Money/Credit/Debt

A message for Foreign Exchange Strategy clients, There will be no report next week, as we take a summer break. We will be joining our clients and colleagues for our annual investment conference to be held in New York, on September 7 & 8. We will resume our publication the following week, with a Special Report on the Hong Kong dollar, together with our China Investment Strategy colleagues. Looking forward to seeing many of you in person. Kind regards, Chester Ntonifor, Foreign Exchange Strategist Executive Summary No Urgency To Tighten Policy No Urgency To Tighten Policy No Urgency To Tighten Policy The biggest medium-term threat for Japan remains deflation, rather than inflation. This suggests that the BoJ will be loathe to abandon yield curve control anytime soon. That said, inflation is still accelerating globally, and has meaningfully picked up in Japan. Betting on a hawkish BoJ policy shift could therefore be a significant macro trade. We have identified five conditions that need to be met for the BoJ to begin removing accommodation. None are currently indicating an imminent need to alter monetary policy settings, particularly with the Japanese economy softening alongside subdued inflation expectations. The yen will soar on any hawkish BoJ policy shift. Currently, BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy is short EUR/JPY. That said, the historical evidence suggests waiting for an exhaustion in yen selling pressure, before placing fresh bets on selling USD/JPY. Longer-term bond yields in Japan, for maturities beyond the BoJ yield target, are already moving higher, while speculative interest in shorting JGBs has increased.  We recommend fading these trends for now – shorting JGBs outright will remain a “widowmaker trade”. Bottom Line: The yen has undershot and longer-term investors should buy it - our preferred way to express that view in the near-term is to be short EUR/JPY.  Bond investors should be underweight “low-beta” JGBs in fixed-income portfolios on a tactical basis, not as a hawkish BoJ bet, but because global bond yields are more likely to stay in broad trading ranges than break to new highs. Feature Chart 1The BoJ Is A Lonesome Dove When Will The BoJ Abandon Yield Curve Control? When Will The BoJ Abandon Yield Curve Control? Almost every G10 central bank has raised rates over the last 12 months, even the perennially dovish banks like the ECB and Swiss National Bank, in response to soaring inflation.  The one exception has been the Bank of Japan (BoJ). The BoJ has kept policy rates unchanged throughout the year (Chart 1), while also maintaining its Yield Curve Control policy of capping 10-year Japanese government bond (JGB) yields at 0.25%. There has been interest from the macro investor community on Japan in recent months, betting on the BoJ eventually succumbing to the global monetary tightening trend.  If the BoJ were to shift gears and turn less accommodative, then the yen would surely soar, while JGBs will go on a fire sale. In this report, jointly published by BCA Research Foreign Exchange Strategy and Global Fixed Income Strategy, we explore the necessary conditions that need to be in place for the BoJ to meaningfully shift policy, most likely starting with the end of Yield Curve Control before interest rate hikes. We see five such conditions, which will form a “checklist” to be monitored in the months ahead. Condition 1: Overshooting Inflation Expectations The BoJ has a policy mandate on inflation and most measures of underlying Japanese inflation are still well below its 2% target. For example, the weighted median and mode CPI inflation rates are only at 0.5%, even as headline CPI inflation has climbed to 2.6% on the back of two primarily non-domestic factors – rapidly rising prices for energy and goods (Chart 2). With such low baseline inflation, it has been hard to lift market-based Japanese inflation expectations like CPI swap rates above 1%, even as far out as ten years (Chart 3). CPI swaps have tended to provide a more realistic assessment of underlying Japanese inflation, adhering more closely to trends in realized core CPI inflation, and thus deserve the most attention from the BoJ.  This is in stark contrast to the BoJ’s own consumer survey of inflation expectations, that has consistently overestimated inflation over the years, which is currently showing both 1-year-ahead and 5-year-ahead inflation expectations at a startling, yet highly inaccurate, 5%.  Chart 2Low Underlying Inflation In Japan Low Underlying Inflation In Japan Low Underlying Inflation In Japan Chart 3No Unmooring Of Inflation Expectations In Japan No Unmooring Of Inflation Expectations In Japan No Unmooring Of Inflation Expectations In Japan The BoJ is likely to side with the more subdued read on market-based inflation expectations in determining if monetary policy needs to turn less dovish – especially with the BoJ’s own estimate of the output gap now at -1.2%, indicating spare capacity in the economy and a lack of underlying inflation pressures (Chart 4). Chart 4Japan Still Suffers From Excess Capacity Japan Still Suffers From Excess Capacity Japan Still Suffers From Excess Capacity Condition 2: Excessive Yen Weakness Our more comprehensive measure of determining the pressure to change monetary policy is captured in our central bank monitor for Japan, a.k.a. the BoJ Monitor.  The Monitor includes economic, inflation and financial variables. This measure suggests that the BoJ should not be tightening monetary policy today (Chart 5). One of the variables that goes into our BoJ Monitor is the yen. The yen impacts monetary conditions through two ways. First, import prices tend to rise as the yen weakens, feeding into domestic inflation. In short, it eases monetary conditions. That has been the story over the last year with the yen falling -15% on a trade-weighted basis (Chart 6). The second impact is through profit translation effects. Overseas earnings for Japanese exporters are buffeted in yen terms as the currency depreciates. Both impacts would tend to put more pressure to tighten monetary policy, on the margin. Chart 5No Urgency To Tighten Policy No Urgency To Tighten Policy No Urgency To Tighten Policy Chart 6Yen Weakness Only Generates Temporary Inflation Yen Weakness Only Generates Temporary Inflation Yen Weakness Only Generates Temporary Inflation However, the impact of yen weakness in boosting profit translation costs for Japanese concerns has eased over the years. As many Japanese companies have offshored production, lower wages in Japan have been offset by higher costs abroad. As a result, profit margins for multinational Japanese corporations are not rising meaningfully relative to their G10 peers, despite yen weakness (Chart 7). That puts the central bank in a quandary regarding how to interpret yen weakness vis-à-vis future policy moves. On the one hand, soaring global inflation and a weak yen should be allowing the BoJ to declare victory on rising inflation expectations in Japan. On the other hand, domestic wage growth will not reach “escape velocity” (Chart 8), and inflation will fail to overshoot on a sustainable basis, if corporate profit margins are not rising meaningfully. Chart 7No Widespread Signs Of Increased Profitability From Yen Weakness No Widespread Signs Of Increased Profitability From Yen Weakness No Widespread Signs Of Increased Profitability From Yen Weakness Chart 8No Escape Velocity Yet In Japanese ##br##Wages No Escape Velocity Yet In Japanese Wages No Escape Velocity Yet In Japanese Wages Of course, Japanese authorities care about excessive moves in the yen, but they also understand their limited ability to alter the path of the currency. The Ministry of Finance last intervened to support the currency in 1998. That helped the yen temporarily, but global factors dictated its longer-term trend. A BoJ monetary tightening designed solely to stabilize the yen, before inflation expectations stabilize at the BoJ target, is a recipe for failure on both fronts. The bottom line is that yen weakness is giving a lift to inflation, but this is unlikely to be sticky. The yen needs to fall 10% every year just to generate a one percentage point increase in Japanese inflation. As such, the current bout of yen weakness is unlikely to alter the longer-term goals of BoJ policy, unless a wave of selling undermines financial stability. Condition 3: Continually Rising Energy Costs Chart 9Japan Is More Energy Dependent Than Many Other Countries Japan Is More Energy Dependent Than Many Other Countries Japan Is More Energy Dependent Than Many Other Countries Policy makers in the eurozone have told us that even in the face of a recession, a threat to their credibility on price stability – like the energy-fueled overshoot of European inflation - is worth defending through monetary tightening. Thus, a continued external energy shock could also cause the BoJ to shift. Our Chief Commodity Strategist, Robert Ryan, expects the geopolitical risk premium on oil to increase in the near term. Japan imports almost all its energy and has structurally been more dependent on fossil fuels than Europe (Chart 9). A rise in energy costs that unanchors inflation expectations is a threat worth monitoring for the BoJ, one that could drag it into monetary tightening as has been the case in Europe. That said, adjustments are already underway. Japanese and European LNG imports from the US are rising. As a result, the price arbitrage between US Henry Hub prices and the Dutch TTF equivalent is likely to soften, assuaging energy import costs (Chart 10). Japan is also ramping up nuclear power production, which can help provide alternative sources to imported energy (Chart 11). Chart 10An Unprecedented Arbitrage An Unprecedented Arbitrage An Unprecedented Arbitrage Chart 11Nuclear Power Could Help? Nuclear Power Could Help? Nuclear Power Could Help? The BoJ would likely not consider an early exit from accommodative monetary policy based solely on energy-fueled inflation.  After all, the current surge in global energy prices, compounded by yen weakness, has barely pushed headline inflation above the BoJ 2% target – with little follow-through into core inflation or wage growth. Condition 4: An Economic Revival In Japan A burst in Japanese growth that absorbs excess capacity and tightens labor market conditions could convince the BoJ that a policy adjustment is due. This could result in higher Japanese interest rates and bond yields.  The yen also tends to appreciate when the Japanese economy is improving (Chart 12). Unfortunately, Japanese growth momentum is going in the wrong direction for that outcome. Chart 12The Yen And the Japanese Economy The Yen And the Japanese Economy The Yen And the Japanese Economy Domestic demand has been under siege from the lingering effects of the pandemic, including an unprecedented collapse in tourism. As the pandemic effects have faded, however, Japan’s economy faces new threats from slowing global growth, waning export demand, and declining consumer confidence (Chart 13). It is notable that while goods spending has been picking up around the world, the personal consumption component of GDP in Japan remains nearly three percentage points below the level implied by its pre-pandemic trend. While Japan’s unemployment rate is 2.6% and falling, it remains above the low reached just before the start of the pandemic. Chart 13A Broad-Based Slowing Of Japanese Growth A Broad-Based Slowing Of Japanese Growth A Broad-Based Slowing Of Japanese Growth What Japan needs now is more fiscal spending. For a low-growth economy, with ultra-loose monetary settings, the fiscal multiplier tends to be much larger. Stronger fiscal spending could lift animal spirits in Japan and cause the BoJ to shift. Yet even on that front, the evidence does not point to a direct link from fiscal stimulus to rising inflation expectations – a necessary catalyst for the BoJ to turn more hawkish. A recent study by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco concluded that there was no boost to depressed Japanese inflation expectations from the massive Japanese government fiscal programs during the worst of the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic shock. Waning Japanese economic momentum is not putting any pressure on the BoJ to begin considering a shift to less accommodative monetary settings. Condition 5: More Hawkish Members At The BoJ There are important transitions occurring within the BoJ’s nine-member board that could change the policy bias in a less dovish direction.  In July, two new board members – Hajime Takata and Naoki Tamura – were appointed to the BoJ board. Both brought up the notion of the need for an “exit strategy” from current easy monetary policies at their introductory press conference, although both were also careful to state that they did not think the conditions were in place yet for that to occur. Related Report  Foreign Exchange StrategyWhat To Do About The Yen? Nonetheless, the two new appointees represent a marginally hawkish shift in the policy bias of the BoJ board, especially Takata who replaced one of the more vocal advocates for maintaining aggressive monetary easing, economist Goushi Kataoka.  Of course, the big change at the top of the BoJ will come next April when Governor Haruhiko Kuroda’s current term ends. This will follow the departures of the two deputy governors, Masayoshi Amamiya and Masazumi Wakatabe in March. That means five of nine board members would be changed in less than one year, including the most senior leadership. That would be a huge change for any central bank, but especially for the BoJ where Governor Kuroda has overseen the introduction of all the current aggressive monetary policies, from negative interest rates to massive quantitative easing to Yield Curve Control. A growing constraint for the future of Yield Curve Control As outlined earlier, underlying inflation and growth trends in Japan are nowhere close to justifying an end to Yield Curve Control or even a mere upward tweak of the current 0.25% yield target on 10-year JGBs. However, there are negative spillover effects from the BoJ’s bond market manipulation that could make the current policies less sustainable over the medium term for the new incoming BoJ leadership. We addressed one of those issues earlier with the extreme yen weakness, which is largely a product of the BoJ keeping a lid on Japanese interest rates while almost the entire rest of the world is in a monetary tightening cycle. But another issue to be addressed is the impaired liquidity of the JGB market. After years of steady, aggressive bond buying, the BoJ has essentially “cornered” the JGB market.  The central bank now owns roughly 50% of all outstanding JGBs, doubling its ownership share since Yield Curve Control started in 2016 (Chart 14).  The numbers are even more extreme when focusing on the specific maturity targeted by the BoJ under Yield Curve Control, with the central bank now owning nearly 80% of all 10-year JGBs (Chart 15). Chart 14The BoJ Has Cornered The JGB Market The BoJ Has Cornered The JGB Market The BoJ Has Cornered The JGB Market Chart 15BoJ Now Owns 80% Of 10yr JGBs When Will The BoJ Abandon Yield Curve Control? When Will The BoJ Abandon Yield Curve Control? By absorbing so much supply of the main risk-free asset in the Japanese financial system, the BoJ has made life more difficult for Japanese commercial banks, insurance companies and pension funds that require JGBs for regulatory and risk management purposes. In the most recent BoJ survey of bond market participants, 68 of 69 firms surveyed described the JGB market as having poor liquidity conditions, with an equal amount stating that JGB trading conditions were as bad or worse than three months earlier. The change in BoJ leadership could also bring about a change in policymakers’ desire to continue manipulating the JGB market via Yield Curve Control.  Although the BoJ would have to be very careful in how it signals and executes any change to Yield Curve Control.  There is currently a very wide gap between a 10-year JGB yield at 0.25% and a 30-year JGB yield at 1.25% (Chart 16). If the BoJ completely ended Yield Curve Control, the 10-year yield would converge rapidly towards that 30-year yield, likely reaching 1%. That would create a major negative total return shock to the Japanese banks and institutional investors that still own nearly 40% of JGBs. Chart 1610yr JGB Yields Will Surge Without Yield Curve Control 10yr JGB Yields Will Surge Without Yield Curve Control 10yr JGB Yields Will Surge Without Yield Curve Control A more likely outcome would be the BoJ raising the yield target on the 10-year to something like 0.50%, or perhaps shifting to a different maturity target where the BoJ owns a smaller share of outstanding JGBs like the 5-year sector. Yet without an actual trigger for such a move coming from faster economic growth or core inflation hitting the 2% BoJ target, it is highly unlikely that the BoJ would dare tinker with its yield curve policy, and risk a JGB market blowup, solely over concerns about bond market liquidity. Investment Conclusions None of the items in our newly constructed “BoJ Checklist” are currently indicating that a shift in Japanese monetary policy is imminent.  We therefore see it as being too early to put on the legendary “widowmaker trade” of shorting JGBs, although a case can be made to go long the yen based on longer-term valuation considerations. Japanese yen The carnage in the yen is in an apocalyptic phase, but the BoJ is unlikely to rescue the yen in the near term. As such, short-term traders should be on the sidelines. For longer-term investors, being contrarian could pay off handsomely. The 1-year drawdown in the yen is within the scope of historical capitulation phases (Chart 17). Meanwhile, according to our PPP models (and a wide variety of others), the Japanese yen is the cheapest G10 currency, undervalued by around -41% (Chart 18). BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy is currently long the yen versus the euro and the Swiss franc. Chart 17The Yen Is On Sale The Yen Is On Sale The Yen Is On Sale Chart 18The Yen Is Very Cheap The Yen Is Very Cheap The Yen Is Very Cheap JGBs Chart 19Stay Tactically Underweight JGBs Stay Tactically Underweight JGBs Stay Tactically Underweight JGBs In the absence of a bearish domestic monetary policy trigger, JGBs should be treated by global bond investors as a risk management tool as much as anything else. The relative return performance of JGBs versus the Bloomberg Global Treasury Index of government bonds is highly correlated to the momentum of global bond yields (Chart 19). Thus, increasing the exposure to JGBs in a global bond portfolio is akin to reducing the interest rate duration of a bond portfolio – both positions will help a portfolio outperform its benchmark when global bond yields rise. On a tactical basis (3-6 month time horizon), an underweight allocation to JGBs in government bond portfolios seems appropriate, even with JGBs offering relatively attractive yields on a currency-hedged basis, most notably for USD-based investors.  Global bond yields are more likely to stay in broad trading ranges, capped by slowing global growth and decelerating goods inflation but floored by stickier non-goods inflation and hawkish central banks. Thus, the defensive properties of JGBs as a “duration hedge” in global bond portfolios are less necessary in the near-term. Beyond the tactical time horizon, the uncertainty over the potential makeup of new BoJ leadership in 2023, along with some easing of global inflation pressures from the commodity space, could justify lower JGB exposure on a more structural basis - if it appears that a new wave of more hawkish policymakers is set to take over in Tokyo. Stay tuned.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis, CFA  Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Cyclical Holdings (6-18 months) Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary

Executive Summary US Military Constraint: Strait Of Hormuz Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? A US-Iran deal would make for a notable improvement in the geopolitical backdrop during an otherwise gloomy year. It would remove the risk of a major new oil shock. We maintain our 40% subjective odds of a deal, which is well below consensus. The risk of failure is underrated. Our conviction level is only moderate because President Biden can make concessions to clinch a deal – and Supreme Leader Khamenei may want to earn some money and time. Yet we have high conviction in our view that the US will ultimately fail to provide Iran with sufficient security guarantees while Iran will pursue a nuclear deterrent. Hence the Middle East will present a long-term energy supply constraint. In the short term, global growth and recession risk will drive oil prices, not any Iran deal. Asset Initiation Date Return LONG GLOBAL AEROSPACE & DEFENSE / BROAD MARKET EQUITIES 2020-11-27 9.3% Bottom Line: Any US-Iran deal will be marginally positive for risky assets. However, the failure of a deal would sharply increase the odds of oil supply disruptions in the short run. Feature Negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program remain in a critical phase. Rumors suggest Iran has agreed to rejoin the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA) with the United States. But these rumors are unconfirmed, while the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) just announced that Iran has started operating more advanced centrifuges at its Natanz nuclear site.1 In this report we provide a tactical update on the topic. A US-Iran nuclear deal is one item on our checklist for global macro and geopolitical stability (Table 1). We are pessimistic about a deal but it would be a positive outcome for markets. Table 1Not A Lot Of Positive Catalysts In H2 2022 Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? A decision could come at any moment so investors should bear in mind our key conclusions about a deal: Chart 1Oil Volatility: The Only Certainty Of Iran Saga Oil Volatility: The Only Certainty Of Iran Saga Oil Volatility: The Only Certainty Of Iran Saga 1.  Any deal will be a short-term, stop-gap measure to delay a crisis until 2024 or beyond. This is not a small point because a crisis could lead to a large military conflict. 2.  The short-run implication of any deal is oil volatility, not a drop in oil prices (Chart 1). Global demand is wobbly and OPEC could cut oil production in reaction to a deal. 3.  Over the long run, global supply and demand balances will remain tight even if a deal is agreed. 4.  If there is no deal, then a major new source of global supply constraint will emerge immediately due to a new spiral of conflict in the Middle East. Iran’s nuclear program will continue which will prompt threats from Israel and the Gulf Arab states and Iranian counter-threats. We are sticking with our subjective 40/60 odds that a deal will occur – i.e. our conviction level is medium, not high. The Biden administration wants a deal and has the executive authority to conclude a deal. Iran wants sanctions lifted and can buy time with a short-term deal. Our pessimism stems from the fact that neither side can trust the other, the US can no longer give credible security guarantees, and Iran has a strategic interest in obtaining nuclear weapons. A deal can happen but its durability depends on the 2024 US election. Status Of Negotiations Table 2Iran’s Three Demands Of US For Rejoining 2015 Nuclear Deal Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Ostensibly there were three outstanding Iranian demands over the month of August that needed to be met to secure a deal (Table 2). Iran reportedly dropped the first demand: that the US remove the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps from the US State Department’s list of Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations. This concession prompted the news media to become more optimistic about a deal. This leaves two outstanding demands. Iran wants the IAEA conclude a “safeguards” investigation into unexplained uranium traces found at unauthorized sites in Iran, indicating nuclear activity that has not been accounted for. The IAEA will be very reluctant to halt such a probe on a political, not technical, basis. But it could happen under US pressure. Related Report  Geopolitical StrategyRoulette With A Five-Shooter Iran also wants the US to provide a “guarantee” that future presidents will not renege on the nuclear deal and reimpose sanctions like President Trump did in 2019. President Biden cannot give any credible guarantee because the JCPA is an executive action, not a formal treaty, so a different president could reverse it. (The deal always lacked sufficient support in the Senate, even from top Democrats.) Iran is demanding certain diplomatic concessions and/or an economic indemnity in the event of another American reversal. Aside from attempting to incarcerate former President Trump, Biden can only offer empty promises on this front. In what follows we review the critical constraints facing the US and Iran. The US’s Constraints The first constraint on the US is the stagflationary economy. High inflation and oil prices pose a threat to President Biden and the Democrats not only in this year’s midterm elections but also in the 2024 presidential election. A recession is not at all unlikely by that time, given the inverted yield curve (Chart 2). If the US can help maintain stability in the Middle East, then the odds of another major oil supply shock (on top of Russia) will be reduced. Lifting sanctions on Iran will free up around 1 million barrels of oil to feed global demand. With Europe and the US imposing an oil and oil shipping embargo on Russia, the world is likely to lose around two million barrels of crude per day that the Gulf Arab states can only partially make up for, according to our Chief Commodity Strategist Bob Ryan (Table 3). This is a notable material constraint – and the main reason that Bob is more optimistic about an Iran deal than we are. Chart 2US Economic Constraint: Stagflation US Economic Constraint: Stagflation US Economic Constraint: Stagflation ​​​​​ Table 3The Oil Math Behind Any Iran Deal Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? However, Saudi Arabia would be alienated by a US-Iran détente. The American view is that Iranian production would threaten Saudi market share and force the Saudis to produce more. But the Saudis are seeing weakening global demand and have signaled that they will cut production. There is still an economic basis for an Iran deal but it is not clear that it will lower prices, especially in the short run. Over the long run the Saudis are a more reliable oil producer than Iran for both economic and geopolitical reasons. The second constraint is political. The US public is primarily concerned about the economy. Stagflation or recession could ultimately bring down the Biden administration. However, in the short run, American voters are much more concerned about domestic social issues (such as abortion access) than they are about foreign policy. In the long run, American voters are likely to maintain their long-held negative view of Iran (Chart 3). So the Biden administration has an incentive to prevent geopolitical events from hurting the economy but not to join arms with Iran in a major diplomatic agreement. The third constraint is military. Americans are not as war-weary today as they were in 2008 or 2016 but they are still averse to any new military conflicts in the Middle East. An Iranian nuclear bomb could change that view – but until a bomb is tested it will persist. Chart 3US Political Constraint: Americans Ignore Foreign Policy, Dislike Iran Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? ​​​​​​ Chart 4US Military Constraint: Strait Of Hormuz Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? If Iran freezes its nuclear program then it will reduce the odds of a Middle Eastern war and large-scale oil supply disruptions. If Iran does not freeze its nuclear program, then Israel will have to demonstrate a credible military threat against nuclear weaponization, and then Iran will have to demonstrate its region-wide militant capabilities, including the ability to shut down the Strait of Hormuz (Chart 4). The Biden administration wants to delay this downward spiral or avoid it altogether. Chart 5US Strategic Constraint: Avoid Mideast Quagmires Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? The fourth constraint is strategic. The Biden administration wants to avoid conflict if possible because it is attempting to reduce America’s burden in the Middle East so that it can focus on emerging great power competition in Eastern Europe and East Asia. The original motivation for the Iran deal was to enable the US to “pivot to Asia” and counter China. Iranian hegemony in the Middle East is less of a threat than Chinese hegemony in East Asia (Chart 5). This logic is sound if Iran can really be brought to halt its nuclear program. The Europeans need to stabilize and open up the Middle East to create an alternative energy supply to Russia. The Americans need to avoid a nuclear arms race and war in the Middle East that distracts them from China. However, if Iran continues to pursue a nuclear weapon, then the US suffers strategically for doing a short-term deal that provides Iran with time and access to funds. Ultimately the only thing that can dissuade Iran from going nuclear is American power projection in the Middle East – and this capability is also one of the US’s greatest advantages over China. Bottom Line: The US has a strategic, military, and economic interest in concluding a deal that freezes Iran’s nuclear program. It arguably has an interest in a deal even if Iran violates the deal and pursues nuclear weaponization, since that will provide a legitimate basis for what would then become a necessary military intervention. The Biden administration faces some political blowback for a deal but will suffer more if failure to get a deal leads to a Middle Eastern oil shock. For all these reasons Biden administration is attempting to clinch a deal. But Iran is the sticking point. Iran’s Constraints Our reasons for pessimism regarding the nuclear talks hinge on Iran, not the United States. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s goal is to secure the regime and arrange for a stable succession in the coming years. A deal with the Americans made sense in that context. But going forward, if dealing with the Americans does not bring credible security guarantees and yet makes the economy vulnerable again to a future snapback of sanctions, then the justification for the deal falls apart. We cannot read Khamenei’s mind any more than we can read Biden’s mind, so we will look at the material limitations. Chart 6Iran's Economic Constraint: Stagflation Iran's Economic Constraint: Stagflation Iran's Economic Constraint: Stagflation First, the economic constraint: The Iranian economy suffered a huge negative shock from the reimposition of sanctions in 2019 (Chart 6). However, the economy has sputtered through this shock and the Covid-19 shock without collapsing. Social unrest is an ever-present risk but it has not spiraled out of control. There has not been an attempted democratic revolution like in 2009. The upswing in the global commodity cycle has reinforced the regime. Sanctions do not prevent exports entirely. There is still a huge monetary incentive to let the Biden administration lift sanctions if it wants to do so: a deal is estimated to free up $100 billion dollars per year in revenue for the regime for ten years.2 Realistically this should be understood as more than $275 billion for two years since the longevity of the deal is in question. The problem is that Iran’s economy would be fully exposed to sanctions again if the US changed its mind. The bottom line is that the economic constraint does not force Iran to accept a deal but it is enticing. Second comes the political constraint. President Ebrahim Raisi hopes to become supreme leader someday and is loath to put his name on a deal with weak foundations. He originally opposed the deal, was vindicated, and does not now want to jeopardize his political future by making the same mistake as his hapless predecessor, Hassan Rouhani. Opinion polls may not be reliable in putting Raisi as the most popular politician in Iran but they probably are reliable in showing Rouhani at the bottom of the heap (Chart 7). There is a significant political constraint against rejoining the deal. Chart 7Iran’s Political Constraint: Risk Of American Betrayal Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Chart 8Iran’s Military Constraint: Outgunned, Unsure Of Allies Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Third comes the military constraint. While Iran is extremely vulnerable to Israeli and American military attack, it is also a fortress of a country, nestled in mountains, and airstrikes may not succeed in destroying the entire nuclear program or bringing down the regime. An attack by Israel could convert an entirely new generation to the Islamic revolution. And Iran may believe that the US lacks the popular support for military action in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan. Iran may also believe that China and Russia will provide military and economic support (Chart 8). Ultimately, America has demonstrated a willingness to attack rogue states and Iran will try to avoid that outcome, since it could succeed in toppling the regime. But if Iran believes it can acquire a deliverable nuclear weapon in a few short years, then it may make a dash for it, since this solution would be a permanent solution: a nuclear deterrent against western attack, as opposed to temporary diplomatic promises. We often compare Iran’s strategic predicament to that of Ukraine, Libya, and North Korea. Ukraine gave up its Soviet nuclear weapons after the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which promised that Russia, the US, the UK, France, and China would guarantee its security. Yet Russia ended up invading 20 years later – and none of the others prevented it or sent troops to halt the Russian advance. Separately Libya gave up its nuclear program in 2003 but NATO attacked and toppled the regime in 2011 anyway. Meanwhile North Korea played the diplomatic game with the US, ever inching along on the path toward nuclear weapons, and today has achieved nuclear-armed status and greater regime security. The outflow of refugees from the various regimes shows why Iran will emulate North Korea (Chart 9). Chart 9Iran’s Strategic Constraint: The Need For A Nuclear Deterrent Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Bottom Line: Iran has a short-term economic incentive to agree to a deal and a long-term military incentive. But ultimately the US cannot provide ironclad security guarantees that would justify halting the quest for a nuclear deterrent. A nuclear deterrent would overcome the military constraint. Therefore Iran will continue on that path. Any deal will be a ruse to buy time. Final Assessment The 2015 deal occurred in a context of Iranian strategic isolation, when American implementation was credible, oil prices were weak, and Iran had not achieved nuclear breakout capacity. Today Iran is not isolated (thanks to US quarrels with Russia and China), American guarantees are not credible (thanks to the polarization of foreign policy), oil prices are not weak (thanks to Russia), and Iran has already achieved nuclear breakout (Table 4). Table 4Iran’s Nuclear Program Status Check, Aug. 31, 2022 Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? Will Iran Crisis Be Averted? The US’s strategic aim is to create a balance of power in the region but Iran’s strategic aim is to ensure regime survival. The US’s emerging balancing coalition (Israel and the Gulf Arab states) increases the strategic threat to Iran and hence its need for a nuclear deterrent. While Russia and China formally support the 2015 deal, they each see Iran as a valuable asset in a great power struggle with the United States. Iran sees them the same way. Russia needs Iran as a partner to bypass western sanctions. Regardless, it benefits from Middle Eastern instability, which could entangle the United States. China must develop a deep long-term partnership with Iran for its own strategic reasons and does not look forward to a time when the US divests from that region to impose tougher strategic containment on China. China can survive a US conflict with Iran – and such a conflict could reduce the US ability to defend Taiwan. While neither Russia nor China positively desire Iran to obtain nuclear weapons, neither power stopped North Korea from obtaining the bomb – far from it. Russia assumes that Israel and the US will take military action to prevent weaponization, which would be catastrophic for the region but positive for Russia. China also assumes Israel and the US will act, which reinforces its need to diversify energy options so that it can access Russian, Central Asian, and Middle Eastern oil via pipeline. Investment Takeaways Our negative view on the global economy and geopolitical backdrop is once again being priced into global financial markets as equities fall anew. An Iran deal would delay a notable geopolitical risk for roughly the next 24 months and hence remove a major upside risk for oil prices. This would be marginally positive for global equities, although it will not be the driver. Europe’s and China’s economic woes are the drivers. The failure of a deal would bring major upside risks for oil into the near term and as such would be negative for equities – and could even become the global driver, as Middle Eastern oil disruptions will follow promptly from any failure of the deal. We continue to recommend that investors overweight US equities relative to global, defensive sectors relative to cyclicals, and large caps relative to small caps. We are overweight aerospace and defense stocks, India and Southeast Asia within emerging markets, and underweight China and Taiwan.   Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      See Iran International, “Exclusive: Ex-IAEA Official Says US And Iran To Sign Deal Soon,” August 30, 2022, iranintl.com. See also Francois Murphy, “Iran enriching uranium with more IR-6 centrifuges at Natanz -IAEA,” Reuters, August 31, 2022, reuters.com. 2     See Saeed Ghasseminejad, “Tehran’s $1 Trillion Deal: An Updated Forecast of Iran’s Financial Windfall From a New Nuclear Agreement,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, August 19, 2022, fdd.org. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix

Executive Summary The Recovery of Chinese Property Market Relies On Home Sales The Recovery of Chinese Property Market Relies on Home Sales The Recovery of Chinese Property Market Relies on Home Sales Property sales, starts, developers’ total financing, and construction activity will likely continue to contract in the next three-to-six months, albeit at a slower rate. More supportive government policies will be released in the coming months, including mortgage rate cuts. It will take time for a recovery in sales and construction activity to occur, because of enormous excesses in the mainland property market/industry. Plus, China’s economy is challenged by the dynamic zero-COVID policy, a budding contraction in exports, and generally weak income growth.   Property developers started to shift their business model from “pre-selling, then completing” to “completing first, selling after.” The move is a long-term positive for China’s property market by reducing financial stability risk. However, it means that the industry will take a longer time to contribute to growth in the broader economy. Bottom Line: We continue to hold a bearish view on the share prices of both onshore and offshore Chinese property developers in absolute terms and relative to China’s overall equity benchmark. A continued weakness in construction volume in the next few months implies less demand for commodities, such as iron ore, steel, cement, and glass.   Chart 1Low Sentiment in Both Current and Future Income Low Sentiment in Both Current and Future Income Low Sentiment in Both Current and Future Income The turmoil in China’s property market has not abated. Homebuyers remain unwilling to buy houses because of concerns over widespread sold but unfinished properties, falling confidence in future incomes, and worsening employment expectations (Chart 1). Property sales, starts, and completions have all collapsed by 25-45% from their mid-2021 peak (Chart 2 and 3). However, these variables will likely start to improve on a rate-of-change basis (i.e., the pace of contraction will moderate) in the months ahead (Chart 3). The rationale is that accelerated policy easing in the housing sector will help on the margin. Notably, policies curbing housing demand have loosened much more this year than they did in 1H2020. Plus, the authorities will introduce more accommodative real estate policy initiatives later this year and early next year, including additional mortgage rate cuts. Chart 2Property Sales, Starts, And Completions Will Further Decline In Their Level Terms… Property Sales, Starts And Completions: Further Decline In Their Level Terms... Property Sales, Starts And Completions: Further Decline In Their Level Terms... Chart 3...Albeit Improving On A Rate-Of-Change Basis ...Albeit Improving On A Rate-Of-Change Basis ...Albeit Improving On A Rate-Of-Change Basis Nevertheless, the construction industry, its suppliers, and the entire economy will take small consolation from the moderating pace of decline in the property sector. The basis for this response is that the level of activity will continue falling in the next three-to-six months, albeit at a slower rate than that of the present moment. Overall, aggressive policy easing will take time to produce a meaningful recovery in the mainland’s property market because it is occurring amid the structural breakdown in the real estate market and a confidence crisis among stakeholders. Policy Support Has Accelerated  Chinese authorities have accelerated their policy initiatives in the real estate sector to restore homebuyers’ confidence and stabilize the sagging domestic property market. Chart 4The Recovery of Chinese Property Market Relies On Home Sales The Recovery of Chinese Property Market Relies On Home Sales The Recovery of Chinese Property Market Relies On Home Sales A nearly 30% year-on-year decline in floor space sold in residential commodity buildings has exacerbated a liquidity crisis among property developers. Deposits, advanced payments, and mortgage payments originating from property pre-sales, have historically contributed to about 50% of property developers’ financing (Chart 4, top panel). Hence, renewed homebuyers’ confidence and a revival in house purchases would alleviate the liquidity crunch among cash-strapped developers (Chart 4, bottom panel), who could then complete more housing units under construction. Chinese authorities have introduced an assortment of supportive housing measures, including the following: Measures To Help Complete Pre-Sold Apartments In response to the homebuyer confidence crisis, the Politburo demanded that local governments be responsible for ensuring the delivery of housing projects. Since July, at least 36 local governments in 15 provinces have released concrete policies in this respect (Box 1).   Box 1 Local Governments:  The Delivery Of Pre-sold Housing Units Turns into a Political Task "Pre-sale fund supervision"1 is an important policy related to "guaranteed delivery" for presold properties. Real estate development enterprises must deposit pre-sale funds into a bank's special supervision account, which can only be used for the construction of a specific project and cannot be withdrawn or used at will. Another important policy is implementing "one building, one policy" and stipulating local government involvement to resolve problems. With the support of local government, a fund required to complete an unfinished building can be raised in various ways including, but not limited to the following: 1) increasing financing from local banks or asset management companies;2  2) encouraging good SOEs or high-quality homebuilders to take over stalled projects; 3) local governments purchasing back unused land from property developers; or 4) asking desperate buyers of those pre-sold and unfinished projects to contribute additional funds.3   Last month, the authorities also established a real estate fund of initially RMB 80 billion, which was funded by China Construction Bank and the central bank. In mid-August, China introduced procedures to ensure property projects are delivered to buyers through special loans from policy banks. The amount of this special loan will be about RMB 200 billion.4 This will be also a part of the real estate fund established last month, which could potentially be increased to RMB 300-400 billion and will be used only to ensure the delivery of presold but unfinished projects. Moreover, the government started to ease policies on property developers’ onshore bond issuance. In August, Chinese regulators instructed China Bond Insurance to provide guarantees for onshore bond issuance by private property developers. We expect more policy easing on developers raising funds though bank loans and more onshore bond issuance (Chart 5).  Measures To Increase Homebuyers’ Affordability The average mortgage rate has been decreased three times so far this year, falling to 4.3% for first-time home buyers. This is the lowest rate since 2009 (Chart 6).  Chart 5Chinese Developers Needs More Policy Easing On Their Borrowing Chinese Developers Needs More Policy Easing On Their Borrowing Chinese Developers Needs More Policy Easing On Their Borrowing Chart 6Easing Policies On Mortgage Rate Easing Policies On Mortgage Rate Easing Policies On Mortgage Rate Since the beginning of this year, over 80 cities relaxed their restrictive policies on loan borrowing. Among these cities, nearly 60 lowered their down payment ratio for a first home purchase, while about 40 reduced their down payment ratio for a second home purchase.5 Local governments also offered financial support for shantytown renewal and cash rebates for home purchases. Multiple cities have also issued incentives to encourage households with second or third children to buy additional properties. Bottom Line: Authorities have ramped up their supportive housing policies in recent months.  We expect more policy stimulus (e.g., another mortgage rate cut) to be announced over the next three-to-six months. Housing Turnaround Takes Time Despite considerable supportive policies in place, housing starts and construction activity will continue to contract and home prices will deflate further in the next three-to-six months. The policies will take time to work, especially ones related to ensuring the delivery of pre-sold housing. A significant amount of financing will be required for problematic projects that real estate developers are unable to build and deliver. Many local governments are also facing financial distress. Therefore, it will take time to arrange financing from third parties. Even after securing financing for incomplete housing projects, there will be delays in the construction and delivery of these units. Potential homebuyers may be willing to purchase in installments and provide funds to developers, but only if they witness increased deliveries of pre-sold homes. These funds are critical to developers as they account for about half of their total financing (Chart 4 above). The willingness to buy has been suppressed by falling confidence over future incomes, worsening future employment expectations and weakening growth of current income (Chart 1 on page 2). The willingness of households to save recently hit a record level; it is higher than during the first outbreak of COVID-19 in early 2020. Meantime, the propensity to invest has tumbled to a multi-year low (Chart 7). Chart 7More Chinese Households Intend To Save Rather Than Invest More Chinese Households Intend To Save Rather Than Invest More Chinese Households Intend To Save Rather Than Invest Chart 8Property Sales In Rich Eastern Provinces: Still In A Deep Contraction Property Sales In Rich Eastern Provinces: Still In A Deep Contraction Property Sales In Rich Eastern Provinces: Still In A Deep Contraction The growth of residential floor space sold in the eastern provinces often leads the rest of China (Chart 8). The Eastern provinces account for about 44% of China’s total residential floor space sales. Residential floor space sales in the Eastern provinces were still down by 30% in July.  The lack of an upturn in the Eastern provinces, especially after the re-opening in Shanghai and Shenzhen, indicates that a property market recovery will not be imminent or V-shaped. Chart 9A Majority Of Key Cities Have Declining Housing Prices A Majority Of Key Cities Have Declining Housing Prices A Majority Of Key Cities Have Declining Housing Prices Currently still 70% and 85% of the 70-city house price indexes are showing year-over-year price declines in newly constructed houses and secondary houses, respectively (Chart 9).  Shrinking pre-sales mean less financing for homebuilders and, ultimately, contracting property investment in the next three-to-six months (Chart 10). Many developers will continue to struggle to attract sufficient financing. Hence, they must cut their starts and completions (Chart 11). Chart 10Shrinking Pre-sales Will Lead To Falling Property Investment Shrinking Pre-sales Will Lead To Falling Property Investment Shrinking Pre-sales Will Lead To Falling Property Investment Chart 11Property Developers Have Been Starting And Preselling But Not Completing Property Developers Have Been Starting And Preselling But Not Completing Property Developers Have Been Starting And Preselling But Not Completing High prices/low affordability, speculative behavior of both developers and homebuyers, very high leverage and risky financing schemes, large volumes of supply and high inventories and vacancies , all need to be absorbed. A dynamic zero-COVID policy, a budding contraction in exports and generally weak income growth will challenge China’s economy in general.  Chart 12Insufficient Financing Will Lead To Weaker Construction Activity Ahead Insufficient Financing Will Lead To Weaker Construction Activity Ahead Insufficient Financing Will Lead To Weaker Construction Activity Ahead Bottom Line: The authorities’ supportive policies will take time to relieve the liquidity crisis among property developers and boost sentiment among homebuyers. Property sales, starts, developers’ total financing and construction activity will likely continue to contract in the next three-to-six months, albeit at a slower rate (Chart 12). A Structural Shift In Developers’ Business Model Chinese property developers started to shift their business model from “preselling, then completing” to “completing first, selling after.” The move is a long-term positive for China’s property market. It will lower the leverage of and curb real estate assets hoarding by developers and, thereby, improve stability in the industry. The old model of “preselling then completing” is not sustainable. In the past decade, Chinese real estate developers aggressively pursued a business model of “buying land, quickly starting property projects, and preselling unfinished homes but not completing them.”6  Chart 13A Structural Shift In Developers' Business Model A Structural Shift In Developers' Business Model A Structural Shift In Developers' Business Model As this model was essentially raising funds via launching property starts despite shrinking completions (Chart 13, top panel), it has resulted in a significant increase in Chinese property developers’ liabilities and unfinished construction carried on the balance sheet of developers. In short, as we have argued before, real estate developers have been involved in a massive carry trade. This is one of the root causes of the current crisis in China’s real estate sector. With this business model, developers carried real estate assets (land and started properties) on their balance sheets to benefit from the positive “carry”; i.e., the difference between the cost of funding and real estate asset price appreciation. However, the carry has turned negative as property asset prices are now flat or deflating rather than rising at double-digit rates. Hence, developers are under pressure to liquidate their assets and reduce their debts. Yet, to sell their not-pre-sold housing projects that are under construction, they first need new funds to complete unfinished homes before they can be sold. Furthermore, both the “three-red lines” policy for property developers and the new bank lending regulations limiting lending to the real estate sector – both put into effect in H2 2020 – remain in place. This means that Chinese real estate developers have no choice but to change their business model to a more sustainable one – the one with more sales coming from existing properties instead of pre-sales. The new model of “completing first, selling after” is a sustainable one. Homebuyers fear buying unfinished houses, preferring existing ones. Critically, increasing sales of existing houses will provide extra funds to debt-laden builders. In contrast, delivery of pre-sold units does not generate new cash for developers because most cash are received long before completion of a dwelling. Facing a liquidity crunch, there is no incentive for developers to complete pre-sold units. Chart 13 shows such a shift has been underway since mid-2021. Sales of completed houses increased considerably, while properties sold in advance plummeted. This trend also reflects a rising preference among homebuyers for completed properties. Buyers can visit and check the quality of a construction-completed unit versus paying for a future unknown unit. Meanwhile, property developers’ leverage will decline with this new business model. A caveat is that less financing from pre-sales means that developers will have a diminished ability to complete projects already started, and that they also need to reduce land purchases and land hoarding. Local government financing will remain tight as land sales account for 23% of local government aggregate expenditure. This will have negative ramifications on infrastructure spending. Bottom Line: Chinese real estate developers have begun shifting from an unsustainable and high-leverage business model to a new way of operating by which sales of completed properties will be prioritized at the expense of falling pre-sales. This will reduce financial stability risks in the future. Investment Implications We expect a continued decline in property sales, starts, completions, and property price deflation in the next three-to-six months. Thus, we maintain our bearish view of both onshore and offshore Chinese property developers’ share prices in absolute terms and relative to China’s overall equity benchmark (Chart 14).  Construction volume will be persistently weak in the coming months, which means less demand for commodities, such as iron ore, steel, cement, and glass. Hence, we expect prices for those commodities to drop further in the near run (Chart 15). Chart 14Chinese Property Developers' Stocks: Structural Breakdown Chinese Property Developers' Stocks: Structural Breakdown Chinese Property Developers' Stocks: Structural Breakdown Chart 15Bearish On Prices Of Construction-related Commodities Bearish On Prices Of Construction-related Commodities Bearish On Prices Of Construction-related Commodities   Ellen JingYuan He Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Supervision of pre-sale funds of presold properties refers to the third-party supervision of such funds by the real estate administrative department in conjunction with the bank. 2     This year, at least six asset management companies injected funds into stalled property projects. So far, the total funds raised for three projects amounts to RMB 17 billion. Source: https://m.huxiu.com/article/644633.html?f=rss 3    Desperate buyers face two options: either add funds to build an unfinished home or continue to wait for an indeterminate period. Buyers tend to increase funds to enable the resumption of construction. 4    Source: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-22/china-plans-29-billion-in-special-loans-to-troubled-developers  5    Source: https://news.stcn.com/sd/202208/t20220826_4822460.html  6    Please see China Investment Strategy Special Reports "China’s Property Market: Making Sense Of Divergences," dated May 9, 2019, and "China: Is The Property Carry Trade Over?" dated October 28, 2021, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Strategic Themes Cyclical Recommendations

Listen to a short summary of this report.     Executive Summary A Beacon Of Hope For AUD A Beacon Of Hope For AUD A Beacon Of Hope For AUD Along with the Canadian dollar, the Aussie has been one of the best performing currencies during a broad-based dollar rally. Rising interest rates are part of the story, but there is more to Aussie strength than meets the eye. Aussie’s resilience is a conundrum worth exploring. First, it is a favorite short play for an imploding economic scenario in China, which suggests it should be a lot weaker. Second, the Aussie should be in the bottom quartile of FX returns in a risk-off currency scenario. Aussie strength can be attributed to strong commodity prices that are providing a terms-of trade-tailwind. Moreover, there is marginal evidence that demand for Australian-sourced commodities could be becoming a tad more inelastic. Chinese economic growth continues to disappoint, but upside surprises will be a welcome fillip for the AUD (Feature chart). On a terms-of-trade basis, the Australian dollar is very cheap. Falling commodity prices are a handicap, but the margin of safety on the valuation makes the AUD a safer bet. Go long AUD/USD if it touches 0.665 cents. AUD/NZD bets are also attractive. However, we will stay on the sidelines on AUD/JPY bets. RECOMMENDATIONS INCEPTION LEVEL inception date RETURN LONG AUD/USD 0.665 2022-08-26 - Bottom Line: The Aussie dollar could go on a fire sale in the coming weeks. We would be buyers of AUD/USD at 0.665 cents. Feature The Australian dollar has been relatively resilient amidst broad-based dollar strength. Year-to-date, AUD is down 3.7% versus a 13.0% rally in the DXY (Chart 1). This is a remarkable development since historically, the AUD has been a very pro-cyclical currency, bearing the heavy lifting of any dollar rally. AUD/JPY, a key barometer for a risk-on/risk-off environment is up 13.4% year to date, despite a broad-based selloff in many risk assets. Chart 1The AUD Has Outperformed The AUD Has Outperformed The AUD Has Outperformed The Aussie’s resilience is a conundrum worth exploring. First, it is a favorite short play for an imploding economic scenario in China, which suggests it should be a lot weaker. Second, the Aussie should be in the bottom quartile of FX returns in a risk-off currency scenario. In this report, we explore base case scenarios for the Australian dollar, with recommendations for both short-term and longer-term trades, as well as plays at the crosses. Technical Indicators Technical indicators suggest the AUD could be ripe for a rebound. Our intermediate-term indicator bottomed at 5.55 and has usually been associated with non-negligible rallies in the AUD (Chart 2). This indicator is volatile and our expectation is that it could relapse in the near term. However, that will be good news for investors that have a constructive view on AUD prospects. Consistently, speculators are very short the Australian dollar. China’s zero COVID-19 policy, along with property market troubles have made the AUD a favorite short play (Chart 3). Given AUD’s resilience, this suggests that speculators are being overwhelmed by a tidal wave of fundamental currency inflows, through commodity purchases, bond market investors and Aussie equity sector bulls. Chart 2Technicals Point To A Coiled-Spring Rebound In The Coming Months Technicals Point To A Coiled-Spring Rebound In The Coming Months Technicals Point To A Coiled-Spring Rebound In The Coming Months Chart 3Investors Have Been Shorting ##br##AUD Investors Have Been Shorting AUD Investors Have Been Shorting AUD Australian Commodity Demand Chart 4A Beacon Of Hope For The AUD A Beacon Of Hope For The AUD A Beacon Of Hope For The AUD Weakness in China is well known and discounted by financial market participants. The latest selloff in the RMB is a case in point. Yet positive economic surprises in China have been improving relative to peers in the developed market (Chart 4). There are two simple reasons for this. First, the Chinese government is easing domestic financial conditions. Contrary to popular belief, lower rates and higher stimulus in China are positive for the AUD since it boosts Australian exports via higher domestic demand (Chart 5). With the Chinese bond market becoming more and more liberalized, it is also becoming a good proxy for monetary conditions in China. As such, lower bond yields in China have tended to lead imports. This is good news for Aussie exports in the coming months. Chart 5AStimulus In China Is Historically Positive For AUD Stimulus In China Is Historically Positive For AUD Stimulus In China Is Historically Positive For AUD Chart 5BStimulus In China Is Historically Positive For AUD Stimulus In China Is Historically Positive For AUD Stimulus In China Is Historically Positive For AUD Second, the Australian capital account could also be on the mend as foreigners are more willing to re-rate Aussie shares (Chart 6). The Chinese credit cycle has often led to a re-rating in Aussie shares. Our China and Emerging Market strategists argue that stimulus measures might not be sufficient to turn around Chinese domestic demand. In our view, that is well priced into the Aussie, which could potentially experience another selloff in the coming weeks. However, any upside surprises in Chinese growth will be a welcome fillip for the Australian dollar. Chart 6China And Australia Are Tied To The Hip China And Australia Are Tied To The Hip China And Australia Are Tied To The Hip A Few Moats Around The AUD Infrastructure spending is a huge chunk of Chinese fixed asset investment. So, while the housing downturn will impact commodity demand, infrastructure could provide a welcome offset. This could be a big moat that investors should pay attention to. Infrastructure is 24.5% of fixed asset investment in China and 18.0% of steel demand (Chart 7). Chart 7AStimulus In China Is Historically Positive For AUD A Small Beacon Of Optimism In Australia A Small Beacon Of Optimism In Australia Chart 7BStimulus In China Is Historically Positive For AUD A Small Beacon Of Optimism In Australia A Small Beacon Of Optimism In Australia On a relative basis, Australian terms-of-trade have outperformed other commodity-producing nations. This is some evidence that the external demand for Aussie commodities could be becoming a tad more inelastic. Among Australia’s exports, liquified natural gas has been increasing both in price and as a share of total volume (Chart 8). This is following a natural tailwind. China has an imperative to become greener, which has led to a rise in the share of renewables and natural gas electricity generation (Chart 9). Australia is in the top three biggest exporters of liquified natural gas in the world and exports world class clean coal that China depends on. The result has been a tremendous gain in terms of trade (Chart 10).  Chart 8Some Aussie Exports Could Be Relatively Demand Inelastic Some Aussie Exports Could Be Relatively Demand Inelastic Some Aussie Exports Could Be Relatively Demand Inelastic Chart 9A Tailwind For Australia A Tailwind For Australia A Tailwind For Australia Chart 10Terms Of Trade Are Favorable In Australia Terms Of Trade Are Favorable In Australia Terms Of Trade Are Favorable In Australia Amidst this moat around the AUD is also a valuation cushion. As a result of strong export prices, the Australian dollar is undervalued on a terms of trade basis. While true that the AUD is vulnerable to a correction in commodity prices, the margin of safety on the valuation is sufficient for investors willing to ride out near term volatility (Chart 11). Remarkably, the 10-year government bond yield in Australia is 56.8 basis points above that in the US. This will have two profound opposing effects. First, from an interest rate perspective, it will cushion the drawdown in the Aussie, as interest-rate differentials matter for currency returns (Chart 12). On the other hand, it puts interest-rate sensitive parts of the economy, such as housing, at risk. Chart 11AUD Is Cheap On A Terms Of Trade Basis AUD Is Cheap On A Terms Of Trade Basis AUD Is Cheap On A Terms Of Trade Basis Chart 12AUD Is Cheap On A Fundamental Basis AUD Is Cheap On A Fundamental Basis AUD Is Cheap On A Fundamental Basis The Risks For The AUD The first risk for the AUD is a downturn in commodity prices. Chinese demand is genuinely slowing. This could lead to an undershoot in the AUD, as a terms-of-trade undershoot (Chart 13). That is why our recommended entry point is lower than today’s level at 0.665 cents. Chart 13A Commodity Correction Is A Risk For AUD A Commodity Correction Is A Risk For AUD A Commodity Correction Is A Risk For AUD Chart 14Housing Is A Big Risk For Australia Housing Is A Big Risk For Australia Housing Is A Big Risk For Australia The second consideration is housing prices. Real estate is experiencing a meaningful roll over in Australia. This has been led by Sydney and Melbourne, where prices were clearly overvalued, but the phenomenon is more broad based (Chart 14). Related Report  Foreign Exchange StrategyTwo Decades After The Creation Of The Euro The impact for financial markets and the AUD is two-fold. First, if the RBA continues to tighten and as this flattens the Aussie yield curve further, it will not be a welcome development for bank net interest margins and profits (Chart 15). Second, the market has already priced in interest rates higher in Australia compared to the US (Chart 16). A slowdown in housing construction activity, that makes the Aussie consumer more cautious could temper the pace of RBA rate hikes and put pressure on the AUD. Chart 15Watch The Relative Performance Of Bank Shares Watch The Relative Performance Of Bank Shares Watch The Relative Performance Of Bank Shares Chart 16The RBA Might Be Relatively Dovish in 2023 The RBA Might Be Relatively Dovish in 2023 The RBA Might Be Relatively Dovish in 2023 A Few Trades Ideas Australia provides a lot of the commodities countries need and want in today’s paradigm. That is bullish. Yet exposure to China is a clear risk that investors need to factor into investment decisions. Our trading strategy is as follows: We would buy AUD/USD at 0.665 cents. In our view, it could undershoot this level but will be an attractive longer-term buy. The risks to the housing market are higher in New Zealand compared to Australia (Chart 17). Terms of trade also likely to favor the Aussie versus the kiwi (Chart 18). As such, bet on long AUD/NZD trades. Chart 17AUD Can Withstand Higher Rates Relative To NZD AUD/NZD Is Attractive AUD/NZD Is Attractive Chart 18Terms Of Trade Will Drive AUD Higher Relative To NZD AUD/NZD Is Attractive AUD/NZD Is Attractive AUD/JPY will benefit from a rally in risk assets but is stretched. Thus, from a sentiment perspective, we are only neutral (Chart 19). Economic surprises could also likely underwhelm in Australia relative to the unloved Japanese market (Chart 20). Chart 19AUD/JPY Is Stretched AUD/JPY Is Stretched AUD/JPY Is Stretched Chart 20AUD/JPY Is Stretched AUD/JPY Is Stretched AUD/JPY Is Stretched   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Strategic View Cyclical Holdings (6-18 months) Tactical Holdings (0-6 months) Limit Orders Forecast Summary

Highlights The risk of a US recession has increased sharply over the past several months. We have not yet concluded that a recession over the coming year is inevitable, but substantial (further) supply-side and pandemic-related disinflation is likely needed for the US economy to avoid a contraction in output. The increased risk of a contraction has caused investors to ponder what the next recession might look like. One very important question concerns the likely behavior of short-term interest rates during the next recession, especially if it occurs sooner rather than later. The historical experience suggests that the Fed may cut interest rates to zero during the next recession, but that the re-establishment of a long-lasting zero interest rate policy and the associated resumption of large-scale asset purchases seem quite unlikely unless the recession is severe. In the post-WWII environment, severe US recessions have been accompanied by aggravating factors that appear to be missing in the current environment. In addition, there are several arguments pointing to the next US recession being a mild one. For fixed-income investors, the implication is that investors should not overstay their welcome in a long-duration position during the next US recession, and should be looking to reduce their duration exposure earlier rather than later. For equity investors, our findings underscore that meaningful downside risk exists for stocks even in a mild recession environment, because the decline in bond yields is not likely to offset a rise in the equity risk premium. Feature Over the past several months, investors have been faced with a sharp increase in the odds of a US recession. Gauging the risk of a recession has featured prominently in our recent reports, and we have concluded, for now, that a US recession over the coming year is not yet inevitable. Still, we acknowledge that the risks are quite elevated, and that substantial (further) supply-side and pandemic-related disinflation is likely needed for the US economy to avoid a contraction in output. Economic expansions do not last forever. This means that the US economy will eventually succumb to a recession at some point over the coming few years. One very important question for investors concerns the likely behavior of short-term interest rates during the next recession, especially if a contraction occurs sooner rather than later. A key aspect of this question is whether the Fed is likely to be forced back towards a zero or negative interest rate policy, and whether it will need to employ asset purchases as part of its stabilization efforts as it has during the last two recessions. If so, long-maturity bond yields are likely to fall significantly during the next recession; if not, investors may be surprised by how modestly long-maturity yields decline. In this report, we examine the historical record of short-term interest rates during recessions and discuss whether the next US recession is likely to be severe or mild. We conclude that the next US recession is more likely to be mild than severe, and that the 10-year Treasury yield is unlikely to fall below 2% during the recession (or fall below this level for very long). In the case of a more severe recession driven by unanchored inflation expectations, the implications would be clearly bearish for bonds. Within a fixed-income portfolio, one conclusion of our analysis is that investors should not overstay their welcome in a long-duration position during the next recession and should be looking to reduce their duration exposure earlier rather than later. For equity investors, our findings underscore that meaningful downside risk exists for stocks even in a mild recession environment, because the decline in bond yields is not likely to offset a rise in the equity risk premium. The Historical Recessionary Path Of Short-Term Interest Rates When projecting how the Fed funds rate is likely to evolve during the next US recession, most investors typically look to the average decline in short-term interest rates during previous recessions as a guide. Based on that approach, Table II-1 highlights that the Fed would likely have to cut rates into negative territory if a recession occurred over the coming 12-18 months, unless it is able to hike interest rates significantly more over the coming year than the market is currently expecting and the FOMC itself is projecting. But in our view, focusing on the historical recessionary decline in interest rates from their peak is not the right approach, because it ignores the fact that recessions typically occur when monetary policy is tight. If a recession occurs within the next 18 months, it will have happened in large part because of a collapse in real wage growth, not just because of the increase in interest rates that has occurred. Chart II-1 highlights that short-term interest rates remain well below potential GDP growth, highlighting that monetary policy would still be easy today – despite the quick pace of increase in short rates – if real wages were growing rather than contracting sharply. In our view, the right approach is to examine how much short-term interest rates have typically fallen during recessions relative to potential or average historical GDP growth. This method captures the degree to which monetary policy easing has typically been required relative to neutral levels to catalyze an economic recovery. Table II-1Based Only On The Historical Decline In Short-Term Interest Rates, The Fed Would Ostensibly Have To Cut Rates Into Negative Territory During The Next Recession September 2022 September 2022 Chart II-1Monetary Policy Would Still Be Easy Today If Real Wage Growth Was Positive Monetary Policy Would Still Be Easy Today If Real Wage Growth Was Positive Monetary Policy Would Still Be Easy Today If Real Wage Growth Was Positive Based on this approach, Chart II-2 highlights that the Fed might have to cut the target range for the Fed funds rate to 0-0.25% during the next recession, but there are some examples (like the 1990-1991 recession) that point to a cut to just 0.25-0.5%. The goal of this exercise is not to be specific about the exact level to which the Fed will have to cut the Fed funds rate, but rather whether the de facto re-establishment of a long-lasting zero interest rate policy and the associated resumption of large-scale asset purchases is likely. Chart II-2The Fed May Have To Cut To Zero During The Next Recession, But Probably Not Into Negative Territory September 2022 September 2022 Structural bond bulls might note that there are five recessions in the post-war era that could potentially point to that outcome based on Chart II-2. However, these episodes involved circumstances that we doubt would be present during the next US recession, especially if one were to emerge over the coming 12-18 months. The 1950s Recessions The recessions of 1953-54 and 1957-58 were fairly sizeable based on the total rise in the unemployment rate, but the monetary policy stance at that time was wildly stimulative in a way that is very unlikely to repeat itself today. In the 1950s, the level of interest rates was still an artifact of WWII (with the Treasury-Fed accord having only been agreed upon in March 1951). Monetary policy was both overly responsive to a period of pent-up disinflation following the initial burst of government spending associated with the Korean war and insufficiently responsive to a strongly positive output gap (Chart II-3). This was meaningfully compounded by a poor understanding of the size of the output gap at that time; the deviation of the unemployment rate from its 10-year average was significantly smaller than its deviation from today’s estimate of NAIRU (Chart II-4). In sum, the economic and monetary policy conditions that existed in the 1950s and that contributed to an interest rate level that was well below the prevailing rate of economic growth do not exist today. As such, we strongly doubt that the Fed’s response to the next US recession would resemble what occurred during that decade. Chart II-3We Strongly Doubt The Fed's Response To The Next US Recession Would Resemble What Occurred In The 1950s We Strongly Doubt The Fed's Response To The Next US Recession Would Resemble What Occurred In The 1950s We Strongly Doubt The Fed's Response To The Next US Recession Would Resemble What Occurred In The 1950s Chart II-4Low Interest Rates In The 1950s Were Partly Caused By Wrong Output Gap Estimates Low Interest Rates In The 1950s Were Partly Caused By Wrong Output Gap Estimates Low Interest Rates In The 1950s Were Partly Caused By Wrong Output Gap Estimates   1973-1975 The recession that began in 1973 occurred because of a huge energy shock that proved to be stagflationary in the true sense of the word. Excluding the 2020 recession, this was the third largest rise in the unemployment rate of any recession since WWII, following 2008/2009 and the 1981/1982 recessions. There are some parallels between this recession and the current economic environment, but the stability of inflation expectations so far does not point to a truly stagflationary outcome. As such, we do not see the 1973-74 recession as a reasonable parallel to today’s environment. In addition, manufacturing employment – which was heavily impacted by the permanent rise in oil prices due to the sector’s energy intensity – stood at 24% of total nonfarm employment in 1973, compared with 8% today. Finally, the weight of food and energy as a share of total consumer spending today is roughly half of what it was during the 1970s (Chart II-5). 2001 Of the five recessions potentially implying that the Fed may have to cut interest rates into negative territory during the next US recession, the 2001 recession is the most relevant parallel to today. It was a modern recession in which the Fed maintained very easy monetary policy for a significant amount of time, in response to concerns about a significant tightening in financial conditions and the impact of prior corporate sector excesses on aggregate demand. The total rise in the unemployment rate during this recession was not very large, but it took some time for the unemployment rate to return to NAIRU. Still, even though this justified a later liftoff, a Taylor rule approach makes it clear that the Fed overstimulated the economy in response to the recession – a view that is reinforced by the enormous rise in household debt that fueled the housing market bubble during that period (Chart II-6). The Fed was very concerned about the negative wealth effects of the bursting of the equity market bubble, which had been caused by a massive decline in the equity risk premium in the second half of the 1990s. These conditions are simply not present today. Chart II-5Today's US Economy Is Meaningfully Less Impacted By Energy And Food Prices Today's US Economy Is Meaningfully Less Impacted By Energy And Food Prices Today's US Economy Is Meaningfully Less Impacted By Energy And Food Prices Chart II-6The Fed Clearly Overstimulated In Response To The 2001 Recession The Fed Clearly Overstimulated In Response To The 2001 Recession The Fed Clearly Overstimulated In Response To The 2001 Recession 2008/2009 Chart II-7A Repeat Of The 2008/2009 Recession In The US Is A Totally Implausible Scenario A Repeat Of The 2008/2009 Recession In The US Is A Totally Implausible Scenario A Repeat Of The 2008/2009 Recession In The US Is A Totally Implausible Scenario Chart II-2 highlighted that the Fed would have to cut interest rates to -1% were the 2008/2009 recession to repeat itself, but we judge that to be a totally implausible scenario given the improvement in US household sector balance sheets and financial sector health since the global financial crisis (Chart II-7). As we discuss below, the next US recession is likely to be meaningfully less severe than the 2008/2009 and 2020 recessions, which we believe carries important significance for the path of interest rates and the response of long-maturity bond yields. The bottom line for investors is that, based on the historical experience of rate cuts during recessions, the Fed may end up cutting interest rates back to or close to the zero lower bound in response to the next recession. But the de facto re-establishment of a long-lasting zero interest rate policy and the associated resumption of large-scale asset purchases seems quite unlikely unless the recession is severe, which we do not expect. Will The Next US Recession Be Severe Or Mild? Chart II-8The Most Severe US Recessions Have Had Aggravating Factors That Do Not Appear To Be Present Today September 2022 September 2022 How drastically the Fed will be forced to cut interest rates during the next recession will be driven by its severity. Chart II-8 presents the total rise in the unemployment rate during post-WWII recessions (excluding 2020), in order to gauge whether the factors that have led to severe recessions in the past are likely to be present during the next contraction in output. From our perspective, the most severe US recessions in the post-WWII era have been driven by factors that are very unlikely to repeat themselves in the current environment. We noted above that a repeat of the 2008/2009 recession is a totally implausible scenario, leaving the 1981-1982, 1973-1975, and 1950s recessions as potential severe recession analogues. In three of these four cases we see clear signs of an aggravating factor that we do not (yet) believe will be present during the next US recession. Chart II-9Inflation Expectations Have Not Yet Unanchored To The Upside, In Sharp Contrast To The 1970s Inflation Expectations Have Not Yet Unanchored To The Upside, In Sharp Contrast To The 1970s Inflation Expectations Have Not Yet Unanchored To The Upside, In Sharp Contrast To The 1970s In the 1981-1982 recession, the unemployment rate rose significantly as the Federal Reserve confronted the fact that inflation expectations had become severely unanchored to the upside, causing a persistent wage/price spiral. While unanchored inflation expectations is a risk today, so far the evidence suggests that both households and market participants expect that currently elevated inflation will not persist over the long run (Chart II-9). If inflation expectations do become unanchored to the upside at some point over the coming 12-18 months (or beyond), we are very likely to change our view about the severity of the next recession. However, this would be a bond bearish outcome (at least initially), as it would imply sharply higher yields at both the short and long end of the yield curve in order to tame inflation and re-anchor inflation expectations. As noted above, in the 1973-74 recession, the unexpected and permanent rise in oil prices and outright energy shortages rendered a significant amount of capital and labor uneconomic, which is different than what has been occurring during the pandemic. Were the recent rise in natural gas prices to be permanent and no alternatives available, Europe’s current energy situation would be more reminiscent of the 1973-1974 recession than the pandemic-driven price pressures and supply shortages affecting the US and other developed economies. Chart II-10The US Is Currently Experiencing Fiscal Drag, But That Will Lessen Next Year The US Is Currently Experiencing Fiscal Drag, But That Will Lessen Next Year The US Is Currently Experiencing Fiscal Drag, But That Will Lessen Next Year Finally, while the 1957-58 recession appears to be somewhat of an anomaly driven by a mix of factors, the 1953-54 recession was clearly exacerbated by a sharp slowdown in government spending following the end of the Korean war. It is true that the US is currently experiencing fiscal drag (Chart II-10), but this has occurred against the backdrop of a strong labor market, and IMF forecasts imply that the drag will be significantly smaller over the coming year than what the US is currently experiencing. There are several additional points suggesting that the next US recession will be comparatively mild: Chart II-11The Milder US Recessions Were All Seemingly Triggered By Tight Monetary Policy (As Would Be The Case Today) The Milder US Recessions Were All Seemingly Triggered By Tight Monetary Policy (As Would Be The Case Today) The Milder US Recessions Were All Seemingly Triggered By Tight Monetary Policy (As Would Be The Case Today) Chart II-11 highlights that the milder recessions, those which have seen the unemployment rate rise by less than 3% from their previous low, have generally been the recessions that appear to have simply been triggered by monetary policy becoming tight or nearly tight. This would likely be the case during the next US recession. In the lead up to the 1970, 1990-91, and 2001 recessions, short-term interest rates approached or exceeded either potential growth or the rolling 10-year average growth rate of nominal GDP. The 1960-61 recession stands out slightly as an exception to this rule, in that interest rates were still moderately easy, which is based on our definition of the equilibrium short-term interest rate. But interest rates had risen close to 400 basis points from 1958 to 1960 (suggesting a change in addition to a level effect of interest rates on aggregate demand), and it is notable that the 60-61 recession was the mildest in post-war history, based on the total rise in the unemployment rate. Chart II-12Labor Scarcity May Mean That Firms Will Be Somewhat More Reluctant To Shed Labor During The Next Recession Labor Scarcity May Mean That Firms Will Be Somewhat More Reluctant To Shed Labor During The Next Recession Labor Scarcity May Mean That Firms Will Be Somewhat More Reluctant To Shed Labor During The Next Recession We argued in Section 1 of our report that monetary policy is not currently restrictive on its own, and that the recessionary risk currently facing the US is the result of a combination of the speed of adjustment in interest rates, the fact that real wages have fallen sharply, and the fact that the Fed is determined to see inflation quickly return to target levels. However, what this also highlights is that a recession would likely cause a rise in real wages via a significant slowdown in inflation (at least for a time); this would likely help stabilize aggregate demand and cause a comparatively mild rise in the unemployment rate. While the odds and magnitude of this effect are difficult to quantify, the fact that the labor market has been so tight over the past year and that the participation rate has yet to recover to its pre-pandemic levels suggests that some firms may be reluctant to shed labor during a recession (Chart II-12), suggesting that the total rise in unemployment in the next recession could be relatively small. Finally, Chart II-13 shows that the excess savings that have accumulated over the course of the pandemic, now primarily the result of reduced spending on services, dwarf the magnitude of precautionary savings that were generated in the prior three recessions as a % of GDP. We agree that the savings rate would likely still rise during the next recession, but the existence of excess savings implies that the rise in the savings rate may be surprisingly small – which would, in turn, imply a comparatively mild rise in the unemployment rate. We noted above that the household sector has deleveraged significantly, which is strong evidence against an outsized or long-lasting decline in consumer spending as a possible driver of an above-average rise in the unemployment rate during the next recession. One question that we often receive from clients is whether excessive corporate sector leverage could cause a more severe decline in economic activity once a recession emerges. Chart II-14 illustrates that the answer is “probably not.” The chart presents one estimate of the US nonfinancial corporate sector debt service ratio, based on national accounts data. The chart highlights that the current debt burden for the nonfinancial corporate sector is very low, underscoring that elevated corporate sector debt would not likely act as an aggravating factor driving an outsized rise in the unemployment rate were a recession to occur today. The chart also shows that even if the 10-year Treasury yield were to rise to 4% and corporate bond spreads were to widen in the lead up to a recession, the nonfinancial corporate sector debt service burden would rise to a lower peak than seen in the last three recessions. One key risk to a mild recession view is a scenario in which inflation does not return to or below the Fed’s target during the recession. In that kind of environment, the Fed would not likely cut interest rates to as low a level as they have in the past relative to potential growth. But the historical record is clear that recessions cause a deceleration in inflation, and if a recession emerges over the coming 12-18 months it will likely happen after supply-side and pandemic-related disinflation has already occurred. That means that inflation is likely to move back to or below the Fed’s target in a recessionary environment. We should note that this assessment differs somewhat from the scenario described by my former colleague Martin Barnes, who wrote a guest report on inflation published in our July Bank Credit Analyst.1 Chart II-13Today’s Pandemic-Related Excess Savings Dwarf Precautionary Savings During The Prior Three Recessions September 2022 September 2022 Chart II-14US Corporate Sector Debt Unlikely To Lead To A More Severe Recession, Even In A Higher Yield Environment US Corporate Sector Debt Unlikely To Lead To A More Severe Recession, Even In A Higher Yield Environment US Corporate Sector Debt Unlikely To Lead To A More Severe Recession, Even In A Higher Yield Environment   Long-Maturity Bond Yields And The Next US Recession What does our analysis imply for long-maturity bond yields and the duration call over the coming few years? In order to judge what is likely to happen to long-maturity bond yields in a recession scenario over the coming 12-18 months, we first project the fair value of the 5-year Treasury yield based on the following hypothetical circumstances: The onset of recession in March 2023 and a peak in the Fed funds rate at a target range of 3.75-4%. A recession duration of eight months, over which time the Fed steadily cuts the policy rate to 0-0.25%. An initial Fed rate hike in September 2024, nine months following the end of the recession, consistent with a relatively short return of the unemployment rate to NAIRU as an expansion takes hold. A rate hike pace of eight quarter-point hikes per year, with the Fed again raising rates to a peak of 4% A longer-term average Fed funds rate of 3%, which we regard as a low estimate. Chart II-15The 5-Year Treasury Yield Would Not Fall Enormously In A Mild Recessionary Scenario The 5-Year Treasury Yield Would Not Fall Enormously In A Mild Recessionary Scenario The 5-Year Treasury Yield Would Not Fall Enormously In A Mild Recessionary Scenario Chart II-15 highlights the fair value path for the 5-year Treasury yield in this scenario. Not surprisingly, the fair value today is lower than the current level of the 5-year yield, highlighting that a shift to a long duration stance will be warranted at some point over the coming year if the US economy enters a non-technical, typical income-statement recession. However, the chart also highlights that a long duration position is not likely to be warranted for very long, given that the lowest level of the 5-year fair value path is substantially higher than it was in 2020 and 2021 and is also higher than its 10-year average. Chart II-16 reveals the importance of forecasting the near-term path of interest rates when predicting the likely behavior of long-maturity bond yields. Even though near- and long-term interest rate expectations should be at least somewhat differentiated, the chart highlights that the real 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield is very closely explained by the real 5-year Treasury yield and a 3-year lag of our adaptive inflation expectations model (which is highly consistent with BCA’s Golden Rule of bond investing framework). Chart II-16 shows that long-maturity bond yields should be higher than they are based on the current level of real 5-year yields and lagged inflation expectations, underscoring the point that we made in Section 1 of our report that significant upside risk exists for long-maturity bond yields in a non-recessionary outcome over the coming year. In a recessionary outcome, it is clear that bond yields will fall as the Fed cuts interest rates, as Chart II-15 demonstrated. But, Chart II-17 highlights that during recessions, there is little precedent for a negative 5-10 yield curve slope outside of the context of the persistently high inflation environment of the late 1960s and 1970s. Applying that template to the fair value path that we showed in Chart II-15 suggests that the 10-year Treasury yield will not fall below 2% during the next recession. As we noted in our August report,2 a 10-year Treasury yield decline to 2% would result in significant performance for long-maturity bonds, but it would not end the structural bear market in bonds that began two years ago – a fact that we suspect would be very surprising to bond-bullish investors. Chart II-165-Year Bond Yields Strongly Explain Yields 5-Years/5-Years Forward 5-Year Bond Yields Strongly Explain Yields 5-Years/5-Years Forward 5-Year Bond Yields Strongly Explain Yields 5-Years/5-Years Forward Chart II-17There Is Not Much Precedent For A Negative 5/10 Yield Curve During Modern Recessions, Suggesting 10-Year Yields Will Not Fall Below 2% During The Next Recession There Is Not Much Precedent For A Negative 5/10 Yield Curve During Modern Recessions, Suggesting 10-Year Yields Will Not Fall Below 2% During The Next Recession There Is Not Much Precedent For A Negative 5/10 Yield Curve During Modern Recessions, Suggesting 10-Year Yields Will Not Fall Below 2% During The Next Recession It is true that bond yields may deviate from the fair value levels shown in Chart II-15 if investors expect a different outcome for the path of the Fed funds rate than we described. However, it is worth noting that changes in our assumed post-recession peak Fed funds rate and the long-term average do not substantially change the outcome shown in Chart II-15. If investors instead assume that the Fed funds rate will peak at 3% during the next expansion, that lowers the fair value path for the 5-year yield by approximately 5 basis points. Changing the long-term average Fed funds rate to 2.4%, the Fed’s current neutral rate expectation, would reduce it by about 25 basis points. These levels would still be significantly above the lows reached in 2011-2013 and in 2020, underscoring that the length of the recession and the speed at which the Fed begins to raise interest rates will be far more important determinants of the path of US Treasury yields. We strongly suspect that investors will recognize that a comparatively mild recession will not result in the same hyper-accomodative monetary policy stance that occurred during the past two recessions, implying that long-maturity bond yields will have less downside during the next recession than may be currently recognized. Investment Conclusions As we have presented, the historical experience suggests that the Fed may cut interest rates to zero during the next recession, but that the re-establishment of a long-lasting zero interest rate policy and the associated resumption of large-scale asset purchases seem quite unlikely unless the recession is severe. In the post-WWII environment, severe US recessions have been accompanied by aggravating factors that appear to be missing in the current environment. In addition to this, there are several arguments pointing to the next US recession being a mild one. In a mild recession scenario, we doubt that the 10-year Treasury yield would fall below 2%, or fall below this level for very long. For fixed-income investors, while bond yields will fall for a time if a recession emerges, the implication is that investors should not overstay their welcome in a long-duration position during the recession and should be looking to reduce their duration exposure earlier rather than later. For equity investors, our findings underscore that meaningful downside risk exists for stocks even in a mild recession environment, because the decline in bond yields is not likely to offset a rise in the equity risk premium. We noted in our July report that if a recession occurred within the coming 6-12 months, that the S&P 500 would likely fall to 3100, even if the recession were average. A mild recession may see the S&P 500 decline less severely than this, but stocks are still likely to incur significant losses during the next recession unless investors price in a much shallower path for short-term interest rates than we believe will be warranted. As noted in Section 1 of our report, we have not yet concluded that a US recession is inevitable over the coming 6-12 months. Still, we acknowledge that the risks are quite elevated, and that substantial (further) supply-side and pandemic-related disinflation is likely needed for the US economy to avoid a contraction in output. Additional changes to our recommended cyclical allocation may thus occur over the coming few months, in response to incoming data, our assessment of the likely implications for monetary policy, and the response of long-maturity government bond yields. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst   Footnotes 1  Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "Inflation Whipsaw Ahead," dated June 30, 2022, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2  Please see The Bank Credit Analyst "August 2022," dated July 28, 2022, available at bca.bcaresearch.com

Executive Summary US Companies Will Attempt To Raise Selling Prices To Protect Their Profit Margins US Companies Will Attempt To Raise Selling Prices To Protect Their Profit Margins US Companies Will Attempt To Raise Selling Prices To Protect Their Profit Margins China needs lower interest rates and a weaker currency to battle deflationary pressures. In the US, the main problem is elevated inflation. This heralds higher interest rates and a stronger currency. Hence, the Chinese yuan will depreciate against the greenback. When the RMB weakens versus the US dollar, commodity prices usually fall, and EM currencies and asset prices struggle. Faced with surging unit labor costs, US companies will continue to raise their prices to protect their profit margins and profitability. This will lead to one of the following two possible scenarios in the months ahead. Scenario 1: If customers are willing to pay considerably higher prices, nominal sales will remain robust, profits will not collapse, and a recession is unlikely. However, this also implies that the Fed will have to tighten policy by more than what is currently priced in by markets. Scenario 2: If customers push back against higher prices and curtail their purchases, then the economy will enter a recession. In this scenario, inflation will plummet, corporate margins will shrink, and their profits will plunge.  In both scenarios, the outlook for stocks is poor. However, one key difference is that scenario 1 is bearish for US Treasurys while scenario 2 is bond bullish. Bottom Line: On the one hand, the US has a genuine inflation problem. The upshot is that the Fed cannot pivot too early. The Fed’s hawkish rhetoric will support the US dollar. A strong greenback is bad for EM financial markets. On the other hand, the Chinese economy and global trade are experiencing deflation/recession dynamics. Cyclical assets underperform and the US dollar generally appreciates in this environment. This is also a toxic backdrop for EM financial markets.   Financial markets have been caught in contradictions. The reason is that investors cannot decide if the global economy is heading into a recession with deflationary forces prevailing, or whether a goldilocks economy or a period of inflation or stagflation will emerge in the foreseeable future. There are also plenty of contradictory data to support all the above scenarios.  As such, financial markets are volatile, swinging wildly as market participants absorb new economic data points. The S&P 500 index has rebounded from its 3-year moving average, which had previously served as a major support (Chart 1). Yet, the rebound has faltered at its 200-day moving average. Its failure to break decisively above this 200-day moving average entails that a new cyclical rally is not yet in the cards. Chart 1The S&P 500 Is Stuck Between Technical Resistance And Support Lines The S&P 500 Is Stuck Between Technical Resistance And Support Lines The S&P 500 Is Stuck Between Technical Resistance And Support Lines The S&P 500 index will remain between these resistance and support lines until investors make up their minds about the economic outlook. The EM equity index has been unable to rebound strongly alongside US stocks. A major technical support that held up in the 1998, 2001, 2002, 2008, 2015 and 2020 bear markets is about 15% below the current level (Chart 2). Hence, we recommend that investors remain on the sidelines of EM stocks. Chart 2EM Share Prices Are Still 15% Above Their Long-Term Technical Support Level EM Share Prices Are Still 15% Above Their Long-Term Technical Support Level EM Share Prices Are Still 15% Above Their Long-Term Technical Support Level BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy team’s macro themes and views remain as follows: Related Report  Emerging Markets StrategyCharts That Matter In China, the main economic risk is deflation and the continuation of underwhelming economic growth. Core and service consumer price inflation are both below 1% and property prices are deflating. Falling prices amid high debt levels is a recipe for debt deflation. We discussed the government’s stimulus – including measures enacted for the property market – in the August 11 report. The latest announcement about the RMB 1 trillion stimulus does not change our analysis. In fact, we expected an additional RMB 1.5 trillion in local government bond issuance for the remainder of the current year. Yet, the government authorized only an additional RMB 0.5 trillion. This is substantially below what had been expected by analysts and commentators in recent months.   In Chinese and China-related financial markets, a recession/deflation framework remains appropriate. Onshore interest rates will drop further, the yuan will depreciate more, and Chinese stocks and China related plays will continue experiencing growth/profit headwinds. Meanwhile, the US economy has been experiencing stagflation this year. Chart 3 shows that even though the nominal value of final sales has expanded by 8-10%, sales and output have stagnated in real terms (close to zero growth). Hence, nominal sales and corporate profits have so far held up because companies have been able to raise prices by 8-9.5% (Chart 4). Is this bullish for the stock market? Not really. Chart 3US Stagflation: Strong Nominal Growth, But Small In Real Terms US Stagflation: Strong Nominal Growth, But Small In Real Terms US Stagflation: Strong Nominal Growth, But Small In Real Terms Chart 4US Corporate Profits Have Held Up Because Of Pricing Power/Inflation US Corporate Profits Have Held Up Because Of Pricing Power/Inflation US Corporate Profits Have Held Up Because Of Pricing Power/Inflation The fact that companies have been able to raise their selling prices at this rapid pace implies that the Fed cannot stop hiking rates. Besides, US wages and unit labor costs are surging (Chart 9 below). The implication is that inflation will be entrenched and core inflation will not drop quickly and significantly enough to allow the Fed to pivot anytime soon. Overall, US economic data releases have been consistent with our view that although real growth is slowing, the US economy is experiencing elevated inflations, i.e., a stagflationary environment. Critically, wages and inflation lag the business cycle and are also very slow moving variables. Hence, US core inflation will not drop below 4% quickly enough to provide relief for the Fed and markets. Is a US recession imminent? It depends. One thing we are certain of is that faced with surging unit labor costs, US companies will attempt to raise their prices to protect their profit margins and profitability. Our proxy for US corporate profit margins signals that they are already rolling over (Chart 5). Hence, business owners and CEOs will attempt to raise selling prices further. Chart 5US Companies Will Attempt To Raise Selling Prices To Protect Their Profit Margins US Companies Will Attempt To Raise Selling Prices To Protect Their Profit Margins US Companies Will Attempt To Raise Selling Prices To Protect Their Profit Margins This will lead to one of two possible scenarios for the US economy in the months ahead. Scenario 1: If customers (households and businesses) are willing to pay considerably higher prices, nominal sales will remain very robust, and profits will not collapse, reducing the likelihood of a recession. Yet, this means that inflation will become even more entrenched, and employees will continue to demand higher wages. A wage-price spiral will persist. The Fed will have to raise rates much more than what is currently priced in financial markets. This is negative for US share prices. Scenario 2: If customers push back against higher prices and curtail their purchases, output volume will relapse, i.e., the economy will enter a recession. In this scenario, inflation will plummet, corporate margins will shrink (prices received will rise much less than unit labor costs) and profits will plunge.  Suffering a profit squeeze, companies will lay off employees, wage growth will decelerate, and high inflation will be extinguished. In this scenario, bond yields will drop significantly but plunging corporate profits will weigh on share prices. We are not certain which of these two scenarios will prevail: it is hard to determine the point at which US consumers will push back against rising prices. Nevertheless, it is notable that in both scenarios, the outlook for stocks is poor.   Finally, as we have repeatedly written, global trade is about to contract. Charts 10-18 below elaborate on this theme. This is disinflationary/recessionary. Investment Conclusions On the one hand, the Chinese economy and global trade are experiencing deflation/recession dynamics. Cyclical assets struggle and the US dollar does well in this environment. This constitutes a toxic backdrop for EM financial markets. On the other hand, the US has a genuine inflation problem. The upshot is that the Fed cannot pivot too early. The Fed’s hawkish rhetoric will support the US dollar. A strong greenback is also bad for EM financial markets. Thus, we do not see any reason to alter our negative view on EM equities, credit and currencies. Investors should continue underweighting EM in global equity and credit portfolios. Local currency bonds offer value, but further currency depreciation and more rate hikes remain a risk to domestic bonds. We continue to short the following currencies versus the USD: ZAR, COP, PEN, PLN and IDR. In addition, we recommend shorting HUF vs. CZK, KRW vs. JPY, and BRL vs. MXN.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Messages From Various US High-Beta / Cyclical Stock Prices US high-beta consumer discretionary, industrials, tech and early cyclical stocks have not yet broken out. The rebounds in high-beta tech and industrials have been rather muted. We are watching these and many other market signs and technical indicators to gauge if the recent rebounds can turn into a cyclical bull market. Chart 6 Messages From Various US High-Beta / Cyclical Stock Prices Messages From Various US High-Beta / Cyclical Stock Prices Chart 7 Messages From Various US High-Beta / Cyclical Stock Prices Messages From Various US High-Beta / Cyclical Stock Prices Falling Global Trade + Sticky US Inflation = US Dollar Overshot On the one hand, US household spending on goods ex-autos is already contracting and will drop further. The same is true for EU demand. The reasons are excessive consumption of goods over the past two years and shrinking household real disposable income. As a result, global trade is set to shrink, which is positive for the US dollar. On the other hand, surging US unit labor costs entail that core CPI will be very sticky at levels well above the Fed’s target. Hence, the Fed will likely maintain its hawkish bias for now, which is also bullish for the greenback. In short, the US dollar will continue overshooting.  Chart 8 Falling Global Trade + Sticky US Inflation = US Dollar Overshot Falling Global Trade + Sticky US Inflation = US Dollar Overshot Chart 9 Falling Global Trade + Sticky US Inflation = US Dollar Overshot Falling Global Trade + Sticky US Inflation = US Dollar Overshot Chinese Exports Will Contract, And Imports Will Fail To Recover Chinese export volume growth has come to a halt. Shrinking imports of inputs used for re-export (imports for processing trade) are pointing to an imminent contraction in the mainland’s exports. Further, Chinese import volumes have been contracting for the past 12 months. The value of imports has not plunged only because of high commodity prices. As commodity prices drop, import values will converge to the downside with import volumes. This is negative for economies/industries selling to China. Chart 10 Chinese Exports Will Contract, And Imports Will Fail to Recover Chinese Exports Will Contract, And Imports Will Fail to Recover Chart 11 Chinese Exports Will Contract, And Imports Will Fail to Recover Chinese Exports Will Contract, And Imports Will Fail to Recover Global Manufacturing / Trade Downtrend Is Intact China buys a lot of inputs from Taiwan that are used in its exports. That is why the mainland’s imports from Taiwan lead the global trade cycle. This is presently heralding a considerable deterioration in global trade.  In addition, falling freight rates and depreciating Emerging Asian (ex-China) currencies are all currently pointing to a further underperformance of global cyclicals versus defensive sectors. Chart 12 Global Manufacturing / Trade Downtrend Is Intact Global Manufacturing / Trade Downtrend Is Intact Chart 13 Global Manufacturing / Trade Downtrend Is Intact Global Manufacturing / Trade Downtrend Is Intact Chart 14 Global Manufacturing / Trade Downtrend Is Intact Global Manufacturing / Trade Downtrend Is Intact Taiwan Is A Canary In A Coal Mine Taiwanese manufacturing companies have seen their export orders plunge and their customer inventories surge. This has occurred in its overall manufacturing and semiconductor companies.  This corroborates our thesis that global export volumes will contract in the coming months. Chart 15 Taiwan Is A Canary In A Coal Mine Taiwan Is A Canary In A Coal Mine Chart 16 Taiwan Is A Canary In A Coal Mine Taiwan Is A Canary In A Coal Mine Korean Exporters Are Struggling Korean export companies are experience the same dynamics as their Taiwanese peers. Semiconductor prices and sales are falling hard in Korea. Export volume growth has come to a halt and will soon shrink. Chart 17 Korean Exporters Are Struggling Korean Exporters Are Struggling Chart 18 Korean Exporters Are Struggling Korean Exporters Are Struggling EM Equities: Cheap And Unloved? The EM cyclically adjusted P/E (CAPE) ratio has fallen to one standard deviation below its mean. Based on this measure, EM stocks are currently as cheap as they were at their bottoms in 2020, 2015 and 2008. EM share prices in USD deflated by US CPI are now at two standard deviations below their long-term time-trend. This is as bad as it got when EM stocks bottomed in the previous bear markets. The reason for EM stocks poor performance and such “cheapness” is corporate profits. EM EPS in USD has been flat, i.e., posting zero growth in the past 15 years. Besides, EM narrow money (M1) growth points to further EM EPS contraction in the months ahead. Chart 19 EM Equities: Cheap And Unloved? EM Equities: Cheap And Unloved? Chart 20 EM Equities: Cheap And Unloved? EM Equities: Cheap And Unloved? Chart 21 EM Equities: Cheap And Unloved? EM Equities: Cheap And Unloved? Chart 22 EM Equities: Cheap And Unloved? EM Equities: Cheap And Unloved? Commodity Prices Remain At Risk China needs lower interest rates and a weaker currency to battle deflationary pressures. In the US, the problem is inflation, which heralds higher interest rates and a stronger currency to fight rising prices. Hence, the yuan will depreciate versus the greenback. When the RMB depreciates versus the US dollar, commodity prices usually fall. Further, commodity currencies (an average of AUD, NZD and CAD) continue drafting lower. This indicator correlates with commodity prices and also presages further relapse in resource prices. Chart 23 Commodity Prices Remain At Risk Commodity Prices Remain At Risk Chart 24 Commodity Prices Remain At Risk Commodity Prices Remain At Risk Oil Prices: A Major Top In Place, But Geopolitics Will Drive Near-Term Fluctuations Chinese crude oil imports have been contracting for almost a year. Global (including US) demand for gasoline has relapsed. Meantime, Russia’s oil and oil product exports have fallen only by a mere 5% from their January level. This explains why oil prices have recently fallen. Oil lags business cycles: its consumption will shrink as global growth downshifts. However, geopolitics remain a wild card. Hence, we are uncertain about the near-term outlook for oil prices. That said, oil has made a major top and any rebound will fail to last much longer or push prices above recent highs. Chart 25 Oil Prices: A Major Top In Place, But Geopolitics Will Drive Near-Term Fluctuations Oil Prices: A Major Top In Place, But Geopolitics Will Drive Near-Term Fluctuations Chart 26 Oil Prices: A Major Top In Place, But Geopolitics Will Drive Near-Term Fluctuations Oil Prices: A Major Top In Place, But Geopolitics Will Drive Near-Term Fluctuations Chart 27 Oil Prices: A Major Top In Place, But Geopolitics Will Drive Near-Term Fluctuations Oil Prices: A Major Top In Place, But Geopolitics Will Drive Near-Term Fluctuations Chart 28 Oil Prices: A Major Top In Place, But Geopolitics Will Drive Near-Term Fluctuations Oil Prices: A Major Top In Place, But Geopolitics Will Drive Near-Term Fluctuations What Is Next For The Chinese RMB? The Chinese yuan will continue depreciating versus the US dollar. China needs lower interest rates and a weaker currency to battle deflationary pressures. While currency is moderately cheap, exchange rates tend to overshoot/undershoot and can remain cheap/expensive for a while. The CNY/USD has technically broken down. Interestingly, the periods of RMB depreciation coincide with deteriorating global US dollar liquidity and, in turn, poor performance by EM assets and commodities. Chart 29 What Is Next For The Chinese RMB? What Is Next For The Chinese RMB? Chart 30 What Is Next For The Chinese RMB? What Is Next For The Chinese RMB? Chart 31 What Is Next For The Chinese RMB? What Is Next For The Chinese RMB? Stay Put On Chinese Equities Odds are rising that Chinese platform companies will likely be delisted from the US as we have argued for some time. Hence, international investors will continue dampening US-listed Chinese stocks. The outlook for China’s economic recovery and profits is downbeat. This will weigh on non-TMT stocks and A shares. Within the Chinese equity universe, we continue to recommend the long A-shares / short Investable stocks strategy, a position we initiated on March 4, 2021. Chart 32 Stay Put On Chinese Equities Stay Put On Chinese Equities Chart 33 Stay Put On Chinese Equities Stay Put On Chinese Equities Chart 34 Stay Put On Chinese Equities Stay Put On Chinese Equities Chart 35 Stay Put On Chinese Equities Stay Put On Chinese Equities Messages For Stocks From Corporate Bonds Historically, rising US and EM corporate bond yields led to a selloff in US and EM share prices, respectively. Corporate bond yields are the cost of capital that matters for equities. Unless US and EM corporate bond yields start falling on a sustainable basis, their share prices will struggle. Corporate bond yields could increase because of either rising US Treasury yields or widening credit spreads. Chart 36 Messages For Stocks From Corporate Bonds Messages For Stocks From Corporate Bonds Chart 37 Messages For Stocks From Corporate Bonds Messages For Stocks From Corporate Bonds EM Currencies And Fixed-Income: An Unfinished Adjustment The profiles of EM FX and credit spreads suggest that their adjustment might not be complete. We expect further EM currency depreciation and renewed EM credit spread widening. EM domestic bond yields have risen significantly and offer value. However, if and as US TIPS yields rise and/or EM currencies continue to depreciate, local bond yields are unlikely to fall. To recommend buying EM local bonds aggressively, we need to change our view on the US dollar. Chart 38 EM Currencies And Fixed-Income: An Unfinished Adjustment EM Currencies And Fixed-Income: An Unfinished Adjustment Chart 39 EM Currencies And Fixed-Income: An Unfinished Adjustment EM Currencies And Fixed-Income: An Unfinished Adjustment Chart 40 EM Currencies And Fixed-Income: An Unfinished Adjustment EM Currencies And Fixed-Income: An Unfinished Adjustment Chart 41 EM Currencies And Fixed-Income: An Unfinished Adjustment EM Currencies And Fixed-Income: An Unfinished Adjustment   Footnotes Strategic Themes (18 Months And Beyond) Equities Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

Executive Summary Unit Labor Costs, Not Oil Prices, Are The Key To US Core Inflation Unit Labor Costs, Not Oil Prices, Are The Key To US Core Inflation Unit Labor Costs, Not Oil Prices, Are The Key To US Core Inflation Inflation is not about oil, food or used car prices. Looking at prices of individual components of a consumer basket is akin to missing the forest for the trees. Despite the latest drop in US headline inflation, various core CPI measures continue trending up and registered considerable month-on-month rises in July. Wages and, more specifically, unit labor costs are the true measure of genuine and persistent inflation. US wage growth is very elevated, and the pace of unit labor cost gains has surged to a 40-year high. The conditions for sustainable and persistent disinflation in the US are not yet present. US inflation will prove to be much stickier and more entrenched than many market participants presently believe. The recovery in China will be U- rather than V-shaped, with risks tilted to the downside. The mainland’s property market breakdown is structural, not cyclical. Excesses are very large, and problems are snowballing, rendering the enacted policy stimulus insufficient. Bottom Line: US core inflation lingering above 4% and easing financial conditions will compel the Fed to continue hiking rates. This will cap global risk asset prices and put a floor under the US dollar.  We continue to recommend an underweight allocation to EM in global equity and credit portfolios. Consistently, we are also reluctant to chase EM currencies higher. Feature The bullish macro narrative circulating in the investment community is that conditions for a cyclical rally in global risk assets have fallen into place. Specifically: US inflation will drop sharply as US growth has crested and commodity prices have plunged; The Fed is nearing the end of a tightening cycle; China has stimulated sufficiently, and its economy is about to recover, which will boost economic conditions among its trading partners in general and EM in particular. These assumptions along with the fact that the S&P 500 index has found support at a 3-year moving average – a proven line of defense – suggest that US share prices have likely bottomed (Chart 1). Are we witnessing déjà vu of the 2011, 2016, 2018 and 2020 market bottoms? Chart 1Déjà Vu? Is 2022 Like The 2011, 2016 And 2018 Bottoms In The S&P 500? Déjà Vu? Is 2022 Like The 2011, 2016 And 2018 Bottoms In The S&P 500? Déjà Vu? Is 2022 Like The 2011, 2016 And 2018 Bottoms In The S&P 500? We have reservations about all of the above fundamental conjectures. We elaborate on these reservations in this report. On the whole, we contend that the current environment is different, and the roadmaps of all post-2009 equity market bottoms are not necessarily currently applicable. BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy team believes that (1) US consumer price inflation is much more entrenched and will prove stickier than is commonly believed; and (2) the Chinese property market’s breakdown is structural, not cyclical; hence, the recovery will not gain traction easily.  Is This The End Of The US Inflation Problem? Not Quite This week’s US inflation data confirmed that headline CPI inflation has probably peaked: prices in several categories plunged. However, inflation is not about oil, food or used car prices. Chart 2 reveals that historically there have been several episodes whereby core inflation remains elevated despite plunging oil prices. Chart 2US Core Inflation Does Not Always Follow Oil Prices US Core Inflation Does Not Always Follow Oil Prices US Core Inflation Does Not Always Follow Oil Prices Looking at price dynamics among the individual components of the CPI basket is akin to missing the forest for the trees. Inflation is a very inert and persistent phenomenon. Underlying inflation does not change its direction often and/or quickly. That is why we believe that it is premature to celebrate the end of the US inflation problem. A few observations on this matter: Despite the drop in US headline inflation, various core CPI measures − like trimmed-mean CPI, median CPI and core sticky CPI − all continue trending up and registered substantial month-on-month rises in July (Chart 3). The range of core inflation based on these annual and month-month annualized rates is between 4-7%. In brief, the rate of genuine/sticky inflation is well above the Fed’s 2% target. Given its unconditional commitment to bringing inflation down to 2%, the Fed will continue hiking interest rates ceteris paribus. Chart 3US Core CPI Measures Are Still Very High US Core CPI Measures Are Still Very High US Core CPI Measures Are Still Very High Chart 4US Wages Growth Has Been Surging US Wages Growth Has Been Surging US Wages Growth Has Been Surging   We continue to emphasize that wages and, more specifically, unit labor costs are the true measures of persistent and genuine inflation. We have written at length about why wages and unit labor costs are more important to inflation than oil or food prices. US wage growth is very elevated and is accelerating (Chart 4). Unit labor costs, calculated as hourly wages divided by productivity, have also been surging to a 40-year high (Chart 5, top panel). Chart 5Unit Labor Costs, Not Oil Prices, Are The Key To US Core Inflation Unit Labor Costs, Not Oil Prices, Are The Key To US Core Inflation Unit Labor Costs, Not Oil Prices, Are The Key To US Core Inflation The reason for this very strong wage growth and swelling unit labor costs is the very tight labor market. The bottom panel of Chart 5 demonstrates that labor demand is still outpacing labor supply by a wide margin. Hence, wage inflation will not subside until the unemployment rate rises meaningfully. Bottom Line: Conditions for sustainable and persistent disinflation in the US are not yet present.  Inflation will prove to be much stickier and more entrenched than many market participants presently believe. Core inflation lingering above 4% and easing financial conditions will compel the Fed to continue hiking rates. This will cap risk asset prices and put a floor under the US dollar.   China: Is This Time Different? If one believes that China’s current business cycle is similar to all previous ones seen since 2009, odds are that a buying opportunity in China-related financial markets is at hand. Chart 6 illustrates that the credit and fiscal spending impulse leads the business cycle by about nine months. Given that this impulse bottomed late last year, a trough in the Chinese business cycle is due. Chart 6Is A Recovery In China's Business Cycle Imminent? Is A Recovery In China's Business Cycle Imminent? Is A Recovery In China's Business Cycle Imminent? It is always risky to suggest that this time is different. Nevertheless, at the risk of being wrong, we contend that a combination of (1) property markets woes, (2) an impending export contraction, and (3) the dynamic zero-COVID policy will reduce the multiplier effect of current stimulus measures. Hence, a meaningful recovery in economic activity will likely fail to materialize in the coming months. The challenges facing the mainland property market are now well known. Yet, excesses are very large, and problems are snowballing, making policy stimulus insufficient. In particular: Authorities are contemplating bailout funds for property developers in the range of RMB 300-400 billion to enable them to complete housing that has been pre-sold. This is not sufficient financing for overall property construction. Table 1How Large Are Property Developers Bailout Funds? Déjà Vu? Déjà Vu? Table 1 illustrates that these amounts are equal to just 3-4% of annual fixed-asset investment in real estate excluding land purchases, 1.5-2% of total financing of developers, and 3-4% of the advance payments that property developers received for pre-sold housing in 2021. Property developers will not be receiving any cash upon the completion and delivery of presold housing units because they were paid in advance. Hence, without liquidating their other assets, homebuilders cannot repay the bailout financing. Consequently, only state financing can work here because, from the viewpoint of providers of this financing, this scheme de-facto means throwing good money after bad. The property industry in China is extremely fragmented. This makes bailouts difficult to organize and execute. There are officially about 100,000 property developers in China. The overwhelming majority of them are not state-owned companies. Plus, the two largest property developers, Evergrande (before defaulting) and Country Garden, had only 3.8% and 3.3% of market share respectively in 2020. The failure of homebuilders to complete and deliver pre-sold housing units could unleash a death spiral for them. In recent years, 90% of housing units have been pre-sold, i.e., buyers made advance payments/prepayments, often taking out mortgages (Chart 7, top panel). Witnessing the inability of developers to deliver on presold units, a rising number of people may decide to wait to buy. The largest source of developers’ financing – advance payments for pre-sold housing units – might very well dry up. This source has accounted for 50% of real estate developers’ total financing in recent years (Chart 7, bottom panel). In brief, a vicious cycle is possible. The lack of financing for homebuilders bodes ill for construction activity (Chart 8). Chart 7China: Housing Presales And Pre-Payments Are Critical To Developers China: Housing Presales And Pre-Payments Are Critical To Developers China: Housing Presales And Pre-Payments Are Critical To Developers Chart 8Lack Of Homebuilder Financing = Shrinking Construction Activity Lack Of Homebuilder Financing = Shrinking Construction Activity Lack Of Homebuilder Financing = Shrinking Construction Activity Chart 9Chinese Property Developers Are Extremely Leveraged Chinese Property Developers Are Extremely Leveraged Chinese Property Developers Are Extremely Leveraged Besides, property developers are very leveraged with an assets-to-equity ratio close to nine (Chart 9). They have grown accustomed to borrowing heavily to accumulate real estate assets. They have been starting but not completing construction (Chart 10, top panel). We have been referring to this phenomenon as the biggest carry trade in the world. The bottom panel of Chart 10 shows two different measures of residential floor space inventories held by property developers. One measure subtracts completed floor space from started floor space, and another one deducts sold floor space from started floor space. On both measures, residential inventories are enormous. In theory, they could raise funds by selling their real estate assets. However, if they all try to sell simultaneously, there will not be enough buyers, and asset prices will plunge, which could lead to a full-blown debt deflation spiral. The last time the real estate market was similarly distressed in 2014-15, the central bank launched the Pledged Supplementary Lending (PSL) facility. This was effectively a QE program to monetize housing. This was the reason why housing recovered strongly in 2016-2017. There is currently no such program up for discussion. On the whole, odds are that the current property market breakdown is structural, not cyclical. Financial markets – the prices of stocks and USD bonds of property developers – convey a similar message and continue to plunge (Chart 11). Chart 10Excessive Property Inventories Excessive Property Inventories Excessive Property Inventories Chart 11No Green Light From Property Stocks And Corporate Bond Prices No Green Light From Property Stocks And Corporate Bond Prices No Green Light From Property Stocks And Corporate Bond Prices Chart 12There Has Been No Recovery In China Without A Revival in Real Estate There Has Been No Recovery In China Without A Revival in Real Estate There Has Been No Recovery In China Without A Revival in Real Estate Without an improvement in the housing market, a meaningful business cycle recovery is unlikely in China. Chart 12 illustrates that all recoveries in the Chinese broader economy since 2009 occurred alongside a revival in property sales. The importance of the property market goes beyond its size. Rising property prices lift household and business confidence, boosting aggregate spending and investment. The sluggish housing market and falling house prices will impair consumer and business confidence. This, along with uncertainty related to the dynamic zero-COVID policy, will dent consumer spending and private investments. Finally, the upcoming contraction in Chinese exports will dampen national income growth. Taken together, the multiplier effect of stimulus in the upcoming months will be lower than it has been in previous periods of stimulus. There are two areas that will see meaningful improvement in the coming months: infrastructure spending and autos. BCA’s China Investment Strategy service discussed the outlook for auto sales in a recent report. Chart 13Green Shoots In China's Infrastructure Investment Green Shoots In China's Infrastructure Investment Green Shoots In China's Infrastructure Investment On the infrastructure front, there has been mixed evidence of an improvement in activity. The top and middle panels of Chart 13 demonstrate that Komatsu machinery’s operational hours and the number of approved infrastructure projects might be bottoming. However, the installation of high-power electricity lines has fallen to a 15-year low (Chart 13, bottom panel).   As we elaborated in last month’s report, the new financing/stimulus for infrastructure development will not result in new investments. Rather, it will by and large offset the drop in local government (LG) revenues from land sales this year. In short, there is little new stimulus for infrastructure beyond what was approved in the budget plan earlier this year. Bottom Line: The recovery in China will be U- rather than V-shaped, with risks tilted to the downside. Investment Recommendations Our bias is that the rebound in global risk assets could last for a few more weeks. The basis is that investor positioning in risk assets was very light when this rebound began. Plus, falling oil prices could reinforce the idea among investors that US inflation is no longer a problem. Looking beyond the next several weeks, the outlook for global and EM risk assets is dismal. Markets will realize that the Fed cannot halt its tightening with core inflation well above 4-5%. Hawkish Fed policy and contracting global trade will boost the US dollar and weigh on cyclical assets. We continue to recommend an underweight allocation to EM in global equity and credit portfolios. Consistently, we are also reluctant to chase EM currencies higher. EM local bonds offer value, as we have argued over the past couple of months, but for now we prefer to focus on yield curve flattening trades. We continue betting on yield curve flattening/inversion in Mexico and Colombia and are long Brazilian 10-year domestic bonds while hedging the currency risk. In addition, we recommend investors continue receiving 10-year swap rates in China and Malaysia.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Strategic Themes (18 Months And Beyond) Equities Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

Executive Summary Dollar Still The Largest Global Reserve Currency Dollar Still Dominating Global Reserves Dollar Still Dominating Global Reserves The rise of cryptocurrencies like stablecoins theoretically pose risks to fiat currencies and their general use. In the US, the Federal Reserve will look to adopt a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) – a digital dollar – this decade, to stave off these risks and usher in a new era of central bank money. A digital dollar would likely be integrated as seamlessly as possible into the current monetary regime, thereby maintaining an intermediated role played by existing financial sector actors as well as operating alongside existing circulating currency. The US dollar will eventually face rising competition from digital currencies, both at home and abroad. While other central banks make headway into developing their own CBDCs, China is by far the most advanced. China’s digital yuan will not resolve all of China’s problems with internationalizing its currency but it will create new opportunities. Public and political pushback will occur and will slow adoption of a digital dollar. Gridlock in 2023 may prove to be another headwind. To adopt a digital dollar, politicians will need to work along bipartisan lines to ensure the US remains at the forefront of digital and monetary innovation, especially as foreign competition on CBDCs rises. Recommendation (Tactical) Initiation Date  Return Long DXY (Dollar Index) 23-FEB-22 10.7% Bottom Line: Policymakers will adopt a CBDC – a digital dollar – this decade. Political pushback may slow adoption, but foreign competition will overcome domestic constraints. Feature Technological innovation over the past decade has given rise to a new asset class – digital assets. Investors are most familiar with cryptocurrencies, and to a lesser extent, non-fungible tokens and decentralized finance-based lending, among others. These assets have witnessed a boom and bust over the past few years (Chart 1). Chart 1Manias: Then And Now Manias: Then And Now Manias: Then And Now Cryptocurrencies have been touted to have money-like characteristics, the most popular being Bitcoin, and others like stablecoins. Stablecoins are mostly used as a medium of exchange between fiat money and cryptocurrencies and vice versa. They are pegged to fiat money and often backed by highly liquid traditional assets1 to maintain their pegs. But cryptocurrencies do not exhibit the traits of durable money today. However, the technological innovation of digital currency represents a natural evolution of money that is irreversible and could someday possess the main characteristics of money: a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and store of value. Cryptocurrencies with money-like qualities theoretically pose a challenge to fiat currencies, i.e. those issued by governments that are not backed by any underlying real asset but rather by trust in government institutions, including the treasury and central bank. Not that trust is a poor basis for a currency. But that trust could fail and new trust could be placed in cryptocurrencies. Governments could eventually lose control of the money supply and payments system, suffer from financial instability, fail to provide regulatory oversight, or fail to prevent the illicit use of digital assets for criminal gain. The same technology driving growth in digital assets has led central banks the world around to research and in some cases develop CBDCs. For an introductory guide to CBDCs, see BCA’s “The Investor’s Guide To Central Bank Digital Currencies.” CBDC research and development are at varying stages across the world’s central banks.2 In the US, the Federal Reserve (Fed) continues to research a CBDC (digital dollar) and its use-case, or justification for being. The Fed has made no commitment to designing a digital dollar anytime soon. But we bet that the Fed’s position will change in coming years. Introducing a digital dollar will reduce the various risks associated with cryptocurrencies whilst also creating efficiencies in the US economy. These efficiencies will also transverse into cross-border efficiencies. Globally, central banks are showing increasing activity in developing CBDCs and introducing a digital dollar would help the Fed maintain monetary dominance across the world while staving off cryptocurrencies, especially stablecoins. The Fed won’t sit idle as a global monetary revolution unfolds. But the policy front is fraught with challenges. Policy makers in the US have expressed mixed views on adopting a digital dollar. Some suggest the Fed would exercise even more control over monetary policy than it does today. Others note risks to consumer data privacy, which could be exploited by government. Public opinion is also mixed with no clear understanding of or need for a digital dollar. Commercial bank business interests may come under attack too, with a digital dollar scalping profit margins from banks, depending on the type and extent of the CBDC operating model employed. Ultimately, the US will want to maintain its position as the global monetary leader. Continued dollar dominance in the global economy is strategically advantageous for the US, especially in a hypo-globalizing world (Chart 2). Ensuring ongoing monetary dominance while rooting out domestic competition from stablecoins will be aided by adopting a digital dollar. Chart 2Dollar Still Dominating Global Reserves Dollar Still Dominating Global Reserves Dollar Still Dominating Global Reserves Bottom Line: The Fed will most likely adopt a digital dollar within the decade. The Fed And A Digital Dollar The Fed has been actively researching a digital dollar for several years with growing research on design, implementation, and necessity. As it stands, the Fed has not committed to introducing a digital dollar in the foreseeable future. But what would a digital dollar look like and what role would it play in the economy if the Fed decided to introduce one? CBDC Model Briefly, the Fed could choose from three different CBDC operating models: unilateral, synthetic, or intermediated (Diagram 1). A unilateral model would mean the Fed performs all CBDC related functions including direct interaction with end-users. A synthetic model would mean non-Fed actors issuing money backed by Fed assets. Diagram 1Three CBDC Operating Models Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Realistically, a unilateral and synthetic digital dollar are unlikely. The former would crowd out traditional banking services, while the latter would let actors other than the Fed issue money, violating the Federal Reserve Act. Hence the Fed will most likely pursue an intermediated CBDC model. This model entails digital dollar issuance by the Fed but includes a role for private sector firms to interact with end-users. The intermediary role would be filled by financial firms but also other types of companies such as payment service providers and mobile phone operators. This means the Fed would not totally crowd out existing players across the payment and financial services space. An intermediated model would require the central bank to regulate and oversee other actors, which adds an extra layer of legal and operational complexity to implementation. But it is the model most consistent with the US’s combination of federal government and liberal capitalism, and the model cited by the Fed to most likely be adopted.3 The intermediated model will align with the current two-tier system currently in place (Diagram 2). Digital dollars will feature in both wholesale and retail transactions. Wholesale involves commercial banks and regulated financial intermediaries, while retail involves individuals and non-financial businesses. The model would also operate alongside existing paper money. A digital dollar would be a liability on the Fed, denominated in dollars, and would form an integral part of base money supply (M0). It would be distributed like, and act as a complement to, dollar bills and could be used in transactions conducted in currency and reserves. It would be legal tender just like the paper dollar. Diagram 2Two-Tier Monetary Regime System Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Digital Dollar Needs The Fed has stated that a digital dollar should, among other things, meet certain criteria before adoption (Table 1). Some of these criteria are already met. Others will be met with adoption. A digital dollar will benefit households, businesses, and the economy at large. For example, a digital dollar would enhance payment transparency, thereby supporting the Fed’s objective to promote safe and efficient payments. And depending on design choices, digital transactions could offer degrees of traceability and aggregate payment data could be analyzed in real time to provide insights into economic health and activity. Table 1Fed Criteria For CBDC Adoption Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Further, a digital dollar would promote diversification of the payments system, thereby increasing the safety and efficiency of US payment infrastructure. It may also attract new actors offering services related to the digital dollar, spurring financial innovation and fostering financial integration. The payments system is already broadly efficient but adding another layer of digitization with a digital dollar would mean that the US economy would be better positioned for the evolution of the digital economy over the next decade and beyond. The need for broad stakeholder support will be a difficult criterion to meet, however. There would need to be more engagement with the public, inter-government agencies, and Congress. For now, these “needs” outlined by the Fed are more than half met, signaling that a digital dollar could come to fruition within the decade from a policy perspective. International advances on this front will spur US policy makers into action even if they are disinclined. Bottom Line: The needs outlined by the Fed to adopt a digital dollar have been mostly met which ticks off one of the policy implementation checkboxes. There are gains to be had across the economy by introducing a digital dollar, ranging from a more efficient payments system to financial inclusion and decreasing transactions costs. Domestic Competition The proliferation of stablecoins has been noted by government agencies around the world. The Fed too has been keeping note. By the end of 2021, stablecoins had a relatively small market capitalization compared to the broader cryptocurrency market, approximately 6%. Now, stablecoins account for almost 16% of cryptocurrency market capitalization. But trading volumes point to stablecoins having a much larger role in transactions (Chart 3). Stablecoins resolve some of the problems of faith and trust that bedevil cryptocurrencies not backed by traditional assets. Chart 3Stablecoins Rise In Popularity Stablecoins Rise In Popularity Stablecoins Rise In Popularity Stablecoins pose two key threats that a digital dollar will essentially nullify: Systemic risk: A growing stablecoin market that is increasingly backed by traditional, high liquid assets could create systemic risk in traditional asset markets. An excessive rise or fall in demand for stablecoins would cause volatility in the liquid assets that back them. Moreover, for example, a fire sale in the stablecoin market would cause demand to fall excessively relative to the backing asset. Prices between stablecoins and the backing asset would diverge, potentially breaking the peg and resulting in further price divergence. And more broadly, high volatility from crypto markets can penetrate traditional or risk-free markets. A digital dollar would render stablecoins unnecessary, allowing cryptocurrency users to transact and convert digital dollars to cryptocurrency while enjoying the backing of the Fed on the value of digital dollars. Cross-border transactions: Stablecoins are also increasingly used for cross-border transactions. According to Fed data, the US pays 5.4% in fees on average per cross-border transaction, which also takes several days to settle. Stablecoins settle almost instantaneously and have much lower transaction fees. So too can a digital dollar. It would settle just as quickly as a stablecoin, if not quicker, and reduce transaction costs for cross-border payments. And because stablecoins are designed to maintain their pegs, they have more potential than cryptocurrencies to act as mediums of exchange outside of the crypto market and economy, potentially threatening the ongoing use of fiat money. Bottom Line: The Fed will design a CBDC around its existing monetary and payments system to allow for seamless integration. There are not many reasons holding back digital dollar adoption from a point of need and benefit. By adopting a digital dollar, the Fed will also fight off the growing risk of stablecoins, which could pose a threat to the use-case of fiat money in everyday life. Other Central Banks On The March The authority to issue money is an important element of economic power. History is replete with examples of currency competition both within countries and between them. CBDC research and development are picking up speed across central banks (Charts 4A and 4B). China is the world leader with its digital yuan, as we discuss below. Design and implementation of CBDCs will follow in coming years just like in the case of the digital yuan. If the theoretical payoffs to adopting a CBDC are met by real-world green shoots, then foreign CBDCs could pose a threat to continued dollar dominance in the global monetary and economic system, namely if countries can draw down their dependence on dollar reserves. Chart 4ACentral Banks Paying More Attention To CBDCs Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Chart 4BCentral Banks Paying More Attention To CBDCs Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Central Bank Competition Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has noted this challenge in recent remarks explaining that any implementation of a “US central bank digital currency must support the prominent role the dollar plays in the global financial system.”4 The Fed is on the same page as the Treasury noting that any CBDC should be used to preserve the dominant international role of the dollar. The dollar is the world’s most widely used currency for payments and investments and serves as the world’s premier reserve currency. The dollar’s international role allows the US to influence the practices and standards of the global monetary and economic system. Basically, when the US constricts the supply of dollars in response to domestic conditions, the rest of the world suffers tighter monetary conditions, and when the US expands the supply, the rest of the world enjoys looser conditions, almost regardless of what other nations want or need. Central banks have made their policy goals clear in respect to developing a CBDC. Some central banks look to expand financial inclusion, market access, and their payments system while others are looking to compete with one another (Table 2). Canada, China, and Sweden want to gain a local and international market advantage for their currencies by introducing CBDCs. Table 2CBDC Policy Goals Of Central Banks Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? China Leading CBDC Race, But… At this early stage, China’s digital yuan poses the largest threat to a digital dollar on the international stage. It is the most prominent CBDC project at this current juncture. The digital yuan entered beta testing at the end of 2020 in parts of the country. Wider testing across provinces is being phased in. China’s monetary endeavors began with the Cross-Border Inter-Bank Payment Service in 2015. The digital yuan will be positioned as an extension of this system to promote the national currency and fight global dollar dominance. But how big of a challenge could a digital yuan mount? The answer is not much, not now. China is the world’s largest trading partner but the renminbi accounts for less than 3% of the world’s reserve currency (Chart 5). The disparity between trade and currency status in the global economy reflects a lack of global trust in the renminbi and is a cause for concern for China. China is structurally invested in the dollar-dominated financial system and hence vulnerable to American influence by means of that system. Chart 5Global Renminbi Reserves Are Low Global Renminbi Reserves Are Low Global Renminbi Reserves Are Low The digital yuan would support more debt issuance based on cost and payment incentives to debt holders when financing BRI projects. This will help drive the use of the digital yuan going forward. For example, China can assert its influence over countries with Chinese debt by having them accumulate digital yuan reserves to pay back loans. China can even provide countries with concessions on loans to promote its digital yuan. Concessions on Chinese debt may lead to easier uptake, therefore promoting issuance. If the cost of switching to the digital yuan is low, countries will see no benefit in continuing their trade transactions with China in US dollars. Using the digital yuan as the currency of invoice to disburse loans can make these transactions more transparent and manageable. This could also allow for more state control over funds, an attractive scenario for China. However, China’s monetary ambitions face serious constraints. Lack of trust in the currency is the most critical challenge for internationalization of the yuan, digital or otherwise. Even if the digital yuan project is five to ten years ahead of the curve, countries still opt to hold the dollar over the yuan in any type of crisis, as has been amply demonstrated in history, and over a range of global shocks since 2019. Hence digital yuan adoption will require guarantees from Chinese institutions. But these same institutions have struggled to internationalize the paper renminbi. Lack of openness, transparency, and convertibility are persistent problems. Bottom Line: Central banks around the world are gearing up to introduce CBDCs in coming years. Some are looking to promote financial inclusivity. Others like China’s digital yuan want to chip away at the dollar’s global dominance. Digital versions of fiat currencies will have to demonstrate substantial economic and trade efficiencies in order to encourage diversification away from the US dollar, since there is no inherent reason a digital version of a nation’s currency would increase trust beyond what is already established. But those efficiencies could take shape, which would put pressure on the US to respond. The US faces significant monetary challenges over the long run, including from CBDCs. But the US is a technological power and will eventually respond by developing its own CBDC. Pushback Against A Digital Dollar The Fed has stated that it would only pursue a digital dollar in the context of broad public and cross-governmental support. However, neither the public nor congress broadly support one at present. Public opinion is uneducated on the issue and therefore highly malleable depending on leadership and events. Public Opinion Is Non-Supportive Across age groups, people do not know enough about digital currencies and think it is a bad idea to introduce a digital dollar (Chart 6). A 2020 poll found that only 13% of respondents approved of a digital dollar.5 Low approval is becoming a trend. However, the same poll showed that 38% of respondents think the US dollar is backed by gold, bonds, or oil. Addressing poor monetary literacy among the public would help to improve public support of a digital dollar. US households say they are more likely to trust traditional financial institutions than government agencies to safeguard their personal data (Chart 7). A digital dollar will grant the Fed and federal government far-reaching information regarding the everyday financial transactions of households. Trust in government has been declining and a digital dollar underpinned by a central ledger system would provoke consumer privacy lobby groups and government activists to fight and protest adoption (Chart 8). Chart 6Popular Support For A Digital Dollar Is Lacking Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Chart 7Households Trust Government Less Than Financial Institutions Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Chart 8Trust In Government Has Been Waning Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Chart 9Inflation Outbreak Will Limit Big Government Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? About half of the US public already view the government as “doing too much” (Chart 9). The explosive inflation of 2020-22 will slow the underlying ideological shift to the political left, potentially limiting support for a digital dollar. Public opinion has been shifting for decades in favor of more government involvement in people’s day-to-day lives (Chart 10), but that trend may well stall now that excess of government creates tangible negatives for household pocketbooks (inflation). The bigger of a problem the Fed has in taming inflation in 2022-23, the bigger the political backlash will be. Federal solutions will suffer as a result. This is our theme of “Limited Big Government,” since the role of the state will increase relative to the past 40 years but still within an American context of checks and balances. Chart 10People Have Favored Government Involvement Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Bottom Line: There is no clear public demand for the digitization of the dollar at present. A major financial or economic disruption stemming from the monetary system or digital assets may be necessary to call public attention to the question. Meanwhile the private sector will drive innovation and the federal government will react to try to maintain domestic stability and international competitiveness. These data support the Fed taking an intermediated approach to cbdc when forced to take action. Policymakers Will Resist Policymakers are divided over the idea of a digital dollar. Senator Ted Cruz introduced a bill in March 2022 to “prohibit the Federal Reserve from offering products or services directly to individuals, maintaining accounts on behalf of individuals, or issuing a central bank digital currency directly to an individual.”6 Cruz has yet to receive widespread party support on the bill but he could get the backing from more GOP members if Republicans take over Congress, as expected, this November. Some Republicans and Democrats have favored cryptocurrencies while others have not, advocating for crypto-mining and crypto start-ups in progressive-left and libertarian right states. But the center-left and center-right might lean more toward cryptocurrency regulation and digital dollar adoption. Coalitions may need to be formed on the topic of a digital dollar, in parties and between parties. A digital dollar will cause a level of disruption, which will affect both the Democrats and Republicans. Government gridlock will create challenges to digital dollar adoption too. The upcoming mid-term elections favor the GOP. Both the House and the Senate are expected to flip in favor of the GOP in 2023. The “Blue Sweep” policy setting will end and only the White House will remain in Democrat control. Republicans have a shot at flipping the White House in 2024, which could see a “Red Sweep.” This scenario may slow adoption of a digital dollar but it will only preclude the unilateral cbdc model, not the intermediated model. The period of 2023-24 is too soon for adoption of a digital dollar anyway but the fact is that gridlock will delay the process until external factors force US action. Bottom Line: Public and political pushback will slow the adoption of a digital dollar. Politicians will need to work along bipartisan lines to ensure the US remains at the forefront of digital and monetary innovation but this will be difficult in a highly polarized country and will likely depend on foreign competition. Investment Takeaways We avoided cryptocurrencies during the irrational exuberance over the past two years. We expect governments to regulate the sector in order to preserve a monopoly over money supply and hence geopolitical interests. With monetary conditions tightening, we expect continued volatility in the crypto space. The US dollar remains strong tactically but is nearing its peak cyclically. We remain long but have put the currency on downgrade watch as the market more fully prices a range of bad news this year. On the global stage, the US dollar will remain the premier reserve currency despite cyclical ups and downs. The current macroeconomic backdrop is negative for the US financial sector (Chart 11). Mergers and acquisitions are drying up while regulatory risks loom. Initial public offerings are also slowing, while trading volume is low. Consumers had already accumulated debt earlier in the cycle and with rising interest rates amid a more challenging job environment, growth in loans and ultimately bank profits will slow. The commercial banking sector faces challenges during the upcoming transitional period of disruptive innovation and regulatory uncertainty. We believe the Fed and policymakers in general will want to cause as little disruption as possible, by integrating any digital dollar with the traditional finance sector as seamlessly as possible. However, transitions, especially those digital in nature, bring with them high uncertainty in the financial sector and elsewhere. Chart 11Financial Sector Facing Macro Headwinds Financial Sector Facing Macro Headwinds Financial Sector Facing Macro Headwinds     Guy Russell Senior Analyst guyr@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     Stablecoins are backed by various assets and means. Fiat money, commodities, other cryptocurrencies and by algorithmic means are some examples. 2     See The Bank For International Settlements, Central Bank Digital Currencies: Executive Summary, September 2021, bis.org. 3    See The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Money and Payments: The U.S.Dollar in the Age of Digital Transformation, January 2022, federalreserve.gov. 4    See U.S. Department Of The Treasury, Remarks from Secretary of the Treasury Janet L. Yellen on Digital Assets, April 2022, treasury.gov. 5    See Cointelegraph, Most Americans are against a digital dollar CBDC, survey reveals,september 25, 2020, cointelegraph.com 6    See Ted Cruz’s Proposed Bill to amend the Federal Reserve Act to prohibit the Federal reserve banks from offering certain products or services directly to an individual, and for other purposes, March 2022, cruz.senate.gov.   Strategic View Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)   Table A2Political Risk Matrix Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Table A3US Political Capital Index Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Chart A1Presidential Election Model Third Quarter US Political Outlook: Last Ditch Effort Third Quarter US Political Outlook: Last Ditch Effort Chart A2Senate Election Model Third Quarter US Political Outlook: Last Ditch Effort Third Quarter US Political Outlook: Last Ditch Effort  Table A4House Election Model Will Trump Run Again? What About Biden? Will Trump Run Again? What About Biden? Table A5APolitical Capital: White House And Congress Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Table A5BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Table A5CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon? Digital Dollar, Will US Policymakers Launch One Soon?

Executive Summary Iran Reaches Nuclear Breakout Biden And Putin Court The Middle East Biden And Putin Court The Middle East The next geopolitical crisis will stem from the Middle East. The US, Russia, and China are striving for greater influence there and Iran’s nuclear quest is reaching a critical juncture. The risk of US-Israeli attacks against Iran remains 40% over the medium term and will rise sharply if Iran attempts to construct a deliverable nuclear device. Saudi Arabia may increase oil production but only if global demand holds up, which OPEC will assess at its August 3 meeting. Global growth risks will prevail in the short term and reduce its urgency. Russia will continue to squeeze supplies of energy and food for the outside world. The restart of Nord Stream 1 and the Turkey-brokered grain export proposal are unreliable signals. Russia’s aim is victory in Ukraine and any leverage will be used. The US may be done with the Middle East but the Middle East may not be done with the US. Structurally we remain bullish on gold and European defense stocks but we are booking 17% and 18% gains on our current trades. The deterioration in global growth and likely pullback in inflation will temporarily undercut these trades. Tactical Recommendation Inception Date Return LONG GOLD (CLOSED) 2019-06-12 17.1% LONG EUROPEAN AEROSPACE & DEFENSE / EUROPEAN TECH EQUITIES (CLOSED) 2022-03-18 17.9% Bottom Line: Global demand is weakening, which will weigh on bond yields and commodities. Yet underlying oil supply constraints persist – and US-Iran conflict will exacerbate global stagflation. Feature Chart 1Equity Volatility And Oil Price Volatility Equity Volatility And Oil Price Volatility Equity Volatility And Oil Price Volatility US President Joe Biden visited Saudi Arabia last week in a belated attempt to make amends with OPEC, increase oil production, and reduce inflation ahead of the midterm election. Biden also visited Israel to deter Iran, which is the next geopolitical crisis that markets are underrating. Meanwhile Russian President Vladimir Putin went to Iran on his second trip outside of Russia since this year’s invasion of Ukraine. Putin sought an ally in his conflict with the West, while also negotiating with Turkish President Recep Erdogan, who sought to position himself as a regional power broker. In this report we analyze Biden’s and Putin’s trips and what they mean for the global economy and macro investors. Macroeconomics is bearish for oil in the short term but geopolitics is bullish for oil in the short-to-medium term. The result is volatility (Chart 1). OPEC May Pump More Oil But Not On Biden’s Time Frame Here are the important developments from Biden’s trip: A credible threat against Iran: The US and Israel issued a joint declaration underscoring their red line against Iranian nuclear weaponization.1 Meanwhile the Iranians claimed to have achieved “nuclear breakout,” i.e. enough highly enriched uranium to construct a nuclear device (Chart 2). A balance-of-power coalition to contain Iran: Israel and Saudi Arabia improved relations on the margin. Each took action to build on the strategic détente between Israel and various Arab states that is embodied in the 2020 Abraham Accords.2 This strategic détente has staying power because it is a self-interested attempt by the various nations to protect themselves against common rivals, particularly Iran (Chart 3). Biden also tried to set up a missile defense network with Israel and the Arabs, although it was not finalized.3 Chart 2Iran Reaches Nuclear Breakout Biden And Putin Court The Middle East Biden And Putin Court The Middle East A reaffirmed US-Saudi partnership: The US and Saudi Arabia reaffirmed their partnership despite a rocky patch over the past decade. The rocky patch arises from US energy independence, China’s growth, and US attempts to normalize ties with Iran (Chart 4). These trends caused the Saudis to doubt US support and to view China as a strategic hedge. Chart 3Iran: Surrounded And Outgunned Biden And Putin Court The Middle East Biden And Putin Court The Middle East ​​​​​​ President Biden came into office aiming to redo the Iran deal and halt arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Since then he has been chastened by high energy prices, a low approval rating, and hawkish Iranian policy. On this trip he came cap in hand to the Saudis in a classic example of geopolitical constraints. If the US-Iran deal is verifiably dead, then US-Saudi ties will improve sustainably. (Though of course the Saudis will still do business with China and even start trading with China in the renminbi.) What global investors want to know is whether the Saudis and OPEC will pump more oil. The answer is maybe someday. The Saudis will increase production to save the global business cycle but not the Democrats’ election cycle. They told Biden that they will increase production only if there is sufficient global demand. Global Brent crude prices have fallen by 6% since May, when Biden booked his trip, so the kingdom is not in a great rush to pump more. Its economy is doing well this year (Chart 5). Chart 4Drivers Of Saudi Anxiety Drivers Of Saudi Anxiety Drivers Of Saudi Anxiety ​​​​​ Chart 5Saudis Won't Pump If Demand Is Weak Saudis Won't Pump If Demand Is Weak Saudis Won't Pump If Demand Is Weak ​​​​​​ At the same time, if global demand rebounds, the Saudis will not want global supply constraints to generate punitive prices that cap the rebound or kill the business cycle. After all, a global recession would deplete Saudi coffers, set back the regime’s economic reforms, exacerbate social problems, and potentially stir up political dissent (Chart 6). Related Report  Geopolitical StrategyThird Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning Hence the Saudis will not increase production substantially until they have assessed the global economy and discussed the outlook with the other members of the OPEC cartel in August and September, when the July 2021 agreement to increase production expires. We expect global demand to weaken as Europe and China continue to struggle. Our Commodity & Energy Strategist Bob Ryan argues that further escalation in the energy war between the EU and Russia could push prices above $220 per barrel by Q4 2023, whereas an economic collapse could push Brent down to $60 per barrel. His base case Brent price forecast remains $110 per barrel on average in 2022 and $117 per barrel in 2023 (Chart 7). Chart 6Saudis Will Pump To Prevent Recession Saudis Will Pump To Prevent Recession Saudis Will Pump To Prevent Recession ​​​​​​ Chart 7BCA's July 2022 Oil Price Forecast BCA's July 2022 Oil Price Forecast BCA's July 2022 Oil Price Forecast ​​​​​​ The geopolitical view suggests upside oil risks over the short-to-medium time frame but the macroeconomic view suggests that downside risks will be priced first. Bottom Line: Saudi Arabia may increase production but not at any US president’s beck and call. The Saudis are not focused on US elections, they benefit from the current level of prices, and they do not suffer if Republicans take Congress in November. The downside risk in oil prices stems from demand disappointments in global growth (especially China) rather than any immediate shifts in Saudi production discipline. Volatility will remain high. US-Iran Talks: Dying But Not Dead Yet In fact the Middle East underscores underlying and structural oil supply constraints despite falling global demand. While Iran is a perennial geopolitical risk, the world is reaching a critical juncture over the next couple of years. Investors should not assume that Iran can quietly achieve nuclear arms like North Korea. Since August 2021 we have argued that the US and Iran would fail to put back together the 2015 nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPA). This failure would in turn lead to renewed instability across the Middle East and sporadic supply disruptions as the different nations trade military threats and potentially engage in direct warfare. This forecast is on track after Biden’s and Putin’s trip – but we cannot yet say that it is fully confirmed. Biden’s joint declaration with Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid closed any daylight that existed between the US and Israel. Given that there was some doubt about the intentions of Biden and the Democrats, it is now crystal clear that the US is determined to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons even if it requires military action. The US specifically said that it will use “all instruments of national power” to prevent that outcome. Chart 8Iran Not Forced To Capitulate Iran Not Forced To Capitulate Iran Not Forced To Capitulate Judging by the tone of the statement, the Israelis wrote the document and Biden signed it.4 Biden’s foreign policy emphasizes shoring up US alliances and partnerships, which means letting allies and partners set the line. Israel’s Begin Doctrine – which says that Israel is willing to attack unilaterally and preemptively to prevent a hostile neighbor from obtaining nuclear weapons – has been reinforced. The US is making a final effort to intimidate Iran into rejoining the deal. By clearly and unequivocally reiterating its stance on nuclear weapons, and removing doubts about its stance on Israel, there is still a chance that the Iranian calculus could change. This is possible notwithstanding Ayatollah Khamenei’s friendliness with Putin and criticisms of western deception.5 After all, why would the Iranians want to be attacked by the US and Israeli militaries? Iran will need to think very carefully about what it does next. Khamenei just turned 83 years old and is trying to secure the Islamic Republic’s power transition and survival after his death. Here are the risks: Iran’s economy, buoyed by the commodity cycle, is not so weak as to force Khamenei to capitulate. Back in 2015 oil prices had collapsed and his country was diplomatically isolated. Today the economy has somewhat weathered the storm of the US’s maximum pressure sanctions (Chart 8). Iran is in bad shape but it has not been brought to its knees. Another risk is that Khamenei believes the American public lacks the appetite for war. Americans say they are weary of Middle Eastern wars and do not feel particularly threatened by Iran. However, this would be a miscalculation. US war-weariness is nearing the end of its course. The US engages in a major military expedition roughly every decade. Americans are restless and divided – and the political elite fear populism – so a new foreign distraction is not as unlikely as the consensus holds. Moreover a nuclear Iran is not an idle threat but would trigger a regional nuclear arms race and overturn the US grand strategy of maintaining a balance of power in the Middle East (as in other regions). In short, the US government can easily mobilize the people to accept air strikes to prevent Iran from going nuclear because there is latent animosity toward Iran in both political parties (Chart 9). Chart 9Risk: Iran Overrates US War-Weariness Biden And Putin Court The Middle East Biden And Putin Court The Middle East Another risk is that Iran forges ahead believing that the US and Israel are unwilling or unable to attack and destroy its nuclear program. The western powers might opt for containment like they did with North Korea or they might attack and fail to eliminate the program. This is hard to believe but Iran clearly cannot accept US security guarantees as an alternative to a nuclear deterrent when it seeks regime survival. At the same time Russia is courting Iran, encouraging it to join forces against the American empire. Iran is planning to sell drones to Russia for use in Ukraine, while Russia is maintaining nuclear and defense cooperation with Iran. Putin’s trip highlighted a growing strategic partnership despite a low base of economic ties  (Chart 10).6 Chart 10Russo-Iranian Ties Russo-Iranian Ties Russo-Iranian Ties ​​​​​​ Chart 11West Vulnerable To Middle East War Biden And Putin Court The Middle East Biden And Putin Court The Middle East While Russia does not have an interest in a nuclear-armed Iran, it is not afraid of Iran alone, and it would benefit enormously if the US and Israel got bogged down in a new war that destabilized the Middle East. Oil prices would rise, the US would be distracted, and Europe would be even more vulnerable (Chart 11). Chart 12China's Slowdown And Dependency On Middle East China's Slowdown And Dependency On Middle East China's Slowdown And Dependency On Middle East China’s interest is different. It would prefer for Iran to undermine the West by means of a subtle and long-term game of economic engagement rather than a destabilizing war in the region that would upset China’s already weak economy. However, Beijing will not join with the US against Iran, especially if Iran and Russia are aligned. Ultimately China needs to access Iranian energy reserves via overland routes so that it gains greater supply security vis-à-vis the American navy (Chart 12). Since June 2019, we have maintained 40% odds of a military conflict with Iran. The logic is outlined in Diagram 1, which we have not changed. Conflict can take various forms since the western powers prefer sabotage or cyber-attacks to outright assault. But in the end preventing nuclear weapons may require air strikes – and victory is not at all guaranteed. We are very close to moving to the next branch in Diagram 1, which would imply odds of military conflict rise from 40% to 80%. We are not making that call yet but we are getting nervous. Diagram 1Iran Nuclear Crisis: Decision Tree Biden And Putin Court The Middle East Biden And Putin Court The Middle East Moreover it is the saber rattling around this process – including an extensive Iranian campaign to deter attack – that will disrupt oil distribution and transport sooner rather than later. Bottom Line: The US and Iran could still find diplomatic accommodation to avoid the next step in our decision tree. Therefore we are keeping the odds of war at a subjective 40%. But we have reached a critical juncture. The next step in the process entails a major increase in the odds of air strikes. Putin’s Supply Squeeze Will Continue As we go to press, financial markets are reacting to President Putin’s marginal easing of Russian political pressure on food and energy supplies. First, Putin took steps toward a deal, proposed by Turkish President Erdogan, to allow Ukrainian grain exports to resume from the Black Sea. Second, Putin allowed a partial restart of the Nord Stream 1 natural gas pipeline, after a total cutoff occurred during the regular, annual maintenance period. However, these moves should be kept into perspective. Nord Stream 1 is still operating at only 40% of capacity. Russia reduced the flow by 60% after the EU agreed to impose a near-total ban on Russian oil exports by the end of the year. Russia is imposing pain on the European economy in pursuit of its strategic objectives and will continue to throttle Europe’s natural gas supply. Russia’s aims are as follows: (1) break up European consensus on Russia and prevent a natural gas embargo from being implemented in future (2) pressure Europe into negotiating a ceasefire in Ukraine that legitimizes Russia’s conquests (3) underscore Russia’s new red line against NATO military deployments in Finland and Sweden. Europe, for its part, will continue to diversify its natural gas sources as rapidly as possible to reduce Russia’s leverage. The European Commission is asking countries to decrease their natural gas consumption by 15% from August to March. This will require rationing regardless of Russia’s supply squeeze. The collapse in trust incentivizes Russia to use its leverage while it still has it and Europe to try to take that leverage away. The economic costs are frontloaded, particularly this winter. The same goes for the Turkish proposal to resume grain exports. Russia will continue to blockade Ukraine until it achieves its military objectives. The blockade will be tightened or loosened as necessary to achieve diplomatic goals. Part of the reason Russia invaded in the first place was to seize control of Ukraine’s coast and hold the country’s ports, trade, and economy hostage. Bottom Line: Russia’s relaxation of food and energy flows is not reliable. Flows will wax and wane depending on the status of strategic negotiations with the West. Europe’s economy will continue to suffer from a Russia-induced supply squeeze until Russia achieves a ceasefire in Ukraine. So will emerging markets that depend on grain imports, such as Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan. Investment Takeaways The critical juncture has arrived for our Iran view. If Iran does not start returning to nuclear compliance soon, then a fateful path of conflict will be embarked upon. The Saudis will not give Biden more oil barrels just yet. But they may end up doing that if global demand holds up and the US reassures them that their regional security needs will be met. First, the path for oil over the next year will depend on the path of global demand. Our view is negative, with Europe heading toward recession, China struggling to stimulate its economy effectively, and the Fed unlikely to achieve a soft landing. Second, the path of conflict with Iran will lead to a higher frequency of oil supply disruptions across the Middle East that will start happening very quickly after the US-Iran talks are pronounced dead. In other words, oil prices will be volatile in a stagflationary environment. In addition, while inflation might roll over for various reasons, it is not likely to occur because of any special large actions by Saudi Arabia. The Saudis are waiting on global cues. Of these, China is the most important. We are booking a 17% gain on our long gold trade as real rates rise and China’s economy deteriorates (Chart 13). This is in line with our Commodity & Energy Strategy, which is also stepping aside on gold for now. Longer term we remain constructive as we see a secular rise in geopolitical risk and persistent inflation problems. Chart 13Book Gains On Gold ... For Now Book Gains On Gold ... For Now Book Gains On Gold ... For Now We are booking an 18% gain on our long European defense / short European tech trade. Falling bond yields will benefit European tech (Chart 14). We remain bullish on European and global defense stocks. Chart 14Book Gains On EU Defense Vs Tech ... For Now Book Gains On EU Defense Vs Tech ... For Now Book Gains On EU Defense Vs Tech ... For Now ​​​​​​ Chart 15Markets Underrate Middle East Geopolitical Risk Biden And Putin Court The Middle East Biden And Putin Court The Middle East ​​​​​ Stay long US equities relative to UAE equities. Middle Eastern geopolitical risk is underrated (Chart 15). Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      The White House, “The Jerusalem U.S.-Israel Strategic Partnership Joint Declaration,” July 14, 2022, whitehouse.gov. 2     Israel and the US will remove international peacekeepers from the formerly Egyptian Red Sea islands of Tiran and Sanafir, which clears the way for Saudi Arabia to turn them into tourist destinations. Saudi Arabia also removed its tight airspace restrictions on Israel, enabling civilian Israeli airlines to fly through Saudi airspace on normal basis. Of course, Saudi allowance for Israeli military flights to pass through Saudi airspace would be an important question in any future military operation against Iran. 3     The US has long wanted regional missile defense integration. The Biden administration is proposing “integrated air defense cooperation” that would include Israel as well as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). A regional “air and missile defense architecture” would counter drones and missiles from rival states and non-state actors such as Iran and its militant proxies. Simultaneously the Israelis are putting forward the proposed Middle East Air Defense Alliance (MEAD) in meetings with the same GCC nations. Going forward, Iran’s nuclear ambitions will give more impetus to these attempts to cooperate on air defense. 4     This is apparent from the hard line on Iran and the relatively soft line on Russia in the document. Israel is wary of taking too hard of a line against Russia because of its security concerns in Syria where Russian forces are present. See footnote 1 above. 5     Khamenei called for long-term cooperation between Russia and Iran; he justified Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a defense against NATO encroachment; he called for the removal of the US dollar as the global reserve currency. See “Khamenei: Tehran, Moscow must stay vigilant against Western deception,” Israel Hayom, July 20, 2022, israelhayom.com. 6     Russia’s natural gas champion Gazprom signed an ostensible $40 billion memorandum of understanding with Iran’s National Oil Company to develop gas fields and pipelines. See Nadeen Ebrahim, “Iran and Russia’s friendship is more complicated than it seems,” CNN, July 20, 2022, cnn.com. However, while there are longstanding obstacles to Russo-Iranian cooperation, the West’s tough new sanctions on Russia and EU diversification will make Moscow more willing to invest in Iran. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix

Listen to a short summary of this report.     Executive Summary The odds of a recession in the US are lower than widely perceived. The probability of a recession is higher in Europe, although this week’s partial resumption of gas flows through the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, along with increased use of coal-fired power plants, should soften the blow. Chinese growth should rebound in the second half of the year. However, the specter of future lockdowns, the shift in global spending away from manufactured goods towards services, and the weakening property sector will continue to weigh on activity. With the Twentieth Party Congress slated for later this year, it is increasingly likely that the authorities will open up a firehose of stimulus. Fading recession risks will buoy stocks in the near term. However, a brighter economic outlook also means that the Fed, and several other central banks, may see little need to cut policy rates in 2023, as the markets are currently discounting. The end result is that government bond yields will rise from current levels, implying that stock valuations will not return to last year’s levels even if a recession is averted. After Rapidly Raising Rates, Markets Expect Some DM Central Banks To Start Easing Next Year The Downside Of A Soft Landing The Downside Of A Soft Landing Bottom Line: We recommend a modest overweight on global equities for now but would turn neutral if the S&P 500 were to rise above 4,050.   Dear Client, I am delighted to announce that Ritika Mankar, CFA, has joined the Global Investment Strategy team. Ritika will be writing occasional special reports on a variety of topical issues. Next week, she will make the case that the US economy’s ability to spawn mega-sized companies may become increasingly compromised over the next decade. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist The Case for a Soft Landing in the US Chart 1Cyclicals Underperformed Defensives As Recession Risks Intensified Cyclicals Underperformed Defensives As Recession Risks Intensified Cyclicals Underperformed Defensives As Recession Risks Intensified Over the last few months, investors have become concerned that the Fed and many other central banks will need to engineer a recession in order to bring inflation down to more comfortable levels. While these fears have abated over the past trading week, they still continue to dominate market action (Chart 1). We place the odds of a US recession at about 40%. This is arguably more optimistic than the consensus view. According to Bank of America, the majority of fund managers saw recession as likely in this month’s survey. Not surprisingly, investors consider recession to be a major risk for equities over the next 12 months (Chart 2). Chart 2Many Investors Now See Recession As Baked In The Cake The Downside Of A Soft Landing The Downside Of A Soft Landing Even if a recession does occur, we have contended that it will likely be a mild one, perhaps so mild that it will be difficult to distinguish it from a soft landing. A number of things make a soft landing in the US more probable than in the past: Labor supply has scope to increase. The labor participation rate is still 1.2 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level, two-thirds of which is due to decreased participation among workers under the age of 55 (Chart 3). The share of workers holding multiple jobs is also below its pre-pandemic level (Chart 4). The number of multiple job holders has been rising briskly lately. That is one reason why job growth in the payroll survey – which double counts workers if they hold more than one job – has been stronger than job growth in the household survey. Increased labor supply would obviate the need for the Fed to take drastic actions to curtail labor demand in its effort to restore balance to the labor market. Chart 3Labor Supply Has Scope To Rise Labor Supply Has Scope To Rise Labor Supply Has Scope To Rise Chart 4The Number Of Multiple Job Holders Is Still Below Pre-Pandemic Levels The Number Of Multiple Job Holders Is Still Below Pre-Pandemic Levels The Number Of Multiple Job Holders Is Still Below Pre-Pandemic Levels A high level of job openings creates a moat around the labor market. There are almost two times as many job openings as there are unemployed workers in the US (Chart 5). Many firms are likely to pull job openings before they cut jobs in response to a slowing economy. A high level of job openings will also allow workers who lose their jobs to find employment more quickly than usual, thus limiting the rise in so-called frictional unemployment. It is worth noting that the job openings rate has declined from a record 7.3% in March to a still-high 6.9% in May, with no change in the unemployment rate over this period. Chart 5A High Level Of Job Openings Creates A Moat Around The Labor Market A High Level Of Job Openings Creates A Moat Around The Labor Market A High Level Of Job Openings Creates A Moat Around The Labor Market A steep Phillips curve implies that only a modest increase in unemployment may be necessary to knock down inflation towards the Fed’s target. Just as was the case in the 1960s, the Phillips curve has proven to be kinked near full employment (Chart 6). Unlike in the late 1960s, however, when rising realized inflation caused long-term inflation expectations to reset higher, expectations have remained well anchored this time around (Chart 7). Chart 6The Phillips Curve Is Kinked At Very Low Levels Of Unemployment The Downside Of A Soft Landing The Downside Of A Soft Landing Chart 7Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Well Anchored Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Well Anchored Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Well Anchored   The unwinding of pandemic and war-related dislocations should push down inflation. A recent study by the San Francisco Fed estimates that about half of May’s PCE inflation print was the result of supply-side disturbances (Chart 8). While the ongoing war in Ukraine and the threat of another Covid wave in China will continue to unsettle global supply chains, these problems should fade over time. Falling inflation would allow real wages to start rising again. This would bolster confidence, making a soft landing more likely (Chart 9). Chart 8Supply Factors Explain Half Of The Increase In Prices Over The Past Year The Downside Of A Soft Landing The Downside Of A Soft Landing Chart 9Positive Real Wage Growth Will Bolster Consumer Confidence Positive Real Wage Growth Will Bolster Consumer Confidence Positive Real Wage Growth Will Bolster Consumer Confidence A lack of major financial imbalances makes the US economy more resilient to economic shocks. As a share of disposable income, US household debt is 34 percentage points below its 2008 peak (Chart 10). Relative to net worth, household debt is at multi-decade lows. About two-thirds of mortgages carry a FICO score above 760 compared to only one-third during the housing bubble (Chart 11). Non-mortgage consumer credit also remains in good shape, as my colleague Doug Peta elaborated in this week’s US Investment Strategy report. While corporate debt has risen over the past decade, the ratio of corporate debt-to-assets today is still below where it was during the 1990s. Moreover, thanks to stronger corporate profitability, the interest coverage ratio is near an all-time high (Chart 12).   Chart 10AUS Household Debt Is Not Especially High Anymore (I) US Household Debt Is Not Especially High Anymore (I) US Household Debt Is Not Especially High Anymore (I) Chart 10BUS Household Debt Is Not Especially High Anymore (II) US Household Debt Is Not Especially High Anymore (II) US Household Debt Is Not Especially High Anymore (II) Chart 11FICO Scores For Residential Mortgages Have Improved Considerably Since The Pre-GFC Housing Bubble The Downside Of A Soft Landing The Downside Of A Soft Landing Chart 12Corporate Balance Sheets Are In Decent Shape Corporate Balance Sheets Are In Decent Shape Corporate Balance Sheets Are In Decent Shape Chart 13Tight Supply Limits The Downside Risks To Housing Tight Supply Limits The Downside Risks To Housing Tight Supply Limits The Downside Risks To Housing Just like the US does not suffer from major financial imbalances, it does not suffer from any major economic imbalances either. The homeowner vacancy rate is near a record low, which should put a floor under residential investment (Chart 13). Outside of investment in intellectual property, which is not especially sensitive to the business cycle, nonresidential investment is still below pre-pandemic levels and not much above where it was as a share of GDP during the Great Recession (Chart 14). Spending on consumer durable goods has retraced four-fifths of its pandemic surge, with little ill-effect on aggregate employment (Chart 15). Chart 14Outside Of IP, Nonresidential Investment Is Still Low Outside Of IP, Nonresidential Investment Is Still Low Outside Of IP, Nonresidential Investment Is Still Low Chart 15Spending On Durable Goods Has Been Normalizing Without Derailing The Economy Spending On Durable Goods Has Been Normalizing Without Derailing The Economy Spending On Durable Goods Has Been Normalizing Without Derailing The Economy Europe: A Deep Freeze Will Likely Be Avoided Chart 16Russia Can Potentially Cause Significant Economic Damage In The EU If It Closes The Taps The Downside Of A Soft Landing The Downside Of A Soft Landing The macroeconomic picture is less benign outside the US. Four years ago, German diplomats laughed off warnings that their country had become dangerously dependent on Russian energy. They are not laughing anymore. German industry, just like industry across much of Europe, is facing a major energy crunch. The IMF estimates that output losses associated with a full Russian gas shutoff over the next 12 months could amount to as much as 2.7% of GDP in the EU (Chart 16). In Central and Eastern Europe, output could shrink by 6%. Among the major economies, Germany and Italy are the most at risk. Fortunately, Europe is finally stepping up to the challenge. The highly ambitious REPowerEU plan seeks to displace two-thirds of Russian gas by the end of 2022. The plan does not include any additional energy that could be generated by increased usage of coal-fired power plants, a strategy that the European political establishment (including the German Green Party!) has only recently begun to champion. It is possible that EU leaders felt the need to generate a crisis mentality to justify the decision to burn more coal. Dire warnings about how Europe is prepared to ration gas also send a message to Russia that the EU is ready to suffer in order to thwart Putin’s despotic regime. Whether Europe actually follows through is a different story. It is worth noting that the Nord Stream 1 pipeline resumed operations this week after Germany received, over Ukrainian objections, a repaired turbine from Canada. The resumption of partial flows through the pipeline, along with increased fiscal support for households and firms, reduces the risks of a “deep freeze” recession in Europe. The unveiling of the ECB’s new Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI) this week should also help anchor sovereign credit spreads across the euro area. While the exact conditions under which the TPI will be engaged have yet to be fleshed out, we expect the terms to be fairly liberal, reflecting not only the lessons learned from last decade’s euro debt crisis, but also to serve as a powerful bulwark against Putin’s efforts to destabilize the EU economy. China: Government’s Growth Target Looks Increasingly Unrealistic Stronger growth in China would help European exporters (Chart 17). Chinese real GDP grew by just 0.4% in the second quarter from a year earlier as the economy was battered by Covid lockdowns. Activity should pick up in the second half of the year, but at this point, the government’s 5.5% growth target looks completely unachievable. The specter of future lockdowns, the shift in global spending away from manufactured goods towards services, and the weakening Chinese property sector are all weighing on the economy (Chart 18). Chart 17European Exporters Would Welcome A Stronger Chinese Economy European Exporters Would Welcome A Stronger Chinese Economy European Exporters Would Welcome A Stronger Chinese Economy The authorities will likely seek to stimulate the economy by allowing local governments to bring forward $220 billion in bond issuance that had been originally slated for 2023. The problem is that land sales – the main source of local government revenue – have collapsed. Worried about the ability of local governments to service their obligations, both retail investors and banks have shied away from buying local government debt. Chart 18A Slowing Property Market And Covid Lockdowns Have Been Weighing On The Chinese Economy A Slowing Property Market And Covid Lockdowns Have Been Weighing On The Chinese Economy A Slowing Property Market And Covid Lockdowns Have Been Weighing On The Chinese Economy Meanwhile, the inability of property developers to secure adequate financing to complete construction projects has left a growing number of home buyers in the lurch. In most cases, these properties were purchased off-the-plan. Understandably, home buyers have balked at the prospect of having to make mortgage payments on properties that they do not possess.  With the Twentieth Party Congress slated for later this year, it is increasingly likely that the authorities will open up a firehose of stimulus, including increased assistance for property developers and banks, as well as income-support measures for households. While such measures will not address China’s myriad structural problems, they will help keep the economy afloat. Equity Valuations in a Soft-Landing Scenario A few weeks ago, the consensus view was that stocks would tumble in the second half of the year as the global economy fell into recession but would then rally in 2023 as central banks began lowering rates. We argued the opposite, namely that stocks would likely rebound in the second half of the year as the economy outperformed expectations but would then face renewed pressure in 2023 as it became clear that the Fed and several other central banks had no reason to cut rates (Chart 19). Chart 19After Rapidly Raising Rates, Markets Expect Some DM Central Banks To Start Easing Next Year The Downside Of A Soft Landing The Downside Of A Soft Landing Chart 20Real Rates Have Jumped This Year Real Rates Have Jumped This Year Real Rates Have Jumped This Year In a baseline scenario where a recession is averted, we argued that the S&P 500 could rise to 4,500 (60% odds). In contrast, we noted that the S&P 500 could fall to 3,500 in a mild recession scenario (30% odds) and to 2,900 in a deep recession scenario (10% odds). It is worth stressing that even at 4,500, the S&P 500 would still be 11% lower in real terms than it was on January 4th. At the stock market’s peak in January, the 10-year TIPS yield stood at -0.91%, while the 30-year TIPS yield stood at -0.27%. Today, they stand at 0.58% and 0.93%, respectively (Chart 20). If real rates do not return to their prior lows, it is unlikely that equity valuations will return to their prior highs. This limits the upside for stocks, even in a soft-landing scenario. The sharp rally in stocks over the past week has priced out some of this recession risk, moving equity valuations closer towards what we regard as fair value. As we noted last week, we will turn neutral on equities if the S&P 500 were to rise above 4,050. As we go to press, we are only 1.3% from that level.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Follow me on         LinkedIn & Twitter Global Investment Strategy View Matrix The Downside Of A Soft Landing The Downside Of A Soft Landing Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores The Downside Of A Soft Landing The Downside Of A Soft Landing