merkel is elected Chancellor; another during the global and European financial crises; another during the Ukraine invasion and refugee influx; and finally another with the U.S.-China trade war (Chart 7). Chart 6Our French Indicator Picks Up Domestic And European Unrest Our French Indicator Picks Up Domestic And European Unrest Our French Indicator Picks Up Domestic And European Unrest Chart 7Greater German Risk Amid The Trade War Greater German Risk Amid The Trade War Greater German Risk Amid The Trade War   We have annotated each country’s GeoRisk indicator heavily in the appendix so that readers can see for themselves the correspondence with political events. The indicators are affected by international developments – like the Great Recession – but we have done our best to isolate risks that either originate internally or otherwise affect the country more than other countries. (As a consequence, the Great Recession is muted in some cases.) What are the indicators telling us now? Most obviously, they highlight the extreme risk we have witnessed in the U.K. over the now-delayed March 29 Brexit deadline. We would bet against this risk as the political reality has demonstrated that a “hard Brexit” is very low probability: the U.K. has the ability to back off unilaterally while the EU is willing to extend for the sake of regional stability. In this sense the pound is a tactical buy, which our foreign exchange strategist Chester Ntonifor has highlighted.6 Our U.K. risk indicator has been fairly well correlated with the GBP/USD since the global financial crisis and it suggests that the pound has more room to rally (Chart 8). Chart 8Betting Against A Hard Brexit, the GBP Is A Tactical Buy Betting Against A Hard Brexit, the GBP Is A Tactical Buy Betting Against A Hard Brexit, the GBP Is A Tactical Buy Meanwhile, Spanish risks are overstated while Italy’s are understated. As for the emerging world, Turkish risks should be expected to spike yet again, as divisions emerge within the ruling coalition in the wake of critical losses in local elections and a failure to reassure investors over monetary policy and the currency. Brazilian risks will probably not match the crisis points of the impeachment and the 2018 election, at least not until controversial pension reforms reach a period of peak uncertainty over legislative passage. Both our new Russian indicator and its prototype are collapsing (see Chart 4 above). This captures the fact that we stand at a critical juncture in Russian affairs, where President Putin is attempting to shift focus to domestic stability even as the U.S. and the West maintain pressure on the economy to deter Russia from its aggressive foreign policy. Given that both Putin’s and the government’s approval ratings are low amid rising oil prices, the stage is set for Russia to take a provocative foreign policy action meant to distract the populace from its poor living conditions. Venezuela is the obvious candidate, but there are others. Moscow will want to test Ukraine’s newly elected, inexperienced president; it may also make a show of support for Iran. With Russia equities having rallied on a relative basis over the past year and a half, and with the Iranian waiver decision already boosting oil prices as we go to press, the window of opportunity to buy Russian stocks is starting to close. (We remain overweight relative to EM on a tactical horizon; our Emerging Markets Strategy is also overweight.) Going forward, we will update these risk indicators regularly as needed and publish the full appendix at the end of every month along with our long-running Geopolitical Calendar. We will also fine-tune the indicators as new information comes to light. In other words, here we present only the beta version. We hope that these indicators will help inform investors as to the direction, and even magnitude, of political risks as the market prices them. Our GeoRisk indicators are not predictive, as establishing a trend is not a prediction. The main purpose of this exercise is to answer the critical question, “What is already priced in?” How is the market currently calculating geopolitical risk for a country? After that, it is the geopolitical strategist’s job to unpack this question through qualitative, constraint-based analysis. It is when our qualitative assessments disagree with what is priced in that we can generate geopolitical alpha.    Ekaterina Shtrevensky, Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic Consulting Editor marko@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      See Sean Higgins, “Auto tariffs decision could be delayed, Kudlow says,” Washington Examiner, April 3, 2019, www.washingtonexaminer.com. 2      Norman C. Dalkey and Olaf Helmer-Hirschberg, “An Experimental Application of the Delphi Method to the Use of Experts,” Management Science, Vol. 9, Issue: 3 (April 1963) pp. 458- 467. 3      Darryl S. L. Jarvis, “Conceptualizing, Analyzing and Measuring Political Risk: The Evolution of Theory and Method,” Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Research Paper No. LKYSPP08-004 (July 2008).  William D. Coplin and Michael K. O'Leary, "Political Forecast For International Business," Planning Review, Vol. 11 Issue: 3 (1983) pp.14-23. The PRS Group, “Political Risk Services”™ (PRS) or the “Coplin-O’Leary Country Risk Rating System”™ Methodology. Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430 (September 2010). 4      Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J. Davis, “Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 131, Issue 4, November 2016 (July 2016) pp.1593–1636. Dario Caldara and Matteo Iacoviello, “Measuring Geopolitical Risk,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, Working Paper (January 2018). 5      Please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “Five Myths On Geopolitical Forecasting,” dated July 9, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6      Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, “Not Out Of The Woods Yet,” April 5, 2019, available at www.bcaresearch.com.   Appendix Appendix France France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Appendix U.K. U.K.: GeoRisk Indicator U.K.: GeoRisk Indicator Appendix Germany Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Appendix Italy Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Appendix Spain Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Appendix Russia Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Appendix Korea Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Appendix Taiwan Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Appendix Turkey Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Appendix Brazil Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator What’s On The Geopolitical Radar? Chart 19      Geopolitical Calendar
Our Emerging Markets Strategy team performed a simulation including in the public budget, all of Pemex’s payments and all its receipts from the government. While the overall fiscal position deteriorates, it is not unsustainable. The primary and…
Our Emerging Markets Strategy team has incorporated Pemex into their budget analysis. The resulting fiscal deterioration is not calamitous. Specifically, international credit agencies estimate that Pemex needs an additional $13 billion to $20 billion in…