Latin America

Highlights We continue to recommend overweighting Mexican local fixed-income markets, the peso and sovereign credit relative to their respective EM benchmarks. A new trade: Sell Mexican CDS / buy Brazilian and South African CDS. Continue holding the long MXN / short ZAR position. We have a lower conviction view that Mexican equities will outperform the EM benchmark. Feature Since the election of Andrés Manuel López Obrador – or AMLO, as he is commonly known – as President, investors have been worrying about Mexico’s fiscal policy and public debt sustainability. Specifically, investors have expressed concern over the debt dynamics of state-owned petroleum company Pemex and its impact on the country’s public debt. While these concerns are not groundless, on balance we find the risk-reward profile of Mexico’s sovereign credit and local currency bonds superior relative to their respective EM peers. Fiscal Sustainability: A Comparative Analysis We discussed debt sustainability in Brazil and South Africa in two of our recent reports, and concluded that their public debt dynamics are unsustainable without drastic fiscal reforms. However, a closer look at debt sustainability in Mexico reveals a different picture. Chart 1Public Debt Burden Including SOE Debt Public Debt Burden Including SOE Debt Public Debt Burden Including SOE Debt Mexico’s public debt level including the debt of state-owned enterprises is lower than those in Brazil and South Africa (Chart 1). Notably, Mexico’s public debt-to-GDP ratio has been flat over the past three years. Importantly, as detailed below, the two primary conditions for public debt sustainability – the level of government borrowing costs and the primary fiscal balance - are far superior in Mexico relative to Brazil and South Africa.   Government borrowing costs in local currency terms are only slightly above nominal GDP in Mexico. Brazil and South Africa score much worse on this measure (Chart 2). The primary fiscal balance in Mexico is much better than in Brazil and South Africa (Chart 3). In fact, Mexico is targeting a primary surplus of 1% for 2019. Chart 2Local Borrowing Costs Versus Nominal GDP Local Borrowing Costs Versus Nominal GDP Local Borrowing Costs Versus Nominal GDP Chart 3Primary Fiscal Balances Primary Fiscal Balances Primary Fiscal Balances Even with potential pension reforms, Brazil will continue to run primary deficits for the next few years. As we discussed in our recent report on Brazil, the government’s submitted draft on social security reforms will save only BRL190 billion over the next four years, or 0.7% of GDP per year. The current primary deficit is 1.5% of GDP. Unless nominal GDP growth and government revenue growth shoot up, the primary deficit will not be eliminated in the next four years. Unlike Brazil and South Africa, the growth of public sector debt in Mexico is not outpacing nominal GDP growth (Chart 4). Critically, the latter point is also true in Mexico if one includes state-owned enterprises’ debt. Brazil and South Africa sovereign spreads are currently only 40 and 85 basis points above those in Mexico, respectively. The spread will widen further in favor of Mexico, given the latter’s superior fundamentals (Chart 5). In terms of local currency bonds, real yields in Mexico are also on par with Brazil but are well above those in South Africa (Chart 6). Hence, Mexican local bonds offer relative value versus many of their EM peers. Chart 4Public Debt and GDP Growth Public Debt and GDP Growth Public Debt and GDP Growth Chart 5Sell Mexican CDS / Long South African and Brazilian CDS Sell Mexican CDS / Long South African and Brazilian CDS Sell Mexican CDS / Long South African and Brazilian CDS             Nominal local currency bond yields in Mexico are about 200 basis points above the EM GBI benchmark domestic bond yield index (Chart 7). This is great value. Clearly, Mexico’s fiscal worries are overblown relative to those in Brazil and South Africa. Besides, relative valuations of sovereign credit and local bonds adjusted for relative fundamentals warrant outperformance in Mexico versus the other two markets as well as against the respective EM benchmarks in the months ahead. Chart 6Real Bond Yields: Decent Value In Mexico Real Bond Yields: Decent Value In Mexico Real Bond Yields: Decent Value In Mexico Chart 7Nominal Bond Yields: Great Value In Mexico Nominal Bond Yields: Great Value In Mexico Nominal Bond Yields: Great Value In Mexico In addition, AMLO’s administration has proven to be committed to fiscal austerity. Last month, the Ministry of Finance reinforced this notion by announcing a reduction in public spending on social programs in order to balance the loss of fiscal revenue from decreasing oil revenues and lower GDP estimates. Mexico’s fiscal worries are overblown relative to those in Brazil and South Africa. Besides, relative valuations of sovereign credit and local bonds adjusted for relative fundamentals warrant outperformance in Mexico versus the other two markets as well as against the respective EM benchmarks in the months ahead. We view the primary fiscal target of 1% for 2019 as aggressive and potentially unattainable due to a shortfall in revenues. However, these actions prove that AMLO’s administration is not intending to run a large fiscal deficit to finance populist spending programs, as investors had feared. Adding Pemex To Public Finances Pemex’s financial position and the government budget’s reliance on oil revenues are an Achilles’ heel for Mexico’s public finances. Therefore, we have incorporated Pemex into the budget. The resulting fiscal deterioration is not calamitous. Specifically, international credit agencies estimate that Pemex needs an additional $13 billion to $20 billion in capital expenditures per year in order to maintain current operations and replenish reserves. This is in addition to its debt service obligations in the coming years, as shown in Table 1. Table 1Pemex Debt Servicing Mexico: The Best Value In EM Fixed Income Mexico: The Best Value In EM Fixed Income We have the following considerations on this issue: First, this year the government announced $5.7 billion of financing for Pemex in the form of direct investment, tax breaks, deductions for drilling and exploration costs and revenue recovered from oil theft. In addition, the government will also do a one-time transfer of $6.8 billion from its $15.4 billion budget stabilization fund in order to finance Pemex’s debt payments due by the end of this year. While Congress must first approve the use of these funds, odds are that the bill will pass as AMLO’s party holds a majority. That would bring total capital injection into Pemex to $12.5 billion for the year, almost enough to finance the company’s capital spending this year. Second, in order to revive operations at Pemex in the medium to long term, the government must maintain this level of investment on an annual basis. Essentially, AMLO’s administration will inevitably have to sacrifice part of the $29 billion in net oil transfers it receives every year to finance the oil company and prevent further downgrades to its credit rating. How large is this required Pemex financing as a share of the public budget? We performed a simulation including into the public budget all of Pemex’s payments and all its receipts from the government. While the overall fiscal position deteriorates, it is not unsustainable. The primary and overall deficits would widen to 1.9% and 4.4% of GDP, respectively, if the government eliminates all transfers to Pemex and if the company stops all payments to the government budget, including direct transfers and indirect oil taxes1 (Table 2, Scenario 1). Table 2Mexico: Pemex And Government Budget Mexico: The Best Value In EM Fixed Income Mexico: The Best Value In EM Fixed Income In such a scenario, Pemex would gain $ 29 billion each year to invest in exploration and production. Pemex is the largest fiscal challenge for Mexico. Yet, even including Pemex debt and required financing, the nation’s fiscal accounts are not worrisome. Chart 8Mexico's Budget Balance Adjusted For Financing To Pemex Mexico's Budget Balance Adjusted For Financing To Pemex Mexico's Budget Balance Adjusted For Financing To Pemex Third, provided Pemex’s capital spending needs could be met by half of this $29 billion, the government could provide the company just half of this amount (Table 2, Scenario 3). In this scenario, the oil company will have sufficient funds to invest. Meanwhile, the government’s primary and overall fiscal deficit will deteriorate only moderately to 0.7% and 3.2% of GDP, respectively (Chart 8 and Table 2). Finally, the importance of oil revenues – both directly from Pemex and via indirect taxation on the oil industry – have already declined as a share of total fiscal revenues – from 40% in 2012 to 18.3% currently (Chart 9). In short, Mexico’s budget is less reliant on oil revenues. If economic growth picks up, non-oil revenues will improve. Consequently, the government’s fiscal position will improve, giving it more maneuvering room to deal with Pemex. Bottom Line: Pemex is the largest fiscal challenge for Mexico. Yet, even including Pemex debt and required financing, the nation’s fiscal accounts are not worrisome. Cyclical Economic Conditions The Mexican economy is slowing and inflationary pressures are subsiding. Narrow money (M1) and retail sales growth are decelerating (Chart 10, top panel) Capital spending is contracting and non-oil exports will be in a soft spot over the next six months, according the U.S. manufacturing ISM new orders-to-inventory ratio (Chart 10, bottom panel). Core inflation is at 3.55% and is heading south. Chart 9Dependence On Oil Revenues Has Declined A Lot Dependence On Oil Revenues Has Declined A Lot Dependence On Oil Revenues Has Declined A Lot Chart 10Mexico: Cyclical Conditions Mexico: Cyclical Conditions Mexico: Cyclical Conditions   Barring major turmoil in EM currency markets that weighs on the peso, weakening growth and disinflation will lead the domestic fixed-income market to discount rate cuts. Mexico’s central bank is very hawkish and will be slow to ease policy. Yet, such a policy stance warrants a bullish view on domestic bonds. The basis is that the longer they delay rate cuts, the more they will need to cut in the future. Investment Strategy We have been recommending an overweight position in Mexico in EM local currency and sovereign credit portfolios, and are reiterating these strategies. Relative value investors should consider this trade: Sell Mexico CDS / buy Brazilian and South African CDS. The Mexican sovereign credit market has made a major bottom versus the EM benchmark and the path of least resistance is now up (Chart 11). EM local currency bond portfolios should continue overweighting Mexico while underweighting Brazil and South Africa (Chart 12). Chart 11Sovereign Excess Returns: A Relative Bull Market In Mexico Sovereign Excess Returns: A Relative Bull Market In Mexico Sovereign Excess Returns: A Relative Bull Market In Mexico Chart 12Total Return on Local Currency Bonds in Dollar Terms Total Return on Local Currency Bonds in Dollar Terms Total Return on Local Currency Bonds in Dollar Terms Similarly, among EM currencies, we favor the Mexican peso because it is cheap (Chart 13). Specifically, we continue to hold the long MXN / short ZAR position; investors who are not yet in this trade should consider entering it now. Chart 13The Mexican Peso Is Cheap The Mexican Peso Is Cheap The Mexican Peso Is Cheap Finally, in the EM equity universe, we are overweight Mexican stocks, but our conviction level is lower than in the case of fixed-income markets. The basis is that AMLO’s policies intend to weaken oligopolies and monopolies and undermine their pricing power. These policies are very positive for fixed-income markets and the exchange rate in the long run, as they entail lower inflation resulting from a more competitive environment. Yet, they could hurt profits of incumbent monopolies and oligopolies. This is why we recommend equity investors focus on Mexican small-caps. That said, from a macro perspective, resulting disinflation and lower local rates are also positive for equity multiples. Hence, the Mexican stock market will also likely outperform the EM benchmark in common currency terms.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Juan Egaña, Research Associate juane@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1 Indirect oil taxation includes different taxes for the oil fund for stabilization and development, such as rights on drilling and exploration, import and export duties on oil and gas and financing for oil and gas research.

Highlights Odds are that the recent improvement in Chinese manufacturing PMIs could be due to inventory re-stocking rather than a decisive turnaround in final demand. “Hard” data have not shown meaningful improvements in China’s final demand. Weighing the pros and cons, we are instituting a stop-buy on our EM strategy: We will turn tactically positive on EM risk assets if the MSCI EM equity index breaks above 1125, which is 4% above its current level. Keep Malaysia on an upgrade watch list. Downgrade Brazil to underweight. Feature The strong Chinese PMI prints released this week have challenged our negative view on EM assets and China plays. This week we take a deeper look at the underlying reasons behind the recent improvement in China’s PMI data. In addition, we elaborate on what it would take for us to alter our current strategy on EM risk assets. A Manufacturing Upturn The upturn in China’s manufacturing PMIs in March has been validated by improvement in Taiwanese PMI’s export orders (Chart I-1, top panel). The latter’s amelioration has been broad-based across all sectors: electronics and optical, electrical machinery and equipment, basic materials, and chemical/biological/medical (Chart I-1, bottom panel). China accounts for 30% of Taiwanese exports, making Taiwan’s manufacturing sector heavily exposed to China’s business cycle. Does this improvement in manufacturing PMIs reflect a final demand revival in China? Looking For Final Demand Revival China’s domestic and overseas orders remain weak, as exhibited in Chart I-2. These indicators give us the primary trajectory of the Chinese business cycle, while the PMI indexes exhibit considerable short-term volatility. Chart I-1One-Month Surge In China's And Taiwan's PMIs One-Month Surge In China's And Taiwan's PMIs One-Month Surge In China's And Taiwan's PMIs Chart I-2Noise And Business Cycle Trajectory Noise And Business Cycle Trajectory Noise And Business Cycle Trajectory   The domestic demand and overseas orders reflect quarterly data from 5,000 enterprises. The latest datapoints are from Q1 2019 and were released on March 22. To be sure, we are not suggesting an absence of bright spots, but at the moment “hard” data do not corroborate broad-based improvement in final demand. Consumer spending: There has been no improvement in households’ propensity to spend. Our proxy for households’ marginal propensity to spend has not turned up (Chart I-3). Consistently, China’s smartphone sales and passenger car sales are contracting at double-digit rates, while the growth rate in online sales of services has not improved (Chart I-4, top three panels). Chart I-3Chinese Consumers' Propensity To Spend Chinese Consumers' Propensity To Spend Chinese Consumers' Propensity To Spend Chart I-4China: No Improvement In "Hard" Data China: No Improvement In "Hard" Data China: No Improvement In "Hard" Data   The bottom panel of Chart I-4 demonstrates the retail sales of consumer goods during the Chinese New Year compared with the previous year’s spring festival. It is evident that as of mid-February, when this year’s spring festival took place, there was no improvement in Chinese consumer demand. Business spending / investment: Our proxy for enterprises’ propensity to spend continues to decline (Chart I-5). Companies’ propensity to spend has historically led the cyclical trajectory in industrial metals prices. Crucially, this has not corroborated the rebound in base metals prices over the past three months. Besides, China’s imports of capital goods, its total imports from Korea and its machinery and machine tool imports from Japan are all still contracting at a double-digit rate (Chart I-6). Chart I-5China: Enterprises' Propensity To Spend And Metals China: Enterprises' Propensity To Spend And Metals China: Enterprises' Propensity To Spend And Metals Chart I-6Contracting At A Double Digit Rate Contracting At A Double Digit Rate Contracting At A Double Digit Rate   China’s fixed asset investment in infrastructure has picked up of late and will continue to improve. However, this may not be sufficient to revive the mainland’s economy. China’s growth decelerated in 2014-2015 and industrial commodities prices dwindled, despite robust growth in infrastructure investment at the time (Chart I-7). The culprit was the decline in property construction in 2014-2015. As to the property market, the People’s Bank of China’s (PBoC) Pledged Supplementary Lending (PSL) financing points to further weakness in property demand in the coming months (Chart I-8). Chart I-7China's Infrastructure Investment And Base Metals Prices China's Infrastructure Investment And Base Metals Prices China's Infrastructure Investment And Base Metals Prices Chart I-8China: The Outlook For Residential Property Demand China: The Outlook For Residential Property Demand China: The Outlook For Residential Property Demand   Moreover, property starts have been surging, yet their completions have been tumbling. This suggests a ballooning amount of work-in-progress on real estate developers’ balance sheets. To be sure, we are not suggesting an absence of bright spots, but at the moment “hard” data do not corroborate broad-based improvement in final demand. It may well be that property developers do not have financing to complete work or that they are reluctant to bring new units to the market amid tame demand. Whatever the case, the mediocre pace of construction activity is negative for suppliers to the construction industry. Government spending: Aggregate government spending in China – including central and local government as well as government-managed funds (GMF) – has been very robust in the past year (Chart I-9). Hence, government spending has not been the reason behind the economic slowdown. Chart I-9China's Aggregate Fiscal Spending China's Aggregate Fiscal Spending China's Aggregate Fiscal Spending For 2019, overall government spending is projected to expand by 11% in nominal terms from a year ago, down from 17% in 2018. The key fiscal risk is shrinking land sales, which account for 86% of GMF revenues. The latter have substantially increased in size and now makeup 27% of aggregate fiscal spending. Local and central government expenditures account for 62% and 11% of aggregate fiscal spending, respectively. If land revenues undershoot, GMF and local governments will not be able to meet their expenditure targets without Beijing altering the former’s borrowing quotas. In brief, fiscal policy may be involuntarily tightened due to a shortfall in land sales revenues before the central government permits local governments to borrow more. Exports: Chinese shipments to the U.S. will recover as China and the U.S. finalize their trade deal. The media is extremely focused on the trade negotiations, and markets have been trading off the headlines. Nevertheless, it is essential to realize that China’s exports to the U.S. make up only 3.6% of the country’s total GDP (Chart I-10). This contrasts with capital spending that accounts for 42% of the mainland’s GDP.  Consequently, we believe the credit cycle that drives construction and capital spending is more important to China’s growth than its shipments to the U.S. Global ex-China Demand: The areas of global final demand that weighed on global growth last year remain depressed. Global semiconductors and auto sales have been shrinking at a rapid pace and have so far not experienced a reversal (Chart I-11). Chart I-10China Is Not Reliant On Exports To The U.S. China Is Not Reliant On Exports To The U.S. China Is Not Reliant On Exports To The U.S. Chart I-11Global "Hard" Data Are Still Bad Global "Hard" Data Are Still Bad Global "Hard" Data Are Still Bad   Bottom Line: There is a lack of pertinent “hard” business cycle data in China that have improved. What Does It All Mean Having reviewed final demand conditions in China, it is reasonable to argue that the improvement in the Chinese and Taiwanese manufacturing PMIs could be due to inventory re-stocking. Unfortunately, in China, there is limited reliable data that quantifies inventory levels well in various industries. Having reviewed final demand conditions in China, it is reasonable to argue that the improvement in the Chinese and Taiwanese manufacturing PMIs could be due to inventory re-stocking. The consensus view in the investment community is that China’s credit stimulus has boosted the economy since the beginning of this year. Business conditions have certainly improved. The rally in Chinese stocks has in turn mirrored this improvement. Yet it is not clear that this revival in the business cycle is due to the credit stimulus. Chart I-12 plots the credit impulse, including local government general and special bonds issuance, with the three typical business cycle variables: manufacturing PMI and nominal manufacturing production growth. Chart I-12China: Credit Impulse Leads "Hard" Data China: Credit Impulse Leads "Hard" Data China: Credit Impulse Leads "Hard" Data As can be seen from the chart, the manufacturing PMI is very volatile. In the short term, there is little correlation between it and the credit impulse (Chart I-12, top panel). Meanwhile, the credit impulse leads nominal manufacturing output growth by nine months (Chart I-12, bottom panel). Based on the past time lag relationships, the mainland’s business cycle should not have bottomed until the third quarter of this year. Hence, the bottom in the manufacturing PMIs in January does not fit the historical pattern of the relationship between the credit impulse and the mainland’s business cycle. Bottom Line: Presently, it is hard to make a definite conclusion on the reasons behind the pick-up in Chinese manufacturing. That said, business cycles do not always evolve in a common-sense manner that can be both rationalized and forecast by indicators. Therefore, it is essential for investors, to have confirmation signals from financial markets on the direction of the business cycle. Financial Markets As A Litmus Test We continuously monitor numerous financial markets that are sensitive to both the global and Chinese business cycles. These financial market-based indicators are often coincident with EM asset prices. Hence, they can be used to confirm or refute EM market direction. Our Risk-On-to-Safe-Haven (ROSH) currency ratio has recently softened, flashing a warning signal for EM share prices (Chart I-13). Chart I-13Currency Markets Are Flashing Amber For EM Stocks bca.ems_wr_2019_04_04_s1_c13 bca.ems_wr_2019_04_04_s1_c13 The ROSH ratio is the relative total return (including carry) of six commodities currencies (AUD, NZD, CAD, CLP, BRL and ZAR) versus two safe-haven currencies: the yen and Swiss franc. Hence, this currency ratio is agnostic to U.S. dollar trends, making its signals especially valuable. Our Reflation Confirming Indicator has retreated, also signaling a pullback in the EM equity index (Chart I-14). This indicator is composed of an equal-weighted average of industrial metals prices (a play on Chinese growth), platinum prices (a play on global reflation) and U.S. lumber prices (a proxy play on U.S. growth). Chart I-14Commodities Markets Are Flashing Amber For EM Stocks Commodities Markets Are Flashing Amber For EM Stocks Commodities Markets Are Flashing Amber For EM Stocks Within EM credit markets, corporate investment-grade spreads have begun narrowing versus high-yield spreads (Chart I-15). This typically coincides with lower EM share prices. Finally, EM share prices have been underperforming DM since late December. Relative performance of EM ex-China stocks against the global equity index has been even more underwhelming. In short, these markets are at a critical juncture. A decisive breakout will entail a lasting rally, while a failure to break out will signal imminent downside risk. Bottom Line: These financial market signals are not consistent with a durable China-led recovery in the global business cycle. Investment Strategy A number of financial markets are currently at a critical juncture. These markets will either break out or break down, with subsequently significant moves. The broad U.S. trade-weighted dollar has been flattish in the past nine months despite falling interest rate expectations in the U.S. and the risk-on market environment. We read this as a sign of underlying strength. The trade-weighted dollar is presently sitting on its 200-day moving average (Chart I-16). Consistent with a flattish trend in the greenback, the U.S. dollar volatility has dropped to very low levels. Exchange rates usually do not trade sideways much longer than that. Hence, the dollar is about to break out or break down and any move will be lasting and large. Chart I-15A Message From EM Corporate Credit Market A Message From EM Corporate Credit Market A Message From EM Corporate Credit Market Chart I-16The U.S. Dollar Is About To Make A Big Move The U.S. Dollar Is About To Make A Big Move The U.S. Dollar Is About To Make A Big Move   The Korean won has been forming a tapering wedge pattern from both short-term and long-term perspectives (Chart I-17, top and middle panels). Its volatility has also plunged to a record low (Chart I-17, bottom panel). Chart I-17The Korean Won Is At Crossroads The Korean Won Is At Crossroads The Korean Won Is At Crossroads Chart I-18A Stop-Buy On EM Stocks A Stop-Buy On EM Stocks A Stop-Buy On EM Stocks Finally, emerging Asian equities’ relative performance to global stocks is facing an important technical resistance as are copper and oil prices. In short, these markets are at a critical juncture. A decisive breakout will entail a lasting rally, while a failure to break out will signal imminent downside risk. Consistently, China’s “soft” data that has improved markedly yet there is no “hard” data confirmation. Moreover, there is some evidence to suggest that the pickup in the soft data may simply reflect inventory building.   Weighing the pros and cons, we are instituting a stop-buy on our EM strategy: We will turn tactically positive on EM risk assets if the MSCI EM equity index in U.S. dollar terms breaks above 1125, which is 4% above its current level (Chart I-18). Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Malaysia: Keep On Upgrade Watch List Malaysian equities have been underperforming their EM counterparts since 2013 and are now resting around their 2017 lows (Chart II-1). The odds are high that this market’s underperformance is late. Chart II-1Malaysian Stocks Relative to EM Malaysian Stocks Relative to EM Malaysian Stocks Relative to EM Investors should keep Malaysian equities on an upgrade watch list. We upgraded the Malaysian bourse from underweight to neutral in December 2018. In a Special Report published at that time, we argued that the structural outlook for Malaysia had improved, yet the cyclical downturn would persist. The latter did not warrant moving the bourse to overweight. This view is still at play. Economic Slowdown Is Advanced The Malaysian economy has been digesting credit and property market excesses. Property sector: Property sales have declined by 37% since 2010, and prices for some property segments are beginning to deflate (Chart II-2). Similarly, housing construction approvals have slumped severely since 2012. Consumers: Passenger vehicle sales have been falling since 2012 along with households' declining marginal propensity to consume, and retail trade has been very weak (Chart II-3). Chart II-2Property Sector Is Depressed Property Sector Is Depressed Property Sector Is Depressed Chart II-3Consumer Sector Is Weak Consumer Sector Is Weak Consumer Sector Is Weak   An ongoing purge of excesses by companies entails lower wage growth and weaker employment, resulting in subdued household income growth. The latter could extend the consumer slump. Business sector: Capital spending growth in real terms has decelerated and may contract. Both profit margins and return-on-equity (ROE) for non-financial publicly listed companies have slumped and are currently resting below their 2008 levels (Chart II-4). This warrants cost-cutting and reduced corporate spending/capital expenditures for now. Chart II-4Corporate Restructuring On The Way? Corporate Restructuring On The Way? Corporate Restructuring On The Way? Reduced employment and weak wage growth are negative dynamics for households but positive for companies’ profit margins. Commercial Banks: Malaysian banks remain unhealthy. At 1.5%, their NPLs remain low relative to the credit boom that occurred over the past decade. Moreover, Malaysian banks have been lowering their provisions levels to boost profits. This is an unsustainable strategy. Provided economic growth will remain weak, both NPLs and provisions will rise, hurting banks’ profits and share prices. Banks hold a very large market-cap weighting in this bourse, and the negative outlook for banks’ profits deters us from upgrading this equity market. Purging Excesses: Implications For The Exchange Rate Purging of economic excesses is painful in the short- and medium-term, as it instills deflation. A currency often depreciates during this phase to mitigate the deflationary forces in the economy. However, purging excesses, deleveraging and corporate restructuring are ultimately structurally bullish for a currency. First, corporate restructuring and improved capital allocation lift productivity growth in the long run. The Malaysian economy has been digesting credit and property market excesses. Second, low inflation or outright deflation allow the currency to depreciate in real terms. The Malaysian ringgit is already cheap based on the real effective exchange rate (Chart II-5). Finally, amid deflation and in the absence of widespread bailout of debtors funded by bank loans or excessive government borrowing, cash becomes “king”. Hence, deleveraging is ultimately currency positive. In contrast, pervasive bailouts funded by money creation – i.e., mushrooming money growth – usually undermine residents’ and foreigners’ willingness to hold the currency. A capital flight ensues and the currency plunges. Malaysia in 2015 was the latter case, with the ringgit plummeting as residents converted their ringgits to U.S. dollars (Chart II-6, top panel). Chart II-5The Ringgit Is Cheap The Ringgit Is Cheap The Ringgit Is Cheap Chart II-6Malaysia: 2015 Vs. Now Malaysia: 2015 Vs. Now Malaysia: 2015 Vs. Now   Presently, the opposite dynamics are at play. The central bank is reducing commercial banks’ excess reserves, domestic private credit growth is weak and residents are not fleeing the ringgit (Chart II-6). In addition, the structural reorientation of the economy from commodities to semiconductors/technology is beginning to bear fruit. As a result, overall trade balance has significantly improved, despite weak commodities prices. This is also positive for the currency. Finally, a more stable (i.e., modestly weaker) exchange rate amid both a global and domestic downturn will allow Malaysia’s central bank to reduce interest rates and smooth the growth slump. This is in contrast to 2015 when capital outflows and the plunging currency did not allow the central bank to reduce borrowing costs. Investment Conclusions We recommend keeping Malaysian stocks on an upgrade watch list for now. We recommend upgrading Malaysian sovereign credit and local currency government bonds from underweight to neutral relative to their respective EM benchmarks A relatively stable ringgit will benefit Malaysia’s local and U.S. dollar bonds. Furthermore, foreign ownership of local bonds has fallen meaningfully, diminishing the risk of future outflows. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Downgrading Brazil: The Honeymoon Is Over In our October 9 report, we upgraded Brazil following the outcome of the first round of presidential elections. We, like the market, gave a benefit of the doubt to the new president. However, the honeymoon is over for President Bolsonaro. The markets are becoming increasingly pessimistic because of the lack of progress on the social security reforms front. It is no secret that Brazil needs bold pension reform to make its public debt sustainable. As things stand now, the public debt dynamic in Brazil is precarious. Two prerequisites for public debt sustainability are (1) for interest rates to be below nominal GDP growth or (2) continuous robust primary fiscal surpluses. Hence, a government can stabilize its debt-to-GDP ratio by either having nominal GDP above its borrowing costs, or by running persistent and sizable primary fiscal surpluses. Neither of these two stipulations are presently satisfied in Brazil. The gap between government local currency bond yields and nominal GDP growth is still very wide (Chart III-1). Meanwhile, the primary fiscal deficit is 1.5% of GDP (Chart III-2). Chart III-1Brazil: An Unsustainable Gap Brazil: An Unsustainable Gap Brazil: An Unsustainable Gap Chart III-2Brazil: Public Debt Dynamics Are Precarious Brazil: Public Debt Dynamics Are Precarious Brazil: Public Debt Dynamics Are Precarious     In the early 2000s, the government stabilized its public debt dynamics by running persistent primary surpluses of about 4% of GDP (Chart III-2, top panel). Will Brazil achieve primary fiscal surpluses in the coming years assuming some form of the pension reform is adopted? It is doubtful. According to the government’s own forecasts, the submitted draft of social security reforms, including the one for the army, will save only BRL190 billion in next four years or 0.7% of GDP per year. The current primary deficit is 1.5% of GDP (Chart III-2). Unless nominal GDP growth and government revenue growth shoot up, the primary deficit will not be eliminated or the primary surplus will be very small. Overall, it seems unlikely that the government’s proposed pension reforms will be sufficient to turn around Brazil’s public debt dynamics in the next several years - barring very strong economic growth that will fill in government coffers. Bottom Line: We are downgrading Brazil from overweight to underweight within EM equity, local currency bonds and sovereign credit benchmarks. Andrija Vesic, Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com Footnotes Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights Venezuela’s oil production likely fell ~ 500k b/d last week in the wake of nationwide power outages, reducing total output to ~ 500k b/d. However, neither OPEC 2.0 nor U.S. President Donald Trump drew much attention to it. During an industry gathering in Houston last week, an administration official conceded events in Venezuela could affect whether U.S. waivers on its Iranian oil-export sanctions are extended beyond May 4, but that was pretty much it.1 This is consistent with the thesis we laid out last month, which reflects our view OPEC 2.0 is evolving a more flexible production strategy that allows it to adjust production quickly in response to exogenous events over which it has little control; chiefly, U.S. foreign, trade and monetary policy.2 This will result in higher prices, satisfying the sometimes-conflicting goals of OPEC 2.0’s leadership – i.e., KSA’s budgetary need for prices closer to $80/bbl, and Russian producers’ need to increase revenue through higher volumes. Given this backdrop, our updated balances and price forecasts remain largely unchanged, with minor adjustments to the overall supply side and no change on the demand side. We continue to expect Brent to average $75/bbl this year. For 2020, we continue to expect Brent to average $80/bbl – higher U.S. shale output will be offset by delays in building out deepwater export facilities in the U.S. Gulf for most of the year. We expect WTI to trade $7 and $5/bbl lower in 2019 and 2020, respectively. The balance of price risk remains to the upside, as policy risk – i.e., a miscalculation on all sides – is elevated. Highlights Energy: Overweight. We are closing our 2020 long WTI vs. short Brent position at tonight’s close, given delays in the buildout of deepwater-harbor capacity in the U.S. Gulf caused by additional environmental assessments. This likely will push the spread out to $5/bbl+, vs. our target of $3.25/bbl. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper got another endorsement from Fitch Solutions, which is predicting LME prices will average $6,900 and $7,100/MT this year and next, on the back of lower inventories and improving supply-demand fundamentals. We remain long copper, which is up 2.7% since we recommended it on March 7. Precious Metals: Neutral. Our colleagues at BCA Research’s Global Investment Strategy expect the USD to weaken in 2H19, which, all else equal, will support gold and precious metals.3 Our long gold portfolio hedge is up 6.3% since inception on May 4, 2017. Agriculture: Underweight. Grain markets likely will trade sideways ahead of the USDA’s Prospective Plantings survey of farmer intentions next Friday.   Feature The sudden loss of Venezuelan output – and exports – was barely noticed in price action over the past week.  U.S. foreign and trade policy will continue to keep oil supply and demand uncertainty elevated, particularly as sanctions against Venezuela play out against the backdrop of a collapsing infrastructure. Last week’s nationwide power outage likely caused crude oil production to drop 500k b/d from ~ 1mm b/d previously.4 The sudden loss of Venezuelan output – and exports – was barely noticed in price action over the past week. Global inventories remain swollen (Chart 1), and OPEC 2.0’s spare capacity is increasing as it cuts production (Chart 2). This allows Venezuelan production losses to be covered with little or no disruption to supply or demand, and little or no increase in the level of agita in oil markets. Chart of the WeekOECD Inventories Still High, But Continue to Drain OECD Inventories Still High, But Continue to Drain OECD Inventories Still High, But Continue to Drain Chart 2 That cushion allows the U.S. to continue to prosecute its sanctions strategy against Venezuela and Iran. But it does not give the U.S. carte blanche to pursue regime change in both countries at the same time. As we noted in our New Political Economy of Oil report last month, OPEC 2.0 possibly could cover the loss of 500k b/d of Venezuelan exports and maybe up to 1.5mm b/d of Iranian exports.5 We continue to expect waivers on the Iran sanctions to be extended, although Trump administration officials remain guarded in terms of providing markets any forward guidance. However, it would tighten the heavy-sour market even more than it is now.6 And, full-on sanctions campaigns conducted simultaneously on Venezuela and Iran following the expiration of U.S. waivers on export sanctions against the latter would leave spare capacity dangerously thin, and push the risk premium in oil prices up sharply, given the volumes Iran already is supplying (Chart 3, Table 1). Chart 3 Table 1Iran Exports By Country 2018 (‘000 b/d) OPEC 2.0: Oil's Price Fulcrum OPEC 2.0: Oil's Price Fulcrum We continue to expect waivers on the Iran sanctions to be extended, although Trump administration officials remain guarded in terms of providing markets any forward guidance. The most that’s been offered came last week in Houston at an industry convention, where Brian Hook, special representative for Iran at the U.S. State Department, indicated the U.S. administration is aware of the supply-side pressure associated with its campaigns against Venezuela and Iran. However, he offered nothing definitive one way or another, so markets will continue to assign a non-zero probability that waivers will not be extended.7 Oil Supply Expectations Remain Stable For our part, we believe waivers on the U.S. Iranian export sanctions will be extended out of necessity. While more than 2mm b/d of Venezuelan and Iranian production can be offset by increased OPEC 2.0 spare capacity – now running ~ 2.1mm b/d based on U.S. EIA estimates – it is not sufficient to cover any additional losses due to unplanned outage of the sort seen in May 2016, when 1mm b/d of Canadian oil production was lost to wildfires. These are real risks, not abstractions meant to illustrate a point.8 For 2H19, our base case now assumes OPEC 2.0’s production rises by ~ 0.5mm b/d vs. 1H19 production of 44.5mm b/d. This will smooth out the loss of Venezuelan output as it falls to 500k b/d by the end of this year, vs. the 650k b/d we expected last month. We also expect Iranian production to remain close to the 3mm b/d it will average in 1H19, likely increasing as global storage levels fall and waivers are exercised (much like a call option). News reports suggest KSA continues to advocate the extension of production cuts by OPEC 2.0 to year end. However, if the coalition’s goal is to keep Brent prices close to $75/bbl this year, and closer to $80/bbl next year – the assumptions we’re working with – OPEC 2.0 likely will have to raise production by 0.5mm b/d in 2H19 and 0.72mm b/d next year. Maintaining production cuts into 2H19 risks sending prices significantly higher, in our estimation. Globally, the big driver of growth on the supply side continues to be U.S. shales, which we now expect to increase 1.2mm b/d in 2019 and 0.9mm b/d next year, a small increase of ~ 60k b/d versus our estimates last month.9 While it is true the Permian bottleneck will be cleared by the end of this year – adding some 2mm b/d of new takeaway capacity – export capacity will remain challenged by new delays to the build-out of deepwater-harbor capacity in the U.S. Gulf well into 2020, following requests of Carlyle Group and Trafigura AG to provide additional information in environmental filings to regulators before work begins.10 This will push the Permian bottleneck from the basin to the U.S. Gulf refining market. On the back of this development, we are closing our 2020 long WTI vs. short Brent recommendation at tonight’s close, given these delays likely push the deep-water expansion in the Gulf to 4Q20 or later. Oil Demand Also Remains Stable Oil demand will continue to be supported by the easing of monetary policy in DM and EM economies to offset a slowdown in global growth. In addition, we expect China’s credit cycle to bottom in 1Q19, which will be supportive of oil demand there and in EMs generally (Chart 4). We continue to expect the Sino – U.S. trade war to be resolved in 1H19, as both presidents Trump and Xi need to get a deal done to satisfy domestic audiences – i.e., U.S. elections next year and the upcoming 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2021, respectively. Chart 4EM Growth Will Lift In 2H19 EM Growth Will Lift In 2H19 EM Growth Will Lift In 2H19 During the second half of this year, we expect a more significant pick-up in China’s credit cycle, which will set the stage for a year-end rally in commodities generally – oil and base metals in particular. We also expect global demand to get a lift from a weaker USD beginning in 2H19 and extending to the end of 2020.11 We expect demand growth of 1.5mm b/d this year and 1.6mm b/d next year, slightly more than the EIA and IEA. We expect EM to account for 53.7mm b/d of growth this year and 55mm b/d next year. Total global demand will average 101.8mm b/d and 103.4mm b/d in 2019 and 2020. U.S. policy is keeping the supply- and demand-side uncertainty elevated, but OPEC 2.0’s hand has been strengthened by the fact that it is, more than ever, the fulcrum of the oil market. OPEC 2.0’s Balancing Strategy U.S. policy is keeping the supply- and demand-side uncertainty elevated, but OPEC 2.0’s hand has been strengthened by the fact that it is, more than ever, the fulcrum of the oil market: It can balance shortfalls out of spare capacity – boosted some by its production cuts – and it can reduce unintended inventory accumulation via its demonstrated ability to cut output rapidly. Our 2019 and 2020 Brent price forecasts remain at $75 and $80/bbl (Chart 5). Delays in building out U.S. Gulf deepwater-harbor capacity next year will keep exports constrained. This will back production up behind the pipe in the Permian Basin next year, and keep inventories fuller than they otherwise would be. And it means Brent markets will remain tighter than we previously expected in 2020, as WTI won’t be exported in the volumes needed to tighten the Brent - WTI spread as much as we previously expected. For 2019, we expect WTI to trade $7/bbl under Brent, and $5/bbl under in 2020 (vs. our earlier expectation of $3.25/bbl), on the back of these delays. This compels us to liquidate our long WTI vs. Brent recommendation in 2020 at tonight’s close. Chart 5OPEC 2.0 Output Hike Needed To Keep Market Balanced in 2H19 OPEC 2.0 Output Hike Needed To Keep Market Balanced in 2H19 OPEC 2.0 Output Hike Needed To Keep Market Balanced in 2H19 OPEC 2.0’s position as the fulcrum effectively means it can balance the market to achieve its price goals (Chart 6, Table 2). This does not drive our forecast, but it does line up with what we would expect an economically rational agent to do. Chart 6Our Ensemble Forecasts Remain Fairly Stable Our Ensemble Forecasts Remain Fairly Stable Our Ensemble Forecasts Remain Fairly Stable Table 2BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) OPEC 2.0: Oil's Price Fulcrum OPEC 2.0: Oil's Price Fulcrum We believe OPEC 2.0 is succeeding in evolving a strategy that allows it sufficient flexibility to respond to exogenous forces affecting oil prices, which are, for the most part, out of its control. Bottom Line: Policy uncertainty is elevated, but we believe OPEC 2.0 is succeeding in evolving a strategy that allows it sufficient flexibility to respond to exogenous forces affecting oil prices, which are, for the most part, out of its control – i.e., U.S. foreign, trade and monetary policy.12 As such, we believe it will adjust output to achieve price targets, which, despite the sometimes-public disagreements between KSA and Russia, are closer to our forecast levels of $75 and $80/bbl for Brent this year and next than not.     Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com       Footnotes 1      OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the OPEC/non-OPEC producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia.  U.S. waivers were granted by the Trump administration just before the sanctions against Iranian oil exports went into effect November 4; these waivers expire May 4, 2019. 2      Please see “The New Political Economy of Oil,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy February 21, 2019.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3      Please see “What’s Next For The Dollar,” published by BCA Research’s Global Investment Strategy published March 15, 2019.  It is available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4     In its March 2019 Oil Market Report, the IEA notes, “The electricity crisis in Venezuela has paralysed most of the country for significant periods of time. Although there are signs that the situation is improving, the degradation of the power system is such that we cannot be sure if the fixes are durable. Until recently, Venezuela’s oil production had stabilised at around 1.2 mb/d. During the past week, industry operations were seriously disrupted and ongoing losses on a significant scale could present a challenge to the market.”  We await better data to assess the full extent of the production lost in Venezuela. 5      Please see “The New Political Economy of Oil,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy February 21, 2019.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6      Please see “Oil Price Diffs: Global Convergence,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy March 7, 2019.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7      Please see “CERAWeek: US waivers for Iran oil imports may hinge on Venezuela sanctions impact: State official,” published by S&P Global Platts March 13, 2019. 8      We treat these waivers as quasi call options on Iranian crude oil in our analysis.  As inventories draw, importers holding waivers can be expected to exercise their option and lift more crude from Iran without running afoul of U.S. sanctions. 9      We approximate our shale production based on the big 5 basins (Anadarko, Bakken, Permian, Eagle Ford and Niobrara). 10     Please see “US Suspends Review On Trafigura Oil-Port Project” published by Hart Energy March 18, 2019.  See also “Exclusive: Environmental review could delay Carlyle deepwater oil export project up to 18 months,” published by reuters.com March 14, 2019. 11     See footnote 3 above. 12     A perfect example of this can be seen OPEC 2.0’s decision to move its ministerial meeting to June: A decision from the U.S. on whether to extend waivers on the Iranian sanctions will come May 4, right around the time OPEC 2.0 member states are deciding on export schedules.  If waivers are extended, member states can maintain production discipline or add volumes to the market as needed; if sanctions are re-imposed in full, they can increase production as needed. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades Image

Political economy – i.e., the interplay between critical nation states’ policies and markets – often trumps straightforward supply-demand analysis in oil. This is because policy decisions affect production and consumption, along with global trade. These decisions, in turn, determine constraints states – central and tangential – confront in pursuit of their interests. Presently, U.S. policies toward Venezuela and Iran dominate oil supply considerations, while Sino – U.S. trade tensions and their effect on EM consumption dominate the demand side. In this month’s balances assessment, we revised some of our supply-side assumptions to include the high probability U.S. waivers on Iranian export sanctions will have to be extended until Venezuela stabilizes. OPEC 2.0 appears to be flexible -- positioning for either an extension of waivers, or sanctions. This keeps our baseline oil-supply assumptions fairly steady this year as the coalition adjusts to changes in Venezuela’s output. Adjustments could be volatile, however. On the demand side, we continue to expect growth of 1.49mm b/d this year and 1.57mm b/d in 2020. Steadier production and unchanged demand assumptions lower our price forecasts slightly to $75/bbl and $80/bbl this year and next for Brent, with WTI trading $7.0/bbl and $3.25/bbl below those levels, respectively (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekExpect OPEC 2.0 To Smooth Venezuelan Production Losses In 2019 Expect OPEC 2.0 To Smooth Venezuelan Production Losses In 2019 Expect OPEC 2.0 To Smooth Venezuelan Production Losses In 2019 Highlights Energy: Overweight. Nigeria’s elections, scheduled for this past weekend, were unexpectedly postponed until Saturday. Political leaders urged Nigerians to “refrain from civil disorder and remain peaceful, patriotic and united to ensure that no force or conspiracy derail our democratic development.”1 Nigeria produces ~ 1.7mm b/d of oil. Base Metals/Bulks: Neutral. Estimated LMEX, CME, SHFE and bonded Chinese warehouse copper inventories are down 29.8% y/y, which will continue to be supportive of prices. Precious Metals: Neutral. Palladium is trading ~ $111/oz over gold, as concerns over supply deficits persist. The last time this occurred was on November, 2002. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Chinese buyers are believed to have cancelled as much as 1.25mm bushels of soybean purchases last week, according to feedandgrain.com. Feature The analytical framework informing global political economy provides a useful augmentation to our standard supply-demand analysis, particularly now, when U.S. policy continues to play a pivotal role in the evolution of oil fundamentals. In particular, we believe the near-term evolution of oil prices hinges on how events in Venezuela play out, following the imposition of U.S. trade and financial sanctions directed against the state-owned PDVSA oil company and the Maduro regime. The evolution of the U.S.’s PDVSA sanctions will directly determine whether waivers on Iranian export sanctions granted by the Trump administration in November are extended when they expire in May.2 These tightly linked evolutions, in turn, will drive OPEC 2.0 production policy, and whether its production-cutting agreement is extended beyond its June 2019 termination. As we discussed recently, we see OPEC 2.0 building its flexibility to adjust quickly to either an extension of the waivers on Iranian sanctions, or to accommodate the termination of these sanctions at the end of May. Given the state of the market, which we discuss below, we believe waivers on Iranian export sanctions almost surely will be extended when they expire in May. Global Oil Markets Are Tightening Our supply assumptions are driven by our assessment that global spare capacity of just over 2.5mm b/d could accommodate the loss of Venezuelan oil exports with little difficulty (in a matter of months), aside from a further tightening at the margin in the heavy-sour crude oil market (Chart of the Week and Table 1). In fact, the loss of up to 1mm b/d or more of Iranian exports – versus the ~ 800k b/d we now expect if waivers are extended until December – could also be accommodated by OPEC 2.0’s spare capacity, given the rebuilding of this potential output on the back of OPEC production cuts, which have the effect of increasing spare capacity (Chart 2).3 Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply – Demand Balances (MMb/d) (Base Case Balances) The New Political Economy Of Oil The New Political Economy Of Oil Chart 2 However, should this combination of events be realized, an unplanned outage similar to the one that removed ~ 1mm b/d of Canadian production due to wildfires in the summer of 2016, with Venezuela production falling toward 650k b/d and Iranian exports even partially constrained, could move the oil market perilously close to the limits of global spare capacity, which now stands just over 2.5mm b/d, based on the EIA’s reckoning. This would increase the risk of dramatically higher prices, simply because the flex in the system would approach zero. Iranian Waivers Hinge On Venezuela The manner in which U.S. sanctions against PDVSA and the Maduro regime evolve – in particular, whether regime change is affected – will determine whether waivers on the oil-export sanctions the U.S. re-imposed on Iran last November are extended beyond their end-May terminal point. In turn, this will affect OPEC 2.0’s production policies, particularly after its production-cutting agreement expires in June. In our current model of OPEC 2.0 production, we now expect its 2019 production to continue to decline in 1H19, to drain the overhang resulting from the ramp-up member states undertook in preparation for U.S. sanctions against Iran. This policy was substantially reversed with the last-minute granting of waivers to eight importing countries by the Trump administration prior to sanctions kicking in in November. This led to a sharp sell-off in crude oil prices in 4Q18, as market participants re-calibrated the supply side of global balances. In 2H19, our base case assumes OPEC 2.0’s production rises by ~ 900mm b/d (December vs. July 2019 level), to