Mexico

Mexico is caught between crosscurrents. On the one hand, headline and core inflation are at multi-decade highs. On the other hand, genuine inflationary pressures are subdued, and fiscal and monetary policies are hawkish. Going forward, the economy will decelerate meaningfully, but likely achieve a soft landing as the central bank will be able to cut rates in H2 2022. Further, the nation’s healthy external accounts will put a floor in the domestic slowdown. We continue to overweight Mexico across all EM asset classes.

Executive Summary Mexico: Inflation Is At A Two-Decade High Mexico: Inflation Is At A Two-Decade High Mexico: Inflation Is At A Two-Decade High Mexican financial markets – stocks, fixed-income and the currency – will continue outperforming their EM counterparts. The Mexican economy is vulnerable to faltering US growth, but this negative shock will be mitigated by robust auto shipments, tourism revenues and remittances. Notably, Mexican exports will suffer less than those of Emerging Asia and South America. Economic activity in Mexico has barely recovered to its pre-pandemic level. Conditions for a lasting inflationary outbreak are currently absent. Considering these factors, we believe that a major economic bust is not in the cards. Very tight monetary and fiscal policies are favorable for Mexican fixed-income markets as they will slow down the economy and cap inflationary pressures. Mexican assets are likely to be re-rated versus their EM counterparts in the coming years due to geopolitical considerations. On EM Equity Benchmark Recommendation Inception Date RETURN Long MXN / Short BR 2022-07-28   Bottom Line: We continue to recommend investors overweight Mexican equities, and local and sovereign fixed income within their respective EM portfolios. We are instituting a stop buy on Mexican local currency 10-year government bonds. For currency traders, we recommend a long MXN/short BRL position. Feature We have been overweighting Mexican markets on a cyclical and structural basis since early 2018 and this strategy has played out well (Chart 1 and Chart 2). Chart 1Our Calls On Mexican Equities And Currencies Have Done Really Well... Our Calls On Mexican Equities And Currencies Have Done Really Well... Our Calls On Mexican Equities And Currencies Have Done Really Well... Chart 2...And So Have Our Fixed-Income Calls ...And So Have Our Fixed-Income Calls ...And So Have Our Fixed-Income Calls In this report, we elaborate on the reasons why Mexican financial markets – stocks, fixed-income and the currency – remain among our favorites within the EM space, and why they are in a strong position to continue outperforming their EM counterparts, even amidst a US growth slump. Is The Economy Overheating? As in many economies around the world, headline inflation has reached a two-decade high in Mexico (Chart 3, top panel). How big of a threat is it for the Mexican economy? In our view, the Mexican economy has not been overheating, and a wage-price spiral has not yet developed. Hence, inflation in Mexico is not fully entrenched and is not likely to be persistent. First, the business cycle is only now moving from a recovery to an expansionary phase. Chart 4 shows that various segments of the economy have only recently reached – or are nearing – their pre-pandemic levels. Note that the chart shows the series as a three-year rate of change, i.e., the last datapoints compare 2022 with 2019. In brief, economic activity and demand have not yet surpassed their pre-pandemic (2019) levels. Chart 3Mexico: Inflation Is At A Two-Decade High Mexico: Inflation Is At A Two-Decade High Mexico: Inflation Is At A Two-Decade High Chart 4Mexico: Economic Activity Is Only Back To Pre-Pandemic Levels Mexico: Economic Activity Is Only Back To Pre-Pandemic Levels Mexico: Economic Activity Is Only Back To Pre-Pandemic Levels Chart 5Mexico: The Labor Market Is Tightening, But Slack Remains Mexico: The Labor Market Is Tightening, But Slack Remains Mexico: The Labor Market Is Tightening, But Slack Remains Second, according to data from the central bank (Banxico), the output gap remains quite negative at around -4% of potential GDP, suggesting there is plenty of slack in the economy. Third, there is still room for the labor market is tighten further without major upward pressure on wages. The top two panels of Chart 5 show that the unemployment and underemployment rates have not yet dropped to new lows, i.e., they remain above pre-pandemic levels. Further, although average wage growth has accelerated, it remains within its historical range, and is well below core CPI (Chart 5, bottom panel). Finally, Mexico lacks a key driver of genuine inflation, which is mushrooming unit labor costs – defined as the ratio of wages over productivity. Inflation is unlikely to become entrenched unless unit labor costs rise sharply, i.e., unless wage growth outstrips productivity growth. In Mexico, unit labor costs – using real not nominal wages – are actually falling (Chart 6). Please see our latest strategy report for a more detailed explanation of the relationship between unit labor costs and inflation. Chart 6Unit Labor Costs In Mexico Are Falling Unit Labor Costs In Mexico Are Falling Unit Labor Costs In Mexico Are Falling Overall, rising inflation has by and large not been due to excessive demand, and a wage-price spiral has not yet developed. Consistently, even though alternative core measures of inflation – like trimmed-mean CPI and services CPI – have also risen, they remain much more contained than headline and core CPI (Chart 3, bottom panel, above). This makes Mexico stand apart from Chile, Brazil, and Colombia, where economic overheating has created fertile grounds for genuine and persistent inflation. In these countries, part of the inflationary outbreak can be explained by massive pandemic fiscal packages and a slow response from monetary authorities, leading to an overheating scenario. Accordingly, the Mexican central bank will not have to raise rates as much as its regional peers because the Mexican economy is not overheating. Bottom Line: Economic activity in Mexico has barely recovered to its pre-pandemic level. Conditions for a lasting inflationary outbreak are currently absent. Considering these factors, we believe that a major economic bust is not in the cards. Monetary And Fiscal Policies: Ahead Of The Inflation Curve? A tight monetary and fiscal policy mix will slow down the economy and cap inflationary pressures. The central bank is in full hawkish mode, and it will continue raising rates until the end of this year. The basis is that Banxico will be reluctant to go on hold when the nation’s inflation remains well above target. In addition, the Fed is set to continue hiking rates into next year. The US, in contrast to Mexico, is already experiencing a wage-price spiral. The Fed’s tightening will continue supporting the US dollar and weigh on other currencies, including the Mexican peso. In brief, Banxico will at least match the Fed hikes in the reminder of this year. Overall, high and rising borrowing costs in Mexico will restrain domestic demand. Our proxy for the marginal propensity to consume indicates that household consumption will slow down in the coming months (Chart 7, top panel). This will likely lead to a roll-over in core CPI. In fact, the sharp deceleration in narrow money (M1) supply points to cresting inflationary pressures (Chart 7, bottom panel)  On the fiscal front, while left-wing in name, the government of Mexico continues to run one of the most austere fiscal policies in the world. The primary fiscal balance has been around zero and the overall deficit has not exceeded 3% of GDP – even during the peak of the pandemic (Chart 8, top panel). The fiscal thrust in 2022 is expected to be -1.3% of GDP (Chart 8, bottom panel). This will also curtail domestic demand growth, and thereby diminish inflationary pressures. Chart 7Mexico's Growth And Inflation Will Slow Down Mexico's Growth And Inflation Will Slow Down Mexico's Growth And Inflation Will Slow Down Chart 8Mexico's Fiscal Policy Has Been Among The Tightest In The World Mexico's Fiscal Policy Has Been Among The Tightest In The World Mexico's Fiscal Policy Has Been Among The Tightest In The World   Furthermore, government policies have also kept inflation at bay by subsidizing the cost of gasoline at the pumps. In effect, this has allowed gasoline prices in Mexico to fall below those in the US for the first time in over five years. Given the high pass-through effect from fuel to other prices in developing economies, this policy will also limit the rise in core inflation. We can expect this subsidy policy to remain in place for the coming months. The basis is that the net cost of this subsidy from March to May has been around $3 billion USD or a mere 0.2% of GDP. Given that the primary fiscal balance is at zero and public debt stands at a manageable 42% of GDP, the government will be able to continue financing this policy with little fiscal risk. Bottom Line: Very tight monetary and fiscal policies are favorable for Mexican fixed-income markets as they will slow down the economy and cap inflationary pressures. The External Backdrop Favors Mexico Relative To Other EMs The global macro outlook will help the Mexican economy and its financial markets outperform their EM peers. In our view, the global economy is experiencing a material growth slowdown. On the one hand, developed countries (the US and the EU) are experiencing a shift from demand for consumer goods (ex-autos) towards vehicles and services. On the other hand, China’s newly enacted infrastructure financing will serve to only offset the fall in government revenues from land sales. Hence, there is little new stimulus for infrastructure beyond what has been approved in the budget plan earlier this year. In brief, China’s business cycle recovery will be U-shaped rather than V-shaped with risks to the downside. This will weigh heavily on developing countries dependent on Chinese imports. Our baseline global macro scenario assumes contracting global trade and a further drop in commodity prices. This is indeed worrisome for Mexico, which is both a major manufacturing hub supplying the US and a commodity producer. That said, the country will likely outperform other EMs during this global downturn for the following reasons. First, Mexico will suffer less from the shift in US household spending from consumer goods towards autos and services due to its unique export composition. Mexican vehicle exports constitute 23% of its total exports, while exports of non-auto consumer goods (excluding food and beverages) make up only 13%. Further, Mexican vehicle exports remain below pre-pandemic levels in unit terms (Chart 9). As the global chip shortage eases, Mexico will experience a boom in auto exports as it increases production. Pent-up demand for cars in the Americas combined with the large share of autos in Mexican exports will help Mexico outperform Asian economies – which export a lot of consumer goods (non-autos) to DM – and LATAM economies that sell commodities. In short, Mexican exports will suffer less than those of Emerging Asia and South America in the coming months. Second, Mexico stands to benefit from the shift in DM/US demand from goods to services due to its large tourism industry. Not only has the number of tourists recently surged, but also the average revenue per visitor has skyrocketed by 50% (Chart 10, top and middle panel). However, the number of visitors is still well below the pre-pandemic level, meaning the upside potential is still substantial. Chart 9Mexican Vehicle Exports Have Much More Upside Mexican Vehicle Exports Have Much More Upside Mexican Vehicle Exports Have Much More Upside Chart 10Mexican Tourism Revenues Will Continue Rising Mexican Tourism Revenues Will Continue Rising Mexican Tourism Revenues Will Continue Rising   Mexico’s overall tourism revenues will expand given the pent-up demand for travel (Chart 10, bottom panel).   Chart 11Remittances Into Mexico Will Remain Robust Remittances Into Mexico Will Remain Robust Remittances Into Mexico Will Remain Robust Third, remittance flows into Mexico will remain robust for now (Chart 11). US nominal wages are rising sharply, and employment among low-skilled workers will not decline much. The basis for this is that there are still many open positions to be filled. Hence, US household nominal income growth, and thereby remittances to Mexico, will remain robust in the months ahead. Finally, even though oil prices will likely drop materially in the coming months for reasons we discussed in last week’s report, the peso will not be affected as much as other commodity currencies. The basis is that oil exports comprise only 6.7% of Mexican total exports. Plus, the government typically hedges a portion of its oil revenues. Thus, Mexico did not benefit a lot from the oil price surge earlier this year, and it will not suffer enormously as crude prices drop further. Bottom Line: Robust auto shipment, tourism revenues and remittances will mitigate the negative shock to the Mexican economy and balance of payments from faltering US growth. Consumer goods (ex-autos) account for a larger share of Asian exports vis-à-vis Mexican exports. Meanwhile, South American countries export a significant amount of commodities. Contracting shipments of consumer goods to the US and the EU will hurt emerging Asian economies significantly while deflating commodity prices will weigh down on the balance of payments, growth and financial markets of South American economies. Overall, Mexico will be a relative winner. Structural Backdrop Chart 12Mexico: Foreign And Domestic Investments Are Turning Around Mexico: Foreign And Domestic Investments Are Turning Around Mexico: Foreign And Domestic Investments Are Turning Around Mexico’s structural backdrop is also somewhat more benign relative to many other emerging economies: As we have written in previous reports, Mexico is in a unique position to profit from the US’s and global multinationals’ nearshoring efforts to shift manufacturing away from China. There is some anecdotal evidence1 and data confirming that this process has started: FDI inflows and capital expenditures are bottoming, and capital goods imports are back to their previous highs (Chart 12). More FDIs will enhance manufacturing productivity and the competitiveness of Mexico’s maquiladora sector. Besides, business confidence has finally recovered to levels prior to the election of president Andrés Manuel López Obrador (commonly known as AMLO). Importantly, while AMLO has been interventionist in the energy sector (oil and electricity), he has not meddled in other industries. Improved business confidence could lead to more domestic investment (Chart 13). Mexico badly needs more capital spending to boost meager productivity growth in domestic sectors. The risk premium on Mexican markets will probably drop relative to other EMs due to geopolitical considerations, i.e., Mexican assets are likely be re-rated versus their EM counterparts in the coming years. The geopolitical confrontation between the US and China might split the world into two competing camps: US- and China-centric geopolitical and economic blocs, with Mexico surely being in the US-centric one. As a result, multinationals as well as US, European and Japanese portfolio investors will feel more comfortable investing in Mexico than in many Asian markets. Some Emerging Asian financial markets might experience international portfolio capital exodus if they join the China-centric bloc. Structural macro parameters – such as the current account, fiscal deficit and public debt, and private sector leverage – are more favorable in Mexico compared to other EMs. Mexico’s current account balance is almost at zero (Chart 14, top panel). Public debt is at 42% of GDP and private credit penetration stands at only 19% of GDP (Chart 14, bottom panel). Even if state-owned oil company PEMEX’s entire debt is taken over by the government, it will add about 8% of GDP to Mexico’s public debt burden, i.e., the latter will rise to only 50% of GDP. Chart 13Mexico: Business Confidence Has Recovered Despite AMLO Mexico: Business Confidence Has Recovered Despite AMLO Mexico: Business Confidence Has Recovered Despite AMLO Chart 14Mexico: Balance Of Payments And Debt Backdrops Are Healthy Mexico: Balance Of Payments And Debt Backdrops Are Healthy Mexico: Balance Of Payments And Debt Backdrops Are Healthy   These benign macro parameters – coupled with the orthodox and tight fiscal and monetary policy mix – suggest that downside in the peso will be limited. The basis is that global fixed-income investors typically favor currencies where monetary and fiscal policies are orthodox and err on the side of tightness. Finally, banks are well capitalized and their provisions are high. Banks are in a healthy position to finance the nation’s growth. Overall, we are not suggesting that Mexico is free from serious socio-economic problems and that its economy is set to boom. This nation has numerous structural issues like organized crime, corruption in local governments, weak rule of law, low productivity, and high concentration (oligopolistic structure) in select industries that enable their pricing power and make inflation persistent. However, compared with many other developing countries, Mexico’s profile is slightly more favorable, especially adjusted for its financial market valuations. Investment Recommendations To come up with an investment strategy for Mexican financial markets, we must incorporate our global macro view. Two of our broad macro themes are: (1) the Fed and the US stock market are on a collision course;  and (2) the US dollar will continue overshooting. Together these suggest that, in absolute terms, Mexican financial markets and the exchange rate remain at risk of selling off in the coming months. Nevertheless, we reiterate our overweight stance on Mexico across all EM asset classes: stocks, local bonds, sovereign credit and currencies. Equities: Keep overweighting Mexico within an EM equity portfolio. Mexican equity valuations remain attractive in absolute terms and relative to EMs based on the various multiples (Chart 15 and Chart 16).  Chart 15Mexican Stocks Are Cheap In Absolute Terms!... Mexican Stocks Are Cheap In Absolute Terms!... Mexican Stocks Are Cheap In Absolute Terms!... Chart 16...And Are Also Attractive Relative To EM ...And Are Also Attractive Relative To EM ...And Are Also Attractive Relative To EM Furthermore, relative bond yields between Mexico and mainstream EM will drop. This will support the outperformance of Mexican equities versus EM non-TMT stocks and the overall EM benchmark. Currency: The Mexican peso is vulnerable in the near term as the Fed continues ratcheting up interest rates and the US economy slumps. However, the peso is cheap, and its depreciation will be more limited compared to other LATAM countries.  Therefore, we recommend investors long the MXN and short the BRL. Not only are Mexico’s macro variables more favorable than those of Brazil, but also the peso is cheap while the Brazilian real is slightly expensive (Chart 17). We elaborated on Brazil’s macroeconomic, financial and political outlook in our May 17 report. Sovereign credit (US dollar bonds): We continue to recommend an overweight position in Mexican sovereign credit within an EM credit portfolio. The rationale for this is Mexico’s benign structural macro parameters, as discussed above. Local currency bonds: 10-year local currency bond yields at 8.8% offer very good value. Weighing long-term pros and near-term cons, we are instituting a stop buy trade on Mexican 10-year domestic government bonds when either yields hit 10% or the MXN/USD reaches 22.5 (Chart 18). Chart 17Go Long MXN Versus BRL Go Long MXN Versus BRL Go Long MXN Versus BRL Chart 1810-Year Domestic Mexican Bonds Offer Good Value 10-Year Domestic Mexican Bonds Offer Good Value 10-Year Domestic Mexican Bonds Offer Good Value Chart 19We Have Been Betting On Yield Curve Flattening We Have Been Betting On Yield Curve Flattening We Have Been Betting On Yield Curve Flattening For now, we continue betting on further yield curve inversion. We instituted this position on August 12, 2021 and it has been very profitable (Chart 19).   Juan Egaña Associate Editor juane@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     George Lei and Michael O’Boyle, “Mexico’s ‘Super Peso’ Shocks Traders Who Were Betting On Wipeout,” Bloomberg, July 26, 2022, www.bloomberg.com.

Executive Summary Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Terms Of Trade Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Terms Of Trade Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Terms Of Trade  Petrocurrencies have lagged the surge in crude prices. This has been specific to the currency space since energy stocks have been in an epic bull market.Both cyclical and structural factors explain this conundrum.Cyclically, rising interest rate expectations in the US have dwarfed the terms-of-trade boost that the CAD, NOK, MXN, COP and even BRL typically enjoy (Feature Chart).Structurally, the US is now the biggest oil producer in the world (and a net exporter of natural gas). This has permanently shifted the relationship between the foreign exchange of traditional oil producers and the US dollar.Oil prices are overbought and vulnerable tactically to any resolution in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. That said, they are likely to remain well bid over a medium-term horizon, ultimately supporting petrocurrencies.Petrocurrencies also offer a significant valuation cushion and carry relative to the US dollar, making them attractive for longer-term investors.Tactically, the currencies of oil producers relative to consumers could mean revert. It also suggests the Japanese yen, which is under pressure from rising energy imports, could find some footing, even as oil prices remain volatile.RECOMMENDATIONINCEPTION LEVELINCEPTION DATERETURNShort NOK/SEK1.112022-03-24-Bottom Line: Given our thesis of lower oil prices in the near term, but firmer prices in the medium term, we will be selling a basket of oil producers relative to oil consumers, with the aim of reversing that trade from lower levels.FeatureOil price volatility is once again dominating global market action. After hitting a low of close to $96/barrel on March 16th, Brent crude is once again at $120 as we go to press. Over the last two years, Brent crude has been as cheap as $16, and as expensive as $140. Energy stocks (and their respective bourses) have been the proximate winner from rising oil prices (Chart 1).Related ReportForeign Exchange StrategyWhat Next For The RMB?In foreign exchange markets, the currencies of commodity-producing countries have surprisingly lagged the improvement in oil prices (Chart 2). Historically, higher oil prices have had a profound impact on the external balance of oil producing versus consuming countries in general and petrocurrencies in particular. Chart 1Energy Stocks Have Tracked Forward Oil Prices Energy Stocks Have Tracked Forward Oil Prices Energy Stocks Have Tracked Forward Oil Prices   Chart 2Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Oil Prices Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Oil Prices Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Oil Prices  Based on the observation above, this report addresses three key questions:Are there cyclical factors depressing the performance of petrocurrencies?Are there structural factors that have changed the relationship of these currencies with the US dollar?What is the outlook for oil, and the impact on short term versus longer-term currency strategy?We will begin our discussion with the outlook for oil.Russia, Oil, And PetrocurrenciesA high-level forecast from our Commodity & Energy Strategy colleagues calls for oil prices to average $93 per barrel this year and next.1 The deduction from this forecast is that we could see spot prices head lower from current levels this year but remain firm in 2023. From our perspective, there are a few factors that support this view:Forward prices tend to move in tandem with the spot fixing (Chart 3), but recently have also been a fair predictor of where current prices will settle over the medium term. Forward oil prices are trading at a significant discount to spot, suggesting some measure of mean reversion (Chart 4). Chart 3Forward And Spot Oil Prices Move Together Forward And Spot Oil Prices Move Together Forward And Spot Oil Prices Move Together   Chart 4The Oil Curve And Spot Prices The Oil Curve And Spot Prices The Oil Curve And Spot Prices  There is a significant geopolitical risk premium embedded in oil prices. According to the New York Federal Reserve model, the demand/supply balance would have caused oil prices to fall between February 11 and February 25 this year. They however rose. This geopolitical risk premium has surely increased since then (Chart 5).Chart 5Oil Prices Embed A Significant Geopolitical Risk Premium The Oil-Petrocurrency Conundrum The Oil-Petrocurrency Conundrum  Russian crude is trading at a sizeable discount compared to other benchmarks. This means that the incentive for substitution has risen significantly. Our Chief Commodity expert, Robert Ryan, noted on BLU today that intake from India is rising. This is helping put a floor on the Russian URAL/Brent discount blend at around $30 (Chart 6). Oil is fungible, and seaborne crude can be rerouted from unwilling buyers to satiate demand in starved markets.A fortnight ago, we noted how the US sanctions on Russia could shift the foreign exchange landscape, especially vis-à-vis the RMB. Specifically, RMB-denominated trade in oil is likely to increase significantly going forward. China has massively increased the number of bilateral swap lines it has with foreign countries, while stabilizing the RMB versus the US dollar.2Finally, smaller open economies such as Canada, Norway and even Mexico are opening the oil spigots (Chart 7). While individually these countries cannot fill any potential gap in Russian production, collectively they could help in the redistribution of oil supplies. Chart 6Russian Oil Is Selling At A Discount Russian Oil Is Selling At A Discount Russian Oil Is Selling At A Discount   Chart 7Small Oil Producers Will Benefit From High Prices Small Oil Producers Will Benefit From High Prices Small Oil Producers Will Benefit From High Prices  The observations above suggest that the currencies of small oil-producing nations are likely to benefit in the medium term from a redistribution in oil demand. Remarkably, there has been little demand destruction yet from the rise in prices, according to the New York Fed. This suggests that as the global economy reopens, and the demand/supply balance tightens, longer-term oil prices will remain well bid.The key risk in the short term is the geopolitical risk premium embedded in oil prices fades, especially given the potential that Europe, China, and India continue to buy Russian supplies. We have been playing this very volatile theme via a short NOK/SEK position. We are stopped out this week for a modest profit and are reinitiating the trade if NOK/SEK hits 1.11.On The Underperformance Of Petrocurrencies? Chart 8Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Terms Of Trade Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Terms Of Trade Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Terms Of Trade  The more important question is why the currencies of oil producers like the CAD, NOK, MXN or even BRL have not kept pace with oil prices as they historically have. As our feature chart shows (Chart 8), petrocurrencies have severely lagged the improvement in their terms of trade. This has been driven by both cyclical and structural factors.Cyclically, the underlying driver of FX in recent quarters has been the nominal interest rate spread between the US and its G10 counterparts. We have written at length on this topic, and on why we think there is a big mispricing in market behavior in our report – “The Biggest Macro Question By FX Investors Could Potentially Be The Least Relevant.” In a nutshell, two-year yields in the G10 have been lagging US rates, despite other central banks being ahead of the curve in hiking interest rates. This means that rising interest rate expectations in the US have dwarfed the terms of trade boost that the CAD, NOK, MXN, COP and even BRL typically enjoy.Structurally, the US is now the biggest oil producer in the world (Chart 9). This means the CAD/USD and NOK/USD exchange rates are experiencing a tectonic shift on a terms-of-trade basis. In 2010, the US accounted for only about 6% of global crude output. Collectively, Canada, Norway, and Mexico shared about 10% of global oil production. The elephant in the room was OPEC, with a market share just north of 40%. Today, the US produces over 14%, with Russia and Saudi Arabia around 13% each, the US having grabbed market share from many other countries. Chart 9The US Dominates Oil Production The US Dominates Oil Production The US Dominates Oil Production   Chart 10The US Dollar Is Becoming Increasingly Correlated To Oil The US Dollar Is Becoming Increasingly Correlated To Oil The US Dollar Is Becoming Increasingly Correlated To Oil  As a result of this shift, the positive correlation between petrocurrencies and oil has gradually eroded. Measured statistically, the dollar had a near-perfect negative correlation with oil around the time US production was about to take off. Since then, that correlation has risen from around -0.9 to around -0.2 (Chart 10).A Few Trade IdeasThe analysis above suggests a few trade ideas are likely to generate alpha over the medium term:Long Oil Producers Versus Oil Consumers: This trade will suffer in the near term as oil prices correct but benefit from a relatively tighter market over a longer horizon. It will also benefit from the positive carry that many oil producers provide (Chart 11). We will go long a currency basket of the CAD, NOK, MXN, BRL, and COP versus the euro at 5% below current levels.Chart 11Real Rates Are High Amongst Petrocurrencies The Oil-Petrocurrency Conundrum The Oil-Petrocurrency Conundrum  Sell CAD/NOK As A Trade: Norway is at the epicenter of the likely redistribution that will occur with a Russian blockade of crude, while Canada is further away from it. Terms of trade in Norway are doing much better than a relative measure in Canada (Chart 12). The discount between Western Canadian Select crude oil and Brent has also widened, which has historically heralded a lower CAD/NOK exchange rate. Chart 12CAD/NOK And Terms Of Trade CAD/NOK And Terms Of Trade CAD/NOK And Terms Of Trade  Follow The Money: Oil now trades above the cash costs for many oil-producing countries. This means the incentive to boost production, especially when demand recovers, is quite high. This incentivizes players with strong balance sheets to keep the taps open. This could be a particular longer-term boon for the Canadian dollar which is seeing massive portfolio inflows (Chart 13). Chart 13Canadian Oil Export Boom And Portfolio Flows Canadian Oil Export Boom And Portfolio Flows Canadian Oil Export Boom And Portfolio Flows  On The Yen (And Euro): Rising oil prices have been a death knell for the yen which is trading in lockstep with spot prices. Ditto for the euro. However, the yen benefits from very cheap valuations and extremely depressed sentiment. Any temporary reversal in oil prices will boost the yen (Chart 14). In our trading book, we were stopped out of a short CHF/JPY position last Friday, and we will look to reinitiate this trade in the coming days.  Chart 14The Yen And Oil Prices The Yen And Oil Prices The Yen And Oil Prices   Chester NtoniforForeign Exchange Strategistchestern@bcaresearch.comFootnotes1 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, “Uncertainty Tightens Oil Supply”, dated March 17, 2022.2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, “What Next For The RMB?”, dated March 11, 2022.Trades & ForecastsStrategic ViewTactical Holdings (0-6 months)Limit OrdersForecast Summary

Highlights Mexico has been experiencing stagflation: core inflation has risen sharply while the level of domestic demand in real terms is well below its pre-pandemic level. Going forward, tight fiscal and monetary policies will put a lid on domestic demand, easing inflationary pressures. The two main upside risks to Mexico’s inflation are a continuous rise in global food prices and broad EM currency depreciation causing a setback in the peso. Weighing pros and cons, we reiterate our overweight stance in Mexican equities, local bonds and sovereign credit within their respective EM portfolios. Fixed-income investors should stay with the yield curve trade: pay 1-year and receive 10-year swap rates in Mexico. Feature Mexican assets have been among the top performers in the EM space this year. However, there is one force which threatens to upset its economic recovery and financial outperformance versus its EM counterparts: inflation. In Mexico, core and headline consumer price inflation rates are at worrisome levels, rising well above the central bank’s target range (Chart 1). In our view, this overshoot in Mexico’s inflation will not be enduring. A combination of domestic demand weakness and a relatively firm currency will reduce core inflation in the coming months as projected by our inflation model (Chart 2). Chart 1Mexico: Inflation Is Well Above The Central Bank's Target Range Mexico: Inflation Is Well Above The Central Bank's Target Range Mexico: Inflation Is Well Above The Central Bank's Target Range Chart 2Will Mexico's Core CPI Roll Over In The Coming Months? Will Mexico's Core CPI Roll Over In The Coming Months? Will Mexico's Core CPI Roll Over In The Coming Months? We therefore maintain our overweight stance in Mexican equities, local bonds and sovereign credit within their respective EM portfolios. While Mexico has a number of problems and vulnerabilities - as discussed in The Stars Are Aligning For Mexico report - its financial markets offer a better risk-reward profile than the rest of EM. Stagflation And Its Causes Chart 3Mexico: Domestic Demand Is Below Pre-Pandemic Levels Mexico: Domestic Demand Is Below Pre-Pandemic Levels Mexico: Domestic Demand Is Below Pre-Pandemic Levels Mexico’s core consumer price inflation has surged while the post-pandemic domestic demand recovery has been mediocre – the level of consumer spending and capital expenditures in real terms are well below their pre-pandemic level (Chart 3). This qualifies as stagflation. When addressing inflation concerns in any country, the first question we must ask ourselves is what the underlying causes of broadly rising prices are, and if these factors will persist. While Mexico shares many characteristics of the post-pandemic worldwide spike in inflation, there are also some intrinsic factors that have contributed significantly to the rise in its inflation. Among common inflation factors affecting many economies around the world are high commodity prices, supply constraints, easy monetary policy and the release of pent-up demand from the economic reopening. On the other hand, it is worth noting those particular forces that have pushed inflation higher in Mexico: Chart 4Un- And Under-Employment Rates In Mexico Did Not Rise A Lot Un- And Under-Employment Rates In Mexico Did Not Rise A Lot Un- And Under-Employment Rates In Mexico Did Not Rise A Lot Mexico’s labor market did not collapse during the pandemic, which prevented household incomes from plummeting as in the rest of Latin America. Chart 4 shows that the unemployment and underemployment rates in Mexico rose much less than those in Brazil or other Latin American countries. This is because throughout the past year and a half, Mexico’s social distancing measures were milder than they were in the rest of the region. This lack of measures has meant less in the way of job losses, though it has contributed to one of the world’s highest death tolls and infection rates. On the supply side, many businesses in Mexico folded. As a result, supply has been seriously reduced and, with less competition, those businesses that remain afloat have gained pricing power. Mexico had one of the world’s lowest pandemic aid programs in the world, worth only around 1.2% of GDP. This was particularly rough on small businesses, which only received an equivalent one-time $1,100 USD loan to cover losses. Data from the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) shows that 21% of established businesses closed down in 2020. Finally, high inflation can be attributed to structurally low competition and lack of productive capacity. As we wrote in a previous report, the prevalence of oligopolies in many industries and the lack of investment have led to sluggish productivity growth in Mexico, which has created fertile conditions for higher inflation. Chart 5Mexico Has Not Been Investing Mexico Has Not Been Investing Mexico Has Not Been Investing In general, Mexico is a very underinvested country. Chart 5 shows that real capital expenditures as a share of real GDP have been dwindling since 2008 to a very low level of 17.5% of GDP. Capacity has not been expanding sufficiently for many years. This and the demise of many businesses during the pandemic have created conditions where output cannot match even a modest increase in demand. Such a phenomenon also leads to structurally high household and business inflation expectations, which facilitates the pass-through effect of higher commodity prices. Bottom Line: Mexico’s inflation outbreak has happened not due to booming demand but to lagging supply. Hence, the current episode has stagflation undertones.   The Inflation Outlook Going forward, tight fiscal and monetary policies will put a lid on domestic demand, easing inflationary pressures: Commercial banks’ credit is very weak for both consumers and companies (Chart 6). This and decelerating money supply foreshadow a slowdown in domestic demand (Chart 7). Chart 6Mexico: Private Sector Credit Is Sluggish Mexico: Private Sector Credit Is Sluggish Mexico: Private Sector Credit Is Sluggish Chart 7Narrow Money Points To Economic Weakness Narrow Money Points To Economic Weakness Narrow Money Points To Economic Weakness Chart 8Wage Growth Is Zero In Real Terms Wage Growth Is Zero In Real Terms Wage Growth Is Zero In Real Terms Average nominal wages per worker have rolled over dramatically, and in real terms (deflated by core CPI) wage growth is zero (Chart 8). This will limit household purchasing power. The inflation overshoot in Mexico has not been very broad-based. Our measure of trimmed-mean core inflation has already rolled over, and services inflation remains within the central bank’s target range (Chart 9). There are higher odds that inflation will not be persistent and enduring when it is not generalized across various goods, services and industries. Further, economists and analysists do not see broad-based inflationary pressures in the economy – their inflation expectations have not broken out (Chart 10). These data are from a monthly survey by the central bank (Banxico) which polls local and foreign banks and financial analysts. Chart 9The Inflation Overshoot Is Not Broad-Based The Inflation Overshoot Is Not Broad-Based The Inflation Overshoot Is Not Broad-Based Chart 10Inflation Expectations Are Contained Inflation Expectations Are Contained Inflation Expectations Are Contained The government and central bank have been and will continue pursuing very orthodox fiscal and monetary policies. Banxico is committed to keeping inflation under control to maintain its credibility: the tightening they have undertaken will cap inflation and inflation expectations from running away. In real terms, the policy rate remains at historical lows around zero percent (deflated by core and trimmed-mean inflation) (Chart 11). Odds are Banxico will push the real policy rate above 1% either through lower inflation and/or higher nominal rates. In terms of fiscal policy, there are no imminent worries of inflation triggered by fiscal profligacy. President AMLO continues to run the tightest fiscal policy in the region, maintaining a primary fiscal surplus throughout most of the past year and a half (Chart 12). Chart 11Banxico Will Push Real Rates Well Above Zero Banxico Will Push Real Rates Well Above Zero Banxico Will Push Real Rates Well Above Zero Chart 12Fiscal Policy Is Modestly Restrictive Fiscal Policy Is Modestly Restrictive Fiscal Policy Is Modestly Restrictive Next year’s budget proposes a 0.3% primary deficit and a nominal 3.8% growth in primary expenditures. The latter implies negative fiscal spending growth in real terms next year. This signifies a tight fiscal stance. Consistently, the fiscal thrust will be zero in 2022. Chart 13Mexico: Balance Of Payments Dynamics Are Healthy Mexico: Balance Of Payments Dynamics Are Healthy Mexico: Balance Of Payments Dynamics Are Healthy Externally, balance of payments dynamics will remain healthy, which will support the peso. A firm currency will exert downward pressure on inflation and inflation expectations: To begin, Mexico is in the advantageous position of being more exposed to the US business cycle than to China’s “old economy”. Therefore, unlike for other EM and regional peers, a slowdown in China’s construction and infrastructure sectors (and thereby possibly raw material prices) will not be very negative for the Mexican economy. The benefits from this exposure to the US economy is seen through the surge in Mexican non-energy exports, already surpassing pre-pandemic levels (Chart 13, top panel). This has occurred even though auto production has been derailed by parts/semiconductor shortages. As auto production revives, Mexican exports will expand further. With such robust exports, the trade and current account balances will remain at healthy surpluses (Chart 13, middle panel), continuing to support the peso going forward. Another positive development for this nation is the massive boom in remittances (Chart 13, bottom panel). Even if they begin to slow down in the coming months, their flow will remain well above pre-pandemic levels. Mexico will also profit from high oil prices. Even if oil prices drop from their current level, they will likely remain relatively elevated (say, above $60 per barrel) in the coming months. In addition, stable political dynamics in Mexico will reduce the chances of sudden depreciation moves in the currency. In fact, Mexico’s political landscape remains the most stable in Latin America.  Bottom Line: Odds are that core CPI will rollover in early 2022 (Chart 2, above). A Play On The US Industrial Boom As we discussed in the report titled Industrials As Equity Sector Winner In The Coming Years, the US will continue experiencing an industrial boom and this will spill into Mexico. In brief, Mexico is one of the few plays in the EM universe to benefit from the US industrial boom. Mexico is in a unique position to attract domestic and foreign capital inflows to its manufacturing industry. International reshoring efforts, its geographical and diplomatic closeness to the US, its well-established maquiladora sector and its cheap currency all serve to allow Mexico to benefit from the US industrial boom. In this context, FDI inflows will have a secular rise over the coming years (Chart 14, top panel). Capital goods imports are reviving (Chart 14, bottom panel). Rising imports of capital goods bodes well for the nation’s productivity, competitiveness and exports in the years to come. Upside Risks To Inflation Even though we are betting on diminishing inflationary pressures in Mexico, there are some upside risks to inflation. These factors are external: As in many developing economies, in Mexico food accounts for a very large weight in the CPI basket and food prices have material impact on inflation expectations and, hence, broader inflation. If global corn and wheat prices continue their impressive rally (Chart 15, top panel), they could sustain high inflation prints in Mexico. Chart 14FDI Inflows To Mexico Are Set To Revive FDI Inflows To Mexico Are Set To Revive FDI Inflows To Mexico Are Set To Revive Chart 15Rising Food Prices Pose An Upside Risk To Mexico's Inflation Rising Food Prices Pose An Upside Risk To Mexico's Inflation Rising Food Prices Pose An Upside Risk To Mexico's Inflation Critically, oligopolies in Mexico’s baked products sector have enjoyed high pricing power and amplify the effect of high global grain prices on domestic inflation. The CPI measure for food – and bread, tortillas and cereals in particular – is running at 8-10% (Chart 15, bottom panel). In comparison, cereals and bakery inflation for the US is at just 3.5%. Lower commodity prices (due to weakness in China’s economy) and rising US bond yields could induce EM currency weakness. Typically, the MXN depreciates significantly when EM currencies weaken as many investors short MXN – one of most liquid EM currencies –as a hedge for their long EM positions. If this scenario transpires and the peso relapses meaningfully and for several months, the rollover in core CPI will be modest or delayed. Investment Implications Equities: We recommend that investors maintain an overweight stance in Mexican stocks within an EM equity portfolio (Chart 16). Weak consumer spending is a risk to share prices. However, the outlook for many other EM bourses is worse. That is why we maintain our overweight in Mexico. The Mexican bourse remains cheap according to its cyclically-adjusted P/E ratio both in absolute terms and relative to the EM benchmark (Chart 17). Chart 16Mexican Stocks In Absolute Terms And Relative To EM Mexican Stocks In Absolute Terms And Relative To EM Mexican Stocks In Absolute Terms And Relative To EM Chart 17Mexican Equities Offer Value Mexican Equities Offer Value Mexican Equities Offer Value Chart 18The Mexican Peso Is Cheap The Mexican Peso is Cheap The Mexican Peso is Cheap Currency: The Mexican peso remains one of our favorites in the EM space. While we are negative on EM currencies versus the US dollar, we believe the MXN will outperform the rest of its peers outside a potential EM volatility-driven selloff period. Particularly, the peso remains cheap according to its real effective exchange rate (Chart 18). Fixed Income: We continue recommending overweight positions in both local bonds and sovereign credit within their respective EM portfolios. An orthodox macro policy mix, relatively stable political dynamics, healthy balance of payments as well as contained inflation will help Mexican fixed-income markets outperform their EM counterparts. Further, Mexico is one of the few countries worldwide that has actually lowered its public debt-to-GDP ratio below pre-pandemic levels, and it remains at a low 50% of GDP. Finally, we reiterate the following yield curve trade: pay 1-year and receive 10-year swap rates in Mexico. While Banxico will likely hike rates further making the short end of the curve vulnerable, long-dated local bond yields/swap rates have limited upside. We expect the yield curve will continue flattening. Juan Egaña Research Analyst juane@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes

Highlights The US Climate Prediction Center gives ~ 70% odds another La Niña will form in the August – October interval and will continue through winter 2021-22. This will be a second-year La Niña if it forms, and will raise the odds of a repeat of last winter's cold weather in the Northern Hemisphere.1 Europe's natural-gas inventory build ahead of the coming winter remains erratic, particularly as Russian flows via Ukraine to the EU have been reduced this year. Russia's Nord Stream 2 could be online by November, but inventories will still be low. China, Japan, South Korea and India  – the four top LNG consumers in Asia  – took in 155 Bcf of the fuel in June. A colder-than-normal winter would boost demand. Higher prices are likely in Europe and Asia (Chart of the Week). US storage levels will be lower going into winter, as power generation demand remains stout, and the lingering effects from Hurricane Ida reduce supplies available for inventory injections. Despite spot prices trading ~ $1.30/MMBtu above last winter's highs – currently ~ $4.60/MMBtu – we are going long 1Q22 NYMEX $5.00/MMBtu natgas calls vs short NYMEX $5.50/MMBtu natgas calls expecting even higher prices. Feature Last winter's La Niña was a doozy. It brought extreme cold to Asia, North America and Europe, which pulled natural gas storage levels sharply lower and drove prices sharply higher as the Chart of the Week shows. Natgas storage in the US and Europe will be tight going into this winter (Chart 2). Europe's La Niña lingered a while into Spring, keeping temps low and space-heating demand high, which delayed the start of re-building inventory for the coming winter.  In the US, cold temps in the Midwest hampered production, boosted demand and caused inventory to draw hard. Chart of the WeekA Return Of La Niña Could Boost Global Natgas Prices A Return Of La Niña Could Boost Global Natgas Prices A Return Of La Niña Could Boost Global Natgas Prices Chart 2Europe, US Gas Stocks Will Be Tight This Winter NatGas: Winter Is Coming NatGas: Winter Is Coming Summer in the US also produced strong natgas demand, particularly out West, as power generators eschewed coal in favor of gas to meet stronger air-conditioning demand. This is partly due to the closing of coal-fired units, leaving more of the load to be picked up by gas-fired generation (Chart 3). The EIA estimates natgas consumption in July was up ~ 4 Bcf/d to just under 76 Bcf/d. Hurricane Ida took ~ 1 bcf/d of demand out of the market, which was less than the ~ 2 Bcf/d hit to US Gulf supply resulting from the storm.  As a result, prices were pushed higher at the margin. Chart 3Generators Prefer Gas To Coal NatGas: Winter Is Coming NatGas: Winter Is Coming US natgas exports (pipeline and LNG) also were strong, at 18.2 Bcf/d in July (Chart 4). We expect US LNG exports, in particular, to resume growth as the world recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic (Chart 5). This strong demand and exports, coupled with slightly lower supply from the Lower 48 states – estimated at ~ 98 Bcf/d by the EIA for July (Chart 6) – pushed prices up by 18% from June to July, "the largest month-on-month percentage change for June to July since 2012, when the price increased 20.3%" according to the EIA. Chart 4US Natgas Exports Remain Strong US Natgas Exports Remain Strong US Natgas Exports Remain Strong Chart 5US LNG Exports Will Resume Growth NatGas: Winter Is Coming NatGas: Winter Is Coming Chart 6US Lower 48 Natgas Production Recovering US Lower 48 Natgas Production Recovering US Lower 48 Natgas Production Recovering Elsewhere in the Americas, Brazil has been a strong bid for US LNG – accounting for 32.3 Bcf of demand in  June – as hydroelectric generation flags due to the prolonged drought in the country. In Asia, demand for LNG remains strong, with the four top consumers – China, Japan, South Korea, and India – taking in 155 Bcf in June, according to the EIA. Gas Infrastructure Ex-US Remains Challenged A combination of extreme cold weather in Northeast Asia, and a lack of gas storage infrastructure in Asia generally, along with shipping constraints and supply issues at LNG export facilities, led to the Asian natural gas price spike in mid-January.2 Very cold weather in Northeast Asia, drove up LNG demand during the winter months. In China, LNG imports for the month of January rose by ~ 53% y-o-y (Chart 7).3 The increase in imports from Asia coincided with issues at major export plants in Australia, Norway and Qatar during that period. Chart 7China's US LNG Exports Surged Last Winter, And Remain Stout Over The Summer NatGas: Winter Is Coming NatGas: Winter Is Coming Substantially higher JKM (Japan-Korea Marker) prices incentivized US exporters to divert LNG cargoes from Europe to Asia last winter. The longer roundtrip times to deliver LNG from the US to Asia – instead of Europe – resulted in a reduction of shipping capacity, which ended up compounding market tightness in Europe. Europe dealt with the switch by drawing ~ 18 bcm more from their storage vs. the previous year, across the November to January period. Countries in Asia - most notably Japan – however, do not have robust natural gas storage facilities, further contributing to price volatility, especially in extreme weather events. These storage constraints remain in place going into the coming winter. In addition, there is a high probability the global weather pattern responsible for the cold spells around the globe that triggered price spikes in key markets globally – i.e., a second La Niña event – will return. A Second-Year La Niña  Event The price spikes and logistical challenges of last winter were the result of atmospheric circulation anomalies that were bolstered by a La Niña event that began in mid-2020.4 The La Niña is characterized by colder sea-surface temperatures that develops over the Pacific equator, which displaces atmospheric and wind circulation and leads to colder temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere (Map 1). Map 1La Niña Raises The Odds Of Colder Temps NatGas: Winter Is Coming NatGas: Winter Is Coming The IEA notes last winter started off without any exceptional deviations from an average early winter, but as the new year opened "natural gas markets experienced severe supply-demand tensions in the opening weeks of 2021, with extremely cold temperature episodes sending spot prices to record levels."5 In its most recent ENSO update, the US Climate Prediction Center raised the odds of another La Niña event for this winter to 70% this month. If similar conditions to those of the 2020-21 winter emerge, US and European inventories could be stretched even thinner than last year, as space-heating demand competes with industrial and commercial demand resulting from the economic recovery. Global Natgas Supplies Will Stay Tight JKM prices and TTF (Dutch Title Transfer Facility) prices are likely to remain elevated going into winter, as seen in the Chart of the Week. Fundamentals have kept markets tight so far. Uncertain Russian supply to Europe will raise the price of the European gas index (TTF). This, along with strong Asian demand, particularly from China, will keep JKM prices high (Chart 8). The global economic recovery is the main short-term driver of higher natgas demand, with China leading the way. For the longer-term, natural gas is considered as the ideal transition fuel to green energy, as it emits less carbon than other fossil fuels. For this reason, demand is expected to grow by 3.4% per annum until 2035, and reach peak consumption later than other fossil fuels, according to McKinsey.6 Chart 8BCAs Brent Forecast Points To Higher JKM Prices BCAs Brent Forecast Points To Higher JKM Prices BCAs Brent Forecast Points To Higher JKM Prices Spillovers from the European natural gas market impact Asian markets, as was demonstrated last winter. Russian supply to Europe – where inventories are at their lowest level in a decade – has dropped over the last few months. This could either be the result of Russia's attempts to support its case for finishing Nord Stream 2 and getting it running as soon as possible, or because it is physically unable to supply natural gas.7 A fire at a condensate plant in Siberia at the beginning of August supports the latter conjecture. The reduced supply from Russia, comes at a time when EU carbon permit prices have been consistently breaking records, making the cost of natural gas competitive compared to more heavy carbon emitting fossil fuels – e.g., coal and oil – despite record breaking prices. With Europe beginning the winter season with significantly lower stock levels vs. previous years, TTF prices will remain volatile. This, and strong demand from China, will support JKM prices. Investment Implications Natural gas prices are elevated, with spot NYMEX futures trading ~ $1.30/MMBtu above last winter's highs – currently ~ $4.60/MMBtu. Our analysis indicates prices are justifiably high, and could – with the slightest unexpected news – move sharply higher. Because natgas is, at the end of the day, a weather market, we favor low-cost/low-risk exposures. In the current market, we recommend going long 1Q22 NYMEX $5.00/MMBtu natgas calls vs short NYMEX $5.50/MMBtu natgas calls expecting even higher prices. This is the trade we recommended on 8 April 2021, at a lower level, which was stopped out on 12 August 2021 with a gain of 188%.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish Earlier this week, Saudi Aramco lowered its official selling price (OSP) by more than was expected – lowering its premium to the regional benchmark to $1.30/bbl from $1.70/bbl – in what media reports based on interviews with oil traders suggest is an attempt to win back customers electing not to take volumes under long-term contracts. This is a marginal adjustment by Aramco, but still significant, as it shows the company will continue to defend its market share. Pricing to Northwest Europe and the US markets is unchanged. Aramco's majority shareholder, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), is the putative leader of OPEC 2.0 (aka, OPEC+) along with Russia. The producer coalition is in the process of returning 400k b/d to the market every month until it has restored the 5.8mm b/d of production it took off the market to support prices during the COVID-19 pandemic. We expect Brent crude oil prices to average $70/bbl in 2H21, $73/bbl in 2022 and $80/bbl in 2023. Base Metals: Bullish Political uncertainty in Guinea caused aluminum prices to rise to more than a 10-year high this week (Chart 9). A coup in the world’s second largest exporter of bauxite – the main ore source for aluminum – began on Sunday, rattling aluminum markets. While iron ore prices rebounded primarily on the record value of Chinese imports in August, the coup in Guinea – which has the highest level of iron ore reserves – could have also raised questions about supply certainty. This will contribute to iron-ore price volatility. However, we do not believe the coup will impact the supply of commodities as much as markets are factoring, as coup leaders in commodity-exporting countries typically want to keep their source of income intact and functioning. Precious Metals: Bullish Gold settled at a one-month high last Friday, when the US Bureau of Labor Statistics released the August jobs report. The rise in payrolls data was well below analysts’ estimates, and was the lowest gain in seven months. The yellow metal rose on this news as the weak employment data eased fears about Fed tapering, and refocused markets on COVID-19 and the delta variant. Since then, however, the yellow metal has not been able to consolidate gains. After falling to a more than one-month low on Friday, the US dollar rose on Tuesday, weighing on gold prices (Chart 10). Chart 9 Aluminum Prices Recovering Aluminum Prices Recovering Chart 10 Weaker USD Supports Gold Weaker USD Supports Gold       Footnotes 1      Please see the US Climate Prediction Center's ENSO: Recent Evolution, Current Status and Predictions report published on September 6, 2021. 2     Please see Asia LNG Price Spike: Perfect Storm or Structural Failure? Published by Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. 3     Since China LNG import data were reported as a combined January and February value in 2020, we halved the combined value to get the January 2020 amount. 4     Please see The 2020/21 Extremely Cold Winter in China Influenced by the Synergistic Effect of La Niña and Warm Arctic by Zheng, F., and Coauthors (2021), published in Advances in Atmospheric Sciences. 5     Please see the IEA's Gas Market Report, Q2-2021 published in April 2021. 6     Please see Global gas outlook to 2050 | McKinsey on February 26, 2021. 7     Please see ICIS Analyst View: Gazprom’s inability to supply or unwillingness to deliver? published on August 13, 2021.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades

Highlights The dollar is fighting a tug of war between two diverging forces: an economic slowdown around the world but plunging real interest rates in the US. The litmus test for determining which force will gain the upper hand is if the DXY fails to break above the 93-94 level that marked the March highs. So far that appears to be the case. In the interim, investors can capitalize on a few themes that will ultimately unfold: an end to the China slowdown, a bet on real rates staying low for longer, and a play on the Olympics. The expressions of these themes are long AUD/MXN, long silver and long the yen, respectively. Natural disasters are also rising in frequency globally. Historically, this has coincided with rising currency volatility. Long CHF/NZD positions can be a potent play on this trend. We ultimately expect the dollar lower 9-12 months from now. The best currencies to express this view today are NOK and SEK. Feature We are a month into the second half of year, and it is instructive to revisit the dollar view and our roadmap towards year-end. As a starting point, two key themes are propping the dollar on a tactical basis: The first is a global economic slowdown, one that could be exacerbated by increased infections of the COVID-19 Delta variant. The dollar tends to rise in an environment where global growth is weak. This is especially the case when US growth is relatively resilient, like now (Chart I-1). The second is the resilience of the US equity market, not only due to superior earnings, but also as regulatory crackdowns hit shares in China specifically, and emerging markets in general. Equity inflows into the US were a key reason the dollar did not collapse in 2020. Renewed inflows into US equities will be particularly beneficial for the dollar (Chart I-2). This will especially be the case if technology and healthcare earnings keep surprising to the upside. Chart I-1The Dollar And Relative Economic Momentum The Dollar And Relative Economic Momentum The Dollar And Relative Economic Momentum Chart I-2The US Is Leading The Earnings ##br##Cycle The US Is Leading The Earnings Cycle The US Is Leading The Earnings Cycle At the same time, real interest rates in the US are very depressed. In its latest meeting, the Federal Reserve reiterated that it will keep running the economy hot, a thesis central to our bearish dollar view. This puts the dollar in a tug of war between two diverging forces: an economic slowdown around the world but plunging real interest rates in the US. Arbitrating The Tug Of War Historically, unless the world economy experiences a recession, the interest rate story has dominated currency market action. Our report last week showed that real interest rates matter for currencies both short term and longer term. Given our bias that global growth will moderate rather than contract, the future path of interest rates will once again become important for currency market action. In this light, lower real rates are negative for the US dollar. How long the outperformance of US equities will last is a tougher call. What we do know is that in a rising interest rate environment, the US equity market has tended to derate relative to the rest of the world. Our base case is that bond yields will be higher globally on a cyclical horizon, suggesting investors should fade the current outperformance of US equities. Scandinavian Currencies As A Strategic Dollar Play The best currencies to express a cyclically lower dollar are the NOK and SEK, for a few reasons other than the strong correlation with the DXY index (Chart I-3): Chart I-3NOK And SEK Are A Play On DXY NOK and SEK Are A Play On DXY NOK and SEK Are A Play On DXY Economic momentum in both Norway and Sweden is picking up steam. In Norway, high oil prices will be a cyclical boost to the currency, as has been the case historically. Meanwhile, Sweden is benefiting from a strong manufacturing landscape, especially in autos where pricing has skyrocketed due to shortages. While the Swedish manufacturing PMI has moderated recently, it still sits at 65.8, the highest level since the mid-1990s. Both currencies remain very cheap according to our models. Our favored PPP model shows that NOK and SEK are trading at a discount of 20% and 17% respectively, amongst the cheapest in the G10 (Chart I-4). Chart I-4The Dollar Is Expensive Trade Themes Into Year End Trade Themes Into Year End Norway, Sweden and Canada are among the countries whose output gaps are expected to close relatively fast (Chart I-5). In the case of Norway (and Canada), the central bank has been vocal about curtailing monetary accommodation, as market conditions improve. The upside surprise in Swedish GDP this week lowers the odds of more monetary accommodation from the Riksbank. This will boost real rates in these countries, supporting their currencies. Chart I-5Output Gaps Across The G10 Trade Themes Into Year End Trade Themes Into Year End In a nutshell, if the dollar heads lower 9-12 months from now, this will benefit most procyclical currencies, with the NOK and SEK as winners. The Yen As An Olympian Chart I-6Currencies And The Olympics Trade Themes Into Year End Trade Themes Into Year End We made the case last month that the yen was the most underappreciated G10 currency, and that certainly remains true.  Since then, there has been improvement in the Japanese economy: The vaccination campaign is progressing smoothly, with 27% of the population having been inoculated from almost nil earlier this year. Meanwhile, about 38% have received at least one dose. This should curtail hospitalizations, despite the increase in new cases. Economic momentum remains tepid, but there are green shoots. Real cash earnings are inflecting higher, which is boosting household spending. There was also remarkable improvement in the Eco Watchers Survey, a sign of optimism among small and medium-sized businesses. Global trade remains strong, which is a boost to the Japanese external sector. While this may slow going forward, it will be a benign headwind. Japan is less exposed to China, a key market for exports, compared to its developed market peers like Australia and New Zealand. Meanwhile, China is already easing policy at the margin. The true catalyst for the yen could be the Olympics. Since the 1970s, the median performance of a currency hosting the Olympics is 4% over a year. The performance of the yen today falls well below the 25th percentile of this performance gap (Chart I-6). This year’s games have obviously been unique given the pandemic but given that the yen is the most shorted G10 currency, this is probably already in the price. It also it does raise the prospect that the yen rises from being an underdog to staging a powerful mean reversion rally. While Japan will not get a tourism boost this summer that will buffet discretionary spending, foreigners are likely to return as the pandemic is put behind us. It is remarkable that Japanese shares, even construction and material companies, that should have benefited from the leadup to the Olympics, have massively underperformed (Chart I-7). This suggests that at the margin, many investors have folded hands and sold Japanese equities indiscriminately. Chart I-7Japanese Shares Have Underperformed Japanese Shares Have Underperformed Japanese Shares Have Underperformed Finally, real rates in Japan are among the highest in the G10. This will not only prevent Japanese concerns from deploying yen cash on foreign paper, but could also lead to some repatriation of funds, boosting the yen. Low Real Rates: Buy Silver (And Platinum) The case for buying silver has become compelling, at least on a tactical basis. First, the runup in prices from under $12/oz in March to almost $30/oz in August ushered silver into a well-defined wedge formation, with a series of higher lows. We are now sitting close to the lower bound of this wedge. Given our expectation that any DXY rally will be capped at 93-94, this puts a solid floor under silver prices around the $22-$23/oz level (Chart I-8). This makes for an attractive risk/reward since silver could overtake its 2011 highs near $50/oz, once strong resistance at $30/oz is breached. Second, similar to gold, silver benefits from low interest rates, plentiful liquidity, and the incentive for fiat money debasement. But unlike gold or even cryptocurrencies, physical use for silver is quite elevated. Silver fabrication demand benefits from electronic production (whereby there is a shortage, so it is bound to eventually increase), as well as new green industries such as solar power that are dominating the manufacturing landscape (Chart I-9). Meanwhile, our Commodity & Energy Strategists have flagged that the surplus of silver is expected to shrink significantly this year, driven by both industrial and investment demand (Chart I-10). Chart I-8Buy Some Silver Buy Some Silver Buy Some Silver Chart I-9Silver Demand Is Picking Up Trade Themes Into Year End Trade Themes Into Year End Chart I-10The Silver Surplus Is Shrinking Trade Themes Into Year End Trade Themes Into Year End Third, silver is also a more potent play on a lower dollar. This is because the silver market is thinner and more volatile, with futures open interest at about one-third that of gold. Put another way, volatility in silver has always been historically higher than gold, which is why silver tends to outperform gold when the dollar is falling (Chart I-11). Chart I-11Silver Is A More Potent Play On The Dollar Silver Is A More Potent Play On The Dollar Silver Is A More Potent Play On The Dollar It is worth pointing out that the velocity of money between the US and China is slowing again, suggesting growth is likely to start outperforming outside the US, beyond the current slowdown. The US benefits less from a pickup in Chinese growth, compared to other countries. This has generally pushed the dollar lower and set fire under the silver/gold ratio (Chart I-12). Finally, there is also a case to be made for platinum. It has lagged both gold and palladium prices (Chart I-13). Meanwhile, breakthroughs are being made in substituting palladium for platinum in gasoline catalytic converters. Chart I-12Money Velocity And The GSR Money Velocity And The GSR Money Velocity And The GSR Chart I-13Platinum And Silver Have Lagged Gold Platinum And Silver Have Lagged Gold Platinum And Silver Have Lagged Gold China Slowdown Almost Over: Buy AUD/MXN Soon We highlighted in February that a tactical opportunity had opened to go short the AUD/MXN cross. With the cross down 11% from its recent highs, an opportunity to go long will soon open up. China has started easing policy at the margin. The AUD/MXN cross correlates quite strongly with the Chinese credit cycle, as Australia is economically tied to China while Mexico depends more on the US (Chart I-14). The Australian PMI has remained quite firm, despite a slowdown in the Chinese credit impulse. Strong commodity prices have been a factor, but it also points to endogenous strength in the Aussie economy. Relative terms of trade favor the Aussie. We had expected terms of trade between Australia and Mexico to relapse on the basis of destocking in China, but that has not been the case (Chart I-15). With oil prices structurally challenged by EVs, while metal prices benefit from the buildout of green infrastructure, terms of trade will remain favorable for the cross longer term. Australian stocks have been underperforming the more defensive Mexican bourse (Chart I-16). This should reverse as cyclicals start to regain the upper hand. Chart I-14AUD/MXN Tracks Chinese Credit AUD/MXN Tracks Chinese Credit AUD/MXN Tracks Chinese Credit Chart I-15AUD/MXN And Terms Of Trade AUD/MXN And Terms Of Trade AUD/MXN And Terms Of Trade Chart I-16AUD/MXN And Relative Equity Prices AUD/MXN And Relative Equity Prices AUD/MXN And Relative Equity Prices The timing for a long position is tricky as Chinese economic activity is likely to slow in the coming months, and cyclical equities could remain under pressure. Meanwhile, as value investors, we are also uncomfortable with AUD/MXN valuations. This suggests that in the very near term, short positions still make sense. That said, the 13-14 zone should provide formidable support to go long, an opportunity likely to unfold in the next 3 months (Chart 17).  Chart I-17AUD/MXN And Momentum AUD/MXN And Momentum AUD/MXN And Momentum A Final Thought On Rising Catastrophes We have been watching with obvious trepidation the rising incidence of catastrophes globally. The occurrence of weather events such as droughts, floods, storms, cyclones, and wildfires has been skyrocketing (Chart I-18). Chart I-18Disasters And Volatility Trade Themes Into Year End Trade Themes Into Year End The direct play is to buy global construction and machinery stocks that are likely to benefit from increased reconstruction activity. It also favors agricultural futures. As for currency markets, the one observation is rising volatility with the VIX having spiked significantly in the years with numerous weather events.  We are already long CHF/NZD and the yen as a play on rising currency volatility, and we will be exploring this thesis more deeply in future publications.    Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 Data out of the US this week was relatively robust: The Markit manufacturing PMI for July edged up from 62.1 to 63.1. That said, the services PMI fell from 64.6 to 59.8. Durable goods orders were rather weak, rising 0.8% year on year in June, versus a consensus of a 2.2% increase. Admittedly, the core non-defense measure, excluding aircraft and parts, rose by 0.5% from 0.1%. Consumer confidence remains resilient, rising from 127.3 to 129.1 in July, well above expectations. Q2 GDP came in at 6.5% quarter on quarter, versus an 8.4% consensus. The US dollar DXY index fell this week. The Fed meeting highlighted that the authorities are in no rush to tighten monetary policy, despite what has been a robust recovery in labor market conditions and inflation. The aftermath of the meeting saw a drop in US real yields and the dollar. The Fed’s dovish stance has been a central theme to our bearish dollar view. Report Links: Arbitrating Between Dollar Bulls And Bears - March 19, 2021 The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 Are Rising Bond Yields Bullish For The Dollar? - February 19, 2021 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Data out of the eurozone this week softened: The manufacturing PMI fell to 62.6 in July from 63.4. The services PMI surprisingly improved, rising from 58.3 to 60.4 in July. Economic confidence rose from 117.9 to 119 in July. The German IFO survey was below consensus in July, but the expectations component did rise from 99.6 to 100.4. The euro rose by 1% this week. We went long the euro at 1.18 on expectations that at the margin, monetary policy in the euro area will shift in a more hawkish fashion. Since then, the ECB has adopted a symmetric inflation target, promising to keep interest rates low for longer. The euro’s indifference to this dovish development suggests a strong floor under the currency, and upside should euro area growth beat consensus. Report Links: Relative Growth, The Euro, And The Loonie - April 16, 2021 The Euro Dance: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward - April 2, 2021 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 The Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Japanese data was rather mixed this week: The Jibun manufacturing PMI eased slightly in July, to 52.2 from 52.4. The services component also fell to 46.4. Department store sales came in at 3.7% year on year in June. We highlighted last week that supermarket sales also remain strong. The yen was up 0.4% against the dollar this week. In the history of the Olympics, the incumbent currency has tended to rise over the course of the year. Given the yen is the most shorted developed-market currency currently, this sets it up for a coiled spring rebound. Report Links: The Case For Japan - June 11, 2021 The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 On Japanese Inflation And The Yen - January 29, 2021 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 There were some mixed data out of the UK this week: Retail sales in the UK were in line with expectations. The measure excluding automobiles and fuel rose by 7.4% year on year in June. The PMIs generally slowed from very strong levels. The manufacturing print for July was 60.4, while the services component came in at 57.8. House price inflation remains strong, with the nationwide measure coming in at 10.5% year on year in July. Mortgage approvals fell slightly in June but remain at a robust 81.3K. The pound rose by 1.5% this week. The big surprise in the UK has been a reversal in the COVID-19 infection rate, despite an economy that is reopening quite briskly. This sets cable up for a volatile few weeks and months, given a poor technical picture (speculations are cutting long positions from very aggressive levels). We like GBP long term but will stand aside for now. Report Links: Why Are UK Interest Rates Still So Low? - March 10, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Thoughts On The British Pound - December 18, 2020 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 The inflation report in Australia was in line with expectations for Q2: Headline CPI rose from 1.1% to 3.8%. The trimmed mean and median measure came in at 1.6% and 1.7% respectively. The AUD was flat this week, the worst performing G10 currency. The dominant story remains the renewed restrictions from a resurgence in COVID-19, particularly in Sydney. That said, weakness in AUD is starting to create an attractive reward/risk profile. Speculators are net short the Australian dollar, and our bias is that there has been spillover pressure from the recent turmoil in Asian/Chinese markets. In the end, this only makes for a coiled spring rebound in the AUD. Report Links: The Dollar Bull Case Will Soon Fade - March 5, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Australia: Regime Change For Bond Yields & The Currency? - January 20, 2021 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 The was scant data out of New Zealand this week: The trade balance came in at NZ$261 million, even with stronger imports in June. The ANZ activity outlook index fell in July, to 26.3 from 31.6. The NZD was up 0.5% this week. The strong rally in NZD after a hawkish RBNZ a fortnight ago continues to fade. This week, we highlighted a new theme, which is the rising incidence of natural disasters. Historically, this has been great for agricultural prices, benefiting NZD. But it has also been accompanied by a tremendous rise in currency volatility, which hurts the NZD vis-à-vis safe-haven currencies. We are currently long CHF/NZD and will be exploring this theme in future publications. Report Links: How High Can The Kiwi Rise? - April 30, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Currencies And The Value-Versus-Growth Debate - July 10, 2020 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 Data out of Canada this week has been mixed: Retail sales fell month on month in May by 2.1% but this was above expectations. Inflation remains robust. Headline CPI was 3.1%, while the core trim, median and common measures came in at 2.6%, 2.4% and 1.7% respectively. The CAD rose by 0.8% this week. The backdrop for the loonie remains positive as the Bank of Canada is leaning against monetary accommodation by tapering asset purchases, and signaling interest rate increases, while the Fed remains on hold. These pin real interest rate differentials in favor of the loonie. Report Links: Relative Growth, The Euro, And The Loonie - April 16, 2021 Will The Canadian Recovery Lead Or Lag The Global Cycle? - February 12, 2021 The Outlook For The Canadian Dollar - October 9, 2020 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 There was scant data out of Switzerland this week: Investor confidence from the Credit Suisse survey fell in July, from 51.3 to 42.8. Total sight deposits were unchanged at CHF 712 bn for the week of July 23. The Swiss franc was up 1.3% this week. Incoming Swiss inflation data next week will dictate whether the SNB steps up the pace of FX intervention. So far, there have been no big moves in the CHF exchange rate to implore central bank attention. A rebound in global bond yields will be a welcome relief since the franc tends to weaken in that environment. For the time being, we believe volatility can continue to rise. As such, the franc will benefit, justifying long CHF/NZD bets. Report Links: An Update On The Swiss Franc - April 9, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 The Dollar Conundrum And Protection - November 6, 2020 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 There was scant data out of Norway this week: Retail sales were flat month on month in June. The NOK was up 1% this week. Our limit buy on Scandinavian currencies was triggered a fortnight ago, nudging us in the money with this week’s currency moves. We are not fighting the Norges Bank, which has signaled they will increase interest rates this year, ahead of both the Federal Reserve and the ECB. As such, we are short EUR/NOK and USD/NOK. Report Links: The Norwegian Method - June 4, 2021 Portfolio And Model Review - February 5, 2021 Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 Recent data from Sweden have been improving: The PPI for July came in at 9.6%, up from 7.9%. The June trade balance showed a healthy surplus of SEK 10.3 billion. The economic tendency survey for July came in at 122.4 from 119.8. Manufacturing confidence continues to inflect higher, rising from 125.2 to 129.2 in July. The SEK was the strongest performing G10 currency this week, rising 1.5%. Swedish Q2 GDP was a welcome positive surprise, up by 10.5% year on year and 0.9% quarter on quarter. This is paring back expectations of more stimulus from the Riksbank. We have been highlighting that SEK remains one of our most potent plays on a global growth recovery. As such, we are short EUR/SEK and USD/SEK. Report Links: Revisiting Our High-Conviction Trades - September 11, 2020 More On Competitive Devaluations, The CAD And The SEK - May 1, 2020 Sweden Beyond The Pandemic: Poised To Re-leverage - March 19, 2020 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights Geopolitical risk is trickling back into financial markets. China’s fiscal-and-credit impulse collapsed again. The Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index is ticking back up after the sharp drop from 2020. All of our proprietary GeoRisk Indicators are elevated or rising. Geopolitical risk often rises during bull markets – the Geopolitical Risk Index can even spike without triggering a bear market or recession. Nevertheless a rise in geopolitical risk is positive for the US dollar, which happens to stand at a critical technical point. The macroeconomic backdrop for the dollar is becoming less bearish given China’s impending slowdown. President Biden’s trip to Europe and summit with Russian President Vladimir Putin will underscore a foreign policy of forming a democratic alliance to confront Russia and China, confirming the secular trend of rising geopolitical risk. Shift to a defensive tactical position. Feature Back in March 2017 we wrote a report, “Donald Trump Is Who We Thought He Was,” in which we reaffirmed our 2016 view that President Trump would succeed in steering the US in the direction of fiscal largesse and trade protectionism. Now it is time for us to do the same with President Biden. Our forecast for Biden rested on the same points: the US would pursue fiscal profligacy and mercantilist trade policy. The recognition of a consistent national policy despite extreme partisan divisions is a testament to the usefulness of macro analysis and the geopolitical method. Trump stole the Democrats’ thunder with his anti-austerity and anti-free trade message. Biden stole it back. It was the median voter in the Rust Belt who was calling the shots all along (after all, Biden would still have won the election without Arizona and Georgia). We did make some qualifications, of course. Biden would maintain a hawkish line on China and Russia but he would reject Trump’s aggressive foreign and trade policy when it came to US allies.1 Biden would restore President Obama’s policy on Iran and immigration but not Russia, where there would be no “diplomatic reset.” And Biden’s fiscal profligacy, unlike Trump’s, would come with tax hikes on corporations and the wealthy … even though they would fall far short of offsetting the new spending. This is what brings us to this week’s report: New developments are confirming this view of the Biden administration. Geopolitical Risk And Bull Markets Chart 1Global Geopolitical Risk And The Dollar Global Geopolitical Risk And The Dollar Global Geopolitical Risk And The Dollar In recent weeks Biden has adopted a hawkish policy on China, lowered tensions with Europe, and sought to restore President Obama’s policy of détente with Iran. The jury is still out on relations with Russia – Biden will meet with Putin on June 16 – but we do not expect a 2009-style “reset” that increases engagement. Still, it is too soon to declare a “Biden doctrine” of foreign policy because Biden has not yet faced a major foreign crisis. A major test is coming soon. Biden’s decision to double down on hawkish policy toward China will bring ramifications. His possible deal with Iran faces a range of enemies, including within Iran. His reduction in tensions with Russia is not settled yet. While the specific source and timing of his first major foreign policy crisis is impossible predict, structural tensions are rebuilding. An aggregate of our 13 market-based GeoRisk indicators suggests that global political risk is skyrocketing once again. A sharp spike in the indicator, which is happening now, usually correlates with a dollar rally (Chart 1). This indicator is mean-reverting since it measures the deviation of emerging market currencies, or developed market equity markets, from underlying macroeconomic fundamentals. The implication is positive for the dollar, although the correlation is not always positive. Looking at both the DXY’s level and its rate of change shows periods when the global risk indicator fell yet the dollar stayed strong – and vice versa. The big increase in the indicator over the past week stems mostly from Germany, South Korea, Brazil, and Australia, though all 13 of the indicators are now either elevated or rising, including the China/Taiwan indicators. Some of the increase is due to base effects. As global exports recover, currencies and equities that we monitor are staying weaker than one would expect. This causes the relevant BCA GeoRisk indicator to rise. Base effects from the weak economy in June 2020 will fall out in coming weeks. But the aggregate shows that all of the indicators are either high or rising and, on a country by country level, they are now in established uptrends even aside from base effects. Chart 2Global Policy Uncertainty Revives Global Policy Uncertainty Revives Global Policy Uncertainty Revives Meanwhile the global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index is recovering across the world after the drop in uncertainty following the COVID-19 crisis (Chart 2). Policy uncertainty is also linked to the dollar and this indicator shows that it is rising on a secular basis. The Geopolitical Risk Index, maintained by Matteo Iacoviello and a group of academics affiliated with the Policy Uncertainty Index, is also in a secular uptrend, although cyclically it has not recovered from the post-COVID drop-off. It is sensitive to traditional, war-linked geopolitical risk as reported in newspapers. By contrast our proprietary indicators are sensitive to market perceptions of any kind of risk, not just political, both domestic and international. A comparison of the Geopolitical Risk Index with the S&P 500 over the past century shows that a geopolitical crisis may occur at the beginning of a business cycle but it may not be linked with a recession or bear market. Risk can rise, even extravagantly, during economic expansions without causing major pullbacks. But a crisis event certainly can trigger a recession or bear market, particularly if it is tied to the global oil supply, as in the early 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s (Chart 3). Chart 3Secular Rise In Geopolitical Risk Soon To Reassert Itself Secular Rise In Geopolitical Risk Soon To Reassert Itself Secular Rise In Geopolitical Risk Soon To Reassert Itself While geopolitical risk is normally positive for the dollar, the macroeconomic backdrop is negative. The dollar’s attempt to recover earlier this year faltered. This underlying cyclical bearish dollar trend is due to global economic recovery – which will continue – and extravagant American monetary expansion and budget deficits. This is why we have preferred gold – it is a hedge against both geopolitical risk and inflation expectations. Tactically this year we have refrained from betting against the dollar except when building up some safe-haven positions like Japanese yen. Over the medium and long term we expect geopolitical risk to put a floor under the greenback. The bottom line is that the US dollar is at a critical technical crossroads where it could break out or break down. Macro factors suggest a breakdown but the recovery of global policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk suggests the opposite. We remain neutral. A final quantitative indicator of the recovery of geopolitical risk is the performance of global aerospace and defense stocks (Chart 4). Defense shares are rising in absolute and relative terms. Chart 4Another Sign Of Geopolitical Risk: Defense Stocks Outperform As Virus Ebbs And Military Spending Surges Another Sign Of Geopolitical Risk: Defense Stocks Outperform As Virus Ebbs And Military Spending Surges Another Sign Of Geopolitical Risk: Defense Stocks Outperform As Virus Ebbs And Military Spending Surges Can The WWII Peace Be Prolonged? Qualitative assessments of geopolitical risk are necessary to explain why risk is on a secular upswing – why drops in the quantitative indicators are temporary and the troughs keep getting higher. Great nations are returning to aggressive competition after a period of relative peace and prosperity. Over the past two decades Russia and China took advantage of America’s preoccupations with the Middle East, the financial crisis, and domestic partisanship in order to build up their global influence. The result is a world in which authority is contested. The current crisis is not merely about the end of the post-Cold War international order. It is much scarier than that. It is about the decay of the post-WWII international order and the return of the centuries-long struggle for global supremacy among Great Powers. The US and European political establishments fear the collapse of the WWII settlement in the face of eroding legitimacy at home and rising challenges from abroad. The 1945 peace settlement gave rise to both a Cold War and a diplomatic system, including the United Nations Security Council, for resolving differences among the great powers. It also gave rise to European integration and various institutions of American “liberal hegemony.” It is this system of managing great power struggle, and not the post-Cold War system of American domination, that lies in danger of unraveling. This is evident from the following points: American preeminence only lasted fifteen years, or at best until the 2008 Georgia war and global financial crisis. The US has been an incoherent wild card for at least 13 years now, almost as long as it was said to be the global empire. Russian antagonism with the West never really ended. In retrospect the 1990s were a hiatus rather than a conclusion of this conflict. China’s geopolitical rise has thawed the frozen conflicts in Asia from the 1940s-50s – i.e. the Chinese civil war, the Hong Kong and Taiwan Strait predicaments, the Korean conflict, Japanese pacifism, and regional battles for political influence and territory. Europe’s inward focus and difficulty projecting power have been a constant, as has its tendency to act as a constraint on America. Only now is Europe getting closer to full independence (which helped trigger Brexit). Geopolitical pressures will remain historically elevated for the foreseeable future because the underlying problem is whether great power struggle can be contained and major wars can be prevented. Specifically the question is whether the US can accommodate China’s rise – and whether China can continue to channel its domestic ambitions into productive uses (i.e. not attempts to create a Greater Chinese and then East Asian empire). The Great Recession killed off the “East Asia miracle” phase of China’s growth. Potential GDP is declining, which undermines social stability and threatens the Communist Party’s legitimacy. The renminbi is on a downtrend that began with the Xi Jinping era. The sharp rally during the COVID crisis is over, as both domestic and international pressures are rising again (Chart 5). Chart 5Biden Administration Review Of China Policy: More China Bashing Biden Administration Review Of China Policy: More China Bashing Biden Administration Review Of China Policy: More China Bashing While the data for China’s domestic labor protests is limited in extent, we can use it as a proxy for domestic instability in lieu of official statistics that were tellingly discontinued back in 2005. The slowdown in credit growth and the cyclical sectors of the economy suggest that domestic political risk is underrated in the lead up to the 2022 leadership rotation (Chart 6). Chart 6China's Domestic Political Risk Will Rise China's Domestic Political Risk Will Rise China's Domestic Political Risk Will Rise Chart 7Steer Clear Of Taiwan Strait Steer Clear Of Taiwan Strait Steer Clear Of Taiwan Strait The increasing focus on China’s access to key industrial and technological inputs, the tensions over the Taiwan Strait, and the formation of a Russo-Chinese bloc that is excluded from the West all suggest that the risk to global stability is grave and historic. It is reminiscent of the global power struggles of the seventeenth through early twentieth centuries. The outperformance of Taiwanese equities from 2019-20 reflects strong global demand for advanced semiconductors but the global response to this geopolitical bottleneck is to boost production at home and replace Taiwan. Therefore Taiwan’s comparative advantage will erode even as geopolitical risk rises (Chart 7). The drop in geopolitical tensions during COVID-19 is over, as highlighted above. With the US, EU, and other countries launching probes into whether the virus emerged from a laboratory leak in China – contrary to what their publics were told last year – it is likely that a period of national recriminations has begun. There is a substantial risk of nationalism, xenophobia, and jingoism emerging along with new sources of instability. An Alliance Of Democracies The Biden administration’s attempt to restore liberal hegemony across the world requires a period of alliance refurbishment with the Europeans. That is the purpose of his current trip to the UK, Belgium, and Switzerland. But diplomacy only goes so far. The structural factor that has changed is the willingness of the West to utilize government in the economic sphere, i.e. fiscal proactivity. Infrastructure spending and industrial policy, at the service of national security as well as demand-side stimulus, are the order of the day. This revolution in economic policy – a return to Big Government in the West – poses a threat to the authoritarian powers, which have benefited in recent decades by using central strategic planning to take advantage of the West’s democratic and laissez-faire governance. If the West restores a degree of central government – and central coordination via NATO and other institutions – then Beijing and Moscow will face greater pressure on their economies and fewer strategic options. About 16 American allies fall short of the 2% of GDP target for annual defense spending – ranging from Italy to Canada to Germany to Japan. However, recent trends show that defense spending did indeed increase during the Trump administration (Chart 8). Chart 8NATO Boosts Defense Spending Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was The European Union as a whole has added $50 billion to the annual total over the past five years. A discernible rise in defense spending is taking place even in Germany (Chart 9). The same point could be made for Japan, which is significantly boosting defense spending (as a share of output) after decades of saying it would do so without following through. A major reason for the American political establishment’s rejection of President Trump was the risk he posed to the trans-Atlantic alliance. A decline in NATO and US-EU ties would dramatically undermine European security and ultimately American security. Hence Biden is adopting the Trump administration’s hawkish approach to trade with China but winding down the trade war with Europe (Chart 10). Chart 9Europe Spending More On Guns Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Chart 10US Ends Trade War With Europe? Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was A multilateral deal aimed at setting a floor in global corporate taxes rates is intended to prevent the US and Europe from undercutting each other – and to ensure governments have sufficient funding to maintain social spending and reduce income inequality (Chart 11). Inequality is seen as having vitiated sociopolitical stability and trust in government in the democracies. Chart 11‘Global’ Corporate Tax Deal Shows Return Of Big Government, Attempt To Reduce Inequality In The West Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Risks To Biden’s Diplomacy It is possible that Biden’s attempt to restore US alliances will go nowhere over the course of his four-year term in office. The Europeans may well remain risk averse despite their initial signals of willingness to work with Biden to tackle China’s and Russia’s challenges to the western system. The Germans flatly rejected both Biden and Trump on the Nord Stream II natural gas pipeline linkage with Russia, which is virtually complete and which strengthens the foundation of Russo-German engagement (more on this below). The US’s lack of international reliability – given the potential of another partisan reversal in four years – makes it very hard for countries to make any sacrifices on behalf of US initiatives. The US’s profound domestic divisions have only slightly abated since the crises of 2020 and could easily flare up again. A major outbreak of domestic instability could distract Biden from the foreign policy game.2 However, American incapacity is a risk, not our base case, over the coming years. We expect the US economic stimulus to stabilize the country enough that the internal political crisis will be contained and the US will continue to play a global role. The “Civil War Lite” has mostly concluded, excepting one or two aftershocks, and the US is entering into a “Reconstruction Lite” era. The implication is negative for China and Russia, as they will now have to confront an America that, if not wholly unified, is at least recovering. Congress’s impending passage of the Innovation and Competition Act – notably through regular legislative order and bipartisan compromise – is case in point. The Senate has already passed this approximately $250 billion smorgasbord of industrial policy, supply chain resilience, and alliance refurbishment. It will allot around $50 billion to the domestic semiconductor industry almost immediately as well as $17 billion to DARPA, $81 billion for federal research and development through the National Science Foundation, which includes $29 billion for education in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, and other initiatives (Table 1). Table 1Peak Polarization: US Congress Passes Bipartisan ‘Innovation And Competition Act’ To Counter China Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was With the combination of foreign competition, the political establishment’s need to distract from domestic divisions, and the benefit of debt monetization courtesy of the Federal Reserve, the US is likely to achieve some notable successes in pushing back against China and Russia. On the diplomatic front, the US will meet with some success because the European and Asian allies do not wish to see the US embrace nationalism and isolationism. They have their own interests in deterring Russia and China. Lack Of Engagement With Russia Russian leadership has dealt with the country’s structural weaknesses by adopting aggressive foreign policy. At some point either the weaknesses or the foreign policy will create a crisis that will undermine the current regime – after all, Russia has greatly lagged the West in economic development and quality of life (Chart 12). But President Putin has been successful at improving the country’s wealth and status from its miserably low base in the 1990s and this has preserved sociopolitical stability so far. Chart 12Russia's Domestic Political Risk Russia's Domestic Political Risk Russia's Domestic Political Risk It is debatable whether US policy toward Russia ever really changed under President Trump, but there has certainly not been a change in strategy from Russia. Thus investors should expect US-Russia antagonism to continue after Biden’s summit with Putin even if there is an ostensible improvement. The fundamental purpose of Putin’s strategy has been to salvage the Russian empire after the Soviet collapse, ensure that all world powers recognize Russia’s veto power over major global policies and initiatives, and establish a strong strategic position for the coming decades as Russia’s demographic decline takes its toll. A key component of the strategy has been to increase economic self-sufficiency and reduce exposure to US sanctions. Since the invasion of Ukraine in 2014, Putin has rapidly increased Russia’s foreign exchange reserves so as to buffer against shocks (Chart 13). Chart 13Russia Fortified Against US Sanctions Russia Fortified Against US Sanctions Russia Fortified Against US Sanctions Putin has also reduced Russia’s reliance on the US dollar to about 22% (Chart 14), primarily by substituting the euro and gold. Russia will not be willing or able to purge US dollars from its system entirely but it has been able to limit America’s ability to hurt Russia by constricting access to dollars and the dollar-based global financial architecture. Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov highlighted this process ahead of the Biden-Putin summit by declaring that the National Wealth Fund will divest of its remaining $40 billion of its US dollar holdings. Chart 14Russia Diversifies From USD Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was In general this year, Russia is highlighting its various advantages: its resilience against US sanctions, its ability to re-invade Ukraine, its ability to escalate its military presence in Belarus and the Black Sea, and its ability to conduct or condone cyberattacks on vital American food and fuel supplies (Chart 15). Meanwhile the US is suffering from deep political divisions at home and strategic incoherence abroad and these are only starting to be mended by domestic economic stimulus and alliance refurbishment. Chart 15Cyber Security Stocks Recover Cyber Security Stocks Recover Cyber Security Stocks Recover Europe’s risk-aversion when it comes to strategic confrontation with Russia, and the lack of stability in US-Russia relations, means that investors should not chase Russian currency or financial assets amid the cyclical commodity rally. Investors should also expect risk premiums to remain high in developing European economies relative to their developed counterparts. This is true despite the fact that developed market Europe’s outperformance relative to emerging Europe recently peaked and rolled over. From a technical perspective this outperformance looks to subside but geopolitical tensions can easily escalate in the near term, particularly in advance of the Russian and German elections in September (Chart 16). Chart 16Developed Markets In Europe Will Outperform Emerging Europe Unless Russian Geopolitical Risk Abates Developed Markets In Europe Will Outperform Emerging Europe Unless Russian Geopolitical Risk Abates Developed Markets In Europe Will Outperform Emerging Europe Unless Russian Geopolitical Risk Abates Developed Europe trades in line with EUR-RUB and these pair trades all correspond closely to geopolitical tensions with Russia (Chart 17). A notable exception is the UK, whose stock market looks attractive relative to eastern Europe and is much more secure from any geopolitical crisis in this region (Chart 17, bottom panel). The pound is particularly attractive against the Czech koruna, as Russo-Czech tensions have heated up in advance of October’s legislative election there (Chart 18). Chart 17Long UK Versus Eastern Europe Long UK Versus Eastern Europe Long UK Versus Eastern Europe Chart 18Long GBP Versus CZK Long GBP Versus CZK Long GBP Versus CZK Meanwhile Russia and China have grown closer together out of strategic necessity. Germany’s Election And Stance Toward Russia Germany’s position on Russia is now critical. The decision to complete the Nord Stream II pipeline against American wishes either means that the Biden administration can be safely ignored – since it prizes multilateralism and alliances above all things and is therefore toothless when opposed – or it means that German will aim to compensate the Americans in some other area of strategic concern. Washington is clearly attempting to rally the Germans to its side with regard to putting pressure on China over its trade practices and human rights. This could be the avenue for the US and Germany to tighten their bond despite the new milestone in German-Russia relations. The US may call on Germany to stand up for eastern Europe against Russian aggression but on that front Berlin will continue to disappoint. It has no desire to be drawn into a new Cold War given that the last one resulted in the partition of Germany. The implication is negative for China on one hand and eastern Europe on the other. Germany’s federal election on September 26 will be important because it will determine who will succeed Chancellor Angela Merkel, both in Germany and on the European and global stage. The ruling Christian Democratic Union (CDU) is hoping to ride Merkel’s coattails to another term in charge of the government. But they are likely to rule alongside the Greens, who have surged in opinion polls in recent years. The state election in Saxony-Anhalt over the weekend saw the CDU win 37% of the popular vote, better than any recent result, while Germany’s second major party, the Social Democrats, continued their decline (Table 2). The far-right Alternative for Germany won 21% of the vote, a downshift from 2016, while the Greens won 6% of the vote, a slight improvement from 2016. All parties underperformed opinion polling except the CDU (Chart 19). Table 2Saxony-Anhalt Election Results Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Chart 19Germany: Conservatives Outperform In Final State Election Before Federal Vote, But Face Challenges Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Chart 20Germany: Greens Will Outperform in 2021 Vote Germany: Greens Will Outperform in 2021 Vote Germany: Greens Will Outperform in 2021 Vote The implication is still not excellent for the CDU. Saxony-Anhalt is a middling German state, a CDU stronghold, and a state with a popular CDU leader. So it is not representative of the national campaign ahead of September. The latest nationwide opinion polling puts the CDU at around 25% support. They are neck-and-neck with the Greens. The country’s left- and right-leaning ideological blocs are also evenly balanced in opinion polls (Chart 20). A potential concern for the CDU is that the Free Democratic Party is ticking up in national polls, which gives them the potential to steal conservative votes. Betting markets are manifestly underrating the chance that Annalena Baerbock and the Greens take over the chancellorship (Charts 21A and 21B). We still give a subjective 35% chance that the Greens will lead the next German government without the CDU, a 30% that the Greens will lead with the CDU, and a 25% chance that the CDU retains power but forms a coalition with the Greens. A coalition government would moderate the Greens’ ambitious agenda of raising taxes on carbon emissions, wealth, the financial sector, and Big Tech. The CDU has already shifted in a pro-environmental, fiscally proactive direction. Chart 21AGerman Greens Will Recover Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Chart 21BGerman Greens Still Underrated Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was No matter what the German election will support fiscal spending and European solidarity, which is positive for the euro and regional equities over the next 12 to 24 months. However, the Greens would pursue a more confrontational stance toward Russia, a petro-state whose special relations with the German establishment have impeded the transition to carbon neutrality. Latin America’s Troubles A final aspect of Biden’s agenda deserves some attention: immigration and the Mexican border. Obviously this one of the areas where Biden starkly differs from Trump, unlike on Europe and China, as mentioned above. Vice President Kamala Harris recently came back from a trip to Guatemala and Mexico that received negative media attention. Harris has been put in charge of managing the border crisis, the surge in immigrant arrivals over 2020-21, both to give her some foreign policy experience and to manage the public outcry. Despite telling immigrants explicitly “Do not come,” Harris has no power to deter the influx at a time when the US economy is fired up on historic economic stimulus and the Democratic Party has cut back on all manner of border and immigration enforcement. From a macro perspective the real story is the collapse of political and geopolitical risk in Mexico. From 2016-20 Mexico faced a protectionist onslaught from the Trump administration and then a left-wing supermajority in Congress. But these structural risks have dissipated with the USMCA trade deal and the inability of President Andrés Manuel López Obrador to follow through with anti-market reforms, as we highlighted in reports in October and April. The midterm election deprived the ruling MORENA party of its single-party majority in the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of the legislature (Chart 22). AMLO is now politically constrained – he will not be able to revive state control over the energy and power sectors. Chart 22Mexican Midterm Election Constrained Left-Wing Populism, Political Risk Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Chart 23Buy Mexico (And Canada) On US Stimulus Buy Mexico (And Canada) On US Stimulus Buy Mexico (And Canada) On US Stimulus American monetary and fiscal stimulus, and the supply-chain shift away from China, also provide tailwinds for Mexico. In short, the Mexican election adds the final piece to one of our key themes stemming from the Biden administration, US populism, and US-China tensions: favor Mexico and Canada (Chart 23). A further implication is that Mexico should outperform Brazil in the equity space. Brazil is closely linked to China’s credit cycle and metals prices, which are slated to turn down as a result of Chinese policy tightening. Mexico is linked to the US economy and oil prices (Chart 24). While our trade stopped out at -5% last week we still favor the underlying view. Brazilian political risk and unsustainable debt dynamics will continue to weigh on the currency and equities until political change is cemented in the 2022 election and the new government is then forced by financial market riots into undertaking structural reforms. Chart 24Brazil's Troubles Not Truly Over - Mexico Will Outperform Brazil's Troubles Not Truly Over - Mexico Will Outperform Brazil's Troubles Not Truly Over - Mexico Will Outperform Elsewhere in Latin America, the rise of a militant left-wing populist to the presidency in a contested election in Peru, and the ongoing social unrest in Colombia and Chile, are less significant than the abrupt slowdown in China’s credit growth (Charts 25A and 25B). According to our COVID-19 Social Stability Index, investors should favor Mexico. Turkey, the Philippines, South Africa, Colombia, and Brazil are the most likely to see substantial social instability according to this ranking system (Table 3). Chart 25AMexico To Outperform Latin America Mexico To Outperform Latin America Mexico To Outperform Latin America Chart 25BChina’s Slowdown Will Hit South America China's Slowdown Will Hit South America China's Slowdown Will Hit South America Table 3Post-COVID Emerging Market Social Unrest Only Just Beginning Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Joe Biden Is Who We Thought He Was Investment Takeaways Close long emerging markets relative to developed markets for a loss of 6.8% – this is a strategic trade that we will revisit but it faces challenges in the near term due to China’s slowdown (Chart 26). Go long Mexican equities relative to emerging markets on a strategic time frame. Our long Mexico / short Brazil trade hit the stop loss at 5% but the technical profile and investment thesis are still sound over the short and medium term. Chart 26China Slowdown, Geopolitical Risk Will Weigh On Emerging Markets China Slowdown, Geopolitical Risk Will Weigh On Emerging Markets China Slowdown, Geopolitical Risk Will Weigh On Emerging Markets Chart 27Relative Uncertainty And Safe Havens Relative Uncertainty And Safe Havens Relative Uncertainty And Safe Havens China’s sharp fiscal-and-credit slowdown suggests that investors should reduce risk exposure, take a defensive tactical positioning, and wait for China’s policy tightening to be priced before buying risky assets. Our geopolitical method suggests the dollar will rise, while macro fundamentals are becoming less dollar-bearish due to China. We are neutral for now and will reassess for our third quarter forecast later this month. If US policy uncertainty falls relative to global uncertainty then the EUR-USD will also fall and safe-haven assets like Swiss bonds will gain a bid (Chart 27). Gold is an excellent haven amid medium-term geopolitical and inflation risks but we recommend closing our long silver trade for a gain of 4.5%. Disfavor emerging Europe relative to developed Europe, where heavy discounts can persist due to geopolitical risk premiums. We will reassess after the Russian Duma election in September. Go long GBP-CZK. Close the Euro “laggards” trade. Go long an equal-weighted basket of euros and US dollars relative to the Chinese renminbi. Short the TWD-USD on a strategic basis. Prefer South Korea to Taiwan – while the semiconductor splurge favors Taiwan, investors should diversify away from the island that lies at the epicenter of global geopolitical risk. Close long defense relative to cyber stocks for a gain of 9.8%. This was a geopolitical “back to work” trade but the cyber rebound is now significant enough to warrant closing this trade.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Trump’s policy toward Russia is an excellent example of geopolitical constraints. Despite any personal preferences in favor of closer ties with Russia, Trump and his administration ultimately reaffirmed Article 5 of NATO, authorized the sale of lethal weapons to Ukraine, and deployed US troops to Poland and the Czech Republic. 2 As just one example, given the controversial and contested US election of 2020, it is possible that a major terrorist attack could occur. Neither wing of America’s ideological fringes has a monopoly on fanaticism and violence. Meanwhile foreign powers stand to benefit from US civil strife. A truly disruptive sequence of events in the US in the coming years could lead to greater political instability in the US and a period in which global powers would be able to do what they want without having to deal with Biden’s attempt to regroup with Europe and restore some semblance of a global police force. The US would fall behind in foreign affairs, leaving power vacuums in various regions that would see new sources of political and geopolitical risk crop up. Then the US would struggle to catch up, with another set of destabilizing consequences.