Manufacturing

Copper prices are vulnerable to the downside in the coming months on a narrowing global supply-demand deficit. We expect that copper prices will plummet by 15-20% from the current level. However, the lingering structural supply deficit will put a floor under copper prices after this correction.

The most important question investors need to answer is whether this is the right time to shift the portfolio to a more aggressive and cyclical stance now that the end of the hiking cycle is in sight. To answer this question, we review the most recent macroeconomic, geopolitical, and equity market developments, and do our best to separate facts and data from sentiment and conjecture. We conclude that there are many challenges ahead and equities are not in a clear yet. We recommend investors add small positions in areas of the market that benefit from rate stabilization while maintaining an overall defensive stance.

Global investors should sell Chinese assets on strength this year and diversify into other emerging markets. American investors should limit China exposure. Short CNY-USD.

In this, our final report of a tumultuous year, we summarize our policy outlook for the “Big 4” central banks – the Fed, the ECB, the Bank of England (BoE) and the BoJ – and the associated bond market implications for 2023.

We explore the eight major themes that will define economic and market trends for Europe next year.

The Chinese government will repress social unrest, then relax Covid-19 social restrictions to try to stabilize the economy. Russia will be aggressive in the short term but will pursue a ceasefire before March 2024. European and Italian risk will stay high on energy constraints.

Central banker messaging after the latest rate hike announcements in the US, UK and Australia indicates a shift in focus from the pace of hikes to how high rates must rise to slow growth and bring down inflation. This represents the next stage of the global tightening cycle, where rates will go higher in countries where neutral rates are higher, like the US, compared to countries with lower neutral rates like the UK and Australia.

While there is much variability in company profitability, earnings contractions have commenced and appear to be broad-based. We expect earnings growth to deteriorate further into year-end. Companies are reporting concerns about the trajectory of future economic growth and the uncertainty that it brings. Consumer spending on goods has slowed sharply, while spending on discretionary services has surprised on the upside. Business-to-business spending is still strong.

Executive Summary Turkey is staring into an abyss: economic crisis that will morph into political crisis in the June 2023 election cycle. President Erdoğan will pursue populist economic policies and foreign policy adventurism to try to stay in power, leading to negative surprises and “black swan” risks over the coming 9-12 months. While Erdoğan and the ruling party are likely to be defeated in elections, which is good news, investors should not try to front-run the election given high uncertainty. Neither Turkey’s economy and domestic politics nor the global economy and geopolitics warrant a bullish view on Turkish assets. GEOPOLITICAL STRATEGY  Recommendation (TACTICAL) Initiation Date Return LONG JPY/TRY 2022-09-23     Erdoğan’s Net Negative Job Approval Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Bottom Line: The Lira will depreciate further versus the dollar. Both Turkish stocks and local currency bonds merit an underweight stance in an EM basket. EM sovereign credit investors, however, should be neutral on Turkish sovereign credit relative to the EM sovereign credit benchmark. Feature Turkey – now technically Türkiye – is teetering on the verge of a national meltdown. The inflation rate is the fastest in G20 countries, both because of a domestic wage-price spiral and soaring global food and fuel prices. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) have been in power since 2002, making them highly vulnerable to demands for change in the general election slated for June 18, 2023. Yet Erdoğan is a strongman who won a popular vote to revise the constitution in 2017 and increase his personal power over institutions. His populist Islamist movement is starkly at odds with the country’s traditional elite, including the secular military establishment. Given the poor state of the economy, Erdoğan will likely lose the 2023 election but he could refuse to leave office … or he could win the election and be ousted in a coup d'état, as happened in Turkey in 1960, 1971, and 1980.1 Meanwhile Turkey is beset by foreign dangers – including war in Ukraine and instability in the Middle East. Erdoğan will try to use foreign policy to bolster his popular standing. Turkey has inserted itself in various regional conflicts and could instigate conflicts of its own. While global investors are eager to buy steeply discounted Turkish financial assets ahead of what could be a monumental change in national policy in 2023, the country is extremely unstable. It is a source of “black swan” risks. The best bet is to remain underweight Turkish assets unless and until a pro-market election outcome shakes off the two-decade trend toward economic ruin. Turkish Grand Strategy Turkey is permanently at a crossroads. The land-bridge between Europe and Asia, it is secular and cosmopolitan but also Islamist and traditional. Its past consists of the greatness of empires – Byzantine, Ottoman – while its present consists of a frustrating search for new opportunities in a chaotic regional context. The core of the country consists of the disjointed coastal plains around the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits and the Sea of Marmara, where Istanbul is located. The Byzantine and Ottoman empires were seated on this strategic location at the juncture of the world’s east-west trade. To secure this area, the Turks needed to control the larger Anatolian peninsula – Asia Minor – to prevent roving Eurasian powers from invading, just as they themselves had originally invaded from Central Asia. During times of greatness the Turks could also expand their empire to control the Balkan peninsula and Danube river valley up to Vienna, Crimea and the Black Sea coasts, and the eastern Mediterranean island approaches. During the Ottoman empire’s golden days Turkish power extended all the way into North Africa, Mesopotamia, the Nile river valley, and Mecca and Medina. The empire – and the Islamic Ottoman Caliphate – collapsed in 1924 after centuries of erosion and the catastrophes of World War I. Subsequently Turkey emerged as a secular republic. It adapted to the post-WWII world order by allying with the United States and NATO, in conflict with the Soviet Union which encircled the Turks on all sides. The Russians are longstanding rivals of Turkey, notably in the Black Sea and Crimea, and Stalin wanted to get his hands on the Dardanelles and Bosporus straits. Hence alliance with the US and NATO fulfilled one of the primary demands of Turkish grand strategy: a navy that could defend the straits and Turkish interests in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean. The collapse of the Soviet Union seemed to usher in an era of opportunity for Turkey. Turkey benefited from democratization, globalization, and foreign capital inflows. But then America’s wars and crises, Russia’s resurgence, and Middle Eastern instability created a shatter-belt surrounding Turkey, impinging on its national security. In this context of limited foreign policy options, Turkey’s domestic politics coalesced around Erdoğan, the AKP, political Islam, and investment-driven economic growth. Erdoğan and the AKP represent the Anatolian, religious, and Middle Eastern interests in Turkey, as opposed to the maritime, secular, and Euro-centric interests rooted in Istanbul. This point can be illustrated by observing that the poorer interior regions have grown faster than the national average over the period of AKP rule, whereas the more developed coastal regions have tended to lag (Map 1). Voting patterns from the 2018 general election overlap with these economic outcomes. The AKP has steered investment capital into the interior to fund infrastructure and property construction while currency depreciation, rather than productivity enhancement, has merely maintained the status quo with the manufacturing export sector in the coastal regions (Chart 1). Map 1Turkey’s Anatolian Model And The Struggle With The Coasts Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Chart 1Turkey's Export Competitiveness Turkey's Export Competitiveness Turkey's Export Competitiveness Today Turkey faces three distinct obstacles to its geopolitical expansion: Russian aggression: Russia’s resurgence, especially with the seizure of Crimea in 2014 and broader invasion of Ukraine in 2022, threatens Turkey’s interests in the Black Sea and eastern Mediterranean. Turkey must always deal with Russia carefully but over the past 14 years Russia has become belligerent, forcing Turkey to come to terms with Putin while maintaining the NATO alliance. Today Erdoğan tries to mediate the conflict as it does not want to encourage Russian aggression but also does not want NATO to provoke Russia. For instance, Turkey is willing to condone Finland and Sweden joining NATO but only if the West grants substantial benefits to Turkey itself. Ultimately Turkish ties with Russia are overrated. For both economic reasons and grand strategic reasons outlined above, Turkey will cleave to the West (Chart 2). Chart 2Turkey Still Linked To The West Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan ​​​​​ Chart 3Turkish Energy Ties With Russia Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Western liberal hegemony: The EU and NATO foreclosed any Turkish ambitions in Europe. The EU has consolidated with each new crisis while rejecting Turkish membership. This puts limits on Turkish access to European markets and influence in the Balkans. Turkey has guarded its independence jealously against the West. After the Cold War the US expected Turkey to serve American interests in the Middle East and Eurasia. The EU expected it to serve European interests as an energy transit state and a blockade against Middle Eastern refugees. But Turkish interests were often sidelined while its domestic politics did not allow blind loyalty to the West. This led Turkey to push back against the West and cultivate other options, such as deeper economic ties with Russia and China. Turkish dependency on Russian energy is substantial and Turkey has tried to play a mediating role in Russia’s conflict with NATO (Chart 3). Recently Turkey offered to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a military alliance of Asian powers. However, as with trade, Turkish defense and security ties with the Russo-Chinese bloc are ultimately overrated (Chart 4).  