Monetary

Dear Client, This week, the US Bond Strategy service is hosting its Quarterly Webcast (February 15 at 10:00 AM EST, 15:00 PM GMT, 16:00 PM CET). In addition, we are sending this Quarterly Chartpack that provides a recap of our key recommendations and some charts related to those recommendations and other areas of interest for US bond investors. Please tune in to the Webcast and browse the Chartpack at your leisure, and do let us know if you have any questions or other feedback. To view the Quarterly Chartpack PDF please click here. Best regards, Ryan Swift, US Bond Strategist

Feature This week, we present the third edition of the BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) Global Credit Conditions Chartbook – a review of central bank surveys of bank lending standards and loan demand. The data from lending surveys during the last quarter of 2021 were mixed, with business credit standards easing in the US, Japan, Canada, and New Zealand while remaining mostly unchanged in the euro area and UK (Chart 1). Supply chain disruptions have had a two-pronged effect on borrowing. While they have hurt business confidence and prospects, they have also created loan demand as firms look to replenish depleted inventory stocks. The overall picture is one of solid economic fundamentals that are nonetheless perturbed by inflation concerns and lingering uncertainty regarding Covid-19 infections. Chart 1Credit Standards Eased In Most Developed Markets In Q4/2021 Credit Standards Eased In Most Developed Markets In Q4/2021 Credit Standards Eased In Most Developed Markets In Q4/2021 An Overview Of Global Credit Conditions Surveys Chart 2Credit Standards And Spreads Are Correlated Credit Standards And Spreads Are Correlated Credit Standards And Spreads Are Correlated After every quarter, major central banks compile surveys to assess prevailing credit conditions. The purpose is to obtain from banks an assessment of how their lending standards and demand for loans, for both firms and consumers, changed over the previous quarter. Most surveys also ask questions about the key factors driving these changes and expectations for the next quarter.1 For fixed income investors, these surveys are valuable for a few reasons. Firstly, data on consumer lending is a window into consumer health while business loan demand sheds light on the investment picture. These help derive a view on the path of future economic growth and interest rates and thus, the appropriate duration stance of a bond portfolio. Also, credit standards can tell us about the pass-through from fiscal and monetary policy measures to realized financial conditions (i.e. corporate borrowing rates). Most importantly, credit standards exhibit a direct correlation with corporate bond spreads (Chart 2). As they have access to detailed, non-public information on a large number of borrowers, loan officers are uniquely positioned to evaluate corporate health. When banks are tightening standards, they see an issue with the credit quality of either current or future loans, which impacts borrowing costs in the corporate bond market. Tightening standards indicate a worsening borrowing backdrop and weaker growth, which then pushes up corporate spreads. Vice-versa, easing standards imply a favorable backdrop and plentiful liquidity—both bullish signs for spread product. US In the US, a net percentage of domestic respondents to the Fed’s Senior Loan Officer Survey, reported easing standards for commercial and industrial (C&I) loans to firms of all sizes over Q4/2021 (Chart 3). This marks the fourth consecutive quarter of easing standards. However, banks did report a slower pace of easing, which correlates with tighter financial conditions on the margin (top panel). While we are still in a period of easy financial conditions in absolute terms, this could soon start to change as hot inflation prints and booming economic data cause the Fed to turn increasingly hawkish. Despite this, banks expect to ease standards further over 2022, indicating confidence that underlying economic fundamentals and corporate health will be able to weather monetary tightening. US banks also reported stronger C&I loan demand from all firms in Q4, marking three consecutive quarters of improvement (middle panel). The picture was optimistic, with banks attributing increased loan demand to inventory financing, mergers & acquisitions, and fixed investment. Meanwhile, only 4.2% and 12.5% of banks saw a decrease in internal funds and increasing precautionary demand, respectively, as somewhat important. Inventories accounted for all but 2% of the 6.9% annualized GDP growth in Q4. With inventory stocks still depressed in absolute terms, we expect inventory restocking will continue to buoy demand over 2022. Chart 3US Credit Conditions US Credit Conditions US Credit Conditions ​​​​​ Chart 4US Loan Demand Outlook For 2022 Q1/2022 Credit Conditions Chartbook: Tightening Cometh? Q1/2022 Credit Conditions Chartbook: Tightening Cometh? On the consumer side, banks reported easier standards across the board, with standards easing for credit card, auto, and other consumer loans (bottom panel). However, the pace of easing, which has historically been good at calling turning points in consumer confidence (on a rate-of-change basis), appears to have peaked. Consumer sentiment has already been battered by rampant inflation and falling real wage expectations; tighter credit standards down the road could prove to be a further headwind. As part of the one-off special questions in this edition of the survey, respondents were asked about the reasoning behind their outlook for loan demand over 2022 (Chart 4). Of those that expected higher demand, 70% cited higher spending and investment demand from borrowers as their income prospects improved. Meanwhile, only 33% thought that precautionary demand for liquidity would be a factor. Lenders thought that both, a worsening or an improvement in supply chain disruptions, could contribute to increased demand. 53% expected that continued disruption would create greater inventory financing needs. Meanwhile, 55% expected that easing supply chain troubles would boost demand as product availability concerns faded. Of those that expected weaker loan demand, interest rates were by-and-large the biggest factor, with an overwhelming 96% believing that rising rates would quell loan demand. This was followed by concerns that supply chain disruptions would keep prices high and product availability scarce (70%). On the whole, the responses capture a US economy that is at a tipping point, with market participants watching to see how it weathers an aggressive rate hiking cycle from the Fed. While underlying economic variables such as growth and employment remain strong, it still remains to be seen how much of a tightening in financial conditions the markets can bear. Euro Area In the euro area, banks on net reported a very slight tightening of standards to enterprises for the second consecutive quarter in Q4/2021 (Chart 5). Effectively, standards were unchanged as 96 of the 100 respondents to the survey reported no change from Q3. Slightly lower risk tolerance from banks contributed to tightening while lower risk perceptions related to the general economic outlook and the value of collateral had an easing effect. As in the US, standards in the euro area do show a correlation to overall financial conditions. Those have already tightened noticeably since the February 3rd meeting of the European Central Bank (ECB) Governing Council where President Lagarde set a more hawkish tone. While banks do expect a slight easing of standards over Q1/2022, that is unlikely given high inflation and geopolitical uncertainties which will negatively impact risk perceptions. Chart 5Euro Area Credit Conditions Euro Area Credit Conditions Euro Area Credit Conditions ​​​​​​ Chart 6Credit Demand In Major Euro Area Economies Credit Demand In Major Euro Area Economies Credit Demand In Major Euro Area Economies ​​​​​​ Loan demand growth from enterprises was remarkably strong in Q4, with 18% of firms reporting increased demand for loans (middle panel). The main driver was increased demand for inventories, followed closely by fixed investment and merger & acquisition needs. Loan demand leads realized growth in inventories, which has been already been picking up. In Q1, banks expect continued growth in loan demand, albeit at a slower pace. On the consumer side, however, loan demand only increased slightly, with the pace of growth slowing from the previous quarter (bottom panel). This was in line with consumer confidence taking a hit from rising inflation and the Omicron variant in the fourth quarter. The generally low level of interest rates had a small positive impact, while durable goods spending had a slight negative impact on consumer credit demand. Lenders expect moderate growth in consumer credit demand in Q1. Moving to the four major euro area economies, demand for loans to enterprises picked up in Germany, France, and Italy, while remaining unchanged in Spain (Chart 6). Fixed investment needs made a positive contribution across the board. This is corroborated by data on total lending, which is still growing on a year-on-year basis, even though the pace of growth is slowing in all the major euro area economies except Spain. UK In the UK, overall corporate credit standards eased slightly in Q4/2021, marking the fourth straight quarter of easing (Chart 7). However, there was dispersion along firm size. Large private non-financials accounted for all the easing and standards for small and medium firms actually tightened slightly. Going forward, lenders expect a further easing in standards in Q1, about on par with the easing seen in Q4. Chart 7UK Credit Conditions UK Credit Conditions UK Credit Conditions ​​​​​ Chart 8UK Lenders Expect A Robust Growth To Ease Credit Availability Q1/2022 Credit Conditions Chartbook: Tightening Cometh? Q1/2022 Credit Conditions Chartbook: Tightening Cometh? ​​​​​​ On the demand side, lenders reported slightly weaker corporate demand for lending in Q4. Again, the results were uneven across firm size – loan demand from large firms strengthened moderately, while demand from small and medium firms weakened. On average, lenders expect a slight pickup in corporate demand over Q1. Moving to the UK consumer, demand for unsecured lending continued to rise at a brisk pace, hovering around the highest levels since Q4/2014 (bottom panel). Going forward, lenders expect a continued increase in demand, but at a much slower pace. The strong developments in loan growth are seemingly at odds with the GfK consumer confidence index which has declined a total of 12 points since its July peak. Although the Bank of England does not survey respondents on the factors driving household unsecured lending demand, the divergence between confidence and loan demand suggests that precautionary demand for liquidity is playing a role. This lines up with the GfK survey, where expectations for the general economic situation over the next year are in freefall with consumers bracing for high inflation and further Bank Rate increases. Pivoting back to the drivers of corporate lending, the leading factor behind increased credit availability was an improvement in the overall economic outlook, followed by market share objectives (Chart 8). In contrast to the UK consumer, lenders are bullish on the economic outlook and believe it will continue to drive further easing over Q1/2022. On the demand side, investment in commercial real estate, which has seen steady improvement since Q3/2020, was the leading factor. This was followed by merger & acquisition and inventory financing needs. Capital investment needs, meanwhile, were a drag on demand. Moving forward, real estate investment and inventory restocking needs are expected to drive demand. Japan In Japan, credit standards to firms and households continued to ease in Q4/2021 (Chart 9). However, more than 90% of respondents in each case reported that standards were basically unchanged, and there were no reported instances of tightening among the sample of 50 lenders. Those that did report easier standards cited aggressive competition from other banks and strengthened efforts to grow the business. The vast majority of lenders expect standards to remain unchanged over Q1, but there is a slight easing expected on a net percentage basis. Chart 9Japan Credit Conditions Japan Credit Conditions Japan Credit Conditions Business loan demand on the whole was unchanged in Q4 although small and medium firms did increase demand slightly (middle panel). In contrast to other regions, business loan demand tends to behave counter-cyclically in Japan, with businesses borrowing more on a precautionary basis when they are pessimistic and vice-versa. Those dynamics were at play in Q4, with lenders attributing increased demand to a fall in firms’ internally generated funds. Banks expect a slight net pickup in demand next quarter, in line with business confidence which has fallen from its September peak on the back of concerns about Covid-19 infections, supply chain disruptions, and rising input prices. On the consumer side, loan demand was basically unchanged, with a very small net percentage of banks reporting weaker demand (bottom panel). The key reason for decreased demand was a decrease in household consumption, which is in line with retail sales, where the pace of growth has been falling. Even though core inflation in Japan is low, consumers are still exposed to rising energy prices, which might cause them to tighten other parts of their budgets. Canada Chart 10Canada Credit Conditions Canada Credit Conditions Canada Credit Conditions In Canada, business lending standards continued to ease at a slightly slower pace in Q4/2021 (Chart 10). This marks the fourth consecutive quarter of easing conditions, coming amid booming economic activity, high capacity utilization, and buoyant sentiment. Both, price and non-price lending conditions eased at roughly the same pace. On the consumer side, non-mortgage lending conditions continued to ease, but at a slower pace (middle panel). 1-year ahead consumer spending growth expectations, sourced from the Bank of Canada’s (BoC) Survey Of Consumer Expectations, and non-mortgage lending conditions typically display an inverse correlation, with expected spending growth increasing when standards are getting easier on the margin and vice-versa. The divergence in Q4 is explained in part by excess savings accumulated during the pandemic that have yet to be spent down, and in part by expected price increases over the coming year. In either case, it demonstrates that nominal spending has room to grow even in an environment where consumer credit availability is worsening. We also saw mortgage standards ease at a slightly slower pace in Q4, with both price and non-price lending conditions easing (bottom panel). While the BoC has made a hawkish pivot, underlying conditions are still easy – the conventional 5-year mortgage rate is still flat at 4.79%, the same level as Q3/2020. However, house price growth has peaked, and rate hikes this year will help prices moderate further. New Zealand Chart 11New Zealand Credit Conditions New Zealand Credit Conditions New Zealand Credit Conditions In New Zealand, business credit standards eased in the six month period ended September 2021 (Chart 11). However, the real impact of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand’s (RBNZ) tightening is being felt in the housing market, where actual standards entered tightening territory. More importantly, a net 23.1% of respondents expect mortgage credit availability to erode by the end of March; if realized, this figure would be a series high. Banks reporting less credit availability cited regulatory changes and risk perceptions. On the mortgage loan demand side, banks continued to see increased demand even after the record spike in March 2021 (middle panel). Going forward, demand is expected to moderate and fall from current levels. These dynamics have already made their mark on house prices which have already peaked, indicating that the RBNZ’s push is working as intended. Business loan demand does not appear to have been much affected by higher rates, with demand picking up slightly and expected to increase going forward (bottom panel). However, confidence has been falling since September 2021, with businesses feeling the twin bite of supply chain disruptions and labor shortages.   Shakti Sharma Senior Analyst ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com Appendix: Where To Find The Bank Lending Surveys A number of central banks publish regular surveys of bank lending conditions in their domestic economies. The surveys, and the details on how they are conducted, can be found on the websites of the central banks: US Federal Reserve: https://www.federalreserve.gov/data/sloos.htm European Central Bank: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/ecb_surveys/bank_lending_survey/ Bank of England: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/credit-conditions-survey/2021/2021-q4 Bank of Japan: https://www.boj.or.jp/en/statistics/dl/loan/loos/index.htm/ Bank of Canada: https://www.bankofcanada.ca/publications/slos/ Reserve Bank of New Zealand: https://www.rbnz.govt.nz/statistics/c60-credit-conditions-survey   Footnotes 1      The weblinks to each individual survey for the US, euro area, UK, Japan, Canada and New Zealand can be found in the Appendix on page 12. GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark Q1/2022 Credit Conditions Chartbook: Tightening Cometh? Q1/2022 Credit Conditions Chartbook: Tightening Cometh? The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Q1/2022 Credit Conditions Chartbook: Tightening Cometh? Q1/2022 Credit Conditions Chartbook: Tightening Cometh? Global Fixed Income - Strategic Recommendations* Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Overlay Trades

Highlights A feedback loop has emerged in European markets. Tightening financial conditions will preempt the European Central Bank from hiking rates as much as the money market is pricing in. The widening in peripheral and credit spreads is overdone. Investors already long should maintain their positions. Investors without exposure will soon find an attractive entry point. Despite these near-term gyrations, the ECB is still on track to hike interest rates once in Q4 2022 and lift them aggressively in 2023. Feature Last week’s hawkish pivot by the European Central Bank (ECB) continues to affect markets. We take the words of the ECB at their face value; we anticipate the Governing Council (GC) to begin lifting interest rates at the end of 2022 and to continue to do so steadily over 2023 and 2024. However, as the shock filters through financial asset prices, we become more confident that the ECB will not lift rates five times in 2022 as the Euro Short Term Rate (ESTR) curve currently anticipates. Chart 1Growing Tensions In The Periphery... Growing Tensions In The Periphery... Growing Tensions In The Periphery... First, the behavior of Italian and Greek bond markets constitutes a major support to our view. Italian and Greek 10-year spreads have widened by respectively 46 and 65 basis points over the past six trading days (Chart 1). This tension highlights that investors still view these economies as continental trouble spots. Meanwhile, the ECB’s communication continues to highlight the need for flexibility to maintain order in the sovereign debt market. The GC does not want inadvertently to engineer a severe tightening in financial conditions in the already fragile periphery. In this context, it is highly unlikely that the ECB will rush to terminate the Asset Purchase Program (APP), an end on which rate hikes depend. Second, the corporate bond market is also going through a significant period of ruction. Both investment grade and high-yield bond yields have risen rapidly in recent days, and they are now retesting their late-2018 levels (Chart 2, top two panels). Spreads too are widening meaningfully, even though they remain further away from their 2018 highs (Chart 2, bottom two panels) The ECB is unwilling to let a liquidity shock morph into a solvency problem for European firms. For now, the behavior of the European credit market remains consistent with a liquidity shock. Funding markets are experiencing a violent adjustment, which is bleeding into the overall level of spreads. However, investors are not differentiating based on credit risk. Chart 3 shows that CCC credit (the lowest rated HY bonds) is not selling off relative to the overall high-yield index, which we would anticipate if investors were worried about underlying default risk. Chart 3No Distinction On Credit Risk No Distinction On Credit Risk No Distinction On Credit Risk Chart 2...And In European Corporates ...And In European Corporates ...And In European Corporates If the liquidity shock were to deepen further and last long enough, the resilience of the corporate sector would fritter away. However, the GC has tried to resist a deflationary shock for more than ten years now, and a solvency problem would undo all the progress made toward escaping the European liquidity trap, especially because wages have yet to recover. Third, members of the ECB’s GC are already trying to talk down the market. President Christine Lagarde displayed a more dovish tone when she spoke in front of the EU Parliament on February 7, 2022. ECB Chief Economist Philippe Lane remains steadfast that wages are not yet a problem. The Governor of the Bank of France, François Villeroy de Galhau still sees an imminent peak in CPI, and Olli Rehn, Governor of the Bank of Finland, recently lectured about the need for a gradual normalization of policy. Even hawks like the Bundesbank’s Joachim Nagel or the DNB’s Klaas Knot have gestured toward higher rates, but only toward the end of the year. In this context, we expect credit spreads to begin to narrow again; however, it will likely first require an easing in funding pressures. This is unlikely to happen until US yields form an interim peak. However, as Chart 4 highlights, the Treasury market is becoming extremely oversold. Moreover, a JP Morgan survey shows that its clients are massively short duration. The risk of a pullback in Treasury yields is growing, even if rising inflation and fears of a tighter Fed prevail for now. If US yields were to decline Bunds would likely follow the Treasury market because the ECB is becoming louder that it does not want to tighten financial conditions abruptly. Hence, a pullback in global risk-free yields will be the key to a period of calm in credit spreads, since valuations have improved materially, with the breakeven spreads on investment grade and high-yield bonds moving back to their 43rd and 44th percentiles, respectively (Chart 5). A stabilization in global yields and European spreads should also percolate to the peripheral sovereign bond market and limit the upside to Italian and Greek spreads. Chart 4Oversold Treasurys Oversold Treasurys Oversold Treasurys Chart 5Restoring Value In Corporates Restoring Value In Corporates Restoring Value In Corporates Bottom Line: The tightening in financial conditions taking place in Europe indicates that money market curves are pricing in the path for European policy rates too aggressively. The ECB has changed since 2011. It will not let peripheral borrowing costs threaten the recovery in Southern European economies, nor will it allow a liquidity shock in the corporate bond market to become a solvency issue that will damage growth prospects. European peripheral and corporate spreads will narrow once global risk-free rates peak.   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com

Executive Summary The Pandemic-Led Surge In E-Commerce Spending Is Reverting Back To Trend The Pandemic-Led Surge In E-Commerce Spending Is Reverting Back To Trend The Pandemic-Led Surge In E-Commerce Spending Is Reverting Back To Trend Rising interest rates and a cooling in pandemic-related tech spending will cap the upside for technology shares over the remainder of 2022. Looking further out, US big tech companies are likely to suffer from heightened competition in increasingly saturated markets. Concerns about big tech’s excessive market power, cavalier attitudes towards personal data, proclivity for censoring non-establishment opinions, and the deleterious impact of social media on teenage mental health are all fueling a public backlash. Investors should expect increased regulation and antitrust enforcement of big tech companies in the years ahead. Bottom Line: The hegemony of today’s US-based big tech companies is coming to an end. While we do not expect tech stocks to decline in absolute terms in 2022, they will lag the S&P 500. Given tech’s heavy representation in the US, investors should underweight the US in a global equity portfolio. Sinking Ark Tech stocks have had a tough ride since the start of the year. So far in 2022, the NASDAQ Composite has fallen 9.3% compared to 5.5% for the S&P 500. The ARK Innovation ETF, Cathie Wood’s collection of “disruptor” companies, has dropped -22%, and is now down -53% from its peak last year (Chart 1). We expect tech shares to lag the market during the remainder of 2022. The pandemic was a boon for many tech companies. Generous stimulus payments and stay-at-home policies led to a surge in e-commerce spending (Chart 2). As economies continue to reopen, many tech companies could face an air pocket in demand for their goods and services.  Chart 1Tech Stocks: Rough Start to 2022 Tech Stocks: Rough Start to 2022 Tech Stocks: Rough Start to 2022 Chart 2The Pandemic-Led Surge In E-Commerce Spending Is Reverting Back To Trend The Pandemic-Led Surge In E-Commerce Spending Is Reverting Back To Trend The Pandemic-Led Surge In E-Commerce Spending Is Reverting Back To Trend   Despite some softening of late, retail sales remain well above their pre-pandemic trendline (Chart 3). If Amazon’s still-rosy projections are any guide, a further slowdown in goods spending is something that the analyst community is not fully discounting (Chart 4). Chart 3US Retail Spending Is Above Trend US Retail Spending Is Above Trend US Retail Spending Is Above Trend Chart 4Amazon Sales Estimates May Be Too Optimistic Amazon Sales Estimates May Be Too Optimistic Amazon Sales Estimates May Be Too Optimistic Rate Hikes Will Disproportionately Hit Tech Chart 5Long Rates Anticipate The Movements In Short Rates Long Rates Anticipate The Movements In Short Rates Long Rates Anticipate The Movements In Short Rates US rate expectations continued to move up this week, egged on by St. Louis Fed President James Bullard’s statement earlier today declaring that he favors raising interest rates by a full percentage point by the start of July. The market is now pricing in six rate hikes by the end of the year.  Historically, bond yields have increased starting about four months before the first rate hike and over the period in which the Fed is raising rates (Chart 5). While we do not think the Fed will need to deliver more tightening this year than what is already discounted, we do think that investors will eventually be forced to revise up their expectations of the neutral rate to between 3%-and-4%. As Chart 6 shows, the market expects the Fed to stop raising rates when they reach 2%, which we regard as unrealistic. Chart 6The Market Thinks The Fed Will Not Be Able To Lift Rates Above 2% The Disruptor Delusion The Disruptor Delusion An increase in the market’s estimate of the neutral rate will push up bond yields. Unlike banks, tech tends to underperform in a rising yield environment (Chart 7). Priced For Perfection? Higher bond yields and a reversion-to-trend in tech spending would be less of a problem for technology shares if valuations were cheap. They are not, however. The Nasdaq Composite still trades at 29-times forward earnings compared to 20-times forward earnings for the broader S&P 500 (Chart 8). Chart 8Tech Shares Are No Bargain Tech Shares Are No Bargain Tech Shares Are No Bargain Chart 7Rising Bond Yields Will Help Bank Stocks But Hurt Tech Shares Rising Bond Yields Will Help Bank Stocks But Hurt Tech Shares Rising Bond Yields Will Help Bank Stocks But Hurt Tech Shares Tech investors would argue that such a hefty valuation premium is warranted given the tech sector’s superior growth prospects. Underlying this argument is the assumption that just because tech spending will grow more quickly than the rest of the economy, this will necessarily translate into above-average earnings growth and outsized returns for publicly-listed tech companies. But is that really the case? Over short horizons of a few years, there is a decent correlation between relative industry growth and relative equity returns (Chart 9). However, that relationship evaporates over very long-term horizons (Chart 10). In fact, since 1970, the best-performing equity sector has been tobacco, hardly a paragon of technological innovation (Chart 11). Chart 9Stocks In Industries That Experience A Burst Of Output Growth Do Tend To Outperform Other Stocks … The Disruptor Delusion The Disruptor Delusion Chart 10… But Over The Long Haul, Companies In Fast- Growing Industries Do Not Outperform Their Peers The Disruptor Delusion The Disruptor Delusion Chart 11Tobacco Industry Returns Have Smoked All Others The Disruptor Delusion The Disruptor Delusion What Goes Around Comes Around Table 1History Shows Leaders Can Become Laggards The Disruptor Delusion The Disruptor Delusion Tech stock enthusiasts tend to forget that the disruptors themselves can be disrupted. History is littered with tech companies that failed to keep up with a changing world: RCA, Kodak, Polaroid, Atari, Commodore, Novell, Digital, Sinclair, Wang, Iomega, Corel, Netscape, AltaVista, AOL, Myspace, Compaq, Sun, Lucent, 3Com, Nokia, Palm, and RIM were all major players in their respective industries, only to fade into oblivion. Table 1 shows that all but one of the ten biggest tech names in the S&P 500 IT index in 2000 underperformed the broader market by a substantial degree over the subsequent ten years. Today, the incentive for startups to emerge has never been stronger. Venture capital funds are flush with cash. Tech profit margins are near record highs, making challenging the incumbents an increasingly enticing goal. About one-third of the outperformance of US tech stocks since 1996 can be explained by rising relative profit margins, with faster sales growth and relative P/E multiple expansion explaining 45% and 23% of the remainder, respectively (Chart 12). Chart 12Decomposing Tech Outperformance The Disruptor Delusion The Disruptor Delusion Meta’s Malaise Chart 13Unlike Economists, Facebook Just Ain't Cool No More The Disruptor Delusion The Disruptor Delusion Which of today’s tech titans could join the “has been club”?  As we flagged in August, Meta is certainly a possibility. In its disastrous quarterly earnings report, the company revealed that globally, the number of Facebook users is shrinking for the first time ever. While this came as a surprise to many investors, the writing has been on the wall for a long time. According to Piper Sandler’s survey of teen preferences conducted late last year, only 27% of teenagers used Facebook, down from 94% in 2012 (Chart 13). Meta has been fortunate in that many Facebook users have migrated to Instagram, a social media platform it acquired in 2012. Unfortunately, the latest data suggests that even Instagram usage is starting to slow as more young people flock to TikTok. Google Also Vulnerable Unlike Meta, Alphabet crushed earnings estimates. However, the similarities between the two companies may be greater than most investors are willing to admit. Like Facebook, Google’s profits almost entirely come from ad spending. According to eMarketer, Google garnered 44% of digital ad spending in 2021 while Facebook took in 23%. Digital advertising accounted for 63% of all ad spending in 2021, up from 58% in 2020 and 51% in 2019. While there may be scope for digital ads to take further market share,  eventually, growth in digital ad spending will converge with overall consumption growth, which in the US is likely to average no more than 2% in real terms over time. Monopoly Power Another important similarity between Meta and Alphabet is that both companies are increasingly coming under scrutiny from politicians and regulators. The antitrust case brought against Alphabet by 14 US states contains a litany of allegations of unfair practices. After an initial failed attempt, the Federal Trade Commission’s antitrust suit against Meta is also moving forward. Privacy Matters In addition, the way big tech companies handle private data is raising some hackles. In its annual report filed earlier this month, Meta warned that it would need to shut down Facebook and Instagram in Europe unless regulators drew up new privacy regulations. This came on top of Meta’s disclosure that it will lose $10 billion this year after Apple introduced pop-ups on the iPhone’s operating system asking users if they wanted to be tracked by apps.  Turn Off That Phone! Another looming worry revolves around the corrosive impact of excessive social media usage on mental health. Academic studies have shown that adolescents who use Facebook and Instagram frequently feel greater anxiety and unease than those who do not. The share of students reporting high levels of loneliness more than doubled in both the US and abroad over the past decade, a trend that predates the pandemic (Chart 14). In 2020, the last year for which comprehensive data is available, one-quarter of US girls between the ages of 12 and 17 reported experiencing a major depressive episode, up from 12% in 2011 (Chart 15). Chart 15The Rise In Depression Rates Coincided With Increased Social Media Usage The Disruptor Delusion The Disruptor Delusion Chart 14Alone In The Crowd The Disruptor Delusion The Disruptor Delusion     Backlash Public contempt for tech companies is fueling a political backlash. According to a Gallup poll conducted last year, only 34% of Americans held a favorable view of tech companies such as Amazon, Facebook, and Google, down from 46% in 2019; 45% had an unfavorable opinion, up from 33% in 2019 (Chart 16). Chart 16Americans Do Not Hold Tech Companies In High Regard The Disruptor Delusion The Disruptor Delusion The shift in public sentiment over the past two years has been entirely driven by Independent and Republican voters, many of whom feel that tech companies are unfairly censoring their opinions (Table 2). The same poll revealed that the majority of Americans – including the majority of Republicans – now favor increased regulation of tech companies.  Table 2American Views On Big Tech The Disruptor Delusion The Disruptor Delusion Investment Conclusions Chart 17Value Stocks Are Cheap Value Stocks Are Cheap Value Stocks Are Cheap Considering that global growth is likely to remain above-trend this year, we do not expect tech stocks to decline in absolute terms. A flattish, though volatile, trajectory is the most plausible outcome. In relative terms, however, tech stocks will underperform. Despite having outperformed tech-heavy growth stocks by 14% since last November, value stocks remain exceptionally cheap by historic standards (Chart 17). Tech stocks are overrepresented in the US. Thus, if tech continues to underperform, it stands to reason that non-US equities will outperform their US peers over the coming years.    Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Global Investment Strategy View Matrix The Disruptor Delusion The Disruptor Delusion Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores The Disruptor Delusion The Disruptor Delusion

Executive Summary Brazil: Are Political & Macro Risks Priced-In? Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Presidential elections are due in Brazil on October 2, 2022. While the left-of-center former President Lula da Silva will likely win, the road to his victory will not be as smooth as markets expect. Incumbent President Jair Bolsonaro will make every effort to cling to power, including fiscal populism and attacks on Brazil’s institutions. These moves may roil Brazil’s equity markets as they may provide a fillip to Bolsonaro’s popularity. Bolsonaro’s institutional attacks have triggered down moves in the market before and any fiscal expansion may worry investors as it could prove to be sticky. We urge investors to take-on only selective tactical exposure in Brazil. Equities appear cheap but political and macro risks abound. To play the rally yet stave-off political risk in Brazil, we suggest a tactical pair trade: Long Brazil Financials / Short India. Tactical Recommendation Inception Date Long Brazil Financials / Short India 2022-02-10   Bottom Line: On a tactical timeframe we suggest only selective exposure to Brazil given the latent political and macro risks. On a strategic timeframe, we are neutral on Brazil given that its growth potential coexists with high debt and low proclivity to structural reform. Feature Chart 1Brazil Underperformed Through 2020-21, Is Cheap Today Brazil Underperformed Through 2020-21, Is Cheap Today Brazil Underperformed Through 2020-21, Is Cheap Today Brazil’s equity markets underperformed relative to emerging markets (EMs) for a second consecutive year in 2021 (Chart 1). But thanks to this correction, Brazilian equities now appear cheap (Chart 1). With Brazil looking cheap, China easing policy, and Lula’s return likely, is now a good time to buy into Brazil? We recommend taking on only selective exposure to Brazil on a tactical horizon for now. Brazil in our view may present a near-term value trap as markets are under-pricing political and economic risks. Lula Set For Phoenix-Like Return Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (or popularly Lula) of the Worker’s Party (PT) appears all set to reclaim the country’s presidency in the fall of 2022. The main risk that Lula’s presidency may bring is a degree of fiscal expansion. Despite this markets may ultimately welcome his victory at the presidential elections as Lula is in alignment with the median voter, is expected to be better for Brazil’s institutions, will institute a superior pandemic-control strategy, and may also undertake badly needed structural reforms in the early part of his tenure. Despite these points we urge investors to limit exposure to Brazil for now and turn bullish only once the market corrects further. Whilst far-right President Jair Bolsonaro managed to join a political party (i.e., the center-right Liberal Party) late last year, he is yet to secure something more central to winning elections i.e., a high degree of popularity. To boost his low popularity ratings (Chart 2), we expect Bolsonaro to leverage two planks: populism and authoritarianism. These measures will bump up Bolsonaro’s popularity enough to shake up Brazil’s markets with renewed uncertainty, but not enough to win him the presidency. Chart 2Lula Is Ahead But His Lead Has Narrowed Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Lula is a clear favorite to win. After spending more than a year in jail on corruption charges, Lula is back in the fray and has maintained a lead on Bolsonaro for the first round of polling (Chart 2). Even if a second-round run-off election were to take place, Lula would prevail over Bolsonaro or other key candidates (Chart 3). By contrast, Bolsonaro’s lower popularity means that in a run-off situation he stands a chance only if pitted against center-right candidates like Sergio Moro (his former justice minister) or João Doria (i.e., the center-right Governor of São Paulo) (Chart 4). Chart 3Lula Leads Run-Off Vote Against All Potential Candidates Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ Chart 4In A Run-Off, Bolso Stands Best Chance Of Winning If Pitted Against Moro Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ What has driven the swing to the left in Brazil? After the pandemic and some stagflation, Brazil’s median voter’s priorities have changed. In specific: Brazil’s median voter’s top concerns in 2018 were centered around improving law and order (Chart 5). A right-of-center candidate with concrete law-and-order credentials like Bolsonaro was well placed to tap into this public demand. Chart 5In 2018-19, Law And Order Issues Dominated Voters’ Concerns Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Now, however, Brazil’s voters’ top concerns are focused around improving the economy and controlling the pandemic, where Bolsonaro’s record is dismal (Chart 6). Given this change of priorities, a left-of-center candidate with a solid economic record like Lula is best placed to address voters’ concerns. Lula had the fortune to preside over a global commodity bull market and Brazilian economic boom in the early 2000s (Chart 7). Regarding pandemic control, almost any challenger would be better positioned than Bolsonaro, who initially dismissed Covid-19 as “a little flu” and lacked the will or ability to set up a stable public health policy. Chart 6In 2022, Median Voter Cares Most About Economic Issues, Pandemic-Control Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ Chart 7Lula’s Presidency Overlapped With An Economic Boom Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ A left-of-center candidate like Lula, or even Ciro Gomes (Chart 8), is more in step with the median voter today for two key reasons: Inflation Surge, Few Jobs: Inflation has surged, and the increase is higher than that seen under the previous President Michael Temer (Chart 7). Transportation, food, and housing costs have all taken a toll on voter’s pocketbooks (Chart 9). The cost of electricity has also shot up. For 46% of Brazilian families, expenditure on power and natural gas is eating into more than half of their monthly income, according to Ipec. Chart 8Left-Of-Center Candidates Stand A Better Chance In Brazil In 2022 Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ Chart 9Under Bolso Inflation Has Surged Across Key Categories Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​ Distinct from inflation, unemployment too has been high under Bolsonaro (Chart 10). Chart 10Unemployment Too Has Surged Under Bolsonaro Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ Chart 11Brazil’s Per Capita Income Growth Has Lagged That Of Peers Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ Chart 12Since 2018, Brazil's Economic Miseries Have Grown More Than Those Of Peers Since 2018, Brazil's Economic Miseries Have Grown More Than Those Of Peers Since 2018, Brazil's Economic Miseries Have Grown More Than Those Of Peers Stagnant Incomes: Despite a strong post-pandemic fiscal stimulus, GDP growth in Brazil has been low (Chart 7). In a country that is structurally plagued with high inequalities, the slow growth in Brazil’s per capita income (Chart 11) under a right-wing administration is bound to trigger a leftward shift. It is against this backdrop of rising economic miseries (Chart 12) that Latin America’s largest economy is seeing its ideological pendulum swing leftwards. This phenomenon has played out before too - most notably when Lula first assumed power as the president of Brazil in 2002. Brazil’s GDP growth was low, inflation was high and per capita incomes had almost halved under the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (or popularly FHC) over 1995-2002. This economic backdrop played a key role in Lula’s landslide win in 2002. Brazil’s political differences are rooted in regional as well as socioeconomic disparities. In the 2018 presidential elections, left-of-center candidates like Fernando Haddad generated greatest traction in the economically backward northeastern region of Brazil. On the other hand, Bolsonaro enjoyed higher traction in the relatively well-off regions in southern and northern Brazil (Maps 1 & 2). Now Bolsonaro has faltered under the pandemic and Lula can reunite the dissatisfied parts of the electorate with his northeastern base. Map 1Brazil’s South, Mid-West And North Supported Bolso In 2018 Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Map 2Left-Of-Center 2018 Presidential Candidate Haddad Had Greatest Traction In Regions With Low Incomes Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Bottom Line: The stage appears set for Lula’s return to Brazil’s presidency. But will the road be smooth? We think not. Investors should gird for downside risks that Brazilian markets must contend with as President Bolsonaro fights back. Brace For Bolso’s Fightback The road to Bolsonaro’s likely loss will be paved with market volatility and potentially a correction. Interest rates have surged in Brazil as its central bank combats inflation (Chart 13). Even as BCB’s actions will lend some stability to the Brazilian Real (Chart 13), political events over the course of 2022 will spook foreign investors. Bolsonaro will leverage two planks in a desperate attempt to retain control: Plank #1: Populism Brazil’s financial markets experienced a major correction in the second half of 2021. This was partially driven by the fact that Brazilian legislators approved a rule that allows the government to breach its federal spending cap. Given Bolsonaro’s low popularity ratings today and given that his fiscal stance has been restrained off late, Bolsonaro could well drive another bout of fiscal expansion in the run up to October 2022. Such a move will bump up his popularity but at the same time worry markets given Brazil’s elevated debt levels (Chart 14). Bolsonaro can technically pass these changes in the Brazilian national assembly given that in both houses the government along with the confidence and supply parties has more than 50% of seats. Chart 13Brazil’s Central Bank Has Hiked Rates Aggressively Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ Chart 14Brazil Is One Of The Most Indebted Emerging Markets Today Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ Plank #2: Institutional Attacks To rally his supporters, the former army captain could also sow seeds of doubt in Brazil’s judiciary and electoral process. Given the strong support that Bolsonaro enjoys amongst conservatives, he may even mobilize supporters to stage acts of political violence in the run up to the elections. Bolsonaro could make more dramatic attempts to stay in power than former US President Trump, whose rebellion on Capitol Hill did not go as far as it could have gone to attempt to seize power for the outgoing president. Last but not the least, there is a possibility that the Brazilian judiciary presents an unexpected roadblock to Lula’s candidacy. Given the unpredictable path of Brazil’s judicial decisions, investors should be prepared for at least some kind of official impediments to Lula’s rise. Even if Lula is ultimately allowed to run, any ruling that casts doubt on his candidacy or corruption-related track record will upset financial markets. Global financial markets rallied through the Trump rebellion on January 6 last year. But US institutions, however flawed, are more stable than Brazil’s. Brazil only emerged from military dictatorship in 1985. Bolsonaro has fired up elements of the populace that are nostalgic for that period, as we discuss below. Bottom Line: Brazil’s equities look cheap today, but political risks have not fully run their course. President Bolsonaro may launch his fightback soon, which could drive another down-leg in Brazil’s markets. His institutional attacks have triggered down moves before and any potential fiscal expansion that Bolsonaro pursues may worry investors, as this expansion could stick under the subsequent administration. In addition, there is a chance that civil-military relations undergo high strain in the run-up to or immediately after Brazil’s elections. Is A Self-Coup By Bolso Possible? “One uncomfortable fact of the dictatorship is that its most brutal period of repression overlapped with what Milton Friedman called an economic miracle.… Brazil’s economy, nineteenth largest in the world before the coup, grew into the eighth largest. Jobs abounded and the regime then was actually popular.” – Alex Cuadros, Brazillionaires: Wealth, Power, Decadence, and Hope in an American Country (Spiegel & Grau, 2016) It is extremely difficult for President Bolsonaro to win the support of a majority of the electorate. But given his open admiration for Brazil’s dictatorship, is a self-coup possible in 2022? The next nine months will be tumultuous. A coup attempt could occur. However, we allocate a low probability to a successful self-coup because: Bolsonaro’s Popularity Is Too Low: Even dictators need to have some popular appeal. Bolsonaro has lost too much support (Chart 15), he never had full control of any major institutions (including the military), and few institutional players will risk their credibility for his sake. If he somehow clung to power, his subsequent administration would face overwhelming popular resistance. Chart 15Bolsonaro’s Low Approval Ratings - A Liability Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Bolsonaro’s Economy Is Too Weak: The dictatorship in Brazil managed to hold power for more than two decades partially because this period of authoritarianism was accompanied by a degree of economic well-being. Currently the public is shifting to the left because low growth and high inflation have dented the median voter’s purchasing power. The weak economy would make an authoritarian government unsustainable from the start. Lack Of American Support: Some military personnel may be supportive of a coup and several retired military officers are occupying civilian positions in the Brazilian federal government, thanks to Bolsonaro. So why can’t Brazil slip right back into a military dictatorship led by Bolsonaro, say if the election results are narrow and hotly contested? The coup d'état in Brazil in 1964 was a success to a large extent because this regime-change was supported by America. Back then communism was a threat to the US and Washington was keen to displace left-leaning heads of states in Latin America, such as Brazilian President João Goulart. But America’s strategic concerns have now changed. America today is attempting to coalesce an axis of democracies and the Biden administration has no incentive whatsoever to muddy its credentials by supporting dictatorship in Latin America’s largest country. Even aside from ideology, any such action would encourage fearful governments in the region to seek support from America’s foreign rivals, thus inviting the kind of foreign intervention that the US most wants to prevent in Latin America. The Brazilian Military Has Not Been Suppressed Or Sidelined: History suggests that coups are often triggered by a drop in the military’s importance in a country. However, the military’s power in Brazil has remained meaningful through the twenty-first century. Brazil has maintained steady military spends at around 1.5% of GDP over the last two decades. Thus, top leaders of Brazil’s military have no reason to feel aggrieved or disempowered. Having said that, it is not impossible that an extreme faction of junior officers might try to pull off a fantastical plot, even if they have little hope of succeeding, which is why we highlight that markets can be rudely awakened by the road to Brazil’s election this year. In Turkey in July 2016, an unsuccessful coup attempt caused Turkish equities to decline by 9% over a four-day period. Bottom Line: Investors must gird for the very real possibility of civil-military relations undergoing high degrees of strain in Brazil, particularly if a contested election occurs. While Bolsonaro’s supporters and disaffected elements of the Brazilian military could resist a smooth transition of power away from Bolsonaro, the transition will eventually take place because two powerful constituencies – Brazil’s median voter and America – will not support a coup in Brazil. Will Lula Be Good For Brazil’s Markets? Looking over Bolsonaro’s presidency, from a market-perspective, some policy measures were good, some were bad, and some were downright ugly. In specific: The Good: Pension Reforms And Independent Monetary Policy In Bolsonaro’s first year in power, he delivered pension sector reforms. The law increased the minimum retirement age and also increased workers’ pension contributions thereby resulting in meaningful fiscal savings. Bolsonaro passed a law to formalise the BCB’s autonomy and the BCB has been able to pursue a relatively independent monetary policy. BCB has now lifted the benchmark Selic rate by 725bps over 2021 thereby making it one of the most hawkish central banks amongst EMs (Chart 13). This is in sharp contrast to the situation in EMs like Turkey where the central bank cut rates owing to the influence of a populist head of state. The Bad: Poor Free Market Credentials And Fiscal Expansion In early 2021, President Bolsonaro fired the head of Petrobras (the state-owned energy champion) reportedly for raising fuel prices. Bolsonaro then picked a former army general (with no relevant work experience) to head the company. Although Bolsonaro positioned himself as a supporter of privatization in the run up to his presidency, he failed to follow through. Another area where the far-right leader has disappointed markets is with respect to Brazil’s debt levels. Under his presidency, a constitutional amendment to raise a key government spending cap was passed. Shortly afterwards came the creation of the massive welfare program Auxílio Brasil. Bolsonaro embraced fiscal populism to try to save his presidency after the pandemic. Consequently Brazil’s public debt to GDP ratio ballooned from 86% in 2018 to a peak of 99% in 2020. The Ugly: Poor Pandemic Response And Institutional Attacks The darkest hour of Bolsonaro’s presidency came on September 7, 2021, i.e., Brazil’s Independence Day. During rallies with his supporters, Bolsonaro levelled attacks on the Brazilian judiciary and sowed seeds of doubt in Brazil’s electoral process. More concretely, the greatest failing of the Bolsonaro administration has been its lax response to the pandemic. Bolsonaro delayed preventive measures, and this has meant that Brazil was one of the worst hit major economies of the world. The pandemic has claimed more than 630,000 lives in Brazil i.e., the second highest in the world. In relative terms too, Brazil has experienced a high death rate of about 2,960 per million which is even higher than the US rate of 2,720 per million. President Bolsonaro’s poor handling of the pandemic will cost the President in terms of votes in 2022 as the highest Covid-19-related death rates were seen in Southern Brazil (Map 3) i.e., a region that had voted in large numbers for Bolsonaro in 2018 (see Map 1 above). Map 3The Pandemic Has Had A Devastating Impact In Brazil’s South, Mid-West And North Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Given this backdrop, a Lula presidency will be welcomed by global financial markets, potentially for three reasons: Superior Pandemic-Control: An administration headed by Lula will bring in a more scientific and cohesive pandemic-control strategy thereby saving lives and benefiting the economy. Alignment With Institutions: Lula will act in alignment with Brazil’s institutions. He stands to benefit from the existing electoral system, the civil bureaucracy, academia, and the media. He may have rougher relations with the judiciary and parts of the military, but he is a known quantity and not likely to attempt to be a Hugo Chavez. Possibility Of Some Structural Reform: Given Brazil’s unstable debt dynamics, and the “lost decade” of economic malaise in the 2010s, there is a chance that Lula could pursue some structural reforms. Lula is more popular than his Worker’s Party, which is still tainted by corruption, so his strength in Congress will not be known until after the election. But Brazilian parties tend to coalesce around the president and Lula has experience in managing the legislative process. The probability of Lula pushing through some bit of structural reform will be the greatest in 2021. Back in 2019, it is worth recounting that only 4% of the Brazilian public supported pension reforms. Despite this Bolsonaro managed the passage of painful pension reforms in 2019 because market pressure forced the parties to cooperate. Faced with inflation and low growth, Lula may be forced to push through some piecemeal structural financial sector and economic reforms. However, if commodity prices and financial markets are cheering his election, he may spend his initial political capital on policies closer to his base of support, which means that a market riot may be necessary to force action on structural reforms. This dynamic will have to be monitored in the aftermath of the election. Assuming Lula does pursue some structural reforms while he has the political capital, and therefore that his first year is positive for financial markets, there is a reason to be positive on Brazil selectively on a tactical basis. However, electoral compulsions could cause Lula to pursue left-wing populism, fiscal expansion, and to resist privatization over the remaining three years of his presidency. Given Brazil’s already elevated debt levels (Chart 14), such a policy tilt would be market negative. It is against this backdrop that we expect a pro-Lula market rally to falter after the initial excitement. Bottom Line: Once the power transition is complete, a relief rally may follow as markets factor in the prospects of institutional stability and possibly a dash of structural reform in the first year of Lula’s presidency. But given Brazil’s elevated inequalities, even a pro-Lula rally will eventually fade as the administration will be constrained to switch back to the old ways and pursue an expansionary fiscal policy when elections loom. Investment Conclusions Brazil Presents A Value Trap, Fraught with Politico-Economic Risks From a strategic perspective, we are neutral on Brazil. A decade of bad news has been priced in but there is not yet a clear and sustainable trajectory to improve the country’s productivity. History suggests that both left-wing and right-wing presidents are often forced to backtrack on structural reforms and resort to cash-handouts in the run up to elections. This tends to add to Brazil’s high debt levels, prevents the domestic growth engine from revving up, and adds to inflation. Low growth and high inflation then set the wheels rolling for another bout of fiscal expansion (Chart 16). Chart 16The Vicious Politico-Economic Cycle That Brazil Is Trapped In Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Exceptions to this politico-economic cycle occur when a commodity boom is underway or if China, which is Brazil’s key client state, is booming. China today buys a third of Brazil’s exports (Chart 17) and is Brazil’s largest export market. The other reason we remain circumspect about Brazil’s strategic prospects is because of the secular slowdown underway in China. China is not in a position today to recreate the commodity and trade boom that buoyed Lula during his first presidency. China’s policy easing is a tactical boon at best, which can coincide with a Lula relief rally, but afterwards investors will be left with Chinese deleveraging and Brazilian populism. Political Risks Are High, Selective Tactical Exposure Brazil Will Be Optimal We urge investors to buy into Brazilian assets only selectively, even as Brazilian equities appear cheap (Chart 18). Political risks and economic risks such as low growth in GDP and earnings (Chart 19) could contribute to another correction and/or volatility in Brazilian equities. Chart 17China Buys A Third Of Brazil’s Exports Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​ ​​​​​Chart 18Brazil: Are Political & Macro Risks Priced-In? Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Chart 19Brazil's EPS Growth Tracks China's Total Social Financing Growth With A Lag Brazil's EPS Growth Tracks China's Total Social Financing Growth With A Lag Brazil's EPS Growth Tracks China's Total Social Financing Growth With A Lag China’s policy easing is an important macro factor playing to Brazil’s benefit. As we highlighted in our “China Geopolitical Outlook 2022,” Beijing is focused on ensuring stability over the next 12 months. But history suggests that Brazil’s corporate earnings respond to a pick-up in China’s total social financing with a lag of more than six months (Chart 19). Thus, even from a purely macro perspective it may make sense to turn bullish on Brazil after the election turmoil concludes. Given that politically sensitive sectors account for an unusually high proportion of Brazil’s market capitalization (Chart 18), and given the political risks in the offing for Brazil, we suggest taking-on selective exposure in Brazil. To play the rally yet mitigate political risks (that can be higher for capital-heavy sectors), we suggest a pair trade: Long Brazil Financials / Short India. We remain positive on India on a strategic horizon. However, in view of India approaching the business-end of its five-year election cycle, when policy risks tend to become elevated, we reiterate our tactical sell on India. India currently trades at a 81% premium to MSCI EM on a forward P-E ratio basis versus its two year average of 56%. A Quick Note On The Nascent EM Rally Investors should gradually look more favorably on emerging markets, but tactical caution is warranted. MSCI EM and MSCI World are down YTD 1.1% and 4.6% respectively. Despite the dip, we are not yet turning bullish on EM as a whole, owing to both geopolitical and macroeconomic factors. Global geopolitical risks in the new year are high. We recently upgraded the odds of Russia re-invading Ukraine from 50% to 75%. Besides EM Europe, we also see high and underrated geopolitical risks in the Middle East in the short run. Both the Russia and Iran conflicts raise a non-negligible risk of energy shocks that undermine global growth. Once these hurdles are cleared, we will turn more positive toward risky assets. Macroeconomically, the current EM rally can be sustained only if China delivers a substantial stimulus, and the US dollar continues to weaken. The former is likely, as we have argued, but the dollar looks to be resilient and it will take several months before China’s credit impulse rebounds. Hence conditions for a sustainable EM rally do not yet exist. Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist ritika.mankar@bcaresearch.com   Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

Executive Summary The End Of The Negative Bond Yield Era Europe Joins The Global Bond Bear Market Europe Joins The Global Bond Bear Market Recent price action in developed market government bond markets confirms a backdrop that has been in place for the past several years - movements in US Treasuries define the trend in global yields, but Europe sets the effective floor. Higher core European bond yields are also pushing up non-European yields, in the context of the current global monetary policy tightening cycle. The hawkish market pricing for the ECB this year has gone a bit too far, as the start of European rate hikes this year is more likely in Q4 than in the summer – and only after ECB asset purchases begin to formally wind down. In the UK, the Bank of England appears to be trying to front load policy tightening, both rate hikes and balance sheet runoff, in response to overshooting UK inflation. A shorter, sharper policy tightening cycle means that the UK Gilt curve will continue to bear-flatten.  Bottom Line: Within the “Big 3” developed market central banks, the Fed and Bank of England are more likely to deliver discounted rate hikes than the ECB over the next 6-12 months. Remain underweight US Treasuries and UK Gilts versus German Bunds in global bond portfolios. Feature Chart 1A Global Repricing Of Interest Rate Expectations A Global Repricing Of Interest Rate Expectations A Global Repricing Of Interest Rate Expectations Persistent elevated inflation readings are forcing policymakers to move up the timetable of expected cyclical interest rate increases, but without signaling any change to longer-term interest rate expectations. The result has been an upward move in bond yields led by a repricing of shorter-term yields, leading to bearish yield curve flattening pressure across the developed markets (Chart 1). As the global bond bear market has intensified and broadened across countries and fixed income sectors, the amount of bonds worldwide with negative yields has been slashed by $9 trillion since December (Chart 2). Some notable examples: the 10-year German Bund yield is now up to +0.26%, the 30-year US real TIPS yield is now at +0.04% and even the 5-year Japanese government bond yield climbed to +0.02% for the first time since 2016. Last week, bond markets had to digest both a 25bp Bank of England (BoE) rate hike - that was almost a 50bp move - and a huge upside surprise in the January US employment report. However, it was the more hawkish-than-expected messaging from the European Central Bank (ECB) that really rattled fixed income markets. At the February monetary policy meeting, ECB President Christine Lagarde opened the door to potential ECB rate hikes this year, a notable change from the previous forward guidance that rates would stay unchanged in 2022. This not only triggered a major decline in European government bond prices, but also notable jumps in bond volatility for both longer-term and, especially, shorter-term yields. Implied volatilities for swaptions on 2-year European swap rates now sit at the highest levels since the depths of the European Debt Crisis in 2011 (Chart 3). Chart 2The End Of The Negative Bond Yield Era The End Of The Negative Bond Yield Era The End Of The Negative Bond Yield Era ​​​​​ Chart 3The Front-Ends Of Yield Curves Awaken The Front-Ends Of Yield Curves Awaken The Front-Ends Of Yield Curves Awaken ​​​​​​ Overnight index swap (OIS) curves are now discounting multiple rate hikes from the Fed (+127bps), BoE (+125bps) and ECB (+46bps) this year. Tighter monetary policy is the inevitable consequence of the current combination of steady above-trend growth, tight labor markets and very high inflation in those countries. This mix will continue to put upward pressure on global bond yields through a blend of steady inflation expectations and higher real yields as pandemic era monetary stimulus is removed – a process that is already underway in the US and Europe (Chart 4). Our Central Bank Monitors – designed to measure the cyclical pressure to change monetary policy – are all indicating the need for tightening in the US, UK and euro area. However, the risk is that tightening perceived to be too aggressive or too rapid will be received poorly by financial markets that have grown accustomed to easy money policies during the pandemic. Given the current starting point of high equity valuations and relatively tight corporate credit spreads in the US, financial conditions are no impediment to additional Fed rate hikes in 2022 (Chart 5). The same cannot be said in the UK, where the steady appreciation of the trade-weighted pound is tightening financial conditions, on the margin. In the euro area, financial conditions remain relatively stimulative, as the euro is undervalued on a trade-weighted basis. Chart 4A Recipe For Even Higher Bond Yields A Recipe For Even Higher Bond Yields A Recipe For Even Higher Bond Yields Given high realized inflation, financial stability concerns are playing a secondary role in the policy deliberations of central banks facing an inflation-fighting credibility crisis. In the absence of a big fall in inflation, it will take much larger selloffs in equity and corporate credit markets than what has occurred so far in 2022 before policymakers would step back from interest rate increases over the next year. Chart 5Financial Conditions Are No Impediment To Rate Hikes Financial Conditions Are No Impediment To Rate Hikes Financial Conditions Are No Impediment To Rate Hikes ​​​​​​ The ECB Will Lag The Fed On Rate Hikes Chart 6Faster Growth & Slower Inflation Expected In 2022 Faster Growth & Slower Inflation Expected In 2022 Faster Growth & Slower Inflation Expected In 2022 One of our highest conviction bond market views to begin 2022 called for US Treasuries to underperform German Bunds. Our view was based on the likelihood that the Fed would lift the fed funds rate multiple times this year and the ECB was likely to hold off on rate hikes until the first half of 2023 at the earliest. Last week’s shift in the ECB’s tone does not change that relative call. The Fed is still under far greater pressure to hike rates than the ECB, even if there is now a greater chance that the ECB could begin to tighten by the end of 2022. From an economic growth perspective, both central banks have good reasons to consider withdrawing monetary accommodation. The economic expectations in both the US and euro area have started to recover, according to the ZEW survey of financial market professionals, with a bigger bounce seen in the latter since the trough of last October (Chart 6). The fading Omicron wave is likely playing a large role in lifting economic expectations, as the variant has proven to be less lethal than previous waves of the virus. The ZEW survey also asks respondents about their views on future inflation and interest rate changes. The ZEW Inflation Expectations index has fallen back to pre-pandemic lows in both the US and euro area, indicating that a majority expect lower inflation in the US and Europe over the next year. Both the Fed and ECB also expect inflation to fall from current elevated levels this year. However, there is still a much stronger case for tightening in the US given the tight labor market that is pushing up wages. Last week’s January US payrolls data was a shocker, with employment rising +476,000 on the month when some forecasters were calling for an outright contraction in jobs due to the impact of the Omicron variant. Wage growth accelerated smartly, with average hourly earnings up 0.7% on the month and 5.7% on a year-over-year basis (Chart 7). This continues the trend of wage acceleration seen in other data series like the Employment Cost Index, confirming that the US labor market is tight enough to elicit a strong policy response from the Fed. In the euro area, the recent economic data has been a bit more mixed. The Markit manufacturing PMI rose to a five-month high of 59.0 in January, beating expectations. However, the services PMI fell to a nine-month low of 51.2 as renewed COVID lockdowns weighed on consumer confidence and spending (Chart 8). With Omicron numbers now slowing, some recovery in consumer spending is likely over the next few months as euro area governments reduce restrictions. However, the manufacturing recovery will struggle to gain significant upside momentum without stronger demand for European exports – an outcome that is not currently heralded by an upturn in reliable indicators like the global leading economic indicator or the China credit impulse (Chart 9). Chart 7Persistent US Labor Market Strength Persistent US Labor Market Strength Persistent US Labor Market Strength ​​​​​​ Chart 8A Mixed Picture On European Growth A Mixed Picture On European Growth A Mixed Picture On European Growth ​​​​​​ Even within the euro area inflation data, there are mixed trends that make it less clear that a major tightening cycle is necessary. Headline euro area HICP inflation hit a 37-year high of 5.1% in January, which was heavily influenced by a 28.6% rise in the energy component of the index (Chart 10). Goods price inflation reached 6.8%, its highest level since 1991, fueled by global supply chain disruptions and greater consumer demand for goods versus services during the pandemic. For the latter, services inflation reached a much more subdued 2.4% in January, in line with core HICP inflation of 2.3%. We expect goods price inflation to slow substantially, on a global basis and not just in Europe, as supply chain disruptions ease over the course of 2022 and consumers shift spending back towards services from durable goods as economies reopen post-Omicron. Chart 9A Gloomy Picture For European Exports A Gloomy Picture For European Exports A Gloomy Picture For European Exports ​​​​​ Chart 10European Inflation Surge Focused On Energy & Goods European Inflation Surge Focused On Energy & Goods European Inflation Surge Focused On Energy & Goods ​​​​​ Surging oil and natural gas prices will keep the energy component elevated over the next few months, particularly if geopolitical tensions over Ukraine result in Russia withholding natural gas supplies to Europe. Yet it is not clear how much of this will pass through to core inflation, which actually decelerated in January from the 2.6% pace seen in December 2021 despite surging energy prices. What does a typical ECB liftoff look like? Should the ECB focus more on the headline or core inflation numbers when deciding if rate hikes are necessary later this year? The answer may lie more in the breadth across countries, rather than depth across sectors, of euro area inflation pressures. In the relatively short history of the ECB, dating back to the inception of the euro in 1998, there have been only three monetary tightening episodes that involved interest rate increases: 1999-00, 2006-08 and 2011. In Chart 11, we show the percentage share of individual euro area countries that have accelerating growth momentum (measured as a leading economic indicator above the level of a year earlier), and with headline/core inflation above the ECB’s 2% target. In all three of those past ECB tightening episodes, essentially all euro area countries had to see strong growth or inflation at or above the ECB target before the ECB would hike rates. Chart 11The Growth & Inflation Conditions For An ECB Rate Hike Are In Place The Growth & Inflation Conditions For An ECB Rate Hike Are In Place The Growth & Inflation Conditions For An ECB Rate Hike Are In Place Chart 12Watch European Wages To Determine The ECB's Next Move(s) Watch European Wages To Determine The ECB's Next Move(s) Watch European Wages To Determine The ECB's Next Move(s) A similar story can be told looking at the state of the euro area labor market. The 1999-00 and 2006-08 tightening cycles occurred when nearly all euro area countries had an unemployment rate below the OECD’s estimate of the full employment NAIRU (Chart 12). Only in 2011, which was widely regarded as a major policy error, did the ECB hike rates without widespread labor market strength across the euro area. Right now, the breadth of the growth and inflation data across the euro area would indicate that the ECB will soon begin to tighten policy, if history is any guide. The one missing piece of the puzzle is faster wage growth. Euro area wage growth is severely lagging compared to other developed economies. For the last known data point in Q3/2021, wages were only growing at a 1.5% year-over-year rate. Wage growth has very likely accelerated since then, with the overall euro area unemployment rate now down to an all-time low of 7.0%, well below the OECD NAIRU estimate of 7.7%. The ECB will need to see confirmation of that faster wage growth in the data, however, before embarking on a path of rate hikes. Since last week’s ECB meeting, numerous ECB officials – including President Lagarde - have stated that asset purchases must stop before rate hikes can begin. While the ECB’s pandemic emergency bond buying program is set to end next month, the existing Asset Purchase Program is set to continue with no expiry date. If the ECB officials are to be taken at their word, it is very difficult to imagine a scenario where asset purchases would be fully wound down (i.e. net purchases of zero, with buying only to replace maturing bonds held by the ECB) before the July liftoff date now priced into the Euro OIS curve. Such a rapid removal of the ECB bid would be very disruptive to the riskier parts of European fixed income markets, like Italian and Greek sovereign debt, that have benefited from heavy ECB buying under the pandemic bond buying program. European bond strategy implications While an ECB rate hike in 2022 is now a more probable scenario, it is not yet a done deal. The European growth picture remains mixed, and inflation readings outside of supply-constrained energy and durable goods – including wages - are far less threatening than headline inflation. At the moment, underlying inflation pressures are far more intense in the US. Durable goods inflation in the US reached 16.8% on a year-over-year basis last month, but climbed to “only” 3.8% in Europe (Chart 13). The Cleveland Fed’s trimmed mean CPI index accelerated to 4.8% in January, compared to 3.0% for the euro area trimmed mean CPI inflation gauge constructed by our colleagues at BCA Research European Investment Strategy. Chart 13Stay Positioned For A Wider UST-Bund Spread Stay Positioned For A Wider UST-Bund Spread Stay Positioned For A Wider UST-Bund Spread The Fed has a lot more work ahead of it in terms of tightening monetary policy to rein in inflation pressures (and inflation expectations) than the ECB. This will lead to a faster pace of rate hikes in the US than in Europe and renewed widening of the US Treasury-German Bund yield spread. Financial conditions in Europe will also play a role in limiting when, and how much, the ECB can eventually tighten monetary policy. Yields and spreads on the riskier parts of the European fixed income markets like Italian government bonds have already widened substantially in response to the more hawkish guidance from the ECB (Chart 14). The euro has also stabilized after the steady depreciation seen since the May 2021 peak. Markets are obviously pricing in an end to ECB asset purchases – the precursor to rate hikes – which would force the private sector to absorb a greater share of Italian bond issuance than has been the case over the past few years. It will likely take higher yields to entice those buyers compared to the price-insensitive ECB that has been buying Italian debt as a monetary policy tool. The speed of the adjustment in Italian bond yields has no doubt alerted the ECB Governing Council to the financial stability risks of moving too fast on tightening monetary conditions. We must acknowledge that most the recent trends in the Treasury-Bund spread (narrower) and Italian bond yields/spreads (higher) go against our current strategic recommendations to overweight European fixed income. Markets have moved to price in a far more aggressive move from the ECB than we had envisioned for 2022. However, as highlighted above, it is not clear that the ECB needs to dial back monetary accommodation as rapidly as markets now expect. Thus, we are sticking with our strategic recommendations to overweight euro area government bonds, both in the core and periphery, in global bond portfolios. At the same time, we continue to recommend a below-benchmark duration stance within dedicated European portfolios, even with the 10-year German Bund yield having already reached our end-2022 yield target of 0.25% (Chart 15). European bond yields will remain under upward pressure until euro area inflation finally peaks and the ECB will be under less pressure to tighten. Chart 14ECB Facing An "Italy-vs-Inflation" Tradeoff ECB Facing An "Italy-vs-Inflation" Tradeoff ECB Facing An "Italy-vs-Inflation" Tradeoff ​​​​​ Chart 15Too Much, Too Soon Priced Into Bund Yields Too Much, Too Soon Priced Into Bund Yields Too Much, Too Soon Priced Into Bund Yields ​​​​​ Bottom Line: Markets are overestimating how quickly the ECB can begin to tighten European monetary policy. An initial rate hike can occur in Q4 of this year, at the earliest, which is later than the current mid-summer liftoff date discounted in interest rate forwards. Ride out the current European rates volatility and stay overweight European government debt versus the US. UK Update: The BoE Wants To Tighten Fast At last week's policy meeting, the BoE Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) voted 5-4 to raise Bank Rate by 25bps to 0.5%. That close vote is less dovish than it appears, though, as the four “dissenting” MPC members wanted to raise rates by 50bps instead! This was a hawkish surprise that resulted in bearish flattening of the UK Gilt yield curve. Chart 16UK Gilts: Volatile, But Underperforming UK Gilts: Volatile, But Underperforming UK Gilts: Volatile, But Underperforming We have maintained a below-benchmark strategic recommendation on Gilts since August of last year. The relative performance of Gilts versus the Bloomberg Global Treasury benchmark index has seen tremendous volatility since then, particular after the BoE delayed the expected initial rate hike last November (Chart 16) Gilts began to underperform again after the BoE hiked in December and have continued to be one of the worst performing G10 bond markets, validating our bearish call. After last week’s BoE hike, we still see value in betting on additional Gilt underperformance, as markets may still be underestimating how high the BoE will have to raise rates in the current tightening cycle. In the new set of economic projections from the BoE’s Monetary Policy Report published last week, the central bank raised its expectation for the April peak in UK inflation to 7.25% (Chart 17). This compares to the latest inflation rate of 5.4%. Higher energy and goods prices account for three-quarters of that expected inflation increase, according to the BoE. UK inflation is projected to fall rapidly from that April peak, in response to an expected deceleration of energy and goods prices and slower UK economic growth. However, the Monetary Policy Report also highlighted that domestic UK cost pressures are intensifying in response to a very tight UK labor market. The BoE’s Agents’ survey of UK businesses reported that UK firms continue to have difficulty filling job openings, while also having success in passing on rising labor costs into selling prices. Thus, the UK labor market is now the critical variable to watch to determine how many more rate hikes the BoE will need to deliver in the current cycle. On that note, the BoE expects UK wage growth to accelerate to just under 5% over the next year, which is well above the central bank’s estimate of “underlying” pre-pandemic wage growth around 3.5%. Inflation expectations in the UK remain elevated. The YouGov/Citigroup survey shows that UK consumers expect inflation to be 4.8% on year from now and 3.8% 5-10 years ahead (Chart 18, top panel). Market-based inflation expectations have been more volatile of late but CPI swaps are pricing in inflation of 5.0% in two years and 4.2% in ten years.1 Thus, by any measure – realized inflation, expected inflation or wage growth – UK inflation is too high, which justifies tighter monetary policy. The UK OIS curve now discounts a peak in Bank Rate of 1.85% in April 2023, but this is immediately followed by rate cuts that take Bank Rate to 1.5% by the end of 2024. That path over the next year is a bit more hawkish than the results from the BoE’s new Market Participants Survey of bond investors, which showed an expected peak in Bank Rate of 1.5% sometime in the latter half of 2023. In both cases, Bank Rate is expected to settle below the BoE’s 2% inflation target, or below current inflation expectations. Suggesting an implied belief that the BoE will not be able to raise real interest rates into positive territory. In terms of forward guidance, several BoE officials have noted that they expect that only a few more hikes will be needed to help bring UK inflation back down to the 2% target. Yet the OIS curve is pricing in a “policy error” scenario where the BoE pushes up rates too rapidly and is then forced to cut rates soon afterward. We see both the BoE guidance and the OIS pricing as far too cautious on the eventual peak in Bank Rate, which leads us to maintain our underweight recommendation on UK Gilt exposure, both in terms of duration and country allocation in global bond portfolios. Chart 17BoE Sees A Short, Sharp Shock From Inflation & Rates BoE Sees A Short, Sharp Shock From Inflation & Rates BoE Sees A Short, Sharp Shock From Inflation & Rates We have also been recommending a Gilt curve steepening trade in our Tactical Overlay portfolio on page 20 since last October. This trade went long a 10-year Gilt bullet versus a barbell combination of a 7-year and 30-year Gilt. Chart 18Stay Underweight UK Gilts Stay Underweight UK Gilts Stay Underweight UK Gilts ​​​​​ Our view at the time of trade inception was that a Gilt steepener would benefit from a scenario where the market would be forced to reassess how high rates would go in the next BoE tightening cycle. However, the BoE now appears to be “front loading” the tightening cycle by moving rates sooner and more aggressively, as evidenced by the near 50bp rate hike last week, while also moving to an accelerated runoff of bonds accumulated during quantitative easing operations. The Gilt yield curve has flattened considerably in response to increasing BoE hawkishness, with the yield spread between the 10-year and 2-yield Gilt now down to a mere +17bps. While we still see the potential for the longer-end of the Gilt curve to rise in response to an eventual repricing of terminal rate expectations that appear too low, the BoE’s acceleration of its hiking timetable will make it difficult for the curve to bearishly steepen in the near term. Thus, we are closing out our tactical Gilt curve steepener at a small gain of +23bps.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      UK CPI swaps, and inflation breakevens on index-linked Gilts, reference the UK Retail Price Index (RPI) which typically runs higher than the UK Consumer Price Index (CPI). This imparts an upward bias to UK inflation expectations when compared to CPI swaps and breakevens in other countries. Currently, RPI inflation is running at 7.5% compared to CPI inflation of 5.4%. GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark Europe Joins The Global Bond Bear Market Europe Joins The Global Bond Bear Market The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Europe Joins The Global Bond Bear Market Europe Joins The Global Bond Bear Market Tactical Overlay Trades

Executive Summary The European Central Bank (ECB) has engaged in a decisive pivot toward higher policy rates. Markets are pricing in a first interest-rate hike in July and three more increases thereafter in 2022. This is too much for one year. Limited domestic inflationary pressures, weakness in long-term inflation expectations, economic slack, and vulnerability in the periphery will limit the ECB to one hike in December. Nonetheless, the ECB will increase interest rates more than the market anticipates beyond 2022. The UK is setting up for a dangerous latter half of 2022. Too Much Now, Not Enough Later Too Much Now, Not Enough Later Too Much Now, Not Enough Later Bottom Line: Bet on a steepening of the euro short-term rate (€STR) curve. Current pricing for 2022 is too aggressive; however, it is too timid beyond the yearend. European financials will be the prime beneficiary of this tilt. Feature On Thursday, February 3, ECB President Christine Lagarde announced a decidedly hawkish pivot at the ECB press conference. The Frankfurt-based institution, worried by higher-than-anticipated inflation, no longer excludes rate hikes for 2022. In a context in which the BoE is resolutely hiking rates and the Fed is ready to initiate a sustained tightening campaign, investors are pricing in a 10bp ECB rate hike as early as July 2022. They also foresee three additional increases by the end of the year. We agree that the ECB will start lifting the deposit rate this year; however, we expect the tightening to begin in December. Nonetheless, we expect the ECB to lift policy rates more aggressively than the €STR prices in subsequent years. European Inflation Is Different Chart 1Surprise! Surprise! Surprise! The knee-jerk reaction of investors to price in a sudden, sustained campaign of ECB rate hikes this year similar to that of the Fed is natural in light of elevated Eurozone inflation and inflation surprises (Chart 1). However, we continue to view European inflation as distinct from US inflation. European inflation remains dominated by dynamics in the energy market. While headline inflation increased from 5% to 5.1% in January, the core Consumer Price Index (CPI) declined modestly to 2.3% from 2.6%. Crucially, the variance of headline CPI is still almost fully explained by the variance of its energy component (Chart 2, top panel). However, it is concerning that there is also evident pass-through from energy prices to core CPI taking place today (Chart 2, bottom panel). Naturally, natural gas prices play a particularly important role in this energy-driven inflation spike (Chart 3). Chart 2Energy Still Drives Inflation Energy Still Drives Inflation Energy Still Drives Inflation Chart 3Natural Gas Remains Key Natural Gas Remains Key Natural Gas Remains Key Imported inflation is another key driver of European inflation. Chart 4 highlights that there is a robust relationship between the level of headline Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) across EU nations and their import prices. This confirms that a large proportion of the European inflationary outburst has taken root outside of the continent’s borders. Chart 4Imported Inflation? The ECB Is Not the Fed—Not Yet The ECB Is Not the Fed—Not Yet Despite this energy-driven, imported inflation, domestic pressures are still much more muted than those in the US. VAT increases played an important role in pushing core CPI higher. Without this contribution, CPI excluding food and energy would be 50 bps lower (Chart 5). Meanwhile, rent inflation remains a modest 1.1%, which is significantly lower than that in the US (Chart 6, top panel), whereas used car CPI is not nearly as extreme as across the Atlantic (Chart 6, bottom panel). Chart 5Elevated Contribution From Taxes Elevated Contribution From Taxes Elevated Contribution From Taxes Chart 6Comparatively Muted Domestic Inflation Drivers Comparatively Muted Domestic Inflation Drivers Comparatively Muted Domestic Inflation Drivers Wage dynamics too are not yet as concerning in the Eurozone as they are in the US. Negotiated wages remain near a record low of 1.4%, and unit labor costs at 0.9% are still inconsistent with strong underlying inflationary pressures (Chart 7, top and second panel). The labor market is tightening and the Euro Area unemployment rate fell to a new low at 7%. However, the total hours worked have not yet reached their pre-pandemic levels (Chart 7, third panel), which suggests that it could take a few more months before the dislocation caused by the pandemic has been fully absorbed and wages become a risk. That being said, it is only a matter of time, as job vacancies are skyrocketing (Chart 7, bottom panel). Chart 8Plentiful Slack Plentiful Slack Plentiful Slack Chart 7The Labor Market Will Heat Up... Later The Labor Market Will Heat Up... Later The Labor Market Will Heat Up... Later The European output gap also limits a repetition of the wage-price spiral taking hold in the US. The OECD’s Weekly Tracker of GDP, a proxy for the overall Eurozone comprised of Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, reveals that, as of mid-January, aggregate output was still 4.9% below its pre-pandemic trend (Chart 8, top panel). Looking at the actual GDP of European countries individually, only France stands above its pre-pandemic trend, whereas Germany, Italy, and Spain still linger well below the average economic path that prevailed from 2012 to 2019 (Chart 8, bottom panels). Chart 9The Inflationary Role Of Bottlenecks The Inflationary Role Of Bottlenecks The Inflationary Role Of Bottlenecks Bottlenecks have also played an important role in relation to higher inflation. Goods inflation is much more elevated than services inflation (Chart 9, top panel), and industrial companies rank the ability to procure equipment and materials as their most important production constraint (Chart 9, second panel). However, production bottlenecks are dissipating. A recent Ifo survey highlights that the proportion of retailers with procurement issues declined from 82% in December 2021 to 57% in January 2022. Moreover, the supplier deliveries indexes of the PMIs are improving across the world. In fact, our simple Supply Disruption Index has begun to rollover, which points toward an imminent end to the wave of inflation surprises (Chart 9, bottom panel). European inflation expectations bear the imprint of those more modest domestic inflationary pressures, which explains the comparatively more limited wage-price spiral on the continent. The inflation expectations of Eurozone households are rising, but they are still within the norm of the past 20 years. In the US, they are breaking out. Moreover, our Index of Common Inflation Expectations, designed to mimic the New York Fed’s measure, remains well contained and is tentatively rolling over (Chart 10). Collectively, these forces explain the radically different inflation profiles of the Euro Area and the US. On the western shore of the Atlantic, the two-year annualized rate of change of the core CPI has completely shattered its highs of the past 20 years, indicating that more than simple base-effects are contributing to inflation (Chart 11, top panel). Meanwhile, the two-year annualized rate of change of the European core CPI is higher than the past deflationary eight years, but it is still low compared to the rates that prevailed prior to the European sovereign debt crisis (Chart 11, bottom panel). Chart 10Inflation Expectations: Unlike The US Inflation Expectations: Unlike The US Inflation Expectations: Unlike The US Chart 11Realized Inflation: Unlike The US Realized Inflation: Unlike The US Realized Inflation: Unlike The US Chart 12The Coming CPI Peak? The Coming CPI Peak? The Coming CPI Peak? Going forward, there remains a high likelihood that Eurozone inflation will soon peak. The impact of the German VAT increases will soon dissipate from the data, energy inflation will diminish as the annual rate of change of oil and natural gas prices peaks, and the growth in monetary aggregates has normalized sharply. Most importantly, in the absence of significant domestic inflationary pressures, the sharp decline in the ZEW Inflation Expectations components point toward a deceleration in headline HICP (Chart 12). Nonetheless, we cannot be too sanguine. The European output gap is likely to close this year and wages pressures will emerge before the end of 2022. As a result, inflation will not fall below 2% anytime soon. Moreover, as we wrote last week, any long-lasting crisis in Ukraine will prevent energy inflation from declining, and thus, there remains significant upside risk to our inflation view in the coming months.  Bottom Line: European inflation remains dominated by energy prices and imported price pressures. For now, domestic inflation dynamics are still mild, which explains why Europe’s inflation profile is much shallower than that of the US. Moreover, the near-term picture suggests that the imported inflation will peak, giving a respite to the HICP. Nonetheless, toward the yearend, domestic inflationary forces will pick up as wages gain traction. ECB Pricing: Too Much And Too Little ECB President Christine Lagarde delivered a message that was loud and clear: The ECB is abandoning its ultra-dovish stance. Despite this policy pivot, investors are pricing in too many hikes this year, whereas we only expect one rate increase toward yearend. True, if energy prices spike anew, risks to this forecast will be skewed to the upside. Nonetheless, we are inclined to fade the number of rate hikes priced in for 2022 and bet for more hikes in 2023 and 2024 (Chart 13). Chart 13Too Much Now, Not Enough Later Too Much Now, Not Enough Later Too Much Now, Not Enough Later Why does our base case only include one rate hike in December? First, we are considering the entirety of the inflation picture. As we argued above, inflationary dynamics in Europe are much tamer than those in the US, especially in terms of domestic inflation, which the ECB can influence. Moreover, the ECB is still reeling from its infamous 2011 policy mistake, which accentuated underlying deflationary pressures and caused the ECB to undershoot its mandate for eight years in a row (Chart 14). Inflation expectations also offer some leeway to the ECB. Predictions by professional forecasters continue to track below two percent for the medium term. Importantly, market-based inflation expectations remain consistent with a temporary inflation shock, and do not meet yet the ECB’s criteria of being above the 2% target durably. 10-year CPI swaps hover around 2%, driven by the jump in 2-year CPI swaps to 2.7%. Long-dated expectations approximated by the 5-year/5-year forward CPI swap remain below 2% and the inflation curve is its most inverted on record (Chart 15). Chart 15Inflation Swaps Don't Fit The ECB's Criteria Inflation Swaps Don't Fit The ECB's Criteria Inflation Swaps Don't Fit The ECB's Criteria Chart 14The Legacy Of The 2011 Mistake The Legacy Of The 2011 Mistake The Legacy Of The 2011 Mistake In the end, President Lagarde did mention in the press conference that inflation is finally moving toward its target after years of undershoot. In the context described above, it is likely that the ECB will continue to tolerate some higher inflation in the near term if it represses the deflationary mentality that had engulfed the Eurozone last decade and caused a progressive Japanification of the region. This is a small price to pay to exit at last the lower bound of interest rates on a durable basis. Second comes the sequencing of policy. President Lagarde reiterated the importance of the order of events. First, the ECB will have to bring asset purchases to a net zero before lifting rates. It has yet to curtail purchases. The March meeting will be of paramount importance, since it will feature the tapering schedule of the central bank. We continue to see a progressive pace of declining assets purchases that will likely end in September 2022. Moreover, the ECB will want to see how the European economy and markets will absorb the TLTRO cliff this June, when EUR1.3 trillion of facility expire. Chart 16The Italian Constraint The Italian Constraint The Italian Constraint Third, the ECB remains hamstrung by financial dynamics in the periphery. On Thursday, as Bund yields rose 10 basis points, BTP yields rose 21 basis points, bringing the Italian-German spread to 150bps, its highest level since September 2020 (Chart 16). Simply put, the periphery remains fragile because Italy and Spain sport some of the most negative output gaps in the region. Waiting for a stronger position out of those countries would let the ECB increase rates further down the road, allowing for a cleaner exit from negative policy rates in Europe. While these factors continue to favor a cautious posture by the ECB in 2022 and, therefore, support our base view of only one 10bps hike in December to be flagged when net purchases end in September, they will evolve and allow for many more hikes in 2023 and 2024. We expect the following developments to unfold: The output gaps across the region will close this year, which will put the economy in a position of strength and generate stronger domestic inflationary pressures down the road. Salaries will begin to accelerate meaningfully by the summer. This force will accentuate domestic inflationary pressures in late 2022 and 2023, and will contribute to higher household inflation expectations. The periphery will grow increasingly stronger as the Next Generation EU (NGEU) disbursements accelerate in 2022 and 2023. These disbursements are primarily geared toward infrastructure/capex spending (Chart 17) and will therefore sport elevated fiscal multipliers. The resulting strength will provide more resilience to the periphery and limit the tightening of financial conditions caused by higher interest rates. Chart 17The NGEU Will Matter… A Lot The ECB Is Not the Fed—Not Yet The ECB Is Not the Fed—Not Yet Chart 18Terminal Rates Are Too Low Terminal Rates Are Too Low Terminal Rates Are Too Low In the longer term, we also believe that markets still understate the ability of the ECB to lift rates. The market-derived terminal rate proxy for Europe is in the vicinity of the levels recorded in the wake of the European sovereign debt crisis last decade (Chart 18). Fiscal policy is more generous, however, and thus domestic demand is stronger. As a corollary, the accelerator model implies that capex will be more robust than it was last decade. Finally, the European Union is not as politically divided as it once was, which creates a stronger block. Together, these developments suggest that the r-star or the neutral rate of interest in the Euro Area is higher than last decade. Bottom Line: The €STR curve is pricing in the potential path of the ECB this year too aggressively. The ECB is likely to start raising rates in December, not in July. Domestic inflation and inflation expectations remain too modest, while the periphery remains fragile. Moreover, the ECB will stick to the previously decided sequence that calls for an end to net asset purchases ahead of hikes. Beyond 2022, we expect the ECB to increase rates more than what is priced into the €STR curve. Investment Implications The first implication of our view is that the European yield curve is likely to steepen further in the coming year. This is true in absolute terms but also relative to the US. We remain long European steepeners relative to US ones. Second, we continue to favor European financials. European banks are a direct equity play on higher yields and on a steeper yield curve (Chart 19). Moreover, European financials have upside relative to their US competitors. They are cheap, and they will benefit from the relative steepening in the European yield curve (Chart 20). Additionally, European monetary conditions will remain easier this year than US ones, whereas European growth will continue to catch up to the US. Chart 20Roll Over XLF Roll Over XLF Roll Over XLF Chart 19Banks Will Shine More Banks Will Shine More Banks Will Shine More Chart 21A Bit More Stress A Bit More Stress A Bit More Stress Third, the equity market correction might have a little more to run. In the near term, equities had become very oversold. This week’s bounce makes sense after the S&P 500’s RSI plunged below 30. However, hedge funds are not shorting the market as violently as they did in 2018, yet all the major global central banks (apart from the BoJ) are abandoning their pandemic-driven policy. As a result of the prospect of a global decline in liquidity, a retest of the 2018-lows in net exposure is likely as we approach the March Fed meeting, especially as credit spreads are still too low to cause a meaningful change in tone by the Fed (Chart 21). Thus, European stocks could experience another wave of selling in the coming weeks, especially when the risks surrounding Ukraine have yet to clear. Keep some protections in place. Finally, the euro has surged this week. With looming Ukrainian risk, the potential for a repricing downward of the near-term European policy rates and the risk of a last sell-off in equities, the euro could give up some of its recent gains and remain in a churning pattern, in place since December 2021. The uncertainty is therefore elevated for near-term traders. However, considering last week’s ECB pivot and the likelihood of an upward revision of the €STR curve for 2024 rates, long-term investors should use a pull back in the euro in the coming weeks to gain exposure to long EUR/USD. What About The BoE? Last week, the Bank of England increased rates by 25bps to 0.5%, which was a widely expected move. The BoE is naturally ahead of the ECB because inflation swaps stand at 4.3% and are even higher than those in the US. The BoE is forced to be more aggressive because inflation expectations are becoming unmoored, which raises the risk of a wage-price spiral north of the Channel. This is a legacy of years of higher inflation and of the labor-supply problems created by Brexit. Additionally, the UK is exiting Omicron lockdowns faster than the Euro Area, which accentuates its near-term economic strength. The UK is not, however, out of the woods. A perfect storm is brewing for the remainder of the year. Interest rates are set to rise sharply, energy price caps will disappear in two months, and the budget is anticipating a significant tightening in the coming quarters after taxes rise in April. This will hurt economic activity in the latter half of the year and will cause tensions in the domestic market. The tax hikes are not guaranteed and a reversal is still possible. PM Boris Johnson is currently embroiled in the so-called “Partygate” scandal and Rishi Sunak, Chancellor of the Exchequer, is seen as the most likely candidate within the Conservative Party to replace Johnson if he were to be pushed out of power by the 1922 Committee. As a colleague observed, it remains to be seen whether Sunak’s political ambitions will scuttle his fiscal rectitude. Nonetheless, the threats to UK small-cap stocks are increasing, warranting a cautious stance if the tax increases are not revoked in the coming weeks.   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com Tactical Recommendations Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Trades

BCA Research is proud to announce a new feature to help clients get the most out of our research: an Executive Summary cover page on each of the BCA Research Reports. We created these summaries to help you quickly capture the main points of each report through an at-a-glance read of key insights, chart of the day, investment recommendations and a bottom line. For a deeper analysis, you may refer to the full BCA Research Report. Executive Summary China’s Property Bust To Dwarf Japan’s China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China’s confluence of internal and external risks will continue to weigh on markets in 2022. Internally China’s property sector turmoil is one important indication of a challenging economic transition. The Xi administration will clinch another term but sociopolitical risks are underrated. Externally China faces economic and strategic pressure from the US and its allies. The US is distracted with other issues in 2022 but US-China confrontation will revive beyond that. China will strengthen relations with Russia and Iran, though it will not encourage belligerence. It needs their help to execute its Eurasian strategy to bypass US naval dominance and improve its supply security over the long run. China will ease monetary and fiscal policies in 2022 but it has no interest in a massive stimulus. Policy easing will be frontloaded in the first half of the year. Featured Trade: Strategically stay short the renminbi versus an equal-weighted basket of the dollar and the euro. Stay short TWD-USD as well. Recommendation INCEPTION Date Return SHORT TWD / USD 2020-06-11 0.5% SHORT CNY / EQUAL-WEIGHTED BASKET OF EURO AND USD 2021-06-21 -3.9% Bottom Line: Beijing is easing policy to secure the post-pandemic recovery, which is positive for global growth and cyclical financial assets. But structural headwinds will still weigh on Chinese assets in 2022. China’s Historic Confluence Of Risks Global investors continue to clash over China’s outlook. Ray Dalio, founder of Bridgewater Associates, recently praised China’s “Common Prosperity” plan and argued that the US and “a lot of other countries” need to launch similar campaigns of wealth redistribution. He warned about the US’s 2024 elections and dismissed accusations of human rights abuses by saying that China’s government is a “strict parent.”1 By contrast George Soros, founder of the Open Society Foundations, recently warned against investing in China’s autocratic government and troubled property market. He predicted that General Secretary Xi Jinping would fail to secure another ten years in power in the Communist Party’s upcoming political reshuffle.2 Geopolitics can bring perspective to the debate: China is experiencing a historic confluence of internal (political) and external (geopolitical) risk, unlike anything since its reform era began in 1979. At home it is struggling with the Covid-19 pandemic and a difficult economic transition that began with the Great Recession of 2008-09. Abroad it faces rising supply insecurity and an increase in strategic pressure from the United States and its allies. The implication is that the 2020s will be an even rockier decade than the 2010s. In the face of these risks the Chinese Communist Party is using the power of the state to increase support for the economy and then repress any other sources of instability. Strict “zero Covid” policies will be maintained for political reasons as much as public health reasons. Arbitrary punitive measures will put pressure on the business elite and foreigners. The geopolitical outlook is negative over the long run but it will not worsen dramatically in 2022 given America’s preoccupation with Russia, Iran, and midterm elections. Bottom Line: Global investor sentiment toward China will remain pessimistic for most of the year – but it will turn more optimistic toward foreign markets, especially emerging markets, that sell into China. China’s Internal Risks Chart 1China's Demographic Cliff China's Demographic Cliff China's Demographic Cliff By the end of 2021, China accounted for 17.7% of global economic output and 12.1% of global imports. However, the secular slowdown in economic growth threatens to generate opposition to the single-party regime, forcing the Communist Party to seek a new base of political legitimacy. Most countries saw a drop in fertility rates in the third quarter of the twentieth century but China’s “one child policy” created a demographic cliff (Chart 1). At first this generated savings needed for national development. But now it leaves China with excess capacity and insufficient household demand. Across the region, falling fertility rates have led to falling potential growth and falling rates of inflation. Excess savings increased production relative to consumption and drove down the rate of interest. The shift toward debt monetization in the US and Japan, in the post-pandemic context, is now threatening this trend with a spike in inflation. China is also monetizing debt after a decade of deflationary fears. But it remains to be seen whether inflation is sustainable when fertility remains below the replacement rate over the long run, as is projected for China as well as its neighbors (Chart 2). China’s domestic situation is fundamentally deflationary as a result of chronic over-investment over the past 40 years. China’s gross fixed capital formation stands at 43% of GDP, well above the historic trend of other major countries for the past 30 years (Chart 3). Chart 2Will Inflation Decouple From Falling Fertility? Will Inflation Decouple From Falling Fertility? Will Inflation Decouple From Falling Fertility? ​​​​​​ Chart 3Over-Investment Is Deflationary, Not Inflationary China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 Like other countries, China financed this buildup of fixed capital by means of debt, especially state-owned corporate debt. While building a vast infrastructure network and property sector, it also built a vast speculative bubble as investors lacked investment options outside of real estate. The growth in property prices has tracked the growth in private non-financial sector debt. The downside is that if property prices fall, debt holders will begin a long and painful process of deleveraging, just like Japan in the 1990s and 2000s. Japan only managed to reverse the drop in corporate investment in the 2010s via debt monetization (Chart 4). Chart 4Japan’s Property Bust Coincided With Debt Deleveraging China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 ​​​​​​ Chart 5China's Debt Growth Halts China's Debt Growth Halts China's Debt Growth Halts Looking at the different measures of Chinese debt, it is likely that deleveraging has begun. Total debt, public and private, peaked and rolled over in 2020 at 290% of GDP. Corporate debt has peaked twice, in 2015 and again in 2020 at around 160% of GDP. Even households are taking on less debt, having gone on a binge over the past decade (Chart 5). In short China is following the Japanese and East Asian growth model: the stark drop in fertility and rise in savings created a huge manufacturing workshop and a highly valued property sector, albeit at the cost of enormous private and considerable public debt. If the private sector’s psychology continues to shift in favor of deleveraging, then the government will be forced to take on greater expenses and fund them through public borrowing to sustain aggregate demand, maximum employment, and social stability. The central bank will be forced to keep rates low to prevent interest rates from rising and stunting growth. China’s policymakers are stuck between a rock and a hard place. New regulations aimed at controlling the property bubble (the “three red lines”) precipitated distress across the sector, emblematized by the failure of the world’s most indebted property developer, Evergrande. Other property developers are looking to raise cash and stay solvent. Property prices peaked in 2015-16 and are now dropping, with third-tier cities on the verge of deflation (Chart 6). Chart 6China's Property Crisis Weighs On Construction China's Property Crisis Weighs On Construction China's Property Crisis Weighs On Construction As the property bubble tops out, Chinese policymakers are looking for new sources of productivity and growth. Chart 7Productivity In Decline China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 ​​​​​​ Productivity growth is subsiding after the export and property boom earlier in the decade, in keeping with that of other Asian economies. And sporadic initiatives to improve governance, market pricing, science, and technology have not succeeded in lifting total factor productivity (Chart 7). The initial goal of the Xi administration’s reforms, to rebalance the economy away from manufacturing toward services, has stumbled and will continue to face headwinds from the financial and real estate sectors that powered much of the recent growth in services (Chart 8). Chart 8China’s Structural Transition Falters China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 Indeed the Communist Party is rediscovering the value of export-manufacturing in the wake of the pandemic, which led to a surge in durable goods orders as global consumers cut back on services and businesses initiated a new cycle of capital expenditures (Chart 9). The party encouraged the workforce to shift out of manufacturing over the past decade but is now rethinking that strategy in the face of the politically disruptive consequences of deindustrialization in the US and UK – such that the state can be expected to recommit to supporting manufacturing going forward (Chart 10). Policymakers are emphasizing economic self-sufficiency and “dual circulation” (import substitution) as solutions to the latent socioeconomic and political threat posed by disillusioned former manufacturing workers. Chart 9China Turns Back To Exports China Turns Back To Exports China Turns Back To Exports ​​​​​​ Chart 10De-Industrialization Will Be Halted De-Industrialization Will Be Halted De-Industrialization Will Be Halted Even beyond ex-manufacturing workers, the country’s economic transition risks generating social instability. The middle class, defined as those who consume from $10 to $50 per day in purchasing power parity terms, now stands at 55% of total population, comparable to where it stood when populist and anti-populist political transformations occurred in Turkey, Thailand, and Brazil (Chart 11). China’s middle class may not be willing or able to intervene into the political process, but the government is still concerned about the long-term potential for discontent. Otherwise it would not have launched anti-corruption, anti-pollution, and anti-industrial measures in recent years. These measures vary in effectiveness but they all share the intention to boost the government’s legitimacy through social improvements and thus fall in line with the new mantra of “common prosperity.” For decades the ruling party claimed that the “principle contradiction” in society arose from a failure to meet the people’s “material needs,” but beginning in 2021 it emphasized that the principle contradiction is the people’s need for a “better life.” Real wages continue to grow but the pace of growth has downshifted from previous decades. The bigger problem is the stark rise in inequality, here proxied by skyrocketing housing prices. Hong Kong’s inequality erupted into social unrest in recent years even though it has a much higher level of GDP per capita than mainland China (Chart 12). In major cities on the mainland, housing prices have outpaced disposable income over the past two decades. Youth unemployment also concerns the authorities. Chart 11Social Instability A Genuine Risk China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 Bottom Line: The Chinese regime faces historic social and political challenges as a result of a difficult structural economic transition. The ongoing emphasis on “common prosperity” reveals the regime’s fear of social instability. The underlying tendency is deflationary, though Beijing’s use of debt monetization introduces a long-term inflationary risk that should be monitored. Chart 12Causes Of Hong Kong Unrest Also Present In China Causes Of Hong Kong Unrest Also Present In China Causes Of Hong Kong Unrest Also Present In China ​​​​​​ China’s External Risks Geopolitically speaking, China’s greatest challenge throughout history has been maintaining domestic stability. Because China is hemmed in by islands that superior foreign powers have often used as naval bases, it is isolated as if it is a landlocked state. A stark north-south division within its internal geography and society creates inherent political tension, while buffer regions are difficult to control. Hence foreign powers can meddle with internal affairs, undermine unity and territorial integrity, and exploit China’s large labor force and market. However, in the twenty-first century China has the potential to project power outward – as long as it can maintain internal stability. Power projection is increasingly necessary because China’s economy increasingly depends on imports of energy, leaving it vulnerable to western maritime powers (Chart 13). Beijing’s conversion of economic into military might has also created frictions with neighbors and aroused the antagonism of the United States, which increasingly seeks to maintain the strategic anchor in the western Pacific that it won in World War II. Chart 13Import Dependency A Strategic Security Threat Import Dependency A Strategic Security Threat Import Dependency A Strategic Security Threat As China’s influence expands into East Asia and the rest of Asia, conflicts with the US and its allies are increasingly likely, especially over critical sea lines of communication, including the Taiwan Strait. China’s reinforcement of its manufacturing prowess will also provoke the United States, while the US’s erratic attempts to retain its strategic position in Asia Pacific will threaten to contain China. Yet the US cannot concentrate exclusively on countering China – it is distracted by internal politics and confrontations with Russia and Iran, especially in 2022. China will strengthen relations with Russia and Iran. As an energy importer, China would prefer that neither Russia nor Iran take belligerent actions that cause a global energy shock. But both Moscow and Tehran are essential to China’s Eurasian strategy of bypassing American naval dominance to reduce its supply insecurity. And yet, in 2022 specifically, the US and China are both concerned about maintaining positive domestic political dynamics due to the midterm elections and twentieth national party congress. This includes a desire to reduce inflation. Hence both would prefer diplomacy over trade war, with regard to each other, and over real war, with regard to Ukraine and Iran. So there is a temporary overlap in interests that will discourage immediate confrontation. China might offer limited cooperation on Iranian or North Korean nuclear and missile talks. But the same domestic political dynamics prevent a significant improvement in US-China relations, as neither side will grant trade concessions in 2022, and the underlying strategic tensions will revive over the medium and long run. Bottom Line: China faces historic external risks stemming from import dependency and conflict with the United States. In the short run, the US conflicts with Russia and Iran might lead to energy shocks that harm China’s economy. Japan never recovered its rapid growth rates after the 1973 Arab oil embargo. In the long run, while Washington has little interest in fighting a war with China, its strategic competition will focus on galvanizing allies to penalize China’s economy and to substitute away from China, in favor of India and ASEAN. China’s Macro Policy In 2022: Going “All In” For Stability In last year’s China Geopolitical Outlook, we maintained our underweight position on Chinese equities and warned that Beijing’s policy tightening posed a significant risk to global cyclical assets – and yet we concluded that policymakers would avoid overtightening policy to the extent of spoiling the global recovery. This view prevailed over the course of 2021. Policymakers tightened monetary and fiscal policy in the first half of the year, then started loosening up in the summer. Chinese equities crashed but global equities powered through the year. In December 2020, at the Central Economic Work Conference, policymakers stated that China would “maintain necessary policy support for economic recovery and avoid sharp turns in policy” in 2021. In the event they did the minimal necessary, though they did avoid sharp turns. For 2022, the key word is “stability.” At the Central Economic Work Conference last month, the final communique mentioned “stability” or “stabilize” 25 times (Table 1). Hence the main objective of Chinese policymakers this year is to prioritize both economic and social stability ahead of the twentieth national party congress. Authorities will avoid last year’s tight policies. Table 1Key Chinese Policy Guidance 2021-22 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China’s quarterly GDP growth slipped to just 4% in Q4 2021, from rapid recovery growth of 18.3% in Q1 2021. Considering the low base effect of 2020, the average growth of 2020 and 2021 ranged from 5-5.5% (Chart 14). This growth rate is in line with the pre-pandemic trajectory of 2015-2019. In Jan 2022, the IMF cut China’s 2022 growth forecast to 4.8%, while the World Bank lowered its forecasts to 5.1%. Considering the two-year average growth and government’s goal of “all in for stability,” we see an implicit GDP target of 5-5.5%. Chart 14Breakdown Of China’s GDP Growth China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 Does this target matter? Although China stopped announcing explicit GDP growth targets, understanding the implicit target helps investors predict the turning point in macro policy. Due to robust global demand, net exports are now making a sizable contribution to GDP growth. However, due to the high base effect of 2021, there is limited room for exports to grow in 2022. Hence economic growth has to rely on final consumption expenditure and gross capital formation. Yet as a result of policy tightening, gross capital formation’s contribution to GDP has decreased significantly, from positive in H1 2021 to a rare negative contribution to GDP in the second half. At the same time, the contribution from final consumption expenditure also slipped over the course of 2021, due to worsening Covid conditions, one of the three pressures stated by the government. What does that mean? It means that loosening up macro policies is the pre-condition for stabilizing growth and the economy. Just like the officials said (see Table 1), the Chinese economy is “facing triple pressure from demand contraction, supply shocks, and weakening expectations,” so that “all sides need to take the initiative and launch policies conducive to economic stability.” Bottom Line: It is reasonable to expect accommodative fiscal and monetary policies in 2022, at least until the party congress ends. In fact, authorities have already started to make these adjustments since Q4 2021. China Avoids Monetary Overtightening Credit growth can be seen as an indicator for gross capital formation. In the second half of 2021, China’s total social financing (total private credit) growth plunged below 12% (Chart 15), the threshold we identified for determining whether authorities overtightened policy. Correspondingly, gross capital formation’s contribution to GDP dropped into the negative zone (see Chart 14 above). However, money growth did not dip below the threshold, and authorities are now trying to boost credit growth. Starting from December 2021, the market has seen marginally positive news out of the People’s Bank of China: December 15, 2021: The PBOC conducted its second reserve requirement ratio (RRR) cut in 2021. The 50 bps cut was expected to release $188 billion in liquidity to support the real economy. December 20, 2021: The PBOC conducted its first interest rate cut since April 2020 by cutting 1-Year LPR by 5 bps on December 20 (Chart 16). Chart 15China's Money And Credit Growth Hits Pain Threshold China's Money And Credit Growth Hits Pain Threshold China's Money And Credit Growth Hits Pain Threshold ​​​​​​ Chart 16China Monetary Policy Easing China Monetary Policy Easing China Monetary Policy Easing ​​​​​​ January 17, 2022: The PBOC cut the interest rate on medium-term lending facility (MLF) loans and 7-day reverse repurchase (repos) rate both by 10 bps. January 20, 2022: The PBOC further lowered the 1-year LPR by 10 basis points and cut the 5-year LPR by 5 basis points, the first cut since April 2020. Chart 17China Policy Easing Will Boost Import Volumes China Policy Easing Will Boost Import Volumes China Policy Easing Will Boost Import Volumes The timing and size of the last two rate cuts came as a surprise to the market, signaling more comprehensive easing than was expected (confirming our expectations).3 The market saw a clear turning point: Chinese authorities are now fully aware of the need to loosen up monetary policy to counter intensifying downward pressure on the economy. Incidentally, the fine-tuning of the different lending facilities suggests the government aims to lower borrowing costs and stimulate the market without over-heating the property sector again. PBOC officials claim there is still some space for further cuts, though narrower now, when asked about if there is any room to further cut the RRR and interest rates in Q1. They added that the PBOC should “stay ahead of the market curve” and “not procrastinate.”4 Recent movements have validated this point. Going forward, M2 growth should stay above 8%. Total social financing growth should move up above our “too tight” threshold, although weak sentiment among private borrowers could force authorities to ease further to ensure that credit growth picks up. If the government is still committed to fighting housing speculation, as before, then we could see a smaller adjustment to the 5-Year LPR in the future. Otherwise the government is taking its foot off the brake for stability reasons, at least temporarily. Bottom Line: China will keep easing monetary policy in 2022, at least in the first half. This will result in an improvement in Chinese import volumes and ultimately emerging market corporate earnings, albeit with a six-to-12-month lag (Chart 17). China Avoids Fiscal Overtightening China will also avoid over-tightening fiscal policy in 2022. In December the government stressed the need to “maintain the intensity of fiscal spending, accelerate the pace, and moderately advance infrastructure investment.” In 2021, local government bond issuance did not pick up until the second half of the year. Considering the time lag of construction projects, it was too late for local government investment to stimulate the economy. By Q3 2021, local government bond issuance had just completed roughly 70% of the annual quota. By comparison, in 2018-2020, local governments all completed more than 95% of the annual quota by the end of September each year (Chart 18A). Chart 18AChina: No Pause In Local Bond Issuance In H1 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 ​​​​​ Chart 18BChina: No Pause In Local Bond Issuance In H1 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 ​​​​​​ There are several reasons behind the slow pace last year. The central government refused to pre-approve and pre-authorize the quota for bond issuance at the beginning of the year in 2021, in order to restore discipline after the massive 2020 stimulus measures. The quota was not released until after the Two Sessions in March, which means local government bond issuance did not pick up until April 2021, causing a 3-month vacuum in local government fiscal support (see Chart 18B). In contrast, for 2019 and 2020, the central government pre-authorized the bond issuance quota ahead of time to try to provide fiscal support evenly throughout the year. Starting from 2020, the central government strengthened supervision and evaluation of local government investment projects, again to instill discipline. Previously local governments could easily issue general-purpose bonds and the funds were theirs to spend. But now local governments are required to increase the transparency of their investment projects and mainly finance these projects via special-purpose bonds, i.e. targeted money for authorized projects (Table 2). In 2021 local governments were less willing to issue bonds. At the April 2021 Politburo meeting, the central government vowed to “establish a disposal mechanism that will hold local government officials accountable for fiscal and financial risks.” This triggered risk-aversion. Beijing wanted to prevent a growth “splurge” in the wake of its emergency stimulus, like what happened in 2008-11. The fiscal turning point came in the second half of the year. The central government called for accelerating local government bond issuance several times from July to October. The pace significantly picked up in the second half of 2021 and Q4 accounted for a significant portion of annual issuance (Chart 18). As a result, fixed asset investment and fiscal impulse should pick up in Q1 2022. Thus, unlike last year, authorities are trying to avoid a sharp drop in the fiscal impulse. The Ministry of Finance has already frontloaded 1.46 trillion yuan ($229 billion) from the 2022 special purpose bonds quota. This amount is part of the 2022 annual local government bond issuance quota, with the rest to be released at the Two Sessions in March. Pulling these funds forward indicates the rising pressure to stabilize economic growth in Q1 this year. That being said, investors should differentiate easing up fiscal policy and “flood-like” stimulus in the past. The government still claims it will “contain increases in implicit local government debts.” In fact, pilot programs to clean up implicit debts have already started in Shanghai and Guangdong. This means, China will not reverse past efforts on curbing hidden debts. Hence fiscal support will be more tightly controlled in future, like water taps in the hands of the central government. The risk of fiscal tightening is backloaded in 2022. The tremendous amount of local government bonds issued in Q4 2021 will start to kick in early 2022. These will combine with the frontloaded special purposed bonds. Fiscal impulse should tick up in Q1. However, fiscal impulse might decelerate in the second half. A total of $2.7 trillion yuan worth of local government bonds will reach maturity this year, with $2.2 trillion yuan reaching maturity after June 2022 (Table 3). This means that in the second half, local governments will need to issue more re-financing bonds to prevent insolvency risk, thus undermining fiscal support for the economy. And this last point underscores the threat of economic and financial instability that China faces over the long run. Table 2Breakdown Of China Local Government Bond Issuance China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 Bottom Line: Stability is the top priority in 2022. China will continue to easy up monetary and fiscal policy in H1, to combat the economic downward pressure ahead of the twentieth national party congress (Chart 19). Policy tightening risk is backloaded. Structural reforms will likely subside for now until the Xi administration re-consolidates power for the next ten years. Table 3China: Local Government Debt Maturity Schedule China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 China Geopolitical Outlook 2022 ​​​​​​ Chart 19Policy Support Expected For 20th Party Congress Policy Support Expected For 20th Party Congress Policy Support Expected For 20th Party Congress Note: An error in an earlier version of this report has been corrected. Chinese fixed asset investment in Chart 19 is growing at 0.1%, not 57.6% as originally shown. The chart has been adjusted. Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Yushu Ma Research Associate yushu.ma@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      See Bei Hu and Bloomberg, “Ray Dalio thinks the U.S. needs more of China’s common prosperity drive to create a ‘fairer system,’” Fortune, January 10, 2022, fortune.com. 2     See George Soros, “China’s Challenges,” Project Syndicate, January 31, 2022, project-syndicate.org. 3     The 5-year LPR had remained unchanged after the December 2021 cut. At that time, only the 1-Year LPR was cut by 5bps. Furthermore, the different magnitudes of the January 20 LPR cut also have some implications. The 1-Year LPR mostly affects new and outstanding loans, short-term liquidity loans of firms, and consumer loans of households. In comparison, the 5-Year LPR has a larger impact, affecting the borrowing costs of total social financing, including mortgage loans, medium- to long-term investment loans, etc. The MLF rate was cut by 10 basis points on January 17; in theory the LPR should also be cut by the same size. However, the 5-Year LPR adjustments was very cautious and was only cut by 5 bps, smaller than the MLF cut and the 1-Year LPR cut. The 5-year LPR serves as the benchmark lending rate for mortgage loans. 4     To combat the negative shock caused by the initial outburst of COVID-19, altogether China lowered the MLF and 1-year LPR by 30 bps and 5-year LPR by 15 bps in H1 2020. This also suggests that there is still room for future interest rate cuts or RRR cuts in the coming months. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

BCA Research is proud to announce a new feature to help clients get the most out of our research: an Executive Summary cover page on each of the BCA Research Reports. We created these summaries to help you quickly capture the main points of each report through an at-a-glance read of key insights, chart of the day, investment recommendations and a bottom line. For a deeper analysis, you may refer to the full BCA Research Report. Executive Summary The golden rule for investing in the stock market simply states: “Stay bullish on stocks unless you have good reason to think that a recession is imminent.” The catch, of course, is that it is difficult to know whether a recession is lurking around the corner. Still, we can learn a lot from past recessions. As we document in this week’s report, every major downturn was caused by the buildup of imbalances within the economy, which were then laid bare by some sort of catalyst, usually monetary tightening. Today, the US is neither suffering from an overhang of capital spending, as it did in the lead-up to the 2001 recession, nor an overhang of housing, as it did in the lead-up to the Great Recession. US inflation has risen, but unlike in the early 1980s, long-term inflation expectations remain well anchored. This gives the Fed scope to tighten monetary policy in a gradual manner. Outside the US, vulnerabilities are more pronounced, especially in China where the property market is weakening, and debt levels stand at exceptionally high levels. Fortunately, the Chinese government has enough tools to keep the economy afloat, at least for the time being. Equity Bear Markets And Recessions Go Hand In Hand Equity Bear Markets And Recessions Go Hand In Hand Equity Bear Markets And Recessions Go Hand In Hand Bottom Line: Equity bear markets rarely occur outside of recessions. With global growth set to remain above trend at least for the next 12 months, investors should continue to overweight equities. However, they should underweight the tech sector since tech stocks remain disproportionately vulnerable to rising rates, increased regulation, and a retrenchment in pandemic-induced spending on electronics and online services. Macro Matters Investors tend to underestimate the importance of macroeconomics for stock market outcomes. That is a pity. Charts 1, 2, and 3 show that the business cycle drives the evolution of corporate earnings; corporate earnings, in turn, drive the stock market; and as a result, the business cycle determines the path for stock prices. Chart 1The Business Cycle Drives Earnings… The Business Cycle Drives Earnings... The Business Cycle Drives Earnings... Chart 2…Earnings In Turn Drive Stock Prices… ...Earnings In Turn Drive Stock Prices... ...Earnings In Turn Drive Stock Prices... An appreciation of macro forces leads to our golden rule for investing in the stock market. It simply states: Stay bullish on stocks unless you have good reason to think that a recession is imminent. Chart 3…Hence, The Business Cycle Is The Main Driver Of Equity Returns ...Hence, The Business Cycle Is The Main Driver Of Equity Returns ...Hence, The Business Cycle Is The Main Driver Of Equity Returns Historically, stocks have peaked about six months before the onset of a recession. Thus, it usually does not pay to turn bearish on stocks if you expect the economy to grow for at least another 12 months. In fact, aside from the brief but violent 1987 stock market crash, during the past 50 years, the S&P 500 has never fallen by more than 20% outside of a recessionary environment (Chart 4). Peering Around The Corner The catch, of course, is that it is difficult to know whether a recession is lurking around the corner. Leo Tolstoy began his novel Anna Karenina with the words “Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” By the same token, every economic boom seems the same, whereas every recession has its own unique features. This makes forecasting recessions difficult. Difficult, but not impossible. Even though recessions differ substantially in their magnitude and causes, they all share the following three characteristics: 1) The buildup of imbalances that make the economy vulnerable to a downturn; 2) A catalyst that exposes these imbalances; and 3) Amplifiers or dampeners that either exacerbate or mitigate the slump. Let us review six past recessions to better understand what these three characteristics reveal about the current state of the global economy. Chart 4Equity Bear Markets And Recessions Go Hand In Hand Equity Bear Markets And Recessions Go Hand In Hand Equity Bear Markets And Recessions Go Hand In Hand The 1980 And 1982 Recessions The double-dip recessions of 1980 and 1982 were the last in which inflation played a starring role. Throughout the 1970s, the Fed consistently overstated the degree of slack in the economy (Chart 5). This led to a prolonged period in which interest rates stayed below their equilibrium level. The resulting upward pressure on inflation from an overheated economy was compounded by a series of oil shocks, the last of which occurred in 1979 following the Iranian revolution. Chart 6The Volcker Era: It Took Massive Monetary Tightening To Bring Down Inflation The Volcker Era: It Took Massive Monetary Tightening To Bring Down Inflation The Volcker Era: It Took Massive Monetary Tightening To Bring Down Inflation Chart 5The Fed Continuously Overstated The Magnitude Of Economic Slack In The 1970s The Fed Continuously Overstated The Magnitude Of Economic Slack In The 1970s The Fed Continuously Overstated The Magnitude Of Economic Slack In The 1970s In an effort to break the back of inflation, newly appointed Fed chair Paul Volcker raised rates, first to 17% in April 1980, and then following a brief interlude in which the effective fed funds rate dropped back to 9%, to a peak of 19% in July 1981 (Chart 6).   The 1990-91 Recession Overheating also contributed to the early 1990s recession. After reaching a high of 10.8% in 1982, the unemployment rate fell to 5% in 1989, about one percentage point below its equilibrium level at that time. Core inflation began to accelerate, reaching 5.5% by August 1990. The Fed initially responded to the overheating economy by hiking interest rates. The fed funds rate rose from 6.6% in March 1988 to a high of 9.8% by May 1989. By the summer of 1990, the economy had already slowed significantly. Commercial real estate, still reeling from the effects of the Savings and Loan crisis, weakened sharply. Defense outlays continued to contract following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The final straw was Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, which caused oil prices to surge and consumer confidence to plunge (Chart 7).   The 2001 Recession An overhang of IT equipment sowed the seeds of the 2001 recession. Spending on telecommunications equipment rose almost three-fold over the course of the 1990s, which helped lift overall nonresidential capital spending from 11.2% of GDP in 1992 to 14.7% in 2000 (Chart 8). Chart 7Overheating In The Leadup To The 1990-91 Recession Overheating In The Leadup To The 1990-91 Recession Overheating In The Leadup To The 1990-91 Recession The recession itself was fairly mild. After subsequent revisions to the data, growth turned negative for just one quarter, in Q3 of 2001. However, due to the lopsided influence of the tech sector in aggregate profits – and even more so, in market capitalization – the dotcom bust had a major impact on equity prices (Chart 9). Chart 9The Dotcom Bust Dragged Down Tech Earnings The Dotcom Bust Dragged Down Tech Earnings The Dotcom Bust Dragged Down Tech Earnings Chart 8A Glut Of I.T. Equipment Sowed The Seeds Of The 2001 Recession A Glut Of I.T. Equipment Sowed The Seeds Of The 2001 Recession A Glut Of I.T. Equipment Sowed The Seeds Of The 2001 Recession Having raised rates to 6.5% in May 2000, the Fed responded to the downturn by easing monetary policy. Falling rates were effective in reviving the economy – indeed, perhaps too effective. The resulting housing boom paved the way for the Great Recession.   The Great Recession (2007-2009) The housing sector was the source of imbalances in the lead-up to the Great Recession. In the US, and in other countries such as Spain and Ireland, house prices soared as lenders doled out credit on increasingly lenient terms. Chart 10A Long House Party A Long House Party A Long House Party Rising house prices stoked a consumption boom and incentivized developers to build more homes. In the US, the personal savings rate fell to historic lows. Residential investment reached a high of 6.7% of GDP, up from an average of 4.3% of GDP in the 1990s (Chart 10). While the housing bubble would have burst at some point anyway, tighter monetary policy helped expedite the downturn. Starting in June 2004, the Fed raised rates 17 times, pushing the fed funds rate to 5.25% by June 2006. The ECB also hiked rates; it raised the refi rate from 2% in December 2005 to 4.25% in July 2008, continuing to tighten policy even after the Fed had begun to cut rates. Once global growth started to weaken, a number of accelerants kicked in. As is the case in every recession, rising unemployment led to less spending, which in turn led to even higher unemployment. To make matters worse, a vicious circle engulfed the housing market. Falling home prices eroded the collateral underlying mortgage loans, producing more defaults, tighter lending standards, and even lower home prices. The Fed responded to the crisis by cutting rates and introducing an alphabet soup of programs to support the financial system. However, the zero lower-bound constraint limited the degree to which the Fed could cut rates, forcing it to resort to unorthodox measures such as quantitative easing. While these measures arguably helped, they fell short of what was needed to resuscitate the economy. Fiscal policy could have picked up the slack, but political considerations limited the scale and scope of the 2009 Recovery Act. The result was a needlessly long and drawn-out recovery.   The Euro Crisis (2012) Chart 11The State Is Here To Mop Up The Mess The State Is Here To Mop Up The Mess The State Is Here To Mop Up The Mess A reoccurring theme in economic history is that financial crises often force governments to assume private-sector liabilities in order to avoid a full-scale economic collapse. Unlike Greece, where government debt stood at very high levels even before the GFC, debt levels in Spain and Ireland were quite modest before the crisis. However, all that changed when Spain and Ireland were forced to bail out their banks (Chart 11). Unlike the US, UK, and Japan, euro area member governments did not have access to central banks that could serve as buyers of last resort for their debts. This limitation created a feedback loop where rising bond yields made it more onerous for governments to service their debts, which led to a higher perceived likelihood of default and even higher yields (Chart 12). Chart 12Multiple Equilibria In The Debt Market Are Possible Without A Lender Of Last Resort The Golden Rule For Investing In The Stock Market The Golden Rule For Investing In The Stock Market The ECB could have short-circuited this vicious cycle. Unfortunately, under the hapless leadership of Jean-Claude Trichet, instead of providing assistance, the central bank raised rates twice in 2011. This helped spread the crisis to Italy and other parts of core Europe. It ultimately took Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes pledge” to restore some semblance of normality to European sovereign debt markets. Lessons For Today The current environment bears some resemblance to the one preceding the recessions of the early 1980s. As was the case back then, inflation today has surged well above the Federal Reserve’s target, forcing the Fed to turn more hawkish. Oil prices have also risen, despite slowing global growth. Even Russia has returned to its status as the world’s leading geopolitical boogeyman. Yet, digging below the surface, there is a big difference between today and the early ‘80s. For one thing, long-term inflation expectations remain well anchored. While expected inflation 5-to-10 years out has risen to 3.1% in the latest University of Michigan survey, this just takes the reading back to where it was not long after the Great Recession. It is still nowhere near the double-digit levels reached in the early ‘80s (Chart 13). Market-based inflation expectations are even more subdued. In fact, the widely watched 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate is currently well below the Fed’s comfort zone (Chart 14). Chart 13Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Inching Up But Are Still Low Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Inching Up But Are Still Low Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Inching Up But Are Still Low Chart 14Market-Based Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Below The Fed's Comfort Zone Market-Based Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Below The Fed's Comfort Zone Market-Based Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Below The Fed's Comfort Zone Higher oil prices are unlikely to have the sting that they once did. The energy intensity of the global economy has fallen steadily over time, especially in advanced economies (Chart 15). Today, the US generates three-times as much output for every joule of energy consumed than it did in 1970. Household spending on energy has declined from a peak of 8.3% of disposable income in 1980 to 3.8% in December 2021. The US also produces over 11 million barrels of oil per day, more than Saudi Arabia (Chart 16). Chart 15The Global Economy Has Become Less Energy Intensive Over Time The Global Economy Has Become Less Energy Intensive Over Time The Global Economy Has Become Less Energy Intensive Over Time Chart 16When It Comes To Energy Production, The USA Is Now #1 When It Comes To Energy Production, The USA Is Now #1 When It Comes To Energy Production, The USA Is Now #1 Unlike in the late 1990s, advanced economies do not face a significant capex overhang. Quite the contrary. Capital spending has been fairly weak across much of the OECD. In the US, the average age of the nonresidential capital stock has risen to the highest level since the 1960s (Chart 17). Looking out, far from cratering, capital spending is set to rise, as foreshadowed by the jump in core capital goods orders (Chart 18). Chart 17The Aging Capital Stock The Aging Capital Stock The Aging Capital Stock Chart 18The Outlook For US Capex Is Bright The Outlook For US Capex Is Bright The Outlook For US Capex Is Bright Chart 19Need More Houses Need More Houses Need More Houses In contrast to the glut of housing that helped precipitate the Global Financial Crisis, housing remains in short supply in many developed economies. In the US, the homeowner vacancy rate has fallen to a record low. There are currently half as many new homes available for sale as there were in early 2020 (Chart 19). Even in Canada, where homebuilding has held up well, government officials have been hitting the panic button over a brewing home shortage.   The Biggest Risk Is Debt The biggest macroeconomic risk the global economy faces stems from high debt levels. While household debt has fallen by 20% of GDP in the US, it has risen in a number of other economies. Corporate debt has generally increased everywhere, in many cases to finance share buybacks and M&A activity (Chart 20). Public debt has also soared to the highest levels since during World War II. Chart 20Mo' Debt Mo' Debt Mo' Debt Among emerging markets, China’s debt burden is especially pronounced. Total private and public debt reached 285% of GDP in 2021, nearly double what it was in early 2008. The property market is also slowing, which will weigh on growth. Like many countries, China finds itself in a paradoxical situation: Any effort to pare back debt is likely to crush nominal GDP by so much that the debt-to-GDP ratio rises rather than falls. Ironically, the only solution is to adopt reflationary policies that allow the economy to run hot. In the near term, this could prove to be a favorable outcome for investors since it will mean that monetary policy stays highly accommodative. Over the long haul, however, it may lead to a stagflationary environment, which would be detrimental to equities and other risk assets. In summary, investors should remain overweight stocks for now. However, they should underweight the tech sector since tech stocks remain disproportionately vulnerable to rising rates, increased regulation, and a retrenchment in pandemic-induced spending on electronics and online services.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Global Investment Strategy View Matrix The Golden Rule For Investing In The Stock Market The Golden Rule For Investing In The Stock Market Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores The Golden Rule For Investing In The Stock Market The Golden Rule For Investing In The Stock Market

BCA Research is proud to announce a new feature to help clients get the most out of our research: an Executive Summary cover page on each of the BCA Research Reports. We created these summaries to help you quickly capture the main points of each report through an at-a-glance read of key insights, chart of the day, investment recommendations and a bottom line. For a deeper analysis, you may refer to the full BCA Research Report. In lieu of next week’s report, I will be presenting the quarterly Counterpoint webcast series ‘Where Is The Groupthink Wrong?' I do hope you can join. Executive Summary Spending on goods is in freefall while spending on services is struggling to regain its pre-pandemic trend.  If spending on goods crashes to below its previous trend, then there will be a substantial shortfall in demand. The good news is that the freefall in goods spending is leading inflation. With spending on goods now crashing back to earth, inflation will also crash back to earth later this year. Underweight the goods-dominated consumer discretionary sector, and underweight semiconductors versus the broader technology sector. Sell Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) and other overbought inflation hedges such as commodities that have not yet corrected. Overbought base metals are particularly vulnerable. Fractal trading watchlist: We focus on nickel versus silver, add tobacco versus cannabis, and update bitcoin, biotech, CAD/SEK, and EUR/CZK. As Spending On Goods Crashes Back To Earth, So Will Inflation As Spending On Goods Crashes Back To Earth, So Will Inflation As Spending On Goods Crashes Back To Earth, So Will Inflation Bottom Line: As spending on goods crashes back to earth, so will inflation, consumer discretionary stocks, semiconductors, and overbought commodities. Feature The pandemic has unleashed a great experiment in our spending behaviour. After a binge on consumer goods, will there be a massive hangover? We are about to find out. The pandemic binge on consumer goods, peaking in the US at a 26 percent overspend, is unprecedented in modern economic history. Hence, we cannot be certain what happens next, but there are three possibilities: We sustain the binge on goods, at least partly. Spending on goods falls back to its pre-pandemic trend. There is a hangover, in which spending on goods crashes to below its previous trend. The answer to this question will have a huge bearing on growth and inflation in 2022-23. After The Binge Comes The Hangover… The pandemic’s constraints on socialising, movement, and in-person contact caused a slump in spending on many services: recreation, hospitality, travel, in-person shopping, and in-person healthcare. Nevertheless, with incomes propped up by massive stimulus, we displaced our spending to items that could be enjoyed within the pandemic’s confines; namely, goods – on which, we binged (Chart I-1). Chart I-1Spending On Goods Is In Freefall Spending On Goods Is In Freefall Spending On Goods Is In Freefall Gradually, we learned to live with SARS-CoV-2, and spending on services bounced back. At the same time, we made some permanent changes to our lifestyles – for example, hybrid office/home working and more online shopping. Additionally, a significant minority of people changed their behaviour, shunning activities that require close contact with strangers – going to the cinema or to amusement parks, using public transport, or going to the dentist or in-person doctors’ appointments. The result is that spending on services is levelling off well short of its pre-pandemic trend (Charts I-2-Chart I-5). Chart I-2Spending On Recreation Services Is Far Below Its Pre-Pandemic Trend Spending On Recreation Services Is Far Below Its Pre-Pandemic Trend Spending On Recreation Services Is Far Below Its Pre-Pandemic Trend Chart I-3Spending On Public Transport Is Far Below Its Pre-Pandemic Trend Spending On Public Transport Is Far Below Its Pre-Pandemic Trend Spending On Public Transport Is Far Below Its Pre-Pandemic Trend Chart I-4Spending On Dental Services Is Far Below Its Pre-Pandemic Trend Spending On Dental Services Is Far Below Its Pre-Pandemic Trend Spending On Dental Services Is Far Below Its Pre-Pandemic Trend Chart I-5Spending On Physician Services Is Far Below Its Pre-Pandemic Trend Spending On Physician Services Is Far Below Its Pre-Pandemic Trend Spending On Physician Services Is Far Below Its Pre-Pandemic Trend Arithmetically therefore, to keep overall demand on trend, spending on goods must stay above its pre-pandemic trend. Yet spending on goods is crashing back to earth. The simple reason is that durables, by their very definition, are durable. Even nondurables such as clothes and shoes are in fact quite durable. Meaning that are only so many cars, iPhone 13s, gadgets, clothes and shoes that any person can binge on before reaching saturation. Indeed, to the extent that our bingeing has brought forward future purchases, the big risk is a period of underspending on goods. Countering The Counterarguments Let’s address some counterarguments to the hangover thesis. One counterargument is that some goods are a substitute for services: for example, eating-in (food at home) substitutes for eating-out; and recreational goods substitute for recreational services. So, if there is a shortfall in services spending, there will be an automatic substitution into goods spending. The problem is that the substitutes are not mirror-image substitutes. Spending on eating-in tends to be much less than on eating-out. And once you have bought your recreational goods, you don’t keep buying them! A second counterargument is that provided the savings rate does not rise, there will be no shortfall in spending. Yet this is a tautology. The savings rate is simply the residual of income less spending. So, to the extent that there is a structural shortfall in services spending combined with a hangover in goods spending, the savings rate must rise – as it has in the past two months. A third counterargument is that the war chest of savings accumulated during the pandemic will unleash a tsunami of spending. Well, it hasn’t. And, it won’t. Previous episodes of excess savings in 2004, 2008, and 2012 had no impact on the trend in spending (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Previous Episodes Of Excess Savings Had No Impact On Spending Previous Episodes Of Excess Savings Had No Impact On Spending Previous Episodes Of Excess Savings Had No Impact On Spending The explanation comes from a theory known as Mental Accounting Bias. This points out that we segment our money into different ‘mental accounts’. And that the main factor that establishes whether we spend our money is which mental account it resides in. The moment we move money from our ‘income’ account into our ‘wealth’ account, our propensity to spend it collapses. Specifically, we will spend most of the money in our ‘income’ mental account, but we will spend little of the money in our ‘wealth’ mental account. Hence, the moment we move money from our income account into our wealth account, our propensity to spend it collapses. Still, this brings us to a fourth counterargument, which claims that even though the ‘wealth effect’ is small, it isn’t zero. Therefore, the recent boom in household wealth will bolster growth. Yet as we explained in The Wealth Impulse Has Peaked, the impact of your wealth on your spending growth does not come from your wealth change. It comes from your wealth impulse, which is fading fast (Chart I-7). Chart I-7The 'Wealth Impulse' Has Peaked The 'Wealth Impulse' Has Peaked The 'Wealth Impulse' Has Peaked Analogous to the more widely-used credit impulse, the wealth impulse compares your capital gain in any year with your capital gain in the preceding year. It is this change in your capital gain – and not the capital gain per se – that establishes the growth in your ‘wealth effect’ spending. Unfortunately, the wealth impulse has peaked, meaning its impact on spending growth will not be a tailwind. It will be a headwind. As Spending On Goods Crashes Back To Earth, So Will Inflation, Consumer Discretionary Stocks, And Overbought Commodities In the fourth quarter of 2021, US consumer spending dipped to below its pre-pandemic trend and the savings rate increased. Begging the question, how did the US economy manage to grow at a stellar 6.7 percent (annualised) rate? The simple answer is that inventory restocking contributed almost 5 percent to the 6.7 percent growth rate. In fact, removing inventory restocking, US final demand came to a virtual standstill in the second half of 2021, growing at just a 1 percent (annualised) rate. Growth that is dependent on inventory restocking is a concern because inventory restocking averages to zero in the long run, and after a massive positive contribution there tends to come a symmetrical negative contribution. If, as we expect, spending on services fails to catch up to its pre-pandemic trend while spending on goods falls back to its pre-pandemic trend, then there will be a demand shortfall. And if there is a hangover, in which spending on goods crashes to below its previous trend, then the demand shortfall could be substantial. As inflation crashes back to earth, so will overbought commodities. The good news is that the freefall in durable goods spending is leading inflation. In this regard, you might be surprised to learn that the US core (6-month) inflation rate has already been declining for five consecutive months. With spending on goods now crashing back to earth, inflation will also crash back to earth later this year (Chart I-8). Chart I-8As Spending On Goods Crashes Back To Earth, So Will Inflation As Spending On Goods Crashes Back To Earth, So Will Inflation As Spending On Goods Crashes Back To Earth, So Will Inflation Sell Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) and other overbought inflation hedges such as commodities that have not yet corrected. Given that the level (rather than the inflation) of commodity prices is irrationally tracking the inflation rate, the likely explanation is that investors have piled into commodities as a hedge against inflation. Hence, as inflation crashes back to earth, so will overbought commodities (Chart I-9). Overbought base metals are particularly vulnerable. Chart I-9Overbought Commodities Are Particularly Vulnerable Overbought Commodities Are Particularly Vulnerable Overbought Commodities Are Particularly Vulnerable Fractal Trading Watchlist This week we focus on nickel versus silver, add tobacco versus cannabis, and update bitcoin, biotech, CAD/SEK, and EUR/CZK. To reiterate, overbought base metals are vulnerable, and the 70 percent outperformance of nickel versus silver through the past year has reached the point of fractal fragility that signalled previous major turning-points in 2014, 2016, 2018, and 2020 (Chart I-10). Accordingly, this week’s recommended trade is to go short nickel versus silver, setting the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 20 percent.  Chart I-10Short Nickel Versus Silver Short Nickel Versus Silver Short Nickel Versus Silver A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis Bitcoin's 65-Day Fractal Support Is Holding For Now Bitcoin's 65-Day Fractal Support Is Holding For Now Bitcoin's 65-Day Fractal Support Is Holding For Now Biotech Approaching A Major Buy Biotech Approaching A Major Buy Biotech Approaching A Major Buy CAD/SEK Approaching A Sell CAD/SEK Approaching A Sell CAD/SEK Approaching A Sell EUR/CZK At A Bottom EUR/CZK At A Bottom EUR/CZK At A Bottom Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System After The Pandemic Binge Comes The Pandemic Hangover... After The Pandemic Binge Comes The Pandemic Hangover... After The Pandemic Binge Comes The Pandemic Hangover... 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