New Zealand

Highlights In this Weekly Report, we present our semi-annual chartbook of the BCA Central Bank Monitors - one of our favorite and long-standing indicators to assess the potential for monetary policy changes. The broad conclusion - the Monitors are all at or above the threshold signaling that tighter monetary policy is required, validating the recent hawkish shift by policymakers. Feature September has been an active month for central bankers. The Bank of Canada hiked rates again, the European Central Bank gave strong hints that a tapering of its asset purchase program will soon be announced, and the Bank of England warned that tighter policy might soon be required. Just last week, the Federal Reserve began the process of reducing its massive balance sheet while also making no changes to its plans to hike interest rates several times over the next year. This is setting up a potential nasty surprise for bond markets. Investors have became deeply skeptical about the possibility of policymakers shifting in a more hawkish direction without an obvious trigger from faster inflation. Yet the global economy is in a synchronized expansion with the largest share of countries operating at (or beyond) full employment since the pre-crisis years. Inflation is in the process of stabilizing, or grinding higher, in most of the major economies. In this Weekly Report, we present our semi-annual chartbook of the BCA Central Bank Monitors - one of our favorite indicators to assess the potential for monetary policy changes. The broad conclusion - the Monitors are all at or above the threshold signaling that tighter policy is required, validating the recent hawkish shift by policymakers (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekGrowing Pressures To Tighten, According To Our Central Bank Monitors Growing Pressures To Tighten, According To Our Central Bank Monitors Growing Pressures To Tighten, According To Our Central Bank Monitors An Overview Of The BCA Central Bank Monitors Chart 2Upward Pressure On Global Bond Yields Upward Pressure On Global Bond Yields Upward Pressure On Global Bond Yields The BCA Central Bank Monitors are composite indicators designed to measure the cyclical growth and inflation pressures that can influence future monetary policy decisions. The economic data series used to construct the Monitors are not the same for every country, but the list of indicators generally measure the same things (i.e. manufacturing cycles, domestic demand strength, commodity prices, labor market conditions, exchange rates, etc). The data series are standardized and combined to form the Monitors. Readings above the zero line for each Monitor indicate pressures for central banks to raise interest rates, and vice versa. Through the nexus between growth, inflation, and market expectations of future interest rate changes, the Monitors do exhibit broad correlations to government bond yields in the Developed Markets (Chart 2). Currently, the Monitors are all near or above the zero line, providing context for why central bankers have shifted towards a more hawkish bias of late. Actual rate hikes are still not likely over the next few months outside of the Fed and BoC (we remain skeptical on the potential for the BoE to realistically tighten policy). More importantly, the underlying growth and inflation pressures indicated by the Monitors suggest that policymakers will maintain a hawkish bias (or, at best, a neutral tone) in their communications with the markets. One new addition to the individual country sections in this Chartbook are charts showing the Monitors, broken into growth and inflation components. The conclusion from these new charts is that the current level of the overall Monitors is a reflection of strong economic growth in all countries, with the inflation components giving more mixed signals. The Fed Monitor: Neutral For Now, Likely To Head Higher Again Our Fed Monitor has drifted lower over the past several months, and now sits just slightly above the zero line, calling for no imminent need to change U.S. monetary policy (Chart 3A). FOMC members have been sending more balanced messages in their recent speeches, specifically noting the confusing mix of what appears to be a U.S. economy operating at full employment but with slowing core inflation (Chart 3B). Chart 3AU.S.: Fed Monitor U.S.: Fed Monitor U.S.: Fed Monitor Chart 3BNo Spare Capacity In The U.S. No Spare Capacity In The U.S. No Spare Capacity In The U.S. When looking at the breakdown of our Monitor into its main inputs (Chart 3C), the growth component remains in a steady grinding uptrend. The inflation component had softened since the peak earlier this year, but the latest reading shows a slight uptick. Chart 3CPressure On The Fed From U.S. Growth. Is Inflation Next? Pressure On The Fed From U.S. Growth. Is Inflation Next? Pressure On The Fed From U.S. Growth. Is Inflation Next? Looking ahead, we expect realized U.S. inflation, which looks to be stabilizing after the downturn since the spring, to grind higher alongside a steadily expanding U.S. economy. With corporate profits and household incomes expanding, and with leading indicators steadily climbing, there is little reason to expect much sustained slowing of U.S. growth in the next few quarters. The next move in our Fed Monitor will likely be upward. The historical correlations between changes in our Fed Monitor and changes in U.S. Treasury yields suggest that any renewed increase in the Monitor should put more upward pressure on the front end of the yield curve than the back end (Chart 3D). This suggests that Treasury curve would bear-flatten as the market priced in more Fed rate hikes. However, we see a greater near-term risk of a bear-steepening of the curve given the low level of market-based inflation expectations. The Fed will want to see those rise - which will require signs of realized inflation rebounding - before delivering another rate hike, perhaps as soon as December. Chart 3DThe Fed Monitor Is Most Correlated To Shorter-Maturity USTs The Fed Monitor Is Most Correlated To Shorter-Maturity USTs The Fed Monitor Is Most Correlated To Shorter-Maturity USTs BoE Monitor: The Window Is Closing For A Rate Hike Our Bank of England (BoE) Monitor has been in the "tight money required" zone since the end of 2015 and has not signaled a need for easier monetary policy since 2012 (Chart 4A). This is unsurprising with the U.K. economy running beyond full employment for over three years alongside a steady rise in inflation (Chart 4B). Chart 4AU.K.: BoE Monitor U.K.: BoE Monitor U.K.: BoE Monitor Chart 4BTight Capacity In The U.K. Tight Capacity In The U.K. Tight Capacity In The U.K. The after-effects of the Brexit vote last year are still an issue for the U.K. economy and the BoE. The central bank eased monetary policy (rate cuts and QE) after the Brexit shock as insurance against the massive economic uncertainty. Yet that not only provided stimulus to an economy that was already operating beyond full employment, but also resulted in a 16% peak-to-trough decline in the British Pound. The result: a surge in headline U.K. inflation to 2.9%, well above the BoE's 2% target. The BoE sent a hawkish message at the policy meeting earlier this month, signaling that interest rates would have to rise if growth evolves in line with their forecasts. We are skeptical on that front: U.K. leading economic indicators have rolled over, real income growth has stagnated due the high inflation, and business confidence continues to be dragged down by Brexit uncertainties. Also, the greater stability in the trade-weighted Pound - now essentially flat versus year-ago levels - should result in some cooling off of the currency-driven surge in inflation, which the inflation component of our BoE Monitor is already signaling (Chart 4C). Chart 4CThe Inflation Component Of The BoE Monitor Has Collapsed The Inflation Component Of The BoE Monitor Has Collapsed The Inflation Component Of The BoE Monitor Has Collapsed We remain neutral on Gilts, as we expect the BoE to remain on hold and not follow through on their recent hawkish commentary (Chart 4D). Chart 4DThe Gilt/BoE Monitor Correlations Are Higher At The Long-End The Gilt/BoE Monitor Correlations Are Higher At The Long-End The Gilt/BoE Monitor Correlations Are Higher At The Long-End ECB Monitor: On Course For A 2018 Taper Our European Central Bank (ECB) Monitor has steadily climbed over the course of 2017 and now sits right on the zero line (Chart 5A). The solid and broad-based economic expansion in the Euro Area has soaked up spare capacity. The unemployment rate has fallen to an 8-year low of 9.1%, suggesting that the Euro Area economy is very close to full employment for the first time since the Great Recession (Chart 5B). Chart 5AEuro Area: ECB Monitor Euro Area: ECB Monitor Euro Area: ECB Monitor Chart 5BExcess Capacity In Europe Dwindling Fast Excess Capacity In Europe Dwindling Fast Excess Capacity In Europe Dwindling Fast Against that strong growth backdrop, core inflation has been grinding higher off the lows, but at 1.4% remains below the ECB 2% target for headline inflation. When looking at the components of our ECB Monitor, however, rising inflation pressures have been as important a reason behind the pickup in the Monitor as stronger growth (Chart 5C). Chart 5CGrowth Has Pushed The ECB Monitor Higher This Year Growth Has Pushed The ECB Monitor Higher This Year Growth Has Pushed The ECB Monitor Higher This Year The deflation threat that prompted the ECB to begin its own asset purchase program in 2015 has passed, and we expect the ECB to announce a tapering of the bond buying starting in January 2018. If growth and inflation evolve according to the ECB's forecasts - which is likely barring an additional major surge in the euro from current elevated levels - then there is a good chance that the asset purchase program will be wound down by the end of 2018. Interest rate hikes are still some time away, though. The market is currently discounting a first 25bp ECB rate hike around October 2019. We agree with that pricing, as the ECB will "follow the Fed playbook" and not begin rate hikes until well after the end of the asset purchase program. We remain underweight Euro Area government debt, with a bias towards bear-steepening of yield curves as inflation expectations should steadily climb higher and the ECB keeps policy rates unchanged (Chart 5D). Chart 5DStronger Bond/ECB Monitor Correlations At The Short-End Stronger Bond/ECB Monitor Correlations At The Short-End Stronger Bond/ECB Monitor Correlations At The Short-End BoJ Monitor: Creeping Higher, Surprisingly The Bank of Japan (BoJ) Monitor has steadily climbed throughout 2017 and now sits right on the zero line (Chart 6A). While overall inflation rates remain well below the 2% BoJ target, the steady economic expansion has absorbed spare economic capacity, with the unemployment rate now down to a mere 2.8% (Chart 6B). Both the growth and inflation components of our BoJ Monitor have been rising (Chart 6C). Chart 6AJapan: BoJ Monitor Japan: BoJ Monitor Japan: BoJ Monitor Chart 6BTight Labor Market, But Still No Inflation Tight Labor Market, But Still No Inflation Tight Labor Market, But Still No Inflation While the pickup in inflation off the lows is a welcome sight for the BoJ, there is no immediate pressure to shift to a less accommodative policy stance (Chart 6D). In fact, the central bank has already done its own version of a "taper" by moving to a 0% yield target on JGBs one year ago. Maintaining that yield level has required a slower pace of asset purchases by the central bank, which are running at an annualized pace of 70 trillion yen so far in 2017, below the 80 trillion yen target for the current QE program. Chart 6CTight Labor Market, But Still No Inflation Tight Labor Market, But Still No Inflation Tight Labor Market, But Still No Inflation We do not see the BoJ abandoning the 0% yield target anytime soon. By depressing JGB yields, the BoJ hopes to engineer additional weakness in the yen which will feed through into faster inflation and rising inflation expectations. This appears to be the only way to generate any inflation in Japan, even with such a low unemployment rate. Chart 6DLow Correlations Between the BoJ Monitor & JGB Yields Low Correlations Between the BoJ Monitor & JGB Yields Low Correlations Between the BoJ Monitor & JGB Yields It will require a rise in Japanese core inflation back towards 2% before the BoJ will even begin to discuss any real tapering of its QE program. Thus, JGBs will remain a low-beta "safe-haven" among Developed Market government bonds, where there is greater risk of central bank tightening actions that will push yields higher. Remain overweight. BoC Monitor: More Tightening To Come The Bank of Canada (BoC) Monitor has been comfortably above the zero line throughout 2017 (Chart 7A). The Canadian economy has shown robust growth, which has soaked up spare capacity (Chart 7B). The BoC is projecting that the output gap in Canada will likely be fully closed before the end of this year. The surprising surge in growth is likely to continue given the strength in the leading economic indicators and the robust readings from the BoC's own Business Outlook Survey. Chart 7ACanada: BoC Monitor Canada: BoC Monitor Canada: BoC Monitor Chart 7BStill Not Much Inflation In Canada Still Not Much Inflation In Canada Still Not Much Inflation In Canada The central bank has already responded to the faster-than-expected pace of growth with two 25bps rate hikes since July. This took place even without much of a pick-up in realized inflation or in the inflation component of our BoC Monitor (Chart 7C). Clearly, the BoC is focusing more on the rapidly accelerating economy, with real GDP growth surging to a 3.7% year-over-year pace in Q2. With the BoC Overnight Rate still at a very low level of 1%, well below the central bank's own estimate of the neutral "terminal" rate of 3%, there is room for additional rate hikes as long as growth remains robust. Chart 7CRising Growth Pressures On The BoC, Still No Inflation Rising Growth Pressures On The BoC, Still No Inflation Rising Growth Pressures On The BoC, Still No Inflation The surging Canadian dollar is not yet a concern for the BoC, as this reflects both the improving Canadian economy and the Fed taking a pause on its own rate hiking cycle. With the latter poised to resume in December and continue into 2018, the appreciation of the "Loonie" is likely to cool off, even if the BoC keeps raising rates. We have maintained an underweight stance on Canadian bonds, with a curve flattening bias, since mid-year (Chart 7D). We are sticking with that stance, even with the market now priced for nearly 70bps of additional rate hikes over the next year. If the Canadian economy continues to grow rapidly, and the Fed returns to hiking rates, the BoC can tighten to levels beyond current market pricing. Chart 7DA Rising BoC Monitor Typically Leads To A Flatter Canadian Yield Curve A Rising BoC Monitor Typically Leads To A Flatter Canadian Yield Curve A Rising BoC Monitor Typically Leads To A Flatter Canadian Yield Curve RBA Monitor: Conflicting Forces Our Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) Monitor remains in "tighter policy required" territory (Chart 8A). Core inflation has picked up slightly, dragging market expectations along with it, but headline price growth has declined below 2% (Chart 8B). However, commodity prices continue to ease, survey-based measures of inflation expectations have pulled back and the inflation component of the RBA Monitor has retreated from the highs (Chart 8C). Chart 8AAustralia: RBA Monitor Australia: RBA Monitor Australia: RBA Monitor Chart 8BNo Inflation Pressures On The RBA No Inflation Pressures On The RBA No Inflation Pressures On The RBA The RBA is facing conflicting forces of an improving labor market and booming house prices, combined with high consumer indebtedness and nonexistent real wage growth. Though employment growth has recently spiked, part time employment as a percentage of total is just starting to roll over and underemployment remains elevated. Labor market conditions will need to tighten considerably for wages to rise and consumer confidence to recover. A wide output gap, mixed employment backdrop and a lack of inflation pressure will likely keep the policymakers on hold for longer than the market expects. Chart 8CRBA Facing Surging Growth Pressures & Cooling Inflation Pressures BCA Central Bank Monitor Chartbook: The Less Dovish Rhetoric Is Justified BCA Central Bank Monitor Chartbook: The Less Dovish Rhetoric Is Justified We are currently at a neutral stance on Australian government bonds, given the mixed economic backdrop. Instead, we prefer to maintain our 2yr/10yr yield curve flattener trade. The short end will remain anchored by an inactive RBA, with the long end facing downward pressure from soft inflation expectations and macro-prudential measures in the housing market dampening credit growth. Even if the RBA were to tighten policy as markets expect, the yield curve would flatten. Additionally, negative correlations between Australian yield curves and the RBA monitor have been more robust in the post-crisis era (Chart 8D). As labor markets continue to improve, the other components of the Monitor, such as wages, retail sales and consumer confidence, will follow. Chart 8DThe Entire Australian Curve Is Highly Correlated To Our RBA Monitor The Entire Australian Curve Is Highly Correlated To Our RBA Monitor The Entire Australian Curve Is Highly Correlated To Our RBA Monitor RBNZ Monitor: Rate Hikes Are Needed Our Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) Monitor has been the strongest of all our Monitors, and is currently well into "tight money required" territory" (Chart 9A). The solid New Zealand economic expansion has fully absorbed spare capacity, and both headline core inflation are accelerating towards the RBNZ target (Chart 9B). Both the inflation and growth components are surging, contributing to the overall sharp rise in the RBNZ Monitor (Chart 9C). Chart 9ANew Zealand: RBNZ Monitor New Zealand: RBNZ Monitor New Zealand: RBNZ Monitor Chart 9BFull Employment & Rising Inflation In NZ Full Employment & Rising Inflation In NZ Full Employment & Rising Inflation In NZ So with growth and inflation looking perkier, why has the RBNZ not delivered on rate hikes this year? They central bank has highlighted "international uncertainties" related to geopolitical risks as well as trade tensions between China and the U.S. that could spill over into New Zealand exports to Asia. The central bank has also shown caution in its own growth and inflation forecasts, despite the signs of strength. Chart 9CHow Much Longer Can The RBNZ Ignore This? How Much Longer Can The RBNZ Ignore This? How Much Longer Can The RBNZ Ignore This? More likely, the RBNZ has been actively trying to avoid an unwanted surge in the currency that could derail the economy. Given the elevated geopolitical tensions with North Korea, it is likely that the RBNZ will stick with a dovish message - especially given the recent pickup in the currency. We have been running long positions in New Zealand government debt versus U.S. Treasuries and German Bunds in our Tactical Overlay portfolio since May. We've been heeding the commentary of the central bank rather than our own RBNZ Monitor, although the divergence between the two is becoming unsustainable (Chart 9D). The Q3 CPI inflation report due in October will be critical to assess the RBNZ's next move. We are sticking with our recommended trades, for now. Chart 9DNZ Bonds Are Vulnerable To Current Cyclical Growth & Inflation Pressures NZ Bonds Are Vulnerable To Current Cyclical Growth & Inflation Pressures NZ Bonds Are Vulnerable To Current Cyclical Growth & Inflation Pressures Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Patrick Trinh, Associate Editor Patrick@bcaresearch.com BCA Central Bank Monitor Chartbook: The Less Dovish Rhetoric Is Justified BCA Central Bank Monitor Chartbook: The Less Dovish Rhetoric Is Justified Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Feature Valuations, whether for currencies, equities, or bonds, are always at the top of the list of the determinants of any asset's long-term performance. This means that after large FX moves like those experienced this year, it is always useful to pause and reflect on where currency valuations stand. In this context, this week we update our set of long-term valuation models for currencies that we introduced in February 2016 in a Special Report titled, "Assessing Fair Value In FX Markets". Included in these models are variables such as productivity differentials, terms-of-trade shocks, net international investment positions, real rate differentials and proxies for global risk aversion.1 The models cover 22 currencies, incorporating both G10 and EM FX markets. Twice a year, we provide clients with a comprehensive update on all of these long-term models in one stop. These models are not designed to generate short- or intermediate-term forecasts. Instead, they reflect the economic drivers of a currency's equilibrium. Their purpose is therefore threefold. First, they provide guideposts to judge whether we are at the end, beginning, or middle of a long-term currency cycle. Second, by providing strong directional signals, the models help us judge whether any given move is more likely be a countertrend development or not, offering insight on potential longevity. Finally, they assist us and our clients in cutting through the fog and understanding the key drivers of cyclical variations in a currency's value. The U.S. Dollar Chart 1The Dollar's Overvaluation Is Gone The Dollar's Overvaluation Is Gone The Dollar's Overvaluation Is Gone After its large 7.5% fall in trade-weighted terms since the end of 2016, the real effective dollar is now trading at a 2% discount vis-à-vis its fair value based on its principal long-term drivers - real yield differentials and relative productivity between the U.S. and its trading partners (Chart 1). The U.S. dollar's equilibrium - despite having been re-estimated higher earlier this year due to upward revisions by the Conference Board to its U.S. productivity series - has flattened as of late, as real rate differentials between the U.S. and the rest of the world have declined. While 2017 has been an execrable year for dollar bulls, glimmers of hope remain. First, the handicap created by expensive valuations has been purged. Second, the excessive bullishness toward the greenback that prevailed earlier this year has morphed into deep pessimism. Third, U.S. real interest rates have fallen as investor doubts that the Federal Reserve will be able to increase interest rates as much as it wants to in the face of paltry inflation have surged. However, the U.S. economy is strong and at full capacity, suggesting that inflation will hook back up at the end of 2017 and in the first half of 2018. This should once again lift the U.S. interest rate curve, the dollar's fair value, and the dollar itself. That being said, this story is unlikely to become fully relevant over the next three months. The Euro Chart 2The Euro's Fair Value Is Now Rising The Euro's Fair Value Is Now Rising The Euro's Fair Value Is Now Rising On a multi-year time horizon, the euro is driven by the relative productivity trend of the euro area with its trading partners, its net international investment position, terms-of-trade shocks and rate differentials. Thanks to its powerful rally this year, the euro's discount to its fair value has narrowed from 7% in February to 6% today (Chart 2). This narrowing is not as great as the rally in the trade-weighted euro itself as its fair value has also improved, mainly thanks to continued improvement in the euro area's net international position - a development driven by the euro zone's current account of 3% of GDP. Nonetheless, the EUR's current discount to fair value is still not in line with previous bottoms, such as those experienced in both early 1985 or in 2002. We do expect a new wave of weakness in the EUR to materialize toward the end of the year and in early 2018 as markets once again move to discount much more aggressive tightening by the Fed than what will be executed by the European Central Bank: U.S. inflation is set to move back towards the Fed's target, but European inflation will remain hampered by the large amount of labor market slack still prevalent in the European periphery. What's more, euro area inflation is about to suffer from the lagged effects of the tightening in financial conditions that have been created by a higher euro. However, the fact that the euro's fair value has increased implies it is now very unlikely for the EUR/USD to hit parity this cycle. The Yen Chart 3The Yen Is Very Cheap, But It May Not Count For Much The Yen Is Very Cheap, But It May Not Count For Much The Yen Is Very Cheap, But It May Not Count For Much The yen's long-term equilibrium is a function of Japan's net international investment position, global risk aversion, and commodity prices. The JPY discount to this fair value has deepened this year, despite the fall in USD/JPY from 118 to 108 (Chart 3). This is mainly because the euro and EM as well as commodity currencies have all appreciated against the Japanese currency. Low domestic inflation has been an additional factor that has depressed the Japanese real effective exchange rate. While valuations point to a higher yen in the coming year, this will be difficult to achieve. The Bank of Japan remains committed to boosting Japanese inflation expectations. To generate such a shock to expectations, the BoJ will have to keep policy at massively accommodative levels for an extended period. As global growth remains robust, global bond yields should experience some upside over the next 12 months. With JGB yields capped by the Japanese central bank, this will create downside for the yen. However, because the yen is so cheap, it is likely to occasionally rally furiously each time a risk-off event, such as any additional North Korean provocations, puts temporary downward pressure on global yields. The British Pound Chart 4The Pound Is Attractive On A Long-Term Basis The Pound Is Attractive On A Long-Term Basis The Pound Is Attractive On A Long-Term Basis The pound has fallen 6% against the euro this year, the currency of its largest trading partner. This has dragged down the GBP's real effective exchange rate to a large 11% discount to its fair value, the largest since the direct aftermath of the Brexit vote (Chart 4). Because Great Britain has entered a paradigm shift - the exit from the European Union will change the nature of the U.K. relationship on 43% of its trade - assessing where the pound's fair value lies is a more nebulous exercise than normal. However, signs are present that the pound is indeed cheap. British inflation remains perky, the current account has narrowed to 4% of GDP, and despite large regulatory uncertainty, net FDI into the U.K. has hit near record highs of 7% of GDP. Movements in cable are likely to remain a function of the gyrations in the U.S. dollar. However, at this level of valuation, the pound is attractive against the euro on a long-term basis. We had a target on EUR/GBP at 0.93, which was hit two weeks ago. This cross is likely to experience downside for the next 12 months. The biggest risk for the pound remains British politics - and not Brexit itself but its aftershock. The EU has made clear the transition process will be long, leaving time for the British economy to adjust. However, the conservative party has been greatly weakened, and Jeremy Corbyn's popularity is increasing. This raises the specter that, in the not-so-distant future, a Labour government could be formed. Under Corbyn's leadership, this would be the most left-of-center administration in any G10 country since François Mitterrand became French president in 1981. The early years of the Mitterrand presidency were marked by a sharp decline in the franc as he nationalized broad swaths of the French private sector, increased taxes and implemented inflationary policies. Keep this in mind. The Canadian Dollar Chart 5The CAD Has Lost Its Valuation Advantage The CAD Has Lost Its Valuation Advantage The CAD Has Lost Its Valuation Advantage The loonie's fair value is driven by commodity prices, relative productivity trends, and the Canadian net international position. In February, the CAD was trading in line with its fair value. However, after its blistering rally since May, when the Bank of Canada began to hint that policy could be tightened this year, the Canadian dollar is now expensive vis-à-vis its long-term fundamental drivers (Chart 5). In a Special Report two months ago, we argued that the BoC was one of the major global central banks best placed to increase interest rates.2 With the Canadian economy firing on all cylinders, and with the output gap closing faster than the BoC anticipated in its July Monetary Policy Statement, the two interest rate hikes recorded this year so far make sense, and another one is likely to materialize in December. However, while the CAD could continue to rise until then, traders have moved from being massively short the CAD to now holding very sizeable net long positions. Additionally, interest rate markets are now discounting more than two hikes in Canada over the next 12 months, while expecting less than one full hike in the U.S. over the same time frame. If this scenario were to pan out, the tightening in monetary conditions emanating from a massive CAD rally would likely choke the Canadian recovery. Instead, we expect U.S. rates to increase more than what is currently embedded in interest rate markets, thus limiting the downside in USD/CAD. We prefer to continue betting on a rising loonie over the next 12 months by buying it against the euro and the Australian dollar. The Australian Dollar Chart 6The AUD Is Very Expensive The AUD Is Very Expensive The AUD Is Very Expensive The fair value of the Aussie is driven by Australia's net international position and commodity prices. Even with the tailwind of stronger metal prices, the AUD's rallies have been beyond what fundamentals justify, leaving it at massively overvalued levels (Chart 6). This suggests the AUD is at great risk of poor performance over the next 24 months. Timing the beginning of this decline is trickier, and valuations offer limited insight. One of the key factors that has supported the AUD has been the large increase in fiscal and public infrastructure spending in China this year - a move by Beijing most likely designed to support the economy in preparation for the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, where the new members of the Politburo are designated. As this event will soon move into the rearview mirror, China may abandon its aggressive support of the industrial and construction sectors - two key consumers of Australia's exports. The other tailwind behind the AUD has been the very supportive global liquidity backdrop. Global reserves growth has increased, dollar-based liquidity has expanded and generalized risk-taking in global financial markets has generated large inflows into EM and commodity plays.3 While U.S. inflation remains low and investors continue to price in a shy Fed, these conditions are likely to stay in place. However, a pick-up in U.S. inflation at the end of the year is likely to force a violent re-pricing of U.S. interest rates and drain much of the global excess liquidity, especially as the Fed will also be shrinking its balance sheet. This is likely to be when the AUD's stretched valuations become a binding constraint. The New Zealand Dollar Chart 7No More Premium In The NZD No More Premium In The NZD No More Premium In The NZD Natural resources prices, real rate differentials and the VIX are the key determinants of the kiwi's fair value, highlighting the NZD's nature as both a commodity currency and a carry currency. Both the fall in the VIX and the rebound in commodities prices are currently causing gradual appreciation in the New Zealand's dollar equilibrium exchange rate. However, despite these improving fundamentals, the real trade-weighted NZD has fallen this year, and now trades in line with its fair value (Chart 7). Explaining this performance, the NZD began 2017 at very expensive levels, even when compared to the already-pricey AUD. Also, despite a very strong New Zealand economy, the Reserve Bank Of New Zealand has disappointed investors by refraining from increasing interest rates, as the expensive currency has tightened monetary conditions on its behalf. Going forward, the recent weakness in the real effective NZD represents a considerable easing of policy, which could warrant higher rates in New Zealand. As a result, while a tightening of global liquidity conditions could hurt the NZD in addition to the AUD, the kiwi is likely to fare better than the much more expensive Aussie, pointing to an attractive shorting opportunity in AUD/NZD over the next 12 months. The Swiss Franc Chart 8The CHF Is Cheap, The SNB Is Happy The CHF Is Cheap, The SNB Is Happy The CHF Is Cheap, The SNB Is Happy Switzerland's enormous and growing net international investment position continues to be the most important factor lifting the fair value of the Swiss franc. The recent sharp rally in EUR/CHF has now pushed the Swissie into decisively cheap territory (Chart 8). The decline in political risk in the euro area along with the lagging economic and inflation performance of the Swiss economy fully justify the discount currently experienced by the Swiss franc: money has flown out of Switzerland, and the Swiss National Bank is doing its utmost to keep monetary policy as easy as it can. For a small open economy like Switzerland, this means keeping the exchange rate at very stimulative levels. The continued growth in the SNB's balance sheet is a testament to the strength of its will. For the time being, there is very little reason to bet against SNB policy; the CHF will remain cheap because the economy needs it. However, this peg contains the seeds of its own demise. The cheaper the CHF gets, the larger the economic distortions in the Swiss economy become. Already, Switzerland sports the most negative interest rates in the world. This directly reflects the large injections of liquidity required from the SNB to keep the CHF down. These low real rates are fueling bubble-like conditions in Switzerland real estate and are threatening the achievability of return targets for Swiss pension plans and insurance companies, forcing dangerous risk-taking. But until core inflation and wage growth can move and stabilize above 1%, these conditions will stay in place. The Swedish Krona Chart 9The Swedish Krona Has More Upside The Swedish Krona Has More Upside The Swedish Krona Has More Upside Even after its recent rebound, the Swedish krona continues to trade cheaply, even if its long-term fair value remains on a secular downward trajectory (Chart 9). Yet the undemanding valuations of the SEK hide a complex picture. It is approximately fairly valued against the GBP and expensive against the NOK, two of its largest trading partners. However, the SEK is cheap against the USD and the euro. We expect the SEK to continue appreciating. While Swedish PMIs have recently softened, the Swedish economy is running well above capacity, and the Riksbank resources utilization indicator suggests the recent surge in inflation has further to run. Moreover, Sweden is in the thralls of a dangerous real-estate bubble that has pushed nonfinancial private-sector debt above 228% of GDP. With many amortization periods on new mortgages now running above 100 years, the Swedish central bank is concerned that further inflating this bubble could result in a milder replay of the debt crisis experienced in the early 1990s. The shift in leadership at the Riksbank's helm at the beginning of 2018 is likely to be the key factor that prompts the beginning of the removal of policy accommodation in that country. We like buying the krona against the euro. The USD/SEK tends to be a high-beta play on the greenback, and thus is very much a call on the USD. However, EUR/SEK displays a much lower correlation, and thus tends to be a more effective medium to isolate the upcoming tightening in monetary policy we expect from the Riksbank. The Norwegian Krone Chart 10The NOK is The Cheapest Commodity Currency The NOK is The Cheapest Commodity Currency The NOK is The Cheapest Commodity Currency The Norwegian krone remains the cheapest commodity currency in the world, along with the Colombian peso (Chart 10). The slowdown in Norwegian inflation and a very negative output gap of 2% of GDP implies that the Norges Bank will remain one of the most accommodative central banks in the G10. Thus, the NOK should remain cheap. However, we continue to like buying the krone against the euro. EUR/NOK has only traded above current levels when Brent prices have been below US$40/bbl. Not only is Brent currently trading above US$50/bbl, but the outlook for oil remains bright: production is in control as the agreement between Russian and OPEC is still in place. Additionally, the recent carnage and refinery shutdowns caused by hurricane Harvey should result in large drawdowns to finished-products inventories in the coming months. This will contribute to an anticipated normalization in global excess petroleum inventories, which have been the most important headwind to oil prices. Finally, the fact that the Brent curve is now backwardated also represents a support for oil prices, as this creates a "positive carry" for oil investors. The Yuan Chart 11The Yuan Can Rise On A Trade-Weighed Basis The Yuan Can Rise On A Trade-Weighed Basis The Yuan Can Rise On A Trade-Weighed Basis Despite the recent strength in both the trade-weighted RMB and the yuan versus the U.S. dollar, the renminbi still trades at a discount to its long-term fair value (Chart 11). Confirming this insight, China continues to sport a sizeable current account surplus, and its share of global exports is still on an expanding path. With the RMB being cheap, now that China is once again accumulating reserves instead of spending them to create a floor under its currency, the downside risk to the CNY has decreased significantly. Thus, since the People's Bank of China targets a basket of currencies when setting the yuan's value, to legitimize any bullish view on USD/CNY one needs to have a bullish view on the USD. While we do anticipate the dollar to rally toward the end of the year, our expectation that it will remain flat until then implies that we do not see much upside for now to USD/CNY. However, our bullish medium-term USD view, along with the cheapness of the CNY, suggests that the RMB could continue to appreciate on a trade-weighted basis going forward. While Chinese policymakers have highlighted their desire to make their currency a more countercyclical tool, the recent stability in Chinese inflation implies there is no need to let the CNY depreciate to reflate China. In fact, at this point, elevated PPI readings would argue that the Chinese authorities do have a built-in incentive to let the CNY appreciate on a trade-weighted basis for the coming six to 12 months. The Brazilian Real Chart 12The BRL is Vulnerable To A Pullback In Global Liquidity The BRL is Vulnerable To A Pullback In Global Liquidity The BRL is Vulnerable To A Pullback In Global Liquidity Hampered by poor productivity trends, which weigh on the Brazilian current account balance, the fair value of the real remains quite depressed, even as commodity prices have sharply rebounded since early 2016. In fact, the violent rally in the BRL over the same timeframe has made it one of the most expensive currencies tracked by our models (Chart 12). This level of overvaluation points to poor returns for the BRL on a one-to-two-year basis, however, it gives no clue to timing. The strong sensitivity of the Brazilian real to EM asset prices implies that the BRL is unlikely to weaken significantly so long as EM bonds remain well-bid. Moreover, because the BRL still offers an elevated carry, until U.S. interest rate expectations turn the corner, U.S. market dynamics will continue to put a floor under the real. However, this combination suggests the BRL could become one of the prime casualties of any rebound in U.S. inflation. Such a development would cause global liquidity to fall, hurting EM bonds in the process and making the BRL's high-risk carry much less attractive. Confirming this danger, the fact that the USD/BRL has not been able to breakdown for more than a year despite the weakness in the USD suggests momentum under the BRL is rather weak. The Mexican Peso Chart 13Mexican Peso: From Bargain To Luxury Mexican Peso: From Bargain To Luxury Mexican Peso: From Bargain To Luxury In the direct aftermath of Trump's electoral victory, the Mexican peso quickly became one of the cheapest currencies in the world. However, the peso's 25% rally versus the U.S. dollar since January has eradicated this valuation advantage to the point where it is now one of the most expensive major currencies in the world (Chart 13). As the peso was collapsing through 2016, the Mexican central bank fought back, increasing interest rates. The massive surge in the prime lending rate points to a protracted period of weakness in the growth of nonfinancial private credit, which should weigh on consumption and investment. Actually, the growth in retail sales volumes has already begun to weaken. This could force the Banxico to cut rates, especially as inflation will slow in the face of peso's rebound this year. Lower Mexican rates, in the face of stretched long positioning in MXN by speculators, could be the key to generating a weakening in the peso over the next 12 months. To see real fireworks in the peso, one would need to see a resumption in the U.S. dollar bull market. Mexico has external debt equivalent to 66% of GDP, the highest among large EM nations. This makes the Mexican economy especially vulnerable to a strong dollar, as such a move would imply a massive increase in debt servicing costs. Thus, while the MXN may not be as vulnerable as the BRL, it could still suffer greatly if global liquidity becomes less generous next year. The Chilean Peso Chart 14CLP Needs HIgh Copper Prices CLP Needs HIgh Copper Prices CLP Needs HIgh Copper Prices The Chilean peso real effective exchange rate is driven by the country's productivity trend relative to its trading partners and the real price of copper - which proxies Chilean terms-of-trade. Thanks to the CLP's rally since the winter of 2015, the real peso is at a four-year high and is now in expensive territory (Chart 14). We expect copper to see downside from now until the end of the year, pulling down the CLP with it. Current dynamics in the Chinese real estate market and the Chinese credit cycle, which tend to be leading indicators of industrial metals prices, point to an upcoming selloff. Moreover, Chinese monetary conditions have begun to tighten, and are set to continue doing so. This will weigh on Chinese credit growth and capex, creating headwinds for copper and the peso. That being said, the CLP will likely outperform the BRL and the ZAR. M1 money growth is back in positive territory after contracting last year, while industrial activity seems to have hit a bottom and is now picking up. Moreover, since Chile's economy does not have the credit excesses of its other EM peers, we expect the CLP to show more resilience than other currencies linked to industrial metals. The Colombian Peso Chart 15COP: A Rare Bargain Among EM COP: A Rare Bargain Among EM COP: A Rare Bargain Among EM The real COP's fair value is driven by Colombia's relative productivity trends and the price of oil, the country's main export. The fall in oil prices since the beginning of the year have caused a small decline in the fair value of the COP. Nevertheless, the peso is still one standard deviation below fair value (Chart 15). This partly reflects the premium demanded by investors to compensate for Colombia's large current account deficit of 6.3% of GDP. Overall the COP looks attractive, particularly against other commodity currencies. Historically a discount of 20% or more, like what the peso has today, marks a bottom in the real effective exchange rate. Furthermore, our Commodity and Energy Strategy Service expects Brent prices to climb to US$60/bbl towards the end of year, as OPEC's and Russia's production controls translate into oil inventory drawdowns. This should further increase the value of the COP against the ZAR and the BRL. Domestic dynamics also point to outperformance of the peso against other EM currencies. As opposed to countries like Brazil, where private debt stands at nearly 85% of GDP, Colombia has a more modest 60% leverage ratio - the byproduct of an orthodox banking system. Thus, the peso should be able to withstand a liquidity drawdown in EM better than its peers. The South African Rand Chart 16Lack Of Productivity And Politics Are The Greatest Risk To The Rand Lack Of Productivity And Politics Are The Greatest Risk To The Rand Lack Of Productivity And Politics Are The Greatest Risk To The Rand South Africa's dismal productivity trend continues to be the greatest factor pulling the rand's long-term fair value lower. Due to this adverse trend, while the ZAR has been broadly stable this year, it is now slightly more expensive than it was in February (Chart 16). Not captured by the model, the political risks in South Africa remain elevated, creating a further handicap for the rand. The story behind the ZAR is very similar to the one underpinning the gyrations in the BRL. Both currencies, thanks to their elevated carries and deep liquidity - at least by EM currency standards - will continue to be buoyed by very generous global liquidity conditions. However, global real rates seem dangerously low and could move sharply higher, especially when U.S. inflation picks up at the end of the year and in early 2018. Such a move would cause the currently very supportive reflationary conditions to dissipate. This would put the expensive ZAR in a very precarious position. An additional danger for the ZAR is the price of gold. Gold and precious metals have also benefited from these generous global liquidity conditions. This has helped the South African terms of trade. However, gold is likely to be a key victim if U.S. interest rates rise because it is negatively correlated with both real interest rates and the U.S. dollar. Thus, while we do not see much upside for the expensive ZAR for the time being, it is likely to suffer greatly once U.S. inflation turns around, suggesting the ZAR possesses a very poor risk/reward ratio. The Russian Ruble Chart 17The Ruble Is Expensive But Russia Has The Best EM Fundamentals The Ruble Is Expensive But Russia Has The Best EM Fundamentals The Ruble Is Expensive But Russia Has The Best EM Fundamentals The RUB is currently trading at a very large premium to fair value (Chart 17). The risk created by such an overvaluation is only likely to materialize once U.S. inflation turns the corner and U.S. interest rates pick up - a scenario we've mentioned for late 2017 and early 2018. This risk is most pronounced against DM currencies, the U.S. dollar in particular. The RUB remains one of our favorite currencies within the EM space, especially when compared to other EM commodity producers. The Russian central bank is pursuing very orthodox policy, despite the fall in realized inflation, and is maintaining very elevated real interest rates in order to fully tame inflation expectations. Moreover, oil prices are likely to experience upside in the coming months as oil inventories are drawn down. This could result in an increase in the ruble's equilibrium exchange rate, which would help correct some of the RUB's overvaluation. The Korean Won Chart 18KRW Is Where You Can Really See The North Korean Tensions KRW Is Where You Can Really See The North Korean Tensions KRW Is Where You Can Really See The North Korean Tensions The fair value of the Korean won continues to be lifted by the combined effect of lower Asian bond spreads and Korea's current account surplus. Yet, the KRW is trading at an increasingly large discount to its equilibrium (Chart 18). At first glance, this seems highly surprising as global trade is growing at its fastest pace in six years - a situation that always benefits trading nations like South Korea. Instead, political developments are to blame. Not only is North Korea ramping up its tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear devices, but also Seoul is within range of Pyongyang's conventional artillery. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service does not expect the current standoff to result in military conflict. Ultimately, North Korea is no match for the military might of the U.S. and its allies. Moreover, the capacity for Pyongyang's actions to shock financial markets is exhibiting diminishing returns. This suggests the risk premium imbedded in the won should dissipate. However, the won will remain very exposed to dynamics in the USD, global liquidity and global trade. Instead, a lower-risk way for investors to take advantage of the KRW's cheapness is to buy it against the Singapore dollar. While just as exposed to global liquidity as the won, the SGD is currently trading at a premium to fair value. The Philippine Peso Chart 19The PHP Has Over-Discounted The Fall In The Current Account The PHP Has Over-Discounted The Fall In The Current Account The PHP Has Over-Discounted The Fall In The Current Account The fair value of the Philippine peso is driven by the country's net international investment position and commodity prices. After falling 6% this year, the real effective PHP now trades at a 13% discount to its fair value (Chart 19). A deteriorating current account, which is now in deficit, has fueled a selloff in the peso, making the Philippine currency one of the worst performing in the EM space. Worryingly, this has occurred alongside faltering foreign exchange reserves. However, the deficit is mainly the mirror image of large capital inflows, fueled by the government's ambitious infrastructure spending. Remittances are growing again and, with a weaker peso, will support consumer spending going forward. Employment had a setback last year, but is growing again. Higher investment and consumer spending will likely push rates up. As inflation rebounded alongside commodity prices last year, it is now at its 3% target. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas will need to rein in inflationary pressures to avoid overheating the economy. While the Philippines economy should expand further, the 'Duterte Discount' remains in place. Negative net portfolio flows reflect negative investor sentiment, as policy uncertainty remains elevated. The Singapore Dollar Chart 20SGD Remains Expensive SGD Remains Expensive SGD Remains Expensive The fair value of the Singapore dollar is driven by commodity prices. This is because the exchange rate is the main policy tool used by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. As a result, when commodity prices rise, which leads to inflationary pressures, MAS tightens policy by spurring appreciation in the SGD. The opposite holds true when commodity prices weaken. Based on this metric, the SGD is currently 4.2% overvalued (Chart 20). Domestically, dynamics are quite mixed. Retail sales have picked up. However, both manufacturing and construction employment are contracting and labor market slack is increasing, pointing to continued subdued wage growth. Additionally, property prices are contracting and vacancy rates are on the rise, led by the commercial property sector. Thus, the recent pickup in inflation could soon vanish, especially as it has been driven by the rebound in oil prices in 2016. This combination suggests that Singapore still needs easy monetary conditions. USD/SGD closely follows the DXY. While the Fed will be able to increase interest rates by more than the 35 basis points priced over the next 24 months, Singapore still needs a lower exchange rate to maintain competitiveness and alleviate deflationary pressures. The Hong Kong Dollar Chart 21The Fall In The USD Has Helped The HKD The Fall In The USD Has Helped The HKD The Fall In The USD Has Helped The HKD The HKD remains quite expensive. However, being pegged to the USD, its valuation premium has decreased this year (Chart 21). The fall in the greenback has driven the HKD - which itself has fallen 0.75% versus the U.S. dollar - lower against the CNY and other EM currencies. If the U.S. dollar does resume its uptrend over the next six months, the valuation improvement in the HKD will once again dissipate. However, this does not spell the end of the HKD peg. With reserves of US$414 billion, or 125% of GDP, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority has the firepower to support the peg, which has been one of the cornerstones of Hong Kong economic stability since 1983. Instead, the HKMA will tolerate deep deflationary pressures that will cause a fall in the real effective exchange rate. This is the path that Hong Kong picked in the 1990s, and it will be the path followed again in the face of any broad-based USD appreciation. This suggests that Hong Kong real estate prices could experience significant downside in the coming years. The Saudi Riyal Chart 22The Riyal Is Still Expensive The Riyal Is Still Expensive The Riyal Is Still Expensive The Saudi riyal remains prohibitively expensive, even as its valuation premium has decreased this year (Chart 22). The SAR is afflicted by similar dynamics as the HKD: its peg with the USD means the greenback's gyrations are the main source of variation in the SAR's real effective exchange rate on a cyclical basis. However, on a structural horizon, the fair value of the riyal is dominated by Saudi Arabia's poor productivity. An economy dominated by crude extraction and processing and living on one of the most sizable economic rents in the world, Saudi Arabia has not endured the competitive pressures that are often the source of productivity enhancement in most nations. Additionally, Saudi capital expenditures are heavily skewed to the oil sector, a sector whose output growth has been limited for many decades by natural constraints. We do not believe the current valuation premium in the riyal will force the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority to devalue the SAR versus the USD. Saudi Arabia, like Hong Kong, possesses copious foreign exchange reserves, and growth has improved now that oil prices have rebounded. Additionally, the KSA is also likely to tolerate deflationary pressures. Not only has it done so in the past, but Saudi Arabia imports most of its household products, especially its food needs. A fall in the SAR would cause a large amount of food inflation, representing a massively negative price shock for a very young population. This is a recipe for disaster for the royal family of a country with no democratic outlet. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Haaris Aziz, Research Assistant haarisa@bcaresearch.com Juan Manuel Correa, Research Analyst juanc@bcaresearch.com 1 For a more detailed discussion of the various variables incorporated in the models, please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Assessing Fair Value In FX Markets", dated February 26, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy and Global Alpha Sector Strategy Special Report, "Who Hikes Next?", dated June 30, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 For a more detailed discussion on the global liquidity environment, please Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Dollar-Bloc Currencies: More Than Just China", dated August 18, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Closed Trades

Highlights Despite a tightening in Chinese monetary conditions, dollar bloc currencies have continued to rally. Rising global reserves and strong carry inflows into EM prompted by low global financial volatility have created plentiful liquidity conditions in EM, supporting dollar-bloc currencies. The beginning of the Fed's balance-sheet runoff could reverse these dynamics, hurting the AUD, CAD and NZD in the process. Monitor U.S. inflation, cross-currency basis swap spreads, gold, EM currencies and Chinese monetary conditions to judge when a break in dollar-bloc currencies will materialize. Feature The rally in the dollar-bloc currencies since July 2016 has been nothing short of stunning. We did highlight in April last year that commodity currencies had room to appreciate, but we did not anticipate such a prolonged move.1 In fact, the up leg that began in April 2017 caught us by surprise. At this juncture, it is essential to analyze whether or not the bull move in commodity currencies has further to run, or whether it is in its final innings. A principal component analysis of the returns of the AUD, the CAD, and the NZD shows that despite differing central bank postures in the three countries, a simple common factor explains 86% of their variability against the USD since 2010 (Chart I-1). Because of this result, our focus in this week's report are the global forces that may be driving this factor. Today, the key risk to the dollar-bloc currencies is global liquidity tightening. Behind this danger lies the removal of policy accommodation in the U.S., and the risks to carry trades created by the already-very-low volatility of risk assets. A China-Fueled Rebound, But Something Is Amiss... The key reason behind the rally in commodity currencies has been improvement in EM growth relative to DM economies since 2016 (Chart I-2). This growth outperformance has been underpinned by a few factors. Chart I-1One Factor To Drive Them All One Factor To Drive Them All One Factor To Drive Them All Chart I-2Commodity Currencies And EM Growth Commodity Currencies And EM Growth Commodity Currencies And EM Growth China has played an essential role. As the Chinese economy decelerated in 2015, Beijing implemented a large amount of fiscal stimulus, which saw government spending grow at a 25% annual rate in November 2015. Due to the lags of stimulus on the economy, the full force of that stimulus was felt in 2016. Direct fiscal goosing was not the only road taken by Beijing. The Chinese authorities also applied a considerable amount of monetary pressure on China. After tightening massively through 2015, Chinese monetary conditions eased greatly in 2016 as real borrowing costs collapsed from a peak of 10.5% in the fall of 2015 to a trough of -3.5% earlier this year (Chart I-3). Directed expansion of credit through banking channels was also used to support the economy, resulting in a surge in the Chinese credit impulse. However, in recent months these positives have dissipated. Chinese money growth has slowed, and the combined credit and fiscal impulse has been lessened. Yet EM equity prices, copper prices and commodity currencies are all continuing their rally, and are now re-testing their May 2015 levels - levels last experienced right before EM assets and related plays entered a vicious tailspin that lasted all the way until January 2016 (Chart I-4). Chart I-3China: From Tailwind ##br##To Headwind China: From Tailwind To Headwind China: From Tailwind To Headwind Chart I-4EM, Copper, Dollar Bloc: ##br##Back To May 2015 Levels EM, Copper, Dollar Bloc: Back To May 2015 Levels EM, Copper, Dollar Bloc: Back To May 2015 Levels Bottom Line: The rally in dollar-bloc currencies that begun in January 2016 was powered by improving growth performance within EM economies. The original driver behind this move was Chinese monetary and fiscal stimulus. However, even once the easing faded, EM plays, including the AUD, the CAD and the NZD continued to appreciate. Another factor is currently at play. ...And This Something Is Global Liquidity Our view is that global liquidity is now the key factor supporting EM plays in general and dollar-bloc currencies in particular. Since the end of 2016, we have seen a rebound in the Federal Reserve's custody holdings - one that has happened as foreign central banks resumed their purchases of Treasury securities (Chart I-5). Fed custodial holdings for other monetary authorities are a key component of our dollar-based liquidity indicator. A rebound in this indicator tends to be associated with a surge in high-powered money globally. The capital outflows from China have dissipated, helping high-powered money find its way into EM plays and the commodity-currency complex. Private FX settlements - a proxy for the Chinese private sector's selling of yuan - was CNY -43 billion in July, a massive improvement compared to the CNY 800 billion in outflows experienced in August 2015 (Chart I-6). Through stringent administrative controls and a lessening of deflation, China gained the upper hand over its capital account. This development has two implications: it means that China does not need to sell reserves anymore, and in fact has been accumulating Treasurys since February 2017. It also means that investors are now less afraid of a sudden devaluation in the CNY, which has heartened risk-taking globally - especially in assets most exposed to China, which includes EM, commodities and dollar-bloc currencies. Chart I-5Easing Global Liquidty In 2017 Easing Global Liquidty In 2017 Easing Global Liquidty In 2017 Chart I-6Chinese Capital Account Under Control Chinese Capital Account Under Control Chinese Capital Account Under Control The collapse in the volatility of risk assets has been an additional element helping global liquidity make its way into EM plays and commodity currencies. As Chart I-7 illustrates, there is a relationship between the realized volatility of the U.S. stock market and the performance of dollar-bloc currencies. The first hunch is to dismiss the relationship as an artifact of the fact that both stock prices and commodity currencies are "risk-on" instruments. But there is an economic underpinning behind this relationship. As we argued in a Special Report on carry trades last year, the main reason carry trades have been able generate high Sharpe ratios since the 1980s is because they offer investors a risk premium for taking on exposure to unforeseen spikes in volatility.2 As a result, when the volatility of risk assets collapses, as has been the case recently, carry currencies outperform. The opposite holds true when volatility spikes back up. Chart I-7Dollar Bloc Currencies Like Low Vol Dollar Bloc Currencies Like Low Vol Dollar Bloc Currencies Like Low Vol When carry trades do well, investors end up aggressively buying EM currencies. As a result of these purchases, they inject funds - i.e. liquidity - into these economies. These injections of liquidity end up boosting money growth and supporting their economic activity, which stimulates global trade, commodity prices, and thus commodity currencies - even if these are not currently "high-yielders." Bottom Line: Chinese monetary conditions have deteriorated, creating a handicap for EM assets and the dollar-bloc currencies. Nonetheless, an increase in high-powered money growth, a decline in the risk premium to compensate investors for the risk of sudden new Chinese devaluation, and a collapse in global financial volatility have reinforced each other to create the ideal breeding ground for a rally in the AUD, the CAD and the NZD. The Sweet Spot Is Passing At the current juncture, the sweet spot for the dollar-bloc currencies may be passing. To begin with, commodity currencies are trading at a significant premium to underlying commodity prices, suggesting they are expensive and vulnerable to a decrease in global liquidity (Chart I-8). The AUD and the NZD stand out as especially expensive, while the CAD is only trading at a small premium to its long-term fair value (Chart I-9). This suggests that the Canadian dollar is likely to continue to outperform the Australian and New Zealand currencies, as it has been doing in choppy fashion since November 2016. Chart I-8Dollar Bloc Currencies Are Expensive Dollar Bloc Currencies Are Expensive Dollar Bloc Currencies Are Expensive Chart I-9AUD And NZD Are Expensive AUD And NZD Are Expensive AUD And NZD Are Expensive Another problem for dollar-bloc currencies is that they have greatly overshot global liquidity metrics. Historically, the commodity currencies have moved in lockstep with the evolution of global central bank reserves - a key measure of global liquidity (Chart I-10). While global reserves have improved, the average of the AUD, the CAD and the NZD has over-discounted this positive, pointing to potential vulnerability once liquidity ebbs. The problem with this overshoot is that liquidity is likely to decline with the imminent reduction in the Fed's balance sheet size. As Chart I-11 shows, the USD has been closely linked to changes in the reserves of commercial banks held at the Fed. As commercial banks accumulate excess reserves, this provides fuel for the repo market and the Eurodollar market, creating a supply of globally available USD for offshore markets. However, mechanically, once the Fed lets the assets on its balance sheet run off (its holdings of Treasurys), a liability will also have to decrease. This liability is most likely to be excess reserves as banks buy the Treasurys sold by the Fed. A fall in the accumulation of reserves of commercial banks in the U.S. is also directly linked with weaker dollar-bloc currencies (Chart I-12). This is because falling reserves push up the dollar and hurt commodity prices - a negative terms-of-trade shock for the AUD, the CAD and the NZD. Moreover, less reserves point to less liquidity making its way into EM economies. This also hurts the expected returns of holding assets in dollar-bloc economies. This therefore means that not only is there less liquidity available to move into these markets, the rationale to do so also dissipates. Without this dollar-based liquidity support, the tightening in Chinese monetary conditions could finally show its true impact on commodity currencies. Chart I-10Commodity Currencies Have##br## Overshot Global Liquidity Commodity Currencies Have Overshot Global Liquidity Commodity Currencies Have Overshot Global Liquidity Chart I-11Falling Excess Bank Reserves##br## Equals Strong Greenback Falling Excess Bank Reserves Equals Strong Greenback Falling Excess Bank Reserves Equals Strong Greenback Chart I-12Falling Excess Reserves Equals##br## Falling Commodity Currencies Falling Excess Reserves Equals Falling Commodity Currencies Falling Excess Reserves Equals Falling Commodity Currencies The last worrisome development for the dollar-bloc currencies is the volatility of financial assets. When volatility falls, it creates a wonderful environment for these currencies. But today, historical volatility is near the bottom of its distribution of the past 28 years. Being a highly mean-reverting series, it is thus more likely to rise than fall further going forward. There are three fundamental factors pointing to a potential reversal. First, share buyback activity has been declining, which historically points to rising volatility. Second, the U.S. yield curve slope also points toward a higher level of volatility. Volatility tends to bottom before the stock market peaks, and the stock market tends to peak before the economy enters recession. The yield curve itself tends to invert a year or so before a recession emerges. As a result, the yield curve begins to flatten around two years before volatility picks up (Chart I-13). Third, the anticipated decline in bank reserves - an important factor that has supported risk-taking around the globe - is likely to be the key catalyst supporting the relationship between the yield curve and volatility. If volatility increases, carry trades are likely to perform poorly, which will hurt EM currencies and result in outflows from these markets. This will cause liquidity conditions in EM economies to dry out, hurting their growth outlook. EM M1 growth has already weakened considerably, and is currently pointing to problems for commodity currencies (Chart I-14). The dry out in liquidity resulting from a reversal in carry trades will only amplify this phenomenon. Chart I-13Listen To The Yield Curve: ##br##Volatility Will Pick Up Listen To The Yield Curve: Volatility Will Pick Up Listen To The Yield Curve: Volatility Will Pick Up Chart I-14EM M1 Growth Is Becoming ##br##A Headwind For The Dollar Bloc EM M1 Growth Is Becoming A Headwind For The Dollar Bloc EM M1 Growth Is Becoming A Headwind For The Dollar Bloc Bottom Line: Global liquidity conditions are set to begin to tighten. While it is probably not enough to cause the bull market in stock prices to end now, it could be enough to affect the area of the global economy most exposed to this risk factor: carry trades and the dollar-bloc currencies. Specifically, commodity currencies are likely to be negatively affected by their elevated valuations, their strong sensitivity to excess bank reserves, and their high responsiveness to changes in financial market volatility. Key Indicators To Monitor After the surge that the dollar-bloc currencies have experienced since the spring and the large increase in the long exposure of speculators to these currencies, they are naturally at risk of experiencing a period of weakness. However, what worries us is not a retracement of 3-4%, but rather a 10-15% move. We suggest monitoring the following: First, watch U.S. inflation closely. The U.S. dollar is only likely to genuinely rally once the market believes the Fed can actually increase rates. So long as inflation remains tepid, investors will continue to second-guess the Fed. The market's response to this week's release of the most recent Federal Open Market Committee minutes only confirmed this. Mentions of debate on inflation within the FOMC was enough to send bond yields and the dollar reeling. However, based on the dynamics in the U.S. velocity of money, we continue to expect inflation to pick up in the second half of 2017 (Chart I-15).3 Second, follow cross-currency basis swap spreads. The cost of hedging U.S. assets back into euro or yen has normalized somewhat after hitting record levels in early 2016 (Chart I-16). If the removal of excess bank reserves in the U.S. system does affect global liquidity conditions, this market will be one of the first to be affected. Third, scrutinize the price of gold. The yellow metal remains a key gauge of global liquidity. Moreover, it is extremely sensitive to real rates and the dollar - two major determinants of the cost of global liquidity. In the summer of 2015, EM and dollar-bloc currencies severely suffered once gold broke below 1150. Today, a break below 1200 would be a sign of danger ahead. Fourth, watch EM currencies. A breakdown in EM currencies would be a key indication that carry trades are being reversed, and that global liquidity is no longer making its way into EM and EM-related plays. Commodity currencies are currently trading at a premium to their historical relationship with EM currencies, suggesting they would be highly vulnerable to such an event (Chart I-17). Chart I-15Watch U.S. Inflation Watch U.S. Inflation Watch U.S. Inflation Chart I-16Monitor Cross-Currency Basis Swap Spreads Monitor Cross-Currency Basis Swap Spreads Monitor Cross-Currency Basis Swap Spreads Chart I-17Dollar-Bloc Currencies At The Mercy Of EM FX Dollar-Bloc Currencies At The Mercy Of EM FX Dollar-Bloc Currencies At The Mercy Of EM FX Finally, keep an eye on Chinese monetary conditions. If Chinese monetary conditions improve from here, it would alleviate some of the negative pressure exercised on dollar-bloc currencies by the upcoming deterioration in global liquidity. However, if Chinese monetary conditions deteriorate further, this would negatively affect commodity prices, EM returns and the commodity currency complex. It would also hurt expected returns on Chinese assets, re-kindling outflows out of China and thus raising the risk premium associated with what would become a growing risk of CNY depreciation. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Pyrrhic Victories", dated April 29, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report titled, "Carry Trades: More Than Pennies And Steamrollers", dated May 6, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Fade North Korea, And Sell The Yen", dated August 11, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 U.S. data has been mixed this week: The Empire State Manufacturing Index increased to 25.2, a significant jump and beat Retail Sales increased at a 0.5% monthly pace, with the ex. Autos measure increasing at 0.5%, both beating expectations; The Import Price Index increased by 1.5% since last year; Initial jobless claims dropped to 232,000, beating expectations significantly; However, housing starts and building permits both underperformed expectations. While the DXY has rebounded, the FOMC's July minutes discussed the recent shortfall of inflation, which was interpreted bearishly by markets. The Fed is likely to begin normalizing its balance sheet very soon, as well as raising rates again by the end of this year. The greenback will likely continue its ascent when firmer inflation data emerges. Report Links: Fade North Korea, And Sell The Yen - August 11, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Improving euro area growth prospects have propelled the euro 12% higher since the beginning of the year. However, the market seems to begin questioning the ECB's hawkishness. In its minutes, the ECB expressed worries about a potential euro overshoot. Additionally, rumors emerged that Mario Draghi will not give much guidance in Jackson Hole. Together, these stories have reversed some of the euphoria that had engulfed the euro. The tightening in euro area financial conditions relative to the U.S. has prompted a roll over in relative economic and inflation surprises, justifying these budding doubts. Furthermore, U.S. inflation should begin to meaningfully accelerate in the fall. This is likely to add to the euro's weakness, as the greenback will resume its upward trend. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Data in Japan was mixed this week: Annualized gross domestic product growth grew by 4% on an annualized basis, crushing expectations. Additionally the month-to-month growth of industrial production came in at 2.2%, also beating expectations. However both export and import growth underperformed, coming in at 13.4% and 16.3% respectively. On cue, after we placed a long USD/JPY trade last week, USD/JPY rallied half percentage point, even if it gave up some of the gain now. We continue to be bearish on the yen as we expect U.S. yields to start picking up, in an environment where market expectations are very depressed. But could a correction in EM caused by the rise in the dollar help the yen? Not in the short term, given that historically the yen only gains in very sharp EM selloffs that themselves weigh on bond yields. Report Links: Fade North Korea, And Sell The Yen - August 11, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 Data in the U.K. was mixed this week: Retail sales prices increased by 3.6% year-on-year, outperforming expectations. However, The trade balance not only worsened since last month but also came in below expectations, at -4.564 Billion pounds Crucially, most inflation metrics came in below expectations, with headline inflation coming in at 2.6% while PPI core output inflation came in at 2.4%. Overall, we continue to believe that the market's rate expectations for the BoE remain too hawkish. As the pass through from the currency dissipates, inflation should also start to come down. Furthermore, one has to remember that the BoE has a higher hurdle for raising rates than other central banks due to the unique situation in which the U.K. is currently in. Lowered rate expectations will be negative for cable in the short term. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 Despite initially weak data, a risk-on environment and increasing copper prices have fueled a rally in the AUD. Data from China has been soft, and Australian data has been neutral: Chinese retail sales increased annually by 10.4%, less than expected; Chinese industrial production also underperformed at 6.4%; Australian wages increased at a 1.9% annual pace, in line with expectations; Australian unemployment dropped to 5.6%; participation rate increased to 65.1%; and a net of 27,900 jobs were filled. However, full-time employment went down by 20,300 while part-time employment increased by 48,200, so hours worked contracted. This development is likely to comfort the RBA in its dovish stance. In its minutes, the RBA discussed its worries concerning the housing market, and that "borrowers investing in residential property had been facing higher interest rates". This further worries the RBA regarding the impact of higher interest rates, limiting the room for more hawkish speeches. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand has been positive: Retail sales and retail sales ex-autos Quarter-on-quarter growth strengthened relatively to the previous quarter, coming in at 2% and 2.1% respectively. Moreover quarter-on-quarter inflation both for producer prices in outputs and inputs outperformed expectations, coming in at 1.3% and 1.4%. Currently, differences in perception adjustment between the dovishness of the RBNZ and the RBA have pushed Australian rate expectations to the point that the market is now pricing a hike in Australia before New Zealand. Overall, this seems like a mispricing, as the kiwi economy is on a stronger footing than the aussie one. Moreover, a slowdown in China would be more harmful for Australia as iron ore is more sensitive to the Chinese industrial cycle than dairy products. Thus we remain bearish on AUD/NZD. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 The CAD has regained some composure despite weak oil prices. Even with the U.S. dollar weakening and inventories drawing massively, oil dropped. This dynamic is particularly worrying for oil, as the markets are doubting the durability of the curtailment in global oil production. While this could be worrying for the CAD, we still believe the USD 40-60/bbl equilibrium price level, as postulated by the BoC, will have a limiting effect on the oil-based currency, which has been driven by interest rate differentials. Both central banks are now hiking, but we believe that markets are underpricing Fed hikes. Thus, the CAD should weaken against USD. However, it will outperform other G10 currencies. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 Recent data has continued to show a mixed picture for the Swiss economy: Consumer prices inflation, increased slightly from the previous month, coming in at 0.3%, in line with expectations. The unemployment rate also came in in line of expectations at 3.2%, unchanged from the previous month. However, producer prices contracted by 0.1%, underperforming expectations. EUR/CHF has been weakening since its August second overbought extreme. For the moment, we expect the SNB to stand pat in its ultra-dovish monetary policy, at least until inflation and other economic indicators start to strengthen considerably. USD/CHF however might appreciate, given that the euro might fall the ECB minutes this week showed that the ECB is concerned by a potential euro overshoot. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 Data in Norway this week was mixed: Headline inflation came in at 1.5% in July, outperforming expectations. However, it softened from June's 1.9% reading. Core inflation came at 1.2% in July, in line with expectations, decreasing from 1.6% in June. Moreover, manufacturing output contracted by 0.6% year-on-year. We continue to be bullish on USD/NOK, as the increasing gap in real rate differentials between the United States and Norway should outweigh any oil rally. Indeed, the recent numbers in Norway illustrate the lack of inflationary pressures in this Scandinavian country. This should keep a lid on rates, and thus help USD/NOK. On the other hand EUR/NOK should follow the path of oil. Thus, the OPEC supply cuts will ultimately support oil prices and thus, weigh on this cross. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 A Market Update: June 23, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 The SEK has had a particularly strong week, as inflation surprised to the upside on both a monthly and a yearly basis, coming in at 0.5% and 2.2% respectively. While it initially appreciated against all currencies, the uptick in commodity currencies on Wednesday made it lose its gains against AUD, CAD, NZD and NOK. As inflationary pressures grow, the SEK is likely to appreciate further, especially against the EUR and GBP. Additionally, with current Riskbank governor Stefan Ingves' term coming to an end by the end of this year, the hawkish rhetoric is likely to only increase. Report Links: Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Closed Trades

Highlights The bottom in the dollar will have to wait for clearer signs that U.S. inflation has hit a trough. DXY is unlikely to punch below its May 2016 low. We examine balance of payments dynamics across the G10. This analysis shows that while the euro has long-term upside, it is too early to bet on any move above 1.20. The Japanese balance of payment dynamics will deteriorate as the BoJ keeps pressing on the gas pedal. Markets will have to price out rate hikes from the U.K. Feature Our most recent attempt at selling EUR/USD ended promptly in failure, as the euro is currently supported by a perfect storm of factors, making the timing of a reversal of its powerful bull run a tricky exercise. On the one hand, European politics continue to enjoy a re-rating among investors. As 2017 began, observers were worried that France was about to fall under the control of populists - euro-skeptic politicians like Marine Le Pen. This could well have spelled the end of the euro. Instead, the French electorate delivered a pro-market outcome with Emmanuel Macron clinching the keys to the Elysée Palace, and his centrist, pro-reform party now controlling Parliament. Meanwhile, German politics remain steady, and the Italian political risk has been pushed back to 2018. On the other hand, investors started the year expecting a hyperactive Trump presidency that would deliver de-regulation and tax reforms. Instead, the U.S. has a Twitterer-in-Chief and a chaotic White House that has been able to only achieve political paralysis. While political developments have grabbed the most headlines, economics have played an even more crucial role. Most importantly, inflation dynamics have been at the crux of the euro's rally. Namely, U.S. inflation has been a big source of disappointment, as the core PCE deflator has fallen from 1.9% in late 2016 to 1.5% today - a move away from the Federal Reserve's 2% target. As a result, the dollar and interest rates have moved away from discounting the Fed's path as implied by the "dot plot" (Chart I-1). However, our work on capacity utilization and financial conditions highlights that the U.S. inflation slowdown has been a reflection of the lagged impact of massive financial tightening in late 2014, and subsequent deceleration in economic activity. In fact, improvements in both capacity utilization and financial conditions witnessed since then point to a turnaround in inflation this fall (Chart I-2). Chart I-1Downward Move In Inflation Rate Expectations Downward Move In Inflation Rate Expectations Downward Move In Inflation Rate Expectations Chart I-2U.S. Inflation To Trough Soon U.S. Inflation To Trough Soon U.S. Inflation To Trough Soon What should investors do in the meantime? The market will only believe the Fed's hiking intensions once inflation rears its head again. After so many false starts and disappointments, signs that inflation might be coming will not be enough, as narratives of a near-permanent state of zero percent inflation are taking hold of the general discourse. Because investors have purged their excess dollar longs and are now heavily positioned for a euro rally, the dollar downside is currently limited, and a significant breach below the May 5, 2016 low in the DXY is unlikely. However, the dollar-rebound camp will have to wait for clear evidence that U.S. inflation is exiting its doldrums. This is a story for the fall. A Look At Balance-Of-Payments Dynamics The U.S. Chart I-3U.S. Balance Of Payments U.S. Balance Of Payments U.S. Balance Of Payments The U.S. current account deficit has been hovering below -2% of GDP for most of the post-great-financial-crisis period, and therefore has played little to no role in explaining the dollar's moves since 2011. However, the U.S. basic balance (current account plus net foreign direct investments) registered a sharp improvement in 2015 on the back of a surge in net FDI into the U.S. Despite a small pullback in the past 18 months, the U.S. basic balance remains consistent with levels recorded during the dollar bull market of the 1990s (Chart I-3). Portfolio flows in the U.S. have moved back into positive territory after a period of net outflows in 2015 and 2016. Yet, the total amount of net portfolio flows remains very low by historical standards, suggesting investors have not wagered aggressively on the U.S. economy's outperformance. Together, the aggregate U.S. balance-of-payment paints a neutral picture for the U.S. The deep imbalances in the current account and basic balance that prevailed prior to the financial crisis have been purged, but portfolio flows into the U.S. do not show any excessive optimism. In fact, the recent period of dollar weakness will likely help the U.S. balance of payments: It should support the trade balance, and make FDI and portfolio flows more attractive going forward as easing U.S. financial conditions help economic activity and asset returns. The Euro Area Chart I-4Euro Area Balance Of Payments Euro Area Balance Of Payments Euro Area Balance Of Payments Since the euro area crisis, the region's current account has surged to a very large surplus of 3.5% of GDP (Chart I-4). This mostly reflects a large correction of imbalances in peripheral nations. Countries like Spain and Italy have seen their own current account balances morph from deficits of 10.2% of GDP and 3.8% of GDP in 2008 and 2011, respectively, to surpluses of 1.9% of GDP and 2.7% of GDP today. The large contraction in imports on the back of moribund domestic demand has been the key driver of this phenomenon. The euro area remains an exporter of FDIs, experiencing near-constant outflows since 2004. As a result, the euro area's basic balance has not experienced as pronounced an improvement as the current account. It is still nonetheless in surplus - something that did not prevent EUR/USD from experiencing a 25% decline from June 2014 to March 2015. Net portfolio flows in the euro area have moved into deeply negative territory, reflecting massive outflows from the bond market. European investors have also been avid buyers of foreign equities, despite the recent increase in foreign buying of euro area stocks. In aggregate, we would interpret the current balance-of-payments dynamic in Europe as potentially supportive of the euro down the line. Aggregate portfolio flows are so depressed that there is a greater likelihood they will improve than deteriorate. However, while the basic balance and portfolio flows bottomed in 2000, the euro was not able to rally durably until 2002. Together, this suggests the euro is unlikely to re-test parity this cycle, but could remain capped below 1.20 for a few more quarters. Japan Chart I-5Japan Balance Of Payments Japan Balance Of Payments Japan Balance Of Payments Thanks to large investment income emanating from a net international investment position of 62% of GDP, Japan sports a current account surplus 2.5% of GDP greater than its trade balance. However, as the country continues to export capital abroad, it still carries a 3.1%-of-GDP deficit in terms of net FDI. This means that the Japanese basic balance of payments remains around 0% of GDP (Chart I-5). Meanwhile, net portfolio flows into Japan have improved greatly in 2017, explaining the yen's strength this year. While we see more upside for equity inflows into Japan, the efforts by the Bank of Japan to suppress JGB yields are likely to result into continued outflows on the fixed-income front. Since BCA is calling for higher global bond yields, fixed income portfolio outflows are likely to grow bigger, making the recent improvement in the Japanese balance of payments a fleeting phenomenon. This will weigh on the yen. We continue to expect the JPY to be one of the worst-performing currencies over the next 12-18 months. The U.K. Chart I-6U.K. Balance Of Payments U.K. Balance Of Payments U.K. Balance Of Payments Financing the U.K.'s current account deficit of 4% of GDP has taken center stage in the wake of the Brexit vote last year. However, while the trade-weighted pound has depreciated 12% since then, the British basic balance of payments has improved and moved back into positive territory. Net FDI inflows lie behind this stunning development. FDI into the U.K. has been surging since 2016 (Chart I-6). However, the recent slowdown in M&A deals into the U.K. points to a potential end for this GBP support. The key costs of controlling the free movement of people in the U.K. - a demand of Brexit voters - will be the loss of passporting rights for the financial services sector. Since this sector has been the biggest magnet for FDI in the U.K., net FDI could soon become a drag on the basic balance of payments. In contrast to FDI, net portfolio flows into the U.K. have followed the anticipated post-Brexit script, falling from 5% of GDP in Q2 2016 to zero earlier this year. This development was the biggest contributor to the pound's weakness last year. Going forward, the case for the Bank of England to turn hawkish is likely to dissipate as the inflation pass-through from the weak pound dissipates (see below). For the pound to rally further, a continued expansion in global liquidity will be necessary. However, we anticipate global liquidity to deteriorate for the remainder of 2017 as the Fed begins the runoff of its balance sheet, and the PBoC keeps tightening the screws on the bubbly Chinese real estate market. Hence, we would position ourselves for pound weakness against the USD in the second half of 2017. Canada Chart I-7Canada Balance Of Payments Canada Balance Of Payments Canada Balance Of Payments Canada runs a current account deficit of 3% of GDP. This is not a new development. Canada has been running a current account deficit since 2009 (Chart I-7), as weakness in the CAD from 2011 to 2016 was counterbalanced by weak export growth to the U.S. and poor oil prices. From a balance-of-payment perspective, the capacity of the CAD to rally may be limited. A surge in FDI to boost the basic balance of payments is unlikely. In 2001, the Canadian dollar was much cheaper than at present, and the impact of the tech bubble was still influencing M&A inflows into the country. In 2008, oil was trading near US$150/bbl. Today, Canada is a high-cost oil producer in a world of cheap oil, making Canadian oil plays unattractive, at least much more so than in 2007-2008. Additionally, net portfolio inflows into the country are already at near-record high levels, explaining the strong performance of the CAD since January 2016. However, going forward, oil prices are unlikely to double once more, and the combination of elevated Canadian indebtedness along with bubbly house prices and rising interest rates will create headwinds for the Canadian economy. Such an outcome would hurt expected returns on Canadian assets, and thus portfolio flows. However, if the hole in Canadian banks' balance sheets proves much bigger than BCA anticipates, this could prompt a repatriation of funds held abroad by banks - assets that currently equal nearly 50% of their balance sheets, temporarily helping the CAD. Australia Chart I-8Australia Balance Of Payments Australia Balance Of Payments Australia Balance Of Payments While the Australian trade balance has moved back in positive territory, the current account remains in deficit, burdened with negative international incomes associated with a negative net international investment position of -60% of GDP. Yet, because the current account has nonetheless improved, the Australian basic balance of payments is back in positive territory, as net FDI inflows have remained steady around 4% of GDP (Chart I-8). From a balance-of-payments perspective, the Australian dollar looks good. The current account balance is likely to remain well supported as the capex needs of Western Australia have decreased - exerting downward pressure on imports - but new mines are coming online and generating revenues and exports. Meanwhile, portfolio flows in Australia are quite depressed, suggesting some long-term upside as investors seem to be underweight Australian assets. That being said, the Aussie is currently trading at 12% above its long-term fair value. Moreover, any tightening in global liquidity thanks to the Fed and the PBoC could increase the cost of financing Australia's large negative net international investment position, and cause a last down leg in metals prices and the AUD. New Zealand Chart I-9New Zealand Balance Of Payments New Zealand Balance Of Payments New Zealand Balance Of Payments New Zealand's current account has been stable at around -3% of GDP since 2010. While New Zealand has been a constant magnet for FDI (Chart I-9), the positive balance in this account has not been able to lift the national basic balance of payments above the zero line. Interestingly, despite still-higher interest rates offered by New Zealand compared to the rest of the G10, the kiwi has been experiencing net portfolio outflows so far this year, potentially explaining why NZD/USD has not been able to break out like AUD/USD. Balance-of-payment dynamics looks supportive for the AUD relative to the NZD, as Australia runs a positive basic balance while New Zealand does not. Additionally, while Australian portfolio flows are very depressed, New Zealand's could suffer more downside. Mitigating these positives for AUD/NZD, the New Zealand economy is much stronger than that of Australia, and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand is in much better position to increase rates than the Reserve Bank of Australia is.1 Switzerland Chart I-10Switzerland Balance Of Payments Switzerland Balance Of Payments Switzerland Balance Of Payments The Swiss franc may be expensive relative to its purchasing power parity, and it may also be contributing to the country's strong deflationary tendencies, but it does not seem to be hampering its international competitiveness. The Swiss trade balance is at a massive 6% of GDP. Additionally, thanks to the international income generated by Switzerland's gigantic net international investment position of 127% of GDP, the country runs an incredible current account surplus of around 11% of GDP (Chart I-10). Being a nation with a steady current account surplus, Switzerland re-exports much capital abroad, generating a nearly permanent deficit in its net FDI account. However, this deficit is not enough to generate a basic balance-of-payments deficit. Instead, the BBoP still stands at 6% of GDP, creating a long-term support for the CHF. In terms of portfolio flows, Switzerland has historically run a deficit, reflecting its status as a capital exporter. Only at the height of the euro area crisis did Switzerland experience net portfolio inflows. Today, portfolio flows continue to leave the country, albeit at a slower pace than before the euro area crisis. Over the next 12 months, the CHF is likely to experience continued downside against both the euro and the USD, as the Swiss National Bank remains steadfast in its fight against domestic deflationary forces. However, from a long-term perspective, Switzerland will continue to run a balance-of-payments surplus that will support the structural upward trend in the real trade-weighted CHF. Sweden Chart I-11Sweden Balance Of Payments Sweden Balance Of Payments Sweden Balance Of Payments The Swedish trade balance recently moved into deficit territory, but the nation's current account remains in a healthy surplus of more than 4% of GDP, reflecting large amounts foreign income extracted by Sweden's thanks to its large amount of assets held abroad - a legacy of decades of current account surpluses. The net FDI balance has recently moved into positive territory, as Sweden possesses some of the strongest long-term economic fundamentals in Western Europe. Thanks to this development, the basic balance of the largest Nordic economy is at its highest level in eight years (Chart I-11), representing a long-term positive for the cheap SEK. Finally, portfolio flows into Sweden are at a neutral level. However, we expect the Riksbank to begin increasing rates early next year, putting it well ahead of its European peers. This should result in growing inflows into the country, supporting the SEK, at least against the EUR and the GBP. Norway Chart I-12Norway Balance Of Payments Norway Balance Of Payments Norway Balance Of Payments Due to the collapse in oil prices since 2014, the Norwegian trade surplus has melted from a gargantuan 15% of GDP to a more modest 5% of GDP (Chart I-12). However, falling oil prices and North-Sea production have also resulted in a collapse of FDIs into the country. Because of these developments, the Norwegian basic balance of payments has fallen into deficit for the first time in more than 20 years. This combination could explain why the NOK has been trading at its deepest discount to long-term fair value in decades. Ultimately, the constantly positive BBoP has historically been one of the key drivers of the krone. Without this support, since the Norges Bank stands among the most dovish central banks in the G10, the NOK does need a greater-than-normal discount. Norway too has historically experienced net portfolio outflows, also a consequence of its massive current account surplus. Thus, we do not read today's relatively small portfolio outflows as a positive. Instead, they simply reflect the deterioration in the current account and basic balance. Putting it all together, while balance-of-payment dynamics do explain why the NOK is trading at a historically large discount to fair value, we remain positive on this currency relative to the euro. When all is said and done, even accounting for these exceptional factors, the NOK is too cheap. Additionally, BCA does expect oil prices to move back toward US$60/bbl, which should help move the basic balance back into positive territory. Bottom Line: Balance-of-payment dynamics rarely have much impact on G10 currencies in the short run. However, in the long run, they can become paramount. Using this framework, while the USD could experience some upside in the next 12 months or so, any such upside is likely to mark the last hurrah of the bull market: the U.S. balance of payments is relatively neutral, but Europe's is currently excessively handicapped by extremely depressed portfolio flows. This latter situation is likely to be reversed in the coming years. The yen balance-of-payment dynamics will become increasingly tenuous if the BoJ continues on its current policy path. Among commodity currencies, the AUD has the best long-term profile in terms of balance-of-payment dynamics. Finally, the SNB faces a Herculean task: While it is currently keeping the CHF at bay in order to alleviate deflationary tendencies in Switzerland, the country's perennially strong balance of payment will ultimately prove too great a hurdle to overcome. The CHF could overtake the yen as the true risk-off currency of the world in future. BoE Is Stuck With Low Rates For Now In our January 13 Special Report titled, "GBP: Dismal Expectations,"2 we discussed why fears of any calamity that Brexit could bring to the British economy was overdone, and thus why buying the pound was an attractive opportunity. So far, our view has been validated, as cable has rallied by almost 8%. However, although we stand by our analysis on a cyclical horizon, a tactical selloff in the pound may be due. At the beginning of the year, the U.K. economy outperformed almost every forecast. Since then, expectations have risen along with the pound, but the British economy has shifted from star performer to disappointment (Chart I-13). For example, house price growth has collapsed to levels not seen since the euro area crisis (Chart I-14, top panel). Furthermore, the rapid rise in inflation has also caused a contraction in real disposable income comparable to that of 2012 (Chart I-14, bottom panel). Chart I-13Shift In U.K. Surprises Shift In U.K. Surprises Shift In U.K. Surprises Chart I-14Cracks In The U.K. Cracks In The U.K. Cracks In The U.K. Rate expectations have become too lofty. After the 2016 collapse in the pound, both headline and core inflation rose above the BoE's target. Consequently, rate expectations spiked, particularly after three MPC members voted for hikes. But can this rate of inflation continue? Looking at individual components of inflation, it is clear that the pound selloff was an important culprit behind the inflation surge. Thus, as the pass-through from the currency dissipates, inflation will also subside (Chart I-15). Falling inflation and weaker growth are already forcing the BoE to retreat from its relative hawkishness. Yesterday, as the "Old Lady" curtailed both its growth and wage forecast for 2017 and 2018, only two members voted for a hike. Political dynamics have also supported cable so far this year. Today, the U.K. policy uncertainty index is at par with that of the U.S. as the Trump White House continues to be in disarray, and the outlook for tax reform and/or infrastructure spending looks grim (Chart I-16). But the U.S. is not the country engaging in its most contentious and significant treaty negotiation in 50 years. Instead, the U.K. is this country, with a weakened government at its helm following its recent electoral debacle. Thus, we would expect a reversal of the currently pro-pound relative political uncertainty indexes, as Brexit negotiations heat up in the coming quarters. Chart I-15U.K. Inflation Is Peaking U.K. Inflation Is Peaking U.K. Inflation Is Peaking Chart I-16Does Trump Really Trump Brexit? Does Trump Really Trump Brexit? Does Trump Really Trump Brexit? While policy and political considerations are likely to hurt the pound this fall, for GBP/USD to correct, a fall in the euro will be needed as well. In the meantime, investors may look to continue to buy EUR/GBP. Since July 7th, we have been anticipating this cross to hit the 0.93 level. This analysis confirms this view. Bottom Line: The U.K. economy should be able to weather its exit from the European Union. This should help the pound on a cyclical horizon. However, the pound has become overbought and interest rate expectations are too elevated, as the market has forgotten that a price still has to be paid for Brexit. GBP/USD is too dependent on the EUR/USD dynamics to short cable outright right now. As such, investors may keep buying EUR/GBP for now, and look to sell GBP/USD near 1.33. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Juan Manuel Correa, Research Analyst juanc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy and Global Alpha Sector Strategy Special Report titled, "Who Hikes Next?", dated June 30, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report titled "GBP: Dismal Expectations", dated January 13, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 The U.S. has shown some signs of strength this week, however the data remains mixed: Both headline PCE and core PCE beat expectations, coming in at 1.4% and 1.5% respectively; While the headline ISM manufacturing number weakened, the Price Paid component rebounded to 62. Initial jobless claims beat expectations by 2,000; however, continuing claims underperformed; Factory orders improved on a monthly basis. While the U.S. is still in an inflation slump, we believe that inflation is close to bottoming out. The depreciation in the greenback and the rally in risk assets have greatly eased financial conditions, creating support for the economy. This should push the greenback up as the markets begin to reprice Fed hikes. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Look Ahead, Not Back - June 9, 2017 Capacity Explosion = Inflation Implosion - June 2, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Euro appreciation has continued. While the general tone of data remains strong, some leading indicators are showing early cracks: Unemployment, a lagging indicator, decreased to 9.1%, outperforming expectations; Headline inflation remained steady at 1.3%, however core inflation increased to 1.2%; GDP numbers came in as expected, growing at a 0.6% quarterly rate, and a 2.1% annual rate; However, German and EMU Markit Manufacturing PMIs both underperformed expectations. Momentum is on the euro's side, which traded above 1.19 on Wednesday. The euro area owes much of its economic growth to the 25% depreciation since mid-2014. While data has surprised to the upside, the ECB remains the central bank of the peripheries, where inflation has failed to emerge as strongly. Rate differentials will weigh on the euro towards the end of the year, but momentum could continue to push the euro up in the coming weeks. Report Links: Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 A Market Update: June 23, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Japanese data came in positive: Overall household spending yearly growth came in above expectations at 2.3% Japan's job-to-applicants ratio came in at 1.51. Above expectations and growing from the previous month. The unemployment rate fell to 2.8%, coming in below expectations of 3%. These two last data points are important, as they show that the Japanese labor market is getting increasingly tight. However, as evidenced by the last 2 years, inflation will not be able to rise sustainably without a depreciating yen, even if the labor market is tight. Thus, the recent selloff in USD/JPY will only incentivize authorities to remain very accommodative while other central banks are exiting maximum accommodation, reinforcing our negative cyclical view on the yen. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 A Market Update: June 23, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 Data in the U.K. was mixed this week: Both Markit Manufacturing and Markit Services PMI beat expectations coming in at 55.1 and 53.8 respectively. However both consumer credit and mortgage approvals fell from the previous month and underperformed expectations. Up to yesterday the pound had gained almost 2% during the week, however following the interest rate decision by the BoE, the pound fell by roughly 1%. The reason for this fall, was that the BoE is becoming less hawkish. Not only did the number of MPC members voting for a hike decrease from 3 to 2, but the bank also lowered its forecast for growth and wages. We believe this will start a trend toward a less hawkish BoE, which will weigh on the pound on the short term. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Last Innings Of The Dollar Correction - April 21, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 Momentum is showing signs of topping out. The MACD is rolling over, and is converging with the Signal line; and the RSI is weakening from deeply overbought levels. This week, AUD has displayed broad-based weaknesses. Despite one key blotch, data relevant to Australia has been good: TD Securities Inflation increased at a 2.7% rate in July; Chinese Caixin Manufacturing PMI came out better than expected at 51.1; Building permits increased at a striking 10.9% monthly rate. They contracted at a 2.3% yearly pace, a sharp improvement over the the previous month's 18.7% contraction. However, the trade balance underperformed missed expectations by a large margin, coming in at AUD856mn, compared to the expected AUD1,800mn. The recent RBA statement highlighted that the recent appreciation in the Australian dollar "is expected to contribute to subdued price pressures", and "is weighing on the outlook for output and employment". This could add substantial pressure on the AUD in the near future. Report Links: Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 Even as the dollar has fallen, the kiwi has depreciated by almost 1.4% this week, as New Zealand data has come in weak: Both the ANZ Activity outlook and the ANZ business confidence came in below the previous month reading at 40.3% and 19.4 respectively. The participation rate came below expectations at 70%. Meanwhile employment also came below expectations contracting by 0.2% Month-on-Month. Overall we continue to be bearish on commodity currencies in general and the kiwi in particular. Recently, the Chinese authorities have been getting tougher on credit excesses. This could be the trigger for a risk off period in emerging markets, which wouldweigh on the NZD. That being said, we are more bearish on AUD/NZD, as the kiwi economy is on much stronger footing than the Australian one. Report Links: Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 The CAD has displayed some considerable broad-based weakness this week following weak data releases: Industrial Product Price contracted monthly by 1% in June; The Raw Material Price Index also contracted, at 3.7%; However, the Markit Manufacturing PMI saw an increase to 55.5 from 54.7. Markets have priced in a 75% probability of a hike by the end of this year by the BoC, compared to 42% for the Fed. Although we agree with the market's perception of the BoC, we disagree that the probability of the Fed hiking is this low. We therefore believe the CAD could correct further in the upcoming weeks. Report Links: Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland has been positive: The KOF leading indicator came at 106.8, beating expectations. Real retail sales grew by 1.5% year on year, increasing from last month number and beating expectations. The SVME Purchasing Manager Index came in very strong at 60.9, beating expectations and also increasing from last month's reading. While data was positive, EUR/CHF went vertical this week, rising by more than 3%. At this point EUR/CHF is the most overbought it has been in more than 4 years, and at least a small correction seems overdue. The SNB will be satisfied with a depreciating currency, as this dramatic fall should help ease deflationary pressures in the alpine country. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 The Fed And The Dollar: A Gordian Knot - April 14, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 Recent data has been mixed in Norway: The Labor forced survey, which measures unemployment, came in at 4.3% outperforming expectations of 4.5%. The above data point was confirmed by the registered unemployment reading, which also outperformed expectations, coming in at 2.8%. However retail sales contracted by 0.6% month-on-month. Even as the dollar continues to fall, USD/NOK has stayed relatively flat this week. Curiously this has also happened amid rising oil prices. Overall, we expect USD/NOK to rally in the fall, as the Norwegian economy remains tepid, and inflation is not likely to rise above target any time soon, while investors are still underestimating the Fed's will to push interest rates higher. That being said, we are bearish on EUR/NOK, as this cross trades as a mirror image of oil, and the OPEC deal should continue to remove excess supply from the market and push prices higher. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 A Market Update: June 23, 2017 Exploring Risks To Our DXY View - May 26, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 Sweden has been generating substantial inflationary pressures, and increasing economy activity is likely to support these pressures, hence the Riksbank's recent hawkishness. With China tightening policy, SEK strength could be a story of rate differentials going forward, appreciating against EUR, AUD, NZD and NOK, as the Riksbank is likely to become increasingly nervous in the face of rising inflationary pressures. However, as the market currently underprices the risk of a more hawkish Fed, the picture for USD/SEK is less clear. Report Links: Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Bloody Potomac - May 19, 2017 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - April 28, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Highlights The Fed is behind the curve in raising rates, as is the Bank of Canada, the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, and the Swedish Riksbank. In contrast, the Bank of Japan, the ECB, and the Swiss National Bank have little need to tighten monetary policy. Accordingly, investors should favor USD, CAD, SEK, NZD, and to a lesser extent, AUD. EUR, CHF, and JPY will weaken. GBP will trade sideways. Short-term momentum could push EUR/USD to 1.18, but the euro will ultimately reach parity against the dollar next year, as the Fed is forced to accelerate the pace of rate hikes. Stay structurally long DXY. Go long SEK/CHF. We are closing our longstanding overweight positions in Australian and New Zealand government bonds for a handsome profit. Remain overweight global equities for now, but be prepared to turn bearish in the second half of 2018. Feature The Fed: It's Time To Get A Bit More Hawkish In our December 2015 report "The Fed Makes An Unforced Error," we made the case that the Federal Reserve would regret its decision to tighten monetary policy.1 Subsequent events validated this view: U.S. growth sagged in the first half of 2016, leading to a sharp flattening in the yield curve. It would be another 12 months before the Fed raised rates again. As bond prices and the economic data evolved over the course of 2016, our recommendations changed accordingly. On July 5th, we published a note entitled "The End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market" arguing that it was time to take profits on long duration positions.2 As luck would have it, this was the exact same date that the 10-year Treasury yield hit a record closing low of 1.37%. Fast forward to the present and investors are once again debating the next steps that central banks are likely to take. However, unlike in 2015, a strong case can be made that the Fed is now behind the curve in raising rates, rather than ahead of it. There are three reasons for this: There is less slack now than in 2015. The unemployment rate stands at 4.4%, down from 5% in December 2015. The broader U-6 unemployment rate has fallen even more, from 9.9% to 8.6%. Other measures of labor market slack are also closing in on their past business-cycle lows (Table 1). Table 1Comparing Current Labor Market Slack With Past Cycles Are Central Banks Behind The Curve Or Ahead Of It? Are Central Banks Behind The Curve Or Ahead Of It? The neutral interest rate has likely risen somewhat over the past 18 months (Chart 1). Household debt has continued to decline as a share of disposable income. The share of national income going to labor has increased. Wage growth among lower-income workers who tend to spend most of their paychecks has accelerated. All this should give consumers the wherewithal to spend more, warranting higher interest rates. Bank balance sheets have also continued to improve, as evidenced by the recent stress test results. In addition, fiscal policy has eased modestly and could ease even more if Congress is able to pass legislation cutting taxes later this year or in early 2018. Financial conditions have eased significantly since the start of the year, which should boost growth in the second half of this year (Chart 2). This is in sharp contrast to 2015, a year when financial conditions tightened sharply. Easier financial conditions are boosting credit growth. The annualized 3-month change in bank credit has accelerated from 1.1% in April to 4.2% at present. (Chart 3). Chart 1Households Have The Wherewithal To Spend More Households Have The Wherewithal To Spend More Households Have The Wherewithal To Spend More Chart 2Financial Conditions Have Eased Financial Conditions Have Eased Financial Conditions Have Eased Chart 3Credit Growth Has Picked Up Credit Growth Has Picked Up Credit Growth Has Picked Up The prospect of stronger growth over the next few quarters implies that the unemployment rate is likely to fall below 4% early next year, possibly breaking through the 2000 low of 3.8%. If that were to happen, the unemployment rate would end up being nearly a full percentage point below the Fed's estimate of NAIRU. It is possible, of course, that the true value of NAIRU is lower than official estimates suggest. Older workers change jobs less frequently, and so an aging workforce tends to produce less frictional unemployment. The internet has also improved the ability of companies to fill vacancies with suitable workers. On the flipside, declining geographical mobility and falling demand for low-skilled labor may have raised structural unemployment. On balance, we are skeptical that the current estimate of NAIRU of 4.7% - already one percentage point below its post-1960 average (Chart 4) - is significantly overstated. A tighter U.S. labor market will put upward pressure on wages. While recent wage data has been on the soft side, our wage tracker is still growing twice as fast as in 2010 (Chart 5). Indeed, for all the talk about how wage growth is "inexplicably" slow, real wages have been rising more quickly than productivity for three straight years now - the longest stretch since the late 1990s (Chart 6). Chart 4NAIRU Is Low By Historic Standards NAIRU Is Low By Historic Standards NAIRU Is Low By Historic Standards Chart 5A Stronger Labor Market Will Lead To Faster Wage Growth A Stronger Labor Market Will Lead To Faster Wage Growth A Stronger Labor Market Will Lead To Faster Wage Growth Chart 6Real Wages Now Increasing Faster Than Productivity Real Wages Now Increasing Faster Than Productivity Real Wages Now Increasing Faster Than Productivity Inflation: A Lagging Indicator When will accelerating wage growth translate into sharply higher price inflation? Probably not this year. Historically, inflation has been the mother-of-all lagging indicators. Core inflation peaked at 2.5% in August 2008, eight months after the start of the recession. In fact, core inflation has topped out in every single business cycle over the past 40 years only after the expansion has ended and the recession begun (Chart 7). Likewise, core inflation typically bottoms several years after the economic recovery is underway. This suggests that inflation could stay subdued for the next 12 months as the labor market slowly overheats, before moving higher in the second half of 2018. Chart 7Inflation Is A Lagging Indicator Are Central Banks Behind The Curve Or Ahead Of It? Are Central Banks Behind The Curve Or Ahead Of It? If the Fed drags its feet in raising interest rates, it will be difficult to achieve a soft landing. Stabilizing the economy is akin to landing a plane: You don't just need to know the speed at which you have to hit the runway, you also have to time your descent in order to touch the ground at precisely the right speed. Even if the Fed knew where the neutral interest rate stood (which it doesn't), tightening monetary policy too late could end up pushing the unemployment rate to such a low level that it has nowhere to go but up. And as we have shown before, once the unemployment rate starts rising, it generally keeps rising, owing to the presence of numerous negative feedback loops.3 The Fed has arguably already fallen into the trap of waiting too long. If so, gradual rate hikes this year will give way to more aggressive hikes late next year, setting the stage for a recession in 2019. The Bank Of Canada Turns Hawkish On the other side of the 45th parallel, the Bank of Canada raised rates last week and signaled that further hikes lie in store. The BoC revised up its GDP growth forecasts for 2017 and 2018. It also indicated that the output gap would close later this year, rather than next year as it had earlier projected. The Bank of Canada's newfound optimism was bolstered by the most recent Business Outlook Survey, which pointed to accelerating growth, dwindling spare industrial capacity, and an increasingly tight labor market (Chart 8). The moose in the living room is the Canadian housing market (Chart 9). Central bankers are generally reluctant to use the blunt tool of tighter monetary policy to target excessive property prices. However, when stricter macroprudential regulations fail to do the job, the standard prescription is to tighten monetary policy slowly but early. The Bank of Canada has done the former but not the latter. Consequently, as my colleague Jonathan LaBerge argued in last week's Special Report, the coming housing bust is likely to be a nasty affair.4 This will be the price the Bank of Canada pays for being behind the curve. Chart 8Canadian Growth Picture Is Upbeat Are Central Banks Behind The Curve Or Ahead Of It? Are Central Banks Behind The Curve Or Ahead Of It? Chart 9Housing Bubbles Abound Housing Bubbles Abound Housing Bubbles Abound For now, we remain long the Canadian dollar in our currency recommendations. We are expressing this view by being long CAD/EUR, a trade that has gained 3.5% in the nine weeks since we initiated it. We also recommend being underweight Canadian government bonds within a global fixed-income portfolio. It is important to stress, however, that these are 12-month views. Most Canadian mortgages are floating rate. Higher borrowing costs will likely trigger a housing bust late next year or in 2019, forcing the Bank of Canada to slow or even reverse the pace of rate hikes. The RBA And RBNZ ... Behind The Curve Too Australia and New Zealand have also been grappling with dangerously overvalued housing markets, and just as in Canada, the RBA and RBNZ have been behind the curve in responding to the brewing excesses. That is starting to change. The Reserve Bank of Australia struck a hawkish tone in the July 4 meeting minutes released this week, sending the Aussie dollar to a 26-month high against the greenback. The RBA highlighted the improvement in business conditions and a tightening labor market. It also indicated that the "neutral cash rate" was 3.5%, two points higher than the rate of 1.5%. Australia's terms of trade have been recovering of late and this should support the economy as well as the Aussie dollar (Chart 10). The RBNZ is even further behind the curve than the RBA (Chart 11). Nominal GDP is growing at over 6% and retail sales are expanding at nearly 8%. Population growth has risen sharply in recent years due to increased immigration, leading to greater demand for housing. The government has increased infrastructure spending and cut taxes. The unemployment rate has fallen back to an 8-year low of 4.9%, while the terms of trade is approaching record-high levels. Chart 10RBA Behind The Curve... RBA Behind The Curve... RBA Behind The Curve... Chart 11... And RBNZ Too? ... And RBNZ Too? ... And RBNZ Too? With all this in mind, we are closing our longstanding overweight positions in Australian and New Zealand government bonds for gains of 59.5% and 74.2%, respectively.5 Riksbank: End Of NIRP? The Swedish repo rate stands at -0.5%, despite the fact that the output gap has moved into positive territory (Chart 12). Inflation is still slightly below target, but is moving higher. The Riksbank is taking notice of the changing economic environment. The central bank backed away from its easing bias at its most recent policy meeting. The facts on the ground support this decision. Sweden's GDP is now 0.7% above potential and the economy continues to strengthen. The Riksbank's resource utilization indicator points to a sharp acceleration in Swedish inflation in the coming quarters. Nonfinancial private credit has reached 237% of GDP, up from 106% in 2000. If the Riksbank falls too far behind the curve, it will be forced to jack up rates very aggressively down the road, reviving the specter of the debt crisis of the early 1990s. The ECB, SNB, And BoJ: Take It Easy Whereas a strong case can be made that the central banks discussed above are behind the curve in normalizing monetary policy, the same cannot be said for the ECB, Swiss National Bank, or Bank of Japan. Labor market slack across the euro area as a whole is still 3.2 percentage points higher than in 2008 and 6.7 points higher outside of Germany (Chart 13). Moreover, as we discussed two weeks ago, the neutral rate in the euro area remains very depressed.6 Thus, even if the euro area economy were close to full employment, the ECB would still not have much scope to raise rates. Chart 12NIRP In Sweden: R.I.P. NIRP In Sweden: R.I.P. NIRP In Sweden: R.I.P. Chart 13Euro Area: Labor Market Slack Still High Outside Of Germany Euro Area: Labor Market Slack Still High Outside Of Germany Euro Area: Labor Market Slack Still High Outside Of Germany In this light, investors have gotten too optimistic about the ability of the ECB to tighten monetary policy. While the ECB will further taper asset purchases as early as this autumn, sustained rate hikes are still a few years away. Mario Draghi explicitly said during his press conference yesterday that "the last thing that the governing council may want is actually an unwanted tightening of the financing conditions." This is in sharp contrast to the Fed, which is trying to tighten financial conditions by raising rates. Swiss monetary conditions are far from accommodative, despite a policy rate that remains buried in negative territory (Chart 14). Core inflation is close to zero and wage growth is anemic. An overvalued currency has offset the benefits from lower interest rates. Given the SNB's policy of intervening in the currency markets to keep EUR/CHF within a reasonably tight range, the recent appreciation of the euro will further add to the deflationary pressures weighing on the Swiss economy. Investors should position for a weaker franc (and euro) in the months ahead. Go long SEK/CHF (Chart 15). Chart 14The Swiss Economy Still Needs Low Rates The Swiss Economy Still Needs Low Rates The Swiss Economy Still Needs Low Rates Chart 15Long SEK/CHF Long SEK/CHF Long SEK/CHF Similar to the ECB and the SNB, the Bank of Japan is in no position to tighten monetary policy. Core inflation has fallen back to zero and medium-to-long-term inflation expectations have dipped so far this year (Chart 16). The annual shunto wage negotiations this summer produced little in the way of salary hikes. And even if inflation were to rise, the government would likely want to tighten fiscal policy before contemplating removing the monetary punch bowl. The Bank Of England: A Tough Call If one didn't know what transpired last June, the case for tighter monetary policy in the U.K. would be fairly straightforward. The unemployment rate is at a 9-year low and inflation is well above target. The trade-weighted pound has weakened by 21% since November 2015, which in most cases, would translate into stronger growth in the years ahead. Reflecting these points, our Central Bank Monitors show that the U.K. is more in need of tighter money than any other major developed economy (Chart 17). Chart 16BoJ: In No Position To Tighten BoJ: In No Position To Tighten BoJ: In No Position To Tighten Chart 17The Message From Our Central Bank Monitors The Message From Our Central Bank Monitors The Message From Our Central Bank Monitors Brexit negotiations are likely to cast a pall over the economy, however. The EU will be forced to take a tough line with the U.K., for fear that the Brexit vote could prompt other countries to follow's Britain's lead. BCA's geopolitical strategists ultimately expect a "hard Brexit" to be averted, but things may need to be brought to the precipice before that happens. The pound is cheap and so we do not expect it to weaken significantly from current levels. Nevertheless, the upside for both sterling and gilt yields will remain constrained until political uncertainty abates. Investment Conclusions As a rule of thumb, investors should favor currencies in economies whose central banks are behind the curve. Such central banks are likely to find themselves in a position where they have to scramble to tighten monetary policy. We noted on July 7th that short-term momentum favors the euro and that we would not be surprised if EUR/USD reaches 1.18 over the coming weeks. Looking further ahead, the appreciation of the euro in the first half of this year will weigh on growth in the remainder of 2017 and into early 2018. This will force the ECB to cool its heels. In contrast, U.S. growth should accelerate. Against the backdrop of diminished spare capacity, this will prompt the Fed to turn more hawkish. We expect EUR/USD to fall to 1.05 by year-end, and reach parity next year as the Fed ramps up the pace of rate hikes. The market is betting that the Fed will deliver fewer rate hikes than implied by the 'dots'. Our hunch is that the Fed will deliver more hikes than what its forecast suggests, especially starting early next year when inflation is liable to accelerate. Bullish sentiment towards the dollar has collapsed. Investors should turn contrarian and position for a stronger greenback over the next 12 months. In addition to the dollar, we like the Swedish krona, Canadian dollar, and New Zealand dollar. The Aussie dollar should also perform reasonably well, provided that the Chinese economy continues to hold up, as we expect it will. The Japanese yen remains our least favorite currency. Despite the dollar selloff, USD/JPY has managed to gain 3% since mid-April. As the Fed and a number of other central banks raise rates, the spread in yields between foreign government bonds and JGBs will widen. This will push down the yen, helping Japanese stocks in the process. As far as overall risk sentiment is concerned, another rule of thumb says that stocks rarely fall on a sustained basis outside of recessions (Chart 18). We do not expect a recession in the U.S. or elsewhere until 2019. This implies that investors should maintain an overweight position in global equities for now, favoring cyclical sectors over defensive ones. Chart 18Stocks Rarely Fall On A Sustained Basis Outside Of Recessions Stocks Rarely Fall On A Sustained Basis Outside Of Recessions Stocks Rarely Fall On A Sustained Basis Outside Of Recessions Peter Berezin, Global Chief Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed Makes An Unforced Error," dated December 18, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market," dated July 5, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "When Doves Cry," dated June 9, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Canada: A (Probably) Happy Moment In An Otherwise Sad Story," dated July 14, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Calculated as the total excess return on the 10-year bond index relative to global government benchmark since inception in 2009, foreign-currency hedged since 2014. The 10-year yield for New Zealand government bonds has dropped from 4.28% at the time of inception to 2.94% today. The 10-year yield for Australian government bonds has fallen from 4.10% to 2.74% over this period. 6 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Draghi's Dilemma," dated July 7, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Feature Chart 1Global Growth Pick Up Global Growth Pick Up Global Growth Pick Up As a whole, G10 economies have been in expansion for more than seven years now. Moreover, after a near-recessionary episode in late 2015 / early 2016, the global economy is on a renewed upswing, with global trade and capex having regained vigor (Chart 1). Similar upswings in aged economic expansions have historically been the ideal breeding ground for global monetary tightening. However, the world economy is still dealing with two deflationary anchors: two decades of over-investment in emerging markets that have led to chronic overcapacity globally, and a strong preference for savings - a legacy of the great financial crisis (GFC) in the West and of financial repression in China. Thanks to this confluence of forces, global central banks have been fearful of tightening policy, hence, global policy rates continue to hover near multi-generational lows. Yet, now that the Federal Reserve has opened Pandora's box and raised rates four times, the question on every investor's mind is who is next. In this piece, we examine a few key domestic indicators for each G10 central bank (CB), and try to categorize CBs according to their likelihood of being the next one to tighten policy. We find three groups. The first one with the highest likelihood of hiking includes New Zealand, Sweden, and Canada. We place Australia, the U.K., and the Euro Area in the somewhat-likely-to-tighten camp. Finally, among the economies where we see little scope for tighter policy are Norway, Switzerland, and Japan. Using this ranking, we examine the implications for these countries' respective currencies and equity markets' relative performance. In this optic, it is important to remember that while conventional wisdom dictates that the stock market needs a depreciating currency in order to advance, empirically, countries with appreciating exchange rates have tended to outperform the global equity benchmark, reflecting the effect of international flows into these economies and markets.1 Finally, we look forward to publish in the coming months a quantitative model based on the indicators used in this report. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President Global Alpha Sector Strategy & U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com Most Likely To Increase Rates First: 1) New Zealand Chart 2New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand The real Official Cash Rate has never been at such a discount to trend real GDP growth (Chart 2). As a result, nominal GDP is growing at a strong 6% a year, and core inflation is moving back toward 2%. Additionally, nominal retail sales are expanding at nearly 8% per year, the highest pace since 2007. According to the OECD, GDP is now nearly 2% above trend, which highlights the inflationary nature of New Zealand's economy. Supporting that, capacity constraints are becoming rampant, despite strong immigration into the country, unemployment is now nearly 1% below equilibrium, further confirming that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand is keeping policy at too-stimulative levels. This time around, hiking rates will not be a policy mistake as it was in both 2010 and 2014. In 2010, the difference between real rates and trend real GDP growth was much narrower than today, and the output gap was still very negative. In 2014, measures of slack were also not supportive of higher rates, and a rollover in core inflation as well as muted retail sales growth created additional headwinds. Most Likely To Increase Rates First: 2) Sweden Chart 3Sweden Sweden Sweden The Riksbank's repo rate has been driven lower in response to the European Central Bank's own bias, resulting in a Swedish repo rate of -0.5%. The gap between the real policy rate in Sweden and trend GDP growth is hovering around record-low levels (Chart 3). Supported by such a stimulative policy setting, Swedish non-financial private credit has expanded massively, hitting 230% of GDP. Today, the output gap is in positive territory and the unemployment gap indicates that the labor market has tightened considerably. In fact, both measures are congruent with the levels recorded during prior rate-tightening cycles. Core inflation is still below the central bank's 2% target, but is accelerating higher. The Riksbank's resource utilization indicator is further confirming this trend and points toward much higher inflation in the second half of 2017.2 Retail sales have been soggy, but they are picking up anew, clearing the way for a rate hike. Crucially, under the tutelage of Stefan Ingves, the Riksbank has been extremely dovish, but his second term as head of the institution ends this year. For now, he does not look set to be re-appointed. His re-appointment constitutes the greatest risk to our Riksbank view. Most Likely To Increase Rates First: 3) Canada Chart 4Canada Canada Canada The gap between the real policy rate and trend real GDP growth is still very negative, much more so in fact than was the case in 2010, the last time the Bank of Canada (BoC) tried to hike interest rates. The output gap and the unemployment gap continue to point toward a small degree of slack in the Canadian economy (Chart 4). Nonetheless, the BoC expects the output gap to close in 2018. However, the amount of slack in the economy remains very low compared to what prevailed in 2010. Like in the U.S., core inflation has recently sagged, but retail sales continue to grow at a healthy pace. Canadian policy rates have rarely diverged from those in the U.S. for long as the Canadian economy is deeply integrated in the U.S. supply chain. This means that economic impulses in the U.S. are often transferred to Canada. The Fed increasing rates in the U.S. puts pressure on the BoC. If rates diverge for too long, the Loonie will weaken considerably, exacerbating inflationary pressures in Canada. Recent communications of the BoC's most senior staff indicate a very sharp move away from dovishness. Middle Of The Pack: 1) Australia Chart 5Australia Australia Australia The gap between real policy rates and trend real GDP growth is in stimulative territory, but it is not at the level seen in New Zealand, Sweden or Canada. While the unemployment gap suggests the labor market is becoming increasingly tight, the OECD's measure of the output gap still stands near record lows, suggesting that in aggregate there remains substantial slack in Australia (Chart 5). This paints a mixed picture rather than an indubitably good or bad one. Core inflation remains in a downtrend and nominal retail sales are growing at very low rates, further highlighting that monetary policy is not as accommodative as in New Zealand or Canada. Improvement in global trade continues to support the Australian economy, and strong real estate activity suggests that policy is too easy for domestic asset prices. These two forces are critical in preventing Australia from falling into the bottom basket of central banks. Even if a small deceleration in global activity emerges, so long as it does not degenerate into the kind of vicious commodity selloff experienced in the second half of 2015 and early 2016, the Australian economy will be able to avoid another deceleration. Middle Of The Pack: 2) The U.K. Chart 6U.K. U.K. U.K. On many fronts, the U.K. looks ripe for an imminent rate hike. The gap between the real policy rate and trend real GDP growth is as depressed as the levels recorded in the countries in the first bucket, suggesting that the Bank of England's policy stance is extremely accommodative (Chart 6). However, like in Australia, measures of economic slack paint a mixed picture. The unemployment gap points to an absence of slack, while the output gap remains negative and indicative of some slack in the U.K. Retail sales have been lifted by the recent surge in inflation, with core consumer prices now growing at a 2.6% annual rate. However, this picture is distorted. Real retail sales have massively decelerated, and the surge in inflation has had nothing to do with domestic conditions but has been entirely due to the pass-through associated with the near-20% collapse in the trade-weighted pound since November 2015. Beyond the negative output gap, the key reason why the BoE is not at the top of the list of potential hikers is because U.K. household inflation expectations remain well behaved, and the economy could continue to decelerate in the face of uncertainty associated with Brexit. This could even prompt Mark Carney to keep an even more dovish stance that we or the market currently anticipate. Middle Of The Pack: 3) The Euro Area Chart 7Euro Area Euro Area Euro Area The gap between the real policy rate and trend real GDP growth in the euro area is actually also at extremely stimulative levels (Chart 7), partly explaining why the European economy has been able to generate so many positive data surprises. However, the euro area economy still needs easy policy. The output gap remains very negative and unemployment is still below equilibrium. In fact, as we have argued, this latter indicator may even underestimate the amount of labor market slack in Europe, as measures of labor underutilization remain very elevated. Euro area core inflation has been moving up, but at around 1% remains well shy of the ECB's objective of close to but below 2%. True, officially the ECB targets headline inflation, but Draghi's emphasis on underlying domestic inflation trends belies a focus on core inflation. Ultimately, the combination of labor underutilization, simmering political risk in Italy and a still-negative output gap suggests the ECB in unlikely to lift interest rates until at least late 2018. The biggest risk to our view would be for the ECB to tighten policy more than we or even the market anticipate. This would put the ECB ahead of the BoE. The Laggards: 1) Norway Chart 8Norway Norway Norway The gap between Norway's real policy rate and trend real GDP growth is still indicative of an easy policy stance. However, the recent dip in core inflation has caused an inadvertent policy tightening, as illustrated by the gap's sharp narrowing (Chart 8). The OECD's measure of Norway's output gap is very negative, and the unemployment rate has not been this deeply above equilibrium in more than 20 years. As such, there seems to remain large amounts of slack in the Norwegian economy. Corroborating this assessment, Norwegian wages are contracting at a 4% annual pace. Norwegian retail sales have been very weak, and core inflation has collapsed from 4% to 1.5%. This easing in inflation is a blessing for the Norges Bank as this allows it to focus on the large amount of slack still present in the economy. The Laggards: 2) Switzerland Chart 9Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland Despite a deeply negative nominal policy rate and a continuously expanding central bank balance sheet, Switzerland monetary policy does not seem to be very easy, as the gap between the real policy rate and the trend real GDP growth rate is in neutral territory (Chart 9). The OECD's output gap and the difference between the headline unemployment rate and equilibrium unemployment rate both point toward plentiful slack in the Swiss economy. Swiss wage growth also remains quite tame, only hitting 0.1% last quarter. Core inflation remains well below target as it only modestly moved back into positive territory three months ago. The confluence of not-so-easy monetary policy and plentiful excess capacity suggests that despite the challenging conditions for Swiss pension plans and insurance companies created by deeply negative rates the Swiss economy is not yet ready to handle tighter monetary policy. The Laggards: 3) Japan Chart 10Japan Japan Japan Japan might be the most perplexing economy in the G10 right now, and the Bank of Japan is in the toughest position of all the major central banks in the advanced economies. Like Switzerland, despite negative nominal short-term interest rates and large asset purchases by the BoJ, the gap between Japan's real policy rates and trend real GDP growth suggests that policy is only at a neutral setting (Chart 10). This would seem appropriate given that both the output gap and the unemployment gap point to little spare capacity in Japan. However, this does not square with core inflation moving back into negative territory and barely expanding retail sales. Ultimately, Japan's problem is two-fold. First, the unemployment gap underestimates the amount of labor underutilization in Japan, as output per hour worked remains 11% and 34% behind that of the OECD and the U.S, respectively. Second, extremely depressed Japanese inflation expectations continue to result in an extraordinarily flat Philips curve. Due to these dynamics, we expect that it will take continued sustained efforts by the BoJ to overheat the economy before any signs of inflation emerge. FX Implications Based on our assessments, we would expect the RBNZ, the Riksbank and the BoC to be the first central banks to hike now that the Fed has blazed the trail. Within this group, the RBNZ is potentially the cleanest story, as all factors are aligned. We would expect the RBNZ to hike late summer / early fall 2017. Technically, the Riksbank seems in a better place to hike rates than the BoC. However, the leadership of the BoC is already preparing the market for higher rates. Canadian rates could also rise as soon as late summer / early fall 2017. Meanwhile, so long as Ingves remains head of the Riksbank, the Swedish central bank will likely stand pat. Thus, we would expect the first hike to materialize early next year, as soon as a new governor takes the helm, although, we believe markets will begin pricing in such a hike as soon as his replacement is announced. In the second group of central banks, we expect the RBA to be the first to increase rates. The BoE does face a much more inflationary environment than the RBA, but the U.K.'s economic uncertainty remains such that the BoE is likely to tread carefully and wait to see how the economy handles the new wave of political trauma unleashed by this month's election. The ECB is likely to begin tapering its own purchases at the end of 2017, but our base case anticipates that it will not touch policy rates until well into 2018. Among the laggards, the Norges Bank will most likely be the first to push up rates - something we do not anticipate until late 2018. While BCA expects oil prices to rebound, this is unlikely to boost the economy fast enough to close the output gap for at least 18 months. Switzerland and Japan need to do a lot of work before their respective economies generate any kind of inflationary pressures. We do not anticipate any tightening for Switzerland until well after the ECB has moved. The BoJ may not tighten policy for the remainder of this decade. This means that the CAD and the NZD are likely to prove to be the best-performing currencies in the dollar bloc. Investors should stay short AUD/NZD and AUD/CAD. CAD/NOK also possesses more upside. The SEK could prove to be the best performing European currency. Swedish money markets are pricing in only 40 basis points of hikes over the next 12 months, something that seems too low considering the inflationary risk in that country. Stay short EUR/SEK. The EUR/USD rebounded this week on the back of seemingly hawkish comments by Draghi. Even when the ECB somewhat backtracked and communicated that the market had misinterpreted the speech, EUR/USD looked the other way. This confirms our fear that the momentum in this pair is too strong to fight. EUR/USD should retest 1.15-1.16, the upper bound of its trading range put in place since March 2015. Based on our economics work, any move above 1.15 should be used to short the euro. The pound will continue to suffer from a political discount, however, because our base case expects the BoE to tighten policy before the ECB, we continue to recommend that investors use moves above 0.88 to begin shorting EUR/GBP. The SNB is unlikely to remove its cap on the Swiss franc, which means the natural upward pull created by the large net international position of Switzerland will be of little solace for investors. Finally, the JPY should be the worst performing currency in the G10 as the BoJ will not be able to lift rates - a great handicap when, as BCA expects, global bond yields are likely to enjoy more upside than downside over the next 12 months. Equity Implications U.S. Equities Chart 11U.S. U.S. U.S. Contrary to popular belief equities and the currency are joined at the hip especially during currency bull markets. A rising currency tends to attract flows and equities outperform in common and local currency terms. Keep in mind that domestic equity exposure dominates stock market weightings, further solidifying the positive currency and equity correlation. The top panel of Chart 11 shows that this relationship is extremely tight in the U.S. with equities outperforming the MSCI ACWI when the dollar advances and suffering a setback when the greenback depreciates. The Fed has raised rates three times since December 2015 and is slated to tighten monetary policy one more time later this year. This is well telegraphed to the markets, and thus the U.S. dollar has been in sell off mode for the past 6 months, weighing on relative equity performance. The relative economic surprise indexes also have an excellent track record in forecasting relative equity momentum, and the current message is grim for relative share prices. We expect the U.S. to continue to trail other G10 bourses in the coming months and the MSCI ACWI as other CBs have more scope to tighten monetary policy, and recommend an underweight stance in global equity portfolios. Bank/financials performance is also closely linked to monetary policy. While the yield curve flattening tends to suppress net interest margins (NIM), the recovery in loan volumes and drop in NPLs owing to a pickup in economic growth more than offsets the fall in NIMs. We continue to recommend overweight exposure in U.S. banks/financials both in global and U.S. only portfolios.3 New Zealand Equities Chart 12New Zealand New Zealand New Zealand The positive stock and currency correlation exists in New Zealand. Currently, the Kiwi has been rising, but relative equities have not followed suit. If our analysis proves prescient and the RBNZ becomes the next G10 CB to hike, then a playable relative equity catch up phase will materialize (Chart 12). The relative surprise index is firing on all cylinders and corroborates the bullish economic message from our macro analysis and hints that New Zealand equities are a buy. We recommend an overweight stance in New Zealand stocks in global equity portfolios. While all the rest of the G10 have a domestic banking sector, New Zealand is the exception. Australian banks dominate the banking scene in New Zealand, and thus serve as a good proxy. We are comfortable to have a modest Australian banks/financials exposure in New Zealand only portfolios. However, there is one caveat: the housing market is bubbly. While excesses are well documented, we doubt that the housing markets would burst either in Australia or in New Zealand in the coming 6-12 months and bring down the Australian banking sector. In such a time frame, both CBs will still be early in their respective tightening cycles. Swedish Equities Chart 13Sweden Sweden Sweden The Swedish krona moves in lockstep with relative share prices, a relationship that has been in place for the better part of the past two decades (Chart 13). Were the Riksbank to raise the policy rate from deeply negative territory, as our macroeconomic analysis pegs it as second most likely, then equities will outperform the MSCI ACWI, and we recommend an above benchmark allocation in global equity portfolios. Economic surprises in Sweden continue to outnumber the G10, heralding additional momentum gains in relative share prices (bottom panel). The elimination of NIRP would also benefit the banking sector. NIRP serves as a noose around banks' necks, as bankers cannot pass on NIRP to retail depositors weighing on NIMs. Chart 21 in the Appendix shows that Swedish financials comprise over 30% of the overall Swedish market and drive overall market performance. Thus, we are comfortable with an overweight stance in financials in Swedish only equity portfolios given the prospects of tighter monetary policy in the coming quarters. Canadian Equities Chart 14Canada Canada Canada The Loonie and relative equity performance also move in tandem (Chart 14). At the current juncture the bear market in oil prices has dampened both the currency and equities, as Canada is an excellent proxy for commodity prices in general and oil prices in particular. The BoC is the third most likely CB to raise interest rates in the coming months according to our analysis, raising the odds of a reversal of fortunes for Canadian equities. The relative economic surprise index is surging, opening a wide gap with relative share price momentum. If our thesis proves accurate and the BoC pulls the trigger soon, then Canadian equities will gain some traction. Under such a backdrop we recommend an overweight stance in global equity portfolios. In terms of financials, Canadian financials' market capitalization weight is the second largest in the G10, exerting significant influence in overall equity direction. If the commodity complex is healthy enough for the BoC to tighten monetary policy, then banks will outperform on the back of firming loan growth and receding commodity related NPLs. Nevertheless, the housing market poses a clear risk. Were a housing crisis to grip the Canadian economy, bank earnings and thus performance would suffer a sizable blow. Our sense is that such an outcome is highly unlikely in the next year, making us comfortable recommending overweight financials exposure in Canadian only equity portfolios. Australian Equities Chart 15Australia Australia Australia The positive correlation between FX rates and relative equity performance is prevalent in Australia (Chart 15). Currently, the Aussie has stayed resilient, but equities have given way suffering alongside commodities in general and iron ore prices in particular. The RBA sits in the middle of the pack in terms of hiking interest rates next according to our thesis, but still remains the fourth most likely CB in the G10 to pull the trigger ahead of the BoE and the ECB. As such, we recommend a neutral weight in global equity portfolios. While the relative economic surprise index has vaulted higher, the positive correlation with relative share price momentum seems to have broken down in recent years. Similar to Canada, Australian financials comprise a large chunk of the broad equity market (see Chart 21 in the Appendix on page 24), setting the tone for overall equity returns. If Canada's housing market is frothy, then Australia is a definite bubble and poses a significant risk to the banking sector. The APRA is breathing down banks' necks and that is reflected in recent bank underperformance. As we mentioned earlier, we doubt the Australian housing market blows up in the next 6-12 months as the RBA will be in the early innings of a tightening cycle. As a result, only a benchmark allocation is warranted in Australian banks in Australian only portfolios. U.K. Equities Chart 16U.K. U.K. U.K. Cable and relative U.K. equity performance also follow our currency/FX positive correlation playbook (Chart 16). Relative share prices have ticked up recently taking cue from the rebound in sterling. British economic surprises have been outnumbering the G10 post Brexit, and sport a positive correlation with relative share price momentum. Our U.K. macroeconomic analysis highlights that the BoE stands right in the middle of the CB pack. Importantly, the BoE is our "surprise risk" of staying easy for longer than the economic variables would suggest as the dust clears from the Brexit aftermath. Under such a backdrop we recommend a modest underweight in U.K. equities in global equity portfolios. Similarly, U.K. banks also warrant a slight underweight stance in U.K. only equity portfolios. Eurozone Equities Chart 17Euro Area Euro Area Euro Area Euro area stocks and the euro have been positively correlated especially since 2003. Year-to-date EUR/USD is up roughly 10% and Eurozone equities have been stellar outperformers. The catalyst for the euro's sizable gains has been the market's realization that the ECB passed its maximum easing in Q1/2017. Receding geopolitical uncertainty has also played a key role. In addition, the economy has responded well both to the extraordinarily easy monetary policy measures and move away from austerity. The bottom panel of the Chart 17 shows that relative economic surprises are probing 5-year highs pulling relative equity momentum higher. While our macro analysis suggests that the ECB stays pat for a while longer, our "surprise risk" is that the ECB moves earlier than we expect and removes some of the extreme monetary accommodation. As a result we continue to recommend above benchmark exposure both in Eurozone equities and banks/financials. Importantly, not only will euro area banks benefit from the eventual ECB's removal of NIRP and the related boost to NIMs, but also NPLs have peaked and will continue to drift lower along with the unemployment rate. More recently, the speedy and contained resolution of two Italian bank failures along with the absorption of two Spanish banks by Santander and Bankia are a giant step in the right direction. These moves also suggest that there is political will to overcome the banking issues in the euro area. Additional bank cleanup is likely and this is a welcome development in the Eurozone that should entice healthier banks to extend credit to the economy. Norwegian Equities Chart 18Norway Norway Norway Over the past two decades, the Norwegian krone and relative equity performance have moved in lockstep (Chart 18). Year-to-date, relative Norwegian equities have fallen to fresh cycle lows. Similar to Canada, the country's substantial oil dependency has weighed on relative share prices and also knocked down the krone. Our macro analysis concluded that the Norges Bank will be late in lifting interest rate and sits at the bottom of the G10 CBs. As a result, we recommend underweight exposure in Norwegian stocks in global equity portfolios. Financials in Norway comprise one fifth of the stock market's capitalization (Chart 21 in the Appendix on page 24) and have been on a nearly uninterrupted run since the end of the GFC and catapulted to multi-decade highs. Given our thesis of the Norges Bank staying late in raising rates we recommend lightening up on financials equities in Norwegian only equity portfolios. Swiss Equities Chart 19Switzerland Switzerland Switzerland Since the late 1990s relative Swiss share prices and the CHF have been enjoying an almost perfect positive correlation (Chart 19). At the current juncture Swiss stocks have been propelling higher versus the MSCI ACWI as the franc has been appreciating. There are extremely low odds that the SNB would move the needle in terms of normalizing interest rates any time soon, according to our analysis. Keep in mind that the SNB is conducting the ultimate QE experiment by purchasing U.S. stocks, underscoring that there are a lot of layers/levers of momentary policy easing that it will have to eventually to unwind. The implication is that we would lean against recent strength in the Swiss equity market and recommend a below benchmark allocation. Switzerland financials have the third lowest market cap weight in the G10 as UBS and CS are still licking their wounds from the aftermath of the GFC. Relative financials performance has been soft and taken a turn for the worse recently in marked contrast with global financials exuberance since Brexit. Our macro analysis suggests that a below benchmark allocation is warranted in financials in Swiss only portfolios. Japanese Equities Chart 20Japan Japan Japan The Japanese yen and relative equity performance were joined at the hip from the mid-1990s until 2009. From the end of the GFC until 2015 this correlation broke down as Japan has been in-and-out of recession. Since then however, there is tentative evidence that Japanese equities and the yen have resumed moving in tandem (Chart 20). Our macroeconomic analysis suggests that Japan will be the last G10 CB to lift interest rates. While our study would signal that investors should avoid Japanese equities, we do not have high confidence in that view. The break and resumption in the equity/currency correlation is worrisome and suggests that other more important factors are in play dictating relative share price performance. As a result, we would modestly overweight Japanese equities in global equity portfolios in line with BCA’s Global Investment Strategy service view.4 On the financials front, relative performance in Japan has fallen into oblivion. NIRP is anchoring NIMs. But, an extremely low unemployment rate suggests that NPLs will continue to probe multi decade lows and provide an offset to bank EPS. Thus, we would stick with a neutral weighting in Japanese financials.5 Appendix Chart 21G10 Financial Market Cap Weights Who Hikes Next? Who Hikes Next? 1 For a more detailed discussion on the correlation between equity prices and the currency market, please see Global Alpha Sector Strategy Special Report titled, "Can The S&P 500 Rise Alongside The U.S. Dollar?", dated October 7, 206, available at gss.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Central Banks Are Sticking To Their Guns", dated June 16, 017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Girding For A Breakout?", dated May 1, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy - Strategy Outlook "Third Quarter 2017: Aging Bull", June 30, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Global Alpha Sector Strategy Weekly Report titled "The Year Of The Letter "R"", January 13, 2017, available at gss.bcaresearch.com

Highlights Reflation Trade: The backdrop for global growth and monetary liquidity remains positive, and suggests that risk assets will outperform government debt for the balance of 2017. However, there are some early signs of fading momentum which raises risks for financial markets in 2018. New Zealand: The more dovish tone taken by the RBNZ reflects the more uncertain outlook for New Zealand growth and inflation. Go long 5-year New Zealand government bonds versus 5-year U.S. Treasuries (currency-hedged) and also versus 5-year German government debt (currency-unhedged). South Korea: Large expected increases in fiscal spending from the new government in Seoul will drive up the longer end of the South Korean government bond curve, while the Bank of Korea's easing stance and weak domestic economy will anchor the short-end of the curve. Position for this by entering a 2-year/10-year steepening trade in the South Korean government bond market. Feature "I know it makes no difference to what you're going through; but I see the tip of the iceberg, and I worry about you." - Rush Is The Liquidity Party Starting To Wind Down? Global financial markets continue to enjoy the "sweet spot" of a solidly expanding global economy, but without enough inflation pressure to force central banks to slam on the monetary brakes. That backdrop is starting to change, though. Odds are rising that the European Central Bank (ECB) will begin tapering its bond buying next year, with some hints of that possibly being announced as soon as next week's monetary policy meeting. At the same time, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) - faced with the operational constraints of buying an ever-increasing share of Japanese financial assets - is focused on targeting long-term interest rates rather than increasing liquidity. Even the Federal Reserve is now talking about reducing its massive balance sheet later this year. The liquidity tailwind to global growth and risk assets is now at risk of becoming a headwind. Already, the growth rate of the major central bank balance sheets has rolled over and is on course to decelerate further over the next year (Chart of the Week). Importantly, this downshift in global liquidity momentum is happening as signs of slowing growth have appeared in some major economies like China and the U.S. (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekLiquidity Tailwind To Risk##BR##Assets Is Fading Liquidity Tailwind To Risk Assets Is Fading Liquidity Tailwind To Risk Assets Is Fading Chart 2Growth Momentum##BR##Already Starting To Cool Off Growth Momentum Already Starting To Cool Off Growth Momentum Already Starting To Cool Off We remain concerned that the Chinese economy will see a policy-induced deceleration in the 2nd half of the year. However, we still expect the U.S. to rebound after the soft patch of growth in the first quarter, and we see nothing in the Euro Area data to suggest that the current solid expansion is at risk of fading quickly. This should allow inflation expectations to drift upward toward the central bank targets given the apparent lack of spare capacity on both sides of the Atlantic (Chart 3). Chart 3Fed & ECB Facing##BR##Economic Capacity Constraints Fed & ECB Facing Economic Capacity Constraints Fed & ECB Facing Economic Capacity Constraints We still expect the Fed to deliver another two rate hikes before year-end and the ECB to begin its exit strategy from the current extraordinary monetary policies by slowing the pace of asset purchases starting early next year. For now, the backdrop will remain supportive for the outperformance of growth-sensitive assets like corporate credit and equities over government bonds in the U.S. and Europe over the balance of 2017. However, the early signals sent by "leading leading" indicators such as our Global Leading Economic Indicator diffusion index (Chart 2, top panel) suggests that liquidity and growth trends will become far more challenging for the markets in 2018. Bottom Line: The backdrop for global growth and monetary liquidity remains positive, and suggests that risk assets will outperform government debt for the balance of 2017. However, there are some early signs of fading momentum which raises risks for financial markets in 2018. Maintain a below-benchmark duration exposure and an overweight allocation to corporate debt in global fixed income portfolios. New Zealand: Safety From A Global Bond Apocalypse? A growing number of the world's most wealthiest (and, arguably, most paranoid) people are reportedly buying real estate in New Zealand as a safe haven place to live if modern civilization collapses.1 While the immediate need for taking such precautions can be debated, there is sound logic in treating New Zealand as a location far removed from the current geopolitical and socio-economic problems of the world. We now see a case for treating New Zealand bonds as a potential "safe haven" market for global fixed income investors. The Economic Backdrop Has Become More Muddled We have been running a SHORT position in New Zealand (paying 12-month OIS rates) in our Tactical Overlay portfolio since last November. Our view then was that the New Zealand economy would surprise to the upside in 2017 and inflation was likely to start drifting upward. This would pressure the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) to raise the Official Cash Rate (OCR) from the highly accommodative level of 1.75%. So far, that expectation has not panned out as the RBNZ has held rates steady amid a more uncertain outlook for the New Zealand economy. Growth indicators have been a bit mixed over the past few months, but the current uptick in the manufacturing purchasing managers' index (PMI) is pointing to real GDP expanding around 3% on a year-over-year basis (Chart 4). If maintained for the full year, this would be slightly above the RBNZ's estimate of potential growth at 2.8%. There are some downside risks, however, given that consumer and business confidence are both below previous cyclical peaks and fiscal policy is expected to be mildly restrictive in 2017 (bottom three panels). The housing market remains a key cyclical wild card. Residential construction has been a significant source of growth over the past few years, driven by a surge in net immigration into New Zealand and declining interest rates (Chart 5). However, the RBNZ is projecting immigration inflows to slow from the current high level, largely due to improving labor market conditions in the developed economies (most notably, Australia, which is the largest source of New Zealand immigrants). Chart 4Stable NZ Growth...For Now Stable NZ Growth...For Now Stable NZ Growth...For Now Chart 5NZ Housing Activity Starting To Peak Out NZ Housing Activity Starting To Peak Out NZ Housing Activity Starting To Peak Out Slower immigration would reduce the demand for New Zealand housing at a time when mortgage rates have already been rising off the record lows seen in 2016 (bottom panel). This has occurred without any rate hikes from the RBNZ, as rising global bond yields have put upward pressure on New Zealand bank funding costs, which have been passed through to higher mortgage rates. The RBNZ is currently projecting growth in house prices to slow sharply from last year's robust 15% pace to just 5% in 2017. The main drivers are higher borrowing costs and the ongoing impact of macro-prudential regulations against high loan-to-value ratio mortgage lending. Importantly, slower housing activity will not only have a direct impact on GDP growth through softer construction, but will also indirectly dampen consumer spending growth via wealth effects. Yet even with this expected drag on growth from housing, the New Zealand economy is still expected to face capacity constraints over the rest of the year. Higher Uncertainty Over Price Pressures Both the RBNZ and the International Monetary Fund estimate that the output gap has fully closed and is projected to move into positive territory this year (Chart 6). At the same time, the current unemployment rate of 4.9% is below the OECD's estimate of the full employment level and the RBNZ projects a further decline in joblessness in 2017 (third panel). Despite this evidence of the economy reaching capacity constraints, both wage growth and price inflation remain subdued and inflation expectations remain well-anchored around 2% - the midpoint of the RBNZ's 1-3% target range. Wage costs are particularly depressed, growing only 1% on a year-over-year basis in Q1. This may be related to the rise in the labor force participation rate - up to an all-time high of 70.6% in Q1 from a cyclical low of 68.2% at the end of 2015 - that has increased the available supply of labor. The most recent headline inflation print for Q1 was quite strong, taking the year-over-year growth rate up to 2.2%. Yet in the RBNZ's April Monetary Policy Statement (MPS), the central bank took a surprisingly dovish tone, citing uncertainty over the true degree of slack in the economy and downside risks to growth that would prevent a further acceleration of inflation.2 The RBNZ now forecasts inflation to not rise above 2.2% this year and to fall back to 1.1% in both 2018, led by a sharp decline in growth for tradeables, mostly energy and food inflation (Chart 7). Importantly, this forecast includes the recent decline in the trade-weighted New Zealand Dollar (NZD). Non-tradeables inflation is also expected to stabilize on the back of slower housing-related items in the consumer price index. Chart 6RBNZ Not Expecting A Big Rise In Inflation... RBNZ Not Expecting A Big Rise In Inflation... RBNZ Not Expecting A Big Rise In Inflation... Chart 7...As Growth In Tradeables Prices Cools ...As Growth In Tradeables Prices Cools ...As Growth In Tradeables Prices Cools A Weaker Case For Tighter Monetary Policy The official RBNZ projection is that the OCR will stay unchanged at 1.75% until September 2019. The market expectation priced into the NZD OIS curve calls for 27bps of hikes over the next twelve months (Chart 8). Our New Zealand Central Bank Monitor has been suggesting the need for tighter monetary policy since mid-2016, but appears to be rolling over (2nd panel). The diminished rate hike expectations have coincided with a decline in the NZD and a sharp underperformance of New Zealand equities. The markets are giving a consistent signal on softening growth prospects in New Zealand, confirming the central bank's more recent dovish turn. Chart 8Market Expectations Of##BR##RBNZ Hikes Are Fading Market Expectations Of RBNZ Hikes Are Fading Market Expectations Of RBNZ Hikes Are Fading Given the newfound uncertainties over the New Zealand growth and inflation outlook, the case for owning New Zealand interest rate exposure has grown a little bit stronger. Admittedly, we do not envision a major pullback in growth, and inflation may not fall by as much as the RBNZ is expecting given how little spare capacity there appears to be in the economy. Yet there is now just enough uncertainty to keep the central bank on hold for longer than expected, as was noted in the "scenario analysis" section of the April MPS.3 The RBNZ noted that if the level of spare capacity is smaller than currently assumed, then the latest growth forecast will result in inflation eventually moving to 2.0% in 2018 and 2.3% in 2019, resulting in the OCR needing to rise to 2.25% in two years. Alternatively, if housing demand slows even faster than current projections, inflation would be below the 2% target during the next two years and the OCR would need to fall to 1.25% by the end of 2018. Our takeaway from this is that, even in the more positive scenario, interest rates are not expected to rise by much more than the markets are currently discounting. Position For Tighter New Zealand Spreads Versus Treasuries & Bunds The economic risks in New Zealand now appear evenly balanced. This argues for stable monetary policy and diminished bond volatility. Current market forwards for both government bonds and NZD swaps shows that very little movement in interest rates is expected over the next year (Chart 9). We generally agree with this pricing, although the uncertainty over the degree of spare capacity, and underlying inflation pressures, make a directional view on interest rates or the shape of the yield curve an unattractive risk proposition. A more interesting opportunity presents itself in looking at spread trades between New Zealand government bonds versus other developed market sovereign debt. The yield betas for New Zealand versus the U.S. and Germany have fallen steadily over the past year (Chart 10), indicating that New Zealand bonds can be more insulated from the rise in yields that we expect for U.S. Treasuries and German Bunds over the latter half of 2017. Given the competitively high yields on offer in New Zealand, even on a currency-hedged basis (bottom panel), we see a case for going long New Zealand interest rate exposure versus U.S. and Germany. Chart 9Higher NZ Bond Yields##BR##Priced Into Forwards Higher NZ Bond Yields Priced Into Forwards Higher NZ Bond Yields Priced Into Forwards Chart 10NZ Bonds: Now Lower Beta##BR##With Higher Hedged Yields NZ Bonds: Now Lower Beta With Higher Hedged Yields NZ Bonds: Now Lower Beta With Higher Hedged Yields At current yield levels, going long New Zealand versus Germany looks more compelling relative to spread compression trades versus U.S. Treasuries. We see strong potential for New Zealand-Germany spreads to tighten faster than the forwards over the next six months (Chart 11), largely through rising German yields as the ECB signals that a tapering of bond purchases is set to begin next year. The downside potential for New Zealand-U.S. spread compression looks less likely from current tight levels, although if Treasury yields rise by as much as we expect in the coming months, some spread tightening should occur here, as well. Chart 11Go Long 5Yr NZ Bonds Vs##BR##USTs and German OBLs Go Long 5yr NZ Bonds vs USTs and German OBLs Go Long 5yr NZ Bonds vs USTs and German OBLs Based on our analysis, we are closing our current NZD rates trade in our Tactical Overlay portfolio with a tiny profit of +3bps , and entering two new trades: long 5-year NZD government bonds versus 5-year U.S. Treasuries, on a currency-hedged basis; and long 5yr NZD government bonds versus 5-year German government debt, on a currency-unhedged basis.4 We are choosing to hedge the currency exposure back into USD for the former given the view of BCA's currency strategists that the EUR/USD exchange rate is now stretched too far to the upside and is at risk of declining as the Fed delivers on additional rate hikes in the coming months.5 In other words, we see a greater potential for a decline in NZD/USD than NZD/EUR in the next 3-6 months. Bottom Line: The more dovish tone taken by the RBNZ reflects the more uncertain outlook for New Zealand growth and inflation, in contrast to the strong likelihood of additional Fed rate hikes and an ECB taper announcement in the next few months. Go long 5-year New Zealand government bonds versus 5-year U.S. Treasuries (currency-hedged) and also versus 5-year German government debt (currency-unhedged). South Korea: A Bad Moon Rising For Bond Yields Chart 12Markets Not Worried##BR##About The New President Markets Not Worried About The New President Markets Not Worried About The New President The new South Korean president, Moon Jae-In was elected on May 9th, ending a year of political turmoil after the previous president's scandal and impeachment. Our colleagues at BCA Geopolitical Strategy view Moon and his Democratic Party as a major shift to the political left.6 The new president's policy agenda is aimed at economic stimulus for the working class alongside reforms of the country's chaebol industrial giants. Korean financial markets have greeted the election result positively, with the benchmark KOSPI equity index up 2.7%, and the Korean won up 1% versus the U.S. dollar, from the pre-election levels on May 8th. (Chart 12). This is consistent with past market behavior, as the won tends to be less reactive toward domestic events (i.e. after the previous president's impeachment, the won actually strengthened) and more sensitive to international uncertainties (i.e. North Korea-U.S. military tensions, as occurred in mid-March). Korean interest rates, however, have shown little response to the change in leadership in Seoul, with bond yields unchanged since the election. We see this as presenting an opportunity for fixed income investors. Clearly, the new regime in Seoul represents a real change for the Korean people, but it also represents a potential shift in the economic backdrop - namely, through an expected large fiscal stimulus from the new government - that will impart a steepening bias to the Korean interest rate curve. A Sluggish Economy Greets The New President While the steady, if unspectacular, pace of global growth in the past few years has been enough to absorb spare capacity in many countries, South Korea's sub-par economic performance has left the country with a widening output gap (Chart 13). Policymakers are well aware that consumer spending, which contributes about 60% of GDP, has been steadily weakening alongside slowing credit growth. Chart 13Sluggish Growth In South Korea Sluggish Growth In South Korea Sluggish Growth In South Korea The new government will attempt to boost domestic consumption, and thus overall growth, by increasing social welfare spending. Moon's economic agenda calls for raising the minimum wage by 55% by 2020, increasing subsidies for education costs and parental leave, and doubling the basic pension payment for the elderly regardless of their income level. It might prove to be very effective in the short term at boosting consumer spending, but this may not prove to be a sustainable driver of growth in South Korea, where the marginal swings in the economy have historically been driven more by exports. Youth joblessness is another problem that Moon will attempt to tackle with his ambitious economic program. While the labor market may appear healthy, with an overall unemployment rate of only 3.7%, the situation is far more challenging for young adults in South Korea - the jobless rate for those aged 20-29 is 11.3%. One of the reasons for such a high unemployment rate among young South Koreans is that university graduates, of which there are many in this highly-educated nation, expect (and look for) high-paying jobs, but cannot find enough of them.7 The labor market has become more competitive in recent years as weak economic growth has limited the ability of private sector, especially large corporations, to hire as much. To solve this problem, the new government has promised to create 810,000 jobs in the public sector. Creating public sector jobs may temporarily solve the high unemployment rate, but in the long run, this will also cause larger fiscal burdens for taxpayers. Position For A Steeper South Korean Yield Curve Headline CPI inflation in South Korea is currently hovering around the 2% target of the Bank of Korea (BoK), while core CPI growth is lower at 1.3%. The BoK has maintain the policy rate at 1.25% since June 2016, with a bias towards additional easing given the lack of sustained inflationary pressure amid weak domestic demand. The BoK did sound a slightly more upbeat tone on the economy at last week's monetary policy meeting, led by the spillover effects from improving global growth rather than a more bullish expectation on the Korean consumer. Importantly, the central bank still expects inflation pressures to remain subdued - no surprise given the large output gap. The BoK did note that it is monitoring several factors in judging future policy decisions: the pace of rate hikes by the Fed, trends in global trade, geopolitical tensions, the pace of household debt accumulation and "the directions of the new government's fiscal policies." The latter may end up being the most important factor, as President Moon is proposing an increase in government spending equal to 0.7% of GDP - an amount equal to ½ of the estimated output gap coming after a 2016 budget surplus of 1% of GDP. This increase in fiscal spending could directly drive up the longer-end of Korean yield curve, as this would result in a narrower budget surpluses and greater KGB issuance. At the same time, the lack of domestic inflation pressures, even with the fiscal stimulus, will keep the BoK on an easing bias that will keep short dated yields well anchored. Therefore, we see the potential for the Korean yield curve to eventually steepen and break the downward-sloping trendline in place since 2014 (Chart 14). We recommend positioning for this move by entering a 2-year/10-year steepening trade in the Korean yield curve. Admittedly, this trade is more structural than tactical in nature, as the Moon stimulus policies will take time to unfold. Importantly, a flattening of the 2-year/10-year KGB curve is currently priced into the forwards, meaning that positioning now for a steepener does not incur negative carry (Chart 15). Chart 14More Fiscal Stimulus =##BR##Steeper Korea Curve More Fiscal Stimulus = Steeper Korea Curve More Fiscal Stimulus = Steeper Korea Curve Chart 15Enter A 2Yr/10Yr##BR##Korean Bond Curve Steepener Enter a 2yr/10yr Korean Bond Curve Steepener Enter a 2yr/10yr Korean Bond Curve Steepener Also, Korean 10-year bond yields are currently exhibiting a strong correlation to similar maturity U.S. Treasuries with a yield beta around 1.0 (bottom panel). Given our view that longer-dated U.S. yields have upside risk from both additional Fed rate increases and higher U.S. inflation expectations, that high yield beta suggests that the Korean yield curve could suffer some of the same cyclical bear-steepening pressures that we expect for U.S. Treasuries in the next 3-6 months. Bottom Line: Large expected increases in fiscal spending from the new government in Seoul will drive up the longer end curve of the South Korean government bond curve, while the Bank of Korea's easing stance and weak domestic economy will anchor the short-end of the curve. Position for this by entering a 2-year/10-year steepening trade in the South Korean bond curve. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com 1 https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jan/29/silicon-valley-new-zealand-apocalypse-escape 2 The central bank noted that its "suite" of output gap estimates, using varying methodologies, have an unusually wide range at the moment between -1.5% and +2%. 3 http://www.rbnz.govt.nz/monetary-policy/monetary-policy-statement 4 These trades can be done using interest rate swaps as well (receiving NZD rates vs paying USD & EUR rates), as swap spreads are expected to remain broadly stable in all three regions. 5 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Bloody Potomac", dated May 19 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets" dated May 24 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 According to the OECD, Korea's college enrollment rate was a whopping 87% as recently as 2014. The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Distant Early Warning Distant Early Warning Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights Uncovered Interest Rate Parity still works for currencies. However, it needs to be based on a combination of short- and long-term real rates. Currencies are also affected by the global risk appetite, as approximated by corporate spreads, and commodity prices. Based on our timing model­s, the countertrend correction in the dollar is toward its tailend. Any additional weakness should be used to buy the greenback. The euro is now expensive based on our timing model. However, it could become slightly more expensive as markets continue to price in the euro area-friendly outcome of the first round of the French election. Feature In July 2016, in a Special Report titled "In Search Of A Timing Model," we introduced a set of intermediate-term models to complement our long-term fair value models for various currencies.1 These groups of models provide additional discipline, a sanity check if you will, to our regular analysis. In this report, we review the logic underpinning these intermediate-term models and provide a commentary on their most recent readings for the G10 currencies vis-à-vis the USD. UIP, Revisited The uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) relationship is at the core of this modeling exercise. This theory suggests that an equilibrium exchange rate is the one that will make an investor indifferent between holding the bonds of country A or country B. This means that as interest rates rise in country A relative to country B, the currency of country B will fall today in order to appreciate in the future. These higher expected returns are what will drive investors to hold the lower-yielding bonds of country B (Chart 1). Chart 1Interest Rate Differentials Remain Useful ##br##Gauges For XR Determination Interest Rate Differentials Remain Useful Gauges For XR Determination Interest Rate Differentials Remain Useful Gauges For XR Determination There has long been a debate as to whether investors should focus on short rates or long rates when looking at exchange rates through the prism of UIP. Research by the Fed and the IMF suggest that incorporating longer-term rates to UIP models increases their accuracy.2 This informational advantage works whether policy rates are or aren't close to their lower bound.3 Incorporating long-term rates as an explanatory variable increases the performance of UIP models because exchange rate movements do not only reflect current interest rate conditions, but currency market investors also try to anticipate the path of interest rates over many periods. By definition, long-term bonds do just that as they are based on the expected path of short rates over their maturity - as well as a term premium, which compensates for the uncertain nature of future interest rates. There is another reason why long-term rate differential changes improve the power of UIP models. Since UIP models are based on the concept of investor indifference between assets in two countries, changes in the spreads between 10-year bonds in these two countries will create more volatility in the currency pair than changes in the spreads between 3-month rates. This is because an equivalent delta in the 10-year spread will have much greater impact on the relative prices of the bonds than on the short-term paper, courtesy of their much more elevated duration. To compensate for these greater changes in prices, the currency does have to overshoot its long-term PPP to a much greater extent to entice investors trading the long end of the curve. Bottom Line: The interest rate parity relationship still constitutes the bedrock of any shorter-term currency fair value model. However, to increase its accuracy, both long-term and short-term rates should be used. Real Rates Really Count Another perennial question regarding exchange rate determination is whether to use nominal or real rate differentials. At a theoretical level, real rates are what matter. Investors can look through the loss of purchasing power created by inflation. Therefore, exchange rates overshoot around real rate differentials, not nominal ones. On a practical level, there are additional reasons to believe that real rates should matter, especially when trying to explain currency moves beyond a few weeks. Indeed, various surveys and studies on models used by forecasters and traders show that FX professionals use purchasing power parity as well as productivity differential concepts when setting their forex forecasts.4 Indeed, as Chart 2 illustrates, real rate differentials have withstood the test of time as an explanatory variable for exchange rate dynamics, albeit with periods where rate differentials and the currency can deviate from each other. It is true that very often, nominal rate differentials can be used as a shorthand for real rate differentials as both interest rate gaps tend to move together. However, regularly enough, they do not. In countries with very depressed inflation expectations (Japan comes to the front of the mind), nominal and real rate differentials can in fact look very different (Chart 3). With the informational cost of incorporating market-based inflation expectations being very low, we find the shorthand unnecessary when building UIP-based models. Chart 2Over The Long Run, Real Rate ##br##Differentials Work Best Over The Long Run, Real Rate Differentials Work Best Over The Long Run, Real Rate Differentials Work Best Chart 3Real And Nominal Rates ##br##Can Be Different Real And Nominal Rates Can Be Different Real And Nominal Rates Can Be Different Finally, it is important to remark that in environments of high inflation, inflation differentials dominate any other factor when it comes to exchange rate determination. However, the currencies discussed in this report currently are not like Zimbabwe or Latin America in the early 1980s. Bottom Line: When considering an intermediate-term fair value model for exchange rates, investors should focus on real, not nominal long-term rate differentials. Global Risk Aversion And Commodity Prices Chart 4The Dollar Benefits From Global Woes The Dollar Benefits From Global Woes The Dollar Benefits From Global Woes Global risk appetite is also a key factor to consider when trying to model exchange rates. Risk aversion shocks tend to lead to an appreciation in the dollar, which benefits from its status as the global reserve currency.5 Much literature has often focused on the use of the VIX as a gauge for global risk appetite. Our exercise shows stronger explanatory power for the option-adjusted spreads on junk bonds (Chart 4). Commodity prices, too, play a key role. Historically, commodity prices have displayed a very strong negative correlation with the dollar.6 This correlation is obviously at its strongest for commodity-producing nations, as rising natural resource prices constitute a terms-of-trade-shock for them. However, this relationship holds up for the euro as well, something already documented by the ECB.7 The Models The models for each cross rate are built to reflect the insight gleaned above. Each cross is modeled on three variables, with the model computed on a weekly timeframe: Real rates differentials: We use the average of 2-year and 10-year real rates. The rates are deflated using inflation expectations. Global risk appetite: Proxied by junk OAS. Commodity prices: We use the Bloomberg Continuous Commodity Index. For all countries, the variables are statistically highly significant and of the expected signs. These models help us understand in which direction the fundamentals are pushing the currency. We refer to these as Fundamental Intermediate-Term Models (FITM). We created a second set of models, based on the variables above, which also include a 52-week moving average for each cross. Real rates differentials, junk spreads, and commodity prices remain statistically very significant and of the correct sign. They are therefore trend- and risk-appetite adjusted UIP-deviation models. These models are more useful as timing indicators on a 3-9 month basis, as their error terms revert to zero much faster. We refer to these as Intermediate-Term Timing Models (ITTM). The U.S. Dollar Chart 5Dollar Fundamentals Strengthening... Dollar Fundamentals Strengthening... Dollar Fundamentals Strengthening... Chart 6...But Timing Could Be Better To Buy DXY ...But Timing Could Be Better To Buy DXY ...But Timing Could Be Better To Buy DXY To model the dollar index (DXY), we used two approaches. In the first one, we took all the deviation from fair value for the pairs constituting the index, based on their weights in the DXY. In the second approach, we ran the model specifically for the DXY, using the three variables described above. U.S. real rates were compared to an average of euro area, Japanese, Canadian, British, Swiss, and Swedish real rates weighted by their contribution to the DXY. We then averaged both approaches, which gave us very similar results to begin with. The FITM for the DXY has stabilized and is now slowly moving upward (Chart 5). The ITTM itself is even pointing upward, arguing that the dollar is at a neutral level and that its previous overshoot has now been corrected. However, historically, the DXY rarely stabilizes at its fair value, overshooting the mark instead. Based on historical behavior, the DXY is likely to undershoot its ITTM by another two percent or so before an ideal entry point to buy the USD emerges (Chart 6). Longer term, we continue to expect the dollar to stay on an upward trend. The U.S. neutral rate remains above that of Europe and Japan. Moreover, U.S. economic slack is dissipating much faster than in Europe, and the U.S. may already be in the process of hitting its own capacity constraints. This suggests that the Fed has much greater scope to normalize policy than the ECB. With the OIS curve pricing in a 25 basis point hike in the U.S. over the next 12 months, this will support the USD versus the euro. Japan, too, exhibits increasing signs of limited slack in its economy. However, with the BoJ committed to an inflation overshoot in order to upwardly shock moribund Japanese inflation expectations, we think that Japanese real rates will lag U.S. ones, putting significant upside on USD/JPY. The Euro Chart 7Euro Fundamentals Are Deteriorating Euro Fundamentals Are Deteriorating Euro Fundamentals Are Deteriorating Chart 8The Euro Is No Longer Cheap The Euro Is No Longer Cheap The Euro Is No Longer Cheap The FITM for EUR/USD has rolled over and is now pointing south, suggesting that fundamentals are moving against the euro (Chart 7). This reflects large rate differentials between the U.S. and the euro area, but also, the recent softness in some corners of the commodity complex. Last spring, the FITM did a good job forecasting the rebound in the euro, and the fact that it is flagging impeding euro weakness deserves to be highlighted. In terms of entering a short EUR/USD tactical bet, at the current juncture, the ITTM suggests an entry point is soon to emerge (Chart 8). Now that the dueling pair of the second round of the French election has been determined - Macron vs Le Pen - the euro was able to price out nightmare scenarios involving two Eurosceptic candidates. In fact, with the realization that Macron holds a 20% lead over Le Pen in second round polling, the market has begun to completely price out any euro-endangering outcome for the French election. This means that the euro is likely to move toward its historical premium to the ITTM before reverting toward its cyclical downtrend. Practically, this means that EUR/USD could run toward 1.11-1.12 before rolling over, something that may happen by May 8th. On a 12- to 18-months basis, we are comfortable with the current message from the FITM. The European economy may be growing above trend, but there remains enough slack in Europe that wage and core inflation dynamics are still very muted. This contrasts with the U.S. economy, where most indicators we track argue that wages and core inflation should gain some upward momentum this year. This means that rate differentials between the euro area and the U.S. are likely to underperform even what is priced into the relative interest rate curves. This should weigh on EUR/USD as the euro is not cheap enough to compensate for these economic dynamics. The Yen Chart 9A Dovish BoJ Will Weigh ##br##On Yen Fundamentals A Dovish BoJ Will Weigh On Yen Fundamentals A Dovish BoJ Will Weigh On Yen Fundamentals Chart 10The Yen Is No Longer ##br##Tactically Cheap The Yen Is No Longer Tactically Cheap The Yen Is No Longer Tactically Cheap The FITM model shows that the post-election rally in USD/JPY was overdone as the yen's fundamentals have stopped deteriorating after October 2016 (Chart 9). As we see the growing likelihood of a decreasing deflationary impulse in Japan, the strong dovish commitment of the Bank of Japan should pull Japanese real rates lower vis-à-vis their U.S. counterparts. This underpins why we remain cyclical bears on the yen. Tactically, based on the ITTM, it will soon be time to close our short USD/JPY trade. While the yen had massively undershot any rational anchor in the wake of the Trump electoral victory, this undervaluation appears to have vanished after the yen's sharp rebound (Chart 10). A small overshoot in the yen is likely, but unless one is already short USD/JPY, this move should not be chased. In fact, USD/JPY below 108 should be used as an opportunity to reverse yen longs and play what may prove to be a powerful USD/JPY rally. The British Pound Chart 11GBP: A Long-Term Bargain... GBP: A Long-Term Bargain... GBP: A Long-Term Bargain... Chart 12...But Upside Against USD Is Limited ...But Upside Against USD Is Limited ...But Upside Against USD Is Limited According to the FITM, the pound's fair value has been stable post-Brexit, but it is now beginning to point lower. However, despite this turn of events, GBP/USD is currently trading at such an exceptional discount to the FITM - courtesy of a heightened geopolitical risk premium - that this deterioration in fair value is unlikely to matter much (Chart 11). Nonetheless, the fact that fundamentals have a negative directional bias for cable is prompting us to express our tempered optimism toward the pound by shorting EUR/GBP instead of buying GBP/USD. At a tactical level, the ITTM suggests that GBP/USD could have a bit more upside. GBP/USD is at equilibrium based on our timing model, but undershoots tend to be compensated by subsequent overshoots (Chart 12). That being said, with the ITTM still pointing south - in line with the FITM - any further rebound in GBP/USD is likely to prove to be limited. GBP/USD beyond 1.33 should be used as an opportunity to sell cable. On a multi-year basis, GBP is quite cheap, not only on a PPP basis, but also when incorporating relative productivity dynamics. This means that while we have a positive dollar-bias over the next 12-18 months, our favorite non-USD currency is currently the GBP. The June 8th general election is likely to give Theresa May the parliamentary majority she needs to have a more comfortable negotiating position with the EU, helping her obtain more advantageous terms for the U.K., re-enforcing our positive long-term bias on the GBP. The Canadian Dollar Chart 13Oil And Spreads Are Working##br##Against The Loonie... Oil And Spreads Are Working Against The Loonie... Oil And Spreads Are Working Against The Loonie... Chart 14...And So Is##br## Wilbur Ross ...And So Is Wilbur Ross ...And So Is Wilbur Ross According to the FITM, the aggregate fundamentals have rolled over and are beginning to point directionally south for the loonie: Oil has lost momentum, and rate differentials are not particularly flattering for the CAD (Chart 13). That being said, the CAD has greatly lagged these same fundamentals, probably as investors have been pondering the potential negative implications for NAFTA and Canada of the Trump administration. Our ITTM suggests that with this handicap taken into account, the CAD may not be a short after all (Chart 14). However, because the CAD is more sensitive to the trend in the broad U.S. dollar and general commodity prices than anything else, we prefer to express a positive bias on the loonie by buying it against the AUD, a commodity currency that does not trade at the same discount to its ITTM. The Swiss Franc Chart 15Inflationary Dynamics Should##br## Continue To Weigh On The Franc Inflationary Dynamics Should Continue To Weigh On The Franc Inflationary Dynamics Should Continue To Weigh On The Franc Chart 16No Clear Timing##br## Signals Yet No Clear Timing Signals Yet No Clear Timing Signals Yet Even if flat for the past year or so, the directional fundamentals on the Swiss franc vis-à-vis the USD still seems to be in a long-term bear market (Chart 15). This simply highlights the fact that with the U.S. economy able to generate some inflationary dynamics while Switzerland continues to suffer from pronounced deflationary anchors, U.S. real rates have more room to move upward than Swiss ones. In terms of timing, the ITTM is in the neutral zone, suggesting that there is no particularly compelling reason to buy or short USD/CHF at the current juncture (Chart 16). The SNB is unofficially targeting a floor under EUR/CHF around 1.06 to tame the deflationary impulse in Switzerland. While the Swiss economy is improving, it is not yet strong enough to handle a removal of this policy. In all likelihood, this means that for the rest of 2017, USD/CHF will remain a near-perfect mirror image of EUR/USD. The Australian Dollar Chart 17Iron Ore Prices: From Friend To Foe Iron Ore Prices: From Friend To Foe Iron Ore Prices: From Friend To Foe Chart 18No Valuation Cushion For AUD No Valuation Cushion For AUD No Valuation Cushion For AUD AUD/USD has not been able to break above 0.77, and the reason simply is that the forces embedded in the FITM have sharply rolled over (Chart 17). Not only have commodity prices stopped appreciating - with iron prices, the most crucial determinant of Australia's terms of trade down 21% - but U.S. short rates and long rates have been going up relative to Australia. Most disturbing for Australia, unlike the CAD it does not possess any cushion when analyzed through the prism of our ITTM (Chart 18). This suggests that the deteriorating Australian fundamentals are likely to be directly translated into a lower AUD/USD. Moreover, historically, previous undershoots in the AUD were followed by an overshoot. We do not think this time is any different; but the dovish slant of the RBA and the drubbing received by iron ore prices suggest that if the AUD overshoots, it will be because it may not fall as fast as its fundamentals at first. If that is the case, we do expect a catch-up later this year. As previously mentioned, the relative dynamics between the Canadian and Australian ITTM suggest that investors in commodity currencies should short AUD/CAD. Moreover, on a longer-term basis, we also favor oil producers over metal ones. The supply dynamics in the oil market are much more favorable than for metals. Not only have many global oil producers cut down their output, our sister publication Commodity And Energy strategy expects the OPEC + Russia agreement to be extended for the rest of 2017.8 Meanwhile, metal production cutbacks have been much more timid. The New Zealand Dollar Chart 19NZD Suffers From ##br##Similar Ills As AUD... NZD Suffers From Similar Ills As AUD... NZD Suffers From Similar Ills As AUD... Chart 20...However Inflationary Backdrop##br## Is More Favorable ...However Inflationary Backdrop Is More Favorable ...However Inflationary Backdrop Is More Favorable The fundamentals for the New Zealand dollar have also rolled over after having pointed to a strong Kiwi since February 2016 (Chart 19). Interestingly, the rollover in the NZD FITM has not been as sharp as the rollover in the Australian Dollar's FITM. The ITTM does argue that as with the CAD, the NZD does have a healthy margin of maneuver before the deteriorating fundamentals become a bidding constraint (Chart 20). In fact, the recent NZD weakness may have exaggerated the underlying deterioration in NZ data. The recent stronger-than-expected inflation data may prompt investors to reconsider their very dovish take on the RBNZ. Our preferred fashion to take advantage of the NZD's discount to its ITTM is also against the AUD. Both currencies are very exposed to EM and China shocks, and both currencies display a similar beta to the USD. As such, it is very rare for the NZD to trade at a discount to the ITTM while the AUD is at equilibrium. With the New Zealand domestic economy in better shape than that of Australia, our bet is that both currencies will have to converge, which should weigh on AUD/NZD. The Norwegian Krone Chart 21NOK Fundamentals Have Worsened ##br##Even With Firm Oil Prices NOK Fundamentals Have Worsened Even With Firm Oil Prices NOK Fundamentals Have Worsened Even With Firm Oil Prices Chart 22Not A Good Time To##br## Buy The Krone Yet Not A Good Time To Buy The Krone Yet Not A Good Time To Buy The Krone Yet Like other currencies, the fundamentals for the Norwegian krone have begun to roll over. The sharpness of that turnaround is particularly striking when one considers that oil prices have remained resilient, despite their recent weakness (Chart 21). NOK has taken the cue from the FITM and has weakened in line with fundamentals. Is it time to lean against this weakness and buy the NOK now? We doubt it. The NOK may benefit against the USD if the euro overshoots in the wake of the French election. However, the NOK has yet to correct previous overshoots, and the fact that it currently trades in line with the ITTM suggests that it provides very little insulation against any further deterioration in its own fundamentals (Chart 22). In the longer term, we are more positive on the NOK. It is cheap based on long-term models that take into account Norway's stunning net international position of 203% of GDP. Moreover, the high inflation registered between 2015 and 2016 is now over as the pass-through from the weak trade-weighted krone between 2014 and 2015 is gone. This means that the PPP fair value of the NOK has stopped deteriorating. The Swedish Krona Chart 23Dollar Strength Has Dislodged ##br##The SEK From Fundamentals Dollar Strength Has Dislodged The SEK From Fundamentals Dollar Strength Has Dislodged The SEK From Fundamentals Chart 24Taking Momentum Into Account##br## The SEK Is Not Cheap Taking Momentum Into Account The SEK Is Not Cheap Taking Momentum Into Account The SEK Is Not Cheap The SEK continues to display one of the highest beta to the USD of all the G10 currencies. As a result, when the USD is strong, even if fundamentals do not warrant it, the SEK is especially weak. The rally in the USD in the second half of 2016 took an especially brutal toll on the krona, which has dissociated itself from its pure fundamentals. If the dollar follows the recent improvement in its own FITM, then SEK too will weaken despite its apparent undershoot (Chart 23). Now, however, the SEK's weakness will follow the deterioration in directional fundamentals. The timing model corroborates this picture. The ITTM takes into account the trend of USD/SEK, and when this is done, the undervaluation of the SEK disappears (Chart 24). Over the next three to nine months, we expect U.S. rates to have more upside relative to European ones than is currently priced in by markets. Therefore, we anticipate the USD to strengthen further, and as a corollary, the SEK will suffer especially strongly under these circumstances. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy / Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Assessing Fair Value In FX Markets," dated February 26, 206, available at fes.bcaresearch.com and gis.bcaresearch.com 2 Ravi Balakrishnan, Stefan Laseen, and Andrea Pescatori, "U.S. Dollar Dynamics: How Important Are Policy Divergence And FX Risk Premiums?" IMF Working Paper No.16/125 (July 2016); and Michael T. Kiley, "Exchange Rates, Monetary Policy Statements, And Uncovered Interest Parity: Before And After The Zero Lower Bound," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2013-17, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (January 2013). 3 Michael T. Kiley (January 2013). 4 Please see Yin-Wong Cheung, and Menzie David Chinn, "Currency Traders and Exchange Rate Dynamics: A Survey of the U.S. Market," CESifo Working Paper Series No. 251 (February 2000); and David Hauner, Jaewoo Lee, and Hajime Takizawa, "In which exchange rate models do forecasters trust?" IMF Working Paper No.11/116 (May 2010) for revealed preference approach based on published forecasts from Consensus Economics. 5 Ravi Balakrishnan, Stefan Laseen, and Andrea Pescatori (July 2016). 6 Ravi Balakrishnan, Stefan Laseen, and Andrea Pescatori (July 2016). 7 Francisco Maeso-Fernandez, Chiara Osbat, and Bernd Schnatz, "Determinants Of The Euro Real Effective Exchange Rate: A BEER/PEER Approach," Working Paper No.85, European Central Bank (November 2001). 8 Please see Commodity And Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC 2.0 Cuts Will Be Extended Into 2017H2; Fade The Skew And Get Long Calls Vs. Short Puts," dated April 20, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Highlights The locomotive of the U.S. economy, the consumer, remains supported by powerful tailwinds. The Fed will be able to tighten monetary policy relative to other central banks by a higher degree than the market appreciates. The dollar will rise further. Use this dip to buy more dollars. Being tactically long the yen is a hedge against growth disappointments. Set a stop-sell for AUD/NZD. Feature In June of last year, we wrote a piece titled "What Could Go Right?" arguing key changes in the global economy may have justified a more pro-risk stance for investors.1 The core of the argument was that markets were pricing in a lot of negatives, as the annual return of the global stock-to-bond ratio was deeply negative and could only fall further if a recession were to emerge. Moreover, as commodity prices were improving, we foresaw a waning of deflationary forces that had engulfed the world. This easing deflation would cause real rates to fall and economic activity in EM to rebound. Chart I-1Global Asset Prices: From Gloom To Glee Global Asset Prices: From Gloom To Glee Global Asset Prices: From Gloom To Glee Over the subsequent nine months, this scenario moved from the world of theories to being the reality for the global economy. Today, the annual return of the global stock-to-bond ratio is now the mirror image of last June (Chart I-1). Thus, for the stock-to-bond ratio to move higher, we need to explore where growth may come from. Moreover, we need to consider whether this growth is likely to help the dollar or help other currencies. The U.S. Is In Charge The U.S. economy continues to show the most promise. It is true that some signs do point to a weak Q1. Much noise has been made about the decline in commercial and industrial loans. We are more sanguine. To begin with, the Conference Board includes C&I loans in its list of lagging indicators, not leading ones. Additionally, C&I loans lag banks' lending standards, and, in fact, the weakness in this subsection of credit aggregates is the natural consequence of the 2015-2016 tightening in lending standards. Their recent easing points toward a rebound in C&I loans, as do core durable goods new orders (Chart I-2). What is more concerning is the slowdown in credit to households (Chart I-3). The U.S. economy is driven by household dynamics and the Conference Board does include consumer credit in its list of leading indicators. Moreover, the amount of MBS and ABS on primary dealers' balance sheets remains in a downtrend. This is worrisome because it suggests that the slowing accumulation of consumer debt on banks' balance sheet is genuine, and not a reflection of securitization (Chart I-4). Chart I-2C&I Loans##br## Will Pick Up C&I Loans Will Pick Up C&I Loans Will Pick Up Chart I-3However, Household Credit ##br##Dynamics Are A Worry However, Household Credit Dynamics Are A Worry However, Household Credit Dynamics Are A Worry Chart I-4Securitization Unlikely ##br##To Be The Culprit Securitization Unlikely To Be The Culprit Securitization Unlikely To Be The Culprit However, there are causes to minimize these concerns. Mainly, the drivers of household income and spending are still healthy. First, U.S. financial conditions remain easy, a phenomenon that tends to boost GDP growth in the following quarters, suggesting that national income will remain strong. Second, the outlook for employment in the U.S. remains robust. As Chart I-5 illustrates, the employment components of the ISM and the Philly Fed surveys both point to a pick-up in job creation. This further supports the notion that nominal household income will strengthen Third, our real disposable income indicator, based on various components of the NFIB survey, is showing that households should enjoy strong income growth in the coming months (Chart I-6). Moreover, despite the failure of the AHCA, Marko Papic, the head of BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service argues that it will be much easier for the GOP to implement tax cuts, especially geared toward the middle class, than it was to repudiate the much-maligned Obamacare.2 This could further help household disposable income. Chart I-5Job Growth Will Rebound Job Growth Will Rebound Job Growth Will Rebound Chart I-6Household Income: Highway Star Household Income: Highway Star Household Income: Highway Star Fourth, household liquid assets represent 270% of disposable income, the highest level in decades. Moreover, household debt-servicing costs are still near multi-generational lows, suggesting that households are in the best financial shape they have been in decades. And fifth, household confidence has surged to its highest levels since 2000, reflecting both the large increase in net worth created by surging asset values as well as the very low level of unemployment in the U.S. (Chart I-7). Thus, the decline in the savings rate from 6.2% in 2015 to 5.5% at present could deepen further, adding more impetus to transform income gains into consumption gains. At the worst, this development suggests that the household savings rate will not rise much. These factors all imply that household consumption will remain robust and may in fact accelerate in the coming quarters. Consequently, that capex too has upside. We have highlighted how capex intentions have risen substantially, and this has historically been a powerful leading indicator of capex itself.3 However, the financial press is replete with commentators reminding us that the positive global economic surprises have mostly been a reflection of "soft data" and that "hard data" has not followed through. Not only do we philosophically disagree with this statement - historically soft data does indeed lead hard data - but as Chart I-8 illustrates, core capital goods orders have risen quite sharply, mimicking the developments in retail sales. A combination of strong retail sales and strong orders tend to portend to a rise in capex. Chart I-7Happy Shiny People Happy Shiny People Happy Shiny People Chart I-8Capex Will Rebound Capex Will Rebound Capex Will Rebound These developments raise the likelihood that U.S. growth will power the global economy and that the Fed will be in a good position to make good on its intent to increase interest rates two more times this year. In fact, there is even a growing probability that the Fed will add another tool to its tightening arsenal: letting MBS run off, resulting in a contraction of its balance sheet. The combined tightening of two more hikes and a shrinking balance sheet will be much greater than any tightening emanating from an ECB taper. As we argued last week: Europe's inflation and wage backdrop remains icy cold, limiting how far the ECB can tighten monetary policy.4 While an environment of globally rising rates is normally negative for the yen, with the BoJ displaying and even easier bias than in the past, any increase in rates in the U.S. is likely to supercharge weaknesses in the yen, as the BoJ will put a lead on JGB yields and force them to remain subdued.5 As a result of these views, we remain very committed dollar bulls on a 12-18 months basis and recommend using the current dip in the dollar as a buying opportunity, especially on a trade-weighted basis. Bottom Line: While consumer loan growth has slowed - which could result in a poor Q1 U.S. growth number - the outlook for U.S. household income and consumption remains promising. This will also feed through to higher investment growth, clearing the Fed's path toward higher rates. This dip in the dollar should be used as an occasion to buy the greenback. But Why Still Long The Yen Tactically? This position has two purposes. First, we have been worried about dynamics in China that could cause a correction in EM markets.6 More recently, the decline in Chinese house-price appreciation has deepened, representing an ominous sign for the iron ore market (Chart I-9). Poor metal prices tend to represent a negative terms of trade shock and therefore an economic handicap for many large EM nations. Moreover, back in June, the improvement in Taiwanese IP was one of the factors that prompted us to highlight a potential improvement in the global economy. So was the uptrend in our boom/bust indicator. Today, not only is the boom/bust indicator losing steam, but Taiwanese IP has sharply rolled over (Chart I-10). While this is not a reason to worry about our bullish view on the U.S. economy, this could suggest that the global manufacturing upswing has seen its heyday, a development that is likely to weigh more heavily on EM economies than on the U.S. Any EM stress is likely to boost the yen's appeal, temporarily countering the BoJ's aggressive stance. Chart I-9Problems For Iron Ore Problems For Iron Ore Problems For Iron Ore Chart I-10Two Clouds For Global Growth Two Clouds For Global Growth Two Clouds For Global Growth Second, we do not want to be dogmatic on our U.S. growth view. As the top panel of Chart I-11 illustrates, increases in 2-year Treasury yields have tended to lead to decreases in U.S. inflation expectations. While we would argue that the U.S. economy is on a stronger footing to withstand higher rates than at any point since 2010, a policy mistake is not out of the scope of probabilities. If rising rates is indeed a policy mistake, a large risk-off event would be a very likely outcome, one that boosts the yen. Finally, as the middle and bottom panels of Chart I-11 shows, a fall in U.S. inflation expectations would also extract its toll on EM and cyclical plays, further reinforcing any disappointment out of China, and further adding shine to the yen. Our original target on USD/JPY was 110, we are moving it to 108. At this point, we will become sellers of the yen, unless we see signs that the global economy is entering a more dangerous path than originally anticipated. Additionally, investors looking to express a bearish view on EM may want to go short MXN/JPY (Chart I-12). The peso has massively rallied and is now at a crucial technical spot against the JPY. Moreover, while being short USD/JPY may be a dangerous move - after all, we are playing what amounts in our view to a countertrend bounce in the yen - if EM are at risk, these risks could be exacerbated by the tightening in financial conditions created by a higher dollar. Mexico, with its high external debt, representing nearly 70% of GDP, is particularly exposed to this problem. Also, MXN, with its high liquidity for an EM currency, is often a vehicle for investors to play EM weaknesses. Thus, shorting MXN/JPY could be a great hedge for investors with long EM exposures. Chart I-11Are We Out Of The Woods Yet? Are We Out Of The Woods Yet? Are We Out Of The Woods Yet? Chart I-12A Gauge And A Play A Gauge And A Play A Gauge And A Play Bottom Line: Being tactically long the yen in a portfolio offers two advantages. First, it is a direct play on any disappointment of investors in the EM space, and, second, it is also a hedge against the risks to our strong U.S. growth view. AUD/NZD: Not A Bargain It is often argued that AUD/NZD is a bargain as it trade 6% below its purchasing power parity rate. This may be a valid reason to buy this cross, but only for investors with extremely long investment horizons, as PPP deviations can take seven years to correct. In fact, following the recent rebound in AUD/NZD, we would be inclined to short this pair once again. On the international front, AUD/USD seems to be driven by the dynamic in Chinese nominal GDP growth. We doubt Chinese nominal GDP growth will accelerate much beyond Q1. As Chart I-13 illustrates, AUD/USD seems to have moved ahead of Chinese GDP, putting this currency at risk. We also can also interpret AUD/NZD as a vehicle to play the growth rebalancing in China. The AUD (iron ore, other metals, and coal) is a bet on industrial and investment growth while the NZD (dairy, meat, and wool) is a wager on the Chinese households. As China moves away from an investment-led growth model toward a more consumption-led growth model, AUD/NZD should underperform. A simple fair value model for this cross designed to capture these dynamics as well as the USD dynamics indicates that AUD/NZD is 8% overvalued (Chart I-14). Chart I-13AUD Prices In Chinese Optimism AUD Prices In Chinese Optimism AUD Prices In Chinese Optimism Chart I-14AUD/NZD Is Expensive AUD/NZD Is Expensive AUD/NZD Is Expensive Moreover, still with an eye firmly planted on China, AUD/NZD has tended to perform poorly when Chinese monetary conditions tighten. The recent upward move in the Chinese 7-day repo rate could be a harbinger of bad things to come for this cross. Relative domestic factors also temper any bullishness on AUD/NZD. Kiwi house prices are outperforming Aussie prices and New Zealand inflation is catching up to that of Australia's. Moreover, the RBA has been paying more attention to the poor state of the Australian labor market, while that of New Zealand remains very strong. These dynamics suggest that kiwi rates could rise relative to that of Australia (Chart I-15). More technically, investors are massively long the AUD relative to the NZD (Chart I-16). This usually is a good signal to bet against this pair. Chart I-15Domestic Conditions Favor##br## Higher NZ Rates Vs. Australia Domestic Conditions Favor Higher NZ Rates Vs. Australia Domestic Conditions Favor Higher NZ Rates Vs. Australia Chart I-16Speculators ##br##Are Bullish Speculators Are Bullish Speculators Are Bullish Bottom Line: Shorting AUD/NZD at current levels makes sense. Not only is it a way to take advantage of the desire by Chinese authorities to rebalance growth away from the Chinese industrial sector, the Kiwi economy is outperforming that of Australia, and too much negativity has been priced in for the RBNZ relative to the RBA. Finally investors are overly long the AUD relative to the NZD. Set up a stop-sell of AUD/NZD at 1.1100, with a target of 1.000 and a stop at 1.1330. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "What Could Go Right?", dated June 24, 2016 available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Five Questions On Europe", dated March 22, 2017 available at gps.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Outlook: 2017's Greatest Hits", dated December 16, 2016 available at fes.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Healthcare Or Not, Risks Remain", dated March 24, 2017 available at fes.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "JPY: Climbing To The Springboard Before The Dive", dated February 24, 2017 available at fes.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Healthcare Or Not, Risks Remain", dated March 24, 2017 available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 The DXY displayed resilience this week: the third estimate for U.S. GDP in 2016Q4 outperformed expectations at 2.1%, after being revised up from 1.9%; consumer confidence increased to 125.6, the highest level since 2000; yet Initial jobless claims ticked in at 258,000, underperforming expectations of 248,000 but beating previous figures of 261,000. Another factor lifting the dollar were recent comments by Secretary of Transportation, Elaine Chao, who stated that Trump's $1 trillion infrastructure plan will be unveiled later this year. This could be considerably positive for U.S. economic growth as it will cover a large part of the economy: "transportation infrastructure, energy, water and potentially broadband and veterans hospitals as well." Although specifics were not disclosed, such stimulus in the face of tightening labor market could fan inflation. Under the assumption of a proactive Fed, this could translate into a strong dollar. Report Links: USD, Oil Divergences Will Continue As Storage Draws - March 17, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Last week's hawkish comments by ECB board member Ewald Nowotny drove the euro higher, while recent comments by Peter Praet confirmed that "a very substantial degree of monetary accommodation is still needed", which pushed the euro down. Promoting the euro's downside were Italian industrial sales and orders, which contracted at a monthly pace of 3.5% and 2.9% respectively, although annual rates remain positive. Article 50's invocation was another factor which contributed to volatility. How Brexit negotiations evolve will dictate movements in EUR/GBP for the foreseeable future. President Tusk's demeanor was also quite negative in his speech, focusing on minimizing "the costs for EU citizens, businesses and Member States". In other news, Portugal's Finance Minister Mario Centeno hinted at a possible upgrade to the growth forecast to around 2% from 1.5% as exports grew by 19% in January. As exports continue to be a key driver of growth for this country, this suggests a weaker euro is still needed to support growth in the periphery. Report Links: Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 The French Revolution - February 3, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent data has been mixed for Japan: Corporate services prices rose by 0.8% year-over-year, outperforming expectations. However, retail trade yearly growth deteriorated to 0.1% from 1% the previous month, underperforming expectations. Furthermore, manufacturing PMI fell to 52.6 from 53.3 the previous month. We are changing our tactical target for USD/JPY from 110 to 108. The decline in Chinese property prices as well as slowing inflation expectations in the U.S. might create a risk off environment that will affect carry currencies and will benefit the safe havens like the yen. On a cyclical basis, we remain yen bears, as recent sluggishness will only embolden BoJ policy makers to maintain their radical monetary stance. Report Links: Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 JPY: Climbing To The Springboard Before The Dive - February 24, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 It's official: Theresa May has triggered Article 50. The pound reacted relatively positive to the event as both parties in the negotiations chose to start with the carrot rather than the stick: In her letter to the EU Theresa May stated that she hoped to enjoy a "deep and special" relationship with the European Union once Brexit is finalized. On the other side of the channel, Donald Tusk also pledged to work "closely" with their counterparts in London, and that he hoped that the U.K. will stay a close partner after Brexit. These developments are encouraging, as it shows that cooler heads might prevail at the end of the day. This rosier outlook in an environment where expectations for the Britain are still too pessimistic makes the pound a very attractive buy, particularly against the euro, despite the potential for short-term volatility as the stick will ineluctably come out. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017’s Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 In an attempt to curb housing market euphoria, all four major banks - ANZ, CBA, NAB and Westpac - increased lending rates on investor and interest-only mortgages this month. Fitch Ratings reports that the tightening was done "ahead of probable regulatory tightening", as hinted frequently by the RBA. Rising wholesale funding costs due to tighter U.S. policy is also a motivating factor behind this. For the time being, the housing market risk will continue to be restricted through macroprudential policies rather than actual tightening by the central bank. Eventually risks related to record-high household debt will limit the capacity of the RBA to increase rates. On the brighter side, banks are well positioned with strong capital buffers and pre-impairment to profitability, with Fitch rating them 'Stable'. This means that risks may not lie with the banking sector, but that the consumer sector will be the key drag on growth. Report Links: AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 In the current environment, although we like to continue to be short the NZD against the yen, we are also shorting AUD/NZD once again. Beyond its uncorrelated nature, there are many reasons why this is an attractive cross to short: AUD/NZD tends to perform poorly when Chinese monetary conditions tighten. Therefore, the spike in Chinese repo rates could weigh on this cross. Furthermore, investors are very long the AUD relative to the NZD. This gives us confidence that this cross might be in overbought territory and that the 5.5% rally in AUD/NZD over the last 2 months may be exhausting itself. Finally, as we have mentioned before, domestic factors still favor the NZD, as kiwi house prices are rising at a faster pace than Aussie ones, which should put pressure on rate differentials. Report Links: Et Tu, Janet? - March 3, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Risks To The Cyclical Dollar View - February 3, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 The CAD is displaying some strength on the back of stronger oil prices, outweighing the pressure from a stronger USD. As mentioned last week, the trend for USD/CAD is still negative in the short term, as corroborated by a negative MACD trend. The greenback's seasonal behavior is also generally negative in April, which could buoy the CAD in the next month. Nevertheless, at the Bank of Canada's meeting in two weeks, Poloz is likely to continue displaying a dovish rhetoric, limiting the CAD's resilience. Similar to Australia, risks lie with the consumer sector, which is burdened by a huge debt load. This gives another reason for Poloz to stay off hikes for the time being and concentrate instead on promoting the implementation of macroprudential policies to regulate lending standards and mitigate housing market risks. Report Links: AUD And CAD: Risky Business - March 10, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017’s Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 EUR/CHF now hovers around 1.07, clearing the implied floor by the Swiss National Bank. Recent data have been positive: The Zew survey for economic expectations reached 29.6, up from 19.4 in February. It is now at the highest level in 3 years. The KOF leading indicator came at 107.6, above expectations. Although it does seem that the Swiss economy is still improving, the SNB will stay resolute in its intervention for the time being. Indeed, this was the message of SNB Governing Board Member Andrea Maechler, who asserted that there was no limit on their expansion of FX reserves, and that the Swiss franc was "strongly overvalued". We will continue to observe how the Swiss economy develops. However, for the time being the SNB is likely to keep its floor in place. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017’s Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 Long-Term FX Valuation Models: Updates And New Coverages - September 30, 2016 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 USD/NOK has been relatively flat this week, even in the face of a rally in oil prices. This has been in part due to a phenomenon that should continue in the next months: an appreciation of the U.S. dollar against EM and commodity currencies. Furthermore, domestic factors should continue to weigh on the krone, as employment continues to contract and inflation is receding due to the stabilization of the krone. Indeed, Governor Olsen signaled that the Norges bank will likely leave rates unchanged for "a good while" due to these developments. Furthermore, oil could be at risk as well, as the market is starting to doubt the Russian commitment to its deal with OPEC. This, coupled with a slowdown in EM, could prompt a down leg in oil, hurting the NOK in the process. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017’s Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 The Pound Falls To The Conquering Dollar - October 14, 2016 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 Swedish data came out strong: Retail sales annual growth remains unchanged at 2.7%; The producer price index grew at 7.5%; Consumer confidence for March was at 102.6, down from the previous 104.3. Interesting technical developments for the krona are pointing to further weakness. USD/SEK has rebounded from oversold levels and the MACD line is beginning to overtake the signal line. More importantly, the Coppock curve is rebounding, signifying a bullish trend. EUR/SEK is showing similar signs with the MACD pointing up and the Coppock curve rebounding. Interestingly, Swedish inflation expectations have substantially decreased this week which might give the Riksbank cover to remain dovish. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Value Models - February 17, 2017 Outlook: 2017’s Greatest Hits - December 16, 2016 One Trade To Rule Them All - November 18, 2016 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

Highlights The years since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis have been dominated by the major central banks emptying their toolkits to fight off deflationary pressures and sustain even modest nominal growth rates. Extraordinary policy measues like quantitative easing, negative interest rates and "forward guidance" were all intended to be signals to expect nothing but stimulative monetary policy, even if there were brief pickups in growth or realized inflation rates. This helped suppress both bond yields and volatility, forcing investors to take on more risk to generate acceptable returns in fixed income markets. Now, however, there are signs that the world economy may finally be becoming a bit more "normal" after the years of malaise. While growth can hardly be described as booming, there are a growing number of countries that appear to have passed the worst phase of the excess capacity/deflation pressures that dominated the post-crisis era. This is creating more two-way risk with regards to central bank decisions than we have seen for some time. In this Special Report, we update one of our favorite tools to assess the potential for monetary policy changes, the BCA Central Bank Monitors. We present them in a chartbook format with a focus on the relationship to government bond yields. Feature An Overview Of The BCA Central Bank Monitors The BCA Central Bank Monitors are composite indicators that are designed to measure the cyclical growth and inflation pressures that can influence future central bank policy decisions. We created Monitors for the major developed economies: the U.S., Euro Area, Japan, the U.K., Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The list of data series used to construct the Monitors is not the same for each country, but the components generally measure the same things (i.e. manufacturing cycles, domestic demand pressures, commodity prices, labor market conditions, exchange rates, etc) Right now, the Monitors are rising in a coordinated fashion for the first time since 2011 (Chart 1 on Page 1). What is different in 2017 is that there is much less spare capacity in the developed economies than there was six years ago. For central bankers who still adhere to the Phillips curve tradeoff of unemployment versus inflation, tight labor markets alongside highly accommodative policy settings pose a problem. In the rest of this report, we show the individual Central Bank Monitors, along with measures of spare capacity and inflation for each country. We also show the correlations between the Monitors and changes in government bond yields, both before and after the 2008 Crisis. Correlations have shifted in the post-crisis era, but there are still some reliable relationships that can provide signals for bond investors. The broad conclusions: Japanese Government Bonds (JGBs) are the ideal country overweight in a world where all other developed economy central banks are witnessing rising cyclical pressures, while bonds in the U.K., Australia and New Zealand are likely to struggle as central banks in those regions become increasingly hawkish (Chart 2). Chart 1More Central Banks Are Under Pressure To Tighten More Central Banks Are Under Pressure To Tighten More Central Banks Are Under Pressure To Tighten Chart 2Tightening Pressures (Ex-Japan) ##br##Can Push Bond Yields Higher Tightening Pressures (ex-Japan) Can Push Bond Yields Higher Tightening Pressures (ex-Japan) Can Push Bond Yields Higher The Fed Monitor Is Pointing To Additional U.S. Rate Hikes Our Fed Monitor has just recently pushed above the zero line, indicating the need for the Fed to tighten policy (Chart 3A). The Fed already began raising the funds rate back in late 2015, but this was the beginning of normalizing the crisis-era policy settings rather than a move to offset improving U.S. cyclical conditions. The latter is now indeed happening, and it is perhaps no surprise that the Fed has just delivered 50bps of rate hikes in a span of three months. Chart 3AU.S.: Fed Monitor U.S.: Fed Monitor U.S.: Fed Monitor Chart 3BNo Spare Capacity In The U.S. No Spare Capacity In The U.S. No Spare Capacity In The U.S. Chart 3CThe Fed Monitor Is Most Correlated To ##br##Shorter Maturity U.S. Treasuries The Fed Monitor Is Most Correlated To Shorter Maturity U.S. Treasuries The Fed Monitor Is Most Correlated To Shorter Maturity U.S. Treasuries We still see the Fed pursuing a relatively gradual process of raising rates further in 2017, but in line with the current FOMC projections of another 50bps of tightening before year-end. Measures like the output gap and the unemployment gap (unemployment relative to the level consistent with stable inflation) show no spare capacity in the U.S. economy (Chart 3B). At the same time, core inflation continues to only grind higher and inflation expectations are also drifting up towards the Fed's 2% target. This can hardly be qualified as an "overheating" economy that needs a sharp tightening of monetary conditions, particularly with the still-expensive U.S. dollar not providing any stimulus. The correlations between our Fed Monitor and the year-over-year changes in U.S. Treasury yields (Chart 3C) have been extremely low since the 2008 Crisis - unsurprising with the Fed keeping the funds rate near zero for most of that period while also buying large amounts of Treasuries. While the correlations appear to be shifting on the margin, we still see the Treasury curve steepening first (via rising inflation expectations), then flattening later (through tighter monetary conditions). BoE Monitor Calling For Tighter U.K. Policy Our Bank of England (BoE) Monitor is at very elevated levels (Chart 4A), driven by a combination of improving production data and high inflation. There is much more bubbling beneath the surface, however. The more domestically-focused components of the Monitor are losing some upward momentum, while the inflation elements are also starting to top out as the big post-Brexit depreciation of the Pound is losing momentum. Chart 4AU.K.: BoE Monitor U.K.: BoE Monitor U.K.: BoE Monitor Chart 4BTight Capacity In The U.K. Tight Capacity In The U.K. Tight Capacity In The U.K. Chart 4CGilts Are At Risk From A More Hawkish Turn From The BoE Gilts Are At Risk From A More Hawkish Turn From The BoE Gilts Are At Risk From A More Hawkish Turn From The BoE This is creating a dilemma for the BoE - respond to high U.K. inflation with tighter monetary policy, or focus on the slowdown in domestic demand and do nothing? The BoE signaled in February that the biggest concern for policy was a slump in consumer spending led by lower real income growth on the back of rising inflation. Yet at the March policy meeting, one BoE member even voted to raise rates and others raised concerns about the elevated level of U.K inflation. With even policymakers unsure about their next move, the marginal swings in U.K. growth should have an even greater impact on Gilt yields. The U.K. economy is running around full capacity and both headline and core inflation are rising (Chart 4B). Somewhat surprisingly, the correlations between changes in Gilt yields and our BoE Monitor have actually increased since the 2008 Crisis (Chart 4C). This raises a potential risk for the Gilt market if the BoE decides that the U.K. economy is not slowing as much as it is expecting. For now, we continue to recommend a neutral stance on Gilts until there is greater clarity on the state of the economy. ECB Monitor Reflects A Less Deflationary Backdrop In Europe Our European Central Bank (ECB) Monitor has recently crept above the zero line for the first time in three years (Chart 5A). This is driven mostly by the current uptrend in headline inflation in the Euro Area, but also by the steady improvement in economic growth. Chart 5AEuro Area: ECB Monitor Euro Area: ECB Monitor Euro Area: ECB Monitor Chart 5BExcess Capacity in Europe Dwindling Fast Excess Capacity in Europe Dwindling Fast Excess Capacity in Europe Dwindling Fast Chart 5CStable Correlations Between The ECB Monitor & The Front End Of The Yield Curve Stable Correlations Between The ECB Monitor & The Front End Of The Yield Curve Stable Correlations Between The ECB Monitor & The Front End Of The Yield Curve The Euro Area is the one economy presented in this report where no indicator (either the output gap or unemployment gap) is pointing to a lack of spare capacity (Chart 5B). All of the rise in headline Euro Area inflation can be attributable to base effects related to last year's rise in oil prices and decline in the euro. The latest ECB projections call for core inflation to return to just under 2% in 2019, suggesting that there is no hurry to begin tightening monetary policy. Yet the ECB remains in an asset purchase program which is set to expire at the end of this year, so a policy decision must be made in the next 3-6 months. We expect the ECB to begin tapering its bond buying in the first quarter of 2018, with interest rate hikes to follow after the tapering has been completed. The ECB could raise rates before tapering to try and minimize the impact on Peripheral sovereign and corporate bond yields (it is buying both), although that would likely create a greater degree of tightening than the ECB would like before full employment is reached. Given the strong correlations between our ECB Monitor and much of the Euro Area yield curve (Chart 5C), however, we anticipate moving soon to an underweight stance on Euro Area bonds after our recent downgrade to neutral. BoJ Monitor: Nothing To See Here Our BoJ Monitor has been in the "easier policy required" zone for most of the past 25 years, barring a brief blip above the zero line that heralded the rate hikes in 2006/07 (Chart 6A). Inadequate growth and excess capacity remain the biggest problem with Japan's economy, preventing any meaningful upturn in inflation beyond that caused by higher commodity prices or a weaker yen. Chart 6AJapan: BoJ Monitor Japan: BoJ Monitor Japan: BoJ Monitor Chart 6BTight Labor Market, But Still No Inflation Tight Labor Market, But Still No Inflation Tight Labor Market, But Still No Inflation Chart 6CLonger-Maturity JGB Yields Have No Correlation To The BoJ Monitor Longer-Maturity JGB Yields Have No Correlation To The BoJ Monitor Longer-Maturity JGB Yields Have No Correlation To The BoJ Monitor Even with Japan operating at full employment, with an unemployment rate at 3%, there has barely been any acceleration in wages or core inflation (Chart 6B). The only way out of this for Japan is to keep monetary policy settings as easy as possible to ensure that there is enough growth to eat away at the remaining spare capacity in the Japanese economy. That means keeping both policy rates and the yen as low as possible, and hoping that this will cause enough of a rise in inflation expectations to lower real interest rates and boost domestic demand. As an added "kicker", the BoJ is even anchoring the long end of the Japan yield curve by targeting a 0% yield level on 10-year government debt - a policy that we do not expect to change anytime soon. We see Japan as a low-beta "safe haven" government bond market in an environment where other central banks are seeing some tightening pressures and Japanese bonds have virtually no correlation to the BoJ Monitor (Chart 6C). We continue to recommend an overweight stance on Japan within an overall defensively positioned government bond portfolio with below-benchmark duration exposure. BoC Monitor: No Big Need To Tighten In Canada Our Bank of Canada (BoC) Monitor has recently moved into positive territory (Chart 7A) , primarily due to some improvement in growth and higher commodity prices. Given the close linkages between the U.S. and Canadian economies, we include some U.S. growth variables in our BoC Monitor and these are also helping boost the indicator. However, there are no signs that the Canadian economy is overheating - unless you are trying to buy a home in Toronto - with both the output gap and unemployment gap not yet in positive territory (Chart 7B). Chart 7ACanada: BoC Monitor Canada: BoC Monitor Canada: BoC Monitor Chart 7BStill Not Much Inflation In Canada Still Not Much Inflation In Canada Still Not Much Inflation In Canada Chart 7CThe BoC Monitor Is Highly Correlated To Shorter-Maturity Canadian Bonds The BoC Monitor Is Highly Correlated To Shorter-Maturity Canadian Bonds The BoC Monitor Is Highly Correlated To Shorter-Maturity Canadian Bonds The BoC is maintaining a dovish bias at the moment. Some of that has to do with the uncertainty over the U.S. economic outlook, especially with regards to the fiscal and trade policies of the Trump administration. While a boost to U.S. growth via a fiscal easing could help support Canadian exports to the U.S., any move to renegotiate trade agreements involving the two countries could end up hurting the Canadian economy. Add to that the concerns over the bubbly valuations of Canadian real estate that could be pricked by even modest rate increases, and the BoC will likely not want to contemplate any early tightening of monetary policy. The higher correlations between our BoC Monitor and the front end of the Canadian yield curve (Chart 7C) suggest that a bear flattener would be the appropriate trade if and when the BoC does contemplate a rate hike. For now, however, we see that as a low-probability event and we are maintaining a neutral stance on Canadian bonds until there is greater clarity on U.S. growth and Trump's policy agenda. RBA Monitor: Higher Because Of Growth, Not Inflation Our Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) Monitor has surged into the "tighter policy required" territory in recent months (Chart 8A), driven by higher commodity prices and stronger Asian export demand. Survey-based measures of inflation expectations are also part of the Monitor, and those have also been rising despite a lack of realized inflation in Australia (Chart 8B). The low inflation readings have been causing a bit of a problem for the RBA, given the tight labor market and that boost to Aussie demand from better Asian growth. This is especially true given the surprisingly soft readings on employment growth, consumer confidence and spending, all occurring against a persistent deceleration in core inflation. The RBA was focusing on the inflation story last year when it delivered some surprise rate cuts, and we still suspect that a lack of inflation pressure will keep the RBA on hold for at least the next few months. We are currently at a neutral stance on Australian government bonds, given these conflicting forces of better export growth but weakening domestic demand. The lack of an inflation threat could make Australia an outperformer in a world of rising bond yields. Given the surge in our RBA Monitor, however, we see some risk in looking at Aussie bonds as a potential safe haven market given upward pressures on yields in the U.S. and Europe. The correlations between Australian yields and the RBA Monitor are extremely high (Chart 8C), and have actually gone up in the post-crisis era. Chart 8AAustralia: RBA Monitor Australia: RBA Monitor Australia: RBA Monitor Chart 8BNo Inflation Pressures On The RBA No Inflation Pressures On The RBA No Inflation Pressures On The RBA Chart 8CAussie Bonds Across The Curve Are Highly Correlated To The RBA Monitor Aussie Bonds Across The Curve Are Highly Correlated To The RBA Monitor Aussie Bonds Across The Curve Are Highly Correlated To The RBA Monitor RBNZ Monitor: A Strong Case For A Rate Hike Our Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) Monitor is strongly in positive territory (Chart 9A), led by the components focused on commodity prices and global growth. However, there is a fairly solid structural case for an RBNZ rate hike, given the lack of any spare capacity in New Zealand and inflation on the rise (Chart 9B). Chart 9ANew Zealand: RBNZ Monitor New Zealand: RBNZ Monitor New Zealand: RBNZ Monitor Chart 9BFull Employment & Rising Inflation In NZ Full Employment & Rising Inflation In NZ Full Employment & Rising Inflation In NZ Chart 9ANZ Bonds Are Vulnerable To Current Cyclical Pressures NZ Bonds Are Vulnerable To Current Cyclical Pressures NZ Bonds Are Vulnerable To Current Cyclical Pressures The RBNZ has been maintaining a dovish bias of late, although it has chosen to sight more "international" risks related to geopolitics, rather than domestic economic conditions. Perhaps this is nothing more than a fear of a potential shock outcome in the upcoming French elections, although it could also be worries that tensions between the Trump White House and China (or, worse yet, North Korea) could trigger a hit to demand for New Zealand exports to Asia. In the end, we think the RBNZ will be forced to a hike off the current record low interest rates as the next policy move. While we do not include New Zealand government bonds as part of our model fixed income portfolio, we do currently have a bearish rates trade on in our list of Tactical Overlay Trades, choosing to pay 12-month NZD OIS rates. We will maintain that recommendation, but we may look to add some bearish New Zealand bond trades, as well, given the strong correlation between our RBNZ Monitor and bond yields (Chart 9C). Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com