There is room for some cooperation but Turkey is not eager to abandon American military backing in a period in which Russia is threatening to control the Black Sea rim, cut off grain exports arbitrarily, and use tactical nuclear weapons. Chart 4Turkey’s Defense Alliance With The West Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Middle Eastern instability: The Middle East is a potential area for Turkey to increase influence, especially given the AKP’s embrace of political Islam. Turkey benefits from regional economic development and maintains relations with all players. But the region’s development is halting and Turkey is blocked by competitors. The US toppled Iraq in 2003, which strengthened Iran’s regional clout over the subsequent decades. But Iran is not stable and the US has not prevented Iran from achieving nuclear breakout capacity. Turkey cannot abide a nuclear-armed Iran. At the same time, the US continues to support Israel and the Gulf Arab monarchies, which oppose Turkey’s combination of Islam and democratic populism. Russia propped up Syria’s regime in league with Iran, which threatens Turkey’s border integrity. Developments in Syria, Iraq, and Iran have all complicated Turkey’s management of Kurdish militancy and separatism. Kurds make up nearly 20% of Turkey’s population and play a central role in the country’s political divisions. Erdoğan’s Anatolian power base is antagonistic toward the Kurds and regional Kurdish aspirations. China’s strategic rise brings both risks and rewards for Turkey but China is too distant to become the focus of Turkish strategy: China’s dream of reviving the Silk Road across Eurasia harkens back to the glory days of Ottoman power. The Belt and Road Initiative and other investments help to develop Central Asia and the Middle East, enabling Turkey to benefit once again as the middleman in east-west trade (Chart 5). Chart 5Turkey Benefits From East-West Trade Turkey Benefits From East-West Trade Turkey Benefits From East-West Trade But insofar as China’s Eurasian strategy is successful, it could someday impinge on Turkish ambitions, particularly by buttressing Russian and Iranian power. In recent years Erdoğan has experimented with projecting Turkish power in the Middle East (Syria), North Africa (Libya), the Caucasus (Armenia), and the eastern Mediterranean (Cyprus). He cannot project power effectively because of the obstacles outlined above. But he can manipulate domestic and foreign security issues to try to prolong his hold on power. Bottom Line: Boxed in by Russian aggression, western liberal hegemony, and Middle Eastern instability, Turkey cannot achieve its geopolitical ambitions and has concentrated on internal development over the past two decades. However, the country retains some imperial ambitions and these periodically flare up in unpredictable ways as the modern Turkish state attempts to fend off the chaotic forces that loom in the Black Sea, Middle East, North Africa, and Caucasus. The Erdoğan regime is focused on consolidating Anatolian control of Turkey and projecting military power abroad so that the military does not become a political problem for his faction at home. Erdoğan’s Domestic Predicament President Erdoğan has stayed in power for 20 years under the conditions outlined above but he faces a critical election by June 18, 2023 that could see him thrown from power. The result will be extreme political turbulence over the coming nine months until the leadership of the country is settled by hook or by crook. Erdoğan has pursued a strongman or authoritarian leadership style, especially since domestic opposition emerged in the wake of the Great Recession. By firing three central bankers, he has pressured the central bank into running an ultra-dovish monetary policy, producing a 12% inflation rate prior to the Covid-19 pandemic and an 80% inflation rate today. He has also embraced populist fiscal handouts and foreign policy adventurism. Taken together his policies have eroded the country’s political as well as economic stability. From the last general election in 2018 to the latest data in 2022: Real household disposable income  growth has fallen from -7.4% to -18.7% (Chart 6). Chart 6Real Incomes Falling Real Incomes Falling Real Incomes Falling ​​​​​​ Chart 7Turkish Activity Slows Ahead Of Election Turkish Activity Slows Ahead Of Election Turkish Activity Slows Ahead Of Election ​​​​​ The manufacturing PMI has fallen from 49.0 to 47.4 (Chart 7). Consumer confidence has fallen from 92.1 to 72.2 (Chart 8). Chart 8Consumer Confidence: Not Better Off Than At Last Election Consumer Confidence: Not Better Off Than At Last Election Consumer Confidence: Not Better Off Than At Last Election ​​​​​​ Chart 9Erdoğan’s Net Negative Job Approval Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan ​​​​​​ Bad economic news is finally altering public opinion, with polls now shifting against the president and incumbent party: Since the pandemic erupted, Erdoğan’s approval rating has fallen from a peak of 57% to 40% today. Disapproval has Erdoğan’s risen to 54%, leaving him a net negative job approval (Chart 9). Bear in mind that Erdoğan won the election with 52.6% of the vote in 2018, only slightly better than the 51.8% he received in 2014 and well below the 80% that his AKP predecessor received in 2007. Meanwhile the AKP, which never performs as well as Erdoğan himself, has fallen from a 45% support rate to 30% today in parliamentary polls, dead even with the main opposition Republican People’s Party (Chart 10). The AKP won 42.6% of the vote in 2018, down from 49.5% in the second election of 2015, 49.8% in 2011, and 46.6% in 2007. Chart 10Justice And Development Party Neck And Neck With Republican Opposition Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan The gap between Erdoğan and his Republican rivals has narrowed sharply since the global food and fuel price spike began to bite in late 2021 (Chart 11). Chart 11Erdoğan Faces Tough Re-Election Race Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan Turkey: Before And After Erdoğan However, the 2023 election is not straightforward. There are several caveats to the clear anti-incumbent tendency of economic and political data: Soft Economic Landing? The election takes place in nine months, enough time for surprises to salvage Erdoğan’s presidential campaign, given his and his party’s heavily entrenched rule. For example, it is possible – not probable – that Russia will resume energy exports, enabling Europe to recover, and that central banks will achieve a “soft landing” for the global economy. Turkey’s economy would bounce just in time to help the incumbent party. This is not what we expect (see below) but it could happen. Foreign Policy Victories? Erdoğan could achieve some foreign policy victories. He has negotiated a tenuous deal with Russia and Ukraine, along with the UN, to enable grain exports out of Odessa. He could build on this process to negotiate a broader ceasefire in Ukraine. He could also win major concessions from the US and NATO to secure Finnish and Swedish membership in that bloc. If he did he would come off looking like a grand statesman and might just buy another term in office. Unfortunately what is more likely is that Erdoğan will pursue an aggressive foreign policy in an attempt to distract voters from their bread-and-butter woes, only to destabilize Turkey and the region further. Stolen Election? Erdoğan revised the constitution in 2017 – winning 51.4% of the votes in a popular referendum – to give the presidency substantial new powers across the political system. Using these powers he could manipulate the election to produce a favorable outcome or even cling to power despite unfavorable election results. He does not face nearly as powerful and motivated of a liberal establishment as President Trump faced in 2020 or as Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro faces in 2022. As noted Erdoğan has a contentious relationship with the Turkish military, so while investors cannot rule out a stolen election, they also cannot rule out a military coup in reaction to an attempted stolen election. Thus the election could produce roughly four outcomes, which we rank below from best to worst in terms of their favorability for global investors: 1.  Best Case: Decisive Opposition Victory – 25% Odds – A resounding electoral defeat for the AKP would reverse its unorthodox economic policies in the short term and serve as a lasting warning to future politicians that populism and economic mismanagement lead to political ruin. This outcome would also provide the political capital and parliamentary strength necessary to impose tough reforms and restore a semblance of macroeconomic stability. 2.  Good Case: Narrow AKP Defeat – 50% Odds – A narrow or contested election would produce a weak new government that would at least put a stop to the most inflationary AKP policies. It would improve global investor sentiment around Turkey’s eventual ability to stabilize its economy. The new government would lack the ability to push through structural reforms but it could at least straighten out the affairs of the central bank so as to ensure a cycle of monetary policy tightening, which would stabilize the currency. 3.  Bad Case: Narrow AKP Victory – 15% Odds – A narrow victory would force the AKP to compromise with opposition parties in parliament and pacify social unrest. Foreign adventurism would continue but harmful domestic policies would face obstructionism. 4.  Worst Case: Decisive AKP Victory – 10% Odds – A resounding victory for the ruling party would vindicate Erdoğan and his policies despite their negative economic results, driving Turkey further down the path of authoritarianism, populism, money printing, currency depreciation, and hyper-inflation. He could also be emboldened in his foreign adventurism. Bottom Line: We expect Erdoğan and the AKP to be defeated and replaced. However, Turkey is in the midst of an economic and political crisis and the next 12 months will bring extreme uncertainty. The election could be indecisive, contested, stolen, or overthrown. The aftermath could be chaotic as well as the lead-up. If the AKP stays in power then investors will abandon Turkey and its economy will suffer a historic shock. Therefore investors should underweight Turkey – at least until the next phase in the economic downturn confirms our forecast that the AKP will fall from power. Macro Outlook: Fade The Equity Rally Chart 12Turkish Stock Rally Will Fade Soon; Stay Underweight This Market Versus EM Turkish Stock Rally Will Fade Soon; Stay Underweight This Market Versus EM Turkish Stock Rally Will Fade Soon; Stay Underweight This Market Versus EM The Turkish economy is beset by hyper-inflation. Headline consumer prices are rising at upwards of 80% and core inflation is 65%. Yet Turkish government 10-year bond yields are low and falling: they are down to 11% currently, from a high of 24% at the beginning of the year. Turkish stocks have also outperformed their Emerging Markets counterparts this year in common currency terms even though the lira has been the worst performing EM currency (Chart 12). So, what’s going on in this market? The answer is hidden in the slew of unorthodox policies adopted by the authorities. These measures caused massive distortions in both the economy and the markets. Specifically, late last year, despite very high inflation, the central bank began to cut policy rates encouraging massive loan expansion. As a result, both local currency loans and money supply surged. Which, in turn, completely unhinged inflation (Chart 13). As inflation rose, so did government bond yields. In a bid to keep government borrowing costs low, policymakers changed several bank regulations to force commercial banks to buy government bonds.2  The upshot was that the bond yields stopped tracking inflation and instead began to fall even as inflation skyrocketed. The rampant inflation meant Turkish non-financial firms’ nominal sales skyrocketed. Indeed, sales of all MSCI Turkey non-financials companies have risen by 40% in US dollar terms and 200% in local currency (Chart 14). Chart 13Massive Bank Credit And Money Growth Completely Unhinged The Inflation Massive Bank Credit And Money Growth Completely Unhinged The Inflation Massive Bank Credit And Money Growth Completely Unhinged The Inflation This was at a time when policy rates were being cut. The policy rate has fallen to 12% today from 19% a year earlier. Firms’ local currency real borrowing costs have fallen deeply into negative territory (Chart 15). It helped reduce firms’ costs significantly. Chart 14Surging Sales Amid Deeply Negative Real Borrowing Costs Boosted Firms' Profits Surging Sales Amid Deeply Negative Real Borrowing Costs Boosted Firms' Profits Surging Sales Amid Deeply Negative Real Borrowing Costs Boosted Firms' Profits ​​​​​ Chart 15Policy Rates Are Being Cut Even As The Inflation Reigns Havoc Policy Rates Are Being Cut Even As The Inflation Reigns Havoc Policy Rates Are Being Cut Even As The Inflation Reigns Havoc ​​​​​ Chart 16Wage Costs Have Risen Too, But Not As Much As Inflation Wage Costs Have Risen Too, But Not As Much As Inflation Wage Costs Have Risen Too, But Not As Much As Inflation ​​​​​ Meanwhile, even though wage growth accelerated, it still fell short of inflation, and therefore of nominal sales of the firms (Chart 16). Firms’ wage costs did not rise as much as their prices. All this boosted non-financial firms’ margins. Total profits have risen by 35% in US dollar terms from a year earlier (200% in lira terms). ​​​​​​​ Chart 17The Deluge Of Money Has Led All Kinds Of Asset Prices To Skyrocket The Deluge Of Money Has Led All Kinds Of Asset Prices To Skyrocket The Deluge Of Money Has Led All Kinds Of Asset Prices To Skyrocket ​​​​​​​ On their part, listed financials’ profits have surged by 50% in USD terms and 220% in local currency terms. They benefited both from surging interest income due to rapid loan growth and from massive capital gains on their holding of government securities (see Chart 14 above). All this is reflected in Turkish companies’ earnings per share as well. The spike in EPS has propped up Turkish stocks for past few months. Over the past year, not only have corporate profits and share prices surged, but also house prices have skyrocketed by 170% in local currency terms and 30% in USD terms (Chart 17). In sum, the abnormally low nominal and deeply negative real borrowing costs have produced a money/credit deluge, which has generated a massive inflationary outbreak and has inflated revenues/profits as well as various asset prices. The Lira To Depreciate Further This macro setting is a recipe for a major currency sell-off.  First, Europe – the destination of 90% of Turkish exports – will likely slide into recession over the coming year (Chart 18).  Chart 18A Slowing Europe Will Materially Dent Turkish Growth Too A Slowing Europe Will Materially Dent Turkish Growth Too A Slowing Europe Will Materially Dent Turkish Growth Too A fall in exports will widen Turkey’s current account deficit. Notably, imports will not fall much since the authorities are pursuing easy money policy. Second, the lack of credible macro policies as well as political crisis will assure that foreign capital escapes Turkey. Turkey will find the current account deficit nearly impossible to finance. Third, the country’s net foreign reserves, after adjusting for the central bank’s foreign currency borrowings and commercial banks’ deposits with the central bank, stand at minus 30 billion dollars. In other words, the central bank now has large net US dollar liabilities. As such, it has little wherewithal to defend the currency. There are very high odds that the lira depreciation will accelerate in the months ahead. Fourth, the slew of unorthodox measures taken by the Turkish authorities will encourage banks to buy more government local currency bonds to suppress the government’s borrowing costs. When commercial banks buy government securities from non-banks, they create money “out of thin air.” Hence, the ongoing money supply deluge will continue. This is bearish for the currency. Notably, the economy will likely enter into recession next year – and yet core inflation will stay very high (30% and above). Recent unorthodox bank regulations are meant to encourage a certain kind of lending – loans to farmers, exporters, and small and medium-sized businesses – while discouraging other kinds. Consequently, the overall loan growth will likely slow in nominal terms. There are already signs that credit is decelerating on the margin (Chart 19). Given the very high inflation, slower credit growth will likely lead to a liquidity crunch for many businesses – forcing them to curtail their activity.  Chart 19Bank Credit Will Decelerate Due To Many Unorthodox Bank Regulations Bank Credit Will Decelerate Due To Many Unorthodox Bank Regulations Bank Credit Will Decelerate Due To Many Unorthodox Bank Regulations ​​​​​​ Chart 20Bank Loans Are Already Contracting in Real Terms: Not a Good Omen For Real GDP Bank Loans Are Already Contracting in Real Terms: Not a Good Omen For Real GDP Bank Loans Are Already Contracting in Real Terms: Not a Good Omen For Real GDP ​​​​​​ Indeed, in real terms (deflated by core CPI), local currency loan growth has already slipped into negative territory. This is a bad omen for the overall economy: contracting real loan growth is a harbinger of recession (Chart 20). In short, Turkey is looking into an abyss: a recession amid high inflation (i.e., stagflation) as well as a brewing political crisis (with Erdoğan likely doubling down on unorthodox and populist policies). All this point to another period of a large currency depreciation. While the country will likely change direction to avoid the abyss, investors should wait to allocate capital until after the change in direction is confirmed.    Investment Takeaways The Turkish lira will fall much more vis-à-vis the US dollar in the year ahead. Both Turkish stocks and local currency bonds merit an underweight stance in an EM basket. EM sovereign credit investors, however, should be neutral on Turkish sovereign credit relative to the EM sovereign credit benchmark. Turkey is involved in an economic crisis that will devolve into a political crisis over the election cycle. While Erdoğan and the AKP are likely to fall from power as things stand today, they are heavily entrenched and will be difficult to remove, creating large risks of an indecisive or contested election in 2023 that will increase rather than decrease policy uncertainty and the political risk premium in Turkish assets. As a strongman leader Erdoğan has consolidated political power in his own hands, so there is no one to take the blame for the country’s economic mismanagement – other than foreigners. Hence there is a distinct risk that his foreign policy adventurism will escalate between now and next year, resulting in significant military conflicts or saber-rattling. These will shake out western investors who try to speculate on the likelihood that the election or the military will oust Erdoğan and produce sounder national and economic policies. That outcome is indeed likely but Erdoğan is not going without a fight. Our Geopolitical Strategy also recommends tactically shorting the lira versus the Japanese yen in light of global slowdown, extreme geopolitical risk, and the Bank of Japan’s desire to prevent the yen from falling too far.   Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Rajeeb Pramanik Senior EM Strategist rajeeb.pramanik@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic Consulting Editor Footnotes 1      Sinan Ekim and Kemal Kirişci, “The Turkish constitutional referendum, explained,” Brookings Institution, April 13, 2017, brookings.edu. 2     The central bank replaced an existing 20% reserve requirement ratios for credits with a higher 30% treasury bond collateral requirement. Lenders will have to cut interest rates on commercial loans (except for loans to farmers, exporters, and SMEs). Otherwise, banks will have to maintain additional securities. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix

Listen to a short summary of this report.     Executive Summary Euro Bulls Are Evaporating Euro Bulls Are Evaporating Euro Bulls Are Evaporating The euro is likely to undershoot in the near term, as the winter months approach and economic volatility in Europe rises. However, much of the euro’s troubles are well understood and discounted by financial markets. This suggests a floor closer to parity for the EUR/USD. Unlike many other developed economies, the fiscal drag in the eurozone is likely to be minimal for the rest of this year and early next year. The forces pressuring equilibrium rates lower in the periphery are slowly dissipating. That should lift the neutral rate of interest in the entire eurozone. China’s zero Covid-19 policy along with property market troubles has weighed heavily on the euro, but that could change. RECOMMENDATIONS INCEPTION LEVEL inception date RETURN Long EUR/GBP 0.846 2021-10-15 -0.13 Short EUR/JPY 141.20 2022-07-07 2.46 Bottom Line: The euro tends to be largely driven by pro-cyclical flows, which will be a positive when risk sentiment picks up. Meanwhile, making a structural case for the euro is easy when it comes to valuation. According to our in-house PPP models, an investor who buys the euro today can expect to make 6% a year over the next decade, should the euro mean revert to fair value and beyond. Our current stance is more measured because investors could see capitulation selling in the coming months. Feature Chart 1Two Decades After The Creation Of The Euro Two Decades After The Creation Of The Euro Two Decades After The Creation Of The Euro The creation of the euro was an ambitious project. It began with a simple idea – let’s create the biggest monetary union and everything else will follow, not least, economic might. Over the last two decades, the euro has survived, but its ambitions have been jolted by various crises. Today, the euro is sitting around where it was at the initiation of the project (Chart 1). That has been a tremendous loss in real purchasing power for many of its citizens. Given that we are back to square one, this report examines the prospects for the euro from the lens of its original ambitions, while navigating the economic and geopolitical landscape today. Surviving The Winter Chart 2A European Recession Is Well Priced In A European Recession Is Well Priced In A European Recession Is Well Priced In Winter will be tough for eurozone citizens. But how tough? In our view, less than what the euro is pricing in. According to the ZEW sentiment index, the eurozone manufacturing PMI should be around 45 today, but sits at 49.8. The euro, which has been tracking the ZEW index tick-for-tick has already priced in a deep recession, worse than the 2020 episode (Chart 2). Bloomberg GDP growth consensus forecasts for the eurozone are still penciling in 2.8% growth for 2022, down from a high of 4%. For 2023, forecasts have hit a low of 0.8%. It is certainly possible that euro area growth undershoots this level, which will cause a knee jerk sell off in the euro. However, much of the euro’s troubles are well understood and discounted by financial markets. Natural gas storage is already close to 80%, the EU’s target, to help the eurozone navigate the winter. Coal plants are firing on all cylinders, and Germany has decided to delay the closure of its nuclear power plants. It is true that electricity prices are soaring, but part of the story has been weather-related, notably a heat wave across Europe, falling water levels along the Rhine that has delayed coal shipments, and lower wind speeds that have affected renewable energy generation. France is also having problems with nuclear power generation, due to little availability of water for cooling reactors. Looking ahead, energy markets are already discounting a steep fall in prices from the winter energy cliff (Chart 3). If that turns out to be true, it will be a welcome fillip for eurozone growth. First, it will ease the need for the ECB to tighten policy aggressively, and second, it will boost real incomes, which will support spending. This is not being discussed in financial markets today. Chart 3AFutures Markets Suggest The Energy Crunch Will Ebb Futures Markets Suggest The Energy Crunch Will Ebb Futures Markets Suggest The Energy Crunch Will Ebb Chart 3CFutures Markets Suggest The Energy Crunch Will Ebb Futures Markets Suggest The Energy Crunch Will Ebb Futures Markets Suggest The Energy Crunch Will Ebb Chart 3BFutures Markets Suggest The Energy Crunch Will Ebb Futures Markets Suggest The Energy Crunch Will Ebb Futures Markets Suggest The Energy Crunch Will Ebb Fiscal Policy To The Rescue? Unlike many other developed economies, the fiscal drag in the eurozone is likely to be minimal for the rest of this year and early next year (Chart 4). As funds from the next generation EU plan are being disbursed into strategic sectors, including renewable energy, Europe’s productive capital base will also improve. This is likely to have a huge multiplier effect on European growth. Chart 4AThe Fiscal Drag In The Eurozone Could Be Minimal The Fiscal Drag In The Eurozone Could Be Minimal The Fiscal Drag In The Eurozone Could Be Minimal Chart 4BThe Fiscal Drag In The Eurozone Could Be Minimal The Fiscal Drag In The Eurozone Could Be Minimal The Fiscal Drag In The Eurozone Could Be Minimal Taking a bigger-picture view, what has become evident in recent years is stronger solidarity among eurozone countries, both economically and politically. Related Report  Foreign Exchange StrategyMonth In Review: Inflation Is Still Accelerating Globally Economically, the standard dilemma for the eurozone was that interest rates were too low for the most productive nation, Germany, but too expensive for others, such as Spain and Italy. As such, the euro was often caught in a tug of war between a rising equilibrium rate of interest for Germany, but a very low neutral rate for the peripheral countries. The good news is that for the eurozone, a lot of this internal rupture has been partly resolved. Labor market reforms have seen unit labor costs in Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain collectively contract since 2008. This has effectively eliminated the competitiveness gap with Germany, accumulated over the last two decades (Chart 5). Italy remains saddled with a rigid and less productive workforce, but the overall adjustments have still come a long way to close a key fissure plaguing the common currency area. The result has been a collapse in peripheral borrowing spreads, relative to Germany (Chart 6). Ergo, interest payments as a share of GDP are now manageable. It is true that Italy remains a basket case but the ECB’s Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI) will ensure that peripheral spreads remain well contained and a liquidity crisis (in Italy) does not morph into a solvency one. Chart 5The Periphery Is Now Competitive The Periphery Is Now Competitive The Periphery Is Now Competitive Chart 6Peripheral Spreads Are Still Contained In Real Terms Peripheral Spreads Are Still Contained In Real Terms Peripheral Spreads Are Still Contained In Real Terms Beyond the adjustment in competitiveness, productivity among eurozone countries might also converge. Our European Investment Strategy colleagues suggest that the neutral rate is still wide between Germany and the periphery. That said, gross fixed capital formation in the periphery has been surging relative to core eurozone members (Chart 7). If this capital is deployed in the right sectors, it will have two profound impacts. First, the neutral rate of interest in the eurozone will be lifted from artificially low levels. The proverbial saying is that a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. This means that if the forces pressuring equilibrium rates lower in the periphery are slowly dissipating, that should lift the neutral rate of interest in the entire eurozone. Over a cyclical horizon, this should be unequivocally bullish for the euro. Second, and more importantly, economic solidarity among eurozone members will help ensure the survival of the euro, over the next decade and beyond. Chart 7The Periphery Could Become More Productive The Periphery Could Become More Productive The Periphery Could Become More Productive Trading The Euro The above analysis suggests long-term investors should be buying the euro today. However, the long run can be a very long time to be offside. Our trading strategy is as follows: Over the next 6 months, stay neutral to short the euro. The economic landscape for the eurozone remains fraught with risk. This is a typical recipe for a currency to undershoot. Eurozone banks are very sensitive to economic conditions in the eurozone, and ultimately the performance of the euro, and the signal from bank shares remains negative (Chart 8). Chart 8European Banks Are Not Part Of The Agenda Watch Eurozone Banks European Banks Are Not Part Of The Agenda Watch Eurozone Banks European Banks Are Not Part Of The Agenda Watch Eurozone Banks Investors have been cutting their forecasts for the euro but have not yet capitulated. Bets are that the euro will be at 1.10 by the end of next year, and 14% higher in two years. A bottom will be established when investors cut their forecasts below current spot prices (Chart 9). This corroborates with data from net speculative positions that have yet to hit rock bottom.  Chart 9Euro Bulls Are Evaporating Euro Bulls Are Evaporating Euro Bulls Are Evaporating Real interest rates in the euro area are still plunging across the curve, relative to the US. The two-year real yield has hit a cyclical low. Five-year, 10-year and 30-year real yields are also falling. Historically, the euro tends to trend higher when interest rate differentials are moving in favor of the eurozone (Chart 10). Chart 10AReal Rates Are Dropping In The Euro Area Real Rates Are Dropping In The Euro Area Real Rates Are Dropping In The Euro Area Chart 10BReal Rates Are Dropping In The Euro Area Real Rates Are Dropping In The Euro Area Real Rates Are Dropping In The Euro Area Hedging costs have risen tremendously, as the forward market (like investors) is already pricing in an appreciation in the euro. The embedded two-year return for EUR investors is circa 4%, in line with the carry costs (Chart 11). In real terms, the returns are closer to 9% to compensate for much higher inflation expectations in the eurozone. Higher hedging costs will dissuade foreign investors from gobbling up European assets on a hedged basis. Chart 11A 5% Rally In The Euro Is Already Anticipated A 5% Rally In The Euro Is Already Anticipated A 5% Rally In The Euro Is Already Anticipated In short, the euro is likely to enter a capitulation phase. Our sense is that that it will push EUR/USD below parity, towards 0.98. Below that level, we believe the risk/reward profile will become much more attractive for both short- and longer-term investors. Signals From External Demand Chart 12The Euro Is Increasingly Dependant On Chinese Data The Euro Is Increasingly Dependant On Chinese Data The Euro Is Increasingly Dependant On Chinese Data The eurozone is a very open economy. Exports of goods and services represented 51% of euro area GDP in 2021. This means that what happens with external demand, especially in the US, the UK and China, matters for European growth (Chart 12). Of all its major export partners, China is the biggest question mark. China’s zero Covid-19 policy along with property market troubles has weighed heavily on the euro. Historically, the Chinese credit impulse has been a good coincident indicator for EUR/USD. Lately, that relationship has decoupled (Chart 13A). We favor the view that the credit transmission mechanism in China is merely delayed, rather than broken. For one, a rising Chinese credit impulse usually leads European exports, and this time should be no different. Chinese bond markets are also becoming more liberalized, and as such are a key signal for financial conditions in China. For over a decade, easing financial conditions have usually been a good signal that import demand is about to improve (Chart 13B). This is good news for European export demand. The bottom line is that investors are currently too pessimistic on Europe’s growth prospects at a time when a few green shoots are emerging for external demand. That may not save the euro in the near term but will be a welcome fillip for euro bulls when it does undershoot. Chart 13AThe Muse For The Euro Is Chinese Data The Muse For The Euro Is Chinese Data The Muse For The Euro Is Chinese Data Chart 13BThe Muse For The Euro Is Chinese Data The Muse For The Euro Is Chinese Data The Muse For The Euro Is Chinese Data Concluding Thoughts Chart 14The Goldilocks Case For The Euro The Goldilocks Case For The Euro The Goldilocks Case For The Euro The euro tends to be largely driven by pro-cyclical flows. Fortunately for investors, European equities remain unloved, given that they are trading at some of the cheapest cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings multiples in the developed world. Analysts are aggressively revising up their earnings estimates for eurozone equities, relative to the US. They might be wrong in the near term, but over a 9-to-12-month horizon, this has been a good leading indicator for the euro.  Making a structural case for the euro is easy when it comes to valuation. According to our in-house PPP models, an investor who buys the euro today can expect to make 6% a year over the next decade, should the euro mean revert to fair value and beyond (Chart 14). Meanwhile, beyond the winter months, inflation could come crashing back to earth in the eurozone, which will provide underlying support for the fair value of the currency. Our near-term stance is more measured because investors are only neutral the euro, and risk reversals are not yet at a nadir. This is particularly relevant given that Europe still has a war in its backyard, with the potential of generating more market volatility ahead. Given this confluence of factors, we have chosen to play euro via two channels: Long EUR/GBP: As we argued last week, the UK has a bigger stagflation problem compared to the eurozone. This trade is also a bet on improving economic fundamentals between the eurozone and the UK, as well as a bet on policy convergence between the two economies. Short EUR/JPY: The yen is even cheaper than the euro. In a risk-off environment, EUR/JPY will sell off. In a risk-on environment, the yen can still benefit since it is oversold. Meanwhile, investors remain bullish EUR/JPY. Long EUR/USD: We will go long the euro if it breaks below 0.98.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Cyclical Holdings (6-18 months) Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary