Mexico

Analysis on Mexico and Central Europe is available on pages 6 and 10, respectively. Highlights Deflationary pressures have been intensifying in Malaysia and the central bank will be forced to cut its policy rate. To play this theme, we recommend receiving 2-year swap rates. In Mexico, pieces are falling into place for stocks to outperform the EM equity benchmark on a sustainable basis. We are also keeping an overweight allocation on Mexican sovereign credit and local currency bonds. In Central Europe (CE), inflation will continue to rise as both labor shortages and ultra-accommodative monetary and fiscal policies promote strong domestic demand. We are downgrading our allocation of CE local currency bonds from overweight to neutral. Malaysia: Besieged By Deflationary Pressures Malaysian interest rates appear elevated given the state of its economy. Deflationary pressures have been intensifying and the central bank will be forced to cut its policy rate. The Malaysian economy continues to face strong deflationary pressures. To play this theme, we recommend receiving 2-year swap rates. We are also upgrading our recommended allocation to Malaysian local currency and U.S. dollar government bonds for dedicated EM fixed-income portfolios from neutral to overweight. The Malaysian economy continues to face strong deflationary pressures, requiring significant rate cuts by the central bank: Chart I-1 shows that the GDP deflator is flirting with deflation, and nominal GDP growth has slowed to the level of commercial banks’ average lending rates. Falling nominal growth amid elevated corporate and household debt levels is an extremely toxic mix (Chart I-2, top panel). Notably, debt-servicing costs for the private sector – both businesses and households – are high at 13.5% of GDP and are also rising (Chart I-2, bottom panel).  Chart I-1The Malaysian Economy Is Flirting With Deflation The Malaysian Economy Is Flirting With Deflation The Malaysian Economy Is Flirting With Deflation Chart I-2High Leverage & Debt Servicing Costs Among Businesses & Households High Leverage & Debt Servicing Costs Among Businesses & Households High Leverage & Debt Servicing Costs Among Businesses & Households Crucially, real borrowing costs are elevated. In real terms, the prime lending rate stands at 5% when deflated by the GDP deflator, and at 3% when deflated by headline CPI. Notably, private credit growth (outstanding business and household loans) has plunged to a 15-year low (Chart I-3), underscoring that real borrowing costs are excessive. Chart I-3Malaysia: Credit Growth Is In Freefall Malaysia: Credit Growth Is In Freefall Malaysia: Credit Growth Is In Freefall Chart I-4Malaysia's Corporate Sector Is Struggling Malaysia's Corporate Sector Is Struggling Malaysia's Corporate Sector Is Struggling Malaysia’s corporate sector is struggling. The manufacturing PMI is below the critical 50 threshold and is showing no signs of recovery. Listed companies’ profits are shrinking (Chart I-4, top panel). Poor corporate profitability is prompting cutbacks in capex spending (Chart I-4, middle and bottom panels) and weighing on employment and wages. The household sector has been retrenching; retail sales have been contracting and personal vehicle sales have been shrinking (Chart I-5). The property market – in particular the residential sub-sector – is still in recession. Property sales and starts are falling, and property prices are flirting with deflation (Chart I-6).   Critically, monetary policy easing and exchange rate depreciation are the only levers available to policymakers to reflate the economy. Fiscal policy is constrained as the budget deficit is already large at 3.4% of GDP, and public debt is elevated. Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad is in fact aiming to reduce the total national debt (including off-balance-sheet debt) back to the government’s ceiling of 54% of GDP (from 80% currently). Chart I-5Malaysian Households Are Retrenching Malaysian Households Are Retrenching Malaysian Households Are Retrenching Chart I-6Malaysia's Property Sector Is In A Downturn Malaysia's Property Sector Is In A Downturn Malaysia's Property Sector Is In A Downturn   Bottom Line: The Malaysian economy is besieged by deflationary pressures and requires lower borrowing costs. The central bank will deliver rate cuts in the coming months. Investment Recommendations A new trade idea: receive 2-year swap rates as a bet on rate cuts by the central bank. Consistently, for dedicated EM bond portfolios, we are upgrading local currency and U.S. dollar-denominated government bonds from neutral to overweight. Chart I-7Overweight Malaysian Local Currency And U.S. Dollar Government Bonds Overweight Malaysian Local Currency And U.S. Dollar Government Bonds Overweight Malaysian Local Currency And U.S. Dollar Government Bonds While we are downbeat on the ringgit versus the U.S. dollar, Malaysian domestic bonds will likely outperform the EM GBI index in common currency terms on a total return basis (Chart I-7, top panel). The same is true for excess returns on the country’s sovereign credit (Chart I-7, bottom panel).     The basis for the ringgit’s more moderate depreciation, especially in comparison with other EM currencies, is as follows: First, foreigners have reduced their holdings of local currency bonds. The share of foreign ownership has declined from 36% in 2015 to 22% now of total outstanding local domestic bonds in the past 4 years (Chart I-8). Hence, currency depreciation will not trigger large foreign capital outflows. Second, the trade balance is in surplus and improving. This will provide a cushion for the ringgit. Finally, the ringgit is cheap in real effective terms which also limits the potential downside (Chart I-9).   Dedicated EM equity portfolios should keep a neutral allocation on Malaysian stocks. We are taking profits on our long Malaysian small-cap stocks relative to the EM small-cap index position. This recommendation has generated a 6.6% gain since its initiation on December 14, 2018. Chart I-8Foreigners' Share Of Local Currency Bonds Has Dropped Foreigners' Share Of Local Currency Bonds Has Dropped Foreigners' Share Of Local Currency Bonds Has Dropped Chart I-9The Ringgit Is Cheap The Ringgit Is Cheap The Ringgit Is Cheap   Ayman Kawtharani Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com   Mexico: Raising Our Conviction On Equity Outperformance Mexican local currency bonds, as well as sovereign and corporate credit, have been one of our highest conviction overweights for some time. These positions have played out very well (Chart II-1). Presently, pieces are falling into place for Mexican stocks to outperform the EM equity benchmark on a sustainable basis. First, long-lasting outperformance by Mexican local currency bonds and corporate credit will lead to the stock market’s outperformance relative to the EM benchmark. Chart II-2 shows that when Mexican local currency bond and corporate dollar bond yields fall relative to their EM peers, the Bolsa tends to outperform. In brief, a relative decline in the cost of capital will eventually translate into relative equity outperformance. Chart II-1Mexico Vs. EM: Domestic Bonds And Credit Markets Mexico Vs. EM: Domestic Bonds And Credit Markets Mexico Vs. EM: Domestic Bonds And Credit Markets Chart II-2Mexico: Relative Stock Prices Are Correlated With Relative Cost Of Capital Mexico: Relative Stock Prices Are Correlated With Relative Cost Of Capital Mexico: Relative Stock Prices Are Correlated With Relative Cost Of Capital Second – as discussed in detail in our previous Special Report – market worries about Mexico’s fiscal position are overblown, especially relative to other developing nations such as Brazil and South Africa. Orthodox fiscal and monetary policies, as well as low public debt, warrant a lower risk premium in Mexico, both in absolute terms and relative to other EM countries. Moreover, market participants and credit agencies have overstated the precariousness of Pemex’s debt and financing requirements. Pemex U.S. dollar bond yields have been falling steadily compared to EM aggregate corporate bond yields since the announcements of policies aimed at supporting the company’s debt sustainability. We have discussed Pemex’s financial sustainability and its effect on public finances in past reports.1  Third, having cut rates twice since September, the Central Bank of Mexico (Banxico) has embarked on a rate cutting cycle. This is positive for stock prices, as it implies higher equity valuations and will eventually put a floor under the economy.  Given that both core and headline inflation have fallen within the target bands, this gives the monetary authorities more room to reduce interest rates. Banxico members have been vocal about their desire to cut rates further, which is being foreshadowed by the swap market (Chart II-3, top panel). Given that both core and headline inflation have fallen within the target bands, this gives the monetary authorities more room to reduce interest rates. The slowdown in the domestic economy and Andrés Manuel López Obrador’ (AMLO) administration’s tight fiscal policy will enable and encourage Banxico to further ease monetary policy (Chart II-3, bottom panel). Fourth, another positive market catalyst for Mexican equities is the ongoing outperformance of EM consumer staples versus the overall EM index. Consumer staples have a large 35% share of the overall Mexico MSCI stock index, while this sector in the EM MSCI benchmark accounts for only 7%. Therefore, durable outperformance by consumer staples often hints at a relative cyclical outperformance for the Mexican bourse (Chart II-4). Chart II-3Mexico: Continue Betting On Lower Rates Mexico: Continue Betting On Lower Rates Mexico: Continue Betting On Lower Rates Chart II-4Mexican Equities Are A Play On Consumer Staples Mexican Equities Are A Play On Consumer Staples Mexican Equities Are A Play On Consumer Staples Chart II-5Mexican Stocks Offer Reasonable Value Mexican Stocks Offer Reasonable Value Mexican Stocks Offer Reasonable Value Finally, Mexican equities are not expensive. Chart II-5 illustrates that according to our cyclically-adjusted P/E ratios, Mexican stocks offer good value in both absolute terms and relative to EM overall. We continue to believe AMLO’s administration is proving to be a pragmatic government with the aim of reducing rent-seeking activities and addressing structural issues such as poverty, corruption and crime. These policies will be positive for the economy over the long run and share prices will move higher in anticipation. Bottom Line: We are reiterating our overweight allocation on Mexican sovereign credit and domestic local currency bonds within their respective EM benchmarks. With further rate cuts on the horizon, yet upside risks to EM local currency bond yields, we continue to recommend a curve steepening trade in Mexico: receiving 2-year and paying 10-year swap rates.  We now have high conviction that Mexican share prices will stage a cyclical outperformance relative to their EM peers. The bottom panel of Chart II-4 on page 8 illustrates that Mexican stocks seem to have formed a major bottom and are about to begin outperforming the EM equity benchmark. Dedicated EM equity managers should have a large overweight allocation to Mexican stocks. Our recommendation of favoring small-caps over large-cap companies in Mexico has been very profitable since we argued for this trade last November. We are taking a 12.9% profit on this position and recommend keeping an overweight allocation to both Mexican large- and small-caps within an EM equity portfolio.   Juan Egaña Research Associate juane@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com     Central Europe: An Inflationary Enclave In Deflationary Europe Our macroeconomic theme for Central European (CE) economies – Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, elaborated in the linked report, has been as follows: Inflation will continue to rise as both labor shortages and ultra-accommodative monetary as well as fiscal policies in CE promote strong domestic demand. CE economies have stood out as an inflationary enclave in Europe. Notably, CE economies have stood out as an inflationary enclave in Europe. Going forward, inflation will continue to rise across this region, despite the ongoing contraction in European manufacturing. First, Hungary’s and Poland’s central banks are behind the curve – they remain reluctant to hike rates amid rampantly rising inflation within overheating economies (Chart III-1). In turn, real policy rates across CE are becoming more negative and will promote robust money and credit growth (Chart III-2).      Chart III-1CE Central Banks Are Behind The Curve CE Central Banks Are Behind The Curve CE Central Banks Are Behind The Curve Chart III-2Low Real Rates Promote Rampant Credit Growth Low Real Rates Promote Rampant Credit Growth Low Real Rates Promote Rampant Credit Growth Policymakers are justifying stimulative policies by stressing ongoing woes in the Europe-wide manufacturing downturn. Yet, they are paying little attention to genuine inflationary pressures in their own economies. Most notably in Hungary, the National Bank of Hungary (NBH) has been aggressively suppressing its policy rate and engaging in a corporate QE program, despite rising inflation and an overheating economy. Similarly, the National Bank of Poland (NBP) seems inclined to cut rates sooner rather than later. On the other end of the spectrum though, the Czech National Bank (CNB) is the only CE central bank to have embarked on a rate hiking cycle over the past 18 months. Going forward, the CNB looks most likely to normalize rates by continuing its hiking cycle. This development will favor rate differentials between it and the rest of CE. As such, we remain long the CZK versus both the HUF and PLN (Chart III-3). Chart III-3Favor CZK Versus PLN & HUF Favor CZK Versus PLN & HUF Favor CZK Versus PLN & HUF Chart III-4Germany's Manufacturing Cycles And CE Inflation Germany's Manufacturing Cycles And CE Inflation Germany's Manufacturing Cycles And CE Inflation Second, European manufacturing cycles have historically defined CE inflation trends, with time lags of around 12 to 18 months. However, this time around, the euro area manufacturing recession will not translate into slower CE inflation and growth dynamics (Chart III-4). Above all, booming credit induced by real negative borrowing costs has incentivized robust domestic demand in general and construction activity in particular in CE. In addition, employment growth remains strong and double-digit wage growth has supported strong consumer spending (Chart III-5). As a result, manufacturing production volumes have remained relatively resilient in Hungary and Poland, even as manufacturing output volumes in both Germany and the broader euro area have been contracting (Chart III-6). Chart III-5Strong Domestic Demand In CE… bca.ems_wr_2019_10_31_s3_c5 bca.ems_wr_2019_10_31_s3_c5 Chart III-6...Entails Divergences In Manufacturing With Euro Area ...Entails Divergences In Manufacturing With Euro Area ...Entails Divergences In Manufacturing With Euro Area Third, inflationary pressures in CE are both acute and genuine. Wage growth has been rising faster than productivity growth across the region, leading to surging unit labor costs (Chart III-7). Mounting wage pressures reflect widespread labor shortages. Further, output gaps in these economies have turned positive, which has historically been a precursor of inflationary pressures. Finally, fiscal policy in CE will remain very expansionary, supporting strong business and consumer demand. Bottom Line: Super-accommodative monetary and fiscal policies have led to a classic case of overheating within CE, particularly in Hungary and Poland, and less so in the Czech Republic. Chart III-7Genuine Inflationary Pressures In Central Europe Genuine Inflationary Pressures In Central Europe Genuine Inflationary Pressures In Central Europe Chart III-8A Widening Current Account Deficit Is A Symptom Of Overheating A Widening Current Account Deficit Is A Symptom Of Overheating A Widening Current Account Deficit Is A Symptom Of Overheating Investment Implications Deteriorating current accounts (Chart III-8), rising inflation and behind-the-curve central banks warrant further currency depreciation in both Hungary and Poland. This is why we continue to recommend a short position on both the HUF and PLN versus the CZK. We are closing our Hungarian/euro area relative three-year swap rate trade with a loss of 87 basis points. Our expectation that the market would price in rate hikes in Hungary despite the central bank’s dovishness has not materialized. Investors should remain overweight CE equities within an EM portfolio due to strong domestic demand in these economies and no direct economic exposure to China. As we expect EM equities to underperform DM stocks, we continue to recommend underweighting CE versus the core European markets. We are downgrading our allocation to CE local currency bonds from overweight to neutral within an EM domestic bond portfolio. The primary reason is a risk of a selloff in core European rates.   Anddrija Vesic Research Analyst andrija@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1. Please see Emerging Markets Strategy, "Mexico: The Best Value In EM Fixed Income," dated April 23, 2019 and "Mexico: Crying Out For Policy Easing," dated September 5, 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

The Mexican economy is heading into a full-blown recession. Most segments of the economy are in contraction, and leading indicators point to further downside. Both manufacturing and non-manufacturing PMIs are well below 50 (Chart II-1). Monetary policy remains too restrictive: Nominal and real interest rates are both very high and plunging narrow money (M1) growth is signaling  further downside in economic activity (Chart II-2). Chart II-1The Economy Is Deteriorating The Economy Is Deteriorating The Economy Is Deteriorating Chart II-2Narrow Money Points To Negative Growth Narrow Money Points To Negative Growth Narrow Money Points To Negative Growth   An inverted yield curve signifies that the central bank is behind the curve and foreshadows growth contraction (Chart II-3). Fiscal policy has tightened as the government has remained committed to achieving a primary fiscal surplus of 1% of GDP in 2019 (Chart II-4, top panel). Consequently, nominal government expenditures have been curbed (Chart II-4, bottom panel). The government’s fiscal stimulus has not been large and has been implemented too late. Chart II-3A Message From The Inverted Yield Curve A Message From The Inverted Yield Curve A Message From The Inverted Yield Curve Chart II-4Fiscal Policy Has Tightened A Lot Fiscal Policy Has Tightened A Lot Fiscal Policy Has Tightened A Lot   Finally, business confidence is extremely low due to uncertainty over President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s (AMLO) policies towards the private sector. The president is attempting to revive business confidence, but it will take time. Chart II-5Mexico Versus EM: Domestic Bonds And Sovereign Credit Mexico Versus EM: Domestic Bonds And Sovereign Credit Mexico Versus EM: Domestic Bonds And Sovereign Credit Our major theme for Mexico has been that both monetary and fiscal policies are very tight. Consequently, we have been recommending overweight positions in Mexican domestic bonds and sovereign credit relative to their respective EM benchmarks. (Chart II-5). Recessions are bad for share prices, but in tandem with prudent macro policies, they can be positive for fixed-income markets. Meanwhile, we have been favoring the Mexican peso relative to other EM currencies due to the fact that AMLO is not as negative for the country as was initially perceived by markets. With inflation falling and the Federal Reserve cutting rates, Banxico will ease further. Yet, it will likely cut rates slower than warranted by the economy. The longer the central bank takes to ease, the lower domestic bond yields will drop. Concerning sovereign credit, investors should remain overweight Mexico within an EM credit portfolio. Mexico’s fiscal position is healthier, and macroeconomic policies will be more prudent relative to what the market is currently pricing. We continue to believe concerns about Pemex’s financing and its impact on government debt are overblown, as we discussed in detail in our previous Special Report. In July, the government released an action plan for Pemex financing. We view this plan as marginally positive. To supplement this plan, the government can use the $14.5 billion federal budget stabilization fund to fill in financing shortfalls in the coming years. Importantly, the starting point of Mexican public debt is quite low, which will allow the government to finance Pemex in the years to come by borrowing more from markets. Lastly, our overweight recommendation in Mexican stocks has not played out. However, we are maintaining it for the following reasons: Chart II-6 illustrates that when Mexican domestic bond yields decline relative to EM ones (shown inverted on Chart II-6), Mexican share prices usually outperform their EM counterparts in common currency terms. Consistent with our view that Mexican local currency bonds will outperform their EM peers, we expect Mexican stocks to outpace the EM equity benchmark. The Mexican bourse’s relative performance against EM often swings with the relative performance of EM consumer staples versus the EM equity benchmark. This is due to the large share of consumer staples stocks in Mexico (34.5%) compared to that in the EM benchmark (7%). Consumer staples stocks are beginning to outpace the EM equity index, raising the odds of Mexican equity outperformance versus its EM peers (Chart II-7). Chart II-7Consumer Staples Have A Large Weight In Mexican Bourse Consumer Staples Have A Large Weight In Mexican Bourse Consumer Staples Have A Large Weight In Mexican Bourse Chart II-6Local Bond Yields And Relative Stocks: Mexico Versus EM Local Bond Yields And Relative Stocks: Mexico Versus EM Local Bond Yields And Relative Stocks: Mexico Versus EM   We do not expect a major rally in this nation’s stock market given the negative growth outlook. Our bet is that Mexican share prices - having already deflated considerably - will drop less in dollar terms than the overall EM equity index. Bottom Line: We continue to recommend an overweight stance on Mexican sovereign credit, domestic bonds and equities relative to their respective EM benchmarks. The main risk to the Mexican peso stems from persisting selloff in EM currencies. Traders’ net long positions in the MXN are elevated posing non-trivial risk (Chart II-8). We have been long MXN versus ZAR but are taking profit today. This trade has generated a 9.7% gain since March 29, 2018. A plunging oil-gold ratio warrants a caution on this cross rate in the near term (Chart II-9). Chart II-8Investors Are Long MXN Investors Are Long MXN Investors Are Long MXN Chart II-9Take Profits On Long MXN / Short ZAR Trade Take Profits On Long MXN / Short ZAR Trade Take Profits On Long MXN / Short ZAR Trade   Juan Egaña, Research Associate juane@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes

Highlights The lingering global manufacturing recession and the substantial drop in U.S. bond yields have been behind the decoupling between both EM stocks and the S&P 500, and cyclical and defensive equities. Neither the most recent economic data, nor the relative performance of global cyclicals, China-related plays and high-beta markets herald a broad-based and lasting risk-on phase in global markets. On the contrary, economic and market signposts continue to indicate either further bifurcation in global markets or a risk-off period. We review some of our long-standing themes and associated recommendations. Feature Global financial markets have become bifurcated. On one hand, numerous segments of global financial markets leveraged to global growth, including EM stocks, have already sold off (Chart I-1). On the other hand, share prices of growth companies, defensive stocks and global credit markets have remained resilient. Chart I-2 shows that a similar divergence has taken place within EM asset classes: EM share prices have plummeted while EM corporate credit excess returns have not dropped much. Chart I-1Bifurcated Equity Markets Bifurcated Equity Markets Bifurcated Equity Markets Chart I-2Bifurcated Markets In EM Bifurcated Markets In EM Bifurcated Markets In EM   How to explain this market bifurcation? Financial markets sensitive to global trade and manufacturing cycles have been mirroring worsening conditions in global trade and manufacturing. Some of the affected segments include: Global cyclical equity sectors. Emerging Asia manufacturing-related currencies (KRW, TWD and SGD) versus the U.S. dollar (Chart I-3). EM and DM commodity currencies (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Total Return (Including Carry): KRW, TWD And SGD Vs. USD bca.ems_wr_2019_09_05_s1_c3 bca.ems_wr_2019_09_05_s1_c3 Chart I-4EM And DM Commodity Currencies EM And DM Commodity Currencies EM And DM Commodity Currencies   Industrial and energy commodities prices. U.S. high-beta stocks as well as U.S. small caps (Chart I-5). Chart I-5U.S. High-Beta Stocks U.S. High-Beta Stocks U.S. High-Beta Stocks DM bond yields.  Crucially, the current global trade and manufacturing downturns have taken place despite robust U.S. consumer spending. In fact, our theme for the past several years has been that a global business cycle downturn would occur despite ongoing strength in American household spending. The rationale has been that China and the rest of EM combined are large enough on their own to bring down global trade and manufacturing, irrespective of strength in U.S. consumer spending. At the current juncture, one wonders whether such a market bifurcation is justified. It is not irrational. The basis for decoupling between cyclical and defensive equities has been U.S. bond yields. The substantial downshift in U.S. interest rate expectations has led to a re-rating of non-cyclicals and growth company stocks. Corporate bonds have also done well, given the background of a falling risk-free rate. Will the current market bifurcation continue? Or will these segments in global financial markets recouple and in which direction? What To Watch China rather than the U.S. has been the epicenter of this slowdown, as we have argued repeatedly in the past. Hence, a major rally in global cyclical equities and EM risk assets all hinge on a recovery in the Chinese business cycle. The basis for decoupling between cyclical and defensive equities has been U.S. bond yields. The substantial downshift in U.S. interest rate expectations has led to a re-rating of non-cyclicals and growth company stocks. Even though Caixin’s PMI for China was slightly up in August, many other economic indicators remain downbeat: The latest hard economic data out of Asia suggest that global trade/manufacturing continues to contract. Korea’s total exports in August contracted by 12.5% from a year ago, and its shipments to China plunged by 20% (Chart I-6). The import sub-component of China’s manufacturing PMI is not showing signs of amelioration (Chart I-7). The mainland’s import recovery is very critical to a revival in global trade and manufacturing. Chart I-6Korean Exports: No Recovery Korean Exports: No Recovery Korean Exports: No Recovery Chart I-7Chinese Imports To Remain Weak Chinese Imports To Remain Weak Chinese Imports To Remain Weak Chart I-8German Manufacturing Confidence German Manufacturing Confidence German Manufacturing Confidence German manufacturing IFO business expectations and current conditions both suggest that it is still early to bet on a global trade recovery (Chart I-8). Newly released August data points reveal that U.S., Taiwanese, and Swedish manufacturing new export orders continue to tumble. To gauge whether bifurcated markets will recouple and whether it will occur to the downside or the upside, investors should watch the relative performance of China-exposed markets, global cyclicals and high-beta plays – the ones that have already sold off substantially. The notion is as follows: These markets’ relative performance will likely bottom before their absolute performance recovers. If so, their relative performance will likely foretell the outlook for their absolute performance. Concerning share prices of growth companies, defensive equity sectors and credit markets, these segments are at risk because of expensive valuations and crowded investor positioning. In other words, they could sell off even if a global recession is avoided. Concerning share prices of growth companies, defensive equity sectors and credit markets, these segments are at risk because of expensive valuations and crowded investor positioning. To assess the outlook for global cyclicals and China-related plays, we are monitoring the following financial market indicators: The Risk-On/Safe-Haven currency ratio is the average of high-beta commodity currencies such as the CAD, AUD, NZD, BRL, CLP and ZAR total return (including carry) indices relative to the average of JPY and CHF total returns (including carry). This ratio is dollar-agnostic. This ratio is making a new cyclical low (Chart I-9). Hence, it presently warrants a negative view on global growth, China’s industrial sector and commodities. Global cyclical equity sectors seem to be on the edge of breaking down versus defensives (Chart I-10). This ratio does not signal ameliorating global growth conditions. Chart I-9The Risk-On/Safe-Haven Currency Ratio bca.ems_wr_2019_09_05_s1_c9 bca.ems_wr_2019_09_05_s1_c9 Chart I-10Global Cyclicals Versus Defensives Global Cyclicals Versus Defensives Global Cyclicals Versus Defensives Chart I-11U.S. High-Beta Stocks Versus S&P 500 U.S. High-Beta Stocks Versus S&P 500 U.S. High-Beta Stocks Versus S&P 500 Finally, U.S. high-beta stocks continue to underperform the S&P 500 (Chart I-11). This is consistent with overall U.S. growth deceleration. Bottom Line: Neither the most recent economic data, nor the relative performance of global cyclicals, China-related plays and high-beta markets herald a broad-based and lasting risk-on phase in global markets. On the contrary, economic and market signposts continue to foreshadow either further bifurcation in global markets or a risk-off period. Continue trading EM stocks and currencies on the short side, and underweighting EM risk assets versus DM. Our Investment Themes And Positions Some of our open positions often run for years because they reflect our long-standing themes. Our core theme has for some time been that a global trade/manufacturing recession will be generated by a growth relapse in China. To capitalize on this theme, we have been recommending a short EM stocks / long 30-year U.S. Treasurys strategy since April 2017. This recommendation has produced a 25% gain since its initiation (Chart I-12). Continue betting on lower local interest rates in emerging economies where the central bank can cut rates despite currency depreciation. To implement this theme, we have been recommending receiving swap rates in Korea and Chile for the past several years. Our reluctance to recommend an outright buy on local bonds stems from our bearish view on both currencies – the Korean won and Chilean peso. In fact, we have been shorting both the KRW and the CLP against the U.S. dollar. Chart I-13 shows that swap rates in Korea and Chile have dropped substantially since our recommendations to receive rates in these countries. More rate cuts are forthcoming in these economies, and we are maintaining these positions. Chart I-12EM Stocks Have Massively Underperformed U.S. Bonds EM Stocks Have Massively Underperformed U.S. Bonds EM Stocks Have Massively Underperformed U.S. Bonds Chart I-13Continue Receiving Rates In Korea And Chile Continue Receiving Rates In Korea And Chile Continue Receiving Rates In Korea And Chile   We have been bearish on EM banks in general and Chinese banks in particular. We have expressed these themes in a number of ways: Short EM and Chinese / long U.S. bank stocks. Short EM banks / long EM consumer staples (Chart I-14). Within Chinese banks, we have been short Chinese medium and small banks / long large ones. All these strategies remain valid. In credit markets, we have been favoring U.S. corporate credit versus EM sovereign and corporate credit. Ability to service debt is better among U.S. debtors than EM/Chinese borrowers. We have been playing this theme in the following ways: Underweight EM sovereign and corporate credit / overweight U.S. investment-grade corporates (Chart I-15). Chart I-14Short EM Banks / Long EM Consumer Staples Short EM Banks / Long EM Consumer Staples Short EM Banks / Long EM Consumer Staples Chart I-15Underweight EM Credit / Overweight U.S. Investment-Grade Corporates Underweight EM Credit / Overweight U.S. Investment-Grade Corporates Underweight EM Credit / Overweight U.S. Investment-Grade Corporates   Underweight Asian high-yield corporate credit / overweight emerging Asian investment-grade corporates. As a bet on a deteriorating political and business climate in Hong Kong, in our Special Report on Hong Kong SAR from June 27, we reiterated the following positions: Short Hong Kong property stocks / long Singapore equities. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Mexico: Crying Out For Policy Easing The Mexican economy is heading into a full-blown recession. Most segments of the economy are in contraction, and leading indicators point to further downside. Both manufacturing and non-manufacturing PMIs are well below 50 (Chart II-1). Monetary policy remains too restrictive: Nominal and real interest rates are both very high and plunging narrow money (M1) growth is signaling  further downside in economic activity (Chart II-2). Chart II-1The Economy Is Deteriorating The Economy Is Deteriorating The Economy Is Deteriorating Chart II-2Narrow Money Points To Negative Growth Narrow Money Points To Negative Growth Narrow Money Points To Negative Growth   An inverted yield curve signifies that the central bank is behind the curve and foreshadows growth contraction (Chart II-3). Fiscal policy has tightened as the government has remained committed to achieving a primary fiscal surplus of 1% of GDP in 2019 (Chart II-4, top panel). Consequently, nominal government expenditures have been curbed (Chart II-4, bottom panel). The government’s fiscal stimulus has not been large and has been implemented too late. Chart II-3A Message From The Inverted Yield Curve A Message From The Inverted Yield Curve A Message From The Inverted Yield Curve Chart II-4Fiscal Policy Has Tightened A Lot Fiscal Policy Has Tightened A Lot Fiscal Policy Has Tightened A Lot   Finally, business confidence is extremely low due to uncertainty over President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s (AMLO) policies towards the private sector. The president is attempting to revive business confidence, but it will take time. Chart II-5Mexico Versus EM: Domestic Bonds And Sovereign Credit Mexico Versus EM: Domestic Bonds And Sovereign Credit Mexico Versus EM: Domestic Bonds And Sovereign Credit Our major theme for Mexico has been that both monetary and fiscal policies are very tight. Consequently, we have been recommending overweight positions in Mexican domestic bonds and sovereign credit relative to their respective EM benchmarks. (Chart II-5). Recessions are bad for share prices, but in tandem with prudent macro policies, they can be positive for fixed-income markets. Meanwhile, we have been favoring the Mexican peso relative to other EM currencies due to the fact that AMLO is not as negative for the country as was initially perceived by markets. With inflation falling and the Federal Reserve cutting rates, Banxico will ease further. Yet, it will likely cut rates slower than warranted by the economy. The longer the central bank takes to ease, the lower domestic bond yields will drop. Concerning sovereign credit, investors should remain overweight Mexico within an EM credit portfolio. Mexico’s fiscal position is healthier, and macroeconomic policies will be more prudent relative to what the market is currently pricing. We continue to believe concerns about Pemex’s financing and its impact on government debt are overblown, as we discussed in detail in our previous Special Report. In July, the government released an action plan for Pemex financing. We view this plan as marginally positive. To supplement this plan, the government can use the $14.5 billion federal budget stabilization fund to fill in financing shortfalls in the coming years. Importantly, the starting point of Mexican public debt is quite low, which will allow the government to finance Pemex in the years to come by borrowing more from markets. Recessions are bad for share prices, but in tandem with prudent macro policies, they can be positive for fixed-income markets. Lastly, our overweight recommendation in Mexican stocks has not played out. However, we are maintaining it for the following reasons: Chart II-6 illustrates that when Mexican domestic bond yields decline relative to EM ones (shown inverted on Chart II-6), Mexican share prices usually outperform their EM counterparts in common currency terms. Consistent with our view that Mexican local currency bonds will outperform their EM peers, we expect Mexican stocks to outpace the EM equity benchmark. The Mexican bourse’s relative performance against EM often swings with the relative performance of EM consumer staples versus the EM equity benchmark. This is due to the large share of consumer staples stocks in Mexico (34.5%) compared to that in the EM benchmark (7%). Consumer staples stocks are beginning to outpace the EM equity index, raising the odds of Mexican equity outperformance versus its EM peers (Chart II-7). Chart II-6Local Bond Yields And Relative Stocks: Mexico Versus EM Local Bond Yields And Relative Stocks: Mexico Versus EM Local Bond Yields And Relative Stocks: Mexico Versus EM Chart II-7Consumer Staples Have A Large Weight In Mexican Bourse Consumer Staples Have A Large Weight In Mexican Bourse Consumer Staples Have A Large Weight In Mexican Bourse   We do not expect a major rally in this nation’s stock market given the negative growth outlook. Our bet is that Mexican share prices - having already deflated considerably - will drop less in dollar terms than the overall EM equity index. Bottom Line: We continue to recommend an overweight stance on Mexican sovereign credit, domestic bonds and equities relative to their respective EM benchmarks. The main risk to the Mexican peso stems from persisting selloff in EM currencies. Traders’ net long positions in the MXN are elevated posing non-trivial risk (Chart II-8). We have been long MXN versus ZAR but are taking profit today. This trade has generated a 9.7% gain since March 29, 2018. A plunging oil-gold ratio warrants a caution on this cross rate in the near term (Chart II-9). Chart II-8Investors Are Long MXN Investors Are Long MXN Investors Are Long MXN Chart II-9Take Profits On Long MXN / Short ZAR Trade Take Profits On Long MXN / Short ZAR Trade Take Profits On Long MXN / Short ZAR Trade   Juan Egaña, Research Associate juane@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights Bad news is still looming in the trade war. Public opinion polling in the U.S. gives President Trump more leeway to push the envelope on tariffs and sanctions against China than the consensus recognizes. Trump’s tendency to push the envelope is forcing China into a corner in which structural concessions become too risky. Unrest in Hong Kong reveals the city-state’s political woes as well as the tail-risk of a geopolitical incident in Taiwan. Tariffs on Mexico are still possible. Close long MXN/BRL. Maintain tactical safe-haven plays. Feature Judging by the S&P 500, the Federal Reserve has cut interest rates and the G20 summit between Presidents Donald Trump and Xi Jinping has been a success (Chart 1). Chart 1Trade War? Who Cares! Trade War? Who Cares! Trade War? Who Cares! The problem is that there is not yet a compelling, positive, political catalyst on the trade front. And the Fed has an incentive to wait until after the June 28-29 G20 to make its decision on any cut. At least in the case of the December 1 G20 summit in Buenos Aires there was significant diplomatic preparation ahead of time. That is not yet the case for the summit in Osaka, Japan. And even Buenos Aires ended up being a flop given the subsequent tariff escalation. We are maintaining our tactical safe-haven recommendations – long gold, Swiss bonds, and Japanese yen – until we see a clearer pathway for the risk-on phase to resume amid a summer loaded with fair-probability geopolitical risks: Trump’s aggressive foreign policy, the Democratic primary, China’s domestic policy, the U.S. immigration crisis, and Brexit. Beyond this near-term caution, we agree with BCA’s House View in remaining overweight equities on a cyclical basis (12 months). China’s economic stimulus is likely to pick up further this summer and it still has the capacity to deliver positive surprises. Preparing For The G20 Over the course of this year we have argued for a 50% chance and then 40% chance that the U.S. and China would conclude a trade deal by the G20 summit. However, Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross and other administration officials, including Chief of Staff Mick Mulvaney, have recently indicated that the best case at the G20 is for the leaders to have dinner and agree to a new timetable that aims to close the negotiations in the coming months. The Trump-Xi summit itself remains unconfirmed as we go to press. This suggests that we were too optimistic about even a barebones trade deal at the G20. We are now extending our time frame to the November 2020 election -- the only deadline that really matters. Diagram 1 presents a cogent and conservative decision tree that results in a 41% chance of a major, Cold War-style escalation in tensions; a 27% chance of a minor escalation that is contained but without a final trade agreement; and a 28% chance of a tenuous or short-term deal. It gives only a 4% chance of a “grand compromise” that initiates a new phase of re-engagement between the two economies. These outcomes clearly represent a large downside risk given where equities are positioned today. Diagram 1Trade War Decision Tree (Updated June 13, 2019) Another Phony G20? And A Word On Hong Kong Another Phony G20? And A Word On Hong Kong Why such gloom when the two sides may be on the brink of a new tariff ceasefire? First, delaying the talks beyond the G20 is disadvantageous for Trump and will make him angry sooner or later. The Trump administration, unlike its predecessors, has made a point of opposing China’s traditional playbook of drawing out negotiations. China benefits in talks over the long run because it gains economic and strategic leverage. This has been the case in every major round of dialogue since the 1980s and it is specifically the case today, as China gradually stimulates its way out of the slowdown that afflicted it at the time of the last G20 (Chart 2). Chart 2China's Bargaining Leverage To Improve On Stimulus China's Bargaining Leverage To Improve On Stimulus China's Bargaining Leverage To Improve On Stimulus Trump would not have called a ceasefire on Dec. 1, 2018 if the stock market had held up amid Fed rate hikes and the Sept. 24 implementation of the 10% tariff on $200 billion. This year the U.S. equity market has bounced back and the Fed has paused, but China’s economy has not yet fully recovered. This gives Trump an advantage that may not last if the talks extend through the rest of the year. And this reasoning explains why Trump raised the tariff rate and blacklisted China’s tech companies in May – to try to clinch a deal by the end of June. He is also threatening to impose tariffs on the remaining $300 billion worth of imports if Xi snubs him in Osaka. If the G20 fails to produce progress, we would bet that Trump will proceed with a sweeping tariff on the remaining $300 billion worth of Chinese imports, whether immediately after the summit or at some later point when he decides that the Chinese are indeed playing for time. How can we be confident of this? After all, Trump’s approval rating has fallen since he escalated the trade war in May and it remains well beneath the average post-World War II presidents at this stage in their first terms, including President Obama’s rating in the summer of 2011 (Chart 3). Recent opinion polls suggest that voters are getting wise to the negative impact of tariffs on their pocketbooks. The financial and political constraints on Trump are not very pressing. Chart 3 We are confident because the financial and political constraints on Trump are not very pressing, at least not at the moment. First, the stock market has risen despite the tariff hikes, so Trump is likely emboldened. Second, Trump is less constrained in the use of tariffs than in other areas. He is bogged down with a Democratic Congress, investigations, and scandals at home. He cannot pursue policy through legislation – he shifted to the threat of tariffs on Mexico because he could not build his border wall. By turbo-charging his trade policy and foreign policy – against China, Iran, Mexico, Russia, most recently Germany … basically everyone except North Korea – he creates the option of turning 2020 into a “foreign policy election” rather than an election about the economy or social policy. A strong economy has not enabled him to break through his ceiling in public opinion thus far and he will lose a social policy election easily (see health care). The risk of his aggressive foreign policy is that it triggers an international crisis. But that would likely benefit him in the polls, given the natural inclination to defend America against foreign enemies. See George W. Bush, 2004 (Chart 4). Third, popular opposition to Trump’s trade war is not clear-cut – voters are ambivalent. In the past we have shown that President Trump’s 2020 run still depends on his ability to increase voter turnout among whites, specifically white males, low-income whites, and whites without college degrees. Recent polls suggest that voters have turned against tariffs and the trade war – namely the Quinnipiac and Monmouth University polls released in late May after the latest tariff hike. But it is essential to dig beneath the surface. These polls reveal that the key voting groups look more favorably than the rest of the country upon Trump’s policies on both trade and China (Chart 5). Chart 4 Chart 5 These voters’ assessment of Trump’s performance overall, across a range of policies, is not disapproving, despite all of the unorthodox and disruptive decisions that Trump has made in his presidency thus far (Chart 6). Chart 6 American voters are neither as enthusiastic about free trade nor as appalled by protectionism as the headline polling suggests. For instance, take the Monmouth University poll, which asked very specific questions about trade, tariffs, and retaliation. If we combine the group of voters who are clearly protectionist with those who are “not sure” or think the answer “depends,” the results do not suggest that Trump is heavily constrained (Table 1). Table 1Americans Are Not As Pro-Free Trade As It Seems Another Phony G20? And A Word On Hong Kong Another Phony G20? And A Word On Hong Kong In swing counties 51% of voters think that free trade is either a bad idea or are undecided. And even 57% percent of voters in counties that voted for Hillary Clinton by more than a 10% margin are in favor of tariffs or unsure. And a majority of voters in the most relevant categories – independents, moderates, non-college graduates, low-income earners – believe that Trump’s tariffs will bring manufacturing back, a highly relevant point for an election that will likely swing on the Rust Belt yet again. This includes Clinton’s most secure districts (Chart 7)! Chart 7 The point is not that Trump lacks political constraints on the trade war – after all, these voters are on the borderline in many cases and concerned about all-out trade war with China. Rather, his aggressive trade tactics enable him to reconnect with and energize his voter base at a time when his other signature policies are tied down. This is critical because his reelection prospects, which we have pegged at 55%, are in great peril, at least judging by his lag in the head-to-head polling against the top Democrats in swing states. Bottom Line: Going forward, Trump has more room to push the envelope than investors realize. A failed G20 summit poses the risk of another selloff in global equities. We are maintaining our tactical safe-haven trades.   What About Xi Jinping’s Constraints? Xi is president for life and must be attentive to long-term ramifications. Chart 8Xi Jinping's Immediate Constraint Xi Jinping's Immediate Constraint Xi Jinping's Immediate Constraint If Trump is tempted to continue pushing the envelope, will President Xi back down? While not constrained by the stock market or elections, he does face the prospect of instability in the manufacturing sector and large-scale unemployment (Chart 8), which Beijing has not had to deal with for 20 years. The point is not to claim that laid-off Chinese workers will turn around and protest against their own country in the face of gunboat diplomacy by capitalist imperialists – on the 70th anniversary of the regime, no less. Rather, Xi is president for life and must be attentive to the long-term ramifications of a disruptive transition in the excessively large manufacturing sector. This would cause economic and, yes, ultimately socio-political problems for him down the road. If Trump continues to move toward his 2016 campaign pledge of a 45% tariff on all Chinese imports, as the 2020 election approaches, China’s leaders have far less incentive to put their careers (and lives) on the line to produce structural concessions. A tariff covering all Chinese goods is an absolutist position that China can only address by doubling down on its demand for full tariff rollback. Yet Trump needs to retain some tariffs to enforce the implementation of any agreement. Thus slapping tariffs on all Chinese imports is almost, but not quite, an irreversible step. This is captured in Diagram 1 via the 29% chance that tensions are contained even if a deal falls through. Tensions are even less likely to be contained if the Trump administration follows through on its threats against China’s tech sector. On August 19, the Commerce Department will decide whether to renew the license for U.S. companies to sell key components to Huawei and other blacklisted companies. If the administration denies the license – and moves further ahead with export controls on emerging and foundational technologies – then Beijing faces an outright technological blockade. It will retaliate against U.S. companies – a process already beginning1 – and will likely act on other threats such as a rare earths embargo. In this case strategic tensions will escalate dramatically, including saber-rattling in the air, in cyberspace, or on the high seas. At the moment political frictions in Hong Kong are exacerbating U.S.-China distrust. Bottom Line: Since President Xi’s constraints are longer-term, he has the ability to deny structural concessions to Trump. But Trump’s ability to push the trade war further and further risks forcing China to a point of no return. There is not a clear basis for the geopolitical risk affecting the global trade and growth outlook to fall. Hong Kong: A New Front In The U.S.-China Struggle The large-scale protests that have erupted in Hong Kong – first on April 28 and most recently on June 9 –are important for several reasons: they highlight the immense geopolitical pressure in East Asia emanating from China’s “New Era” under Xi Jinping; they are rapidly becoming entangled in U.S.-China tensions, particularly over technological acquisition; and they foreshadow the political instability on the horizon in Taiwan. Tensions have been rising between Hong Kong and mainland China since the Great Recession and the shock to capitalist financial centers around the world. The tensions are symptomatic of the dramatic change in China over the past decade; the decline of the post-Cold War status quo; and the broader decline of the western world order (e.g. the British Empire). After all, the West is lacking tools to preserve the rights and privileges that Hong Kong was supposed to be guaranteed when the transfer of sovereignty occurred in 1997. More immediately, the current protests are part of a process going back to 2012 in which the disaffected and marginalized parts of Hong Kong society began speaking up against the political establishment. This emerged because of high income inequality (Chart 9), shortcomings in quality of life, excessive property prices (Chart 10), and the mainland’s reassertion of Communist Party rule and encroachments on Hong Kong’s autonomy. Chart 9 Chart 10Another Source Of Hong Kong's Unrest Another Source Of Hong Kong's Unrest Another Source Of Hong Kong's Unrest A simple comparison with Singapore, the other major East Asian city-state, shows that Hong Kong has trailed in GDP per capita and wage gains, while property price inflation has soared ahead (Chart 11). These structural economic factors contributed to the emergence of the “Occupy Central” protests in 2014, which were smaller than today’s protests but signaled the abrupt shift in the political sphere toward disenchantment and activism. Chart 11Why Hong Kong Is Not As Quiet As Singapore Why Hong Kong Is Not As Quiet As Singapore Why Hong Kong Is Not As Quiet As Singapore The 2016 elections for the Legislative Council (LegCo) resulted in a fiasco by which a number of pro-democracy activists, known as “localists,” were squeezed out of the legislature through a combination of juvenile mistakes and heavy-handed intervention by Beijing and the pro-mainland Hong Kong authorities (Chart 12 A&B). Beijing exploited the occasion to extend its legal writ over Hong Kong society and curb some of the city’s freedoms.2 The democratic opposition and dissidents have been sidelined or repressed — and now they face the prospect of being extradited, given that the LegCo is highly likely to pass the “Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters” bill that sparked the protests this year. Chart 12 Chart 12 The exclusion of the localists from power runs the risk of radicalizing them and increasing disaffection, making mass protests likely to recur both in the near term and in future. Hong Kongers are losing confidence in the “One Country, Two Systems” arrangement (Chart 13). They are similarly becoming more disillusioned with mainland China, adding fuel to the fire over time (Chart 14). However, in the specific case of the city-state, there is no alternative to Beijing’s ultimate say – and the older generations will continue to support the political establishment. Chart 13 Chart 14 Nevertheless Hong Kong’s discontents will become entangled in the broader Cold War emerging between the U.S. and China. Beijing is accusing the protesters of being lackeys of foreign powers. The U.S. Congress, on both sides of the aisle, is threatening to declare that Hong Kong is no longer sufficiently autonomous from Beijing and therefore no longer eligible for special privileges. Hong Kong faces rising political dependency on China and the potential for special relations with the United States to decline. Chart 15 Part of Washington’s concern lies with Beijing’s aggressive technological acquisition program. Hong Kong has been able to import advanced dual-use technology products from the United States without Beijing’s restrictions. This is not apparent from the proportion of exports but it is important on the technological level (Chart 15). It introduces a backdoor for China to acquire these goods and has prompted a rethink in Washington. Hong Kong is also accused of facilitating the circumventing of sanctions on U.S. enemies. It thus faces rising political dependency on China and the potential for special relations with the United States to decline. These pressures also highlight why we view Taiwan as a potential “Black Swan.” Similar political fissures are emerging as Beijing expands its economic and military dominance over Taiwan. Of course, the political backlash against Beijing has recently been receding in Taiwanese opinion, due to the fact that the nominally pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party has lost most of the momentum it gained after the large-scale “Sunflower” student protests of 2014 (Chart 16). But there are still several reasons that the January 2020 election could become a geopolitical flashpoint: namely the developments in Hong Kong, China’s handling of them, Beijing’s tensions with Washington, and the Trump administration’s temptation to achieve some key goals with the Tsai Ing-wen administration before it leaves office (including arms sales). Even if the Taiwanese political winds shift to become less confrontational toward Beijing after January, the time between now and then is ripe for an “incident” of some kind. Beyond that, the pro-independence opposition will begin activating and marching against the next government if it proves obsequious to the mainland. Chart 16Taiwan: Pro-Mainland Forces Revive Taiwan: Pro-Mainland Forces Revive Taiwan: Pro-Mainland Forces Revive Chart 17 Over the long run, Taiwan is far more autonomous than Hong Kong, harder for Beijing to control, and much more attractive for Beijing’s enemies to defend – namely the U.S. and Japan. Moreover, as the tech conflict with Washington heats up, Taiwan becomes vital for China’s technological self-sufficiency, putting it at higher risk (Chart 17). Beijing will also frown upon the role of Taiwanese companies like FoxConn for taking early steps to diversify the supply chain away from China. This regional strategic reality is not conducive to U.S.-China trade negotiations. And even aside from the U.S., Beijing’s growing power generates resistance from its periphery. This is true of Chinese ally North Korea, which is trying to broaden its options, as well as a historic enemy like Vietnam. Other countries at a bit more of a distance are trying to accommodate both Beijing and Washington, but are increasingly seeing their regimes vacillate based on their orientation toward China – this is true of Thailand in 2014, the Philippines in 2015, South Korea in 2017, and Malaysia in 2018. These changes inject economic policy uncertainty on the country level. Over the long run we see Southeast Asia as a beneficiary of the relocation of supply chains out of China. But at the moment, with the trade war escalating and unresolved and with China taking a heavier hand, we are only recommending holding relatively insulated countries like Thailand. Bottom Line: Our theme of U.S.-China conflict is intertwined with our theme of geopolitical risk rotation to East Asia. States that have domestic-oriented economies, limited exposure to China, or greater U.S. support – including Japan, Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, and Malaysia – face less geopolitical risk than those heavily exposed to China (Taiwan) or that lack U.S. security guarantees (Hong Kong, Vietnam). Investment Recommendations In addition to our safe-haven tactical trades – long spot gold, long Swiss bonds, and long JPY-USD – we are maintaining our long recommendation for a basket of companies in the MVIS global rare earth and strategic metals index. The basket includes companies not based in mainland China that have seen their stock prices appreciate this year yet have a P/E ratio under 35 (Chart 18). Chart 18Go Long Rare Earth Firms Ex-China Go Long Rare Earth Firms Ex-China Go Long Rare Earth Firms Ex-China We remain short the CNY-USD on the expectation that trade tensions will encourage Beijing to use depreciation as a countervailing tool, despite our expectation of increasing fiscal-and-credit stimulus. Over the long run, we would observe that trade escalation between the U.S. and China bodes poorly for China’s long-term productivity and efficiency. The basis for a reduction in trade tensions is a recommitment to the liberal structural reform agenda that Chinese state economists outlined at the beginning of Xi Jinping’s term in 2012-13. The current trajectory of “the New Long March,” in which Beijing pursues personalized power and uses stimulus to improve self-sufficiency and import-substitution, goes the opposite direction. It is not a pathway for innovation, openness, and technological progress. A simple comparison of China’s long-term equity total return highlights the market’s lack of enthusiasm about the current administration’s approach (Chart 19). The contexts were different, but the earlier outperformance grew from painful structural reforms and a grand compromise with the United States in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Chart 19The Market Wants Reforms And Trade Deal The Market Wants Reforms And Trade Deal The Market Wants Reforms And Trade Deal We are closing our long MXN / short BRL trade for a gain of 4.6%. This trade has bounced back from the U.S.-Mexico deal to avert tariffs. The agreement was not entirely hollow compared to earlier agreements: it calls for Mexico to accelerate the deployment of the National Guard to stem the flow of refugees from Guatemala and central America and expand the Migrant Protection Protocols across the southern border. Trump’s reversal – under Senate pressure, entirely unlike the China dynamic – gave the peso a boost, benefiting our trade. However, one of the fundamental reasons for this trade – the improvement in Mexico’s relative current account balance – has now rolled over (Chart 20) and the tariff threat will reemerge if Mexico proves unable or unwilling to stem the inflow of asylum seekers into the United States (Chart 21). Chart 20Peso Has Outperformed The Real Peso Has Outperformed The Real Peso Has Outperformed The Real Chart 21   As we go to press, the attacks on tankers in Oman highlight our view that oil prices will witness policy-induced volatility and a rising geopolitical risk premium as “fire and fury” shifts to the U.S. and Iran in the near-term. Our expectation of increasing Chinese stimulus helps underpin the constructive view on oil and energy-producing emerging markets.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The American Chamber of Commerce in China and Shanghai released a survey on May 22, 2019 revealing that while 53% of companies have not yet experienced “non-tariff” retaliation by Chinese authorities, 47% had experienced it: 20.1% through increased inspections; 19.7% through slower customs clearance; 14.2% through slow license approvals; another 14.2% through bureaucratic and regulatory complications; and smaller numbers dealing with problems associated with American employees’ visas, increased difficulty closing investment deals, products rejected by customs, and rejections of licenses and applications. 2 We noted at the time, “Mainland forces will bring down the hammer on the pro-independence movement. The election of a new chief executive will appear to reinforce the status quo but in reality Beijing will tighten its legal, political, and security grip. Large protests are likely; political uncertainty will remain high.” See BCA Geopolitical Strategy, “Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now,” December 14, 2016, available at www.bcaresearch.com.

"Tariff Man" Is On Fire "Tariff Man" Is On Fire While the media has zeroed in on the newly announced tariffs on Mexico late last week, tariffs on Indian imports and the narrowly avoided Australia trade war front barely made the news. This heightened policy uncertainty has taken investors aback. Worrisomely, the recent May update of the “Baker, Bloom, and Davis” categorical trade policy uncertainty index surged, which bodes ill for the overall market (trade policy uncertainty shown inverted, top panel). Similarly, we updated the article count that mention “trade war” using Bloomberg data and the message is similar: the opening up of new trade war fronts will continue to weigh on the broad market (trade war article count shown inverted, bottom panel). Bottom Line: Refrain from trying to catch a falling knife, a tactically cautious equity market stance is still warranted.

Highlights We continue to recommend overweighting Mexican local fixed-income markets, the peso and sovereign credit relative to their respective EM benchmarks. A new trade: Sell Mexican CDS / buy Brazilian and South African CDS. Continue holding the long MXN / short ZAR position. We have a lower conviction view that Mexican equities will outperform the EM benchmark. Feature Since the election of Andrés Manuel López Obrador – or AMLO, as he is commonly known – as President, investors have been worrying about Mexico’s fiscal policy and public debt sustainability. Specifically, investors have expressed concern over the debt dynamics of state-owned petroleum company Pemex and its impact on the country’s public debt. While these concerns are not groundless, on balance we find the risk-reward profile of Mexico’s sovereign credit and local currency bonds superior relative to their respective EM peers. Fiscal Sustainability: A Comparative Analysis We discussed debt sustainability in Brazil and South Africa in two of our recent reports, and concluded that their public debt dynamics are unsustainable without drastic fiscal reforms. However, a closer look at debt sustainability in Mexico reveals a different picture. Chart 1Public Debt Burden Including SOE Debt Public Debt Burden Including SOE Debt Public Debt Burden Including SOE Debt Mexico’s public debt level including the debt of state-owned enterprises is lower than those in Brazil and South Africa (Chart 1). Notably, Mexico’s public debt-to-GDP ratio has been flat over the past three years. Importantly, as detailed below, the two primary conditions for public debt sustainability – the level of government borrowing costs and the primary fiscal balance - are far superior in Mexico relative to Brazil and South Africa. Government borrowing costs in local currency terms are only slightly above nominal GDP in Mexico. Brazil and South Africa score much worse on this measure (Chart 2). The primary fiscal balance in Mexico is much better than in Brazil and South Africa (Chart 3). In fact, Mexico is targeting a primary surplus of 1% for 2019. Chart 2Local Borrowing Costs Versus Nominal GDP Local Borrowing Costs Versus Nominal GDP Local Borrowing Costs Versus Nominal GDP Chart 3Primary Fiscal Balances Primary Fiscal Balances Primary Fiscal Balances Even with potential pension reforms, Brazil will continue to run primary deficits for the next few years. As we discussed in our recent report on Brazil, the government’s submitted draft on social security reforms will save only BRL190 billion over the next four years, or 0.7% of GDP per year. The current primary deficit is 1.5% of GDP. Unless nominal GDP growth and government revenue growth shoot up, the primary deficit will not be eliminated in the next four years. Unlike Brazil and South Africa, the growth of public sector debt in Mexico is not outpacing nominal GDP growth (Chart 4). Critically, the latter point is also true in Mexico if one includes state-owned enterprises’ debt. Brazil and South Africa sovereign spreads are currently only 40 and 85 basis points above those in Mexico, respectively. The spread will widen further in favor of Mexico, given the latter’s superior fundamentals (Chart 5). In terms of local currency bonds, real yields in Mexico are also on par with Brazil but are well above those in South Africa (Chart 6). Hence, Mexican local bonds offer relative value versus many of their EM peers. Chart 4Public Debt and GDP Growth Public Debt and GDP Growth Public Debt and GDP Growth Chart 5Sell Mexican CDS / Long South African and Brazilian CDS Sell Mexican CDS / Long South African and Brazilian CDS Sell Mexican CDS / Long South African and Brazilian CDS             Nominal local currency bond yields in Mexico are about 200 basis points above the EM GBI benchmark domestic bond yield index (Chart 7). This is great value. Clearly, Mexico’s fiscal worries are overblown relative to those in Brazil and South Africa. Besides, relative valuations of sovereign credit and local bonds adjusted for relative fundamentals warrant outperformance in Mexico versus the other two markets as well as against the respective EM benchmarks in the months ahead. Chart 6Real Bond Yields: Decent Value In Mexico Real Bond Yields: Decent Value In Mexico Real Bond Yields: Decent Value In Mexico Chart 7Nominal Bond Yields: Great Value In Mexico Nominal Bond Yields: Great Value In Mexico Nominal Bond Yields: Great Value In Mexico In addition, AMLO’s administration has proven to be committed to fiscal austerity. Last month, the Ministry of Finance reinforced this notion by announcing a reduction in public spending on social programs in order to balance the loss of fiscal revenue from decreasing oil revenues and lower GDP estimates. Mexico’s fiscal worries are overblown relative to those in Brazil and South Africa. Besides, relative valuations of sovereign credit and local bonds adjusted for relative fundamentals warrant outperformance in Mexico versus the other two markets as well as against the respective EM benchmarks in the months ahead. We view the primary fiscal target of 1% for 2019 as aggressive and potentially unattainable due to a shortfall in revenues. However, these actions prove that AMLO’s administration is not intending to run a large fiscal deficit to finance populist spending programs, as investors had feared. Adding Pemex To Public Finances Pemex’s financial position and the government budget’s reliance on oil revenues are an Achilles’ heel for Mexico’s public finances. Therefore, we have incorporated Pemex into the budget. The resulting fiscal deterioration is not calamitous. Specifically, international credit agencies estimate that Pemex needs an additional $13 billion to $20 billion in capital expenditures per year in order to maintain current operations and replenish reserves. This is in addition to its debt service obligations in the coming years, as shown in Table 1. Table 1Pemex Debt Servicing Mexico: The Best Value In EM Fixed Income Mexico: The Best Value In EM Fixed Income We have the following considerations on this issue: First, this year the government announced $5.7 billion of financing for Pemex in the form of direct investment, tax breaks, deductions for drilling and exploration costs and revenue recovered from oil theft. In addition, the government will also do a one-time transfer of $6.8 billion from its $15.4 billion budget stabilization fund in order to finance Pemex’s debt payments due by the end of this year. While Congress must first approve the use of these funds, odds are that the bill will pass as AMLO’s party holds a majority. That would bring total capital injection into Pemex to $12.5 billion for the year, almost enough to finance the company’s capital spending this year. Second, in order to revive operations at Pemex in the medium to long term, the government must maintain this level of investment on an annual basis. Essentially, AMLO’s administration will inevitably have to sacrifice part of the $29 billion in net oil transfers it receives every year to finance the oil company and prevent further downgrades to its credit rating. How large is this required Pemex financing as a share of the public budget? We performed a simulation including into the public budget all of Pemex’s payments and all its receipts from the government. While the overall fiscal position deteriorates, it is not unsustainable. The primary and overall deficits would widen to 1.9% and 4.4% of GDP, respectively, if the government eliminates all transfers to Pemex and if the company stops all payments to the government budget, including direct transfers and indirect oil taxes1 (Table 2, Scenario 1). Table 2Mexico: Pemex And Government Budget Mexico: The Best Value In EM Fixed Income Mexico: The Best Value In EM Fixed Income In such a scenario, Pemex would gain $ 29 billion each year to invest in exploration and production. Pemex is the largest fiscal challenge for Mexico. Yet, even including Pemex debt and required financing, the nation’s fiscal accounts are not worrisome. Chart 8Mexico's Budget Balance Adjusted For Financing To Pemex Mexico's Budget Balance Adjusted For Financing To Pemex Mexico's Budget Balance Adjusted For Financing To Pemex Third, provided Pemex’s capital spending needs could be met by half of this $29 billion, the government could provide the company just half of this amount (Table 2, Scenario 3). In this scenario, the oil company will have sufficient funds to invest. Meanwhile, the government’s primary and overall fiscal deficit will deteriorate only moderately to 0.7% and 3.2% of GDP, respectively (Chart 8 and Table 2). Finally, the importance of oil revenues – both directly from Pemex and via indirect taxation on the oil industry – have already declined as a share of total fiscal revenues – from 40% in 2012 to 18.3% currently (Chart 9). In short, Mexico’s budget is less reliant on oil revenues. If economic growth picks up, non-oil revenues will improve. Consequently, the government’s fiscal position will improve, giving it more maneuvering room to deal with Pemex. Bottom Line: Pemex is the largest fiscal challenge for Mexico. Yet, even including Pemex debt and required financing, the nation’s fiscal accounts are not worrisome. Cyclical Economic Conditions The Mexican economy is slowing and inflationary pressures are subsiding. Narrow money (M1) and retail sales growth are decelerating (Chart 10, top panel) Capital spending is contracting and non-oil exports will be in a soft spot over the next six months, according the U.S. manufacturing ISM new orders-to-inventory ratio (Chart 10, bottom panel). Core inflation is at 3.55% and is heading south. Chart 9Dependence On Oil Revenues Has Declined A Lot Dependence On Oil Revenues Has Declined A Lot Dependence On Oil Revenues Has Declined A Lot Chart 10Mexico: Cyclical Conditions Mexico: Cyclical Conditions Mexico: Cyclical Conditions   Barring major turmoil in EM currency markets that weighs on the peso, weakening growth and disinflation will lead the domestic fixed-income market to discount rate cuts. Mexico’s central bank is very hawkish and will be slow to ease policy. Yet, such a policy stance warrants a bullish view on domestic bonds. The basis is that the longer they delay rate cuts, the more they will need to cut in the future. Investment Strategy We have been recommending an overweight position in Mexico in EM local currency and sovereign credit portfolios, and are reiterating these strategies. Relative value investors should consider this trade: Sell Mexico CDS / buy Brazilian and South African CDS. The Mexican sovereign credit market has made a major bottom versus the EM benchmark and the path of least resistance is now up (Chart 11). EM local currency bond portfolios should continue overweighting Mexico while underweighting Brazil and South Africa (Chart 12). Chart 11Sovereign Excess Returns: A Relative Bull Market In Mexico Sovereign Excess Returns: A Relative Bull Market In Mexico Sovereign Excess Returns: A Relative Bull Market In Mexico Chart 12Total Return on Local Currency Bonds in Dollar Terms Total Return on Local Currency Bonds in Dollar Terms Total Return on Local Currency Bonds in Dollar Terms Similarly, among EM currencies, we favor the Mexican peso because it is cheap (Chart 13). Specifically, we continue to hold the long MXN / short ZAR position; investors who are not yet in this trade should consider entering it now. Chart 13The Mexican Peso Is Cheap The Mexican Peso Is Cheap The Mexican Peso Is Cheap Finally, in the EM equity universe, we are overweight Mexican stocks, but our conviction level is lower than in the case of fixed-income markets. The basis is that AMLO’s policies intend to weaken oligopolies and monopolies and undermine their pricing power. These policies are very positive for fixed-income markets and the exchange rate in the long run, as they entail lower inflation resulting from a more competitive environment. Yet, they could hurt profits of incumbent monopolies and oligopolies. This is why we recommend equity investors focus on Mexican small-caps. That said, from a macro perspective, resulting disinflation and lower local rates are also positive for equity multiples. Hence, the Mexican stock market will also likely outperform the EM benchmark in common currency terms.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Juan Egaña, Research Associate juane@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1 Indirect oil taxation includes different taxes for the oil fund for stabilization and development, such as rights on drilling and exploration, import and export duties on oil and gas and financing for oil and gas research.

Highlights We continue to recommend overweighting Mexican local fixed-income markets, the peso and sovereign credit relative to their respective EM benchmarks. A new trade: Sell Mexican CDS / buy Brazilian and South African CDS. Continue holding the long MXN / short ZAR position. We have a lower conviction view that Mexican equities will outperform the EM benchmark. Feature Since the election of Andrés Manuel López Obrador – or AMLO, as he is commonly known – as President, investors have been worrying about Mexico’s fiscal policy and public debt sustainability. Specifically, investors have expressed concern over the debt dynamics of state-owned petroleum company Pemex and its impact on the country’s public debt. While these concerns are not groundless, on balance we find the risk-reward profile of Mexico’s sovereign credit and local currency bonds superior relative to their respective EM peers. Fiscal Sustainability: A Comparative Analysis We discussed debt sustainability in Brazil and South Africa in two of our recent reports, and concluded that their public debt dynamics are unsustainable without drastic fiscal reforms. However, a closer look at debt sustainability in Mexico reveals a different picture. Chart 1Public Debt Burden Including SOE Debt Public Debt Burden Including SOE Debt Public Debt Burden Including SOE Debt Mexico’s public debt level including the debt of state-owned enterprises is lower than those in Brazil and South Africa (Chart 1). Notably, Mexico’s public debt-to-GDP ratio has been flat over the past three years. Importantly, as detailed below, the two primary conditions for public debt sustainability – the level of government borrowing costs and the primary fiscal balance - are far superior in Mexico relative to Brazil and South Africa.   Government borrowing costs in local currency terms are only slightly above nominal GDP in Mexico. Brazil and South Africa score much worse on this measure (Chart 2). The primary fiscal balance in Mexico is much better than in Brazil and South Africa (Chart 3). In fact, Mexico is targeting a primary surplus of 1% for 2019. Chart 2Local Borrowing Costs Versus Nominal GDP Local Borrowing Costs Versus Nominal GDP Local Borrowing Costs Versus Nominal GDP Chart 3Primary Fiscal Balances Primary Fiscal Balances Primary Fiscal Balances Even with potential pension reforms, Brazil will continue to run primary deficits for the next few years. As we discussed in our recent report on Brazil, the government’s submitted draft on social security reforms will save only BRL190 billion over the next four years, or 0.7% of GDP per year. The current primary deficit is 1.5% of GDP. Unless nominal GDP growth and government revenue growth shoot up, the primary deficit will not be eliminated in the next four years. Unlike Brazil and South Africa, the growth of public sector debt in Mexico is not outpacing nominal GDP growth (Chart 4). Critically, the latter point is also true in Mexico if one includes state-owned enterprises’ debt. Brazil and South Africa sovereign spreads are currently only 40 and 85 basis points above those in Mexico, respectively. The spread will widen further in favor of Mexico, given the latter’s superior fundamentals (Chart 5). In terms of local currency bonds, real yields in Mexico are also on par with Brazil but are well above those in South Africa (Chart 6). Hence, Mexican local bonds offer relative value versus many of their EM peers. Chart 4Public Debt and GDP Growth Public Debt and GDP Growth Public Debt and GDP Growth Chart 5Sell Mexican CDS / Long South African and Brazilian CDS Sell Mexican CDS / Long South African and Brazilian CDS Sell Mexican CDS / Long South African and Brazilian CDS             Nominal local currency bond yields in Mexico are about 200 basis points above the EM GBI benchmark domestic bond yield index (Chart 7). This is great value. Clearly, Mexico’s fiscal worries are overblown relative to those in Brazil and South Africa. Besides, relative valuations of sovereign credit and local bonds adjusted for relative fundamentals warrant outperformance in Mexico versus the other two markets as well as against the respective EM benchmarks in the months ahead. Chart 6Real Bond Yields: Decent Value In Mexico Real Bond Yields: Decent Value In Mexico Real Bond Yields: Decent Value In Mexico Chart 7Nominal Bond Yields: Great Value In Mexico Nominal Bond Yields: Great Value In Mexico Nominal Bond Yields: Great Value In Mexico In addition, AMLO’s administration has proven to be committed to fiscal austerity. Last month, the Ministry of Finance reinforced this notion by announcing a reduction in public spending on social programs in order to balance the loss of fiscal revenue from decreasing oil revenues and lower GDP estimates. Mexico’s fiscal worries are overblown relative to those in Brazil and South Africa. Besides, relative valuations of sovereign credit and local bonds adjusted for relative fundamentals warrant outperformance in Mexico versus the other two markets as well as against the respective EM benchmarks in the months ahead. We view the primary fiscal target of 1% for 2019 as aggressive and potentially unattainable due to a shortfall in revenues. However, these actions prove that AMLO’s administration is not intending to run a large fiscal deficit to finance populist spending programs, as investors had feared. Adding Pemex To Public Finances Pemex’s financial position and the government budget’s reliance on oil revenues are an Achilles’ heel for Mexico’s public finances. Therefore, we have incorporated Pemex into the budget. The resulting fiscal deterioration is not calamitous. Specifically, international credit agencies estimate that Pemex needs an additional $13 billion to $20 billion in capital expenditures per year in order to maintain current operations and replenish reserves. This is in addition to its debt service obligations in the coming years, as shown in Table 1. Table 1Pemex Debt Servicing Mexico: The Best Value In EM Fixed Income Mexico: The Best Value In EM Fixed Income We have the following considerations on this issue: First, this year the government announced $5.7 billion of financing for Pemex in the form of direct investment, tax breaks, deductions for drilling and exploration costs and revenue recovered from oil theft. In addition, the government will also do a one-time transfer of $6.8 billion from its $15.4 billion budget stabilization fund in order to finance Pemex’s debt payments due by the end of this year. While Congress must first approve the use of these funds, odds are that the bill will pass as AMLO’s party holds a majority. That would bring total capital injection into Pemex to $12.5 billion for the year, almost enough to finance the company’s capital spending this year. Second, in order to revive operations at Pemex in the medium to long term, the government must maintain this level of investment on an annual basis. Essentially, AMLO’s administration will inevitably have to sacrifice part of the $29 billion in net oil transfers it receives every year to finance the oil company and prevent further downgrades to its credit rating. How large is this required Pemex financing as a share of the public budget? We performed a simulation including into the public budget all of Pemex’s payments and all its receipts from the government. While the overall fiscal position deteriorates, it is not unsustainable. The primary and overall deficits would widen to 1.9% and 4.4% of GDP, respectively, if the government eliminates all transfers to Pemex and if the company stops all payments to the government budget, including direct transfers and indirect oil taxes1 (Table 2, Scenario 1). Table 2Mexico: Pemex And Government Budget Mexico: The Best Value In EM Fixed Income Mexico: The Best Value In EM Fixed Income In such a scenario, Pemex would gain $ 29 billion each year to invest in exploration and production. Pemex is the largest fiscal challenge for Mexico. Yet, even including Pemex debt and required financing, the nation’s fiscal accounts are not worrisome. Chart 8Mexico's Budget Balance Adjusted For Financing To Pemex Mexico's Budget Balance Adjusted For Financing To Pemex Mexico's Budget Balance Adjusted For Financing To Pemex Third, provided Pemex’s capital spending needs could be met by half of this $29 billion, the government could provide the company just half of this amount (Table 2, Scenario 3). In this scenario, the oil company will have sufficient funds to invest. Meanwhile, the government’s primary and overall fiscal deficit will deteriorate only moderately to 0.7% and 3.2% of GDP, respectively (Chart 8 and Table 2). Finally, the importance of oil revenues – both directly from Pemex and via indirect taxation on the oil industry – have already declined as a share of total fiscal revenues – from 40% in 2012 to 18.3% currently (Chart 9). In short, Mexico’s budget is less reliant on oil revenues. If economic growth picks up, non-oil revenues will improve. Consequently, the government’s fiscal position will improve, giving it more maneuvering room to deal with Pemex. Bottom Line: Pemex is the largest fiscal challenge for Mexico. Yet, even including Pemex debt and required financing, the nation’s fiscal accounts are not worrisome. Cyclical Economic Conditions The Mexican economy is slowing and inflationary pressures are subsiding. Narrow money (M1) and retail sales growth are decelerating (Chart 10, top panel) Capital spending is contracting and non-oil exports will be in a soft spot over the next six months, according the U.S. manufacturing ISM new orders-to-inventory ratio (Chart 10, bottom panel). Core inflation is at 3.55% and is heading south. Chart 9Dependence On Oil Revenues Has Declined A Lot Dependence On Oil Revenues Has Declined A Lot Dependence On Oil Revenues Has Declined A Lot Chart 10Mexico: Cyclical Conditions Mexico: Cyclical Conditions Mexico: Cyclical Conditions   Barring major turmoil in EM currency markets that weighs on the peso, weakening growth and disinflation will lead the domestic fixed-income market to discount rate cuts. Mexico’s central bank is very hawkish and will be slow to ease policy. Yet, such a policy stance warrants a bullish view on domestic bonds. The basis is that the longer they delay rate cuts, the more they will need to cut in the future. Investment Strategy We have been recommending an overweight position in Mexico in EM local currency and sovereign credit portfolios, and are reiterating these strategies. Relative value investors should consider this trade: Sell Mexico CDS / buy Brazilian and South African CDS. The Mexican sovereign credit market has made a major bottom versus the EM benchmark and the path of least resistance is now up (Chart 11). EM local currency bond portfolios should continue overweighting Mexico while underweighting Brazil and South Africa (Chart 12). Chart 11Sovereign Excess Returns: A Relative Bull Market In Mexico Sovereign Excess Returns: A Relative Bull Market In Mexico Sovereign Excess Returns: A Relative Bull Market In Mexico Chart 12Total Return on Local Currency Bonds in Dollar Terms Total Return on Local Currency Bonds in Dollar Terms Total Return on Local Currency Bonds in Dollar Terms Similarly, among EM currencies, we favor the Mexican peso because it is cheap (Chart 13). Specifically, we continue to hold the long MXN / short ZAR position; investors who are not yet in this trade should consider entering it now. Chart 13The Mexican Peso Is Cheap The Mexican Peso Is Cheap The Mexican Peso Is Cheap Finally, in the EM equity universe, we are overweight Mexican stocks, but our conviction level is lower than in the case of fixed-income markets. The basis is that AMLO’s policies intend to weaken oligopolies and monopolies and undermine their pricing power. These policies are very positive for fixed-income markets and the exchange rate in the long run, as they entail lower inflation resulting from a more competitive environment. Yet, they could hurt profits of incumbent monopolies and oligopolies. This is why we recommend equity investors focus on Mexican small-caps. That said, from a macro perspective, resulting disinflation and lower local rates are also positive for equity multiples. Hence, the Mexican stock market will also likely outperform the EM benchmark in common currency terms.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Juan Egaña, Research Associate juane@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1 Indirect oil taxation includes different taxes for the oil fund for stabilization and development, such as rights on drilling and exploration, import and export duties on oil and gas and financing for oil and gas research.