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Highlights China stands out as the most likely candidate to send negative shock waves through EM and commodities in 2018. Granted the ongoing policy tightening in China will likely dampen money growth further, the only way mainland nominal GDP growth can hold up is if the velocity of money rises meaningfully, offsetting the drop in money growth. Assigning equal probabilities to various scenarios of velocity of money, the outcome is as follows: one-third probability of robust nominal growth (continuation of the rally in China-related plays) and two-third odds of a non-trivial slowdown in nominal growth with negative ramifications for China-related plays. Hence, we reiterate our negative stance on EM risk assets Feature The key question for emerging markets (EM) in 2018 is whether a slowdown in Chinese money growth will translate into a meaningful growth deceleration in this economy, and in turn produce a reversal in EM risk assets. This week we address the above question in detail elaborating on what could make China's business cycle defy the slowdown in its monetary aggregates and how investors should approach such uncertainty. Before this, we review the status of financial markets going into 2018. Priced To Perfection Or A New Paradigm? Several financial markets are at extremes. Our chart on the history of financial market manias reveals that some parts of technology/new concept stocks may be entering uncharted territory (Chart I-1). Tencent's share price, for instance, has surged 11-fold since January 2010. Chart I-1History Of Financial Markets Manias: They Lasted A Decade History Of Financial Markets Manias: They Lasted A Decade History Of Financial Markets Manias: They Lasted A Decade This is roughly on par with the prior manias' average 10-year gains. As this chart indicates, the manias of previous decades run wild until the turn of the decade. It is impossible to know whether technology/new concept stocks will peak in 2018 or run for another two years. Regardless whether or not the mania in tech/new concept stocks endures up until 2020, some sort of mean reversion in their share prices is likely next year. This has relevance to EM because the magnitude of the EM equity rally in 2017 has been enormously boosted by four large tech/concept stocks in Asia. Our measure of the cyclically-adjusted P/E (CAPE) ratio for the U.S. market suggests that equity valuations are reaching their 2000 overvaluation levels (Chart I-2, top panel). The difference between our measure and Shiller's measure of CAPE is that Shiller's CAPE is derived by dividing share prices by the 10-year moving average of EPS in real terms (deflated by consumer price inflation). Our measure is calculated by dividing equity prices by the time trend in real EPS (Chart I-2, bottom panel). Our CAPE measure assumes that in the long run, U.S. EPS in real terms will revert to its time trend. Meanwhile, the Shiller CAPE is based on the assumption that real EPS will revert to its 10-year mean. Hence, the assumptions behind our CAPE model are quite reasonable if not preferable to those of Shiller's P/E. Remarkably, the U.S. (Wilshire 5000) market cap-to-GDP ratio is close to its 2000 peak (Chart I-3). With respect to EM equity valuations, the non-financial P/E ratio is at its highest level in the past 15 years (Chart I-4). EM banks have low multiples and seem "cheap" because many of them have not provisioned for NPLs. Hence, their profits and book values are artificially inflated. In short, excluding financials, EM stocks are not cheap at all, neither in absolute terms nor relative to DM bourses. Chart I-2A Perspective On U.S. Equity Valuation A Perspective On U.S. Equity Valuation A Perspective On U.S. Equity Valuation Chart I-3The U.S. Market Cap-To-GDP ##br##Ratio Is Close To 2000 Peak The U.S. Market Cap-To-GDP Ratio Is Close To 2000 Peak The U.S. Market Cap-To-GDP Ratio Is Close To 2000 Peak Chart I-4EM Non-Financial Equities Are Not Cheap EM Non-Financial Equities Are Not Cheap EM Non-Financial Equities Are Not Cheap Such elevated DM & EM stock market valuations might be justified by currently low global long-term bond yields. Yet, if and when long-term bond yields rise, multiples will likely shrink. The latter will overpower the profit growth impact on share prices, as multiples are disproportionately and negatively linked to interest rates - especially when interest rates are low - but are proportionately and positively linked to EPS.1 As a result, a small rise in long-term bond yields will lead to a meaningful P/E de-rating. Despite very high equity valuations, U.S. advisors and traders are extremely bullish on American stocks. Their sentiment measures are at all time and 11-year highs, respectively. So are copper traders on red metal prices (Chart I-5). The mirror image of the strong and steady rally in global stocks is record-low implied volatility. The aggregate financial markets' implied volatility index is at a multi-year low (Chart I-6). Finally, yields on junk (high-yield) EM corporate and sovereign bonds are at all-time lows (Chart I-7). They are priced for perfection. Chart I-5Bullish Sentiment On Copper Is Very Elevated Bullish Sentiment On Copper Is Very Elevated Bullish Sentiment On Copper Is Very Elevated Chart I-6Aggregate Global Financial Markets ##br##Implied VOL Is At Record Low Aggregate Global Financial Markets Implied VOL Is At Record Low Aggregate Global Financial Markets Implied VOL Is At Record Low Chart I-7EM Junk Bond Yields Are At Record Low EM Junk Bond Yields Are At Record Low EM Junk Bond Yields Are At Record Low Are we in a new paradigm, or are we witnessing financial market extremes that are unsustainable? In regard to the timing, can these dynamics last throughout 2018 or at least the first half of next year, or will they reverse in the coming months? We have less conviction on the durability of the U.S. equity rally, but our bet is that EM risk assets will roll over in absolute terms and begin underperforming their DM peers very soon. What could cause such a reversal in EM risk assets? China stands out as the most likely candidate to send negative shock waves through emerging markets and commodities. China: "Financial Stability" Priority Entails Tighter Policy The Chinese authorities are facing unprecedented challenges: The outstanding value of broad money in China (measured in U.S. dollars) is now larger than the combined U.S. and euro area broad money supply (Chart I-8, top panel). Chart I-8Beware Of Money Excesses In China Beware Of Money Excesses In China Beware Of Money Excesses In China As a share of its own GDP, broad money in China is much higher compared to any other nation in history (Chart I-8, bottom panel). In brief, there is too much money in China and most of it - $21 trillion out of $29 trillion - has been created by the banking system since early 2009. We maintain that the enormous overhang of money and credit in China represents major excess/imbalances and has nothing to do with the nation's high savings rate.2 Rather, it is an outcome of animal spirits running wild among bankers and borrowers over the past nine years. Easy money often flows into real estate and China has not been an exception. Needless to say, property prices are hyped and expensive relative to household income. Policy tightening amid lingering excesses and imbalances makes us negative on China's growth outlook. In a nutshell, we place more weight on tightening when there are excesses in the system, and downplay the importance of tightening in a healthy system without excesses. Importantly, excessive money creation seems to finally be pushing inflation higher. Consumer price services and core consumer price inflation rates are on a rising trajectory (Chart I-9, top and middle panels). As a result, banks' deposit rates in real terms (deflated by core CPI) have plunged into negative territory for the first time in the past 12 years (Chart I-9, bottom panel). Remarkably, the People's Bank of China's existing $3 trillion of international reserves is sufficient to "back up" only 13% and 11% of official M2 and our measure of M3, respectively (Chart I-10). If Chinese households and companies decide to convert 10-15% of their deposits into foreign currency and the PBoC takes the other side of the trade, its reserves will be exhausted. Chart I-9China: Inflation Is Rising And ##br##Real Deposit Rate Is Negative China: Inflation Is Rising And Real Deposit Rate Is Negative China: Inflation Is Rising And Real Deposit Rate Is Negative Chart I-10China: Low Coverage Of ##br##Money Supply By FX Reserves bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c10 bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c10 Therefore, reining money and credit expansion is of paramount importance to China's long-term financial and economic stability. "Financial stability" has become the key policy priority. "Financial stability" is policymakers' code word for containing and curbing financial imbalances and bubbles. Having experienced the equity bubble bust in 2015, policymakers are determined to preclude another bubble formation and its subsequent bust. Consequently, the ongoing tightening campaign will not be reversed in the near term unless damage to the economy becomes substantial and visible. By the time the authorities and investors are able to identify such damage in the real economy, China-related plays in financial markets will be down substantially. Chart I-11China: Corporate Bond Yields And Yield Curve China: Corporate Bond Yields And Yield Curve China: Corporate Bond Yields And Yield Curve Faced with significant excesses in money, leverage and property markets, the Chinese authorities have been tightening - and have reinforced their policy stance following the Party's Congress in October. There is triple tightening currently ongoing in China: 1. Liquidity tightening: Money market rates have climbed, and onshore corporate bond yields are rising (Chart I-11, top panel). Remarkably, the yield curve is flat, pointing to weaker growth ahead (Chart I-11, bottom panel). 2. Regulatory tightening: The China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) is forcing banks to bring off-balance-sheet assets onto their balance sheets, and is reining banks' involvement in shadow banking activities. In addition, financial regulators are trying to remove the government's implicit "put" from the financial system, and thereby curb speculative and irresponsible investment behavior. Finally, many local governments are tightening investors' participation in the real estate market. 3. Anti-corruption campaign is embracing the financial institutions: The powerful anti-corruption commission is planning to dispatch groups of inspectors to examine financial institutions' activities. This could dampen animal spirits among bankers and shadow banking organizations. The Outlook: The "Knowns"... In China, broad money growth has already slumped to an all-time low (Chart I-12). The money as well as the credit plus fiscal spending impulses both point to a considerable slowdown in the mainland's industrial cycle and overall economic activity (Chart I-13). Chart I-12China: Broad Money ##br##Growth Is At All-Time Low bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c12 bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c12 Chart I-13China: Money And Credit & ##br##Fiscal Impulses Are Negative bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c13 bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c13 The slowdown is not limited to money growth; there are a few real business cycle indicators that are already weakening. For example, the growth rate of property floor space sold and started has slumped to zero (Chart I-14). Electricity output and aggregate freight volume growth have both decisively rolled over (Chart I-15). Chart I-14China: Property Starts Are Set To Contract Again China: Property Starts Are Set To Contract Again China: Property Starts Are Set To Contract Again Chart I-15China: A Few Signs Of Slowdown China: A Few Signs Of Slowdown China: A Few Signs Of Slowdown That said, based on the past correlation between money and credit impulses on the one hand and the business cycle on the other, China's economy should have slowed much more, and its negative impact on the rest of the world should have already been felt (Chart I-13, on page 9). This has been the key pillar of our view on EM, but it has not yet transpired. Is it possible that the relationship between money/credit impulses and the business cycle has broken down? If so, why? And how should investors handle such uncertainty? Bottom Line: China's ongoing policy tightening will ensure that money and credit impulses remain negative for some time. Can the country's industrial sectors de-couple from its past tight correlation with money and credit? ...And The "Unknowns" By definition, the only way to sustain nominal economic growth in the face of a decelerating money supply is if the velocity of money increases. This is true for any economy. Nominal GDP = Money Supply x Velocity of Money Provided China's policy tightening will likely further dampen money growth, the only way nominal GDP growth can hold up is if the velocity of money rises meaningfully, offsetting the drop in money growth. This is the main risk to our view and strategy. Chart I-16 portrays all three variables. Chart I-16China: Money, Nominal GDP ##br##And Velocity Of Money China: Money, Nominal GDP And Velocity Of Money China: Money, Nominal GDP And Velocity Of Money Even though the velocity of money has fallen structurally over the past nine years (Chart I-16, bottom panel), it has risen marginally in 2017, allowing the mainland's nominal economic growth to hold up despite a considerable relapse in money supply growth. Notably, this has been the reason why our view has not worked this year. What is the velocity of money, and how can we forecast its fluctuations and, importantly, the magnitude of its variations? The velocity of money is one of the least understood concepts in economic theory. The velocity of money is anything but stable. In our opinion, the velocity of money reflects animal spirits of households and businesses as well as government spending decisions. Forecasting animal spirits and the magnitude of their variations is not very a reliable exercise. In a nutshell, the banking system (commercial banks and the central bank) creates money via expanding its balance sheet - making loans to or acquiring assets from non-banks. However, commercial banks have little direct influence on the velocity of money. The latter is shaped by non-banks' decisions to spend or not (i.e., save). Significantly, non-banks' spending and saving decisions do not alter the amount of money in the system. Yet they directly impact the velocity of money. The banking system creates money, and non-banks churn money (make it circulate). At any level of money supply, a rising number of transactions will boost nominal output, and vice versa. Further, there is a great deal of complexity in the interaction between money supply and its velocity. Both are sometimes independent, i.e. they do not influence one another, but in some other cases one affects the other. For example, with the ongoing triple tightening in China and less money being originated by the banking system, will households and businesses increase or decrease their spending? Our bias is that they will not increase spending. This is especially true for the corporate sector, which has record-high leverage and where access to funding has been tightening. It is also possible that rising velocity will lead to more money creation as more spending leads to higher loan demand and banks accommodate it - i.e., originating more loans/money. These examples corroborate that money supply and the velocity of money are not always independent of each other. On the whole, it is almost impossible to reliably forecast the magnitude of changes in velocity of money. In the same vein, it is difficult to forecast animal spirit dynamics in any economy. Chart I-17U.S.: The Rise In Velocity Of Money ##br##Overwhelmed Slowdown In Money U.S.: The Rise In Velocity Of Money Overwhelmed Slowdown In Money U.S.: The Rise In Velocity Of Money Overwhelmed Slowdown In Money One recent example where nominal GDP has decoupled from broad money growth is the U.S. Chart I-17 demonstrates that in the past 12 months, U.S. nominal GDP growth has firmed up even though broad money (M2) growth has slumped. This decoupling can only be explained by a spike in the velocity of M2. In other words, soaring confidence and animal spirits among U.S. households and businesses have boosted their willingness to spend, even as the banking system has created less money and credit growth has slowed considerably over the past 12 months. Going back to China, how should investors consider such uncertainty in changes in the velocity of money? Investing is about the future, which is inherently uncertain. Hence, an investment process is about assigning probabilities to various scenarios. Provided the velocity of money is impossible to forecast, we assign equal probabilities to each of the following scenarios for China in 2018 (Figure I-1): One-third odds that the velocity of money rises more than the decline in broad money growth, producing robust nominal GDP growth; One-third probability that the velocity of money stays broadly flat - the outcome being meaningful deceleration in nominal GDP growth; A one-third chance that the velocity of money declines - the result being a severe growth slump. Figure I-1How Investors Can Consider Uncertainty Related To Velocity Of Money Questions For Emerging Markets Questions For Emerging Markets In short, a positive outcome on China-related plays has a one-third probability of playing out, while a negative outcome carries a two-thirds chance. This is why we continue to maintain our negative view on EM and commodities. Commodities Our view on commodities and commodity plays is by and large shaped by our view on China's capital spending. Given the credit plus fiscal spending impulse is already very weak, the path of least resistance for capital expenditures is down. Besides, the government is clamping down on local governments' off-balance-sheet borrowing and spending (via Local Government Financing Vehicles). A deceleration in capital expenditures in general and construction (both infrastructure and property development) in particular is bearish for industrial metals (Chart I-18). Money and credit impulses herald a major downturn in Chinese imports values and volumes (Chart I-19). Chart I-18Industrial Metals / Copper Are At Risk bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c18 bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c18 Chart I-19China Will Be A Drag On Its Suppliers bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c19 bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c19 As to China's commodities output reductions, last week we published a Special Report3 on China's "de-capacity" reforms in steel and coal. The report concludes the following: The path of least resistance for steel, coal and iron ore prices is down over the next 12-24 months. China's "de-capacity" reforms in steel and coal will continue into 2018 and 2019, but the scale and pace of "de-capacity" will diminish. Importantly, the mainland's steel and coal output will likely rise going forward as new capacity using more efficient and ecologically friendly technologies come on stream. The capacity swap policy introduced by the authorities has been allowing steel and coal producers to add new capacity in order to replace almost entirely obsolete capacity. The combination of demand slowdown and modest production recovery will weigh on non-oil raw materials. As for oil, the picture is much more complicated. Oil prices have been climbing in reaction to declining OECD inventories as well as on expectations of an extension to oil output cuts into 2018. One essential piece of missing information in the bullish oil narrative is China's oil inventories. In recent years, China has been importing more crude oil than its consumption trend justifies. Specifically, the sum of its net imports and domestic output of crude oil has exceeded the amount of refined processed oil. This difference between the sum of net imports and production of crude oil and processed crude oil constitutes our proxy for the net change of crude oil inventories. Chart I-20 shows that our proxy for mainland crude oil inventories has risen sharply in recent years. This includes both the nation's strategic oil reserves as well as commercial inventories. There is no reliable data on the former. Therefore, it is impossible to estimate the country's commercial crude oil inventories. Chart I-20China: Beware Of High Chinese Oil Inventories China: Beware Of High Chinese Oil Inventories China: Beware Of High Chinese Oil Inventories Nevertheless, whether crude oil inventories have risen due to a build-up of strategic petroleum reserves or commercial reserves, the fact remains that crude oil inventories in China have surged and appear to be reaching the size of OECD total crude and liquid inventories (Chart I-20). In short, China has been a stabilizing force for the oil market over the past three years by buying more than it consumes. Without such excess purchases from China, oil prices would likely have been much weaker. Going forward, the pace of Chinese purchases of crude oil will likely slow due to several factors: (a) China prefers buying commodities on dips, especially when it is for strategic inventory building. With crude oil prices having rallied to around $60, the authorities might reduce their purchases temporarily, creating an air pocket for prices, and then accelerate their purchases at lower prices; (b) Commercial purchases of oil will likely decelerate due to tighter money/credit, possibly high inventories and a general slowdown in industrial demand for fuel. Bottom Line: Raw materials and oil prices4 are at risk from China and overly bullish investor sentiment. Beyond Commodities The slowdown in China will impact not only commodities but also non-commodity shipments to the mainland (Chart I-21). In fact, 47% of the nation's imports are commodities and raw materials and 45% are industrial/capital goods - i.e., China's imports are heavily exposed to investment expenditures, not consumer spending. This is why money/credit impulses correlate so well with this country's imports. Consistently, China's broad money (M3) impulse leads EM corporate profit growth by 12 months - and currently heralds a major EPS downtrend (Chart I-22). In addition, aggregate EM narrow money (M1) growth also points to a material slump in EM EPS (Chart I-23). Chart I-21China Is A Risk To ##br##Non-Commodity Economies Too bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c21 bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c21 Chart I-22Downside Risk To EM EPS bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c22 bca.ems_wr_2017_11_29_s1_c22 The only EM countries that are not materially exposed to China and commodities are Turkey and India. The former is a basket case on its own. Indian stocks are expensive and will have a difficult time rallying in absolute terms when the EM equity benchmark relapses. As for Korea and Taiwan, their largest export destination is not advanced economies but China. China accounts for 25% of Korea's exports and 28% of Taiwan's. This compares to a combined 22% of total Korean exports and 20% of total Taiwanese exports going to the U.S. and EU combined Can robust growth in the U.S. and EU derail the growth slowdown in China when capital spending slows? This is very unlikely, in our view. Chart I-24 portends that China's shipments to the U.S. and EU account for only 6.6% of Chinese GDP, while capital spending and credit origination constitute 45% and 25% of GDP, respectively. Chart I-23EM M1 And EM EPS EM M1 And EM EPS EM M1 And EM EPS Chart I-24What Drives Chinese Growth? What Drives Chinese Growth? What Drives Chinese Growth? A final word on tech stocks. EM's four large-cap tech stocks (Tencent, Ali-Baba, Samsung and TSMC) have gone exponential and are extremely overbought. At this juncture, any strong opinion on tech stocks is not warranted because they can sell off or continue advancing for no fundamental reason. We have been recommending an overweight position in tech stocks, and continue recommending overweighting them, especially Korean and Taiwanese semiconductor companies. As for Tencent and Alibaba, these are concept stocks, and as a top-down house we have little expertise to judge whether or not they are expensive. These are bottom-up calls. Investment Strategy EM Stocks: Asset allocators should continue to underweight EM versus DM, and absolute-return investors should stay put. Our overweights are Taiwan, China, Korean tech stocks, Thailand, Russia and central Europe. Our underweights are Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, Peru and Malaysia. Chart I-25EM Currencies: A Canary In ##br##Coal Mine For EM Credit? EM Currencies: A Canary In Coal Mine For EM Credit? EM Currencies: A Canary In Coal Mine For EM Credit? Stay short a basket of the following EM currencies: ZAR, TRY, BRL, IDR and MYR. We are also shorting the COP and CLP. Unlike in 2014-2015, EM currencies will depreciate not only versus the U.S. dollar but also the euro. For traders who prefer a market neutral currency portfolio, our recommended longs (or our currency overweights) are TWD, THB, SGD, ARS, RUB, PLN and CZK. INR and CNH will also outperform other EM currencies. Continue underweighting EM sovereign and corporate credit relative to U.S. investment grade bonds. The mix of weaker EM/China growth, lower commodities prices and EM currency depreciation bode ill for already very tight EM credit spreads (Chart I-25). Within the sovereign credit space, our underweights are Brazil, Venezuela, South Africa and Malaysia and our overweights are Russia, Argentina and low beta defensive credits. The main risk to EM local currency bonds is EM currency depreciation. With foreign ownership of EM domestic bonds at all-time highs, exchange rate depreciation could trigger non-trivial selling pressure. Among local currency bond markets, the most vulnerable are Turkey, South Africa, Indonesia and Malaysia. The least vulnerable are Korea, Russia, China, India, Argentina and Central Europe. Other high-conviction market-neutral recommendations: Long U.S. banks / short EM banks. Long U.S. homebuilders / short Chinese property developers. Long the Russian ruble / short oil. Long the Chilean peso / short copper. Long Big Five state-owned Chinese banks / short small- and medium-sized banks. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 For example, given that interest rates are in the denominator of the Gordon Growth model, a one percentage point change in interest rates from a low level can have a significant impact on the fair value P/E ratio. 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Reports from October 26, 2016, November 23, 2016 and January 18, 2017; available on ems.bcaresearch.com 3 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled "China's 'De-Capacity' Reforms: Where Steel & Coal Prices Are Headed," dated November 22, 2017, link available on page 22. 4 This is the Emerging Markets Strategy team's view and is different from BCA's house view on commodities. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Dear Client, Today we are sending you a two-part Special Report prepared by my colleague Billy Zicheng Huang of our Emerging Markets Equity Sector Strategy team, entitled “A Sector Guide To A-shares”. Part I of the report was published in September, and emphasized the key takeaways from MSCI’s decision to include A-shares in the MSCI EM index beginning in June 2018. More importantly, it provided a comprehensive analysis of the financials, industrials, consumer discretionary, and consumer staples sectors. Part II of the report was published at the end of October, and provided an analysis of the remaining sectors not included in Part I. The reports underscore that while the top-down impact of MSCI’s decision is limited, it is significant in terms of expanding potential alpha from security selection. I trust that you will find this report to be useful. Best regards, Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports Part I of the Special Report discussed the market impact of MSCI's decision to include A-shares in the MSCI Emerging Markets Index, followed by a comprehensive analysis of the four most investment-relevant sectors with corresponding company calls in each sector. In the second part of the Special Report, the EMES team will analyze the remaining sectors, and provide investment recommendations. We will publish an Investment Case by the end of this year, highlighting our best sector picks from Part I and Part II of the Special Reports to construct an A-share portfolio. A Recap In the first part of our A-shares special report, the EMES team discussed the key takeaways from A-shares' inclusion in the MSCI EM index and concluded that, despite a limited near-term impact on the market from a passive investment standpoint, the MSCI's decision will provide an expansion of the investable universe for active EM investors, and more opportunities to allocate assets and generate alpha.1 Moreover, we looked at the four sectors most relevant for investors - financials, industrials, consumer discretionary, and consumer staples - analyzing valuations, profitability, leverage, and the growth outlook. In this special report, we will continue our journey through the remaining sectors: energy, healthcare, IT, materials, real estate, and utilities. Please note that only one company, Dr.Peng Telecom & Media (CH 600804), will be added to telecoms, and will not result in material changes to the sector. Thus we omitted analysis of this sector. Energy Seven companies from the energy sector will be included into the MSCI EM index, including six from the oil & gas industry. The equally weighted basket of the seven A-share energy companies has underperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 26.2%, and by 19.8% over a one-year period (Table 1). With the Chinese government's mandate to cut excess capacity, capex growth in the energy sector will continue to be weak, which will weigh on the growth outlook for the sector. Image In terms of valuation, stripping out two dual-listed names that are already in the MSCI EM Index (Sinopec and PetroChina - please see Appendix I for the full list), Lu'an Environmental and Xishan Coal & Electric Power are trading at significantly cheaper valuations than their peers. On the other end of the spectrum, Guanghui Energy and Wintime Energy's P/Es have expensive valuations. Looking at profitability, low P/E names tend to have high ROEs, while Guanghui Energy suffers from the weakest ROE (Charts 1A & 1B). From a profitability-versus-valuation perspective, Lu'an Environmental offers a superior risk-reward profile, while Guanghui Energy has the least favorable risk-reward profile (Chart 1C). Image Image Image Wintime and Lu'an reported the strongest operating margins, while Offshore Oil Engineering has the weakest margin among peers (Chart 1D). On leverage, Offshore Oil Engineering has the lowest debt-to-equity (D/E) ratio, mainly because its core business is energy equipment and service rather than oil & gas exploration. All energy producers are highly leveraged, with Wintime and Guanghui topping the list. On free cash flow yield, Lu'an leads the table, while both Guanghui and Wintime have negative yields which, together with high leverage, is a negative combination (Charts 1E, 1F, 1G). Image Image Image Image The A-share Energy companies have a dividend yield of less than 2%, with Offshore Oil Engineering enjoying the highest yield among peers, while Xishan Coal & Electric Power has the lowest yield (Chart 1H). Screening the earnings forecasts, all companies' EPS are expected to growth by more than 10%, led by Offshore Oil Engineering and Guanghui Energy (Chart 1I). Image Image Taking all the factors into consideration, we suggest investors should be cautious on the energy sector, and should be especially cautious about betting on the likelihood of Guanghui Energy's turnaround. The company registered surprising positive bottom-line growth in 1H17, but this was mainly due to a low base in 2016. The commencement of its new liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal in Jiangsu Province will not help much to lift sales volumes or margins, given little LNG price recovery and growing competition from well-positioned larger players such as Kunlun and CNOOC. Healthcare There are 13 companies in the A-share healthcare sector. Stocks in the sector have a heavy tilt towards pharmaceutical producers. The equally weighted basket has underperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 1.8%, and outperformed by 0.9% over a one-year period (Table 2). On an absolute return basis performance was resilient across various time horizons. The EMES team has been bullish on healthcare sector on a long-term investment horizon, with overweight calls on Fosun Pharma (2196 HK) from among the current MSCI EM constituents.2 We prefer companies with innovative drug R&D pipelines, which will more likely take advantage of the new China FDA rule encouraging biopharmaceutical innovation. Image Shanghai Pharma and Fosun Pharma are excluded from our analysis, as their H-listed shares are already in the MSCI EM index. Examining valuations, on a trailing P/E basis we favor Sanjiu Medical and Dong-E-E-Jiao. By contrast, Hengrui Medicine and Guizhou Bailing look expensive (Chart 2A). Looking at the profitability side, Salubris Pharma and Dong-E-E-Jiao have the strongest ROE, while Tongrentang and Baiyunshan Pharma lie on the other end of the spectrum (Chart 2B). In summary, Salubris Pharma and Dong-E-E-Jiao will likely outperform, based on a valuation-versus-profitability comparison (Chart 2C). Image Image Image Furthermore, Salubris Pharma and Dong-E-E-Jiao also lead by operating margin, with relatively safe leverage levels at the same time (Chart 2D). On the other hand, Jointown suffers from the highest debt level, the only one with debt-to-equity surpassing 100%. In terms of free cash flow, Sanjiu Medical and Salubris have the most attractive FCF yield, while Jointown and Tasly, both companies with the highest debt levels, also display a worryingly negative FCF yield (Charts 2E, 2F, 2G). Salubris and Baiyun Shan dominate the dividend yield rank (Chart 2H). Image Image Image Image Concerning the earnings outlook, Huadong Medicine and Kangmei are expected to see fast bottom-line growth in 2018, driven by robust antibiotic and cardiovascular sales respectively, while Tongrentang and Baiyunshan are likely to fall behind the industry average (Chart 2I). Image Image In summary, we prefer Salubris Pharma among the A-share healthcare basket, supported by its stronger fundamentals and the bullish outlook on innovative drug R&D and sales in China, in which Salubris Pharma is specialized. IT 14 names from the IT sector will be added to the MSCI EM index. The equally weighted basket has outperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 22.3%, and outperformed by 23.3% over a one-year period (Table 3), with most stocks performing strongly across various investment horizons. We believe the A-share IT basket provides investors with attractive opportunities in the investable universe given that it is less expensive than its H-share counterpart. The inclusion will also dilute the weight of IT sector ADRs, such as Alibaba and Sina Weibo, in the index. Please note that Protruly Vision Tech has been suspended from trading due to legal issues, with no further detail released by the court. Stripping out ZTE because of its H-share listing already in the MSCI EM index, there are 12 names left. Image Regarding valuations, most companies are trading at a below-50 trailing P/E, with the exceptions of Hundsun Tech and iFlytek, both of which are above 150x, while Aisino and BOE are relatively undervalued compared to other names in the sector. It is worth mentioning that Hundsun is 100% owned by Zhejiang Finance Credit Network Technology, a company 99% owned by Alibaba. From a profitability perspective, Hikvision Digital and Dahua Tech have the highest ROE, while Hundsun Tech and Tsinghua Unisplendour lie at the other end of the spectrum (Charts 3A & 3B). Taking these two factors into consideration, we highlight Hikvision Digital and Dahua Tech as the most attractive based on their risk-reward profile (Chart 3C). Image Image Image When looking at the income statement, Sanan Optoelectronics displays robust operating margins, with 2345 Network following suit. By contrast, Hundsun Tech and Tsinghua Unisplendour report the most disappointing margins (Chart 3D). On the positive side, Hundsun Tech has virtually zero debt on the balance sheet, while Dongxu Optoelectronic is more than 80% leveraged. Meanwhile, only four companies register positive FCF yields. Taking both metrics into account, Aisino can most easily service its debt with free cash flow (Charts 3E, 3F, 3G). By dividend yield, Aisino and Hikvision rank top (Chart 3H). Image Image Image Image With respect to forward EPS growth, iFlytek and Hundsun Tech are expected to see the fastest bottom-line expansion, while Aisino's and BOE Tech's bottom lines will increase at the slowest pace (Chart 3I). Image Image Based on our criteria, we like video surveillance manufacturers Hikvision and Dahua Tech for their robust fundamentals and reasonable valuations. In particular, Hikvision is likely to have the largest market cap among A-share tech companies newly included in the MSCI indexes. Materials Currently only seven Chinese companies from the materials sector are included into the MSCI EM Index. After the inclusion, some 26 more companies will be added, substantially expanding the investable universe. Two subsectors will most likely draw investors' attention due to the significant exposure increase: metals & mining, and chemicals. The equally weighted basket has underperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 2%, but outperformed by 4.6% over a one-year period (Table 4). We exclude five names, which are already in the current MSCI EM index: Sinopec Shanghai Petrochem, Anhui Conch Cement, Aluminum Corp of China, Jiangxi Copper, and Zijin Mining. Among the other companies, we have been underweight Maanshan Iron & Steel (H-share listing) and Aluminum Corp of China (H-share listing) in our China Materials trade, and overweight Tianqi Lithium in the lithium supply chain trade. Image Maanshan Iron & Steel and Angang Steel have attractive valuations, with trailing P/Es below 15. On the other end of this scale, China Northern Rare Earth and Baotou Steel appear very expensive (Chart 4A). On profitability, Wanhua Chemical and Tianqi Lithium top the ROE rank, while Jinduicheng Molybdenum and Baotou Steel sit at the bottom (Chart 4B). Screening the risk-reward profile, it is noticeable that chemicals normally demonstrate a better ROE vs. P/E metric than companies from the metals & mining industry. Specifically, Wanhua Chemical and Tianqi Lithium are the most attractive, while Jindiucheng Molybdenum is the least attractive (Chart 4C). Image Image Image In terms of operations, Tianqi Lithium reported the strongest operating margin, followed by Junzheng, while Hainan Rubber and Jinduicheng Molybdenum are the only companies that registered negative operating margins (Chart 4D). Looking at the balance sheet, Jinduicheng Molybdenum has the healthiest leverage, while Hesteel shows the most worrisome leverage. Moreover, it has the lowest FCF yield. In terms of FCF yield versus leverage, Kingenta offers the best tradeoff, while Hesteel is the least attractive (Charts 4E, 4F, 4G). Furthermore, dividend yield favors Longsheng and disfavors Northern Rare Earth (Chart 4H). Image Image Image Image In terms of projected EPS growth, Jinduicheng Molybdenum and Shandong Gold Mining have the strongest outlook for next year, while Maanshan Iron & Steel and Angang Steel are likely to report profit declines (Chart 4I). Image Image In summary, apart from Maanshan Iron & Steel, Hainan Rubber is a good candidate for the underweight basket due to its relatively expensive valuation, negative margin and FCF yield. Moreover, its focus on the rubber business diversifies the portfolio risk from metal & mining-concentrated underweight exposure. China Molybdenum, with its above-average risk-reward profile, moderately strong operations and financial position, as well as robust growth outlook, is a good candidate for the overweight basket of our lithium supply trade to replace Ganfeng Lithium. The company has a strong market presence in Congo, where over 60% of cobalt is mined. Real Estate Some 14 developers will be added to the existing MSCI EM index. Among the top 10 Chinese developers, measured by contracted sales and floor space sold, existing MSCI EM constituents account for six, while the A-share list will add two (Poly Real Estate and China Fortune Land). In the environment of property market tightening in China, primary land supply has remained stagnant. The government is unlikely to ease the supply restrictions in the near-term, especially in the residential land space. In this vein, we believe large market players will be better-positioned in this market, due to their bargaining power. Also, developers with heavy exposure to commercial property will be less affected by policy uncertainty than their residential counterparts. Looking at historical performance, the equally weighted basket has underperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 20.5%, and by 17.1% over a one-year period (Table 5). Image Xinhu Zhongbao and Financial Street are trading at the cheapest valuations, while Zhejiang China Commodities and China Fortune Land seem to be slightly overpriced compared to peers. The ROE for Xinhu Zhongbao is remarkable, while Zhangjiang High-tech Park is the only company with ROE under 10% (Charts 5A, 5B). Taking both dimensions into account, Xinhu Zhongbao and Gemdale display an attractive risk-reward profile (Chart 5C). Image Image Image Looking at operational metrics, Zhejiang China Commodities and Financial Street enjoy the highest margin, while Xinhu Zhongbao and Tahoe lie on the other end of the spectrum (Chart 5D). Due to the nature of business, leverage is high across the sector. In particular, Oceanwide and Tahoe have a high debt-to-equity ratio, while Zhejiang China Commodities and Gemdale have a more prudent capital structure. Furthermore, FCF yields vary a lot across companies, with Financial Street and Xinhu Zhongbao on the positive end, and Tahoe and Oceanwide on the negative. Financial Street also beats other developers in terms of cash generation for debt payment (Charts 5E, 5F, 5G). Image Image Image Image Gemdale and Risesun have the highest dividend yield, while Tahoe and Zhejiang China Commodities have the lowest (Chart 5H). Image Regarding the full-year 2018 expectations, Financial Street and Zhejiang China Commodities have a robust growth outlook with respect to funds from operations (FFO) and EPS respectively, while Gemdale is likely to see sluggish growth on both metrics (Charts 5I & 5J). In summary, we believe Financial Street Holding is likely to outperform in the real estate sector, given its appealing risk-reward profile, decent dividend yield, superior cash flow yield and operating margin, reasonable debt ratio, and robust FFO growth. Its large-scale and commercial property exposure is expected to be more immune to policy tightening in China. Image Image Utilities Some 12 utility companies will be added to the existing MSCI EM index, most of which are in power generation and renewables. EMES published in July an investment case on China utilities, underlining our preference toward companies with a focus on the environment and clean power, in line with the Chinese government's emphasis in the 13th five-year plan.3 In the A-share basket, we highlight Yangtze Power, the hydro power large cap, National Nuclear, as its name suggests the state-owned nuclear power operator, and Beijing Capital, the water utility provider. The equally weighted basket has underperformed the MSCI EM index year to date by 19.2%, and by 14.2% over a one-year period (Table 6). Image Huaneng Power is excluded from our analysis, as its H-share is already in the MSCI EM Index. Screening valuations, the trailing P/E factor favors Shenery and Chuantou Energy. By contrast, Huadian Power and Beijing Capital look expensive (Chart 6A). On profitability, Yangtze Power and Chuantou Energy have the strongest ROE, while Huadian Power and Shenzhen Energy fall far behind the average (Chart 6B). Based on valuation versus profitability, Chuantou Energy, Yangtze Power, and SDIC Power will likely outperform (Chart 6C). Image Image Image Yangtze Power and SDIC Power have remarkably high operating margins, while Shenery and Beijing Capital are at the other end of the spectrum (Chart 6D). Concerning leverage, most large-scale players such as Datang International Power and National Nuclear Power are highly leveraged. By contrast, low leveraged players, such as Hubei Energy and Shenergy, tend to have small market caps of around US$ 5 bn. In terms of FCF yield, we highlight Yangtze Power and Chuantou Energy, while we are cautious on Shenzhen Energy and National Nuclear Power due to their deeply negative yields. In summary, we like Chuantou Energy, Yangzte Power, Zheneng Electric, and Shenergy with respect to FCF yield versus leverage, which also coincides with dividend yield rank (Charts 6E, 6F, 6G, 6H). Image Image Image Image Finally, Huadian Power and Datang are expected to show the fastest bottom-line growth next year, while Yangtze Power and Chuantou Energy are likely to see limited earnings expansion (Chart 6I). Image Image Therefore, within utilities sector, we expect Yangtze Power to outperform in the long term, supported by its appealing risk-reward profile, margin expansion, and debt service ability. We also like the fact that the company's dominant strength of hydropower is the Yangtze River Delta. Billy Zicheng Huang, Research Analyst billyh@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see EM Equity Sector Strategy Special Report "A Sector Guide To A-shares - Part I ", dated September 19, 2017, available at emes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see EM Equity Sector Strategy Investment case "China Healthcare, Getting Healthier", dated August 9, 2016, available at emes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see EM Equity Sector Strategy Investment case "Budding Green Equities In China", dated July 11, 2017, available at emes.bcaresearch.com Appendix - I Image Appendix - II Overweight Company Profile Image Image Image Image Underweight Company Profile Image Image

Overweight After a very healthy start to the year, the S&P containers & packaging index has fallen back to where it started. Worries over hydrocarbon input prices, driven by hurricane-related supply constraints, combined with overcapacity concerns in containerboard have been the key culprits. While these cost fears are legitimate, we think investor focus should remain squarely on the demand side of the equation. Container & packaging earnings have been dramatically outpacing the broad market, driven by surging food production (second panel). Increasing consumer outlays on food and beverage (the drivers of packaging demand) have been closely associated with valuation rerating phases for the industry; a significant increase in the former over the past year has not been met with a catch up yet in the latter (bottom panel). We think investors will be rewarded for patience; stay overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5CONP - IP, WRK, BLL, PKG, SEE, AVY. Container & Packaging Valuation Has Not Caught Up To Demand Container & Packaging Valuation Has Not Caught Up To Demand

Highlights The path of least resistance for steel, coal and iron ore prices is down over the next 12-24 months. China's "de-capacity" reforms in steel and coal will continue into 2018 and 2019, but the scale and pace of "de-capacity" will diminish. The Mainland's steel and coal output will likely rise going forward as new capacity using more efficient and ecologically friendly technologies come on stream. Both the steel and coal industries in China are becoming more efficient and more competitive, with low-quality output falling and high-quality supply rising. Feature Reducing capacity (also called "de-capacity") in the oversupplied commodities markets (e.g., steel, coal, cement, and aluminum) has been a key priority within China's structural supply side reforms over the past two years. The reforms were announced by President Xi Jinping in November 2015 and have focused primarily on steel and coal, and to a lesser extent on the aluminum and cement sectors. China's "de-capacity" reforms have been aiming to reduce inefficient productive capacity and low-quality output of the above mentioned commodities, as well as boost medium-to-high-quality production. The main focus of this report is to dissect China's supply side "de-capacity" reforms, and to assess their impact on steel, coal and iron ore prices. The de-capacity reforms were announced in late 2015 and, coincidentally, all major industrial commodities prices made a synchronized bottom in late 2015/early 2016 (Chart I-1). Chart I-1ASynchronized Bottom & Rally: ##br##Due To Chinese 'De-Capacity' Reforms? Synchronized Bottom & Rally: Due To Chinese 'De-Capacity' Reforms? Synchronized Bottom & Rally: Due To Chinese 'De-Capacity' Reforms? Chart I-1BSynchronized Bottom & Rally: ##br##Due To Chinese 'De-Capacity' Reforms? Synchronized Bottom & Rally: Due To Chinese 'De-Capacity' Reforms? Synchronized Bottom & Rally: Due To Chinese 'De-Capacity' Reforms? China is the largest producer and consumer of various raw materials, ranging from steel and coal to base metals. Hence, two interesting questions arise: was it the "de-capacity" reforms or other factors that caused the various raw materials to bottom in early 2016 and rally thereafter? How will China's ongoing "de-capacity" reforms affect steel, coal, and iron ore prices going into 2018 and 2019? Progress Of "De-Capacity" Reforms Three main approaches have been used by policymakers with respect to de-capacity reforms: The government sets up capacity reduction targets and then implements concrete plans to achieve these targets. The government conducts inspections to ensure the reforms are being implemented or for environmental protection purposes. The government aims to eliminate outdated capacity by setting up electricity price rules (higher electricity prices for producers with inefficient technologies) as well as ordering banks to curtail lending to those producers. In terms of timelines, the Chinese supply side "de-capacity" reforms so far have been rolled out in three phases: Phase I: Initiation and preparation phase (2015 Q4 - 2016 H1): The first phase involved policy makers drawing related policies and capacity reduction targets in the steel and coal industries. Local governments and related SOEs began implementing the so-called "de-capacity" reforms. During this period, only 30% of the 2016 capacity reduction targets for both steel and coal markets were achieved. Phase II: The accelerating implementation phase (2016 H2): The second phase included a ramp-up of "de-capacity" reforms, with over 70% of 2016 steel and coal capacity reduction targets being implemented. Meanwhile, steel production disruptions increased due to more stringent environmental rules, more frequent inspections, and government-ordered closures of low-quality steel (called "Ditiaogang" in Chinese) production in Jiangsu and Shandong provinces. Phase III: The reform-deepening phase (2017): The third phase, implemented in the first half of this year, was a clamping down on overcapacity to eliminate all illegal sub-standard steel (Ditiaogang) production and capacity by the end of June 2017. To date, the Chinese authorities have succeeded in their "de-capacity" reforms in steel and coal: both the steel and coal industries in China have become more efficient, more competitive, and have much less obsolete excess capacity: The government's plan was to reduce capacity by 100-150 million metric tons in steel and 1 billion metric tons in coal within "three to five years." This equated to a 9-13% and 18% reduction of existing 2015 Chinese capacity in steel and coal, respectively. In addition, this is equivalent to 7-9% for steel and 10% for coal of 2015's global output (Table I-1). As of August 2017, within less than two years since the beginning of the supply side reforms, 77% of the steel "de-capacity" target (or 10% of 2015 capacity) and 52% of the coal "de-capacity" target (or 7% of 2015 capacity) have been achieved (Table I-1). Table I-1Chinese Supply-Side Reform - Capacity Reduction Target And Actual Achievement China's 'De-Capacity' Reforms: Where Steel & Coal Prices Are Headed China's 'De-Capacity' Reforms: Where Steel & Coal Prices Are Headed With declining capacity and rising production, the capacity utilization rates (CUR) of the steel and coal industries have increased meaningfully. The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) reported that as of the third quarter of 2017, the CUR for the steel industry has risen to 76.7% (the highest since 2013, and an increase of 4.4 percentage points from a year ago). As for the coal sector, the CUR reached 69% (the highest since 2015, and an increase of 10.6 percentage points from a year ago). With outdated and illegal production capacity exiting the marketplace, the number of companies and the number of employees have declined significantly in both the steel and coal industries (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Since the start of the "de-capacity" reforms, the central government has allocated 100 billion yuan (0.1% of GDP and 3.6% of central government spending) to a special fund for the relocation of employees in the coal and steel industries. Chart I-2Consolidation In Chinese Steel ##br##And Coal Sectors: Fewer Companies... Consolidation In Chinese Steel And Coal Sectors: Fewer Companies... Consolidation In Chinese Steel And Coal Sectors: Fewer Companies... Chart I-3...And Fewer Employees ...And Fewer Employees ...And Fewer Employees Higher prices for steel and coal have greatly boosted producers' profitability. From January 2016 to September 2017, the number of loss-making enterprises as a share of all enterprises has dropped from 25% to 17% in the steel industry and from 34% to 21% in the coal sector. Improving financial conditions have enhanced steel and coal companies' ability to invest in industrial upgrades (i.e., more investment in advanced technologies and new equipment). Bottom Line: Chinese "de-capacity" reforms have been successfully implemented, which has improved economic efficiency in the steel and coal industries by reducing high-cost and low-quality supply, and by increasing lower-cost and high-quality output. Understanding The Cycle In this section, we try to connect the dots between the progress of China's supply side reforms, and steel and coal prices. Chart I-4A and Chart I-4B show the fascinating dynamics among policy actions, production and prices. Chart I-4APolicy Actions And Market Dynamics: Coal Sector Policy Actions And Market Dynamics: Steel Sector Policy Actions And Market Dynamics: Steel Sector Chart I-4BPolicy Actions And Market Dynamics: Steel Sector Policy Actions And Market Dynamics: Coal Sector Policy Actions And Market Dynamics: Coal Sector Here are our major findings: (A) Except for coal, Chinese "de-capacity" reforms were not the major trigger for the price bottom in major industrial commodities in early 2016. As the period from November 2015 to June 2016 was only the initiation stage of the reforms, not much steel capacity reduction - only 1.2% of total existing 2015 capacity - occurred in the first half year of 2016. Moreover, most of the reduced capacity was outdated capacity and probably had been offline for years. Therefore, the policy driven capacity cut in the first half of 2016 was unlikely the reason for the rally in steel prices. The reasons behind the bottom in raw materials prices in general and steel in particular during the first half of 2016 were the following: 1. Production cuts in both 2015 and the first half of 2016 was market-driven. In other words, it was not government reforms but natural market forces (the dramatic drop in raw materials prices in 2015) that caused company closures and declines in various raw materials output in both 2015 and the first half of 2016 (Chart I-4A). The price recovery in the first half of 2016 was not sufficient to make most producers profitable. 2. Remarkably, the authorities injected considerable amounts of credit and fiscal stimulus in late 2015 and early 2016. As a result, demand recovery was another major trigger for the synchronized bottom in early 2016. The rise in the aggregate credit and fiscal spending impulse led to a revival in property construction, automobile production and infrastructure investment in the first half of 2016 (Chart I-5). 3. Financial/speculative demand for commodities was also a driving force behind the early 2016 price recovery. Chart I-6 illustrates that Mainland trading volumes in various commodities futures surged in the first half of 2016, and specifically in coal in the third quarter of 2016, coinciding with their respective price spikes. Chart I-5Strong Demand Recovery In 2016 Strong Demand Recovery In 2016 Strong Demand Recovery In 2016 Chart I-6Speculative Buying In Early 2016 Speculative Buying In Early 2016 Speculative Buying In Early 2016 All of these factors contributed to the synchronized price bottom in early 2016 and the consequent price rally in the first half of 2016, in which Chinese "de-capacity" reforms only played a minor role, especially in the steel market. (B) Chinese "de-capacity" reforms were the determining factor for the coal price spike in 2016 and steel price appreciation in 2017. Coal in 2016: "De-capacity" reforms were behind the surge in coal and coke prices throughout 2016. In February 2016, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) stipulated that domestic coal mines could operate no more than 276 working days in one year, down from 330 working days in the past. This was equivalent to the immediate removal of 16% of existing operating capacity off the market. Before this decision, Chinese coal production had already declined 2.5% in 2014 and 3.3% in 2015 (Chart I-4B on page 6). On top of this decision, the government enforced a 250 million metric ton capacity cut target in the coal industry in 2016. Furthermore, actual coal capacity reduction in 2016 was 116% of that year's target (Table I-1). The end result was a 10% decline in Chinese coal production during the period of January and September of 2016 from the same period of 2015, triggering an exponential rise in both thermal coal and coking coal prices (Chart I-1 on page 2). Coking coal is mainly used for coke production, and coke is employed as a fuel in smelting iron ore in a blast furnace to produce steel. Therefore, a shortage of coking coal combined with a revival in steel production made coke the best-performing commodity last year, with its price skyrocketing by 300%. Chart I-7Diverging Prices In 2017 DIVERGING PRICES IN 2017 DIVERGING PRICES IN 2017 Towards the end of last year, the authorities realized that "de-capacity" in the coal market was too aggressive, and began loosening up coal production restrictions in September 2016. Last November the NDRC further eased policy by allowing companies to operate 330 days a year again (Chart I-4B on page 6). In response to these adjustments, thermal coal, coking coal and coke prices all peaked in December 2016/early 2017 (Chart I-1 on page 2). This reveals how Chinese supply side reforms can be a determining factor for global commodities prices. Steel prices in 2017: Steel prices have exhibited a steady rally throughout 2017, even though prices for coal, coke and iron ore all declined. There has been considerable price divergence this year between steel, on one hand, and coal, coke and iron ore, on the other. Prices for thermal coal, coking coal, coke and iron ore all peaked in late 2016/early 2017, while prices for steel continued to rise and reached a six-year high in September, expanding profit margins for steel producers (Chart I-7). The resilience of steel prices this year was because the Mainland had dismantled all "Ditiaogang" capacity by the end of June 2017, resulting in an accelerated drop in steel products production (Chart I-4A on page 6). "Ditiaogang" is low-quality steel made by melting scrap metal in cheap and easy-to-install induction furnaces. These steel products are of poor quality, and also lead to environmental degradation. "Ditiaogang" is often converted into products like rebar and wire rods. As steel produced this way is illegal, it is not recorded in official crude steel production data. However, after it is converted into steel products, official steel products production data do include it. Both falling steel products production and surging scrap steel exports entail that the "Ditiaogang" capacity elimination policy has been very effective (Chart I-8). Chart I-8The Removal Of 'Ditiaogang' Has ##br##Been Successfully Implemented The Removal Of 'Ditiaogang' Has Been Successfully Implemented The Removal Of 'Ditiaogang' Has Been Successfully Implemented As reported by the government, about 120 million metric tons per year of "Ditiaogang" capacity has been eliminated, more than double this year's steel "de-capacity" target of 50 million metric tons. A considerable portion of the 120 million metric ton "Ditiaogang" capacity was still in operation early this year when "Ditiaogang" producers enjoyed higher profit margins than large steel producers. This rapid change created a sudden squeeze on steel products supply, which consequently boosted their prices. Bottom Line: China's "de-capacity" reforms have played a major role in driving the rallies in steel prices in 2017 and in the coal markets in 2016. In short, China's supply-side reforms have been effective in shaping prices and boosting efficiency in Mainland industries by eliminating weak/inefficient producers or forcing their industrial upgrade. However, the government efforts at times have also produced large price swings, as in the case of both coal and coke. The Outlook For 2018 And 2019 Given past success and the nation's leadership adherence to reforms, China will firmly proceed with its "de-capacity" reform strategy over the next two years. However, steel and coal prices are likely to decline going forward. The most aggressive phase of "de-capacity" reforms is now behind us. The pace of capacity reduction for both steel and coal will decrease over the next two years as more than half of the 2016-2020 target has already been achieved for both sectors. Both steel and coal producers currently enjoy near-decade high profit margins, and their profits have swelled (Chart I-9A and Chart I-9B). Not surprisingly, steel and coal producers have already sped up their investment in advanced technologies to augment their capacity - by introducing ecologically friendly equipment that can produce medium- to high-end quality products. Chart I-9AStrong Profits For Steel And Coal Producers Rising Profit Margins For Steel And Coal Producers Rising Profit Margins For Steel And Coal Producers Chart I-9BRising Profit Margins For Steel And Coal Producers Strong Profits For Steel And Coal Producers Strong Profits For Steel And Coal Producers Importantly, the capacity swap policy introduced by the authorities has been allowing steel and coal producers to add new capacity to replace obsolete capacity at a ratio of 1:1-1.25 (the range depends on region). In short, having eliminated the inefficient/outdated capacity, producers are now allowed to add as much capacity as they had before, but using efficient technologies. This will weigh on steel and coal prices as output gains and production costs will likely be lower with new technologies. In addition, Chinese steel producers are accelerating the expansion of advanced electric furnace (EF) capacity. At 6%, current Chinese EF steel output as a share of total steel production is much lower than the same ratio for the major world steel producers and the world average (Chart I-10). The Chinese government's target is to raise the share of EF crude steel production as a share of total production to 15% by 2020. It usually takes at least 1-2 years to build a new EF plant. Hence, newly installed EF capacity will likely come into operation in 2018-'19. On the whole, this points to lower prices for crude steel and steel products. The EF steel-making process only requires scrap steel and electricity to produce crude steel. It does not need either iron ore or coke. This is negative for iron ore and coke prices. With the abundance of used cars and used home appliances in China, the domestic availability of scrap steel has significantly improved over the past few decades. In addition, electricity prices for industrial use have declined by about 5% since March 2015. Therefore, easing resource constraints (availability of scrap steel) and lower electricity costs will facilitate EF steel capacity expansion in China. Some words about the policy-driven steel production cut during the winter season. More than two dozen cities in northern China drew up detailed action plans during September and October to fight the notorious winter smog. China has set a target to reduce the level of Particulate Matter (PM) 2.5 pollution by at least 15% in cities around the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region between October 2017 and March 2018. The new rules will require seasonal suspensions or production cuts of steel, aluminum and cement (with the most focus on steel) during the winter heating season from November 15 to March 15. Therefore, over the next four months, downside in steel and coal prices may be limited due to support from these output cuts. This also entails less short-term demand for coke and iron ore, prices for these commodities may remain under downward pressure. Nonetheless, Chinese crude steel output is set to continue rising over the next two years, which in turn will eventually reverse the recent decline in steel products production and assure expansion in steel products production in 2018-'19 (Chart I-11). Chart I-10Chinese Electric Furnace Crude ##br##Steel Production Will Go Up China's 'De-Capacity' Reforms: Where Steel & Coal Prices Are Headed China's 'De-Capacity' Reforms: Where Steel & Coal Prices Are Headed Chart I-11Steel Products Output Will Soon Catch Up Steel Products Output Will Soon Catch Up Steel Products Output Will Soon Catch Up For coal, production will accelerate in 2018. The NDRC expects coal production capacity to rise by a net 200 million metric tons this year as increases at more "advanced" mines exceed shutdowns of outmoded facilities. This will be a 50 million metric ton gain over this year's 150 million metric ton obsolete capacity reduction target. In addition, China's coal utilization rate as of the third quarter of 2017 was still below 70%, implying substantial additional capacity remains, potentially boosting coal output, so long as the government does not alter the 330 working-day rule. Importantly, on the demand side, China is aiming to reduce coal usage for electricity generation while promoting renewable energy like hydro, nuclear, wind and solar. This constitutes a structural headwind to coal prices. This is especially significant, given than China accounts for half of global coal consumption. The supply side reforms of the past two years (shutting down inferior capacity) along with the adoption of new, more efficient technologies, has already strengthened the competitiveness of Chinese steel and coal producers. This entails that China will soon resume net exports of steel products, and that its net imports of coal will drop (Chart I-12). This is bad news for international steel and coal producers, who in the past two years have benefited from higher steel and coal prices on the back of a revival in Chinese demand, and curtailed supply. Last but not least, our broad money impulse as well as the aggregate credit and fiscal spending impulse shows that economic growth in general and demand for industrial metals in particular are set to decelerate considerably in the next nine to 12 months or so (Chart I-13). Chart I-12China May Increase Its Net Steel Exports ##br##And Decrease Its Net Coal Imports China May Increase Its Net Steel Exports And Decrease Its Net Coal Imports China May Increase Its Net Steel Exports And Decrease Its Net Coal Imports Chart I-13Demand Is Set To Decelerate bca.ems_sr_2017_11_22_s1_c13 bca.ems_sr_2017_11_22_s1_c13 Chinese steel and coal markets will determine the direction of coke and iron ore prices, both of which will likely be headed lower as well. Coke: Rising coking coal output as a result of coal production ramping up will increase coke supply sizably. As an increasing share of steel output will come from non-coke-reliant EF capacity, coke demand growth will be constrained. Iron ore: Recovering domestic iron ore production could cap China's imports of iron ore (Chart I-14). First, a marginal rise in profit margins for Chinese iron ore domestic producers and a declining number of loss-generating companies heralds modest upside for iron ore output in China (Chart I-15). Chart I-14Chinese Iron Ore Output Will Rise Chinese Iron Ore Output Will Rise Chinese Iron Ore Output Will Rise Chart I-15Chinese Iron Ore Producers: ##br##Marginal Rise In Profit Margins Chinese Iron Ore Producers: Marginal Rise In Profit Margins Chinese Iron Ore Producers: Marginal Rise In Profit Margins Second, more vertical integration - a rising number of Chinese steel producers that have bought iron ore mines - will result in higher domestic iron ore output. Steel companies' current fat profit margins could prompt them to boost iron ore output from the mines that they have integrated into their production chain. Although profits from iron ore production specifically are likely to be limited. This will be the case especially if the government encourages them to do so. Last year, Chinese iron ore imports accounted for 87% of national total consumption - an all-time high. The authorities dislike such great dependence on resource imports, and the government will likely introduce policies such as reducing taxes for domestic iron ore producers or other efforts to boost domestic production. Bottom Line: China's "de-capacity" reforms in steel and coal will continue into 2018 and 2019, but the scale and pace of "de-capacity" will diminish. The Mainland's steel and coal output will likely rise going forward as new capacity using more efficient and ecologically friendly technologies come on stream. The path of least resistance for steel, coal and iron ore prices is down over the next 12-24 months. Ellen JingYuan He, Editor/Strategist EllenJ@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights Broad Chinese equity market performance since last month's Party Congress is consistent with our view that the pace of reforms over the coming year will not cause a meaningful deceleration in China's industrial sector. Stay overweight Chinese stocks. After accounting for idiosyncrasy, divergent sector performance is largely consistent with the stated intentions of Chinese policymakers. Our new China Reform Monitor, which is based on sector performance, should help investors identify whether the pace of reforms is moving too rapidly to be consistent with a benign growth outlook. We are adding two new reform-themed trades this week, and closing one existing position (with a healthy profit). Feature BCA's China Investment Strategy service has presented a relatively benign view of the economic impact of stepped up reform efforts in China over the coming 6-12 months. As we noted in last week's report, while a "status quo" scenario of no significant reforms is highly unlikely over the coming year, the pace of reforms will be structured at a level of intensity that will be sufficient to avoid an outsized deceleration in China's industrial sector. We also highlighted that monitoring reform progress would be an important theme to revisit, and in this week's report we review the response of investors to the Party Congress, both at the broad market and sector level, to judge whether it is consistent with our outlook and positioning. We also introduce two new reform-themed trades, and recommend booking profits on an existing position. Broad Market Performance Post-Congress Before gauging the market's view of the likely impact of refocused reform efforts on the Chinese economy over the coming year, it is worth revisiting what kind of market performance would be consistent with our view. To recap the view of our Geopolitical Strategy service,1 President Xi's reform agenda is likely to intensify over the next 12 months, suggesting that Chinese policymakers will make meaningful efforts to: Pare back heavy-polluting industry Hasten the transition of China's economy to "consumer-led" growth2 Deleverage the financial sector Continue to crack down on corruption and graft From the perspective of BCA's China Investment Strategy service, a rapid and intense pace of these reforms would likely be a net negative for Chinese equities, as well as for emerging markets (EM) and other plays on China's industrial sector. For example, in terms of the impact on Chinese stock prices, we highlighted in last week's report that MSCI China ex-tech earnings have been closely correlated with the Li Keqiang index, which would likely decline non-trivially in the face of a very pressing reform push. In addition, the potential for a policy mistake would presumably raise the risk premium on Chinese equities, which would reverse at least some of their meaningful re-rating vs the global benchmark since late-2015. As such, to be consistent with our view, broad market performance (relative to emerging market or global stocks) should have been largely unaffected in the immediate aftermath of the Party Congress, but somewhat divergent at the sector level, given the likely creation of at least some industry "winners" and "losers" from renewed reforms. For the overall market, Chart 1 shows that this is exactly what has occurred over the past month. The chart presents the relative performance of Chinese equities versus the emerging market (EM) and global benchmarks, both in US$ terms and rebased to 100 on the day of President Xi's speech at the Party Congress. The initial reaction to the speech was modestly negative, with Chinese stocks falling a little over 2% in relative terms versus their global peers. But this loss disappeared less than three weeks following the speech, underscoring that market participants agree with our assessment that a rebooted reform effort will not threaten the economy as a whole. Investors should stay overweight Chinese stocks relative to their benchmark. Chart 1No Sign That Stepped Up Reforms Will Be A Net Negative For Chinese Economic Growth No Sign That Stepped Up Reforms Will Be A Net Negative For Chinese Economic Growth No Sign That Stepped Up Reforms Will Be A Net Negative For Chinese Economic Growth The Sector Implications Of Renewed Reforms Chart 2 shows that the sector effects of President Xi's speech have indeed been more divergent, which is also in line with our perspective of view-consistent performance. The chart shows that the past month's performance of the 11 level 1 GICS sectors relative to the broad market can be grouped into three distinct categories: Chart 2China's Reforms Will Create Some Winners##br## And Losers China's Reforms Will Create Some Winners And Losers China's Reforms Will Create Some Winners And Losers Clear outperformers, which include health care, energy, information technology, and consumer staples, Neutral to modest underperformers, which include utilities, telecom services, and financials, and Clear underperformers, which include industrials, real estate, consumer discretionary, and materials Several of these results are not surprising, as they clearly resonate with the stated intensions of Chinese policymakers. In particular, the outperformance of health care, technology, and consumer staples stocks and the underperformance of capital-goods intensive industrials straightforwardly reflects the goal of re-orienting "old China" towards a new, consumer-focused economy. While energy stocks are viewed as a traditionally cyclically-sensitive carbon-intensive sector, oil prices have risen over the past month and China's share of global energy consumption is much smaller than that of base metals. However, the relative return profiles of a few sectors mentioned above are at least somewhat counterintuitive. On this front, several observations are noteworthy: At first blush, the significant underperformance of Chinese consumer discretionary stocks is counterintuitive if policymakers are aiming to reduce the country's reliance on investment and increase the share of private consumption. However, as Table 1 shows, Chinese consumer discretionary stocks have likely sold off due to the automobile & components industry group, which is potentially at risk of being negatively impacted by the environmental mandate of President Xi's proposed reforms. The table shows that the automobiles & components industry group accounts for a full 1/3rd of Chinese consumer discretionary market capitalization, which is non-trivially larger than in the case of the global benchmark. Table 1 also highlights that China's retailing industry group is as large as that of automobiles & components, which in theory should have provided an offset to the latter's weakness. However, in market capitalization terms, retailers in the MSCI China index are dominated by two large players, one of which is active in providing corporate travel management services. The continuation and expansion of China's anti-corruption campaign was a key message from the Party Congress, and it would appear that investors are concerned about the potential for anti-graft efforts to negatively impact the demand for goods & services that could be potentially linked to corruption or largesse. The underperformance of the materials sector is seemingly reform-consistent, although here too the details of China's investible indexes matter. Table 2 presents a sub-industry breakdown of the MSCI China materials index, as well as an indication whether rebooted reform efforts are a clear negative for the sub-industry. The table highlights that the likely impact of a renewed reform push is mixed: construction materials firms and copper producers (at least in terms of output) are like to suffer, but there are no obvious negative implications for aluminum,3 gold, and paper products producers. The impact on commodity chemicals producers is ambiguous, given that packaging for consumer goods is a significant end market for the petrochemical industry. Table 1Autos Make Up A Significant Share Of ##br##China's Consumer Discretionary Sector Messages From The Market, Post-Party Congress Messages From The Market, Post-Party Congress Table 2Impact Of Renewed Reforms ##br##On The Materials Sector Is Mixed Messages From The Market, Post-Party Congress Messages From The Market, Post-Party Congress Finally, there appears to be at least somewhat of a discrepancy between the benign performance of Chinese financials and the underperformance of the real estate sector. Attempts to curb "excessive" financial risks and debt could certainly hurt the real estate sector, but this would also negatively impact banks via a slowdown in credit growth. For now, the significant valuation gap between Chinese financials and real estate appears to be the only explanation for this divergent performance post Party Congress, but we will continue to watch these sectors for signs of a wider market implication. Sector idiosyncrasies aside, the broad conclusion from China's equity market performance over the past month is that investors acknowledge that there are likely to be winners and losers from a rebooted reform mandate, but that overall economic growth in China is not likely to significantly decelerate. This is consistent with our view that the pace of reform efforts over the coming year will not be so intense as to trigger a meaningful decline in the growth rate of China's industrial sector. But the potential for an aggressive pace of reforms is a clear risk to our view that the ongoing slowdown in China's economy is likely to be benign and controlled. Chart 3 introduces our China Reform Monitor as one way to monitor this risk, which is calculated as an equally-weighted average of the four "winner" sectors highlighted above relative to an equally-weighted average of the remaining seven sectors. Significant underperformance of "loser" sectors could become a headwind for broad MSCI China outperformance (especially ex-tech), and we will be watching closely for signs that our monitor is rising largely due to outright declines in the denominator. Chart 3Our China Reform Monitor Will Help Us Track The Impact Of A Renewed Reform Push Our China Reform Monitor Will Help Us Track The Impact Of A Renewed Reform Push Our China Reform Monitor Will Help Us Track The Impact Of A Renewed Reform Push Two New Reform-Themed Trade Ideas, And One Trade Closure We have new two trade ideas for investors given the performance of Chinese equities in the wake of the Party Congress: Long investable consumer staples / short investable consumer discretionary Long investable environmental, social and governance (ESG) leaders / short investable benchmark The basis for the first trade stems from our earlier discussion of the current limitations of China's investable consumer discretionary index as a clear-cut play on retail-oriented consumer spending. In addition, while consumer staples stocks are reliably low-beta, they have recently been rising vs consumer discretionary in relative terms despite a rise in the broad investable market (Chart 4). The odds favor a continuation of this trend if a renewed reform push continues to appear likely (i.e., we are banking that this trade will be driven by alpha rather than beta). Chart 4Staples Are A Better Consumer Play Staples Are A Better Consumer Play Staples Are A Better Consumer Play Chart 5ESG Leaders Should Fare Quite Well In A Reform Environment ESG Leaders Should Fare Quite Well In A Reform Environment ESG Leaders Should Fare Quite Well In A Reform Environment The basis for the second trade is to overweight stocks that are best positioned to deliver "sustainable" growth. Our proxy for this trade is the MSCI ESG Leaders index, which favors firms with the highest MSCI ESG ratings in each sector (using a proprietary ranking scheme). The index maintains similar sector weights as the investable benchmark, which limits the beta risk of the trade. Chart 5 highlights that MSCI's ESG Leaders index has outperformed the broad market by almost 7% per year since 2010, with current valuation levels that are broadly similar to the benchmark. To us, this trade represents an attractive risk-reward profile even if the pace of China's reforms are not aggressive over the coming year. Chart 6Close Our China / DM Materials Trade Close Our China / DM Materials Trade Close Our China / DM Materials Trade Finally, we recommend closing our long MSCI China investable materials sector / short developed markets materials trade. A scenario where China continues to shrink the domestic production capacity of metals without significantly curtailing its overall import volume may be modestly positive for global base metals prices, but it would appear that DM materials producers would benefit more from this outcome than Chinese producers (owing to the impact of production constraints on the volume of product sold). While the Chinese material sector remains grossly undervalued versus its DM peer, the bottom line is that the outlook for this trade is cloudier than before at a time when it is correcting sharply from previously overbought conditions (Chart 6). We suggest that investors close the trade for now, booking a healthy profit of 11%. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Special Report, "China: Party Congress Ends ... So What?" dated November 2, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 2 Investors should note that BCA's China Investment Strategy service has long been skeptical of calls to shift China's economy to a consumption-driven growth model, because it significantly raises the odds that the country will not be able to escape the middle-income trap. For example, please see Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "On A Higher Note", dated October 5, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 3 In our view, the use of aluminum in transportation is consistent with an environmental protection mandate, given that its light-weight properties allow for reduced energy consumption. For example, in the U.S. in 2014/2015, Ford Motor Company switched the production of the F150 from a steel to an aluminum frame, resulting in a significant improvement in fuel economy. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Tipping points tend to occur when too many long-term value investors are uncharacteristically behaving like short-term momentum traders. Long IBEX35 versus Eurostoxx50 constitutes a good tactical trade. The underperformance of Spanish equities appears excessively pessimistic. Euro/dollar is technically extended by about 4 cents. The near term event risk is the ECB meeting on October 26, when a taper of asset purchases which extends well beyond 12 months might be regarded as dovish. But in the medium term, euro/dollar will head well north of 1.30. Underweight Basic Materials equities relative to the market as a tactical trade. Feature Spain: Red Herring Or Red Flag? Long Spanish equities is an excellent tactical trade provided that the imbroglio in Catalonia turns out to be a red herring. The IBEX35 index is at a classic tipping point of excessive short-term (negative) groupthink and herding (Chart of the Week). Chart Of The WeekThe Underperformance Of Spanish Equities Seems Excessive The Underperformance Of Spanish Equities Seems Excessive The Underperformance Of Spanish Equities Seems Excessive But is the imbroglio in Catalonia a red herring? Most likely, yes. As my colleague Marko Papic, BCA Chief Geopolitical Strategist points out, any unilateral declaration of independence from Catalonia would be vacuous if it lacked international legitimacy, or the ability to enforce it with arms. German sociologist Max Weber famously defined a nation's sovereignty as a "monopoly over the use of legitimate force." Unlike the Basque separatists, Catalan separatists have never resorted to force. A descent into violence remains unlikely because the Catalan independence movement is mainly a bourgeois, middle and upper class intellectual vision. The majority of Catalonia's working class are neither Catalan, nor support independence. Any unilateral declaration of independence would also lack political credibility because the opponents of independence largely boycotted the recent referendum to avoid giving it legitimacy. The vote for independence comprised only 37% of the electorate, meaning that popular support for independence remains questionable. The real (and unspoken) reason for the independence referendum was that it was the only glue holding together the Junts Pel Si (Together For Yes) four party coalition forming Catalonia's regional government. Without this glue, the two nationalist parties from opposite sides of the ideological spectrum would not be in bed with each other. And it is unclear whether this unholy alliance can stay entwined. To sum up, Catalan independence is an intellectual vision which at the moment lacks political and implementation credibility. For the imbroglio to become a full-blown crisis, the Catalan government, or militant groups, or the Spanish government would have to escalate tensions with the use of force. We do not expect this to happen. So the underperformance of Spanish equities appears excessively pessimistic, and long IBEX35 versus Eurostoxx50 constitutes a good 3-month trade (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Chart I-2The IBEX 35 And Euro Stoxx 50 Have Parted Company The IBEX35 And Euro Stoxx 50 Have Parted Company The IBEX35 And Euro Stoxx 50 Have Parted Company Chart I-3The IBEX 35 Has Catch-Up Potential The IBEX35 Has Catch-Up Potential The IBEX35 Has Catch-Up Potential Identifying Tipping Points Of Price Trends Let's take this opportunity to review how we identify such tipping points of excessive groupthink and herding. Tipping points tend to occur when too many long-term value investors are uncharacteristically behaving like short-term momentum traders. Instead of dispassionately investing on the basis of value, long-term investors get sucked into chasing a price trend, and thereby amplify it. These price trends reach exhaustion when there are no more value investors left to suck in, and at the margin, someone wants to get out. The following analysis describes the tipping point of a price uptrend, but exactly the same analysis applies in reverse to the tipping point of a price downtrend. When a financial asset price starts to rise, the momentum trader's natural inclination is to chase the price rise, and buy. Conversely, the long-term value investor's natural inclination, ordinarily, is to lean against the price rise, and sell. The two investors interpret the same information in polar opposite ways because they have very different time horizons. Importantly, their different interpretations of the same information - stemming from their different time horizons - allow the momentum trader and the value investor to trade with one another in very large volume at the current price. This is what creates a healthy market with plentiful liquidity. Now consider what happens when a long-term value investor flips out of character and acts like a momentum trader. With the numerical balance shifting to the momentum traders, the price has to move up to balance buy and sell orders. As more and more value investors defect to momentum trading, the price uptrend gathers steam. This uptrend is exhausted when the long-term value investors have all joined the trend. Regular readers know that we identify these tipping points by comparing the behaviour of investors with 'short-term' 1-day horizons and investors with 'long-term' 65-day horizons. For any financial asset, a near term price reversal is likely to occur when its 65-day fractal dimension hits a lower limit of 1.25 (Chart I-4), which we have found to be the 'universal constant of finance'.1 Chart I-4When The Valuation Framework Changes, It Is More Difficult To Assess Tipping Points When The Valuation Framework Changes, It Is More Difficult To Assess Tipping Points When The Valuation Framework Changes, It Is More Difficult To Assess Tipping Points At this remarkably consistent limit, the long-term investor reverts back to character, realises the stock is now overvalued and wants to sell. The trouble is that everybody has already joined the trend. To sell, there needs to be a buyer. But who will buy at the current price? Usually, the answer is nobody. The marginal buyer will be a new category of investor: an 'ultra-long term' value investor - let's say, with a 130-day horizon - who stayed true to character and refused to join the uptrend. As this investor knows that the stock is overvalued at the current price, he will only provide liquidity at the 'correct' lower price. So this is the tipping point at which the price trend reverses. Occasionally, there is another possibility. The ultra-long term value investor could also join the trend at the current price. This might happen when the valuation framework for an investment is especially uncertain, leaving long-term value investors extremely disoriented and unable to assess the 'correct' price. An important conclusion is that when the valuation framework for an investment is undergoing a major change, it is much more difficult to assess the tipping point of a price trend. Which brings us to the euro. Is The Euro Overbought? Through the second half of 2014 and early 2015, the euro was in a major downtrend as the ECB first signalled and then implemented its QE program. On several occasions, the 65-day downtrend seemed technically exhausted but after only minor reversals, the downtrend continued (see Chart I-4 again). Even after the 130-day downtrend seemed exhausted at the start of 2015, it persisted into the spring (Chart I-5). The reason was that as the ECB moved into the uncharted territory of QE, ZIRP and NIRP, the valuation framework for the euro also moved into uncharted territory. Without a reliable valuation anchor, longer and longer term investors jumped on the euro bear bandwagon. Chart I-5The Euro Is Overbought, But The Reversal Might Be Minor The Euro Is Overbought, But The Reversal Might Be Minor The Euro Is Overbought, But The Reversal Might Be Minor Today, we face the mirror-image situation. The euro has been in a major uptrend for most of 2017 as the ECB has signalled a recalibration of its extraordinary monetary easing. But though the 65-day uptrend seemed exhausted in the early summer, the uptrend continued as longer term investors joined the trend. Just as in 2014-15, the question today is: at a major turning point in ECB policy, what is the most reliable valuation anchor? For us, the best explanatory model for euro/dollar is the expected difference in ECB versus Fed policy rates 5 years ahead. As this differential compressed from -230 bps to -160 bps, euro/dollar rallied in perfect lockstep from 1.03 to 1.15. However, the subsequent rally has deviated from the expected policy rate differential, suggesting that the euro's uptrend is indeed overdone by about 4 cents. But in the medium term, the much bigger question is: what will happen to the expected policy rate differential? As we explained in Positioning For A Sea-Change2 the differential must eventually compress to around -40 bps, because this is the mid-point of a very well established multi-decade cycle (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). In which case, euro/dollar must eventually head well north of 1.30 (Chart I-8). Chart I-6The Euro Area - U.S. Average ##br##Interest Rate Differntial = -40 bps... The Euro Area - U.S. Average Interest Rate Differntial = -40bps... The Euro Area - U.S. Average Interest Rate Differntial = -40bps... Chart I-7...Because The Euro Area-U.S. ##br##Inflation Differential = -40 bps ...Because The Euro Area-U.S. Inflation Differential = -40bps ...Because The Euro Area-U.S. Inflation Differential = -40bps Chart I-8An Expected Interest Differential ##br##Of -40 bps Means EUR/USD Goes North Of 1.30 An Expected Interest Differential Of -40 bps Means EUR/USD Goes North Of 1.30 An Expected Interest Differential Of -40 bps Means EUR/USD Goes North Of 1.30 To be clear, north of 1.30 is the medium term direction of travel, and the journey will not be a straight line. The near term event risk is the ECB meeting on October 26, when the central bank will very likely announce a recalibration of its monetary policy. A taper of asset purchases which extends well beyond 12 months might be regarded as dovish, as it would delay the timing of policy rate normalisation. In which case, euro/dollar could retest 1.15. Finally, and very briefly, Chart I-9 shows the major equity sector most at risk of a price trend reversal is Basic Materials. Although global growth seems healthy and synchronized, materials equities seem to have run much too far ahead, especially relative to other cyclical equity sectors. We recommend tactically underweighting Basic Materials relative to the market. Chart I-9Tactically Underweight Basic Materials Tactically Underweight Basic Materials Tactically Underweight Basic Materials Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Universal Constant Of Finance," September 25 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Published on September 7 2017 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model* As decribed in the main body of this report, this week’s new trade recommendation is to go long Spain’s IBEX35 versus the Eurostoxx50 with a profit target/stop loss of 2.5%. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment’s fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 Long Canadian 10-Year Government Bond Long Canadian 10-Year Government Bond * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Weak spots in the U.S. economy have become increasingly hard to find. That said, two standouts are non-residential construction and light vehicle production, both of which remain in contraction despite the overall economic expansion (second panel). Importantly, growth in both of these sectors relies heavily on expanding credit; in the most recent Fed senior loan officer survey, these categories both saw tightening lending standards, implying a negative credit impulse (third panel). All of this is bad news for domestic steel producers, for whom non-residential construction and light vehicle production are the key end markets. Even worse news is that steel imports are gaining share of an increasingly diminished market (fourth panel), despite the Trump administration's pledge to protect domestic steel production through tariffs. Iron ore prices in China, which have struggled to climb off lows (bottom panel), imply that tariffs will need to be substantial to stem foreign inflows. Bottom Line: Weak demand, policy uncertainty and increasing offshore competition should sustain downward pressure on steel stocks. Stay underweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the S&P 1500 steel index are: BLBG: S15STEL - NUE, STLD, RS, X, ATI, CRS, CMC, WOR, AKS, TMST, SXC, HAYN, ZEUS. Rust Never Sleeps But Steel Stocks Do Rust Never Sleeps But Steel Stocks Do

Our market neutral trade long materials/short utilities has delivered much faster than we had anticipated, returning more than 6% since the August 21st inception. Three key factors explain the exceptional performance right out of the gate: the ongoing shift from defensives toward cyclicals, increasingly supportive macro data and softness in the U.S. dollar. Our relative Cyclical Macro Indicator (top panel) is currently as skewed toward a cyclical portfolio tilt as it has been at any point in the past twelve years. The same can be said for the ISM manufacturing index, which has further accelerated since we initiated the trade (second panel). Lastly, the export-oriented materials manufacturers enjoy a twofold benefit from the year-to-date depreciation in the greenback: global market share gains and pricing power led top and bottom line growth (third panel). In contrast and in a relative sense, domestic-dependent utilities companies suffer from the U.S. dollar's softness. Our relative EPS model (bottom panel) captures these forces and indicates, despite solid gains in its first month, profits from this trade should persist. Accordingly, we recommend maintaining a long S&P materials/short S&P utilities pair trade. Fundamentals Continue To Drive Materials Over Utilities Fundamentals Continue To Drive Materials Over Utilities

Overweight A neglected aspect of the catastrophe of Hurricane Harvey was the shutdown of nearly 40% of ethylene production, the key ingredient in plastics packaging for foodstuffs, still the largest customer for the containers & packaging index. While production is gradually coming back on line, near-term capacity constraints have driven a 50% spike in ethylene prices (not shown). In the end, we expect Harvey to be a transitory margin blip that is outweighed by the current global economic resurgence driving increasing global exports, particularly U.S. food exports (second & third panels). Moreover, chemical producers have committed capital for approximately 15% more capacity of ethylene production coming on stream in the next two years, meaning this price spike should prove fleeting. We think investors should stay focused on the rebound in containers & packaging pricing power and the industry's disciplined productivity focus (bottom panel). Taken together these factors should generate profit growth that will significantly outlast a hurricane-related dip. Stay overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5CONP - IP, WRK, BLL, PKG, SEE, AVY. Looking Through Ethylene Prices Looking Through Ethylene Prices

Highlights We estimate total Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) investment will rise from US$120 billion this year to about US$170 billion in 2020. The size of BRI investments is about 47 times smaller than China's annual gross fixed capital formation (GFCF). Therefore, a slump in domestic capital spending in China will fully offset the increase in demand for industrial goods and commodities as a result of BRI projects. Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Ghana will benefit the most among major frontier markets from BRI. Investors should consider buying these bourses in sell-off. On a positive note, BRI leads to improved global capital allocation, allows China to export its excess construction and heavy industry capacity, and boosts recipient countries' demand for Chinese exports. Feature China's 'Belt and Road' Initiative (BRI) is on an accelerating path (Chart I-1), with total investment expected to rise from US$120 billion to about US$170 billion over the next three years. Chart I-1Accelerating BRI Investment From China bca.ems_sr_2017_09_13_s1_c1 bca.ems_sr_2017_09_13_s1_c1 The BRI has been one of the central government's main priorities since late 2013. The primary objectives of the BRI are: To export China's excess capacity in heavy industries and construction to other countries - i.e., build infrastructure in other countries; To expand the country's international influence via a grand plan of funding investments into the 69 countries along the Belt and the Road (B&R) (Chart I-2); To build transportation and communication networks as well as energy supply to facilitate trade and provide China access to other regions, especially Europe and Africa; To facilitate the internationalization of the RMB; To speed up the development of China's poor (and sometimes restive) central and western regions, namely by turning them into economic hubs between coastal China and the BRI countries in the rest of Asia; To boost China's strategic position in central, south, and southeast Asia through security linkages arising from BRI cooperation, as well as from assets (like ports) that could provide military as well as commercial uses in the long run. From a cyclical investment perspective, the pertinent questions for investors are: How big is the current scale of BRI investment, and where is the funding coming from? Will rising BRI investment be able to offset the negative impact from a potential slowdown in Chinese capex spending? Which frontier markets will benefit most from Chinese BRI investment? Chart I-2The Belt And Road Program China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China's BRI: Scale And Funding Scale China has been implementing its strategic BRI since 2013. To date it has invested in 69 B&R countries through two major approaches: infrastructure project contracts and outward direct investment (ODI). The first approach - investment through projects - is the main mechanism of BRI implementation. BRI projects center on infrastructure development in recipient countries, encompassing construction of transportation (railways, highways, subways, and bridges), energy (power plants and pipelines) and telecommunication infrastructure. The cumulative size of the signed contracts with B&R countries over the past three years is US$383 billion, of which US$182 billion of projects are already completed. However, the value of newly signed contracts in a year does not equal the actual project investment occurred in that year, as generally these contracts will take several years to be implemented and completed. Table I-1 shows our projection of Chinese BRI project investment over the years of 2017-2020, which will reach US$168 billion in 2020. This projection is based on two assumptions: an average three-year investing and implementation period for BRI projects from the date of signing the contract to the commercial operation date (COD) of the project, and an average annual growth rate of 10% for the total value of the annual newly signed contracts over the next three years. Table I-1Projection Of Chinese BRI Project Investment Over The Years 2017-2020 China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? The basis for the first assumption is that the majority of the completed BRI projects were by and large finished within three years, and most of the existing and future BRI projects are also expected to be completed within a three-year period.1 The second assumption of the 10% future growth rate is reasonable, given the 13.5% average annual growth rate for the past two years, but from a low base. These large-scale infrastructure projects were led mainly by Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and often in the form of BOTs (Build-Operate Transfers), Design-Build-Operate (DBOs), BOOT (Build-Own-Operate-Transfers), BOO (Build-Own-Operate) and other types of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). After a Chinese SOE successfully wins a bid on an infrastructure project in a hosting country, the company will typically seek financing from a Chinese source to fund the project, and then execute construction of the project. After the completion of the project, depending on the terms pre-specified in the contract, the company will operate the project for a number of years, which will generate revenues as returns for the company. The second approach - investing into the recipient countries through ODI - is insignificant, with an amount of US$14.5 billion last year. This was only 12% of BRI project investment, and only 8.5% of China's total ODI. Chinese ODI has so far been mainly focused on tertiary industries, particularly in developed countries that can educate China in technology, management, innovation and branding. Besides, most of the Chinese ODI has been in the form of cross-border M&A purchases by Chinese firms, with only a small portion of the ODI targeted at green-field projects, which do not lead to an increase in demand for commodities and capital goods. Therefore, in this report we will only focus on the analysis of project investment as a proxy of Chinese BRI investment, as opposed to ODI. The focal point of this analysis is to gauge the demand outlook for commodities and capital goods originating from BRI. The Sources Of Chinese Funding The projected US$120 billion to US$170 billion BRI investment every year seems affordable for China. This is small in comparison to about US$3-3.5 trillion of new money origination, or about US$3 trillion of bank and shadow-bank credit (excluding borrowing by central and local governments) annually in the past two years. The financing sources for China's BRI investment include China's two policy banks (China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China), two newly established funding sources (Silk Road Fund and Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank), Chinese commercial banks, and other financial institutions/funds. Table I-2 shows our estimate of the breakdown of BRI funding in 2016. Table I-2BRI Funding Sources In 2016 China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China Development Bank (CDB): As the country's largest development bank, the CDB has total assets of US$2.1 trillion, translating into more than US$350 billion of potential BRI projects over the next 10 years, which could well result in US$35 billion in funding annually from the CDB. The Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM): The EXIM holds an outstanding balance of over 1,000 BRI projects, and has also set up a special lending scheme worth US$19.5 billion over the next three years. This will increase EXIM's BRI lending from last year's US$5 billion to at least US$6.5 billion per year. Silk Road Fund (SRF): The Chinese government launched the SRF in late 2014 with initial funding of US$40 billion to directly support the BRI mission. This year, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged a funding boost to the SRF with an extra 100 billion yuan (US$15 billion). Therefore, SRF funding to BRI projects over the next three years will be higher than the US$6 billion recorded last year. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB): The AIIB was established in October 2014 and started lending in January 2016. It only invested US$1.7 billion in loans for nine BRI projects last year. The BRI funding from the AIIB is set to accelerate as the number of member countries has significantly expanded from an original 57 to 80 currently. Chinese commercial banks: Chinese domestic commercial banks, the largest source of BRI funding, have been driving BRI investment momentum. Chinese commercial banks currently fund about 62% of BRI investment and the main financiers are Bank of China (BoC) and Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (ICBC). After lending about US$60 billion over the past two years, the BOC plans to provide US$40 billion this year. The ICBC has 412 BRI projects in its pipeline, involving a total investment of US$337 billion over the next 10 years, which will likely result in an annual US$34 billion in BRI investment. The China Construction Bank (CCB) also has over 180 BRI projects in its pipeline, worth a total investment of US$90 billion over the next five to 10 years. Only three commercial banks will likely fund US$80 billion of BRI projects over the next three years. A few more words about the currency used in BRI funding. The U.S. dollar and Chinese RMB will be the two main currencies employed in BRI funding. Chinese companies can get loans denominated either in RMBs or in USDs from domestic commercial banks/policy banks/special funds/multilateral international banks to buy machinery and equipment (ME) from China. For some PPP projects that involve non-Chinese companies or governments (i.e. those of recipient countries), the local presence can use either USD loans or their central bank's Chinese RMB reserves from the currency swap deal made with China's central bank. China has long looked to recycle its large current account surpluses by pursuing investments in hard assets (land, commodities, infrastructure, etc.) across the world, to mitigate its structural habit of building up large foreign exchange reserves that are mostly invested in low-interest-bearing American government securities. Risky but profitable BRI infrastructure projects are a continuation of this trend. China had so far signed bilateral currency swap agreements worth an aggregate of more than 1 trillion yuan (US$150 billion) with 22 countries or regions along the B&R. The establishment of cross-border RMB payment, clearing and settlement has been gaining momentum, and the use of RMB has been expanding gradually in global trade and investment, notwithstanding inevitable setbacks. Bottom Line: We estimate total BRI investment with Chinese financing will rise from US$120 billion this year to about US$170 billion in 2020, and Chinese financial institutions will be capable of funding it. Can BRI Offset A Slowdown In China's Capex? From a global investors' perspective, a pertinent question around the BRI program is whether the BRI-funded capital spending can offset the potential slowdown in China's domestic investment expenditure. This is essential to gauge the demand outlook for industrial commodities and capital goods worldwide. Our short answer is not likely. Table I-3 reveals that in 2016, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) in China was estimated by the National Bureau of Statistics to be at RMB 32 trillion, or $4.8 trillion. Table I-3China's GFCF* Vs. China's BRI Investment Expenditures China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? Meantime, China-funded BRI investment expenditure amounted to US$102 billion in 2016. In a nutshell, last year GFCF in China was about 47 times larger than BRI investment expenditures. The question is how much of a drop in mainland GFCF would need to take place to offset the projected BRI investment. The latter will likely amount to US$139 billion in 2018, US$153 billion in 2019 and US$168 billion in 2020. Provided estimated sizes of Chinese GFCF in 2017 are RMB 33.5 trillion (US$4.9 trillion), it would take only 0.4% contraction in GFCF in 2018, 0.3% in 2019 and 2020 to completely offset the rise in BRI-related investment expenditure (Table 3). Chart I-3Record Low Credit Growth... bca.ems_sr_2017_09_13_s1_c3 bca.ems_sr_2017_09_13_s1_c3 We derive these results by comparing the expected absolute change in BRI capital spending expenditures with the size of China's GFCF. The expected increases in BRI in 2018, 2019 and 2020 are US$20 billion, US$14 billion and US$15 billion. Given the starting point of GFCF in 2017 was US$4.9 trillion, it will take only about 0.4% of decline in $4.9 trillion to offset the $20 billion rise in BRI. In the same way, we estimated that it would take only an annual 0.3% contraction in nominal GFCF in China to completely offset the rise in BRI capital spending in both 2019 and 2020. To be sure, we are not certain that the GFCF will contract in each of the next three years. Yet, odds of such shrinkage in one of these years are substantial. As always, investors face uncertainty, and they need to make assessments. Is an annual 0.4% decline in China's GFCF likely in 2018? In our opinion, it is quite likely, based on our money and credit growth, as illustrated in Chart I-3. Importantly, interest rates in China continue to drift higher. A higher cost of borrowing and regulatory tightening on banks and shadow banking will lead to a meaningful deterioration in China's credit origination. The latter will weigh on investment expenditures. The basis is that the overwhelming portion of GFCF is funded by credit to public and private debtors, and aggregate credit growth has already relapsed. Chart I-4 and Chart I-5 demonstrate that money and credit impulses lead several high-frequency economic variables that tend to correlate with capital expenditure cycles. Chart I-4Negative Money Credit Impulses Point To... ...Negative Money Credit Impulses Point To... ...Negative Money Credit Impulses Point To... Chart I-5...Slowing Capital Expenditure ...Slowing Capital Expenditure ...Slowing Capital Expenditure Therefore, we conclude that meaningful weakness in the GFCF is quite likely in 2018, and that it will spill out to 2019 if the government does not counteract it with major stimulus. By and large, odds are that a slump in domestic capital spending in China offset the rise in BRI-related capital expenditures. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy service has written substantively on motives surrounding China's capital spending and how it is set to slow, and we will not cover these topics. Some reasons why investment spending is bound to slow include: considerable credit excesses/high indebtedness of companies; misallocation of capital and resultant weak cash flow position of companies; non-performing assets on banks' and other creditors' balance sheets and their weak liquidity position. To be sure, investors often ask whether or not material weakness in mainland growth will lead the authorities to stimulate. Odds are they will. Yet, before the slowdown becomes visible in economic numbers, financial markets will likely sell-off. In brief, policymakers are currently tightening and will be late to reverse their policies. Finally, should one compare the entire GFCF, or only part of it? There is a dearth of data to analyze various types of capital spending. In a nutshell, Chart I-6 reveals that installation accounts for roughly 70% of investment, while purchases of equipment account for the remaining 18%. Therefore, we guess the composition of BRI projects will be similar to structure of investment spending in China, and hence it makes sense to use overall GFCF as a comparative benchmark. In addition, the GFCF data is a better measure for Chinese capital spending over Chinese fixed asset investment (FAI) data, as the FAI number includes land values, which have risen significantly over the years and already account for about half of the FAI (Chart I-7). Chart I-6Chinese Fixed Investment Structure Chinese Fixed Investment Structure Chinese Fixed Investment Structure Chart I-7GFCF Is A Better Measure Than FAI GFCF Is A Better Measure Than FAI GFCF Is A Better Measure Than FAI Bottom Line: While it is hard to forecast and time exact dynamics over the next several years, odds are that the next 12-24 months will turn out to be a period of a slump in China's capital spending. This will more than offset the increase in demand for industrial goods and commodities as a result of BRI projects. Implication For Frontier Markets The BRI, which currently covers 69 countries, will keep expanding its coverage for the foreseeable future. Insofar as it is a way for China to create new markets for its exports, Beijing has no reason to exclude any country. In practice, however, certain countries will receive greater dedication, for the simple reason that their development fits into China's political, military and strategic interests as well as economic interests. As most of the investments are infrastructure-focused, aiming to improve transportation, energy and telecommunication connectivity as well as special economic zones, the recipient countries, especially underdeveloped frontier markets, will benefit considerably from China's BRI. Table I-4 shows that Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Ghana will benefit the most among major frontier markets, as the planned BRI investment in those countries amounts to a significant amount of their GDP. Chart I-8 also shows that, in terms of current account deficit coverage by the Chinese BRI funding, the three countries that stand to benefit most are also Pakistan, Kazakhstan and Ghana. Table I-1The B&R Countries That Benefit From ##br##China's BRI Investment (Ranged From High-To-Low) China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? Chart I-8Chinese BRI Funding's Impact On ##br##External Account Of B&R Countries China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? Of these, clearly Pakistan and Kazakhstan have the advantage of attracting China's strategic as well as economic interest: Kazakhstan offers China greater access into Central Asia and broader Eurasia; Pakistan is a large-population market that offers a means of accessing the Indian Ocean without the geopolitical complications of Southeast and East Asia. These states also neighbor China's restive Xinjiang, where Beijing hopes economic development can discourage separatist and terrorist activities. Pakistan Pakistan is a key prospect for China's exports in of itself, and in the long run offers a maritime waystation and an energy transit hub separate from China's other supply lines. For China, it is a critical alternative to Myanmar and the Malacca Strait. In April 2015, China announced a remarkable US$46.4 billion CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) investment plan in Pakistan, equal to 16.4% of Pakistani GDP. It is expected to be implemented over five years. In particular, the planned US$33.2 billion energy investment will increase Pakistan's existing power capacity by 70% from 2017 to 2023. On the whole, China's CPEC plan will be significantly positive to economic development in Pakistan in the long run, but in the near term it is still not enough to boost the nation's competitiveness (Chart I-9A, top panel). Chart I-9AOur Calls Have Been Correct Top 3 Frontier Markets Benefiting Most From Chinese BRI Investment Top 3 Frontier Markets Benefiting Most From Chinese BRI Investment Chart I-9BTop 3 Frontier Markets Benefiting Most ##br##From Chinese BRI Investment Our Calls Have Been Correct Our Calls Have Been Correct Also, as about 40% of the investment has already been invested over the previous two years, odds are that China's CPEC investment will go slower and smaller this year and over the next few years. BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy service's recent tactical bearish call on Pakistani stocks has been correct, with a 25% decline in the MSCI Pakistan Index in U.S. dollar terms since our recommendation in March (Chart I-9B, top panel).2 We remain tactically cautious for now. Kazakhstan Kazakhstan is a key transit corridor for Chinese goods to enter Europe and the Middle East. In June 2017, Chinese and Kazakh enterprises and financial institutions signed at least 24 deals worth more than US$8 billion. China's BRI investment in Kazakhstan facilitated the country's accelerated economic growth (Chart I-9A, middle panel). BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy service reiterates its positive view on Kazakhstan equities because of a recuperating economy, considerable fiscal stimulus and rising Chinese BRI investment (Chart I-9B, middle panel).3 Ghana Ghana is not strategic for China (it is a minor supplier of oil). Instead, it illustrates the fact that BRI is not always relevant to China's strategic or geopolitical interests. Sometimes it is simply about China's need to invest its surplus U.S. liquidity into hard assets around the world. Of course, Ghana itself will benefit considerably from the committed US$19 billion BRI investment, which was announced only a few months ago. This is a huge amount for the country, equaling 45% of Ghana's 2016 GDP. This massive fresh investment will boost Ghana's economic growth in both the near and long term (Chart I-9A, bottom panel). BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy service upgraded its stance on the Ghanaian equity market from negative to neutral in absolute terms at the end of July, and we also recommended overweighting the bourse relative to the broader MSCI EM universe (Chart I-9B, bottom panel).4 Our positive view on Ghana remains unchanged for now and we are looking to establish a long position in the absolute terms in this bourse amid a potential EM-wide sell-off. Other Macro Ramifications Industrial goods and commodities/materials are vulnerable. BRI will not change the fact that a potential relapse in capital spending in China will lead to diminishing growth in commodities demand. If there is a massive slowdown in property market like China experienced in 2015, which is very likely due to lingering excesses, Chinese commodity and industrial goods demand could even contract (Chart I-10). Notably, mainland's imports of base metals have been flat since 2010, and imports of capital goods shank in 2015 even though GDP and GFCF growth were positive (Chart I-11). The point is that there could be another cyclical contraction in Chinese imports of commodities and industrial goods, even if headline GDP and GFCF do not contract. Chart I-10Chinese Capital Goods Imports Could Contract Again bca.ems_sr_2017_09_13_s1_c10 bca.ems_sr_2017_09_13_s1_c10 Chart I-11Imports Of Metals Could Slow Further Imports Of Metals Could Slow Further Imports Of Metals Could Slow Further As China accounts for 50% of global demand of industrial metals and it imports about US$ 589 billion of industrial goods and materials annually, either decelerating growth or outright demand contraction will be negative news for global commodities markets and industrial goods producers. China's Exports Have A Brighter Outlook China's machinery and equipment (ME) exports account for 47% of total exports, and 9% of its GDP (Table I-5). The BRI investment will boost Chinese ME exports directly through large infrastructure projects. Table I-5Structure Of Chinese Exports (2016) China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown? Meantime, robust income growth in the recipient countries will boost their demand for household goods (Chart I-12). China has a very strong competitive advantage in white and consumer goods production, especially in low-price segments that are popular in developing economies. Therefore, not only is China exporting its excess construction and heavy industry capacity, but the BRI is also boosting recipient countries' demand for Chinese household and other goods exports. Adding up dozens of countries like Ghana can result in a meaningful augmentation in China's customer base. Notably, Chinese total exports have exhibited signs of improvement as Chinese ME exports and exports to the major B&R countries have contributed to a rising share of total Chinese exports since 2015 (Chart I-13). Chart I-12BRI Will Lift Chinese Exports Of ##br##Capital And Consumer Goods BRI Will Lift Chinese Exports Of Capital And Consumer Goods BRI Will Lift Chinese Exports Of Capital And Consumer Goods Chart I-13Signs Of Improvement In Chinese Exports ##br##Due To Rising BRI Investment Signs Of Improvement In Chinese Exports Due To Rising BRI Investment Signs Of Improvement In Chinese Exports Due To Rising BRI Investment BRI Leads To Improved Global Capital Allocation BRI is one of a very few global initiatives that improves the quality of global capital allocation. Therefore, it is bullish for global growth from a structural perspective. By shifting capital spending from a country that has already invested a lot in the past 20 years (China) to the ones that have been massively underinvested, BRI boosts the marginal productivity of capital. One billion dollars invested in the underinvested recipient countries will generate more benefits than the same amount invested in China. Risks To BRI Projects Notable deterioration in the health of Chinese banks may meaningfully curtail BRI funding, as Chinese non-policy banks will likely need to provide 60% of BRI projects' funding. Political stability/changes in destination countries: As most infrastructure projects have been authorized by the top government and need their cooperation, any changes in the recipient countries' governments or regimes may slow down or deter BRI projects. China already has a checkered past with developing countries where it has invested heavily. This is because of its employment of Chinese instead of local labor, its pursuit of flagship projects seen as benefiting elites rather than commoners, its allegedly corrupt ties with ruling parties, and perceived exploitation of natural resources to the neglect of the home nation. As China's involvement grows, local politics will be more difficult to manage, requiring China to suffer occasional losses due to political reversals or to defend its assets through aggressive economic sanctions, or even expeditionary force. For now, as there are no clear signs that any these risks are imminent, we remain positive on the further implementation of China's BRI program. Ellen JingYuan He, Editor/Strategist ellenj@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 China has long been known to use three-year periods - as distinct from its better known "five year plans" - for major domestic initiatives. In 2016, the National Development and Reform Commission re-emphasized three-year planning periods for "continuous, rolling" implementation. 2 Please see BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report "Pakistani Stocks: A Top Is At Hand", published March 13, 2017. Available at fms.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report "Kazakhstan: A Touch Less Dependent On Oil Prices", published March 28, 2017. Available at fms.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA's Frontier Markets Strategy Special Report "Ghana: Sailing On Chinese Winds", published July 31, 2017. Available at fms.bcaresearch.com.