Middle East & North Africa

Highlights So What? Donald Trump's reelection depends on the timing of the next recession. Why? The midterm elections will not determine Trump's reelection chances. Rather, the timing of the next recession will. BCA's House View expects it by 2020. Otherwise, President Trump is favored to win. Trump may be downgrading "maximum pressure" on Iran, reducing the risk of a 2019 recession. Trade war with China, gridlock, and budget deficits are the most investment-relevant outcomes of U.S. politics in 2018-20. Feature The preliminary results of the U.S. midterm elections are in, with the Democrats gaining the House and failing to gain the Senate, as expected. Our view remains that the implications for investors are minimal. The policy status quo is now locked in - a gridlocked government is unlikely to produce a major change in economic policy over the next two years. While the election is to some extent a rebuke to Trump, this report argues that he remains the favored candidate for the 2020 presidential election - unless a recession occurs. A Preliminary Look At The Midterms First, the preliminary takeaways from the midterms, as the results come in: The Democrats took the House of Representatives, with a preliminary net gain of 27 seats, resulting in a 51%-plus majority, and this is projected to rise to 34 seats as we go to press Wednesday morning. This is above the average for midterm election gains by the opposition party, especially given that Republicans have held the advantage in electoral districting. Performance in the Midwest, other swing states, and suburban areas poses a threat to Trump and Republicans in 2020. Republicans held the Senate, with a net gain of at least two seats, for a 51%-plus majority. Democrats were defending 10 seats in states that Trump won in 2016. While Democrats did well in the Midwest, these candidates had the advantage of incumbency. On the state level, the Democrats gained a net seven governorships, two of them in key Midwestern states. The gubernatorial races were partly cyclical, as the Republicans had hit a historic high-water mark in governors' seats and were bound to fall back a bit. However, the Democratic victory in Michigan and Wisconsin, key Midwestern Trump states, is a very positive sign for the Democrats, since they were not incumbents in either state and had to unseat incumbent Governor Scott Walker in Wisconsin. (Their victory in Maine could also help them in the electoral college in 2020.) The governors' races also suggest that moderate Democrats are more appealing to voters than activist Democrats. Candidate Andrew Gillum's loss in Florida is a disappointment for the progressive wing of the Democratic Party.1 With the House alone, Democrats will not be able to push major legislation through. In the current partisan environment it will be nigh-impossible to reach the 60 votes needed to end debate in the Senate ("cloture"), and even then House Democrats will face a presidential veto. They will not be able to repeal Trump's tax cuts, re-regulate the economy, abandon the trade wars, resurrect Obamacare, or revive the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal. Like the Republicans after 2010, they will be trapped in the position of controlling only one half of one of the three constitutional branches. The most they can do is hold hearings and bring forth witnesses in an attempt to tarnish Trump's 2020 reelection chances. They may eventually bring impeachment articles against him, but without two-thirds of the Senate they cannot remove him from office (unless the GOP grassroots abandons him, giving senators permission to do so). U.S. equities generally move upward after midterm elections - including midterms that produce gridlock (Chart 1A & Chart 1B). However, the October selloff could drag into November. More worryingly, as Chart 1B shows, the post-election rally tends to peter out only six months after a gridlock midterm, unlike midterms that reinforce the ruling party. Chart 1AMidterm U.S. Elections Tend To Be Bullish... Midterm U.S. Elections Tend To Be Bullish... Midterm U.S. Elections Tend To Be Bullish... Chart 1B... But Markets Lose Steam Six Months Post-Gridlock ... But Markets Lose Steam Six Months Post-Gridlock ... But Markets Lose Steam Six Months Post-Gridlock However, the 2018 midterms could be mildly positive for the markets, as they do not portend any major new policies or uncertainty. Trump's proposed additional tax cuts would have threatened higher inflation and more Fed rate hikes, whereas House Democrats will not be able to raise taxes or cut spending alone. Bipartisan entitlement reform seems unlikely in 2018-20 given the acrimony of the two parties and structural factors such as inequality and populism. An outstanding question is health care, which Republicans left unresolved after failing to repeal Obamacare, and which exit polls show was a driving factor behind Democratic victories. Separately, as an additional marginal positive for risk assets, the Trump administration has reportedly granted eight waivers to countries that import Iranian oil. We have signaled that Trump's "maximum pressure" doctrine poses a key risk for markets due to the danger of an Iran-induced oil price shock. A shift toward more lax enforcement reduces the tail-risk of a recession in 2019 (Chart 2). Of course, the waivers will expire in 180 days and may be a mere ploy to ensure smooth markets ahead of the midterm election, so the jury is still out on this issue. Chart 2Rapid Increases In Oil Prices Tend To Precede Recessions The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast This brings us to the main focus of this report: what do the midterms suggest about the 2020 election? Bottom Line: The midterm elections have produced a gridlocked Congress. Trump can continue with his foreign policy, most of his trade policy, his deregulatory decrees, and his appointment of court judges with limited interference from House Democrats. The only thing the Democrats can prevent him from doing is cutting taxes further. He tends to agree with Democrats on the need for more spending! While the U.S. market could rally on the back of this result, we do not see U.S. politics being a critical catalyst for markets going forward. On balance, a gridlocked result brings less uncertainty than would otherwise be the case, which is positive for markets in the short term. The Midterms And The 2020 Election There is a weak relationship at best between an opposition party's gains in the midterms and its performance in the presidential election two years later. Given that the president's party almost always loses the midterms - and yet that incumbent presidents tend to be reelected - the midterm has little diagnostic value for the presidential vote, as can be seen in recent elections (Chart 3A & Chart 3B). Chart 3AMidterm Has Little Predictive Power For Presidential Popular Vote ... The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast Chart 3B... Nor For Presidential Electoral College Vote The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast Nevertheless, historian Allan Lichtman has shown that since 1860, a midterm loss is marginally negative for a president's reelection chances.2 And for Republicans in recent years, losses in midterm elections are very weakly correlated with Republican losses of seats in the electoral college two years later (Chart 4). Chart 4Republican Midterm Loss Could Foreshadow Electoral College Losses The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast Still, this midterm election does not give any reason to believe that Trump's reelection chances have been damaged any more than Ronald Reagan's were after 1982, or Bill Clinton's after 1994, or Barack Obama's after 2010. All three of these presidents went on to a second term. A midterm loss simply does not stack the odds against reelection. Why are midterm elections of limited consequence for the president? They are fundamentally different from presidential elections. For instance, "the buck stops here" applies to the president alone, whereas in the midterms voters often seek to keep the president in check by voting against his party in Congress.3 Despite the consensus media narrative, the president is not that unpopular. Trump's approval rating today is about the same as that of Clinton and Obama at this stage in their first term (Chart 5). This week's midterm was not a wave of "resistance" to Trump so much as a run-of-the-mill midterm in which the president's party lost seats. Its outcome should not be overstated. Bottom Line: There is not much correlation between midterms and presidential elections. The best historians view it as a marginal negative for the incumbent. This result is not a mortal wound for Trump. Chart 5President Trump Is Hardly Losing The Popularity Contest The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast 2020: The Recession Call Is The Election Call The incumbent party has lost the White House every single time that a recession occurred during the campaign proper (Chart 6).4 The incumbent party has lost 50%-60% of the time if recession occurred in the calendar year before the election or in the first half of the election year. Chart 6A 2020 Recession Is Trump's Biggest Threat A 2020 Recession Is Trump's Biggest Threat A 2020 Recession Is Trump's Biggest Threat This is a problem for President Trump because the current economic expansion is long in the tooth. In July 2019, it will become the longest running economic expansion in U.S. history, following the 1991-2001 expansion. The 2020 election will occur sixteen months after the record is broken, which means that averting a recession over this entire period will be remarkable. BCA's House View holds that 2020 is the most likely year for a recession to occur. The economy is at full employment, inflation is trending upwards, and the Fed's interest rate hikes will become restrictive sometime in 2019. The yield curve could invert in the second half of 2019 - and inversion tends to precede recession by anywhere from 5-to-16 months (Table 1). No wonder Trump has called the Fed his "biggest threat."5 Table 1Inverted Yield Curve Is An Ominous Sign The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The risks to this 2020 recession call are probably skewed toward 2021 instead of 2019. The still-positive U.S. fiscal thrust in 2019 and possibly 2020 and the Trump administration's newly flexible approach to Iran sanctions, if maintained, reduce the tail-risk of a recession in 2019. If there is not a recession by 2020, Trump is the favored candidate to win. First, incumbents win 69% of all U.S. presidential elections. Second, incumbents win 80% of the time when the economy is not in recession, and 76% of the time when real annual per capita GDP growth over the course of the term exceeds the average of the previous two terms, which will likely be the case in 2020 unless there is a recession (Chart 7). Chart 7Relative Economic Performance Could Give Trump Firepower Relative Economic Performance Could Give Trump Firepower Relative Economic Performance Could Give Trump Firepower The above probabilities are drawn from the aforementioned Professor Allan Lichtman, at American University in Washington D.C., who has accurately predicted the outcome of every presidential election since 1984 (except the disputed 2000 election). Lichtman views presidential elections as a referendum on the party that controls the White House. He presents "13 Keys to the Presidency," which are true or false statements based on historically derived indicators of presidential performance. If six or more of the 13 keys are false, the incumbent will lose. On our own reading of Lichtman's keys, Trump is currently lined up to lose a maximum of four keys - two shy of the six needed to unseat him (Table 2). This is a generous reading for the Democrats: Trump's party has lost seats in the midterm election relative to 2014; his term has seen sustained social unrest; he is tainted by major scandal; and he is lacking in charisma. Yet on a stricter reading Trump only has one key against him (the midterm). Table 2Lichtman's Thirteen Keys To The White House* The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast What would it take to push Trump over the edge? Aside from a recession (which would trigger one or both of the economic keys against him), he would need to see two-to-four of the following factors take shape: a serious foreign policy or military failure, a charismatic Democratic opponent in 2020, a significant challenge to his nomination within the Republican Party, or a robust third party candidacy emerge. In our view, none of these developments are on the horizon yet, though they are probable enough. For instance, it is easy to see Trump's audacious foreign policy on China, Iran, and North Korea leading to a failure that counts against him. Thus, as things currently stand, Trump is the candidate to beat as long as the economy holds up. What about impeachment and removal from office prior to 2020? As long as Trump remains popular among Republican voters he will prevent the Senate from turning against him (Chart 8). What could cause public opinion to change? Clear, irrefutable, accessible, "smoking gun" evidence of personal wrongdoing that affected Trump's campaigns or duties in office. Nixon was not brought down until the Watergate tapes became public - and that required a Supreme Court order. Only then did Republican opinion turn against him and expose him to impeachment and removal - prompting him to resign. Chart 8Trump Cannot Be Removed From Office The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast All that being said, Trump tends to trail his likeliest 2020 adversaries in one-on-one opinion polling. Given our recession call, we would not dispute online betting markets giving Trump a less-than-50% chance of reelection at present (Chart 9). The Democratic selection process has hardly begun: e.g. Joe Biden could have health problems, and Michelle Obama, Oprah Winfrey, or other surprise candidates could decide to run. The world will be a different place in 2020. Bottom Line: The recession call is the election call. If BCA is right about a recession by 2020, then Trump will lose. If we are wrong, then Trump is favored to win. Chart 9A Strong Opponent Has Yet To Emerge The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast Is It Even Possible For Trump To Win Again? Election Scenarios Is it demographically possible for Trump to win? Yes. In 2016 BCA dubbed Trump's electoral strategy "White Hype," based on his apparent attempt to increase the support and turnout of white voters, primarily in "Rust Belt" battleground states. While Republican policy wonks might have envisioned a "big tent" Republican Party for the future, demographic trends in 2016 suggested that this strategy was premature. Indeed, drawing from a major demographic study by the Center for American Progress and other Washington think tanks,6 we found that a big increase in white turnout and support was the only 2016 election scenario in which a victory in both the popular vote and electoral college vote was possible. In other words, while "Minority Outreach" have worked as a GOP strategy in the future, Donald Trump's team was mathematically correct in realizing that only White Hype would work in the actual election at hand. This strategy did not win Trump the popular vote, but it did secure him the requisite electoral college seats, notably from the formerly blue of Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. Comparing the 2016 results with our pre-election projections confirms this point: Trump won the very swing states where he increased white GOP support and lost the swing states where he did not. Pennsylvania is the notable exception, but he won there by increasing white turnout instead of white GOP support.7 Can Trump do this again? Yes, but not easily. Map 1 depicts the 2016 election results with red and blue states, plus the percentage swing in white party support that would have been necessary to turn the state to the opposite party (white support for the GOP is the independent variable). In Michigan, a 0.3% shift in the white vote away from Republicans would have deprived Trump of victory; in Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, a 0.8% shift would have done the same; in Florida, a 1.5% change would have done so. Map 1The 'White Hype' Strategy Narrowly Worked In 2016 The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast Critically, the country's demographics have changed significantly since 2016 - to Trump's detriment. The white eligible voting population in swing states will have fallen sharply from 81% of the population to 76% of the population by 2020 (Chart 10). Chart 10Demographic Shift Does Not Favor Trump The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast Thus, to determine whether Trump still has a pathway to victory, we looked at eight scenarios, drawing on the updated Center for American Progress study. The assumptions behind the scenarios in Table 3 are as follows: Status Quo - This replicates the 2016 result and projects it forward with 2020 demographics. 2016 Sans Third Party - Replicates the 2016 result but normalizes the third party vote, which was elevated that year. Minority Revolt - In this scenario, Hispanics, Asians, and other minorities turn out in large numbers to support Democrats, even with white non-college educated voters supporting Republicans at a decent rate. The Kanye West Strategy - Trump performs a miracle and generates a swing of minority voters in favor of Republicans. Blue Collar Democrats - White non-college-educated support returns to 2012 norms, meaning back to Democrats. Romney's Ghost - White college-educated support returns to 2012 levels. White Hype - White non-college-educated support swings to Republicans. Obama versus Trump - White college-educated voters ally with minorities in opposition to a surge in white non-college-educated voters for Republicans. Table 3Assumptions For Key Electoral Scenarios In 2020 The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The results show that Trump's best chance at remaining in the White House is still White Hype, as it is still the only scenario in which Trump can statistically win a victory in the popular vote (Chart 11). Another pathway to victory is the "2016 Sans Third Party" scenario. But this scenario still calls for White Hype, since a third party challenger is out of his hands (Chart 12).8 Chart 11'White Hype' May Be Only Way To Secure Both Popular And Electoral College Vote... The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast   Chart 12... Although Moving To The Center Could Still Yield Electoral College Vote The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast However, the data show that Trump cannot win merely by replicating his white turnout and support from 2016, due to demographic changes wiping away the thin margins in key swing states. He needs some additional increases in support. These increases will ultimately have to be culled from his record in office - which reinforces the all-important question of the timing of recession, but also raises the question of whether Trump will move to the center to woo the median voter. In the "Kanye West" and "Romney's Ghost" scenarios, Trump wins the electoral college by broadening his appeal to minorities and college-educated white voters. This may sound far-fetched, but President Clinton reinvented himself after the "Republican Revolution" of 1994 by compromising with Republicans in Congress. The slim margins in the Midwest suggest that the probability of Trump shifting to the middle is not as low as one might think. Especially if there is no recession. Independents remain the largest voting block - and they have not lost much steam, if any, since 2016. Moreover, the number of independents who lean Republican is in an uptrend (Chart 13). Without a recession, or a failure on Lichtman's keys, Trump will likely broaden his base. Chart 13Trump Shows Promise Among Independents Trump Shows Promise Among Independents Trump Shows Promise Among Independents Bottom Line: Trump needs to increase white turnout and GOP support beyond 2016 levels in order to win 2020. Demographics will not allow a simple repeat of his 2016 performance. However, he may be able to generate the requisite turnout and support by moving to the center, courting college-educated whites and even minorities. His success will depend on his record in office. Investment Implications What are the implications of the above findings for 2018-20 and beyond? The Rust Belt states of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin will become pseudo-apocalyptic battlegrounds in 2020. The Democrats must aim to take back all three to win the White House, as they cannot win with just two alone.9 They are likely to focus on these states because they are erstwhile blue states and the vote margin is so slim that the slightest factors could shift the balance - meaning that Democrats could win here without a general pro-Democratic shift in opinion that hurts Trump in other key swing states such as Florida, North Carolina, or Arizona. The "Blue Collar Democrat" scenario, for instance, merely requires that white non-college-educated voters return to their 2012 level of support for Democrats. Joe Biden is the logical candidate, health permitting, as he is from Pennsylvania and was literally on the ballot in 2012! Moreover, these states are the easiest to flip to the Democratic side via the woman vote. In Michigan, a 0.5% swing of women to the Democrats would have turned the state blue again; in Pennsylvania that number is 1.6% and in Wisconsin it is 1.7% (Table 4). These are the lowest of any state. Women from the Midwest or with a base in the Midwest - such as Michelle Obama or Oprah Winfrey - would also be logical candidates. Table 4Women Voters May Hold The Balance The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The 2020 U.S. Election: A "Way Too Soon" Forecast The Democrats could also pursue a separate or complementary strategy by courting African American turnout and support, especially in Florida, Georgia, and North Carolina. But it is more difficult to flip these states than the Midwestern ones. With the Rust Belt as the fulcrum of his electoral strategy and reelection, Trump has a major incentive to maintain economic nationalism over the coming two years. Trump may be more pragmatic in the use of tariffs, and will certainly engage in talks with China and others, but he ultimately must remain "tough" on trade. He has fewer constraints in pursuing trade war with China than with Europe. For the same Rust Belt reason, the Democrats, if they get into the Oval Office, will not be overly kind to the "butchers of Beijing," as President Clinton called the Chinese leadership in the 1992 presidential campaign (after the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident). Hence we are structurally bearish U.S.-China relations and related assets. Interestingly, if Trump moves to the middle, and tones down "white nationalism" in pursuit of college-educated whites and minorities, then he would have an incentive to dampen the flames of social division ahead of 2020. The key is that in an environment without recession, Trump has the option of courting voters on the basis of his economic and policy performance alone. Whereas if he is seen fanning social divisions, it could backfire, as Democrats could benefit from a sense of national crisis and instability in a presidential election. Either way, culture wars, controversial rhetoric, identity politics, unrest, and violence will continue in the United States as the fringes of the political spectrum use identity politics and wedge issues to rile up voters.The question is how the leading parties and their candidates handle it. What about after 2020? Are there any conclusions that can be drawn regardless of which party controls the White House? The two biggest policy certainties are that fiscal spending will go up and that generational conflict will rise. On fiscal spending, Trump was a game changer by removing fiscal hawkishness from the Republican agenda. Democrats are not proposing fiscal responsibility either. The most likely areas of bipartisan legislation in 2018-20 are health care and infrastructure - returning House Speaker Nancy Pelosi mentioned infrastructure several times in her election-night speech - which would add to the deficit. The deficit is already set to widen sharply, judging by the fact that it has been widening at a time when unemployment is falling. This aberration has only occurred during the economic boom of the 1950s and the inflation and subsequent stagflation beginning in the late 1960s (Chart 14). The current outlook implies a return of the stagflationary scenario. In the late 1960s, the World War I generation was retiring, lifting the dependent-to-worker ratio and increasing consumption relative to savings. Today, as Peter Berezin of BCA's Global Investment Strategy has shown, the Baby Boomers are retiring with a similar impact. Chart 14The Deficit Is Blowing Out Even Without A Recession The Deficit Is Blowing Out Even Without A Recession The Deficit Is Blowing Out Even Without A Recession Trump made an appeal to elderly voters in the midterms by warning that unfettered immigration and Democratic entitlement expansions would take away from existing senior benefits. By contrast, Democrats will argue that Republicans want to cut benefits for all to pay for tax cuts for the rich, and will try to activate Millennial voters on a range of progressive issues that antagonize older voters. The result is that policy debates will focus more on generational differences. Mammoth budget deficits - not to mention trade war - will be good for inflation, good for gold, and a headwind for U.S. government bonds and the USD as long as the environment is not recessionary. The greatest policy uncertainties are health care and immigration. These are the two major outstanding policy issues that Republicans and Democrats will vie over in 2018 and beyond. While President Trump could achieve something with the Democrats on either of these issues with some painful compromises, it is too soon to have a high conviction on the outcome. But assuming that over the coming years some immigration restrictions come into play and that some kind of public health care option becomes more widely available, there are two more reasons to expect inflation to trend upward on a secular basis. Also on a secular basis, defense stocks stand to benefit from geopolitical multipolarity, especially U.S.-China antagonism. Tech stocks stand to suffer due to the trade war and an increasingly bipartisan consensus that this sector needs to be regulated.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com   1 Furthermore, victories on the state level, if built upon in the 2020 election, could give the Democrats an advantage in gerrymandering, i.e. electoral redistricting, which is an important political process in the United States. 2 Please see Allan J. Lichtman, Predicting The Next President: The Keys To The White House 2016 (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016). 3 Please see Joseph Bafumi, Robert S. Erikson, and Christopher Wlezien, "Balancing, Generic Polls and Midterm Congressional Elections," The Journal of Politics 72:3 (2010), pp. 705-19. 4 Please see footnote 2 above. 5 Please see Sylvan Lane, “Trump says Fed is his ‘biggest threat,’ blasting own appointees,” The Hill, October 16, 2018, available at thehill.com. 6 Please see Rob Griffin, Ruy Teixeira, and William H. Frey, "America's Electoral Future: Demographic Shifts and the Future of the Trump Coalition," Center for American Progress, dated April 14, 2018, available at www.americanprogress.org. 7 In several cases, he did not have to lift white support by as much as we projected because minority support for the Democrats dropped off after Obama left the stage. 8 Interestingly, however, this scenario would result in an electoral college tie! Since the House would then vote on a state delegation basis, it would likely hand Trump the victory (and Pence would also win the Senate). 9 However, if they win Pennsylvania plus one electoral vote in Maine, they can win the electoral college with either Michigan or Wisconsin.

Mounting supply-side uncertainty will keep the risk premium in oil prices - and volatility - elevated after U.S. export sanctions against Iran kick in November 4 (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekOil-Price Risk Premium Will Continue To Increase Risk Premium In Oil Prices Rising; KSA Lifts West Coast Export Capacity Risk Premium In Oil Prices Rising; KSA Lifts West Coast Export Capacity These sanctions likely will remove 1.0 - 1.5mm b/d of Iranian exports, and absorb the combined spare capacity of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia (Chart 2) in the process. Export capacity expansions on KSA's West coast - intended to keep oil flowing if the Strait of Hormuz is closed - put the supply-side risks sharply in focus. Chart 2Lost Iranian Exports Could Exceed KSA's and Russia's Spare Capacity Risk Premium In Oil Prices Rising; KSA Lifts West Coast Export Capacity Risk Premium In Oil Prices Rising; KSA Lifts West Coast Export Capacity OPEC 2.0's production increases last month calmed markets.1 All the same, it is worth noting they occurred just before a widely expected U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) release coinciding with refinery turnarounds, and one-off Asian demand shocks. On the back of these supply boosts, and an upward revision to U.S. shale output (see below), and a slight decrease in our expected demand growth next year, we lowered our 2019 Brent forecast to $92/bbl from $95/bbl. We now expect Brent prices to peak in April 2019. WTI will trade $6/bbl lower (Chart 3). Our forecasts are conditioned on Iranian export losses of 1.25mm b/d, and Venezuelan losses of just over 450k b/d. A loss of 1.7mm+ b/d of Iran exports, as Platts Analytics expects, or a Venezuela collapse, means an unplanned outage anywhere will take prices above $100/bbl. Chart 3OPEC 2.0 Production Hike Pushes Price Spike To 2Q19 OPEC 2.0 Production Hike Pushes Price Spike To 2Q19 OPEC 2.0 Production Hike Pushes Price Spike To 2Q19 Highlights Energy: Overweight. The IMF downgraded global GDP growth expectations from 3.9% to 3.7% p.a. this year and next. This reduced our base case demand growth for 2019 slightly, to 1.5mm b/d from 1.6mm b/d previously. Base Metals: Neutral. Global copper stocks stand at half their late April peak - the lowest level since late 2016, on the back of restrictions on Chinese scrap imports. Precious Metals: Neutral. Palladium traded to record levels above $1,140/oz this week, as persistent physical deficits into 2020 are priced into the market. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA's Crop Progress Report showed soybean harvests accelerating: 53% of the crop was harvested as of last week, below the 2013 - 17 average of 69%, but well above the previous week's 38% level. Feature U.S. Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin is convinced global oil markets have fully priced in the loss of Iranian crude oil exports arising from the re-imposition of export sanctions by the U.S. November 4. Speaking with Reuters over the weekend, he said, "Oil prices have already gone up, so my expectation is that the oil market has anticipated what's going on in the reductions. I believe the information is already reflected in the price of oil."2 We are not so sure. The price-decomposition model shown in the Chart of the Week is a bottom-up fundamental model that assesses how changes in OPEC and non-OPEC supplies, global demand and inventories contribute to overall price changes, as new information becomes available regarding these variables. These variables are shown in Chart 4 and Table 1.3 Chart 4BCA Global Oil Supply-Demand Balances BCA Global Oil Supply-Demand Balances BCA Global Oil Supply-Demand Balances The "residual" term in the model covers everything not explained by these fundamental variables.4 We believe the unexplained effect on prices in the residuals reflects market participants' perception of riskiness - either to supply or demand - given the big fundamental drivers of price are accounted for in the other variables. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d) Risk Premium In Oil Prices Rising; KSA Lifts West Coast Export Capacity Risk Premium In Oil Prices Rising; KSA Lifts West Coast Export Capacity Close inspection reveals the residual term has been increasing as we approach the deadline for the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran. And the fact is, estimates of the loss in Iranian exports are widely dispersed - from less than 1mm b/d to 1.7mm b/d by tanker trackers like Platts Analytics. As Chart 2 shows, export losses at the high end of this range would absorb almost all of the world's spare capacity - the 1.3mm b/d the U.S. EIA estimates for OPEC (most of it held by KSA, plus whatever other Gulf Arab producers can muster). Russia, which is producing at a record of ~ 11.4mm b/d, likely has ~ 250k b/d of spare capacity at its disposal. With the increase in global demand largely being covered by U.S. shales, which are constrained to ~ 1.3mm b/d of growth p.a. until 2H19, when we expect production to increase at a 1.44mm b/d annual rate, this leaves the global market perilously exposed to any and all unplanned production outages. Any deterioration in Venezuela's production, which we expect to fall to 865k b/d on average in 2019 (versus 1.3mm b/d on average this year), or an unplanned loss in exports from historically unstable states like Nigeria and Libya - where we raised our production estimates to 1.75mm b/d and 1.05mm b/d in line with OPEC survey data - almost surely will spike prices above $100/bbl.5 OPEC 2.0 Got Lucky OPEC 2.0 - the producer coalition led by KSA and Russia - picked a fortuitous moment to increase production this past month. OPEC, led by KSA, lifted crude and liquids production 140k b/d in September, while Russia's production rose 150k b/d. It is worth noting these output increases occurred just before a widely expected U.S. SPR release in October - November, which overlapped with refinery maintenance (turnaround) season in the U.S. Midwest refiners were expected to take 300k to 460k b/d of capacity offline in September and October, a relatively high level of maintenance, while Gulf Coast refiners were expected to take 430k to 535k b/d down.6 Both events raise the supply of crude relative to demand, and reduce inventory drawdowns. In addition, one-off Asian demand shocks - an earthquake and typhoon in Japan - dented demand. KSA lifted its production to 10.5mm b/d in September, bringing average 3Q18 production to 10.4mm b/d versus a bit more than 10mm b/d in 1H18. Russia's crude and liquids output rose to 11.45mm b/d in 3Q18 versus 11.2mm b/d in 1H18. The higher production calmed markets somewhat. OPEC 2.0 effectively got a two-month assist from the U.S. refinery turnarounds and a U.S. SPR release, just as markets were fretting prices would breach $90/bbl earlier this month.7 These production boosts will allow OECD inventories to rebuild somewhat going in to the Northern Hemisphere's winter (Chart 5). Nonetheless, OPEC 2.0 has begun tearing into spare capacity with these output increases. Chart 5OPEC 2.0 Production Boost Allows OECD Stocks To Rebuild OPEC 2.0 Production Boost Allows OECD Stocks To Rebuild OPEC 2.0 Production Boost Allows OECD Stocks To Rebuild KSA Talks Markets Lower... While the U.S. SPR release and inventory builds associated with U.S. turnarounds progressed, KSA's Energy Minister Khalid al-Falih was reassuring markets the Kingdom can ramp production to 11mm b/d, and even 12mm b/d if needs be. KSA has been increasing rig counts in 2H18 as Brent prices rise, but we remain highly dubious KSA can ramp production to 11mm b/d - let alone 12mm b/d - and sustain it for any meaningful length of time (Chart 6). Chart 6KSA Increasing Rig Counts, After Price-Induced Slowdown KSA Increasing Rig Counts, After Price-Induced Slowdown KSA Increasing Rig Counts, After Price-Induced Slowdown The likelihood KSA can significantly boost production before the end of 1H19 became even more doubtful, following reports the Kingdom and Kuwait were having difficulty agreeing on restarting Neutral Zone production. We've downgraded our assessment that 350k b/d of Neutral Zone production will be returned to the market beginning in 2Q19 to a 50% likelihood, following reports KSA and Kuwaiti officials are diverging on operational control of the production. Apparently, the two states also differ on geopolitical issues in the Gulf, as well - e.g., the Qatar blockade lead by KSA, and Iran policy.8 While core Gulf Arab producers are raising output, we expect the non-Gulf members of the Cartel continue to see output decline (Chart 7). Indeed, with the exception of the core OPEC Gulf Arab producers, U.S. shale operators and Russia, the rest of the world is barely keeping its output level (Chart 8). Chart 7Non-Gulf OPEC Output Continues to Decline Non-Gulf OPEC Output Continues to Decline Non-Gulf OPEC Output Continues to Decline Chart 8Global Production Growth Stalls Outside U.S. Onshore, GCC And Russia Global Production Growth Stalls Outside U.S. Onshore, GCC And Russia Global Production Growth Stalls Outside U.S. Onshore, GCC And Russia ...And Shores Up Export Capacity Export capacity expansions on KSA's West coast - intended to keep oil flowing if the Strait of Hormuz is closed - put global supply-side risks sharply in focus. KSA has added 3 mm b/d of oil export capacity to the Red Sea coast of the Kingdom, with an upgrade to its Yanbu crude oil terminal. Prior to the expansion, Yanbu terminal's export capacity was 1.3mm b/d; it was used mainly for refined products and petrochemicals shipments, due to its relative proximity to refineries in Yanbu, Rabigh, Yasref, Jeddah and Jazan. Shipping via the Red Sea port allows KSA to move crude to Asia through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait to the south, which at times is threatened by Yemen's Houthi militia, and the north to Western markets through the Suez Canal. In addition, KSA's national oil company, Aramco, says it intends to restore operations at al-Muajjiz crude oil terminal, which has been out of operation since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Aramco intends to integrate the Muajjiz terminal into the Yanbu facilities to expand Red Sea export capacity from ~ 8 mm b/d to some 11.5 mm b/d. KSA's total export capacity is scheduled to reach 15mm b/d by year-end. These expansions give KSA the option to reroute all of its ~ 7mm b/d exports through the Red Sea, in the event the Strait of Hormuz is closed by Iran. However, this option could be limited by pipeline infrastructure. The current capacity of the East - West crude pipeline is 5mm b/d, although Aramco signalled its intention to boost capacity to 7mm b/d by end-2018. No announcements indicating this was on schedule or completed could be found. Global Demand Holds Up The IMF downgraded its global GDP growth expectation from 3.9% p.a. to 3.7% this year and next. This reduced our base case demand growth for 2019 to 1.5mm b/d from 1.6mm b/d. Even so, we note that oil prices for EM consumers in local-currency terms are at or close to post-GFC highs (Charts 9A and9B). A number of EM governments relaxed or removed subsidies on fuel prices following the oil-price collapse of 2014 - 16, which means consumers in these states are feeling most or all of the effect of higher prices directly for the first time in the modern era (beginning in the 1960s, when OPEC became the dominant producer cartel in the market).9 Chart 9ALocal-Currency Cost Of Oil In Select EM Economies Local-Currency Cost Of Oil In Select EM Economies Local-Currency Cost Of Oil In Select EM Economies Chart 9BLocal-Currency Cost Of Oil In Select EM Economies Local-Currency Cost Of Oil In Select EM Economies Local-Currency Cost Of Oil In Select EM Economies As we've noted previously, high fuel costs (in local-currency terms) coupled with high absolute prices deliver a double-whammy to EM consumers, which are the driving force in global oil-demand growth. In fact, 1.1mm b/d of the 1.5mm b/d of demand growth we expect next year in our base case is accounted for by EM growth. In our scenarios analysis, we assume every $10/bbl jump in prices above $90/bbl destroys 100k b/d of EM demand. This lowers the unconstrained oil-price trajectory, and reduces our base case growth estimate of 1.5mm b/d next year to 1.3mm b/d (Chart 10). Chart 10An Oil-Supply Shock Would Lower Demand An Oil-Supply Shock Would Lower Demand An Oil-Supply Shock Would Lower Demand An oil-supply shock that seriously erodes EM demand would - in the course of months, we believe - translate into a disinflationary impulse into DM markets. This could force the Fed to change course and dial its rates-normalization policy back, as we recently noted.10 Bottom Line: Volatility will remain elevated following the re-imposition of sanctions against Iran's oil exports next month. OPEC 2.0's fortuitously timed production increases - coincident with a scheduled U.S. SPR release and refinery turnarounds - will be absorbed by markets once turnaround season ends in the U.S. Global spare capacity is insufficient to cover Iranian export losses at the high end of market expectations, if Venezuelan production falls more than expected or that state collapses. Any unplanned outage anywhere will quickly push prices through $100/bbl, necessitating further U.S. SPR releases. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the OPEC/non-OPEC coalition led by KSA and Russia. This coalition likely will be formalized at the December 7 OPEC meeting in Vienna via treaty. This has been alluded to over the past year, most recently in an interview given to Tass, the Russian state-owned news agency. Please see "Saudi energy minister Al-Falih speaks to TASS on OPEC+, oil prices and Khashoggi," published by TASS, October 22, 2018. 2 Please see "Mnuchin says it will be harder for Iran oil importers to get waivers," published by uk.reuters.com October 21, 2018. 3 The Federal Reserve Bank of New York publishes a similar price-decomposition model weekly in its "Oil Price Dynamics Report," which is available online. 4 We can assume USD effects will be reflected in demand and supply at the margin - i.e., a stronger USD reduces demand by raising the local-currency costs of oil, and increases supply by lowering the local-currency costs of production, and vice versa. Uncertainty as to the USD's trajectory adds to overall uncertainty in the model. 5 This likely would trigger withdrawals from the U.S. SPR, or the EU's strategic petroleum reserves, but that will take time to implement. Both Libya and Nigeria likely will hold elections next year: Nigeria in February, Libya possibly on December 10, but more likely next year following passage of a UN resolution to extend the mandate of its political mission there to September 15, 2019. Civil unrest in Libya has been increasing, as ISIS fighters increase the tempo of operations on the ground. 6 Please see "Falling into refiner Turnaround Season & Maintenance outlook," published by Genscape August 23, 2018. 7 This occurs at a fortuitous time in the U.S. election cycle, as mid-terms will be held November 6, two days after Iran sanctions kick in. We expected an SPR draw ahead of midterms; please see "Trade, Dollars, Oil & Metals ... Assessing Downside Risk," published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy August 23, 2018. It is available at: ces.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see "Oil output from Saudi, Kuwait shared zone on hold as relations sour," published by uk.reuters.com October 18, 2018. 9 The U.S. Federal Reserve is in the process of a rates-normalization cycle, which likely will keep the USD appreciating against EM currencies into next year. Our House view calls for five additional hikes between December and the end of 2019. Please see "Trade, Dollars, Oil & Metals ... Assessing Downside Risk," published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy August 23, 2018, for further discussion. ces.bcaresearch.com. 10 We discuss this at length in a Special Report published last week with BCA Research's entitled "Man Bites Dog: Could Sharply Rising Oil Prices Lead To Lower Global Bond Yields in 2019?" It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trade Recommendation Performance In 3Q18 Risk Premium In Oil Prices Rising; KSA Lifts West Coast Export Capacity Risk Premium In Oil Prices Rising; KSA Lifts West Coast Export Capacity Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017 Summary Of Trades Closed In 2017 Risk Premium In Oil Prices Rising; KSA Lifts West Coast Export Capacity Risk Premium In Oil Prices Rising; KSA Lifts West Coast Export Capacity

Highlights So What? Go long Brent / short S&P 500. The risk of a recession in 2019 is underappreciated. Why? The likelihood is increasing of a geopolitically-induced supply-side shock that pushes crude prices above $100 per barrel in the coming 6-12 months. Oil supply disruptions in Iran, Iraq, and Venezuela represent the primary source of risk. Historically, the combination of Fed rates hike and an oil price spike has preceded 8 out of the last 9 recessions. Also... A recession in 2019, ahead of the 2020 election, would set the stage for a confrontation between Trump and the Fed, adding fuel to market volatility. Feature Geopolitical tensions are brewing from the Strait of Hormuz to the Strait of Malacca. As we go to press, news is breaking that a Chinese naval vessel almost collided with the USS Decatur as the latter conducted "freedom of navigation" operations within 12 nautical miles of Gaven and Johnson reefs in the Spratly Islands. Given the trade tensions between China and the U.S., this alleged maneuver by the Chinese vessel suggests that Beijing is not backing off from a confrontation. Our view remains that Sino-American trade tensions can get a lot worse before they get better. The latest incident, which builds on a series of negative gestures recently in the South China Sea, suggests that both sides are combining longstanding geopolitical tensions with the trade war. This will likely encourage brinkmanship and further degrade U.S.-China relations. Yet China-U.S. tensions are not the only concern for investors in 2019. Another crisis is brewing in the Middle East, with the potential to significantly increase oil prices over the next 12 months. U.S. households may have to deal with a double-whammy next year: higher costs of imported goods as the U.S.-China trade war rages on and a significant increase in gasoline prices. In this report, we discuss this dire outlook. The Folly Of Recession Forecasting In mid-2017, BCA Research published two reports, one titled "Beware The 2019 Trump Recession" and another titled "The Timing Of The Next Recession."1 Both argued that if the Federal Reserve kept raising rates in line with the FOMC dots, then monetary policy would move into restrictive territory by early 2019 and increase the likelihood of recession thereafter. We subsequently adjusted the timing of our recession forecast to 2020 or beyond, based on a more positive assessment of the U.S. economy. In this report, we explore a risk to the BCA House View on the timing of the next recession. As BCA's long-time Chief Economist Martin Barnes has said, predicting recessions is a mug's game. There have been eight recessions in the past 60 years (excluding the brief 1980-81 downturn) and the Fed failed to forecast all of them (Table 1). Table 1Fed Economic Forecasts Versus Outcomes 2019: The Geopolitical Recession? 2019: The Geopolitical Recession? The Atlanta Fed produces a recession indicator index which is designed to highlight the odds of recession based on trends in recent GDP data. At the moment, the indicator is at a historically sanguine 2.4%. Unfortunately, low readings are not a reliable cause for optimism. The 1974-75, 1981-82, and 2007-09 recessions were all severe and the Atlanta Fed's recession indicator had a low reading of 10%, 1.6%, and 7.7%, respectively - just as the recession was about to begin (Chart 1). Chart 1The Market Is Not Expecting A Recession The Market Is Not Expecting A Recession The Market Is Not Expecting A Recession The 1974-75 recession is instructive, given the numerous parallels with the current environment: Energy Geopolitics: The 1973 oil crisis caused a massive spike in crude prices. This point is especially pertinent since the 1973 oil embargo is widely viewed as an important contributor to the 1974-75 recession. Real short rates had risen and the yield curve had inverted long before oil prices spiked, so recession was almost inevitable even without the oil price move. But the oil spike made the recession much deeper than otherwise. Protectionism: President Nixon imposed a 10% across-the-board tariff on all imports into the U.S. in 1971 to try to force trade partners to devalue the U.S. dollar. Dislocation: Competition from newly industrialized countries - Japan and the East Asian tigers in particular - laid waste to the steel industry in the developed world. Polarization: President Nixon polarized the nation with both his policies and behavior, leading to his resignation in 1974. Given the exogenous and geopolitical nature of oil supply shocks, today's recession indicators are missing a critical potential headwind to the economy. A geopolitically induced oil-price shock could create more pain than the economy is able to handle. Why An Oil Price Shock? America's renewed foray into the politics of the Middle East will unravel the tenuous equilibrium that was just recently established between Iran and its regional rivals. The U.S.-Iran détente that produced the signing of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA) created conditions for a precarious balance of power between Israel and Saudi Arabia on one side, and Iran and its allies on the other side. This equilibrium led to a meaningful change in Tehran's behavior, particularly on the following fronts: The Strait of Hormuz: Tehran ceased to rhetorically threaten the Strait as soon as negotiations began with the U.S. (Chart 2). Since then, Iran's capabilities to threaten the Strait have grown, while the West's anti-mine capabilities remain unchanged.2 Iraq: Iran directly participated in the anti-U.S. insurgency in Iraq. Tehran changed tack after 2013 and cooperated closely with the U.S. in the fight against the Islamic State. In 2014, Iran acquiesced to the removal of the deeply sectarian, and pro-Iranian, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. Bahrain and the Saudi Eastern Province: Iran's material and rhetorical support was instrumental in the Shia uprisings in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province in 2011 (Map 1). Saudi Arabia had to resort to military force to quell both. Since the détente with the U.S. in 2015, Iranian support for Shia uprisings in these critical areas of the Persian Gulf has stopped. Chart 2Geopolitical Crises And Global Peak Supply Losses 2019: The Geopolitical Recession? 2019: The Geopolitical Recession? Map 1Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province Is A Crucial Piece Of Real Estate 2019: The Geopolitical Recession? 2019: The Geopolitical Recession? Put simply, the 2015 nuclear deal traded American acquiescence toward Iranian nuclear development in exchange for Iran's cooperation on a number of strategically vital regional issues. By unraveling that détente, President Trump is upending the balance of power in the Middle East and increasing the probability that Iran retaliates. Since penning our latest net assessment of the U.S.-Iran tensions in May, Iran has already retaliated.3 Our checklist for "kinetic" conflict has now risen from zero to at least 15%, if not higher (Table 2). We expect the probability to rise once the U.S. starts implementing the oil embargo in November. This will dovetail our Iran-U.S. decision tree, which sets the subjective probability of kinetic action by the U.S. against Iran at a baseline of 20% (Diagram 1). Table 2Will The U.S. Attack Iran? 2019: The Geopolitical Recession? 2019: The Geopolitical Recession? Diagram 1Iran-U.S. Tensions Decision Tree 2019: The Geopolitical Recession? 2019: The Geopolitical Recession? Bottom Line: The premier geopolitical risk to investors in 2019 is that President Trump's maximum pressure tactic on Iran spills over into Iraq, causing a loss of supply from the world's fifth-largest crude producer.4 We expect the U.S. oil embargo against Iran to remove between 1 million and 1.5 million barrels per day from the market. In addition, the loss of Iraqi production due to sabotage could be anywhere between 500,000 and 3.5 million barrels per day. Added to this total is the potential loss of Venezuelan exports due to the deteriorating situation there. When our commodity team combines all of these factors, they generate a worst-case scenario where the price of crude rises to $110 per barrel in 2019 or higher (Chart 3). And this scenario assumes that EMs do not reinstitute energy subsidies (and therefore their consumption falls faster than if they do reinstitute them). Chart 3Worst-Case Scenario Propels Oil Price Toward 0/Barrel Worst-Case Scenario Propels Oil Price Toward $110/Barrel Worst-Case Scenario Propels Oil Price Toward $110/Barrel The Ayatollah Recession We believe that the midterm election is a dud from an investment perspective, no matter the outcome. However, the election does matter as a hurdle that, once cleared, will allow President Trump to renew his "maximum pressure" tactic against China, Iran, and perhaps domestic tech corporations.5 Iran is a critical risk in this strategy. If President Trump applies maximum pressure on Iran, then a reduction in crude exports from Iran, Iranian retaliation in Iraq, and the simultaneous loss of Venezuelan supplies could combine to increase the likelihood of U.S. recession in 2019. Readers might recall that no sitting president has gotten re-elected during a recession. Why would Trump pursue a policy that risks his re-election chances in 2020? Surely he would deviate from his maximum pressure tactic if faced with the prospect of a recession. However, it is folly to assume that policymakers are perfectly rational, or fully informed. American presidents are some of the most unconstrained policymakers in the world, given both the hard power of the United States and the constitutional lack of constraints on the president when it comes to national security. Trump may believe, for instance, that the 660 million barrels of crude in America's Strategic Petroleum Reserve can offset the impact of sanctions against Iran.6 Or he may believe that he can force OPEC to supply enough oil to offset the Iranian losses. The problem for President Trump is that Iran is not led by idiots. Iranian policymakers understand that the best way to reduce American pressure is to induce an oil price spike in the summer of 2019 that hurts President Trump's re-election chances, forcing him to back off. As such, sabotaging Iraqi oil exports, which mainly transit through the port of Basra - a city highly vulnerable to Shia-on-Shia violence that is already a risk to the country's stability - would be an obvious target. An oil price spike would serve as a negotiating tool against the U.S., and the additional revenue would help replace what Iran loses due to the embargo. Tehran and Washington will therefore play a game of chicken throughout 2019, and there is a fair probability that neither side will swerve. President Trump may be making the same mistake as many predecessors have made, assuming that the Iranian regime is teetering at a precipice and that a mere nudge will force the leadership to negotiate. Oil price shocks and recessions have a historical connection. In a recent report, our commodity strategists highlighted that a spike in oil prices preceded 10 out of the past 11 recessions in the U.S. since 1945 (Table 3). Admittedly, not all spikes were followed by recession. The combination of an oil price spike and Fed rate hikes has produced a recession 8 out of 9 times.7 If oil prices rose to $100 per barrel in the coming 6-12 months, there will be several negative macro consequences. In particular, gasoline prices will rise back toward $4 per gallon (Chart 4). Retail gasoline prices have already increased by more than 50% since they bottomed in February 2016. So how much more upside can the U.S. private sector take? Table 3History Of Oil Supply Shocks 2019: The Geopolitical Recession? 2019: The Geopolitical Recession? Chart 4A Source Of Pressure For Consumers A Source Of Pressure For Consumers A Source Of Pressure For Consumers The Household Sector Consumer confidence is currently near all-time highs, which tends to signal that the path of least resistance is flat or down (Chart 5). Household gasoline consumption has already declined in response to higher oil prices since the middle of 2017. Given that gasoline demand is relatively inelastic, consumers may already be near their minimum consumption level. Chart 5Nearing All-Time Highs Nearing All-Time Highs Nearing All-Time Highs Instead, households will experience a decline in their disposable income. This will come on the back of both higher gasoline prices and an increase in the prices of other goods and services, as the oil spike spills across sectors. U.S. households - and most likely those in other markets - are stretched to the limit already. A recent Fed survey found that 40% of U.S. households do not have the funds needed to meet an unexpected $400 cost in any given month.8 Such an unexpected expense would require them to either sell possessions, borrow, or cut back on other purchases. Chart 6Most Americans Cannot Cut Saving To Spend Most Americans Cannot Cut Saving To Spend Most Americans Cannot Cut Saving To Spend Left with few other options, households would react to their lower disposable income by reducing demand for other goods and services. This dent in consumer spending would bring down aggregate demand, leading to slower employment growth and even less income and spending. Households could save less to maintain their current purchasing levels, given the recent rise in the savings rate (Chart 6). But this is unlikely. Although the household savings rate has increased in recent years, we have previously argued that a material part of the increase was driven by small business-owner profits. These owners have much higher levels of income than the median consumer. For Americans living paycheck-to-paycheck, it would be difficult to reduce a savings rate that is already close to, or below, zero. Higher oil prices will also hurt growth in Europe and Japan, economies that are already struggling to gain economic momentum after grappling with a weaker growth impulse from China. In addition, EM economies that took the opportunity to reform their oil subsidies amid lower oil prices post-2014 will have to grapple with a much larger shock to consumers than usual. The Corporate Sector In theory, what consumers lose from rising oil prices, producers of crude can gain in stronger revenue. This is especially important in the U.S. as domestic energy production has increased significantly over the past 10 years. Nonetheless, the oil and gas extraction sector accounts for just 1.1% of GDP and 0.1% of total employment. The marginal propensity to spend out of every dollar of income is lower for producers than consumers. Moreover, if consumer confidence fell and consumer spending weakened, non-energy capex would decline as businesses reassessed household demand and held off from making investment decisions. Small business confidence is at record highs, and as with consumer confidence, vulnerable to downward revisions (Chart 7). Chart 7Dizzying Heights Dizzying Heights Dizzying Heights Chart 8Only One Way To Go (Down) Only One Way To Go (Down) Only One Way To Go (Down) Profit margins remain at a highly elevated level and also have only one way to go (Chart 8). If high oil prices should combine with rising borrowing costs and upward pressure on wages (which could develop in this macro environment) the result would be a triple hit to margins (Chart 9). Of course, rising wages would give consumers some offset to higher oil prices, so the question will be the net effect of all variables. And if the dollar bull market continues, as our FX team believes it will, the combination of higher oil prices and a strong USD would hurt U.S. companies with international exposure. The debt load held by the U.S. corporate sector would turn this bad dream into a nightmare. Many American companies have spent the past 10 years increasing leverage to buy back equity (Chart 10). Companies with high debt would need to revise down their profit expectations, with potentially devastating consequences. Elevated debt levels also increase the likelihood of financial market stress if bond investors get worried and spreads begin to widen significantly. Chart 9Rising Pressures On Earnings? Rising Cost Pressures On Earnings Rising Cost Pressures On Earnings Chart 10Large Corporate Debts Large Corporate Debts Large Corporate Debts According to all measures, U.S. stocks are at or near their all-time valuation peaks. Investors have also priced in a significant amount of optimism for profit growth (Chart 11). These expectations would be subject to quick revision if our oil shock scenario plays out. In other words, investor expectations for profit margins are not sufficiently factoring the triple hit of higher oil prices, higher interest rates, and higher wages. Chart 11The Market Has High Hopes The Market Has High Hopes The Market Has High Hopes An additional geopolitical risk on the horizon for 2019 is the creeping "stroke of pen" risk from potential regulation of technology enterprises. This is unrelated to an oil price spike (other than that it would be an effect of U.S. policy) but could nonetheless combine with rising energy prices to sour investors' mood.9 Bottom Line: An oil price spike above $100 would produce negative consequences for the U.S. household and corporate sectors. Given the supply-side nature of the price shock, it would not be accompanied by the usual decline in USD, and could therefore hurt the foreign profits of U.S. corporations as well. If investors must also deal with mounting regulatory pressures on FAANG stocks, they could face a perfect storm. Given the high probability of such an oil price shock, why isn't a 2019 recession BCA's House View, rather than merely a risk to it? Because it is difficult to say how high oil prices need to rise to cause a recession. For example, 1973 both marked a permanent move up in oil prices and saw oil prices triple. In 2019 terms, that would mean an oil price above $200, a far less probable scenario than $100-$110. Nevertheless, the combination of elevated oil prices and the price impact on consumer goods of the U.S.-China trade war could combine to create a nightmare scenario for consumers. But it is impossible to gauge the level of both required to push the U.S. into a recession. Second, there are many ways in which today's macro environment is different from that in 1974. In the 1970s the inventory cycle was a key factor in the business cycle, with excesses building up ahead of recessions, forcing output cutbacks as demand weakened. That is no longer the case in today's world of just-in-time inventory management. Also, inflation was a much bigger problem back then, requiring tougher Fed action. On the other hand, debt burdens were much lower. Investment Implications To be clear, none of the usual recession indicators that BCA Research uses are flashing red at this time. The point of this analysis is to illustrate a credible, exogenous scenario that cannot be revealed through the usual data-driven recession forecasting methods. What happens if a recession does occur ahead of the 2020 election? How would President Trump react to a recession induced by his foreign policy adventurism in the Middle East? By doing what every other president would do: finding someone else to blame. In this case, we would put high odds on the Federal Reserve becoming the target of President Trump's fury. Ahead of 2020, the Fed and its independence may very well become an election issue.10 This could spell serious trouble for the Fed, which is at a massive disadvantage when it comes to explaining to voters why central bank independence is so important. The Fed had great difficulty managing public opinion regarding its extraordinary measures to combat the Great Recession - its attempts at public outreach largely failed. Compare the number of Trump's Twitter followers to that of the Fed's (Chart 12). Chart 12The Fed's PR Abilities Are Limited 2019: The Geopolitical Recession? 2019: The Geopolitical Recession? Though most of our clients and colleagues will probably disagree, we do not see central bank independence as a static quality. It was bestowed upon central banks by politicians following widespread inflation fears throughout the 1970s and 1980s, although in the U.S. the current tradition goes back to the 1951 Treasury Accord that restored the independence of the Fed. Our colleague Martin Barnes penned a report on the politicization of monetary policy in 2013.11 His conclusion is that political meddling in monetary affairs is less pernicious than economic performance. The Fed will incur Trump's ire, in other words, but it will be its failure to generate economic growth that causes a break in independence. We are not so sure. The next recession is likely to be a mild one for Main Street given the lack of real economic bubbles. But given the slow recovery in real wages over the past decade and the general angst of the populace towards governing elites, even a mild recession that merely reminds voters of 2008-2009 could produce deep anxiety and significant public reactions. Further, the idea of "independent," non-politically accountable institutions is going out of style. President Trump - and other policymakers in the developed world - have specifically targeted the "so-called experts" and "institutions." President Trump has attacked America's foreign policy architecture, NATO, the WTO, and a slew of supposedly outdated norms and practices for being "out of touch" with the electorate. This policy has served him well thus far. If our nightmare scenario of an oil price-induced recession plays out, the immediate implication for investors will be a sharp downturn in risk assets. As such, we are recommending that investors hedge their portfolios with a long Brent / short S&P 500 trade. Alternatively we would recommend going long U.S. energy / short technology stocks. A longer-term, and perhaps even more pernicious implication, would be the end of the era of central bank independence and a full politicization of the economy. Laissez-faire capitalist system would give way to dirigisme. In the process, the U.S. dollar and Treasuries would be doomed. Jim Mylonas, Global Strategist Daily Insights & BCA Academy jim@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research Special Report, "Beware The 2019 Trump Recession," dated March 7, 2017, and Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Timing Of The Next Recession," dated June 16, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy and Commodity & Energy Strategy Special Report, "U.S., OPEC Talk Oil Prices Down; Gulf Tensions Could Become Kinetic," dated July 19, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize," dated May 30, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Fade The Midterms, Not Iraq Or Brexit," dated September 12, 2018 and "Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply," dated September 5, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "A Story Told Through Charts: The U.S. Midterm Election," dated September 19, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 The Strategic Petroleum Reserve currently covers 100 days of net crude imports, or 200 days of net petroleum imports, and can be tapped for reasons of political timing as well as international emergencies. 7 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Oil-Supply Shock, Rising U.S. Rates Favor Gold As A Portfolio Hedge," dated September 13, 2018, available at bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see the U.S. Federal Reserve, "Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2017," May 2018, available at federalreserve.gov. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, "Is The Stock Rally Long In The FAANG?" dated August 1, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Daily Insights, "Politics And Monetary Policy," dated August 22, 2018, and "The Battle Of The Press Conferences: Trump Versus Powell," dated September 27, 2018, available at dailyinsights.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see BCA Special Report, "The Politicization Of Monetary Policy: Should We Care?" dated April 15, 2013, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights The risk of unplanned oil-production outages is rising. One or more such events will severely test OPEC 2.0's spare capacity in a supply-constrained market (Chart of the Week).1 As things now stand, OPEC 2.0 spare capacity - if it is available - and a likely U.S. SPR release of 500k b/d in 1Q19 will not cover expected production losses, if markets are hit with another unplanned outage from Libya or Iraq.2 Demand destruction via higher prices will have to balance markets. Oil markets are tightening (Chart 2). Falling supply and stable demand will produce a 1mm b/d physical deficit into 1H19, forcing continued OECD inventory draws (Chart 3). The dominant scenario in our forecast includes a supply shock arising from lost Iranian and Venezuelan exports, which triggers price-induced demand destruction. We raised the odds of Brent prices hitting $100/bbl by 1Q19, and our 2019 forecast to $95/bbl on the back of these factors. Unplanned outages would lift prices higher. Energy: Overweight. The long April, May and June 2019 Brent calls struck at $85/bbl vs short $90/bbl calls we recommended last week are up an average 33.8%, as of Tuesday's close. Base Metals: Neutral. Our foreign-exchange strategists expect the USD to correct further. This will be bullish for copper, which is up ~ 10% since Sept. 11. Precious Metals: Neutral. The USD correction will support gold in the short term. Technically, gold appears to be forming a pennant, which could be short-term bullish. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Corn prices are benefiting from strong exports, according to USDA data. Accumulated exports for the current crop year are up 27% vs last year in the week ending Sept. 13. Chart of the WeekUnplanned Oil-Production Outage Risks Up, OPEC 2.0's Spare Capacity Down Risks From Unplanned Oil-Outage Rising; OPEC 2.0's Spare Capacity Is Suspect Risks From Unplanned Oil-Outage Rising; OPEC 2.0's Spare Capacity Is Suspect Chart 2Physical Oil Deficit Returns##BR##To Oil Market Next Year Physical Oil Deficit Returns To Oil Market Next Year Physical Oil Deficit Returns To Oil Market Next Year Chart 3Fundamentals Support##BR##Strong Prices Risks From Unplanned Oil-Outage Rising; OPEC 2.0's Spare Capacity Is Suspect Risks From Unplanned Oil-Outage Rising; OPEC 2.0's Spare Capacity Is Suspect Feature Oil markets are approaching a moment of truth. OPEC 2.0's spare capacity likely will be put to the test in 1Q19, as Iranian export volumes continue to fall, and other threats to production - Venezuelan losses, and increasing sectarian tension in Iraq and Libya - come to the fore. As the Chart of the Week demonstrates, spare capacity in the traditional OPEC states is low and falling: The U.S. EIA's most recent estimate of OPEC spare capacity is 1.7mm b/d this year and 1.3mm next year, well below the 2.3mm b/d average of 2008 - 2017. For its part, Russia - the other putative leader of OPEC 2.0 - likely only has ~ 200k b/d of spare capacity to ramp. On a relative basis, OPEC spare capacity is even more stretched: This year, the EIA expects it to average 1.7% of global demand. By next year, it is expected to fall to 1.3%, or ~ 1.3mm b/d. This will be lower than the spare capacity reported for 2008 (1.6%), when OPEC (mostly KSA) found itself struggling to meet surging EM demand, and well below the 2.6% average for 2008 - 2017. Spare capacity is very close to levels last seen in 2016, when low prices resulted in supply destruction. In the wake of the oil-price rout of 2014 - 16, capex collapsed as did maintenance spending needed to keep production steady y/y. This can be seen in the relentless decline in OPEC production ex GCC and the stagnation in other states unable to grow output (Chart 4 and Chart 5). Indeed, as prices hit their nadir in 1Q16, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in OPEC and non-OPEC states were being liquidated to cover gaping holes in producers' fiscal accounts. This partly explains the growing incidence of unplanned outages, and our contention OPEC spare-capacity claims are highly suspect (Chart of the Week). Chart 4OPEC 2.0's Core Producers Would Be Taxed to Replace Lost Exports OPEC 2.0's Core Producers Would Be Taxed to Replace Lost Exports OPEC 2.0's Core Producers Would Be Taxed to Replace Lost Exports Chart 5Outside Of A Very Few Regions, Oil Production Has Struggled Outside Of A Very Few Regions, Oil Production Has Struggled Outside Of A Very Few Regions, Oil Production Has Struggled U.S. Remains Adamant On Shutting Down Iran's Exports The Trump administration's goal is to reduce Iranian oil exports to zero via the sanctions it will impose beginning November 4 from ~ 2.5mm b/d back in April, when the U.S. sanctions were announced. However, as the EIA data indicates, achieving this goal would leave markets seriously short oil. Indeed, the Washington-based Center for International Strategic Studies (CSIS) noted in late August, "realistically, there is simply not enough readily available spare oil production capacity in the world to replace the loss of all Iranian barrels (some 2.4 mm b/d), coupled with the potential for further reductions in Venezuela, Libya, Nigeria, and elsewhere."3 Our modeling includes 1.25mm b/d of lost Iranian and Venezuelan exports, continued y/y losses in non-core OPEC (Chart 4), constrained U.S. production growth, and stagnate supply growth outside a handful of states able to lift their output (Chart 5). We do not believe OPEC 2.0 spare capacity is sufficient to cover these losses and one or two additional unplanned outages in Iraq or Libya, or anywhere for that matter. In addition, a 500k b/d release of U.S. SPR after the price goes above $90/bbl in 1Q19 will contain the supply shock we expect slightly, but will not completely reverse it. We have long believed KSA's ability to maintain production above 10.5mm b/d for an extended period is suspect, despite its claims it can ramp to its capacity of 12mm b/d.4 We are carrying KSA's current production at 10.4mm b/d in our balances estimates, roughly the level it self-reported to OPEC last month. To be clear, we are not saying KSA's production cannot be increased - perhaps to 10.7mm b/d - but we are dubious it can get to its claimed 12mm b/d capacity, or that it can sustain 10.7mm b/d indefinitely. It is important to note any short-term increase in OPEC 2.0's production will come out of spare capacity available to meet unplanned outages, or deeper-than-expected Venezuelan losses next year. Lastly, unplanned outages in a market already stretched by tighter supply will accelerate the rate of demand destruction via higher prices. This also would accelerate the arrival of a U.S. recession brought about by an oil-price shock, all else equal.5 Iran's Hand Is Strengthening You'd never know it from the declarations of President Trump and U.S. Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin - both of whom are adamant in their professed desire to see Iranian oil exports fall to zero - but the U.S. has been attempting to engage Iran in treaty discussions to limit the country's ballistic-missile capabilities and nuclear-development program.6 Not surprisingly, Iranian officials have shown no interest in such discussions. This is a remarkable turn of events, but not unexpected. At some point, it likely became apparent to the Trump administration the global oil markets are on a trajectory for significantly higher prices, as our analysis and forecasts indicate. It also likely is apparent to administration officials that oil prices - and gasoline prices, in particular, which matter most to U.S. voters - will be surging just as the 2020 presidential campaign gets underway next summer. Along with our colleague Marko Papic, who runs BCA's Geopolitical Strategy, we believe that, from a game-theoretic perspective, the approach from the U.S. actually strengthens Iran's hand. Given its history with the previous round of sanctions, and the economic hardships they imposed, the government in Iran likely believes it can ride out 12 to 18 months of renewed sanctions. It is not unrealistic to entertain the possibility Iranian politicians take the bet that sharply higher gasoline prices in the U.S. by 2H19 will give Democrats in U.S. presidential and congressional races - which kick off next summer - a powerful issue with which to campaign against President Trump and the GOP. Bottom Line: There is a non-trivial chance that OPEC 2.0 spare capacity will prove insufficient to cover the losses in Iranian and Venezuelan exports we foresee in the very near term. Should this prove to be the case, the odds that Brent crude oil prices exceed our $95/bbl forecast for next year are high. We believe Iran's political hand could be strengthened, if it rebuffs overtures by the Trump administration to negotiate a treaty to replace the executive agreement with former U.S. president Obama that limited its nuclear program. We recommended getting long Brent call spreads last week to position for the higher prices we are forecasting for next year. Specifically, we recommended getting long April, May and June 2019 Brent calls struck at $85/bbl vs short $90/bbl calls. As of Tuesday's close, these positions were up 33.8% on average vs their opening levels last Thursday. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Upside Risks Dominate BCA's Oil Price Forecast," published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy October 26, 2017, and "OPEC 2.0 Scrambles To Reassure Markets," published June 28, 2018. Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the oil-producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia, which was formed in November 2016, following the price collapse brought on by OPEC's market-share war launched in November 2014. Please see last week's Commodity & Energy Strategy lead article, "Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl." It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. In that article we note that, in addition to the highly visible export losses in Iran due to U.S. sanctions and continued deterioration in Venezuelan production, the EIA reduced its estimate of U.S. production growth by 201k b/d in 2019, and the IEA reduced its estimate of Brazilian output this year by 260k b/d. 3 Please see "Whither the Oil Market? Headlines and Tariffs and Bears, Oh My..." published by csis.org August 29, 2018. We are closely following a just-proposed workaround to U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil exports made by the High Representative of the EU, Federica Mogherini, at the UN General Assembly meeting in New York on Tuesday. Ms. Mogherini proposed setting up a special-purpose vehicle that would allow importers in the EU, China and Russia to continue purchasing Iranian oil crude. The SPV would transact in euros, yuan, and roubles, so as to avoid processing transactions through the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication SWIFT system in Brussels. The SWIFT system is dominated by USD transactions, and the U.S. Treasury has high visibility into transactions made using the system, given USD-denominated transaction like oil purchases and sales must ultimately be cleared through a U.S. bank or intermediary. Iran already takes yuan for its oil, and this mechanism would allow it to purchase goods and services denominated in these currencies. If technical details of the proposed system can be worked out, the SPV could facilitate increased Iranian exports under the U.S. sanctions regime. This would cause us to lower our estimate of lost exports from that country from our baseline assumption of 1.25mm b/d. Please see "Why India Will Struggle to Join Iran's Sanctions Busters," published by bloomberg.com on September 26, 2018. 4 We are not the only ones dubious of KSA's ability to ramp production. Please see "Can Saudi Arabia pump much more oil," published by reuters.com July 1, 2018. 5 In our House view, a recession in the U.S. does not arrive until 2H20. We have argued an oil-supply shock, particularly during a Fed tightening cycle, typically presages a recession in the 6 - 18 months following the shock. Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy lead article, "Odds of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl." It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see "U.S. seeking to negotiate a treaty with Iran," published September 19, 2018, by reuters.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Risks From Unplanned Oil-Outage Rising; OPEC 2.0's Spare Capacity Is Suspect Risks From Unplanned Oil-Outage Rising; OPEC 2.0's Spare Capacity Is Suspect Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017 Risks From Unplanned Oil-Outage Rising; OPEC 2.0's Spare Capacity Is Suspect Risks From Unplanned Oil-Outage Rising; OPEC 2.0's Spare Capacity Is Suspect

Highlights Recent estimates by ship trackers put the loss of Iranian exports at close to 1mm b/d as of mid-September vs April levels. This loss is higher (and sooner) than our previous baseline expectation, and prompts us to raise our estimate of lost Iranian oil exports to 1.25mm b/d by November, when U.S. sanctions kick in. Venezuela still is close to collapse, but may avoid a complete meltdown with Chinese companies stepping in to safeguard the $50 billion loaned to the country's oil industry.1 We expect production to fall below 1mm b/d next year - to less than half its end-2016 level. With Fed policy likely to continue tightening into 2019 as oil prices surge, the odds of an equity bear market and recession arriving in 2H19 - vs our 2H20 House view - also increase. Our dominant scenario now includes a supply shock and higher prices in 1Q19, which is followed by a U.S. SPR release and price-induced demand destruction (Chart of the Week). As a result, we are raising the odds of Brent prices reaching or exceeding $100/bbl by as early as 1Q19, and lifting our 2019 forecast to $95/bbl. Energy: Overweight. U.S. refining capacity utilization remains close to 19-year highs. At 97.1% of operable capacity, it is within a whisker of the four-week-moving-average highs of 97.3% recorded in August, driven by strong product demand ex U.S. Base Metals: Neutral. The U.S. Treasury granted permission to Rusal's existing customers to continue signing new contracts with the aluminum producer. The announcement stopped short of a full removal of sanctions, which are set to come into effect on October 23. Precious Metals: Neutral. The strong trade-weighted USD continues to hold gold prices on either side of $1,200/oz. We remain long as a portfolio hedge. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA's Crop Production report forecasts record yields for corn and soybeans - 181.3 and 52.8 bushels/acre, respectively - which continues to weigh on prices. The bean harvest is expected to be a record. Feature Chart of the WeekBCA Ensemble Forecast Lifts Brent To $95/bbl, As Market Tightens BCA Ensemble Forecast Lifts Brent To $95/bbl, As Market Tightens BCA Ensemble Forecast Lifts Brent To $95/bbl, As Market Tightens With the loss of Iranian exports occurring faster and sooner than expected, and Venezuela remaining on the brink of collapse, senior energy officials from the U.S., Russia and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) are going to great lengths to reassure their domestic consumers everything - particularly on the supply side - is under control. We are inclined to believe their comfort level re global oil supply is inversely proportional to the amount of reassurance they provide their domestic audiences. The more they meet and talk - particularly to the media - the more concerned they are. And right now, they're pretty concerned. Rick Perry, the U.S. Energy Secretary, held a presser in Moscow following his meeting with Alexander Novak, Russia's Energy Minister, saying the U.S., KSA and Russia can lift output over the next 18 months to compensate for the loss of exports from Iran, Venezuela, and other unplanned outages.2 That might be true, but the market's already tightening far faster and far sooner than many analysts expected. Covering a supply shortfall in 18 months does nothing for the market over the next few months, particularly with demand remaining robust (Chart 2) and OECD inventories falling (Chart 3). Since 2017, our factor model shows Brent prices have been supported by two factors acting simultaneously together: Chart 2Fundamentals Support Strong Prices Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl Chart 3Inventory Draws Will Accelerate Inventory Draws Will Accelerate Inventory Draws Will Accelerate Strong compliance of OPEC 2.0 members to the coalition's production-cutting agreement, which reduced the OPEC Supply-and-Inventory factor's role, and The pickup in global oil demand, particularly in EM economies, which pushed our Global Demand factor up. These effects were partly counterbalanced by the rise in our non-OPEC Supply factor - driven by strong growth in U.S. shale-oil output - which became the largest negative contributor to price movements. Global demand's been strengthening since the end of 1H17 on the back of stellar EM income growth. This remains the fundamental backdrop to global oil for now. While our base case remains relatively supportive for oil prices, we are raising the odds of a price spike resulting from a supply shock as early as 1Q19 on the back of larger- and faster-than-expected Iranian export losses, and continued declines in Venezuelan production. Should this occur, we believe it would trigger a U.S. SPR release, and produce demand destruction at a rate that could be faster than historical experience would suggest (Table 1). This further tightens balances, and leads us to raise our 2019 forecast for Brent crude oil to $95/bbl on average, up from $80/bbl last month, with WTI trading $6/bbl below that (Chart 4). This forecast is highly conditional, given our assumptions re supply-side variables, a U.S. SPR release, and demand destruction estimates. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d) (Base Case Balances) Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl Chart 4BCA's Oil Balances Tighter BCA's Oil Balances Tighter BCA's Oil Balances Tighter Oil Balances Tighten As Supply Contracts In our monthly balances update, we are incorporating a sharply accelerated loss of Iranian export barrels to the market, which already is evident. Bloomberg this week reported its tanker-tracking service registered a decline in Iranian exports of close to 1mm b/d between April, when sanctions were announced, and mid-September.3 At this rate, the assessment by Platts Analytics last week that as much as 1.4mm b/d of Iranian exports could be lost by the time U.S. sanctions kick in November 4 appears more likely.4 However, to be conservative, we are building in a loss of 1.25mm b/d in our balances, and have it developing over the July - November period in increments of 250k b/d, instead of the November - February interval we assumed in last month's balances. We will monitor this situation and revise our estimates as new information arrives. Also on the supply side, we are assuming the U.S. SPR releases 500k b/d starting a month after Brent prices go over $90/bbl in March 2019. This is in line with the SPR's enabling legislation, which limits drawdowns to 30mm b/d over a 60-day period, after the President authorizes such action to meet a severe energy supply interruption. Lastly, we continue to carry supply constraints arising from the lack of sufficient take-away capacity to get all of the crude produced in the Permian Basin to refining markets in our models. To wit: We continue to expect 1.2mm b/d of supply growth from the U.S. shales, driven largely by Permian production, vs an earlier expectation of 1.4mm b/d of growth. We expect the Permian to be de-bottlenecked by 4Q19. We expect the Big 3 producers Secretary Perry expects to fill supply gaps in 18 months - the U.S., Russia, and KSA - to produce 10.83mm, 11.4mm and 10.4mm b/d in 2H18, and 11.79mm, 11.43mm and 10.4mm b/d next year, respectively. They will get some help from OPEC's Gulf Arab producers - i.e., the core OPEC producers (Chart 5) - but, supply will continue to fall/stagnate in most of the rest of the world, particularly in offshore producers (Chart 6). Chart 5While Core OPEC Can Increase Supply... While Core OPEC Can Increase Supply... While Core OPEC Can Increase Supply... Chart 6... 'The Other Guys' Output Stagnates Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl We also note the EIA and IEA have lowered their supply-growth estimates this month. The EIA this month reduced expected U.S. crude production growth by 210k b/d in 2019, and the IEA lowered its estimate of offshore production growth in Brazil from 260k b/d to just 30k b/d this year. These are non-trivial adjustments in a market that was tight prior to the downgrade in supply growth. Still, there are significant marginal disagreements on the supply side among the major data supporters (the EIA, IEA and OPEC), which can be seen in Table 2. Table 2Comparison Of Major Balances Estimates Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl Demand Destruction Likely As Prices Spike In 1Q19 We expect the rate of growth in EM incomes and trade - a proxy for income - to slow slightly this year vs 2017, on the back of a strengthening USD. This will reduce the rate of growth in EM imports and the rate of growth in EM commodity demand, at the margin. However, y/y growth in EM incomes is expected to remain positive over the next 12 months in our baseline scenario, which will keep the level of commodity demand - particularly for oil and industrial metals - robust. This will drive global demand growth of ~ 1.6mm b/d this year, roughly unchanged from last month. Higher prices risk slowing next year's growth. This is where it gets tricky. An oil-supply shock occurring when global demand is strong most likely will produce a price spike, as we've been arguing for the past several weeks.5 This price spike, coupled with continued monetary-policy tightening by the Fed, raises the likelihood of demand destruction globally. Higher oil prices and a stronger USD act as a double-whammy on EM oil demand. The problem we have now is gauging the elasticity of oil demand, particularly in EM. Oil markets are fundamentally different now than at any point in the modern era - roughly beginning in the early 1960s with the ascendance of OPEC - because many big oil-importing EM economies removed or relaxed subsidies following the prices collapse of 2014 - 2016. Prominent among these states are China and India. OPEC states also took advantage of the price collapse to relax or remove subsidies, e.g., KSA.6 The price shock we anticipate, therefore, will be the first in the modern era in which EM consumers - the principal driver of oil demand in the world, accounting for roughly 70% of the demand growth we expect - are exposed directly to higher prices. How quickly they will respond to higher prices is unknown. For this reason, we're introducing what we consider a reasonable first approximation of how EM demand might respond to higher prices and a stronger USD into the scenarios we include in our ensemble forecast (Chart 7). As a first approximation - subject to at least monthly adjustment, as more data become available - we are modeling a 100k b/d loss of demand for every $10/bbl increase in crude oil prices.7 We will continue to iterate on this as new information becomes available. Chart 7Ensemble Scenarios Reflect New Risks Ensemble Scenarios Reflect New Risks Ensemble Scenarios Reflect New Risks Bottom Line: We've raised the odds of a supply shock in the oil markets that takes Brent prices to or through $100/bbl by 1Q19. Should this occur, we expect it will be met by a U.S. SPR release of 500k b/d a month after prices breach $90/bbl. This price spike will set off a round of demand destruction, which we expect will be quicker than history would suggest, given many large EM oil-consuming states have relaxed or eliminated fuel subsidies, leaving their consumers exposed to the price shock. This will be exacerbated by a stronger USD going forward, as the Fed likely looks through the price spike and continues with its policy-rate normalization. In this scenario, a U.S. recession could arrive in 2H19 vs our House view of 2H20 or later. In addition, we would expect an equity bear market to ensue sooner than presently anticipated. We recommend using Brent call spreads to express the view consistent with our research. At tonight's close, we will go long April, May and June 2019 calls struck at $85/bbl and short $90/bbl calls. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Venezuela hands China more oil presence, but no mention of new funds," published by reuters.com September 14, 2018. 2 U.S. Energy Secretary Rick Perry made this claim at a press conference after meeting with Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak last Friday. Please see "Big Three oil states can offset fall in Iran supplies: Perry," published by reuters.com September 14, 2018. 3 Please see "Saudi Arabia Is Comfortable With Brent Oil Above $80," published by bloomberg.com September 18, 2018. 4 Please see "OPEC crude oil production rises to 32.89 mil b/d in Aug as cuts unwind: Platts survey" published by SP Platts Global September 6, 2018. 5 Please see "Oil-Supply Shock, Rising U.S. Rates Favor Gold As A Portfolio Hedge," published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report on September 13, 2018. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. For a discussion of the effect of a stronger USD on global oil demand, please see "Trade, Dollars, Oil & Metals ... Assessing Downside Risk," published by the Commodity & Energy Strategy August 23, 2018. 6 Please see the Special Focus in the World Bank's January 2018 Global Economic Prospects entitled "With The Benefit of Hindsight: The Impact of the 2014 - 16 Oil Price Collapse," beginning on p. 49. 7 In this simulation, we employ an iterative one-step-ahead forecasting methodology that reduces demand by 100k b/d for every $10/bbl increase in prices. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2018 Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl

Highlights The U.S. midterm elections are far less investment-relevant than consensus holds; Trump will increase the pressure on China and Iran regardless of the likely negative election results for the GOP; The Iranian sanctions, civil conflict in Iraq, and other oil supply issues are the real geopolitical risk; Despite the tentative good news on Brexit, political uncertainty in the U.K. makes now a bad time to buy the pound; Go long Brent crude / short S&P 500; long U.S. energy / tech equities; long JPY / short GBP. Feature The U.S. political cycle begins in earnest after Labor Day. Understandably, we have noticed an uptick in client interest, with a steady stream of questions and conference call requests about U.S. politics. Generally, our forecast remains unchanged since our April net assessment of the upcoming midterm election.1 Democrats have a slightly better than 60% probability of winning the House of Representatives, with a solid 45% probability of taking the Senate, and rising. The latter is astounding, given that the "math" of the Senate rotation is against the Democrats. Our bias toward a Democratic victory is based on current polling (Chart 1) and President Trump's woeful approval rating (Chart 2). There are a lot of other moving parts, however, and we will update them next week in detail. Chart 1GOP Trails In Polls, But It Is Still Close GOP Trails In Polls, But It Is Still Close GOP Trails In Polls, But It Is Still Close Chart 2Trump's Approval Rating Lines The GOP Up For Steep Losses Fade The Midterms, Not Iraq Or Brexit Fade The Midterms, Not Iraq Or Brexit But why, dear client, should you care? Do the midterms really matter for investors? History suggests that they tend to be a bullish catalyst for the stock market (Chart 3). Will this time be any different? The two bearish narratives hanging over markets have to do with the Democrats foiling President Trump's pro-business policy and impeaching him. The former would purportedly have a direct impact on earnings by stymieing Trump's pluto-populist agenda, while the latter would presumably force Trump to seek relevance abroad - through an aggressive foreign policy or trade policy. We think both concerns are without merit. First, by taking over the House of Representatives, the Democrats will not be able to stop or reverse the president's economic agenda. Trump's deregulation will continue, given that regulatory affairs are the sole prerogative of the executive branch of government. Tax cuts will not be reversed, given that Democrats have no chance of gaining a 60-seat, filibuster-proof, majority in the Senate, and would not have a two-thirds majority in each chamber to override Trump's veto. As for fiscal stimulus, it is highly unlikely that the party of the $15 minimum wage and "Medicare for all" would seek to impose fiscal discipline on the nation. As far as the market is concerned, President Trump has accomplished all he needed to accomplish. Gridlock is perfectly fine, which is why a divided Congress has not stopped bull markets in the past (Chart 4). And should the Republicans somehow retain Congress, the result would be a "more of the same" rally. Chart 3Midterm U.S. Elections Tend To Be Bullish... Fade The Midterms, Not Iraq Or Brexit Fade The Midterms, Not Iraq Or Brexit Chart 4... Even Those That Produce Gridlock Fade The Midterms, Not Iraq Or Brexit Fade The Midterms, Not Iraq Or Brexit What about impeachment? Well, what about it? As we have illustrated in our net assessment of the impeachment risk, the Senate is not likely to convict Trump, so markets can look through it, albeit with bouts of volatility (Chart 5A & 5B).2 Chart 5AMarkets Can Rally Through Impeachment... Markets Can Rally Through Impeachment... Markets Can Rally Through Impeachment... Chart 5B...Despite Volatility ...Despite Volatility ...Despite Volatility To this our clients counter: "But Trump is different!" According to this theory, President Trump would respond to the threat of impeachment by becoming unhinged and seeking relevance abroad through an aggressive foreign and trade policy. But can he be more aggressive than ... Threatening nuclear war with North Korea; Re-imposing an oil embargo against Iran - and thus unraveling the already shaky equilibrium in the Middle East; Imposing tariffs on half, possibly all, U.S. imports from China; Threatening additional tariffs on U.S. allies like Canada, the EU, and Japan? More aggressive than that? We are agnostic towards the upcoming midterm elections. We already have a deeply alarmist view towards U.S. foreign policy posture vis-à-vis Iran3 and U.S. trade policy vis-à-vis China,4 both of which we have articulated at length. The midterm elections factor very little in our analysis of either. As such, they are a non-diagnostic variable. The outcome of the vote is a red herring. President Trump will seek relevance abroad whether or not his Republican Party holds the House and Senate. In fact, we believe that the midterms are a distraction. Investors have already forgotten about Iran (Chart 6), at a time when global oil spare capacity is falling (Chart 7). BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy is forecasting Brent to average $80/bbl in 2019, but prices would easily reach $120/bbl in a case where all three pernicious scenarios occur (shale production bottlenecks, Venezuela export collapse, and Iran sanctions).5 Chart 6Nobody Is Paying Attention To Iranian Supply Risk! Nobody Is Paying Attention To Iranian Supply Risk! Nobody Is Paying Attention To Iranian Supply Risk! Chart 7Global Spare Capacity Stretched Thin Global Spare Capacity Stretched Thin Global Spare Capacity Stretched Thin These figures are alarming. But they could become even worse if our Q4 Black Swan - a Shia-on-Shia civil war in Iraq - manifests. The end of the U.S.-Iran détente has put the tenuous geopolitical equilibrium in Iraq on thin ice.6 Since our missive on this topic last week, the violence in Basra has intensified, with rioters setting the Iranian consulate alight. Investors were largely able to ignore the Islamic State insurgency in Iraq because it occurred in areas of the country that do not produce oil. A Shia-on-Shia conflict, however, would take place in Basra. This vital port exports 3.5 bpd. Any damage to its facilities, which is highly likely if Iran gets involved in the conflict, would instantly become the world's largest supply loss since the first Gulf War (Chart 8). Bottom Line: Our message to clients is that midterm elections are far less investment-relevant than is assumed. President Trump has already initiated aggressive foreign and trade policy. We expect the White House to intensify the pressure on Iran and China regardless of the outcome of the midterm election. And we also expect the Democratic Party to be unable to stop President Trump on either front, should it gain a majority in the House of Representatives. The truly underappreciated risk for investors is a massive oil supply shock in 2019 that comes from a combination of instability in Venezuela, aggressive U.S. enforcement of the oil embargo against Iran, and Iran's retaliation against such sanctions via chaos in Iraq. We are initializing a long Brent / short S&P 500 trade, as well as a long energy stocks / short tech trade, as hedges against this risk (Chart 9). Chart 8Civil Unrest In Basra Would Be Big Fade The Midterms, Not Iraq Or Brexit Fade The Midterms, Not Iraq Or Brexit Chart 9Two Hedges We Recommend Two Hedges We Recommend Two Hedges We Recommend Government Shutdown Is The One True Midterm-Related Risk There is a declining possibility of a government shutdown before the midterm - and a much larger possibility afterwards. It is well known that the election odds favor the Democrats, but if there were ever a president who would do something drastic to try to turn the tables, it would be Trump. A majority in the House gives Democrats the ability to impeach. While we think the Senate would acquit Trump of any impeachment articles, this view is based on stout Republican support. A "smoking gun" from Special Counsel Robert Mueller - comparable to Nixon's Watergate tapes - could still change things. Trump would rather avoid impeachment altogether. Trump could still conceivably try to upset the election by insisting on funding his promised "Wall" on the border. The Republicans want to delay the appropriations bill for the Department of Homeland Security, which would include any border security funding increases, until after the election (but before the new House sits in January). Trump has repeatedly threatened to reject his own party's plan, though he has recently backed off these threats. A shutdown ahead of an election would conventionally be political suicide - especially given the likely need for a federal response to Hurricane Florence. Moreover Trump's border wall is opposed by over half the populace. But Trump could reason that the greatest game changer would be a spike in turnout when his supporters hear that he is willing to stake the entire election on this key issue. Turnout is everything. The success of such a kamikaze run would hinge on the Senate. Assuming that Trump retained full Republican support to push through wall funding, as GOP incumbents frantically sought to end the shutdown, there would be 12 Democratic senators, in the broadest measure, who could conceivably be intimidated into voting with them (Table 1). These senators would have to decide on the spot whether they are safer running for office during a government shutdown or after having given Trump his wall. They may decide on the latter. Table 1A Government Shutdown Could Conceivably Intimidate Trump-State Democrats Fade The Midterms, Not Iraq Or Brexit Fade The Midterms, Not Iraq Or Brexit This would total 63 votes in the Senate, enough to invoke "cloture," ending debate, and hence break any Democratic filibuster against proposed wall funding. But this calculation is also extremely generous to Trump. More likely, at least four of the twelve senators would refuse to break rank: Debbie Stabenow of Michigan, Robert Menéndez of New Jersey, Sherrod Brown of Ohio, and Bob Casey of Pennsylvania. They would be averse to defecting from their party on such a consequential vote, even if eight of their colleagues were willing to do so.7 This is presumably why Mick Mulvaney, Trump's budget director, has already gone to Capitol Hill and "personally assured" the leading Republicans that Trump is not going to pursue a government shutdown.8 The legislative math doesn't really work. Nevertheless, there is still some chance that Trump - as opposed to any other president - will try this gambit. Especially as the loss of the House and potentially the Senate begins to appear "inevitable." After the midterm, of course, all bets are off. A lame duck Congress, or worse a Democratic Congress, will give President Trump all the reason he needs to grind things to a halt over his wall, with a view to 2020. The odds of a shutdown will shoot up. Do shutdowns matter for investors? Not really. S&P 500 returns tend to be flat for the first two weeks after a shutdown. Looking at eight past shutdowns, the average return was 1% fifteen days later, and 4.5% two months later. Bottom Line: We give a pre-election shutdown 10% odds due to Trump's unorthodoxy and desperate need to boost turnout among his voter base. Post-midterm election, a government shutdown is inevitable, unless congressional Republicans manage to convince President Trump to sign long-term appropriation bills before the election. Brexit: Is The Pound Pricing In Uncertainty? The U.K.-EU negotiations are entering their final, and thus most uncertain, phase. Our Brexit decision-tree looks messy and complicated (Diagram 1). While we believe that Prime Minister Theresa May has increased the probability of the sanguine "soft Brexit" outcome, there are plenty of pathways that lead to risk-off events. Diagram 1Brexit: Decision Tree And Conditional Probabilities Fade The Midterms, Not Iraq Or Brexit Fade The Midterms, Not Iraq Or Brexit Is the pound sufficiently pricing in this uncertainty? According to BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy, which recently penned a special report on the subject, the answer is no.9 According to their long-term fair value model, the trade-weighted pound exhibits only a 3% discount - well within its historical norm (Chart 10). Chart 10Pound: A Much Smaller Discount On A Trade-Weighted Basis Pound: A Much Smaller Discount On A Trade-Weighted Basis Pound: A Much Smaller Discount On A Trade-Weighted Basis In order to assess the degree of political risk priced into the pound, one needs to isolate the risk of the U.K. leaving the EU. This is because all fair value models - including that of our FX team - are based on a potentially unrepresentative sample, one where the U.K. is part of the EU! The problem is that the traditional variables used to explain exchange rate movements were also greatly affected by the shock following the Brexit vote in June 2016. For example, looking at the behavior of British gilts, the FTSE, consumer confidence, and business confidence, one can see very abnormal moves occurring in conjunction with large fluctuations in the pound during the summer of 2016 (Chart 11A & 11B). Thus, if one were to regress the pound on these variables, one would not have observed a risk premium, even though the market was clearly very concerned with the geopolitical outlook for the U.K. Chart 11AAbnormal Moves Around The Brexit Vote... Abnormal Moves Around The Brexit Vote... Abnormal Moves Around The Brexit Vote... Chart 11B...Make It Hard To Spot Geopolitical Risk ...Make It Hard To Spot Geopolitical Risk ...Make It Hard To Spot Geopolitical Risk Our FX team therefore decided to try to explain the pound's normal behavior using variables that did not experience large abnormal moves in the direct aftermath of the British referendum. For GBP/USD (cable), the currency pair was regressed versus the dollar index and the British leading economic indicator (LEI). For EUR/USD, the currency pair was regressed against the trade-weighted euro and U.K. LEI. The reason for using the trade-weighted dollar and euro as explanatory variables is simple: it helps isolate the pound's movements from the impact of fluctuations in the other leg of the pair. Using the U.K. LEI helps incorporate the immediate outlook for U.K. growth and U.K. monetary policy into the pound's movement. The remaining error term was mostly a reflection of geopolitical risk.10 The results of the models are shown in Chart 12A & 12B. While the pound did show a geopolitical discount in the second half of 2016 (as evidenced by the abnormally large discount from the fundamental-based model), today the pound's pricing shows no geopolitical risk premium, whether against the dollar or the euro. This corroborates the message from the economic policy uncertainty index computed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis, which shows a very low level of economic policy uncertainty based on news articles (Chart 13). Chart 12ANo Geopolitical Risk Embedded... No Geopolitical Risk Embedded... No Geopolitical Risk Embedded... Chart 12B...In Today's Pound Sterling ...In Today's Pound Sterling ...In Today's Pound Sterling Chart 13Policy Uncertainty Index Muted Policy Uncertainty Index Muted Policy Uncertainty Index Muted Considering the thin risk premium embedded in the pound against both the dollar and the euro, GBP does not have much maneuvering room through the upcoming busy calendar. The problem for the pound is that the 5% net disapproval of Brexit among the British public remains smaller than the cohort of British voters who remain undecided (Chart 14). This means that domestic politics in the U.K. could remain a source of surprise, especially as Prime Minister Theresa May's polling remains tenuous (Chart 15). This raises the risk that Hard Brexiters end up controlling 10 Downing Street - despite their status as a minority within the ranks of Conservative MPs (Chart 16). Chart 14A Liability For Sterling A Liability For Sterling A Liability For Sterling Chart 15Theresa May's Tenuous Grip Theresa May's Tenuous Grip Theresa May's Tenuous Grip Chart 16Hard Brexiters Are A Minority Fade The Midterms, Not Iraq Or Brexit Fade The Midterms, Not Iraq Or Brexit With the global economic outlook already justifying a lower pound, especially versus the dollar, the pound seems to be too risky of an investment at this moment. It is true that positioning and sentiment towards cable are currently very depressed, raising the risk of a short-term rebound (Chart 17). This could particularly occur if the EU meeting in Salzburg in two weeks results in some breakthrough. Such an event would still not resolve May's domestic conundrum, which is why we would be inclined to fade any such rebound. Bottom Line: On a six-to-nine-month basis, it makes sense to short the pound against the dollar and the yen. Slowing global growth hurts the pound but also hurts the euro while benefiting the greenback and the yen. The political environment in Japan, in particular, supports this reasoning. As we have maintained, Shinzo Abe is not going to lose the September 20 leadership election for the ruling party (Chart 18).11 And the Trump administration is not going to wage a full-scale trade war against Japan. However, after the leadership poll, Abe will press ahead with his agenda to revise the constitution, which will initiate a controversial process and stake his fate on a popular referendum that is likely to be held next year. Chart 17Fade Any Short-Term Rebound Fade Any Short-Term Rebound Fade Any Short-Term Rebound Chart 18Abe Lives, But Yen Will Rise Fade The Midterms, Not Iraq Or Brexit Fade The Midterms, Not Iraq Or Brexit At the same time, Trump might try throwing some threats or jabs against Japan before his defense secretary and admirals are able to convince him that such actions subvert U.S. strategy against China. Therefore Japan-specific political risks are on the horizon, in addition to the ongoing trade war with China, which is already a boon for the yen. We are therefore initiating a long yen / short pound tactical trade. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Juan Manuel Correa, Senior Analyst juanc@bcaresearch.com Ekaterina Shtrevensky, Research Associate ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Will Trump Fail The Midterm?" dated April 18, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment," dated May 17, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Why Conflict With Iran Is A Big Deal - And Why Iraq Is The Prize," dated May 30, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The U.S. And China: Sizing Up The Crisis," dated July 11, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Trade, Dollars, Oil & Metals ... Assessing Downside Risk," dated August 23, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Commodity & Energy Strategy Special Report, "Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply," dated September 5, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see Burgess Everett, "Key red-state Democrat sides with Trump on wall funding," Politico, August 8, 2018, available at www.politico.com, and Ali Vitali, "Vulnerable Senate Democrats embrace Trump's wall," NBC News, August 13, 2018, available at www.nbcnews.com. 8 Please see Niv Elis and Scott Wong, "Trump again threatens shutdown," The Hill, September 5, 2018, available at thehill.com. 9 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Assessing The Geopolitical Risk Premium In The Pound," dated September 7, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 10 To make sure the exercise was robust, Foreign Exchange Strategy tested the out-of-sample performance of the model. Reassuringly, the GBP/USD and EUR/GBP models showed great predictive power out-of-sample (see Appendix), while remaining significant and explaining 80% and 65% of the pairs' variations respectively. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Japan: Kuroda Or No Kuroda, Reflation Ahead," dated February 7, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Appendix: Traditional Variables Are Of Little Use To Isolate A Geopolitical Risk Premium Chart 19 Out-Of-Sample Testing Of Model (I) Out-Of-Sample Testing Of Model (I) Chart 20 Out-Of-Sample Testing Of Model (II) Out-Of-Sample Testing Of Model (II) Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights Iraq remains vital for the security of the Middle East and global oil supply; Sectarian tensions in Iraq have peaked, but risk of Shia-on-Shia violence is rising, which could imperil the all-important export facilities in Basra; With the Islamic State defeated, Iran's military support is no longer needed; This opens a window of opportunity for Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) allies to make diplomatic inroads in the country; Stability and security are positive for investments in Iraq's energy sector, but official targets are overly ambitious. BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy expects oil prices to push higher ahead of the likely loss of 2 million bbl/day of exports on the back of U.S.-imposed sanctions against Iran and the all-but-certain collapse of Venezuela's economy. Feature "Divisiveness is not good for the people ... the policy of exclusion and the policy of marginalization must end in Iraq ... All Iraqis should live under one roof and for one goal." Muqtada Al Sadr, April 2012 "Competition between parties and election candidates must center on economic, educational, and social service programs that can be realistically implemented; to be avoided are narcissism [and] inflammatory sectarian and nationalist rhetoric" Ayatollah Al Sistani, May 4, 2018 "Say no to sectarianism, no to corruption, no to division of shares, no to terrorism and no to occupation" Muqtada Al Sadr's call for a peaceful million man "Day of Rage," September 2018 Moqtada Al Sadr's Sairuun party's unlikely victory in Iraq's May elections came as a surprise. The former leader of the Mahdi Army - a militia that terrorized U.S. forces - has reinvented himself into a champion of reform and a counterweight against foreign influence in the country, particularly Iranian. His political success is due to his ability to recognize that Iraq is at a crossroads. Attitudes and priorities are shifting on several levels: Iraq is turning away from sectarian politics after a decade and a half of internal strife. The security threat from the Islamic State has been eliminated, with nationalism replacing sectarianism. Iran-Saudi tensions are ramping up again at the same time that the U.S. is putting pressure on Iran by reimposing a global oil embargo. Iraq, a buffer state between Iran and Saudi Arabia, will become a battlefield between the two regional powers, but the battlefield may be shifting from the military theatre to the economic one. These junctures provide both opportunities to transition the country to a new stage, as well as challenges in cleansing the system of its old demons. The composition of Iraq's new government matters. It will ultimately determine whether these impulses will pave the way for a stronger, more unified country, or whether Iraq will remain consumed with internal battles. Unity is required for Baghdad to boost its oil output in the way it hopes. The Iraqi economy's relationship with oil markets is two-sided. Not only is its income dependent on oil, but global oil markets are also reliant on Iraqi supplies at a time when global spare capacity is razor-thin. Given that Iraq is currently the fifth-largest crude oil producer in the world - the second-largest within OPEC - and accounts for 5% of global crude oil supply, Iraq's production ambitions are important for global oil markets (Chart 1). Chart 1Iraqi Upstream Production Matters Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply As such, when Baghdad announced its ambitions to raise capacity to 6.5 million bbl/day by 2022, the energy markets were paying attention. If this capacity increase translates to a rise in actual production, additional Iraqi oil by the end of the four-year period would roughly equal 2 million bbl/day. This is equivalent to BCA's Commodity and Energy Strategy's expectation of a loss of exports from the two main risks to energy markets today: the Iranian oil embargo and the internal strife in Venezuela (Chart 2).1 (Of course, the Iraqi production would not come in time to prevent the run-up in prices that we expect as a result of the latter two risks, given that they are immediate risks whereas Iraq will take four years to ramp up.) Chart 2Losses From Venezuela and Iran Will Push Prices Higher Losses From Venezuela and Iran Will Push Prices Higher Losses From Venezuela and Iran Will Push Prices Higher The doubling of Iraq's production over the past decade occurred despite constant sabotage of its oilfields, pumping stations, and pipelines by insurgents. It would seem that the restoration of security offers an optimistic outlook for Iraq's production plan, especially given Iraq's naturally competitive conditions (Table 1). But there is no certainty in Baghdad's ability to reach these targets. Iraqi output is now operating near full capacity (Chart 3). The past decade and a half have wreaked havoc on its infrastructure and discouraged investments needed to develop its fertile oilfields. Table 1Operating Costs Are Competitive Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Chart 3Not Much Idle Capacity Not Much Idle Capacity Not Much Idle Capacity In this report, we assess whether political conditions will support stability in Iraq. The alternative scenario, one where Iraq becomes a physical battlefield between Iran and Saudi Arabia, would not only snuff out any hope of an oil export boom, but could also become yet another risk to global oil supply. Political Will Is Not Enough To Boost Oil Output An expansion of oil production capacity would bring much needed revenue to aid in Iraq's rebuilding efforts. Iraq's economy is highly dependent on the energy sector, even relative to other major oil-producing Middle Eastern peers (Chart 4). The rebound in oil prices over the past couple of years has therefore helped support Iraq's budget, with a surplus expected this year for the first time since 2012 (Chart 5). Extra revenue has, in turn, helped grease the wheels of stability and reconciliation in the country. Chart 4Addicted to Petrodollars Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Chart 5Higher Prices Will Help Flip the Deficit Higher Prices Will Help Flip the Deficit Higher Prices Will Help Flip the Deficit However, political will is not a sufficient condition. Rather, the success of the plan to expand capacity is contingent on Baghdad overcoming several key constraints: While the threat from Islamic State has for the most part subsided, security and the potential for sabotage remain risks to Iraq's current oil infrastructure. Ongoing disputes over the status of Kurds in northern Iraq - risks that contains almost 20% of proven reserves - raise the potential for conflict. Additionally, oil infrastructure may become vulnerable to sabotage from Iran, or Iranian-backed militants, if there is a souring of relationships (see more on that below). Discontent among Iraqis in the southern oil-rich region also raises the probability of disruptions. Over the weekend, protesters upset with corruption and poor services gathered near the Nahr Bin Omar oilfield. Clashes between Basna protesters and security forces have already led to six deaths over the past three days. Iraq's current network of pipelines, pumping stations, and storage facilities - many of which are damaged beyond repair - are not capable of handling greater volumes. An expansion of the export capacity is required for Iraq to be able to benefit from future increases in production. Such an expansion will require FDI, which in turn will require stability and a political climate conducive to large-scale, long-term investments. There are currently two main functioning oil export hubs - the northern network of pipelines, and the southern shipping route (Map 1). Map 1Iraq's Oil Infrastructure On Shaky Ground Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply In northern Iraq, the Iraq-Ceyhan pipeline is connected to Kurdish lines at the city of Fishkabur and carries northern oil to the Turkish port (Table 2). Table 2Defunct Pipelines Leave Room For Improvement Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Northern exports account for ~15% of Iraq's total crude exports (Chart 6). While the Fishkabur-Ceyhan pipeline has a nameplate capacity of 1.5 million bbl/day, usable capacity is reportedly significantly lower, constraining Iraq's northern exports. Chart 6Southern Crude Accounts For Bulk Of Iraqi Exports Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Although the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has its own network of pipelines transporting crude from fields in the Khurmala Dome and Tawke fields to Ceyhan via Fishkabur, the main infrastructure on the Baghdad-controlled side - the Kirkuk-Fishkabur pipeline - has been targeted by insurgents and has slowly been losing capacity. Its pre-2003 0.9 million bbl/day capacity was reduced to 0.25 million bbl/ day in 2013. Finally, it was closed down in March 2014 rendering it inoperable. Exports from Kirkuk have been on hold following Iraq's takeover of the oilfield in October 2017, as the Iraqi government does not have the infrastructure to bypass Kurdish pipelines. As a result, exports through Ceyhan have collapsed to almost half their pre-October levels.2 The closure of the Kirkuk pipeline undercuts Iraq's ambitions to increase Kirkuk's oil production to 1 million bbl/day. This has been partially mitigated by an agreement for Iraq to truck 0.03-0.06 million bbl/day of Kirkuk oil to Iran in exchange for oil in the south. Ultimately, the vulnerability of northern exports highlights the need for more reliable transportation channels. As such, the Iraqi government announced plans late last year to build a new pipeline from Baiji to Fishkabur, replacing the defunct Kirkuk pipeline in transporting oil to Ceyhan. Furthermore, the idea of using KRG pipelines to export Kirkuk's oil was floated during meetings between current Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and former President of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) Masoud Barzani, and thus could be a possibility going forward. A positive outcome would require a thaw in Iraqi-Kurdish relations and ultimately hinges on the outcome of government formation in Baghdad. Thus, the northern infrastructure - which currently has a nameplate export capacity of 1.5 million bbl/day - underlines the vulnerability of Iraq's exports, not only to sabotage, but also to internal strife. Export capacity from southern Iraq, which accounts for 85% of oil exports, will also require expansion. Pipelines between the oilfields, storage facilities, and export terminals on the Persian Gulf are also susceptible to damage. However, authorities have been expanding export capacity there. The authorities currently operate five single point moorings, bringing total export capacity from the Persian Gulf to 4.6 million bbl/day. The Iraqi Pipeline to Saudi Arabia (IPSA), which could support export capacity from the south, runs through the Arabian Peninsula to the Red Sea. However, it has not been operating since the first Gulf War, and the Saudis have converted their section of the pipeline to transport natural gas. Talks of a revival of this line have recently surfaced. An improvement in Saudi-Iraqi relations would certainly be a positive sign for southern export capacity, providing another outlet for any potential supply increase. Currently there are no operating export pipelines going westward.3 The Kirkuk-Baniyas pipelines were damaged in 2003, and while Iraq and Syria agreed to replace these pipelines with two new ones in 2010, no progress has been made yet. Given instability in Syria, this is unlikely to happen anytime soon. However, there is a plan in place to create a new line between Basra and Aqaba in Jordan with an export capacity of 1 million bbl/day. This would allow Iraq to transport just under a quarter of its total exports via the Red Sea, rather than the Persian Gulf. In terms of internal transportation, the Iraq Strategic Pipeline is a pair of bi-directional lines that run vertically between the country's most important oil-producing regions. However, it has been damaged and currently operates only northward, from Basra to Karbala. Since there are no operational pipelines to the north under Iraqi control, it is currently of limited use. In other words, the oil is stuck in Iraq. Increases in water injection facilities are also required to maintain pressures in the reservoir and boost oil production. Natural gas, which Iraq currently flares, could technically be used as an alternative to water injection. Iraq is working towards reducing gas flaring and hopes to use the captured gas for electricity. The Common Seawater Supply Project (CSSP) aims to treat and transport 5-7.5 million bbl/day of seawater from the Persian Gulf to oil production facilities. 1.5 bbl of water injected are required to produce 1 bbl of oil in the major southern oilfields. However, since the termination of talks with Exxon Mobil Corp on the construction of the facility in June (after two years of negotiations!) there has been no progress on this project. It will likely be awarded to another company, but the lack of clarity regarding CSSP's completion date adds uncertainty to Iraq's expansion plans. Electricity shortages also put expansion plans in peril. Iraq needs significant upgrades to its electricity grid. Given that the oil and gas industry is the top industrial customer of electricity, a stable connection is required to boost output. The World Bank reports that in 2011, an average of 40 outages occurred each month, affecting 77% of firms in Iraq. Bottom Line: Export capacity of Iraq's northern pipeline to Ceyhan currently stands at 1.5 million bbl/day, while its southern ports allow for 4.6 million bbl/day to be shipped through the Persian Gulf. These figures are generous. Usable capacity is reportedly much lower. Iraq has plans to increase its western export capacity to 1 million bbl/day through a new pipeline to Aqaba. Nevertheless, this infrastructure is vulnerable to sabotage by residual insurgents, as well as to Iraq-Kurdish and Iraq-Iran disputes. Iraq's Shifting Interests... Policymakers in Baghdad face the challenge of ensuring sufficient water and electricity not only for the country's oilfields but also for the population. Electricity shortages triggered the recent protests in Basra. Demonstrators have been calling for improved access to these essentials, along with job opportunities and a crackdown on corruption. Furthermore, there is increased evidence that Iraqis have become disillusioned with the political elite and are losing confidence in the political "establishment," such as it is (Chart 7). Transparency International rates Iraq as "highly corrupt" and ranked it 169 out of the 180 countries in its 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index. It stands out even among its highly corrupt Middle Eastern peers (Chart 8). Chart 7Iraqis Lack Confidence In Their Leaders Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Chart 8Corruption Is Rampant Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Iraqis fear that even as their country exploits its oil, they will remain destitute. Although the southern region contains three-quarters of Iraq's oil reserves (Table 3), it has the highest poverty rate (Chart 9). Table 3Southern Oilfields Are Iraq's Crown Jewel... Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Chart 9...Yet Poverty Is Widespread There Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Anti-establishment sentiment is rising, as reflected in the most recent parliamentary elections in May 2018. Voter turnout was reported at 44%, down from 60% in the previous two elections. The success of Moqtada Al Sadr's Sairuun coalition in winning the majority of seats highlights this shift in allegiance (Box 1). While Iraq's demographic makeup remains heterogeneous, voters are no longer instinctively looking for sectarian parties to represent them. Rather, they want policymakers to resolve basic needs like electricity, water, and corruption. Protesters in Basra are therefore not chanting sectarian slogans, but rather demanding basic services and jobs (Chart 10). Box 1 Ma'a Salama Sectarianism? In surprising results from the May parliamentary elections, the Sairuun coalition - an unlikely combination of communists, leftists, and centrist groups, led by firebrand Shia cleric Moqtada Al Sadr - attained the largest number of votes (Table 4). Nevertheless, it was not able to garner enough seats to secure an outright majority necessary to form the government on its own. Instead, alliances are now being forged as parties scramble to establish the largest coalition group. Of the 329 seats in Iraq's Council of Representatives, just over half are represented by the main Shia parties. The challenge for them this time around is that the five main Shia blocs, which were previously united, have split into two opposing camps. Table 4Politicians Are Picking Up On Shifting Trends Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply The Sadr-backed Sairuun coalition, along with (1) Prime Minister Abadi's Nasr al Iraq, (2) the conservative Hikma bloc, and (3) the Ayad Allawi, centrist Wataniyya bloc have already announced a preliminary agreement to form a coalition as well as a commitment to take an anti-sectarian approach. Several smaller Sunni, Christian, Turkmen, and Yazidi parties have pledged that they would support the non-sectarian, nationalist, bloc of parties. This brings their seats to 187. At the other end are the pro-Iranian Fateh and Dawlet al Qanun blocs, which recently announced that they had formed the largest bloc. The two main Kurdish parties are not included in either alliance. Together they hold 43 seats, giving them the power to be the tie-breakers. They have drafted a list of demands and stated their willingness to join whichever bloc is able to guarantee their fulfillment. Given Maliki's previously divisive rule, we assign a greater probability to the scenario in which they join the core coalition headed by Sadr, as several Sunnis have already done so. The danger of a nationalist, cross-sectarian movement is that it would signal the rebirth of an independent Iraq, which is not necessarily in the interest of its two powerful neighbors, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Iran, in particular, would feel its dominant position weaken and might want to instigate sectarian conflict in order to arrest the nationalist, Sadr-led movement. This would definitely matter to global investors as a Shia-on-Shia conflict in Iraq would geographically take place around Basra, the main shipment route for 85% of the country's oil exports. Chart 10Iraqis Want Better Services Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Prime Minister al-Abadi has also become more responsive to people's needs. He recently sacked the electricity minister and promised to fund electricity and water projects. Furthermore, amid demands for employment opportunities in the oil sector and accusations of corruption, the Iraqi cabinet recently announced a regulation requiring that at least 50% of foreign oil company employees be Iraqi citizens. Given that the voice of discontent in Iraq is getting louder, we expect the government to uphold these promises. Pacifying protesters will increase stability, reduce risks of violence and disruptions, and build support for the government. Nevertheless, many voters still see the prime minister as part of the corrupt political elite. Bottom Line: Iraqis are demanding their basic rights, and this is taking the form of increased pro¬tests, especially in the south where key oilfields are located. The schism among the main Shia parties along the nationalist/Iran axis suggests that Iraq has evolved beyond the purely sectarian political system. This is a positive in the long term as it means that the country can focus on material issues that matter to Iraqis. However, in the short term, the Iran-aligned Shia groups could spur violence, especially if they realize that the sectarian model of politics is waning. ...And Shifting Allegiance? Apart from the shift in focus toward issues-based politics, the election also highlights a pivot in allegiance away from Iran. Sadr's Sairuun bloc is critical of Iranian interference, and while it was initially open to joining forces with Amiri's Iran-backed Fateh coalition, it ultimately allied with the more secular Shia parties. Iran's recent role in Iraq has been mainly through military aid. It proved vital in driving the Islamic State militants out of Iraq - training, equipping, and funding Iraqi militias who fought against the terrorist group. Iran-backed militias united in 2014 to form the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and eventually defeated Islamic State. The PMF, estimated to be between 100,000-150,000 strong, was officially recognized as part of the Iraqi army earlier this year. However, the loyalty of the Shia militias to Baghdad remains unclear. Furthermore, when Washington expressed reluctance in arming Iraq with U.S. military equipment to fight terrorist groups in early 2014, Iran stepped up and signed a deal to sell arms and ammunition worth $195 million (Table 5). Iran also sent its own troops to support in fights against insurgencies - dispatching 2,000 troops to Central Iraq in June 2014. This military collaboration culminated in the signing of a July 23, 2017 agreement between Iran and Iraq for military cooperation in the fight against terrorism and extremism. Table 5Iran's Military Support Was Needed In The Past... Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Yet with the curbing of Islamic State, Iraq is preparing to begin a new chapter - rebuilding its war-torn cities. In doing so, its needs will shift from military support to financial support, potentially shifting its allegiance from Iran to Saudi Arabia. Furthermore, Iran's current economic situation - especially with the anticipated impact of U.S. sanctions - will leave fewer funds available for it to direct towards Iraq. The electricity crisis earlier this summer symbolizes the shifting dynamic. Iran, which has been supplying southern Iraq with electricity, announced it would no longer provide Iraq with power, citing its dissatisfaction with the accumulation of unpaid bills. Iran itself is experiencing electricity shortages and is no longer willing or able to sacrifice for Iraq, which it fears is drifting outside its sphere of control. Iran eventually took back this move and restarted its electricity exports. However, this occurred only after the Iraqi government sent a delegation to Saudi Arabia to negotiate an agreement to supply electricity to southern Iraq. The Saudis also offered to build a solar power plant to provide electricity to Iraq at a quarter of the Iranian price. Baghdad therefore used the crisis to signal to Tehran that it has other options, including a closer economic relationship with Iran's chief rival, Saudi Arabia. This emerging rift was also apparent during the International Conference for Iraq's Reconstruction, hosted in Kuwait, where Iraq hoped to secure $88 billion worth of funds. There, Iraq obtained $30 billion in pledges toward rebuilding its economy (Chart 11). While Iraq's Arab neighbors jointly pledged over $10 billion, Iran - despite being present at the conference - failed to guarantee any funds. Later it offered Iraq a $3 billion credit line. Chart 11...But Now Iraq Needs Monetary Support Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Iran is not only limited by the dire state of its economy. Protests in Iran earlier this year partly focused on Tehran's foreign policy expenses, i.e. its support of various loyal regimes around the region. This "loyalty" costs money that Iranians believe could be better spent on their domestic needs. As such, Iranian policymakers will be wary of committing more funding to Iraq, as it could be seen as wasteful by restless voters at home. What's more, Iraq's Arab GCC neighbors have both the willingness and the ability to ally with Iraq and, in turn, to curb Iran's influence in the region. Bottom Line: Stronger ties with its Arab neighbors - and the accompanying funds - are what Iraq needs right now. Iraq requires another $58 billion towards its reconstruction efforts. Its southern neighbors can help it get there. Whether this will transpire hinges on Iran's ability to infiltrate Iraq's political elite. Given that Iraqi people have become disillusioned with many of these leaders, Iran will likely face a bigger challenge this time around. Investment Implications: Short-Term Pain For Long-Term Gain Since 2011, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has stressed the emerging Saudi-Iranian proxy war as the main regional dynamic.4 With the U.S. "deleveraging" out of the Middle East, the field is open for regional power dynamics. The result is a "security dilemma," in which Saudi and Iranian attempts to improve their defenses appear offensive to the other side, resulting in a vicious cycle of distrust. The Trump administration has deepened the tensions by ending the Obama administration détente with Iran. Lower oil revenue will limit Iran's ability to influence the Middle East through its proxies, including in Iraq. Iran may decide that Iraq is lost. At that point, it may conclude that if it cannot own Iraq, it must break it. Recently, Reuters reported that Iran has moved short-range ballistic missiles into Iraq in order to threaten Saudi Arabia and Israel, in case it needs to retaliate against a U.S. attack against its nuclear facilities.5 While the report was strongly denied by Iran, it suggests that Tehran could be trying to sow discord in Iraq, or even that its operatives are working with impunity in Iraq. Iran's pain is ultimately Saudi Arabia's gain. An Iranian economy battered by the imposition of sanctions will give way to increased Saudi influence in Iraq. The oil-rich GCC countries certainly have the coffers to incentivize such a switch. In offering to fill the funding gaps of its less fortunate neighbors, Saudi Arabia has already won the allegiance of other strategic regional partners such as Egypt, Pakistan, and Sudan. In 2016, amid economic turmoil in Egypt, Saudi Arabia signed agreements worth over $40 billion to support Egypt (Table 6). This does not include financing from other GCC allies. The UAE and Kuwait also support Egypt's economy in a significant fashion. Table 6Saudi Arabia Is No Stranger To Purchasing Allies Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Iraq: The Fulcrum Of Middle East Geopolitics And Global Oil Supply Similar financial backing in Iraq would go a long way towards filling the $58 billion funding gap for its reconstruction. The quid pro quo would be the backing of Saudi Arabia's regional political agenda, which includes curbing Iranian influence. Not only would such investment accelerate the eventual increase in Iraqi oil production. It would also curb Iran's ability to retaliate through the region, both by removing an important ally and by cutting off Syria and Lebanese Hezbollah geographically from Tehran. Domestic Iraqi politics are therefore critical for global investors. If Iraq forms a nationalist, non-sectarian government over the next several months, it will degrade Iran's ability to influence the country. At that point, Iran may either lash out against the new Baghdad government and try to create domestic strife through its proxies - the battle-hardened Shia militias - or it may be pressed into negotiations with the U.S., lest it lose more allies in the region. If Iran choses to lash out against Iraq, we suspect that it will do so through attacks and sabotage against Iraqi infrastructure. This could present an additional tailwind to oil prices over the next several months. Any additional risk premium on the cost of a barrel of oil would be a boon for Iran as it deals with a loss of exports due to sanctions. Such a campaign of sabotage, however, would ensure that Baghdad firmly moves outside the Iranian sphere in the long term, which could open up the potential for Saudi Arabia and its GCC allies to invest in the country. In the short term, therefore, there is further risk to global oil supply as the shifting political dynamics in Iraq will put the country squarely in the middle of the ongoing Saudi-Iranian proxy war, right where it has always been. In the long term, we believe that Iranian influence in Iraq has peaked and will wane going forward. This opens up the opportunity for Baghdad to rely on Saudi Arabia and GCC countries for funding. This could be a boon for global oil supply over the next decade. Of course, much will hinge on whether Saudi Arabia is willing to finance the development of Iraqi oil fields. Oil produced in those fields would compete directly for market access with Saudi's own production. If Saudi Arabia decides to look out for its own, short-term, economic interests, then Iraq may be limited in terms of funding its development, or even be thrust back into Iran's orbit. Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Special Report, "Re Oil Demand: Fed Policy Trumps Tariffs," August 30, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 Prior to the takeover, Kirkuk oil was being transported to Fishkabur via KRG pipelines, which the Iraqi government can no longer access. 3 The Kirkuk-Haifa line has been defunct since 1948. 4 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy and Commodity & Energy Strategy Special Report, "Riyadh's Oil Gambit," dated October 11, 2011, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see John Irish and Ahmed Rasheed, "Exclusive: Iran moves missiles to Iraq in warning to enemies," Reuters, dated August 31, 2018, available at reuters.com.

Highlights Our antennae are twitching wildly, as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) walks back a widely telegraphed commitment to surge production. This occurs against the backdrop of a possible loss of as much as 2mm b/d in exports from Iran and Venezuela next year, with demand expected to remain fairly strong. U.S. President Donald Trump remains silent. We believe the proximate cause of KSA's reversal boils down to one or all of the following: President Trump told KSA to expect an SPR release ahead of November mid-terms; KSA found it difficult to maintain higher production; or Short-term demand for KSA's output is falling, so they reduced production. We have questioned the ability of KSA to sustain production above 10.5mm b/d for an extended period in the past. However, we believe July's 200k b/d cut was produced by a combination of No. 1 and No. 3. We expect KSA to build storage ahead of Iran sanctions. On the back of our updated balances modeling we are maintaining our 2H18 Brent ensemble forecast of $70/bbl, and raising our 2019 forecast to $80/bbl from $75/bbl (Chart of the Week): The front-loaded production increase we expected from OPEC 2.0 could be less than expected. Highlights Energy: Overweight. The U.S. EIA reported U.S. crude and product inventories rose 17.4mm barrels for the week ended August 10, 2018. Markets traded sharply lower as a result, falling more than 3% in WTI and 2% in Brent. As we went to press, October Brent was trading just above $70/bbl. We are maintaining our $70/bbl Brent forecast for 2H18. Base Metals: Neutral. Union leaders at BHP's Escondida mine in Chile, the largest in the world, will take proposed contract terms to members this week.1 We were stopped out of our tactical Dec18 copper call spread with a 10.2% loss. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold remains under pressure as the broad trade-weighted USD rises. We remain long as a portfolio hedge. Ags/Softs: Underweight. USDA export data show year-to-date wheat and soybean exports are down 20% and 10% y/y in the Oct17 - Jun18 period. Feature Forward guidance from OPEC 2.0's leadership and its predecessor, the regular old OPEC, has not been helpful of late.2 This complicates our balances assessment this month (Chart of the Week), and raises the odds volatility will increase sooner than we expected. Chart of the Week2H18 Brent Forecast Stays At $70/bbl, 2019 Moved Up To $80/bbl 2H18 Brent Forecast Stays At $70/bbl, 2019 Moved Up To $80/bbl 2H18 Brent Forecast Stays At $70/bbl, 2019 Moved Up To $80/bbl KSA's reversal in July of its earlier, widely telegraphed decision to sharply raise production in response to aggressive tweeting from U.S. President Donald Trump beginning in May - to as much as 11mm b/d from just over 10mm b/d in the first five months of this year - was followed by an abrupt output cut of ~ 200k b/d last month. Last month, we expected KSA's crude production to average 10.60mm b/d in 2H18, and 10.50mm b/d next year. In our current balances estimate (Table 1), we now expect the Kingdom's output to average 10.28mm b/d in 2H18 and 10.35mm b/d in 2019, down 300k b/d and 150k b/d, respectively. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d) (Base Case Balances) OPEC 2.0 Sailing Close To The Wind OPEC 2.0 Sailing Close To The Wind Russia, OPEC 2.0's other putative leader, also is complicating assessments of liquids production by the producer coalition. Given the signaling it and KSA were providing over the past couple of months, we expected Russia to raise production 80k b/d in 2H18 to 11.27mm b/d, and by 160k b/d in 2019 to 11.35mm b/d. We still expect Russia to raise its production and revised our baseline estimates to 11.32mm b/d and to 11.43mm b/d for this year and next, respectively. However, it is difficult to reconcile our expectation with the 11.13mm b/d 2H18 liquids production expected by OPEC for Russia in its August Monthly Oil Market Report (MOMR), as we are highly confident Russia signed off on that estimate before it was published. Chart 2Physical Deficit Worsens Physical Deficit Worsens Physical Deficit Worsens Our global liquids supply estimate for 2H18 now stands at 101.08mm b/d, down 680k b/d from last month's estimate. For 2019, we lowered our supply estimate by 800k b/d to 101.01mm b/d. But this could end up overstating supply, given what we're seeing from OPEC 2.0 presently. On the demand side, we've lowered our 2018 and 2019 expectations slightly - to 1.67mm b/d and 1.62mm b/d, respectively, or ~ 50k b/d on average versus our previous estimates. This is still relatively stout demand growth - supported by still-strong global trade, particularly in the EM economies - which means storage will be forced to draw harder next year than we expected even a month ago (Chart 2). Physical Deficit Worsens In 2019 We expected OPEC 2.0's supply increase would persist at a higher level during 2H18, which would allow refiners to build precautionary inventories going into next year. This no longer is a tenable assumption, given what is being reported for OPEC 2.0's largest producers - KSA and Russia. In addition, we have amended our base case supply model, to reflect the loss of 1mm b/d of Iranian exports to U.S. sanctions for most of next year; we have this occurring in 250k b/d increments in the Nov18 - Feb 19 period, leaving production from March 2019 on at 2.8mm b/d. This replaces our earlier assumption of a 500k b/d by the end of 1H19. We took this action on the back of the increasingly strident rhetoric from the U.S. administration, and press reports indicating widespread compliance with the sanctions is expected - particularly reports suggesting China and India will not be looking to increase purchases of Iranian crude. Offsetting the higher Iranian export losses we foresee, our base case includes a re-start of Neutral Zone production in 2Q19.3 We expect KSA and Kuwait to each bring 175k b/d back on line, for a total of 350k b/d. It is not clear this is counted in both countries' spare capacity, but if it is, then spare capacity will become tighter within OPEC 2.0 next year. In our scenario analysis, we continue to give a relatively high weight to the loss of Venezuela's exports - anywhere from 800k to 1mm b/d - as that country's oil industry continues to degrade. Our ensemble analysis indicates OECD storage will draw more than previously estimated (Chart 3), on the back of these higher assumed Iranian export losses, and a reduction in OPEC 2.0's front-loaded production increases, particularly in 2019. As storage draws, days-forward-cover (DFC) also will contract (Chart 4). In addition to steepening the backwardation in crude forward curves, we expect implied option volatility to increase in 2019 (Chart 5). Chart 3Storage Will Draw##BR##Harder Next Year Storage Will Draw Harder Next Year Storage Will Draw Harder Next Year Chart 4Days-Forward-Cover##BR##Will Fall In 2019 Days-Forward-Cover Will Fall In 2019 Days-Forward-Cover Will Fall In 2019 Chart 5Implied Volatilities Will Rise,##BR##As OECD Storage Falls OPEC 2.0 Sailing Close To The Wind OPEC 2.0 Sailing Close To The Wind Ensemble Forecast Update In addition to moving the 1mm b/d loss of Iranian exports from a scenario and into our base case - offset somewhat by higher Neutral Zone production - we expect transportation bottlenecks in the Permian Basin to slow production growth in the U.S. shales even more. We have lowered our expected U.S. production growth to 1.21mm b/d this year and 1.22mm b/d in 2019, versus earlier estimates of 1.30mm b/d and 1.34mm b/d, as a result (Chart 6 shows the trajectory we expect from this scenario).4 Coupled with the lower-than-expected production increase from OPEC 2.0 and still-strong demand growth globally, this will lead to tighter markets in 2019. Chart 6Higher Volatility = Wider Expected Price Range Higher Volatility = Wider Expected Price Range Higher Volatility = Wider Expected Price Range We also are including a scenario showing a slowdown in demand growth, which takes y/y growth to 1.43mm b/d in 2018 and 2019, versus our current estimates of average growth of 1.64mm b/d over the two-year interval. Bottom Line: Numerous conflicting data have entered the oil pricing picture over the past month, which greatly complicates our analysis and forecasting. The fact that OPEC 2.0's leadership - KSA and Russia - is providing little in the way of forward guidance does not make this any easier. We admit to being puzzled by KSA's apparent decision to walk back its production increase going into 2019, when the likelihood of losing close to 2mm b/d of exports from Iran and Venezuela becomes markedly higher. Based on our current modeling we expect higher prices next year ($80/bbl vs. our earlier estimate of $75/bbl for Brent), and a steepening of the Brent and WTI backwardations next year. We continue to expect WTI to trade $6/bbl below Brent in 2H18 and 2019. The steepening backwardation will lift implied volatility, particularly next year. We remain long call option spreads along the Brent forward curve in 2019, in expectation prices and volatility will move higher. We continue to believe the balance of price risk is to the upside. However, as the lower-demand scenario in our ensemble forecast shows, an unexpected slowdown in growth can have profound effects on prices. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Chile's Escondida union to take new labor proposal to members," published by reuters.com August 15, 2018. 2 OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia. At the end of June, the coalition's member states agreed to increase production to bring it into line with the originally agreed deal to remove 1.8mm b/d of output from the market. 3 Please see "Kuwait, Saudi to resume output from Neutral Zone in 2019 - Toyo Engineering," published by reuters.com July 2, 2018. 4 We place our scenarios within the context of a market-generated confidence interval, which we calculate using implied volatilities derived from Brent and WTI options markets. Please see Ryan, Bob and Tancred Lidderdale (2009), "Energy Price Volatility and Forecast Uncertainty," particularly Appendix 1 beginning on p. 18, for a derivation of the confidence intervals. The article was published by the U.S. EIA. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table OPEC 2.0 Sailing Close To The Wind OPEC 2.0 Sailing Close To The Wind Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017 OPEC 2.0 Sailing Close To The Wind OPEC 2.0 Sailing Close To The Wind

Highlights The eye of the storm is passing over the oil market. OPEC 2.0's recent production increase will temporarily halt the sharp decline in OECD commercial oil inventories, allowing stocks of crude oil and refined products in member states to level off ahead of the sharp drawdowns we expect next year (Chart of the Week).1 This will keep the front of Brent's forward curve in a modest contango going into 4Q18, and suppress short-term price volatility. Thereafter, reduced OPEC 2.0 output post-U.S. midterm elections, and lower Iranian and Venezuelan exports will force OECD inventories to resume drawing sharply, backwardating Brent's forward curve and raising oil price volatility (Chart 2).2 Chart of the WeekOECD Inventories Rebuild Slightly,##BR##Then Resume Falling Next Year OECD Inventories Rebuild Slightly, Then Resume Falling Next Year OECD Inventories Rebuild Slightly, Then Resume Falling Next Year Chart 2Brent, WTI Implied Volatility Vs. Curve Shape:##BR##Implied Vol Is Higher At Storage Extremes Calm Before The Storm In Oil Markets Calm Before The Storm In Oil Markets Chart 3Physical Oil Deficit Returns##BR##To Oil Market Next Year Physical Oil Deficit Returns To Oil Market Next Year Physical Oil Deficit Returns To Oil Market Next Year Highlights Energy: Overweight. The U.S. EIA revised its estimate of OPEC spare capacity down slightly for this year - to 1.7mm b/d from 1.8mm b/d. Spare capacity for next year was raised to 1.3mm b/d from just over 1mm b/d previously. At ~1.5% of global consumption this year and next, spare capacity is chronically low. Base Metals: Neutral. Chinese policymakers could sanction new infrastructure spending and easier credit to counter slower growth related to trade tensions, Reuters reported.3 Precious Metals: Neutral. We were stopped out of our tactical long silver position with a 10% loss. Ags/Softs: Underweight. There is more evidence that U.S. ags are finding new markets. EU imports of U.S. soybeans almost quadrupled in recent weeks. This comes amid the June plunge in prices and a thawing in trade tensions, following talks between EU Commission President Juncker and President Trump late last week.4 Feature The oil market sits in the eye of a pricing storm we expect to hit later this year. Following highly vocal - and twitter-textual - jawboning by U.S. President Donald Trump, OPEC's Gulf Arab producers lifted production in June and again in July.5 Reuters survey data indicate the OPEC Cartel (including new member Congo) lifted production by 70k b/d in July, bringing output to its highest level this year (32.64mm b/d).6 KSA boosted its output to 10.6mm b/d in June, up from less than 10mm b/d in the January - May period. This likely was a combination of higher production and inventory draws. OPEC's compliance level fell to 111% of the 1.2mm b/d of cuts agreed in November 2016, versus compliance levels exceeding 150% earlier this year. This is attributed to sharp declines in Venezuela's output, sporadic losses from Libya and Nigeria, and ongoing declines in non-Gulf OPEC states. We expect Russia, the putative co-head of the OPEC 2.0 coalition, will increase production by 200k b/d in 2H18 (Table 1). Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) Calm Before The Storm In Oil Markets Calm Before The Storm In Oil Markets Global Oil Market Will Tighten Again Post-U.S. mid-term elections in November - just when the U.S. sanctions are re-imposed against Iranian crude exports - we expect OPEC 2.0 to dial back production increases made at the behest of President Trump. Continued declines in non-Gulf OPEC output, led by ongoing and deep losses in Venezuelan output, and random unplanned production outages also will contribute to a tightening on the supply side going into 2019. Rising geopolitical tensions in the Gulf will keep markets on edge, with a predisposition to push higher. This supply-side tightness will once again come up against strong global oil demand, which we estimate will grow at a 1.7mm b/d rate this year and next. We are not expecting a repeat of the evolution of prices observed following OPEC 2.0's January 2017 agreement, which cut production to reverse the massive accumulation of inventories brought about by the original cartel's market-share war launched in November 2014. This evolution is depicted in the price-decomposition model for Brent shown in Chart 4. We segmented the fundamental price drivers - i.e. demand, supply and inventories - into distinct factors, and estimated an econometric model that allows us to track whether the evolution of prices is consistent with our expectations for these factors. Chart 4Factor Decomposition For Brent Prices Calm Before The Storm In Oil Markets Calm Before The Storm In Oil Markets Our modeling indicates the 2014 - 15 decline in oil prices was driven by a not-often-seen combination of every single factor, with our OPEC Supply-and-Inventory factor accounting for the largest negative contribution to the evolution of prices during this period. Since 2017, our factor model shows Brent prices have been supported by two factors acting simultaneously together: (1) the strong compliance of OPEC 2.0 members to the coalition's production-cutting agreement, which reduced the OPEC Supply-and-Inventory factor's role, and (2) the pickup in global oil demand, particularly in EM economies, which pushed our Global Demand factor up. These effects were partly counterbalanced by the rise in our Non-OPEC Supply factor, which became the largest negative contributor to price movements, driven by strong U.S. shale production growth. Return Of Backwardation Will Spur Volatility Our ensemble forecasts for Brent in 2H18 and 2019 are $70 and $75/bbl, with WTI expected to trade $6/bbl below these levels (Chart 5). The supply-side tightening we expect, coupled with continued demand growth, will once again lead to sharp draws in OECD inventories beginning in 4Q18 and continuing into 2019, as seen in the Chart of the Week. This will steepen the backwardations in the Brent and WTI forward curves (Chart 6). Chart 5BCA Brent And##BR##WTI Forecasts BCA Brent And WTI Forecasts BCA Brent And WTI Forecasts Chart 6Backwardation Will Return##BR##To Brent's Forward Curve Backwardation Will Return To Brent's Forward Curve Backwardation Will Return To Brent's Forward Curve Our research shows that as the slope of the Brent and WTI forward curves steepen - i.e., backwardations become more positive in percentage terms (or contangoes become more negative) - the implied volatility of options written on these crude oil futures increases, as can be seen in Chart 2.7 All else equal, higher volatility makes options written on these crude futures more valuable. Higher Vol ... Higher Prices ... In the different scenarios we use to produce our ensemble forecast, we view the balance of risks to be on the upside. This can be seen in the different paths our scenarios cover over the next year and a half, which include physical and geopolitical variables affecting price expectations (Chart 7).8 Chart 7Higher Volatility = Wider Expected Price Range Higher Volatility = Wider Expected Price Range Higher Volatility = Wider Expected Price Range Our base case assumes the supply and demand estimates shown in Table 1, which include the loss of 500k b/d due to the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions against Iran. However, we also model the loss of 1mm b/d of Iranian exports. Furthermore, we account for the loss of ~ 800k b/d of Venezuelan exports in the event that country collapses and nothing but the 250k b/d of output required to produce refined products for the local market remains online. Lastly, we account for the Permian transportation bottlenecks preventing all of the crude produced in the Basin from getting to refiners or to export markets. In this week's publication, we also include an estimate of the 95% confidence interval derived from Brent and WTI options' implied volatilities, so that our scenarios can be placed in the context of market-derived assessments of the range in which prices will trade. ... Lower Prices ... ? In modeling these risks, we also must account for downside price risks. Most prominent among these is a resolution of the long-simmering U.S. - Iran conflict, which, from time to time, results in physical confrontation. This is an outcome markets were forced to consider earlier this week when President Trump offered to meet Iranian President Rouhani without any preconditions. Among other things, Trump suggested he would have interest in working on a nuclear-arms deal to replace the one negotiated under President Obama's watch, which he scuppered in May. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo walked this remark back later. We believe the odds of such a meeting are extremely low. The odds such meeting would lead to a resolution of animosities - or at least a working understanding between the two sides - are even lower. Even so, investors need to account for this tail risk, which, if realized could take $5 to $10/bbl out of the current oil price structure. That is, until KSA and Russia muster the OPEC 2.0 member states to again reduce production to keep prices at levels that work best for their economies. Bottom Line: Our modeling and the forecasts point to higher prices and a steepening of the backwardation in Brent and WTI forward curves. This will lead to an increase in implied volatilities for options written on these crude oil futures. For this reason, we suggest investors remain long call spreads further out the Brent forward curve in 2019, which can be found in the Strategic Recommendations table on page 10 of this publication. That said, downside risks have emerged, even if, at present, the likelihood of a diplomatic breakthrough that triggers them is remote. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia. At the end of June, the coalition's member states agreed to increase production, which we estimate will raise its output ~ 275k b/d in 2H18 (vs. 1H18). We expect a physical deficit of ~ 430k b/d in 1H19 (vs 1H18, Chart 3). 2 "Contango" and "backwardation" are terms of art in commodity markets. In oil trading, when prompt-delivery crude is priced below deferred-delivery material markets are in contango; vice versa for backwardation. 3 Please see "Exclusive: China eyes infrastructure boost to cushion growth as trade war escalates - sources," published by uk.reuters.com July 27, 2018. 4 We discussed this possibility under Option 1 in our July 26, 2018, Commodity & Energy Strategy lead article entitled "Policy Uncertainty Could Trump Ag Fundamentals." It is published by BCA Research, and is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see our Special Report entitled "U.S., OPEC Talk Oil Prices Down; Gulf Tensions Could Become Kinetic," published jointly July 19, 2018, by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see "OPEC July oil output hits 2018 peak, but outages weigh: Reuters survey," published July 30, 2018, by uk.reuters.com. 7 Chart 2 shows the V-shaped mapping of implied volatility as a function of the slope of the forward curve - , i.e., the difference between the 1st- and 12th-nearby futures divided by the 1st -nearby future (to get the number in %) - against the at-the-money Implied Volatilities of 3rd-nearby Brent and WTI options (also in %). Our findings extend results published in Kogan et al (2009), who show realized volatilities calculated using historical settlements of crude oil futures have a similar V-shaped mapping with the slope of crude oil futures conditioned on 6th- vs. 3rd-nearby futures returns (in %). Please see Kogan, L., Livdan, D., & Yaron, A. (2009). "Oil Futures Prices in a Production Economy With Investment Constraints." The Journal of Finance, 64 (3), 1345-1375. Strictly speaking, volatility is the standard deviation of percent returns, usually measured on a per annum basis. Realized volatility uses futures prices to calculate returns and standard deviations; options' implied volatility is a parameter of an option-pricing model that is solved for once an option's premium, or price, is known (i.e., clears the market). This makes implied volatility a forward-looking market-cleared parameter, provided market participants agree the model used to calculate its value. Research shows implied volatilities do a better job of forecasting actual volatility than historical volatilities constructed using futures prices. See Ryan, Bob and Tancred Lidderdale (2009). "Energy Price Volatility and Forecast Uncertainty." U.S. Energy Information Administration. 8 We do not try to model a closure of the Strait of Hormuz or its prices implications. We do, however, consider this in our Special Report published July 19, 2018, "U.S., OPEC Talk Oil Prices Down; Gulf Tensions Could Become Kinetic," referenced above. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Calm Before The Storm In Oil Markets Calm Before The Storm In Oil Markets Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017 Calm Before The Storm In Oil Markets Calm Before The Storm In Oil Markets