smooth out the loss of Venezuelan output as it falls to 650k b/d by the end of this year from just under 1.1mm b/d now. The goal of this policy is to quickly drain global inventories to levels comfortably below the five-year average (in 1H19), and then to keep Brent prices in the $75/bbl to $80/bbl range over 2H19 – end-2020 (Chart 3). We expect core OPEC 2.0 countries, led by KSA, core GCC states and Russia production to rise by more than 500k b/d in 2H19 (vs. 1H19 levels), to maintain inventories at desired levels and prices in the $75/bbl to $80/bbl range. Chart 3Core OPEC And Non-OPEC Output Will Rise To Offset Venezuelan Losses Core OPEC And Non-OPEC Output Will Rise To Offset Venezuelan Losses Core OPEC And Non-OPEC Output Will Rise To Offset Venezuelan Losses To this end, we assume core OPEC 2.0’s production rises in 2020 to 33.52mm b/d from 32.98mm b/d in 2019, led by a ~ 200k b/d increase from KSA – which takes its output to ~ 10.4mm b/d from ~ 10.2mm b/d in 2019. We expect Russian production to rise to 11.7mm b/d from ~ 11.5mm b/d in 2019. Additional output hikes come from core OPEC and other non-OPEC producers (Chart 4, Table 1). Chart 4OPEC 2.0's Goal: Quickly Reduce Inventories In 1H19 OPEC 2.0's Goal: Quickly Reduce Inventories In 1H19 OPEC 2.0's Goal: Quickly Reduce Inventories In 1H19 We do not try to forecast how the sanctions against PDVSA and the Maduro government play out – i.e., whether the incumbent government survives, or whether a peaceful or violent regime change occurs. If Venezuela were to descend into civil war, or were to experience a violent revolution, the outcome would be unpredictable and the rebuilding of that economy – regardless of who emerges to take control of the state – would require years. Likewise, if President Maduro and the military leaders supporting him were to quietly decamp, it still would require years to rebuild that country’s oil industry and economy.4 We view the odds of a confrontation between the U.S. and Venezuela’s benefactors/creditors as extremely low. We believe the U.S. would revive the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and that Russia and China most likely would concede Venezuela is within the U.S.’s sphere of influence, as neither intend to project the force and maintain the supply lines such a confrontation would require.5 Because the resolution of the political uncertainty in Venezuela is unsure and the outcome unknowable – particularly when unplanned outages represent such a non-trivial risk to global supply at the margin – we strongly believe waivers granted on U.S. sanctions against Iranian oil exports will be extended at least by 90 to 180 days when they expire at the end of May. As we discuss above, global spare capacity is insufficient to cover the loss of Venezuelan and Iranian output, and still have the flexibility required to meet a large unplanned outage over the course of this year or next. For this reason, Iranian sanctions will not be immediately re-imposed following the termination of U.S. waivers on exports from that state; importers most likely will be increasing their liftings of Iranian crude, in line with the extension of the waivers we expect over the course of 2H19 (Chart 5). Chart 5 Oil Demand Continues To Hold Up We continue to expect global oil demand to grow by 1.49mm b/d this year and 1.57mm b/d in 2020, led as always by strong EM demand growth, with China and India at the forefront (Table 1). DM demand growth is expected to slow this year, but put in a respectable performance, as well. EM commodity demand growth generally has been trending down at a slow and constant pace since the beginning of 2018, as we discussed last week when we presented our new Global Industrial Activity (GIA) index. The index indicates demand is not as stellar as it was during the synchronized global upturn of 2017, but that it also is not as bad as sentiment and expectations would indicate.6 Pulling It All Together On balance, we expect the combination of stronger OPEC 2.0 output, plus an 800k b/d increase in U.S. shale-oil production, which lifts total U.S. crude-oil output from 12.42mm b/d to 13.49mm b/d next year, is enough to keep Brent prices close to $80/bbl next year, vs. the $75/bbl we expect this year (Chart 6). We revised our expectation for WTI slightly, and now expect it to trade ~ $7.0/bbl under Brent this year and at a $3.75/bbl discount next year. Chart 6Balanced Oil Market Expected This Year and Next ... Balanced Oil Market Expected This Year and Next ... Balanced Oil Market Expected This Year and Next ... The OPEC 2.0 production discipline and lower U.S. shale-oil output, coupled with strong – not stellar – demand growth combine to allow OECD commercial oil inventories (crude and products) to resume drawing and to fall comfortably below OPEC 2.0’s 2010 – 2014 five-year average target (Chart 7). This will be supportive of the Brent backwardation trade we recommended on January 3, 2019 which now is up 265.5%, as of Tuesday’s close. Chart 7... And Oil Inventories Resume Falling ... And Oil Inventories Resume Falling ... And Oil Inventories Resume Falling Bottom Line: We revised our supply estimates, and now expect OPEC 2.0 to cover lost Venezuelan output arising from the imposition of U.S. sanctions on PDVSA and the continued deterioration of that state’s oil industry. Because global spare capacity cannot handle the loss of Venezuelan and Iranian oil exports at the same time and still cover a large unplanned outage, we expect the waivers on U.S. sanctions of Iranian oil exports to be extended for up to 180 days following their termination at the end of May. We expect Brent crude oil prices to average $75/bbl this year and $80/bbl next year as oil markets balance. We expect WTI to trade ~ $7.0/bbl below Brent this year, and $3.25/bbl under in 2020.   Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see “Nigeria Election 2019: Appeal For Calm After Shock Delay,” published February 16, 2019, by bbc.com. 2 OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the producer coalition of OPEC states, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and non-OPEC states led by Russia, which recently agreed to cut production by ~ 1.2mm b/d to drain commercial oil inventories and re-balance markets globally. OPEC 2.0’s market monitoring committee meets in April to assess the production-cutting deal it reached in November, which is set to expire in June. The full coalition meets in May to set policy going forward. This is just ahead of the expiration of U.S. waivers on Iranian oil exports. For a discussion of OPEC 2.0’s production optionality, please see “OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy January 24, 2019.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 We are watching the evolution of the partial closure of the offshore Safaniya field in KSA about two weeks ago closely. With 1mm b/d capacity, this is the world’s largest offshore producing field; no updates have been provided by KSA this week. 4 Please see “What Next For Venezuela,” by Anne Kreuger published by project-syndicate.org on February 15, 2019 for a discussion. 5 We note here that Gazprombank, the Russian bank, froze PDVSA’s accounts over the weekend to avoid running afoul of U.S. sanctions against the company. Please see “Russia’s Gazprombank decided to freeze PDVSA accounts – source,” published by reuters.com February 17, 2019. See also “What Comes Next For Venezuela’s Oil Industry,” published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies February 12, 2019, which details how U.S. sanctions amount to the equivalent of a full-on embargo by forcing payment for Venezuelan oil to be deposited in accounts that cannot be accessed by the government or PDVSA. 6 We discuss our global demand outlook in last week’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, in an article entitled “Oil, Copper Demand Worries Are Overdone.” It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 4Q18 Image Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Trades Closed in Image

Highlights Spread Product Valuation: Corporate bond spreads don’t look especially cheap relative to average historical levels. But they are far too elevated for the current phase of the economic cycle. Valuations in other spread products are not nearly as attractive. Investors should remain overweight corporate bonds (both investment grade and junk) within U.S. fixed income portfolios. Corporate Defaults: Slowing corporate profit growth during the next 12 months will cause corporate leverage to flatten-off and will lead to a slightly higher default rate than most baseline forecasts suggest. Junk spreads currently offer adequate compensation for the extra default risk, but that cushion will evaporate quickly if spreads tighten during the next few months. Mexican Sovereign Bonds: Mexico’s USD-denominated sovereign debt is attractively priced relative to similarly-rated U.S. corporate credit. U.S. fixed income investors should take the opportunity to add USD-denominated Mexican bonds to their portfolios. Feature Corporate bonds have been on fire since the start of the year. High-yield excess returns have already made back all of their lost ground from 2018, and investment grade credits are on their way (Chart 1). With the Fed’s rate hike cycle on hold and some signs of credit easing in China, the near-term backdrop is amenable to further spread compression. Especially from current elevated levels. Chart 1Corporate Bonds Having A Good Run In 2019 Corporate Bonds Having A Good Run In 2019 Corporate Bonds Having A Good Run In 2019 On the flipside, some indicators of corporate default risk are starting to deteriorate and we can easily envision a more difficult environment for corporate spreads in the second half of this year. Especially if the Fed re-starts rate hikes, as we expect.1 In this week’s report we illustrate the extent of undervaluation in corporate spreads, and also detail our concerns related to budding default risk. We conclude that investors should maintain an overweight allocation to corporate bonds (both investment grade and high-yield) for now, but be prepared to trim exposure once spreads reach more reasonable levels. Finally, we identify an opportunity in USD-denominated Mexican sovereign bonds. Too Cheap For Phase 2 In our Special Report from mid-December that laid out our key themes for 2019, we described how we split the economic cycle into different phases based on the slope of the yield curve (Chart 2).2 We define the three phases of the cycle as follows: Chart 2Expect To Stay In Phase 2 For Most (If Not All) Of 2019 Expect To Stay In Phase 2 For Most (If Not All) Of 2019 Expect To Stay In Phase 2 For Most (If Not All) Of 2019 Phase 1: From the end of the prior recession until the 3-year / 10-year Treasury slope flattens to below 50 bps Phase 2: When the 3/10 slope is between 0 bps and 50 bps Phase 3: From when the 3/10 slope inverts until the start of the next recession Dividing the cycle this way reveals a reliable pattern in corporate bond excess returns versus Treasuries. Excess returns tend to be highest in Phase 1. They tend to be quite low but still positive in Phase 2, and they tend not to turn negative until Phase 3. We argued in December that we are currently in Phase 2 and that we will probably stay there for most, if not all, of 2019. The main reason that excess returns are lower in Phase 2 than in Phase 1 is that corporate bond spreads are much tighter in Phase 2. Most of the cyclical spread compression occurs in Phase 1, in the immediate aftermath of the recession. With that in mind, consider the data presented in Chart 3. The chart shows 12-month breakeven spreads for each corporate bond credit tier as a percentile rank relative to history.3 For example, a percentile rank of 50% means that the breakeven spread has been tighter than its current level half of the time throughout history. Chart 3 also divides the historical data into two samples, showing how breakeven spreads rank relative to the entire history of available data, and also how they rank relative to other Phase 2 periods only. Chart 3 When the full historical sample is considered, only the B-rated and Caa-rated credit tiers have breakeven spreads above their historical medians. However, when we focus exclusively on Phase 2 environments we see that spreads for every credit tier other than Aaa look extremely cheap. Essentially, Chart 3 shows that today’s spread levels are more consistent with periods when the economy is either just exiting or entering a recession. Absent that sort of macro environment, there would appear to be an obvious buying opportunity in corporate bonds. Interestingly, other spread products don’t look nearly as cheap as corporate bonds. Chart 4 shows the same data as Chart 3 but for all non-corporate U.S. spread products with available data prior to 2000. It shows that Agency MBS and Consumer ABS spreads are close to median Phase 2 levels. USD-denominated Sovereign debt looks somewhat cheap. Meanwhile, Domestic Agencies and Supranationals both look expensive. What’s clear is that right now corporate credit offers the most attractive opportunity in U.S. fixed income. Chart 4 Bottom Line: Corporate bond spreads don’t look especially cheap relative to average historical levels. But they are far too elevated for the current phase of the economic cycle. Valuations in other spread products are not nearly as attractive. Investors should remain overweight corporate bonds (both investment grade and junk) within U.S. fixed income portfolios. Default Cycle At A Turning Point?  Another valuation tool in our arsenal is the High-Yield default-adjusted spread. This is the excess spread available in the high-yield index after accounting for expected 12-month default losses. It can also be thought of as the 12-month return earned by the High-Yield index in excess of a position in duration-matched Treasuries, assuming that default losses match expectations and that there are no capital gains (losses) from spread tightening (widening). Expected default losses are calculated using the Moody’s baseline default rate forecast and our own forecast of the recovery rate. Combining the Moody’s baseline default rate forecast of 2.4% and our recovery rate forecast of 45% gives expected 12-month default losses of 1.3%. Those expected default losses are then subtracted from the average High-Yield index option-adjusted spread to get a default-adjusted spread of 274 bps. This is slightly above the historical average of 250 bps (Chart 5). In other words, junk investors are currently being compensated at slightly above average levels to bear default risk. Chart 5A Look At The Default-Adjusted Spread A Look At The Default-Adjusted Spread A Look At The Default-Adjusted Spread Another way to conceptualize the default-adjusted spread is to ask what default rate would have to prevail over the next 12 months for junk investors to earn average historical excess compensation. This spread-implied default rate is denoted by the ‘X’ in the second panel of Chart 5. It is currently 2.8%, slightly above Moody’s baseline expectation. Is The Baseline Default Rate Forecast Reasonable? If we view the Moody’s 2.4% default rate forecast as reasonable, then we should conclude that junk bonds are attractively valued. However, some macro indicators suggest that 2.4% might be too optimistic. Chart 6 shows a model of the 12-month trailing speculative grade default rate based on gross leverage, which we define as total debt over pre-tax profits, and C&I lending standards. Chart 6A Simple Model Of The 12-Month Trailing Speculative Grade Default Rate A Simple Model Of The 12-Month Trailing Speculative Grade Default Rate A Simple Model Of The 12-Month Trailing Speculative Grade Default Rate Gross leverage has improved during the past few quarters as profit growth has outpaced corporate debt growth (Chart 6, panel 2). This has acted to push down the fair value reading from our default rate model. On the other hand, commercial & industrial (C&I) lending standards tightened in the fourth quarter of last year (Chart 6, bottom panel). A net tightening in C&I lending standards is consistent with a higher default rate. Overall, the fair value reading from our default rate model is currently 3.5%, above the current 12-month trailing default rate of 2.6%. For the purposes of valuation, where the default rate will be 12 months from now is more important than where it is currently. To get a sense of where the fair value from our model is headed we need forecasts for corporate profit and debt growth. Profit growth will almost certainly moderate from its current lofty levels (Chart 7). Pressures on revenues and expenses both point in that direction. Total business sales and the ISM Manufacturing PMI have both fallen sharply from their recent highs (Chart 7, panel 2), suggesting lower corporate revenue growth going forward. Meanwhile, wages continue to accelerate (Chart 7, bottom panel). Chart 7Forecasting Profit Growth Forecasting Profit Growth Forecasting Profit Growth Using a model based on nominal GDP growth, wage growth, industrial production and the trade-weighted dollar, if we forecast that nominal GDP growth slows to the same rate as wage growth over the next 12 months, then the model predicts that profit growth will fall into the mid-single digits (Chart 7, top panel). This would be more or less consistent with the recent growth rate in corporate debt, meaning that gross leverage would flatten-off and the fair value reading from our default rate model would stabilize near 3.5%. In summary, if profit growth moderates in line with our expectations during the next 12 months, then it is likely that the corporate default rate will be somewhat higher than the current Moody’s forecast of 2.4%, possibly as high as 3.5%. But even a 3.5% default rate would still translate to a default-adjusted junk spread of 211 bps. Positive compensation for default risk, though less than average historical levels. In that case we would still expect solid positive excess returns from junk bonds. However, it will be important to monitor our default-adjusted spread during the next few months. If junk spreads tighten in the near-term, as we anticipate, then the excess compensation for default risk will evaporate quickly. Bottom Line: Slowing corporate profit growth during the next 12 months will cause corporate leverage to flatten-off and will lead to a slightly higher default rate than most baseline forecasts suggest. Junk spreads currently offer adequate compensation for the extra default risk, but that cushion will evaporate quickly if spreads tighten during the next few months. Buy Mexican Bonds While most spread products have benefited from the Fed’s pause, delivering excellent year-to-date returns. We notice that the spreads on Mexico’s USD-denominated sovereign debt have not tightened alongside other comparable credits (Chart 8). This presents an attractive opportunity. Chart 8Mexican Bonds: An Attractive Opportunity Mexican Bonds: An Attractive Opportunity Mexican Bonds: An Attractive Opportunity When we compare 12-month breakeven spreads between the USD-denominated sovereign debt of different emerging market countries versus the spreads on equivalently-rated U.S. corporate bonds, we see that Mexico has now joined Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE and Poland as the only countries that offer attractive compensation relative to the U.S. corporate sector (Chart 9). Chart 9 Why has this happened? Our Emerging Markets Strategy service postulates that many investors fear that the new political regime will bring fiscal profligacy, but in fact, the AMLO administration is proving to be less populist and more pragmatic than expected.4 The 2019 budget, for example, targets a primary surplus of 1% of GDP, and envisages a decline in nominal expenditures in 29 out of 56 categories. This commitment to sound fiscal policy should benefit Mexican sovereign bond spreads. More fundamentally, our Emerging Markets strategists note that the Mexican peso is very cheap as measured by the real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs. This is not surprising given that the peso has been relatively flat versus the dollar during the past two years, despite interest rates being much higher in Mexico than in the U.S. The Mexican 10-year real yield is currently 4.1%, well above real GDP growth which was 2.6% during the past four quarters (Chart 10). Contrast that with the U.S., where the 10-year real yield is a meagre 0.8% versus real GDP growth of 3% during the past four quarters. In other words, interest rate differentials favor a stronger peso, which is positive for USD-denominated sovereign spreads. Chart 10Good Time To Add USD-Denominated Mexican Bonds To A Portfolio Good Time To Add USD-Denominated Mexican Bonds To A Portfolio Good Time To Add USD-Denominated Mexican Bonds To A Portfolio Though the Mexican/U.S. interest rate differential remains wide, it is likely to compress going forward. Elevated Mexican interest rates relative to growth signal that monetary policy is restrictive. A fact that is already evident in decelerating Mexican money supply (Chart 10, bottom panel). Meanwhile, low U.S. real yields relative to GDP suggest that further Fed tightening is necessary before U.S. rates are similarly restrictive. Bottom Line: Mexico’s USD-denominated sovereign debt is attractively priced relative to similarly-rated U.S. corporate credit. U.S. fixed income investors should take the opportunity to add USD-denominated Mexican bonds to their portfolios. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Caught Offside”, dated February 12, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2      Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3      The 12-month breakeven spread is the spread widening required over the next 12 months for the corporate bond to break even with a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. We use the breakeven spread instead of the average index spread because it takes into account the changing duration of the bond indexes. 4      Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “Dissecting China’s Stimulus”, dated January 17, 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights The current trajectory in global share prices resembles what took place in 2000 and early 2001. The early 2001 rebound in global and EM stocks lasted several weeks only, despite ongoing easing by the Federal Reserve. Corporate profits – not the Fed – was the key driver in 2001 and remains the principal driver of global and EM stocks today. EM corporate profits are set to contract this year due to China’s continuing slowdown and weakening global trade. This suggests the current EM rally is unsustainable; continue underweighting EM. In Chile, bet on lower swap rates. Continue shorting the peso but overweight the local bourse within an EM equity portfolio. Feature The dovish shift by the U.S. Federal Reserve in the past month has boosted EM risk assets and currencies. Yet, we find that in the medium and long term there is a very low correlation between Fed policy and U.S. interest rates, on the one hand, and EM financial markets on the other. Instead, EM risk assets and currencies correlate with EM/China business cycles and global trade (Chart I-1). We have not detected any improvement in China/EM growth, nor in global trade (Chart I-1). What’s more, we expect Chinese growth and world trade to continue to weaken in the coming six months. Therefore, the EM rebound and outperformance will be reversed sooner than later. Chart I-1Global Growth Indicators Do No Confirm EM Rally Global Growth Indicators Do No Confirm EM Rally Global Growth Indicators Do No Confirm EM Rally Please note this is the view of BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy team. BCA’s house view is presently positive on global risk assets and global growth. The basis for this difference between our current position and that of the majority of our colleagues is the outlook for China’s growth. A Replay Of 2016 Or 2001? Most investors are betting that 2019 will be a replay of 2016, when the Fed’s dovish turn and China’s stimulus propelled the EM and global equity rallies. It is enticing to compare the current episode in financial markets to the one that occurred only three years ago. To be sure, there are a lot of similarities: the global trade slowdown driven by China/EM, selloffs in global equity and credit markets, a dovish shift in the Fed’s stance and policy stimulus in China are all reminiscent of early 2016. Not surprisingly, this has created a stampede into EM. According to the most recent Bank of America Merrill Lynch survey, as of mid-January some 29% of investors were overweight EM stocks compared to 1% overweight in the U.S., 11% underweight in the euro area and 1% underweight in Japan. By now, the overweight in EM equities is most likely even higher, given the stampede into EM assets that has occurred over the past several weeks. This stands in contrast to the 33% underweight in EM equities in January 2016. It is apparent that the majority of investors are indeed extrapolating 2016 into 2019. We hold a different view and believe China’s slowdown will be more protracted than in 2015-’16, and that EM corporate earnings are set to contract (please refer to Chart I-5 on page 6). A key distinction between China’s current policy efforts and what was implemented in 2015-‘16 is the absence of stimulus for real estate. The odds are that China’s property market will continue to languish, weighing on household and business sentiment as well as spending. Further, the efficiency of monetary transmission mechanisms could be lower today than it was in 2016 due to the regulatory tightening on both banks and non-banks. The fiscal multiplier could also be lower due to the fragile sentiment among consumers and businesses. We discussed these issues in detail in our January 17, 2019 report. Remarkably, it appears that global share prices are tracking the pattern of 1998-2001 – their trajectories are identical in terms of both magnitude and duration (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Global Stocks Are Tracking Pattern Of 1998-2001 In Magnitude And Duration Global Stocks Are Tracking Pattern Of 1998-2001 In Magnitude And Duration Global Stocks Are Tracking Pattern Of 1998-2001 In Magnitude And Duration That said, there are substantial differences between today and 2001 in respect to the economic backdrops in the U.S. and China. Our focal point is to demonstrate that the Fed easing is not sufficient to prop up share prices if it does not lead to a recovery in corporate earnings. We conclude that the latest rebound in EM risk assets is probably late because neither the Fed’s pause nor China’s stimulus will revive EM corporate profits in the next nine months. In terms of market action, one can draw a number of parallels between the trajectory in global share prices today and in 2000-’01. Following an exponential rally in 1999, the global equity index peaked in January 2000 (Chart I-3). The equity selloff accelerated in the last quarter of 2000, with stocks plunging in December of that year. Chart I-3Is Rebound In Global And EM Stocks Late? Is Rebound In Global And EM Stocks Late? Is Rebound In Global And EM Stocks Late? Oversold conditions in global share prices and the Fed’s intra-meeting 50-basis-point rate cut on January 3, 2001, generated a 7% and 15% rebound in global and EM stocks, respectively. The bounce lasted from late December 2000 until early February 2001. The current trajectory in global share prices – the rollover in late January 2018, the top formation lasting several months followed by a dramatic plunge, the bottom in late December, 2018 and the subsequent rebound – closely resemble the path global share prices took in 2000 and early 2001 (Chart I-3, top panel). The same holds true for EM share prices (Chart I-3, bottom panel). Critically, the Fed continued to cut interest rates in 2001 and 2002, yet the bear market in global equities, including EM, persisted until March 2003 (Chart I-4A and I-4B, top panels). The culprit was shrinking corporate profits (Chart I-4A and Chart I-4B, bottom panels). Chart I-4AFed Easing Did Not Help Global Stocks In 2001 Fed Easing Did Not Help Global Stocks In 2001 Fed Easing Did Not Help Global Stocks In 2001 Chart I-4BFed Easing Did Not Help EM Stocks In 2001 Fed Easing Did Not Help EM Stocks In 2001 Fed Easing Did Not Help EM Stocks In 2001 Odds are that EM earnings are set to contract this year as discussed below and shown in Chart I-5. As a result, this view bolsters our conviction that EM equities are likely to roll over soon and plunge anew in absolute terms, and certainly underperform U.S. stocks. Bottom Line: There are many economic differences between today and 2001. Our main point is that the Fed easing-inspired rally in global equities in early 2001 lasted several weeks only and was followed by a new cycle low. The key factor was not Fed policy but corporate profits. Provided our view that corporate earnings in EM and global cyclical sectors will contract this year, the rally in these segments is not sustainable regardless of Fed policy. What Drives EM: Chinese Or U.S. Growth? Predicting the outlook for China and global trade correctly is key to getting the EM call right. First, China’s credit and fiscal spending impulse leads EPS growth of companies included in the EM MSCI equity index by nine months, and it currently points to continued deceleration and contraction in EM EPS in the months ahead (Chart I-5, top panel). The average of new and backlog orders within China’s manufacturing PMI also portends a negative outlook for EM corporate earnings (Chart I-5, bottom panel). Chart I-5EM Profits Are Heading Into Contraction EM Profits Are Heading Into Contraction EM Profits Are Heading Into Contraction The primary linkage between China’s credit and fiscal spending impulse and EM profits is as follows: China impacts EM and the rest of the world via its imports. This explains why EM share prices correlate with Chinese PMI imports (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Chinese Imports And EM Equities Chinese Imports And EM Equities Chinese Imports And EM Equities Second, China’s imports are to a large extent driven by capital spending, especially construction. Some 85% of mainland imports are composed of various commodities, industrial goods and materials, and autos. Consumer goods make up only about 15% of imports. Major capital expenditures in general and construction, in particular, cannot be undertaken without financing. This is why the country’s credit and fiscal spending impulse leads its imports cycles (Chart I-7). This impulse is presently foreshadowing a deepening slump in mainland imports and by extension its suppliers’ revenues and profits. Chart I-7Chinese Imports Are Heading South bca.ems_wr_2019_02_07_s1_c7 bca.ems_wr_2019_02_07_s1_c7 Third, as EM shipments to China dwindle, not only will EM corporate revenues and profits disappoint but EM currencies will also depreciate. The latter bodes ill for EM U.S. dollar and local currency bonds. The basis is that exchange rate depreciation makes U.S. dollar debt more expensive to service, and also pushes up local bond yields in high-yielding EM fixed-income markets. Fourth, The majority of developing economies sell more to China than to the U.S. Remarkably, global trade and global manufacturing decelerated in 2018, even though U.S. goods imports were booming (Chart I-8). Crucially, the more recent strength in the U.S.’s intake of goods was in part due to frontloading of shipments to the U.S. before the import tariffs went into effect on January 1, 2019. Chart I-8U.S. Imports Are Very Robust U.S. Imports Are Very Robust U.S. Imports Are Very Robust Yet despite robust U.S. demand, aggregate exports of Korea, Taiwan, and Japan have done poorly and their manufacturing have slumped (Chart I-9A and Chart I-9B). Chart I-9AAsian Exports: Flirting With Contraction Asian Exports: Flirting With Contraction Asian Exports: Flirting With Contraction Chart I-9BAsian Manufacturing: Flirting With Contraction Asian Manufacturing: Flirting With Contraction Asian Manufacturing: Flirting With Contraction This highlights the increased significance of Chinese demand and the diminished importance of U.S. domestic demand in world trade. In particular, at $6 trillion, EM aggregate goods and services imports, including Chinese imports (but excluding China’s imports for processing and re-exporting), is greater than the combined imports of the U.S. and EU, which currently stand at $4.7 trillion ($2.5 trillion plus $2.2 trillion, respectively). Finally, the media and many investors have exaggerated the impact of U.S. tariffs on the Chinese economy. We are not implying that the tariffs are not relevant at all, or that they have not damaged sentiment among mainland businesses and households. They have. The point is that China’s exports to the U.S. constitute 3.8% of Chinese GDP only (Chart I-10). This compares to Chinese capital spending amounting to 42% of GDP and total annual credit origination and fiscal spending of 26% of GDP. Chart I-10China's Exports To U.S. Are Small (3.8% of GDP) China's Exports To U.S. Are Small (3.8% of GDP) China's Exports To U.S. Are Small (3.8% of GDP) Overall, China’s growth slowdown in 2018 was not due to its plunging shipments to the U.S. – actually, the latter were rising strongly till December due to frontloading – but due to weakness in credit origination, primarily among non-banks (shadow banking). Bottom Line: The Chinese business cycle – not the U.S.’s – is the key driver of EM share prices and currencies and more important than the Fed. EM And The Fed On the surface, it seems that EM is tracking Fed policy. To us, however, this is akin to“not seeing the forest for the trees”. Investors need to stand back and examine the medium- and long-term relationships between U.S. interest rates, DM central banks’ balance sheets, and EM financial markets. In this broader context, the following becomes apparent: There is no stable correlation between EM share prices, EM currencies and EM sovereign credit, on the one hand, and U.S. 10-year bond yields, on the other (Chart I-11). Chart I-11EM And U.S. Bond Yields: No Stable Correlation EM And U.S. Bond Yields: No Stable Correlation EM And U.S. Bond Yields: No Stable Correlation Historically, the correlation between EM share prices and the Fed funds rate has been mixed, albeit more positive than negative (Chart I-12). On this 40-year chart, we shaded the periods when EM stocks did well during periods of a rising fed funds rate. These time spans are 1983-1984, 1988-1989, 1999-2000, 2003-2007 and 2017. Chart I-12EM Stocks And Fed Funds Rate: A Historical Perspective EM Stocks And Fed Funds Rate: A Historical Perspective EM Stocks And Fed Funds Rate: A Historical Perspective The only two episodes when EMs crashed amid rising U.S. interest rates were the 1982 Latin America debt crisis and the 1994 Mexican peso crisis. Yet, it is essential to emphasize that these crises occurred because of poor EM fundamentals: elevated foreign currency debt levels, negative terms-of-trade shocks, large current account deficits and pegged exchange rates. Dire EM fundamentals also prevailed before the Asian/EM crises of 1997-1998. However, these late-1990s crises occurred without much in the way of Fed tightening or rising U.S. bond yields. Remarkably, there is also no correlation between the size and the rate of change of DM central banks’ balance sheets, on the one hand, and EM risk assets and currencies on the other. In particular, Chart I-13 validates that the annual growth rate of G4 central banks’ balance sheets does not correlate with either EM share prices or EM local currency bonds’ total returns in U.S. dollars. Chart I-13Pace Of QEs And EM: No Correlation Pace Of QEs And EM: No Correlation Pace Of QEs And EM: No Correlation Finally, there is a low correlation between U.S. real interest rates and the real broad trade-weighted dollar (Chart I-14). Notably, Chart I-15 illustrates that the greenback often acts as a countercyclical currency, appreciating when global growth is slowing and depreciating when the global business cycle accelerating. Please note that the dollar is shown inverted on this chart. Chart I-14The U.S. Dollar And U.S. Real Rates The U.S. Dollar And U.S. Real Rates The U.S. Dollar And U.S. Real Rates Chart I-15The U.S. Dollar Is Countercyclical The U.S. Dollar Is Countercyclical The U.S. Dollar Is Countercyclical Bottom Line: Many analysts and investors assign more significance to the Fed policy’s impact on EM risk assets than historical evidence warrants. Unless Fed policy easing coincides with EM growth recovery, the Fed’s positive impact on EM will prove to be fleeting. Investment Considerations Widespread bullish bias on EM among investors currently and a continuous slew of poor growth data in China and global trade give us the conviction to argue that the current EM rally is not sustainable. Even if the S&P 500 drifts higher, EM stocks and credit will underperform their U.S. counterparts (Chart I-16). Chart I-16Stay Short EM / Long S&P 500 Stay Short EM / Long S&P 500 Stay Short EM / Long S&P 500 The EM equity index is sitting at a major technical resistance, and a decisive break above this level will challenge our view (Chart I-17, top panel). The same holds true for many EM currencies and copper (Chart I-17, bottom panel). However, for now, we are maintaining our negative bias. Chart I-17EM Equities And Copper Are Facing Resistance EM Equities And Copper Are Facing Resistance EM Equities And Copper Are Facing Resistance Within the EM equity universe, our overweights are Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Russia, central Europe, Korea, and Thailand. Our underweights are Indonesia, India, Philippines, South Africa, and Peru. We continue to recommend shorting the following EM currency basket versus the U.S. dollar: ZAR, IDR, MYR, CLP, and KRW. The full list of our recommended positions across EM equities, local rates, credit, and currencies is available on pages 17-18. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Chile: Favor Bonds Over Stocks Local currency bonds will outperform equities in Chile over the next six to nine months (Chart II-1). Chart II-1Chile: Favor Bonds Over Stocks Chile: Favor Bonds Over Stocks Chile: Favor Bonds Over Stocks The central bank is raising interest rates to cap inflation. However, we believe this is misguided because China’s ongoing deceleration along with lower copper prices, will slow growth in Chile over the course of this year. In addition, the current domestic inflation dynamics are less worrisome than the central bank contends. There is ongoing debate in the policy circles of Santiago over whether the recent large net immigration wave, particularly from Venezuela, is inflationary or disinflationary. On the one hand, net immigration expands the supply of labor and puts downward pressure on wages, and hence is disinflationary (Chart II-2). On the other hand, net immigration bolsters demand, and thereby inflation. Chart II-2Chile: Labor Force Is Expanding At 2% Chile: Labor Force Is Expanding At 2% Chile: Labor Force Is Expanding At 2% The central bank has acknowledged both effects but has cited that the latter will overwhelm the former. We disagree with this assessment and believe that current immigration in Chile will be more disinflationary. There are a number of factors that make us believe so: Both nominal and real wage growth are cooling off rapidly (Chart II-3). This corroborates the thesis that the expanding supply of labor is capping wage increases. Chart II-3Chile: Wage Growth Is Decelerating Chile: Wage Growth Is Decelerating Chile: Wage Growth Is Decelerating Central banks in any country need to be concerned with rising unit labor costs and service sector inflation. Energy and food prices are beyond a central bank’s control. Monetary policy should not respond to fluctuations in these prices unless there are second-round effects on wages and other prices.  There is presently no genuine inflationary pressures in Chile. The average of Chile’s core and trimmed mean inflation rates stands at 2.5%, and service sector inflation is at 3.7% (Chart II-4). This is within the central bank’s inflation target range of 3% +/-1%. Chart II-4Chile: Inflation Is Within Target Range Chile: Inflation Is Within Target Range Chile: Inflation Is Within Target Range Finally, Chile’s exports are set to shrink due to the ongoing deceleration in China and lower copper prices (Chart II-5). With exports accounting for 30% of GDP, a negative external shock will slow domestic demand too. This will be disinflationary. Chart II-5Chilean Exports Are About To Contract Chilean Exports Are About To Contract Chilean Exports Are About To Contract The fixed-income market in Chile is pricing in rate hikes (Chart II-6). We continue to recommend receiving 3-year swap rates. Even if the central bank continues to tighten, long-term interest rates will decline, anticipating rate cuts down the road. Chart II-6Chile: Receive 3-Year Swap Rates Chile: Receive 3-Year Swap Rates Chile: Receive 3-Year Swap Rates Chilean share prices, in absolute terms, are at risk from the EM and commodities selloff. However, we recommend dedicated EM equity portfolios overweight Chile. The economy is fundamentally and structurally solid, and local equity markets are supported by large local investment pools. Importantly, unlike many other commodity producers, currency depreciation in Chile does not stop the central bank from cutting interest rates. Banco Central de Chile does not target the exchange rate and will cut rates to mitigate the adverse external shock. This will ensure that business cycle fluctuations in Chile will be milder than in other developing economies where central banks tighten to defend their currencies. This is positive for Chilean stocks versus other EM bourses. Finally, the peso is at risk of depreciation from lower copper prices. Bottom Line: Local investors should favor domestic bonds over stocks. Fixed-income traders should bet on lower three-year swap rates. Dedicated EM investors should overweight Chilean equities. Currency traders should maintain a short CLP / long USD trade. Footnotes Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights We advocate implementing asset allocation not across EM assets, but rather relative to their DM counterparts. EM stocks should be part of a global equity portfolio. EM sovereign and corporate credit should be part of a global credit portfolio. EM local currency government bonds are a unique asset class with idiosyncratic features and a low correlation with other assets. Hence, their addition to any multi-asset class portfolio is beneficial. We continue recommending below benchmark allocation to EM equities, credit and local bonds. The rebound in various EM financial markets is reaching a critical technical level where it will either stop or, if broken, will carry on for some time. In Peru, further decline in industrial metals prices and ongoing involuntary monetary tightening bode ill for share prices; continue underweighting. Feature We frequently receive questions from our clients on how they should be positioning their portfolios within EM asset classes such as equities, EM U.S. dollar bonds (credit markets) and local currency government bonds – whether they should be overweight EM stocks versus EM credit markets and domestic bonds, or vice versa. While BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy service covers EM stocks, credit and domestic bonds and exchange rates, we do not make asset allocation calls between EM equities, EM credit and local currency bonds. The reason is very simple: in a risk-on market, EM equities always outperform EM credit and local bonds, and in a risk-off environment, stocks always underperform fixed income (Chart I-1). Chart I-1EM Stocks Versus EM Credit And Local Bonds EM Stocks Versus EM Credit And Local Bonds EM Stocks Versus EM Credit And Local Bonds With respect to the relative performance of EM credit markets versus domestic bonds, the performance of EM currencies is key. A large portion of total returns on EM local currency bonds comes from exchange rates (Chart I-2). Hence, when EM currencies appreciate, domestic bonds outperform EM credit markets (U.S. dollar bonds), and vice versa (Chart I-3). Chart I-2EM Currencies Are Key To EM Local Bonds Returns EM Currencies Are Key To EM Local Bonds Returns EM Currencies Are Key To EM Local Bonds Returns Chart I-3EM Local Bonds Versus EM Credit: It Is A Currency Call EM Local Bonds Versus EM Credit: It Is A Currency Call EM Local Bonds Versus EM Credit: It Is A Currency Call For investors willing to allocate across EM asset classes, a directional view on financial markets should drive allocation between equities and fixed-income. In rallies, equities should be favored, while during risk-off periods, fixed income should be preferred. It follows that investors should overweight EM credit markets versus domestic bonds when EM currencies depreciate, and tilt allocation toward local currency bonds versus EM credit markets when EM exchange rates appreciate. Recommended Approach To Asset Allocation We advocate implementing asset allocation not across EM assets, but relative to their DM counterparts: EM stocks should be part of a global equity portfolio. A pertinent asset allocation decision should be whether to be overweight, neutral or underweight EM within a global equity portfolio. In short, EM stocks should not be compared with EM credit or local bonds, but rather versus their DM counterparts. Having mentioned that, we are maintaining our underweight recommendation on EM within a global equity portfolio for now. EM sovereign and corporate credit should be part of a global credit portfolio – i.e., asset allocators should compare them with other credit instruments such as U.S. and European corporate bonds. Total returns on EM U.S. dollar-denominated sovereign and corporate bonds can be deconstructed into the total return on U.S. Treasurys and the excess return of these EM bonds over U.S. Treasurys. Investors can obtain exposure to U.S. Treasurys by owning them outright. Hence, the unique feature of EM sovereign and corporate bonds is their spreads over U.S. government bonds. EM sovereign and corporate bond spreads over U.S. Treasurys reflect issuers' ability and willingness to pay. Thereby, investors should treat EM dollar-denominated bonds as a pure credit product and this asset class should be part of a global credit portfolio. At the moment, we recommend asset allocators underweight EM sovereign and corporate credit versus U.S./DM corporate credit, in line with our short EM equities/long U.S./DM equities strategy (Chart I-4). Within credit markets, EM investment-grade and high-yield credit should be compared with their peers in U.S./DM, respectively. The reason we are negative on EM credit markets relative to the U.S. and DM universe is that the majority of EM sovereign and corporate bond issuers in Latin America and the EMEA are commodity producers. Hence, their revenues fluctuate with commodity prices, and their spreads should be under upward pressure as commodity prices drop further and EM currencies correspondingly depreciate (Chart I-5). Chart I-4EM Credit Versus U.S. Credit EM Credit Versus U.S. Credit EM Credit Versus U.S. Credit Chart I-5EM Credit Spreads Are Sensitive To Commodities And EM Currencies EM Credit Spreads Are Sensitive To Commodities And EM Currencies EM Credit Spreads Are Sensitive To Commodities And EM Currencies In the meantime, Chinese property companies, financials and industrials/materials remain the largest issuers of corporate debt in emerging Asia. Specifically, U.S. dollar bonds issued by Chinese companies account for 32% of the Barclay’s overall EM USD Credit index and 56% of the EM Asia USD Credit index. Crucially, Chinese corporate credit is essential to trends in emerging Asian credit markets. We are bearish on the fundamentals of Chinese corporate bond issuers due to our negative view on Chinese capital spending, particularly in the real estate sector. With respect to EM local-currency government bonds, this is an entirely different asset class with returns often uncorrelated with any other asset. Table 1 shows that EM local currency bond returns in U.S. dollars have a low correlation with most other asset classes. Therefore, adding EM local-currency bonds to a global multi-asset class portfolio will help achieve risk diversification provided an expectation of a positive return on this asset class in the long run. Chart I- EM domestic bond returns are comprised of local yield carry and capital gains/losses, as well as currency appreciation/depreciation. Business cycles and monetary policies could from time to time be desynchronized across EM countries, and EM currencies could also at times diverge. In short, all of this will add idiosyncratic risk to any global multi-asset class portfolio and push out the portfolio’s efficient frontier – i.e., the portfolio could achieve higher returns for the same amount of risk (volatility). The exposure to EM local currency bonds should be altered according to the view on this asset’s absolute performance. Presently, we recommend below benchmark allocation to this asset class because we expect the majority of EM currencies to depreciate versus the U.S. dollar, the euro and the Japanese yen. The key driver of EM currencies is not U.S. interest rates but the global business cycle (Chart I-6). Odds are high that global trade will continue disappointing as China’s growth weakens further. This will lead to tumbling EM currencies and outflows from high-yielding EM domestic bonds. Chart I-6What Drive EM Currencies What Drive EM Currencies What Drive EM Currencies Within an EM local currency bond portfolio, our recommended overweights are Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Russia, central Europe, Thailand and Korea. The list of our overweights and underweight across EM stocks, credit markets, local bonds and currencies is always published at the end of our reports. Bottom Line: Global asset allocation should treat EM stocks as part of a global equity portfolio. EM sovereign and corporate credit should be part of a global credit portfolio. In turn, EM local currency government bonds are a unique asset class with idiosyncratic features and a low correlation with other assets. Hence, their addition to any multi-asset class portfolio is recommended given an expectation of a positive return in the long run. A Make It Or Break It Juncture The rebound in various EM financial market segments is reaching a critical technical level. At that point, it will either reverse, or will break through and carry on the upward momentum for some time: EM share prices have troughed at their three-year moving averages but are now facing resistance at their 200-day moving averages (Chart I-7). Failure to break above their 200-day moving averages would signal higher risks of a major breakdown. Conversely, a decisive break above their 200-day moving averages would suggest that the recent rebound has much farther to go. Our Risk-on versus Safe-Haven currency ratio has found support at its 6-year moving average but is now facing resistance at its 200-day moving average (Chart I-8, top panel). This ratio is highly correlated with EM share prices, and its breakout or breakdown will be an important signal for the direction of EM, commodities and global cyclical assets in general (Chart I-8, bottom panel). Chart I-7EM Share Prices Are Between Support And Resistance EM Share Prices Are Between Support And Resistance EM Share Prices Are Between Support And Resistance Chart I-8This Currency Ratio Is Key To EM And Commodities Trend bca.ems_wr_2019_01_31_s1_c8 bca.ems_wr_2019_01_31_s1_c8 A relapse from this level would be a major bearish signal, as it would confirm the formation of a head-and-shoulders pattern in this currency ratio. The latter would entail a major breakdown. A number of EM currencies such as ZAR, MXN, KRW, TWD, MYR and CNY are at a critical juncture (Chart I-9). A breakout or failure to do so will entail a major move. Chart I-9AEM Exchange Rates Are At Make It Or Break It Juncture EM Exchange Rates Are At Make It Or Break It Juncture EM Exchange Rates Are At Make It Or Break It Juncture Chart I-9BEM Exchange Rates Are At Make It Or Break It Juncture EM Exchange Rates Are At Make It Or Break It Juncture EM Exchange Rates Are At Make It Or Break It Juncture Meanwhile, the BRL may be forming an inverted head-and-shoulders pattern (Chart I-10). Hence, continuous BRL strength would signal rising odds of an extension to the rally in Brazilian markets. Chart I-10The Brazilian Real: An Inverted Head-And-Shoulder? The Brazilian Real: An Inverted Head-And-Shoulder? The Brazilian Real: An Inverted Head-And-Shoulder? Finally, industrial metals prices have failed to rebound and appear to be forming a head-and-shoulders formation. This pattern foreshadows considerable downside from current levels (Chart I-11, top panel). In the meantime, oil prices have bounced off their long-term moving average and might have a bit more room to advance before hitting a major resistance between $65-$70 for Brent (Chart I-11, bottom panel). Image Bottom Line: Our fundamental view on EM risk assets remains negative due to our expectations of further weakness in China’s growth. However, we are monitoring various signals and indicators to gauge whether the latest rebound can last much longer, which would cause us to change our stance tactically. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Peru: Involuntary Monetary Tightening Peru’s central bank is tightly managing the country’s exchange rate. As a result, it has little control over local interest rates. The Impossible Trinity thesis stipulates that in a country that has an open capital account, the central bank can control either interest rates or the exchange rate, not both simultaneously. Provided Peru has an open capital account, its central bank can have tight control over either the exchange rate or interest rates. So long as the central bank focuses on exchange rate stability, local interest rates will fluctuate with its balance of payments (BoP). Therefore, Peru’s credit cycle and hence domestic demand swings and bank share prices are driven by BoP (Chart II-1). Negative BoP dynamics – shrinking inflow of U.S. dollars – causes local interest rates to move higher while a positive BoP leads to lower borrowing costs (Chart II-2). Chart II-1Commodities Prices & Bank Stocks Are Correlated Commodities Prices & Bank Stocks Are Correlated Commodities Prices & Bank Stocks Are Correlated Chart II-2Trade Balance Drives Interbank Rates Trade Balance Drives Interbank Rates Trade Balance Drives Interbank Rates We expect negative BoP dynamics for Peru going forward – metals prices will drop as China’s growth continues to decelerate, and EM countries will likely experience a bout of portfolio capital outflows. If Peru’s central bank continues to favor limited currency depreciation, its interbank rates will march higher. Chart II-3 illustrates that the pace of net foreign exchange reserves accumulation often negatively correlates with interbank rates and leads loan growth by around 12 months (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Peruvian Local Rates Have Risen Peruvian Local Rates Have Risen Peruvian Local Rates Have Risen Chart II-4Peru: Bank Loan Growth Will Relapse Peru: Bank Loan Growth Will Relapse Peru: Bank Loan Growth Will Relapse When the monetary authorities purchase foreign exchange reserves, they inject local currency excess reserves (liquidity) into the banking system. More plentiful banking system liquidity drives down interbank rates and allows banks to expand credit, boosting domestic demand. The reverse also holds true. The Peruvian central bank was able to mitigate upside in local rates amid the negative terms-of-trade shock in 2014-‘15 by conducting foreign currency swaps with banks. This swap led to an injection of local currency reserves into the system. Currently these swaps are being unwound and banks’ excess reserves are dwindling, putting upward pressure on local rates. Hence, the rise in interbank rates in the past 12 months has not only been due to negative terms of trade but also due to the expiration of foreign currency swaps. As metals prices drop and exports contraction deepens, the currency will come under selling pressure (Chart II-5). To prevent the currency from depreciating considerably, the central bank has to tighten liquidity, producing higher interbank rates. The latter bodes ill for domestic demand. Chart II-5Money Growth Is Contingent On Trade Money Growth Is Contingent On Trade Money Growth Is Contingent On Trade Bottom Line: We continue to underweight the Peruvian bourse because of its exposure to mining companies and banks. The former is at risk from falling industrial metals prices, while the latter will suffer from rising interbank rates. Within the mining sector, gold and silver stocks should outperform copper producers because we foresee more downside in industrial metals than precious metals prices. Andrija Vesic, Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com Footnotes Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations