Mexico

Please note that in addition to today's abbreviated Weekly Bulletin, we are also publishing a Special Report on Argentina. Feature Regarding recent financial market dynamics, it appears that the high-yielding EM currencies are breaking down as U.S. bond yields march higher. Several EM exchange rates have formed a tapering wedge pattern, as shown in Chart I-1. Such patterns eventually lead a major break out or break down. Our bias remains that we are witnessing a major breakdown in several EM high-yielding currencies. If this transpires, it would be a precursor for a wider selloff in EM risk assets. Below we discuss interesting dynamics that have emerged in India's onshore fixed-income market lately, and their implications for the nation's equity market. India Several signals tentatively indicate that the price of liquidity has risen at the margin in India. Onshore BBB corporate bond yields have increased and their respective credit spreads have widened (Chart I-2). In addition, the yield curve has steepened modestly. Chart I-1A Tapering Wedge: ##br##A Breakout Or Breakdown? A Tapering Wedge: A Breakout Or Breakdown? A Tapering Wedge: A Breakout Or Breakdown? Chart I-2India: Onshore BBB Corporate Bond ##br##Yields And Spreads Have Spiked India: Onshore BBB Corporate Bond Yields And Spreads Have Spiked India: Onshore BBB Corporate Bond Yields And Spreads Have Spiked Rising corporate bond yields and widening corporate credit spreads have been negative for share prices in the past (Chart I-3). Similarly, steepening yield curves have been associated with a pullback in equity prices in recent years (Chart I-4). Note that yields, spreads and the yield curve are shown inverted on Charts I-3 and I-4. Chart I-3India: Corporate Bond Yields ##br##And Spreads Versus Stocks India: Corporate Bond Yields And Spreads Versus Stocks India: Corporate Bond Yields And Spreads Versus Stocks Chart I-4India: Yield Curve ##br##And Share Prices India: Yield Curve And Share Prices India: Yield Curve And Share Prices Why has the market price of liquidity risen in India? In our opinion, it has to do with both the domestic and external environments. On the domestic side, the fiscal deficit has widened, implying that borrowing requirements by central and state governments have risen (Chart I-5). Increased demand for credit from the government would not have been a problem had the commercial banks accommodated for it by creating enough new money. Yet, broad money supply growth remains depressed (Chart I-6). Chart I-5India: Ballooning Fiscal Deficits ##br##And Weak Money Creation India: Ballooning Fiscal Deficits And Weak Money Creation India: Ballooning Fiscal Deficits And Weak Money Creation Chart I-6Indian Money Growth: ##br##New Record Low INDIA MONEY GROWTH: NEW RECORD LOW INDIA MONEY GROWTH: NEW RECORD LOW As a result, the diminished amount of new money relative to demand for money, among other reasons, pushed marginal borrowing costs higher. Chart I-7 shows our proxy for new money available to the private sector has dipped into negative territory. On the external side, the recent rise in U.S. bond yields and the rebound in the U.S. dollar against several EM currencies might have also contributed to higher borrowing costs in India. We expect this U.S. dollar rebound versus EM currencies to persist and U.S. Treasury yields to continue drifting higher. Hence, the global backdrop heralds marginally higher bond yields in India. Although the onshore corporate bond market - and its BBB segment - is not very large, investors should heed to its signals because it reflects the cost of borrowing for the marginal corporate borrower. Besides, its signals have worked quite well in the past as shown in previous Chart I-3 on page 2. Some commentators might argue that the mild rise in government bond yields has been driven by a rise in inflation and growth expectations. We will not disagree with that, but both economic growth and inflation variables are still muted. Chart I-8 shows economic activity is lukewarm at best. Chart I-7India: Proxy For New Money ##br##Available To Private Sector India: Proxy For New Money Available To Private Sector India: Proxy For New Money Available To Private Sector Chart I-8India's Growth Is ##br##Lukewarm At Best India's Growth Is Lukewarm At Best India's Growth Is Lukewarm At Best On the inflation outlook, the picture is mixed as well. Consumer price inflation, especially core measures, might have bottomed (Chart I-9). Critically, the government approved a draft bill in July that allows the central government to set minimum wages across all sectors and states. The central government is currently reviewing the formula used to set minimum wage and the new formula might lead to significant increases in minimum wages. These policy changes come on top of the pay raises that public sector workers saw earlier this year. Importantly, if consumer demand accelerates while capital spending remains in the doldrums, inflationary pressures will mount. Chart I-10 shows that since 2012 consumer spending has outpaced investment by a large margin. Chart I-9India: Consumer Inflation ##br##Might Be Bottoming India: Consumer Inflation Might Be Bottoming India: Consumer Inflation Might Be Bottoming Chart I-10India: Consumer Spending ##br##Has Outpaced Investment India: Consumer Spending Has Outpaced Investment India: Consumer Spending Has Outpaced Investment Provided India has been, and remains, an underinvested economy, if this gap persists, it will produce either inflation or a widening current account deficit. Rising consumption without an equal increase in the supply of goods and services will either lead to higher prices or mushrooming consumer goods imports. Both scenarios bode ill for the macro dynamics, the currency, and ultimately equity multiples. As to financial markets, the Indian bourse is one of the most expensive in the EM space, so it is not very surprising that share prices could react negatively to marginally higher interest rates. For dedicated EM equity investors, we downgraded India from overweight to neutral on August 23, and this stance remains intact. While near-term underperformance cannot be ruled out, the medium-term outlook for relative performance warrants a neutral stance. Bottom Line: There are signals that liquidity is tightening on the margin in India's fixed-income markets due to domestic and external reasons. This will likely hurt share prices. Dedicated EM equity investors should keep a neutral allocation on India's bourse. Mexico: Close Currency, Rates, And Credit Overweights NAFTA risks to Mexico are escalating again. According to our Geopolitical Strategy team, there is non-trivial probability that the NAFTA negotiations will become negative for Mexican financial markets. The recent relapse in Mexico's financial markets will likely endure. We are closing the following positions: long MXN / short BRL; long MXN / short ZAR; receive Mexican 2-year / pay 2-year swap rates as well as overweight positions in Mexican sovereign credit versus Colombia and Indonesia. Dedicated equity investors should stay neutral on this bourse. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights EM EPS growth is set to decelerate significantly and will likely turn negative in 2018 based on the China/EM money/credit indicators. All measures of Chinese broad money growth have fallen to a record low signifying a major growth slump. The two pillars of the EM currency rally - strong growth in China that manifests in higher commodities prices and lower U.S. bond yields- are set to reverse. EM equities and credit markets relative performance versus their DM peers is about to relapse. A new fixed-income trade: receive 2-year swap rates in Mexico / pay 2-year swap rates in the U.S. Feature Last week we were on the road, meeting with some of our U.S. East Coast clients. This week we address some of the common questions we received. Q: Why do you think EM profits will relapse in the next six-to-nine months, given both global and EM growth continue to show strength? A: Our reluctance to change our view on EM risk assets in general and equities in particular has to do with EM/China business cycle/corporate profit indicators. Several indicators for EM profits - which have exhibited very good track records - presently forecast a material slowdown and possibly a contraction in EM EPS starting late this year and well into next year. In particular, China's broad and narrow money impulses lead EM EPS by about nine months, and are currently signaling that EPS growth is set to peak and begin to decline in the next nine months (Chart I-1). What's more, a few business cycle indicators from Korea and Taiwan, such as nominal manufacturing production and manufacturing shipments-to-inventory ratios, corroborate a peak in EM EPS growth (Chart I-2). Chart I-1EM EPS Is Set to Decelerate ##br##And Probably Contract EM EPS Is Set to Decelerate And Probably Contract EM EPS Is Set to Decelerate And Probably Contract Chart I-2More Signs Of Relapse##br## In EM EPS Growth More Signs Of Relapse In EM EPS Growth More Signs Of Relapse In EM EPS Growth Importantly, the EM corporate earnings slowdown will not occur in a vacuum. It will transpire amid a slowdown in Asian trade and lower commodities prices. In particular: China's broad money M3 impulse leads domestic industrial orders, nominal manufacturing production and imports (Chart I-3). Even though Asian export data were strong in August, China's container freight index signals a slowdown in Asian trade lies ahead (Chart I-4). Chart I-3China: M3 Impulse And Domestic Demand China: M3 Impulse And Domestic Demand China: M3 Impulse And Domestic Demand Chart I-4Asian Export Growth To Slow Asian Export Growth To Slow Asian Export Growth To Slow The Chinese broad money impulse also points to a rollover in Korean, Taiwanese, other EM as well as DM countries' shipments to the mainland (Chart I-5). This is how the slowdown in China's money/credit will hurt corporate profits in EM as well as in DM sectors with substantial exposure to Chinese growth. Besides, China's broad money impulse leads industrial metals prices in general and iron ore prices in particular (Chart I-6). This signifies downside risks to commodities producers. Finally, China's yield curve suggests that mainland manufacturing PMI will roll over after its recent ascent (Chart I-7). Chart I-5Shipments To China Are At Risk Shipments To China Are At Risk Shipments To China Are At Risk Chart I-6Industrial Metals Prices Have Peaked Industrial Metals Prices Have Peaked Industrial Metals Prices Have Peaked Chart I-7China: The Yield Curve And Manufacturing PMI China: The Yield Curve And Manufacturing PMI China: The Yield Curve And Manufacturing PMI In short, China has been gradually tightening monetary policy, which has already manifested in record-low broad money growth. The next phase is evidence of a material deterioration in sales and profits among China-exposed plays. The EM stock markets are unlikely to ignore it. Q: It seems you are putting a lot of emphasis on China's broad money M3 measure. Why do you look at your version of Chinese broad money M3 and not at official M2 and total social financing (TSF)? A: Over the past several months we have done a lot of research and analysis on China's money and credit, and believe that our broad money M3 measure and private and public credit aggregate calculated by BIS are presently better measures of money and credit than official broad money M2 and TSF: First, the TSF data have become distorted because of the local government financing vehicles (LGFV) debt swap program. Specifically, according to the LGFV debt swap mechanics, starting in 2015 provincial governments began issuing bonds that have been purchased by banks. The amount of bonds issued was RMB 3.2 trillion in 2015, RMB 4.9 trillion in 2016 and expected to be RMB 4.8 trillion in 2017. This amounts to total issuance of RMB 12.9 trillion since the commencement of the program. As the next step, local governments were supposed to transfer the proceeds from these bond issuances to their LGFVs, with the latter using the money to pay down their debt. The ultimate goal of the program is to shift the debt from LGFVs to provincial governments, as the latter's creditworthiness is much better than the former. This has also reduced interest rates on the debt as provincial governments borrow at lower interest rates than LGFVs. All that said, it is unclear how much of their debt LGFVs have repaid. The main problem with using TSF data is knowing the amount of proceeds from the issued debt swap bonds that were used to pay down LGFV debt. If the entire amount of these bonds issued by provincial governments was used to pay down LGFV debt, there would not be an impact on economic activity, and only a very short-term impact on money supply. When banks buy bonds from non-banks (including governments), they create new money. When debtors (including governments and their entities) pay down debt to banks, money is destroyed. Nevertheless, both official M1 growth and our measure of broad money (M3) were too strong in 2015 and 2016 – i.e., they remained strong much longer than would have been justified by the LGFV debt swap. Furthermore, private and public credit, M2 and M3 money measures have decoupled from TSF since the middle of 2015 (Chart I-8A). TSF adjusted for the LGFV debt swap – the latter is added to TSF – has also diverged from official M2, our broad money M3 and BIS’s private and public credit measures (Chart I-8B). This corroborates that TSF data can no longer serve as a reliable measure of credit/money origination. Chart I-8AChina: TSF Has Diverged From ##br##Other Money/Credit Measures China: TSF Has Diverged From Other Money/Credit Measures China: TSF Has Diverged From Other Money/Credit Measures Chart I-8BChina: TSF Adjusted For LGFV Debt Swap Has Also Decoupled From Money/Credit Measures China: TSF Adjusted for LGFV Debt Swap Has Also Decoupled From Other Money/Credit Measures China: TSF Adjusted for LGFV Debt Swap Has Also Decoupled From Other Money/Credit Measures Markedly, paying down debt by LGFVs should have reduced corporate debt outstanding by RMB 12.9 trillion, which would represent a 12% drop from the RMB 112 trillion outstanding at the end of 2015. However, corporate debt has continued to expand rapidly, even as government debt has surged. Given all of the above, we doubt all of the proceeds from bonds issued within the LGFV debt swap program were immediately used to repay LGFV debt. Instead, we suspect the proceeds from the bond issuance might have been at least partially invested into the economy in 2016, in defiance of the rules of LGFV debt swap operation. We played down the rise in M1 in late 2015 and early 2016 because we regarded it as temporary, reflecting the LGFV debt swap program. In retrospect, it was a mistake - this was one of the main reasons we did not heed the message from recovering money growth in early 2016 to turn cyclically positive on China's growth, and consequently on commodities and broader EM. Provided we do not know what portion of LGFV debt was repaid and when, corporate credit and total social financing data have become difficult to interpret. Chart I-8A and Chart I-8B demonstrate that TSF with and without the LGFV debt swap has diverged from private and public debt since the middle of 2015 when the LGFV debt swap program commenced. Apparently, one no longer can rely on TSF or adjust it by the amount of LGFV debt swap to gauge money and credit creation in China. In this context, the aggregate of private and public credit is a much more appropriate measure of credit provision and debt creation than TSF. The basis is because it includes both private and public debt. Indeed, the reshuffling of debt between local governments and LGFVs (the latter are treated as enterprises in China's banking statistics), does not affect either aggregate borrowing or amount of debt held in the economy. Second, when credit numbers are distorted, one needs to resort to money supply measures to judge credit dynamics. The reason is because financial engineering and, in the case of China, the LGFV debt swap program, can obscure the amount of outstanding credit, but they cannot conceal the amount of money banks create when they lend or purchase bonds or any other asset. Money is created when a bank originates claims on non-banks, and money is destroyed when a debt is paid back to the bank. Accordingly, money traces debt creation by banks. Banks can disguise their assets, and corporations and governments can conceal their liabilities, but none of them can camouflage the amount of money in circulation. In short, we trace money to gauge the amount of private and public sector borrowing from banks. This is why we have calculated various measures of money in China to overcome the shortcomings of the TSF. Specifically, we have calculated broad money M3 (see details of our calculation below) and credit-money. The latter is the sum of commercial banks' assets such as claims on non-financial institutions, claims on other financial institutions, claims on government and claim on other resident sectors and commerical banks' as well as the central bank's foreign currency assets. Chart I-9 demonstrates various measures of broad money and outstanding credit: official M2, our measure of broad money M3, our credit-money measure, and private and public debt (source BIS). Importantly, all measures of money and private and public credit suggest that credit origination/money creation was very strong in 2015 and 2016, and that it has slowed substantially in 2017. In brief, the message from various measures of money/credit is consistent. Chart I-9China: Money/Credit Growth Has Decelerated To New Lows China: Money/Credit Growth Has Decelerated To New Lows China: Money/Credit Growth Has Decelerated To New Lows Interestingly, broad money M3 rose by RMB 21 trillion in 2015, RMB 20 trillion in 2016 and by only RMB 16.5 trillion in the past 12 months through end of August. This is why the M3 impulse - a change in money flows - has turned negative since early this year. Third, we prefer our broad money measure M3 to official M2 because it is more consistent with the BIS's measure of private and public credit. It has also served as a better tool in forecasting the 2016-2017 recovery in Chinese growth. As can be seen in Chart 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 on previous pages, the M3 impulse - its second derivative - has a great track record in forecasting China's business cycle dynamics. The acceleration in M2 growth in 2015-16 was milder than one would expect in order to achieve meaningful acceleration in nominal economic activity. M2 growth was more subdued than a rise in both private and public debt (Chart I-9). We suspect that M2 is no longer an encompassing measure of broad money in China, and therefore we have calculated other measures of broad money to gauge true money/credit creation. Chart I-10China: Consumer Price Inflation Is Rising China: Consumer Price Inflation Is Rising China: Consumer Price Inflation Is Rising Broad money consists of various liabilities of commercial banks. While the official M2 includes many of their liabilities such as corporate demand deposits, corporate time deposits and personal deposits. It does not include some others. We have added the following commercial banks' liabilities - transferable deposits and other deposits which are not included in M2, liabilities to other financial corporations and other liabilities - to M2 to produce a more all-inclusive measure of broad money M3. Q: Why can't the Chinese authorities stimulate and revive growth again, like they have done many times in the past? A: Of course, they can. However, if the authorities begin easing monetary/credit and fiscal policies now, it will affect growth six to nine months down the road. Based on money and credit indicators shown in the charts above, growth is set to slow over the next nine months because of the time lag that money/credit has on the economy. In the next six to nine months, economic activity and corporate profits are likely to decelerate considerably, based on the monetary/credit tightening that has already occurred in China. Provided China-related financial markets in general and EM risk assets in particular have so far not discounted the slowdown suggested by China's money/credit indicators, they are very vulnerable. Finally, the magnitude of the impending growth slump is likely to be large, as evidenced by the substantial decline in these money and credit indicators that has already occurred. In brief, policymakers have been tightening credit/money creation, and it has not yet impacted financial markets. Furthermore, inflation is rising in China (Chart I-10) and policymakers are unlikely to start easing before they witness a major growth slump. Until the latter becomes visible in economic data and on the ground, financial markets leveraged to mainland growth will sell off notably. Q: There is no indication that the Federal Reserve will turn hawkish. This will be especially true if global growth slows - as you argue it will because of China. Why do you expect the EM currency rally to peter out amid a dovish Fed? Historical empirical evidence suggests that EM currencies are often driven by commodities prices, not the interest rate differential over U.S. rates. Let's take the BRL and the ZAR as examples. Charts I-11A and Chart I-11B illustrate that the BRL and ZAR exchange rates versus the U.S. dollar have historically been closely correlated with commodities prices, not the level of or change in their interest rate differential over the U.S. Chart I-11ABrazil: What Drives The Currency? Brazil: What Drives The Currency? Brazil: What Drives The Currency? Chart I-11BSouth Africa: What Drives The Currency? South Africa: What Drives The Currency? South Africa: What Drives The Currency? This has also been true over the past 18 months. The rally in EM currencies since early 2016 can be largely attributed to the rise in commodities prices. As and when commodities prices roll over - as we expect to occur - the trade balances of commodities-producing nations will deteriorate, as will their currencies. Remarkably, there are tentative signs that the drop in U.S. bond yields and the greenback's depreciation are late and overdone. Two-year U.S. bond yields have bounced from their 200-day moving average (please refer to the middle panel of Chart II-1 in the Mexican section). Typically, such a technical profile leads to new highs. Our sense is that U.S. bond yields will rebound in the coming months, which will also weigh on EM currencies. Importantly, one of the drivers behind the U.S. dollar selloff since early this year has been the rise in banks' excess reserves at the Fed (Chart I-12). The latter was due to the debt ceiling, as the U.S. Treasury was running down its account at the Fed by issuing less paper. In short, since the beginning of this year the U.S. Treasury did not issue bonds/bills and deposit them at its Treasury General Account (TGA) at the Fed - meaning it was not destroying banking system reserves as it typically does. This boosted the supply of U.S. dollars - banks' excess reserves at the Fed rose by US$ 300 billion. More dollar supply depressed both the exchange rate and U.S. interest rates. Chart I-12 demonstrates that in the post-QE era, banks' excess reserves at the Fed have correlated with the U.S. dollar's exchange rate. The debt ceiling has been resolved for now, and the Treasury will now begin accumulating dollars in its TGA account again. It has already announced that its TGA will rise from $73 billion now to $400 billion at the end of this year. The Treasury will issue more paper, and deposit U.S. dollars in the TGA. This will shrink banks' excesses reserves. This, in tandem with the reduction in the Fed's balance sheet, will diminish banks' excess reserves. The latter will reduce U.S. dollar supply in off-shore markets and will likely trigger a U.S. dollar rebound. On the whole, the two pillars of the EM currency rally - strong growth in China that manifests in higher commodities prices and lower U.S. bond yields - are set to reverse. In turn, a potential EM currency selloff along with deteriorating EM corporate profits will likely weigh on EM equities and EM sovereign and corporate debt. Q: Does this mean EM stocks will relapse in absolute terms, or simply underperform the DM equity markets? Our strongest conviction at the moment is on EM relative equity performance versus DM equity markets. Odds are that a relapse in relative performance is imminent as and if U.S. bond yields rise (Chart I-13). Chart I-12U.S. Banks' Excess Reserves ##br##And The U.S. Dollar U.S. Banks' Excess Reserves And The U.S. Dollar U.S. Banks' Excess Reserves And The U.S. Dollar Chart I-13U.S. Stocks Outperform EM Ones When ##br##U.S. Bond Yields Are Rising U.S. Stocks Outperform EM Ones When U.S. Bond Yields Are Rising U.S. Stocks Outperform EM Ones When U.S. Bond Yields Are Rising In addition, U.S. stocks' underperformance versus the global equity index in common currency terms is at a technical support (Chart I-14, top panel), and will likely reverse as the dollar firms up. Historically, when U.S. stocks outperform the global benchmark in common currency terms - denoted by shaded periods in Chart I-14, EM stocks typically underperform the global equity index. The dynamics of EM equity absolute performance depends on investor's risk appetite. It will be hard for EM share prices to drop meaningfully as the DM rally persists. Global stocks are still trading well, and it is very difficult to pinpoint any trigger that will lead to a reversal. As our readers well know, we do not forecast triggers for the simple reason that the chances of getting it right are much lower than a coin toss. That said, in the medium term, the reason for a correction in DM stocks could well be EM/China growth, as it was in 2015. In such a scenario, EM risk assets will sell off first. As to timing, it is hard to find indicators that lead share prices, but aggregate EM narrow (M1) money growth has historically been coincident or leading with EM share prices - and it presently points to a considerable drop in EM equity prices (Chart I-15). This EM M1 aggregate is equity market-cap weighted making it relevant to investors. Chart I-14EM And U.S. Equites Typically Do Not Outperform Global Stocks Simultaneously EM And U.S. Equites Typically Do Not Outperform Global Stocks Simultaneously EM And U.S. Equites Typically Do Not Outperform Global Stocks Simultaneously Chart I-15EM M1 Growth And EM Share Prices EM M1 Growth And EM Share Prices EM M1 Growth And EM Share Prices Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com A New Trade: Receive Mexican / Pay U.S. 2-Year Swap Rates Mexico's 2-year bond yield has recently fallen through a technical support line while the U.S. 2-year bond yield has recently bounced off a major support level (Chart II-1). Our bias is that the 2-year yield in Mexico will fall relative to 2-year U.S. yield (Chart II-1, bottom panel). We recommend a new trade: receive 2-year swap rates in Mexico and pay U.S. 2-year swap rates. Historically, the domestic demand cycle in Mexico was synchronized with the business cycle in the U.S., mainly due to the fact these two economies are heavily integrated. However, the two economies have recently become desynchronized. This is evident by the fact that the Mexican export sector - which is leveraged to U.S. - is booming while the domestic demand in Mexico is slowing down (Chart II-2). Chart II-12-Year Bond Yields: Mexico And U.S. 2-Year Bond Yields: Mexico And U.S. 2-Year Bond Yields: Mexico And U.S. Chart II-2Divergence Within Mexican Economy Divergence Within Mexican Economy Divergence Within Mexican Economy The culprit behind this desynchronization is the previous collapse in the peso. Falling oil prices and excessive money/credit expansion in Mexico led to a major peso depreciation in 2014 and 2015. The election of Trump pushed it off the cliff in 2016. Inflation in Mexico spiked due to the massive currency depreciation. Consequently, the Mexican central bank has hiked interest rates by 400 basis points since the end of 2015. This, along with fiscal tightening, has choked domestic demand growth in Mexico. At this point, our bias is that the short-term interest rate differential between Mexico and the U.S. is unjustifiably wide and is about to narrow. Going forward, we expect inflation to fall in Mexico and interest rate expectations will at minimum not rise. Inflation in Mexico will roll over soon and moderate because of the following: A large part of the rise in inflation was caused by the depreciation in the peso. The peso's material appreciation this year will reduce the inflation rate (Chart II-3). Consumer spending and capital expenditure are set to continue slumping as the impact of higher interest rates continues filtering through the economy (Chart II-4, top and bottom panel). Chart II-3Mexico: Exchange Rate And Core Inflation Mexico: Exchange Rate And Core Inflation Mexico: Exchange Rate And Core Inflation Chart II-4Mexico: Domestic Demand To Disappoint Further Mexico: Domestic Demand To Disappoint Further Mexico: Domestic Demand To Disappoint Further Domestic vehicle sales are shrinking signifying no revival in interest rate-dependent sectors. Fiscal policy has been tightening and this will continue to be a headwind on economic growth (Chart II-5). Hence, despite flourishing exports to the U.S., very weak domestic demand will dampen inflation in Mexico. Finally, there were several one-off effects to inflation such as the gasoline subsidy removal that took place at the end of last year, and the minimum wage hike that was implemented at the beginning of the year. As the base effect of these fade, the inflation rate will moderate. In the U.S., our bias is that interest rate expectations are too low given the tight labor market, reasonably strong growth, and the U.S. dollar depreciation this year. Odds are that the U.S. interest rate expectations will rise as core inflation moves up (Chart II-6). Chart II-5Mexico: A Major Improvement In Fiscal Position Mexico: A Major Improvement In Fiscal Position Mexico: A Major Improvement In Fiscal Position Chart II-6U.S. Core Inflation To Rise U.S. Core Inflation To Rise U.S. Core Inflation To Rise Investment Recommendations We recommend fixed-income traders to receive Mexican / pay U.S. 2-year swap rates. The main risk to this trade lies in the event of an abrupt sell-off in the peso against the U.S dollar that could push up the 2-year swap rate differential. While we expect EM currencies, including the peso, to depreciate, this trade is still favorable in terms of risk-reward because of the starting point in interest rate differential and peso valuations: Despite the rally this year, the peso is still cheap (Chart II-7). Furthermore, its current account and fiscal balances have improved dramatically. So, the peso should depreciate less than many other EM currencies. Chart II-7The MXN Is Still Cheap The MXN Is Still Cheap The MXN Is Still Cheap In fact, the interest rate spread between Mexico and the U.S. is already historically high, and the peso depreciation might not push it much higher. We would not be recommending this trade if the peso was fairly or overvalued, or if interest rates in Mexico were not this high. Entering this position under these current circumstances reduces the downside risk and, therefore, makes the risk-reward attractive. As to Mexican financial markets in general, we remain constructive on the peso versus other EM currencies. More specifically, we continue to recommend long positions in MXN versus ZAR and BRL. Mexican local currency bonds and sovereign credit offer good value relative to their EM counterparts. Fixed income investors should continue to overweight Mexican local currency and sovereign credit within their respective EM benchmarks. Finally, the outlook for Mexican stocks in absolute terms is poor as domestic demand will slump, further hampering corporate profits. Within an EM equity portfolio we recommend neutral allocation to this bourse mainly due to our expectations of the peso outperforming other EM currencies. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Feature Valuations, whether for currencies, equities, or bonds, are always at the top of the list of the determinants of any asset's long-term performance. This means that after large FX moves like those experienced this year, it is always useful to pause and reflect on where currency valuations stand. In this context, this week we update our set of long-term valuation models for currencies that we introduced in February 2016 in a Special Report titled, "Assessing Fair Value In FX Markets". Included in these models are variables such as productivity differentials, terms-of-trade shocks, net international investment positions, real rate differentials and proxies for global risk aversion.1 The models cover 22 currencies, incorporating both G10 and EM FX markets. Twice a year, we provide clients with a comprehensive update on all of these long-term models in one stop. These models are not designed to generate short- or intermediate-term forecasts. Instead, they reflect the economic drivers of a currency's equilibrium. Their purpose is therefore threefold. First, they provide guideposts to judge whether we are at the end, beginning, or middle of a long-term currency cycle. Second, by providing strong directional signals, the models help us judge whether any given move is more likely be a countertrend development or not, offering insight on potential longevity. Finally, they assist us and our clients in cutting through the fog and understanding the key drivers of cyclical variations in a currency's value. The U.S. Dollar Chart 1The Dollar's Overvaluation Is Gone The Dollar's Overvaluation Is Gone The Dollar's Overvaluation Is Gone After its large 7.5% fall in trade-weighted terms since the end of 2016, the real effective dollar is now trading at a 2% discount vis-à-vis its fair value based on its principal long-term drivers - real yield differentials and relative productivity between the U.S. and its trading partners (Chart 1). The U.S. dollar's equilibrium - despite having been re-estimated higher earlier this year due to upward revisions by the Conference Board to its U.S. productivity series - has flattened as of late, as real rate differentials between the U.S. and the rest of the world have declined. While 2017 has been an execrable year for dollar bulls, glimmers of hope remain. First, the handicap created by expensive valuations has been purged. Second, the excessive bullishness toward the greenback that prevailed earlier this year has morphed into deep pessimism. Third, U.S. real interest rates have fallen as investor doubts that the Federal Reserve will be able to increase interest rates as much as it wants to in the face of paltry inflation have surged. However, the U.S. economy is strong and at full capacity, suggesting that inflation will hook back up at the end of 2017 and in the first half of 2018. This should once again lift the U.S. interest rate curve, the dollar's fair value, and the dollar itself. That being said, this story is unlikely to become fully relevant over the next three months. The Euro Chart 2The Euro's Fair Value Is Now Rising The Euro's Fair Value Is Now Rising The Euro's Fair Value Is Now Rising On a multi-year time horizon, the euro is driven by the relative productivity trend of the euro area with its trading partners, its net international investment position, terms-of-trade shocks and rate differentials. Thanks to its powerful rally this year, the euro's discount to its fair value has narrowed from 7% in February to 6% today (Chart 2). This narrowing is not as great as the rally in the trade-weighted euro itself as its fair value has also improved, mainly thanks to continued improvement in the euro area's net international position - a development driven by the euro zone's current account of 3% of GDP. Nonetheless, the EUR's current discount to fair value is still not in line with previous bottoms, such as those experienced in both early 1985 or in 2002. We do expect a new wave of weakness in the EUR to materialize toward the end of the year and in early 2018 as markets once again move to discount much more aggressive tightening by the Fed than what will be executed by the European Central Bank: U.S. inflation is set to move back towards the Fed's target, but European inflation will remain hampered by the large amount of labor market slack still prevalent in the European periphery. What's more, euro area inflation is about to suffer from the lagged effects of the tightening in financial conditions that have been created by a higher euro. However, the fact that the euro's fair value has increased implies it is now very unlikely for the EUR/USD to hit parity this cycle. The Yen Chart 3The Yen Is Very Cheap, But It May Not Count For Much The Yen Is Very Cheap, But It May Not Count For Much The Yen Is Very Cheap, But It May Not Count For Much The yen's long-term equilibrium is a function of Japan's net international investment position, global risk aversion, and commodity prices. The JPY discount to this fair value has deepened this year, despite the fall in USD/JPY from 118 to 108 (Chart 3). This is mainly because the euro and EM as well as commodity currencies have all appreciated against the Japanese currency. Low domestic inflation has been an additional factor that has depressed the Japanese real effective exchange rate. While valuations point to a higher yen in the coming year, this will be difficult to achieve. The Bank of Japan remains committed to boosting Japanese inflation expectations. To generate such a shock to expectations, the BoJ will have to keep policy at massively accommodative levels for an extended period. As global growth remains robust, global bond yields should experience some upside over the next 12 months. With JGB yields capped by the Japanese central bank, this will create downside for the yen. However, because the yen is so cheap, it is likely to occasionally rally furiously each time a risk-off event, such as any additional North Korean provocations, puts temporary downward pressure on global yields. The British Pound Chart 4The Pound Is Attractive On A Long-Term Basis The Pound Is Attractive On A Long-Term Basis The Pound Is Attractive On A Long-Term Basis The pound has fallen 6% against the euro this year, the currency of its largest trading partner. This has dragged down the GBP's real effective exchange rate to a large 11% discount to its fair value, the largest since the direct aftermath of the Brexit vote (Chart 4). Because Great Britain has entered a paradigm shift - the exit from the European Union will change the nature of the U.K. relationship on 43% of its trade - assessing where the pound's fair value lies is a more nebulous exercise than normal. However, signs are present that the pound is indeed cheap. British inflation remains perky, the current account has narrowed to 4% of GDP, and despite large regulatory uncertainty, net FDI into the U.K. has hit near record highs of 7% of GDP. Movements in cable are likely to remain a function of the gyrations in the U.S. dollar. However, at this level of valuation, the pound is attractive against the euro on a long-term basis. We had a target on EUR/GBP at 0.93, which was hit two weeks ago. This cross is likely to experience downside for the next 12 months. The biggest risk for the pound remains British politics - and not Brexit itself but its aftershock. The EU has made clear the transition process will be long, leaving time for the British economy to adjust. However, the conservative party has been greatly weakened, and Jeremy Corbyn's popularity is increasing. This raises the specter that, in the not-so-distant future, a Labour government could be formed. Under Corbyn's leadership, this would be the most left-of-center administration in any G10 country since François Mitterrand became French president in 1981. The early years of the Mitterrand presidency were marked by a sharp decline in the franc as he nationalized broad swaths of the French private sector, increased taxes and implemented inflationary policies. Keep this in mind. The Canadian Dollar Chart 5The CAD Has Lost Its Valuation Advantage The CAD Has Lost Its Valuation Advantage The CAD Has Lost Its Valuation Advantage The loonie's fair value is driven by commodity prices, relative productivity trends, and the Canadian net international position. In February, the CAD was trading in line with its fair value. However, after its blistering rally since May, when the Bank of Canada began to hint that policy could be tightened this year, the Canadian dollar is now expensive vis-à-vis its long-term fundamental drivers (Chart 5). In a Special Report two months ago, we argued that the BoC was one of the major global central banks best placed to increase interest rates.2 With the Canadian economy firing on all cylinders, and with the output gap closing faster than the BoC anticipated in its July Monetary Policy Statement, the two interest rate hikes recorded this year so far make sense, and another one is likely to materialize in December. However, while the CAD could continue to rise until then, traders have moved from being massively short the CAD to now holding very sizeable net long positions. Additionally, interest rate markets are now discounting more than two hikes in Canada over the next 12 months, while expecting less than one full hike in the U.S. over the same time frame. If this scenario were to pan out, the tightening in monetary conditions emanating from a massive CAD rally would likely choke the Canadian recovery. Instead, we expect U.S. rates to increase more than what is currently embedded in interest rate markets, thus limiting the downside in USD/CAD. We prefer to continue betting on a rising loonie over the next 12 months by buying it against the euro and the Australian dollar. The Australian Dollar Chart 6The AUD Is Very Expensive The AUD Is Very Expensive The AUD Is Very Expensive The fair value of the Aussie is driven by Australia's net international position and commodity prices. Even with the tailwind of stronger metal prices, the AUD's rallies have been beyond what fundamentals justify, leaving it at massively overvalued levels (Chart 6). This suggests the AUD is at great risk of poor performance over the next 24 months. Timing the beginning of this decline is trickier, and valuations offer limited insight. One of the key factors that has supported the AUD has been the large increase in fiscal and public infrastructure spending in China this year - a move by Beijing most likely designed to support the economy in preparation for the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, where the new members of the Politburo are designated. As this event will soon move into the rearview mirror, China may abandon its aggressive support of the industrial and construction sectors - two key consumers of Australia's exports. The other tailwind behind the AUD has been the very supportive global liquidity backdrop. Global reserves growth has increased, dollar-based liquidity has expanded and generalized risk-taking in global financial markets has generated large inflows into EM and commodity plays.3 While U.S. inflation remains low and investors continue to price in a shy Fed, these conditions are likely to stay in place. However, a pick-up in U.S. inflation at the end of the year is likely to force a violent re-pricing of U.S. interest rates and drain much of the global excess liquidity, especially as the Fed will also be shrinking its balance sheet. This is likely to be when the AUD's stretched valuations become a binding constraint. The New Zealand Dollar Chart 7No More Premium In The NZD No More Premium In The NZD No More Premium In The NZD Natural resources prices, real rate differentials and the VIX are the key determinants of the kiwi's fair value, highlighting the NZD's nature as both a commodity currency and a carry currency. Both the fall in the VIX and the rebound in commodities prices are currently causing gradual appreciation in the New Zealand's dollar equilibrium exchange rate. However, despite these improving fundamentals, the real trade-weighted NZD has fallen this year, and now trades in line with its fair value (Chart 7). Explaining this performance, the NZD began 2017 at very expensive levels, even when compared to the already-pricey AUD. Also, despite a very strong New Zealand economy, the Reserve Bank Of New Zealand has disappointed investors by refraining from increasing interest rates, as the expensive currency has tightened monetary conditions on its behalf. Going forward, the recent weakness in the real effective NZD represents a considerable easing of policy, which could warrant higher rates in New Zealand. As a result, while a tightening of global liquidity conditions could hurt the NZD in addition to the AUD, the kiwi is likely to fare better than the much more expensive Aussie, pointing to an attractive shorting opportunity in AUD/NZD over the next 12 months. The Swiss Franc Chart 8The CHF Is Cheap, The SNB Is Happy The CHF Is Cheap, The SNB Is Happy The CHF Is Cheap, The SNB Is Happy Switzerland's enormous and growing net international investment position continues to be the most important factor lifting the fair value of the Swiss franc. The recent sharp rally in EUR/CHF has now pushed the Swissie into decisively cheap territory (Chart 8). The decline in political risk in the euro area along with the lagging economic and inflation performance of the Swiss economy fully justify the discount currently experienced by the Swiss franc: money has flown out of Switzerland, and the Swiss National Bank is doing its utmost to keep monetary policy as easy as it can. For a small open economy like Switzerland, this means keeping the exchange rate at very stimulative levels. The continued growth in the SNB's balance sheet is a testament to the strength of its will. For the time being, there is very little reason to bet against SNB policy; the CHF will remain cheap because the economy needs it. However, this peg contains the seeds of its own demise. The cheaper the CHF gets, the larger the economic distortions in the Swiss economy become. Already, Switzerland sports the most negative interest rates in the world. This directly reflects the large injections of liquidity required from the SNB to keep the CHF down. These low real rates are fueling bubble-like conditions in Switzerland real estate and are threatening the achievability of return targets for Swiss pension plans and insurance companies, forcing dangerous risk-taking. But until core inflation and wage growth can move and stabilize above 1%, these conditions will stay in place. The Swedish Krona Chart 9The Swedish Krona Has More Upside The Swedish Krona Has More Upside The Swedish Krona Has More Upside Even after its recent rebound, the Swedish krona continues to trade cheaply, even if its long-term fair value remains on a secular downward trajectory (Chart 9). Yet the undemanding valuations of the SEK hide a complex picture. It is approximately fairly valued against the GBP and expensive against the NOK, two of its largest trading partners. However, the SEK is cheap against the USD and the euro. We expect the SEK to continue appreciating. While Swedish PMIs have recently softened, the Swedish economy is running well above capacity, and the Riksbank resources utilization indicator suggests the recent surge in inflation has further to run. Moreover, Sweden is in the thralls of a dangerous real-estate bubble that has pushed nonfinancial private-sector debt above 228% of GDP. With many amortization periods on new mortgages now running above 100 years, the Swedish central bank is concerned that further inflating this bubble could result in a milder replay of the debt crisis experienced in the early 1990s. The shift in leadership at the Riksbank's helm at the beginning of 2018 is likely to be the key factor that prompts the beginning of the removal of policy accommodation in that country. We like buying the krona against the euro. The USD/SEK tends to be a high-beta play on the greenback, and thus is very much a call on the USD. However, EUR/SEK displays a much lower correlation, and thus tends to be a more effective medium to isolate the upcoming tightening in monetary policy we expect from the Riksbank. The Norwegian Krone Chart 10The NOK is The Cheapest Commodity Currency The NOK is The Cheapest Commodity Currency The NOK is The Cheapest Commodity Currency The Norwegian krone remains the cheapest commodity currency in the world, along with the Colombian peso (Chart 10). The slowdown in Norwegian inflation and a very negative output gap of 2% of GDP implies that the Norges Bank will remain one of the most accommodative central banks in the G10. Thus, the NOK should remain cheap. However, we continue to like buying the krone against the euro. EUR/NOK has only traded above current levels when Brent prices have been below US$40/bbl. Not only is Brent currently trading above US$50/bbl, but the outlook for oil remains bright: production is in control as the agreement between Russian and OPEC is still in place. Additionally, the recent carnage and refinery shutdowns caused by hurricane Harvey should result in large drawdowns to finished-products inventories in the coming months. This will contribute to an anticipated normalization in global excess petroleum inventories, which have been the most important headwind to oil prices. Finally, the fact that the Brent curve is now backwardated also represents a support for oil prices, as this creates a "positive carry" for oil investors. The Yuan Chart 11The Yuan Can Rise On A Trade-Weighed Basis The Yuan Can Rise On A Trade-Weighed Basis The Yuan Can Rise On A Trade-Weighed Basis Despite the recent strength in both the trade-weighted RMB and the yuan versus the U.S. dollar, the renminbi still trades at a discount to its long-term fair value (Chart 11). Confirming this insight, China continues to sport a sizeable current account surplus, and its share of global exports is still on an expanding path. With the RMB being cheap, now that China is once again accumulating reserves instead of spending them to create a floor under its currency, the downside risk to the CNY has decreased significantly. Thus, since the People's Bank of China targets a basket of currencies when setting the yuan's value, to legitimize any bullish view on USD/CNY one needs to have a bullish view on the USD. While we do anticipate the dollar to rally toward the end of the year, our expectation that it will remain flat until then implies that we do not see much upside for now to USD/CNY. However, our bullish medium-term USD view, along with the cheapness of the CNY, suggests that the RMB could continue to appreciate on a trade-weighted basis going forward. While Chinese policymakers have highlighted their desire to make their currency a more countercyclical tool, the recent stability in Chinese inflation implies there is no need to let the CNY depreciate to reflate China. In fact, at this point, elevated PPI readings would argue that the Chinese authorities do have a built-in incentive to let the CNY appreciate on a trade-weighted basis for the coming six to 12 months. The Brazilian Real Chart 12The BRL is Vulnerable To A Pullback In Global Liquidity The BRL is Vulnerable To A Pullback In Global Liquidity The BRL is Vulnerable To A Pullback In Global Liquidity Hampered by poor productivity trends, which weigh on the Brazilian current account balance, the fair value of the real remains quite depressed, even as commodity prices have sharply rebounded since early 2016. In fact, the violent rally in the BRL over the same timeframe has made it one of the most expensive currencies tracked by our models (Chart 12). This level of overvaluation points to poor returns for the BRL on a one-to-two-year basis, however, it gives no clue to timing. The strong sensitivity of the Brazilian real to EM asset prices implies that the BRL is unlikely to weaken significantly so long as EM bonds remain well-bid. Moreover, because the BRL still offers an elevated carry, until U.S. interest rate expectations turn the corner, U.S. market dynamics will continue to put a floor under the real. However, this combination suggests the BRL could become one of the prime casualties of any rebound in U.S. inflation. Such a development would cause global liquidity to fall, hurting EM bonds in the process and making the BRL's high-risk carry much less attractive. Confirming this danger, the fact that the USD/BRL has not been able to breakdown for more than a year despite the weakness in the USD suggests momentum under the BRL is rather weak. The Mexican Peso Chart 13Mexican Peso: From Bargain To Luxury Mexican Peso: From Bargain To Luxury Mexican Peso: From Bargain To Luxury In the direct aftermath of Trump's electoral victory, the Mexican peso quickly became one of the cheapest currencies in the world. However, the peso's 25% rally versus the U.S. dollar since January has eradicated this valuation advantage to the point where it is now one of the most expensive major currencies in the world (Chart 13). As the peso was collapsing through 2016, the Mexican central bank fought back, increasing interest rates. The massive surge in the prime lending rate points to a protracted period of weakness in the growth of nonfinancial private credit, which should weigh on consumption and investment. Actually, the growth in retail sales volumes has already begun to weaken. This could force the Banxico to cut rates, especially as inflation will slow in the face of peso's rebound this year. Lower Mexican rates, in the face of stretched long positioning in MXN by speculators, could be the key to generating a weakening in the peso over the next 12 months. To see real fireworks in the peso, one would need to see a resumption in the U.S. dollar bull market. Mexico has external debt equivalent to 66% of GDP, the highest among large EM nations. This makes the Mexican economy especially vulnerable to a strong dollar, as such a move would imply a massive increase in debt servicing costs. Thus, while the MXN may not be as vulnerable as the BRL, it could still suffer greatly if global liquidity becomes less generous next year. The Chilean Peso Chart 14CLP Needs HIgh Copper Prices CLP Needs HIgh Copper Prices CLP Needs HIgh Copper Prices The Chilean peso real effective exchange rate is driven by the country's productivity trend relative to its trading partners and the real price of copper - which proxies Chilean terms-of-trade. Thanks to the CLP's rally since the winter of 2015, the real peso is at a four-year high and is now in expensive territory (Chart 14). We expect copper to see downside from now until the end of the year, pulling down the CLP with it. Current dynamics in the Chinese real estate market and the Chinese credit cycle, which tend to be leading indicators of industrial metals prices, point to an upcoming selloff. Moreover, Chinese monetary conditions have begun to tighten, and are set to continue doing so. This will weigh on Chinese credit growth and capex, creating headwinds for copper and the peso. That being said, the CLP will likely outperform the BRL and the ZAR. M1 money growth is back in positive territory after contracting last year, while industrial activity seems to have hit a bottom and is now picking up. Moreover, since Chile's economy does not have the credit excesses of its other EM peers, we expect the CLP to show more resilience than other currencies linked to industrial metals. The Colombian Peso Chart 15COP: A Rare Bargain Among EM COP: A Rare Bargain Among EM COP: A Rare Bargain Among EM The real COP's fair value is driven by Colombia's relative productivity trends and the price of oil, the country's main export. The fall in oil prices since the beginning of the year have caused a small decline in the fair value of the COP. Nevertheless, the peso is still one standard deviation below fair value (Chart 15). This partly reflects the premium demanded by investors to compensate for Colombia's large current account deficit of 6.3% of GDP. Overall the COP looks attractive, particularly against other commodity currencies. Historically a discount of 20% or more, like what the peso has today, marks a bottom in the real effective exchange rate. Furthermore, our Commodity and Energy Strategy Service expects Brent prices to climb to US$60/bbl towards the end of year, as OPEC's and Russia's production controls translate into oil inventory drawdowns. This should further increase the value of the COP against the ZAR and the BRL. Domestic dynamics also point to outperformance of the peso against other EM currencies. As opposed to countries like Brazil, where private debt stands at nearly 85% of GDP, Colombia has a more modest 60% leverage ratio - the byproduct of an orthodox banking system. Thus, the peso should be able to withstand a liquidity drawdown in EM better than its peers. The South African Rand Chart 16Lack Of Productivity And Politics Are The Greatest Risk To The Rand Lack Of Productivity And Politics Are The Greatest Risk To The Rand Lack Of Productivity And Politics Are The Greatest Risk To The Rand South Africa's dismal productivity trend continues to be the greatest factor pulling the rand's long-term fair value lower. Due to this adverse trend, while the ZAR has been broadly stable this year, it is now slightly more expensive than it was in February (Chart 16). Not captured by the model, the political risks in South Africa remain elevated, creating a further handicap for the rand. The story behind the ZAR is very similar to the one underpinning the gyrations in the BRL. Both currencies, thanks to their elevated carries and deep liquidity - at least by EM currency standards - will continue to be buoyed by very generous global liquidity conditions. However, global real rates seem dangerously low and could move sharply higher, especially when U.S. inflation picks up at the end of the year and in early 2018. Such a move would cause the currently very supportive reflationary conditions to dissipate. This would put the expensive ZAR in a very precarious position. An additional danger for the ZAR is the price of gold. Gold and precious metals have also benefited from these generous global liquidity conditions. This has helped the South African terms of trade. However, gold is likely to be a key victim if U.S. interest rates rise because it is negatively correlated with both real interest rates and the U.S. dollar. Thus, while we do not see much upside for the expensive ZAR for the time being, it is likely to suffer greatly once U.S. inflation turns around, suggesting the ZAR possesses a very poor risk/reward ratio. The Russian Ruble Chart 17The Ruble Is Expensive But Russia Has The Best EM Fundamentals The Ruble Is Expensive But Russia Has The Best EM Fundamentals The Ruble Is Expensive But Russia Has The Best EM Fundamentals The RUB is currently trading at a very large premium to fair value (Chart 17). The risk created by such an overvaluation is only likely to materialize once U.S. inflation turns the corner and U.S. interest rates pick up - a scenario we've mentioned for late 2017 and early 2018. This risk is most pronounced against DM currencies, the U.S. dollar in particular. The RUB remains one of our favorite currencies within the EM space, especially when compared to other EM commodity producers. The Russian central bank is pursuing very orthodox policy, despite the fall in realized inflation, and is maintaining very elevated real interest rates in order to fully tame inflation expectations. Moreover, oil prices are likely to experience upside in the coming months as oil inventories are drawn down. This could result in an increase in the ruble's equilibrium exchange rate, which would help correct some of the RUB's overvaluation. The Korean Won Chart 18KRW Is Where You Can Really See The North Korean Tensions KRW Is Where You Can Really See The North Korean Tensions KRW Is Where You Can Really See The North Korean Tensions The fair value of the Korean won continues to be lifted by the combined effect of lower Asian bond spreads and Korea's current account surplus. Yet, the KRW is trading at an increasingly large discount to its equilibrium (Chart 18). At first glance, this seems highly surprising as global trade is growing at its fastest pace in six years - a situation that always benefits trading nations like South Korea. Instead, political developments are to blame. Not only is North Korea ramping up its tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear devices, but also Seoul is within range of Pyongyang's conventional artillery. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service does not expect the current standoff to result in military conflict. Ultimately, North Korea is no match for the military might of the U.S. and its allies. Moreover, the capacity for Pyongyang's actions to shock financial markets is exhibiting diminishing returns. This suggests the risk premium imbedded in the won should dissipate. However, the won will remain very exposed to dynamics in the USD, global liquidity and global trade. Instead, a lower-risk way for investors to take advantage of the KRW's cheapness is to buy it against the Singapore dollar. While just as exposed to global liquidity as the won, the SGD is currently trading at a premium to fair value. The Philippine Peso Chart 19The PHP Has Over-Discounted The Fall In The Current Account The PHP Has Over-Discounted The Fall In The Current Account The PHP Has Over-Discounted The Fall In The Current Account The fair value of the Philippine peso is driven by the country's net international investment position and commodity prices. After falling 6% this year, the real effective PHP now trades at a 13% discount to its fair value (Chart 19). A deteriorating current account, which is now in deficit, has fueled a selloff in the peso, making the Philippine currency one of the worst performing in the EM space. Worryingly, this has occurred alongside faltering foreign exchange reserves. However, the deficit is mainly the mirror image of large capital inflows, fueled by the government's ambitious infrastructure spending. Remittances are growing again and, with a weaker peso, will support consumer spending going forward. Employment had a setback last year, but is growing again. Higher investment and consumer spending will likely push rates up. As inflation rebounded alongside commodity prices last year, it is now at its 3% target. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas will need to rein in inflationary pressures to avoid overheating the economy. While the Philippines economy should expand further, the 'Duterte Discount' remains in place. Negative net portfolio flows reflect negative investor sentiment, as policy uncertainty remains elevated. The Singapore Dollar Chart 20SGD Remains Expensive SGD Remains Expensive SGD Remains Expensive The fair value of the Singapore dollar is driven by commodity prices. This is because the exchange rate is the main policy tool used by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. As a result, when commodity prices rise, which leads to inflationary pressures, MAS tightens policy by spurring appreciation in the SGD. The opposite holds true when commodity prices weaken. Based on this metric, the SGD is currently 4.2% overvalued (Chart 20). Domestically, dynamics are quite mixed. Retail sales have picked up. However, both manufacturing and construction employment are contracting and labor market slack is increasing, pointing to continued subdued wage growth. Additionally, property prices are contracting and vacancy rates are on the rise, led by the commercial property sector. Thus, the recent pickup in inflation could soon vanish, especially as it has been driven by the rebound in oil prices in 2016. This combination suggests that Singapore still needs easy monetary conditions. USD/SGD closely follows the DXY. While the Fed will be able to increase interest rates by more than the 35 basis points priced over the next 24 months, Singapore still needs a lower exchange rate to maintain competitiveness and alleviate deflationary pressures. The Hong Kong Dollar Chart 21The Fall In The USD Has Helped The HKD The Fall In The USD Has Helped The HKD The Fall In The USD Has Helped The HKD The HKD remains quite expensive. However, being pegged to the USD, its valuation premium has decreased this year (Chart 21). The fall in the greenback has driven the HKD - which itself has fallen 0.75% versus the U.S. dollar - lower against the CNY and other EM currencies. If the U.S. dollar does resume its uptrend over the next six months, the valuation improvement in the HKD will once again dissipate. However, this does not spell the end of the HKD peg. With reserves of US$414 billion, or 125% of GDP, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority has the firepower to support the peg, which has been one of the cornerstones of Hong Kong economic stability since 1983. Instead, the HKMA will tolerate deep deflationary pressures that will cause a fall in the real effective exchange rate. This is the path that Hong Kong picked in the 1990s, and it will be the path followed again in the face of any broad-based USD appreciation. This suggests that Hong Kong real estate prices could experience significant downside in the coming years. The Saudi Riyal Chart 22The Riyal Is Still Expensive The Riyal Is Still Expensive The Riyal Is Still Expensive The Saudi riyal remains prohibitively expensive, even as its valuation premium has decreased this year (Chart 22). The SAR is afflicted by similar dynamics as the HKD: its peg with the USD means the greenback's gyrations are the main source of variation in the SAR's real effective exchange rate on a cyclical basis. However, on a structural horizon, the fair value of the riyal is dominated by Saudi Arabia's poor productivity. An economy dominated by crude extraction and processing and living on one of the most sizable economic rents in the world, Saudi Arabia has not endured the competitive pressures that are often the source of productivity enhancement in most nations. Additionally, Saudi capital expenditures are heavily skewed to the oil sector, a sector whose output growth has been limited for many decades by natural constraints. We do not believe the current valuation premium in the riyal will force the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority to devalue the SAR versus the USD. Saudi Arabia, like Hong Kong, possesses copious foreign exchange reserves, and growth has improved now that oil prices have rebounded. Additionally, the KSA is also likely to tolerate deflationary pressures. Not only has it done so in the past, but Saudi Arabia imports most of its household products, especially its food needs. A fall in the SAR would cause a large amount of food inflation, representing a massively negative price shock for a very young population. This is a recipe for disaster for the royal family of a country with no democratic outlet. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Haaris Aziz, Research Assistant haarisa@bcaresearch.com Juan Manuel Correa, Research Analyst juanc@bcaresearch.com 1 For a more detailed discussion of the various variables incorporated in the models, please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Assessing Fair Value In FX Markets", dated February 26, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy and Global Alpha Sector Strategy Special Report, "Who Hikes Next?", dated June 30, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 For a more detailed discussion on the global liquidity environment, please Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar-Bloc Currencies: More Than Just China", dated August 18, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Closed Trades

Highlights Duration: An environment characterized by strong global growth and a weak dollar is very bearish for U.S. bonds. According to our model, fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield is 2.6%. Stay at below-benchmark duration. The Fed & The Dollar: A weak dollar eases financial conditions and supports higher core goods inflation. All else equal, this will strengthen the Fed's hawkish resolve in the near term. However, a rebound in core services (excluding shelter and medical care) inflation will be necessary for core inflation to reach the Fed's target on a sustained basis. USD Sovereigns: USD-denominated sovereigns are not attractive compared to domestic Baa-rated U.S. credit. At the country level, Finland, Mexico and Colombia offer the most attractive spreads and Finnish debt offers the best risk/reward trade-off. Feature Please note there will be no U.S. Bond Strategy report next week. Our regular publishing schedule will resume on August 29, 2017. Chart 1Firm Growth, Despite Weaker $ Firm Growth, Despite Weaker $ Firm Growth, Despite Weaker $ Escalating tension between the U.S. and North Korea captured the market's attention during the past week, causing investors to ignore what in our view is a more important economic development: Global growth has managed to stay firm even in the face of significant dollar depreciation. Not only does this break the pattern of the past few years when periods of substantial dollar weakness were associated with slowing global growth (Chart 1), but in our view it sends a very bearish signal for U.S. bonds. Above all else, a weak dollar amidst strong global growth suggests that the breadth of the economic recovery is improving. This intuition is confirmed by the fact that our Global Manufacturing PMI Diffusion Index, which measures the net percentage of countries with PMIs above the 50 boom/bust line, is fast approaching 90% (Chart 2). Not only that, but PMIs from the four most important economic blocs are all showing signs of strength. Both the Eurozone and Japanese PMIs are holding firm at high levels, while the U.S. and Chinese PMIs have recently reversed their year-to-date downtrends (Chart 2, bottom two panels). Why is the breadth of the global recovery important? Precisely because a more synchronized recovery prevents the dollar from appreciating too quickly. All else equal, a stronger dollar causes investors to reduce their forecasts for future U.S. growth and inflation. This implies a slower expected pace of rate hikes and lower Treasury yields. Conversely, a weaker dollar causes investors to revise up their growth and inflation forecasts, leading to a quicker expected pace of rate hikes and higher yields. To capture the importance of both global growth and the exchange rate we turn to our 2-factor Treasury model (Chart 3). This is a simple model of the 10-year Treasury yield based on the Global PMI and bullish sentiment toward the dollar. A stronger Global PMI pressures the model's fair value higher, as does increasingly bearish dollar sentiment. Chart 2Synchronized Global Growth Synchronized Global Growth Synchronized Global Growth Chart 310-Year Treasury Yield Fair Value 10-Year Treasury Yield Fair Value 10-Year Treasury Yield Fair Value At present, the model pegs fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.6%, meaning the current 10-year Treasury yield of 2.22% is 38 bps below fair value. This is the most expensive Treasuries have appeared on our model since the immediate aftermath of last year's Brexit vote. Political Uncertainty & Flights To Quality While our 2-factor model does a good job, there is one important driver of Treasury yields it does not capture. That is the tendency for political events to drive a flight to safety into Treasuries (Chart 4). Typically, if it is possible to identify a purely politically-driven flight to safety - one that is unlikely to exert a meaningful economic impact during the next 6-12 months - then the correct strategy is to heed our model's message and position for higher yields. This strategy worked out perfectly following the Brexit vote, and we anticipate it will work again this time around. Chart 4Policy Uncertainty Is A Driver Of Bond Yields Policy Uncertainty Is A Driver Of Bond Yields Policy Uncertainty Is A Driver Of Bond Yields With regards to the catalyst for last week's flight to safety, our Geopolitical Strategy service wrote in a recent Special Report1 that a pre-emptive strike by the U.S. on North Korea is extremely unlikely. The theatrics of the past week demonstrate only that the U.S. needs to establish a "credible threat" if it wants to eventually open a new round of negotiations over North Korea - not unlike the Iranian nuclear negotiations of the past decade. Looking further down the road, if those talks eventually fail then the potential for military conflict is high. We therefore conclude that there is not much potential for U.S. / North Korean tensions to exert a meaningful economic impact during the next 6-12 months, and view the recent bond rally as an opportunity to position for sharply higher yields in the near-term. Bottom Line: An environment characterized by strong global growth and a weak dollar is very bearish for U.S. bonds. According to our model, fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield is 2.6%. Stay at below-benchmark duration. How The Fed Views A Weaker Dollar Financial Conditions Chart 5Weak $ Eases Financial Conditions Weak $ Eases Financial Conditions Weak $ Eases Financial Conditions The Fed views the 7% year-to-date depreciation of the dollar as a significant easing of financial conditions. In fact, most broad indicators of financial conditions have eased this year, even though the Fed has lifted rates by 75 bps since December (Chart 5). In the Fed's framework, this means that the pace of rate hikes might need to increase in order to tighten financial conditions as much as desired. New York Fed President William Dudley summed up this approach in a 2015 speech:2 All else equal, if financial conditions tighten sharply, then we are likely to proceed more slowly. In contrast, if financial conditions were not to tighten at all or only very little, then - assuming the economic outlook hadn't changed significantly - we would likely have to move more quickly. In the end, we will adjust the policy stance to support financial market conditions that we deem are most consistent with our employment and inflation objectives. Of course, all else is not equal. Core inflation has disappointed so far this year and our current assessment of monetary policy is that while the Fed will take action to start shrinking its balance sheet next month, rate hikes are on hold until inflation turns higher. We remain optimistic that inflation will show sufficient strength in time for the Fed to lift rates in December.3 Inflation Chart 6Weak $ = Higher Inflation Weak $ = Higher Inflation Weak $ = Higher Inflation A weaker dollar also increases the Fed's confidence that inflation will head higher. Although so far we have not seen much evidence that this is occurring. Last Friday's July CPI report showed that core CPI rose only 0.1% month-over-month, while the year-over-year growth rate held flat at 1.7%. However, evidence is mounting that core inflation will soon put in a bottom. Our CPI diffusion index bounced back into positive territory in July (Chart 6) and our PCE diffusion index is at its highest level since last October.4 Both of these measures have excellent track records capturing the near-term swings in core inflation. The year-to-date weakness in the dollar has led to a surge in import prices. Stronger import prices will soon translate into higher core goods inflation (Chart 6, panels 2 and 3). Unfortunately, any increase in core goods inflation is unlikely to be sustained beyond the next 12 months. If the year-to-date dollar weakness starts to reverse, as our currency strategists anticipate,5 then import prices will decline anew. Eventually, this will translate into a deceleration in core goods inflation. For core inflation to sustainably reach the Fed's target, improvement in the lagging core services (excluding shelter and medical care) component will be required. Historically, this component is the most tightly linked to wage growth (Chart 6, bottom panel). A Rising Wage Growth Environment Two related methods do an excellent job predicting the direction of wage growth on a cyclical horizon. First, wages accelerate when the unemployment rate is falling, and second, wages accelerate when the prime-age (25-54) employment-to-population ratio is increasing. The top two panels of Chart 7 show the relationship between wage growth and the unemployment rate. The shaded regions in both panels correspond to periods when the unemployment rate is falling. As can be seen, wage growth always rises during these periods. That being the case, we calculate that non-farm employment needs to grow by more than 125k per month (on average) for the unemployment rate to continue its downtrend, assuming the labor force participation rate remains flat. Chart 7A Rising Wage Environment A Rising Wage Environment A Rising Wage Environment Of course it is not guaranteed that the labor force participation rate will stay flat. In a recent report we discussed the risk that a large cyclical increase in the participation rate might cause the unemployment rate to rise even as the economy continues to recover.6 This is why we also look at the shaded regions in the bottom two panels of Chart 7 and see that wages always rise during periods when the prime-age employment-to-population ratio is rising. By looking at the employment-to-population ratio instead of the unemployment rate we do not need to make an assumption about the trend in labor force participation. Using this method, we calculate that monthly employment growth must exceed 140k (on average) for the prime-age employment-to-population ratio to keep increasing. Non-farm payroll growth has averaged 184k per month so far in 2017 and averaged 187k per month in 2016. In other words, the U.S. jobs machine is running at a fairly steady pace, well above the thresholds we see as necessary for the recovery in wage growth to continue. Bottom Line: A weak dollar eases financial conditions and supports higher core goods inflation. All else equal, this will strengthen the Fed's hawkish resolve in the near term. However, a rebound in core services (excluding shelter and medical care) inflation will be necessary for core inflation to reach the Fed's target on a sustained basis. Sovereigns Not Buying The Weak Dollar USD-denominated sovereign bonds should benefit from a falling dollar. A weaker U.S. dollar makes the debt obligation cheaper in the issuing nation's local currency. However, the USD Sovereign index has actually underperformed the duration-matched Baa U.S. Credit index during the past six months, despite a depreciating U.S. currency (Chart 8). The duration-matched Baa-rated U.S. Credit index is the closest comparable we can find for the Sovereign index. It matches the Sovereign index in terms of duration and average credit rating, although historically it also delivers less excess return volatility (Chart 8, bottom panel). The two main factors we consider when deciding whether to add USD-denominated sovereigns to our portfolio at the expense of domestic U.S. credit are relative valuation and the outlook for the dollar. Historically, spread differential has been an important driver of relative returns. Attractive starting valuations even allowed sovereigns to outperform credit in 2014 and 2015 despite the dollar's surge. But at the moment, relative value is skewed heavily in favor of domestic U.S. credit (Chart 8, panel 1). Chart 8Sovereigns Too Expensive Sovereigns Too Expensive Sovereigns Too Expensive Added to that, with U.S. growth likely to remain strong and U.S. inflation poised to rebound, we think there is a high likelihood that the Fed will deliver more rate hikes than are currently priced in. This will make it difficult for the dollar to decline further from current levels. Taken together, poor relative valuation and a bullish outlook for the dollar lead us to continue underweighting USD-denominated sovereigns in our portfolio. The Sovereign Index: Country Breakdown Even though the overall index is unappealing, opportunities might still exist at the country level. Chart 9 shows a risk/reward picture for each country in the Bloomberg Barclays Sovereign index. The upper panels show the option-adjusted spread for each country relative to its duration and credit rating. The lower panels show a risk-adjusted spread on the y-axis. This risk-adjusted spread is the excess spread that remains after we adjust for differences in credit rating and duration using a cross-sectional model. What sticks out immediately is that Finland, Colombia and Mexico all offer compelling spreads after adjusting for differences in credit rating and duration. The outlook for each country's currency versus the U.S. dollar is obviously also important. And in fact, the lower-right panel of Chart 9 shows that exchange rate volatility is positively correlated with the risk-adjusted spreads from our cross-sectional model. This implies that the extra compensation available in Mexican and Colombian sovereigns is probably compensation for assuming highly volatile currency risk. By this measure, Finland looks even more attractive given the euro's slightly lower volatility. Chart 9USD Sovereign Index: Country Breakdown The Upside Of A Weaker Dollar The Upside Of A Weaker Dollar Bottom Line: USD-denominated sovereigns are not attractive compared to domestic Baa-rated U.S. credit. Remain underweight. At the country level, Finland, Mexico and Colombia offer the most attractive spreads and Finnish debt offers the best risk/reward trade-off. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire", dated April 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2015/dud150605 3 For further details on our outlook for the near-term path of monetary policy please see U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "On Hold, But Not For Long", dated August 8, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 For a chart of the PCE diffusion index please see page 11 of U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "On Hold, But Not For Long", dated August 8, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Fade North Korea, And Sell The Yen", dated August 11, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Three Scenarios For Treasury Yields In 2017", dated June 20, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Highlights The Mueller investigation is part of the "Trump Put;" General White House disarray and congressional incompetence combine to produce Goldilocks conditions for U.S. equities; Mexico's frontrunner in the upcoming elections, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, is no Chavez; Malaysian political risks are overstated, the ruling Barisan Nasional has pushed through painful reforms; With economic growth stabilizing, cheap valuations, and overstated political risks, Malaysia could be an intriguing investment opportunity. Feature This week, we turn to two emerging markets: Mexico and Malaysia. Our approach to EMs is to look for opportunities where politics may emerge as the alpha amidst appealing valuations. We rely on our sister strategy, BCA's Emerging Market Strategy, for fundamental analysis, to which we then add our political research. We find it striking that these two EMs are the very two that stood to suffer the most should U.S. Congress have passed a border adjustment tax (Chart 1). Not only have the Republicans forsworn the border tax, but these countries will benefit from other trends, as we explain below. Before we dive into Malaysia and Mexico, however, a short note on the latest developments in the White House is in order. Clients from St. Louis, Missouri to Auckland, New Zealand are asking us the same question this summer: when does the Mueller investigation become a headwind for the SPX? Chart 1Vulnerability To U.S. Import Tariffs And Border Adjustment Taxes Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America The "Trump Put" Continues Our answer is that Special Counsel Robert Mueller's investigation may already be a tailwind to the U.S. equity market. The investigation, along with general White House disarray and congressional incompetence, makes up the ongoing "Trump Put."1 The American political imbroglio has combined with decent earnings and steady global growth to produce Goldilocks conditions for U.S. equities, while simultaneously weakening the USD and supporting Treasuries. The political fulcrum upon which all these assets turn is the failure of the Trump administration to deliver its promised fiscal stimulus (Chart 2). Tax reform, which was supposed to be the main vehicle of such stimulus, is increasingly looking like it will fail to live up to its hype. We still think it will pass, for three broad reasons: Chart 2Handcuffed Trump The Most Likely Scenario Handcuffed Trump The Most Likely Scenario Handcuffed Trump The Most Likely Scenario Trump's low popularity remains an albatross around the neck of GOP candidates in the November 2018 elections, with potentially ominous results. Our simple "line-of-best-fit" model between a Republican president's approval rating and the GOP's midterm performance produces a 38-seat loss in the upcoming election (Chart 3). Republicans need a legislative win and need it fast. The House has laid the groundwork for tax reform, passing the FY2018 budget resolution with reconciliation instructions focused on tax legislation. This means that the Obamacare replace and repeal effort has until October 1 to be resolved.2 Investors are conflating replacing and repealing Obamacare with tax reform. The former is an entitlement program, the latter a more popular measure that Republicans have always tried to move through Congress. It is very rare for U.S. policymakers to successfully reduce or remove an entitlement program. Cutting, even reforming, taxes is easier to justify politically. Chart 3The Clock Is Ticking For The GOP On Tax Reform Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Although we still maintain that tax reform, or mere tax cuts, will happen, they are unlikely to be as stimulative as originally advertised. Corporate and household tax rates are unlikely to be lowered by as much as originally touted. That is because Republicans in the House will demand "revenue offsets" to accomplish rate reduction, yet they have already lost key offsets like Obamacare repeal and the border adjustment tax.3#fn_3 The White House could change all that by using its considerable political capital among conservative grassroots voters and the bully pulpit to get fiscally conservative Republicans in the House to move a stimulative tax reform through Congress. But, as we noted two weeks ago, factional fighting in the White House and an ineffective chief of staff are considerable hurdles.4 A few days after we published that report, President Trump replaced Reince Priebus with retired General and Homeland Security Secretary John Kelly. While Kelly is likely to introduce some discipline into the White House, we doubt he will make the executive more effective in cajoling House Representatives to toe the administration's line on tax reform. This is because Kelly adds no legislative experience to a White House that is already quite low on it by recent historical standards (Chart 4). Chart 4Trump Administration Is On The Low End Of Congressional Experience Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Additionally, the Trump Administration continues to drag its feet on presidential appointments, hurting the effectiveness of the executive. Only 220 appointments had been sent to the Senate by July 19, compared to the average 309 during the same time period by the previous four presidents (Chart 5). The Senate is very slow in confirming the candidates, perhaps because of their unorthodox backgrounds and resumes. The average time to confirm a Trump nominee is 45 days, which is astonishing given that the Senate is controlled by Republicans. Chart 5The Trump Administration Is Dragging Its Feet On Appointments Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America In addition to the ineffectiveness of the White House, investors fret that the ongoing Mueller investigation, which has just impaneled a grand jury, could undercut the rally in risk assets. By summoning a grand jury Mueller can subpoena documents and obtain testimony of witnesses under oath. Doing so will accelerate the investigation and perhaps take it down new avenues. For example, the Kenneth Starr investigation initially focused on the suicide of deputy White House counsel Vince Foster and the Whitewater real estate investments by Bill Clinton. But the trail led elsewhere. Ultimately, the "Starr Report" alleged that Clinton lied under oath regarding his extramarital affair with Monica Lewinsky. Impeachment proceedings ensued. That said, we are sticking with our conclusion from May that investors should look through any risk of impeachment or indictment for President Trump, at least as long as Republicans hold the House of Representatives (i.e., at least until the midterms in 2018).5 In particular, there are three main reasons to fade any near-term equity market volatility: President Mike Pence - Under both impeachment rules and the 25th amendment, the U.S. president would be replaced by the vice president. Vice President Pence's approval rating largely tracks that of President Trump and is in the 40% area, but investors should note that he once stood at nearly 60% during the campaign (Chart 6). As such, the worst-case scenario for investors in the event of a post-midterm impeachment is that Trump is replaced by Pence, an orthodox Republican, and that Pence has to deal with a split Congress. And that is not bad! It would grind reforms to a halt, but at least tax reform would be out of the way by then. Midterm Election - If the Trump White House becomes engulfed in scandal, Republicans in the House will fear losing their majority. Yes, the partisan drawing of electoral districts - "gerrymandering" - has reduced the number of competitive U.S. House districts from 164 in 1998 to 72 in 2016 (Chart 7). But the Democrats managed to win the House in 2006 and the Republicans managed to take it back in 2010, so there is no reason the roles cannot be reversed yet again. However, this is not a risk, it is an opportunity. It will motivate the GOP in Congress to lock in tax and health care reform well ahead of the midterm elections. Counter-Revolution - With Trump embattled and facing impeachment, the market may let out a sigh of relief because it would mark a clear defeat of populist politics in the U.S. Much as with electoral outcomes in Europe, investors may want to cheer the defeat of an unorthodox, anti-establishment movement in the U.S. As such, we would push against any "Russia scandal"-induced volatility in the U.S. markets, at least until the midterm election. We think the market would digest the volatility and realize that Trump's impeachment, were it to occur after midterm elections, would not arrest the Republican agenda before the midterms. After all, the GOP has waited over 15 years to make Bush-era tax cuts permanent and the opportunity to do so may evaporate within the next 12 months. In addition, given the performance of high tax-rate S&P 500 equities (Chart 8), investors appear to have already discounted the failure of meaningful tax reform in the market. This means that the "Trump Put" is in full effect: investors are bidding up risk assets not because they expect something to happen (tax reform, fiscal stimulus, financial deregulation, etc.), but because they expect nothing to happen (no fiscal stimulus, no fast Fed rate hikes, no onerous regulation for businesses, etc.). Chart 6Could Be Worse ##br##Than Pence Could Be Worse Than Pence Could Be Worse Than Pence Chart 7Gerrymandering Reduces##br## Competitive House Seats Gerrymandering Reduces Competitive House Seats Gerrymandering Reduces Competitive House Seats Chart 8Investors No Longer##br## Expect Tax Reform Investors No Longer Expect Tax Reform Investors No Longer Expect Tax Reform What about the long term? A scandal-ridden White House, escalating leaks against the administration, and a mounting bureaucratic revolt against the executive cannot be good for the U.S., can they? The news flow out of Washington increasingly looks like news from Ankara, Brasilia, or Pretoria. There are two diametrically opposed directions the U.S. can take. The first is deepening polarization and policy gridlock that leads to President Trump being replaced by an even greater bout of populism in 2020 or 2024. We described this scenario recently in a pessimistic note about the coming social unrest in America.6 The alternative is that Democrats and Republicans in Congress (particularly the Senate), representing the country's elites, decide to work together on legislation. Both parties recently united to pass veto-proof sanctions on Russia with a 98-2 vote that has bound the executive to future review by Congress. And some green shoots of bipartisanship appeared over the past two weeks on tax reform and even on health care. It is too soon to say which path American policymakers will take. Investors may have to wait until after the midterm election for genuine cooperation. But it would be very positive for the U.S. economy and prospects of reform if genuine bipartisanship emerged as a reaction to the incompetence, scandal, nationalism, and populism of the White House. Bottom Line: The intensifying Mueller investigation and ongoing White House incompetence will only further fuel the "Trump Put." This is positive for U.S. equities, neutral for bonds, and bad for the dollar, ceteris paribus. A significant pickup in inflation could overwhelm the "Trump Put" and cause the dollar to rally. As such, investors should focus on inflation prospects more than politics in the White House. What If Mexico Builds A Wall First? For every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. The election of President Donald Trump, an unabashed nationalist who campaigned on an anti-immigrant platform, is spurring the campaign of Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador, also known as AMLO, in the upcoming July 1, 2018 elections in Mexico. Obrador has been a left-wing firebrand of Mexican politics for years. He was the Head of Government of Mexico City (essentially the city's mayor) from 2000 to 2005 and contested a close election against Felipe Calderon in 2006, which he narrowly lost. He lost the 2012 election by a much wider margin, but still came second to current president Enrique Pena Nieto of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Obrador's election campaign calls for a confrontational attitude towards President Trump, the renegotiation of NAFTA, an increase to farm subsidies, and limitations on foreign investment in Mexico. He has said that he would reverse the opening of the energy sector to foreign investment through a referendum, but that he is in favor of public-private partnerships in the sector. That said, his left-wing firebrand persona is more PR than substance. In 2012, for example, he also campaigned on cutting government expenditure and ending monopolies - not exactly Chavista credentials. Nonetheless, he quit the left-leaning Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) to form a more left-wing movement. Obrador's new party, the National Regeneration Movement (MORENA), did well in the 2015 midterms and is currently leading in the polls ahead of the 2018 election (Chart 9). MORENA also did well in the State of Mexico, a PRI stronghold and Nieto's home state, in the June 4 election. The ruling PRI held the state for 90 years and is accused of election-rigging in order to, only narrowly, defeat an unknown MORENA candidate this year. Chart 9MORENA Has Lead In The Polls Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Given that the election is a year away, it is too soon to make a forecast. Nonetheless, it is clear that Obrador is the frontrunner for the presidency. There are three reasons why his election may be an over-hyped risk: The Congress: For much of Mexico's twentieth century history, the president was essentially a dictator due to the one-party rule of PRI. In the twenty-first century, however, Congress has become plural, forcing the president to cooperate with the body or see his reforms stalled. Given recent elections (Chart 10), it is highly unlikely that Obrador would have a congressional majority behind him, thus forcing him to temper his policies. Chart 10Mexico's Rising Political Plurality Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America The PAN-PRD Alliance: An unlikely alliance of the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the center-left PRD has emerged as a reaction to the rise of MORENA in the polls. (These two parties have a history of cooperating against PRI presidents.) The two parties come from completely opposite ideological spectrums, but successfully joined forces in several state elections in 2016. It is unlikely that the two parties will unify sufficiently to field a single candidate - they failed to do so in the June 4 State of Mexico elections - but they may get enough votes to form a plurality in Congress. Mexicans do not lean left: Unlike most of Latin America, Mexico is a conservative country. Most Mexicans either think of themselves as centrist or lean right (Chart 11). While our data stops in 2015, the historical trend is clear: Mexico is a right-leaning country. As such, it is highly unlikely that AMLO will be able to manipulate the country's democratic institutions - which have been strengthened over the past twenty years - to turn Mexico into Venezuela. Chart 11Mexicans Lean Right Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America We would therefore fade any politically induced volatility in Mexican assets. Next year, investors should prepare to "sell the rumor and buy the news" (you read that right), as Mexican election fever grips the markets. Given current macroeconomic fundamentals, an entry point in Mexican assets may develop if they sell off ahead of the election - but they are not a buy at the moment. BCA's Emerging Market Strategy has pointed out in a recent report that:7 Inflation is well above the central bank's target and is broad based (Chart 12). Notably, wage growth is elevated (Chart 13). Given meager productivity growth, unit labor costs - calculated as wage-per-hour divided by productivity (output-per-hour) - are rising. This will depress companies' profit margins and make them eager to hike selling prices. This will, in turn, prevent inflation from falling and, consequently, hamper Banxico's ability to cut rates for now. Chart 12Inflation is Above Target Inflation is Above Target Inflation is Above Target Chart 13Wage Inflation Is High Wage Inflation Is High Wage Inflation Is High Meanwhile, the impact of higher interest rates will continue filtering through the economy. High interest rates entail a further slowdown in money and credit growth and, hence, in domestic demand. Both consumer spending and capital expenditure by companies are set to weaken a lot (Chart 14). This will weigh on corporate profits and share prices. Even though non-oil exports and manufacturing output are accelerating (Chart 15), non-oil exports - which make about 30% of GDP - are not large enough to offset the deceleration in domestic demand from monetary tightening. That said, the positive for Mexico is that the Mexican peso remains cheap (Chart 16) and may rally against other EM currencies. Our EM strategists suggest that investors should overweight MXN versus ZAR and BRL. Chart 14Domestic Demand to Buckle Domestic Demand to Buckle Domestic Demand to Buckle Chart 15Exports are Robust Exports are Robust Exports are Robust Chart 16Peso is Cheap Peso is Cheap Peso is Cheap If EM currencies depreciate or oil prices drop, it would be difficult to see MXN rally against the USD. However, MXN should outperform other currencies, especially given that political risks in Mexico are far lower than they are in Brazil and South Africa. Bottom Line: The Mexican markets may get AMLO-fever in 2018. Obrador is a clear frontrunner in the election to be held a year from now. However, AMLO will face off against constitutional, political, and societal constraints. As such, we would fade any politically induced risks in Mexican markets. Go strategically long MXN versus BRL and ZAR and look for an entry point into Mexican risk assets over the next 12 months. Malaysia: Hold Your Nose And Buy We have been broadly bearish on Malaysia since August 2015, but the upcoming elections - due by August 2018, but we expect to occur sooner rather than later - are likely to cause the markets to re-price Malaysian assets (Chart 17). The country's fundamentals are not rosy, and it remains vulnerable to a slowdown in China, a drop in commodities prices, and bad loans. Nevertheless, its underperformance is late, and this fact, combined with the political outlook, suggests that it will outperform for a while. Malaysia is in the midst of a long saga of party polarization that began amid the Asian Financial Crisis, when Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad ousted his ambitious deputy, Anwar Ibrahim. Both men hailed from the dominant party of the country's ethnic Malay majority: the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), which is the center of Barisan Nasional (BN). The BN is a multi-ethnic coalition that has held power in one form or another since independence in 1957. Anwar went on to lead the reformasi (reform) movement, creating an opposition coalition of strange bedfellows: his own urban Malay People's Justice Party (PKR), the ethnic Chinese DAP, and the Islamist PAS. In the 2008 general elections, the opposition shocked the BN, depriving it of a two-thirds super-majority for the first time since 1969. In the 2013 general elections, the opposition won the popular vote, though BN retained control of parliament due to inherent advantages in the electoral system (Chart 18). Hence the past two elections, particularly the last one in 2013, have shaken the political system to the core. Since the 2013 shock, the opposition has had its sights set on the 2018 election, and a series of blows to the Najib government have given cause for hope. First, exports and commodity prices plunged from 2014 to 2016, damaging the economy and giving the opposition a grand opportunity to attack the administration (Chart 19). Second, Najib was personally implicated in a massive scandal involving 1MDB, a sovereign wealth fund that Najib helped create and from which he allegedly embezzled $700 million (!). Street protests emerged in 2015 and suddenly Najib faced a revolt from the old guard within his own party (including Mahathir himself). Chart 17Malaysian Underperformance Is Late Malaysian Underperformance Is Late Malaysian Underperformance Is Late Chart 18Opposition Threatens UMNO's Dominance Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Chart 19Commodities Should Help Malaysian Exports Commodities Should Help Malaysian Exports Commodities Should Help Malaysian Exports The problem for the opposition, however, is timing. The 2008 election occurred before the worst of the global financial crisis had been felt; the 2013 election occurred before the full impact of the commodity bust; and now the ruling coalition's fortunes are recovering in time for the upcoming election - which, of course, the prime minister schedules to his advantage. Thus, the opposition once again faces an uphill battle in this election cycle: The Malaysian economy has beaten expectations, growing by 5.6% in the first quarter of 2017, the fastest rate in two years. This was driven mainly by exports and the manufacturing sector (Chart 20). Money supply growth is strong while the credit impulse has bottomed and is approaching positive territory (Chart 21). The 1MDB scandal has mostly dissipated. Najib publicly confessed that the $700 million found in his personal account was a donation from a foreign government, and Saudi Arabian authorities confirmed this, prompting Najib to return the money. Malaysia's attorney general, anti-corruption commission, and central bank have all cleared Najib of wrongdoing, and his popular support has recovered from the fever pitch of the scandal in 2015-16, as demonstrated by the net-gain for BN in by-elections since 2013, and the fact that the BN saw its share of seats rise from 27% to 37% in the 2016 Sarawak State Assembly elections. This state's local elections have tended to foreshadow national elections, and it has the largest representation of any state in the national parliament (31/222). The opposition is split. Najib has courted the Islamist opposition party, PAS, peeling it away from the opposition coalition. Without PAS, the opposition falls from 89 seats in parliament to 71 seats, which is 41 shy of a majority. Even in the best case scenario for the opposition in the upcoming election, in which the opposition holds all seats from 2013 and Bersatu gains all of UMNO's seats in Kedah and Johor, the opposition would still fall 16 seats shy of a majority. Chart 20Growth Is Strong Growth Is Strong Growth Is Strong Chart 21Credit Cycle Is Picking Up Credit Cycle Is Picking Up Credit Cycle Is Picking Up Bottom Line: Our baseline case holds that Najib and BN will retain control of the government in the upcoming election on the back of the fading scandal, economic recovery, and a shrewd practice of dividing political enemies. What Does A Najib Win Mean? Is a Najib/BN victory positive for Malaysian risk assets? We think so, at least relative to other EMs. While Malaysia would benefit in the long run from breaking the BN's monopoly over parliament, the immediate consequence of an opposition victory would be confusion as the various opposition parties have widely divergent interests ... and zero governing experience. On the other hand, Najib's government has undertaken some significant reforms, expanded infrastructure, and improved government finances, making his corrupt and pseudo-authoritarian government not as market unfriendly as one might expect: As a result of weak commodities, cuts in subsidies, and the introduction of a goods and services tax (GST) and a tourism tax, Malaysia's fiscal deficit has improved from 5.5% in 2013, when Najib took office, to 3.1% today (Chart 22). The government is on a path to close the deficit by the end of the decade. The GST has allowed the government to reduce its dependency on oil revenues. Non-tax revenues, which include oil royalties, have decreased from 35% in 2010 to only 20% of total revenue, while indirect taxes (which include GST) have increased from 17% to 28% of revenue (Chart 23, top three panels). There are plans to increase the goods covered by the GST in the near future. The government has cut subsidies in fuel and cooking gas, taking advantage of low oil prices. The government had also eliminated subsidies in cooking oil and sugar. Subsidies as a percent of total expenditures have declined from almost 20% in 2014 to only 9% today (Chart 23, bottom panel). The government has expanded infrastructure, completing a mass rail transit extension in Kuala Lumpur, connecting the two East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak via a 2,000 km highway, and attracting Chinese investment from the One Belt One Road program. The latter entails China building an East Coast Rail Link to connect the west and east coasts. Upon completion, this link will enable shippers to circumvent the port of Singapore and reach the South China Sea in a shorter time period. Chart 22Austerity Works Austerity Works Austerity Works Chart 23Tax Reforms Paid Off Tax Reforms Paid Off Tax Reforms Paid Off One perceived drawback of Najib's government is that in order to stay in power, he has had to court the Islamist PAS party, as mentioned above, specifically by allowing it to promote aspects of shariah law in the country's parliament. However, Malaysia is not at risk of being swept away by an imaginary rising tide of Islamic extremism. The country is very diverse, and Malay Muslims make up only a little more than half of the population. Malaysians are highly religious, but they are also highly tolerant, as they have lived among other races and religions since independence (Chart 24). Moreover, Islam is regulated and bureaucratized in Malaysia, which discourages the emergence of charismatic, anti-establishment religious leaders and the development of extremist movements. Finally, the government has an absolute need to win votes both in the Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak, which have sizable Christian and non-Malay populations (adding up to more than half), and in the population centers of Kuala Lumpur and Penang. This means that it is not likely to allow PAS (or other Islamist movements) to go too far. Chart 24Malaysians Are Tolerant Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Update On Emerging Markets: Malaysia, Mexico, And The United States Of America Bottom Line: Najib's government is corrupt and has authoritarian leanings, but has improved its management of the economy and public finances, and is not getting out of control with Islamism or populism. We would not expect a sustained market sell off in the face of a BN victory in upcoming polls. By contrast, if the opposition coalition wins a majority, it offers the long-term promise of a more inclusive and competitive political system that would be good for Malaysia, but would bring greater policy uncertainty in the short term. The opposition would likely have a low probability of achieving major reforms, as the BN party-state conglomerate would fight tooth and nail against it. A positive knee-jerk market response to an opposition win - on the expectation that "regime change" raises the probability of pro-market reforms - would likely be ephemeral. Investment Conclusion A key internal risk to the Malaysian economy stems from the country's fairly sizable debt, which may eventually become unsustainable. Yet at the moment, household and government debt are both rolling over even as growth is improving (Chart 25). A key external risk stems from China. Chinese politics are likely to shift from a tailwind for Chinese growth - fiscal stimulus and the need for stability ahead of the National Party Congress - to a headwind, as stimulus subsides and reforms are rebooted in 2018.8 We do not expect China's investment in Malaysia to fall sharply, since it is tied to a broad, long-term, strategic plan; nor do we see Malaysia as overexposed to Chinese imports or tourism. Nevertheless, Malaysia would suffer to some extent, and it is indirectly vulnerable as Malaysian exports to ASEAN and tourists from ASEAN are significant, and ASEAN would suffer from a Chinese slowdown. In short, China is a risk, albeit not as direct or major as one might think. The Malaysian ringgit has already become the best-performing currency this year. Yet this recent appreciation has not come near to reversing the currency's roughly 20% depreciation since 2014. A cheap currency, combined with robust external demand, should be a tailwind for Malaysian exports and the broader economy (Chart 26). Moreover, the rising price of key Malaysian exports like energy and palm oil should be positive for Malaysian equities (Chart 27). Chart 25Debt Is High, But Is Rolling Over Debt Is High, But Is Rolling Over Debt Is High, But Is Rolling Over Chart 26Cheap Currency Is A Tailwind For Exports Cheap Currency Is A Tailwind For Exports Cheap Currency Is A Tailwind For Exports Chart 27Commodities Support Equity Prices Commodities Support Equity Prices Commodities Support Equity Prices At the same time, valuations are attractive. Malaysian equities have underperformed the EM universe and its ASEAN peers since 2013 (see Chart 17 above). Malaysian equities have lost considerable value relative to their EM peers, and are trading at a discount relative to ASEAN peers. Compared to historical valuations, Malaysian equities are also trading at a discount (Chart 28 A and B). Chart 28aMalaysia Is Cheap Compared To Peers... Malaysia Is Cheap Compared To Peers... Malaysia Is Cheap Compared To Peers... Chart 28b...And Its Historical Valuation ...And Its Historical Valuation ...And Its Historical Valuation Bottom Line: The likely start of a new credit cycle, improving government finances, a persistently cheap currency, and the likelihood of an acceptable policy status quo should put a tailwind behind Malaysian risk assets. We recommend going long Malaysian equities relative to their EM peers. Jesse Anak Kuri, Research Analyst jesse.kuri@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst Emerging Markets Strategy stephang@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "How Long Can The 'Trump Put' Last?" dated June 14, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Reconciliation And The Markets - Warning: This Report May Put You To Sleep," dated May 31, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Will Congress Pass The Border Adjustment Tax?," dated February 8, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The Wrath Of Cohn," dated July 26, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment," dated May 17, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Populism Blues: How And Why Social Instability Is Coming To America," dated June 9, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Emerging Market Strategy Weekly Report, "The Case For A Major Top In EM," dated July 12, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights EM growth is set to falter due to budding weakness in Asia's trade, a decline in commodities prices, and the frailty of EM banking systems. U.S./DM bond yields are heading higher for now and China's money/credit growth is set to decelerate. Together, these will trigger a selloff in EM risk assets. The EM equity outperformance versus DM has been extremely narrow and, hence, it is unsustainable. The EM tech sector is unlikely to support the equity rally much further because these stocks are overbought, and the Asian semiconductor cycle is entering a soft patch. Take profits on the yield curve flattening trade in Mexico. Stay long MXN on crosses versus BRL and ZAR and continue overweighting Mexican bonds. Feature Higher bond yields within the advanced economies and policy tightening in China remain the key threats to EM risk assets in the near term (the next three months). In the medium-term (the next three to 12 months or so), the principle risk is weaker growth in EM/China, and hence contracting corporate profits in EM. While this rally has lasted longer and has gone further than we had anticipated, we find the risk-reward for EM risk assets extremely unattractive. In fact, the huge amount of money that has flown into EM equity and debt markets in the past year amid poor fundamentals suggests to us that the next move will not be a simple correction but rather a major bear market. EM Recovery To Falter Although on the surface global growth appears to be on solid footing, there are early signs of a slowdown in Asian exports. Both Taiwanese exports of electronic parts and the country's overall exports to China have rolled over - the latter two lead global export volumes by a few months, as shown in Chart I-1. The reason why Taiwanese exports of electronic parts lead global trade cycles is because these parts are used in the assembly of final products, and producers order and receive these parts before final products are made and shipped. Similarly, a lot of Taiwanese exports to China serve as inputs into final products assembled in China and shipped worldwide. This is why Taiwan's overall shipments to China lead global trade cycles. On top of this, Korea's overall manufacturing and semiconductor shipments-to-inventory ratios have relapsed. Historically, these ratios have correlated with the KOSPI (Chart I-2). Chart I-1Signs Of Slowdown ##br##In Asian Trade Signs Of Slowdown In Asian Trade Signs Of Slowdown In Asian Trade Chart I-2Korea's Manufacturing ##br##Growth Has Peaked Korea's Manufacturing Growth Has Peaked Korea's Manufacturing Growth Has Peaked Outside the manufacturing-based Asian economies, most other EMs are basically commodities plays, except for India and Turkey. The latter two countries are not only relatively small, but Indian stocks are also expensive and overbought while Turkey is sufferings from its own malaise. In short, if the Asian tech cycle rolls over, China slows down and commodities prices relapse, EM growth will falter. That is why the focus of our analysis has been and remains on China's growth, commodities prices and the Asian trade cycle. Meanwhile, many banking systems in the developing world remain frail following the credit excesses of the preceding years. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy service remains bearish on commodities, and believes the breakdown in the correlation between commodities prices and EM risk assets since the beginning of this year is temporary and unsustainable. As for the increased importance of the technology sector in the EM equity benchmark, we offer further analysis on page 10. Our negative view on EM growth is not contingent on a relapse in U.S. and euro area growth. In fact, our current baseline scenario is that DM growth will remain solid, and government bond yields in these markets will rise further. Although growth in both the U.S. and euro area is robust, their importance for EM has become small. For example, exports to the U.S. and EU altogether account for 35% of total exports in China, 22% in Korea and 20% in Taiwan. All in all, if commodities prices continue to downshift and Asian trade slows, as we expect, EM growth will decelerate. Bottom Line: EM growth is set to falter notably, despite solid demand growth in DM. Liquidity Backdrop To Deteriorate Investors and market commentators often use the term "liquidity" loosely, and denote numerous things by it. We use the term 'liquidity' to signify the level and/or direction of interest rates as well as the level and/or direction of money/credit growth. Below we review some different perspectives of liquidity: EM narrow money (M1) growth points to both lower share prices and a relapse in EPS growth in the months ahead (Chart I-3). Chart I-3EM: Narrow Money (M1) Points To EPS Downturn And Lower Stock Prices EM: Narrow Money (M1) Points To EPS Downturn And Lower Stock Prices EM: Narrow Money (M1) Points To EPS Downturn And Lower Stock Prices This is an equity market cap-weighted aggregate of narrow money growth. M1 growth in China - the largest market cap in the EM equity benchmark - has been essential in driving aggregate EM M1 cycles in recent years. More importantly, China has been tightening liquidity, yet the majority of investors remain complacent about its impact on growth. In this regard, investors should remind themselves that monetary policy works with time lags, and the considerable rise in China's interbank rates and corporate bond yields will produce a growth slowdown in the real economy later this year. Chart I-4 demonstrates that China's broad money growth (M2) - which has in effect dropped to an all-time low - leads bank and non-bank credit origination. This suggests the odds of a slowdown in bank and non-bank credit flows are considerable. There has been no stable correlation between the size of DM central banks' balance sheets and EM stock prices, bond yields and currencies since 2011. Therefore, the Fed's move to reduce its balance sheet by itself should not matter for EM risk assets from a fundamental perspective. Nevertheless, EM risk assets have been negatively correlated with U.S. TIPS yields (Chart I-5), and the potential further rise in U.S./DM real and nominal yields will hurt EM sentiment, with flows to EM drying up. Chart I-4China: M2 Heralds ##br##Slowdown In Credit Growth China: M2 Heralds Slowdown In Credit Growth China: M2 Heralds Slowdown In Credit Growth Chart I-5EM Currencies To Depreciate ##br##As U.S. Real Yields Drift Higher EM Currencies To Depreciate As U.S. Real Yields Drift Higher EM Currencies To Depreciate As U.S. Real Yields Drift Higher Importantly, traders' bets on U.S. yield curve flattening have risen, as evidenced by large short positions in 2-year U.S. notes and considerable long positions in 10- and 30-year bonds. The unwinding of these positions will drive bond yields higher. Chart I-6Precious Metals Signal ##br##Higher Real Yields Ahead Precious Metals Signal Higher Real Yields Ahead Precious Metals Signal Higher Real Yields Ahead Notably, precious metal prices have failed to break out amid a weak U.S. dollar and have lately relapsed (Chart I-6). Precious metals prices could be sensing a further rise in U.S. real yields and/or an upleg in the U.S. dollar. Both the rise in U.S. yields and a stronger dollar will be negative for EM. Bottom Line: We maintain that U.S./DM bond yields are heading higher in the months ahead and China's money/credit growth is set to decelerate. Altogether these will trigger a selloff in EM risk assets. Underwhelming EM Technicals It is a well-known fact that flows into EM debt funds have been enormous, making EM fixed-income markets vulnerable to a reversal of these flows at the hands of tightening liquidity and EM growth disappointments, as argued above. This section focuses on a number of bearish technical signals for EM share prices. In particular: The EM equity implied volatility curve - 12-month VOL minus 1-month VOL - is at a record steep level, based on available history (Chart I-7). Periods of VOL curve flattening have historically coincided with a selloff in EM share prices, as evidenced by Chart I-7. Given that the VOL curve is record steep, the odds of flattening are substantial. Consistently, the probability of an EM selloff is considerable. Chart I-7A Sign Of Top In EM Share Prices? A Sign Of Top In EM Share Prices? A Sign Of Top In EM Share Prices? In absolute terms, EM equity implied 1-month VOL is at an all-time low and reflects enormous complacency about EM. EM equity breadth has also been poor. The MSCI EM equally weighted stock index (where each stock commands an equal weight) has considerably underperformed the EM market cap-weighted index since May 2016 (Chart I-8). This suggests the EM rally has been very narrowly driven. The same measure for DM stocks has done relatively better (Chart I-8). Remarkably, EM has underperformed DM based on equal-weighted equity indexes since July 2016 (Chart I-9). This confirms that EM outperformance against DM since early this year has been largely driven by a few stocks, namely the five companies accounting for the bulk of the EM tech index. Furthermore, EM ex-tech stocks have also failed to establish a bull market, in that the index remains below its prior low (Chart I-10). Chart I-8EM Equity Breadth ##br##Has Been Poor EM Equity Breadth Has Been Poor EM Equity Breadth Has Been Poor Chart I-9EM Versus DM: Relative ##br##Equity Performance EM Versus DM: Relative Equity Performance EM Versus DM: Relative Equity Performance Chart I-10EM Ex-Technology Stocks: ##br##Rebound But No Bull Market EM Ex-Technology Stocks: Rebound But No Bull Market EM Ex-Technology Stocks: Rebound But No Bull Market Finally, the magnitude of the EM rally this year is somewhat misleading. Only three out of 11 sectors - technology, real estate and consumer discretionary (mainly, autos) - have outperformed the EM benchmark this year. Table I-1 illustrates that these three sectors have been responsible for about 50% of the EM rally year-to-date while their market cap is only 36% of total. Table I-1EM Rally In 2017: Return Decomposition The Case For A Major Top In EM The Case For A Major Top In EM Bottom Line: The EM equity outperformance versus DM has been extremely narrow: it has been due to five tech companies that are currently very overbought (see Chart I-8 on page 7). Valuations EM equity valuations are not cheap, as most of the rally since the early 2016 bottom has been driven by a multiple expansion rather than a rise in corporate earnings (Chart I-11). We are not suggesting EM stocks are expensive, but they do not offer good value either. In fact, good companies/countries/sectors are expensive, while those, that appear "cheap", command low multiples for a reason. As for currencies, they are not cheap either. The real effective exchange rate of EM ex-China is rather elevated after the rally of the past year or so (Chart I-12). Finally, not only are EM sovereign and corporate spreads close to record lows, but also local government bond yield spreads over U.S. Treasurys are at multi-year lows (Chart I-13). Chart I-11Decomposing EM Equity ##br##Return Into P/E And EPS Decomposing EM Equity Return Into P/E And EPS Decomposing EM Equity Return Into P/E And EPS Chart I-12EM Ex-China Currencies ##br##Are Not Cheap And Vulnerable EM Ex-China Currencies Are Not Cheap And Vulnerable EM Ex-China Currencies Are Not Cheap And Vulnerable Chart I-13EM Local Bond Yields Spreads ##br##Over U.S. Treasurys Is Low EM Local Bond Yields Spreads Over U.S. Treasurys Is Low EM Local Bond Yields Spreads Over U.S. Treasurys Is Low Bottom Line: Adjusted for fundamentals, EM equity, currency and credit market valuations are rather expensive. The odds are that the reality will underwhelm expectations, and that EM risk assets will sell off. A Word On EM Tech: Is This Time Different? During our recent trip to Europe, many clients argued that the increased weight of technology in the EM equity benchmark will cause EM share prices to decouple from the traditional variables they have historically been correlated with, like commodities prices, commodities stocks and others. In brief, the argument is that EM has entered a new paradigm, and past correlations will not work. The last time we at BCA heard similar arguments was back in early 2000 at the peak of the global tech bubble. At the time, the argument was that this time was truly different - that tech stocks could drive the market higher regardless of the old indicators and the performance of other sectors. Chart I-14 portrays that in 2000 the EM equity index, for several months, decoupled from global mining and energy stocks when tech and telecom stocks went ballistic. Chart I-14EM And Commodities Stocks: Can The Recent Decoupling Persist? EM And Commodities Stocks: Can The Recent Decoupling Persist? EM And Commodities Stocks: Can The Recent Decoupling Persist? Back in 2000, the bubble was in tech and telecom stocks. These two sectors together comprised 33% of the EM benchmark as of January 2000 (Chart I-15). This compares with a 27% weighting of technology stocks alone in the EM benchmark now. The combined weight of energy and materials is currently 14% versus 19% in January 2000, as can been seen in Chart I-15. Chart I-15EM Equities Sector Composition Now And In Late 1990s The Case For A Major Top In EM The Case For A Major Top In EM To be sure, we are not suggesting that tech stocks are in a bubble as they were in 2000, and that a bust in share prices is imminent. However, several observations are noteworthy: Chart I-16EM Equities Sector ##br##Composition Now And In Late 1990s EM Equities Sector Composition Now And In Late 1990s EM Equities Sector Composition Now And In Late 1990s Just because EM tech stocks have skyrocketed in the past six months does not mean they will continue to do so. In fact, EM tech is already extremely overbought and likely over-owned (Chart I-16). As global bond yields rise, high-multiples stocks, especially social media/internet companies, could selloff. We, like all macro strategists, can add little value on how to value internet/social media companies and assess their business models. However, we can shed some light on the business cycle in the semiconductor sector that influences performance of heavyweight companies like TSMC and Samsung. As Chart I-1 and I-2 on pages 1 and 3 demonstrate, there are signs that the semi/electronics cycle in Asia has peaked. We do not mean that this sector is headed toward recession. But this is a very cyclical sector, and some slowdown is to be expected following the growth outburst of the past 18 months. This will be enough to cause a correction in semi stocks from extremely overbought levels. The tight correlation between EM share prices and energy and mining stocks has persisted for the past 20 years (Chart I-14 on page 10), and we believe it will re-establish as technology stocks' shine diminishes. Finally, we have been recommending an overweight position in Taiwanese, Korean, and Chinese stocks primarily because of their large tech exposure. For now we maintain this strategy. Bottom Line: While the technology sector could make a difference for EM economies and equity markets in the long run, it is unlikely to support the current rally and outperformance much further. Indeed, tech stocks are heavily overbought, and the Asian semiconductor cycle is entering a soft patch. In brief, the overall EM equity benchmark is at a major risk of relapse and underperformance versus the DM bourses. Stay underweight. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Mexico: Take Profits On Yield Curve Flattener And Stay Long MXN On Crosses Mexico's 10/1-year swap curve has inverted for the first time in history and we are taking a 160 basis points profit on our yield curve flattening trade recommended on June 8, 2016 (Chart II-1). Will the central bank begin cutting interest rates soon? Is it time to get bullish on stocks? We do not think so: Inflation is well above the central bank's target and is broad based (Chart II-2). Notably, wage growth is elevated (Chart II-3). Chart II-1Mexico's Yield Cruve Has Inverted: Take Profits Mexico's Yield Cruve Has Inverted: Take Profits Mexico's Yield Cruve Has Inverted: Take Profits Chart II-2Mexico: Inflation Is Above The Target Mexico: Inflation is Above The Target Mexico: Inflation is Above The Target Chart II-3Mexico: Wage Inflation Is High Mexico: Wage Inflation Is High Mexico: Wage Inflation Is High Provided productivity growth is meager in Mexico, unit labor costs - which are calculated as wage per hour divided by productivity (output per hour) - are rising. This will depress companies' profit margins and make them eager to hike selling prices. This will in turn prevent inflation from falling and, consequently, hamper Banxico's ability to cut rates for now. Meanwhile, the impact of higher interest rates will continue filtering through the economy. High interest rates entail further slowdown in money and credit growth and, hence, in domestic demand. Both consumer spending and capital expenditure by companies are set to weaken a lot (Chart II-4). This will weigh on corporate profits and share prices. Fiscal policy is not going to support growth either because policymakers will opt to consolidate the recent improvement in the fiscal deficit. This is especially true given the latest selloff in oil prices. Notably, oil accounts for about 20% of government revenues. Even though non-oil exports and manufacturing output are accelerating (Chart II-5), non-oil exports - that make about 30% of GDP - are not large enough to offset the deceleration in domestic demand from monetary tightening. Chart II-4Mexico: Domestic Demand To Buckle Mexico: Domestic Demand To Buckle Mexico: Domestic Demand to Buckle Mexico: Domestic Demand To Buckle Mexico: Domestic Demand to Buckle Chart II-5Mexico: Exports Are Robust Contracting Non-Oil Exports Signal Headwinds For Manufacturing Mexico: Exports are Robust Contracting Non-Oil Exports Signal Headwinds For Manufacturing Mexico: Exports are Robust Investment Conclusions The outlook for Mexican stocks in absolute terms is poor as domestic demand will slump, further hampering corporate profits. Meanwhile, inflation is still elevated to justify rate cuts by the central bank. Within an EM equity portfolio, we recommend neutral allocation to this bourse mainly due to our expectations of the peso outperforming other EM currencies. The Mexican peso is still cheap (Chart II-6). Therefore, we continue to recommend long positions in MXN versus ZAR and BRL. If EM currencies depreciate and oil prices drop further as we expect, it will be hard for the peso to appreciate versus the U.S. dollar. However, the peso will outperform many other EM currencies. Mexican local currency bonds and sovereign credit offer good value relative to their EM counterparts. (Chart II-7). Fixed income investors should continue to overweight Mexican local currency and sovereign credit within their respective EM benchmarks. Chart II-6Mexico: Peso Is Cheap Mexico: Peso is Cheap Mexico: Peso is Cheap Chart II-7Continue Overweighting Mexican Bonds Continue Overweighting Mexican Bonds Continue Overweighting Mexican Bonds Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights The sharp downturn in oil prices triggered last week by an unexpected jump in weekly U.S. oil inventories, along with word Mexico's finance ministry had begun soliciting offers for its 2018 oil-revenue hedge, will be reversed by strong fundamentals in the next few weeks. On the data side, we believe markets simply over-reacted to high-frequency U.S. statistics. Taking a slightly broader view of the data suggests the trend in U.S. oil markets is continued tightening, as the northern hemisphere enters the summer driving season. Globally, we expect the OPEC 2.0 production-cut extension and continued strong EM demand to lead to a normalization of global storage levels by end-2017. We continue to expect Brent to trade to $60/bbl in 4Q17, with WTI trailing by ~ $2/bbl. Energy: Overweight. We were stopped out of our long Dec/17 vs. short Dec/18 WTI and Brent spreads by last week's sell-off. We continue to favor long front-to-back exposure, but will wait to re-establish these positions. We will, however, take a lower-risk position consistent with our view and get long Dec/17 $50/bbl WTI calls vs. short $55/bbl WTI calls at tonight's close. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper's brief rally stalled, taking front-month COMEX prices below $2.60/lb this week. The IMF's upgrade of China's growth prospects likely will support copper prices. Precious Metals: Neutral. Spot gold's chart has formed a bullish inverted head-and-shoulders pattern, which could take prices into a gap that opened in the continuation chart at $1,292/oz in the aftermath of November 2016's price plunge. We remain long spot gold. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA's WASDE report did little to temper expectations for another record harvest - or something close enough to it. Even so, given recent U.S. Midwest weather, we would close any shorts. Feature This past week in the oil markets amply demonstrates that the old adage "One week does not a trend make" is more honored in the breach than in the observance. Events we view as transitory - the unexpected 3.3mm bbl jump in weekly U.S. crude-oil inventories, along with news Mexico's finance ministry began lining up offers on crude-oil put options for its 2018 revenue hedge - conspired to shave close to 6% from Brent prices in less than a week. From just over $51/bbl at the beginning of the month, when the Mexican finance ministry reportedly began soliciting offers on crude-oil put options, to the end of last week, Brent prices had fallen ~ $3/bbl. Front-month Brent continued to languish around that level as we went to press.1 Stronger fundamental data, particularly from the U.S., where last week's inventory shock hammered prices, will reverse these transitory effects going into 2H17. Chart of the WeekU.S. Refinery Runs At Record Levels U.S. Refinery Runs At Record Levels U.S. Refinery Runs At Record Levels U.S. Fundamental Strength Will Reverse Weak Crude Prices Third-quarter refining - typically a high-activity period in the U.S. - is opening on a very strong note: U.S. refining runs are at record highs, with net crude inputs posting a four-week average 17.3mm b/d run rate at June 2, 2017 (Chart of the Week). U.S. demand is reviving and now is back over 20mm b/d (Chart 2). We expect low product prices, particularly for gasoline, to boost demand going into the summer driving season. In addition, surging refined-product exports, particularly into Latin American markets, will keep U.S. refiners' appetite for crude high, allowing storage levels to drain (Chart 3). Note the end-2016/early-2017 surge and the ongoing strength in product exports year to date - exports are seasonally strong, even if they dipped a bit. The resumption in export growth after a short-lived downturn will continue to pull total crude and product net imports down in the U.S. (Chart 4). Chart 2U.S. Product Demand Back##BR##Over 20mm b/d U.S. Product Demand Back Over 20mm b/d U.S. Product Demand Back Over 20mm b/d Chart 3U.S. Product Exports##BR##Are Surging U.S. Product Exports Are Surging U.S. Product Exports Are Surging Chart 4U.S. Crude And Product Export Growth##BR##Continues To Lower Net Import Levels U.S. Crude And Product Export Growth Continues To Lower Net Import Levels U.S. Crude And Product Export Growth Continues To Lower Net Import Levels On the supply side, U.S. crude-oil production is up sharply after bottoming yoy with a decline of ~ 850k b/d last September, and stood at ~9.20mm b/d at the beginning of June, based on monthly production data from the EIA (Chart 5). This is up 330k b/d yoy. Much of this is being consumed domestically, but export volumes continue to increase, after hitting a recent high of close to 1mm b/d on a four-week-moving-average basis in March (Chart 6). Given the reception U.S. light crude is receiving in Asian markets, we expect continued growth, which will support the build-out of export-related facilities along the Gulf. Chart 5U.S. Crude Production Is Recovering Smartly ... U.S. Crude Production Is Recovering Smartly ... U.S. Crude Production Is Recovering Smartly ... Chart 6... And U.S. Crude Exports Are Surging ... And U.S. Crude Exports Are Surging ... And U.S. Crude Exports Are Surging Strong product demand and exports will allow crude inventories to continue to draw in the U.S. (Chart 7), particularly in the critically important Cushing storage market, where the NYMEX WTI futures contract delivers (Chart 8). Note that using 4-week-moving-average data shows yoy crude and product storage levels down an average 2.4mm bbl/week over the past eight weeks even with the unexpected surge in stocks reported last week. Cushing storage has become increasingly integrated with U.S. Gulf storage, which supports the strong refining activity there. Chart 7Strong Demand And Exports Allow##BR##U.S. Crude And Product Stocks To Draw Strong Demand And Exports Allow U.S. Crude And Product Stocks To Draw Strong Demand And Exports Allow U.S. Crude And Product Stocks To Draw Chart 8Cushing Crude Storage##BR##Continues To Draw Cushing Crude Storage Continues To Draw Cushing Crude Storage Continues To Draw Mexico's Revenue Hedge Is A Transitory Event Earlier this month, Mexico's Ministry of Finance reportedly began soliciting market-makers for offers on put options, signalling its annual revenue hedge will be forthcoming in the not-too-distant future. Reportedly, the finance ministry began lining up offer indications at the beginning of June, and by the end of last week the news was on the wire services.2 By purchasing puts, the finance ministry secures the right - but not the obligation - to sell oil at the strike price of the options. This puts a floor on the revenue realized by the ministry, since, if oil prices move higher next year, they will be able to sell into the market at the higher market-clearing price. However, if prices go below the strike price of the options, the market-makers - typically banks and, last year, for the first time, the trading arm of a major oil company - have to pay the difference between the puts' strike price and the market price. These hedges paid out $6.4 billion in 2015 and $2.7 billion last year, according to Bloomberg. The Mexican finance ministry's program, which can hedge up to 300mm bbl worth of production revenue, will keep markets leery for a couple of weeks. This is because the market-makers writing the puts for Mexico's ministry of finance will soak up available liquidity by hitting bids across the WTI, Brent, and refined products futures and swaps forward curves. The market-makers typically try to trade out of the exposure they've taken on by providing the hedge to the ministry, because, at the end of the day, they do not want to be made long oil if the options go into the money. This is what would happen if oil prices were to fall below the strike price of the puts purchased by the ministry, when the options approach their monthly expiry dates and their value is determined. To hedge themselves against this potential risk, the market-makers will sell volumes into the futures and swaps markets that are determined by the output of an option-pricing model. The lower prices go, the more they sell forward, and vice versa. More than likely, market-makers will be selling into rallies, so, at least while this hedge is moving through the market, any rally likely to be short-lived, as market-makers hedge themselves. However, once this activity is out of the way and refinery demand for crude kicks into high gear, we expect the physical reality of crude and product draws to take prices higher and backwardate WTI and Brent curves later this year. As an aside, we would expect lower prices will accelerate the draws at the margin, as we approach the peak of the northern hemisphere's summer driving season, as noted above. Strong Demand, Lower Supply Will Draw Stocks And Lift Prices Chart 9OPEC Really Is Cutting ~1.0mm b/d##BR##For More Than 400 Days OPEC Really Is Cutting ~1.0mm b/d For More Than 400 Days OPEC Really Is Cutting ~1.0mm b/d For More Than 400 Days The extension of OPEC 2.0's production cuts to the end of 1Q18 means that - for more than 400 days from January 2017 to March 2018 - OPEC producers with the ability to hold production at relatively high levels, and to even increase it, will have removed more than 1mm b/d from global flows (Chart 9). This will be supplemented by some 300k b/d of cuts from Russia and sundry non-OPEC producers.3 On the demand side, we continue to expect robust growth, given the behavior of EM global trade volumes and non-OECD oil demand strength, led by continued growth in China and India (Chart 10).4 We will be updating our balances next week, but we see no reason to lower our expectation that global demand will grow by more than 1.5mm b/d this year, especially following the IMF's upgrade of China's expected GDP growth this year to 6.7% from 6.6% on the back of "policy support, especially expansionary credit and public investment."5 This is the third upward revision to China's GDP growth made by the Fund this year. We continue to expect lower supply and robust demand this year and into early 2018 to draw visible inventories down to more normal levels (Chart 11), lift prices and backwardate the Brent and WTI forward curves. Given our analysis, we expect Brent to trade to $60/bbl later this year, with WTI trailing it by ~ $2/bbl. Chart 10 Chart 11... And Inventories Will Normalize ... And Inventories Will Normalize ... And Inventories Will Normalize Bottom Line: Markets appear to have extrapolated the weekly data into a trend that would reverse - or at least materially slow - the normalization of inventories, despite the extension of OPEC 2.0's 1.8mm b/d production cuts to the end of 1Q18, and continued strength in EM oil demand, which is driven by continued strength in China's and India's economies. Net, we believe Mexico's revenue hedge and the one-week surge in U.S. inventories are transitory events, which will be reversed in the weeks ahead. Despite being stopped out of our long Dec/17 vs. short Dec/18 Brent and WTI recommendations following last week's sell-off we still are inclined to keep this exposure. However, we will wait for the market to process Mexico's revenue hedge and to work through the IEA's subdued 2017 demand forecast before re-establishing these positions. In the meantime, we will take a lower-risk position consistent with our view and get long Dec/17 $50/bbl WTI calls vs. short $55/bbl WTI calls at tonight's close. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Mexico Said to Take First Steps in Annual Oil Hedging Program," published by bloomberg.com on June 9, 2017. 2 Please see footnote 1. 3 Please see the BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Extending OPEC 2.0's Production Cuts Will Normalize Global Oil Inventories", published June 1, 2017, for an in-depth analysis of OPEC 2.0's production cuts. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see the BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Strong EM Trade Volumes Will Support Oil," published June 8, 2017. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see "IMF Staff Completes 2017 Article IV Mission to China," published June 14, 2017, on the IMF's website imf.org. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016 U.S. Oil Inventories Will Resume Drawing U.S. Oil Inventories Will Resume Drawing U.S. Oil Inventories Will Resume Drawing U.S. Oil Inventories Will Resume Drawing

Highlights This week, Commodity & Energy Strategy is publishing a joint report with our colleagues at BCA's Energy Sector Strategy. Driven by the leadership of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia, OPEC 2.0 formalized the well-telegraphed decision to extend its production cuts for another nine months, carrying the cuts through the seasonally weak demand period of Q1 2018. The extension is will be successful in bringing OECD inventories down to normalized levels, even assuming some compliance fatigue (cheating) setting in later this year. Energy: Overweight. We are getting long Dec/17 WTI vs. short Dec/18 WTI at tonight's close, given our expectation OPEC 2.0's extension of production cuts, and lower exports by KSA to the U.S., will cause the U.S. crude-oil benchmark to backwardate. Base Metals: Neutral. Despite "catastrophic flooding" in March, 1Q17 copper output in Peru grew almost 10% yoy to close to 564k MT, according to Metal Bulletin. This occurred despite strikes at Freeport-McMoRan's Cerro Verde mine, where production was down 20.5% yoy in March. Precious Metals: Neutral. Our strategic gold portfolio hedge is up 2.61% since it was initiated on May 4, 2017. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA's Crop Progress report indicates plantings are close to five-year averages, despite harsh weather in some regions. We remain bearish. Feature Chart 1Real OPEC Cuts Of ~1.0 MMb/d##BR##For Over 400 Days Real OPEC Cuts Of ~1.0 MMb/d For Over 400 Days Real OPEC Cuts Of ~1.0 MMb/d For Over 400 Days OPEC 2.0's drive to normalize inventories by early 2018 will be accomplished with last week's agreement to extend current production cuts through March 2018. In total, OPEC has agreed to remove over 1 MMb/d of producible OPEC oil from the market for over 400 days (Chart 1), supplemented by an additional 200,000-300,000 b/d of voluntary restrictions of non-OPEC oil through Q3 2017 at least, perhaps longer if Russia can resist the temptation to cheat after oil prices start to respond. Many of the participants in the cut, from both OPEC and non-OPEC, are not actually reducing output voluntarily, but have had quotas set for them that merely reflect the natural decline of their productive capacity, limitations that will be even more pronounced in H2 2017 than in H1 2017. With production restricted by the OPEC 2.0 cuts, global demand growth will outpace supply expansion by another wide margin in 2017, just as it did last year (Chart 2). As shown in Chart 3, steady demand expansion and the slowdown in supply growth allowed oil markets to move from oversupplied in 2015 to balanced during 2016; demand growth will increasingly outpace production growth in 2017, creating sharp inventory draws (Chart 4) that bring stocks down to normalized levels by the end of 2017 (Chart 5). Chart 2 Chart 3Production Cuts And Demand##BR##Growth Will Draw Inventories Production Cuts And Demand Growth Will Draw Inventories Production Cuts And Demand Growth Will Draw Inventories Chart 4Higher Global Inventory##BR##Withdrawals Through Rest Of 2017 Higher Global Inventory Withdrawals Through Rest Of 2017 Higher Global Inventory Withdrawals Through Rest Of 2017 Chart 5OECD Inventories To Be##BR##Reduced To Normal OECD Inventories To Be Reduced To Normal OECD Inventories To Be Reduced To Normal The extension of the cut through Q1 2018 will help prevent a premature refilling of inventories during the seasonally weak first quarter next year. The return of OPEC 2.0's production to full capacity in Q2 2018 will drive total production growth above total demand growth for 2018, returning oil markets from deliberately undersupplied during 2017 to roughly balanced markets in 2018, with stable inventory levels that are below the rolling five-year average. 2018 inventory levels will still be 5-10% above the average from 2010-2014, in line with the ~7% demand growth between 2014 and 2018. Compliance Assessment: Only A Few Players Matter In OPEC 2.0 OPEC's compliance with the cuts announced in November 2016 has been quite good, with KSA anchoring the cuts by surpassing its 468,000 b/d cut commitment. In addition to KSA, OPEC is getting strong voluntary compliance from the other Middle Eastern producers (except Iraq), while producers outside the Middle East lack the ability to meaningfully exceed their quotas in any case. OPEC's Core Four Remain Solid. The core of the OPEC 2.0 agreement has delivered strong compliance with their announced cuts. Within OPEC, the core Middle East countries Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and UAE have delivered over 100% compliance of their 800,000 b/d agreed-to cuts. We expect these countries to continue to show strong solidarity with the voluntary cuts through March 2018 (Chart 6). Iraq And Iran Make Small/No Sacrifices. Iraq and Iran were not officially excluded from cuts, but they were not asked to make significant sacrifices either. We estimate Iran has little-to-no capability to materially raise production in 2017 anyhow, and KSA is leaning on Iraq to better comply with its small cuts. Chart 7 shows our projections for Iran and Iraq production levels through 2018. Chart 6KSA, Kuwait, Qatar & UAE Carrying##BR##The Load Of OPEC Cuts KSA, Kuwait, Qatar & UAE Carrying The Load Of OPEC Cuts KSA, Kuwait, Qatar & UAE Carrying The Load Of OPEC Cuts Chart 7Iran And Iraq Production##BR##Near Full Capacity Iran And Iraq Production Near Full Capacity Iran And Iraq Production Near Full Capacity Iraq surged its production above 4.6 MMb/d for two months between OPEC's September 2016 indication that a cut would be coming and the late-November formalization of the cut. Iraq's quota of 4.35 MMb/d is nominally a 210,000 b/d cut from its surged November reference level, but is essentially equal to the country's production for the first nine months of 2016, implying not much of a real cut. Despite the low level of required sacrifice, Iraq has produced about 100,000 b/d above its quota so far in 2017 at a level we estimate is near/at its capacity anyway. KSA and others in OPEC are not pleased with Iraq's overproduction and have pressured it to comply with the agreement. We forecast Iraq will continue producing at 4.45 MMb/d. Iran's quota represented an allowed increase in production, reflecting the country's continued recovery from years of economic sanctions. We project Iran will continue to slowly expand production, but since the country is almost back up to pre-sanction levels, there is little remaining easily-achievable recovery potential. South American & African OPEC Capacity Eroding On Its Own. Chart 8 clearly shows how production levels in Venezuela, Angola and Algeria started to deteriorate well before OPEC formalized its production cuts, with productive capacity eroded by lack of reinvestment rather than voluntary restrictions. The quotas for these three countries (as well as for small producers Ecuador and Gabon) are counted as ~258,000 b/d of "cuts" in OPEC's agreement, but they merely represent the declines in production that should be expected anyway. With capacity deteriorating and no ability to ramp up anyway, these OPEC nations will deliver improving "compliance" (i.e. under-producing their quotas) in H2 2017, and are happy to have the higher oil prices created by the extension of production cuts by the core producers within OPEC 2.0. Libya and Nigeria Exclusions Unlikely To Result In Big Production Gains. Both Libyan and Nigerian production levels have been constrained by above-ground interference. Libyan production has been held below 1.0 MMb/d since 2013 principally by chronic factional fighting for control of export terminals, while Nigerian production--on a steady natural decline since 2010--has been further limited by militants sabotaging pipelines in 2016-2017. While each country has ebbs and flows to the amount of oil they are able to produce, we view both countries' problems as persistent risks that will continue to keep production below full potential (Chart 9). Chart 8 Chart 9Libya And Nigeria Production Could Go Higher##BR##Under Right (But Unlikely) Circumstances Libya And Nigeria Production Could Go Higher Under Right (But Unlikely) Circumstances Libya And Nigeria Production Could Go Higher Under Right (But Unlikely) Circumstances For Nigeria, we estimate the country's crude productive capacity has eroded to about 1.8 MMb/d from 2.0 MMb/d five years ago due to aging fields and a substantial reduction in drilling (offshore drilling is down ~70% since 2013). Within another year or two, this capacity will dwindle to 1.7 MMb/d or below. On top of this natural decline, we have projected continued sabotage / militant obstruction will limit actual crude output to an average of 1.55 MMb/d for the foreseeable future. Libyan production averaged just 420,000 b/d for 2014-2016, a far cry from the 1.65 MMb/d produced prior to the 2011 Libyan Revolution that ousted strongman Muammar Gaddafi. Since Gaddafi was deposed and executed, factional strife and conflict has persisted. Each faction wants control over oil export revenues and, just as importantly, wants to deny the opposition those revenues, resulting in a chronic state of conflict that has limited production and exports. If a détente were reached, we expect Libyan oil production could quickly rise to about 1.0 MMb/d of production within six months; however, we put the odds of a sustainable détente at less than 30%. As such, we forecast Libyan crude production will continue to struggle, averaging about 600,000 b/d in 2017-2018. Non-OPEC Cuts Hang On Russia In November, ten non-OPEC countries nominally agreed to restrict production by a total of 558,000 b/d, but Russia--with 300,000 b/d of pledged cuts--is the big fish that KSA and OPEC are relying on. Mexico's (and several others') agreements are window dressing, reframing natural production declines as voluntary action to rebalance markets. Through H1 2017, Russia has delivered on about 60-70% of its cut agreement, with compliance growing in Q2 (near 100%) versus Q1 (under 50%). From the start, Russia indicated it would require some time to work through the physical technicalities of lowering production to its committed levels, implying that now that production has been lowered, Russia could deliver greater compliance over H2 2017 than it delivered in H1 2017. We are a little more skeptical, expecting some weakening in Russia's compliance by Q4, especially if the extended cuts deliver the expected results of bringing down OECD inventories and lifting prices. Russia surprised us with stronger-than-expected production during 2016. Some of the outperformance was clearly due to a lower currency and improved shale-like drilling results in Western Siberia, but it is unclear whether producers also pulled too hard on their fields to compensate for lower prices, and are using the OPEC 2.0 cut as a way to rest their fields a bit. We have estimated Russian production returning to 11.3 MMb/d by Q4 2017 (50,000 b/d higher than 2016 average production) and holding there through 2018 (Chart 10), but actual volumes could deviate from this level by as much as 100,000-200,000 b/d. Mexico, the second largest non-OPEC "cutter," is in a position similar to Angola, Algeria, and Venezuela. Mexican production has been falling for years (Chart 11), and the nation's pledge to produce 100,000 b/d less in H1 2017 than in Q4 2016 is merely a reflection of this involuntary decline. As it has happened, Mexican production has declined by only ~60,000 b/d below its official reference level, but continues to deteriorate, promising higher "compliance" with their production pledge in H2 2017. Chart 10Russia Expected##BR##To Cheat By Q4 Russia Expected To Cheat By Q4 Russia Expected To Cheat By Q4 Chart 11Mexican Production Deterioration##BR##Unaffected By Cut Pledges Mexican Production Deterioration Unaffected By Cut Pledges Mexican Production Deterioration Unaffected By Cut Pledges Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are not complying with any cuts, and we don't expect them to. Despite modest pledges of 55,000 b/d cuts combined, the two countries have produced ~80,000 b/d more during H1 2017 than they did in November 2016. We don't expect any voluntary contributions from these nations in the cut extension, but Azerbaijan's production is expected to wane naturally (Chart 12). While contributing only a small cut of 45,000 b/d, Oman has diligently adhered to its promised cuts, supporting its OPEC and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) neighbors. We expect Oman's excellent compliance will be faithfully continued through the nine-month extension (Chart 13). Chart 12Kazakhstan And Azerbaijan Not Expected##BR##To Comply With Any Cut Extension Kazakhstan And Azerbaijan Not Expected To Comply With Any Cut Extension Kazakhstan And Azerbaijan Not Expected To Comply With Any Cut Extension Chart 13Oman Has Faithfully Complied##BR##With Cut Promises To Date Oman Has Faithfully Complied With Cut Promises To Date Oman Has Faithfully Complied With Cut Promises To Date OPEC Extension Will Continue To Support Increased Shale Drilling Energy Sector Strategy believed OPEC's original cut announced in November 2016 was a strategic mistake for the cartel, as it would accelerate the production recovery from U.S. shales in return for "only" six months of modestly-higher OPEC revenue. As we cautioned at the time, the promise of an OPEC-supported price floor was foolish for them to make; instead, OPEC should have let the risk of low prices continue to restrain shale and non-Persian Gulf investment, allowing oil markets to rebalance more naturally. However, despite our unfavorable opinion of the strategic value of the original cut, since the cut has not delivered the type of OECD inventory reductions expected (seemingly due to a larger-than-expected transfer of non-OECD inventories into OECD storage), we view the extension of the cut as a necessary, and logical, next step. OPEC 2.0's November 2016 cut agreement signaled to the world that OPEC (and Russia) would abandon KSA's professed commitment to a market share war, and would instead work together to support a ~$50/bbl floor under the price of oil. Such a price floor dramatically reduced the investment risk for shale drilling, and emboldened producers (and supporting capital markets) to pour money into vastly increased drilling programs. Now that the shale investment genie has already been let out of the bottle, extending the cuts is unlikely to have nearly the same stimulative impact on shale spending as the original paradigm-changing cut created. The shale drilling and production response has been even greater than we estimated six months ago, and surely greater than OPEC's expectations. The current horizontal (& directional) oil rig count of 657 rigs is nearly twice the 2016 average of 356 rigs, is 60% higher than the level of November 2016 (immediately before the cut announcement), and is still rising at a rate of 25-30 rigs per month (Chart 14). The momentum of these expenditures will carry U.S. production higher through YE 2017 even if oil prices were allowed to crash today. Immediately following OPEC's cut, we estimated 2017 U.S. onshore production could increase by 100,000 - 200,000 b/d over levels estimated prior to the cut, back-end weighted to H2 2017, with a greater 300,000-400,000 b/d uplift to 2018 production levels. Drilling activity has roared back so much faster than we had expected, indicative of the flooding of the industry with external capital, that we have raised our 2017 production estimate by 500,000 b/d over our December estimate, and raised our 2018 production growth estimate to 1.0 MMb/d (Chart 15). Chart 14Rig Count Recovery Dominated##BR##By Horizontal Drilling Rig Count Recovery Dominated By Horizontal Drilling Rig Count Recovery Dominated By Horizontal Drilling Chart 15Onshore U.S. Production##BR##Estimates Rising Sharply Onshore U.S. Production Estimates Rising Sharply Onshore U.S. Production Estimates Rising Sharply Other Guys' Decline Requires Greater Growth From OPEC, Shales, And Russia We've written before about "the Other Guys' in the oil market, defined as all producers outside of the expanding triumvirate of 1) U.S. shales, 2) Russia, and 3) Middle East OPEC. While the growers receive the vast majority of investors' focus, the Other Guys comprise nearly half of global production and have struggled to keep production flat over the past several years (Chart 16). Chart 17 shows the largest offshore basins in the world, which should suffer accelerated declines in 2019-2020 (and likely beyond) as the cumulative effects of spending constraints during 2015-2018 (and likely beyond) result in an insufficient level of projects coming online. This outlook requires increasing growth from OPEC, Russia and/or the shales to offset the shrinkage of the Other Guys and simultaneously meet continued demand growth. Chart 16The Other Guys' Production##BR##Struggling To Keep Flat The Other Guys' Production Struggling To Keep Flat The Other Guys' Production Struggling To Keep Flat Chart 17 Risks To Rebalancing Our expectation global oil inventories will draw, and that prices will, as a result, migrate toward $60/bbl by year-end is premised on the continued observance of production discipline by OPEC 2.0. GCC OPEC - KSA, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE - Russia and Oman are expected to observe their pledged output reduction, but we are modeling some compliance "fatigue" all the same. Even so, this will not prevent visible OECD oil inventories from falling to their five-year average levels by year-end or early next year. Obviously, none of this can be taken for granted. We have consistently highlighted the upside and downside risks to our longer term central tendency of $55/bbl for Brent crude, with an expected trading range of $45 to $65/bbl out to 2020. Below, we reprise these concerns and our thoughts concerning OPEC 2.0's future. Major Upside Risks Chief among the upside risks remains a sudden loss of supply from a critical producer and exporter like Venezuela or Nigeria, which, respectively, we expect will account for 1.9 and 1.5 MMb/d of production over the 2017-18 period. Losing either of these exporters would sharply rally prices above $65/bbl as markets adjusted and brought new supply on line. Other states - notably Algeria and Iraq - highlight the risk of sustained production losses due to a combination of internal strife and lack of FDI due to civil unrest. Algeria already appears to have entered into a declining production phase, while Iraq - despite its enormous potential - remains dogged by persistent internal conflict. We are modeling a sustained, slow decline in Algeria's output this year and next, which takes its output from 1.1 MMb/d in 2015 down to slightly more than 1 MMb/d on average this year and next. For Iraq, where we expect a flattening of production at ~ 4.4 MMb/d this year and a slight uptick to ~ 4.45 MMb/d in 2018, continued violence arising from dispersed terrorism in that country in the wake of a defeat of ISIS as an organized force, will remain an ongoing threat to production. Longer term - i.e., beyond 2018 - we remain concerned the massive $1-trillion-plus cutbacks in capex for projects that would have come online between 2015 and 2020 brought on by the oil-price collapse in 2015-16 will force prices higher to encourage the development of new supplies. The practical implication of this is some 7 MMb/d of oil-equivalent production the market will need, as this decade winds down, will have to be supplied by U.S. shales, Gulf OPEC and Russia, as noted above. Big, long-lead-time deep-water projects requiring years to develop cannot be brought on fast enough to make up for supply that, for whatever reason, fails to materialize from these sources. In addition, as shales account for more of global oil supplies and "The Other Guys" continue to lose production to higher depletion rates, more and more shale - in the U.S. and, perhaps, Russia - and conventional Persian Gulf production will have to be brought on line simply to make up for accelerating declines. This evolution of the supply side is significantly different from what oil and capital markets have been accustomed to in previous cycles. Because of this, these markets do not have much historical experience on which to base their expectations vis-à-vis global supply adjustment and the capacity these sources of supply have for meeting increasing demand and depletion rates. Lower-Cost Production, Demand Worries On The Downside Downside risks, in our estimation, are dominated by higher production risks. Here, we believe the U.S. shales and Russia are the principal risk factors, as the oil industry in both states is, to varying degrees, privately held. Because firms in these states answer to shareholders, it must be assumed they will operate for the benefit of these interests. So, if their marginal costs are less than the market-clearing price of oil, we can expect them to increase production up to the point at which marginal cost is equal to marginal revenue. The very real possibility firms in these countries move the market-clearing price to their marginal cost level cannot be overlooked. For the U.S., this level is below $53/bbl or so for shale producers. For Russian producers, this level likely is lower, given their production costs are largely incurred in rubles, and revenues on sales into the global market are realized in USD; however, given the variability of the ruble, this cost likely is a moving target. While a sharp increase in unconventional production presently not foreseen either in the U.S. or Russian shales will remain a downside price risk, an increase in conventional output - chiefly in Libya - remains possible. As discussed above, we believe this is a low risk to prices at present; however, if an accommodation with insurgent forces in the country can be achieved, output in Libya could double from the 600k b/d of production we estimate for this year and next. We reiterate this is a low-risk probability (less than 25%), but, in the event, would prove to be significant additions to global balances over the short term requiring a response from OPEC 2.0 to keep Brent prices above $50/bbl. Also on the downside, an unexpected drop in demand remains at the top of many lists. This is a near-continual worry for markets, which can be occasioned by fears of weakening EM oil-demand growth from, e.g., a hard landing in China, or slower-than-expected growth in India. These are the two most important states in the world in terms of oil-demand growth, accounting for more than one-third of global growth this year and next. We do not expect either to meaningfully slow; however, we continue to monitor growth in both closely.1 In addition, we continue to expect robust global oil-demand growth, averaging 1.56 MMb/d y/y growth in 2017 and 2018. This compares with 1.6 MMb/d growth last year. OPEC 2.0's Next Move Knowing the OPEC 2.0 production cuts will be extended to March 2018 does not give markets any direction for what to expect after this extension expires. Once the deal expires, we expect production to continue to increase from the U.S. shales, and for the key OPEC states to resume pre-cut production levels. Along with continued growth from Russia, this will be necessary to meet growing demand and increasing depletion rates from U.S. shales and "The Other Guys." Yet to be determined is whether OPEC 2.0 needs to remain in place after global inventories return to long-term average levels, or whether its formation and joint efforts were a one-off that markets will not require in the future. Over the short term immediately following the expiration of the production-cutting deal next year, OPEC 2.0 may have to find a way to manage its production to accommodate U.S. shales without imperiling their own revenues. This would require a strategy that keeps the front of the WTI and Brent forward curves at or below $60/bbl - KSA's fiscal breakeven price and $20/bbl above Russia's budget price - and the back of the curve backwardated, in order to exert some control over the rate at which shale rigs return to the field.2 As we've mentioned in the past, we have no doubt the principal negotiators in OPEC 2.0 continue to discuss this. Toward the end of this decade, such concerns might be moot, if growing demand and accelerating decline curves require production from all sources be stepped up. Matt Conlan, Senior Vice President Energy Sector Strategy mattconlan@bcaresearchny.com Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see the May 18, 2017, issue of BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy article entitled "Balancing Oil-Shale's Resilience And OPEC 2.0's Production Cuts," in which we discuss the outlook for China's and India's growth. Together, these states account for more than 570k b/d of the 1.56 MMb/d growth we expect this year and next. The article is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 A backwardated forward curve is characterized by prompt prices exceeding deferred prices. Our research indicates a backwardated forward curve results in fewer rigs returning to the field than a flat or positively sloped forward curve. We explored this strategy in depth in the April 6, 2017, issue of BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy, in an article entitled "The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One?" It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016 Extending OPEC 2.0's Production Cuts Will Normalize Global Oil Inventories Extending OPEC 2.0's Production Cuts Will Normalize Global Oil Inventories Extending OPEC 2.0's Production Cuts Will Normalize Global Oil Inventories Extending OPEC 2.0's Production Cuts Will Normalize Global Oil Inventories

Highlights There are a number of market signals and indicators that are denoting opening cracks in the reflation trade in general and EM risk assets in particular. EM/China narrow money (M1) growth points to relapse in their growth and profits in the second half this year. In this vein, we recommend reinstating a short EM stocks / long 30-year U.S. Treasurys trade. The South African rand has considerable downside and local bond yields will rise further. Stay short ZAR versus the U.S. dollar and MXN. Downgrade this bourse from neutral to underweight. Stay long MXN on crosses versus ZAR and BRL. Continue overweighting Mexican local currency bonds and sovereign credit within their respective EM universes. Feature Chart I-1EM Narrow Money Growth ##br##Signals Trouble Ahead EM Narrow Money Growth Signals Trouble Ahead EM Narrow Money Growth Signals Trouble Ahead Emerging market (EM) assets have been the beneficiary of large inflows this year and have delivered solid gains in the first quarter, causing our defensive strategy to miss the mark. In retrospect, it was a mistake not to chase the market higher last year. At the current juncture, however, with investor sentiment on risk assets very bullish, valuations rather expensive or at least not cheap1 and investor expectations for global growth elevated, the question is whether being contrarian or chasing momentum is the best strategy. Weighing the pros and cons, our view is that investors who now adopt a contrarian stance will be rewarded greatly in the next six to nine months. In this vein, we recommend reinstating a short EM stocks / long 30-year U.S. Treasurys trade. Review Of Market Indicators Following is a review of some specific EM market indicators: EM narrow money (M1) impulse - change in M1 growth - points to a potential major top in EM share prices (Chart I-1, top panel). In fact, M1 growth leads EM EPS growth by nine months and heralds a reversal in the months ahead (Chart I-1, bottom panel). We use equity market cap-weighted M1 growth to ensure that the country weights in the M1 aggregate are identical to those in the EM equity benchmark. The M1 impulse has rolled over decisively, not only in China as shown in Chart I-9 on page 6 but also in Taiwan, heralding a major top in the latter's stock market (Chart I-2). The Taiwanese bourse is heavy in technology stocks that have been on fire in the past year. We continue to hold the view that tech stocks will do better than commodity plays or banks. In short, we continue to recommend overweighting tech stocks within the EM universe. However, if tech stocks roll over as per Chart I-2, the EM equity universe will be at major risk. Global mining stocks have lately been struggling while EM share prices have been well bid (Chart I-3). Historically, these two correlate strongly. In this context, the latest rift between the two is unsustainable. Our bet is that EM stocks will converge to the downside with global mining stocks. Chart I-2Taiwan: Narrow Money ##br##Points To Top In Share Prices Taiwan: Narrow Money Points To Top In Share Prices Taiwan: Narrow Money Points To Top In Share Prices Chart I-3A Rift Between Global ##br##Mining And EM Stocks A Rift Between Global Mining And EM Stocks A Rift Between Global Mining And EM Stocks We are well aware that technology and internet stocks now account for 25% of the EM MSCI benchmark, thereby reducing the importance of commodities prices to EM. However, technology stocks are much overbought and could be at risk of a selloff too, as per Chart I-2 on page 2. On a more general level, we expect that if commodities prices relapse EM risk assets will sell off as well. Consistently, commodities currencies seem to be topping out, which also raises a red flag for EM stocks (Chart I-4). Various commodities prices trading in China are also exhibiting weakness, likely signaling a reversal in the mainland's growth revival (Chart I-5). Finally, all of these factors are occurring at a time when investor sentiment toward U.S. stocks is elevated relative to their sentiment on U.S. Treasurys, and the U.S. equity-to-bonds relative risk index is also at a level that has historically heralded stocks underperforming Treasurys (Chart I-6). Chart I-4An Unsustainable Gap An Unsustainable Gap An Unsustainable Gap Chart I-5Commodities Prices In China Commodities Prices In China Commodities Prices In China Chart I-6U.S. Stocks-To-Bonds: ##br##Relative Sentiment And Risk Profile U.S. Stocks-To-Bonds: Relative Sentiment And Risk Profile U.S. Stocks-To-Bonds: Relative Sentiment And Risk Profile Bottom Line: While global economic surveys and data still allude to firm growth conditions, there are a number of market signals and indicators that are denoting opening cracks in the reflation trade in general and EM risk assets in particular. It is important to note that this is the view of BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy team, which differs from BCA's house view. EM/China Growth Outlook Global and EM manufacturing PMIs are elevated and they will roll over in the months ahead. Yet, a top in economic and business surveys at high levels does not always warrant turning bearish. Our negative stance on EM/China growth stems from our fundamental assessment that these economies have not yet gone through deleveraging, i.e., credit excesses of the boom years have not been worked out. This is the reason why we believe the EM/China growth rebound of the last 12 months is unsustainable and sets the stage for another major downleg. There are preliminary indications that the one-off boost from last year's fiscal and credit push in China is waning. In particular, the number and value of newly started capital spending projects have relapsed dramatically (Chart I-7). This is consistent with our view that the 2016 fiscal push that boosted Chinese growth is passing. Meanwhile, private sector investment expenditures remain weak (Chart I-7, bottom panel). A renewed slump in capital spending will have negative ramifications for mainland imports of commodities. With the monetary authorities tightening liquidity and interest rates rising (Chart I-8), odds are that credit and money growth will decelerate, thwarting the recent amelioration in economic growth. Chart I-7China: 2016 Fiscal Stimulus Is Waning China: 2016 Fiscal Stimulus Is Waning China: 2016 Fiscal Stimulus Is Waning Chart I-8Beware Of Rising Rates In China Beware Of Rising Rates In China Beware Of Rising Rates In China We continue to emphasize that even marginal policy tightening amid lingering credit and property bubbles could have a disproportionately dampening impact on growth. Notably, China's narrow money (M1) impulse - the change in M1 growth rate - reliably leads industrial profits. It is now indicating a relapse in industrial profit growth in the months ahead (Chart I-9). There are also some early clues that global trade volumes may soon weaken, as evidenced by the recent drop in China's container shipment freight index (Chart I-10, top panel). Chart I-9China: Industrial Profits And Narrow Money China: Industrial Profits And Narrow Money China: Industrial Profits And Narrow Money Chart I-10Global Trade Volumes To Roll Over Global Trade Volumes To Roll Over Global Trade Volumes To Roll Over This is further corroborated by the most recent survey of 5000 industrial enterprises in China, which portends a top in overseas new orders (Chart I-10, bottom panel). Finally, Taiwan's M1 impulse leads the country's export volume growth, and currently alludes to potential deceleration in export shipments (Chart I-11). We are not suggesting that U.S. or euro area growth is at major risk. On the contrary, our sense is that the main risk to EM and global stocks from the U.S. and the euro area is higher bond yields in these regions in the near term. Importantly, the recent strength in EM trade has largely been due to Chinese imports, not the U.S. or Europe, as evidenced in Chart I-12. Korea's shipments to U.S. and Europe are rather weak, while sales to China have been very robust. In a nutshell, 27% of Korean exports go to China, while only 13% go to the U.S. and 12% to the EU. Chart I-11Taiwan: Narrow Money And Export Volumes Taiwan: Narrow Money And Export Volumes Taiwan: Narrow Money And Export Volumes Chart I-12Korea's Exports By Regions Korea's Exports By Regions Korea's Exports By Regions Furthermore, combined exports to the U.S. and Europe make up 35% of China's total exports and 7% of its GDP. In turn, China's capital spending amounts to 40-45% of GDP. Hence, investment expenditures are much more important for China than exports to the U.S. and Europe combined. In the meantime, the largest export destination for Asian and South American countries is China rather than the U.S. or Europe. Therefore, as China's growth slumps, its imports from Asian/EM as well as commodities prices will decline. Bottom Line: Risks to EM/China growth are to the downside, regardless of growth conditions in the advanced economies. Reinstate Short EM Stocks / Long 30-Year Treasurys Trade We took a 24% profits on this trade on July 13, 2016 and now believe the risk-reward is conducive to re-establish this position. Back in July2 we argued that EM stocks might be supported in the near term while DM bond yields would rise, justifying booking profits on this trade. Looking forward, the basis for reinstating this trade is as follows: Fundamentally, both market indicators as well as the rising odds of a relapse in EM/China growth per our discussion above support this trade. The relative total return on this position is facing a formidable technical support, and we believe it will hold (Chart I-13). The difference between the EM equity dividend yield and the 30-year Treasury yield is one standard deviation from its time-trend (Chart I-14). At similar levels in the past, this indicator heralded significant EM share price underperformance versus U.S. bonds. Chart I-13Reinstate Short EM Stocks-Long ##br##30-year U.S. Treasurys Reinstate Short EM Stocks-Long 30-year U.S. Treasurys Reinstate Short EM Stocks-Long 30-year U.S. Treasurys Chart I-14Relative Value Favors ##br##U.S. Bonds Versus EM Equities Relative Value Favors U.S. Bonds Versus EM Equities Relative Value Favors U.S. Bonds Versus EM Equities Chart I-6 on page 4 reveals that sentiment on stocks versus bonds is bullish. From a contrarian perspective, this invites a bet on stocks underperforming bonds in the months ahead. This trade will pan out regardless of whether a potential selloff in EM share prices is accompanied by rising or falling U.S. bond yields. Even if U.S. bond yields rise (bond prices decline), EM stocks will likely drop more than U.S. Treasury prices. Our base case remains that there is likely more upside in U.S. bond yields in the near term, but this trade is poised to deliver solid gains so long as EM share prices drop. That said, we believe that U.S. bond yields will likely be at current levels or lower by the end of this year when EM/China growth slowdown unleash new deflationary forces in the global economy. Bottom Line: Reinstate a short EM stocks / long 30-year Treasurys trade with a six-nine month time horizon. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "EM Equity Valuations Revisited", dated March 29, 2017, link available on page 18. 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Risks To Our Negative EM View", dated July 13, 2016, link available on page 18. South Africa: Back To Reality Political risks have not risen in South Africa with the dismissal of Finance Minister Pravin Gordhan. They had never declined in the first place. The markets have, however, ignored them in the past 12 months. Investors have failed to recognize the fundamental problem underpinning the disarray in the ruling African National Congress (ANC): growing public discontent with persistently high unemployment and income inequality. Despite a growing body of evidence that political stability has been declining for a decade, strong foreign portfolio flows have papered over the reality on the ground and allowed domestic markets to continue "whistling in the dark." Investors even cheered the poor performance of the ANC in municipal elections in August 2016, despite the fact that by far the biggest winners of the election were the left-wing Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), not the centrist Democratic Alliance. This confirms BCA's Geopolitical Strategy's forecast that the main risk to President Jacob Zuma's rule is from his left flank, led by the upstart EFF of Julius Malema, and by the Youth and Women's Leagues of his own ANC.3 As such, it was absolutely nonsensical to expect Zuma to pivot towards pro-market reforms. Unsurprisingly, he has not. But could the Gordhan firing set the stage for an internal ANC dust-up that gives birth to a pro-reform, centrist party? This is the hopeful narrative in the press today. We doubt it. First, if the ANC splits along left-right lines, it is not clear that the reformers would end up in the majority. Therefore, the hope of the investment community that Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa takes charge and enacts painful reforms is grossly misplaced. Second, Zuma may no longer be popular, but his populist policies are. While both the Communist Party (a partner of the Tripartite Alliance with the ANC) and the EFF now officially oppose his rule, they do not support pro-market reforms. Third, ethnic tensions are rising, particularly between the Zulu and other groups. These boiled over in social unrest last summer in Pretoria when the ruling ANC nominated a Zulu as the candidate for mayor of the Tshwane municipality (which includes the capital city). As such, we see the market's reaction as a belated acceptance of the reality in South Africa, which is that the country's consensus on market reforms is weakening, not strengthening. It is not clear to us that a change at the top of the ANC, or even a vote of non-confidence in Zuma, would significantly change the country's trajectory. In addition, the political tensions are growing at a time when budget revenue growth is dwindling and the fiscal deficit is widening (Chart II-1). To placate investor anxiety over the long-term fiscal outlook, the government should ideally cut its spending. However, it is impossible to do so when there are escalating backlashes from populist parties and from within the ruling Tripartite Alliance. Odds are that the current and future governments will resort to more populist and unorthodox policies. That will jeopardize the public debt outlook and erode the currency's value. Needless to say, the nation's fundamentals are extremely poor -- outright decline in productivity being one of the major causes (Chart II-2). Chart II-1South Africa: Fiscal Stress Is Building Up South Africa: Fiscal Stress Is Building Up South Africa: Fiscal Stress Is Building Up Chart II-2Underlying Cause Of Economic Malaise Underlying Cause Of Economic Malaise Underlying Cause Of Economic Malaise We believe the rand has made a major top and local currency bond yields reached a major low (Chart II-3). We continue to recommend shorting the ZAR versus both the U.S. dollar and Mexican peso. Traders, who are not short, should consider initiating these trades at current levels. Investors who hold local bonds should reduce their exposure. Dedicated EM equity investors should downgrade this bourse from neutral to underweight (Chart II-4). Chart II-3South Africa: Short ##br##The Rand And Sell Bonds South Africa: Short The Rand And Sell Bonds South Africa: Short The Rand And Sell Bonds Chart II-4Downgrade South African ##br##Equities To Underweight Downgrade South African Equities To Underweight Downgrade South African Equities To Underweight Finally, EM credit investors should continue underweighting the nation's sovereign credit within the EM universe and relative value trades should stay with buy South African CDS / sell Russian CDS protection. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "The Coming Bloodbath In Emerging Markets," dated August 2, 2015, and Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 206: Multipolarity & Markets," dated December 9, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Mexico: Stay Long MXN On Crosses And Overweight Fixed-Income Mexico's central bank could still hike interest rates by another 50 basis points or so because inflation is above the target and the recent raise in minimum wage could keep inflation/wage expectations elevated (Chart III-1). Even if further rate hikes do not materialize, the cumulative monetary tightening will depress domestic demand but support the peso, especially versus other EM currencies. We continue recommending long positions in MXN versus ZAR and BRL. Higher borrowing costs will squeeze consumer and investment spending in Mexico. Notably, household expenditures have so far remained very robust. We suspect consumers have brought forward their future demand due to expectations of higher consumer prices. In short, consumer spending will tank as there is very little pent-up demand remaining and higher borrowing costs will start biting very soon (Chart III-2). Chart III-1Inflation Expectations To Stay Elevated For Now Inflation Expectations To Stay Elevated For Now Inflation Expectations To Stay Elevated For Now Chart III-2Mexico: Domestic Demand To Buckle Mexico: Domestic Demand To Buckle Mexico: Domestic Demand To Buckle As household spending and investment expenditure relapse and exports to the U.S. revive, Mexico's current account will improve considerably. In the meantime, Brazil's current account deficit will widen as the economy recovers. Chart III-3 illustrates that the relative current account dynamics are turning in favor of the peso versus the real. The economic recovery that will eventually happen in Brazil this year will come too late and be too weak to stabilize the nation's public debt. We remain concerned about Brazil's public debt dynamics. In contrast, we are not concerned about Mexico's fiscal situation. Mexican policymakers have been very orthodox and we do not expect that to change much. In regard to valuation, the peso is cheap versus the U.S. dollar and is extremely cheap against the BRL and ZAR (Chart III-4). Chart III-3Mexico Versus Brazil: ##br##Current Account And Exchange Rate Mexico Versus Brazil: Current Account And Exchange Rate Mexico Versus Brazil: Current Account And Exchange Rate Chart III-4Mexican Peso Is Cheap Mexican Peso Is Cheap Mexican Peso Is Cheap Finally, investors have flocked from Mexico to Brazil last year amid the deteriorating political outlook in Mexico and stabilization in Brazilian politics. We believe such a positioning swing is overdone and our bet is that Mexico will be getting more investor flows this year compared with Brazil. Investment Conclusions Chart III-5Mexican local Bonds Offer Value Mexican local Bonds Offer Value Mexican local Bonds Offer Value Maintain long positions in MXN versus BRL and ZAR. The outlook for the latter is discussed in a section above. We are reluctant to initiate a long MXN/short U.S. dollar trade because we are negative on the outlook for EM exchange rates. It is not impossible but it will be hard for the peso to appreciate against the U.S. dollar if most EM currencies depreciate and oil prices drop, as we expect. Fixed-income investors should continue overweighting Mexican local currency and sovereign credit within their respective EM benchmarks. Mexico's fixed-income assets offer good value (Chart III-5). Relative value traders should consider the following trade: sell Mexican CDS / buy Indonesia CDS protection. Finally, dedicated EM equity portfolios should maintain a neutral allocation to Mexican stocks. The currency will outperform but share prices in local currency terms will underperform their EM peers. The Mexican bourse is tilted toward consumer stocks that are expensive and at risk of a major downturn in household spending as discussed above. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Stephan Gabillard, Research Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights The locomotive of the U.S. economy, the consumer, remains supported by powerful tailwinds. The Fed will be able to tighten monetary policy relative to other central banks by a higher degree than the market appreciates. The dollar will rise further. Use this dip to buy more dollars. Being tactically long the yen is a hedge against growth disappointments. Set a stop-sell for AUD/NZD. Feature In June of last year, we wrote a piece titled "What Could Go Right?" arguing key changes in the global economy may have justified a more pro-risk stance for investors.1 The core of the argument was that markets were pricing in a lot of negatives, as the annual return of the global stock-to-bond ratio was deeply negative and could only fall further if a recession were to emerge. Moreover, as commodity prices were improving, we foresaw a waning of deflationary forces that had engulfed the world. This easing deflation would cause real rates to fall and economic activity in EM to rebound. Chart I-1Global Asset Prices: From Gloom To Glee Global Asset Prices: From Gloom To Glee Global Asset Prices: From Gloom To Glee Over the subsequent nine months, this scenario moved from the world of theories to being the reality for the global economy. Today, the annual return of the global stock-to-bond ratio is now the mirror image of last June (Chart I-1). Thus, for the stock-to-bond ratio to move higher, we need to explore where growth may come from. Moreover, we need to consider whether this growth is likely to help the dollar or help other currencies. The U.S. Is In Charge The U.S. economy continues to show the most promise. It is true that some signs do point to a weak Q1. Much noise has been made about the decline in commercial and industrial loans. We are more sanguine. To begin with, the Conference Board includes C&I loans in its list of lagging indicators, not leading ones. Additionally, C&I loans lag banks' lending standards, and, in fact, the weakness in this subsection of credit aggregates is the natural consequence of the 2015-2016 tightening in lending standards. Their recent easing points toward a rebound in C&I loans, as do core durable goods new orders (Chart I-2). What is more concerning is the slowdown in credit to households (Chart I-3). The U.S. economy is driven by household dynamics and the Conference Board does include consumer credit in its list of leading indicators. Moreover, the amount of MBS and ABS on primary dealers' balance sheets remains in a downtrend. This is worrisome because it suggests that the slowing accumulation of consumer debt on banks' balance sheet is genuine, and not a reflection of securitization (Chart I-4). Chart I-2C&I Loans##br## Will Pick Up C&I Loans Will Pick Up C&I Loans Will Pick Up Chart I-3However, Household Credit ##br##Dynamics Are A Worry However, Household Credit Dynamics Are A Worry However, Household Credit Dynamics Are A Worry Chart I-4Securitization Unlikely ##br##To Be The Culprit Securitization Unlikely To Be The Culprit Securitization Unlikely To Be The Culprit However, there are causes to minimize these concerns. Mainly, the drivers of household income and spending are still healthy. First, U.S. financial conditions remain easy, a phenomenon that tends to boost GDP growth in the following quarters, suggesting that national income will remain strong. Second, the outlook for employment in the U.S. remains robust. As Chart I-5 illustrates, the employment components of the ISM and the Philly Fed surveys both point to a pick-up in job creation. This further supports the notion that nominal household income will strengthen Third, our real disposable income indicator, based on various components of the NFIB survey, is showing that households should enjoy strong income growth in the coming months (Chart I-6). Moreover, despite the failure of the AHCA, Marko Papic, the head of BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service argues that it will be much easier for the GOP to implement tax cuts, especially geared toward the middle class, than it was to repudiate the much-maligned Obamacare.2 This could further help household disposable income. Chart I-5Job Growth Will Rebound Job Growth Will Rebound Job Growth Will Rebound Chart I-6Household Income: Highway Star Household Income: Highway Star Household Income: Highway Star Fourth, household liquid assets represent 270% of disposable income, the highest level in decades. Moreover, household debt-servicing costs are still near multi-generational lows, suggesting that households are in the best financial shape they have been in decades. And fifth, household confidence has surged to its highest levels since 2000, reflecting both the large increase in net worth created by surging asset values as well as the very low level of unemployment in the U.S. (Chart I-7). Thus, the decline in the savings rate from 6.2% in 2015 to 5.5% at present could deepen further, adding more impetus to transform income gains into consumption gains. At the worst, this development suggests that the household savings rate will not rise much. These factors all imply that household consumption will remain robust and may in fact accelerate in the coming quarters. Consequently, that capex too has upside. We have highlighted how capex intentions have risen substantially, and this has historically been a powerful leading indicator of capex itself.3 However, the financial press is replete with commentators reminding us that the positive global economic surprises have mostly been a reflection of "soft data" and that "hard data" has not followed through. Not only do we philosophically disagree with this statement - historically soft data does indeed lead hard data - but as Chart I-8 illustrates, core capital goods orders have risen quite sharply, mimicking the developments in retail sales. A combination of strong retail sales and strong orders tend to portend to a rise in capex. Chart I-7Happy Shiny People Happy Shiny People Happy Shiny People Chart I-8Capex Will Rebound Capex Will Rebound Capex Will Rebound These developments raise the likelihood that U.S. growth will power the global economy and that the Fed will be in a good position to make good on its intent to increase interest rates two more times this year. In fact, there is even a growing probability that the Fed will add another tool to its tightening arsenal: letting MBS run off, resulting in a contraction of its balance sheet. The combined tightening of two more hikes and a shrinking balance sheet will be much greater than any tightening emanating from an ECB taper. As we argued last week: Europe's inflation and wage backdrop remains icy cold, limiting how far the ECB can tighten monetary policy.4 While an environment of globally rising rates is normally negative for the yen, with the BoJ displaying and even easier bias than in the past, any increase in rates in the U.S. is likely to supercharge weaknesses in the yen, as the BoJ will put a lead on JGB yields and force them to remain subdued.5 As a result of these views, we remain very committed dollar bulls on a 12-18 months basis and recommend using the current dip in the dollar as a buying opportunity, especially on a trade-weighted basis. Bottom Line: While consumer loan growth has slowed - which could result in a poor Q1 U.S. growth number - the outlook for U.S. household income and consumption remains promising. This will also feed through to higher investment growth, clearing the Fed's path toward higher rates. This dip in the dollar should be used as an occasion to buy the greenback. But Why Still Long The Yen Tactically? This position has two purposes. First, we have been worried about dynamics in China that could cause a correction in EM markets.6 More recently, the decline in Chinese house-price appreciation has deepened, representing an ominous sign for the iron ore market (Chart I-9). Poor metal prices tend to represent a negative terms of trade shock and therefore an economic handicap for many large EM nations. Moreover, back in June, the improvement in Taiwanese IP was one of the factors that prompted us to highlight a potential improvement in the global economy. So was the uptrend in our boom/bust indicator. Today, not only is the boom/bust indicator losing steam, but Taiwanese IP has sharply rolled over (Chart I-10). While this is not a reason to worry about our bullish view on the U.S. economy, this could suggest that the global manufacturing upswing has seen its heyday, a development that is likely to weigh more heavily on EM economies than on the U.S. Any EM stress is likely to boost the yen's appeal, temporarily countering the BoJ's aggressive stance. Chart I-9Problems For Iron Ore Problems For Iron Ore Problems For Iron Ore Chart I-10Two Clouds For Global Growth Two Clouds For Global Growth Two Clouds For Global Growth Second, we do not want to be dogmatic on our U.S. growth view. As the top panel of Chart I-11 illustrates, increases in 2-year Treasury yields have tended to lead to decreases in U.S. inflation expectations. While we would argue that the U.S. economy is on a stronger footing to withstand higher rates than at any point since 2010, a policy mistake is not out of the scope of probabilities. If rising rates is indeed a policy mistake, a large risk-off event would be a very likely outcome, one that boosts the yen. Finally, as the middle and bottom panels of Chart I-11 shows, a fall in U.S. inflation expectations would also extract its toll on EM and cyclical plays, further reinforcing any disappointment out of China, and further adding shine to the yen. Our original target on USD/JPY was 110, we are moving it to 108. At this point, we will become sellers of the yen, unless we see signs that the global economy is entering a more dangerous path than originally anticipated. Additionally, investors looking to express a bearish view on EM may want to go short MXN/JPY (Chart I-12). The peso has massively rallied and is now at a crucial technical spot against the JPY. Moreover, while being short USD/JPY may be a dangerous move - after all, we are playing what amounts in our view to a countertrend bounce in the yen - if EM are at risk, these risks could be exacerbated by the tightening in financial conditions created by a higher dollar. Mexico, with its high external debt, representing nearly 70% of GDP, is particularly exposed to this problem. Also, MXN, with its high liquidity for an EM currency, is often a vehicle for investors to play EM weaknesses. Thus, shorting MXN/JPY could be a great hedge for investors with long EM exposures. Chart I-11Are We Out Of The Woods Yet? Are We Out Of The Woods Yet? Are We Out Of The Woods Yet? Chart I-12A Gauge And A Play A Gauge And A Play A Gauge And A Play Bottom Line: Being tactically long the yen in a portfolio offers two advantages. First, it is a direct play on any disappointment of investors in the EM space, and, second, it is also a hedge against the risks to our strong U.S. growth view. AUD/NZD: Not A Bargain It is often argued that AUD/NZD is a bargain as it trade 6% below its purchasing power parity rate. This may be a valid reason to buy this cross, but only for investors with extremely long investment horizons, as PPP deviations can take seven years to correct. In fact, following the recent rebound in AUD/NZD, we would be inclined to short this pair once again. On the international front, AUD/USD seems to be driven by the dynamic in Chinese nominal GDP growth. We doubt Chinese nominal GDP growth will accelerate much beyond Q1. As Chart I-13 illustrates, AUD/USD seems to have moved ahead of Chinese GDP, putting this currency at risk. We also can also interpret AUD/NZD as a vehicle to play the growth rebalancing in China. The AUD (iron ore, other metals, and coal) is a bet on industrial and investment growth while the NZD (dairy, meat, and wool) is a wager on the Chinese households. As China moves away from an investment-led growth model toward a more consumption-led growth model, AUD/NZD should underperform. A simple fair value model for this cross designed to capture these dynamics as well as the USD dynamics indicates that AUD/NZD is 8% overvalued (Chart I-14). Chart I-13AUD Prices In Chinese Optimism AUD Prices In Chinese Optimism AUD Prices In Chinese Optimism Chart I-14AUD/NZD Is Expensive AUD/NZD Is Expensive AUD/NZD Is Expensive Moreover, still with an eye firmly planted on China, AUD/NZD has tended to perform poorly when Chinese monetary conditions tighten. The recent upward move in the Chinese 7-day repo rate could be a harbinger of bad things to come for this cross. Relative domestic factors also temper any bullishness on AUD/NZD. Kiwi house prices are outperforming Aussie prices and New Zealand inflation is catching up to that of Australia's. Moreover, the RBA has been paying more attention to the poor state of the Australian labor market, while that of New Zealand remains very strong. These dynamics suggest that kiwi rates could rise relative to that of Australia (Chart I-15). More technically, investors are massively long the AUD relative to the NZD (Chart I-16). This usually is a good signal to bet against this pair. Chart I-15Domestic Conditions Favor##br## Higher NZ Rates Vs. Australia Domestic Conditions Favor Higher NZ Rates Vs. Australia Domestic Conditions Favor Higher NZ Rates Vs. Australia Chart I-16Speculators ##br##Are Bullish Speculators Are Bullish Speculators Are Bullish Bottom Line: Shorting AUD/NZD at current levels makes sense. Not only is it a way to take advantage of the desire by Chinese authorities to rebalance growth away from the Chinese industrial sector, the Kiwi economy is outperforming that of Australia, and too much negativity has been priced in for the RBNZ relative to the RBA. Finally investors are overly long the AUD relative to the NZD. Set up a stop-sell of AUD/NZD at 1.1100, with a target of 1.000 and a stop at 1.1330. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "What Could Go Right?", dated June 24, 2016 available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Five Questions On Europe", dated March 22, 2017 available at gps.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits", dated December 16, 2016 available at fes.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Healthcare Or Not, Risks Remain", dated March 24, 2017 available at fes.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "JPY: Climbing To The Springboard Before The Dive", dated February 24, 2017 available at fes.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Healthcare Or Not, Risks Remain", dated March 24, 2017 available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 The DXY displayed resilience this week: the third estimate for U.S. GDP in 2016Q4 outperformed expectations at 2.1%, after being revised up from 1.9%; consumer confidence increased to 125.6, the highest level since 2000; yet Initial jobless claims ticked in at 258,000, underperforming expectations of 248,000 but beating previous figures of 261,000. Another factor lifting the dollar were recent comments by Secretary of Transportation, Elaine Chao, who stated that Trump's $1 trillion infrastructure plan will be unveiled later this year. This could be considerably positive for U.S. economic growth as it will cover a large part of the economy: "transportation infrastructure, energy, water and potentially broadband and veterans hospitals as well." Although specifics were not disclosed, such stimulus in the face of tightening labor market could fan inflation. Under the assumption of a proactive Fed, this could translate into a strong dollar. Report Links: USD, Oil Divergences Will Continue As Storage Draws - March 17, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Last week's hawkish comments by ECB board member Ewald Nowotny drove the euro higher, while recent comments by Peter Praet confirmed that "a very substantial degree of monetary accommodation is still needed", which pushed the euro down. Promoting the euro's downside were Italian industrial sales and orders, which contracted at a monthly pace of 3.5% and 2.9% respectively, although annual rates remain positive. Article 50's invocation was another factor which contributed to volatility. How Brexit negotiations evolve will dictate movements in EUR/GBP for the foreseeable future. President Tusk's demeanor was also quite negative in his speech, focusing on minimizing "the costs for EU citizens, businesses and Member States". In other news, Portugal's Finance Minister Mario Centeno hinted at a possible upgrade to the growth forecast to around 2% from 1.5% as exports grew by 19% in January. As exports continue to be a key driver of growth for this country, this suggests a weaker euro is still needed to support growth in the periphery. Report Links: Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 The French Revolution - February 3, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent data has been mixed for Japan: Corporate services prices rose by 0.8% year-over-year, outperforming expectations. However, retail trade yearly growth deteriorated to 0.1% from 1% the previous month, underperforming expectations. Furthermore, manufacturing PMI fell to 52.6 from 53.3 the previous month. We are changing our tactical target for USD/JPY from 110 to 108. The decline in Chinese property prices as well as slowing inflation expectations in the U.S. might create a risk off environment that will affect carry currencies and will benefit the safe havens like the yen. On a cyclical basis, we remain yen bears, as recent sluggishness will only embolden BoJ policy makers to maintain their radical monetary stance. Report Links: Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 JPY: Climbing To The Springboard Before The Dive - February 24, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 It's official: Theresa May has triggered Article 50. The pound reacted relatively positive to the event as both parties in the negotiations chose to start with the carrot rather than the stick: In her letter to the EU Theresa May stated that she hoped to enjoy a "deep and special" relationship with the European Union once Brexit is finalized. On the other side of the channel, Donald Tusk also pledged to work "closely" with their counterparts in London, and that he hoped that the U.K. will stay a close partner after Brexit. These developments are encouraging, as it shows that cooler heads might prevail at the end of the day. This rosier outlook in an environment where expectations for the Britain are still too pessimistic makes the pound a very attractive buy, particularly against the euro, despite the potential for short-term volatility as the stick will ineluctably come out. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017’s Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 In an attempt to curb housing market euphoria, all four major banks - ANZ, CBA, NAB and Westpac - increased lending rates on investor and interest-only mortgages this month. Fitch Ratings reports that the tightening was done "ahead of probable regulatory tightening", as hinted frequently by the RBA. Rising wholesale funding costs due to tighter U.S. policy is also a motivating factor behind this. For the time being, the housing market risk will continue to be restricted through macroprudential policies rather than actual tightening by the central bank. Eventually risks related to record-high household debt will limit the capacity of the RBA to increase rates. On the brighter side, banks are well positioned with strong capital buffers and pre-impairment to profitability, with Fitch rating them 'Stable'. This means that risks may not lie with the banking sector, but that the consumer sector will be the key drag on growth. Report Links: AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 In the current environment, although we like to continue to be short the NZD against the yen, we are also shorting AUD/NZD once again. Beyond its uncorrelated nature, there are many reasons why this is an attractive cross to short: AUD/NZD tends to perform poorly when Chinese monetary conditions tighten. Therefore, the spike in Chinese repo rates could weigh on this cross. Furthermore, investors are very long the AUD relative to the NZD. This gives us confidence that this cross might be in overbought territory and that the 5.5% rally in AUD/NZD over the last 2 months may be exhausting itself. Finally, as we have mentioned before, domestic factors still favor the NZD, as kiwi house prices are rising at a faster pace than Aussie ones, which should put pressure on rate differentials. Report Links: Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Risks To The Cyclical Dollar View - February 3, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 The CAD is displaying some strength on the back of stronger oil prices, outweighing the pressure from a stronger USD. As mentioned last week, the trend for USD/CAD is still negative in the short term, as corroborated by a negative MACD trend. The greenback's seasonal behavior is also generally negative in April, which could buoy the CAD in the next month. Nevertheless, at the Bank of Canada's meeting in two weeks, Poloz is likely to continue displaying a dovish rhetoric, limiting the CAD's resilience. Similar to Australia, risks lie with the consumer sector, which is burdened by a huge debt load. This gives another reason for Poloz to stay off hikes for the time being and concentrate instead on promoting the implementation of macroprudential policies to regulate lending standards and mitigate housing market risks. Report Links: AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017’s Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 EUR/CHF now hovers around 1.07, clearing the implied floor by the Swiss National Bank. Recent data have been positive: The Zew survey for economic expectations reached 29.6, up from 19.4 in February. It is now at the highest level in 3 years. The KOF leading indicator came at 107.6, above expectations. Although it does seem that the Swiss economy is still improving, the SNB will stay resolute in its intervention for the time being. Indeed, this was the message of SNB Governing Board Member Andrea Maechler, who asserted that there was no limit on their expansion of FX reserves, and that the Swiss franc was "strongly overvalued". We will continue to observe how the Swiss economy develops. However, for the time being the SNB is likely to keep its floor in place. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017’s Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 USD/NOK has been relatively flat this week, even in the face of a rally in oil prices. This has been in part due to a phenomenon that should continue in the next months: an appreciation of the U.S. dollar against EM and commodity currencies. Furthermore, domestic factors should continue to weigh on the krone, as employment continues to contract and inflation is receding due to the stabilization of the krone. Indeed, Governor Olsen signaled that the Norges bank will likely leave rates unchanged for "a good while" due to these developments. Furthermore, oil could be at risk as well, as the market is starting to doubt the Russian commitment to its deal with OPEC. This, coupled with a slowdown in EM, could prompt a down leg in oil, hurting the NOK in the process. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017’s Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 Swedish data came out strong: Retail sales annual growth remains unchanged at 2.7%; The producer price index grew at 7.5%; Consumer confidence for March was at 102.6, down from the previous 104.3. Interesting technical developments for the krona are pointing to further weakness. USD/SEK has rebounded from oversold levels and the MACD line is beginning to overtake the signal line. More importantly, the Coppock curve is rebounding, signifying a bullish trend. EUR/SEK is showing similar signs with the MACD pointing up and the Coppock curve rebounding. Interestingly, Swedish inflation expectations have substantially decreased this week which might give the Riksbank cover to remain dovish. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017’s Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 One Trade To Rule Them All - November 18, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades