Oil

Executive Summary Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Terms Of Trade Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Terms Of Trade Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Terms Of Trade  Petrocurrencies have lagged the surge in crude prices. This has been specific to the currency space since energy stocks have been in an epic bull market.Both cyclical and structural factors explain this conundrum.Cyclically, rising interest rate expectations in the US have dwarfed the terms-of-trade boost that the CAD, NOK, MXN, COP and even BRL typically enjoy (Feature Chart).Structurally, the US is now the biggest oil producer in the world (and a net exporter of natural gas). This has permanently shifted the relationship between the foreign exchange of traditional oil producers and the US dollar.Oil prices are overbought and vulnerable tactically to any resolution in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict. That said, they are likely to remain well bid over a medium-term horizon, ultimately supporting petrocurrencies.Petrocurrencies also offer a significant valuation cushion and carry relative to the US dollar, making them attractive for longer-term investors.Tactically, the currencies of oil producers relative to consumers could mean revert. It also suggests the Japanese yen, which is under pressure from rising energy imports, could find some footing, even as oil prices remain volatile.RECOMMENDATIONINCEPTION LEVELINCEPTION DATERETURNShort NOK/SEK1.112022-03-24-Bottom Line: Given our thesis of lower oil prices in the near term, but firmer prices in the medium term, we will be selling a basket of oil producers relative to oil consumers, with the aim of reversing that trade from lower levels.FeatureOil price volatility is once again dominating global market action. After hitting a low of close to $96/barrel on March 16th, Brent crude is once again at $120 as we go to press. Over the last two years, Brent crude has been as cheap as $16, and as expensive as $140. Energy stocks (and their respective bourses) have been the proximate winner from rising oil prices (Chart 1).Related ReportForeign Exchange StrategyWhat Next For The RMB?In foreign exchange markets, the currencies of commodity-producing countries have surprisingly lagged the improvement in oil prices (Chart 2). Historically, higher oil prices have had a profound impact on the external balance of oil producing versus consuming countries in general and petrocurrencies in particular. Chart 1Energy Stocks Have Tracked Forward Oil Prices Energy Stocks Have Tracked Forward Oil Prices Energy Stocks Have Tracked Forward Oil Prices   Chart 2Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Oil Prices Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Oil Prices Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Oil Prices  Based on the observation above, this report addresses three key questions:Are there cyclical factors depressing the performance of petrocurrencies?Are there structural factors that have changed the relationship of these currencies with the US dollar?What is the outlook for oil, and the impact on short term versus longer-term currency strategy?We will begin our discussion with the outlook for oil.Russia, Oil, And PetrocurrenciesA high-level forecast from our Commodity & Energy Strategy colleagues calls for oil prices to average $93 per barrel this year and next.1 The deduction from this forecast is that we could see spot prices head lower from current levels this year but remain firm in 2023. From our perspective, there are a few factors that support this view:Forward prices tend to move in tandem with the spot fixing (Chart 3), but recently have also been a fair predictor of where current prices will settle over the medium term. Forward oil prices are trading at a significant discount to spot, suggesting some measure of mean reversion (Chart 4). Chart 3Forward And Spot Oil Prices Move Together Forward And Spot Oil Prices Move Together Forward And Spot Oil Prices Move Together   Chart 4The Oil Curve And Spot Prices The Oil Curve And Spot Prices The Oil Curve And Spot Prices  There is a significant geopolitical risk premium embedded in oil prices. According to the New York Federal Reserve model, the demand/supply balance would have caused oil prices to fall between February 11 and February 25 this year. They however rose. This geopolitical risk premium has surely increased since then (Chart 5).Chart 5Oil Prices Embed A Significant Geopolitical Risk Premium The Oil-Petrocurrency Conundrum The Oil-Petrocurrency Conundrum  Russian crude is trading at a sizeable discount compared to other benchmarks. This means that the incentive for substitution has risen significantly. Our Chief Commodity expert, Robert Ryan, noted on BLU today that intake from India is rising. This is helping put a floor on the Russian URAL/Brent discount blend at around $30 (Chart 6). Oil is fungible, and seaborne crude can be rerouted from unwilling buyers to satiate demand in starved markets.A fortnight ago, we noted how the US sanctions on Russia could shift the foreign exchange landscape, especially vis-à-vis the RMB. Specifically, RMB-denominated trade in oil is likely to increase significantly going forward. China has massively increased the number of bilateral swap lines it has with foreign countries, while stabilizing the RMB versus the US dollar.2Finally, smaller open economies such as Canada, Norway and even Mexico are opening the oil spigots (Chart 7). While individually these countries cannot fill any potential gap in Russian production, collectively they could help in the redistribution of oil supplies. Chart 6Russian Oil Is Selling At A Discount Russian Oil Is Selling At A Discount Russian Oil Is Selling At A Discount   Chart 7Small Oil Producers Will Benefit From High Prices Small Oil Producers Will Benefit From High Prices Small Oil Producers Will Benefit From High Prices  The observations above suggest that the currencies of small oil-producing nations are likely to benefit in the medium term from a redistribution in oil demand. Remarkably, there has been little demand destruction yet from the rise in prices, according to the New York Fed. This suggests that as the global economy reopens, and the demand/supply balance tightens, longer-term oil prices will remain well bid.The key risk in the short term is the geopolitical risk premium embedded in oil prices fades, especially given the potential that Europe, China, and India continue to buy Russian supplies. We have been playing this very volatile theme via a short NOK/SEK position. We are stopped out this week for a modest profit and are reinitiating the trade if NOK/SEK hits 1.11.On The Underperformance Of Petrocurrencies? Chart 8Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Terms Of Trade Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Terms Of Trade Petrocurrencies Have Lagged Terms Of Trade  The more important question is why the currencies of oil producers like the CAD, NOK, MXN or even BRL have not kept pace with oil prices as they historically have. As our feature chart shows (Chart 8), petrocurrencies have severely lagged the improvement in their terms of trade. This has been driven by both cyclical and structural factors.Cyclically, the underlying driver of FX in recent quarters has been the nominal interest rate spread between the US and its G10 counterparts. We have written at length on this topic, and on why we think there is a big mispricing in market behavior in our report – “The Biggest Macro Question By FX Investors Could Potentially Be The Least Relevant.” In a nutshell, two-year yields in the G10 have been lagging US rates, despite other central banks being ahead of the curve in hiking interest rates. This means that rising interest rate expectations in the US have dwarfed the terms of trade boost that the CAD, NOK, MXN, COP and even BRL typically enjoy.Structurally, the US is now the biggest oil producer in the world (Chart 9). This means the CAD/USD and NOK/USD exchange rates are experiencing a tectonic shift on a terms-of-trade basis. In 2010, the US accounted for only about 6% of global crude output. Collectively, Canada, Norway, and Mexico shared about 10% of global oil production. The elephant in the room was OPEC, with a market share just north of 40%. Today, the US produces over 14%, with Russia and Saudi Arabia around 13% each, the US having grabbed market share from many other countries. Chart 9The US Dominates Oil Production The US Dominates Oil Production The US Dominates Oil Production   Chart 10The US Dollar Is Becoming Increasingly Correlated To Oil The US Dollar Is Becoming Increasingly Correlated To Oil The US Dollar Is Becoming Increasingly Correlated To Oil  As a result of this shift, the positive correlation between petrocurrencies and oil has gradually eroded. Measured statistically, the dollar had a near-perfect negative correlation with oil around the time US production was about to take off. Since then, that correlation has risen from around -0.9 to around -0.2 (Chart 10).A Few Trade IdeasThe analysis above suggests a few trade ideas are likely to generate alpha over the medium term:Long Oil Producers Versus Oil Consumers: This trade will suffer in the near term as oil prices correct but benefit from a relatively tighter market over a longer horizon. It will also benefit from the positive carry that many oil producers provide (Chart 11). We will go long a currency basket of the CAD, NOK, MXN, BRL, and COP versus the euro at 5% below current levels.Chart 11Real Rates Are High Amongst Petrocurrencies The Oil-Petrocurrency Conundrum The Oil-Petrocurrency Conundrum  Sell CAD/NOK As A Trade: Norway is at the epicenter of the likely redistribution that will occur with a Russian blockade of crude, while Canada is further away from it. Terms of trade in Norway are doing much better than a relative measure in Canada (Chart 12). The discount between Western Canadian Select crude oil and Brent has also widened, which has historically heralded a lower CAD/NOK exchange rate. Chart 12CAD/NOK And Terms Of Trade CAD/NOK And Terms Of Trade CAD/NOK And Terms Of Trade  Follow The Money: Oil now trades above the cash costs for many oil-producing countries. This means the incentive to boost production, especially when demand recovers, is quite high. This incentivizes players with strong balance sheets to keep the taps open. This could be a particular longer-term boon for the Canadian dollar which is seeing massive portfolio inflows (Chart 13). Chart 13Canadian Oil Export Boom And Portfolio Flows Canadian Oil Export Boom And Portfolio Flows Canadian Oil Export Boom And Portfolio Flows  On The Yen (And Euro): Rising oil prices have been a death knell for the yen which is trading in lockstep with spot prices. Ditto for the euro. However, the yen benefits from very cheap valuations and extremely depressed sentiment. Any temporary reversal in oil prices will boost the yen (Chart 14). In our trading book, we were stopped out of a short CHF/JPY position last Friday, and we will look to reinitiate this trade in the coming days.  Chart 14The Yen And Oil Prices The Yen And Oil Prices The Yen And Oil Prices   Chester NtoniforForeign Exchange Strategistchestern@bcaresearch.comFootnotes1 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, “Uncertainty Tightens Oil Supply”, dated March 17, 2022.2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, “What Next For The RMB?”, dated March 11, 2022.Trades & ForecastsStrategic ViewTactical Holdings (0-6 months)Limit OrdersForecast Summary

Executive Summary Oil Remains A Prominent Inflation Variable WTI Futures Strongly Linked To US Inflation Expectations WTI Futures Strongly Linked To US Inflation Expectations Tight oil and metals markets will translate into persistently high inflation and inflation expectations over the next 5 – 10 years. High and volatile commodity prices caused by low capex will keep global inventories tight for years.  This will keep the key 5-year/5-year (5y5y) CPI swap rates used by policy makers elevated, given the strong relationship between commodity prices – particularly longer-dated oil prices – and inflation expectations. Central banks will exacerbate this tightness if they follow through on more aggressive policy.  This would increase the cost of capital for commodity producers and could induce a recession.  All the same, commodity supplies still will remain tight, and will keep inflationary pressures emanating from the real economy elevated.  Stagflation is the likely outcome. Gold is lagging as an inflation hedge vs. the average return of our commodity recommendations.  We expect this to persist.  Still, as a safe-haven and store of value during recessionary and inflationary periods, we continue to recommend gold as a portfolio hedge. Bottom Line: The dearth of capex in oil, gas and base metals markets makes persistently high inflation a foregone conclusion for the next 5-10 years.  We remain long the S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF for direct commodity-index exposure, and the XOP, XME and PICK ETFs for exposure to commodity producers' equity. Feature That's all well and good in practice, but how does it work in theory? - Seen on a T-shirt at the University of Chicago1 Related Report  Commodity & Energy StrategyCommodities' Watershed Moment   Central banks are signaling they expect higher inflation and inflation expectations to persist, and now are communicating their collective resolve to deal with this aggressively, if needs be.2 As central-bank policy evolves, commodities – particularly oil – will become even more important as coincident and leading indicators used to assess the likely course of inflation and inflation expectations, particularly their persistence. The ECB notes oil prices have become more than just one of the input costs of manufacturing, or of mining, agriculture and the production of other forms of energy essential to powering modern economies, and delivering these goods globally. For the ECB, "oil is barometer of global economic activity as well as a financial asset."3 Likewise, the BIS stresses the importance of augmenting conventional Phillips curve models with commodity inputs to more accurately capture inflation dynamics.4 This Special Report follows our earlier report published on March 10, 2022 entitled Commodities' Watershed Moment. Here we explore the consequences of tightening commodity markets, especially as regards inflation and inflation expectations, and attempt to dispel some notions about commodities and markets that could lead to policy errors. We also evaluate our commodity recommendations' performance as inflation hedges compared to gold's performance. Modeling Inflation And Inflation Expectations Our own research and modeling broadly aligns with the ECB and BIS approaches. We periodically estimate cointegrating regressions of inflation expectations using WTI futures prices to forecast 5y5y CPI swap rates (Chart 1).5 Our results are strongest when we use 3-years forward WTI prices to forecast 5y5y CPI swap rates, but shorter-term futures also provide useful information and are cointegrated with inflation expectations discovered in the 5y5y market (Chart 2). The prompt-delivery WTI futures are cointegrated with the longer-dated 3-years forward futures contract, indicating that, over time, these different maturities are following a common long-term trend. This also explains why a similar equilibrium obtains using commodity indexes – the Bloomberg Commodity Index, the S&P GSCI, etc. – as regressors in estimating inflation expectations via the 5y5y CPI swap rates. Chart 1WTI Futures Strongly Linked To US Inflation Expectations WTI Futures Strongly Linked To US Inflation Expectations WTI Futures Strongly Linked To US Inflation Expectations Chart 2US Oil Output Slightly Higher US Oil Output Slightly Higher US Oil Output Slightly Higher Globalization of production, distribution and consumption across markets weaves these markets together – e.g., global fertilizer markets experienced a supply shock this past winter when large consuming markets in Asia and Europe got into a bidding war for limited LNG supplies – and transmits shocks across commodity markets. This partly explains the common long-term trend commodities generally share. Another feature weaving markets together globally is the fact that most global trade is invoiced and funded in USD, which means that the Fed's monetary policy decisions reverberate around the world when rates are increased or dollar liquidity is reduced.6 Lastly, trading markets are global. Commodity markets have evolved – as the ECB notes – into asset markets as well as hedging markets. This means arbitrage across commodity and rates markets (interest rates, inflation rates, FX rates, etc.) accelerates the impounding of information into prices quickly. In this environment, cointegration is strengthened among physical and financial trading markets, creating prices that share long-term equilibria. This makes the current time especially fraught, as the Fed embarks on a policy-tightening course against the backdrop of war in Europe and global commodity shortages. These effects are experienced across geographies and across time, forming a dynamic system in which supply, demand and inventories are constantly adjusting to new information. This affects current and expected fundamentals and financial conditions, which arrives to markets instantaneously. It is not surprising, then, that prices in these markets are, for the most part, cointegrated over the long run.7 Policy Errors Likely On The Way Monetary policy is not well suited to dealing with commodity scarcity. Nor is fiscal policy – e.g., government subsidies to soften the blow of rising energy prices only encourage over-consumption of scarce resources, which accelerates inventory depletion and tightens markets further. The Fed, in particular, likely is reviewing its 1970s playbook for lessons learned in the last major supply shock to hit the world – the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973, which was followed by the Iran-Iraq war in 1979. Together, these events triggered a surge in real oil prices, which rose by 4.5x – from $21.55/bbl in 1970 to $116.11/bbl in 1980, according to the EIA (Chart 3). Chart 3Fed Will Look Back At 1970s Playbook Tight Commodity Markets: Persistently High Inflation Tight Commodity Markets: Persistently High Inflation In setting policy, economists generally – at the Fed, the IMF, the World Bank and elsewhere – mistakenly view commodity forward curves as something of a forecast.8 This use of the futures curve is mistaken because it only reflects the price levels as which transactions occurred on any given day. So while a non-specialist might view a backwardated forward curve for Brent as a market-based forecast for lower prices in the future – since prompt prices are trading below deferred prices – a more accurate reading would suggest markets are tight and likely will remain tight. This particular term structure indicates physical inventories are tight, and will remain so until sufficient supply is brought to market to allow refiners to restock. Steep backwardations also predispose markets to higher price volatility, because because of low inventory levels: The market's shock absorber (inventories) is low, so volatility increases.9 Suppose policy makers are counting on lower oil prices – per a forward curve's "forecast" – to bring inflation down. In that case, they likely will be disappointed unless additional supplies arrive. Should the Fed act on the belief that backwardation is a forecast for lower prices and continue to provide forward guidance to markets suggesting inflation will be lower next year, e.g., any delay in its rate hikes will leave it behind the inflation curve. Additional policy errors can come from the fiscal side, for example, when governments provide subsidies to soften the blow of higher oil prices. This retards the function of the price mechanism, and incentivizes higher consumption, which will exacerbate price increases. This would be bullish for oil prices in the short and medium term (6 months – 2 years). Commodity markets are tight globally – at or near scarcity levels in many cases, as can be seen by the continually declining inventories in oil and base metals (Chart 4 and 5). Base metals markets are extremely tight, and are on the back foot – i.e., with physical deficits and low inventories – just as the world's largest economic blocks (EU, US, China) are launching massive buildouts of their renewable-generation fleets and electric grids, and embarking on massive military buildups. These applications will require huge increases in base metals supplies to pull off. Grain markets will tighten as the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine unfolds in the spring, when winter wheat crops in Ukraine will need to be fertilized and tended. Chart 4Oil Markets Remain Tight... Oil Markets Remain Tight... Oil Markets Remain Tight... Chart 5…As Do Metals Tight Commodity Markets: Persistently High Inflation Tight Commodity Markets: Persistently High Inflation Barring an extremely deep recession that sharply reduces aggregate demand globally, it is difficult to see how this is not inflationary for years to come. Nonetheless, even a deep recession will still leave markets massively short base metals, and, after core-OPEC producers Saudi Arabia and the UAE bring what left of their spare capacity to market, oil. Investment Implications In days gone by, gold served as a go-to inflation hedge. At present, gold is lagging as an inflation hedge vs. the average return of our direct and equity-related commodity recommendations (Chart 6). We expect this to persist. Gold has performed well against the broad-trade weighted USD, however (Chart 7). We continue to recommend gold as a portfolio hedge, as it remains responsive to policy and geopolitical shocks. And it remains a safe-haven and store of value during recessionary and inflationary periods. Chart 6Commodity Recommendations Outperform Gold Commodity Recommendations Outperform Gold Commodity Recommendations Outperform Gold Chart 7Gold Outperforms USD Gold Outperforms USD Gold Outperforms USD The dearth of capex in oil, gas and base metals markets makes persistently high inflation a foregone conclusion for the next 5-10 years, barring a steep recession. Such a turn of events diminishes in probability, as governments keep funneling subsidies to households to soften the blow of higher prices and stave off a recessionary contraction in GDP. These subsidies only succeed in retarding the price signal the market is sending to reduce consumption of scarce commodities, which means available inventories will be drawn down more quickly. We remain long the S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF for direct commodity-index exposure, and the XOP, XME and PICK ETFs for exposure to commodity producers' equity. These are long-term holdings, given our view the commodities bull market will run for years.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     Please see That Works Very Well in Practice, But How Does It Work In Theory? Published by quoteinvestigator.com for a history of how this phrase made it to UChicago's T-shirts. 2     Please see Between A Rock And A Hard Place, published 21 March 2022 by our US Investment Strategy, which is led by Doug Peta, a UChicago alum. 3    For insight into how central banks assess inflation and inflation expectations vis-à-vis commodity markets, particularly oil, please see the ECB's September 2020 working paper entitled " Global financial markets and oil price shocks in real time," by Fabrizio Venditti, Giovanni Veronese.  In it, the authors note, "The role that the price of oil plays in economic analysis in central banks and in financial markets has evolved over time. Oil is not seen anymore just as a (sic) input to production but also as a barometer of global economic activity as well as a financial asset."   4    The BIS recently noted augmenting standard Phillips Curve models with information from commodities and FX markets to reflect the profound changes wrought by globalization is critical for improving inflation forecasts, and explaining the dynamics of inflation and inflation expectations. Please see "Has globalization changed the inflation process?" by Kristin J. Forbes, published by the Bank for International Settlements in June 2019.  She notes, "The results in this paper suggest it is necessary to incorporate additional “global” factors in models of inflation dynamics, including global slack, non-fuel commodity prices (as well as oil prices), the exchange rate, and global price competition" to accurately explain and forecast inflation.  See below for further discussion. 5    In our modeling, the regressor with the best fit in our 5y5y CPI swap forecasts is the WTI 3-years forward futures contract. Both the 5y5y CPI swap rate and the WTI futures are non-stationary variables sharing a common long-term trend, meaning these are cointegrated random variables. The time series we use start in 2010, so post-GFC, which was a regime change for markets globally. The regression diagnostics are very strong, particularly for the ARDL model. We also find the 3-years forward WTI price is cointegrated with the prompt WTI futures contract, indicating these variables – one calling for delivery of crude oil in 3 years, the other in one month – are cointegrated. We get similar cointegration results using commodity indexes – e.g., the Bloomberg Commodity Index, and the LME base metals index – which tend to use futures contracts closer to delivery. This indicates commodity prices generally can be thought of as non-stationary variables vibrating randomly around a common long-term trend. We use cointegration models to avoid spurious relationships – e.g., regressing a stationary variable on a non-stationary variable. Statistically, cointegration is much stronger than simple correlation because it avoids the trap of spurious relationships. Please see Granger, C.W.J., Developments in the Study of Cointegrated Variables, Chapter 4 in Engle and Granger (eds): 1991, Long-Run Economic Relationships. Readings in Cointegration, Oxford University Press. This is an a article by Clive Granger, who received the Nobel prize in economics in 2003 for his pioneering work developing the mathematics of cointegration. See also Geman, H. (2007), Mean reversion versus random walk in oil and natural gas prices, in Advances in Mathematical Finance (pp. 219-228), for a rigorous discussion of random-walking oil and gas variables. 6    Please see Global Dimensions of U.S. Monetary Policy by Maurice Obstfeld, which appeared in the February 2020 issue of International Journal of Central Banking for an excellent discussion of the Fed's role in global trade. This is not all a one-way street, as Obstfeld notes, in that policy decisions can create "potential spillback onto the U.S. economy from the disproportionate influence of U.S. monetary policy on the outside world." 7     These cointegrating features of commodity markets, inflation rates and USD effects are not agreed by all economists. See, e.g., the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies report of August 2021 Is the Oil Price-Inflation Relationship Transitory? by Ilia Bouchouev. The paper notes, "In theory, the fundamental relationship that exists between short-term inflation and gasoline futures should be fading away with time, and for 5y5y breakeven it should indeed be close to zero. In practice, however, it is not." 8    Please see Forecasting the price of oil, which was published by the ECB in Issue 4 of its 2015. The Bank notes, "Oil price futures are frequently used as the baseline for oil price assumptions in economic projections. They are used, for example, in the Eurosystem/ECB staff macroeconomic projections and in the projections of many other central banks and international institutions. The main reason for using futures as a baseline for oil price assumptions is that they provide a simple and transparent method which is easy to communicate." (p. 90) 9    Please see Kogan, Leonid, Dmitry Livdan and Amir Yaron (2009), " Oil Futures Prices in a Production Economy With Investment Constraints," The Journal of Finance, 64:3, pp. 1345-1375.   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed in 2021 Image

Due to travel commitments, there will be no Counterpoint report next week. Instead, we will send you a timely update and analysis of the Ukraine Crisis written by my colleague Matt Gertken, BCA Chief Geopolitical Strategist. Executive Summary The tight connection between the oil price and inflation expectations is intuitive, appealing… and wrong. The inflation market is tiny, and its principle function is not to predict inflation per se, but to serve as a hedging investment in an inflation scare, such as that which follows an oil price spike. Hence, we should treat inflation expectations and the real bond yield that is derived from them with extreme care – especially after an oil price spike, which will give the illusion that the real bond yield is lower than it really is. In the near term, the Ukraine crisis has added to already elevated fears about inflation, which will pressure both bonds and stocks. However, looking beyond the next few months, the Ukraine crisis triggered supply shock will cause demand destruction, while central banks also choke demand, and the recent massive displacement of demand into goods, and its associated inflationary impulse, reverses. The 12-month asset allocation conclusion is to overweight stocks and bonds, and to underweight TIPS and commodities. Fractal trading watchlist: The sell-off in some T-bonds is approaching capitulation. The Tight Relationship Between The Oil Price And Inflation Expectations Is Intuitive, Appealing... And Wrong The Tight Relationship Between The Oil Price And Inflation Expectations Is Intuitive,Appealing... And Wrong The Tight Relationship Between The Oil Price And Inflation Expectations Is Intuitive,Appealing... And Wrong Bottom Line: In the near term, an inflationary impulse will dominate, but on a 12-month horizon, a disinflationary impulse will dominate. Feature In his seminal work Thinking Fast And Slow, Nobel Laureate psychologist Daniel Kahneman presented the bat-and-ball puzzle. A bat and ball cost $1.10. The bat costs one dollar more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? “A number came to your mind. The number, of course, is 10: 10 cents. The distinctive mark of this easy puzzle is that it evokes an answer that is intuitive, appealing, and wrong. Do the math, and you will see. If the ball costs 10 cents, then the total cost will be $1.20 (10 cents for the ball and $1.10 for the bat), not $1.10. The correct answer is 5 cents. It is safe to assume that the intuitive answer also came to the mind of those who ended up with the correct number – they somehow managed to resist the intuition.” Kahneman’s crucial finding is that many people are prone to place too much faith in an intuitive answer, an intuitive answer that they could have rejected with a small investment of effort. The Connection Between The Oil Price and Inflation Expectations Is Intuitive, Appealing… And Wrong Today, the financial markets are presenting their very own bat-and-ball puzzle. The surging price of crude oil is driving up the market expectation for inflation over the next ten years (Chart I-1). This tight relationship is intuitive and appealing, because we associate a high oil price with a high inflation rate. But the intuitive and appealing relationship is wrong, and it requires just a small investment of effort to prove the fallacy. Chart I-1The Tight Relationship Between The Oil Price And Inflation Expectations Is Intuitive, Appealing... And Wrong The Tight Relationship Between The Oil Price And Inflation Expectations Is Intuitive, Appealing... And Wrong The Tight Relationship Between The Oil Price And Inflation Expectations Is Intuitive, Appealing... And Wrong Inflation over the next ten years equals the price in ten years’ time divided by the current price. So, to the extent that there is any relationship between the current price and expected inflation, dividing by a higher price today means a lower prospective inflation rate. Empirically, the last fifty years of evidence confirms this very clear inverse relationship (Chart I-2). Chart I-2A High Oil Price Means Lower Subsequent Inflation A High Oil Price Means Lower Subsequent Inflation A High Oil Price Means Lower Subsequent Inflation This raises an obvious question: while many people accept the intuitive (wrong) relationship between the oil price and expected inflation, how can the market make such a glaring error? The answer is that the inflation market is relatively tiny, and that its principle function is not to predict inflation per se, but to serve as a hedging investment in an inflation scare. Compared to the $25 trillion T-bond market, the Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) market is worth just $1.5 trillion, slightly more than the market capitalisation of Tesla. Just as we do not expect Tesla to represent the view of the entire stock market, we should not expect TIPS to represent the view of the entire bond market. A high oil price means lower subsequent inflation. A recent paper by The Oxford Institute For Energy Studies explains: “the tight relationship between the oil price and inflation expectations defies not only the thesis of economics, but the norms of statistics as well, with a correlation that has reached 90 percent over the last ten years and a corresponding r-squared of 82 percent (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). The root cause of this phenomenon should probably be searched for in the behaviour of another large group of market participants, the systematic portfolio allocators, and factor investors.”1  Chart I-3Inflation Expectations Are Just A Mathematical Function Of The Oil Price... Inflation Expectations Are Just A Mathematical Function Of The Oil Price... Inflation Expectations Are Just A Mathematical Function Of The Oil Price... Chart I-4...Therefore 'The Real Bond Yield' Is Just A Mathematical Function Of The Oil Price ...Therefore 'The Real Bond Yield' Is Just A Mathematical Function Of The Oil Price ...Therefore 'The Real Bond Yield' Is Just A Mathematical Function Of The Oil Price So, here’s the explanation for the intuitive, appealing, but wrong connection between the oil price and inflation expectations. In the inflation scare that a surging oil price unleashes, the two main asset-classes – bonds and equities – are vulnerable to sharp losses, leaving TIPS as one of the very few assets that can provide a genuine hedge against inflation. But given that bonds and equities dwarf the $1.5 trillion TIPS (and other inflation) markets, the inflation hedger quickly becomes the dominant force in this tiny market. This large volume of hedging demand chasing limited supply drives down the real yields on TIPS to artificial lows, both in absolute terms and relative to T-bond yields. And as the difference between nominal and real yields defines the ‘market’s expected inflation’, it explains the surge in expected inflation. Be Careful How You Use ‘The Real Bond Yield’ It is an unfortunate reality that we often close the stable door after the horse has bolted, meaning that we react after, rather than before, the event. In financial market terms, this means that we demand inflation protection after, rather than before, it happens, and end up overpaying for it. A high oil price unleashes a massive hedging demand for the tiny TIPS market, driving down the real TIPS yield versus the nominal T-bond yield. To repeat, a high oil price unleashes a massive hedging demand for the tiny TIPS market, driving down the real TIPS yield versus the nominal T-bond yield. The upshot is that the performance of TIPS versus T-bonds is nothing more than a play on the oil price (Chart I-5). Chart I-5The Performance Of TIPS Versus T-Bonds Is Just A Play On The Oil Price The Performance Of TIPS Versus T-Bonds Is Just A Play On The Oil Price The Performance Of TIPS Versus T-Bonds Is Just A Play On The Oil Price A bigger message is that we should interpret the oft-quoted ‘real bond yield’ with extreme care. The real bond yield is nothing more than the nominal bond yield less a mathematical function of the oil price. So, when the oil price is high, it will give the illusion that the real bond yield is low. The danger is that if we value equities against the real bond yield when the oil price is high – such as through 2011-14 or now – equities will appear cheaper than they really are (Chart I-6). Chart I-6When The Oil Price Is High, 'The Real Bond Yield' Will Appear Lower Than It Really Is When The Oil Price Is High, 'The Real Bond Yield' Will Appear Lower Than It Really Is When The Oil Price Is High, 'The Real Bond Yield' Will Appear Lower Than It Really Is In The Case Against A ‘Super Bubble’ (And The Case For) we explained the much better way to value equities is versus the product of the nominal bond price and current profits. This valuation approach perfectly explains the US stock market’s evolution both over the long term (Chart I-7) and the short term. Specifically, over the past year, the dominant driver of the US stock market has been the 30-year T-bond price (Chart I-8). Chart I-7The US Stock Market = Profits Times The 30-Year T-Bond Price (Long-Term Chart) The US Stock Market = Profits Times The 30-Year T-Bond Price (Long-Term Chart) The US Stock Market = Profits Times The 30-Year T-Bond Price (Long-Term Chart) Chart I-8The US Stock Market = Profits Times The 30-Year T-Bond Price (Short-Term Chart) The US Stock Market = Profits Times The 30-Year T-Bond Price (Short-Term Chart) The US Stock Market = Profits Times The 30-Year T-Bond Price (Short-Term Chart) 12-Month Asset Allocation Conclusion The current inflation scare comes not from an aggregate demand shock, but from a massive displacement of demand (into goods) followed by the more recent supply shock for energy and food triggered by the Ukraine crisis. In response, central banks are trying to douse the inflation in the only way they can – by choking aggregate demand. Hence, there is a dangerous mismatch between the malady and the remedy. In the near term, the Ukraine crisis has added to already elevated fears about inflation – and this will pressure both bonds and stocks. However, looking beyond the next few months, the near-term inflationary impulse will unleash a disinflationary response from three sources. First, a supply shock means higher prices without stronger demand, which causes an inevitable demand destruction that then pulls down prices. Second, central banks are explicitly trying to pull down prices – or at least price inflation – by choking demand. And third, the massive displacement of demand into goods, and its associated inflationary impulse, is reversing. On a 12-month horizon, the disinflationary impulse will outweigh the inflationary impulse. Therefore, on a 12-month horizon, the disinflationary impulse will outweigh the inflationary impulse. The asset allocation conclusion is to overweight stocks and bonds, and to underweight TIPS and commodities. Is The Bond Sell-Off Close To Capitulation? Finally, several clients have asked if the recent sell-off in bonds is close to capitulation, based on the fragility of its fractal structures. The answer is yes, but only for the shorter maturity T-bonds. Specifically, the 5-year T-bond has reached the point of fragility on its composite 130-day/260-day fractal structure that marked the bottom of the sell-off in 2018, as well as the top of the rally in 2020 (Chart I-9). Chart I-9The Sell-Off In Shorter-Dated T-Bonds Is Close To Capitulation The Sell-Off In Shorter-Dated T-Bonds Is Close To Capitulation The Sell-Off In Shorter-Dated T-Bonds Is Close To Capitulation Accordingly, this week’s trade recommendation is to buy the 5-year T-bond, setting the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 4 percent, and with a maximum holding period of 1 year. Please note that our full fractal trading watchlist is now available on our website:  cpt.bcaresearch.com     Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Is-the-Oil-Price-Inflation-Relationship-Transitory.pdf Chart 1The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Is Fragile The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Is Fragile The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Is Fragile Chart 2The Strong Trend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile The Strong Trend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile The Strong Trend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile Chart 3AUD/KRW Is Vulnerable To Reversal AUD/KRW Is Vulnerable To Reversal AUD/KRW Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 4Canada Versus Japan Is Vulnerable To Reversal Canada Versus Japan Is Vulnerable To Reversal Canada Versus Japan Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 5Canada's TSX-60's Outperformance Might Be Over Canada's TSX-60's Outperformance Might Be Over Canada's TSX-60's Outperformance Might Be Over Chart 6US Healthcare Vs. Software Approaching A Reversal US Healthcare Vs. Software Approaching A Reversal US Healthcare Vs. Software Approaching A Reversal Chart 7The Euro’s Underperformance Could Be Approaching a Resistance Level The Euro's Underperformance Could Be Approaching a Resistance Level The Euro's Underperformance Could Be Approaching a Resistance Level Chart 8A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis A Potential Switching Point From Tobacco Into Cannabis Chart 9Bitcoin's 65-Day Fractal Support Is Holding For Now Bitcoin's 65-Day Fractal Support Is Holding For Now Bitcoin's 65-Day Fractal Support Is Holding For Now Chart 10Biotech Approaching A Major Buy Biotech Approaching A Major Buy Biotech Approaching A Major Buy Chart 11CAD/SEK Reversal Has Started CAD/SEK Reversal Has Started CAD/SEK Reversal Has Started Chart 12Financials Versus Industrials Is Reversing Financials Versus Industrials Is Reversing Financials Versus Industrials Is Reversing Chart 13Norway's Outperformance Could End Norway's Outperformance Could End Norway's Outperformance Could End Chart 14Greece's Brief Outperformance Has Ended Greece's Brief Outperformance Has Ended Greece's Brief Outperformance Has Ended Chart 15BRL/NZD At A Resistance Point BRL/NZD At A Resistance Point BRL/NZD At A Resistance Point Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades Solved: The Mystery Of The Oil Price And Inflation Expectations Solved: The Mystery Of The Oil Price And Inflation Expectations Solved: The Mystery Of The Oil Price And Inflation Expectations Solved: The Mystery Of The Oil Price And Inflation Expectations 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Executive Summary Higher Prices Expected Higher Prices Expected Higher Prices Expected Global oil supply will move lower for a few months, until shipping can be re-routed and re-priced in response to sanctions against Russian oil producers and refiners.  In the wake of another outbreak of COVID-19 in China, oil demand will likely move marginally lower in the near term.  Chinese fiscal stimulus to support demand and Chinese equity markets will be bullish for oil, natgas and metals. Work-arounds by China and India to circumvent Western sanctions likely will keep the hit to Russian oil production contained to March and April.  However, longer term – 2024 and beyond – sanctions will put Russia's oil output on a downward trajectory. Saudi Arabia will launch an experiment this year to be paid in yuan for oil exports to China.  As a risk-management strategy, KSA needs USD alternatives for storing wealth and retaining access to its foreign reserves, given the success of sanctions in restricting Russia's access to its foreign reserves following its invasion of Ukraine. Our Brent forecast is higher, averaging $93/bbl for this year and in 2023. Bottom Line: We recommend buying the dip in any oil-and-gas equity sell-off.  We remain long the XOP ETF.  We also remain long the S&P GSCI and COMT ETF – long commodity-index based vehicles that benefit from higher commodity prices and increasing backwardation in these markets, particularly oil. Feature Shipping delays in the wake of sanctions – official and self-imposed – against Russian oil and gas exports will stretch out global hydrocarbon supply chains in 1H22. This will have the effect of reducing actual supply, as these vessels are re-routed, and work-arounds are found to get oil to ports accepting Russian material.1 Related Report  Commodity & Energy Strategy2022 Key Views: Past As Prelude For Commodities So far, China and India appear to be moving quickly to develop sanctions work-arounds. Both have long-term trading relationships with Russia, and, in the case of India, the capacity to revive a treaty covering rupee-invoicing of trade in commodities and arms. Estimates of the total hit to Russian oil production resulting from export sanctions imposed by the West following its invasion of Ukraine last month range as high as 5mm b/d in output losses, but we do not share that view.2 There is a strong desire for discounted oil in China and India, and to find alternatives to USD-denominated trade. This has been catalyzed by the sanctions on Russia's central bank and the shutdown of access to its foreign reserves. Payment-messaging systems competitive with the Brussels-based SWIFT network have been stood up already. These will be refined in the wake of the Ukraine war by states with a long-standing desire to diversify payment systems away from the world's reserve currency (i.e., the USD). Among these states, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) is reported to be exploring alternatives for diversifying away from USD-based payment systems, and foreign-reserves custodial relationships dependent on Western central-bank oversight – particularly the US Fed.3 In addition, as ties between China and GCC states have strengthened, the Kingdom might also be looking to diversify its defense partnerships, particularly given the open hostility between the Biden administration in the US and KSA's leadership. Monitoring Chinese state media coverage of this will provide a good indication of the extent of such cooperation. Assessing Highly Uncertain Supply In our base case, Russian output likely falls by ~ 1mm b/d over the March-April period because of shipping delays that force production to be throttled back at the margin due to storage constraints. In its magnitude, this is a similar assumption to the reference case considered by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES) but is extended for two months (Table 1).4 We expect shipping delays and payment work-arounds to be sorted out in a couple of months, which, given the incentives of all involved, does not seem unreasonable. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) To Dec23 Uncertainty Tightens Oil Supply Uncertainty Tightens Oil Supply In our base case modeling, supply changes by core-OPEC 2.0 in 2022 are required to meet physical deficits brought about by less-than-expected volumes returned to the market by the entire coalition from August 2021 to now. This amounts to ~ 1.2mm b/d by our reckoning. For all of 2022, we assume core-OPEC 2.0 will lift supply by 1.3mm b/d, with most of this being provided to markets beginning in May 2022. In 2023, supplies from KSA, UAE and Kuwait are assumed to increase by roughly 0.2mm b/d, led by KSA (Chart 1). This is higher relative to our previous estimates, given our expectation, this core group will have to lift output to compensate not only for reduced Russian output and supply-chain delays this year and next, but falling output within the producer coalition's other non-core states. Outside OPEC 2.0, stronger WTI futures prices in spot markets and along the entire forward curve drive our estimate of US shale output (L48 ex-GoM) to 9.89mm b/d in 2022 (0.86mm b/d above 2021 levels) and 10.58mm b/d in 2023 (0.69mm above our 2022 levels). Supply-chain disruptions and cost inflation showing up in US shale producers' operations likely will dampen output increases.5 For the US, we expect 2022 average US production of 12.1mm b/d, or 900k b/d higher than 2021 output, and 12.8mm b/d in 2023, which is 700k b/d higher than 2022 levels (Chart 2). Chart 1Still Expecting Core-OPEC 2.0 Production Increases Uncertainty Tightens Oil Supply Uncertainty Tightens Oil Supply Chart 2US Oil Output Slightly Higher US Oil Output Slightly Higher US Oil Output Slightly Higher   Higher Brent prices will encourage short-term production increases from North Sea producers and others. However, it is not clear whether this will incentivize the years-long projects that will be needed to offset the lack of capex in the sector over the past decade or so. One of our high-conviction views resulting from the dearth of capex in oil and gas production is increasingly tighter markets by mid-decade – likely apparent by 2024 – which will require higher prices to reverse the lack of investment in new production. In line with our House view, we are not restoring the return of up to 1.3mm b/d of Iranian production to markets, given the guidance from this source proved unreliable earlier this month when it suspended talks with the US on its nuclear deal. We also are not assuming ceasefire talks between Ukraine and Russia will end to the Ukraine war, given the unreliability of the source (Russia) in these reports. Softer Demand Near Term Over the next few months, we expect the recent upsurge in COVID-19 cases in China to reduce Asian demand, but not tank it relative to our existing assumptions.6 Even though this was expected in our balances estimates, we are reducing our 2Q22 demand estimate by an additional 250k b/d, which is split evenly between DM and EM economies. This reflects the direct short-term hit to EM demand from China's lockdowns and a stronger USD, which raises the local-currency costs of oil, as well as the knock-on effects of additional supply-chain disruptions. Global consumption for 2022 is expected to be 4.4mm b/d higher on average vs 2021 levels, coming in at 101.54mm b/d, and 1.7mm b/d higher in 2023 vs. 2022 levels. We expect the Russian sanctions work-arounds being pursued by China and India – together accounting for a bit more than 20% of global oil demand – will be effective and will put overall EM demand back on trend in 2H22, assuming China's COVID-19 outbreak is brought under control (Chart 3).   Chart 3COVID-19 Hits China Demand, But Does Not Tank EM Overall COVID-19 Hits China Demand, But Does Not Tank EM Overall COVID-19 Hits China Demand, But Does Not Tank EM Overall While markets remain highly fluid – subject to sharp changes in perceptions of fundaments and their trajectories – these supply-demand estimates continue to point to relatively a balanced market this year and next (Chart 4). That said, the supply-demand fundamentals still leave inventories extremely tight, which means they will  provide limited buffering against sudden shifts in supply, demand or both (Chart 5). This will, in our estimation, keep forward curves backwardated, which will support our long-term positions in long commodity-index exposure (i.e., the S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF).  Chart 4Markets Remain Balanced... Markets Remain Balanced... Markets Remain Balanced... Chart 5...And Inventories Remain Tight ...And Inventories Remain Tight ...And Inventories Remain Tight Our base-case balances estimates translate into a 2022 Brent price forecast that averages $93/bbl, and a 2023 average estimate of $93/bbl, which are lower than our previous forecasts of $94/bbl and $98/bbl, respectively. For 1Q22, we now expect prices to average $98/bbl; 2Q22 to average $98.25/bbl; 3Q22 $88.45/bbl; and 4Q22 $87.30/bbl. Risks To Our View The supply side of our modeling remains exposed to exogenous political risks, chiefly: A failure on the part of core-OPEC 2.0 to increase production to offset lower-than-expected output outside the coalition's core; Lower-than-expected US oil output, given stronger-than-expected production discipline; and A return of up to 1.3mm b/d of Iranian barrels, which we no longer are assuming in our balances. We continue to believe core-OPEC 2.0 will increase production because it is in their interest not to allow inventory depletion to accelerate and for prices to move higher faster. The local-currency cost of oil in EM economies – the growth engine for oil demand – is high and going higher. In real terms – i.e., inflation-adjusted terms – it is even higher, as the real effective USD trade-weighted FX rate exceeds that of the nominal rate (Chart 6). This can be seen in the local-currency costs of oil in the world's largest consumers (Chart 7). We expect an announcement from core-OPEC 2.0 by the end of this month regarding a production increase. Chart 6High Real USD FX Rates Increase Local Oil Costs Uncertainty Tightens Oil Supply Uncertainty Tightens Oil Supply Chart 7Local-Currency Oil Costs In Large Consuming States Local-Currency Oil Costs In Large Consuming States Local-Currency Oil Costs In Large Consuming States   Of course, KSA's diversification to USD alternatives as a risk-management strategy makes it less certain it will lead an output increase in exchange for an increased US commitment to its defense. Regarding US shale output, producers remain disciplined in their capital allocation. Even though we expect higher prices across the WTI forward curve will incentivize additional production, we could be over-estimating the extent of this increase in our modeling. Lastly, as noted above, Iran and Russia are indicating their trade concerns have been addressed by the US, which presumably will presumably will be followed by the return up to 1.3mm b/d of production to export markets. However, forward guidance from these producers has not been particularly reliable, and we could be wrong here as well. This would be a bearish fundamental on the supply side, which would pressure prices lower. Investment Implications Given the breakdown in talks between the US and Iran – presumably under pressure from Russia for guarantees the US would not sanction its trade with Iran – our Brent price forecast remains above $90/bbl (Chart 8). We expect the near-term price increase will dissipate as the sanctions work-arounds – particularly by China and India – re-route oil flows. Core OPEC 2.0 producers – KSA, the UAE and Kuwait – have sufficient surplus capacity to increase production to allow refiners to re-build inventories. This big question for markets now is will they bring it to market in the near term? KSA's interest in exploring yuan-linked oil trade with China adds an element of uncertainty to whether production will be increased. Perhaps that is a goal of this exercise: The US is being shown there are alternatives available to large oil exporters re terms of trade and providers of defense services. Chart 8Higher Prices Expected Higher Prices Expected Higher Prices Expected There is sufficient spare capacity available at present to address the current physical deficits in global markets. Our analysis indicates markets are balanced but still tight, as can be seen in current and expected inventory levels. We remain long the XOP ETF and the S&P GSCI and COMT ETF. The latter ETFs provide long commodity-index based exposure that benefits from higher commodity prices and increasing backwardation in commodity markets generally, particularly oil.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com     Commodities Round-Up Precious Metals: Bullish Markets expected the Federal Reserve's rate hike of 25 basis points in the March and was not disappointed. Further rate hikes this year will occur against the backdrop of high geopolitical uncertainty and inflation, both of which are bullish for gold. The Russia-Ukraine crisis has added a new layer of complexity, and the Fed will need to proceed with caution to curb inflation but not over-tighten the economy.       Footnotes 1     Please see All at sea: Russian-linked oil tanker seeks a port, published by straitstimes.com on March 10, 2022 for examples of shipping delays. 2     Please see Could Russia Look to China to Export More Oil and Natural Gas? published by naturalgasintell.com on March 9, and India says it’s in talks with Russia about increasing oil imports., published on March 15, for additional reporting. See also Besides China, Putin Has Another Potential De-dollarization Partner in Asia published by cfr.org, which discusses India-Russia trade agreements between 1953-92 with the signing of the 1953 Indo-Soviet Trade Agreement. 3    Please see Saudi considering China’s yuan for oil purchases published by al-monitor.com on March 16. 4    Please see the OIES Oil Monthly published on March 14. 5    Oil producers in a ‘dire situation’ and unable to ramp up output, says Oxy CEO published on March 8 by cnbc.com. 6    A resurgence of COVID-19 in China was not unexpected. It was one of our key views going into 2022. Please see 2022 Key Views: Past As Prelude For Commodities, which we published on December 16, 2021. In that report, we noted, "… China still is operating under a zero-tolerance COVID-19 policy, and has relied on less efficacious vaccines that appear to offer no protection against the omicron variant of the coronavirus. This also is a risk for EM economies that rely on these vaccines. However, the roll-out of mRNA vaccines globally via joint ventures will be gathering steam in 2H22, which is bullish for commodity demand." We continue to expect Chinese authorities to deploy mRNA vaccines or antivirals to combat this outbreak.   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed in 2021 Image

Executive Summary Failure Of Iran Deal Tightens Oil Supply Failure Of Iran Deal Tights Oil Supply Failure Of Iran Deal Tights Oil Supply The US and Iran suspended their attempt to negotiate a nuclear deal on March 11. Countries often get cold feet before major agreements but there are good reasons to believe this suspension will be permanent. A confirmed failure to restore the US-Iran strategic détente will lead to Middle Eastern instability. Iran will be on a trajectory to achieve nuclear weapons in a few years while Israel and the US will have to underscore their red lines against weaponization. The Strait of Hormuz will come under threat again. The immediate impact on oil prices should be positive: sanctions will continue to hinder Iran’s exports, while Iranian conflict with its neighbors will sharply increase the odds of oil disruptions caused by militant actions. Not to mention the Russia-induced energy supply shock. However, a decisive move by the Gulf Arab states to boost crude production would counteract the effect of Iranian sanctions and drive oil down. The Gulf Arabs will be more inclined to coordinate with the Biden administration as long as the Iran deal is ruled out. Thus oil volatility is the main implication beyond any short term oil spike.     Trade Recommendation Inception Date Return Long Gold (Strategic) 2019-12-06 36.8% Bottom Line: Go long US equities relative to global; long US and Canadian stocks versus Saudi and UAE stocks. Stay long XOP ETF, S&P GSCI index, and COMT ETF for exposure to oil prices and backwardation in oil forward curves. Feature The current Iran talks would have restored Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA), which created a strategic détente between the US and Iran. Iran froze its nuclear program while the US lifted sanctions. President Barack Obama negotiated the deal in 2015, without congressional approval, while President Donald Trump nullified it in 2018, arguing that it did not restrict Iran’s ballistic missile development or support for regional militant groups. Chart 1Bull Market In Iran Tensions Will Be Super-Charged Bull Market In Iran Tensions Will Be Super-Charged Bull Market In Iran Tensions Will Be Super-Charged Since then there has been a bull market in Iran tensions (Chart 1), a secret war in which sporadic militant attacks, assassinations, and acts of sabotage occurred but neither side pursued open confrontation. These attacks can be significant, as with the Iran-backed attack on the Abqaiq refinery in Saudi Arabia, which took 6mm b/d of oil-processing capacity offline briefly in September 2019. The implication of this trend is energy supply disruption. Now the trend will be super-charged in the context of a global energy shortage. If no US-Iran détente is achieved, the Middle East will be set on a new trajectory of conflict, or at least a nuclear arms race and aggressive containment strategy. Since Trump turned away from the US-Iran détente and reimposed sanctions on Iran we have given a 40% chance of large-scale military conflict, according to our June 2019 decision tree (Diagram 1). The basis for such a conflict is Iran’s likelihood of obtaining nuclear arms and the need of Israel, its Arab neighbors, and the US to prevent that from happening. Diagram 1US-Iran Conflict: Critical Juncture In Our Decision Tree US-Iran Talks Break Down US-Iran Talks Break Down Between now and then, tit-for-tat military exchanges will increase, posing risks to oil supply in the short and medium run. Without a major diplomatic breakthrough that halts Iran’s nuclear weaponization, a bombing campaign against Iran will be the likeliest long-term consequence, due to the fateful logic of Israel’s strategic predicament (Diagram 2). Diagram 2Over Medium Term, Unilateral Israeli Military Action Is Possible US-Iran Talks Break Down US-Iran Talks Break Down Why Rejoining The US-Iran Deal Was Unlikely Under the Biden administration’s new plan, Iran would have frozen its nuclear program once again while Biden would have relaxed US “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran, opening the way for foreign investment and the development of Iran’s energy sector and economy. The basis for a deal was the belief among some US policymakers that engagement with Iran would open up its economy, reducing regional war risks (especially in Iraq), expanding global energy supply, and fomenting pro-democratic sentiment in Iran. Also the Washington military-industrial complex wanted to reduce the US’s commitment to the Middle East and arrange a grand strategic “pivot to Asia” so as to counter the rise of China. Up till August 2021, we viewed a deal as likely, but that view changed when Iran’s hawkish or hardline faction came back into the presidency. Biden had a very small window of opportunity to negotiate with outgoing Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, who negotiated the original 2015 deal and whose administration fell apart after President Trump withdrew from the deal. When the hawkish Iranian faction took back power, this opportunity slipped. Iran’s hawks were vindicated for having opposed détente with the US in the first place. Since then we have argued that strategic tensions would escalate, for the following reasons: The Iranians could not trust the Americans, since they knew that any new deal could be torn up as early as January 20, 2025 if the Republican Party took back the White House. Indeed, former Vice President Mike Pence recently confirmed this view explicitly. The Iranians were not compelled to agree to the deal because high oil prices ensured that they could export oil regardless of US sanctions (Chart 2). The US no longer has the diplomatic credibility to galvanize a coalition that includes the Russians and Chinese to isolate Iran, like it did back in 2014-15. Chart 2Iranians Not Compelled To A Deal, Can Circumvent Sanctions Iranians Not Compelled To A Deal, Can Circumvent Sanctions Iranians Not Compelled To A Deal, Can Circumvent Sanctions As for Iran’s weak economy spurring social unrest and forcing Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to agree to a deal, the US has had maximum pressure sanctions in place since 2019 and it has not produced that effect. Yes, Iran is ripe for social unrest, but the regime is consolidating power under the hardliners rather than taking any risky course of opening up and reform that could foment pro-democratic and pro-western demands for change. With oil revenues flowing in, the regime will be more capable of suppressing domestic opposition. The Americans could not trust the Iranians because they knew that they would ultimately pursue nuclear weapons regardless of any short-term revival of the 2015 deal. The Iranians have a stark choice between North Korea, which achieved nuclear weaponization and now has a powerful guarantee of future regime survival, and countries like Ukraine and Libya, which gave up nuclear weapons or programs only to be invaded by foreign armies. Moreover the Iranian nuclear deal lacked popular support, even among Obama Democrats back in 2015, not to mention today in the wake of the deal’s cancellation. The deal’s provisions would have begun expiring in 2025 under any conditions. The Israelis and Gulf Arabs opposed the deal. The Russians also switched to opposing the deal and made new demands at the last minute as a result of the US sanctions imposed on Russia in the wake of its invasion of Ukraine. The Russians do not have an interest in Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon and they supported the 2015 deal and the 2021-22 renegotiation while demanding their pound of flesh in the form of Ukraine. But they also know that Israel and the US will use military force to prevent Iran from getting the bomb, so they are not compelled to join any agreement. Crippling US sanctions over Ukraine likely caused them to interfere with the deal. Our pessimistic view is now confirmed, with the suspension of talks. True, informal talks will continue, diplomacy could somehow revive, and it is still possible for a deal to come together. But given our fundamental points above, we would give any durable diplomatic solution a low probability, say 5%. That means that the US and Iran will not engage, which means Iran will re-activate its regional militant proxies and begin pursuing nuclear weaponization. Iran has a powerful incentive to increase regime security before the dangerous leadership succession that looms over the nearly 83 year-old Khamenei and the threatening possibility of a Republican’s reelection in 2024. At present, it is unknown which side of the Iran nuclear deal talks suspended them. While the Iranians were not compelled by an international coalition to join the deal as they were in 2015, we cannot ignore the possibility the suspension in talks arises from a deal being reached between the US and core OPEC 2.0 producers (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait). Very simply, such a deal would entail that the Arab states increase output, to ease the global shortage, in return for the US walking away from the flawed Iran deal and pledging to work with Israel and the Gulf Arabs to contain Iran. Israel and the Gulf Arabs are increasingly aligned in their goal of countering Iran under the Abraham Accords, negotiated in 2020 by the Trump administration. If the US and Gulf states agreed, then the Gulf states are likely to increase production to ease the global shortage and prolong the business cycle, meaning that oil prices could fall rather than rise as their next move. Either way they will remain volatile as a result of global developments. What Next? Escalation In The Middle East The Iranians have made substantial nuclear progress since 2018, despite Israeli attempts at sabotaging critical facilities. Today Iran stands on the brink of achieving “breakout” levels of highly enriched uranium – levels at which it is possible to construct a nuclear device (Table 1). Table 1Iran Will Reach ‘Breakout’ Nuclear Capability US-Iran Talks Break Down US-Iran Talks Break Down The suspension of talks means the Iranians will soon reach breakout capacity, which will splash across global headlines. This news will rattle global financial markets as it will point to a nuclear arms race in the most volatile of regions. There is a gap of one-to-two years between breakout uranium enrichment and deliverable nuclear weapon, according to most experts.1 However, it is much easier to monitor nuclear programs than missile programs, which means western intelligence will lose visibility when it comes to knowing precisely when Iran will obtain a functional nuclear warhead that it can mount on a ballistic missile. The Iranians are skillful at ballistic missiles. The clock will start ticking once nuclear breakout is achieved and the Israelis and Americans will be forced to respond by underscoring their red line against weaponization. Starting right away, Israel and the US will need to demonstrate publicly that they have a “military option” to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear weaponization. They will refrain from immediate military action but will seek to re-establish a credible threat through shows of force. They will also redouble their efforts to use special operations and cyber attacks to set back the Iranian programs. The Iranians will seek to deter them from attacking and will want to highlight the negative consequences. The US-Iran talks were not only about the nuclear program but also about a broader strategic détente. The Iranians will no longer rein in their regional militant proxies, whether the militias in Iraq or the Houthis in Yemen or Hezbollah in Lebanon. In effect we are now looking at a major escalation of militant attacks in the Middle East at a time when oil is already soaring. In many cases the express intent of the Iran-backed groups will be to threaten oil supply to demonstrate the leverage that they have to intimidate the US and its allies and discourage them from applying too much pressure too quickly. Bottom Line: On top of the current oil shock, we are about to have a higher risk premium injected into oil from Middle Eastern proxy conflict involving Iran. If OPEC does not act quickly to boost production then financial markets face additional commodity price pressures, on top of the existing Russia-induced supply shock. Commodity And Energy Implications Our Commodity & Energy Strategist, Bob Ryan, outlines the following implications for the oil market: In BCA Research's oil supply-demand balances, while we recognized the Geopolitical Strategy view that the US-Iran deal would not materialize, nevertheless we assumed that Iran would return up to 1.3mm b/d of production by 2H22, which would have been available for export markets. This would have given a significant boost to oil supply as the market continues to tighten. Chart 3Failure Of Iran Deal Tights Oil Supply Failure Of Iran Deal Tights Oil Supply Failure Of Iran Deal Tights Oil Supply The failure of these barrels to return to the market will result in an oil-price increase of about $15/bbl in 2023, based on our modeling (Chart 3). We can expect backwardations to increase in Brent and WTI, as demand for precautionary inventories increases. The modelled prices include the oil risk premium of ~USD 9/bbl in H2 2022 and USD 5/bbl in 2023. Relative to 2021, we expect core- OPEC - KSA, UAE and Kuwait – and total US crude supply to increase by 1.7 mmb/d and 0.65 mmb/d respectively in 2022. Compared to 2022, core-OPEC supply will level off in 2023, and will increase by 0.6 mmb/d for total US. If the US has a deal with core OPEC, then, based on the reference production levels agreed by OPEC 2.0 in July 2021, core OPEC’s production capacity could cover a large bit of the volumes markets are short (Table 2). This is due to lower monthly additions of output that was supposed to be returned to markets – now above 1mm b/d – and the lost Iranian output (Table 2). Table 2OPEC 2.0 Reference Production Levels US-Iran Talks Break Down US-Iran Talks Break Down Per the OPEC 2.0 reference production schedule released following the July 2021 meeting in Vienna, Saudi Arabia’s output is free to go to 11.5mm b/d by May, the UAE's to 3.5mm b/d, and Kuwait's to just under 3mm b/d. Iraq also could raise output, but its output is variable and it will lie at the center of the new escalation in military tensions, so we do not count it as core OPEC 2.0 production. Assuming these numbers are consistent with actual capacity for core OPEC 2.0, that means Saudi Arabia could lift production by ~ 1.1mm b/d, UAE by ~ 0.5m b/d, and Kuwait by close to 0.3mm b/d. That’s almost 2mm b/d. These reference-production levels might be on the high side of what core OPEC 2.0 is able or willing to do. But they would be close to covering most of the deficit resulting from less-than-anticipated return of 400k b/d from OPEC 2.0 producers beginning last August ( ~ 1.2mm b/d). Most of Iran’s lost output also would be covered. More than likely, these barrels will find their way to market "under the radar" (i.e., smuggled out of Iran) over the next year or so. This was one reason our geopolitical strategists did not view Iran as sufficiently pressured to sign a deal. US shale-oil output will be increasing above the 0.9 mm b/d that we forecast last month for 2022, and the 0.5mm b/d we expect next year, given the sharp price rally prompted by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Our Commodity & Energy Strategy service will be updating our estimate next week when we publish new supply-demand balances and price forecasts. Releases from the Strategic Petroleum Reserves of the US and OECD are available to tide the market over for brief periods due to Middle East shocks or sanctions on Russian oil. Releases from the Strategic Petroleum Reserves of the US and OECD are available to tide the market over for brief periods due to Middle East shocks or sanctions on Russian oil. Over time, a significant share of these displaced Russian barrels will find their way to China, and the volumes being displaced will be re-routed to other Asian and western buyers. Investment Takeaways One of our key geopolitical views for 2022 is that oil producers have enormous strategic leverage, specifically Russia and Iran. The Ukraine war and now the suspension of US-Iran détente bears out this view. It is highly destabilizing for global politics and economy. One of our five black swans for 2022 is that Israel could attack Iran – this is a black swan because it is highly unlikely on such a short time frame. However, if the US-Iran deal cannot be salvaged, then the clock is ticking to a time when Israel and/or the US will have to decide whether to prevent Iran from going nuclear or instead choose containment strategy as with North Korea. Yet the Iran dilemma is less stable than the Korean dilemma because the Israelis are committed to preventing weaponization. The Israelis will not act unilaterally until the last possible moment, when all other options to prevent weaponization are exhausted, as the operation would be extremely difficult and they need American military assistance. If diplomacy fails on Iran, the two options for the future are a major war or a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. The latter would involve an aggressive containment strategy. The global economy faces a major new risk to energy supply as a result of this material increase in Middle East tensions. A stagflationary outcome is much more likely. Europe’s energy security will be far more vulnerable now as it tries to diversify away from Russia but faces a more volatile Middle East (Chart 4). Undoubtedly Russia and Iran recognize their tremendous leverage. China, India, and other resource imports face a larger energy shock if the Gulf Arabs do not boost production promptly. They certainly face greater volatility. China’s policy support for the economy will remain lackluster in an environment in which inflation continues to threaten economic stability. China’s internal stability was already at risk and now it will have to scramble to secure energy supplies amid a global price shock and looming Middle Eastern instability. China has no choice but to accept Russia’s decision to cut ties with the West and lash itself to China as a strategic ally for the foreseeable future (Chart 5). Chart 4The EU’s Two-Pronged Energy Insecurity US-Iran Talks Break Down US-Iran Talks Break Down ​​​​​ Chart 5China's Energy Insecurity China's Energy Insecurity China's Energy Insecurity ​​​​​ Chart 6AGo Long US And Canada / Short Saudi And UAE Go Long US And Canada / Short Saudi And UAE Go Long US And Canada / Short Saudi And UAE ​​​​​ Chart 6BGo Long US And Canada / Short Saudi And UAE Go Long US And Canada / Short Saudi And UAE Go Long US And Canada / Short Saudi And UAE ​​​​​ Geopolitical Strategy recommends investors go long US equities relative to global equities on a strategic basis. We also recommend long US / short UAE equities and long Canadian / short Saudi equities (Charts 6A and 6B). Chart 7Worst Case Oil Risk In Historical Context US-Iran Talks Break Down US-Iran Talks Break Down Unlike Ukraine, the onset of a new Middle East crisis may not come with “shock and awe.” Weeks or months may pass before Iran reaches nuclear breakout. But make no mistake, if diplomacy fails, Iran will ignite a nuclear race and activate its militant proxies, while its enemies will increase sabotage, rattle sabers, and review military options. The Iranians will not be afraid to threaten the Strait of Hormuz, their other nuclear option (Chart 7). A total blockage of Hormuz is not by any means imminent. But war becomes more likely if Iran achieves nuclear breakout and diplomacy continues to fail.   Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      See Ariel Eli Levite, “Can a Credible Nuclear Breakout Time With Iran Be Restored?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 24, 2021, carnegieendowment.org. See also Simon Henderson, “Iranian Nuclear Breakout: What It Is and How to Calculate It,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Watch 3457, March 24, 2021, washingtoninstitute.org.   Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix

Executive Summary Tight Inventories Spike Metals Commodities' Watershed Moment Commodities' Watershed Moment Russia's war against Ukraine is a watershed moment, which will realign production, distribution and consumption of commodities globally. The development of new sources of the critical metals desperately needed to build out renewable energy grids and the drive to secure access to oil, gas and coal will intensify along political lines. China, reinforced by Russia, will lead the East, while the US and its allies will lead the West, in a redux of the Cold War. Local politics will intrude on this process, as left-of-center governments in important commodity-producing states secure their electoral victories and claim greater shares of commodity revenues. The rebuilding of defense systems, particularly in Europe, will compete with the renewable-energy transition. This will stress already-tight metals markets, where low inventories will predispose markets to higher volatility a la this week's oil, natgas and nickel price spikes. This will retard economic growth. In the short term, CO2 emissions will surge. Longer term, the transition to net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 will be pushed back years, as states compete for access to commodities. East-West trade restrictions and hoarding of commodities secured via trade within these respective blocs, as is occurring presently, will increase. Bottom Line: Russia's war against Ukraine is a watershed moment.  The development of new sources of the critical metals desperately needed to build out renewable energy grids, and the drive to secure access to oil, gas and coal will intensify. China, reinforced by Russia, will lead the East, while the US and its allies will lead the West, in a redux of the Cold War. Feature Russia's war with Ukraine provoked a watershed moment for Europe: Leaders suddenly realized they had to reverse decades of energy dependence on Russia, rebuild their militaries, and sustain a massive buildout of the continent's renewable-energy generation and grid. This occurred as inventories of the basic commodities required to achieve all of these objectives were stretched so tight that the mere threat of the cutoff of pipeline natural gas was enough to send benchmark EU natgas prices to a record $113/MMBtu, up nearly 80% from the previous day's close before it settled back to still-elevated levels (Chart 1). Oil inventories also were stretched extremely thin even before Russia launched its invasion of Ukraine 24 February (Chart 2). The situation is not improving, since, in the wake of the Ukraine war, numerous refiners and trading companies now are observing self-imposed sanctions against taking any Russian oil or refined products. It is worthwhile remembering this began before the US and UK announced they would ban all imports of Russian material this week.1 This will stretch supply chains by unknow durations – the movement of crude from Russia to a refiner could take months instead of weeks, until new trade patterns are established. Chart 1Little Flex In EU Gas Inventories Commodities' Watershed Moment Commodities' Watershed Moment Chart 2Little Flex In EU Gas Inventories Little Flex In EU Gas Inventories Little Flex In EU Gas Inventories   Global economic and policy uncertainty is massively elevated, with percent changes in oil and gas prices swinging on a double-digit basis daily. This makes it extremely difficult to bid or offer oil cargoes in the physical market or make markets (i.e., bid or offer) in the futures markets, which has the effect of compounding uncertainty and volatility. Fundamentals – supply, demand and inventories – take a back seat to fear and uncertainty in such markets. This makes it virtually impossible to assign a probability to any price outcomes based on supply and demand – the true definition of uncertainty in the Frank Knight sense – and to make long-term capex decisions over the long term.2 We raised our 2022 and 2023 Brent forecasts on the back of the massive uncertainty in the markets to $90/bbl and $85/bbl, respectively, right after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. We assume 1Q22 Brent will average $100/bbl. We expect core OPEC 2.0 producers – Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait – will increase production beginning in 2Q22; US shale-oil output will rise, and ~ 1.2mm b/d of Iranian production will return to market in 2H22. Among the risks to our forecasts are a failure by core OPEC 2.0 to lift output (we expect an announcement at the end of this month when the producer coalition meets); lower-than-expected US shale output, and a failure to resolve the Iran nuclear deal with the US. Our modeling indicated these outcomes could lift Brent to between $120/bbl and $140/bbl by 2023 (Chart 3). We will be updating our forecasts next week.3 Chart 3Brent Forwards Lift Brent Forwards Lift Brent Forwards Lift EU's Watershed Metals Moment EU leadership is setting out to reverse decades of energy dependence on Russia, rebuild their militaries, and sustain a massive buildout of the continent's renewable-energy grid, all a result of the Ukraine war. This will require massive investment in metals mining and refining, along with steel-making capacity. Already, Germany is pledging to increase LNG import capacity and measures to reduce its dependence on Russian natural gas by 75% this year.4 The EU is looking to restore its natgas inventories to 90% of capacity before next winter, and has pledged to double down on renewables, in order to remove member-state dependence on Russian energy exports.5 These ambitious goals are up against the hard reality of scarce base metals supply globally. This will be exacerbated going forward by actions taken by and against Russia. The Russia-Ukraine crisis will destabilize metal markets, given supply uncertainty from Russia and its contribution to global supply. The commodities heavyweight constitutes 6%, 5% and 4% of global primary aluminum, refined nickel and copper production. Against the backdrop of very low global inventories in these metals (Chart 4), the prices of all three hit record highs over the last few days due to uncertain supply (Chart 5). LME nickel prices more than quadrupled on Tuesday as traders rushed to cover short positions and margin calls. Chart 4Low Inventories... Low Inventories... Low Inventories... Chart 5...Lead To Price Volatility ...Lead To Price Volatility ...Lead To Price Volatility Uncertainty has engulfed metal markets, with a Western ban on Russian metal imports still a possibility. Putin’s announcement regarding raw material export restrictions will further fuel supply uncertainty.6 As in the case of oil, private entities’ self-sanctioning, sanctions on the Russian financial system, and war-related supply chain disruptions are causing current Russian metal export disruptions.7 So far, Western sanctions on commodities have not directly interfered with metal flows from Russia. But markets are taking it day to day. Supply disruptions and sanctions force the formation of new trade patterns, as private entities aim to maximize arbitrage opportunities. For example, high European aluminum price spreads incentivized shipments from China, the world’s largest producer and consumer of refined aluminum. Normally, Europe relies on Russia for aluminum supplies. Rising European physical premiums for delivered metal, caused by Russian export disruptions, will see trading companies take advantage of arbitrage opportunities in other commodities as well. Europe's Risk Profile Rising Since the Ukraine war began, rising European physical premiums in commodities ranging from metals to natgas indicate the continent – more so than others – is particularly vulnerable to Russian export disruptions. Europe’s reliance on Russian energy and its supply disruptions will raise operating costs for smelters and refiners on the continent, threatening smelter shutdowns similar to those we saw this past winter. Markets were expecting power price relief over the warmer months and higher smelting activity. Elevated fuel and power prices, however, will constrain metals refining in Europe, and could shut or close even more smelters, keeping refined metals supply scarce and prices high. Rebuilding Europe's Defenses EU leaders are scheduled to take up a new energy and defense funding proposal today, which media reports are describing as "massive" (no detail provided ahead of the meeting, of course). This program reportedly will be akin to the EU's $2 trillion COVID-relief fund.8 The EU's fast response to defense shortfalls comes against the backdrop discussed above regarding super-tight metals markets, which now face a further complication of unpredictable local politics in metals-producing states. Some of these states have voted left-of-center governments into office, which now appear to be intent on nationalizing mining operations.9 Chile, e.g., accounts for ~ 30% of global copper ore output, and is in the process of re-writing its constitution, which will change tax and royalty law, and could pave the way for nationalization of copper and lithium mines. This political risk compounds any long-term planning operations by consumers like the EU and producers. Investment Implications Energy markets – broadly defined to include oil, gas and coal along with the base metals required for renewables and their supporting grids and electric vehicles – are being rocked by Russia's war with Ukraine. Base metals, in particular, will have to find price levels that destroy demand among competing uses, if the EU's dual-track plan to build out its renewables generation and restore a military capability is approved. A "massive" funding effort in Europe, coupled with equally massive efforts in the US and China – both intent on building out their renewable generation and grids, as well as expanding their defensive capabilities – will be extremely difficult to pull off. Critical base metals inventories remain low, and prices are high because demand exceeds supply for the foreseeable future (Chart 6). Chart 6Tight Inventories Spike Metals Commodities' Watershed Moment Commodities' Watershed Moment The EU will join a world in which the other two great economic centers – the US and China – will engage in a geopolitical competition over access to and control of scarce base metals, oil, gas and coal resources. Russia will remain aggressive toward the West, at least until the Putin regime falls, and will play an ancillary role to China. Fossil fuels and base metals have been starved for capex for more than a decade. Governmental pronouncements will not reverse this. These markets will remain tight, and will get tighter in order to allocate increasingly scarce supply with rapidly growing demand. As such, we remain long commodity-index exposure (S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF), along with equity exposure to oil and gas producers via the XOP ETF, and the XME and PICK ETFs to retain exposure to base metals and bulks producers and traders.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Please see Russian tankers at sea despite ‘big unknown’ over who will buy oil, published by ft.com on March 7, 2022. 2     Please see Explained: Knightian uncertainty, published by mit.edu for discussion. 3    Please see Oil Risk Premium Abates, But Still Remains, which we published on February 25, 2022. 4    Please see Germany Revives LNG Import Plans to Cut Reliance on Russian Natural Gas in Marked Policy Shift, published by naturalgasintel.com on March 1, 2022. 5    Please see Climate change: EU unveils plan to end reliance on Russian gas, published by bbc.co.uk on March 8, 2022, and The EU plan to drastically ramp renewables to replace Russian gas, published by pv-magazine.com on March 9, 2022. 6    Please see Russia to Omit Raw Material Exports but Omits Details, published by Bloomberg on March 9, 2022. 7     Please see here for Which companies have stopped doing business with Russia? 8    Please see Ukraine: ECB governing council to meet as crisis intensifies, published on March 8, 2022 by greencentralbanking.com. 9    Please see Chile a step closer to nationalizing copper and lithium, published by mining.com on March 7, 2022, and Add Local Politics To Copper Supply Risks, which we published on November 25, 2021.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations

Executive Summary Euro Natgas Soars; LME Nickel Squeezed Euro Natgas, Nickel Soar Euro Natgas, Nickel Soar Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak's threat to halt shipmentsof natgas on Nord Stream 1 to Europe lifted European gas prices 25% overnight, and will reverberate for years. We make the odds of a cut-off of Russian natgas exports to the EU low but not extremely low. Russia’s war is about the status of Ukraine. Russia needs the EU markets, and the EU needs Russia's gas. However, if Russia follows through on Novak's threat, it would be a major disruption for gas markets in the short term. Over the medium to long term, US shale gas producers, LNG terminal operators and exporters will benefit from new demand. On the import side, China likely benefits most from Russia's need to re-route gas. But this will require substantial infrastructure investment to monetize Russia's gas supplies and as such will take years to realize. Separately, the LME has shut down its nickel markets following an explosive 250% rally over two days that took prices above $100,000/MT. Nickel settled at ~ $80,000/MT before the LME closed the market today for margin calls on shorts squeezed by the surge in prices to make margin calls. Bottom Line: We remain long commodity-index exposure (S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF), along with equity exposure to oil and gas producers via the XOP ETF. We also remain long the XME and PICK ETFs to retain exposure to base metals and bulks.

Executive Summary US Can Do Without Russia's Oil, EU, NATO … Not So Much US Will Ban Russian Oil Imports US Will Ban Russian Oil Imports The US will ban Russian oil imports shortly.  This is not as big a deal markets had feared over the weekend, when news of a possible ban of Russian oil and refined products into the US and Europe was telegraphed by US officials, powering prices to $140/bbl.1 The US imported a combined 400k b/d of Russian crude oil and refined products in December 2021, the EIA reports, which accounted for less than 5% of the 8.6mm b/d of imports. Europe is another story.  Roughly 60% of Russia's 11.3mm b/d of crude oil and refined-products output goes to OECD Europe, according to the IEA. Russia considers Western sanctions to be on an equal footing with a declaration of war.2  President Putin has threatened a nuclear response if the West interferes with invasion of Ukraine, which could elicit a similar response from the West.3  US shale producers will be highly incentivized to increase output given high prices.  Our view continues to include a production increase from core OPEC 2.0 – Saudi Arabia, UAE and Kuwait.  We also anticipate a return of 1mm b/d from Iran, following a nuclear deal with the US. Bottom Line: We remain long commodity-index exposure (S&P GSCI and the COMT ETF), along with equity exposure to oil and gas producers via the XOP ETF. Footnotes 1     Please see Crude price jumps on talk of US oil ban as Russia steps up shelling of civilian areas, published by the Financial Times on March 6, 2022. 2     Please see Putin says Western sanctions are akin to declaration of war, published on March 5, 2022. 3    Please see How likely is the use of nuclear weapons by Russia?, published by Chatham House on March 1, 2022.  The report notes, " If Russia were to attack Ukraine with nuclear weapons, NATO countries would most likely respond on the grounds that the impact of nuclear weapons crosses borders and affects the countries surrounding Ukraine. NATO could respond either by using conventional forces on Russian strategic assets, or respond in kind using nuclear weapons as it has several options available."

Executive Summary Nuclear Worries Take Center Stage Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse Vladimir Putin has now committed himself to orchestrating a regime change in Kyiv. Anything less would be seen as a defeat for him. Assuming he succeeds, and it is far from obvious that he will, the resulting insurgency will drain Russian resources. Along with continued sanctions, this will lead to a further deterioration in Russian living standards and growing domestic discontent. If Putin concludes that he has no future, the risk is that he will decide that no one else should have a future either. Although there is a huge margin of error around any estimate, subjectively, we would assign an uncomfortably high 10% chance of a civilization-ending global nuclear war over the next 12 months. These odds place some credence on Brandon Carter’s highly controversial Doomsday Argument. Even if World War III is ultimately averted, markets could experience a freak-out moment over the next few weeks, similar to what happened at the outset of the pandemic. Google searches for nuclear war are already spiking. Despite the risk of nuclear war, it makes sense to stay constructive on stocks over the next 12 months. If an ICBM is heading your way, the size and composition of your portfolio becomes irrelevant. Thus, from a purely financial perspective, you should largely ignore existential risk, even if you do care about it greatly from a personal perspective. Bottom Line: The risk of Armageddon has risen dramatically. Stay bullish on stocks over a 12-month horizon. All In on Sanctions In the criminal justice system, there is a reason why the punishment for armed robbery is lower than for murder. If the punishment were the same, an armed robber would have a perverse incentive to kill his victim in order to better conceal his crime. The same logic applies, or at least used to apply, to geopolitics: You do not impose maximum sanctions from the get-go because that removes your ability to influence your enemy with the threat of further sanctions. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the West chose to go all in on sanctions, levying every type imaginable with the exception of those entailing a big cost to the West (such as cutting off Russian energy exports). Most notably, many Russian banks have been blocked from the SWIFT messaging system while the Russian central bank’s foreign exchange reserves have been frozen. Even FIFA has barred Russia from international competition, just weeks before it was set to participate in the qualifying rounds of the 2022 World Cup. At this point, there is not much more that can be done on the sanctions front. This leaves military intervention as the only avenue available to further pressure Russia. A growing chorus of Western pundits, some of whom could not have picked out Ukraine on a map two weeks ago, have begun clamoring for regime change… this time, in Moscow. As one might imagine, this is not something that sits well with Putin. Last week, he declared that “No matter who tries to stand in our way or … create threats for our country and our people, they must know that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.” To ensure there was no uncertainty about what he was talking about, he proceeded to place Russia’s nuclear forces on “special regime of combat duty.” Yes, It’s Possible The Putin regime has used nuclear weapons of a sort in the past. The FSB likely orchestrated the poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko with polonium-210 in 2006, leaving traces of the radioactive substance scattered in dozens of places across London. As former US presidential advisor and Putin biographer Fiona Hill said in a recent interview with Politico, “Every time you think, “No, he wouldn’t, would he?” Well, yes, he would.” Admittedly, there is a big difference between dropping polonium into a cup of tea at the Millennium hotel in Mayfair and dropping a 10-megaton nuclear bomb on London or any other major Western city. Still, if Putin feels that he has no future, he may try to take everyone down with him. The collapse in the ruble, and what is sure to be a major plunge of living standards across Russia, could foment internal opposition to Putin. A quiet retirement is not an option for him. Based on the latest exchange rates, Russia’s GDP is smaller than Mexico’s and barely higher than that of Illinois (Chart 1). While denying gas to Europe is a very real threat, it has a limited shelf life. Europe will aggressively build out infrastructure to process LNG imports. Chart 1Russia's Economic Power Has Faded Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse In a few years, the one viable weapon that Russia will have at its disposal is its nuclear arsenal. As Dutch historian Jolle Demmers has said, “It is precisely the decline and contraction of Russian power, coupled with the possession of nuclear weapons and a tormented repressive president, that poses great risks.” Some of the world’s most prominent strategic thinkers flagged these risks before the invasion, but with little effect. The Mother of All Risks In simulated war games, it is generally difficult to get participants to cross the nuclear threshold, but once they do, a full-blown nuclear exchange usually ensues.1 The idea of “limited” nuclear war is a mirage.  How high are the odds of such a full-blown war? I must confess that my own feelings on the matter are heavily colored by my writings on existential risk. As I argued in Section XII of my special report, “Life, Death, and Finance in the Cosmic Multiverse,” we are probably greatly understating existential risk, especially when we look prospectively into the future. Although there is a huge margin of error around any estimate, subjectively, we would assign an uncomfortably high 10% chance of a civilization-ending global nuclear war over the next 12 months. These odds place some credence on Brandon Carter’s highly controversial Doomsday argument (See Box 1). A Paradox for Investors For investors, existential risk represents a paradoxical concept. If an ICBM is heading your way, the question of whether you are overweight or underweight stocks would be pretty far down on your list of priorities. And even if you were inclined to think about your portfolio, how would you alter it? In a full-blown global nuclear war, most stocks would go to zero while governments would probably be forced to default or inflate away their debt. Gold might retain some value – provided that you kept it in your physical possession – but even then, you would still have trouble exchanging it for anything of value if nothing of value were available to purchase. This means that from a purely financial perspective, you should largely ignore existential risk, even if you do care greatly about it from a personal perspective. What, then, can we say about the current market environment? I touched on many of the key issues in Monday’s Special Alert, in which we tactically downgraded global equities from overweight to neutral. I encourage readers to consult that report for our latest market views. In the remainder of today’s report, allow me to elaborate on a couple of key themes. A Freak-Out Moment Is Coming Chart 2Nuclear Worries Take Center Stage Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse The market today reminds me of early 2020. We wrote a report on February 21 of that year entitled “Markets Too Complacent About The Coronavirus,” in which we noted that a full-blown pandemic “could lead to 20 million deaths worldwide,” and that “This would likely trigger a global downturn as deep as the Great Recession of 2008/09, with the only consolation being that the recovery would be much more rapid than the one following the financial crisis.” Many saw that report as alarmist, just as they saw our subsequent decision to upgrade stocks in March as cavalier.  Even if you knew in February 2020 that the S&P 500 would reach an all-time high later that year, you should have still shorted equities aggressively on a tactical basis. I feel the same way about the present. Google searches for nuclear war are spiking (Chart 2). A freak-out moment is coming, which will present a good buying opportunity for investors. Just to be on the safe side, I picked up a couple of bottles of Potassium Iodide earlier this week. When I checked the pharmacy again yesterday, all the bottles were sold out. They are now being hawked on Amazon for ten times the regular price. From Cold War to Hot Economy? The spike in commodity prices – especially energy prices – will have a negative near-term impact on global growth, while also limiting the ability of central banks to slow the pace of planned rate hikes (Chart 3). In general, inflation expectations and oil prices move together (Chart 4).   Chart 3Central Banks: Caught Between A Rock And A Hard Place Central Banks: Caught Between A Rock And A Hard Place Central Banks: Caught Between A Rock And A Hard Place   Chart 4Inflation Expectations And Oil Prices Go Hand-In-Hand Inflation Expectations And Oil Prices Go Hand-In-Hand Inflation Expectations And Oil Prices Go Hand-In-Hand Assuming the geopolitical situation stabilizes in a few months, oil prices should come down. The forward curve for oil is heavily backwardated now: The spot price for Brent is $111/bbl while the December 2022 price is $93/bbl (Chart 5). BCA’s commodity strategists expect the price of Brent oil to fall to $88/bbl by year-end. The decline in energy prices should provide some relief to global growth and risk assets in the back half of the year, which is one reason we are more constructive on equities over a 12-month horizon than a 3-month horizon. Looking out beyond the next year or two, the new cold war will lead to higher, not lower, interest rates. Increased spending on defense and alternative energy sources will prop up aggregate demand, especially in Europe where the need to diversify away from Russian gas is greatest. As Chart 6 shows, capex in the euro area cratered following the euro debt crisis. Capital spending via the Recovery Fund and other sources will rise significantly over the next few years. Chart 5The Brent Curve Is Heavily Backwardated Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse Chart 6European Capex Is Poised To Increase European Capex Is Poised To Increase European Capex Is Poised To Increase In addition, the shift to a multipolar world will expedite the retreat from globalization. Rising globalization was an important force restraining inflation – and interest rates – over the past few decades. Lastly, the ever-present danger of war could prompt households to reduce savings. It does not make sense to save for a rainy day if that day never arrives. Lower savings implies a higher equilibrium rate of interest. As we discussed in our recent report entitled “A Two-Stage Fed Tightening Cycle,” after raising rates modesty this year, the Fed will resume hiking rates towards the end of 2023 or in 2024, as it becomes clear that the neutral rate in nominal terms is closer to 3%-to-4% rather than the 2% that the market assumes. The secular bull market in equities will likely end at that point. In summary, equity investors should be somewhat cautious over the next three months, more optimistic over a 12-month horizon, but more cautious again over a longer-term horizon of 2-to-5 years. Box 1The Doomsday Argument In A Nutshell Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1     For example, an article from the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation discusses a Reagan administration war game called “Proud Prophet,” an exercise the Americans hatched to test the theory of limited nuclear strikes. The result of this exercise was that the “Soviet Union perceived even a low-yield nuclear strike as an attack, and responded with a massive missile salvo.” Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse Rising Risk Of A Nuclear Apocalypse