Money/Credit/Debt

China: The Recovery And Equity Dichotomy China’s economic recovery has been gathering steam, and policymakers have become reasonably confident about the growth outlook. In fact, transaction activity in the property market has recovered to year-ago levels, auto sales and construction starts have bottomed following a 18 to 20-month contraction (Chart I-1). In line with this economic revival, authorities issued a statement following last week’s Politburo meeting contending that monetary policy should aim “to maintain adequate growth of money supply and credit.” This statement is a change in the monetary policy stance in May when the stated objective was to “significantly accelerate the growth rate of broad money supply and total social financing relative to last year.” This change in language highlights that authorities have become more comfortable with the recovery and are now becoming a bit concerned about amplifying credit and property market excesses. There will be no additional stimulus forthcoming, but policy tightening is not in the cards. In short, there will be no additional stimulus forthcoming, but policy tightening is not in the cards. Policymakers will therefore be in a wait-and-see mode for now, monitoring how economic conditions improve as the enacted stimulus works its way into the economy. Odds are high that the business cycle recovery will continue in China for now. Chart I-2 shows that the amount of credit and fiscal stimulus has been considerable, and that broad money and bank assets impulses remain in uptrend. All these should support the recovery into early next year. Chart I-1China: A Cyclical Recovery Is Underway China: A Cyclical Recovery Is Underway China: A Cyclical Recovery Is Underway Chart I-2China: The Stimulus Will Continue Working Its Way Into Economy China: The Stimulus Will Continue Working Its Way Into Economy China: The Stimulus Will Continue Working Its Way Into Economy As to the risks to Chinese growth emanating from depressed demand in the rest of the world, they are not substantial. First, global demand has already bottomed. Second, China’s total exports account for 17% of GDP, while investment expenditures and consumer spending account for 42% and 38% of GDP, respectively (Chart I-3). Hence, rising capital expenditures and household spending will offset the drag from exports. Finally, China exports many household and medical goods that are currently in very high demand worldwide due to the lockdowns and the pandemic. As a result, Chinese exports have recently done a bit better than global shipments in volume terms (Chart I-4). Chart I-3China Is Not Very Reliant On Exports China Is Not Very Reliant On Exports China Is Not Very Reliant On Exports Chart I-4Chinese Exports Are Doing A Better Than Global Shipments Chinese Exports Are Doing A Better Than Global Shipments Chinese Exports Are Doing A Better Than Global Shipments As to domestic growth drivers, output has been rising faster than consumer demand. Furthermore, capital spending and production by state-owned enterprises has been much stronger than that of private enterprises. However, with the stimulus in full force, both consumer demand and private investment will pick up in the second half of this year. An Equity Market Dichotomy Chart I-5Dichotomy Between Old And New Economy Stocks Dichotomy Between Old And New Economy Stocks Dichotomy Between Old And New Economy Stocks On the surface, the strong rally in Chinese equity indexes has validated the economic recovery thesis. However, a closer examination of the equity performance of various equity sectors reveals that the rebound in cyclical sectors has been rather tame and that the large gains in the equity indexes have been primarily due to tech and new economy businesses, benefiting from working and shopping from home, and to health care stocks (Chart I-5). Chart I-6 illustrates that industrials, materials, autos and real estate stocks are only modestly above their March lows. More importantly, large bank stocks trading in Hong Kong are reaching new lows in absolute terms (Chart I-6, bottom panel). Chart I-6China: Cyclicals Stocks And Banks China: Cyclicals Stocks And Banks China: Cyclicals Stocks And Banks Is such lackluster performance by Chinese cyclical stocks a warning sign to its business cycle recovery? Not necessarily. In our opinion, poor performance of cyclical stocks and banks in China reflects the long-term ramifications of repeated episodes of credit frenzy. A credit-driven growth recovery is always a double-edged sword for both borrowers and creditors. Companies that borrow and invest in new projects accumulate debt. Critically, it is unclear whether these investments will produce new recurring cash flows that would allow the debtors to service their debt. Hence, many companies that take on more debt and invest in financially non-viable projects undermine shareholder value. China has again doubled down on the same policies it has been deploying since the 2008 Lehman crisis. Namely, it has encouraged another boom in money and credit creation, as well as in infrastructure investment. Another outcome of this is that excess money creation leaks into the property market, further fueling the real estate bubble. As for banks, if debtors are unable to service their debt, bank shareholders will be at risk too. This does not mean that banks will be liquidated, but that their shareholders will be diluted. It is critical to put this round of stimulus into perspective: it comes amid already elevated debt levels, following a decade-long credit frenzy and a two decade-long capital spending boom (Chart I-7). Therefore, we doubt that the latest round of investments will be able to substantially increase shareholder value. On the whole, we believe the rally in Chinese stocks outside secular growth plays – such as Alibaba, Tencent – is cyclical not structural. The basis is that while more credit produces a cyclical recovery, it often undermines shareholder value. Chart I-6 on page 4 illustrates that Chinese cyclical stocks and bank share prices have been flat-to-down in the past 10 years despite recurring stimulus.   Finally, the near-term risks for Chinese stocks do not stem from the domestic economy, but from geopolitics and a correction in US FAANG stocks. President Trump may escalate the confrontation with China in order to “rally the nation behind the flag” if his polling does not improve ahead of the November elections. Chart I-8 illustrates that the Americans’ view of China has deteriorated significantly in recent years. This might be exploited by President Trump to boost his re-election chances. A heightened confrontation could produce a correction in Chinese stocks. Chart I-7China Credit Excesses Are Getting Larger China Credit Excesses Are Getting Larger China Credit Excesses Are Getting Larger Chart I-8Americans’ Perception Of China Has Deteriorated In Recent Years China, Indonesia And Turkey China, Indonesia And Turkey Also, if the FAANG mania is either paused or reversed, then Chinese tech and mega-cap stocks will correct, pulling down the broad Chinese equity indexes. Bottom Line: The current round of stimulus in China has made the credit, money and property excesses even larger. As we have written over the years, easy money and credit generally fuel a misallocation of capital. Ultimately, this slows productivity growth on the macro level and destroys shareholder value on the company level.   Small banks, not large ones, have been leading the massive money and credit boom for the past 10 years. Nevertheless, given that the cyclical recovery in China will endure for now, we continue overweighting Chinese investable stocks within an EM equity portfolio. Finally, we are closing our short CNY/long USD position given the change in our USD outlook on July 9. This position has produced a 4.2% loss since its initiation on December 9, 2015. A Stress Test For Bank Stocks Chart I-9China: Small and Medium Banks Versus Large 5 Ones China: Small and Medium Banks Versus Large 5 Ones China: Small and Medium Banks Versus Large 5 Ones Small banks, not large ones, have been leading the massive money and credit boom for the past 10 years. Chart I-9 demonstrates that the risk-weighted assets of smaller banks have risen much faster, and are presently larger, than those of large banks. We have performed a new stress test for both the Big Five and small & medium listed banks. Concerning large banks, our base-case scenario calls for risk-weighted non-performing assets to rise to 13% of total. Accordingly, their equity will be diluted by 46% if they were to provision for these losses (Table I-1). Consequently, the true (adjusted) price-to-book (PBV) ratio will be 1.1. Assuming that the fair value of these large banks corresponds to a PBV ratio of one, then Big Five banks remain moderately (10%) overpriced. For small banks, our baseline scenario assumes a risk-weighted non-performing asset ratio of 13%. If these banks were to provision for these write offs, their equity will be diluted by 61%, pushing the adjusted PBV ratio to 2 (Table I-2). If we use a PBV fair value ratio of 1.3, then small and medium listed banks are substantially overpriced. Table I-1Stress Test Of 5 Large Banks China, Indonesia And Turkey China, Indonesia And Turkey Table I-2Stress Test Of The Other 25 Listed Medium & Small Banks China, Indonesia And Turkey China, Indonesia And Turkey Chart I-10Favor Large 5 Banks Over Small And Medium Ones Favor Large 5 Banks Over Small And Medium Ones Favor Large 5 Banks Over Small And Medium Ones Bottom Line: Chinese banks stocks could rebound, but their structural outlook has deteriorated further following another round of credit binge. Among banks stocks, we reiterate our strategy of favoring large banks over smaller ones (Chart I-10).  Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com  Lin Xiang, CFA Research Analyst linx@bcaresearch.com Indonesia: Struggling To Recover Indonesian stocks and the rupiah have rebounded in line with global risk assets. However, the rebound might be waning. The rupiah has begun weakening anew against the US dollar despite a major weakness in the latter. Relative to EM, Indonesian equities are underperforming again (Chart II-1). Chart II-1Indonesian Stocks Are Underperforming EM Again Indonesian Stocks Are Underperforming EM Again Indonesian Stocks Are Underperforming EM Again Crumbling Economic Activity And Insufficient Stimulus Indonesia is experiencing its worst recession since the Asian Crisis in 1997. Consumer income has dwindled and consumer confidence collapsed (Chart II-2, top panel). In turn, passenger car and truck sales have contracted by 90% and 84%, respectively, from a year ago (Chart II-2, second and third panel). Meanwhile, domestic cement consumption plunged by 17% (Chart II-2, bottom panel). In the meantime, the Coronavirus pandemic is not subsiding and will continue weighing on the Indonesian economy. The authorities have been attempting to prop up domestic demand. Yet the total fiscal stimulus announced so far – which amounts to $48 billion or 4.3% of GDP – is unlikely to be enough, given the harsh nature of this recession. For instance, the commercial banks loan impulse has already dipped to -2.7% of GDP (Chart II-3, top panel). Provided that demand for credit stays weak and banks continue to be reluctant to lend, the credit impulse will drop even further. As a result, the negative credit impulse will offset the fiscal thrust. Chart II-2Indonesia: Domestic Demand Collapsed Indonesia: Domestic Demand Collapsed Indonesia: Domestic Demand Collapsed Chart II-3Indonesia: Lending Rates Are High Indonesia: Lending Rates Are High Indonesia: Lending Rates Are High   On the monetary policy front, Bank Indonesia (BI) has been aggressively cutting its policy rate and injecting banking system liquidity into the market. The BI has been also purchasing government bonds on the secondary and primary markets, de facto conducting quantitative easing. Still, the ongoing monetary easing has not translated into lower lending rates for the real economy. In particular, although the BI lowered its policy rate by 200 basis points since July 2019, bank lending rates have only fallen by 100 basis points (Chart II-3, middle panel). This is a major sign that the monetary transmission mechanism is broken. Furthermore, the commercial banks’ lending rate, in real (inflation-adjusted) terms, remains elevated (Chart II-3, bottom panel). This is severely hurting credit demand (Chart II-3, top panel). The deflationary pressures on the Indonesian economy are intensifying. As a result, the deflationary pressures on the Indonesian economy are intensifying. The top panel of Chart II-4 shows that the GDP deflator is flirting with deflation. Meanwhile, both core and headline inflation have undershot the central bank’s target (Chart II-4, bottom panel). Bottom Line: Very low inflation and crumbling real growth have caused nominal GDP growth to drop below borrowing rates (Chart II-5). This is hitting borrowers’ ability to service their debt and is leading to swelling non-performing loans (NPLs). Chart II-4Indonesia Is Facing Very Low Inflation Indonesia Is Facing Very Low Inflation Indonesia Is Facing Very Low Inflation Chart II-5Indonesia: Nominal GDP Growth Is Well Below Lending Rates Indonesia: Nominal GDP Growth Is Well Below Lending Rates Indonesia: Nominal GDP Growth Is Well Below Lending Rates   Bank Stocks Remain At Risk The outlook for bank stocks that make up 48% of the Indonesia MSCI equity index is bleak. Chart II-6 shows that non-performing loans and special-mention loans (which are composed of doubtful loans) were rising before the pandemic shock. This has forced commercial banks to boost their bad loans provisioning, which has hurt their profitability. Additionally, Indonesian commercial banks’ net interest margins (NIM) have been falling sharply (Chart II-7). This has occurred because, on the revenues side, interest earnings have mushroomed as debtors have halted their interest payments while, on the expenditures side, commercial banks were forced to keep on paying interests to depositors. To protect their profitability, commercial banks have kept their lending rates stubbornly high. However, doing so will end up backfiring – as elevated lending rates punish borrowers and end up causing NPLs to rise, leading to more profit weakness. Chart II-6Indonesia: Bad Loans Are On The Rise Indonesia: Bad Loans Are On The Rise Indonesia: Bad Loans Are On The Rise Chart II-7Indonesia: Banks' Net Interest Margins Are Falling Indonesia: Banks' Net Interest Margins Are Falling Indonesia: Banks' Net Interest Margins Are Falling   Crucially, Bank Central Asia and Bank Rakyat – which now account for a whopping 37% of the Indonesia MSCI market cap – are vulnerable. Both commercial banks are heavily exposed to state-owned enterprises (SOE) and small and medium (SME) companies. Particularly, 40% of Bank Central Asia’s loan book is linked to SOEs and government-led projects across electricity, ports, airports and cement among other sectors. Meanwhile, 68% of Bank Rakyat’s loan book is leveraged to the SME sector and 20% to large companies, including SOEs. Worryingly, both SOEs and SMEs have been undergoing stress. Their profitability and debt servicing ability were questionable even before the COVID-19 pandemic. State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs): The debt servicing ability for these companies has deteriorated. The debt-to-EBITDA ratio has risen considerably while the EBITDA coverage of interest expenses is set to fall from already low levels (Chart II-8). Small & Medium Enterprises (SME): The debt serviceability of the top 40% of the MSCI-listed small cap stocks is also deteriorating. The top panel of Chart II-9 shows that these companies’ debt-to-EBITDA has risen substantially, and that the EBITDA-to-interest expense ratio has plunged (Chart II-9, bottom panel). Chart II-8Indonesian SOEs: Weak Debt Servicing Capacity Indonesian SOEs: Weak Debt Servicing Capacity Indonesian SOEs: Weak Debt Servicing Capacity Chart II-9Indonesian SMEs: Weak Debt Servicing Capacity Indonesian SMEs: Weak Debt Servicing Capacity Indonesian SMEs: Weak Debt Servicing Capacity   Chart II-10Indonesia Equities: Banks, Non-Financials And Small Caps Indonesia Equities: Banks, Non-Financials And Small Caps Indonesia Equities: Banks, Non-Financials And Small Caps All in all, both Bank Central Asia and Bank Rakyat are set to experience a considerable new NPL cycle emanating from the poor profitability of SOEs and SMEs. Importantly, Bank Central Asia and Bank Rakyat’s respective NPLs at 1.3% and 2.6% were relatively low at the start of this year and have much room to rise. Neither are their valuations appealing. At a price-to-book value of 4.4 Bank Central Asia is expensive. As for Bank Rakyat while its multiples are not as high as Bank Central Asia’s (which is trading at a price-to-book value of 1.8), it is not particularly cheap either, considering its enormous exposure to Indonesia’s struggling SME sector.  Bottom Line: The outlook for bank stocks is murky (Chart II-10). Apart from banks, the rest of the Indonesian stock market has been performing very poorly and there is no obvious evidence that this will change (Chart II-10, bottom two panels). Investment Conclusions Continue underweighting the Indonesian stock market. Bank stocks remain at risk. Moreover, there is evidence that retail investors have been active in the stock market as of late. When the stock market does relapse, retail investors will likely rush to sell their holdings, thereby magnifying the equity selloff. Dedicated EM local currency bonds and credit portfolios should continue underweighting Indonesia. Investors in Indonesia’s corporate US dollar bonds should tread carefully as the largest issuers are those SOEs that have experienced deteriorating creditworthiness. Chart II-11Return On Capital Drives EM Currencies Return On Capital Drives EM Currencies Return On Capital Drives EM Currencies If the US dollar continues to depreciate, the rupiah could stabilize and rebound but it will underperform other EM and DM currencies. Return on capital (ROC) is the ultimate driver of EM currencies. Given the magnitude of the recession Indonesia is in and the slow recovery it will experience, its ROC will remain weak. This will weigh on the rupiah (Chart II-11). We continue shorting the rupiah against an equally weighted basket of the euro, Swiss franc and Japanese yen. Ayman Kawtharani Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com Turkey: The Ramifications Of A Money Plethora Turkey is facing another currency turmoil. At the core of significant currency depreciation pressures is an overflow of money. Chart III-1 demonstrates that narrow money (M1) and broad money (M3) are booming at 90% and 50%, respectively, from a year ago. These measures exclude foreign currency deposits. Bank loan annual growth has surged to 45% and commercial bank purchases of government bonds are skyrocketing (Chart III-2). Chart III-1Turkey's Money Overflow Turkey's Money Overflow Turkey's Money Overflow Chart III-2Rampant Credit Creation By Commercial Banks Rampant Credit Creation By Commercial Banks Rampant Credit Creation By Commercial Banks     In turn, the Central Bank of Turkey’s (CBRT) funding of commercial banks has surged (Chart III-3). By providing ample liquidity the CBRT has enabled commercial banks to engage in a credit frenzy and levy of government debt. The latter has capped local currency bond yields at a time when the private sector and foreign investors have been reluctant to finance the government bond given its current yields. At the core of significant currency depreciation pressures is an overflow of money. Consistent with this expanding money bubble, inflation in Turkey remains in a structural uptrend (Chart III-4). Core and service sector consumer price inflation is close to 12% and will rise even further due to the overflow of money in the economy. Besides, residential property prices are already soaring, in local currency terms, as residents are fleeing from liras. Chart III-3Central Bank's Funding Of Banks Central Bank's Funding Of Banks Central Bank's Funding Of Banks Chart III-4Structurally Rising Inflation Structurally Rising Inflation Structurally Rising Inflation   Still, the central bank refuses to acknowledge these inflationary pressures and to tighten its policy stance. Monetary authorities remain well behind the inflation curve. The policy rate, in real terms (deflated by core CPI), is -2%. In the past, when real policy rates have dropped to this level, the exchange rate has often tumbled, as in 2011, 2013, 2015 and 2018 (Chart III-5). Chart III-5Numerous Headwinds For The Lira Numerous Headwinds For The Lira Numerous Headwinds For The Lira In regard to balance of payments, the current account deficit is widening again due to the plunge in exports and tourism revenues and the recovering imports (Chart III-5, bottom panel). Historically, a widening current account deficit has weighed on the currency. Lastly, the central bank is not in the position to defend the exchange rate much longer. Not only has it depleted its own reserves but it has also used up $70 billion of commercial banks deposits and entered a $55 billion foreign exchange swap. Hence, its is massively short on US dollars. Bottom Line: As part of our broader currency strategy, on July 9, we replaced our short Turkish lira versus the US dollar position with a short in TRY versus a basket of the euro, CHF and JPY. This switch has proved to be very profitable and we continue recommending it. Consequently, investors should continue underweighting Turkish stocks, local currency bonds and credit markets relative to their EM counterparts. Fixed-income investors should consider betting on higher inflation expectations, i.e. going long domestic inflation adjusted yields and shorting nominal yields. Andrija Vesic Associate Editor andrijav@bcaresearch.com Footnotes   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights The decade-long US equity market outperformance versus the rest of the world could be nearing its end. We are upgrading EM stocks from underweight to neutral within a global equity portfolio. We reiterate the change in our US dollar outlook from bullish to bearish. The concentration risk in EM (specifically in North Asia) mega-cap stocks, poor fundamentals in EM outside North Asia, and a potential flare-up in US-China tensions are the reasons why we are reluctant to be overweight EM stocks. Feature We recommended the short EM equities / long S&P 500 position in late 2010,1 and have reiterated this strategy consistently over the past decade. Since its inception, this trade has produced a 193% gain with extremely low volatility (Chart 1). We recommend taking profits on this position for the reasons elaborated in this report. Chart 1Book Profits On Our Short EM Stocks / Long S&P 500 Strategy Book Profits On Our Short EM Stocks / Long S&P 500 Strategy Book Profits On Our Short EM Stocks / Long S&P 500 Strategy Chart 2Equity Strategy Of the Decade: The Risk-Reward Is No Longer Attractive Equity Strategy Of the Decade: The Risk-Reward Is No Longer Attractive Equity Strategy Of the Decade: The Risk-Reward Is No Longer Attractive Consistently, we are upgrading EM stocks from underweight to neutral within a global equity portfolio. Our decade-long equity sector theme – introduced in our June 8, 2010 report2 – has been to underweight resources and overweight technology and healthcare (Chart 2). This sector strategy has been one of the reasons for underweighting EM and favoring the US market in a global equity portfolio over the past decade. Going forward, the risk-reward of this sector strategy is no longer attractive. Regarding EM absolute performance, we recommend that absolute-return investors remain on standby for a correction before going long the EM equity benchmark. The End Of US Equity Outperformance The decade-long US equity market outperformance versus the rest of the world could be nearing its end.It is widely known that this decade’s US equity outperformance was largely due to FAANGM stocks (Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, Google and Microsoft). The FAANGM rally meets many of the criteria for a bubble, as we elaborated in our July 16 report. Our FAANGM equity index – an equal-weighted average of the six stocks – has increased almost 20-fold in real (inflation-adjusted) terms since January 2010 (Chart 3). Chart 3Each Decade = One Mania Take Profits On The Short EM / Long S&P 500 Position Take Profits On The Short EM / Long S&P 500 Position Its rise is on par with the magnitude of the bull market in the Nasdaq 100 index through the 1990s, or of Walt Disney. through the 1960s, and it well exceeds other bubbles, as illustrated on Chart 3. All price indexes are shown in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. FAANGM stocks have greatly benefited from the recent “work from home” and other societal shifts and have been outperforming through the March financial carnage. It has made them unassailable in the eyes of investors. Yet, even great companies have a fair price, and considerable price overshoots will not be sustainable in the long term. We sense that a growing number of investors deem the US FAANGM and EM mega-cap stocks to be invincible. When some stocks are regarded as unbeatable, their top is not far. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the FAANGM will outperform in the next selloff. Rather, the odds are that they will underperform because these stocks are extremely expensive, overbought, over-hyped and over-owned. The decade-long US equity market outperformance versus the rest of the world could be nearing its end. Apart from technology and FAANGM, US equities are facing a mediocre profit outlook. As long as the pandemic is not contained, America’s consumer and business confidence will remain lackluster, and, as a result, a recovery in their spending will be subdued. Chart 4US Stocks Are Not Cheap After Removing Market-Cap Bias US Stocks Are Not Cheap After Removing Market-Cap Bias US Stocks Are Not Cheap After Removing Market-Cap Bias Notably, the broad US equity market is also expensive. The equal-weighted US equity index is trading at a 12-month forward P/E ratio of 21 (Chart 4, top panel). The risks associated with domestic politics are rising in the US. Social, political and economic divisions have been magnified by both the pandemic and the economic downtrend. Social and political tensions will likely flare up around the November elections. Our colleagues from the Geopolitical team argue that a contested election is possible and could lead to a crisis of presidential legitimacy in the US. Finally, the US equity market cap has reached 58% of the global market cap, the highest on record. Gravity forces are likely to kick in sooner than later, capping US equity outperformance. Bottom Line: The tailwinds supporting the US equity outperformance are fading. We are booking gains on the short EM stocks / long S&P 500 strategy. Consistently, we are also closing the short EM banks / long US banks and short Chinese banks / long US banks positions. They have produced a 75% gain and an 11% loss, respectively. Downgrading The US Dollar Outlook = Upgrading The EM View We had been bullish on the US dollar and bearish on EM currencies since early 2011 (Chart 5, top panel), but on July 9 made a major change in our currency strategy: we switched our shorts in EM currencies away from the US dollar to against an equal-weighted basket of the euro, Swiss franc and the yen. Since then, the EM ex-China equal-weighted currency index has rebounded versus the US dollar, but has depreciated against the basket of the euro, CHF and JPY (Chart 5, bottom panel). Chart 5EM Currencies Have Bottomed Versus The US Dollar But Not Against Other Safe-Heavens EM Currencies Have Bottomed Versus The US Dollar But Not Against Other Safe-Heavens EM Currencies Have Bottomed Versus The US Dollar But Not Against Other Safe-Heavens While the US dollar could rebound in the short term, especially versus EM currencies, any rebound will likely prove to be short-lived. From now on, the strategy for the greenback should be selling into strength. Here is why: As US inflation rises in the coming years and the Fed refuses to raise interest rates, US real rates will drop further and, as a result, the US dollar will depreciate. A central bank that is behind the inflation curve is bearish for a nation’s currency. The main reason for turning negative on the US dollar structurally is the rising determination by the Federal Reserve to stay behind the inflation curve in the years to come. This strategy will instigate an inflation outbreak. Falling real interest rates have caused a plunge in the US dollar, as well as a surge in precious metal prices, in recent weeks. In fact, risk-on currencies have lately underperformed safe-haven currencies, such as the CHF and JPY (Chart 6). This market move confirms that the dollar’s recent plunge is due to fears of its debasement, not to robust growth in the world economy and in EM/China. As US inflation rises in the coming years and the Fed refuses to raise interest rates, US real rates will drop further and, as a result, the US dollar will depreciate.    Colossal debt monetization. The Fed is undertaking an immense monetization of public and private debt. The current situation, involving the Fed’s purchases of securities, is different from the one following the Lehman crisis. Back in 2008-2014, the Fed’s QE program did not produce an exponential rise in money supply. The US broad money supply (M2) was rising at a single-digit rate between 2009 and 2014 (Chart 7). Presently, US M2 growth has exploded to 24% from a year ago. Chart 6Risk-On Currencies Are Underperforming Safe-Heaven Ones Risk-On Currencies Are Underperforming Safe-Heaven Ones Risk-On Currencies Are Underperforming Safe-Heaven Ones Chart 7Helicopter' Money in the US Helicopter' Money in the US Helicopter' Money in the US The pace of US broad money growth is much higher than that of many advanced and developing economies. Chart 8 shows new money creation as a share of GDP across various economies. It demonstrates that Japan and the US are now experiencing the quickest rate of new money creation in the world.   In short, even though debt monetization is occurring in many advanced and EM economies, the US is doing it on an unprecedented scale. Chart 8Money Creation As % Of GDP In 2Q2020 Take Profits On The Short EM / Long S&P 500 Position Take Profits On The Short EM / Long S&P 500 Position “Helicopter” money will eventually lift inflation. The latest surge in the US money supply has only partially offset the collapse in its velocity. Consequently, America’s nominal GDP has plunged. This stems from the following identity: Nominal GDP = Price Level x Output Volume = Velocity of Money x Money Supply Solving the above equation for inflation, we get: Price Level = (Velocity of Money x Money Supply) / (Output Volume) Going forward, the velocity of US money will likely recover, for it is closely associated with consumers’ and businesses’ willingness to spend. At that point, rising velocity of money and greater money supply will work together to exert upward pressure on nominal GDP. Meantime, the pandemic will probably reduce potential output. The outcome of higher nominal spending and reduced potential productive capacity will be higher inflation. In sum, US inflation will rise well above 2% in the coming years. Yet, the Fed will stay put amid rising inflation. The upshot will be a structural downtrend in the US dollar. Whilst there are many arguments against rising inflation, we are leaning toward the view that US inflation will begin rising as of next year. We will elaborate on this inflation outlook in our future reports.     Rising political and social uncertainty in the US will weigh on the greenback. The failure by the US authorities to contain the spread of the pandemic will continue fueling political and social upheavals. This could culminate in a harshly contested presidential election and a reduction in the US dollar’s allure for foreign investors.    Portfolio inflows into the US will turn into outflows. The stellar performance of US equities attracted portfolio inflows into the US over the last 10 years. These capital inflows, in turn, boosted the greenback. But these dynamics are about to be reversed. Chart 9The US's Net International Investment Position Is At A Record Low The US's Net International Investment Position Is At A Record Low The US's Net International Investment Position Is At A Record Low The top panel of Chart 9 shows that the US’s net international investment position in equities is at its lowest point since 1986. This means that foreign ownership of US stocks exceeds US resident ownership of foreign equities by a record amount. This reflects the fact that investors have by a large margin favored the US versus other bourses. As American share prices outperformed their international peers, both domestic and foreign investors have poured more capital into US equities. As the US relative equity performance reverses, equity capital will flow out of the US, thus dragging down the US dollar. Chart 10 shows that the trade-weighted dollar tracks the relative performance of the S&P500 versus the global equity benchmark in local currency terms. Regarding debt securities, the US’s net international investment position has widened to  - US$8.5 trillion (Chart 9, bottom panel). Not all fixed-income investors hedge currency risk. As the dollar slides, there will be growing pressure on foreign fixed-income investors to hedge their dollar exposure or sell US and buy non-US debt securities. Chart 10A Top In The US$ = The End Of The US Equity Outperformance? A Top In The US$ = The End Of The US Equity Outperformance? A Top In The US$ = The End Of The US Equity Outperformance? Bottom Line: Immense public debt monetization leading to higher inflation down the road and the Fed falling behind the curve, will produce a lasting and considerable downtrend in the US dollar in the coming years. Why Not Overweight EM Stocks? There are a number of reasons why – for now – we are only upgrading EM equities to neutral, rather than to overweight within a global equity portfolio, and why we are still reluctant to recommend buying EM stocks for absolute-return investors:   Concentration risk in EM mega-cap stocks. As US FAANGM share prices come under selling pressure, contagion will spill over to EM mega-cap stocks. The latter have been responsible for a large share of gains in the EM equity index and, conversely, their pullback will considerably impact the EM benchmark’s performance. The top six companies combined account for about 24% of the MSCI EM equity market cap. To compare, US FAANGM (Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix, Google and Microsoft) also account for 24% of the S&P 500 market cap. Hence, the concentration risk in EM equity space is as high as in the US. Geopolitical risk. A potential flare up in in geopolitical tensions will weigh on Chinese, South Korean and Taiwanese stocks. Given that they make up about 65% of the MSCI EM index equity market cap, the EM benchmark will suffer in absolute terms and be unlikely to outperform the global equity index. Faced with decreased approval in regard to his handling of the pandemic, and to a lesser extent, the economy and other social issues, President Trump could well resort to geopolitics to “rally Americans behind the flag.” He may, for example, ramp up tensions with China in an attempt to make geopolitics and China the focal points of the forthcoming presidential election. China will certainly retaliate. The South China Sea, Taiwan, technology transfers, treatment of multinational companies in both China and the US, as well as North Korea, could be focal points of a confrontation. This will weigh on business confidence in Asia and on capital spending. In our opinion, markets are vulnerable to such geopolitical risks. Poor domestic fundamentals in EM outside China, Korea and Taiwan. Fundamental backdrops remain inferior in many EM economies outside the North Asian ones. The number of new infections continues to rise in India, Indonesia, The Philippines, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia and Peru. Many EM economies will only slowly return to normalcy. In certain countries, banking systems were already in poor health, and things have gotten much worse after the crash in economic activity. As to the positives for EM, they are as follows: Rising Chinese demand will boost EM exports to China and help revive their growth. EM equity valuations are very appealing versus the S&P 500 (Chart 11). The bottom panel of Chart 11 shows that EM’s cyclically-adjusted P/E ratio relative to that in the US is over one standard deviation below its mean. Based on the 12-month forward P/E ratio for an equal-weighted index, EM stocks are cheaper than US ones (please refer to Chart 4 on page 4).  EM currencies are also cheap (Chart 12). While they might experience a short-term setback, as a global risk-off phase takes place, EM exchange rates have probably seen their lows versus the US dollar. Chart 11EM Stocks Offer Value Versus The S&P 500 EM Stocks Offer Value Versus The S&P 500 EM Stocks Offer Value Versus The S&P 500 Chart 12EM Currencies Are Cheap EM Currencies Are Cheap EM Currencies Are Cheap The US dollar’s weakness will mitigate risks for EM issuers of US dollar bonds and, thereby, induce more flows into EM sovereign and corporate credit markets. In short, EM local currency bonds will assuredly benefit from the US dollar’s slide. We have been neutral on both EM local currency bonds and EM sovereign and corporate credit, and are waiting for a correction before upgrading to overweight. In nutshell, little or no stress in EM fixed-income markets bodes well for EM share prices. Bottom Line: Risks to EM equity relative performance are presently balanced. A neutral allocation is warranted for now. EM relative equity performance versus DM is only slightly above its recent low (Chart 13, top panel). It is, therefore, a good juncture to move the EM equity allocation from underweight to neutral. In addition, both the EM equal-weighted and small-cap equity indexes are not yet signaling a broad-based and sustainable outperformance (Chart 13, middle and bottom panels). Chart 13EM Relative Equity Performance Is In A Bottom-Out Phase EM Relative Equity Performance Is In A Bottom-Out Phase EM Relative Equity Performance Is In A Bottom-Out Phase Some FAQs Question: Wouldn’t the US dollar rally if global stocks sell off? The greenback will likely attempt to rebound from current oversold levels when and as a global risk-off phase sets in. EM high-beta currencies could experience a non-trivial setback but will remain above their March lows. Yet, any rebound in the US dollar versus European currencies and the Japanese yen will be fleeting and moderate. On July 9, in anticipation of US dollar weakness, we booked profits on the short EM currencies/long US dollar strategy and recommended shorting several EM currencies versus an equal-weighted basket of the euro, CHF and JPY. This strategy remains intact for now. Our short list of EM currencies includes: BRL, CLP, ZAR, TRY, IDR, PHP and KRW. Odds are that EM stocks will likely be broadly flattish relative to those in DM amid the next sell off. Chart 14EM Stocks Have Been Low Beta EM Stocks Have Been Low Beta EM Stocks Have Been Low Beta Question: Aren’t EM stocks high-beta and won’t they underperform if, and as, global stocks sell off? The EM equity index has had a beta lower than one since 2013 (Chart 14). Odds are that EM stocks will likely be broadly flattish relative to those in DM amid the next sell off. Within the DM equity space, the US will likely underperform both Europe and Japan in common currency terms. Question: Which equity markets do you favor within the EM space? Our current overweights are China, Thailand, Russia, Peru, Pakistan and Mexico. Our underweights are Indonesia, India, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Turkey, South Africa, Chile and Brazil. Question: Which currencies and local currency bond markets do you recommend overweighting for dedicated EM managers? We recommended going long the Czech koruna versus the US dollar last week. Other currencies that we favor within the EM space are SGD, TWD, THB, MXN and RUB. As for local currency bonds or swap rates, our top picks are Mexico, Russia, Korea, India, China, Malaysia, Thailand, Peru, Ukraine and Pakistan. As always, the list of country recommendations for equities, fixed-income and currencies is available at the end of our reports (please refer to pages 14-15) or on the website.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Reports "Inflation, Overheating And The Stampede Into Bonds," dated November 30, 2010, and "Emerging Markets In 2011: Not The Best Play In Town," dated December 14, 2010. 2Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "How To Play Emerging Market Growth In The Coming Decade," dated June 8, 2010   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights The Fed’s emergency lending facilities have successfully stabilized markets … : Credit spreads have tightened dramatically since March and liquidity has been restored to the US Treasury market. … at very little cost to the central bank: Just the announcement of Fed lending facilities has been enough to push spreads lower in most cases. The facilities themselves have seen very little actual uptake. The only cost borne by the Fed has been a dramatic expansion of its balance sheet due to purchases of Treasury securities. We still want to “buy what the Fed is buying”: In US fixed income, we want to favor those sectors that are eligible for Fed support. This includes corporate bonds rated Ba and higher, municipal bonds and Aaa-rated securitizations. Keep portfolio duration at neutral: The Fed will be much more cautious about raising interest rates than in the past, and could wait until inflation is above its target before lifting off zero. Feature Back in April, we published a detailed explainer of the extraordinary actions taken by the Federal Reserve to combat the pandemic-induced recession.1 This week, we re-visit that Special Report to assess what the Fed has accomplished during the past three months and to speculate about what lies ahead. Overall, the Fed’s response has been highly effective. Stability was restored to financial markets almost immediately after the most dramatic policy interventions were announced, and it turns out that the announcements themselves did most of the work. The ultimate usage of the Fed’s Section 13(3) emergency lending facilities has been extremely low relative to their stated maximum capacities (Table 1). If you are the Fed, it is apparently enough to marshal overwhelming force and announce your willingness to deploy it. Like the ECB demonstrated in the fraught Eurozone summer of 2012, a bazooka can restore order without being fired.2 Table 1Usage Of The 2020 Federal Reserve Emergency Lending Facilities Alphabet Soup, Part 2: Shocked And Awed Alphabet Soup, Part 2: Shocked And Awed The only possible cost borne by the Fed has been an explosion in the size of its balance sheet, mostly attributable to purchases of Treasury securities. The ultimate usage of the Fed’s facilities has been extremely low relative to their stated maximum capacities. This report looks at how the Fed’s actions have influenced (and will influence) interest rates, Treasury market liquidity, the corporate bond market and other fixed income spread products. It also considers the potential impact of the size of the Fed’s balance sheet on the economy and financial markets. Interest Rates The Fed dropped the funds rate to a range of 0% to 0.25% on March 15, and since then it has aggressively signaled that rates will stay pinned at the zero-lower-bound for a long time. Investors quickly took this message on board (Chart 1). The median estimate from the New York Fed’s Survey of Market Participants has the funds rate holding steady at least through the end of 2022. Meanwhile, the overnight index swap curve isn’t pricing-in a rate hike until 2024. Chart 1The Fed And Market Agree: No Hikes Through 2022 The Fed And Market Agree: No Hikes Through 2022 The Fed And Market Agree: No Hikes Through 2022 Chart 2Better Signaling From The Fed Better Signaling From The Fed Better Signaling From The Fed The market adjusted much more quickly to the Fed’s zero interest rate policy this year than it did during the last zero-lower-bound episode (Chart 2). The MOVE index of Treasury yield volatility has already plunged to below 50. It took several years for it to reach those levels after the Fed cut rates to zero at the end of 2008. Similarly, the yield curve is much flatter today than it was during the last zero-lower-bound episode. This partly reflects the market’s expectation that rates will stay at zero for longer and partly the downward revisions to estimates of the long-run neutral fed funds rate that have occurred during the past few years. The bottom line is that the Fed has successfully achieved its goal on interest rate policy. The funds rate is at its effective lower bound and the entire term structure is priced for it to stay there for a very long time. There are two main reasons for this success. First, the Fed’s forward guidance has been more dovish this year than at any point during the last zero-lower-bound episode, with many FOMC participants calling for the Fed to target a temporary overshoot of the 2% inflation target. Second, the market is more skeptical about inflation ever returning to that target, as evidenced by much lower long-dated inflation expectations (Chart 2, bottom panel). What’s Next? The Fed has already made it clear that it won’t pursue negative interest rates. With those off the table, the next step will be for the Fed to make its forward rate guidance more explicit. In all likelihood this will involve the return of some form of the Evans Rule that was in place between 2012 and 2014. The Evans Rule was a commitment to not lift rates at least until the unemployment rate moved below 6.5% or inflation moved above 2.5%.3 The new version of the Evans Rule will be much more dovish. In a recent speech, Governor Lael Brainard favorably cited research suggesting that the Fed should refrain from liftoff until inflation reaches the 2% target.4 That may very well be the rule that ends up becoming official Fed guidance. If the Fed wants to strengthen its commitment to low rates even more, it could follow the Reserve Bank of Australia’s lead and implement a Yield Curve Control policy. This policy would involve setting caps for Treasury yields out to a 2-year or 3-year maturity. The Fed would pledge to buy as many securities as necessary to enforce the caps and would only lift the caps when the criteria of its new Evans Rule are met. While spreads have tightened across all credit tiers, investment grade corporates have become much more expensive than high-yield. For the time being, there is no rush for the Fed to deliver more explicit forward guidance and/or Yield Curve Control. As we noted above, bond yields are already pricing-in an extremely lengthy period of zero rates. But these policies will become more important as the economic recovery progresses and market participants start to speculate about an eventual exit from the zero bound. Explicit forward guidance and/or Yield Curve Control would then prevent a premature rise in bond yields and tightening of financial conditions. With all that in mind, we would not be surprised to see more explicit (Evans Rule-style) forward guidance rolled out at some point this year, but unless bonds sell off significantly beforehand, it probably won’t have an immediate impact on yields. The same is true for Yield Curve Control, though the odds of that being announced this year are lower as it is a tool with which the Fed is less comfortable. Treasury Market Liquidity Chart 3When Treasury Market Liquidity Evaporated When Treasury Market Liquidity Evaporated When Treasury Market Liquidity Evaporated As the COVID-19 crisis flared in March, there were several tense days when liquidity in the US Treasury market evaporated. Bond yields jumped even as the equity market plunged (Chart 3). Meanwhile, liquidity markers showed that it had become much more difficult to transact in US Treasuries. Treasury Bid/Ask spreads widened dramatically and the iShares 20+ Year Treasury ETF (TLT) traded at a huge discount to its net asset value (Chart 3, panel 3). During the past four months, researchers have identified hedge fund selling of Treasuries to meet margin calls and foreign bank selling of Treasuries to meet demands for US dollar funding as the proximate causes of March’s Treasury rout. However, it is clearly a failure of market structure that the Treasury market was unable to accommodate that selling pressure without liquidity disappearing. In a recent paper from The Brookings Institution, Darrell Duffie explains why the Treasury market was unable to maintain its liquidity during this tumultuous period.5 Essentially, he argues that it is the combination of rising Treasury supply and post-2008 regulations imposed on dealer banks that has led to an environment where there is a large and growing amount of Treasury supply, but where dealers have less balance sheet capacity to intermediate trading. To illustrate, Chart 4 shows the ratio between the outstanding supply of Treasury securities and the quantity of Treasury inventories for which primary dealers obtained financing. Quite obviously, the dealers’ intermediation activities have not kept pace with the expanding size of the market. Chart 4Primary Dealers Have Not Kept Up With Treasury Issuance Primary Dealers Have Not Kept Up With Treasury Issuance Primary Dealers Have Not Kept Up With Treasury Issuance What’s Next? Without changes to Treasury market structure or bank capital requirements (Duffie recommends abandoning the system of competing dealer banks altogether and moving all Treasury trades through one central clearinghouse), we are likely to see more episodes like March where a spate of Treasury selling leads to an evaporation of market liquidity. When that happens, the Fed will be forced to step in and buy Treasuries, as it did in March (Chart 3, bottom panel). The goal of that intervention is simply to remove enough supply from the market so that the remaining trading volume can be handled by the dealers. As this pattern repeats itself over time, it will cause the Fed’s presence in the Treasury market to grow. Bottom Line: Unless structural changes are made to the Treasury market or bank capital regulations are rolled back, we should expect more episodes of Treasury market illiquidity like we saw in March. We should also expect the Fed to respond to those episodes with aggressive Treasury purchases, and for the Fed’s presence in the Treasury market to grow over time. Corporate Bonds The Fed’s intervention in the corporate bond market consists of three lending facilities: The Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility (SMCCF) where the Fed purchases investment grade corporate bonds and recent Ba-rated fallen angels in the secondary market. This facility also purchases investment grade and high-yield ETFs. The Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility (PMCCF) where the Fed buys new issuance from investment grade-rated issuers (and recent fallen angels) in the primary market. The Main Street Lending Facility (MSLF) where the Fed purchases loans off of bank balance sheets. The loans must be made to small or medium-sized firms with Debt-to-EBITDA ratios below 6.0. Chart 5Corporate Issuance Surged Following The Fed's Announcements Corporate Issuance Surged Following The Fed's Announcements Corporate Issuance Surged Following The Fed's Announcements As mentioned above, these facilities have barely been tapped. As of July 1, the Fed had purchased $1.5 billion of corporate bonds and just under $8 billion of ETFs through the SMCCF, while the PMCCF had not been used at all. However, the impact of the Fed’s promise to back-stop such a large portion of the corporate debt market has been immense. Corporate bond issuance surged following the announcement of the Fed’s facilities, and set monthly post-2008 records in March, April and May (Chart 5). The effect on corporate bond spreads has been just as dramatic. Spreads peaked on March 23, the day that the SMCCF and PMCCF were announced, and have tightened significantly since then. Further underscoring the importance of the SMCCF, PMCCF and MSLF announcements is that those segments of the corporate bond market most likely to have access to the Fed’s lending facilities have seen the most spread compression. Recall that investment grade issuers and recent fallen angels have access to the SMCCF and PMCCF, while the MSLF will benefit most issuers rated Ba or higher. Some B-rated issuers are able to tap the MSLF, but not the majority. Issuers rated Caa or below are much less likely to benefit from any of the Fed’s programs. Table 2 shows how the impact of the Fed’s facilities has played out across the different corporate credit tiers. It shows each credit tier’s option-adjusted spread and 12-month breakeven spread as of March 23 and today. It also shows the percentile rank of those spreads since 2010 (100% indicating the widest spread since 2010 and 0% indicating the tightest). While spreads have tightened across all credit tiers, investment grade corporates have become much more expensive than high-yield. The B-rated and below credit tiers are particularly cheap, with 12-month breakeven spreads all above their 80th percentiles since 2010. Table 2The Fed's Impact On Corporate Spreads Alphabet Soup, Part 2: Shocked And Awed Alphabet Soup, Part 2: Shocked And Awed Chart 6Spread Curve Back To Normal Spread Curve Back To Normal Spread Curve Back To Normal The market impact of the Fed’s corporate lending facilities is also apparent across the corporate bond term structure. In March, the investment grade corporate bond spread slope inverted, as 1-5 year maturity corporate bond spreads widened relative to spreads of securities with more than 5 years to maturity (Chart 6).6 The Fed concentrated its lending facilities on securities with less than 5 years to maturity, and it has successfully re-steepened the corporate spread curve. But the Fed’s corporate lending facilities are not all powerful. As Chair Powell likes to say: “the Fed has lending powers, not spending powers”. So while the promise of Fed lending is a big help, it still means that troubled firms will have to increase their debt loads to survive the economic downturn. Those firms that take on debt may still see their credit ratings downgraded as their balance sheet health deteriorates. Indeed, this is exactly what has happened. Ratings downgrades have jumped during the past few months, as have defaults (Chart 7). There has also been a spike in the number of fallen angels – firms downgraded out of investment grade – but not as big a jump as was seen during the last recession (Chart 7, panel 2). The Fed’s emergency lending facilities have likely prevented some downgrades, but not all. Chart 7Fed Can't Prevent Downgrades Fed Can't Prevent Downgrades Fed Can't Prevent Downgrades What’s Next? The Fed’s lending facilities are responsible for a huge portion of the spread compression we’ve seen since late March. That said, it is a potential problem for corporate bonds that those facilities are scheduled to expire at the end of September. Our sense is that the expiry date will be extended, and that the facilities will only be wound down after a significant period of time where they see zero usage. At that point, the Fed should be able to halt the facilities without unduly impacting markets. In terms of investment implications, we think that the Fed’s back-stop will continue to be the most important driver of corporate bond spreads during the next few months. This means we would avoid chasing the attractive valuations in bonds rated B & below, and would continue to focus our corporate bond exposure on bonds rated Ba and above. We make an exception to our “buy what the Fed is buying” rule when it comes to positioning across the corporate bond term structure. Here, we are inclined to grab the extra spread offered by longer-maturity securities even though Fed secondary market purchases are concentrated at the front-end. Our rationale is that the Fed’s secondary market purchases are already low and will likely decline as time goes on. Meanwhile, if firms with long-maturity debt outstanding need help they can still access the PMCCF if needed.  Other Fed Lending Facilities & Fixed Income Sectors Outside of the three programs geared toward the corporate bond market, the Fed also rolled out emergency lending facilities meant to back-stop: money market mutual funds (MMLF), the commercial paper market (CPFF), the asset-backed securities market (TALF), the municipal bond market (MLF) and the federal government’s new Paycheck Protection Program (PPPLF). Once again, the announcement effect did most of the work for all of these facilities and the Fed managed to quickly restore stability to each targeted market without doing much actual lending. For starters, the MMLF successfully halted a flight out of prime money market funds with a relatively modest $53 billion in loans (Chart 8). The CPFF caused the commercial paper/T-bill spread to normalize with only $4 billion of lending, and the LIBOR/OIS spread also tightened soon after the Fed rolled out its facilities (Chart 8, bottom panel). The Fed has dramatically expanded the size of its balance sheet through purchases of Treasury securities and agency MBS. In the asset-backed securities market, the Fed decided that only Aaa-rated securitizations are eligible for TALF. With that in mind, Aaa-rated consumer ABS and CMBS spreads have tightened considerably since TALF’s announcement (Chart 9). Non-Aaa consumer ABS spreads have tightened modestly despite the lack of Fed support. This is because fiscal stimulus has, so far, kept households flush with cash and prevented a wave of consumer bankruptcies. Non-Aaa CMBS, on the other hand, have struggled due to lack of Fed support and a sharp increase in commercial real estate delinquencies. Chart 8Stability Restored Stability Restored Stability Restored Chart 9Consumer ABS & CMBS Spreads Tightened Considerably... Consumer ABS & CMBS Spreads Tightened Considerably... Consumer ABS & CMBS Spreads Tightened Considerably...   The announcement of the MLF also successfully led to compression in municipal bond spreads (Chart 10), though the Aaa muni curve still trades cheap relative to Treasuries. Like the other facilities, the MLF has seen very low take-up. In this instance, low MLF usage results from its expensive pricing. Municipal governments can access loans through the MLF for a period of up to three years at a cost of 3-year OIS plus a fixed spread that varies depending on the municipality’s credit rating. However, current market pricing is well below the MLF rate for all credit tiers (Chart 10, bottom 2 panels). This means that the MLF provides a nice back-stop in case muni spreads widen again, but it is not currently an effective means of getting cash to struggling state & local governments. Chart 10...As Have Municipal Bond Spreads ...As Have Municipal Bond Spreads ...As Have Municipal Bond Spreads Finally, the PPPLF is a facility that purchases loans made through the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) off of bank balance sheets. Essentially, it is an insurance policy designed to make sure that banks have the necessary balance sheet capacity to deliver all of the PPP loans authorized by Congress. It has achieved this goal with relatively little usage. Banks have doled out more than $500 billon of PPP loans and the Fed has purchased only $68 billion. What’s Next? As with the corporate lending facilities discussed above, there is a risk surrounding the scheduled expiry of these other lending facilities at the end of September. Once again, we see the Fed being very cautious in this regard. All facilities will be extended until they have seen long periods of no usage. In the near-term, we think it’s possible that the Fed will make MLF loans cheaper. They will likely feel intense pressure to do so if Congress fails to pass sufficient stimulus to state & local governments in the next bailout package. In terms of investment strategy, we want to stick with what has worked so far. We are overweight Aaa consumer ABS and Aaa CMBS due to the TALF back-stop. We are also overweight municipal bonds, especially in the Aaa-rated space where yields are attractive versus Treasuries and the risk of default is low. We would also advise taking some extra risk in non-Aaa consumer ABS. These securities have no TALF back-stop, but we expect Congress to deliver enough government stimulus to keep the underlying borrowers solvent. The Size Of The Fed’s Balance Sheet As this report has made clear, the Fed’s emergency lending facilities have accomplished a lot during the past four months with the Fed taking very little actual risk onto its balance sheet. But while its usage of the emergency lending facilities has been low, the Fed has dramatically expanded the size of its balance sheet through purchases of Treasury securities and agency MBS. To restore stability to the Treasury and MBS markets, the Fed avidly bought Treasuries and agency MBS from mid-March to mid-April, ballooning the size of its balance sheet by $2 trillion in just five weeks. Tacked onto the QE programs undertaken to battle the GFC, the Fed’s balance sheet expansion has been massive, and it is roughly six times larger as a share of GDP than it was in the three decades preceding the subprime crisis (Chart 11). Chart 11Massive Expansion Of The Fed's Balance Sheet chart 11 Massive Expansion Of The Fed's Balance Sheet Massive Expansion Of The Fed's Balance Sheet Investors and citizens may ask what that balance sheet expansion has achieved so far, and what it’s likely to achieve going forward. Are there unintended consequences that haven’t yet made their presence felt? What constitutes a normalized Fed balance sheet, and when will the Fed be able to get back to it? The immediate consequence many investors attribute to the balance sheet expansion is higher stock prices (Chart 12). Fans of the balance sheet/equities link are undeterred by the decoupling after 2015, arguing that standing pat/tapering the balance sheet by 15% helped precipitate its vicious sell-off in the fourth quarter of 2018. It probably has not escaped their notice that the spectacular bounce from March’s lows has occurred alongside a 70% balance sheet expansion. The money supply boost may prove short-lived, though, as it appears that businesses are borrowing to ensure their continued liquidity, rather than to spend or invest. We don’t think there is much to the observed relationship, however. Correlation is not causation and we have a hard time seeing how the Fed’s purchases of Treasuries, agencies and agency MBS flowed into the equity market. While the Fed’s pre-pandemic QE purchases turbo-charged the size of the monetary base, it only gently expanded the money supply, because the banks that sold securities to the Fed largely handed the proceeds right back to it as deposits (Chart 13). The net effect mainly filled the Fed’s vaults with the new money it had conjured up via its open-market operations. Chart 12Fed Balance Sheet & Stock Prices: Correlation Is Not Causation Fed Balance Sheet & Stock Prices: Correlation Is Not Causation Fed Balance Sheet & Stock Prices: Correlation Is Not Causation Chart 13Only A Modest Expansion Of Money Supply Only A Modest Expansion Of Money Supply Only A Modest Expansion Of Money Supply   Banks were not the only counterparties to the Fed’s QE purchases, of course. Fixed income mutual funds, insurance companies and pension funds must also have trimmed their holdings to accommodate the Fed. They were likely obligated by prospectus mandates or regulatory oversight to redeploy the proceeds into other bonds. Surely some unconstrained investors turned QE cash into new equity investments, but the larger QE effect on financial markets was likely to narrow credit spreads as dedicated fixed income investors redeployed their proceeds further out the risk curve. Tighter spreads helped reduce corporations’ cost of servicing newly issued debt, boosting corporate profits at the margin, but we think it’s a stretch to say QE drove the equity rally. What’s Next? Chart 14Wave Of Bank Deposits Wave Of Bank Deposits Wave Of Bank Deposits The picture is slightly different today, with the money supply popping amidst frenzied corporate borrowing. The money supply boost may prove short-lived, though, as it appears that businesses are borrowing to ensure their continued liquidity, rather than to spend or invest. The largest banks were inundated with deposits in the second quarter (Chart 14), possibly driven by corporations stashing their issuance proceeds in cash just as banks previously stashed their QE proceeds in excess reserves. With households actively paying down their debt and businesses having already pre-funded two or three years of cash needs, the deposits may not be lent out, hemming in the money multiplier and limiting the self-reinforcing magic of fractional-reserve banking. Liquidity that is being hoarded is not available to drive up equity multiples, so we don’t expect the Fed’s new balance sheet expansion will directly boost stock prices any more than we think it did post-crisis. Indirectly, we think it does contribute to economic growth and risk asset appreciation because we view QE and other extraordinary easing measures as a signal that zero interest rate policy will remain in place for a long time. The importance of that signal, and the possibility that nineteen months of tapering at the start of Jay Powell’s term as Fed chair did promote volatility and increased equities’ vulnerability to a sharp downdraft, may well keep the Fed from attempting to normalize the balance sheet any time soon. An outsized Fed balance sheet may well be the new normal, and it may well breed unintended consequences, but we don’t think that kiting stock prices will be one of them. Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Jennifer Lacombe Associate Editor JenniferL@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso Senior Analyst jeremiep@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see US Investment Strategy / US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Alphabet Soup: A Summary Of The Fed’s Anti-Virus Measures”, dated April 14, 2020, available at usis.bcaresearch.com and usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 The Outright Monetary Transactions facility at the heart of ECB President Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes” pledge was never actually used. The ECB did eventually purchase government securities through a separate facility. But this didn’t occur until 2015, after sovereign bond yields had already fallen. 3 This explicit forward guidance was the brainchild of Chicago Fed President Charles Evans. It was official Fed forward guidance between December 2012 and March 2014. 4 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20200714a.htm 5 https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/WP62_Duffie_v2.pdf 6 This inversion of the corporate spread curve is typical during default cycles. For more details on this dynamic please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “On The Term Structure Of Credit Spreads”, dated July 10, 2013, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com

Feature Over the last several years when I travelled to Europe, I would meet with Ms. Mea, an outspoken client of the Emerging Markets Strategy service. We have published our conversations with Ms. Mea in the past and this semi-annual series has complemented our regular reports. She has challenged our views and convictions, serving as a voice for many other clients. In addition, these conversations have highlighted nuances of our analysis, for her and to the benefit of our readers. With travel restrictions in force, this time we had to resort to an online meeting with Ms. Mea. Below are the key parts of our conversation from earlier this week. Ms. Mea: Let’s begin with your main thesis, which over the past several years has been as follows: China’s growth drives EM business cycles and financial markets overall. Indeed, as long as China’s growth dithers, EM growth and asset prices languish. However, since the pandemic started China has stimulated aggressively and there are clear signs that the economy is recovering. The latest surge in Chinese share prices confirms that a robust recovery is underway. Why do you not think China’s economy is on the upswing? Answer: True, we believe China’s business cycle is instrumental to EM economies’ growth and balance of payments. We upgraded our outlook for Chinese growth in our May 28 report as the National People’s Congress set the objective for monetary policy in 2020 to significantly accelerate the growth rate of broad money supply and total social financing relative to last year. Indeed, broad money growth as well as both private and public credit have accelerated since April and will continue to increase (Chart I-1). Domestic orders have also surged though export orders are still languishing (Chart I-2). Chart I-1China: Money And Credit Will Continue Accelerating China: Money And Credit Will Continue Accelerating China: Money And Credit Will Continue Accelerating Chart I-2China: Improvement In Domestic Orders But Not In Export Ones China: Improvement In Domestic Orders But Not In Export Ones China: Improvement In Domestic Orders But Not In Export Ones     That said, financial markets, including the ones leveraged to China, have run ahead of fundamentals and a pullback is overdue. We have been waiting for such a setback to turn more positive on EM risk assets and currencies. Further, the snapback in business activity following the lockdown should not be confused with an economic expansion. As economies around the world reopened, business activity was bound to improve. Were any asset markets priced to reflect months or a whole year of closures? Even at the nadir of the global equity selloff in late March, we do not think risk assets were priced for extended lockdowns. The Chinese economy will likely eventually experience a robust expansion later this year but the nearterm outlook for global risk assets and commodities remains risky. In our view, the rally in global stocks and commodities has been much stronger than is warranted by the near-term economic conditions in a majority of economies around the world. In short, we have not been surprised at all by the economic data that has emerged since economies have reopened, but we have been perplexed by the markets’ response to these data. Even in China, which is ahead of all other countries in regards to the reopening and normalization of business activity, the level and thrust of economic activity remains worrisome. Specifically: China's manufacturing PMI new orders and the backlog of orders sub-components remain below the neutral 50 line (Chart I-3). The imports subcomponent of the manufacturing PMI has shown signs of peaking below the 50 line, portending a risk to industrial metals prices (Chart I-4). Chart I-3China Manufacturing PMI: Measures Of Orders Are Still Below 50 China Manufacturing PMI: Measures Of Orders Are Still Below 50 China Manufacturing PMI: Measures Of Orders Are Still Below 50 Chart I-4A Yellow Flag For Commodities A Yellow Flag For Commodities A Yellow Flag For Commodities   Marginal propensity to spend for both enterprises and households continues to trend lower (Chart I-5). These gauge the willingness of consumers and companies to spend and, hence, reflect the multiplier effect of the stimulus. These indicators contend that the multiplier so far remains low/weak. Finally, with the exception of new economy stocks (such as Ali-Baba and Tencent) that have been exceptionally strong worldwide, Chinese share prices leveraged to capital expenditure and consumer discretionary spending had not been particularly strong before last week, as illustrated in Chart I-6.  Chart I-5Marginal Propensity To Spend Among Chinese Households And Enterprises Marginal Propensity To Spend Among Chinese Households And Enterprises Marginal Propensity To Spend Among Chinese Households And Enterprises Chart I-6Chinese Stocks Had Been Languishing Till Late Outside New Economy Ones Chinese Stocks Had Been Languishing Till Late Outside New Economy Ones Chinese Stocks Had Been Languishing Till Late Outside New Economy Ones In a nutshell, the Chinese economy will likely eventually experience a robust expansion later this year but the near-term outlook for global risk assets and commodities remains risky. As to EM risk assets, the key risk to our stance is a FOMO-driven rally buoyed by the “visible hand” of governments. Ms. Mea: What is your interpretation of the latest policy push in China for higher share prices? Is it also a part of the “visible hand” of government? Don’t you think this could create another strong multi-month run like it did in early 2015? Answer: Yes, this is one of many instances of the “visible hand” of governments around the world. It is not clear why Beijing is boosting investor sentiment and explicitly promoting higher share prices given how badly similar efforts in 2015 ultimately ended. At the moment, we can only speculate that one or several of the following reasons are behind this move: Beijing is preparing for an escalation in the US-China geopolitical confrontation ahead of the US presidential elections. This latter is highly probable in our opinion.1 To limit the impact of this confrontation on their economy, they want to ensure that the stock market remains in an uptrend. The same can be said for the US authorities. Apparently, the “visible hands” of both Washington and Beijing have and will continue to push share prices higher in their domestic markets. Robust equity markets will become a prominent feature of the geopolitical confrontation between the US and China. In the long run, however, this is a very negative phenomenon for the world because the two of the largest and most prominent stock markets could increasingly be driven by the “visible hand” of their governments rather than by fundamentals. As a result, equity markets could regularly send wrong price signals and will no longer serve as an efficient mechanism of capital allocation. Chart I-7Foreign Inflows Into China Have Accelerated This Year Foreign Inflows Into China Have Accelerated This Year Foreign Inflows Into China Have Accelerated This Year Beijing has been luring foreign investors to buy onshore stocks and bonds and this strategy has become more vital in expectation of an escalation in the US-China confrontation. Chart I-7 shows that net inflows into onshore stocks and bonds have been surging. The more US investors buy into mainland markets, the more these investors will exercise pressure on the current and future US administrations to go soft on China. Like those US companies relying on Chinese demand, large US investment funds will have a notable exposure to Chinese financial markets and will accordingly lobby the White House and Congress to take a less adversarial stance toward China. This will reduce the maneuvering room of US politicians in this geopolitical confrontation. Finally, it is also possible that these latest media reports encouraging a bull market in China were not initiated by leaders in Beijing but were in fact spurred by mid-level bureaucrats. If that is the case, a full-blown mania akin to the one in 2015 will not be repeated and the latest frenzy surrounding Chinese stocks could end up being the final surge before a correction sets in. In brief, Chinese stocks, like other bourses worldwide, are in a FOMO-driven mania that might last for a while. Nevertheless, regardless of the direction of Chinese stocks in absolute terms, we reiterate our overweight stance on Chinese equities within the EM benchmark. Also, we have a strong conviction with respect to the merits of a long Chinese/short Korean stocks trade. Both these positions were initiated on June 18 before the latest surge in Chinese stocks. The “visible hands” of both Washington and Beijing have and will continue to push share prices higher in their domestic markets. Ms. Mea: What will it take for you to go long EM risk assets and currencies in absolute terms? Answer: EM equities, credit markets and currencies are driven by three, or more recently four, factors. We need to witness or foresee an imminent improvement in three out of four of these to go outright long. These factors include: (1) China’s business cycle and its impact on EM via global trade; (2) each individual EM country’s domestic fundamentals (inflation/deflation, balance of payments, return on capital, domestic economic cycles, monetary and fiscal policies, health of the banking system, domestic politics, etc.); (3) global risk-on and risk-off cycles that drive portfolio flows into EM. The direction of the S&P500 is an important trendsetter for these risk-on and risk-off cycles; (4) swings in geopolitical confrontation between the US and China. The first element – China’s impact on EM – is becoming positive. There could be a minor setback in mainland business cycles in the near term, but this should be used as a buying opportunity. As to structural problems in China like credit/money and property bubbles as well as the misallocation of capital, ongoing money and credit growth acceleration will fill in holes and kick the can down the road. That said, those structural problems will become even more challenging in the years to come. In short, Beijing is making credit, money and property bubbles even bigger. The second factor – domestic fundamentals in EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan – remain downbeat. The COVID-19 outbreak has been out of control in a number of EM economies (Chart I-8). In addition, outside of China, Korea and Taiwan, EM fiscal stimulus has not been as large as in DM economies. Critically, the monetary transmission mechanism has been broken in several developing economies. In particular, central banks’ rate cuts have not translated to lower lending rates in real terms (Chart I-9). Chart I-8The COVID-19 Pandemic Has Not Peaked In Several Major EM Economies The COVID-19 Pandemic Has Not Peaked In Several Major EM Economies The COVID-19 Pandemic Has Not Peaked In Several Major EM Economies Chart I-9Lending Rates Are Still High In EM ex-China, Korea And Taiwan Lending Rates Are Still High In EM ex-China, Korea And Taiwan Lending Rates Are Still High In EM ex-China, Korea And Taiwan   The basis is two-fold: First, banks saddled with non-performing loans are reluctant to bring down their lending rates and lend more; and second, the considerable decline in EM inflation has pushed up real lending rates (Chart I-9). The third variable driving EM financial markets – the S&P 500 – remains at risk of a material setback. If the S&P drops more than 10 or 15%, EM stocks, currencies and credit markets will also sell off markedly. Finally, there is the fourth aspect of the EM view – geopolitics – which could be critical in the coming months. The US-China confrontation will likely heighten leading up to the US elections. This will likely involve North and South Korea and Taiwan. Chart I-10EM ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Stocks And Currencies EM ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Stocks And Currencies EM ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Stocks And Currencies Chinese investable stocks as well as Korean and Taiwanese equities altogether make up 65% of the MSCI EM benchmark. Hence, a flareup in geopolitical tensions will weigh on these three bourses. Outside these markets, EM share prices and currencies have already rolled over (Chart I-10). In sum, out of the four factors listed above only the Chinese business cycle warrants an upgrade on overall EM. The other three drivers of the EM view are still negative. This keeps us on the sidelines for now. Importantly, we have been gradually moving our investment strategy from bearish to neutral on EM. Specifically, we: Took profits on the long EM currencies volatility trade on March 5. Took large profits on the long gold / short oil and copper trade on March 11. Booked gains on the short position in EM stocks on March 19. Recommended receiving long-term (10-year) swap rates (or buying local currency bonds while hedging the exchange rate risk) in many EMs on April 23. Upgraded EM sovereign credit from underweight and booked profits on our short EM corporate and sovereign credit / long US investment grade bonds strategy on June 4. The only asset class where we have not yet closed our shorts is EM currencies. In fact, we now recommend shifting our short in EM currencies (BRL, CLP, ZAR, TRY, KRW, PHP and IDR) from the US dollar to an equal-weighted basket of the Swiss franc, the euro and the Japanese yen. Unlike the March selloff, the dollar could depreciate even if the S&P 500 and global stocks drop. Ms. Mea: What is the rationale behind switching your short positions in EM currencies against the US dollar to short positions versus the Swiss franc, the euro and Japanese yen? Wouldn’t the selloff in global stocks drive the greenback higher? Answer: We have been bullish on the US dollar since 2011, consistent with our negative view on EM and commodities prices and recommendation of favoring the S&P 500 versus EM. What is making us question this strategy are the following, in order of importance: First, the Federal Reserve is monetizing US public and some private debt. The amount of US dollars is surging. Meanwhile, the pace of broad money supply growth is much more timid in the euro area, Switzerland and Japan. Broad money growth is 23% in the US, 9% in the euro area, 2.5% in Switzerland, 5% in Japan and 11% in China. This will reduce investors’ willingness to hold dollars as a store of value, incentivizing them to switch to other DM currencies. Second, the pandemic is out of control in the US and this will damage its near-term growth outlook. More fiscal stimulus and more debt monetization will be required to revive the economy. Third, the Fed will not hike interest rates even if inflation rises well above their 2% target in the next several years. This implies that the Fed will prefer to be behind the inflation curve in the years to come, which is bearish for the greenback. Finally, the yen and the euro as well as EM currencies are cheaper than the US dollar (Chart I-11 and Chart I-12). Chart I-11The US Dollar Is Expensive, The Yen Is Cheap The US Dollar Is Expensive, The Yen Is Cheap The US Dollar Is Expensive, The Yen Is Cheap Chart I-12EM ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Currencies Are Cheap EM ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Currencies Are Cheap EM ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: Currencies Are Cheap     The broad trade-weighted US dollar has yet to break down as per the top panel of Chart I-13, but we are becoming nervous about it. Unlike the March selloff, the dollar could depreciate even if the S&P 500 and global stocks drop. Ms. Mea: That is interesting. Has there ever been an episode where the US dollar depreciated while the S&P 500 sold off? Answer: Yes, it occurred in late 2007 and H1 2008. The 2007-08 bear market in global stocks can be split into two periods. During the initial phase of that bear market, the US dollar depreciated substantially despite the drawdowns in global equity and credit markets (Chart I-14, top and middle panels). Chart I-13Trade-Weighted Dollar And Asian Currencies: At A Critical Juncture Trade-Weighted Dollar And Asian Currencies: At A Critical Juncture Trade-Weighted Dollar And Asian Currencies: At A Critical Juncture Chart I-14In Late 2007 And H1 2008: The US Dollar Fell Amid An Equity Bear Market In Late 2007 And H1 2008: The US Dollar Fell Amid An Equity Bear Market In Late 2007 And H1 2008: The US Dollar Fell Amid An Equity Bear Market   EM stocks performed in line with DM ones during the first phase (Chart I-14, bottom panel). The economic backdrop was characterized by the US recession and US banks tightening credit. In fact, EM growth was still robust during that phase even though the US economy was shrinking. Remarkably, commodities prices were surging – oil reached $140 per a barrel and copper $4 per ton in June 2008. The second phase of that bear market commenced in autumn of 2008 when Lehman went bust. The orderly bear market in global stocks gave way to an acute phase – a crash in all global risk assets. Business activity collapsed worldwide and the US dollar surged. In the current cycle, the order will likely be the reverse of the 2007-08 bear market. March 2020 witnessed a crash in global risk assets and the global economy plunged similar to the second phase of the 2007-08 bear market while the US dollar surged. The second stage of this recession could resemble the first phase of the 2007-08 bear market. There will be neither worldwide lockdowns nor a crash in business activity. However, the level of activity might struggle to recover as rapidly as markets have priced in or there might be relapses in economic conditions in certain parts of the world. This is especially true for the US and other countries where the pandemic has not been effectively contained. On the whole, the second downleg in the S&P 500 and global stocks will be less dramatic but could last for a while and still be meaningful (more than 10-15%). Critically, unlike the March 2020 selloff, the greenback will likely struggle during this episode for the reasons we outlined above. Ms. Mea: What about overweighting EM equities and credit versus their DM peers? Will EM equities, credit and currencies underperform their DM peers in the potential selloff that you expect? Wouldn’t USD weakness help EM risk assets to outperform even in a broad risk selloff? Answer: Yes, we can see a scenario where EM stocks and credit markets perform in line or better than their DM peers in a potential selloff. The key is the dollar’s dynamics. If the dollar rebounds, EM stocks and credit markets will underperform their DM counterparts. If the dollar weakens during this selloff, EM stocks and credit will likely perform in line with or better than their DM peers. In sum, a technical breakdown in the broad trade-weighted dollar and a breakout in the emerging Asian currency index – both shown in Chart I-13 – would lead us to upgrade our EM allocation in both global equity and credit portfolios. For now, we are only switching our shorts in EM currencies from the US dollar to an equally-weighted basket of the Swiss franc, the euro and the Japanese yen. Ms. Mea: What are some of your other current observations on financial markets? Answer: The breadth and thrust of this global equity rally has already peaked and is weakening. It is just a matter of time before a narrowing breadth translates into lower aggregate stock indexes for both EM and DM equities as illustrated by our advance-decline lines in Chart I-15. Chart I-15EM and DM Equity Breadth Measures Have Rolled Over EM and DM Equity Breadth Measures Have Rolled Over EM and DM Equity Breadth Measures Have Rolled Over Chart I-16Cyclicals And High-Beta Stocks Have Been Struggling Cyclicals and High-Beta Stocks Have Been Struggling Cyclicals and High-Beta Stocks Have Been Struggling Consistently, there has already been a decoupling between various sectors and industries. The rally has been solely focused on tech and new economy stocks. Equity prices in China and Taiwan have been surging while the rest of the EM equity index has been languishing. In the DM equity space, global industrials, US high-beta stocks and micro caps have already rolled over (Chart I-16). Further, our Risk-On/Safe-Haven currency index is flashing red for EM equities (Chart I-17). Chart I-17A Red Flag For EM Equities? A Red Flag For EM Equities? A Red Flag For EM Equities? Chart I-18Long Gold / Short Stocks Long Gold / Short Stocks Long Gold / Short Stocks Finally, EM share prices have outperformed DM stocks since late May mostly due to the sharp rally in Chinese, Korean and Taiwanese stocks. Hence, the breadth of EM equity outperformance has been subdued. Ms. Mea: To wrap up our conversation, I want to ask you what is your strongest conviction trade for the coming months? Answer: Our strongest conviction trade is long gold / short global or EM stocks (Chart I-18). This trade will do well regardless of the direction of global share prices, the US dollar, and bond yields. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report "Watch Out For A Second Wave (Of US-China Frictions)," dated June 10, 2020, available at gps.bcaresearch.com   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Dear Client, US Investment Strategy will take the first of two summer breaks next week, so there will be no publication on July 13th. We will return on July 20th with the latest installment of our Big Bank Beige Book, reviewing the five largest banks’ second quarter earnings calls. Best regards, Doug Peta   Highlights Bottom-up S&P 500 earnings expectations for 2021 are probably high: I/B/E/S expectations incorporating periods six or seven quarters away are little more than extrapolations and investors shouldn’t get hung up on them. The higher corporate income tax rates that would follow a Democratic sweep are a bigger concern. Policymakers have decisively won the early rounds of their bout with the pandemic’s economic effects, … : Transfer payments pushed April and May personal income well above its February level, and households have accordingly stayed current on their rent and other financial obligations. … and they will win the fight provided Congress doesn’t tire, … : Volatility may rise amidst the back and forth of negotiations, but Republican Senators cannot risk allowing aid to elapse three months before the election. … but what’s good for the economy in the long run may come at the expense of active managers’ performance: Value investors can’t catch a break, and all stock pickers will have to contend with a policy backdrop that challenges their established modus operandi.   Feature We have not traveled any farther for work than the kitchen table in three and a half months. Renewing our expiring passport could take a year, and the clock is ticking on our ability to fly domestically on a driver’s license from the persona non grata state of New York. Unless the administration or the electorate has a change of heart, the REAL ID rules may prevent us from seeing a client in person until well into 2021. At least the construction at LaGuardia may be finished by then. Even if we’re not seeing clients face to face, however, communication continues. Several topics have come up repeatedly in virtual discussions and we devote this week’s report to examining them. Our overriding impression is that global investors have been surprised by risk assets’ resilience and are skeptical that it can be sustained. We share the surprise and some measure of the skepticism, though we are more constructive than most BCA clients because of our conviction that policymakers can bridge the economic gap created by the pandemic and the commercially restrictive measures undertaken to combat it. Yes, Estimates Are Too High (But It’s Mainly An Election Story) Q: Consensus S&P 500 earnings estimates for next year are in line with actual 2019 earnings, yet 2019 was the tenth full year of an expansion and we’re likely to begin 2021 with an unemployment rate close to 10%. Isn’t there something wrong with this picture? We agree that consensus estimates for 2021 S&P 500 earnings are too high. It seems unlikely on its face that 2021 earnings, currently estimated at $163, will match 2018 ($162) and 2019 ($163) when the public health and economic backdrops are so uncertain. An additional 14% of EPS growth in 2022 seems like a pipe dream. We put very little stock in consensus estimates more than two quarters into the future, however, because analysts put very little effort into producing them. They focus on the current quarter and the following quarter; estimates beyond that range are nothing more than simple extrapolation. Investors familiar with sell-side analysts’ processes presumably don’t look beyond near two-quarter estimates themselves. We therefore doubt that the equity market is hanging on stated 2021 estimates and will be at risk when they are eventually revised down. We simply conclude that the S&P 500’s forward four-quarter earnings multiple of 24 is somewhat more elevated than it appears to the naked eye. Stocks are not cheap, and investors have probably gotten somewhat complacent. Equities have little margin for safety now and are therefore vulnerable to a near-term decline. Valuation is a notoriously poor timing tool, however, and we are content to remain neutral on equities over the tactical zero-to-three-month timeframe. A much stronger case against the earnings outlook for 2021 and beyond comes from the president’s flagging re-election prospects. Our Geopolitical Strategy service continues to estimate Joe Biden’s probability of winning the election at 65%. The virtual betting market PredictIt places Biden’s odds at 62%, and has had him as the favorite since May 30th. It is too simplistic to say that a Democratic president, backed by majorities in both houses of Congress,1 would be bad for the economy, but a Biden victory would introduce two profit headwinds. First, reversing half of the decline in the top marginal corporate tax rate, as the Biden campaign has proposed, would directly strike at the earnings stream available to common shareholders. Precisely quantifying that drop is not easy. S&P 500 constituents’ effective tax rates vary widely, with only a small proportion paying the statutory rate, and they do not disclose the federal component of their tax bill. We make the simple back-of-the-envelope assumption that the maximum net earnings impact of the cut in the top marginal rate from 35% to 21%, beginning in 2018, was 21.5%, as .79 (1-.21) is 21.5% greater than .65 (1-.35). Similarly, the maximum net earnings impact of hiking the top marginal rate to 28% from 21%, beginning in 2021, would be -9%, as .72 (1-.28) is nearly 9% less than .79 (1-.21). Equities seem to be ignoring the negative profit margin consequences of an increasingly likely Democratic sweep. Chart 1The Tax Cut Materially Boosted Median S&P 500 Earnings Q&A Q&A The change in effective tax rates before and after the 2018 tax cuts was about half of our maximum ballpark estimate. In the two years before the rate cut, excluding 4Q17 and its myriad one-time adjustments, the median effective tax rate for S&P 500 constituents was around 28%; in the two subsequent years, excluding 1Q18, the median rate has hovered near 20% (Chart 1). The change suggests that the tax cuts have boosted median S&P 500 earnings by about 11%.2 In addition to raising taxes, a Biden administration would be considerably more friendly to labor than the Trump administration. A soft labor market in which full employment is at least a few years away argues against broad wage gains, but companies that have benefitted from a complaisant National Labor Relations Board for the last four years could face a rude awakening. If Biden wins, we wager that McDonald’s workers will be unionized before next summer,3 a scenario that McDonald’s stock clearly does not anticipate (Chart 2). Chart 2For McDonald's, A Biden Win Means An NLRB Reversal For McDonald's, A Biden Win Means An NLRB Reversal For McDonald's, A Biden Win Means An NLRB Reversal Bottom Line: A Democratic sweep would weigh on earnings via higher corporate income tax rates and revived advocacy for labor at executive branch departments like the NLRB. Considering these incremental drags, it is unlikely that S&P 500 earnings will match their 2019 levels in 2021. Policymakers Versus The Virus: The Fight So Far Chart 3D.C. Is Keeping Households Afloat ... D.C. Is Keeping Households Afloat ... D.C. Is Keeping Households Afloat ... Q: Your constructive cyclical take depends on policymakers’ ability to offset the pandemic’s economic consequences. How do the data say that’s going so far? The data say that it’s going swimmingly. Thanks to generous transfer payments from the federal government, personal income in April and May comfortably surpassed February’s pre-pandemic peak (Chart 3). Households have not spent much of their windfall (Chart 4), choosing instead to squirrel it away, driving the savings rate to 32% in April and 23% in May. The mountain of savings will make it easy for households to service their debt (Chart 5), which they have been paying down. Chart 4... And They're Saving The Money, ... ... And They're Saving The Money, ... ... And They're Saving The Money, ... Chart 5... Much To Their Creditors' Relief ... Much To Their Creditors' Relief ... Much To Their Creditors' Relief The apartment REITs will not likely disclose June rent collection data before their earnings calls, but the National Multifamily Housing Council rent tracker shows that June collections have built on May’s month-over-month improvement. Through June 27th, June collections are tracking ahead of April and May collections and are barely off of last year’s pace (Table 1). Table 1Apartment Tenants Are Paying Their Rent Q&A Q&A Table 2Consumer Borrowers Are Making Their Payments Q&A Q&A TransUnion’s monthly consumer loan delinquency data for May reinforce the conclusion that policymakers are achieving their goal of preventing a default spiral. Auto loan delinquencies rose sharply in May, but delinquencies in all other personal loan categories fell on a month-over-month basis (Table 2). Mortgage delinquencies are below their year-ago level, while credit cards and other personal loans have risen only slightly from a low base. Auto loan delinquencies are up appreciably from May 2019, but TransUnion’s data show that the true rot is concentrated in loans made by independent lenders. Their 60-day delinquencies rose to 7.2% in May from 4.5% in April, while bank (0.62%) and credit union delinquencies (0.51%) eased slightly in May. Bottom Line: Extremely generous income assistance has helped households amass formidable cash reserves. The aid has allowed households to pay their rent and service their debt, shielding landlords, banks and many specialty lenders from pressure. Policymakers Versus The Virus: Going The Distance Q: What might cause the Fed to waver in its resolution to help the economy battle the virus? Will the Senate block future stimulus efforts? Nothing will cause the Fed to waver in its resolution to shield the economy from the virus; investors can take Chair Powell’s pledge to do whatever it takes for as long as it takes to the bank. Capitol Hill’s commitment is much less certain and public posturing during Senate negotiations could stoke market volatility. Elected officials reliably respond to career incentives, however, and those incentives will keep recalcitrant Senate Republicans from blocking another round of fiscal largesse. Investors need not worry that Republicans in the Senate will pull the rug out from under the economy and markets – doing so would wreck their own political fortunes. The Republicans’ election prospects have been sliding for a month. Four months is an eternity in a campaign, and they have ample time to reverse their fortunes. But if Republican Senators were to obstruct the passage of the next aid bill, they would be signing their own death warrant. They simply cannot cut off ailing households’ lifeline, or strip municipalities of essential services, as the campaign enters the homestretch. Any individual Senator would be imperiling his/her own quest for influence, and the party’s majority status and relevance, if s/he were to cast one of the votes that blocked a new spending round, and it would be folly to do so over a minor matter like principle. Policymakers Versus Active Managers Q: If valuations no longer matter, how do we show our clients that we’re adding value? It chagrined us to acknowledge on a call last week that equity valuations have been greatly deemphasized in our base case scenario. That scenario calls for overweighting equities in balanced portfolios over a twelve-month timeframe on the view that the flood of emergency stimulus will linger in the system long after it’s needed, stoking aggregate demand and pushing up the prices of cyclically exposed assets. Provided that policymakers succeed in limiting defaults and bankruptcies, thus preventing a pernicious chain reaction from taking hold, we are willing to overlook elevated valuations. Massive accommodation makes active managers' jobs harder because there's no telling who's swimming naked when policymakers won't let the tide go out. Those valuations are supported arithmetically by discount rates which appear as if they will remain very low for an extended period as long as investors don’t become nervous and demand a higher equity risk premium, diluting the impact of nominally lower interest rates. Our base case is that they won’t, but there is no doubt that equity investors’ margin of safety is quite thin. We cannot use the term margin of safety without thinking of Benjamin Graham, and it gives us a pang to think that his disciples may face another few years of wandering in the wilderness. Value investing is predicated on making distinctions between individual companies, as is security analysis more generally. A rising tide lifts all boats, however, and the massive stimulus efforts that have been unleashed in all the major economies (Chart 6) have the effect of obliterating differences between companies. That potentially limits the value that skilled active managers can add to an investment portfolio via a focus on traditional bottom-up metrics. Chart 6All Together Now Q&A Q&A Our solution is to try to focus on the varying impact top-down factors will have on different companies and sub-industry groups. We are overweight the SIFI banks because we view them as the biggest beneficiary of policymakers’ attempt to suppress defaults and their rock-bottom valuations stand in sharp contrast with the rest of the market. We echo our fixed income strategists’ recommendations to buy the bonds the Fed is buying. We also think that positioning portfolios for regulatory changes that might ensue in 2021 and beyond could be a rich source of alpha if a blue wave really is poised to strike the US on the first Tuesday in November.   Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1 Our geopolitical team expects the Democrats to take the Senate if they win the White House. PredictIt markets imply that Democrats have a 61% probability of winning a Senate majority. 2After-tax earnings before the tax cut were 72 cents on the dollar (1-28%) = .72. After the tax cut, they rose to 80 cents (1-20%) = .80. 80 is 11.11% greater than 72. 3Please see the NLRB/McDonald’s discussion on pp.7-9 of the February 3, 2020 US Investment Strategy Special Report, “Labor Strikes Back, Part 3: The Public-Approval Contest,” available at usis.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Egypt’s balance of payments have deteriorated materially due to both the crash in oil prices and the global pandemic. The country’s foreign funding requirements in 2020 are high and the currency is under depreciation pressures. Unless domestic interest rates are brought considerably lower, the nation’s public debt is on an unsustainable trajectory. Hence, Egypt needs to reduce local interest rates substantially and rapidly. And in so doing, the central bank cannot control or defend the exchange rate. The latter is set to depreciate. Investors should buy Egyptian local currency bonds while hedging their currency exposure. Feature The Central Bank of Egypt (CBE) is depleting its foreign exchange (FX) reserves to defend the currency (Chart I-1). As the CBE’s foreign exchange reserves diminish, so will its ability to support the currency. As such, the Egyptian pound will likely depreciate in the next 6-9 months. Interestingly, despite being a net importer of energy, many of Egypt’s critical macro parameters are positively correlated with oil prices (Chart I-2). Egypt is in fact deeply integrated in the Gulf oil-economy network via trade and capital flows. In other words, Egypt is a veiled play on oil. Chart I-1The CBE Has Been Defending The Currency The CBE Has Been Defending The Currency The CBE Has Been Defending The Currency Chart I-2Egypt: A Veiled Play On Oil Egypt: A Veiled Play On Oil Egypt: A Veiled Play On Oil   Although oil prices have rallied sharply recently, the Emerging Markets Strategy team believes upside is limited and that oil prices will average about $40 over the next three years.1  In addition, local interest rates that are persistently above 10% are disastrous for both Egypt’s domestic demand and public debt sustainability. Egypt’s current account balance strongly correlates with oil prices because of the strong interlinkages that exist between Egypt and the oil-exporting Gulf countries. To preclude a vicious cycle in both the economy and public debt, the CBE should reduce interest rates materially and rapidly. Therefore, higher interest rates cannot be used to defend the exchange rate. Balance Of Payments Strains Egypt’s balance of payments (BoP) dynamics have deteriorated and the probability of a currency devaluation has risen: Current Account: The current account deficit – which stood at $9 billion and 3% of the GDP as of December 2019 – is widening significantly due to the plunge in oil prices this year (Chart I-2, top panel). Egypt’s current account balance strongly correlates with oil prices because of the strong interlinkages that exist between Egypt and the oil-exporting Gulf countries. The latter have been hard hit by the twin shocks of the coronavirus pandemic and the oil crash. First, Egypt’s $27 billion in annual remittances are drying up (Chart I-2, bottom panel). The majority of these transmittals come from Egyptian workers working in Gulf countries. Second, Egypt’s tourism industry – which brings in $13 billion in annual revenues or 4% of GDP – has collapsed due to the pandemic. Tourist arrivals from Middle Eastern countries – which makeup 20% of total tourist arrivals into Egypt – will diminish substantially due to both the pandemic and the negative income shock that the Gulf economies have experienced (Chart I-3). Third, Egyptian exports are in freefall (Chart I-4, top panel). Not only is this due to the freeze in global trade, but also because the country’s exports to the oil-leveraged Arab economies have taken a massive hit. The latter make up 25% of Egypt’s total goods shipments. Chart I-3Egypt: Tourism Is Linked To Oil Prices Egypt: Tourism Is Linked To Oil Prices Egypt: Tourism Is Linked To Oil Prices Chart I-4Exports Revenues Swing With Oil Prices Exports Revenues Swing With Oil Prices Exports Revenues Swing With Oil Prices   Furthermore, since 2019 Egypt has been increasingly exporting natural gas. The collapse in gas prices has probably already wiped out a large of chunk its natural gas export revenues (Chart I-5). Chart 6 exhibits the structure of Egypt’s exports of goods and services. Energy, tourism and transportation constituted 67% of total exports in 2019. Chart I-5Gas Export Revenues Are At Risk Gas Export Revenues Are At Risk Gas Export Revenues Are At Risk Chart I-6Egypt: Structure Of Goods & Services Exports Egypt: A Veiled Oil Play Egypt: A Veiled Oil Play Chart I-7Exports Are Shrinking Amid Resilient Imports Exports Are Shrinking Amid Resilient Imports Exports Are Shrinking Amid Resilient Imports Finally, while export revenues have plunged, imports remain resilient (Chart I-7). Critically, 26% of Egypt’s imports are composed of essential and basic items such as consumer non-durable goods, wheat and maize. Consumption of these staples and goods are less sensitive to business cycle oscillations. Therefore, the nation’s current account deficit has ballooned. A wider current account deficit needs to be funded by foreign inflows. With foreign investors reluctant to provide funds, the CBE has lately been financing BoP by depleting its foreign exchange reserves (Chart I-1, on page 1). Foreign Funding Requirements: Not only is Egypt facing a massively deteriorating current account deficit, but the country also carries large foreign funding debt obligations (FDO). FDOs are the sum of debt expiring in the next 12 months, and interest as well as amortization payments over the next 12 months. FDOs due in 2020 were $24 billion.2 In turn, Egypt’s total foreign funding requirements (FFR) – which is the sum of FDOs and the country’s current account deficit – has risen to $33 billion.3 Importantly, this FFR amount is based on the current account for 2019 and, thereby, does not take Egypt’s deteriorating current account deficit into consideration – as discussed above. Meanwhile, the central bank has net FX reserves of only $8 billion.4 If the monetary authorities continue to fund FFR of $33 billion in 2020 to prevent the pound from depreciating, the CBE will soon run out of its net FX reserves. Overall, Chart I-8 compares Egypt to the rest of the EM universe: with respect to (1) exports-to-FDO on the x-axis and (2) foreign exchange reserves-to-FFR on the y-axis. Based on these two measurements, Egypt is among the most vulnerable EM countries in terms of the balance of payments as it has the lowest FX reserves-to-FFR ratio and a low export-to-FDO ratio as well. Chart I-8Egypt Is One Of The Most Exposed EM Countries To Currency Depreciation Egypt: A Veiled Oil Play Egypt: A Veiled Oil Play Chart I-9FDI Inflows Are Set To Diminish FDI Inflows Are Set To Diminish FDI Inflows Are Set To Diminish Foreign Funding of Private Sector: Egypt will struggle to attract private-sector foreign inflows to meet its large FFR amid this adverse regional economic environment and the likely renewed relapse in oil prices in the months ahead. FDI inflows are set to drop (Chart I-9). The oil & gas sector has been the largest recipient of FDI inflows recently (around 55% in 2019 according to the central bank). The crash in both crude oil and natural gas prices will therefore ensure that FDIs into this sector will dry up. Besides, overall FDI inflows emanating from Gulf countries are poised to shrink substantially.5 Chart I-10The Egyptian Pound Is Once Again Expensive The Egyptian Pound Is Once Again Expensive The Egyptian Pound Is Once Again Expensive Foreign Funding of Government: With FDI inflows diminishing, the Egyptian government has once again been forced to approach the IMF for assistance. The country managed to secure $8 billion in assistance from the IMF ($2.8 billion in May and $5.2 in June). This has ameliorated international investor confidence in Egypt. Indeed, the country raised $5 billion by issuing US dollar-denominated sovereign bonds in May. Egypt is now seeking another $4 billion from other international lenders. Crucially, assuming Egypt manages to get the $4 billion loan, which would allow it to raise a total of $17 billion, Egypt would still be short on foreign funding to finance its $33 billion in FFR. Therefore, the currency will come under pressure of devaluation. As we argue below, the nation’s public debt sustainability is in jeopardy unless local currency interest rates are brought down substantially. This can only happen if the currency is allowed to depreciate. Consistently, foreign investors might be unwilling to lend to Egypt until interest rates are pushed lower and the country’s public debt trajectory is placed back on a sustainable path. Finally, the Egyptian pound has once again become expensive according to the real effective exchange rate (REER) which is based on both consumer and producer prices (Chart I-10). Bottom Line: Egypt is facing sharply slowing foreign inflows due to both the crash in oil prices and the global pandemic. This is occurring amid increased FFRs. Meanwhile, the CBE’s net FX reserves are insufficient to defend the exchange rate. Public Debt Sustainability The BoP strains discussed above are forcing the CBE to keep interest rates high to prevent the currency from depreciating. Yet the country’s public debt is on a dangerous path due to elevated interest rates. In turn, without currency devaluation that ultimately allows local interest rates to drop dramatically, the sustainability of Egypt’s public debt will worsen considerably. The BoP strains discussed above are forcing the CBE to keep interest rates high to prevent the currency from depreciating. Yet the country’s public debt is on a dangerous path due to elevated interest rates. To start, Egypt’s public debt stands at 97% of GDP – local currency and foreign currency debt account for 79% and 18% of GDP respectively (Chart I-11, top panel). Chart I-12 illustrates that interest payments on public debt is already using up 60% of government revenue and stands at 10% of GDP. Chart I-11Egypt: Public Debt Profile Egypt: Public Debt Profile Egypt: Public Debt Profile Chart I-12The Government's Interest Payments Are Unsustainable The Government's Interest Payments Are Unsustainable The Government's Interest Payments Are Unsustainable   Therefore, if the CBE keeps interest rates at the current level, then the government will continue to pay high interest on its debt. Generally, two conditions need to be met to ensure public debt sustainability in any country (i.e., to ensure that the public debt-to-GDP ratio does not to surge). Nominal GDP growth needs to be higher than government borrowing costs. The government needs to run persistently large primary fiscal surpluses. Chart I-13Egypt: Nominal GDP Growth And Government Borrowing Costs Egypt: Nominal GDP Growth And Government Borrowing Costs Egypt: Nominal GDP Growth And Government Borrowing Costs Regarding the first condition, nominal GDP growth was already dangerously close to the level of Egypt’s government borrowing costs even before the pandemic hit Egypt (Chart I-13). With the pandemic, both domestic demand and exports have plunged. Consequently, nominal GDP is likely close to zero while local currency borrowing costs are above 10%. So long as nominal GDP growth remains below borrowing costs, the public debt sustainability will continue to deteriorate. As to the second condition, Egypt only started running primary fiscal surpluses in 2018 as it implemented extremely tight fiscal policy by cutting non-interest expenditures (Chart I-14). However, that was only possible because economic growth was then strong. As growth has slumped, government revenue is most likely shrinking. Chart I-14Egypt Only Recently Started Running A Primary Fiscal Surplus Egypt Only Recently Started Running A Primary Fiscal Surplus Egypt Only Recently Started Running A Primary Fiscal Surplus Tightening fiscal policy amid the economic downturn will be ruinous. Cutting non-interest expenditures further will depress the already weak economy, drying up both nominal GDP and government revenues even more. This will bring about a vicious economic cycle. Needless to say, the latter option is politically unviable. The most feasible option to ensure sustainability of public debt dynamics is to bring down domestic interest rates considerably. Lower local interest rates will reduce interest expenditures on its domestic debt and will either narrow overall fiscal deficit or free up space for the government to spend elsewhere, boosting much needed economic growth. Meanwhile lower interest rates will boost demand for credit and revive private-sector domestic demand. Provided Egypt’s public debt has a short maturity profile, lower interest rates will reasonably quickly feed into lower interest payments for the government. This means that lower interest rates could reasonably quickly feed to lower interest payments for the government. Importantly, there is a trade-off between the exchange rates and interest rates. Lowering interest rates entail currency depreciation. According to the impossible trinity theory, a central bank facing an open capital needs to choose between controlling interest rates or the exchange rate, it cannot control both simultaneously. As such, if the Central Bank of Egypt opts to bring down local interest rates, while keeping the capital account reasonably open, it needs to tolerate a weaker currency amid its ongoing BoP strains. Bottom Line: Public debt dynamics are treading on a dangerous path. Egypt needs to bring down local interest rates down substantially and rapidly. And in so doing, the CBE cannot control and defend the exchange rate. Devaluation Is Needed All in all, the Egyptian authorities are facing a tight tradeoff: (1) either they continue to defend the currency at the expense of depressing the economy and worsening public debt dynamic, or (2) they tolerate a one-off currency devaluation which would allow the monetary authorities reduce interest rates aggressively. The latter will help stimulate economic growth and make public debt sustainable. Specifically, if the Central Bank of Egypt opts for defending the currency from depreciation, it will need to tolerate much higher interest rates for a long period of time. The CBE would essentially need to deplete whatever little net FX reserves it currently has to fund BoP deficits. This would simultaneously shrink local banking system liquidity, pushing domestic interbank rates higher.  All in all, the Egyptian authorities are facing a tight tradeoff: (1) either they continue to defend the currency at the expense of depressing the economy and worsening public debt dynamic, or (2) they tolerate a one-off currency devaluation which would allow the monetary authorities reduce interest rates aggressively. Worryingly, not only would high interest rates devastate the already shaky Egyptian economy, but higher domestic interest rates carry major ramifications for Egypt’s public debt sustainability as discussed earlier. A one-off currency devaluation is painful and carries some political risks yet, it is still the least worst choice for Egypt from a longer-term perspective. Although inflation will spike due to pass-through from currency devaluation, it will be a transitory one-off increase (Chart I-15). Besides, the pertinent risk to the Egyptian economy currently is low inflation and high real interest rates (Chart I-16). Chart I-15Egypt: Currency-Induced Inflation Is A One-Off Egypt: Currency-Induced Inflation Is A One-Off Egypt: Currency-Induced Inflation Is A One-Off Chart I-16Egypt: Real Interest Rates Are High Egypt: Real Interest Rates Are High Egypt: Real Interest Rates Are High     In turn, currency depreciation will ultimately provide the CBE with scope to reduce its policy rate which will help stimulate the ailing economy as well as make public debt trajectory more sustainable. Finally, odds are high that Egyptian authorities might choose to devalue the currency sooner rather than later. The basis for this is that the government’s foreign public debt is still relatively small at 18% of the GDP and 19% of the total government debt (Chart I-11, on page 8). Further, the majority (70%) of Egypt’s foreign public debt remains linked to international and bilateral government loans making it easier to renegotiate their terms than in the case of publicly traded sovereign US dollar bonds (Chart I-11, bottom panel). This means that currency depreciation will not materially deteriorate the government’s debt servicing ability. Furthermore, Egypt has experience managing and tolerating currency depreciation. The currency depreciated against the US dollar by 50% in 2016 and before that by 12% in 2013. Bottom Line: The Central Bank of Egypt will not hike interest rates or sell its foreign currency reserves for too long to defend the pound. Odds are high that it will allow the currency to depreciate and will cut interest rates materially. Investment Recommendations Chart I-17Egyptian Pound In The Forward Market Egyptian Pound In The Forward Market Egyptian Pound In The Forward Market Investors should buy Egyptian 3-year local currency bonds while hedging their currency exposure. The basis is that low inflation and a depressed economy in Egypt will lead the CBE to cut rates by several hundred basis points over the next 12 months while allowing currency to depreciate. Forward markets are pricing 5% depreciation in the EGP in the next 6 months and 10% in the next 12 months (Chart I-17). We would assign a higher probability of depreciation.   For now, EM credit portfolios should have a neutral allocation on Egyptian sovereign credit. While another potential drop in oil prices and the currency devaluation could push sovereign spreads wider (Chart I-18), eventually large rate cuts by the CBE will make public debt dynamics more sustainable. Absolute return investors should wait for devaluation to go long on Egypt’s US dollar sovereign bonds. Chart I-18Remain Neutral On Egypt's Sovereign Credit Remain Neutral On Egypt's Sovereign Credit Remain Neutral On Egypt's Sovereign Credit Chart I-19Remain Neutral On Egyptian Equities Remain Neutral On Egyptian Equities Remain Neutral On Egyptian Equities   Equity investors should keep a neutral allocation on Egyptian stocks with an EM equity portfolio (Chart I-19). Lower interest rates ahead will eventually boost this stock market. Ayman Kawtharani Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com      1 This is the view of BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy service and it differs from the view of BCA’s Commodities and Energy Strategy service. 2 We exclude the Central Bank’s foreign liabilities due in 2020 as they are mostly deposits at the Central Bank of Egypt owed to Gulf countries. It is highly likely that Gulf lenders will agree to extend these deposits given the difficulties Egypt is experiencing. 3 Excluding the Central Bank’s foreign liabilities due in the next 12 months. Please refer to above footnote. 4 The amount of net foreign exchange reserves currently at the Central Bank – i.e. excluding the Bank’s foreign liabilities– are now low at $8 billion. 5 Gulf Co-operation Countries (GCC) are in no position to provide much financial assistance due to the pandemic and oil crash as they are under severe financial strain themselves. Also, GCC countries run strict currency pegs and need to preserve their dwindling foreign exchange reserves to defend their currency pegs to the US dollar.

Highlights Rising Bond Yields: Global risk assets are discounting a V-shaped economic recovery. With economic data starting to revive as more economies emerge from virus-related shutdowns, bond yields are showing signs of following suit. Duration Strategy: Even with global yields showing signs of a cyclical bottom, we continue to recommend a neutral duration stance. Central banks will remain highly accommodative given the lack of inflationary pressures after the deep COVID-19 recessions. There are still significant risks in the coming months from a potential second wave of coronavirus after economies reopen, worsening US-China relations and domestic US sociopolitical turmoil. Duration Proxy Trades: Given those lingering uncertainties, we prefer to focus on “duration-lite” trades in the developed economies, like overweighting inflation-linked government bonds versus nominals as inflation expectations will drift higher over the next 6-12 months. Feature Dear Client, Next week, instead of publishing a regular Weekly Report, we will hold a webcast on Tuesday, June 16 at 10:00 am ET, discussing our latest views on global fixed income markets. The format will be a short presentation, followed by a Q&A session. We hope you will join us, armed with interesting questions. Kind regards, Rob Robis, Chief Fixed Income Strategist Chart of the WeekBond Yields Bottoming, But Backdrop Not Yet Bearish Bond Yields Bottoming, But Backdrop Not Yet Bearish Bond Yields Bottoming, But Backdrop Not Yet Bearish Bond yields around the world awoke from their COVID-19 induced slumber last week, responding to a growing body of evidence indicating that global growth has bottomed. Over a span of four days, benchmark 10-year government bond yields rose in the US (+20bps), Germany (+13bps), Canada (+20bps), China (+14bps), Japan (+4bps), Mexico (+13bps) and the UK (+12bps). There is potential for yields to continue drifting higher over the next few months, as more countries reopen from virus-related shutdowns. The bounce already seen in survey data like manufacturing and services PMIs, as well as economic sentiment measures like the global ZEW index, should soon translate into real improvements in activity data. This comes at a time when rising commodity prices, most notably oil, suggest that depressed inflation expectations can lead bond yields higher. The cyclical bottom for global yields has likely passed, based on the improvement already seen in our own Global Duration Indicator (Chart of the Week). However, economic policy uncertainty remains elevated as devastated economies try to reopen from lockdowns. In addition, our Central Bank Monitors continue to indicate pressure on policymakers to keep interest rates as low as possible to maintain easy financial conditions as easy as possible. Tighter monetary policies remain a distant prospect, given very high unemployment rates. The cyclical bottom for global yields has likely passed, based on the improvement already seen in our own Global Duration Indicator. Amid those uncertainties, we recommend maintaining a neutral strategic (6-12 months) and tactical (0-6 months) stance on overall duration exposure in fixed income portfolios. Instead, we prefer focusing on lower volatility trades that will benefit from improving global growth and policy reflation, like going long inflation-linked bonds versus nominal government debt throughout the developed markets with breakevens looking too low on our models. Why Are Bond Yields Rising Now? We see five main reasons why global bond yields have started to move higher: 1) Investor risk aversion is declining There has been a sharp recovery in global risk appetite since late March, diminishing the demand for risk-free global government debt. In the US, the S&P 500 is up 43% from its March lows, while the NASDAQ index is back to the all-time highs reached before the coronavirus turned into a global pandemic (Chart 2). US corporate debt has also performed well since the March 23rd peak in spreads, with investment grade and high-yield spreads down -227bps and -564bps, respectively. Non-US assets are also flying, with emerging market (EM) equities up 29% and EM USD-denominated corporate debt up 14% in excess return terms over US Treasuries since the March trough. Even severely lagging assets like European bank stocks are showing a pulse, up 38% since the lows of May 15. Commodity prices are also improving, led not only by gains in oil after the April crash by recoveries in the prices of growth-sensitive commodities like copper (+17%) and lumber (+42%). Add it all up, and the message is clear: investors now prefer risk to safety, which has tempered the demand for government bonds. The flipside of the boom in risk appetite is weakening prices for safe haven assets (Chart 3). The price of gold in US dollar terms is down -4% from the 2020 high on May 20, while the euro price of gold is down –6%. Safe haven currencies like the Japanese yen and Swiss franc have underperformed, while interest rate volatility measures like the US MOVE index and long-dated euro swaption volatility are back to the pre-coronavirus lows. Chart 2Risk Assets Are Booming Worldwide Risk Assets Are Booming Worldwide Risk Assets Are Booming Worldwide Chart 3Safe Haven Trades Losing Luster Safe Haven Trades Losing Luster Safe Haven Trades Losing Luster Add it all up, and the message is clear: investors now prefer risk to safety, which has tempered the demand for government bonds that helped drive yields lower when risk assets were tanking in late February and March. 2) Global growth is improving One of the reasons for the improvement in investor risk appetite is belief that the world economy has exited from the severe COVID-19 global recession. While timely real data is still coming in slowly given reporting lags, there has been a notable bounce in survey data in many countries. PMIs for both manufacturing and services climbed higher in May (Chart 4). The expectations components of economic confidence measures like the ZEW indices have also recovered the losses seen in February and March. Data surprises have also been increasingly on the positive side of late in China, Europe and the US, including the shocking 2.5 million increase in US employment in May. However, the US unemployment rate remains very high at 13.3%, indicating abundant spare capacity that will likely take years, not months, to work off – a problem that most of the world will continue to deal with post-recession. 3) Central bank liquidity is booming The other main reason for the boom in risk asset performance that has started to put upward pressure on bond yields is the extremely accommodative stance of global monetary policy. This is occurring through 0% policy rates in the developed economies but, even more importantly, the aggressive expansion of central bank balance sheets through quantitative easing (QE). The Fed has its foot firmly on the monetary accelerator, with year-over-year growth in its balance sheet of 87% (Chart 5). The European Central Bank (ECB) is no slouch, though, with its balance sheet up 19% from a year ago and having expanded its Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program (PEPP) by another €600 billion last week. Chart 4Signs Of Life In The Global Economy Signs Of Life In The Global Economy Signs Of Life In The Global Economy Chart 5'QE Forever' Driving Money From Bonds To Risk Assets QE Forever' Driving Money From Bonds To Risk Assets QE Forever' Driving Money From Bonds To Risk Assets The combined annual growth of the central bank balance sheets for the “G4” (the Fed, ECB, Bank of Japan and Bank of England) is now up to 26%. The rate of G4 balance sheet expansion has been a reliable leading indicator of global risk asset performance since the 2008 financial crisis (with about a 12-month lead), and the current boom in “liquidity” suggests that the current rise in global equity and corporate bond markets can continue over the next year. Easing global financial conditions are now returning to levels that should support economic growth in the coming months, helping to mitigate (but not eliminate) the potential credit stresses from companies that have suffered during the COVID-19 recession. This recovery remains fragile, however, and policymakers will continue to maintain an extremely dovish policy bias – even with significant fiscal stimulus measures also in place to help economies climb out of recession. This suggests that the current rise in global bond yields is not the start of a new bond bear market driven by expectations of tighter monetary policies. The current rise in global bond yields is not the start of a new bond bear market driven by expectations of tighter monetary policies. Chart 6Global Bond Sentiment Is Still Very Bullish Global Bond Sentiment Is Still Very Bullish Global Bond Sentiment Is Still Very Bullish 4) Bullish sentiment for bonds is at extremes From a contrarian perspective, another factor helping put a floor underneath bond yields is investor sentiment towards fixed income, which remains bullish. The widely followed ZEW survey of economic forecasters also contains a question on the expected change in bond yields over the next year. The latest read on the surveys shows a net balance still expecting lower bond yields in the US, Germany, the UK and Japan, nearing levels seen prior to the end of the recessionary bond bull markets in the early 2000s and after the 2008 financial crisis (Chart 6). In addition, the Market Vane survey of bullish sentiment on US Treasuries is nearing past cyclical peaks, suggesting limited scope for new bond buyers that could drive US yields to new lows. 5) Inflation expectations are moving higher Finally, global yields are rising because the inflation expectations component of yields has started to move higher. The hyper-easy stance of monetary policy is playing a role here. Market-based inflation expectations measures like the breakevens on inflation-linked bonds (or CPI swap rates) are a vote of confidence by investors in the “appropriateness” of policy settings. The fact that inflation expectations are now drifting higher suggests that bond markets now believe that central banks are now "easy" enough to give inflation a shot at rising sustainably as growth recovers. Global yields are rising because the inflation expectations component of yields has started to move higher. Chart 7Oil Prices & Breakeven Inflation Rates Are Both Recovering Oil Prices & Breakeven Inflation Rates Are Both Recovering Oil Prices & Breakeven Inflation Rates Are Both Recovering This move higher in inflation expectations can continue in the coming months, particularly with global oil prices likely to move even higher. Our colleagues at BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy are quite bullish on oil prices, forecasting the benchmark Brent oil price to rise to around $50/bbl by the end of 2020 and continuing up to $78/bbl by the end of 2021. Such an outcome would push up market-based inflation expectations, and likely put more upward pressure on nominal bond yields, given the strong correlation between oil and inflation breakevens in the developed economies that has existed over the past decade (Chart 7). Bottom Line: Global risk assets are discounting a V-shaped economic recovery. With economic data starting to revive as more economies emerge from virus-related shutdowns, bond yields are showing signs of following suit. Duration Strategy For The Next Few Months The trends in growth, inflation and financial conditions all suggest bond yields can continue to drift higher over at least the next 3-6 months. Yet given the potential for a negative shock from a second wave of coronavirus infection, or geopolitical uncertainties in a volatile US election year, a below-benchmark global duration stance is not yet warranted. This is especially true with unemployment rates in most countries remaining elevated even as growth rebounds from recession, forcing central banks to maintain a very dovish policy posture. Our “Risk Checklist” that we have been monitoring to move to a more aggressive recommended investment stance on global spread product – the US dollar, the VIX and the number of new COVID-19 cases - can also be helpful in helping us determine when to shift to a more defensive bias on global duration. On that note, the Checklist still argues for a neutral duration stance, rather than positioning for a big move higher in yields. The US dollar has started to soften, but remains at a very high level relative to interest rate differentials (Chart 8). A weaker greenback is a source of global monetary reflation, primarily through changes in the prices of commodities and other traded goods that are denominated in dollars, but also by helping alleviate funding pressures for companies that have borrowed heavily in US dollars (especially in the emerging world). The dollar is also an “anti-growth” currency that appreciates during periods of slowing global growth, and vice versa, so some depreciation should unfold as more of the world economy emerges from lockdown (middle panel). The VIX index – a measure of investor uncertainty - continues to climb down from the massive surge in February and March, now sitting at 26 after peaking around 80. This is the one part of our Risk Checklist that argues for reducing duration exposure now. We prefer trades that will benefit from the combination of continued global policy reflation and growing investor risk appetite. We call these “duration-lite” trades. The daily number of new reported cases of COVID-19 (using data from the World Health Organization) has come down dramatically in Europe, but in the US the decline in new cases has stalled over the past month – a worrisome sign as the country continues to reopen amid mass protests in major cities (Chart 9). New cases outside the US and Europe are rapidly moving higher, however, primarily in major Latin American countries like Brazil and Mexico. This suggests that while there is a concern about a “second wave” of coronavirus later in the year, the risks from the first wave are far from over. Chart 8Still Not Much Reflationary Push From A Weaker USD Still Not Much Reflationary Push From A Weaker USD Still Not Much Reflationary Push From A Weaker USD Chart 9The COVID-19 Threat Has Not Gone Away The COVID-19 Threat Has Not Gone Away The COVID-19 Threat Has Not Gone Away Instead of shifting to a below-benchmark recommended stance on overall portfolio duration too soon in the cycle, we prefer trades that will benefit from the combination of continued global policy reflation and growing investor risk appetite. We call these “duration-lite” trades. Specifically, we like owning inflation-linked government bonds versus nominal debt, while also positioning for steeper government yield curves (on a duration-neutral basis). Longer-dated breakeven inflation rates within the major developed markets are becoming increasingly correlated to both the level of 10-year government bond yields (Chart 10) and the slope of the 2-year/10-year yield curve (Chart 11). Chart 10Rising Inflation Expectations Will Lead To Higher Bond Yields ... Rising Inflation Expectations Will Lead To Higher Bond Yields ... Rising Inflation Expectations Will Lead To Higher Bond Yields ... Chart 11... And Steeper Yield Curves ... And Steeper Yield Curves ... And Steeper Yield Curves In terms of country selection for these trades, we look to the valuations on inflation-linked bond breakevens from our modeling framework that we introduced back in late April.1 In that framework, we model 10-year breakevens as a function of oil prices, exchange rates and the long-run trend in realized inflation. Chart 12Global Inflation Breakevens Look Cheap On Our Models Global Inflation Breakevens Look Cheap On Our Models Global Inflation Breakevens Look Cheap On Our Models In Chart 12, we show the deviation of 10-year inflation breakevens from the model-implied fair value, shown both terms of standard deviations and basis points. The “cheapest” breakevens from our models are for inflation-linked bonds in Italy and Canada, although almost all counties (outside of the UK) have breakevens to look far too low. This suggests that global bond investors should consider a multi-country portfolio of inflation-linked bonds versus nominal paying equivalents – or in countries where the inflation-linked bond markets are small and illiquid, duration-neutral yield curve steepeners - as a more efficient way to play for a continuation of the current reflationary global backdrop without taking duration risk. Bottom Line: Even with global yields showing signs of a cyclical bottom, we continue to recommend a neutral duration stance. Given the lingering uncertainties about a second wave of coronavirus, and the rising political and social tensions in the US only five months before the presidential election, we prefer to focus on “duration-lite” trades in the developed economies - like overweighting inflation-linked government bonds versus nominals as inflation expectations will drift higher over the next 6-12 months.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Global Inflation Expectations Are Now Too Low", dated April 28, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Global Yields Are Stirring, But It’s Not Yet A Bond Bear Market Global Yields Are Stirring, But It’s Not Yet A Bond Bear Market Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Our base case reflects our view that China’s strong fiscal and monetary stimulus, combined with a weaker US dollar, will provide a favorable backdrop for copper markets in 2H20. Supply factors are for the most part reflected in current copper prices. In 2H20, the speed of the demand recovery will be the determining factor for prices. Global policy uncertainty remains high.  Assessing the joint effects of global monetary and fiscal stimulus, along with consumers’ willingness to spend once lockdowns are lifted will keep uncertainty at relatively high levels.  A possible second wave of COVID-19 returning large economies to lockdown status looms large for copper markets, and for commodity markets generally. The combination of safe-haven demand and a continued dollar shortage for borrowers without access to US swap lines could keep the dollar well bid, suppressing foreign flows to EM economies and commodity demand at the margin. Tactically, we remain on the sidelines until the fog clears around these known and unknown unknowns.  A $3/lb COMEX refined copper price is likely in 2H20, but the risks to this outlook remain high. Feature Copper prices will end the year higher vs. current levels in our base case. But uncertainty remains elevated. Copper prices will end the year higher vs. current levels in our base case. But uncertainty remains elevated. Assessing the synchronicity of EM recoveries and the joint effects of global monetary and fiscal stimulus, along with consumers’ willingness to spend once lockdowns are lifted is extremely difficult. Looming over all of these considerations: A possible second wave of COVID-19 returning large economies to lockdown status loom large. Tactically, we remain on the sidelines as the fog clears around some of these known and unknown unknowns. Importantly, our positive view rests on our expectation of a robust recovery in China’s economic activity and, to a lesser extent, in its main export destinations, which were hit later by the pandemic. A weak recovery in China would slow the rate at which the current copper supply surplus subsides. At ~ $2.50/lb, copper prices have recovered significantly since bottoming in March at $2.11/lb on the COMEX. Still, clearing the $3.30/lb double top reached in June 2018 will require either a significant increase in global demand or a sharp contraction in supply, which we do not expect. Copper markets were severely hit by the global pandemic: Prices fell 10% in January, as the case count grew in China – the largest copper-consuming market – followed by another 19% decline as the virus spread globally (Chart of the Week). The intensification of lockdowns globally pushed copper markets to a 60k MT surplus as of March – the latest data reported by the World Bureau of Metal Statistics (WBMS) – from a 20k MT deficit in 2019. Bearish sentiment moved our Tactical Composite Indicator – which captures sentiment, positioning, and momentum dynamics – to oversold territories on in March (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekCopper Prices Were Severely Hit By The Pandemic Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Chart 2Bearish Sentiment Crushes Copper Prices Bearish Sentiment Crushes Copper Prices Bearish Sentiment Crushes Copper Prices After reaching a low of $2.11/lb on March 23, COMEX copper prices surged 18% with few interruptions as the Chinese economy reopened, and global monetary and fiscal authorities supplied unprecedented economic support (Chart 3). This prompted a wave of short-covering by money managers, releasing some of the downward pressure on prices (Chart 4). Chart 3Unprecedented Fiscal Response Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Chart 4Money Managers Neutral For Now Money Managers Neutral For Now Money Managers Neutral For Now Still, hedge funds have not yet entered bullish positions on the metal. And, importantly, inventory levels are not drawing sharply. China’s Economy Bottomed, World ex-China Still Contracting Our outlook hinges primarily on our assessment of China’s policy-driven copper demand – both from domestic usage perspective, and, to a lesser extent, from copper-intensive exported goods. Since the end of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), copper prices have mostly shadowed China’s economic cycles (Chart 5). China’s importance for copper markets now dominates that of major DM countries (Chart 5, panel 3). The influence of global supply-demand fundamentals on copper prices has declined. Prices are increasingly policy-driven with supply adjusting to demand as dictated by Chinese policymakers’ decisions on the allocation of total social financing funds in that economy. Thus, our outlook hinges primarily on our assessment of China’s policy-driven copper demand – both from domestic usage perspective, and, to a lesser extent, from copper-intensive exported goods. According to the International Copper Study Group (ICSG), around 17% of Chinese copper demand comes from exports of products containing copper.1 In “normal” times, we rely heavily on our monthly indicators to gauge economic and commodity cycles. However, the speed with which the COVID-19 pandemic evolves – and the associated fiscal and monetary responses to it – makes short-term forecasting of cyclical commodities a perilous task. Chart 5DM Consumption Pales Vs. China DM Consumption Pales Vs. China DM Consumption Pales Vs. China High-frequency data suggest Chinese economic growth bottomed in March and is rapidly recovering (Chart 6). Chart 6Chinese Economy Returning To Normal Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Meanwhile in China’s major export destinations, the number of confirmed COVID-19 cases appear to be flattening, containment measures are gradually easing, and mobility is improving (Chart 7, panel 1 and 2). Globally, the copper- and oil-to-gold ratios have stabilized, and stock prices for nine of the largest copper producers have trended up since March 23 (Chart 7, panel 3 and 4). That said, we believe it is still too early to adopt a high-conviction view about a price recovery trajectory. For one, China recently reintroduced containment measures in certain regions, as clusters of coronavirus cases were detected, highlighting the fragility of the current recovery.2 Chart 7China's Major Export Partners Could Rebound Soon China's Major Export Partners Could Rebound Soon China's Major Export Partners Could Rebound Soon Chart 8Strong Domestic Demand, Weak Export Growth Strong Domestic Demand, Weak Export Growth Strong Domestic Demand, Weak Export Growth Moreover, the rebound in overall Chinese demand hasn’t fully offset the collapse in its exports. As a result, the reopening of the supply side of the economy outpaced demand growth (Chart 8). Extrapolating this to its copper market: Chinese refined copper production (40% share of world output) is facing robust domestic demand but weak export demand for copper (44% and 9% of world demand), leaving its market with a supply surplus. Nonetheless, absent a severe second wave of COVID-19 cases, the infrastructure-focused stimulus and market-friendly real estate policies in the country will allow internal demand to overtake production in 2H20, despite limited external demand (more on this below). China’s Credit Growth To Drive Copper Demand Higher The key message emerging from the NPC is that policymakers are willing to do whatever it takes – including abandoning their deleveraging objectives – to reflate the economy.  Markets were unimpressed by the fiscal package announced during China’s National People’s Congress (NPC) last month, which, for the first time in decades, did not contain an annual economic growth target in the Government Work Report (Table 1). Even so, the key message emerging from the NPC is that policymakers are willing to do whatever it takes – including abandoning their deleveraging objectives – to reflate the economy. Broad money and total social financing growth will accelerate relative to last year and notably exceed nominal GDP growth. Our Emerging Markets strategists expect China’s fiscal and credit impulse will reach 15.5% this year (Chart 9).3 Table 1No Economic Growth Target In The Government Work Report Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Additionally, China pledged to stabilize employment and targeted the creation of 9 million new jobs in urban areas. This is an ambitious target amidst the massive layoffs induced by the COVID-19 pandemic this year. Chart 9Chinese Credit Growth Will Surge Chinese Credit Growth Will Surge Chinese Credit Growth Will Surge Policymakers also reserved policy space to be used – without the approval of the NPC at the Politburo’s mid-year review – in the event the shock from the pandemic proves persistent.4 Past episodes of Chinese stimulus resulted in strong rallies in base metals prices. Given China now represents more than half of global copper consumption (vs. 43% in 2009 following the GFC, and 32% in 2012 following the euro area debt crisis), we expect this new round of stimulus will lead to a sharp increase in copper prices.5 By and large, refined copper prices are highly sensitive to growth in EM imports – particularly China’s – which are closely tied to income growth. The latest CPB World Trade Monitor data for March shows EM ex-China imports have been resilient suggesting the rebound in China’s economic activity might be spilling over to other EMs highly leveraged to China (Chart 10). Still, our main cyclical commodity demand indicators were declining as of April. We expect stimulus-driven EM income and investment growth will show up in our indicators in 2H20 (Chart 10). Chart 10Awaiting A Rebound In Our Cyclical Indicators Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Stalling Primary And Secondary Supply Growth In addition to the demand implications, lockdowns also resulted in restrictions – and few complete shutdowns – in mining activities in copper-producing countries. The ICSG revised down its global mine and refined copper output by 950k MT and 1.1mm MT, respectively, for this year on the back of the COVID-19 pandemic.6 The group now expects 2020 mine supply to decline by 3% this year and refined production to remain flat y/y, for a second consecutive year. While important, these adjustments were insufficient to completely offset the large negative demand shock in 1Q and 2Q20.7 In 2H20, the supply-side outlook rests on the evolution of COVID-19 cases and associated governments’ responses in major ore and refined copper-producing countries (i.e. Chile, Peru, US, DRC, China, Russia, and Japan). So far, mining activities were mostly treated as essential and allowed to operate at reduced capacity under additional sanitary and social distancing guidelines. Confirmed cases in these countries appears to be slowing, this could allow activity to slowly return to normal (Chart 11). Chart 11Further Supply Disruptions Are Unlikely Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Supply factors are for the most part reflected in current prices. Going forward the speed of the demand recovery will be the determining factor for copper prices.  While mining and refining of copper concentrates were often classified as essential, scrap activities were not. According to the ICSG, copper scrap supplied decreased significantly as trade flows and generation, collection, and disassembling activities were disrupted by the pandemic. China’s import of scrap copper – a key input for Chinese refiners – declined 37% in 1Q20. This prompted the government to allow more scrap imports to fill the gap, but it might struggle to find suppliers. Globally, scrap makes up ~ 25% of total refined copper supply, thus, it usually plays a non-negligible role in the rebalancing of global markets. Supply factors are for the most part reflected in current prices. Going forward the speed of the demand recovery will be the determining factor for copper prices. In addition, the crisis began at an abnormally low inventory level. Thus, despite the temporary build in 1Q20, inventories are still below their 2010 to 2019 average. The rebound in demand, combined with flat supply and limited scrap availability, will move Chinese inventory down in 2H20 and offset any builds at the LMEX and COMEX warehouses, supporting copper prices this year (Chart 12). Chart 12Inventories Still Low Despite Builds In 1Q20 Inventories Still Low Despite Builds In 1Q20 Inventories Still Low Despite Builds In 1Q20 USD Depreciation Leads To EM Economic Growth Uncertainty over the duration of lockdowns globally continues to fuel safe-haven demand for USD. As the COVID-19 shock abates we expect a weaker US dollar to be more supportive to copper demand. Uncertainty over the duration of lockdowns globally continues to fuel safe-haven demand for USD (Chart 13). The shortage of USD experienced by EM debtors servicing dollar-denominated debt continues to hamper their recovery. The combination of safe-haven demand and a continued dollar shortage for borrowers without access to US swap lines is keeping the dollar well bid, suppressing foreign flows to EM economies and commodity demand at the margin (Chart 14, panel 1). Chart 13Global Financial Cycles Hurting EM Economies Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Chart 14Uncertainty Keeps USD Well Bid Uncertainty Keeps USD Well Bid Uncertainty Keeps USD Well Bid The Fed will continue to accommodate USD demand, in an ongoing attempt to reverse a tightening of global financial conditions. EM economies – the bulk of base metals demand growth – are facing dual domestic demand and global financial shocks.8 These economies have become more dependent on foreign portfolio inflows, both in debt and equity markets (Chart 14, panel 2). Thus, global financial cycles now have a significant impact on their growth. The main factors influencing these flows are risk appetite, EM exchange rates, and DM interest rates.9 We expect all factors to support inflows to emerging markets as the COVID-19 shock abates. The Fed will continue to accommodate USD demand, in an ongoing attempt to reverse a tightening of global financial conditions. A lower USD will decrease the local-currency cost of consuming commodities ex-US. Metals producers' ex-US will face higher local-currency operating costs, reducing supply growth at the margin. A depreciating USD is a necessary factor for our bullish cyclical commodities view (Chart 15). The risk to this view is a severe second wave of COVID-19 infection which would cause safe assets to spike anew. Chart 15Metals Inversely Correlated With The US Dollar Metals Inversely Correlated With The US Dollar Metals Inversely Correlated With The US Dollar $3.00/lb Copper Price Likely; Geopolitical Risks Mounting Over the short term, geopolitical risks – chiefly mounting Sino-US tensions – could derail the rally in copper prices and other risk assets.  For April, our copper demand model suggested prices were at equilibrium relative to underlying demand trends (Chart 16). Chart 16Copper Prices Will Rise As The USD Depreciates Copper Prices Will Rise As The USD Depreciates Copper Prices Will Rise As The USD Depreciates When simulating a 10% decline in the USD and a rebound in EM import growth in 2H20, our model suggests COMEX copper prices could move 25% higher, holding everything else constant. In reality, the USD’s path and the extent of the EM import rebound are among the key known unknowns we confront in estimating a model for copper prices. We do not have a precise view on these variables, which is why we run simulations. Theory would suggest the stimulus we are seeing globally points to a lower USD and a pick-up in EM imports, however, and these factors will create a more supportive environment for metals prices. Over the short term, geopolitical risks – chiefly mounting Sino-US tensions – could derail the rally in copper prices and other risk assets. With the US election now only 5 months away, President Trump’s odds of being reelected on the back of a strong economy are fading amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. According to our Geopolitical strategists, Trump is the underdog and will need to double down on foreign and trade policies to prop-up his chances of winning. Meanwhile, China is seeking to solidify its sphere of influence.10 This is causing US-China tensions to intensify. Depending on the nature of the actions taken by the Trump administration (i.e. increasing tariffs on US imports of Chinese goods vs. cutting China’s access to foreign technology), metals prices could suffer, as was the case in 2018. With these geopolitical risks in mind, we maintain that China’s strong fiscal and monetary stimulus, combined with a falling US dollar will provide a favorable backdrop for copper markets in 2H20.   Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com     Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight Doubts about OPEC 2.0’s commitment to extending their deepest-ever production cuts expiring this month to July, perhaps August, took some of the steam out of crude-oil rally earlier in the week. In our modeling, we do not see the need to extend the massive voluntary cuts announced by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and its Gulf allies: KSA’s cuts of ~ 4.5mm b/d vs. its April output level of 12mm b/d starting this month will take the Kingdom’s output to ~ 7.5mm b/d. The UAE and Kuwait also voluntarily added cuts of 100k and 80k b/d, respectively, to their agreed quotas. We continue to believe the current schedule of production cuts will result in a physical supply deficit in 3Q20, which will require OPEC 2.0 to begin raising production to keep prices from getting too high going into a US presidential election. We expect Brent prices to average $40/bbl this year and $68/bbl next year, with WTI trading $2 - $4/bbl below that (Chart 17).11 Base Metals: Neutral Iron ore prices breached $100/MT this week, as COVID-19-induced supply disruptions in Brazil – the largest exporter of high-grade ore – and South Africa leave the seaborne market open to Australian suppliers to meet higher Chinese demand as port inventories are rebuilt. FastMarkets MB, a sister company of BCA Research, reported May exports to China from Brazil were down 28% y/y to 21.5mm MT from just under 30mm MT the year prior. Iron ore exports from Australia are expected to exceed A$100 billion this year, according to government estimates reported by the Financial Times.12 Precious Metals: Neutral As we go to press, gold prices retreated to $1,700/oz from ~ $1,740/oz last week, exhibiting a positive correlation with the dollar. This is a result of rising risk appetite globally as economies exit lockdowns. In the US, interest rates are continuing to support gold. Going forward, the probability of negative rates is remains low, but the Fed will continue to buy more debt from the public and private sectors to push the shadow rate further down. This supports gold prices (Chart 18). Chart 17Crude Prices Will Rebound Crude Prices Will Rebound Crude Prices Will Rebound Chart 18Fed Buying Supports Gold Prices Fed Buying Supports Gold Prices Fed Buying Supports Gold Prices     Footnotes 1     Please see “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on World Copper Supply,” published by the International Copper Study Group on May 21, 2020. 2     A resurgence of infection triggered renewed lockdowns over a region of 100 million people in May. Please see More than 100 million people in China's northeast back under lockdown to thwart potential second wave published by the National Post on May 19, 2020. 3    Please see BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report "EM Stocks Are At A Critical Resistance Level," published May 28, 2020. It is available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 4    Please see BCA's China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Taking The Pulse Of The People’s Congress," published May 28, 2020. It is available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 5    There remains a risk global monetary stimulus fails to ignite strong consumer and business consumption. The unprecedented shock could raise precautionary savings and keep risk aversion elevated for an extended period. Based on the Quantity Theory of Money, money supply times velocity (the rate at which money changes hands) equals nominal GDP. Low confidence translates to a low velocity of money limiting the reach of monetary policy. This value is extremely difficult to forecast. 6    Please see “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on World Copper Supply,” published by the International Copper Study Group on May 21, 2020. 7     According to BGRIMM Lilan Consulting, China’s real demand for refined copper declined by ~22% in 1Q20. This implies a ~11% decline in global copper consumption. Please see footnote 6 for more details. 8    Global financial cycles capture how global financial conditions affect individual economies. The analysis of these cycles stressed the importance of common factors in global risk asset prices which are driven by risk appetite and US monetary policy. These factors are mainly explained by developments in advanced economies but have a drastic effect on emerging markets. Please see Iñaki Aldasoro, Stefan Avdjiev, Claudio Borio and Piti Disyatat (2020). “Global and domestic financial cycles: variations on a theme,” BIS Working Papers, No 864. 9    Please see Chapter 3 of the Global Financial Stability Report titled “Managing Volatile Portfolio Flows,” published by IMF. 10   Please see BCA's Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report "Spheres Of Influence (GeoRisk Update)," published May 29, 2020. It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11    Please see our May 21, 2020 report entitled US Politics Will Drive 2H20 Oil Prices for our latest view on oil fundamentals and prices, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 12    Please see Australia’s iron ore miners exploit supply gap as Covid-19 hobbles rivals published by the Financial Times June 3, 2020.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2020 Q1 Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2020 Summary of Closed Trades Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices Speed Of Demand Recovery Remains Key To Copper Prices

Dear Client, In lieu of our regular report next week, we will be sending you a Special Report from my colleague Jonathan LaBerge. Jonathan will be examining the global effectiveness of recent pandemic containment measures to judge both the odds of a second infection wave and what policy responses are likely to be effective in countering one were it to occur. I hope you find the report insightful. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Highlights Fiscal deficits have soared in the wake of the pandemic, putting government debt-to-GDP ratios on a trajectory to reach post-WWII highs in many countries. Contrary to popular belief, there is little reason to think that fiscal relief will make it more difficult for governments to repay their obligations down the road. Larger budget deficits tend to increase overall national savings when the economy is depressed because private savings rise more than enough to compensate for the decline in government savings. The end result is a higher level of national wealth that governments can tax in the future. That said, there is more than one way to tax national wealth. For political reasons, higher inflation coupled with financial repression may prove to be more feasible than other forms of taxation. While inflation is not an imminent risk, it could become a formidable problem in two-to-three years. Investors should maintain below-benchmark levels of duration in fixed-income portfolios and favor inflation-linked securities over nominal bonds. Gold prices will rise over the long haul. The yellow metal should perform well even in the near term if the dollar weakens during the remainder of this year, as we anticipate. Real estate investors should reallocate capital away from densely populated urban areas towards suburbs and farmland. Stay Cyclically Overweight Equities Global equities continued to climb higher this week, as more countries reopened their economies. As we discussed three weeks ago in our report entitled “Risks To The U,” the main downside risk facing stocks is a second wave of the disease.1 While the number of new COVID-19 cases has declined in many countries, it continues to rise in others. As a result, the global tally of new cases remains broadly flat. The daily number of deaths seems to be trending lower, but that could easily reverse if social distancing measures are abandoned too quickly (Chart 1). Chart 1COVID-19: Global New Cases Remain Broadly Flat, While Deaths Seem To Be Trending Slightly Lower Will There Be A Fiscal Hangover? Will There Be A Fiscal Hangover? Chart 2Joined At The Hip Joined At The Hip Joined At The Hip Given this risk, we do not have a strong near-term (3-month) view on the direction of equities. Google searches for the “coronavirus” have closely correlated with equity prices and credit spreads (Chart 2). If fears of a new outbreak were to escalate, risk assets would suffer. Looking at a cyclical (12-month) horizon, we still recommend a modest overweight to stocks. Even if a vaccine does not become available later this year, increased testing should allow for a more economically palatable approach to containment strategies. Ample fiscal support will also help. As we provocatively asked in a report entitled “Could The Pandemic Lead To Higher Stock Prices?”,2 one can easily imagine a scenario where central banks keep rates near zero for the foreseeable future, while ongoing fiscal stimulus enables the labor market to reach full employment. Such an outcome could allow corporate profits to return to pre-pandemic levels, but leave the discount rate lower than before. The end result would be a higher fair value for the stock market. Although we would not counsel investors to bank on such a fortuitous outcome, the probability of it occurring is reasonably high – probably in the range of 30%-to-40%. This makes us inclined to favor stocks over a cyclical horizon. Will Indebted Governments Spoil The Party? One potential flaw in this bullish thesis is that massive government deficits could push up interest rates, crowding out private-sector investment in the process. As we argue below, such worries are misplaced for now. For the time being, bigger budget deficits will likely lead to an increase in overall savings, thus raising investment relative to what would have happened in the absence of any stimulus. That said, as we conclude towards the end of this report, there will come a time – probably in two-to-three years – when most economies are back to full employment. If budget deficits are still high at that point, inflation and long-term bond yields could end up rising substantially. Keynes To The Rescue The IMF expects budget deficits in advanced economies to exceed 10% of GDP in 2020, significantly higher than during the financial crisis. The sea of red ink is projected to push government debt-to-GDP ratios to fresh highs in many economies (Chart 3). Chart 3AGovernment Debt Levels Have Surged In The Wake Of The Pandemic Government Debt Levels Have Surged In The Wake Of The Pandemic Government Debt Levels Have Surged In The Wake Of The Pandemic Chart 3BGovernment Debt Levels Have Surged In The Wake Of The Pandemic Government Debt Levels Have Surged In The Wake Of The Pandemic Government Debt Levels Have Surged In The Wake Of The Pandemic Chart 4The Paradox Of Thrift: Not Just A Theory The Paradox Of Thrift: Not Just A Theory The Paradox Of Thrift: Not Just A Theory Should bond investors be worried? Not for now. One of John Maynard Keynes’ great insights was that an individual’s attempt to increase savings could lead to a collective decline in savings, a phenomenon he called the paradox of thrift. Keynes argued that if everyone tried to save more, the resulting contraction in spending would cause total employment to fall by so much that overall income would decline by more than spending. As a result, aggregate savings would fall. This is precisely what happened during the Great Depression and in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (Chart 4). The paradox of thrift implies that bigger budget deficits in a depressed economy will lead to an increase in overall savings, as private savings rise more than one dollar for every dollar decline in government savings. S-I=CA One can see this point using the familiar macroeconomic accounting identity which says that the difference between what a country saves and invests should equal its current account balance.3 In the absence of a change in the current account balance, any increase in investment will translate into an increase in savings. If the government stimulates aggregate demand by increasing spending, cutting taxes, or boosting transfer payments, companies are likely to respond by investing more (or at least not cutting capital expenditures as much as they would otherwise). Thus, if fiscal stimulus raises investment, it will also raise aggregate savings. Chart 5Huge Spike In The US Personal Savings Rate Huge Spike In The US Personal Savings Rate Huge Spike In The US Personal Savings Rate This conclusion has important implications for bond yields. If bigger budget deficits lead to an increase in overall savings, there is no reason to expect real bond yields to rise very much, at least in the short term. The failure of bond yields to rise since March, when governments began to trot out one fiscal stimulus package after another, is a testament to this fact. So too is the stimulus-induced surge in the US personal saving rate, which reached a record high of 33% in April (Chart 5). All That Money Printing If bigger government budget deficits are, in some sense, self-financing, why are so many people convinced that the Fed and other central banks are effectively “monetizing” deficits by buying up bonds? Part of the answer has to do with how one defines monetization. Governments create money whenever they purchase goods or services or make transfers to the public by running down their deposits at the central bank. In theory, the public could use that money to buy government bonds, which would allow the government to replenish its account at the central bank. In practice, it is usually a bit more circuitous than that. Chart 6Commercial Banks Deposits, Bank Reserve Held At The Fed, And Fed Holdings Of Treasuries Have All Expanded This Year Commercial Banks Deposits, Bank Reserve Held At The Fed, And Fed Holdings Of Treasuries Have All Expanded This Year Commercial Banks Deposits, Bank Reserve Held At The Fed, And Fed Holdings Of Treasuries Have All Expanded This Year What normally happens is that the public places the money in a commercial bank deposit and the commercial bank then transfers the money to its account at the central bank. Next, the central bank buys the bonds from the government, crediting the government’s deposit account at the central bank in the process. Chart 6 shows that this is precisely what has happened this year: Commercial bank deposits, bank reserves held at the Fed, and the Fed’s holdings of Treasuries have all risen by roughly the same amount. Granted, there is a bit more to the story. If the central bank buys bonds, it will push down bond yields at the margin, allowing the government to finance itself more cheaply than it could otherwise. However, this is a far cry from the sort of “money printing” that many people have in mind. True debt monetization occurs when governments lose all access to outside financing, forcing the central bank to pick up the tab. Such situations invariably involve accelerating inflation and a collapsing currency, which often culminates in hyperinflation. This is clearly not the case today. Back To Full Employment The idea that bigger budget deficits can generate enough private savings to more than fully compensate for any loss in government savings is applicable only for economies with spare capacity. Once the economy reaches full employment, fiscal stimulus will not lead to more income or production since everyone who wants a job already has one. At that point, bigger budget deficits will cause the economy to overheat and inflation to rise, potentially forcing the central bank to raise rates. Higher interest rates will reduce investment. Higher rates will also put upward pressure on the currency, leading to a reduction in net exports and a corresponding deterioration in the current account balance. If investment and the current account balance both decline, then savings, which is just the sum of the two, must also fall. Strategies For Alleviating A Debt Burden Once the free lunch from fiscal stimulus disappears, the question of how to address the government debt accumulated during the downturn becomes paramount. There are four ways to reduce the ratio of government debt-to-GDP: 1) outgrow the debt burden; 2) tighten fiscal policy; 3) default; and 4) inflate away the debt. Outgrowing It At the end of the Second World War, many governments found themselves saddled with high levels of debt. In the US, the government debt-to-GDP ratio stood at 121% in 1945. In the UK, it hit 270%. In Canada, it reached 155%. For the most part, these governments did not repay the debt they incurred during the war. As Chart 7 shows, the nominal value of debt outstanding either rose or remained broadly constant following the war. What happened was that rapid GDP growth led to a shrinkage in debt-to-GDP ratios. Compared with the post-war period, the two drivers of an economy’s growth potential, labor force and productivity growth, are both weaker now. Thus, outgrowing the debt by raising the denominator of the debt-to-GDP ratio will be more difficult than in the past. It’s About g-r That said, the trajectory of the debt-to-GDP ratio does not depend solely on GDP growth; it also depends on the interest rate that the government pays to service its debt. Conceptually, it is the difference between the two that determines whether the level of any given budget deficit is sustainable or not. While trend GDP growth in advanced economies has declined since the 1950s, equilibrium interest rates have also fallen. As a consequence, the spread between growth rates and interest rates is only somewhat smaller in advanced economies today than it was in the 1950s and 60s and notably higher than it was in the 1980s and 90s (Chart 8). Indeed, as Chart 9 shows, g-r has been trending higher for hundreds of years! Chart 7The Case Of Outgrowing The Debt Burden Post-WWII The Case Of Outgrowing The Debt Burden Post-WWII The Case Of Outgrowing The Debt Burden Post-WWII Chart 8The Rate Of Economic Growth Has Been Higher Than Interest Rates Will There Be A Fiscal Hangover? Will There Be A Fiscal Hangover?   Chart 9A Multi-Century Trend In The Spread Between Growth And Interest Rates Will There Be A Fiscal Hangover? Will There Be A Fiscal Hangover? Today, government borrowing rates in most economies are well below trend growth rates. No matter the size of the budget deficit, the ratio of debt-to-GDP will converge to a stable level as long as the interest rate the government pays on the debt is below the growth rate of the economy.4  A Gordian Fiscal Knot Of course, there is no guarantee that real rates will remain below the rate of trend growth. As we have discussed before, the exodus of baby boomers from the labor force, a peak in globalization, and rising political populism could all curtail aggregate supply, leading to a depletion of national savings.5 What would happen if governments allowed debt levels to reach very high levels only to find that the neutral rate of interest — the interest rate consistent with full employment and stable inflation — has risen above the growth rate of the economy? Raising the policy rate would be very painful in a high-debt environment because even a small increase in interest rates would lead to a large rise in interest payments. Faced with this reality, some governments might elect to tighten fiscal policy. An increase in taxes or a decline in government spending would not only create some resources to pay back debt, but it would also reduce aggregate demand, pushing down the neutral rate of interest in the process. Don’t Blame The Stimulus Ironically, all the fiscal relief efforts that governments have carried out over the past few months have probably left them better placed to pay back debt than if no stimulus had been undertaken in the first place. Box 1 illustrates this point with a numerical example, but the intuition for this claim can be seen easily enough. As noted earlier, fiscal stimulus in a depressed economy will raise overall savings. This means that after the pandemic is over, governments will have a larger tax base available to them than they would have had in the absence of any stimulus (although, obviously, the tax base would be even larger if the pandemic had never occurred). The Inflation Solution Chart 10Long-Term Inflation Expectations Remain Very Depressed Long-Term Inflation Expectations Remain Very Depressed Long-Term Inflation Expectations Remain Very Depressed Still, any decision to tighten fiscal policy down the road is going to be an inherently political one. What if governments do not have the political will to tighten fiscal policy even if the economy begins to overheat? Defaulting on the debt is always an option in that case, but not one that any sensible government would choose given the devastating impact this would have on the financial system and broader economy. Rather, it is conceivable that governments will lean on central banks to keep rates low and let inflation accelerate. While higher inflation will not boost real GDP, it will raise nominal GDP, allowing the ratio of government debt-to-GDP to decline. Investors currently assign very low odds to such an outcome. Long-term market-based inflation expectations remain very depressed (Chart 10). Yet, we think such an eventuality is more plausible than widely believed. As long as inflation does not spiral out of control, central banks are likely to welcome rising prices. A higher inflation rate would make monetary policy more effective by allowing central banks to bring real rates deeper into negative territory whenever the economy falls into recession. Higher inflation would also result in steeper yield curves, reoxygenating commercial banks’ profitability. Profiting From Higher Inflation The path to higher interest rates is paved with lower rates. In order to generate inflation, central banks will need to keep rates at very low levels even once the economy has returned to full employment. Given that unemployment is quite high today, inflation is not an imminent risk. However, it could become a formidable problem in two-to-three years. Investors should maintain below-benchmark levels of duration in fixed-income portfolios and favor inflation-linked securities over nominal bonds. While gold is no longer super cheap, it remains a good hedge against inflation. The yellow metal should also do well if the dollar weakens during the remainder of this year, as we anticipate. As a countercyclical currency, the dollar tends to fall whenever global growth picks up (Chart 11). Chart 11Gold Will Do Well When The Dollar Weakens As Global Growth Picks Up Gold Will Do Well When The Dollar Weakens As Global Growth Picks Up Gold Will Do Well When The Dollar Weakens As Global Growth Picks Up Chart 12Farmland Would Benefit From High Inflation Farmland Would Benefit From High Inflation Farmland Would Benefit From High Inflation Lastly, land will gain from low interest rates in the near term and higher inflation in the long term. Farmland and suburban land are particularly appealing. The pandemic has made remote working more commonplace. It has also highlighted the potential dangers of living in densely populated cities. Since most suburbs are built on top of land that was previously zoned for agriculture, farmland should benefit from the retreat from urban living, much like it did during the inflationary period of the 1970s (Chart 12). Box 1Saving More By Spending More Will There Be A Fiscal Hangover? Will There Be A Fiscal Hangover?   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Risks To The U,” dated May 7, 2020. 2  Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Could The Pandemic Lead To Higher Stock Prices?” dated April 23, 2020. 3  Gross Domestic Product (GDP) can be computed as the sum of consumption (C), investment (I), government spending (G), and net exports (X-M). Gross National Product (GNP) is equal to GDP except that the former includes net income from abroad (which is included in the current account balance). Thus, GNP=C+I+G+CA, or GNP-C-G=I+CA. Savings (S) is equal to GNP-C-G. Taken together, the two expressions imply S-I=CA, or S=I+CA. 4  Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, ”Is There Really Too Much Government Debt In The World?” dated February 22, 2019. 5  Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “A Structural Bear Market In Bonds,” dated February 16, 2018. Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Will There Be A Fiscal Hangover? Will There Be A Fiscal Hangover? Current MacroQuant Model Scores Will There Be A Fiscal Hangover? Will There Be A Fiscal Hangover?

An analysis on Turkey is available below.   Highlights Due to the sizable stimulus announced by the NPC, we are upgrading our outlook for Chinese growth for this year. Nevertheless, in terms of investment strategy, we are reluctant to chase China-related plays higher at the moment. Rising geopolitical tensions between the US and China will likely produce a pullback in China-related risk assets, providing a better entry point in the months ahead. The RMB is set to depreciate dragging down emerging Asian currencies. There is evidence that the equity rally from late-March lows has been driven or supercharged by retail investors worldwide. Such retail-driven manias never end well, though they can last for a while. Feature Emerging market equities are facing a critical technical resistance. Chart I-1 shows that over the past decade, EM share prices often found support at the horizontal line during selloffs. The latter could now become a resistance point. In turn, the Australian dollar and the S&P 500 have climbed to their 200-day moving averages (Chart I-2). Chart I-1EM Stocks Are Facing A Technical Resistance EM Stocks Are Facing A Technical Resistance EM Stocks Are Facing A Technical Resistance Chart I-2S&P 500 And AUD Are At Critical Technical Juncture S&P 500 And AUD Are At Critical Technical Juncture S&P 500 And AUD Are At Critical Technical Juncture   Having rallied strongly in the past two months, it is reasonable to expect that global risk assets will take a breather as investors assess the economic and geopolitical outlooks. China: Aggressive Stimulus… China has embarked on another round of aggressive stimulus. The government program approved by the National People’s Congress (NPC) last week laid out the following macro policy objectives: Stabilize employment. The NPC has pledged to create more than 9 million new jobs in urban areas. Although this is lower than last year’s target of more than 11 million new jobs, it is very ambitious given the number of layoffs that have occurred year-to-date. Chart I-3China: Money/Credit Is Set To Re-Accelerate China: Money/Credit Is Set To Re-Accelerate China: Money/Credit Is Set To Re-Accelerate Significantly accelerate the growth rate of broad money supply and total social financing relative to last year. Indeed, broad money growth accelerated in April and will continue to move higher (Chart I-3). Lending to enterprises and households as well as overall bank asset growth have all accelerated (Chart I-3, bottom two panels). Boost aggregate government spending (budgetary and quasi-fiscal) growth to 13.2% in 2020 versus 9.5% last year.   Local government’s special bond quotas have been set at RMB 3.75 trillion yuan, compared with RMB 2.15 trillion last year. The central government will issue special bonds in the order of 1 trillion yuan. The proceeds will be transferred to local governments to support tax and fee reductions, as well as to boost consumption and investment.  Support SMEs. The government will extend its beneficial loan-repayment policy for SMEs until March 2021. It will extend exemptions for SMEs on social security contributions, VAT and other fees and taxes through to the end of this year. The government estimates a total of RMB 2.5 trillion in tax and fee reductions for companies in 2020. Table I-1 details potential scenarios for the credit and fiscal spending impulse (CFI). In our baseline scenario, the CFI will rise to 15.5% of GDP by year-end (Chart I-4). In short, in 2020 the CFI will likely be larger than it was in 2015-’16 and closer to its 2012 level. However, it will still fall short of the 2009-2010 surge. Table I-1Simulation On Credit And Fiscal Spending Impulse For 2020 EM Stocks Are At A Critical Resistance Level EM Stocks Are At A Critical Resistance Level Chart I-4Our Projections For The Credit And Fiscal Spending Impulse Our Projections For The Credit And Fiscal Spending Impulse Our Projections For The Credit And Fiscal Spending Impulse In summary, it is fair to say that for now, the authorities have abandoned their deleveraging objective and are encouraging a substantial acceleration of both debt and credit. However, it will take time before the stimulus filters through the economy and boosts growth. This will be the case because of the following persistent headwinds: First, the reduced willingness of households and enterprises to spend. The top panel of Chart I-5 reveals that consumers’ marginal propensity to spend is falling. Enterprises’ willingness to invest continues to trend lower. Historically, companies’ willingness to invest has been a good indicator for industrial metals prices. So far it has not validated the advance in base metals (Chart I-5, bottom panel). The rationale for this correlation is that Chinese companies account for 50-55% of global industrial metals demand. Second, the COVID-19 economic downturn in China was much worse than previous downturns, and the financial health of companies and households is considerably poorer than before. This is why it will take very large amounts of stimulus to produce even a moderate recovery. In particular, a portion of the credit expansion will go toward plugging operating cash flow deficits at companies rather than to augment investment. For example, in the US, commercial and industrial loan growth surged in 2007/08 and this year (Chart I-6). In all of those cases, the underlying cause for credit acceleration was companies drawing on their credit lines to close their negative operating cashflow gaps. Chart I-5China: Households And Enterprises Are Less Willing To Spend China: Households And Enterprises Are Less Willing To Spend China: Households And Enterprises Are Less Willing To Spend Chart I-6US Loan Growth Spikes In Recessions US Loan Growth Spikes In Recessions US Loan Growth Spikes In Recessions The same phenomenon is presently occurring in China. This entails more credit origination will be required in China in this cycle before we witness a revival in capital spending. Third, geopolitical tensions between the US and China will escalate further in the months ahead. We elaborate on this in more detail below. As far as China’s growth outlook is concerned, rising geopolitical tensions with the US will weigh on both consumer and business confidence. On the whole, due to the sizable stimulus announced by the NPC, we are upgrading our outlook for Chinese growth for this year. Nevertheless, in terms of investment strategy, we are reluctant to chase China-related plays higher at the moment. Rising geopolitical tensions will likely produce a pullback in China-related risk assets, providing a better entry point in the months ahead. Chart I-7Chinese Economy: Still Very Weak Chinese Economy: Still Very Weak Chinese Economy: Still Very Weak In addition, the mainland economy is still undergoing post-lockdown normalization – not recovery. Both capital spending and household consumption are still in recession (Chart I-7).    Bottom Line: China is yet again resorting to aggressive fiscal and credit stimulus. Mainland growth is bound to improve over the remainder of the year. However, financial markets have run a bit ahead of themselves, and we will wait for a pullback before recommending China-related plays.  …But Geopolitics Is A Major Risk Despite an improving growth outlook, Asian and China-related risk assets could struggle in the months ahead due to escalating geopolitical tensions between the US and China. On the surface, the COVID-19 crisis seems to be the culprit behind rising tensions between the two nations. However, the pandemic has only accelerated an otherwise unavoidable confrontation between the existing superpower and the rising one. BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy team has been writing about cumulating tensions and the potential for them to boil over in the months before the US election. The contours of the rise in geopolitical tensions will be as follows: President Trump’s chances of re-election have declined, with the recession gripping the US economy and unemployment surging. There is little doubt that he will use external foes to rally the nation behind the flag. Blaming China for the pandemic and acting tough is probably the only way for Trump to switch his campaign’s nucleus from the economy to foreign policy, which will raise the odds of his election victory. The US administration will not resort to import tariffs this time around. Going forward, the administration’s goal will be cutting China’s access to foreign technology. Technology in general and semiconductors in particular will be the key battleground in this new cold war. The US will also step up its pressure on multinationals to move production out of China. The broader idea is to impede China’s technological advance. Even though the US rhetoric on China’s policies toward Hong Kong will be tough, there is little the US can do or will do regarding Hong Kong. Rather, the more important battleground will be Taiwan and its semiconductor industry. Finally, China’s political leadership cannot tolerate being perceived as weak domestically in the face of US pressures. They will retaliate against the US. One form of retaliation against Trump could be pushing North Korea to test its strategic military weapons that could undermine Trump’s foreign policy credibility in the US. Another form of retaliation could be tolerating moderate currency depreciation. The latter will challenge Trump’s claims that he has been victorious in dealing with China. The latest decision to ban US and foreign companies from accepting orders from Huawei and the slide in the value of the RMB are consistent with these narratives. To our surprise, however, financial markets in general and Asian markets in particular have not sold off meaningfully in response to the US ban on Huawei and renewed RMB depreciation. Critically, China is the world’s largest consumer of semiconductors, accounting for 35% of global semiconductor demand. Restricting Chinese purchases would be negative for global semiconductor producers. China has been aware of the risk of US restrictions on its imports of semiconductors and has been ramping up its semi imports since 2018. Semi imports have been booming even though smartphone sales had been shrinking (Chart I-8). This is a sign of large semiconductor restocking in China which has helped global semi sales in general and TSMC sales in particular in the past 18 months. In brief, major semi restocking by China in the past 18 months along with the ban on sales to Huawei all but ensure that global semiconductor sales will be weak this year. It does not seem that global semi stocks in general and Asian ones in particular are pricing in this outcome. Global semiconductor stocks are a hair below their all-time highs, and their trailing P/E ratio is at 21. Specifically, given Huawei is the second-largest customer of TSMC, the latter’s sales will be negatively affected (Chart I-9). Chart I-8Has China Been Stockpiling Semiconductors? Has China Been Stockpiling Semiconductors? Has China Been Stockpiling Semiconductors? Chart I-9TSMC Has Benefited From China Stockpiling Semiconductors TSMC Has Benefited From China Stockpiling Semiconductors TSMC Has Benefited From China Stockpiling Semiconductors Finally, both DRAM and NAND prices are falling anew (Chart I-10). Further, DRAM revenue proxy correlates with Korean tech stocks and points to lower share prices (Chart I-11). Chart I-10Semiconductor Prices Have Begun Falling Semiconductor Prices Have Begun Falling Semiconductor Prices Have Begun Falling Chart I-11Semiconductor Prices Are Still Deflating DRAM Revenue Proxy And Korean Tech Stocks Semiconductor Prices Are Still Deflating DRAM Revenue Proxy And Korean Tech Stocks Semiconductor Prices Are Still Deflating DRAM Revenue Proxy And Korean Tech Stocks Crucially, Chinese, Korean and Taiwanese stocks account for 60% of the MSCI EM equity market cap. Hence, a selloff in these bourses will weigh on the EM equity index. Chart I-12 shows that the latest drawdown in these North Asian equity markets was relatively small compared to the drop in the rest of the EM equity universe. Hence, Chinese, Korean and Taiwanese share prices are not discounting a lot of bad news making them vulnerable to the geopolitical risks that lie ahead. Financial markets in Asia are very complacent to mounting geopolitical risks stemming from the US-China confrontation. The RMB is set to depreciate dragging down emerging Asian currencies. Chart I-12North Asian Stocks Versus The Rest Of EM North Asian Stocks Versus The Rest Of EM North Asian Stocks Versus The Rest Of EM Bottom Line: Financial markets in Asia are very complacent to mounting geopolitical risks stemming from the US-China confrontation. The RMB is set to depreciate dragging down emerging Asian currencies. The large share of Chinese, Korean and Taiwanese stocks in the MSCI EM equity index implies significant downside risks to the EM equity benchmark. The Global Economic Outlook As economies around the world open, the level of economic activity will certainly begin to rise. The opening of shops, offices and various other facilities will result in a partial normalization and an increase in economic activities.  However, we cannot call this a recovery. Rather it is just a snapback from the lockdowns which both equity and credit markets have already fully priced in. The outlook for global share prices and credit markets depends on what happens to the global economy following this post-lockdown snapback. Will the snapback be followed by an actual recovery or will the level of activity stagnate at low levels? For now, our sense is that following the initial snapback a U-shaped recovery is the most likely global scenario. This does not exclude the possibility that activity in some sectors/countries will follow a square root trajectory.  From a global macro perspective, we have the following observations to share: Certain industries will likely experience stagflation. Due to social distancing measures, they will be forced to limit their output/capacity and compensate for their increased costs by charging higher prices. In this group, we would include airlines, restaurants, and other service sector businesses. The short-term outlook for consumer spending is contingent on fiscal stimulus. A material reduction in fiscal support for households will weigh on their spending capacity. Capital spending will remain subdued outside China’s stimulus-driven local government and SOE investment outlays, and outside the technology sector, generally. Critically, economic activity in many countries and industries will remain below pre-pandemic levels until late this year. This implies that despite the snapback, some businesses will still be operating below or close to their breakeven points. This will have ramifications on their ability to service debt and on their willingness to invest and hire. Any rise in government bond yields worldwide will be limited as central banks in both DM and EM will cap yields by augmenting their purchase of government and in some cases corporate bonds. We discussed EM QE programs in detail in last week’s report. Bottom Line: It is tempting to interpret the post-lockdown snapback in economic activity as a recovery. However, the nature and depth of this recession is unique. Investors should consider both the direction of economic indicators and the level of economic activity in relation to a company’s breakeven point. This is an extremely difficult task. And that is in addition to gauging the odds of a second wave of COVID-19 infections later this year. In the context of such complexities facing investors, there is astonishing evidence that the recent equity rally has been driven by unsophisticated retail investors. A Retail-Driven Equity Rally There is growing evidence that the equity rally from late-March lows has been driven or supercharged by retail investors, worldwide. There is growing evidence that the equity rally from late-March lows has been driven or supercharged by retail investors, worldwide. Such retail-driven manias never end well, though they can last for a while. The following articles corroborate the worldwide phenomenon that retail investors have been opening broker accounts en masse and investing in stocks: Bored Day Traders Locked at Home Are Now Obsessed With Options Frustrated sports punters turn to US stock market Coronavirus spawns new generation of Japanese stock pickers Stuck at Home, More Filipinos Try Luck at Stock Investing It is fair to assume that retail investors do very little fundamental analysis. Not surprisingly, since March global share prices have decoupled from profit expectations. Although some professional investors have no doubt also played the rally, surveys of asset managers and traders suggest that generally they have stayed lukewarm on stocks. Specifically, the net long position of asset managers and leveraged funds in various US equity index futures remains very low (Chart I-13). Chart I-14 shows that US traders’ and professional individual investors’ sentiment on US stocks are at multi-year lows. Only US investment advisors have become fairly bullish again (Chart I-14, bottom panel). Chart I-13Fund Managers Have Stayed Lukewarm On Stocks Fund Managers Have Stayed Lukewarm On Stocks Fund Managers Have Stayed Lukewarm On Stocks Chart I-14Professional Investors’ Sentiment On Stocks Have Been Subdued Professional Investors Sentiment On Stocks Have Been Subdued Professional Investors Sentiment On Stocks Have Been Subdued Who will capitulate first: retail or professional investors? It is hard to predict the behavior of investors but, if we had to guess, our take could be summed up as follows:  If geopolitical tensions escalate much more or the number of COVID-19 inflections in some large countries rises anew, retail investors will likely sell before professional investors step in. In this scenario, share prices will drop considerably. In the case of an absence of geopolitical tensions or a new wave of infections, it is hard to see how economic data that is improving could lead to a substantial drawdown in equities even if the level of activity remains very depressed. In this case, corrections will be small and short-lived. Investment Strategy Chart I-15Beware Of Breakdowns Beware Of Breakdowns Beware Of Breakdowns For global equity portfolios, we continue recommending underweighting EM stocks. Regardless of the direction of global share prices, EM will continue underperforming DM (Chart I-15, top panel). The basis for this is rising geopolitical tensions in China and weakness in the RMB will spill over into other emerging Asian currencies (Chart I-15, bottom panel). We continue recommending short positions in the RMB and KRW versus the US dollar. In terms of the absolute performance of EM equities and credit markets, as well as EM currencies versus the greenback, we recommend being patient. Global and EM financial markets are presently at a critical juncture, as illustrated in Charts 1 and 2 on pages 1 and 2. If these and some other markets meaningfully break above current levels of resistance, we will upgrade our stance on EM stocks and credit markets and close our short positions in EM currencies versus the US dollar. If they fail to do so, a considerable selloff is likely to follow. As to EM local currency bonds, we are long duration but cautious on EM currencies. For the full list of our recommendations for EM equity, credit, local fixed-income and currency markets, please refer to pages 18 and 19.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Lin Xiang, CFA Research Analyst linx@bcaresearch.com     Turkish Lira: Facing A Litmus Test The Turkish lira has rolled over at its resistance level on a total return (including carry) basis (Chart II-1). The spot rate versus the US dollar is at its 2018 low. In short, the exchange rate is facing a litmus test. The culprit of a potential downleg in the lira is an enormous monetary deluge. Chart II-2 reveals that broad money supply growth has accelerated to 35% from a year ago. Local currency money supply is skyrocketing because the central bank and commercial banks are engaged in rampant money creation and public debt monetization. Chart II-1Turkish Lira (Including Carry): A Good Point To Short Turkish Lira (Including Carry): A Good Point To Short Turkish Lira (Including Carry): A Good Point To Short Chart II-2Turkey’s Broad Money: The Sky Is The Limit Turkey's Broad Money: The Sky Is The Limit Turkey's Broad Money: The Sky Is The Limit While such macro policies could benefit economic growth in the short term, they also herald growing inflationary pressures and currency devaluation. First, Turkish commercial banks have been on a government bonds buying binge since 2018 (Chart II-3, top panel). They presently own 62% of total local currency government bonds, up from 45% in early 2018. In addition, the central bank is de-facto engaging in government debt monetization. The Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) has bought TRY 40 billion of government bonds in the secondary market since March (Chart II-3, bottom panel). When a central bank or commercial bank buys a local currency asset from a non-bank, a new local currency deposit is created in the banking system and the money supply expands.  Chart II-3Turkey: Public Debt Monetization In Full Force Turkey: Public Debt Monetization In Full Force Turkey: Public Debt Monetization In Full Force Chart II-4Turkey: Loan Growth Exceeds 30% Turkey: Loan Growth Exceeds 30% Turkey: Loan Growth Exceeds 30% Second, the commercial banks’ local currency loan growth has surged to 32% (Chart II-4). Government lending schemes and newly introduced regulations are incentivizing commercial banks to continue lending in order to boost domestic demand. In particular, state owned banks are providing loans at interest rates well below both the policy and inflation rates. The most likely outcome from such policies is rampant capital misallocation and an increase in non-performing loans. The former will weigh on productivity in the long turn. Third, the central bank has been providing enormous amounts of liquidity to commercial banks (Chart II-5, top panel). The latter’s local currency excess reserves – which are exclusively created out of thin air by the central bank - have surged (Chart II-5, bottom panel). In fact, the effective policy rate has been hovering below the actual policy rate, suggesting that there is an excess liquidity overflow in the banking system. In a nutshell, the central bank has been providing fuel to commercial banks to expand money supply via the purchases of local currency government bonds and loan origination. Fourth, an overly loose monetary stance will lead to higher inflation and currency devaluation. Moreover, wages continue to expand at an annual rate of 15-20%, confirming the fact that inflationary pressures are genuine and broad within this economy (Chart II-6). Higher inflation, and the consequent loss of purchasing power, is leading residents to switch their holdings of liras to foreign currencies. Chart II-5Central Banks' Liquidity Provision To Banks Central Banks' Liquidity Provision To Banks Central Banks' Liquidity Provision To Banks Chart II-6Turkey: A Sign Of Genuine Inflation Turkey: A Sign Of Genuine Inflation Turkey: A Sign Of Genuine Inflation Higher inflation, and the consequent loss of purchasing power, is leading residents to switch their holdings of liras to foreign currencies. Finally, Turkey’s current account deficit is set to widen, and the central bank’s net foreign currency reserves are non-existent at best. Booming credit growth will keep domestic demand and imports stronger than they otherwise would be. In the meantime, the complete collapse in tourism revenues and Turkey’s large foreign debt obligations, estimated at $160 billion over the next six months, entail negative balance of payment dynamics. Barring capital controls, Turkey will not be able to preclude further currency depreciation. Investment Implications Short the Turkish lira versus the US dollar. We recommend dedicated equity investors underweight Turkish equities and credit relative to their respective EM benchmarks. Also, we are reiterating our short Turkish banks / long Russian banks position. Local currency yields will offer little protection against currency depreciation. As such, investors should underweight domestic bonds.   Andrija Vesic Associate Editor andrijav@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations