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Executive Summary Hopes of an imminent peace deal between Russia and Ukraine will be dashed. The conflict will worsen over the coming days. As was the case during the original Cold War, both sides will eventually forge an understanding that allows the pursuit of mutually beneficial arrangements. A stabilization in geopolitical relations, coupled with fading pandemic headwinds, should keep global growth above trend this year, helping to support corporate earnings. The era of hyperglobalization is over. While central banks will temper their plans to raise rates in the near term, increased spending on defense and energy independence will lead to higher interest rates down the road. How Stocks Fared During The Cuban Missile Crisis How Stocks Fared During The Cuban Missile Crisis How Stocks Fared During The Cuban Missile Crisis Bottom Line: The near-term outlook for risk assets has deteriorated. We are downgrading global equities from overweight to neutral on a tactical 3-month horizon. We continue to expect stocks to outperform bonds on a 12-month horizon as the global economic recovery gains momentum. On an even longer 2-to-5-year horizon, equities are likely to struggle as interest rates rise more than expected.   Dear Client, Given the rapidly evolving situation in Ukraine, we are sending you our thoughts earlier than normal this week. We will continue to update you as events warrant it. Best regards, Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist   False Dawn In the lead-up to the invasion, Vladimir Putin assumed that Ukrainian forces would fold just as quickly as US-backed Afghan forces did last summer. He also presumed that the rest of the world would reluctantly accept Russia’s takeover of Ukraine. Both assumptions appear to have been proven wrong. Even if Putin succeeds in installing a puppet government in Kyiv, a protracted insurgency is sure to follow. In the initial days of the invasion, Russian troops generally tried to avoid harming civilians, partly in the hope that Ukrainians would see the Russian military as liberators. Now that this hope has been dashed, a more brutal offensive could unfold. This would trigger even more sanctions, leading to a wider gulf between Russia and the West. It is highly doubtful that sanctions will dissuade Putin from trying to subdue Ukraine. Putin made a name for himself by staging a successful invasion of Chechnya in 1999, just three years after the Yeltsin government had suffered a major defeat there. To withdraw from Ukraine now, without having fomented a regime change in Kyiv, would be a humiliating outcome for him. In this light, BCA’s geopolitical team, led by Matt Gertken, has argued that ongoing peace talks taking place on the border of Ukraine and Belarus are unlikely to amount to much. The situation will get worse before it gets better. Market Implications It always feels a bit crass writing about finance during times like this, but as investment strategists, it is our job to do so. With that in mind, we would make the following observations: Global equities are likely to suffer another leg down in the near term as hopes of an imminent peace deal fizzle. Consequently, we are downgrading our view on global stocks from overweight to neutral on a 3-month horizon. Nimble investors with a low risk tolerance should consider going underweight equities. We are shifting our stance on US stocks from underweight to neutral on a 3-month horizon. Europe could face significant pressures from near-term disruptions to Russian gas supplies. It does not make much sense for Russia to export gas if it is effectively barred from accessing the proceeds of its sales. Central and Eastern Europe will be particularly hard hit (Chart 1). Chart 1Central and Eastern Europe Would Suffer The Most From A Russian Energy Blockade A New Cold War A New Cold War For now, we are maintaining an overweight to stocks on a 12-month horizon. While it will take a month or two, both sides will ultimately forge an understanding whereby Russia and the West continue to publicly bad-mouth each other while still pursuing mutually beneficial arrangements. Remember that during the Cold War, the Soviet Union continued to sell oil to the West. Even the Cuban Missile Crisis had only a fleeting impact on equities (Chart 2). Chart 2How Stocks Fared During The Cuban Missile Crisis How Stocks Fared During The Cuban Missile Crisis How Stocks Fared During The Cuban Missile Crisis Chart 3European Fiscal Policy Will Remain Structurally Looser Over The Coming Years A New Cold War A New Cold War Assuming that any reduction in Russian energy exports is temporary, oil prices will eventually recede. BCA’s commodities team, led by Bob Ryan, expects Brent to settle to $88/bbl by the end of 2022 (down from the current spot price of $101/bbl and close to the forward price of $87/bbl). Like oil, gold prices have upside in the near term but should edge lower once the dust settles.    Global growth should remain solidly above trend in 2022 as pandemic-related headwinds fade and fiscal policy turns more expansionary. Even before the Ukraine invasion, the structural primary budget deficit in Europe was set to swing from a small surplus to a deficit (Chart 3). The emerging new world order will lead to sizable additional military spending, as well as increased outlays towards achieving energy independence (new LNG terminals, more investment in renewables, and perhaps even some steps towards restarting nuclear power programs). China will also step up credit easing and fiscal stimulus. This will not only benefit the Chinese economy, but it will also provide some much-needed support to European exporters (Chart 4). While credit spreads are apt to widen further in the near term, corporate bonds should benefit from stronger growth later this year. US high-yield bonds are pricing in a jump in the default rate from 1.3% over the past 12 months to 4.2% over the coming year, which seems somewhat excessive (Chart 5).  Chart 4Chinese Policy Will Be A Tailwind For Growth Chinese Policy Will Be A Tailwind For Growth Chinese Policy Will Be A Tailwind For Growth Chart 5Credit Markets Are Pricing In An Excessive Default Rate Credit Markets Are Pricing In An Excessive Default Rate Credit Markets Are Pricing In An Excessive Default Rate Central banks will temper their plans to raise rates in the near term. Investors and speculators are net short duration at the moment, which could amplify any downward move in bond yields (Chart 6). However, over a multi-year horizon, recent events will lead to both higher inflation and interest rates. Larger budget deficits will sap global savings. The retreat from globalization will also put upward pressure on wages and prices. As defensive currencies, the US dollar and the Japanese yen will strengthen in the near term as the conflict in Ukraine escalates. Looking beyond the next few months, the dollar will weaken. On a purchasing power parity basis, the dollar is amongst the most expensive currencies (Chart 7). For example, relative to the euro, the dollar is 22% overvalued (Chart 8). The US trade deficit has doubled since the start of the pandemic, even as equity inflows have dipped (Chart 9). Speculators are long the greenback, which raises the risk of an eventual reversal in dollar sentiment. Chart 6Short Duration Is A Crowded Trade Short Duration Is A Crowded Trade Short Duration Is A Crowded Trade Chart 7The US Dollar Is Overvalued… A New Cold War A New Cold War   Chart 8...Especially Against The Euro A New Cold War A New Cold War The freezing of Russia’s foreign exchange reserves will encourage China to diversify away from US dollars towards hard assets such as land and infrastructure in economies where they are less likely to be seized. It will also encourage the Chinese authorities to bolster domestic demand and permit a further modest appreciation of the RMB since these two steps will reduce the current account surpluses that make foreign exchange accumulation necessary. EM currencies will benefit from this trend. Chart 9The Trade Deficit Is A Headwind For The Dollar The Trade Deficit Is A Headwind For The Dollar The Trade Deficit Is A Headwind For The Dollar In summary, the near-term outlook for risk assets has deteriorated. We are downgrading global equities from overweight to neutral on a tactical 3-month horizon. We continue to expect stocks to outperform bonds on a 12-month horizon as the global economic recovery gains momentum. On an even longer 2-to-5-year horizon, equities are likely to struggle as interest rates rise more than expected. Trade Update: We closed our long Brent oil trade for a gain of 24% last week. Earlier today, we were stopped out of the trade we initiated on September 16, 2021 going long the Russian ruble and the Brazilian real. The BRL leg was up 6.2% at the time of termination while the RUB leg was down 23.1% (based on the Bloomberg RUB/USD Carry Return Index as of 4pm EST today). Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com View Matrix A New Cold War A New Cold War Special Trade Recommendations A New Cold War A New Cold War Current MacroQuant Model Scores A New Cold War A New Cold War

Executive Summary Risk Premium Abates, But Does Not Disappear Oil Risk Premium Abates, But Still Remains Oil Risk Premium Abates, But Still Remains The risk premium in crude oil and natural gas prices is abating, and we expect that to continue. In the immediate aftermath of Russia's invasion, Brent crude oil traded close to $105/bbl on Thursday. At the urging of China's Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin suggested he is prepared to enter negotiations with Ukraine in Minsk to discuss the latter's neutrality. Whether Ukraine is amenable to negotiations framed in this manner remains to be seen. Nothing has changed in supply-demand balances for oil or natgas. Markets are tight, and more supply is needed. In this highly fluid situation, we project Brent crude oil will average $100.00/bbl in 1Q22; $90.30/bbl in 2Q22; $85.00/bbl in 3Q22; and $85.00/bbl in 4Q22 (see Chart). Our estimate for 2023 Brent averages $85.00/bbl. Upside risk dominates in the near term. We expect the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Kuwait, the only members of OPEC 2.0 with the capacity to increase and sustain higher production, to lift output by 1.75mm b/d. The Iran nuclear deal likely gets a boost from the Russian invasion, which will hasten the return of ~ 1.0mm b/d of production in 2H22, perhaps sooner. We also expect the US, and possibly the OECD, to release strategic petroleum reserves, but, as typically is the case, this will have a fleeting impact on markets and pricing. These supply increases will return prices closer to our base case forecast, which we raise slightly to $85/bbl from 2H22 to end-2023. If we fail to see an increase in core-OPEC production, or the US shales, or if Iranian barrels are not returned to export markets, oil prices have a good chance of moving to $140/bbl, as can be seen in the accompanying Chart. Bottom Line: We remain long commodity-index exposure (S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF), along with equity exposure to oil and gas producers via the XOP ETF.  

Executive Summary From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi The geopolitical “big picture” of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the deepening of the Russo-Chinese strategic partnership. While Russia’s economic and military constraints did not prohibit military action in Ukraine, they are still relevant. Most likely they will prevent a broader war with NATO or a total energy embargo of Europe. Still, volatility will persist in the near term as saber-rattling, aftershocks, and spillover incidents will occur this year.  Russo-Chinese relations are well grounded. Russia needs investment capital and resource sales, while China needs overland supply routes and supply security. Both seek to undermine the US in a new game of Great Power competition that will prevent global politics and globalization from normalizing. Tactically we remain defensive but buying opportunities are emerging. We maintain a cyclically constructive view. Favor equity markets of US allies and partners that are geopolitically secure. Trade Recommendation Inception Date Return Long Gold (Strategic) 2019-12-06 32.7% Bottom Line: Tactically investors should remain defensive but cyclically they should look favorably on cheap, geopolitically secure equity markets like those of Australia, Canada, and Mexico. Feature To understand the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the likely consequences, investors need to consider three factors: 1.  Why Russia’s constraints did not prohibit war and how constraints must always be measured against political will. 2.  Why Russia’s constraints will grow more relevant going forward, as the costs of occupation and sanctions take hold, the economy weakens, and sociopolitical pressures build. 3.  Why the struggle of the Great Powers will drive a Russo-Chinese alliance, whose competition with the US-led alliance will further destabilize global trade and investment. Russia’s Geopolitical Will Perhaps the gravest national security threat that Russia can face, according to Russian history, is a western military power based in the Ukraine. Time and again Russia has staged dramatic national efforts at great cost of blood and treasure to defeat western forces that try to encroach on this broad, flat road to Moscow. Putin has been in power for 22 years and his national strategy is well-defined: he aims to resurrect Russian primacy within the former Soviet Union, carve out a regional sphere of influence, and reduce American military threats in Russia’s periphery. He has long aimed to prevent Ukraine from becoming a western defense partner. Chart 1Russia Structured For Conflict From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi While Moscow faced material limitations to military action in Ukraine, these were not prohibitive, as we have argued. Consider the following constraints and their mitigating factors: Costs of war: The first mistake lay in assuming that Russia was not willing to engage in war. Russia had already invaded Ukraine in 2014 and before that Georgia in 2008. The modern Russian economy is structured for conflict: it is heavily militarized (Chart 1). Military spending accounts for 4.3% of GDP, comparable to the United States, also known for waging gratuitous wars and preemptive invasions. Financial burdens: The second mistake was to think that Moscow would avoid conflict for fear of the collapse of the ruble or financial markets. Since Putin rose to power in 2000, the ruble has depreciated by 48% against the dollar and the benchmark stock index has fallen by 57% against EMs. Each new crackdown on domestic or foreign enemies has led to a new round of depreciation and yet Putin remains undeterred from his long-term strategy (Chart 2). Chart 2Putin Doesn't Eschew Conflict For Sake Of Ruble Or Stocks Putin Doesn't Eschew Conflict For Sake Of Ruble Or Stocks Putin Doesn't Eschew Conflict For Sake Of Ruble Or Stocks Economic health: Putin’s foreign policy is not constrained by the desire to make the Russian economy more open, complex, advanced, or productive. While China long practiced a foreign policy of lying low, so as to focus on generating wealth that could later be converted into strategic power (which it is doing now), Russia pursued a hawkish foreign policy for the past twenty years despite the blowback on the economy. Russia is still an undiversified petro-state and total factor productivity is approaching zero (Chart 3). Chart 3Putin Doesn't Eschew Conflict For Sake Of Productivity Putin Doesn't Eschew Conflict For Sake Of Productivity Putin Doesn't Eschew Conflict For Sake Of Productivity ​​​​​​ Chart 4Putin Doesn’t Eschew Conflict For Fear Of Sanctions From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi ​​​​​​ Western sanctions: Western sanctions never provided a powerful argument against Russian intervention into Ukraine. Russia knew all along that if it invaded Ukraine, the West would impose a new round of sanctions, as it has done periodically since 2014. The 2014 oil crash had a much greater impact on Russia than the sanctions. Of course, Russia’s overall economic competitiveness is suffering, although it is capable of gaining market share in exporting raw materials, especially as it depreciates its currency (Chart 4). Chart 5Putin Doesn't Eschew Conflict For Sake Of Popular Opinion Putin Doesn't Eschew Conflict For Sake Of Popular Opinion Putin Doesn't Eschew Conflict For Sake Of Popular Opinion Public opinion: Surely the average Russian is not interested in Ukraine and hence Putin lacks popular support for a new war? True. But Putin has a strong record of using foreign military adventures as a means of propping up domestic support. Of course, opinion polls, which confirm this pattern, are manipulated and massaged (Chart 5). Nevertheless Russians like all people are highly likely to side with their own country in a military confrontation with foreign countries, at least in the short run. Over the long haul, the public will come to rue the war. Moscow believes that it can manage the domestic fallout when that time comes because it has done so since 2014. We doubt it but that is a question for a later time. Investors also need to consider Putin’s position if he did not stage ever-escalating confrontations with the West. Russia is an autocracy with a weak economy – it cannot win over the hearts and minds of its neighboring nations in a fair, voluntary competition with the West, the EU, and NATO. Russia’s neighbors are made up of formerly repressed Soviet ethnic minorities who now have a chance at national self-determination. But to secure their nationhood, they need economic and military support, and if they receive that support, then they inherently threaten Russia and help the US keep Russia strategically contained. Russia traditionally fights against this risk. Bottom Line: Investors and the media focused on the obstacles to Russian military intervention without analyzing whether there was sufficient political will to surmount the hurdles. Constraints Eroded None of the above suggests that Putin can do whatever he wants. Economic and military constraints are significant. However, constraints erode over time – and they may not be effective when needed. Europe did not promise to cancel all energy trade if Russia invaded: Exports make up 27% of Russian GDP, and 51% of exports go to advanced economies, especially European. Russia is less exposed to trade than the EU but more exposed than the US or even China (Chart 6). However, Russia trades in essential goods, natural resources, and the Europeans cannot afford to cut off their own energy supply. When Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014, the Germans responded by building the Nord Stream pipeline, basically increasing energy cooperation. Russia concluded that Europeans, not bound to defend Ukraine by any treaty, would continue to import energy in the event of a conflict limited to Ukraine. Chart 6Putin Limits Conflict For Sake Of EU Energy Trade From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi ​​​​​​ Chart 7Putin Limits Conflict For Sake Of Chinese Trade From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi ​​​​​​ Russia substitutes China for Europe: As trade with the West declines, Russia is shifting toward the Far East, especially China (Chart 7). China is unlikely to reduce any trade and investment for the sake of Ukraine – it desperately needs the resources and the import-security that strong relations with Russia can provide. It cannot replace Europe – but Russia does not expect to lose the European energy trade entirely. (Over time, of course, the EU/China shift to renewables will undermine Russia’s economy and capabilities.) Ukraine is right next door: Aside from active military personnel, the US advantage over Iraq in 2002-03 was greater than the Russian advantage over Ukraine in 2022 (Chart 8). And yet the US got sucked into a quagmire and ultimately suffered political unrest at home. However, Ukraine is not Afghanistan or Iraq. Russia wagers that it can seize strategic territory, including Kiev, without paying the full price that the Soviets paid in Afghanistan and the US paid in Afghanistan and Iraq. This is a very risky gamble. But the point is that the bar to invading Ukraine was lower than that of other recent invasions – it is not on the opposite side of the world. ​​​​​​​Chart 8Putin Limits Conflict For Fear Of Military Overreach From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi Chart 9Putin Limits Conflict For Fear Of Military Weakness From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi NATO faces mutually assured destruction: NATO’s conventional military weight far surpasses Russia’s. For example, Russia, with its Eurasian Union, does not have enough air superiority to engage in offensive initiatives against Europe, even assuming that the United States is not involved. Even if we assume that China joins Russia in a full-fledged military alliance under the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), NATO’s military budget is more than twice as large (Chart 9). However, this military constraint is not operable in the case of Ukraine, which is not a NATO member. Indeed, Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine stems from its fear that Ukraine will become a real or de facto member of NATO. It is the fear of NATO that prompted Russia to attack rather than deterring it, precisely because Ukraine was not a member but wanted to join. Bottom Line: Russia’s constraints did not prohibit military action because several of them had eroded over time. NATO was so threatening as to provoke rather than deter military action. Going forward, Russia’s economic and military constraints will prevent it from expanding the war beyond Ukraine.  Isn’t Russia Overreaching? Yes, Russia is overreaching – the military balances highlighted in Charts 8 and 9 above should make that plain. The Ukrainian insurgency will be fierce and Russia will pay steep costs in occupation and economic sanctions. These will vitiate the economy and popular support for Putin’s regime over the long run. Chart 10The West Is Politically Divided And Vulnerable From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi The West is also vulnerable, however, which has given rise to a fiscal and commodity cycle that helps to explain why Putin staged his risky invasion at this juncture in time: The US and West are politically divided. Western elites see themselves as surrounded by radical parties that threaten to throw them out and overturn the entire political establishment. Their tenuous grip on power is clear from the thin majorities they hold in their legislatures (Chart 10). Nowhere is this clearer than in the United States, where Democrats cannot spare a single seat in the Senate, five in the House of Representatives, in this fall’s midterm elections, yet are facing much bigger losses. Russia believes that its hawkish foreign policy can keep the democracies divided.​​​​​​​ Elites are turning to populist spending: Governments have adopted liberal fiscal policies in the wake of the global financial crisis and the pandemic. They are trying to grow their way out of populist unrest, debt, and various strategic challenges, from supply chains to cyber security to research and development (Chart 11). China is also part of this process, despite its mixed economic policies. The result is greater demand for commodities, which benefits Russia.    Elites are turning to climate change to justify public spending: Governments, particularly in Europe and China, are using fears of climate change to increase their political legitimacy and launch a new government “moonshot” that justifies more robust public investment and pump-priming. The long-term trend toward renewable energy is fundamentally threatening to Russia, although in the short term it makes Russian natural gas and metals all the more necessary. Germany especially envisions natural gas as the fossil-fuel bridge to a green future as it has turned against both nuclear power and coal (Chart 12). Russian aggression will provoke a rethink in some countries but Germany, as a manufacturing economy, is unlikely to abandon its goals for green industrial innovation. Chart 11Politically Vulnerable States Need Fiscal Stimulus Politically Vulnerable States Need Fiscal Stimulus Politically Vulnerable States Need Fiscal Stimulus ​​​​​​ Chart 12The West Reluctant To Abandon Climate Goals From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi ​​​​​​ Proactive fiscal and climate policy motivate new capex and commodity cycle: The West’s attempt to revive big government and strategic spending will require vast resource inputs – resources that Russia can sell at higher prices. The new commodity cycle gives Russia maximum leverage over Europe, especially Germany, at this point in time (Chart 13). Later, as inflation and fiscal fatigue halt this cycle, Russia will lose leverage. Chart 13Commodity Cycle Gives Russia Advantage (For Now) Commodity Cycle Gives Russia Advantage (For Now) Commodity Cycle Gives Russia Advantage (For Now) Meanwhile Russia’s economic and hence strategic power will subside over time. Russia’s potential GDP growth has fallen since the Great Recession as productivity growth slows and the labor force shrinks (Chart 14). Chart 14Future Will Not Yield Strategic Opportunities For Russia Future Will Not Yield Strategic Opportunities For Russia Future Will Not Yield Strategic Opportunities For Russia ​​​​​​ Chart 15Younger Russians Not Calling The Shots (But Will Someday) From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi In short, the Kremlin has chosen the path of economic austerity and military aggression as a means of maintaining political legitimacy and achieving national security objectives. Western divisions, de-carbonization, the commodity cycle, and Russia’s bleak economic outlook indicated that 2022 was the opportunity to achieve a pressing national security objective, rather than some future date when Russia will be less capable relative to its opponents. In the worst-case scenario – not our base case – the invasion of Ukraine will trigger an escalation of European sanctions that will lead to Russia cutting off Europe’s energy and producing a global energy price shock. And yet that outcome would upset US and European politics in Russia’s favor, while Putin would maintain absolute control at home in a society that is already used to economic austerity and that benefits from high commodity prices. Note that Putin’s strategy will not last forever. Ukraine will mark another case of Russian strategic overreach that will generate a social and political backlash in coming years. While Putin has sufficient support among older, more Soviet-minded Russians for his Ukraine adventure, he lacks support among the younger and middle-aged cohorts who will have to live with the negative economic consequences (Chart 15). The entire former Soviet Union is vulnerable to social unrest and revolution in the coming decade and Russia is no exception. The Russo-Chinese Geopolitical Realignment Chart 16From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi From a broader, geopolitical point of view, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine drives another nail into the coffin of the post-Cold War system and hyper-globalization. Russia is further divorcing itself from the western economy, with even the linchpin European energy trade falling victim to renewables and diversification. The US and its allies are imposing export controls on critical technologies such as semiconductors against Russia to cripple any attempts at modernization. The US is already restricting China’s access to semiconductors and from now on is locked into a campaign to try to enforce these export controls via secondary sanctions, giving rise to proxy battles in countries that Russia and China use to circumvent the sanctions. Russia will be forced to link its austere, militarized, resource-driven economy to the Chinese economy. Hence a major new geopolitical realignment is taking place between the US, Russia, and China, on the order of previous realignments since World War II. When the Sino-Soviet communist bloc first arose it threatened to overwhelm the US in economic heft and dominate Eurasia. This communist threat drove the US to undertake vast expeditionary wars, such as in South Korea and Vietnam. These were too costly, so the US sought economic engagement with China in 1972, which isolated the Soviet Union and ultimately helped bring about its demise. Yet China’s economic boom predictably translated into a strategic rise that began to threaten US preeminence, especially since the Great Recession. Today Russia and China have no option other than to cooperate in the face of the US’s increasingly frantic attempts to preserve its global status – and China’s economic growth and technological potential makes this alliance formidable (Chart 16). In short, the last vestiges of the “Nixon-Mao” moment are fading and the “Putin-Xi” alignment is already well-established. Russia cannot accept vassalage to China but it can make many compromises for the sake of strategic security. Their economies are much more complimentary today than they were at the time of the Sino-Soviet split. And Russia’s austere economy will not collapse as long as it retains some energy trade with Europe throughout the pivot to China. In turn the US will attempt to exploit Russian and Chinese regional aggression as a basis for a revitalization of its alliances. But Europe will dampen US enthusiasm by preserving economic engagement with Russia and China. The EU is increasingly an independent geopolitical actor and a neutral one at that. This environment of multipolarity – or Great Power Struggle – will define the coming decades. It will ensure not only periodic shocks, like the Ukraine war, but also a steady undercurrent of growing government involvement in the global economy in pursuit of supply security, energy security, and national security. Competition for security is not stabilizing but destabilizing. Hyper-globalization has given way to hypo-globalization, as regional geopolitical blocs take the place of what once promised to be a highly efficient and thoroughly interconnected global economy. Investment Takeaways Tactically, Geopolitical Strategy believes it is too soon to go long emerging markets. Russia is at war, China is reverting to autocracy, and Brazil is still on the path to debt crisis. Multiples have compressed sharply but the bad news is not fully priced (Chart 17). The dollar is likely to be resilient as the Fed hikes rates and a major European war rages. Europe’s geopolitical and energy insecurity will weigh on investment appetite and corporate earnings. American equities are likely to outperform in the short run. Chart 17Investors Should Not Bet On Russian And European Equities In This Context Investors Should Not Bet On Russian And European Equities In This Context Investors Should Not Bet On Russian And European Equities In This Context ​​​​​ Chart 18Investors Find Value, Minimize Risk In Geopolitically Secure Equity Markets Investors Find Value, Minimize Risk In Geopolitically Secure Equity Markets Investors Find Value, Minimize Risk In Geopolitically Secure Equity Markets ​​​​​​ Cyclically, global equities outside the US, and pro-cyclical assets offer better value, as long as the war in Ukraine remains contained, a Europe-wide energy shock is averted, and China’s policy easing secures its economic recovery. While European equities will snap back, Europe still faces structural challenges and eastern European emerging markets face a permanent increase in geopolitical risk due to Russian geopolitical decline and aggression. Investors should seek markets that are both cheap and geopolitically secure – namely Australia, Canada, and Mexico (Chart 18). We are also bullish on India over the long run.    Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

Executive Summary EU-Russia Energy Trade To Persist Russia Takes Ukraine: What Next? Russia Takes Ukraine: What Next? Russia invaded Ukraine to prevent it from becoming a defense partner of the US and its allies. It is not likely to attack NATO members, which share a mutual defense treaty, so the war is limited in scope. Spillovers can occur but the US and Russia have 73 years of experience avoiding direct war. The US and EU will levy sweeping sanctions but they will not halt Russian energy exports, as that would cause a recession in Europe. European political leaders would likely fall from power in the coming years if there were a full-scale energy crisis. European nations will leverage Russian aggression to strengthen their popular support at home, while diversifying away from Russian energy over the long run. Europe will impose tough sanctions on Russia’s non-energy sectors, including finance and technology, to hobble the regime. China will consolidate power at home and strengthen ties with Russia but a war over Taiwan is a medium-to-long term risk.   Bottom Line: Investors should be cautious over the very near term but should prepare to buy the dip of a geopolitical incident that is generally limited to Ukraine and the Black Sea area. Supply responses from oil producers will remove the risk premium from oil prices and send the price of Brent crude to $85 per barrel by the end of the year. EU-Russia energy flows are the key risk to monitor. Feature Russia launched an invasion of Ukraine on February 24. The invasion was not limited to the far eastern corner of the country but involved attacks in the capital Kiev and in the far west and the coastline. Hence investors should proceed on the assumption that Russia will invade all of Ukraine even if it ends up limiting its invasion, as we expect (Map 1). Map 1Russian Invasion Of Ukraine 2022 Russia Takes Ukraine: What Next? Russia Takes Ukraine: What Next? It is critical for investors to understand the cause of the war in order to gauge its scope and adjust their risk appetite accordingly. Consider: Ukraine does not have mutual defense treaties that automatically trigger a broader war. Russia is attacking Ukraine to prevent it from becoming a defense partner of the US and its allies. Russia does not have the military capacity to attack the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, which have a mutual defense pact. Russia is attacking Ukraine because it does not have a mutual defense pact but was seeking one. Russia aims to neutralize Ukraine. If Moscow sacks Kiev and sets up a puppet state, then Ukraine will not seek western defense cooperation for the foreseeable future. If Russia conquers key territories to strengthen its control over Ukraine, then future Ukrainian governments will limit relations with the West for fear of Russian absorption. Russia is likely to seize coastal territory to ensure the long-term ability to blockade Ukraine. Russia will not withdraw troops until it has changed the government and seized key territories. Russia and NATO have no interest in war with each other. In the immediate fog of war, global financial markets will experience uncertainty about whether fighting will expand into a broader war between Russia and NATO. Such an expansion is unlikely because of mutually assured destruction (MAD) due to nuclear weapons. The US and Europe have already pledged that they will not send troops to fight in Ukraine. They will send troops and arms to support neighboring NATO states in central Europe, such as the Baltic states, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and others. This will serve as a deterrent to Russia to keep its operations limited. Spillover incidents can and will occur, such as with Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 in 2014, but the US and Russia have 73 years of experience avoiding direct war, including when Russia invaded Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and Afghanistan in 1979. The US and EU will levy sweeping sanctions but the EU will not halt Russian energy exports. When Russia first invaded Ukraine and seized territory in 2014, Germany responded by working with Russia to build the Nord Stream II pipeline so as to import energy directly from Russia and circumvent Ukraine. This historical fact over the past eight years reveals Germany’s true interests. Thus energy cooperation increased as a result of Russian aggression. Of course, Germany has suspended the certification of that pipeline in light of today’s invasion, but it was not yet operating, so energy flows are not impeded, and it still physically exists for future operation when Germany finds it politically expedient. Hungary, Italy, Finland, the Czech Republic and others will also need to keep up Russian energy flows. Chart 1EU-Russia Energy Trade To Persist Russia Takes Ukraine: What Next? Russia Takes Ukraine: What Next? Nevertheless, a cessation of energy flows is still the most important risk for investors to monitor, whether triggered by European boycott or Russian embargo. That would cause a recession in Europe. Recession would cause European political leaders to fall from power in the coming years, which explains why they will not pursue that objective in face of Russian aggression. Even the US is vulnerable to a global price shock (during a midterm election year) and hence will allow the EU to keep importing Russian energy, whatever its sanctions package may contain. True, Russia may cut off natural gas flows via Ukraine, which account for nearly 20% of Europe’s imports (Chart 1). Moreover, Europe may threaten or claim that they will sanction the energy sector. But most flows will likely continue. Europe will diversify away from Russian energy over the long run. Instead of cutting off their own vital energy supplies, European nations will leverage Russian aggression to strengthen their popular support at home, while initiating emergency state-led efforts to diversify away from Russian energy over the long run through renewables and imports from the US and its allies. This will be advantageous to European democracies that were already struggling to increase political legitimacy amid nascent populism – they will now have a crusade with which to rally their people and maintain fiscal support for their economy: energy security. Europe will sanction Russia’s non-energy sector. Europe will impose tough sanctions on Russia’s non-energy sectors, including finance and technology, to hobble the regime. Russia will eventually be cut off from the SWIFT banking communications network, since it already has a rudimentary alternative that it developed in recent years, but Germany will not agree to cut it off until the payment alternate to continue energy flows can be arranged, which is ultimately possible. China will take advantage of the moment but is probably not ready to invade Taiwan. China could seize the opportunity to consolidate power at home and it may increase pressure on Taiwan through rhetoric, sanctions, or cyber-attacks, but it is not likely to invade Taiwan. An amphibious invasion of the globally critical territory of Taiwan is far riskier for China than a land invasion of the non-critical territory of Ukraine is for Russia. Russia’s strategic calculations and timing are separate from China’s, despite their growing de facto alliance. But a war in the Taiwan Strait is at risk over the long run, as the situation is geopolitically unsustainable, for reasons similar to that of Ukraine. The situation in Ukraine is likely to get worse before it gets better, implying that investors should expect further volatility in risk assets in the near term. Structurally, the shift to a less geopolitically stable multipolar world will favor defense and cybersecurity stocks. “Great Power Struggle” is our top geopolitical investment theme over the long run and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine highlights its continuing relevance. Bottom Line: A buying opportunity for heavily discounted, pro-cyclical or high-beta assets is emerging rapidly, given our assessment, and we will monitor events over the coming weeks to identify when such a shift is prudent. A wholesale energy cutoff to Europe is the chief risk, as it would justify downgrading global equities relative to long-maturity bonds on a six-to-12 month horizon. Investment Takeaways Global Investment Strategy: With real rates coming down, owning gold remains an attractive hedge. As a fairly cheap and defensive currency, a long yen position is advisable. Assuming the conflict remains contained to Ukraine, equities and other risk assets should recover over the remainder of the year. The geopolitical premium in oil prices should also come down. Consistent with our Commodity & Energy Strategy views, our Global Investment Strategy service is closing its long Brent trade recommendation today for a gain of 24.0%. Commodities & Energy Strategy: While oil exports from Russia are not expected to diminish as a result of the invasion, it will prompt increased production from core OPEC producers – Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait – to take the elevated risk premium out of Brent crude oil prices and allow refiners to rebuild inventories. The US and Iran may rejoin the 2015 nuclear deal, which would add about 1.0mm b/d of production to the market – Russia’s 2014 invasion of Crimea did not prevent the original nuclear deal. These production increases would take prices from the current $105 per barrel level to $85 per barrel by the second half of 2022 and keep it there throughout 2023, according to our base case view. This change marks an increase on our earlier expectation of an average $79.75 per barrel in 2023 in our previous forecast. European Investment Strategy: European equities are likely to continue to underperform in the near-term. Even if Russia and Europe avoid a full embargo of Russian energy shipments to the West, the disruption caused by a rupture of natural gas flows via Ukraine will keep European gas prices at elevated levels. Additionally, investors will continue to handicap the needed risk premia to compensate for the low but real threat of an energy crisis, which would prove particularly debilitating for Hungary, Poland, Germany, Czechia and Italy (Chart 2). Moreover, European equities sport a strong value and cyclical profile with significant overweight positions in financial and industrial equities. Industrials will suffer from higher input costs. European financials will suffer from a decline in yields as hawks in the European Central Bank are already softening their rhetoric on the need to tighten policy. However, due to the likely temporary nature of the dislocation, we do not recommend selling Europe outright and instead will stick with our current hedges, such as selling EUR/JPY and EUR/CHF. The evolution of the military situation on the ground will warrant a re-valuation of this hedging strategy next week. The euro will soon become a buy. Chart 2EU Economy Highly Vulnerable To Any Large Energy Cutoff Risk Premium Will Fade From Oil Price Risk Premium Will Fade From Oil Price Foreign Exchange Strategy: The Ukraine crisis will lead to a period of strength for the US dollar (DXY). Countries requiring foreign capital will be most at risk from an escalation in tensions. We still suspect the DXY will peak near 98-100, but volatility will swamp fundamental biases. Geopolitical Strategy: On a strategic basis, stick with our long trades in gold, arms manufacturers, UK equities relative to EU equities, and the Japanese yen. On a tactical basis, stick with long defensive sectors, large caps, Japanese equities relative to German, and Mexican equities relative to emerging markets. We will revisit these trades next week, after the European energy question becomes clearer, to determine whether to book profits on our bearish tactical trades.   – The BCA Research Team  

Executive Summary Copper Demand Follows GDP Copper Demand Follows GDP Copper Demand Follows GDP European copper demand will increase on the back of still-accommodative monetary policy, coupled with a loosening of COVID-19-related gathering and mobility restrictions as the virus becomes endemic. Copper demand will be supported by the EU's need to diversify natural gas supplies in favor of increased LNG import capacity over the next 10 years, which will require incremental infrastructure investment. Increasing policy stimulus in China and government measures to increase lending to metals-intensive sectors – e.g., construction and grid infrastructure – will boost global copper demand. In the US, the Biden administration is backing a $550 billion bill to fund its renewable-energy buildout, which will result in higher demand for metals and steel over the next decade. Global copper supply growth will be restrained by local politics going forward, particularly in the Americas. Bottom Line: Copper prices have been grinding higher even as China maintains its zero-tolerance COVID-19 public health policy, and markets wait out the Russia-Ukraine standoff.  We are maintaining our forecast for COMEX copper to trade to $5.00/lb this year and $6.00/lb next year.  We remain long commodity-index exposure (S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF), along with equity exposure to miners and traders via the XME and PICK ETFs. Feature Ever since it hit its record high in May 2021, copper prices have been range-bound, despite tight market fundamentals and record low inventories in 3Q21, which, as it happens, have not significantly rebuilt since then (Chart 1, panel 1). This can be explained by weak global macro conditions since prices peaked, which have not been especially conducive to higher copper prices, particularly in Europe and China. Activity in these two markets accounting for ~ 60% and 11% of global refined copper demand, respectively, has had a stop-start aspect that has hindered full recovery to now. Chart 1Global Copper Inventories Remain Tight Global Copper Inventories Remain Tight Global Copper Inventories Remain Tight Chart 2Copper Demand Follows GDP Copper Demand Follows GDP Copper Demand Follows GDP As GDP in these regions rises, demand for copper will rise, as Chart 2 shows. Per our modelling, refined copper demand in China, the EU and the world are highly cointegrated with Nominal GDP estimates provided by the IMF. The coefficient associated with nominal GDP in all three instances is positive. Further, running Granger Causality tests indicate that past and present values of nominal GDP explain present refined copper demand values for all three entities. These results indicate that economic growth and refined copper demand have a positive long-run relationship. China’s zero-COVID tolerance policy and the property-market crisis there have restricted economic growth, activity and hence demand for the metal used heavily in construction and manufacturing. In Europe, lockdowns due to the Omicron variant restricted activity causing supply chain disruptions, which contributed to inflation. Now, Europe is relying on immunity among large shares of its population to keep economies open, as COVID-19 becomes endemic. Germany is loosening restrictions at a slower rate than its neighbors, as COVID still has not reached endemicity (Chart 3). Europe’s top manufacturer reportedly is expected to ease restrictions and increase economic activity by March-end. Chart 3New EU COVID-19 Cases Collapse Copper Will Grind Higher Copper Will Grind Higher Natural Gas Remains Critical To Europe Apart from COVID, elevated natural gas prices have and will continue to affect economic activity in Europe. These prices will only get more volatile as fears of a Russian invasion of Ukraine increase. In the short term, we do not expect Russia to cut off all gas supplies to the EU in case of an invasion.1 However, supplies going through Ukraine likely would be cut. Coupled with the region’s precariously low natgas inventory levels, this could fuel a gas price spike (Chart 4). Higher gas prices could lead to demand destruction, if, as occurred this winter, higher power-generating costs arising from higher natgas costs makes electricity too expensive to keep industrial processes like aluminum smelters up and running. In addition, another regional bidding war could incentivize more re-routing of LNG to Europe instead of Asia. This would reduce European prices, but could force Asian markets to raise their bids. Chart 4EU's Natgas Inventories Remain Critical Copper Will Grind Higher Copper Will Grind Higher Assuming gas prices do not remain significantly higher for the rest of the year, Europe will start seeing economic activity improve, and as our European Investment Strategy notes, PMIs will bottom out by the second quarter of this year. High immunity levels are allowing European nations to relax restrictions as it becomes apparent that COVID in the continent – at least in Western Europe – appears to be reaching endemicity. Importantly for base metals generally, and copper in particular, lower natgas prices will allow smelters and refining units to remain in service as electricity prices stabilize or even fall in the EU. During the pandemic, households – primarily in DM economies – built up significant levels of excess savings, particularly in Europe. The IMF reported that households in Europe have amassed nearly 1 trillion euros more in savings vs. normal levels over the last two years than if the pandemic had never occurred.2 While the entirety of excess savings will not be released as spending, even a portion of it will spur economic activity, once supply-chain issues are ironed out when the global economy reopens. China's Copper Demand Will Revive China’s property sector crisis last year was a major drag on economic growth. The Chinese government’s efforts to stabilize this sector seem to be paying off. China’s National Bureau of Statistics reported that for January housing prices in China’s first-tier cities reversed a month-on-month decline from December. The number of cities that saw home prices fall in January also was lower compared to December. Continued improvements in the property sector in China will be bullish for copper. Once macro hurdles related to COVID and high gas prices dissipate, and China’s property market stabilizes, economic activity will increase and copper demand will rebound (Chart 5). However, a timeline for this is difficult to handicap, given China's insistence – at least for now – on maintaining a zero-covid public-health policy. The zero-covid policy has resulted in sharply lower infection rates than the rest of the world, but, because it has not been accompanied by wide distribution of mRNA vaccines, immunity in the population is low. As global macro factors become conducive for copper, investors’ focus will switch to tight fundamentals in the copper market (Chart 6). Unlike the first half of 2021, copper’s high prices will be more sustained, given COVID’s current trajectory towards endemicity globally, and relatively higher immunity rates. Chart 5China's Demand Will Rebound Copper Will Grind Higher Copper Will Grind Higher Chart 6Coppers Tight Fundamentals Will Come Into Focus Again Coppers Tight Fundamentals Will Come Into Focus Again Coppers Tight Fundamentals Will Come Into Focus Again In addition, markets will have to factor in additional demand from the US that heretofore did not exist: The Biden administration is backing a $550 billion bill to fund renewable-energy development. More such funding can be expected in coming years as the US leans into decarbonization, and competes with the likes of the EU and China for limited base metals supplies. Supply Side Difficulties Mount Local governance is becoming increasingly critical to the supply side of base metals, no moreso than in the Americas – chiefly in Chile, Peru and, of late, the US., where the Biden administration recently shut down a Minnesota mining proposal in a major win for environmental groups.3 A number of these critical commodity-producing states in the Americas have elected – or are leaning toward – left-of-center candidates, some of whom are proposing fundamental changes in the laws and regulations governing resource extraction. Gabriel Boric, Chile’s new president, takes office in March. He has largely focused his campaign on the environment, human rights, and closer ties with other Latin American countries. Boric promotes a “turquoise” foreign policy, which includes “green” policies to combat climate change, and “blue” ones to protect oceans. He is likely to commit Chile, which accounts for ~ 30% of global copper mining, to participation in the Escazú Agreement, is being positioned to span the region.4 Of greatest import to the global metals and mining markets, Boric will push for a constitutional re-write affecting taxes on copper mining, decarbonization, Chile's water crisis and the nationalization of lithium mining. Chile's new constitution is expected to be put up for a vote by the end of 2022. In Peru, which accounts for ~ 10% of global copper output, President Pedro Castillo announced at the UN General Assembly that Peru would declare a "climate emergency," and promised to reach net-zero in Peru by 2050. Civil unrest in Peru directed at mining operations is becoming more widespread, as citizens become increasingly frustrated with pollution and poverty.5 Colombia is not a major metals producer, but it is a resource-based economy leaning left. In May it will hold its general elections to Congress and Presidency. The future president will have pressure on the ratification of the Escazú Agreement, fight against illegal mining, and work on the Amazon deforestation. Presently, a left-of-center candidate, Gustavo Petro, leads the polling, according to the latest December survey by the National Consulting Center.6 Petro is promising to stop approving oil exploration contracts to restructure Colombia's economy away from hydrocarbons, and plans to accelerate the transition towards renewable energy.7 In addition, Petro is trying to gather ideological allies across Latin America and the world to fight against climate change. He hopes Chile’s president-elect Gabriel Boric will be joining this alliance.8 Caution: Downside Risks Remain Apart from the Russia-Ukraine crisis discussed above, there are more headwinds to the bullish copper view. China’s zero-covid policy will lead to reduced activity in the world’s largest producer and consumer of refined copper. This will disrupt global supply chains and, along with high energy prices, spur global inflation, prolonging slow economic growth and activity. Central bank tightening globally – led by the Federal Reserve – will increase borrowing costs, reduce manufacturing, and act as a downside risk to copper, particularly if the Fed miscalculates and lifts rates too high too soon and sparks a USD rally. Finally, while DM economies have high vaccination rates, EM states do not have the same level of immunity (Chart 7). Europe exhibits this dichotomy in immunization rates between advanced and developing countries well. While most of Western Europe appears to be nearing endemicity and reopening, Omicron is spreading quickly into Eastern Europe, where immunity is low. As long as a majority of the global population is not vaccinated, COVID-19 mutations into more virulent and transmissive variants remain a major risk. Chart 7COVID-19 Remains A Risk Copper Will Grind Higher Copper Will Grind Higher Investment Implications Copper prices have been grinding higher even as China maintains its zero-tolerance COVID-19 public-health policy, and markets wait out the Russia-Ukraine standoff (Chart 8). As large economies continue to emerge from COVID-19-related disruptions demand for base metals can be expected to increase, particularly for copper. We are maintaining our forecast for COMEX copper to trade to $5.00/lb this year and $6.00/lb next year. We remain long commodity-index exposure (S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF), along with equity exposure to miners and traders via the XME and PICK ETFs. Chart 8Copper Continues To Grid Higher Copper Continues To Grid Higher Copper Continues To Grid Higher   Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Paula Struk Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy paula.struk@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish The US will expand its leading position as the EU-27's and UK's top liquified natural gas (LNG) supplier this year, in our view, although Qatar will provide stiff competition (Chart 9). In January, the EIA reported half of the Europe's LNG originated in the US. For all of 2021, 26% of Europe's LNG came from the US, while 24% came from Qatar and 20% came from Russia. We expect the Russia-Ukraine military standoff, which has the potential to become a kinetic engagement, will prompt Europe to diversify its natural gas supplies away from Russia to reduce its exposure to military and geopolitical pressure on its energy supplies. This also would apply, in our estimation, to pipeline supplies of natural gas from Russia, which shipped 10.7 Bcf/d to Europe in 2021 (vs. 11.8 Bcf and 14.8 Bcf/d in 2020 and 2019, respectively. Norway supplied 10.4 Bcf/d in 2019 and 2020, rising to 11.1 Bcf/d in 2021. We also would expect additional North Sea supplies to be developed to supply Europe in the wake of the current Russia-Ukraine tensions. Base Metals: Bullish Russia’s recognition of the two breakaway states of Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DPR and LPR), elicited US sanctions targeting Russian sovereign debt and its banking sector. The possibility of sanctions on Russian nickel and aluminum exports sent both metals to multi-year highs in LME trading. Russia constitutes around 6% and 9% of global primary aluminum and nickel ore supply, respectively. Precariously low inventory levels for both nickel and aluminum are inducing high price volatility. Year-over-year, global January LME aluminum and nickel stocks are 45% and 64% lower respectively. Precious Metals: Bullish Geopolitical uncertainty due to the Russia-Ukraine crisis and Western sanctions levied on Russia has pushed gold prices to levels not seen since its last bull run last year. While gold has risen, Bitcoin – once considered to be a safe-haven asset – has fallen on this uncertainty. Over the last two years, Bitcoin has been moving more in tandem with equity markets than with other safe-haven assets, as cryptocurrency has become more popular and central banks began large asset purchase programs in response to the pandemic (Chart 10). From beginning 2018 to end-2019 the coefficient measuring daily Bitcoin prices’ correlation with the S&P 500 index was ~0.31. From beginning 2020 to present day, this value has increased to ~ 0.86. Chart 9 Copper Will Grind Higher Copper Will Grind Higher Chart 10 Bitcoin Price Aligns With Gold Price And S&P 500 INDEX Bitcoin Price Aligns With Gold Price And S&P 500 INDEX     Footnotes 1     Please see our report from February 3, 2022 entitled Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase.  It is available as ces.bcaresearch.com. 2     Please see Europe’s Consumers are Sitting on 1 Trillion Euros in Pandemic Savings published by the International Monetary Fund on February 10, 2022. 3    Please see our report from on November 25, 2021 entitled Add Local Politics To Copper Supply Risks, and Biden administration kills Antofagasta's Minnesota copper project published by reuters.com on January 26, 2022. 4    Please see Chile Turns Left: The Foreign Policy Agenda of President Gabriel Boric, published by Australian Institute of Mining Affairs on January 28, 2022. 5    Please see China's MMG faces Peru whack-a-mole as mining protests splinter, published by reuters.com on February 16, 2022. 6    Please see Six Challenges Facing Colombia in 2022, published by Global Americas on January 6, 2022. 7     Please see Gustavo Petro, who leads polls in Colombia, seeks to create an anti-oil front published by Bloomberg on January 14, 2022. 8    Please see Colombia Presidential Favorite Gustavo Petro Wants to Form a Global Anti-Oil Bloc, published by Time on January 14, 2022. Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed in 2021 Image

BCA Research is proud to announce a new feature to help clients get the most out of our research: an Executive Summary cover page on each of the BCA Research Reports. We created these summaries to help you quickly capture the main points of each report through an at-a-glance read of key insights, chart of the day, investment recommendations and a bottom line. For a deeper analysis, you may refer to the full BCA Research Report. Executive Summary Risk Premium In EU Gas Prices Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase ​​ Regardless of whether Russia invades all, part of or none of Ukraine again, its current standoff with the West will force the EU to reconfigure its gas markets to assure reliability of supplies, and remove geopolitical supply disruptions. We expect the EU's renewable energy taxonomy scheduled for release Wednesday will include natgas as a sustainable fuel, which will help build more diversified sources of supply and deeper spot and term markets.  Success here will increase market share of natgas in EU power generation. In the short run (1-2 years), neither the EU nor Russia can afford Gazprom's pipeline supplies to be significantly curtailed. Over the medium term (3-5 years), alternative supplies from US and Qatari LNG exports will be required to deepen EU gas-market liquidity and supply. Longer term (i.e., beyond 2025), EU energy markets will remain volatile as the renewable-energy transition progresses. High and volatile natgas prices will translate into persistent EU inflation – particularly food prices, because of higher fertilizer costs, and base metals' prices.  Shortages in these markets will slow the energy transition, and raise its price tag. Bottom Line: The Russian standoff with the West over Ukraine puts a higher risk premium in EU gas prices.  We remain long commodity-index exposure (S&P GSCI, and COMT ETF), and the XME ETF.  We are getting long the SPDR S&P Oil & Gas Exploration & Production ETF (XOP) at tonight's close. Feature We expect the EU's financial taxonomy for renewable energy scheduled for release Wednesday will include natgas as a sustainable fuel. This will help in building out more diversified sources of supply and deeper spot and term markets. Success here will increase the market share of natgas in the EU's power generation (Chart of the Week). This coincides with natural gas supply uncertainty, arising from geopolitical tensions. On the back of already-low inventory levels, European natural gas markets are forced to handicap the odds of a major curtailment of Russian pipeline gas supplies resulting from another invasion of Ukraine (Chart 2).  This is keeping a significantly increased risk premium embedded in natgas prices: Russian exports to the EU account for 40% of total gas supplies.  Germany is particularly exposed, as  ~65% of its gas comes from Russia (Chart 3). Chart of the WeekEU Natgas Generation Will Rise In Energy Transition Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy desk upgraded the odds of Russia invading Ukraine to 75% from 50% in its latest research report.1  Our colleagues, however, keep the probability of Russia invading all of Ukraine low.  Their analysis concludes Russia will only invade a part of Ukraine, so as to argue for lighter sanctions being imposed on it by the West, as opposed to having to incur the full wrath of US and EU sanctions.  The other 25% of the probability space includes a diplomatic settlement between the West and Russia. Chart 2Risk Premium In EU Gas Prices Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase While Russia has been trying to diversify its customer base – by increasing natgas exports to China, e.g. – data from the BP Statistical Review of World Energy shows ~ 78% of total natural gas exports (pipeline + LNG) from Russia went to the EU in 2020.2  Chart 3EU Highly Dependent On Russian Gas Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase In light of the fact that Russia likely will face watered-down sanctions, and the EU’s gargantuan share of total Russian exports, we do not believe Europe’s largest natural gas exporter will stop all supply to the EU now or in the near future. In case Russia does go through with its invasion, it likely will cut off natural gas supply to Ukraine, implying Europe will loose slightly more than 6% of total natgas imports as opposed to 40% in the event of a halt to all natgas exports to Europe (Chart 4).  Gas consumption of the EU-27 in 2021 was ~ 500 Bcm, according to the Oxford Institute For Energy Studies (OIES).  Some 85% of EU gas consumption was met by imports. Chart 4Imports Cover Most EU Gas Consumption Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase Can The EU Mitigate The Loss Of Russian Gas? The EU and the US have entered discussions with other countries to plug the potential 6% reduction in imports from Russia.  While in theory, there is enough spare pipeline capacity to import natural gas from existing and new sources (Chart 5), practical limitations may prevent this from occurring.3 The US is working with the EU to ensure energy supply security in case Russia cuts off natural gas supply. However, as can be seen in Chart 6, Panel 1, the US currently is and likely will continue to export nearly at capacity until end-2023. Panel 2 shows global liquefaction also is nearly at capacity. Chart 5EU Gas Import Capacity Exists, But Filling It Will Be Problematic Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase Chart 6US LNG Export Capacity Maxed Out Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase While an increase in gas production at the earthquake-prone Groningen field in the Netherlands is theoretically viable, it will induce a public backlash, as was evidenced when the Dutch government announced plans to double output from the field earlier this year. In the short run, facing few sources of alternate gas supply, the EU will need to focus on curtailing demand. Fossil fuels will need to be considered as an alternative for electricity and heating, since nuclear is not used in all EU countries.  The depth of this crisis and the Dutch TTF price rise will be capped by the fact that we expect the EU to lose a relatively small fraction of total imports.  Further, while we expect Dutch TTF prices to be volatile and face upward pressure, any price increases also will be capped by the fact that the colder-than-expected Northern Hemisphere winter has not yet materialized, and the warmer Spring and Summer months will be approaching soon. Medium-, Long-Term EU Gas Supply On the supply side, over the medium- and long-term, the EU will need to deepen and stabilize its gas supply, so that firms and households can rationally forecast and allocate spending and investment.  This would include finding back-up or alternative supplies to Russian imports, which carry with them uncertain geopolitical risk.  If Brussels includes natural gas as a sustainable fuel in its energy taxonomy, over the medium term (3-5 years), alternative supplies from US and Qatari LNG exports will be required to deepen EU gas-market liquidity and supply.  Longer term (i.e., beyond 2025), EU energy markets will remain volatile as the renewable-energy transition progresses.  Natgas will be a critical component of this transition, until utility-scale battery storage is able to support renewable generation and grid stability.  We believe over the remainder of this decade, high and volatile natgas prices will translate into persistent EU inflation, as pricing pressures spill into oil and coal markets at the margin, as happened over the course of last year.  This will work in the other direction as well – e.g., higher coal prices will spill over into gas and oil markets as price pressures incentivize fuel switching at the margin. Food prices will be right in the inflationary cross-hairs, given the fertilizer required to produce the grains and beans consumed globally consists mostly of natgas in urea and ammonia fertilizers (Chart 7).  This will feed into higher food prices (Chart 8). Chart 7High Natgas Prices Will Show Up In High Fertilizer Prices High Natgas Prices Will Show Up In High Fertilizer Prices High Natgas Prices Will Show Up In High Fertilizer Prices Chart 8… And Higher Food Prices Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase Long-Term EU Gas Volatility Will Increase Base metals' prices also will be upwardly biased as natgas price volatility remains elevated.  Supply shortages in natgas markets will, at the margin, slow the energy transition by reducing reliable energy supplies in the EU, forcing states to compete for back-up and replacement supply in the global LNG markets.  Fuel-switching into oil, gas and coal will transmit EU gas volatility to markets globally. Tight energy and base metals markets also will feed directly into higher inflation and inflation expectations (Chart 9). Chart 9Higher Commodity Prices Will Pressure Inflation Higher Higher Commodity Prices Will Pressure Inflation Higher Higher Commodity Prices Will Pressure Inflation Higher   Investment Implications The standoff between the West and Russia over the latter's amassing of troops on the Ukraine border, plus the marked increase in the tempo of Russian naval operations, will keep the risk premium in EU natgas prices high.  This is not a sustainable equilibrium over the medium- to long-term.  We expect little if any curtailment of Russian natgas exports over the short term; however, prudence suggests EU member states will be forced to find back-up and alternative gas supplies over the medium- to longer-term, as the global renewable-energy transition gains traction. The knock-on effects from the current European geopolitical standoff are keeping EU natgas prices elevated via a higher risk premium to cover possible supply losses.  This will feed into other markets – particularly metals and ags – which will feed directly into inflation and inflation expectations. We remain long commodity index exposure – the S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF – and metals producers via the XME ETF.  At tonight's close, we will be getting long the SPDR S&P Oil & Gas Exploration & Production ETF (XOP).   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish OPEC 2.0's decision to stay with its policy of returning 400k b/d every month appeared to be a foregone conclusion in the markets.  In our January 2022 balances and price forecasts, we anticipated a larger increase, given the producer coalition led by Saudi Arabia and Russia has fallen significantly behind its goal of returning 400k b/d to the market monthly due to declining production among OPEC 2.0 member states ex-Gulf GCC member states, chiefly KSA, UAE and Kuwait (Iraq's exports fell in December and January; production data have not been released).  In the past, KSA has said it will not make up for production shortfalls of OPEC 2.0 member states, and would abide by its production allocation. The upside risk to prices remains, in our estimation, and we continue to expect KSA and its GCC allies to increase output if production from the price-taking cohort led by the US shale-oil producers fails to materialize in over the coming months.  Failure to cover production shortfalls among OPEC 2.0 member states would lift Brent prices by $6/bbl above our baseline forecast, which assumed higher production from the GCC states would be forthcoming at Wednesday's OPEC 2.0 meeting (Chart 10, brown curve). Base Metals: Bullish An environmental committee in Chile's Senate voted out a proposed bill that would, among other things, reportedly make it easier for the government to seize mines developed and operated by private companies.  The proposed legislation still has a long road ahead of it, but copper prices rallied earlier in the week as this news broke.  Even if the odds of the bill's passage are slim, a watered down version of the proposed legislation would markedly change the economic proposition of developing and maintaining copper mines in Chile (Chart 11).  We continue to follow this closely.   Chart 10 Brent Forecast Restored To $80/bbl For 2022 Brent Forecast Restored To $80/bbl For 2022 Chart 11 Bullish For Copper Prices Bullish For Copper Prices     Footnotes 1     Please see All Bets Are Off ... Well, Some (A GeoRisk Update), published by BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy service 27 January 2022.  It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2     Please see bp's Statistical Review of World Energy 2021 | 70th edition. 3    Norway, the EU’s second largest gas exporter after Russia stated that its natural gas production is at the limit. Apart from the issue of production, current LNG flows will need to be redirected from Asia and the Americas. Defaulting on long-term contracts to redirect fuel to Europe could mire exporters’ relationships with importing countries. Finally,  infrastructure in the Eastern and Central section of the EU may not be equipped to receive supplies from the West, thus increasing costs and time associated with putting these systems in place.    Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed in 2021 Image

Highlights Data from the UK revealed it is tantalizingly close to declaring COVID-19 an endemic virus, indicating Britain likely will exit the pandemic ahead of other states soon. The UK is a bellwether market regarding its public-health response to the coronavirus. Some 95% of its population is estimated to carry COVID-19 antibodies (Chart of the Week). Other states – e.g., the US, the EU – have followed the UK with a lag, which we expect will continue. While the Fed's reassurance it will be able to hike rates without disrupting labor markets no doubt encourages markets – and boosted commodity prices – we believe the return to economic normalcy that would be ushed in by endemicity will release pent-up consumer demand for goods and services. This will spur commodity demand. If COVID-19 becomes endemic in enough economies globally, it also would fuel inflation, and inflation expectations.1 Given the tight supplies of industrial commodities – chiefly oil, natural gas and base metals – our assessment of upside price risk is higher now than it was at year-end 2021. We remain long broad-based commodity exposure via the COMT ETF, the PICK ETF, and the S&P GSCI index. Feature Fed Chair Powell's confidence that the US central bank will raise rates and keep inflation under control without destabilizing labor markets stole the show earlier this week. The media credited Powell's remarks for the burst of enthusiasm that lifted commodities as an asset class higher. While none would gainsay the Fed's importance to commodity markets, we would point out the approaching endemicity of COVID-19 in the UK – and the likely follow-on from the US and other large commodity-consuming states – is of equal, if not greater, moment. The UK has been out in front on its public-health response to the COVID-19 pandemic and has become a bellwether in the northern hemisphere; the US will follow. Chart 1 This week, the UK's Office for National Statistics (ONS) reported ~ 95% of England's population tested positive for antibodies to COVID-19 via infection or vaccination in the week beginning 29 November 2021. Similar results were reported for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. This is generally observed in all age cohorts tracked by ONS.2 According to David Heymann of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, "population immunity seems to be keeping the virus and its variants at bay, not causing serious illness or death in countries where population immunity is high."3 In a briefing hosted by Chatham House this week, Heymann observed, “And probably, in the UK, it’s the closest to any country of being out of the pandemic if it isn’t already out of the pandemic and having the disease as endemic as the other four coronaviruses” currently in circulation, which are responsible for roughly a quarter of common colds.4 Based on UK government data, the ratios of hospitalizations and deaths to COVID-19 cases has been falling precipitously (Chart 2). This is encouraging, given the sharp increase in cases driven by the rapid spread of the omicron mutant, which appears to be rolling over. Medical experts in the UK suggest the data also point to a possible peaking in the omicron surge. This would lighten the load on hospitals, as well as reduce death rates attributed to the coronavirus (Chart 3).5 Chart 2 Chart 3 Return To Normal? Nothing will return commodity markets to economic normalcy faster than endemicity. If this stays on track over the next month or so, it will spur commodity demand sooner rather than later, as pent-up consumer demand for goods and services is discounted by trading markets. If, as the data appear to indicate, the UK's transition from pandemic to endemic COVID-19 is followed by other states like the US and EU a few months later, we would expect a renewed leg up in the post-pandemic commodities rally. This would be apparent in futures contracts, which already are pricing commodity deliveries a month or more hence. Such a turn of events would force us to accelerate our time table for oil-demand recovery, which we expect will come in 2H22. This could restore our $80/bbl forecast for 2022, and lift our 2023 expectation. We also would have to revisit our copper and base metals view, and bring forward the timing of the copper-price rally we expect will lift COMEX refined copper to $4.80/lb and $6.00/bbl in 2022 and 2023, respectively, on average.6 These industrial commodities would see demand increase amid extremely tight supply conditions. Oil markets are tightening on the back of OPEC 2.0's production discipline, and the inability of many member states to fully restore the 400k b/d every month it signed on for beginning in August of last year, owning to production shortfalls outside the core producers of the coalition (Chart 4). Copper, the base-metals bellwether, remains very tight, as seen in balances (Chart 5) and inventories (Chart 6). Chart 4OPEC 2.0s Strategy Works OPEC 2.0s Strategy Works OPEC 2.0s Strategy Works Chart 5Coppers Physical Deficits Will Persist... Coppers Physical Deficits Will Persist... Coppers Physical Deficits Will Persist... Chart 6Globally, Exchange Warehouses Tighten Globally, Exchange Warehouses Tighten Globally, Exchange Warehouses Tighten China's zero-COVID-19 policy, which has resulted in numerous lock-downs at the local level, has yet to dent oil demand, which, for the time being, is hovering ~ 16mm b/d. We will be updating our oil balances and price forecasts next week, and will have a more extensive analysis of supply-demand balances then. Return Of Speculative Interest Expected With Endemicity Hedge funds have been reducing their exposure to the industrial commodities over the past year, which suggests they either have better alternatives for investing, or did not believe the rallies in commodities over the past year were durable, given the repeated demand shocks visited upon these markets by COVID-19 (Chart 7). We expect that once the pandemic becomes endemic, hedge funds will return to these markets. All the same, given the higher likelihood of price rallies in these markets, we would expect hedge funds to be cited as a cause of higher prices, as typically happens when markets take a sharp leg higher. Regular readers of our research are aware that this generally is not the case – hedge funds follow the news; they don't lead it. This past week we revisited earlier research to see if hedge-fund involvement in commodity markets causes the prices to go up or down to any meaningful degree. And, again, we found no relationship between hedge-fund positioning and the level of commodity prices.7 Chart 7 The presumed influence of hedge funds has been a persistent feature of futures markets in the post-GFC world, following the collapse of commodity prices along with financial markets in 2008. An entire literature has sprung up to explore the influence of these funds on commodity price formation. Below we highlight a few representative articles consistent with our results. Büyüksahin and Harris (2011) show hedge funds and other speculators follow prices – they do not lead them – based on the Granger-causality testing they performed on oil prices and speculative positioning.8 Brunetti et al (2016) argue hedge funds' trading stabilizes markets – i.e., they provide a bid when markets are selling off and an offer when markets are well bid – while swap-dealer trading is uncorrelated with price volatility.9 Knittel and Pindyck (2016) found speculation has reduced volatility in prices since 2004, including during the 2007-08 price run-up.10 Using a straightforward supply-demand-inventory model, they examined cash and storage markets to determine whether speculation had any effect on them or on convenience yields based on cash-vs-futures spreads. They concluded: "We found that although we cannot rule out that speculation had any effect on oil prices, we can indeed rule out speculation as an explanation for the sharp changes in prices beginning in 2004. Unless one believes that the price elasticities of both oil supply and demand are close to zero, the behavior of inventories and futures-spot spreads are simply inconsistent with the view that speculation has been a significant driver of spot prices. If anything, speculation had a slight stabilizing effect on prices." Investment Implications Assuming the UK remains a bellwether for DM economies with reasonably effective vaccine programs, or which have experienced an omicron surge, markets could be close to exiting the COVID-19 pandemic and entering a phase in which the coronavirus is endemic. This would be bullish for demand. And given the extended tightness on the supply side for industrial commodities in particular, it could presage another leg up in prices as economic normalcy returns. We continue to favor broad-based commodity exposure via the COMT ETF, the PICK ETF, and the S&P GSCI index.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish US LNG baseload and peak liquification capacity is expected to rise ~ 13% this year to 11.4 Bcf/d and 13.8 Bcf/d (on a December-to-December basis), based on the EIA's latest estimates. The agency's forecast for LNG exports is up 17.3% to 11.5 Bcf/d this year, and 12.1 Bcf/d in 2023. With these increases in baseload and peak export capacity, the US is set to become the largest exporter of LNG in the world this year, in the EIA's estimation. This will be integral to US foreign policy, particularly in markets where the US competes with Russia for export sales, in our estimation. Within North America, US pipeline gas exports to Mexico and Canada are expected to average just under 9 Bcf/d this year, a 5% increase vs. 2021, and 9.2 Bcf/d in 2023. Base Metals: Bullish In China, seasonally low production, as stainless-steel firms undergo maintenance, and the upcoming Winter Olympics in February are keeping steel production subdued. To compound this supply shortage, tight raw material markets, particularly that of iron ore and nickel are buoying steel prices. Heavy rainfall in southern-eastern Brazil is curtailing iron ore production in the region. After Australia, Brazil is the second largest iron ore exporter to China. Nickel prices hit a 10-year high on Tuesday on the back of falling inventories. An LME outage also precipitated the price rise. Dwindling inventories point to increasing demand for the metal as electric vehicle companies ramp-up production and sales this year, particularly in China, where the government stated it will remove EV subsidies by the end of 2022. According to The China Passenger Car Association, EV sales in the country will double to 6 million this year. Precious Metals: Bullish Based on the December FOMC minutes, the markets are now pricing in a more hawkish tilt from the Fed, and expect an initial rate hike by March. The Fed may also shrink its balance sheet soon after the initial rate hike, in line with its expectation the U.S. economy will recover faster this time around. While higher nominal interest rates and tighter monetary policy will increase the opportunity cost of holding gold (Chart 8), the commodity-driven inflation we expect this year – especially if COVID-19 becomes endemic across major economies – will buoy demand for the yellow metal as an inflation hedge. An endemic virus this year will also boost physical gold demand from China and India. Chart 8       Footnotes 1     Please see More Commodity-Led Inflation On The Way, which we published on 9 December 2021. 2     Please see Coronavirus (COVID-19) latest insights: Antibodies, published by the ONS on December 23, 2021. 3    Please see Covid-19: UK ‘closest of any country in northern hemisphere to exiting pandemic’, published on January 11, 2022 by msn.com. 4    Please see What four coronaviruses from history can tell us about covid-19, published by newscientist.com on April 29, 2020. 5    Please see Omicron may be headed for a rapid drop in US and Britain, published by msn.com on January 11, 2022 published by msn.com. 6    Please see 2022 Key Views: Past As Prelude For Commodities, which we published on December 16, 2021. 7     We ran cointegrating regressions – using DOLS and ARDL models – to check for any equilibrium between prices and hedge fund positioning and found none. We looked at the post-GFC period from 2010 to now, since this is the data the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) provides for hedge funds and tested whether hedge-fund positions (in the form of open interest) explained prices vs. the alternative (i.e., prices explain hedge-fund positioning). We again found prices explain position (and not vice versa) for crude oil, natural gas, copper and gold. 8    Please see Büyüksahin, Bahattin and Jeffrey H. Harris (2011),"Do Speculators Drive Crude Oil Futures Prices?" The Energy Journal, 32:2, pp. 167-202. This paper used unique data sets provided by the CFTC. 9    Please see Brunetti, Celso, Bahattin Büyüksahin, and Jeffrey H. Harris (2016), "Speculators, Prices, and Market Volatility," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 51:5, pp. 1545-74. 10   Please see Knittel, Christopher R. and Robert S. Pindyck (2016), "The Simple Economics of Commodity Price Speculation," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 8:2, pp. 85–110. Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed In 2021 Image

Highlights Global equities are poised to deliver mid-to-high single-digit returns this year, with the outlook turning bleaker in 2023 and beyond. Non-US markets are likely to outperform. We examine the four pillars that have historically underpinned stock market performance. Pillar 1: Technically, the outlook for equities is modestly bullish, as investor sentiment is nowhere near as optimistic as it usually gets near market tops. Pillar 2: The outlook for economic growth and corporate earnings is modestly bullish as well. While global growth is slowing, it will remain solidly above trend in 2022. Pillar 3: Monetary and financial conditions are neutral. The Fed and a number of other central banks are set to raise rates and begin unwinding asset purchases this year. However, monetary policy will remain highly accommodative well into 2023. Pillar 4: Valuations are bearish in the US and neutral elsewhere. Investors should avoid tech stocks in 2022, focusing instead on banks and deep cyclicals, which are more attractively priced. The Bedrock For Equities In assessing the outlook for the stock market, our research has focused on four pillars: 1) Sentiment and other technical factors, which are most pertinent for stocks over short-term horizons of about three months; 2) cyclical fluctuations in economic growth and corporate earnings, which tend to dictate the path for stocks over medium-term horizons of about 12 months; 3) monetary and financial conditions, which are also most relevant over medium-term horizons; and finally 4) valuations, which tend to drive stocks over the long run. In this report, we examine all four pillars, concluding that global equities are likely to deliver mid-to-high single-digit returns this year, with the outlook turning bleaker in 2023 and beyond. Pillar 1: Sentiment And Other Technical Factors (Modestly Bullish)   Chart 1US Equities: Breadth Is A Concern US Equities: Breadth Is A Concern US Equities: Breadth Is A Concern Scaling The Wall Of Worry Stocks started the year on a high note, before tumbling on Wednesday following the release of the Fed minutes. Market breadth going into the year was quite poor. Even as the S&P 500 hit a record high on Tuesday, only 57% of NYSE stocks and 38% of NASDAQ stocks were trading above their 200-day moving averages compared to over 90% at the start of 2021 (Chart 1). The US stock market had become increasingly supported by a handful of mega-cap tech stocks, a potentially dangerous situation in an environment where bond yields are rising and stay-at-home restrictions are apt to ease (more on this later). That said, market tops often occur when sentiment reaches euphoric levels. That was not the case going into 2022 and it is certainly not the case after this week's sell-off. The number of bears exceeded the number of bulls in the AAII survey this week and in six of the past seven weeks (Chart 2). The share of financial advisors registering a bullish bias declined by 25 percentage points over the course of 2021 in the Investors Intelligence poll. Option pricing is far from complacent. The VIX stands at 19.6, above its post-GFC median of 16.7.  According to the Minneapolis Fed’s market-based probabilities model, the market was discounting a slightly negative 12-month return for the S&P 500 as of end-2021, with a 3.6 percentage-point larger chance of a 20% decline in the index than a 20% increase (Chart 3). Chart 3Option Pricing Is Not Pointing To Elevated Complacency Option Pricing Is Not Pointing To Elevated Complacency Option Pricing Is Not Pointing To Elevated Complacency Chart 2Sentiment Is Not Exceptionally Bullish, Despite The S&P 500 Trading Close To All-Time Highs Sentiment Is Not Exceptionally Bullish, Despite The S&P 500 Trading Close To All-Time Highs Sentiment Is Not Exceptionally Bullish, Despite The S&P 500 Trading Close To All-Time Highs Equities do best when sentiment is bearish but improving (Chart 4). With bulls in short supply, stocks can continue to climb the proverbial wall of worry.   Whither The January Effect? Historically, stocks have fared better between October and April than between May and September (Chart 5). One caveat is that the January effect, which often saw stocks rally at the start of the year, has disappeared. In fact, the S&P 500 has fallen in January by an average annualized rate of 5.2% since 2000 (Table 1). Other less well-known calendar effects – such as the tendency for stocks to underperform on Mondays but outperform on the first trading day of each month – have persisted, however. Chart 4 Chart 5 Table 1Calendar Effects The Four Pillars Of The Stock Market The Four Pillars Of The Stock Market Bottom Line: January trading may be choppy, but stocks should rise over the next few months as more bears join the bullish camp. Last year’s losers are likely to outperform last year’s winners. Pillar 2: Economic Growth And Corporate Earnings (Modestly Bullish)   Economic Growth And Earnings: Joined At The Hip The business cycle is the most important driver of stocks over medium-term horizons of about 12 months. The reason is evident in Chart 6: Corporate earnings tend to track key business cycle indicators such as the ISM manufacturing index, industrial production, business sales, and global trade. Chart 6The Business Cycle Is The Most Important Driver Of Stocks Over Medium-Term Horizons The Business Cycle Is The Most Important Driver Of Stocks Over Medium-Term Horizons The Business Cycle Is The Most Important Driver Of Stocks Over Medium-Term Horizons Chart 7PMIs Signaling Above-Trend Growth PMIs Signaling Above-Trend Growth PMIs Signaling Above-Trend Growth Global growth peaked in 2021 but should stay solidly above trend in 2022. Both the service and manufacturing PMIs remain in expansionary territory (Chart 7). The forward-looking new orders component of the ISM exceeded 60 for the second straight month in December. The Bloomberg consensus is for real GDP to rise by 3.9% in the G7 in 2022, well above the OECD’s estimate of trend G7 growth of 1.4% (Chart 8). Global earnings are expected to increase by 7.1%, rising 7.5% in the US and 6.7% abroad (Chart 9). Our sense is that both economic growth and earnings will surprise to the upside in 2022. Chart 9Analysts Expect Single-Digit Earnings Growth Analysts Expect Single-Digit Earnings Growth Analysts Expect Single-Digit Earnings Growth Chart 8 Plenty Of Pent-Up Demand For Both Consumer And Capital Goods US households are sitting on $2.3 trillion in excess savings (Chart 10). Around half of these savings will be spent over the next few years, helping to drive demand. Households in the other major advanced economies have also buttressed their balance sheets. Chart 10Plenty Of Pent-Up Demand Plenty Of Pent-Up Demand Plenty Of Pent-Up Demand After two decades of subdued corporate investment, capital goods orders have soared. This bodes well for capex in 2022. Inventories remain at rock-bottom levels, which implies that output will need to exceed spending for the foreseeable future (Chart 11). On the residential housing side, both the US homeowner vacancy rate and the inventory of homes for sale are near multi-decade lows. Building permits are 11% above pre-pandemic levels (Chart 12). Chart 11Business Investment Should Be Strong In 2022 Business Investment Should Be Strong In 2022 Business Investment Should Be Strong In 2022 Chart 12Residential Construction Will Remain Well Supported Residential Construction Will Remain Well Supported Residential Construction Will Remain Well Supported Chart 13China's Credit Impulse Has Bottomed China's Credit Impulse Has Bottomed China's Credit Impulse Has Bottomed Chinese Growth To Rebound, Europe To Benefit From Lower Natural Gas Prices Chinese credit growth decelerated last year. However, the 6-month credit impulse has bottomed, and the 12-month impulse is sure to follow (Chart 13). Chinese coal prices have collapsed following the government’s decision to instruct 170 mines to expand capacity (Chart 14). China generates 63% of its electricity from coal. Lower energy prices and increased stimulus should support Chinese industrial activity in 2022. Like China, Europe will benefit from lower energy costs. Natural gas prices have fallen by nearly 50% from their peak on December 21st. A shrinking energy bill will support the euro (Chart 15). Chart 14Coal Prices Are Renormalizing In China Coal Prices Are Renormalizing In China Coal Prices Are Renormalizing In China Chart 15A Shrinking Energy Bill Will Support The Euro A Shrinking Energy Bill Will Support The Euro A Shrinking Energy Bill Will Support The Euro Chart 16 Omicron Or Omicold? While the Omicron wave has led to an unprecedented spike in new cases across many countries, the economic fallout will be limited. The new variant is more contagious but significantly less lethal than previous ones. In South Africa, it blew through the population without triggering a major increase in mortality (Chart 16). Preliminary data suggest that exposure to Omicron confers at least partial immunity against Delta. The general tendency is for viral strains to become less lethal over time. After all, a virus that kills its host also kills itself. Given that Omicron is crowding out more dangerous strains such as Delta, any future variant is likely to emanate from Omicron; and odds are this new variant will be even milder than Omicron. Meanwhile, new antiviral drugs are starting to hit the market. Pfizer claims that its new drug, Paxlovid, cuts the risk of hospitalization by almost 90% if taken within five days from the onset of symptoms. Bottom Line: While global growth has peaked and the pandemic remains a risk, growth should stay well above trend in the major economies in 2022, fueling further gains in corporate earnings and equity prices.   Pillar 3: Monetary And Financial Factors (Neutral)   Chart 17The Overall Stance Of Monetary Policy Will Not Return To Pre-Pandemic Levels For At Least Another 12 Months The Overall Stance Of Monetary Policy Will Not Return To Pre-Pandemic Levels For At Least Another 12 Months The Overall Stance Of Monetary Policy Will Not Return To Pre-Pandemic Levels For At Least Another 12 Months Tighter But Not Tight Monetary and financial factors help govern the direction of equity prices both because they influence economic growth and also because they affect the earnings multiple at which stocks trade. There is little doubt that a number of central banks, including the Federal Reserve, are looking to dial back monetary stimulus. However, there is a big difference between tighter monetary policy and tight policy. Even if the FOMC were to raise rates three times in 2022, as the market is currently discounting, the fed funds rate would still be half of what it was on the eve of the pandemic (Chart 17). Likewise, even if the Fed were to allow maturing assets to run off in the middle of this year, as the minutes of the December FOMC meeting suggest is likely, the size of the Fed’s balance sheet will probably not return to pre-pandemic levels until the second half of this decade.   A Higher Neutral Rate We have argued in the past that the neutral rate of interest in the US is higher than widely believed. This implies that the overall stance of monetary policy remains exceptionally stimulative. Historically, stocks have shrugged off rising bond yields, as long as yields did not increase to prohibitively high levels (Table 2). Table 2As Long As Bond Yields Don’t Rise Into Restrictive Territory, Stocks Will Recover The Four Pillars Of The Stock Market The Four Pillars Of The Stock Market If the neutral rate ends up being higher than the Fed supposes, the danger is that monetary policy will stay too loose for too long. The question is one of timing. The good news is that inflation should recede in the US in 2022, as supply-chain bottlenecks ease and spending shifts back from goods to services. The bad news is that the respite from inflation will not last. As discussed in Section II of our recently-published 2022 Strategy Outlook, inflation will resume its upward trajectory in mid-2023 on the back of a tightening labor market and a budding price-wage spiral. This second inflationary wave could force the Fed to turn much more aggressive, spelling the end of the equity bull market. Bottom Line: While the Fed is gearing up to raise rates and trim the size of its balance sheet, monetary policy in the US and in other major economies will remain highly accommodative in 2022. US policy could turn more restrictive in 2023 as a second wave of inflation forces a more aggressive response from the Fed.   Pillar 4: Valuations (Bearish In The US; Neutral Elsewhere)   US Stocks Are Looking Pricey… While valuations are a poor timing tool in the short run, they are an excellent forecaster of stock prices in the long run. Chart 18 shows that the Shiller PE ratio has reliably predicted the 10-year return on equities. Today, the Shiller PE is consistent with total real returns of close to zero over the next decade. Chart 18 Investors’ allocation to stocks has also predicted the direction of equity prices (Chart 19). According to the Federal Reserve, US households held a record high 41% of their financial assets in equities as of the third quarter of 2021. If history is any guide, this would also correspond to near-zero long-term returns on stocks. Chart 19Valuations Matter For Long-Term Returns (II) Valuations Matter For Long-Term Returns (II) Valuations Matter For Long-Term Returns (II)   … But There Is More Value Abroad Valuations outside the US are more reasonable. Whereas US stocks trade at a Shiller PE ratio of 37, non-US stocks trade at 20-times their 10-year average earnings. Other valuation measures such as price-to-book, price-to-sales, and dividend yield tell a similar story (Chart 20). Chart 20AUS Stocks Are Trading At A Significant Premium To Their Non-US Peers (I) US Stocks Are Trading At A Significant Premium To Their Non-US Peers (I) US Stocks Are Trading At A Significant Premium To Their Non-US Peers (I) Chart 20BUS Stocks Are Trading At A Significant Premium To Their Non-US Peers (II) US Stocks Are Trading At A Significant Premium To Their Non-US Peers (II) US Stocks Are Trading At A Significant Premium To Their Non-US Peers (II) Cyclicals And Banks Overrepresented Abroad Our preferred sector skew for 2022 favors non-US equities. Increased capital spending in developed economies and incremental Chinese stimulus should boost industrial stocks and other deep cyclicals, which are overrepresented outside the US (Table 3). Banks are also heavily weighted in overseas markets; they should also do well in response to faster-than-expected growth and rising bond yields (Chart 21). Table 3Deep Cyclicals And Financials Are Overrepresented Outside The US The Four Pillars Of The Stock Market The Four Pillars Of The Stock Market Chart 21Rising Bond Yields Will Help Bank Shares Rising Bond Yields Will Help Bank Shares Rising Bond Yields Will Help Bank Shares Bottom Line: Valuations are more appealing outside the US, and with deep cyclicals and banks set to outperform tech over the coming months, overseas markets are the place to be in 2022. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Image Special Trade Recommendations Image Current MacroQuant Model Scores Image

Highlights Industrial commodity and ag markets will continue to pull widely followed inflation gauges higher, as global fuel and fertilizer prices remain well bid (Chart of the Week). Unplanned production outages in Libya, faltering supply growth within OPEC 2.0 and a bullish read-through on demand in the wake of relatively mild public-health effects due to the omicron variant will keep oil prices well supported over the short term. Base metals prices will be pulled higher by the ongoing energy crises in Europe and China, which are forcing refiners to shutter capacity as fuels are re-directed to human needs. This is compounded by lockdowns in China – home to ~ 50% of global refining capacity – due to its zero-tolerance COVID-19 policy. These energy crises also are pulling grains higher, as farmers deal with soaring fertilizer costs – driven by soaring natgas prices – this year. Longer term – 2024 and beyond – industrial-commodity production will be concentrated in the hands of a few large producers. More explicit carbon pricing and ESG-induced cost increases will have to be recovered in higher wholesale prices for oil and metals. Grains will remain subject to volatile input costs, and erratic weather. We continue to favor broad-based exposure to commodities vis the S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF. Feature Fundamental supply-demand conditions in commodity markets – largely out of the control of fiscal- and monetary-policymakers – will continue to pull inflation gauges higher this year and for the rest of the 2020s. Oil markets are tight and getting tighter, owing to a dearth of capex since the price collapse triggered by OPEC's market-share war in 2014 (Chart 2). The same is true for base metals, where capex also has languished.1 Chart of the WeekCommodities Continue To Contribute To Global Inflationary Pressures Commodities Continue To Contribute To Global Inflationary Pressures Commodities Continue To Contribute To Global Inflationary Pressures Chart 2 Ag markets are confronting massive cost increases brought about by natgas shortages that first surfaced in 2021 and will continue to dog European and Asian fertilizer markets this year (Chart 3). These tight conditions leave markets vulnerable to unexpected supply and demand shocks, no matter how short-lived they might be. This is easily seen in oil markets: A force majeure declaration by Libya's national oil company following unplanned production shutdowns and pipeline maintenance pulled output below 800k b/d, or 30% lower than November 2021 levels, and almost completely neutralized a supply increase agreed by OPEC 2.0 earlier this week. Combined with what appears to be a relatively sanguine read-through on the impact of surging omicron infections in major consuming markets, these developments took prompt Brent back above $80/bbl.2 Chart 3Tight Natgas Markets Drive Fertilizer/Grain Prices Higher Tight Natgas Markets Drive Fertilizer/Grain Prices Higher Tight Natgas Markets Drive Fertilizer/Grain Prices Higher Oil Price Strength Will Persist Longer term – 2024 and beyond – OPEC 2.0's capacity to increase oil supply will be concentrated in the hands of a few large producers, while US shale-oil producers will face tougher ESG hurdles, which will raise their costs. More explicit carbon pricing also will raise costs. These cost increases will have to be recovered in higher prices. OPEC 2.0’s raison d'être at its inception in 2016 was to regain control over the level of global oil inventories. It has been remarkably successful in this endeavour, despite massive geopolitical uncertainty and a global pandemic (Chart 4). We do not expect any course changes over the coming years. What will change, however, are the fortunes of states in this coalition capable of increasing supply as global demand increases. At present, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia are the putative leaders of OPEC 2.0, and are two of the five states that can increase production at present (Iraq, the UAE and Kuwait also are in that group). By the end of this decade, the leadership of the coalition could come down to KSA and the UAE. While not certain, the US EIA expects Russia's output to level off and then gradually decline over the course of this decade. (Chart 5).3 Russia will remain a significant producer in the coalition, but it likely will be managing declining output as opposed to fighting for higher market share. Chart 4OPEC 2.0s Strategy Works OPEC 2.0s Strategy Works OPEC 2.0s Strategy Works Chart 5 Producers outside the OPEC 2.0 coalition – i.e., the price-taking cohort – have gone to great lengths to improve the attractiveness of their equity, and to maintain access to debt markets to fund their growth. These goals will not support any effort to increase production at the risk of reducing ROEs, as this would set efforts to regain investors' and lenders' favor back years. Going forward, capital markets, climate activists in board rooms and courtrooms, and an increasing load of ESG-related measures – most not yet even defined – will become central to the price-taking cohort's operations and returns. These will impose additional costs on the production of hydrocarbons, with explicit carbon pricing only one of many costs that will have to be recovered in higher prices. Base Metals Again Hit By Gas Shortages Shortages of natural gas continue to plague Europe: According to Gazprom, the Russian state-owned gas company, the continent has withdrawn more than 45% of total gas injected into storage this year, with peak winter in the Northern Hemisphere still to come.4 Just over 20% of power generation in Europe is gas-fired, which means tight gas markets drive gas prices and power prices higher. This power crunch is hitting the continent’s supply of refined aluminum and zinc particularly hard, which means global supplies also are being hit hard. Europe is responsible for ~ 12.5% and ~ 18% of global primary aluminum and zinc slab production, respectively. Low inventories at the start of winter, and cold weather is forcing European natgas to be directed to human needs at the expense of power generation. This has resulted in shutdowns of aluminum smelters in Europe – e.g., Aluminium Dunkerque Industries France was forced to curb production in the second half of December. Around the same time, Trafigura’s Nyrstar – which has the capacity to produce ~ 5.2% of global refined zinc – also announced plans to shut its zinc operations in France beginning January, citing high power prices. While power rationing has helped stabilize an earlier crisis in the world’s largest refined copper, aluminum, and zinc producer, the odds China’s power crisis will worsen has increased, following Indonesia's coal export ban in January to preserve the fuel for domestic energy security. China’s plans to curb air pollution ahead of the Winter Olympics next month will also dampen refining activity. Base metals also are contending with a new fundamental supply risk: Political uncertainty in the critically important producing states of Chile and Peru, the world’s largest producers of the red metal. Gabriel Boric, the new Chilean president, supports higher taxes on copper mining firms, as does his Peruvian counterpart Pedro Castillo. Boric’s election also signals more scrutiny on ore miners’ environmental practices – putting additional ESG-induced costs into wholesale copper prices. The uncertainty surrounding Peru’s constitutional rewrite, with the possibility for a change in mining rules to favor wealth redistribution and the environment will deter mining investments, according to Diego Hernandez, head of Sonami, the Chilean mining society. In Peru, the motion to and failure to impeach Castillo last month will increase political uncertainty, potentially reducing investors’ faith in the country’s mining sector. All of this has a chilling effect on investment in markets that are starved for capex.5 The lack of stable supply and low inventories have caused major price surges over the last year for industrial metals (Chart 6). We expect prices to rise and maintain higher levels over the course of this decade. Base metals production likely will fall short of demand as the world undertakes the green energy transition. Chart 6Copper Inventories Drawing Hard Copper Inventories Drawing Hard Copper Inventories Drawing Hard Investment Implications Industrial commodity markets are tightening over the short term and are on course to tighten further as the current decade progresses. This will raise the cost of the energy transition, as higher prices will be required to spur new supply investments in base metals, which are the sine qua non for this transition. This also will spur additional investment in oil and natgas supply, since these already have the infrastructure in place to move supply to market in order to meet the rising demand for energy we expect going forward. We will be exploring these themes throughout the year, particularly the implications for policy around the development of carbon-capture technologies – especially in natgas markets – and nuclear power, both of which may be the most "shovel ready" sources of incremental energy supply this decade.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish European natgas prices are once again rallying as inventories continue to be drawn down hard due to cold weather, reduced gas supplies from Russia, and higher demand generally (Chart 7). By the end of 2021, European natgas inventories were 57% full, vs the seasonal norm of 72%. At the end of December, close to 50 LNG tankers from the US were sailing to European destinations. As 2022 opens, the European TTF price for natural gas rose 30% to €94/MWh off their recent lows. Cargoes now will be bid in Asia, particularly in China, due to a halt in coal exports during January from Indonesia announced by the government at year end. China had replaced Australian coal imports with Indonesian-sourced material last year. Base Metals: Bullish MMG Ltd’s Las Bambas mine in Apurímac, Peru will restart operations after suspending production in late December. The mine's owner enacted the suspension following a month-long blockade at one of its key roads by the Chumbivilcas community. Prime Minister, Mirtha Vasquez travelled to the region to ensure the conflicting parties reached an agreement.  Las Bambas mine makes up ~2% of global mined copper supply and its tax payments are a significant source of government revenue. While an agreement was reached to lift the blockade, it did not address the Chumbivilcas’ primary concerns. The community wants the mine to employ more locals and provide higher cash contributions to support local infrastructure. This elevates the likelihood of further blockades and supply disruptions this year. Since it commenced operations in 2016, the Las Bambas mine has dealt with blockades over key roads on and off for over 400 days.  Ags/Softs:Neutral Global fertilizer markets will remain tight as natgas prices resume their rally and drive input costs higher. This will contribute to rising food price inflation and may result in global food shortages in 2022. High fertilizer prices might encourage farmers to delay planting this year, in the hope prices will fall. This risks increasing price volatility if too many farmers wait too long to apply fertilizers for their spring crops. Chart 7 Footnotes 1     Please see our most recent update on these factors in 2022 Key Views: Past As Prelude For Commodities, which we published on December 16, 2021. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2     Please see Libyan crude output falls below 800,000 b/d published by argusmedia.com on January 4, 2022, and Oil futures: Prices steady after OPEC+ hike, Brent close to $80/b published by qcintel.com on January 5, 2022. 3    In its December 2021 assessment of Russia's oil-production potential, the US EIA noted: "… declining output from Russia’s more mature fields (primarily in Western Siberia, Russia’s largest oil producing region) may offset the production growth coming from greenfield development, which may result in Russia’s crude oil production declining by the end of the 2020s decade. In addition to greenfield development, companies are increasing drilling at some existing mature oil fields and are tying in smaller fields to existing infrastructure at larger fields to help increase recovery rates and mitigate some of the production decline. However, brownfield development efforts in Russia are unlikely to reverse the decline in production in the longer term." Please see Country Analysis Executive Summary: Russia, published by the EIA on December 13, 2021. 4    Please refer to Hoping for cheaper gas to come, Europe reverses Russian link to tap storage, published by Reuters on December 30, 2021. 5    Please see Add Local Politics To Copper Supply Risks, which we published on November 25, 2021 for additional discussion   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed in 2021 Image