Manufacturing

Highlights China’s Communist Party has overcome a range of challenges over the past 100 years, performed especially well over the past 42 years, but the macro and geopolitical outlook is darkening. The “East Asian miracle” phase of Chinese growth has ended. Potential GDP growth is slowing and it will be harder for Beijing to maintain financial and sociopolitical stability. The Communist Party has shifted the basis of its legitimacy from rapid growth to quality of life and nationalist foreign policy. The latter, however, will undermine the former by stirring up foreign protectionism. In the near term, global investors should favor developed market equities over China/EM equities. But they should favor China and Hong Kong stocks over Taiwanese stocks given significant geopolitical risk over the Taiwan Strait. Structurally, favor the US dollar and euro over the renminbi. Feature Ten years ago, in the lead up to the Communist Party’s 90th anniversary, I wrote a report called “China and the End of the Deng Dynasty,” referring to Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese Communist Party’s great pro-market reformer.1 The argument rested on three points: the end of the export-manufacturing economic model, an increasingly assertive foreign policy, and the revival of Maoist nationalism. After ten years the report holds up reasonably well but it did not venture to forecast what precisely would come next. In reality it is the rule of the Communist Party, and not the leader of any one man, that fits into China’s history of dynastic cycles. As the party celebrates a hundred years since its founding on July 23, 1921, it is necessary to pause and reflect on what the party has achieved over the past century and what the current Xi Jinping era implies for the country’s next 100 years. Single-Party Rule Can Bring Economic Success. Communism Cannot. Regime type does not preclude wealth. Countries can prosper regardless of whether they are ruled by one person, one party, or many parties. The richest countries in the world grew rich over centuries in which their governments evolved from monarchy to democracy and sometimes back again. Even today several of the world’s wealthy democracies are better described as republics or oligarchies. Chart 1China Outperformed Communism But Not Liberal Democracy China’s Communist Party Turns 100: So What? China’s Communist Party Turns 100: So What? The rule of one person, or autocracy, is not necessarily bad for economic growth. For every Kim Il Sung of North Korea there is a Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore. But authority based on a single person often expires with that person and rarely survives his grandchild. In China, Chairman Mao Zedong’s death occasioned a power struggle. Deng Xiaoping’s attempts to step down led to popular unrest that threatened the Communist Party’s rule on two separate occasions in the 1980s. The rule of a single party is thought to be more sustainable. Japan and Singapore are effectively single-party states and the wealthiest countries in Asia. They are democracies with leadership rotation and a popular voice in national affairs. And yet South Korea’s boom times occurred under single-party military rule. The same goes for the renegade province of Taiwan. Only around the time these two reached about $11,000-$14,000 GDP per capita did they evolve into multi-party democracies – though their wealth grew rapidly in the wake of that transition. China and soon Vietnam will test whether non-democratic, single-party rule can persist beyond the middle-income economic status that brought about democratic transition in Taiwan (Chart 1). Vietnam and Taiwan are the closest communist and non-communist governing systems, respectively, to mainland China. Insofar as China and Vietnam succeed at catching up with Taiwan it will be for reasons other than Marxist-Leninist ideology. Most communist systems have failed. At the height of international communism in the twentieth century there were 44 states ruled by communist parties; today there are five. China and Vietnam are the rare examples of communist states that not only survived the Soviet Union’s fall but also unleashed market forces and prospered (Chart 2). North Korea survived in squalor; Cuba’s experience is mixed. States that close off their economies do not have a good record of generating wealth. Closed economies lack competition and investment, struggle with stagflation, and often succumb to corruption and political strife. Openness seems to be a more diagnostic variable than government type or ideology, given the prosperity of democratic Japan and non-democratic China. Has the CPC performed better than other communist regimes? Arguably. It performs better than Vietnam but worse than Cuba on critical measures like infant mortality rates and life expectancy. Has it performed better than comparable non-communist regimes? Not really, though it is fast approaching Taiwan in all of these measures (Chart 3). Chart 2Communist States Get Rich By Compromising Their Communism China’s Communist Party Turns 100: So What? China’s Communist Party Turns 100: So What? Chart 3China Catching Up To Cuba On Basic Wellbeing China’s Communist Party Turns 100: So What? China’s Communist Party Turns 100: So What? What can be said for certain is that, since China’s 1979 reform and opening up, the CPC has avoided many errors and catastrophes. It survived the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s without succumbing to international isolation, internal divisions, or economic crisis. It has drastically increased its share of global power (Table 1). Contrast this global ascent with the litany of mistakes and crises in the US since the year 2000. The CPC also managed the past decade relatively well despite the Chinese financial turmoil of 2015-16, the US trade war of 2018-19, and the COVID-19 pandemic. However, these events hint at greater challenges to come. China’s transition to a consumer-oriented economy has hardly begun. The struggle to manage systemic financial risk is intensifying today at risk to growth and stability (Chart 4). The trade war is simmering despite the Phase One trade deal and the change of party in the White House. And it is too soon to draw conclusions about the impact of the global pandemic, though China suppressed the virus more rapidly than other countries and led the world into recovery. Table 1China’s Global Rise After ‘Reform And Opening Up’ China’s Communist Party Turns 100: So What? China’s Communist Party Turns 100: So What? Chart 4China To Keep Struggling With Financial Instability China To Keep Struggling With Financial Instability China To Keep Struggling With Financial Instability Judging by the points above, there are two significant risks on the horizon. First, the CPC’s revival of neo-Maoist ideology, particularly the new economic mantra of self-reliance and “dual circulation” (import substitution), poses the risk of closing the economy and undermining productivity.2 Second, China’s sliding back into the rule of a single person – after the “consensus rule” that prevailed after Deng Xiaoping – increases the risk of unpredictable decision-making and a succession crisis whenever General Secretary Xi Jinping steps down. The party’s internal logic holds that China’s economic and geopolitical challenges are so enormous as to require a strongman leader at the helm of a single-party and centralized state. But because of the traditional problems with one-man rule, there is no guarantee that the country will remain as stable as it has been over the past 42 years. Slowing Growth Drives Clash With Foreign Powers Every major East Asian economy has enjoyed a “miracle” phase of growth – and every one of them has seen this phase come to an end. Now it is China’s turn. The country’s potential GDP growth is slowing as the population peaks, the labor force shrinks, wages rise, and companies outsource production to cheaper neighbors (Charts 5A & 5B). The Communist Party is attempting to reverse the collapse in the fertility rate by shifting from its historic “one Child policy,” which sharply reduced births. It shifted to a two-child policy in 2016 and a three-child policy in 2021 but the results have not been encouraging over the past five years. Chart 5AChina’s Demographic Decline Accelerating China’s Communist Party Turns 100: So What? China’s Communist Party Turns 100: So What? Chart 5BChina’s Demographic Decline Accelerating China’s Communist Party Turns 100: So What? China’s Communist Party Turns 100: So What? In the best case China’s growth will follow the trajectory of Taiwan and South Korea, which implies at most a 6% yearly growth rate over the next decade (Chart 6). This is not too slow but it will induce financial instability as well as hardship for overly indebted households, firms, and local governments. Chart 6China's Growth Rates Will Converge With Taiwan, South Korea China's Growth Rates Will Converge With Taiwan, South Korea China's Growth Rates Will Converge With Taiwan, South Korea The Communist Party’s legitimacy was not originally based on rapid economic growth but it came to be seen that way over the roaring decades of the 1980s through the 2000s. Thus when the Great Recession struck the party had to shift the party’s base of legitimacy. The new focus became quality of life, as marked by the Xi administration’s ongoing initiatives to cut back on corruption, pollution, poverty, credit excesses, and industrial overcapacity while increasing spending on health, education, and society (Chart 7). Chart 7China’s Fiscal Burdens Will Rise On Social Welfare Needs China’s Communist Party Turns 100: So What? China’s Communist Party Turns 100: So What? The party’s efforts to improve standards of living and consumer safety also coincided with an increase in propaganda, censorship, and repression to foreclose political dissent. The country falls far short in global governance indicators (Chart 8). Chart 8China Lags In Governance, Rule Of Law China’s Communist Party Turns 100: So What? China’s Communist Party Turns 100: So What? A second major new source of party legitimacy is nationalist foreign policy. China adopted a “more assertive” foreign and trade policy in the mid-2000s as its import dependencies ballooned. It helped that the US was distracted with wars of choice and financial crises. After the Great Recession the CPC’s foreign policy nationalism became a tool of generating domestic popular support amid slower economic growth. This was apparent in the clashes with Japan and other countries in the East and South China Seas in the early 2010s, in territorial disputes with India throughout the past decade, in political spats with Norway and most recently Australia, and in military showdowns over the Korean peninsula (2015-16) and today the Taiwan Strait (Chart 9). Chart 9Proxy Wars A Real Risk In China’s Periphery China’s Communist Party Turns 100: So What? China’s Communist Party Turns 100: So What? If China were primarily focused on foreign policy and global strategy then it would not provoke multiple neighbors on opposite sides of its territory at the same time. This is a good way to motivate the formation of a global balance-of-power coalition that can constrain China in the coming years. But China’s outward assertiveness is not driven primarily by foreign policy considerations. It is driven by the secular economic slowdown at home and the need to use nationalism to drum up domestic support. This is why China seems indifferent to offending multiple countries at once (like India and Australia) as well as more distant trade partners whom it “should be” courting rather than offending (like Europe). Such assertive foreign policy threatens to undermine quality of life, namely by provoking international protectionism and sanctions on trade and investment. The US is galvanizing a coalition of democracies to put pressure on China over its trade practices and human rights. The Asian allies are mostly in step with the US because they fear China’s growing clout. The European states do not have as much to fear from China’s military but they do fear China’s state-backed industry and technological rise. Europe’s elites also worry about anti-establishment political movements just like American elites and therefore are trying to win back the hearts and minds of the working class through a more proactive use of fiscal and industrial policy. This entails a more assertive trade policy. China has so far not adapted to the potential for a unified front among the democracies, other than through rhetoric. Thus the international horizon is darkening even as China’s growth rates shift downward. China’s Geopolitical Outlook Is Dimming China’s government has overcome a range of challenges and crises. The country takes an ever larger role in global trade despite its falling share of global population because of its productivity and competitiveness. The drop in China’s outward direct investment is tied to the global pandemic and may not mark a top, given that the country will still run substantial current account surpluses for the foreseeable future and will need to recycle these into natural resources and foreign production (Chart 10). However, the limited adoption of the renminbi as a reserve currency in the face of this formidable commercial power reveals the world’s reservations about Beijing’s ability to maintain macroeconomic stability, good governance, and peaceful foreign relations. Chart 10China's Rise Continues China's Rise Continues China's Rise Continues Chart 11China's Policy Uncertainty: A Structural Uptrend China's Policy Uncertainty: A Structural Uptrend China's Policy Uncertainty: A Structural Uptrend China is not in a position to alter the course of national policy dramatically prior to the Communist Party’s twentieth national congress in 2022. The Xi administration is focused on normalizing monetary and fiscal policy and heading off any sociopolitical disturbances prior to that critical event, in which General Secretary Xi Jinping, who was originally slated to step down at this time according to the old rules, may be anointed the overarching “chairman” position that Mao Zedong once held. The seventh generation of Chinese leaders will be promoted at this five-year rotation of the Central Committee and will further consolidate the Xi administration’s grip. It will also cement the party’s rotation back to leaders who have ideological educations, as opposed to the norm in the 1990s and early 2000s of promoting leaders with technocratic skills and scientific educations.3 This does not mean that President Xi will refuse to hold a summit with US President Biden in the coming months nor does it mean that US-China strategic and economic dialogue will remain defunct. But it does mean that Beijing is unlikely to make any major course correction until after the 2022 reshuffle – and even then a course correction is unlikely. China has taken its current path because the Communist Party fears the sociopolitical consequences of relinquishing economic control just as potential growth slows. The new ruling philosophy holds that the Soviet Union fell because of Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika, not because openness and restructuring came too late. Moreover it is far from clear that the US, Europe, and other democratic allies will apply such significant and sustained pressure as to force China to change its overall strategy. America is still internally divided and its foreign policy incoherent; the EU remains reactive and risk-averse. China has a well-established set of strategic goals for 2035 and 2049, the 100th anniversary of the People’s Republic, and the broad outlines will not be abandoned. The implication is that tensions with the US and China’s Asian neighbors will persist. Rising policy uncertainty is a secular trend that will pick back up sooner rather than later (Chart 11), to the detriment of a stable and predictable investment environment. Chart 12Chinese Government’s Net Worth High But Hidden Liabilities Pose Risks China’s Communist Party Turns 100: So What? China’s Communist Party Turns 100: So What? Monetary and fiscal dovishness and a continued debt buildup are the obvious and necessary solutions to China’s combination of falling growth potential, rising social liabilities, the need to maintain the rapid military buildup in the face of geopolitical challenges. Sovereign countries can amass vast debts if they own their own debt and keep nominal growth above average bond yields. China’s government has a very favorable balance sheet when national assets are taken into consideration as well as liabilities, according to the IMF (Chart 12). On the other hand, China’s government is having to assume a lot of hidden liabilities from inefficient state-owned companies and local governments. In the short run there are major systemic financial risks even though in the long run Beijing will be able to increase its borrowing and bail out failing entities in order to maintain stability, just like Japan, the US, and Europe have had to do. The question for China is whether the social and political system will be able to handle major crises as well as the US and Europe have done, which is not that well. Investment Takeaways The rule of a single party is not a bar to economic success – but the rule of a single person is a liability due to the problem of succession. Marxism-Leninism is terrible for productivity unless it is compromised to allow for markets to operate, as in China and Vietnam. States that close their economies to the outside world usually atrophy. There is no compelling evidence that China’s Communist Party has performed better than a non-communist alternative would have done, given the province of Taiwan’s superior performance on most economic indicators. Since 1979, the Communist Party has avoided catastrophic errors. It has capitalized on domestic economic potential and a favorable international environment. Now, in the 2020s, both of these factors are changing for the worse. China’s “miracle” phase of growth has expired, as it did for other East Asian states before it. The maturation of the economy and slowdown of potential GDP have forced the Communist Party to shift the base of its political legitimacy to something other than rapid income growth: namely, quality of life and nationalist foreign policy. An aggressive foreign policy works against quality of life by provoking protectionism from foreign powers, particularly the United States, which is capable of leading a coalition of states to pressure China. The Communist Party’s policy trajectory is unlikely to change much through the twentieth national party congress in 2022. After that, a major course correction to improve relations with the West is conceivable, though we would not bet on it. Between 2021 and China’s 2035 and 2049 milestones, the Communist Party must navigate between rising socioeconomic pressures at home and rising geopolitical pressures abroad. An economic or political breakdown at home, or a total breakdown in relations with the US, could lead to proxy wars in China’s periphery, including but not limited to the Taiwan Strait. For now, global investors should favor the euro and US dollar over the renminbi (Chart 13). Chart 13Prefer The Dollar And Euro To The Renminbi Prefer The Dollar And Euro To The Renminbi Prefer The Dollar And Euro To The Renminbi Mainland investors should favor government bonds relative to stocks. Chinese stocks hit a major peak earlier this year and the government’s seizure of control over the tech sector is taking a toll. Investors should prefer developed market equities relative to Chinese equities until China’s current phase of policy tightening ends and there is at least a temporary improvement in relations with the United States. But investors should also prefer Chinese and Hong Kong stocks relative to Taiwanese due to the high risk of a diplomatic crisis and the tail risk of a war. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 The report concluded, “the emerging trends suggest a likely break from Deng's position toward heavier state intervention in the economy, more contentious relationships with neighbors, and a Party that rules primarily through ideology and social control.” Co-written with Jennifer Richmond, "China and the End of the Deng Dynasty," Stratfor, April 19, 2011, worldview.stratfor.com. 2 The Xi administration’s new concept of “dual circulation” entails that state policy will encourage the domestic economy whereas the international economy will play a secondary role. This is a reversal of the outward and trade-oriented economic model under Deng Xiaoping. See “Xi: China’s economy has potential to maintain long-term stable development,” November 4, 2020, news.cgtn.com. 3 See Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "China’s Seventh-Generation Leadership Emerges onto the Stage," Jamestown Foundation, China Brief 19:7, April 9, 2019, Jamestown.org.

Dear Client, Next week, in lieu of our regular weekly report, I will be hosting two webcasts where I will discuss the outlook for China’s economy and financial markets, a year into policy normalization. The webcasts will be held on Tuesday, June 22 at 10:00 am EDT (English), and Thursday, June 24 at 9:00 am HKT (Mandarin). We will return to our regular publishing schedule on Wednesday, June 30. Best regards, Jing Sima, China Strategist   Feature China’s onshore stocks rebounded in the past two months on the back of a rapidly appreciating RMB versus the US dollar and accelerating foreign capital inflows (Chart 1). However, in our view, China’s domestic policy backdrop and economic fundamentals do not support a sustained rally in Chinese stocks in the next six months. The RMB’s rise vis-à-vis the US dollar will likely falter in the second half of the year as China’s growth weakens. A narrowing in real yields later this year between China’s government bonds and US Treasuries will also discourage foreign flows into Chinese assets. Performance of Chinese cyclical stocks versus defensives failed to decisively breakout in both the onshore and offshore equity markets. An underperformance in cyclical stocks relative to defensives has historically pointed to waning market sentiment towards the Chinese economy (Chart 2). Chart 1Rapid Appreciation In The RMB Buoyed A Recent Rebound In A-Shares Rapid Appreciation In The RMB Buoyed A Recent Rebound In A-Shares Rapid Appreciation In The RMB Buoyed A Recent Rebound In A-Shares Chart 2Cyclical Stocks Continued To Underperform Defensives Cyclical Stocks Continued To Underperform Defensives Cyclical Stocks Continued To Underperform Defensives The number of onshore stocks with prices rising versus falling remains low, even though there has been a slight improvement this year from Q4 2020. The narrow breath in the equity market implies that recent rebound in A-share stocks has been largely driven by a handful of companies (Chart 3). Such narrow breadth suggests that the rebound in Chinese stock prices will not sustain (Chart 4). Chart 3A Narrow-Based Market Rally in A-Shares A Narrow-Based Market Rally in A-Shares A Narrow-Based Market Rally in A-Shares Chart 4Narrowing Market Breadth Has Historically Led To Price Pullbacks Narrowing Market Breadth Has Historically Led To Price Pullbacks Narrowing Market Breadth Has Historically Led To Price Pullbacks A tightened monetary and credit environment has created obstacles for Chinese equities since early this year. Credit numbers released last week show that credit growth deceleration has gathered speed in May, raising the risk of policy overtightening, i.e. credit growth undershooting the government’s 2021 targets. We could see some moderation in the credit growth deceleration into 2H21. A delay in the rollout of local government (LG) bonds and LG special purpose bonds (SPBs) in the first five months of the year means the pace of LG bond issuance between June and October will escalate, which will help to stabilize credit growth. However, weak corporate bond net financing and contracting shadow banking will cap the upside in credit expansion. Chart 5The Economy Could Surprise The Market To The Downside In Q3 The Economy Could Surprise The Market To The Downside In Q3 The Economy Could Surprise The Market To The Downside In Q3 Additionally, if more LG bonds come onto the market in Q3, then we could see tighter interbank liquidity conditions and higher bond yields. This, in turn, would partially offset the positive effects on the economy and equity market from a slower pace in credit growth deceleration. For the next six months, we continue to hold an underweight position in Chinese onshore and investable stocks, in both absolute terms and within a global equity portfolio. Policy tightening has not reversed course and there is an escalating risk that economic data will surprise the market to the downside in Q3 (Chart 5). Qingyun Xu, CFA Associate Editor qingyunx@bcaresearch.com     Macro Policy Conditions Are Still Unfavorable For Risk Assets A further deterioration in the credit impulse in May reflects Chinese authorities’ efforts to reduce local government leverage and shadow banking activities. Net corporate bond financing contracted for the first time since early 2018, driven by shrinking local government financing vehicle (LGFV) bonds (Chart 6). Meanwhile, the pace of contraction in shadow-bank loans climbed. At this rate of deceleration, credit growth will undershoot the government’s 2021 target, which is expected to be in line with this year’s nominal GDP growth. The pace in credit expansion on a year-over-year basis has dropped to its previous cycle’s trough (Chart 7). Moreover, the speed of the deceleration in credit growth has outpaced the 2017/18 tightening cycle. It has been seven months since Chinese credit growth peaked (October 2020), which is significantly less than the 13 months it took for credit to decline from top to bottom in 2017/18. Chart 6Contraction In Net Corporate Bond Financing And Shadow Banking Dragged Down Credit Growth In May Contraction In Net Corporate Bond Financing And Shadow Banking Dragged Down Credit Growth In May Contraction In Net Corporate Bond Financing And Shadow Banking Dragged Down Credit Growth In May Chart 7Credit Growth Has Decelerated To Its Trough Reached In 2017/18 Tightening Cycle Credit Growth Has Decelerated To Its Trough Reached In 2017/18 Tightening Cycle Credit Growth Has Decelerated To Its Trough Reached In 2017/18 Tightening Cycle Chart 8Most Of LG Bonds Issued In The First Five Months Are Refinancing Bonds The Stars Are Not Yet Aligned For Chinese Stocks The Stars Are Not Yet Aligned For Chinese Stocks So far this year, LG bond issuance is also behind schedule. About 63% of LG bonds issued in the first five months are refinancing bonds (Chart 8). The new LG bonds and LG SPBs issued to date account for only 21% and 16.5%, respectively, of their 2021 quotas. A delay in LG bond issuance in the first five months means that much more bonds will be on the market between June and October, which may help to stabilize credit growth in Q3. However, weak corporate bond financing and an acceleration in contracting shadow banking activities will cap the upside on broad credit. We do not expect a reversal in policy tightening. Instead, credit growth will likely hover near current levels for the rest of the year. In the past, Chinese policymakers eased when the global manufacturing backdrop faltered. Given that global growth is robust, Chinese policymakers will not feel any urgency to reverse policy setting and will likely use the strong external environment as an opportunity for domestic deleveraging. Chinese Exports Will Face Challenges In The Second Half Of The Year Chart 9A Broad-Based Moderation In China's Exports to DMs A Broad-Based Moderation In China's Exports to DMs A Broad-Based Moderation In China's Exports to DMs Export growth slowed in May with a broad-based moderation in the country’s exports to developed markets (DMs), albeit from a very elevated level (Chart 9). The easing in exports reflects an ongoing demand shift in the DMs away from goods to services as economic activity normalizes (Chart 10). China’s robust exports, which have been driven by strong and partly pandemic-induced global demand for goods, will likely gradually lose strength in the second half of the year. China’s weakening new export orders component in the May manufacturing PMI reflects this trend (Chart 11). Chart 10Global Consumption Recovery In Services Will Likely Outpace Goods Global Consumption Recovery In Services Will Likely Outpace Goods Global Consumption Recovery In Services Will Likely Outpace Goods Chart 11China's Softening New Export Orders Signal Further Export-Sector Weakness China's Softening New Export Orders Signal Further Export-Sector Weakness China's Softening New Export Orders Signal Further Export-Sector Weakness An appreciating RMB versus the US dollar is also a headwind for Chinese exports. The USD/CNY historically has led Chinese new export orders by around six months, with the exception of the pandemic-hit outlier in 2020 (Chart 12).  The recent sharp RMB appreciation is starting to weight on Chinese exports. Moreover, BCA’s Geopolitical strategists do not expect that China will principally benefit from US President Biden’s $2.4 trillion infrastructure and green energy plan . US explicitly aims to diminish China’s role as a supplier of US goods and materials. The widening divergence between US’s trade deficit with China and the rest of world already shows evidence (Chart 13). Chart 12The RMB's Rapid Rise Creates Headwinds For Chinese Exports The RMB's Rapid Rise Creates Headwinds For Chinese Exports The RMB's Rapid Rise Creates Headwinds For Chinese Exports Chart 13China's Exports May Not Benefit From Biden's Infrastructure Plan China's Exports May Not Benefit From Biden's Infrastructure Plan China's Exports May Not Benefit From Biden's Infrastructure Plan Still No Inflation Pass-Through Chart 14Chinese Producers Are Unable To Pass Rising Input Costs On To Consumers Chinese Producers Are Unable To Pass Rising Input Costs On To Consumers Chinese Producers Are Unable To Pass Rising Input Costs On To Consumers Chinese surging producer prices overstate domestic inflationary pressures. Inflation in the Producer Price Index (PPI) surged by 9.0% year-over-year in May, jumping to its highest level since 2009. High PPI inflation reflects rising commodity prices and a low base effect. Meanwhile, inflationary pressures are much more muted for consumer goods and services. The gap between producer and consumer prices widened to the highest level since 1990, highlighting the absence of price inflation pass-through from producers to consumers (Chart 14). We expect soaring PPI inflation to be transitory; it will ease when low-base factors from last year and global supply constraints are removed later this year. CPI inflation will remain tame through the year. As such, Chinese authorities are unlikely to tighten monetary policy in response to high PPI readings. Instead, Beijing will continue to use regulatory measures to curb speculation in the commodity market and window-guide industries to readjust material inventories to help ease the pace of rising commodity prices. Historically, PPI inflation’s impact on consumer prices has been weak when prices on producer goods were pushed up by supply shocks rather than mounting domestic demand. The sharp uptick in the PPI during the 2017/18 cycle was mostly due to China’s supply-side reforms and a rapid consolidation in the upstream industries. Global supply constraints linked to the pandemic have also resulted in a sharp upturn in the Chinese PPI since mid-2020. Moreover, Chart 15 shows that the pass-through from PPI inflation to consumers is closely correlated to household income growth. The pass-through has weakened significantly since 2011 when household income growth subdued along with a declining Chinese working population (Chart 16). Chart 15Subdued Household Income Growth Since 2011 Has Suppressed CPI Inflation Subdued Household Income Growth Since 2011 Has Suppressed CPI Inflation Subdued Household Income Growth Since 2011 Has Suppressed CPI Inflation Chart 16Income Growth Decelerated After China's Working Population Peaked Income Growth Decelerated After China's Working Population Peaked Income Growth Decelerated After China's Working Population Peaked Chart 17Profits Diverged Between Upstream And Mid & Downstream Industries The Stars Are Not Yet Aligned For Chinese Stocks The Stars Are Not Yet Aligned For Chinese Stocks Lacking inflation pass-through from producers to consumers has led to a bifurcated profit recovery between upstream and mid & downstream industries. Since late last year, the share of upstream industries in total profits increased sharply at the expense of mid and downstream businesses (Chart 17). A deterioration in the profits of mid and downstream industries will weigh on the outlook for their capex, which in turn, will reduce the demand for upstream goods.     Domestic Demand Remains China’s Weakest Link Investments and household demand remain the weakest links in China’s economy. Sluggish household consumption reflects a fragile post-pandemic recovery in manufacturing and services employment, and a rising propensity for precautionary savings (Chart 18). A PBoC survey shows that households’ preference for more saving deposits soared in 2020 (Chart 19). Although it has slightly diminished since late 2020, the reading is still much higher than its pre-pandemic level and will likely persist to year-end on the back of a subdued outlook for employment and income. Chart 18Weak Employment In Both Manufacturing And Service Industries Weak Employment In Both Manufacturing And Service Industries Weak Employment In Both Manufacturing And Service Industries Chart 19Propensity For Precautionary Savings Is Still Elevated Propensity For Precautionary Savings Is Still Elevated Propensity For Precautionary Savings Is Still Elevated Manufacturing investment continued its rebound in April, but the growth has not rallied to its pre-pandemic state and the recovery was more than offset by falling old-economy infrastructure and real estate investment growth (Chart 20). Although a pickup in LG SPB issuance in Q3 will provide some support to infrastructure expenditures, the effect on aggregate infrastructure investment probably will be muted. China’s Ministry of Finance has raised the requirements for approvals of new investment projects, which have decreased notably since early this year (Chart 21). Hence, growth in infrastructure investment may not significantly improve in 2H21 without a harmonized policy impetus for more bank loans and loosened regulations on local government spending. Chart 20Recovery In Manufacturing Investment Was More Than Offset By Falling Infrastructure And Real Estate Investment Growth Recovery In Manufacturing Investment Was More Than Offset By Falling Infrastructure And Real Estate Investment Growth Recovery In Manufacturing Investment Was More Than Offset By Falling Infrastructure And Real Estate Investment Growth Chart 21Falling New Projects Approval Falling New Projects Approval Falling New Projects Approval Real Estate Sector: Mounting Deleverage Pressure Property developers face challenges from heightened government scrutiny on bank loans and limits on the sector’s leverage ratio, along with curtailed off-balance sheet funding due to Asset Management Regulation (AMR) . Bank loans to real estate developers and household mortgages have tumbled to historical lows and will likely slow further in the next few months (Chart 22, top panel). The tightened financing policies have started to cool demand in the real estate market (Chart 22, bottom panel). Softer housing demand will start to drag down property developers’ capital spending and real estate construction activities (Chart 23). Chart 22Deteriorating Financing Starting To Cool The Property Market Deteriorating Financing Starting To Cool The Property Market Deteriorating Financing Starting To Cool The Property Market Chart 23Real Estate Investments And Construction Activities May Slow Further Real Estate Investments And Construction Activities May Slow Further Real Estate Investments And Construction Activities May Slow Further   Table 1China Macro Data Summary The Stars Are Not Yet Aligned For Chinese Stocks The Stars Are Not Yet Aligned For Chinese Stocks Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary The Stars Are Not Yet Aligned For Chinese Stocks The Stars Are Not Yet Aligned For Chinese Stocks   Footnotes Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Geopolitical risk is trickling back into financial markets. China’s fiscal-and-credit impulse collapsed again. The Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index is ticking back up after the sharp drop from 2020. All of our proprietary GeoRisk Indicators are elevated or rising. Geopolitical risk often rises during bull markets – the Geopolitical Risk Index can even spike without triggering a bear market or recession. Nevertheless a rise in geopolitical risk is positive for the US dollar, which happens to stand at a critical technical point. The macroeconomic backdrop for the dollar is becoming less bearish given China’s impending slowdown. President Biden’s trip to Europe and summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin will underscore a foreign policy of forming a democratic alliance to confront Russia and China, confirming the secular trend of rising geopolitical risk. Shift to a defensive tactical position. Feature Back in March 2017 we wrote a report, “Donald Trump Is Who We Thought He Was,” in which we reaffirmed our 2016 view that President Trump would succeed in steering the US in the direction of fiscal largesse and trade protectionism. Now it is time for us to do the same with President Biden. Our forecast for Biden rested on the same points: the US would pursue fiscal profligacy and mercantilist trade policy. The recognition of a consistent national policy despite extreme partisan divisions is a testament to the usefulness of macro analysis and the geopolitical method. Trump stole the Democrats’ thunder with his anti-austerity and anti-free trade message. Biden stole it back. It was the median voter in the Rust Belt who was calling the shots all along (after all, Biden would still have won the election without Arizona and Georgia). We did make some qualifications, of course. Biden would maintain a hawkish line on China and Russia but he would reject Trump’s aggressive foreign and trade policy when it came to US allies.1 Biden would restore President Obama’s policy on Iran and immigration but not Russia, where there would be no “diplomatic reset.” And Biden’s fiscal profligacy, unlike Trump’s, would come with tax hikes on corporations and the wealthy … even though they would fall far short of offsetting the new spending. This is what brings us to this week’s report: New developments are confirming this view of the Biden administration. Geopolitical Risk And Bull Markets Chart 1Global Geopolitical Risk And The Dollar Global Geopolitical Risk And The Dollar Global Geopolitical Risk And The Dollar In recent weeks Biden has adopted a hawkish policy on China, lowered tensions with Europe, and sought to restore President Obama’s policy of détente with Iran. The jury is still out on relations with Russia – Biden will meet with Putin on June 16 – but we do not expect a 2009-style “reset” that increases engagement. Still, it is too soon to declare a “Biden doctrine” of foreign policy because Biden has not yet faced a major foreign crisis. A major test is coming soon. Biden’s decision to double down on hawkish policy toward China will bring ramifications. His possible deal with Iran faces a range of enemies, including within Iran. His reduction in tensions with Russia is not settled yet. While the specific source and timing of his first major foreign policy crisis is impossible predict, structural tensions are rebuilding. An aggregate of our 13 market-based GeoRisk indicators suggests that global political risk is skyrocketing once again. A sharp spike in the indicator, which is happening now, usually correlates with a dollar rally (Chart 1). This indicator is mean-reverting since it measures the deviation of emerging market currencies, or developed market equity markets, from underlying macroeconomic fundamentals. The implication is positive for the dollar, although the correlation is not always positive. Looking at both the DXY’s level and its rate of change shows periods when the global risk indicator fell yet the dollar stayed strong – and vice versa. The big increase in the indicator over the past week stems mostly from Germany, South Korea, Brazil, and Australia, though all 13 of the indicators are now either elevated or rising, including the China/Taiwan indicators. Some of the increase is due to base effects. As global exports recover, currencies and equities that we monitor are staying weaker than one would expect. This causes the relevant BCA GeoRisk indicator to rise. Base effects from the weak economy in June 2020 will fall out in coming weeks. But the aggregate shows that all of the indicators are either high or rising and, on a country by country level, they are now in established uptrends even aside from base effects. Chart 2Global Policy Uncertainty Revives Global Policy Uncertainty Revives Global Policy Uncertainty Revives Meanwhile the global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index is recovering across the world after the drop in uncertainty following the COVID-19 crisis (Chart 2). Policy uncertainty is also linked to the dollar and this indicator shows that it is rising on a secular basis. The Geopolitical Risk Index, maintained by Matteo Iacoviello and a group of academics affiliated with the Policy Uncertainty Index, is also in a secular uptrend, although cyclically it has not recovered from the post-COVID drop-off. It is sensitive to traditional, war-linked geopolitical risk as reported in newspapers. By contrast our proprietary indicators are sensitive to market perceptions of any kind of risk, not just political, both domestic and international. A comparison of the Geopolitical Risk Index with the S&P 500 over the past century shows that a geopolitical crisis may occur at the beginning of a business cycle but it may not be linked with a recession or bear market. Risk can rise, even extravagantly, during economic expansions without causing major pullbacks. But a crisis event certainly can trigger a recession or bear market, particularly if it is tied to the global oil supply, as in the early 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s (Chart 3). Chart 3Secular Rise In Geopolitical Risk Soon To Reassert Itself Secular Rise In Geopolitical Risk Soon To Reassert Itself Secular Rise In Geopolitical Risk Soon To Reassert Itself While geopolitical risk is normally positive for the dollar, the macroeconomic backdrop is negative. The dollar’s attempt to recover earlier this year faltered. This underlying cyclical bearish dollar trend is due to global economic recovery – which will continue – and extravagant American monetary expansion and budget deficits. This is why we have preferred gold – it is a hedge against both geopolitical risk and inflation expectations. Tactically this year we have refrained from betting against the dollar except when building up some safe-haven positions like Japanese yen. Over the medium and long term we expect geopolitical risk to put a floor under the greenback. The bottom line is that the US dollar is at a critical technical crossroads where it could break out or break down. Macro factors suggest a breakdown but the recovery of global policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk suggests the opposite. We remain neutral. A final quantitative indicator of the recovery of geopolitical risk is the performance of global aerospace and defense stocks (Chart 4). Defense shares are rising in absolute and relative terms. Chart 4Another Sign Of Geopolitical Risk: Defense Stocks Outperform As Virus Ebbs And Military Spending Surges Another Sign Of Geopolitical Risk: Defense Stocks Outperform As Virus Ebbs And Military Spending Surges Another Sign Of Geopolitical Risk: Defense Stocks Outperform As Virus Ebbs And Military Spending Surges Can The WWII Peace Be Prolonged? Qualitative assessments of geopolitical risk are necessary to explain why risk is on a secular upswing – why drops in the quantitative indicators are temporary and the troughs keep getting higher. Great nations are returning to aggressive competition after a period of relative peace and prosperity. Over the past two decades Russia and China took advantage of America’s preoccupations with the Middle East, the financial crisis, and domestic partisanship in order to build up their global influence. The result is a world in which authority is contested. The current crisis is not merely about the end of the post-Cold War international order. It is much scarier than that. It is about the decay of the post-WWII international order and the return of the centuries-long struggle for global supremacy among Great Powers. The US and European political establishments fear the collapse of the WWII settlement in the face of eroding legitimacy at home and rising challenges from abroad. The 1945 peace settlement gave rise to both a Cold War and a diplomatic system, including the United Nations Security Council, for resolving differences among the great powers. It also gave rise to European integration and various institutions of American “liberal hegemony.” It is this system of managing great power struggle, and not the post-Cold War system of American domination, that lies in danger of unraveling. This is evident from the following points: American preeminence only lasted fifteen years, or at best until the 2008 Georgia war and global financial crisis. The US has been an incoherent wild card for at least 13 years now, almost as long as it was said to be the global empire. Russian antagonism with the West never really ended. In retrospect the 1990s were a hiatus rather than a conclusion of this conflict. China’s geopolitical rise has thawed the frozen conflicts in Asia from the 1940s-50s – i.e. the Chinese civil war, the Hong Kong and Taiwan Strait predicaments, the Korean conflict, Japanese pacifism, and regional battles for political influence and territory. Europe’s inward focus and difficulty projecting power have been a constant, as has its tendency to act as a constraint on America. Only now is Europe getting closer to full independence (which helped trigger Brexit). Geopolitical pressures will remain historically elevated for the foreseeable future because the underlying problem is whether great power struggle can be contained and major wars can be prevented. Specifically the question is whether the US can accommodate China’s rise – and whether China can continue to channel its domestic ambitions into productive uses (i.e. not attempts to create a Greater Chinese and then East Asian empire). The Great Recession killed off the “East Asia miracle” phase of China’s growth. Potential GDP is declining, which undermines social stability and threatens the Communist Party’s legitimacy. The renminbi is on a downtrend that began with the Xi Jinping era. The sharp rally during the COVID crisis is over, as both domestic and international pressures are rising again (Chart 5). Chart 5Biden Administration Review Of China Policy: More China Bashing Biden Administration Review Of China Policy: More China Bashing Biden Administration Review Of China Policy: More China Bashing While the data for China’s domestic labor protests is limited in extent, we can use it as a proxy for domestic instability in lieu of official statistics that were tellingly discontinued back in 2005. The slowdown in credit growth and the cyclical sectors of the economy suggest that domestic political risk is underrated in the lead up to the 2022 leadership rotation (Chart 6). Chart 6China's Domestic Political Risk Will Rise China's Domestic Political Risk Will Rise China's Domestic Political Risk Will Rise Chart 7Steer Clear Of Taiwan Strait Steer Clear Of Taiwan Strait Steer Clear Of Taiwan Strait The increasing focus on China’s access to key industrial and technological inputs, the tensions over the Taiwan Strait, and the formation of a Russo-Chinese bloc that is excluded from the West all suggest that the risk to global stability is grave and historic. It is reminiscent of the global power struggles of the seventeenth through early twentieth centuries. The outperformance of Taiwanese equities from 2019-20 reflects strong global demand for advanced semiconductors but the global response to this geopolitical bottleneck is to boost production at home and replace Taiwan. Therefore Taiwan’s comparative advantage will erode even as geopolitical risk rises (Chart 7). The drop in geopolitical tensions during COVID-19 is over, as highlighted above. With the US, EU, and other countries launching probes into whether the virus emerged from a laboratory leak in China – contrary to what their publics were told last year – it is likely that a period of national recriminations has begun. There is a substantial risk of nationalism, xenophobia, and jingoism emerging along with new sources of instability. An Alliance Of Democracies The Biden administration’s attempt to restore liberal hegemony across the world requires a period of alliance refurbishment with the Europeans. That is the purpose of his current trip to the UK, Belgium, and Switzerland. But diplomacy only goes so far. The structural factor that has changed is the willingness of the West to utilize government in the economic sphere, i.e. fiscal proactivity. Infrastructure spending and industrial policy, at the service of national security as well as demand-side stimulus, are the order of the day. This revolution in economic policy – a return to Big Government in the West – poses a threat to the authoritarian powers, which have benefited in recent decades by using central strategic planning to take advantage of the West’s democratic and laissez-faire governance. If the West restores a degree of central government – and central coordination via NATO and other institutions – then Beijing and Moscow will face greater pressure on their economies and fewer strategic options. About 16 American allies fall short of the 2% of GDP target for annual defense spending – ranging from Italy to Canada to Germany to Japan. However, recent trends show that defense spending did indeed increase during the Trump administration (Chart 8). Chart 8NATO Boosts Defense Spending Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was The European Union as a whole has added $50 billion to the annual total over the past five years. A discernible rise in defense spending is taking place even in Germany (Chart 9). The same point could be made for Japan, which is significantly boosting defense spending (as a share of output) after decades of saying it would do so without following through. A major reason for the American political establishment’s rejection of President Trump was the risk he posed to the trans-Atlantic alliance. A decline in NATO and US-EU ties would dramatically undermine European security and ultimately American security. Hence Biden is adopting the Trump administration’s hawkish approach to trade with China but winding down the trade war with Europe (Chart 10). Chart 9Europe Spending More On Guns Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Chart 10US Ends Trade War With Europe? Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was A multilateral deal aimed at setting a floor in global corporate taxes rates is intended to prevent the US and Europe from undercutting each other – and to ensure governments have sufficient funding to maintain social spending and reduce income inequality (Chart 11). Inequality is seen as having vitiated sociopolitical stability and trust in government in the democracies. Chart 11‘Global’ Corporate Tax Deal Shows Return Of Big Government, Attempt To Reduce Inequality In The West Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Risks To Biden’s Diplomacy It is possible that Biden’s attempt to restore US alliances will go nowhere over the course of his four-year term in office. The Europeans may well remain risk averse despite their initial signals of willingness to work with Biden to tackle China’s and Russia’s challenges to the western system. The Germans flatly rejected both Biden and Trump on the Nord Stream II natural gas pipeline linkage with Russia, which is virtually complete and which strengthens the foundation of Russo-German engagement (more on this below). The US’s lack of international reliability – given the potential of another partisan reversal in four years – makes it very hard for countries to make any sacrifices on behalf of US initiatives. The US’s profound domestic divisions have only slightly abated since the crises of 2020 and could easily flare up again. A major outbreak of domestic instability could distract Biden from the foreign policy game.2 However, American incapacity is a risk, not our base case, over the coming years. We expect the US economic stimulus to stabilize the country enough that the internal political crisis will be contained and the US will continue to play a global role. The “Civil War Lite” has mostly concluded, excepting one or two aftershocks, and the US is entering into a “Reconstruction Lite” era. The implication is negative for China and Russia, as they will now have to confront an America that, if not wholly unified, is at least recovering. Congress’s impending passage of the Innovation and Competition Act – notably through regular legislative order and bipartisan compromise – is case in point. The Senate has already passed this approximately $250 billion smorgasbord of industrial policy, supply chain resilience, and alliance refurbishment. It will allot around $50 billion to the domestic semiconductor industry almost immediately as well as $17 billion to DARPA, $81 billion for federal research and development through the National Science Foundation, which includes $29 billion for education in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, and other initiatives (Table 1). Table 1Peak Polarization: US Congress Passes Bipartisan ‘Innovation And Competition Act’ To Counter China Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was With the combination of foreign competition, the political establishment’s need to distract from domestic divisions, and the benefit of debt monetization courtesy of the Federal Reserve, the US is likely to achieve some notable successes in pushing back against China and Russia. On the diplomatic front, the US will meet with some success because the European and Asian allies do not wish to see the US embrace nationalism and isolationism. They have their own interests in deterring Russia and China. Lack Of Engagement With Russia Russian leadership has dealt with the country’s structural weaknesses by adopting aggressive foreign policy. At some point either the weaknesses or the foreign policy will create a crisis that will undermine the current regime – after all, Russia has greatly lagged the West in economic development and quality of life (Chart 12). But President Putin has been successful at improving the country’s wealth and status from its miserably low base in the 1990s and this has preserved sociopolitical stability so far. Chart 12Russia's Domestic Political Risk Russia's Domestic Political Risk Russia's Domestic Political Risk It is debatable whether US policy toward Russia ever really changed under President Trump, but there has certainly not been a change in strategy from Russia. Thus investors should expect US-Russia antagonism to continue after Biden’s summit with Putin even if there is an ostensible improvement. The fundamental purpose of Putin’s strategy has been to salvage the Russian empire after the Soviet collapse, ensure that all world powers recognize Russia’s veto power over major global policies and initiatives, and establish a strong strategic position for the coming decades as Russia’s demographic decline takes its toll. A key component of the strategy has been to increase economic self-sufficiency and reduce exposure to US sanctions. Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2014, Putin has rapidly increased Russia’s foreign exchange reserves so as to buffer against shocks (Chart 13). Chart 13Russia Fortified Against US Sanctions Russia Fortified Against US Sanctions Russia Fortified Against US Sanctions Putin has also reduced Russia’s reliance on the US dollar to about 22% (Chart 14), primarily by substituting the euro and gold. Russia will not be willing or able to purge US dollars from its system entirely but it has been able to limit America’s ability to hurt Russia by constricting access to dollars and the dollar-based global financial architecture. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov highlighted this process ahead of the Biden-Putin summit by declaring that the National Wealth Fund will divest of its remaining $40 billion of its US dollar holdings. Chart 14Russia Diversifies From USD Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was In general this year, Russia is highlighting its various advantages: its resilience against US sanctions, its ability to re-invade Ukraine, its ability to escalate its military presence in Belarus and the Black Sea, and its ability to conduct or condone cyberattacks on vital American food and fuel supplies (Chart 15). Meanwhile the US is suffering from deep political divisions at home and strategic incoherence abroad and these are only starting to be mended by domestic economic stimulus and alliance refurbishment. Chart 15Cyber Security Stocks Recover Cyber Security Stocks Recover Cyber Security Stocks Recover Europe’s risk-aversion when it comes to strategic confrontation with Russia, and the lack of stability in US-Russia relations, means that investors should not chase Russian currency or financial assets amid the cyclical commodity rally. Investors should also expect risk premiums to remain high in developing European economies relative to their developed counterparts. This is true despite the fact that developed market Europe’s outperformance relative to emerging Europe recently peaked and rolled over. From a technical perspective this outperformance looks to subside but geopolitical tensions can easily escalate in the near term, particularly in advance of the Russian and German elections in September (Chart 16). Chart 16Developed Markets In Europe Will Outperform Emerging Europe Unless Russian Geopolitical Risk Abates Developed Markets In Europe Will Outperform Emerging Europe Unless Russian Geopolitical Risk Abates Developed Markets In Europe Will Outperform Emerging Europe Unless Russian Geopolitical Risk Abates Developed Europe trades in line with EUR-RUB and these pair trades all correspond closely to geopolitical tensions with Russia (Chart 17). A notable exception is the UK, whose stock market looks attractive relative to eastern Europe and is much more secure from any geopolitical crisis in this region (Chart 17, bottom panel). The pound is particularly attractive against the Czech koruna, as Russo-Czech tensions have heated up in advance of October’s legislative election there (Chart 18). Chart 17Long UK Versus Eastern Europe Long UK Versus Eastern Europe Long UK Versus Eastern Europe Chart 18Long GBP Versus CZK Long GBP Versus CZK Long GBP Versus CZK Meanwhile Russia and China have grown closer together out of strategic necessity. Germany’s Election And Stance Toward Russia Germany’s position on Russia is now critical. The decision to complete the Nord Stream II pipeline against American wishes either means that the Biden administration can be safely ignored – since it prizes multilateralism and alliances above all things and is therefore toothless when opposed – or it means that German will aim to compensate the Americans in some other area of strategic concern. Washington is clearly attempting to rally the Germans to its side with regard to putting pressure on China over its trade practices and human rights. This could be the avenue for the US and Germany to tighten their bond despite the new milestone in German-Russia relations. The US may call on Germany to stand up for eastern Europe against Russian aggression but on that front Berlin will continue to disappoint. It has no desire to be drawn into a new Cold War given that the last one resulted in the partition of Germany. The implication is negative for China on one hand and eastern Europe on the other. Germany’s federal election on September 26 will be important because it will determine who will succeed Chancellor Angela Merkel, both in Germany and on the European and global stage. The ruling Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is hoping to ride Merkel’s coattails to another term in charge of the government. But they are likely to rule alongside the Greens, who have surged in opinion polls in recent years. The state election in Saxony-Anhalt over the weekend saw the CDU win 37% of the popular vote, better than any recent result, while Germany’s second major party, the Social Democrats, continued their decline (Table 2). The far-right Alternative for Germany won 21% of the vote, a downshift from 2016, while the Greens won 6% of the vote, a slight improvement from 2016. All parties underperformed opinion polling except the CDU (Chart 19). Table 2Saxony-Anhalt Election Results Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Chart 19Germany: Conservatives Outperform In Final State Election Before Federal Vote, But Face Challenges Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Chart 20Germany: Greens Will Outperform in 2021 Vote Germany: Greens Will Outperform in 2021 Vote Germany: Greens Will Outperform in 2021 Vote The implication is still not excellent for the CDU. Saxony-Anhalt is a middling German state, a CDU stronghold, and a state with a popular CDU leader. So it is not representative of the national campaign ahead of September. The latest nationwide opinion polling puts the CDU at around 25% support. They are neck-and-neck with the Greens. The country’s left- and right-leaning ideological blocs are also evenly balanced in opinion polls (Chart 20). A potential concern for the CDU is that the Free Democratic Party is ticking up in national polls, which gives them the potential to steal conservative votes. Betting markets are manifestly underrating the chance that Annalena Baerbock and the Greens take over the chancellorship (Charts 21A and 21B). We still give a subjective 35% chance that the Greens will lead the next German government without the CDU, a 30% that the Greens will lead with the CDU, and a 25% chance that the CDU retains power but forms a coalition with the Greens. A coalition government would moderate the Greens’ ambitious agenda of raising taxes on carbon emissions, wealth, the financial sector, and Big Tech. The CDU has already shifted in a pro-environmental, fiscally proactive direction. Chart 21AGerman Greens Will Recover Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Chart 21BGerman Greens Still Underrated Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was No matter what the German election will support fiscal spending and European solidarity, which is positive for the euro and regional equities over the next 12 to 24 months. However, the Greens would pursue a more confrontational stance toward Russia, a petro-state whose special relations with the German establishment have impeded the transition to carbon neutrality. Latin America’s Troubles A final aspect of Biden’s agenda deserves some attention: immigration and the Mexican border. Obviously this one of the areas where Biden starkly differs from Trump, unlike on Europe and China, as mentioned above. Vice President Kamala Harris recently came back from a trip to Guatemala and Mexico that received negative media attention. Harris has been put in charge of managing the border crisis, the surge in immigrant arrivals over 2020-21, both to give her some foreign policy experience and to manage the public outcry. Despite telling immigrants explicitly “Do not come,” Harris has no power to deter the influx at a time when the US economy is fired up on historic economic stimulus and the Democratic Party has cut back on all manner of border and immigration enforcement. From a macro perspective the real story is the collapse of political and geopolitical risk in Mexico. From 2016-20 Mexico faced a protectionist onslaught from the Trump administration and then a left-wing supermajority in Congress. But these structural risks have dissipated with the USMCA trade deal and the inability of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador to follow through with anti-market reforms, as we highlighted in reports in October and April. The midterm election deprived the ruling MORENA party of its single-party majority in the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of the legislature (Chart 22). AMLO is now politically constrained – he will not be able to revive state control over the energy and power sectors. Chart 22Mexican Midterm Election Constrained Left-Wing Populism, Political Risk Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Chart 23Buy Mexico (And Canada) On US Stimulus Buy Mexico (And Canada) On US Stimulus Buy Mexico (And Canada) On US Stimulus American monetary and fiscal stimulus, and the supply-chain shift away from China, also provide tailwinds for Mexico. In short, the Mexican election adds the final piece to one of our key themes stemming from the Biden administration, US populism, and US-China tensions: favor Mexico and Canada (Chart 23). A further implication is that Mexico should outperform Brazil in the equity space. Brazil is closely linked to China’s credit cycle and metals prices, which are slated to turn down as a result of Chinese policy tightening. Mexico is linked to the US economy and oil prices (Chart 24). While our trade stopped out at -5% last week we still favor the underlying view. Brazilian political risk and unsustainable debt dynamics will continue to weigh on the currency and equities until political change is cemented in the 2022 election and the new government is then forced by financial market riots into undertaking structural reforms. Chart 24Brazil's Troubles Not Truly Over - Mexico Will Outperform Brazil's Troubles Not Truly Over - Mexico Will Outperform Brazil's Troubles Not Truly Over - Mexico Will Outperform Elsewhere in Latin America, the rise of a militant left-wing populist to the presidency in a contested election in Peru, and the ongoing social unrest in Colombia and Chile, are less significant than the abrupt slowdown in China’s credit growth (Charts 25A and 25B). According to our COVID-19 Social Stability Index, investors should favor Mexico. Turkey, the Philippines, South Africa, Colombia, and Brazil are the most likely to see substantial social instability according to this ranking system (Table 3). Chart 25AMexico To Outperform Latin America Mexico To Outperform Latin America Mexico To Outperform Latin America Chart 25BChina’s Slowdown Will Hit South America China's Slowdown Will Hit South America China's Slowdown Will Hit South America Table 3Post-COVID Emerging Market Social Unrest Only Just Beginning Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Investment Takeaways Close long emerging markets relative to developed markets for a loss of 6.8% – this is a strategic trade that we will revisit but it faces challenges in the near term due to China’s slowdown (Chart 26). Go long Mexican equities relative to emerging markets on a strategic time frame. Our long Mexico / short Brazil trade hit the stop loss at 5% but the technical profile and investment thesis are still sound over the short and medium term. Chart 26China Slowdown, Geopolitical Risk Will Weigh On Emerging Markets China Slowdown, Geopolitical Risk Will Weigh On Emerging Markets China Slowdown, Geopolitical Risk Will Weigh On Emerging Markets Chart 27Relative Uncertainty And Safe Havens Relative Uncertainty And Safe Havens Relative Uncertainty And Safe Havens China’s sharp fiscal-and-credit slowdown suggests that investors should reduce risk exposure, take a defensive tactical positioning, and wait for China’s policy tightening to be priced before buying risky assets. Our geopolitical method suggests the dollar will rise, while macro fundamentals are becoming less dollar-bearish due to China. We are neutral for now and will reassess for our third quarter forecast later this month. If US policy uncertainty falls relative to global uncertainty then the EUR-USD will also fall and safe-haven assets like Swiss bonds will gain a bid (Chart 27). Gold is an excellent haven amid medium-term geopolitical and inflation risks but we recommend closing our long silver trade for a gain of 4.5%. Disfavor emerging Europe relative to developed Europe, where heavy discounts can persist due to geopolitical risk premiums. We will reassess after the Russian Duma election in September. Go long GBP-CZK. Close the Euro “laggards” trade. Go long an equal-weighted basket of euros and US dollars relative to the Chinese renminbi. Short the TWD-USD on a strategic basis. Prefer South Korea to Taiwan – while the semiconductor splurge favors Taiwan, investors should diversify away from the island that lies at the epicenter of global geopolitical risk. Close long defense relative to cyber stocks for a gain of 9.8%. This was a geopolitical “back to work” trade but the cyber rebound is now significant enough to warrant closing this trade.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Trump’s policy toward Russia is an excellent example of geopolitical constraints. Despite any personal preferences in favor of closer ties with Russia, Trump and his administration ultimately reaffirmed Article 5 of NATO, authorized the sale of lethal weapons to Ukraine, and deployed US troops to Poland and the Czech Republic. 2 As just one example, given the controversial and contested US election of 2020, it is possible that a major terrorist attack could occur. Neither wing of America’s ideological fringes has a monopoly on fanaticism and violence. Meanwhile foreign powers stand to benefit from US civil strife. A truly disruptive sequence of events in the US in the coming years could lead to greater political instability in the US and a period in which global powers would be able to do what they want without having to deal with Biden’s attempt to regroup with Europe and restore some semblance of a global police force. The US would fall behind in foreign affairs, leaving power vacuums in various regions that would see new sources of political and geopolitical risk crop up. Then the US would struggle to catch up, with another set of destabilizing consequences.

Highlights In the near term, the RMB against the US dollar has ceased to be a one-way bet. Market sentiment will re-focus on economic fundamentals, which are less supportive of further RMB appreciation.  In the longer term, the RMB still has some upside potential, but the pace of its growth should be much slower than in the past 12 months. The sharp rise in the trade-weighted RMB index is starting to threaten China’s export sector and has exacerbated the tightening of domestic monetary conditions. Barring a monetary policy reset by Chinese authorities, even a small increase in the broad-RMB index would heighten the risk of a contraction in corporate profit growth in the coming 12 months. We remain risk adverse to Chinese stocks for the next 6 months. Feature Chart 1The RMB Back On A Fast Ascending Path The RMB Back On A Fast Ascending Path The RMB Back On A Fast Ascending Path After a brief pause in March, China’s currency versus the US dollar extended its steep upward trend began in mid-2020 (Chart 1). Chinese policymakers recently ramped up their strong-worded statements warning against speculating on the RMB. Regulators have also taken steps to stem the rise. Questions we have recently been getting from our clients about the RMB can be summarized as follows: After a 10% appreciation since its trough a year ago, does the RMB have more upside in 2021 and beyond? If the RMB continues to appreciate, what would be the impact on China’s economy and corporate sector? What can the PBoC do to slow the pace of the currency’s appreciation? One could argue that the US dollar will continue to weaken, but we see substantial headwinds to the RMB within the year. A weaker US dollar would support global stock prices outside of the US and foreign inflows have driven the recent rally in China’s onshore stocks. However, we think China’s domestic macro policy and economic conditions pose more downside risks on a cyclical basis. How Far Can The RMB Go? A continued upswing in the CNY relative to the USD can no longer be taken for granted. In the coming months, there is a strengthening case for the RMB to fall against the greenback as factors supporting a strong RMB in the past year start to abate. Economic fundamentals will no longer prop up the RMB’s rise going into 2H21. China’s growth momentum is softening due to significant tightening in the monetary environment in the second half of last year and a rapid deceleration in credit growth this year (Chart 2). Meanwhile, the massive rollouts of COVID-19 vaccines in North America and Europe have successfully reduced new infections and hospitalization rates, allowing these countries to reopen their economies. The economic growth gaps between China and the developed markets (DMs) will narrow more significantly in the coming months (Chart 3). Chart 2Chinese Economic Fundamentals Will Start To Weaken Chinese Economic Fundamentals Will Start To Weaken Chinese Economic Fundamentals Will Start To Weaken Chart 3China's Growth Gap Relative To DMs Will Narrow China's Growth Gap Relative To DMs Will Narrow China's Growth Gap Relative To DMs Will Narrow Chart 4Global Consumption Recovery In Services Will Likely Outpace Goods Global Consumption Recovery In Services Will Likely Outpace Goods Global Consumption Recovery In Services Will Likely Outpace Goods China’s large current account surplus will likely start narrowing. It has been driven by strong global demand for goods, which is unlikely to be sustained as the pent-up demand for services in DMs will outpace the consumption for goods (Chart 4). Emerging countries (EMs), many of which are China’s export competitors, lag far behind DMs and China on inoculation rates and some have resurging COVID cases (Chart 5). However, EMs will likely benefit from meaningful expansions in global vaccine production in the second half of the year.1 A catchup in vaccinations in these countries will reduce China’s export-sector advantage, reversing the RMB’s gains over other Asian currencies in the past month. Chart 5China's Asian Neighbors Have Been Hit By Resurging COVID Cases China's Asian Neighbors Have Been Hit By Resurging COVID Cases China's Asian Neighbors Have Been Hit By Resurging COVID Cases The future trend of the USD also matters to the USD/CNY exchange rate. The recent strength of the CNY vis-à-vis the dollar was the mirror image of USD weakness, which has been due to low real rates in the US and recovering economic momentum outside the US (Chart 6). However, the broad dollar index is sitting at a critical technical level that could either breakout or breakdown (Chart 7). When the Fed announces the slowing of asset purchases, which our BCA US Bond Strategy expects before the end of 2021, it could lead to higher US real yields and reverse the trend of hot money flows into China. Chart 6The Sharp Rise In The RMB In The Past Two Months Has Been Dollar-Driven The Sharp Rise In The RMB In The Past Two Months Has Been Dollar-Driven The Sharp Rise In The RMB In The Past Two Months Has Been Dollar-Driven Chart 7The Dollar Index: Breakout or Breakdown? The Dollar Index: Breakout or Breakdown? The Dollar Index: Breakout or Breakdown? Furthermore, the financial market does not seem to have priced in unstable US-China relations, which could undermine global risk appetite (Chart 8). Recent actions by US President Joe Biden – from expanding the investment ban on 59 blacklisted Chinese tech companies to calling for the US intelligence community to investigate the origins of COVID-19 – point to risks for escalating tensions between the two nations. Longer term, the RMB is at about one standard deviation below its fair value, which suggests that it still has more upside potential (Chart 9). Based on our BCA’s Foreign Exchange Strategist’s real effective exchange rate (REER) model, the RMB’s fair value mostly climbed in the past three decades, driven by higher productivity in China relative to its trading partners. However, part of the RMB’s appreciation since mid-2020 has been a catch up to its pre-trade war value and its valuation gap has rapidly narrowed. From the current valuation levels, the pace of RMB appreciation should be much slower going forward. Chart 8Geopolitical Surprises Could Spook The Market Geopolitical Surprises Could Spook The Market Geopolitical Surprises Could Spook The Market Chart 9Valuation Gap Has Rapidly Narrowed Valuation Gap Has Rapidly Narrowed Valuation Gap Has Rapidly Narrowed We also expect China’s real interest rates relative to the US to dwindle in the next three to five years. Demographic headwinds in China herald lower real rates while the Fed is primed to start rate liftoffs within the next two years. Bottom Line: The RMB still has some upside potential in the long run, but the pace of its appreciation should be much slower than in the past 12 months. In the near term, odds are high that economic fundamentals will not boost the RMB any further.  How Does A Stronger RMB Affect China’s Economy? Historically, a stronger RMB relative to the dollar has not had a significant impact on China’s economy. However, if the CNY appreciates considerably versus the greenback so that it pushes up the trade-weighted RMB index, then China’s corporate profits will be negatively affected (Chart 10). Chart 10Strengthening Broad-RMB Index Has Historically Led To Weaker Corporate Profit Growth... Strengthening Broad-RMB Index Has Historically Led To Weaker Corporate Profit Growth... Strengthening Broad-RMB Index Has Historically Led To Weaker Corporate Profit Growth... Chart 11...And Could Significantly Raise Prob Of A Earnings Contraction In 12 Months ...And Could Significantly Raise Prob Of A Earnings Contraction In 12 Months ...And Could Significantly Raise Prob Of A Earnings Contraction In 12 Months Our earnings growth recession probability model confirms our view. If all else is equal, a 3% rise in the trade-weighted RMB index from its current level would more than double the probability of a contraction in earnings growth in the coming 12 months (Chart 11, Scenario 1). On the other hand, all else will not be equal if the broad RMB index goes up by 3%. A quick increase in the RMB’s value against the currencies of its trading partners will impede China’s export growth and tighten domestic monetary conditions. Chart 12Moving Into Restrictive Territory For Chinese Exports Moving Into Restrictive Territory For Chinese Exports Moving Into Restrictive Territory For Chinese Exports Chart 12 shows the impact on export growth from the speed of the RMB’s appreciation; we calculate the rise in an export-weighted RMB index relative to its highs and lows in the past few years. The metric implies that the acceleration in the RMB’s value has reached levels that should be restrictive for exports. The nominal export-weighted RMB index has been significantly above the median value since 2015 and it is approaching the peak reached in that year. Clearly, the strong RMB is linked to a recent weakness in the PMI surveys on export orders. A 3% increase in the trade-weighted RMB from the current level, coupled with a drop in export growth and further deceleration in credit impulse would prop up the earnings contraction probability to more than 50% (Scenario 2 in Chart 11 above). Bottom Line: Our metrics suggest that the RMB’s recent sharp rise is starting to threaten the export sector. An additional 3% appreciation in the broad RMB index would cause a meaningful increase in the probability of a corporate earnings growth contraction in the coming 12 months. What Can The PBoC Do To Halt The RMB Rally? We break this question into two parts: the willingness and the capability of the PBoC to intervene in the currency market.  On the first aspect, the PBoC in recent years has largely refrained from draconian intervention measures in the currency market. Allowing a more market-based currency exchange rate regime is a crucial part of China’s RMB internationalization process. The PBoC seems to be mostly sticking to this long-term goal. Chart 13New FX Regime Began In 2015 Has Significantly Lowered USD Weight In The Broad-RMB Index... New FX Regime Began In 2015 Has Significantly Lowered USD Weight In The Broad-RMB Index... New FX Regime Began In 2015 Has Significantly Lowered USD Weight In The Broad-RMB Index... Importantly, the new exchange rate regime that the PBoC switched to at end-2015 has greatly weakened the link between the USD and the broad RMB trend (Chart 13). Since then China has continuously cut the weighting of the USD in the CFETS currency index basket, which has reduced the impact of dollar moves on the index. Therefore, the PBoC has mostly ignored short-term volatilities in the CNY/USD exchange rate. The central bank tends to intervene only when swings in the CNY/USD exchange rate are large enough and/or the market forms a unilateral view on the Chinese currency to drive sustained movements in the broader RMB index.  For example, the RMB value rose at a much faster rate against the USD compared with its other trading partners in the second half of 2020. However, this year, the pace of growth in the broad RMB index has caught up with that of the CNY/USD appreciation. Moreover, even when the RMB depreciated against the USD in March, the CFETS index basket kept rising and is now breaching its previous peak in April 2018 (Chart 14). As discussed in the previous section, a sharp jump in the trade-weighted RMB would be more detrimental to China’s corporate profits than an increase in the CNY/USD. Chart 14...But The Massive Appreciation In The CNY/USD Of Late Has Pushed The RMB Index To A Three-Year High ...But The Massive Appreciation In The CNY/USD Of Late Has Pushed The RMB Index To A Three-Year High ...But The Massive Appreciation In The CNY/USD Of Late Has Pushed The RMB Index To A Three-Year High Chart 15The PBoC Has Been Trying To Guide Market Expectations Lower On The RMB The PBoC Has Been Trying To Guide Market Expectations Lower On The RMB The PBoC Has Been Trying To Guide Market Expectations Lower On The RMB On the second aspect, the PBoC is unlikely to alter its monetary policy trajectory to tame the RMB’s appreciation. A looser monetary environment would encourage more asset price bubbles domestically and jeopardize policymakers’ ongoing progress in financial and property-market de-risking. If the CFETS strengthens further, Chinese authorities will probably use tools such as managing market expectations and various capital controls to mop up excess FX liquidity generated from capital inflows. In the near term, the PBoC may set a weaker fixing rate against the dollar to dampen market expectations for more RMB growth (Chart 15). An increase in the FX deposit reserve requirement ratio (RRR) rate, announced by the PBoC last week, is another example of the central bank trying to prevent a one-sided expectation by market participants. However, the previous three FX deposit RRR hikes –all taken place more than a decade ago—did little to alter the path of the CNY exchange rate; the pace of USD/CNY depreciation actually accelerated following the May 2007 RRR hike.  The two-percentage point bump in the FX deposit RRR rate will drain China’s domestic FX liquidity by about US$20 billion. Its effect on domestic FX liquidity and FX loan rates is rather limited – FX inflows to Chinese financial institutions since 2H20 were more than US$20 billion a month –more than offsetting the tightening from a RRR rate hike.  The PBoC can further loosen outward capital controls to release some pressure on the RMB’s increase. In a report from November last year we wrote that Chinese policymakers attempted to slow the pace of appreciation in the RMB through a build-up in strategic FX assets by commercial banks and other financial institutions . Since August last year, China has relaxed outbound investment regulations and increased quotas to help channel domestic money into offshore financial markets. China’s commercial banks significantly ramped up their FX assets last year (Chart 16). In Q1 this year, commercial banks enriched their FX asset holdings by US$518.5 billion, a record high in the past five years.  Bottom Line: The PBoC is willing to allow more volatility in the USD/CNY exchange rate, but a sharp jump in the RMB’s value against a basket of other currencies would warrant further policy actions. Chart 16Chinese Banks Ramped Up FX Asset Holdings Chinese Banks Ramped Up FX Asset Holdings Chinese Banks Ramped Up FX Asset Holdings Chart 17Chinese Onshore Stocks Propped Up By Foreign Investors Chinese Onshore Stocks Propped Up By Foreign Investors Chinese Onshore Stocks Propped Up By Foreign Investors Investment Conclusions A tightened monetary and credit environment has created headwinds for Chinese equities since early this year. However, the domestic market appears to have found support at a key technical level of late (Chart 17). The recent rebound in China’s onshore stocks on the back of a sharp CNY appreciation and accelerated foreign capital inflows, in our view, are unsustainable on a cyclical basis. Despite buoyant global economic growth, investors should consider deteriorating cyclical conditions in China when judging the appropriate allocation for Chinese equities. While policy tightening has brought multiples closer to earth than last year, the upside in Chinese stock prices will be capped by subsiding stimulus and slower profit growth ahead. As such, a decisive breakout to the upside in Chinese stock prices will require major reflationary catalysts, and it is the reason we are still risk adverse on Chinese equities (Chart 18). Meanwhile, we continue to favor onshore consumer discretionary stocks relative to the broad A-share market. A strong RMB can be a booster to domestic discretionary spending. We initiated this trade in May last year and it has largely outperformed China’s onshore broad market (Chart 19). We will close the trade when the CNY loses its strength and Chinese domestic demand starts to falter. Chart 18Cyclical Performance In Chinese Stocks Is Still Driven By Economic Fundamentals Cyclical Performance In Chinese Stocks Is Still Driven By Economic Fundamentals Cyclical Performance In Chinese Stocks Is Still Driven By Economic Fundamentals Chart 19Keep A Long CD Position, But On A Short Leash Keep A Long CD Position, But On A Short Leash Keep A Long CD Position, But On A Short Leash   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1The UN estimates that as many as 15 billion vaccine doses could be produced by the second half of 2021, enough to inoculate most of the world’s population. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights The Seventh National Population Census highlights the seriousness of China’s demographic deterioration; apart from a shrinking working-age population, the nation’s fertility and birth rates have dropped meaningfully. China’s urbanization rate will likely slow in the second half of this decade. The country’s urban population growth is only slightly positive, while the rural population is declining and aging. Demand for housing will experience a structural downshift, particularly in less developed regions.  Competition for labor will become fiercer among regions and sectors, and wage growth will continue to accelerate. However, the manufacturing sector will remain competitive regardless of wage inflation, thanks to the rising quality of China’s labor force and innovation. Interest rates will structurally shift to a lower range, providing some tailwind to Chinese equities and government bonds. Feature The Seventh Population Census, conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics every 10 years, reinforced the magnitude of China’s demographic challenge. The nation’s population is not only aging but is set to start shrinking due to extremely low birth and fertility rates. The main implication is that China’s urbanization rate will slow and property market will likely encounter a structural downshift, tied to declining demand from both its working-age (age 15 to 64) and total population. Demand for housing will increasingly concentrate in top-tier cities because these metropolitan areas have more advantages attracting labor. Secondly, manufacturing will likely maintain its share of GDP, despite China’s push for consumption and growth in the service sector. Importantly, interest rates will continue to shift downward along with a decelerating potential growth; waning interest rates will create a tailwind to China’s capital market in the long term.  Highlights From The Census The Census showed three meaningful shifts in China’s demographics in the past decade:  1.  China is getting old before getting rich. China is experiencing a worse demographic transition than Japan in the early 1990s, with a lower level of per capita wealth than Japan attained when its working-age population peaked (Chart 1). Over the past ten years China’s population has only expanded by 5.4%, the lowest rate since the first census in 1953. Moreover, the country’s oldest cohort rose from 8.9% in 2010 to 13.5% and the working-age population is falling more quickly than in Japan. China’s working-age population peaked in 2010 and then fell by 6.79 percentage points in the next 10 years. In contrast, Japan’s working-age population peaked in 1992 and fell by 2.18 percentage points in the subsequent decade (Chart 1, top panel). 2.  China’s total population is set to start declining in five years. Some demographers project that China’s total population will peak in 2027,1 but a high-level Chinese official recently predicted that the country’s population will start to trend down as early as in 2025.2 The relaxation of the one-child policy in 2015 helped to lift the birthrate (births per 1,000 people) briefly in 2016, before falling sharply again in 2017. The population’s natural growth rate, calculated as birthrate minus deathrate, is rapidly approaching zero (Chart 2). Chart 1China's Working Population Falling Faster Than Japan's In 1990s China's Working Population Falling Faster Than Japan's In 1990s China's Working Population Falling Faster Than Japan's In 1990s Chart 2China's Population Growth Will Turn Negative In Mid-2020s China's Population Growth Will Turn Negative In Mid-2020s China's Population Growth Will Turn Negative In Mid-2020s The birthrate is the main determinant of the population’s natural growth rate given that China’s deathrate has been steady for decades.  If the birthrate continues to fall at the current rate, then China will undoubtedly reach a population turning point and will join nations such as Japan, Germany and South Korea, which have negative population growth.  3.  A low fertility trap. Chart 3China's Alarmingly Low Fertility Rate Is Set To Decline Even Further... China's Alarmingly Low Fertility Rate Is Set To Decline Even Further... China's Alarmingly Low Fertility Rate Is Set To Decline Even Further... China’s extremely low fertility rate3 is a major contributor to its falling birthrate.  The current 1.3 reading is less than in many developed countries, such as Japan with 1.4 and the US with 1.6, and it is far below the fertility rate of 2.1 needed to stabilize a population, according to the United Nations (Chart 3). China’s fertility rate is set to dive even further in the coming years due to structural factors such as a dwindling number of childbearing-age women linked to the one-child policy implemented in the 1980s (Chart 4). China’s high female labor participation rate and low propensity among young people to get married, and the high cost of raising children in urban areas, all are long-standing socio-economic issues hindering the Chinese from having more babies (Chart 5). Chart 4…Due To Fewer Childbearing-Age Women And… China’s Shifting Demographic Profile China’s Shifting Demographic Profile Chart 5...Structural Issues That Curb Chinese Propensity To Produce Babies ...Structural Issues That Curb Chinese Propensity To Produce Babies ...Structural Issues That Curb Chinese Propensity To Produce Babies Bottom Line: These structural trends will take decades to reverse. China faces a dramatic plunge in its population in the very near future if the authorities do not enact significant and immediate policy changes.   Urbanization Pace Will Slow The Census indicates that rapid urbanization continued through 2020, with the rate hitting 64% of the population, up 14 percentage points from 2010. However, the headline number in the urbanization rate understates China’s progress in industrialization, i.e. the country’s rural-to-urban transition has entered a late stage and the current pace cannot be sustained in the future. Significantly, China’s underlying demographic shifts will likely lead to a passive increase in the urbanization rate in the second half of this decade. This trend will curb rather than boost demand in urban areas.  The experience of developed countries suggests that the pace of urbanization begins to slow when the rate reaches around 70% (Chart 6). Based on China’s current level, the country should reach the 70% threshold in just six to seven years. Meanwhile, China is much more industrialized than generally perceived: the country’s industrialization rate is currently 85%, which means that 85% of jobs in China are in non-agricultural sectors (Chart 7). Chart 6Urbanization Progress Stabilizes When Reaching 70% Urbanization Progress Stabilizes When Reaching 70% Urbanization Progress Stabilizes When Reaching 70% Chart 7China Is Much More Industrialized Than Commonly Believed China Is Much More Industrialized Than Commonly Believed China Is Much More Industrialized Than Commonly Believed Furthermore, a higher urbanization reading may be the result of negative natural population growth. Given that the urbanization rate is calculated as a percentage of urban population in the total population, a decline in the absolute level of total population (the denominator) could lead to a passive increase in the numerator. Chart 8Japan Has Had A "Passive" Increase In Urbanization Since 2012 Japan Has Had A "Passive" Increase In Urbanization Since 2012 Japan Has Had A "Passive" Increase In Urbanization Since 2012 For example, Japan’s urbanization rate rose significantly during the 2000s, and maintained an upward momentum even as its total population peaked in 2010. However, its urban population growth rate dropped dramatically and turned negative in 2012 – suggesting the increase in the urbanization rate is due to a shrinking total population instead of expanding urbanities (Chart 8). The rising deathrate of the rural elderly population is another important reason for the accelerated increase in Japan's urbanization rate. China’s urban population growth is on a sharp down trend, although it is still slightly positive (Chart 9). However, the rural population has shrunk and aged, which limits future migration from rural to urban areas (Chart 10).  China’s rural population has shrunk by almost half from its peak in 1995 to 2020. The share of the rural population 50 years and older doubled in the same period. Chart 9China's Urban Population Growth Is On The Decline... China's Urban Population Growth Is On The Decline... China's Urban Population Growth Is On The Decline... Chart 10...While Rural Population Has Shrunk And Aged ...While Rural Population Has Shrunk And Aged ...While Rural Population Has Shrunk And Aged Thus, China’s rural-to-urban migration has slowed in the past decade (the trend turned negative last year due to the pandemic). The number of new migrant workers moving from the country to the city tumbled from 12.5 million a year to 2.5 million, and the number of younger migrants (50 years and younger) has contracted since 2017 (Chart 11). Chart 11The Number Of Young Migrant Workers Started Contracting In 2017 The Number Of Young Migrant Workers Started Contracting In 2017 The Number Of Young Migrant Workers Started Contracting In 2017 Bottom Line: Country-to-city migration will be smaller going forward based on a diminishing rural population, an increasing number of elders and a reduced proportion of young people in rural areas. When China’s population peaks, which is highly likely by 2025, its urbanization progress will turn passive and the aggregate population growth in urban areas may also turn negative. Aggregate Housing Demand Will Dwindle The demographic shifts described above will impact the demand for properties and accentuate regional divergences in housing demand and prices.   Historically, changes in the working-age population led residential home sales by five to six years. Home sales have fluctuated in a downward trend in the past five years along with a peak in the working-age population in 2015 (Chart 12). Moreover, the sharp deterioration in China’s birthrate means that home sales will be significantly reduced in the next 15-20 years. Chart 12Aggregate Demand For Housing Will Dwindle Along With Smaller Labor Force Aggregate Demand For Housing Will Dwindle Along With Smaller Labor Force Aggregate Demand For Housing Will Dwindle Along With Smaller Labor Force Chart 13Population Is An Important Driver For Urban Development Population Is An Important Driver For Urban Development Population Is An Important Driver For Urban Development The regional divergence in the demand for housing will also widen. Population, especially the labor force, is an important driver for urban development and housing (Chart 13 above). Population migration mainly occurs among 15-59-year-olds, and this cohort is also the main homeowner group. As China’s labor force increasingly flocks to developed areas, the economic development of less developed areas will face greater challenges (Chart 14). Those areas will encounter a combination of declining birthrate and outflow of labor force. This demographic shift is already evident in many two- and third-tier cities where housing prices have lagged far behind the tier-one cities (Chart 15). Chart 14Less Developed Regions Have Seen Net Population Losses In The Past Decade… China’s Shifting Demographic Profile China’s Shifting Demographic Profile Chart 15...And Softening Housing Prices ...And Softening Housing Prices ...And Softening Housing Prices Bottom Line: The drop in China’s birthrate and working-age population will lead to less demand for housing. However, China’s first-tier cities (and core metropolitan areas) will likely continue to outperform third- and fourth-tier cities in terms of labor growth, consumption and home prices. Labor Measures And Manufacturing Competitiveness Labor shortages in selected sectors and upward pressure on wages will likely intensify in the coming decade. While labor quantity will decrease, the quality of China’s labor force will remain competitive. From an aggregate economy perspective, improving labor productivity and automation can help to offset the smaller number of workers (Chart 16). Following two decades of rapid expansion in the industrial sector, China’s labor shortages began to multiply when the country’s urbanization ratio rose to between 50% and 60%. Looking at Japan and Korea, for example, a shortage in manufacturing labor emerged when the countries’ manufacturing/agricultural employment ratio climbed above one. China’s employment ratio likely have crossed this threshold in the mid-2010s, coinciding with a rollover in its working-age population and a massive jump in wage growth (Chart 17). Chart 16Improving Labor Quality To Offset Smaller Labor Quantity China’s Shifting Demographic Profile China’s Shifting Demographic Profile Chart 17Manufacturing Labor Shortage And Wage Pressure Intensified In Mid-2010s Manufacturing Labor Shortage And Wage Pressure Intensified In Mid-2010s Manufacturing Labor Shortage And Wage Pressure Intensified In Mid-2010s The manufacturing and service sectors will continue to compete with agriculture for labor. The wage gap between urban and rural areas is disappearing and there are signs of labor market tightness in urban settings (Chart 18).  While the demand for labor has been flat, labor supply peaked in 2013/14 and has been on the wane since that time, which has resulted in an ascending demand-to-supply ratio in China’s urban labor market (Chart 19). Chart 18Wage Gap Between Urban And Rural Areas Is Disappearing Wage Gap Between Urban And Rural Areas Is Disappearing Wage Gap Between Urban And Rural Areas Is Disappearing Chart 19Urban Labor Supply Can't Keep Up With Demand Urban Labor Supply Can't Keep Up With Demand Urban Labor Supply Can't Keep Up With Demand The bright side is that China’s labor shortage and escalating wages have not eroded the competitiveness of its manufacturing sector. Impressive labor productivity gains and progressively improving labor quality have trumped higher input costs (Chart 20). Consistent with improved productivity, China’s share of global trade continues to build regardless of higher wages, a stronger currency, and import tariffs from the US (Chart 21). The manufacturing sector has gradually climbed the value-added chain in recent years and mounting wage pressures will likely push the corporate sector, particularly in more developed coastal regions, to move further away from a labor-intensive model. Chart 20Rising Wages But Stable Unit Labor Costs Rising Wages But Stable Unit Labor Costs Rising Wages But Stable Unit Labor Costs Chart 21Chinese Exporters Have Maintained Their Global Market Share Despite Higher Costs Chinese Exporters Have Maintained Their Global Market Share Despite Higher Costs Chinese Exporters Have Maintained Their Global Market Share Despite Higher Costs The 14th Five-Year Plan outlined policymakers’ decision to maintain the share of manufacturing in GDP, which is around 30%. Labor productivity in the manufacturing sector is notably higher than in the service sector. In an environment of shrinking labor, keeping workers in a high-productivity sector may be a better way to stabilize potential growth. Bottom Line: The competition for labor between sectors will intensify. Meanwhile, manufacturing’s share of China’s economy will likely be sustained in this decade, which will help to mitigate the speed of the deceleration in China’s growth.  Implications On Policy Setting Chart 22AInterest Rates Drop With Aging Population Interest Rates Drop With Aging Population Interest Rates Drop With Aging Population The combination of a weak fertility/birthrate and a decline in the working-age population will weigh on consumption and investment growth, bringing deflationary headwinds to the economy. China’s interest rate regime will likely follow its Asian neighbors to downshift structurally (Chart 22). Despite moderating potential economic growth, a low interest rate environment may be positive for China’s financial asset prices.  Chart 22BInterest Rates Drop With Aging Population Interest Rates Drop With Aging Population Interest Rates Drop With Aging Population Chart 22CInterest Rates Drop With Aging Population Interest Rates Drop With Aging Population Interest Rates Drop With Aging Population Chart 23Support Ratios Are Declining Globally Support Ratios Are Declining Globally Support Ratios Are Declining Globally One could argue that a falling support ratio – measured by the number of workers relative to consumers – can lead to inflation (Chart 23). This could happen to the US where baby boomers retire but continue to spend particularly on healthcare, while production falls along with the available workers. As production falls in relation to consumption, inflation could rise. However, this is not the case in China where both production and consumption will fall. Demand from an aging population may increase pockets of inflationary pressures, such as healthcare and elderly care, but it is unlikely to fully offset weakening demand from a declining working-age population and total population. In other words, both the numerator (workers) and denominator (consumers) will be falling in China. While a weakening demographic profile is negative for economic growth, lower prices on capital will make corporate debt-servicing cheaper. Further industrial consolidation aimed at supply-side reforms will also improve corporate profitability. Cheaper capital, improving productivity and efficiency could provide tailwinds to Chinese stocks and government bonds in the long run.   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1As of 2020, China’s total population is at 1411.78 million. 2"China faces an economic crisis as a population peak nears," South China Morning Post, April 18, 2021. 3The total fertility rate is based on the number of newborns by women in child-bearing years, which is ages 15-44 or 15-49 by international statistical standards.  Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Feature Chinese stocks remain in limbo despite robust economic data in April and early May (Chart 1).  Onshore equities are pricing in policy tightening risks and a peak in the domestic economic cycle. Meanwhile, a regulatory clampdown on the tech sector continues to curb global investors’ enthusiasm towards Chinese investable stocks.  The PBoC has not changed its course of policy normalization. The falling 3-month SHIBOR since March likely reflects softening demand for interbank liquidity rather than monetary easing (Chart 2). Chart 1Stay Underweight Chinese Stocks Stay Underweight Chinese Stocks Stay Underweight Chinese Stocks Chart 2No Easing In Monetary Policy No Easing In Monetary Policy No Easing In Monetary Policy Fiscal policy has also been consolidating with a renewed focus on reducing local government debt load and financial risks. A delay in local government bond issuance in Q1 could potentially boost bond sales in the second half of the year. However, as we noted late last month, without a synchronized policy push for more bank loans and loosened regulations on provincial government spending, an increase in special-purpose bond issuance alone will not make a significant difference in infrastructure investment nor economic growth. We still expect China's economy, which lags the credit cycle by six to nine months, to start weakening by mid-2021 (Chart 3A & 3B). Chart 3ADomestic Economic Growth Set To Slow Domestic Economic Growth Set To Slow Domestic Economic Growth Set To Slow Chart 3BPolicy Tightening Will Weigh On Earnings Growth In 2H21 Policy Tightening Will Weigh On Earnings Growth In 2H21 Policy Tightening Will Weigh On Earnings Growth In 2H21   Qingyun Xu, CFA Associate Editor qingyunx@bcaresearch.com   Our BCA Li Keqiang Leading Indicator continues to fall despite a marginal improvement in the Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) component. The deceleration in both money supply and credit growth has more than offset a small uptick in the MCI (Chart 4). Furthermore, a rising RMB in trade-weighted and real terms will not help the profit outlook for China’s exporters (Chart 5). Overall, monetary conditions remain unfavorable for risk assets. This is consistent with the poor performance of Chinese stocks Chart 4Falling Credit And Money Growth More Than Offset A Minor Improvement In The MCI Falling Credit And Money Growth More Than Offset A Minor Improvement In The MCI Falling Credit And Money Growth More Than Offset A Minor Improvement In The MCI Chart 5Strengthening RMB Will Not Help The Profit Outlook For Chinese Exporters Strengthening RMB Will Not Help The Profit Outlook For Chinese Exporters Strengthening RMB Will Not Help The Profit Outlook For Chinese Exporters   A sharp jump in state-owned enterprise (SOE) defaults since late last year is due to deteriorating corporate balance sheets. The defaults have exposed the weakened fiscal positions of local governments (Chart 6 & 7). SOE bond defaults have surpassed the number of private bond defaults this year. The more restrictive policy on local government financing, together with an acceleration in SOE defaults, will weigh on spending by local governments, local government financing vehicles (LGFVs) and SOEs.  Chart 6Returns On SOE Assets Remain In Deep Contraction Returns On SOE Assets Remain In Deep Contraction Returns On SOE Assets Remain In Deep Contraction Chart 7SOE Bond Defaults Have Surpassed Private Bond Defaults China Macro And Market Review China Macro And Market Review The Politburo meeting on April 30 established new guidelines to reduce local government leverage, both on- and off-balance sheet debt. According to the new rules, local governments are strictly prohibited from obtaining “hidden debts” for new investment projects directly or through their affiliated SOEs, which include LGFVs. The directives also state that the assets of LGFVs with defaulted loans should be restructured or liquidated if companies are unable to repay their debts. In addition, financial institutions should not accept government guarantees when making decisions on lending to LGFVs or government related entities.  Moreover, stricter measures in the property market have further dampened local governments’ fiscal situations since land sales account for 53% of local government fiscal revenues. Growth in government expenditures decelerated in recent months along with slowing land auctions (Chart 8). Scaled down fiscal supports will lead to subdued infrastructure investment growth this year (Chart 9). Chart 8Fiscal Stance Has Tightened Fiscal Stance Has Tightened Fiscal Stance Has Tightened Chart 9Subdued Growth In Infrastructure Investments Subdued Growth In Infrastructure Investments Subdued Growth In Infrastructure Investments   In addition to policy tightening in the domestic economy, Chinese offshore stocks continue to face regulatory headwinds to root out monopolies in technology, media, and telecom (TMT) companies. The antitrust investigations and fines extending from Alibaba and Tencent to Meituan highlight China’s aim to curb platform oligopolies and monopolies. Meanwhile, Chinese tech firms listed on US exchanges are facing another regulatory threat on their accounting reporting standards, which could potentially result in their delisting from the US bourses.  Moreover, elevated valuations and a weakening in the earnings outlook will generate more downside risks for TMT stocks (Chart 10). Given that TMT stocks account for around 50% of the MSCI China Index’s market capitalization, Chinese investable stocks are disproportionally vulnerable to a selloff in TMT stocks (Chart 11). Chart 10ATMT Stocks: From Tailwind To Headwind TMT Stocks: From Tailwind To Headwind TMT Stocks: From Tailwind To Headwind Chart 10BTMT Stocks: From Tailwind To Headwind TMT Stocks: From Tailwind To Headwind TMT Stocks: From Tailwind To Headwind Chart 11MSCI China Is Highly Concentrated In TMT Stocks MSCI China Is Highly Concentrated In TMT Stocks MSCI China Is Highly Concentrated In TMT Stocks   China’s official PMI and the Caixin China PMI moved in opposite directions in April due to the nature of the two surveys. The Caixin PMI covers smaller, more export-oriented businesses while the NBS Manufacturing PMI includes larger, more domestically exposed companies. The divergence highlights that the domestic economy is losing speed while external demand remains robust (Chart 12). Given the dominance of domestic demand in China’s economy (investment expenditures, household spending and government spending), strong external demand will not fully offset the deceleration in domestic growth.  New orders and production subcomponents in the official PMI moderated in April from March, which indicates a slowing momentum in economic activity (Chart 13). Moreover, construction PMI fell to 57.4 from 62.3 in March, corresponding with weaker infrastructure spending and more policy tightening in the real estate sector (Chart 13, bottom panel). Chart 12Conflicting Messages From The NBS And Caixin PMIs Conflicting Messages From The NBS And Caixin PMIs Conflicting Messages From The NBS And Caixin PMIs Chart 13Slowing Momentum In China's Economic Activity Slowing Momentum In China's Economic Activity Slowing Momentum In China's Economic Activity   The moderating momentum in China’s economy is also reflected in April’s trade data, which showed a strengthening external sector and a slowing domestic demand. A few observations support our view: First, strong imports since early this year were partly due to robust re-exports. Solid external demand boosted processing imports, which in turn contributed to China’s overall import growth (Chart 14). Secondly, Chinese imports of commodities in volume, such as copper and steel products, have plunged recently. Chinese domestic demand for commodities will likely peak in the coming months, therefore, inventory destocking pressures and weakness in underlying consumption will threaten commodities prices (Chart 15). Finally, the strengthening of coal imports in volume terms may be related to China’s increasingly stringent environmental policies. A temporary cutback in domestic coal supply boosted the demand for imports. However, in the long run, China’s push for green energy will be bearish for Chinese coal imports (Chart 16). Chart 14Solid External Demand Boosted Processing Imports Solid External Demand Boosted Processing Imports Solid External Demand Boosted Processing Imports Chart 15Demand Of Commodities May Be Approaching A Cyclical Peak Demand Of Commodities May Be Approaching A Cyclical Peak Demand Of Commodities May Be Approaching A Cyclical Peak Chart 16China's Coal Imports Likely To Decline In The Long Run China's Coal Imports Likely To Decline In The Long Run China's Coal Imports Likely To Decline In The Long Run   Housing prices in tier-one cities continue to post major gains despite a slew of tightening regulations in the property sector introduced since the second half of last year (Chart 17). The Politburo meeting last month reiterated authorities’ concerns over a bubble in housing. We expect authorities to impose additional regulations to constrain both financing supply and demand in the property sector. In the meantime, the existing policies have successfully started to cool the real estate market.  Chart 17Skyrocketing Housing Prices In First-Tier Cities Skyrocketing Housing Prices In First-Tier Cities Skyrocketing Housing Prices In First-Tier Cities Chart 18Real Estate And Mortgage Loans Tumbled Under More Restrictive Borrowing Regulations Real Estate And Mortgage Loans Tumbled Under More Restrictive Borrowing Regulations Real Estate And Mortgage Loans Tumbled Under More Restrictive Borrowing Regulations Both mortgage loans and loans to real estate developers tumbled under more restrictive borrowing policies (Chart 18). Growth in home sales has also started to roll over (Chart 19). Housing completed has dropped significantly, which confirms that construction activity is decelerating. Looking forward, the reduced expansion rate of new projects due to shrinking land transfers and stricter borrowing regulations will further dampen construction activities in the second half of this year (Chart 20).   Chart 19Home Sales Growth Started To Ease Home Sales Growth Started To Ease Home Sales Growth Started To Ease Chart 20Real Estate Investments Are Set To Slow Further Real Estate Investments Are Set To Slow Further Real Estate Investments Are Set To Slow Further Table 1China Macro Data Summary China Macro And Market Review China Macro And Market Review Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary China Macro And Market Review China Macro And Market Review ​​​​​​​   Footnotes Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Non-US stocks have greatly underperformed US equities over the last decade, but a leadership change might be underway. As such, equity flows could be an important factor in dictating currency trends over a cyclical horizon. The narrative in favor of non-US stocks includes a recovery in profits, cheap valuations, and a secular theme that will favor capital spending in traditionally “heavy” industries. Non-US growth should also overtake the US beyond 2021, when most of the global population is vaccinated. Cyclical currencies have historically tracked the relative performance of their respective bourses. This implies a lower dollar. Higher bond yields also present a formidable headwind for the outperformance of US stocks, relative to other markets. An outperformance of non-US bourses will be particularly favorable for the AUD, NOK, SEK, and GBP. The yen will likely play catchup towards the middle of the cycle. Feature Currencies respond to broad inflows, including into bonds, equities or foreign direct investment. For most of 2020, the dominant currency flows were from fixed income investors. As most short rates are now anchored near zero, the story is morphing towards the potential winners from a recovery, especially in the equity market sphere. Non-US stocks tend to outperform the US when the dollar is falling. That said, the causality-effect link is not so clear-cut, as we penned in our Special Report last year.1 Admittedly, a lower dollar boosts the common-currency returns for US-based investors, leading to more capital deployment in offshore markets. Meanwhile, commodities tend to do well when the dollar declines, benefiting emerging market and commodity-producing countries. Financing costs for non-US corporations borrowing in dollars are also eased. Historically, profit growth has been the ultimate driver of stock prices and profitability is more contingent on productivity gains than translation effects. This suggests the starting point for gauging relative equity flows, and the potential impact on currencies, is to evaluate which countries/economies could be primed for outperformance. Relative Growth As A Starting Point One of the key drivers of relative earnings growth between two countries is relative economic performance. Chart I-1 shows that earnings-per-share in the G10 relative to the US tended to improve when growth was shifting in favor of the rest of the world. This, in turn, has been a key driver of relative equity performance. Chart I-1Relative Profits And Relative Growth Relative Profits And Relative Growth Relative Profits And Relative Growth What is remarkable is that this relationship has been pretty consistent across countries, including those that have huge exposures to the global economy such as Sweden, Norway, or even the United Kingdom. In general, relative economic performance has driven relative EPS growth (Chart I-2A & 2B). The reason is that these bourses still have a sizeable dependence on the domestic economy. Chart I-3 shows that for even the most export-driven economies, exposure to domestic sales is still at least 20%. Australia, a commodity country has almost 60% of sales from domestic sources. Our bias is that non-US growth will start to outperform towards the backend of this year. This will pressure the dollar lower (Chart I-4). This conviction rests on three critical pillars: Chart I-2AA Cross Country Look At Relative Profits Growth A Cross Country Look At Relative Profits Growth A Cross Country Look At Relative Profits Growth Chart I-2BA Cross Country Look At Relative Profits Growth A Cross Country Look At Relative Profits Growth A Cross Country Look At Relative Profits Growth   Chart I-3Domestic Sales Matter A Lot For Global Equity Bourses Trading Currencies Using Equity Signals Trading Currencies Using Equity Signals Chart I-4The Dollar Trends With ##br##Relative Growth The Dollar Trends With Relative Growth The Dollar Trends With Relative Growth   The rest of the world will catch up in vaccination campaigns relative to the US. This is almost a fait accompli. Canada is well behind in terms of vaccination progress compared to the US or the UK (Chart I-5). But in Quebec, where BCA is headquartered, Premier François Legault has suggested that everyone who wants a vaccine will be able to get their first dose by June 24. Relative employment growth in Canada is already picking up, and the central bank has already begun tapering asset purchases ahead of the Fed. The broader message is that the service sector has been held hostage by relatively closed economies outside the US. This will change as economies open up.   Producer prices (PPI) are picking up globally and the US is leading the pack. This will also rotate in favor of other economies. Producer prices first took off in the US as the sectors that benefited from the pandemic were those related to technology and healthcare. Norway also gained from the rebound in oil prices. Other countries should begin to catch up, as demand for goods and services broadens beyond the pandemic-related scope (Chart I-6). From a longer-term perspective, PPI usually peaks and troughs in the US ahead of other economies. Again, as we exit a recession, consumption tends to broaden from defensive goods towards more discretionary spending. Given that other economies are bigger producers of these discretionary items, this should start to shift relative pricing power towards these countries (Chart I-7). Non-US growth has been held hostage to cascading crises since the US housing market bust. In 2010, we had the euro area debt crisis. In 2011, the Fukushima disaster knocked down Japanese growth. In 2015, tight monetary policy in China led to a global manufacturing recession. In short, rest-of-world growth has not been able to catch breath for a decade. Chart I-5Many Countries Will Replicate The US and UK Vaccination Success Many Countries Will Replicate The US and UK Vaccination Success Many Countries Will Replicate The US and UK Vaccination Success Chart I-6Global PPIs Are ##br##Picking Up Global PPIs Are Picking Up Global PPIs Are Picking Up   Chart I-7US PPI Usually Leads Other Countries US PPI Usually Leads Other Countries US PPI Usually Leads Other Countries The silver lining is that the COVID-19 crisis has ushered in coordinated global monetary and fiscal stimulus. For the first time in a long while, non-US growth can start to outperform, according to IMF estimates (Chart I-8). Chart I-8The IMF Expects Non-US Growth To Outperform The IMF Expects Non-US Growth To Outperform The IMF Expects Non-US Growth To Outperform Flows tend to gravitate to capital markets with the highest expected returns, and this is certainly the case when US versus non-US stocks are concerned. If we accept the premise that relative growth matters for equity allocations, then it also makes sense that relative equity performance will coincide with currency performance, due to portfolio flows. Across the G10 economies, getting the equity call right has usually been synonymous with having the appropriate currency strategy (Chart I-9). This is especially the case since equity flows have been supportive of the dollar (Chart I-10). Chart I-9ACurrencies And Equities Move Together Currencies And Equities Move Together Currencies And Equities Move Together Chart I-9BCurrencies And Equities Move Together Currencies And Equities Move Together Currencies And Equities Move Together Chart I-10Equity Flows Have Been Supportive Of The Dollar Equity Flows Have Been Supportive Of The Dollar Equity Flows Have Been Supportive Of The Dollar A More Quantitative Approach While relative growth is important, it is not the sole factor in determining which countries or sectors will outperform. Most investors have at least two other powerful tools that have stood the test of time in making equity allocations. These include the valuation starting point, and the historical return on capital. Valuation is the easiest place to start. Over time, non-US bourses have tended to outperform the US when the relative valuation starting point was attractive. This has been especially true around recessions, when leadership changes tend to occur. Chart I-11A, 11B, 11C, and 11D show that countries such as Japan, Mexico, and Germany should sport more attractive returns over the next decade compared to the US. The list is not comprehensive, but our previous work suggests this valuation tool works across many countries and various geographies. Chart I-11AValuation Matters For Long-Term Returns Valuation Matters For Long-Term Returns Valuation Matters For Long-Term Returns Chart I-11BValuation Matters For Long-Term Returns Valuation Matters For Long-Term Returns Valuation Matters For Long-Term Returns Chart I-11CValuation Matters For Long-Term Returns Valuation Matters For Long-Term Returns Valuation Matters For Long-Term Returns Chart I-11DValuation Matters For Long-Term Returns Valuation Matters For Long-Term Returns Valuation Matters For Long-Term Returns Trading Currencies Using Equity Signals Trading Currencies Using Equity Signals   Not surprisingly, the currencies that are the most undervalued in our models also have cheap equity markets. These include the Scandinavian currencies, commodity plays, the Japanese yen, and the pound. A rerating of these markets will be synonymous with a rerating in their currencies (Chart I-12). The rise in global bond yields will also prove to be a formidable headwind for US stocks. Technology constitutes 28% of the US equity market, the largest allocation within the G10. Together with defensive sectors such as health care and consumer staples, this ratio rises to 60%. As a result, the relative performance of the US equity market has been inversely correlated to bond yields (Chart I-13). Should bond yields continue to gravitate higher over the next few years, this will lead to a powerful rotation towards more cyclical bourses. The rise in yields will be particularly favorable for deep value sectors like banks (due to rising net interest margins) and commodities (due to inflation protection). Chart I-12The Dollar Remains ##br##Expensive Trading Currencies Using Equity Signals Trading Currencies Using Equity Signals Chart I-13US Outperformance Has Dovetailed With Lower Bond Yields US Outperformance Has Dovetailed With Lower Bond Yields US Outperformance Has Dovetailed With Lower Bond Yields Going forward, expected return on capital will be more difficult to gauge, but countries that have a history of providing superior shareholder returns are a good place to start. For example, we know that the winners of the last decade have had the largest returns on equity, as was the case for the winners during the prior decade. Given the mammoth task of performing this exercise on a cross-country basis, and across factors, we enlisted the help of our colleagues who run BCA’s Equity Analyzer platform. The EA platform provides a BCA score of 0 to 100 for all developed market stocks, according to their ranking on 30 carefully selected and curated factors. Crunching the numbers revealed a few interesting results: A long strategy based on selecting the top decile stocks according to their EA score outperformed both domestic and global indices (Chart I-14). The quality factor has been one of the better determinants of future stock market returns. The EA quality score is based on return on equity, asset growth, accruals, and margins. On this basis, the bourses with a higher concentration of quality stocks in their indices are found outside the US (Chart I-15). Using an overall blended score, which includes not only the quality factor, but also others such as value, size, and momentum, suggests investors will be rewarded by tilting away from the US. For example, 20%-30% of stocks in Scandinavian bourses make it into the top decile EA portfolio (Chart I-16). Even if one focuses solely on growth sectors such as technology and health care, non-US companies are still more attractive (Chart I-17). Chart I-14The BCA EA Platform Allows Investors To Pick Winners Trading Currencies Using Equity Signals Trading Currencies Using Equity Signals Chart I-15Quality Stocks Are Heavily Weighted Outside The US Trading Currencies Using Equity Signals Trading Currencies Using Equity Signals Chart I-16A Composite Score Ranks US Stocks Poorly Trading Currencies Using Equity Signals Trading Currencies Using Equity Signals Chart I-17Lots Of Attractive Growth Stocks Outside The US Trading Currencies Using Equity Signals Trading Currencies Using Equity Signals In a nutshell, non-US markets are attractive from a valuation standpoint and across a swathe of other metrics that have been useful in benchmarking future returns. An outperformance of non-US stocks will favor cyclical currencies, as portfolio flows gravitate to these markets. We are already selectively long a basket of Scandinavian currencies; we will be gradually accumulating other currencies such as the GBP, the CAD, and the JPY on weakness. Specifically, the yen is becoming interesting not only as portfolio insurance, but also as a play on the cyclical Japanese market. We will be covering these currencies in depth in upcoming reports. Housekeeping Three important central banks met this week. The general tone was dovish. The Bank of England kept policy roughly unchanged, but there were three important takeaways. First, the BoE suggested any pickup in UK inflation will be transitory. Second, the BoE will slow its bond purchases, as they approach the central bank’s target. And finally, growth estimates were revised upward. Our take is that the meeting was a non-event for cable in the near term and bullish longer term. The message from the Reserve Bank of Australia was bit more dovish. They kept open the possibility of additional measures on the July 6 meeting. Our bias is that the RBA is trying to fend off deflationary pressures from a strong currency. This only delays the bullish backdrop for the AUD. Next Tuesday’s budget will provide some information about additional support to the Aussie economy. The Norges bank remains on the path to hike interest rates later this year. This supports our bullish NOK thesis. We have been reluctant to establish fresh long positions as we enter a seasonally strong month for the dollar. However, our buy list is growing as we highlighted above. For now our open positions are highlighted on page 14.    Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate," dated July 10, 2020. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 The recent data out of the US were mildly positive. The ISM Manufacturing PMI came in at 60.7 in April, well below an estimate of 65. The ISM Manufacturing New Orders Index came in at 64.3 in April, slightly below an expectation of 66.6. The trade deficit for March was -74.4B USD, in line with expectations. Personal Spending for March was 4.2% month-on-month, as expected. The dollar DXY index rose by 0.8% this week. While the PMI data for April came in on the mild side, inflationary pressures continue to build up as reflected in the robust New Orders, Backlog of Orders as well as the Prices Paid indices. That said, the Fed’s current stance is that price surges will likely be transitory. This is near-term negative for the greenback since it implies policy will not be tightened anytime soon. Report Links: Arbitrating Between Dollar Bulls And Bears - March 19, 2021 The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 Are Rising Bond Yields Bullish For The Dollar? - February 19, 2021 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 The recent Euro data have been mildly positive. Unemployment rate for March was 8.1%, slightly better than the predicted 8.3%. GDP fell 1.8% year-on-year, compared to an expected 2% decrease. CPI came in at 1.6% for April year-on-year, in line with expectation. German Retail Sales for March came in at 7.7% month-on-month comfortably beating a 3% expectation. Overall euro area retail sales surged 12% year-on-year in March, comfortably outpacing consensus of a 9.4% rise. The euro was down 0.9% against USD this week. However, as the weekly vaccination increase in both the US and the UK are slowing down, it continues to rise in the euro area.  Infections are stabilizing in Germany and the Netherlands, and are on a downtrend in France and Italy. This puts a floor under the euro. Report Links: Relative Growth, The Euro, And The Loonie - April 16, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 The Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 The recent data out of Japan have been strong. The unemployment rate for March came in at 2.6%. Industrial Production for March came in at 2.2% month-on-month, versus the estimate of -2%. Tokyo Core CPI came in at -0.2%, below market consensus. Vehicles sales surged by 22.2% year-on-year in April. The Japanese yen was flat against USD this week. A lagging vaccine campaign, rising COVID-19 case count, and the state of emergency continue to drag down sentiment towards Japan. However, the yen’s real effective exchange rate is trading at one standard deviation below fair value and our intermediate-term indicator is hinting at a rebound. Report Links: The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 The recent data out of UK have been positive. The Nationwide HPI for April was 7.1% higher than a year ago, beating an expectation of 5%. The BoE kept interest rates at 0.1% and its asset purchase target at £895bn. The pound was flat against the USD this week. The Bank of England kept policy on hold this week, but there were three important takeaways. First, the BoE sees any near-term pickup in inflation as temporary. This should keep a near-term lid on rate hike expectations and the pound. Second, the BoE will slow its bond purchases, as they approach the central bank’s target. And finally, growth estimates were revised upward, especially for 2022. This is bullish cable longer term. On the political front, a potential surprise of another Scottish independence may put some downward pressure on the currency. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 The recent data out of Australia have been strong. The AIG Manufacturing Index for April came in at 61.7, higher than the prior 59.9 reading. The AIG Construction Index for April came in at 59.1, below the 61.8 print in March. The trade balance for March came in at AUD 5.6bn, below an expectation of AUD 8bn. The RBA cash rate remained at 0.1%. The Australian dollar was flat this week against the USD. The RBA provided a dovish tone at its meeting this week, extending QE until February, and kept open the possibility of additional measures on the July 6 meeting. In the near term, upbeat economic data continue to provide support for the AUD. However, the tourism industry (6% of employment) is needed to get Australia back to full employment. Our bias is that the RBA will continue to fight against an appreciating currency, until the economy reaches escape velocity. Report Links: The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Australia: Regime Change For Bond Yields & The Currency? - January 20, 2021 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 The recent data out of New Zealand have been strong. Employment grew by 0.6% quarter-on-quarter in Q1. The Labor Cost Index for Q1 came in at 0.4% over prior quarter, and 1.6% year-on-year. The unemployment rate for Q1 declined to 4.7%, from 4.9%. Building consents increased 17.9% month-on-month in March. The New Zealand dollar was down 0.5% against USD this week. As we indicated in our report last week, the NZD is overpriced by several measures and the elevated equity market is of particular concern. The weakening GlobalDairyTrade Price Index could potentially be a harbinger of peaking agricultural prices in the coming months. This will lead the NZD to underperform other commodity currencies.  Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 The recent data out of Canada have been soft. The trade balance for March came in at -1.14bn CAD versus CAD 1.42bn the previous month. Building permits rose 5.7% month-on-month in March. The CAD was flat against USD this week. Despite concerns over elevated commodity prices and a vaccination campaign that is lagging other advanced economies, recent strong employment growth and the tapering of asset purchases by the BoC should continue to boost the currency, the top performing among G10 so far this year. In the near term, Canadian exports will benefit from US fiscal stimulus, which will also provide support for the loonie. Report Links: Relative Growth, The Euro, And The Loonie - April 16, 2021 Will The Canadian Recovery Lead Or Lag The Global Cycle? - February 12, 2021 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 The recent Swiss data have been strong. The KOF Leading Indicator for April came in at 134, beating the 119.5 estimate.  CPI for April came in at 0.3%. SECO Consumer Climate for Q2 came in at -18, higher than the -30 back in Q1. The Swiss franc was down 0.5% against the USD this week. The Swiss economy continues to surprise to the upside. With our intermediate-term indicator on a downward path, we remain optimistic on our long EUR/CHF position for now, despite potential upside risks to the franc given the Indian COVID-19 outbreak. Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 On The DXY Breakout, Euro, And Swiss Franc - February 21, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 The recent data out of Norway have been strong. The unemployment rate for April came in at 4%, from 4.2% the prior month. The house price index for April came in at 12.2% year-on-year, similar to the 12.5% reading of March. Interest rate were held at 0% by the Norges Bank. The NOK was down 1.8% against the USD this week. The krone is the winning currency since the pandemic hit, suggesting some consolidation was much due. With Norwegian inflation rising sharply above the central bank’s 2% target earlier this year, the Norges Bank reiterated during its meeting on Thursday that a rate hike later this year is well in sight. Against the backdrop of the impending European recovery this summer and Norway’s own commendable vaccination progress, we continue to be long the NOK against the USD and EUR.  Report Links: Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 A New Paradigm For Petrocurrencies - April 10, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 The recent Swedish data have been strong. Industrial Production for March came in at 1.1% month-on-month. Year-on-year, IP is rising by 5.7%. Industrial New Orders for March came in at 10% year-on-year. GDP in Q1 was 1.1% higher than the prior quarter, beating the estimate of 0.5%. The Swedish krona was down 1.4% against the USD this week. BCA Research’s European Investment Strategy service indicated that there is significantly more upside to Swedish stocks against both Eurozone and US equities over the remainder of the cycle. Sweden is levered to the global industrial cycle with exports representing 45% of GDP. The recovery in both Europe and across the globe should continue to benefit the krona. The tapering of asset purchases by the Riksbank later this year will also provide support to the currency in the meantime. We continue to be long SEK/USD and SEK/EUR. Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights A slower money and credit growth in China will eventually generate disinflationary pressures by weighing on demand for commodities. The PBoC has shifted its inflation anchor and policy framework to target core CPI and the PPI rather than headline CPI. Beijing is scaling back its fiscal supports and cooling the property sector to tackle local government and housing sector debt issues. In the next six to nine months we favor companies and sectors that will benefit from global economic recovery rather than China’s domestic demand. We are long CSI500 relative to China’s A shares. The CSI500 has a larger exposure to the global economy and lower valuation relative to China’s broad onshore market.  Feature As a follow up to last week’s report, we look at another topic raised in recent client meetings: whether rapidly rising producer prices in China will morph into a broad-based inflationary risk and how macroeconomic policies will evolve to counter such a risk. Clients who believe that the ongoing producer price inflation is transitory cited China’s low consumer price inflation, and slowing money and credit growth, as leading indicators of budding disinflationary pressures. Advocates of sustained inflation pointed to robust recoveries and demand among advanced economies, extremely accommodative monetary conditions worldwide, massive fiscal stimulus in the US, a weak US dollar, and supply constraints. It remains to be seen what the worldwide pandemic’s impact will be on the balance between global production capacity and aggregate demand. In this report we analyze the PBoC’s inflation target and policy framework, and conclude that while China’s monetary policy has not become more hawkish, policy tightening seems to be taking place on the fiscal front. Is Inflation In China A Risk? It is debatable whether the strong rebound in GDP growth in Q4 last year and in Q1 this year has closed China’s output gap and will lead to widespread inflation. Given data distortions due to low-base effects from the previous year and uncertainty about China’s productivity and labor force growth, any calculation of the output gap will be unreliable. In addition, China’s employment statistics lack cyclicality and cannot be used to gauge inflationary pressure stemming from wage growth and unit labor costs.     Chart 1A Rollover In Credit Growth Will Weigh On Chinese Demand For Commodities A Rollover In Credit Growth Will Weigh On Chinese Demand For Commodities A Rollover In Credit Growth Will Weigh On Chinese Demand For Commodities Our cyclical view of inflation is therefore based on the framework that the ongoing moderation in China's money and credit growth will eventually generate disinflationary pressures by weighing on the country’s demand for and price of commodities (Chart 1).  Furthermore, behind a resilient PPI, there are suggestions that the strength in China’s economy is still bifurcated. A narrow-based uptrend in the PPI lacks the ground for sustained inflation, and is unlikely to trigger a general tightening in monetary policy.  While mounting global prices for raw materials propelled strong upstream PPI, producer prices for consumer goods and core consumer price inflation remain very subdued (Chart 2).  The inconsistency in producer prices among various industries highlight the unevenness of the economic recovery and, importantly, persistently muted household consumption (Chart 3). Chart 2A Bifurcated Economic Recovery A Bifurcated Economic Recovery A Bifurcated Economic Recovery Chart 3A Muted Recovery In Household Consumption A Muted Recovery In Household Consumption A Muted Recovery In Household Consumption Chart 4Weak Price Transmission From Upstream To Downstream Industries Weak Price Transmission From Upstream To Downstream Industries Weak Price Transmission From Upstream To Downstream Industries The transmission from upstream industrial PPI to the middle and downstream sectors has also been weak (Chart 4). It is evidenced in the faster growth of manufacturing output volume compared with price increases (Chart 5). This contrasts with the previous inflationary cycles, as well as mining and ferrous metals where surging prices for raw materials have way surpassed recovery in output volume (Chart 6). Given that price changes are more important to corporate profits than volume changes, Chinese middle-to-downstream industries face downward pressure on their profit margins and will likely deliver disappointing profits, despite a strong rebound in production. Chart 5China's Manufacturing Recovery: Stronger Volume Than Prices China's Manufacturing Recovery: Stronger Volume Than Prices China's Manufacturing Recovery: Stronger Volume Than Prices Chart 6China's Upstream Industries: Prices Surged Faster Than Production China's Upstream Industries: Prices Surged Faster Than Production China's Upstream Industries: Prices Surged Faster Than Production Furthermore, PMI input prices, which lead core CPI by about nine months, rolled over in April (Chart 7). While it is too soon to conclude that input prices have peaked, it is implied that upward pressure on core CPI from input prices may start to ease in 2H21. Bottom Line: So far there is no sign that elevated upstream producer prices will create sustainable inflationary pressure on consumer prices. Hence our view is that the PBoC will not respond to a rising PPI by further tightening monetary policy. Chart 7PMI Input Prices Have Rolled Over PMI Input Prices Have Rolled Over PMI Input Prices Have Rolled Over Chart 8Core CPI And PPI Have Been The PBoC's Inflation Targets Since 2015 Core CPI And PPI Have Been The PBoC's Inflation Targets Since 2015 Core CPI And PPI Have Been The PBoC's Inflation Targets Since 2015 The PBoC’s Inflation Target Since 2015, China’s monetary tightening cycles have closely correlated with a combination of the core CPI and PPI instead of headline CPI (Chart 8). The shift to targeting core CPI and PPI occurred despite the central bank’s frequent mention of headline CPI as its inflation target. The reasons for the shift are twofold. First, swings in food and fuel prices have become much larger since 2014, often dominating fluctuations in headline CPI (Chart 9).  Secondly, the price swings were often driven by supply-side factors and did not reflect changes in demand. Therefore, monetary policies could do little to mitigate inflationary or deflationary pressures. Furthermore, the PPI seems to play a greater role in the PBoC’s monetary policymaking than the headline and core CPI (Chart 10).  The tighter relationship between the de facto policy rate and the PPI is not surprising, given that China’s ex-factory price inflation reflects changes in corporate pricing, profit, and inventory cycles – all are driven by the country’s money supply and credit cycles.  Chart 9Large Swings In Food And Energy Prices Distorted Headline CPI In Recent Years Large Swings In Food And Energy Prices Distorted Headline CPI In Recent Years Large Swings In Food And Energy Prices Distorted Headline CPI In Recent Years Chart 10PPI Plays A Greater Role In The PBoC's Monetary Policymaking PPI Plays A Greater Role In The PBoC's Monetary Policymaking PPI Plays A Greater Role In The PBoC's Monetary Policymaking The relationship between the 7-day repo rate - the de jure policy rate - and the PPI has broken down since 2015 (Chart 11). Meanwhile, the 3-month repo rate has maintained a close relationship with the PPI (Chart 10, bottom panel). The change in the relationship is because the PBoC shifted its policy to target interest rates instead of the quantity of money supply since 2015 (Chart 12). Moreover, since 2016 the PBoC has generated monetary policy tightening measures through changes in its Macro Prudential Assessment Framework (MPA) rather than directly through interest rate hikes.  Chart 11Relationship Between The 7-Day Repo Rate And The PPI Has Broken Down Since 2015... Relationship Between The 7-Day Repo Rate And The PPI Has Broken Down Since 2015... Relationship Between The 7-Day Repo Rate And The PPI Has Broken Down Since 2015... Chart 12...Due To Monetary Policy Regime Shifted ...Due To Monetary Policy Regime Shifted ...Due To Monetary Policy Regime Shifted Bottom Line:  The PBoC has shifted its inflation anchor and policy framework since 2015. Core CPI and the PPI are now the main inflation targets. A Quiet Fiscal Tightening? Despite a jump in the PPI, the 3-month repo rate fell sharply in the past two months (Chart 10 on page 6, bottom panel).  It is possible that the PBoC considers escalating producer prices as transitory and, therefore, intends to keep its overall policy stance unchanged. However, the PBoC’s relaxed policy response towards inflation risk may be explained by Beijing’s quiet tightening on the fiscal front. Chart 13The Central Bank Has Made Little Interbank Liquidity Injections Lately The Central Bank Has Made Little Interbank Liquidity Injections Lately The Central Bank Has Made Little Interbank Liquidity Injections Lately The PBoC can hold its policy rates steady by supplying adequate liquidity to the interbank system through open market operations or by reducing the demand for liquidity. On a net basis, the PBoC has recently injected very little liquidity into the interbank system, implying that banks’ liquidity demand has likely softened (Chart 13).  This might be a sign of weakening credit origination. In a previous report we discussed how fiscal stimulus has become a more relevant driver of China’s credit origination since the onset of the 2014/15 economic downcycle. A rising 3-month SHIBOR can be the result of rapid fiscal and quasi-fiscal expansions, which occurred in Q3 last year. A flood of local government bond issuance drained liquidity from commercial banks, which boosted the banks’ needs to borrow money from the interbank system and pushed up interbank rates. Despite higher interest rates, credit growth soared in Q3 as fiscal multiplier provided an imminent and powerful reflationary force to the economy. In contrast, local government bond issuance was down sharply in the first four months of this year, compared with 2019 and 2020. Local governments sold 222.7 billion yuan of special-purpose bonds (SPBs) from January to April, a plunge from 730 billion yuan of debt sold in the same period in 2019 and 1.15 trillion yuan in 2020. The total local government bond issuance in Q1 this year has also been 36% and 44% lower than in Q1 2019 and 2020, respectively. A lack of local governments’ appetite to borrow coupled with a shortage in profitable infrastructure projects might have contributed to the sharp drop in bond issuance this year. Local government financing and spending have been under increased scrutiny this year. Following the State Council Executive Meeting in late March, in which Premier Li Keqiang pledged to reduce government leverage ratio and raise regulatory standards on infrastructure investment, Beijing suspended two high-speed rail projects that were initiated by provincial governments. Messages from Politburo’s meeting last week reinforced our view that policymakers may be scaling back fiscal support while further tightening regulations in the property sector. Both aspects have the potential to cool China’s demand for industrial metals and global industrial material prices (Chart 14 and Chart 15). Chart 14A Slowdown In Chinese Manufacturing Demand Will Have A Greater Impact On Global Industrial Material Prices A Slowdown In Chinese Manufacturing Demand Will Have A Greater Impact On Global Industrial Material Prices A Slowdown In Chinese Manufacturing Demand Will Have A Greater Impact On Global Industrial Material Prices Chart 15Lower Housing Demand In China Will Help To Cool Industrial Metal Prices Lower Housing Demand In China Will Help To Cool Industrial Metal Prices Lower Housing Demand In China Will Help To Cool Industrial Metal Prices We expect the intensity of policy tightening to reach its peak between mid-year to third-quarter 2021. It is unclear at this point whether policymakers are willing to allow local governments to significantly undershoot their SPB quota for this year. Local governments reportedly experienced a shortage in profitable investment projects towards the end of last year, and thus, parked more than 10% of proceeds from 2020 SPB issuance at the central bank. The central government may be taking a wait-and-see attitude this year, and saving more fiscal dry powder for later this year when the economic slowdown becomes more meaningful. Bottom Line: Beijing is pulling back its fiscal supports and cooling the property sector to tackle local government and housing sector debt issues. The deleveraging efforts will curb China’s demand for commodities, and may work to ease inflationary pressure on prices for raw materials. Investment Conclusions The outlook for China’s risk asset prices remains bearish, at least in the next six months. If the credit and fiscal impulse slow enough to depress corporate pricing power, inflation will not be a problem because disinflationary pressures will resurface. However, the growth of corporate profits will disappoint (Chart 16). Beijing may be saving more fiscal dry powder for later this year. Still, SPBs are only a small part of local governments’ financing source for infrastructure projects. Given the central government’s renewed focus on reducing public debt, policymakers are unlikely to unleash fiscal power to significantly boost infrastructure spending or economic growth. In the next six to nine months, we favor companies and sectors that will benefit from global economic recovery rather than China’s domestic demand. With this week's report, we initiate a long position on the CSI500 index, which has a larger exposure to the global market and lower valuation relative to China’s broad onshore market (Chart 17).  Chart 16Aggregate Corporate Profit Growth Will Slow Even Though Inflation Is No Longer An Issue Aggregate Corporate Profit Growth Will Slow Even Though Inflation Is No Longer An Issue Aggregate Corporate Profit Growth Will Slow Even Though Inflation Is No Longer An Issue Chart 17Long CSI500/Broad Market Long CSI500/Broad Market Long CSI500/Broad Market   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations