Oil

Trepidation engulfs commodity markets like a fog weaving through half-deserted streets. Central bankers huddle in muttering retreats, growing more cautious by the day. EM growth concerns – particularly slowing trade volumes, and the drama surrounding Sino – U.S. trade negotiations – contribute to this. Europe’s slowdown as Brexit approaches, and a U.S. government that seems forever at loggerheads also sap investor confidence. Nonetheless, the level of industrial commodity demand – oil and copper in particular – continues to hold up. By our reckoning, EM growth still is positive y/y. And central bank caution – along with less-restrictive policies – provides a supportive backdrop for industrial commodities down the road. The production discipline we expect from OPEC 2.0 this year sets the stage for a continued rally in oil prices. Given our view on EM growth, we continue to favor staying long oil exposure, and remaining exposed to industrial commodities generally via the S&P GSCI position we recommended on December 7, 2017. Highlights Energy: Overweight. We are closing our open long call spreads in 2019 Brent, having lost the ~ $1/bbl premium in each. We are opening a new set of similar positions in anticipation of the next up-leg in Brent. At tonight’s close of trading, we will go long Brent $70 Calls vs. short $75 Calls in June, July and August 2019. Base Metals/Bulks: Neutral. Metal Bulletin’s benchmark iron ore price index for China traded through $90/MT earlier this week, as supply concerns continue to weigh on markets in the wake of evacuations from areas close to tailings dams used by miners.1 Precious Metals: Neutral. Bullion broker Sharps Pixley reported the PBOC’s gold reserves total almost 60mm ounces, up 380k ounces from end-2018 levels. Russia’s state media outlet RT proclaimed: “China on gold-buying spree amid global push to end US dollar dominance” on Tuesday. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Last week’s USDA WASDE report estimates world ending stocks for grains will be up slightly for the 2018-19 crop year at 772.2mm MT vs 766.6mm MT previously estimated in December. A January report was not issued due to the U.S. government shutdown. Feature In discussions with clients in the Middle East last week, few contested the assertion OPEC 2.0 is determined to keep supply below demand this year, in order to draw down global oil and refined product inventories.2 This strategy worked well for the coalition after it was stood up in November 2016. Back then, production cutbacks, an unexpected collapse of Venezuelan output, and random outages in Libya and elsewhere combined with above-average global demand to keep consumption above production. This led to a drawdown in OECD inventories of 260mm barrels between January 2017 and June 2018. OPEC 2.0 is off to a strong start on its renewed effort to rein in production and draw down inventories. OPEC (the old Cartel) cut nearly 800k b/d of production in January m/m, bringing members’ total crude output to 30.8mm b/d.3 The largest cut once again came from KSA, which reported it reduced output by just over 400k b/d m/m in January. This follows a 450k b/d reduction in December 2018 reported by the Kingdom in last month’s OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report. For March, KSA already is indicating it plans to drop production to 9.8mm b/d – 1.3mm b/d less than it was pumping in November 2018. There are some signs of discord within OPEC 2.0. Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin once again is arguing against the coalition’s production-cutting strategy, this time in a letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin.4 This is not the first time such disagreements were aired: In November 2017, leaders of Russia’s oil industry walked out of a meeting with Energy Minister Alexander Novak following a disagreement with the government on extending OPEC 2.0’s production-cutting deal launched at the beginning of the year. In the end, the deal was extended after President Putin weighed in.5 A Deeper Look At Demand Uncertainty These supply-side issues are not trivial, and pose significant risks to our price view. All the same, Russia does benefit from higher oil prices, in that inelastic global demand in the short-to-medium term produces a non-linear price increase when supply is reduced. Russia’s OPEC 2.0 quota calls for production to fall from 11.4mm b/d production basis its October 2018 reference level (11.6mm b/d at present) to 11.2mm b/d in 2019. As long as Russia’s participation in the OPEC 2.0 coalition advances its economic and geopolitical interests – i.e., higher revenues than could be expected without having a direct role in global production management, and in deepening its ties with KSA – we expect it to remain a member in good standing in OPEC 2.0. At the moment, the bigger issues center on the state of global demand for industrial commodities. Unlike the situation that prevailed during the first round of OPEC 2.0 cuts, global markets no longer are seeing a synchronized global recovery in aggregate demand. Rather, EM commodity demand growth – the engine of global growth – has been trending down at a slow and constant pace since the beginning of 2018. This is not news: It shows up in our new Global Industrial Activity (GIA) index, and we’ve been writing about it and accounting for it in our metals and oil demand projections for months (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekCommodity Demand May Be Bottoming Commodity Demand May Be Bottoming Commodity Demand May Be Bottoming BCA’s GIA index is heavily weighted to EM commodity demand. Based on our estimates, it appears to be close to or in a bottoming phase and ready to turn up within the next quarter. It is worthwhile pointing out that even with the slowdown over the past year or so, BCA’s GIA index still stands significantly higher than the level registered during the manufacturing downturn of 2015-16. This also adds color as to why the OPEC market-share war launched in November 2014 was so devastating to prices – demand was contracting while supplies were surging from OPEC 2.0 states and from U.S. shale-oil producers. Pessimism Is Overdone We have maintained for some time commodity markets are overly pessimistic on the global growth outlook, mainly because of their gloomy view on the Chinese economy, and anticipated knock-on effects for EM growth arising from this view. Our colleagues at BCA’s Global Fixed Income Strategy succinctly capture the current mood pervading global markets: “… this current soft patch for the global economy is occurring alongside an extreme divergence between plunging growth expectations and more stable readings on current economic conditions. The fall in expectations is visible in the most countries, according to data series that measure confidence for businesses, consumers and investors.”6 We continue to expect the slowdown in EM to persist in 1H19 based on our modeling and actual consumption data. Part – not all – of this is due to the slowdown in China, where policymakers are moving to reverse earlier financial tightening with modest fiscal and monetary stimulus in 1H19. We continue to expect the Communist Party leadership in China will want to start increasing stimulus later this year or in 1H20, so that it hits the economy full force in 2021 in time for the 100th anniversary of the founding of the CCP. Such stimulus will bolster industrial commodity demand. Still, this is difficult to call, particularly the form stimulus will take. President Xi appears committed rebalancing China’s economy – i.e., supporting consumer-led growth – and may want to keep policy powder dry, so to speak, to counter a recession in 2020 or thereafter. Stimulating the consumer economy in China could boost consumption of gasoline, and demand for white goods like household appliances at the expense of heavy industrial demand. Oil and base metals used in stainless steel would benefit in such an environment. Timing this rebound remains difficult. It appears to us that oil and, to a lesser extent, base metals have undershot their fair-value levels (based on our modeling) on the back of negative expectations and sentiment. If we are correct in this assessment, this should limit the negative surprises going forward and open upside opportunities for commodity prices (Chart 2). Chart 2Technically, Oil's Oversold Technically, Oil's Oversold Technically, Oil's Oversold Under The Hood Of BCA’s Newest Model Because demand is so difficult to capture, we continually are looking for different gauges to measure it and cross-check against each other. We developed our Global Industrial Activity index to target the actual performance of commodity-intensive activities globally. Each component is selected based on its sensitivity to the cycle in global industrial activity, hence on the cycle of global commodity demand. This is different from the BCA Global Leading Economic Indicator (LEI), which uses a GDP-weighted average of 23 countries’ LEI. By relying on GDP, the LEI weights in the indicator favor DM countries and do not account for the growing share of the service sector in these economies (Chart 3).7 Chart 3GIA Captures Commodity Demand GIA Captures Commodity Demand GIA Captures Commodity Demand Our GIA index focuses on commodity demand, which is fundamentally different from proxies of global real GDP growth or global economic activity. Nonetheless, we included the BCA global LEI with a small weight (~ 10%) in our index to capture DM economies. This inclusion does add information to our new gauge. Our GIA index correlates with Emerging Markets’ GDP, copper and oil prices with lags of one to three months. This index is designed to measure the strength of the underlying demand for commodities. It does not account for the supply side and other idiosyncratic shocks that affects each commodity. For instance, our index captures ~ 55% of the variation in the y/y movement in oil prices; adding our oil market supply and sentiment indicators on top of the demand variable raises this to more than 80% (Chart 4). Chart 4Combined Indicators Work Best Combined Indicators Work Best Combined Indicators Work Best The index is divided into four main components, which gauge the demand-side impacts of (1) trade; (2) currency movements; (3) manufacturing demand; and (4) the Chinese economy, given its importance to overall commodity demand. The GIA index’s Trade Component combines EM import volumes and an estimate of global dry bulk shipping rates to gauge demand. Readers of the Commodity & Energy Strategy are familiar with our use of EM trade volumes as a proxy for EM income.8 This week, we introduce a new proxy for shipping rates using the Baltic Dry Index (BDI) as a proxy of global economic activity. Our methodology is based on the approaches taken by James D. Hamilton and Lutz Kilian in their respective models that use the BDI to proxy global growth.9 We created two alternative measures based on each of their approaches and average them to come up with our own proxy of the cyclical factor of global shipping rates driven by demand. Both of our alternative measures use a rebased version of the real BDI, which uses the U.S. CPI to deflate the nominal value. Because it picks up the surge in shipping activity in 2H18 resulting from the front-running of tariffs in the Sino – U.S. trade war, the Trade Component of our GIA index gives the most positive readings of all the components (Chart 5, panel 1). By the end of this month, we expect the effects of this front-running to avoid tariffs will wash through the gauge, and we will have greater clarity on the state of global trade. Chart 5Performance Of GIA Components Performance Of GIA Components Performance Of GIA Components The Currency Component uses a basket of currencies that are sensitive to global growth – i.e., the currencies of countries heavily engaged in trade – and the Risky vs. Safe-haven currency ratio built by BCA’s Emerging Market Strategy.10 This allows us to capture the information regarding the state of global economic activity contained in the highly efficient and forward-looking currency markets. This component collapsed in March 2018, but seems to have bottomed recently (Chart 5, panel 2). The Manufacturing Component looks at the PMIs and various business conditions and expectations surveys for countries that have large industrial exposures to the economic health of EM.11 Currently, this component signals a continuation of the downward trend first observed at the beginning of 2018 (Chart 5, panel 3). Lastly, the Chinese Economy Component uses two indicators of the country’s industrial output: the Li Keqiang Index, and our China Construction Indicator. Despite the fact that the slowdown in China is at the center of investor pessimism re global demand, this component is still holding well (Chart 5, panel 4). It has a moderate negative trend, but is not alarming for commodity demand. Moreover, we expect some stimulus in the second half of the year, which should keep this component supportive for commodity prices. Industrial Commodity Demand Still Holding Up Our GIA index proxies demand for industrial commodities, which is closely aligned with EM GDP – as GDP grows, demand for industrial commodities grows (Chart 6, panel 1). The GIA index is more correlated with copper prices than with oil prices, but it still provides an excellent snapshot of the state of demand for these commodities (Chart 4). Chart 6GIA, Meet Dr. Copper GIA, Meet Dr. Copper GIA, Meet Dr. Copper Also, it is interesting to note there appears to be only one large specific supply shock that affected the copper market’s relationship with global demand (Chart 6, panel 2). Our new index supports the Market’s “Dr. Copper” argument, in the sense that copper prices are pretty much always aligned with global industrial activity. We also note that the recent Sino – U.S. trade tensions have pushed copper below the value that is explained by our demand proxy. Bottom Line: The resolve of OPEC 2.0 to reduce production is not in doubt. OPEC (the old Cartel) reported this week its member states cut nearly 800k b/d of production in January m/m, bringing members’ total crude output to 30.8mm b/d. On the demand side, new GIA index indicates things are not as bad as sentiment and expectations would indicate. If anything, we expect the combination of OPEC 2.0’s resolve and rising demand for industrial commodities – oil and copper in particular – to lift prices as the year progresses.   Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please see “Brazil evacuates towns near Vale, ArcelorMittal dams on fears of collapse,” published by reuters.com on February 8, 2019. 2      OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the producer coalition of OPEC states, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and non-OPEC states, led by Russia, which recently agreed to cut production by ~ 1.2mm b/d to drain commercial oil inventories and re-balance markets globally. 3      Please see the February 2019 issue of OPEC’s Monthly Oil Market Report, which is available at opec.org. 4      Please see “Exclusive: Russia’s Sechin raises pressure on Putin to end OPEC deal,” published by uk.reuters.com February 8, 2019. 5      Please see “Russian oil unsettled by talk of longer production cuts,” published by ft.com November 15, 2017. 6      Please see “A Crisis Of Confidence?” published by BCA Research’s Global Fixed Income Strategy, published February 12, 2019.  It is available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 7      The components of the global LEI are also different from our GIA index, and more market-oriented. For details on each series included in the LEI, please see “OECD Composite Leading Indicators: Turning Points of References Series and Component Series,” published February 2019. It is available at oecd.org. 8      Please see BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report “Trade, Dollars, Oil & Metals ... Assessing Downside Risk,” where we discussed the relationship between EM imports volume, EM income and commodity prices, published August 23, 2018, and is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 9      The best approach is still debated in the literature. For more details on Hamilton and Kilian’s measurements, please see James D Hamilton, “Measuring Global Economic Activity,” Working paper, August 20, 2018 and Lutz Kilian, “Measuring Global Real Economic Activity: Do Recent Critiques Hold Up To Scrutiny?” Working paper, January 12, 2019. By selecting EM only import volumes and our proxy shipping rate based on the BDI, we narrow our Trade Component to factors that are mainly linked to industrial activity and commodity-intensive sectors. 10     Our basket of currencies includes Korea, Sweden, Chile, Thailand, Malaysia and Peru. The risky vs. safe-haven currency ratio average of CAD, AUD, NZD, BRL, CLP & ZAR total return indices relative to average of JPY & CHF total returns (including carry). 11     This includes Korea, Singapore, Sweden, Germany, Japan, China and Australia. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades     TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 4Q18 Image Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table   Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Trades Closed in 2018 Image

Highlights Hyman Minsky famously said that “stability begets instability.” The converse is also true: Instability begets stability. None of the preconditions for a U.S. recession are in place yet. The Fed’s decision to press the pause button on further rate hikes ensures that it will take at least another 18 months for monetary policy to turn restrictive. Global growth should accelerate by mid-2019, as Chinese stimulus kicks in and the headwinds facing Europe dissipate. Investors should overweight global equities and underweight bonds over the next 12 months. The leadership role in the equity space will gradually shift outside the United States. Feature The Long Shadow Of The Financial Crisis   "Stability begets instability” declared Hyman Minsky in his widely cited, seldom-read book.1 By this, Minsky meant that periods of economic tranquility often encourage excessive risk-taking, sowing the seeds of their own demise. We would not quarrel with Minsky’s assessment, but we would point out that the converse is also true: Instability begets stability. Following periods of intense financial stress, lenders become more circumspect about whom they lend to, while borrowers become reluctant to take on debt. The result is economically bittersweet. On the plus side, the newfound caution of lenders and borrowers alike ensures that financial imbalances are slow to build up again. On the negative side, sluggish credit growth restrains spending. The net effect is a recovery that is often slow and uneven, but one which lasts longer than expected. Few Signs Of Major U.S. Economic Imbalances This is the world in which we find ourselves today. It took a decade following the subprime crisis for the U.S. to return to full employment. Much of Europe is not even there yet. Lenders continue to take risks. However, they have been quicker than usual to scale back exposure at the first sign of trouble. For example, as U.S. auto loan defaults began rising in 2015, banks tightened lending standards. As a result, the share of auto loans transitioning into delinquency peaked in Q4 of 2016 and has since drifted down modestly (Chart 1). Chart 1Lenders Are More Circumspect These Days: The Case Of Autos Lenders Are More Circumspect These Days: The Case Of Autos Lenders Are More Circumspect These Days: The Case Of Autos A similar thing happened when corporate credit spreads blew out in 2015 following the crash in oil prices (Chart 2). Banks tightened lending standards starting in late 2015. Once defaults peaked in early 2017, banks started easing standards. Chart 2Banks Were Quick To Tighten Lending Standards In 2015 Banks Were Quick To Tighten Lending Standards In 2015 Banks Were Quick To Tighten Lending Standards In 2015 Tellingly, the distress in corporate debt markets in 2015-16 did not cause the financial system to seize up, as evidenced by the fact that financial stress indices only increased marginally during that period. This suggests that financial imbalances never had a chance to rise to a level that threatened the overall economy. The Preconditions For The Next U.S. Recession Are Not Yet In Place Today, the U.S. private-sector financial balance – the difference between what the private sector earns and spends – stands at a healthy surplus of 2.1% of GDP. Both of the last two recessions began when the private-sector balance was in deficit (Chart 3). Chart 3The Private Sector Is Not Living Beyond Its Means The Way It Was Before The Last Two Recessions The Private Sector Is Not Living Beyond Its Means The Way It Was Before The Last Two Recessions The Private Sector Is Not Living Beyond Its Means The Way It Was Before The Last Two Recessions This raises an intriguing question: If the U.S. private sector is not suffering from any major imbalances, what is going to cause the next recession? That’s a very good question, with no obvious answer! The past two recessions were triggered by the bursting of asset bubbles – first the dotcom bubble and then the housing bubble. Today, U.S. equities are far from cheap, but with the S&P 500 trading at 16.1-times forward earnings, they are hardly in a bubble (Chart 4). The housing market is also on much firmer footing: The homeowner vacancy rate is near all-time lows, while the quality of mortgage lending has been very high (Chart 5). Chart 4While U.S. Stocks Are Not Cheap, They Aren't In A Bubble While U.S. Stocks Are Not Cheap, They Aren't In A Bubble While U.S. Stocks Are Not Cheap, They Aren't In A Bubble Chart 5Housing Fundamentals Are Solid Housing Fundamentals Are Solid Housing Fundamentals Are Solid Of course, recessions can occur for reasons other than the bursting of asset bubbles. The 1973-74 recession and the recessions of the early 1980s were triggered by a surge in oil prices, requiring the Fed to hike rates aggressively. Luckily, such an oil-induced recession is highly unlikely today. Inflation expectations are better anchored, while oil consumption represents a much smaller share of GDP than it did back then (Chart 6). In addition, the U.S. has become a major oil producer, which implies that the drag to consumers from higher oil prices would be partly offset by increased capital spending in the energy sector. At any rate, the ability of shale producers to respond to higher prices with additional output limits the extent to which prices can rise in the first place. Chart 6An Oil Price Shock Is Unlikely To Cause A Recession An Oil Price Shock Is Unlikely To Cause A Recession An Oil Price Shock Is Unlikely To Cause A Recession Past economic downturns have also been caused by major adjustments in the cyclical parts of the economy. As a share of GDP, cyclical spending is lower today than it has been at the outset of most recessions (Chart 7). The proliferation of just-in-time inventory systems has also reduced the influence that inventory swings have on the economy (Chart 8). Chart 7Cyclical Spending Is Not Extended Cyclical Spending Is Not Extended Cyclical Spending Is Not Extended Chart 8 A severe tightening of fiscal policy can also trigger a recession.2 Fortunately, the end of the government shutdown reduces the risk of such an outcome. Rightly or wrongly, voters blamed President Trump for the recent closure (Chart 9). As we speak, the Trump administration is negotiating with Democrats to avert another shutdown slated to begin on February 15. The key item of contention concerns funding for a border wall with Mexico. Even if a deal falls through, rather than shuttering the government again, Trump will probably pursue funding for the wall by declaring a national emergency. Our geopolitical strategists believe such an action will be challenged by the Democrats, but is likely to be upheld by the Supreme Court. Chart 9''I Am Proud To Shut Down The Government'' ''I Am Proud To Shut Down The Government''' ''I Am Proud To Shut Down The Government''' Global Growth Should Improve Admittedly, the external environment now has a greater influence on the U.S. economy than in the past. Nevertheless, given that exports are only 12% of GDP, it would take a sizeable external shock to knock the U.S. into recession. We think that such a shock is not in the cards. The trade war is likely to go on hiatus as Trump seeks to take credit for a deal with China. In addition, as we discussed two weeks ago, China will scale back its deleveraging campaign now that credit growth has fallen close to nominal GDP growth (Chart 10).3    Chart 10China: Time To Scale Back Deleveraging China: Time To Scale Back Deleveraging China: Time To Scale Back Deleveraging Euro area growth should reaccelerate over the coming months thanks to lower oil prices, a revival in EM demand, modestly more stimulative fiscal policy, and the palliative effects from the decline in government bond yields across the region. We have also argued that the risks of a “Hard Brexit” should abate.4   Waiting... And Waiting For Inflation To Rise When the next recession rolls around, it will probably be sparked by a surge in inflation, which forces the Fed to raise interest rates much more rapidly than it has so far. Here is the thing though: Inflation is a highly lagging indicator. It usually only peaks long after a downturn has started and troughs after the recovery is well underway (Chart 11). Chart 11   Consider the example of the 1960s. The unemployment rate fell below NAIRU in 1964, but it took another four years for inflation to break out in earnest (Chart 12). The U.S. unemployment rate has been below NAIRU only since 2017. The unemployment rate in Germany and Japan has been below NAIRU for much longer, yet inflation remains stubbornly low in both countries (Chart 13). Chart 12It Took An Overheated Economy For Inflation To Take Off In The Late-1960s It Took An Overheated Economy For Inflation To Take Off In The Late-1960s It Took An Overheated Economy For Inflation To Take Off In The Late-1960s Chart 13The U.S., Japanese, And German Economies Are At Full Employment The U.S., Japanese, And German Economies Are At Full Employment The U.S., Japanese, And German Economies Are At Full Employment Cheer Up This leaves us with a striking conclusion: Perhaps the next U.S. recession is not around the corner, as some grumpy economists seem to think. Perhaps this economic expansion can endure beyond 2020. The recent U.S. data has certainly been consistent with that thesis. The ISM manufacturing index rose 2.3 percentage points to 56.6 in January. New orders jumped by 6.9 percentage points to 58.2. Payroll growth has also accelerated. Real aggregate earnings are up 4.2% from a year earlier, the fastest pace since October 2015 (Chart 14). Chart 14U.S. Labor Income Growth Has Been Accelerating U.S. Labor Income Growth Has Been Accelerating U.S. Labor Income Growth Has Been Accelerating Housing data are showing tentative evidence of stabilization. New home sales are rebounding, while mortgage applications are back near cycle-highs (Chart 15). Chart 15Housing Activity Is Stabilizing After Last Year's Weakness Housing Activity Is Stabilizing After Last Year's Weakness Housing Activity Is Stabilizing After Last Year's Weakness Reflecting these positive developments, the Citigroup economic surprise index has jumped into positive territory (Chart 16). The New York Fed’s estimate for Q1 2019 GDP growth has also moved up to 2.4%. Chart 16U.S. Economic Data Are Beating Low Expectations U.S. Economic Data Are Beating Low Expectations U.S. Economic Data Are Beating Low Expectations Investment Conclusions Recessions and bear markets usually overlap (Chart 17). With the next recession still at least 18 months away, it is premature to turn bearish on equities. We upgraded stocks in December following the post-FOMC sell-off. Although our tactical MacroQuant model is pointing to an elevated risk of a setback over the next few weeks, we continue to see global equities finishing the year 5%-to-10% above current levels. As global growth bottoms out mid-year, the leadership role in equity markets should increasingly move away from the U.S. towards EM and Europe. Chart 17Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Bonds are a tougher call. We do not expect the Fed to raise rates again at least until June. This will limit the upside for bond yields, as well as the dollar, in the near term. Nevertheless, with the fed funds futures pricing in no rate hikes for the next few years, even a modest shift back to tightening in the second half of this year and beyond will push up bond yields, dampening total returns to fixed income. Looking beyond 2019, the case for maintaining a short duration stance in fixed-income portfolios is very strong. The longer the Fed allows the economy to overheat, the greater the eventual overshoot in inflation will be. Inflation expectations have fallen over the past few months (Chart 18). They should have risen. Ultimately, Gentle Jay Powell’s decision to press the pause button on further rate hikes means that rates will end up peaking at a higher level during this cycle than they would have otherwise. Chart 18Inflation Expectations Have Declined Inflation Expectations Have Declined Inflation Expectations Have Declined   Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      As argued in Hyman P. Minsky, “Stabilizing an Unstable Economy,” Yale University Press, (1986). 2      Severe episodes of fiscal tightening have normally followed military demobilizations. These include the recessions following WW1, WW2, and the Korean War, and to a much lesser extent, the 1990-91 recession which was exacerbated by cuts to the defense budget at the end of the Cold War. 3      Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “China’s Savings Problem,” dated January 25, 2019. 4      Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Patient Jay,” dated January 18, 2019. Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Chart 19 Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Venezuela’s stability is deteriorating rapidly along the lines of our projections in recent years. Regime failure is at this point a high probability and poses immediate risks to global oil production. Our conviction is high because of the unprecedented combination of internal and external factors working against the regime: Economic collapse: Economic collapse has translated into total social collapse, as indicated by the large-scale emigration from the country (Chart 1). The current mass protests are the largest ever and are gaining momentum, while the opposition movement is coalescing into a single force against the regime as a whole for the first time. Political illegitimacy: What remained of the Maduro administration’s political legitimacy has eroded with his decision to ignore the results of the 2015 election and rig the election of 2018. The President of the National Assembly, Juan Guaidó, has declared himself President of the Republic based on an interpretation of the Venezuelan constitution and his leadership of the democratically elected National Assembly.1 International opposition: The erosion of Maduro’s legitimacy is reinforced by a rapidly changing international environment, with several countries becoming more assertive in opposing the regime. The United States and Colombia, on January 23, formally recognized Guaidó as president. They are joined by Canada and several other Latin American states, including Brazil, which is taking a more confrontational posture under the newly inaugurated President Jair Bolsonaro. This marks a rare coordination of North and South American states in pursuing a harder policy toward Venezuela. U.S. intervention: The United States, in particular, is taking a more interventionist stance through tighter sanctions. Indeed a limited U.S. military intervention is one of our top five geopolitical “Black Swans” for this year. Such an intervention could be further motivated by President Donald Trump’s need to distract from his domestic woes (Chart 2). His weak popular approval is comparable to that of President Ronald Reagan at this stage in Reagan’s first term, when he intervened in the small island state of Grenada. Venezuela is not Grenada, but the U.S. is also not considering outright invasion. Trump is facing a serious risk of becoming a “lame duck” due to the fall in his popularity amid the government shutdown and gridlock in Congress. A foreign policy response to a humanitarian crisis is an obvious way for him to try to increase his influence over the remainder of his term. Moreover, the U.S. diplomatic and defense establishment may agree on the need to reinforce the Monroe Doctrine against anti-democratic politics and growing Chinese (and Russian) influence in Venezuela. Chart 1 Chart 2Trump May Distract From His Woes Trump May Distract From His Woes Trump May Distract From His Woes What remains is to see whether the U.S. adds force (tougher sanctions) to its more aggressive diplomatic posture, and whether the Venezuelan opposition remains mobilized and unified in rejecting anything except a transition to a new government. The U.S. is already considering expanding sanctions, including a likely deathblow that would involve sanctioning Venezuelan oil imports and the export of diluents necessary to process Venezuela’s heavy sour crude. Within Venezuela, the opposition’s momentum and the role of the National Bolivarian Armed Forces will be decisive: so far there are small signs of fracture (Table 1), but no sign of a substantial turn against the Maduro regime.Sufficient popular pressure can create a “tipping point,” however, after which the military and security forces are no longer effective in executing the government’s writ and the socio-political situation declines beyond the ability of the regime to stay in power. Persistent large-scale protests concentrating on Maduro’s departure and/or a split in the security forces could precipitate the final stage of transition to a new interim government in the short to medium term. Table 1Military Insurgencies Have Been Small And Unsuccessful … So Far Venezuelan Production Near Collapse Venezuelan Production Near Collapse Impact On The Oil Market In this context, we are raising the likelihood of a collapse of that state to an 80% probability, from our prior assessment (33%). We use the word “collapse” to stand for Venezuela’s production falling to 250k b/d to feed domestic refineries, from ~ 1mm b/d at present. In our simulation of how a collapse could affect oil prices, we make the following assumptions based on recent history – i.e., the run-up to the re-imposition of U.S. sanctions against Iranian oil exports. These assumptions are driven by our prior belief that the producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia, which we’ve dubbed OPEC 2.0, and the Trump administration will attempt to hold Brent crude oil prices at or below $80/bbl in the event of a collapse in Venezuela’s oil production. Here are our assumptions: Venezuela collapses next month; OPEC 2.0 responds with a one-month lag, and increases production by 500k b/d in March 2019. If Brent spot prices trade to $85/bbl, OPEC 2.0 raises production an additional 100k b/d. If prices continue to rise toward $100/bbl, OPEC 2.0 adds another 300k b/d to global supply. Further increases lead to the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) releasing 100k b/d as needed to reduce Brent prices to $80/bbl or less. If spot Brent prices rise toward $100/bbl, we assume there will be 200k b/d of demand destruction globally. Chart 3 shows how Brent and WTI prices would evolve per these assumptions. Because Venezuela’s production has fallen so much, we believe the collapse of that country’s oil industry can be managed by OPEC 2.0, and, if necessary, via U.S. SPR releases. Of course, a similar trajectory likely would occur in the event Venezuela’s oil industry collapses later.2 Chart 3A Venezuela Collapse Would Trigger OPEC 2.0 and U.S. Supply Responses A Venezuela Collapse Would Trigger OPEC 2.0 and U.S. Supply Responses A Venezuela Collapse Would Trigger OPEC 2.0 and U.S. Supply Responses In our simulation, the Brent spot price trades to $85/bbl in December 2019, and OPEC 2.0 adds an additional 100k b/d to global supply. Prices continue to rise, and we assume OPEC 2.0 member states release a combined 300k b/d in March 2020. The U.S. release 100k b/d of SPR in 2020. In addition, we do see demand destruction of 200k b/d in 2020, as prices reach close to $100/bbl. With all of this, prices are contained and start decreasing in mid-2020. Of course, whether these surges can be maintained indefinitely – i.e., until Venezuela comes back on line, or comparable crude grades can be shipped south from Canada – is an open question. Even so, there is no doubt that the leaders of OPEC 2.0 silenced more than a few critics by means of their 4Q18 production surge. KSA stands out in this regard, taking its November 2018 production over 11mm b/d from ~ 10mm b/d in 1H18 (Table 2). Table 2BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) Venezuelan Production Near Collapse Venezuelan Production Near Collapse As a practical matter, we have no way of knowing how OPEC 2.0 or the U.S. SPR would respond to a collapse in Venezuela’s oil industry. In these simulations, we’re making a call on how and when OPEC 2.0 might choose to release its spare capacity once again, as they did in the run-up to the U.S.’s Iran oil export sanctions last year (Chart 4). Chart 4 As the members of OPEC 2.0 – mostly KSA, when it’s all said and done – dig deeper into spare capacity, less is available to meet another unplanned outage – e.g., Libya or Nigeria lose significant barrels to civil unrest. That is, we are sure, a discussion OPEC 2.0 is and will be having among its members, and with the U.S. SPR. The global oil market still is exposed to a sharp loss of Iranian barrels on top of the loss of Venezuela’s supplies in the event that country’s oil industry collapses. This argues strongly for an extension of the waivers granted by the Trump administration in November for anywhere from 90 to 180 days, depending on how the Venezuela situation evolves. These waivers expire at the end of May. This would require us to change our balances assessment, should it occur.   Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see Articles 233, 333, 350 of the Venezuelan constitution. The domestic and international legal debate is beside the point: the effective power of the people, the security forces, and the international community will determine the outcome. 2 For more information on global supply and demand balances, and our most recent oil price forecasts, please see “OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy today. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com.  

OPEC 2.0 is building physical optionality, to deal with different possible moves the U.S. can make on Iranian oil export sanctions and waivers. This comes despite an apparent break in the sense of urgency Saudi Arabia and Russia feel re production cuts. The coalition’s market monitoring committee meets in April, followed by a full gathering in May, when U.S. waivers expire. If the U.S. extends waivers, OPEC 2.0 can extend production cuts; if it doesn’t, it can add supply as needed.1 On the demand side, markets appear to be overly concerned about a sharper-than-expected slowdown in China, which, if borne out, would restrain EM growth. We believe these fears are overdone, and expect a slight improvement in EM demand generally this year and next. In our new balances estimates, we see the OECD commercial oil inventory overhang clearing in 1H19, on the back of resilient demand, OPEC 2.0 discipline, and a more moderate level of growth in U.S. shale oil output. This keeps Brent on track to average $80/bbl this year and $85/bbl next year, with WTI trading $74/bbl this year, and $82/bbl next year. Highlights Energy: Overweight. Mandatory cuts of 325k b/d, coupled with additional exports of ~ 190k b/d due to additional train and pipeline capacity out of Canada, will drain the 35mm barrels of excess crude oil inventories targeted by the Alberta government in December by 1H19. The WCS – WTI spread narrowed to -$10/bbl from -$50/bbl on these mandatory cuts. By 2H19, we expect Canadian production cuts to average 95k b/d. Base Metals: Neutral. Aluminum output in China surged 11.3% y/y in December, hitting 3.05mm MT, according to Metal Bulletin. Total output for 2018 was 35.8mm MT, a 7.4% y/y increase. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold is holding its recent gains, as markets become more comfortable with the Fed pausing on its rates-normalization policy until 2H19. Agriculture: Underweight. Hot and dry weather in Brazil is threatening crop yields there. The unfavorable weather is expected to affect three-quarters of cotton-growing regions, half of sugar areas, a third of first-crop corn acreage, and a quarter of soy regions. Feature The first signs of fraying in the relationship between the putative leaders of OPEC 2.0 – the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), which cut production ~ 450k b/d m/m in December, and Russia, which raised output – are emerging, as world leaders meet in Davos. While this casts doubt on the leadership’s carefully cultivated amity, and their shared willingness to abide by the recently agreed output cuts, we do not believe it signals the end of the historic cooperation between these states. Total OPEC output – estimated by production-tracking sources outside the Cartel – stood at 31.6mm b/d in December, a prodigious 751k b/d reduction m/m. We expect continued oil production cuts from core OPEC states and decline-curve losses among non-Gulf OPEC and non-OPEC states within the coalition this year to remove at least 1.2mm b/d from the market, per the quotas agreed by members in December (Chart of the Week, Table 1). On top of this, mandatory Canadian production cuts of 325k b/d in 1H19 and 95k b/d in 2H19 will keep average production cuts at ~ 1.4mm b/d this year. Chart of the WeekOPEC 2.0 Will Resume Production Cuts OPEC 2.0 Will Resume Production Cuts OPEC 2.0 Will Resume Production Cuts Table 1OPEC 2.0 Production Cuts Could Exceed Quotas OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone OPEC 2.0’s cuts could persist into 2020, depending on how the U.S. deals with Iranian oil-export sanctions and waivers. Even though KSA and Russia apparently do not share the same sense of urgency re production cuts right now, we believe OPEC 2.0 is committed to draining oil inventories, particularly in the OECD.2 To do so, they’re increasing their operational flexibility – creating physical options, in a manner of speaking – to deal with a range of uncertain outcomes when U.S. waivers on Iranian export sanctions expire in May. Sanctions And OPEC 2.0’s Physical Options Despite the waivers granted to its eight top consumers shortly after U.S. sanctions took effect in November, Iranian exports plunged below 0.5mm b/d in December. As of December, China had substituted almost all of its Iranian imports for alternative barrels.3 This coincided with a production surge by OPEC 2.0 at the behest of the U.S. leading up to the November sanctions deadline of November 4, 2018, which swelled OECD inventories and took them above their rolling 5-year average level (Chart 2). India retained 30% of its May import levels from Iran, while Europe complied at 100% with U.S. sanctions (Table 2). Chart 3 shows the decrease in exports in preparation for the sanctions over the course of 2018. Chart 2OECD Inventory Overhang Will Draw As OPEC 2.0 Cuts and Losses Kick In OECD Inventory Overhang Will Draw As OPEC 2.0 Cuts and Losses Kick In OECD Inventory Overhang Will Draw As OPEC 2.0 Cuts and Losses Kick In Table 2Iran Exports By Destination 2018 (‘000 b/d) OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone Chart 3 Whether or not the waivers are extended is anyone’s guess. It is possible waivers will be extended for 90 or 180 days, as a way to counter OPEC 2.0 production cuts, and to offset the lag between filling new pipeline takeaway capacity in the Permian. We expect importers to queue up for Iranian barrels as the market tightens in 1H19. OPEC 2.0’s market monitoring committee will meet in April, followed by a ministerial meeting in May, just ahead of the expiration of the waivers.4 If the U.S. extends them, OPEC 2.0 can extend production cuts after it meets in May; if waivers are not extended, the Cartel can calibrate an appropriate supply response. Either way, we expect OPEC 2.0 will closely align its production schedule with any U.S. action on the sanctions and waivers. This will, we believe, keep change in the overall market’s supply side relatively constant, except for the month or two required to adjust OPEC 2.0 output. Permian Will Drive OPEC 2.0 Policy The larger issue for OPEC 2.0 comes in 4Q19, when ~ 2mm b/d of new pipeline takeaway capacity comes on line in the Permian Basin in West Texas. With additional takeaway capacity due to come on in 2020, the Cartel will have its work cut out for it next year.5 Our models show a slight decrease then flattening in U.S. rig counts over the coming months, as a result of the 4Q18 sell-off in WTI, with a rebound around mid-year (Chart 4). This is because rig count lags oil prices by ~4 months. Chart 4U.S. Shales Continue to Drive Lower 48 Production Growth (ex GOM) U.S. Shales Continue to Drive Lower 48 Production Growth (ex GOM) U.S. Shales Continue to Drive Lower 48 Production Growth (ex GOM) We are expecting production in the Big 5 shale basins to average 8.4mm b/d in 2019 and 9.0mm b/d next year, a somewhat higher level than projected by the EIA. Growth in the shales accounts for close to 80% of the 2.3mm b/d of growth in the U.S. over 2019 – 2020. Globally, U.S. shales will continue to provide the bulk of y/y crude oil production growth, accounting for 73% of the 2.5mm b/d of growth we will see over the next two years. Given the near-death experience OPEC 2.0 member states had in the price collapse of 2014 – 2016, we remain convinced OPEC 2.0 member states will once again have to embark on a strategy to backwardate the Brent forward curve as they did in 1H18, to moderate the growth of shale-oil production in the U.S. (Chart 5). Reducing production in the short term will force refiners to draw inventories to supply their units and produce products like gasoline, diesel, jet fuel and a wide range of petrochemicals. Chart 5OPEC 2.0 Needs Backwardated Brent Forwards OPEC 2.0 Needs Backwardated Brent Forwards OPEC 2.0 Needs Backwardated Brent Forwards This will backwardate the Brent forward curve – i.e., prompt-delivery barrels will be more expensive than deferred-delivery barrels. A backwardated forward curve means OPEC 2.0 member states with term contracts indexed to spot prices receive higher prices for their oil than shale producers hedging 2 years forward, all else equal. The trick for OPEC 2.0 will be to keep the Brent forwards backwardated when the Permian takeaway capacity starts to fill, and exports from the U.S. rise in the early 2020s, as deep-water harbors are brought on line. If OPEC 2.0 is successful in keeping the Brent forwards in backwardation, this will, over time, moderate the growth of shale production: Hedgers’ revenue is constrained by lower forward prices.6 We would not be surprised if OPEC 2.0 states started announcing final investment decisions on select investments in spare capacity to augment existing resources, so they are able to quickly bring production to market in the event of unplanned outages that could lift the entire forward curve and incentivize hedging at higher prices. Demand Still Looks Good Oil markets continue to fret over a possible hard landing in China – resulting either from an internal policy error or a ratcheting up of tensions in the Sino – U.S. trade war. This is causing markets to extrapolate into the wider EM space, and take oil-demand projections lower on an almost-daily basis. In a word, markets are overwrought. Chinese policymakers are sensitive to the tight financial conditions that prevailed in 2H18, which, along with the trade war with the U.S., slowed growth and fostered uncertainty among households and firms in China. We agree with our Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy groups that presidents Trump and Xi are pragmatists dealing with restive populations, and want to deliver a deal ahead of U.S. elections and the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 2021.7 We’ve been expecting the government to deploy a modest amount of stimulus in 1H19, which will begin having an effect on the Chinese economy in the second half of this year. Toward the end of the year and into 2020, we expect the larger stimulus to be deployed in the run-up to put a bid under industrial commodities – oil, base metals and bulks in particular. Overall, we are seeing signs global growth may be reviving over the next few months via an apparent bottoming in our Global LEI Diffusion index (Chart 6). The diffusion index measures the proportion of countries where Leading Economic Indicators (LEIs) are rising relative to those in which LEIs are falling. As is apparent in Chart 6, the diffusion index suggests the downturn in the global LEI has bottomed. The index leads the global LEI by a few months. Chart 6BCA's Global LEI Likely Bottoming BCA's Global LEI Likely Bottoming BCA's Global LEI Likely Bottoming In our latest supply-demand balances, we are expecting Chinese oil demand to average 14.3mm b/d this year, and 14.8mm b/d next year. Along with India – expected to consume 5.0mm b/d this year, and 5.2mm b/d next year – these two states account for 36% of the total 54.3mm b/d of EM demand we expect in 2019 and 2020 (Table 3).8 Table 3BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone Overall EM demand, the powerhouse of global oil-demand growth led by China and India, is expected to increase 1.1mm b/d this year – slightly more than we estimated last month – and 1.3mm b/d in 2020. DM demand growth, as always, comes in lower, at 390k b/d this year and 280k b/d next year. Oil Supply-Demand Balances Will Tighten We expect global oil production to average 100.9mm b/d this year and 102.9mm b/d in 2020. Consumption is expected to average 101.8mm b/d this year and 103.4mm b/d next year, respectively (Chart 7). This puts OECD inventories back on a downward trajectory, as storage draws resume (Chart 2). Chart 7Global Oil Balances Will Resume Tightening Global Oil Balances Will Resume Tightening Global Oil Balances Will Resume Tightening On the back of these estimates, we expect Brent to average $80/bbl this year and $85/bbl next year, with WTI averaging $74/bbl and $82/bbl, respectively. Given our expectation for higher prices in Brent and WTI, we continue to favor being long crude oil exposure. We are long outright WTI spot futures; long July 2019 Brent vs. short July 2020 Brent; long call spreads along the 2019 forward Brent curve, and long the S&P GSCI. Bottom Line: Markets will continue to tighten as a combination of lower supply growth and rising consumption allows OECD commercial oil inventories to resume their downward trajectory. The apparent lack of a shared sense of urgency by OPEC 2.0’s leaders – KSA and Russia – will be resolved, in our view. OPEC 2.0 will once again focus on backwardating the Brent forward curve, in order to gain some control over the rate at which U.S. shale oil production grows. We continue to favor long exposures to the crude oil futures.   Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Pavel Bilyk, Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy PavelB@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      In last week’s Commodity & Energy Strategy we noted these upcoming meetings, and OPEC 2.0’s resolve to drain the market.  Please see “Fed’s Capitulation Will Boost Oil,” published by BCA Research January 17, 2019.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2      Bloomberg reported this week KSA’s and Russia’s oil ministers cancelled a planned meeting in Davos, following al-Falih’s criticism of the pace at which Russian oil production is being cut.  Please see “Saudi, Russian Energy Ministers Cancel Planned Davos Meeting,” published by bloomberg.com January 22, 2019.  KSA cut its crude oil output 450k b/d m/m in December to 10.64mm b/d from 11.09mm b/d in November.  Russia increased crude and liquids production to a record 11.65mm b/d in December, an 80k b/d increase m/m, according to OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report published January 17, 2019.  OPEC expects Russian oil output to average 11.47mm b/d in 1H19, and 11.49mm b/d in 2019.  We are carrying something close to this in our balances (11.51mm b/d) for 2019 and 2020. 3      China imported 10.3mm b/d of crude oil in December after posting a record 10.4mm b/d of imports in November 2018, just as sanctions were kicking in. 4      In our base case estimate, we assume Iran’s crude oil output will average ~ 2.8mm b/d, down ~ 1.0mm b/d from its 3.8mm b/d production level in 1H18, which was prior to the U.S.’s announcement it intended to re-impose export sanctions.  One way or another, we expect OPEC 2.0 to adjust production to compensate for whatever production is lost due to sanctions.  5      Please see “Permian tracker: Production growth slowing as pipeline race still on,” published by S&P Global Platts July 2, 2018, for a discussion of the new takeaway capacity planned for the Permian Basin by midstream companies in 2019 and 2020. 6      The Permian basin is closely tied to hedging activity in the WTI futures market.  It is the only basin for which WTI commercial short open interest is an explanatory variable for rig counts in our modeling.  Commercial short open interest in the WTI futures also Granger causes Permian rig counts. 7      Please see the Special Report entitled “Is China Already Isolated,” published by BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy January 23, 2019.  It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com and cis.bcaresearch.com. 8      Our EM demand assumptions are driven by the IMF and World Bank EM GDP forecasts. This week the IMF lowered its global growth forecast for 2019 and 2020 by 0.2 and 0.1 percentage points to 3.5% and 3.6%, respectively. This is only slightly down from our lower estimate last month, but still above the World Bank’s expectation. We are using these variables directly in regressions to estimate prices and EM consumption. This replaced our earlier income-elasticity models used to calculate EM oil consumption.  We proxy EM demand with non-OECD oil consumption. We discuss this in “Fed’s Capitulation Will Boost Oil,” published by BCA Research January 17, 2019.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 4q18 Image Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Insert table images here Summary Of Trades Closed In 2018 Image

The Fed’s near-term capitulation on its rates-normalization policy highlighted by our fixed-income desks will provide a tailwind for EM oil demand this year by weakening the USD. This will reduce refined-products’ costs in local-currency terms ex-U.S., as it buoys EM growth prospects.1 If, as we expect, Chinese policymakers also deploy modest stimulus, global oil demand still will remain on track to grow 1.4mm b/d this year, per our forecast. We are mindful of potential upside surprises on the demand side, particularly, if, as we noted in our last balances update, the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party in 2021 provokes policymakers to deploy large-scale stimulus in 2H19 or 2020.2 The odds of this occurring before 2H19 are low, and we are not yet raising our demand estimates. A partial defusing of the Sino – U.S. trade war is possible, as the 90-day negotiating window agreed at the December G20 meeting starts to close next month. This could trigger a short-term rally in commodities, but, absent durable agreements on the technology front, this potential thawing will be transitory. Highlights Energy: Overweight. China’s crude oil imports surged 30% y/y in December 2018, which helped lift total 2018 imports by 10% vs. 2017 levels. This partly was the result of independent refiners scrambling to use up 2018 import quotas at year-end, so that they could retain those levels this year, according to S&P Global’s Platts.3 Base Metals: Neutral. China’s copper ore and concentrate imports were down 11.5% y/y in December – the largest y/y decline since May 2017 – in line with slowing growth there. Precious Metals: Neutral. We expect gold to continue to rally over the next 3 – 6 months on the back of a weaker USD in 1H19, as the Fed likely pauses on its rate-hiking schedule. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Grains likely will get a short-term price lift as the Fed dials back its rates-normalization policy. Feature For the moment, the Fed’s apparent capitulation on its rates-normalization policy reduces the risk the U.S. central bank will err on the side of being overly aggressive, which would have thrown a spanner into EM growth prospects this year. An easier Fed monetary policy will buoy EM GDP and weaken the USD over the short term, which will, support oil prices via stronger demand (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekEM GDP Growth On Track, Keeping Oil Demand Growth On Track EM GDP Growth On Track, Keeping Oil Demand Growth On Track EM GDP Growth On Track, Keeping Oil Demand Growth On Track On the supply side, we remain convinced OPEC 2.0 is resolved to drain the global inventory overhang as quickly as possible. This unintended inventory accumulation resulted from OPEC 2.0’s production surge and the granting of waivers on U.S. export sanctions against Iran by the Trump administration in November (Chart 2). This conviction was strengthened earlier this week, following the announcement of a proposed earlier-than-expected meeting of the coalition’s market monitoring committee in Baku, Azerbaijan, in mid-March to assess global supply and demand conditions. This could be followed by a full OPEC 2.0 meeting in Vienna in mid-April, following up on their December meeting in Vienna, according to S&P Global Platts.4 Chart 2OPEC 2.0 Is Resolved To Drain Inventory Overhang OPEC 2.0 Is Resolved To Drain Inventory Overhang OPEC 2.0 Is Resolved To Drain Inventory Overhang Pieces Of The Price Puzzle Falling Into Place The Fed is signaling it has put its rates normalization policy on hold, given indications global economic growth is slowing in a manner similar to what occurred in 2014 – 15. Then, the U.S. central bank was attempting to escape the zero lower bound of its monetary policy, following the end of its QE program. In the event, the Fed only raised rates once in December 2015, as the slowdown in growth stayed its hand. Our colleagues at BCA’s Global Fixed Income Strategy note, “the downturn in cyclical growth indicators like manufacturing purchasing managers indices (PMI) and the global leading economic indicator (LEI) … reached levels last seen after that 2014/15 episode” as 2019 unfolded (Chart 3).5 The slowdown in global growth could stabilize, as the LEI diffusion index suggests, but the Fed, at least for now, appears to be comfortable waiting for clear evidence this is the case. Chart 3Global Growth Slowdown Provokes Fed Restraint Global Growth Slowdown Provokes Fed Restraint Global Growth Slowdown Provokes Fed Restraint In and of itself, the Fed’s near-term capitulation to the market will not be sufficient to reverse the “darkening prospects” foreseen by the World Bank in its most recent forecast, but it will be supportive of oil prices.6 On the back of our expectation the Fed will take a break from its rate-normalization, we are expecting a weaker USD over the short term, which will support oil demand and EM GDP growth. All else equal, this will create a tailwind for oil prices, given EM is the main driver of demand growth (Chart 4). Chart 4USD Near-Term Trajectory Will Support Oil Prices USD Near-Term Trajectory Will Support Oil Prices USD Near-Term Trajectory Will Support Oil Prices The Chart of the Week introduces a new model we developed to understand the effect of EM GDP growth on oil prices. The level of EM demand is mean reverting to a linear trend, and anchors other variables – oil prices and FX rates, for example – that oscillate randomly with the arrival of new information to the market. Our modeling indicates Brent and WTI prices can be expected to increase (decrease) 94bp and 73bp for every 1 percent increase (decrease) in EM GDP, assuming the broad trade-weighted index (TWIB) for the USD remains unchanged. A 1 percent decrease (increase) in the USD TWIB (holding EM GDP constant) translates into an increase (decrease) in Brent and WTI prices of ~ 4.0% and 3.6%, respectively. We have found EM GDP levels to be as useful an explanatory variable for Brent and WTI prices as non-OECD oil consumption, our proxy for EM demand. Indeed, it is perhaps even cleaner, since using it directly in our models does not require us to estimate an income elasticity of demand for EM economies, in order to forecast prices.7 We are not raising our expectation for demand growth on the back of the Fed’s apparent moderation in its rates policy. We are keeping our 2019 demand growth estimate at 1.4mm b/d, with 1.0mm b/d of that coming from EM and the remainder from DM. Should the Fed signal a further pause in its rates-normalization policy – extending perhaps deep into 2H19 – we would be inclined to raise our demand-growth estimates. Additional Stimulus Coming From China? China is not the be-all and end-all of EM growth. All the same, next to the U.S., it is the second-largest consumer in the world, accounting for ~ 14% of the 103.75mm b/d of global demand we expect this year. Next in line is India, which accounts for ~ 5% of global demand. The news coming out of China at the moment is confusing. While the Xi administration prosecutes its “Three Tough Battles” – i.e., deleveraging, pollution and poverty – it also is pulling policy levers to counter the economic damage inflicted by its trade war with the U.S.8 Government policymakers are signaling fiscal and monetary stimulus will be forthcoming via tax cuts and bond issuance this year, to counter these headwinds.9 However, we do not expect a massive deployment of stimulus. More than likely, the big stimulative measures arrive in 2H19 or next year. The key target dates for policymakers are further in the future, and are focused on the upcoming 100th Anniversary of the Communist Party in 2021. By 2020, the Xi administration is targeting a doubling of real GDP vs. 2010 levels, and a doubling of rural and urban incomes (Chart 5). Chart 5China Keeping Powder Dry For 2021 "Centenary Goal" China Keeping Powder Dry For 2021 "Centenary Goal" China Keeping Powder Dry For 2021 "Centenary Goal" So the real stimulus out of China likely comes later this year or next year. As our Geopolitical Strategy service notes: “If China launches a large-scale stimulus now, peak output will occur in 2020 and the economy will be decelerating into 2021. This would be bad timing for the centenary. It would make more sense for China to save some dry powder for 2019 or 2020 to ensure a positive economic backdrop in 2021.” There is, as we noted in our last balances update, a low-probability chance stimulus could surprise to the upside if growth – particularly employment – falls precipitously. For now, we are comfortable with our House view that the more extensive fiscal and monetary stimulus will be saved for later this year or next in the run-up to the Communist Party’s anniversary.10 Bottom Line: The Fed appears to have capitulated to markets in the short term, and likely will hold off on another rate hike in 1H19. All else equal, this will weaken the USD and buoy EM GDP over the short term. Together, these effects will keep oil demand on track to growth 1.4mm b/d, per our forecast. Markets are reacting to news of fiscal and monetary stimulus coming out of China. We have been expecting modest stimulus to be deployed this year, most likely in 2H19. We continue to expect a larger package of fiscal and monetary stimulus later in the year and next year in the run-up to the Communist Party’s 100th anniversary.   Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see “Enough With the Gloom: Upgrade Global Corporates On A Tactical Basis,” published January 15, 2019, by BCA Research’s Global Fixed Income Strategy. It is available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. See also “Buy Corporate Credit,” published by BCA’s U.S. Bond Strategy January 15, 2019. It is available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 2      Please see “Oil Volatility Will Persist; 2019 Brent Forecast Lowered to $80/bbl,” published January 3, 2019, by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3      Please see “China’s 2018 crude oil imports rise 10% to 9.28 mil b/d,” published by S&P Global Platts January 14, 2019, online. 4      OPEC 2.0 ministerial meetings usually are held in May/June and again November/December. Please see “OPEC eyes mid-March monitoring committee meeting, mid-April full ministerial,” published by S&P Platts Global January 14, 2019. The cartel also will meet in early February to put the finishing touches on a charter formalizing the coalition. We will be delving deeper into the supply side next week, when we update our balances. 5      Please see footnote 1 above. 6      The World Bank’s most recent forecast can be found in its Global Economic Prospects, published January 8, 2019. The lead article is entitled “Darkening Skies.” 7      We use forecasts of EM GDP and GDP growth published by the World Bank and IMF in our modeling. This is useful for us for a number of reasons, particularly since it is calculated externally by well-regarded global institutions tasked with this function. Like other estimates and projections – e.g., the EIA’s, IEA’s and OPEC’s supply/demand estimates – we can take a view on these data relative to our House view or our own Commodity & Energy Strategy view. NB: Because these are cointegrated systems, regressions in levels is appropriate. 8      This campaign is discussed in depth in “China Sticks To The ‘Three Battles’,” published by BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy October 24, 2018. It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9      Please see “China signals more stimulus as economic slowdown deepens,” published by uk.reuters.com January 15, 2019. 10     Please see footnote 2 above. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 4Q18 Image Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table   Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Trades Closed in 2018 Image

The oil rout that began in October appears to have run its course, based on positioning, sentiment and technicals. All the same, several cross-market gauges we designed to assess investors’ conviction on global macro conditions continue to support a cautious view over the short term. This dichotomy in the markets’ internal dynamics supports our view volatility will remain elevated over the next month or two. After that, we expect clear evidence the global oil market is tightening, as strong OPEC 2.0 compliance with production cuts and robust demand – albeit weaker than that of the past two years – drains inventories in 1H19. This is the basis of our $80/bbl Brent forecast for this year. Highlights Energy: Overweight. Our oil recommendations made last week in the wake of the oil-price vs. fundamentals disconnect – long spot WTI and long July 2019 Brent vs. short July 2020 Brent spread – are up 5.7% and 0.7%. Base Metals: Neutral. Asia trade-volume growth likely will move lower in the short term, even if Sino – U.S. trade talks are fruitful. With or without such an outcome, precautionary inventories built on both sides will have to be drawn down, an outcome we believe is priced into base metals prices. A rapprochement would be supportive for these markets, but these inventories still have to be worked through. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold’s rally is intact, as markets gain conviction the Fed will deliver one rate hike this year. We are aligned with our House view calling for three hikes, which would present a headwind. We remain long gold as a portfolio hedge. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Insiders report China made three large purchases of soybeans from the U.S. over the past month, as trade negotiators met in Beijing this week. Optimism on the trade front is buoying optimism in ag markets.1 Feature The rout in oil prices over the course of 4Q18 appears to have run its course, based on a composite indicator we created to assess technical and sentiment information in the crude oil market, and other metrics designed to gauge internal market dynamics (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekBCA's WTI Composite Indicator Flags Oversold Condition for Crude BCA's WTI Composite Indicator Flags Oversold Condition for Crude BCA's WTI Composite Indicator Flags Oversold Condition for Crude The individual components of the composite at the end of last year all had taken a sharp down leg, indicating investors were seriously concerned about a global slowdown and perhaps even an unexpectedly early recession (Chart 2).2 This concern also was noted by the World Bank, which this week revised its EM growth outlook – the key driver of commodity demand – for 2018 lower, and shaved its global 2019 growth estimate as well.3 Chart 2Sharp Down Leg In Composite's Components Sharp Down Leg In Composite's Components Sharp Down Leg In Composite's Components Ordinarily, there is not a lot of econometric support for technical indicators. Nonetheless, we found this composite indicator does a good job of explaining y/y changes of Brent crude oil prices, and vice versa. That’s right: there is two-way Granger-causality between the BCA WTI Composite indicator and y/y crude prices (Chart 3).4 Chart 3Composite Indicator, WTI Crude Form A Feedback Loop Composite Indicator, WTI Crude Form A Feedback Loop Composite Indicator, WTI Crude Form A Feedback Loop Given this two-way relationship, it is plausible speculative positioning, investor sentiment and price momentum can help forecast short-term price movements. In turn, the movement in prices feeds back to the components of our composite indicator, and can help anticipate positioning, sentiment and momentum. Indeed, it is likely the fundamental supply-side shock arising from the higher-than-expected waivers on Iranian imports granted by the Trump administration in November – separate and apart from the selling pressure in October – set off one of these feedback loops. Given the paucity of data at the time, market participants had to guess the extent of the physical surplus arising from the waivers as OPEC 2.0 rapidly increased production and filled inventories ahead of U.S. sanctions, and at the same time fears over the strength of demand were becoming more pronounced.5 As we noted last week, we do not think the oil price rout was evidence of an as-yet undetected collapse in demand or run-away supply. OPEC 2.0 and Canadian producers will cut ~ 1.4mm b/d of production; decline-curve losses of ~ 200k b/d from states that cannot maintain or increase their supply will persist, and slower U.S. shale growth resulting from price-induced capex declines will reduce output growth there. These supply cuts, plus still-strong demand growth of 1.4mm b/d, are driving our forecast the physical oil overhang will clear in 1H19, and that Brent prices will average $80/bbl this year, with WTI trading $6/bbl below that.6 Based on the most recent “oversold” reading of the BCA WTI Composite indicator, we believe the oil rout has run its course, given the indicator is in deeply oversold territory. By now, we think the negative sentiment and spec positioning components of prices have been exhausted. Unless we see a fundamental shock – a truly unexpected collapse in demand, e.g., or a complete breakdown in OPEC 2.0 production discipline – it is difficult to foresee another sell-off.  As the uncertainty clears and inventory starts to draw, speculators will re-enter the market (allowing producers to hedge), and sentiment will turn more bullish as visible evidence of lower inventories continues to be reported in weekly and monthly data. Some Indicators Still Urge Caution While the case can be made the oil rout has run its course, there still are cautionary signals flashing in our other indicators that assess internal market dynamics within and across EM and commodities. This likely will keep volatility high over the short term (Chart 4). Chart 4Conflicting Signals Will Keep Oil Vol Elevated Conflicting Signals Will Keep Oil Vol Elevated Conflicting Signals Will Keep Oil Vol Elevated BCA’s Emerging Market strategists’ Risk-on vs. Safe-Haven currency ratio has rolled over. This ratio picked up the degradation of demand expectations and rise in recession fears, which then spilled into global bond yields. With the benefit of hindsight, the case can be made this presaged a rise in global risk aversion in currency markets (Chart 5).7 Chart 5Warning Signs Flashing bca.ces_wr_2019_01_10_c5 bca.ces_wr_2019_01_10_c5 In addition, our gold ratios, which serve as growth-versus-safe-haven indicators – i.e., the copper/gold and oil/gold ratios – sagged, as industrial commodities weakened and gold rallied by 7% since November 2018.8 Together, these indicate markets were revising down their growth expectations, and reducing their risk in 4Q18. Even with the recent pick up in EM trade volume – a proxy for EM income growth – our short-term models suggest this likely will not be sustained, and that import volume growth will contract in 2H19 (Chart 6). Chart 6Expect Weaker Trade Volumes In 2H19 Expect Weaker Trade Volumes In 2H19 Expect Weaker Trade Volumes In 2H19 Our EM trade-volume models are driven by the broad trade-weighted USD (TWIB) and other FX and financial variables.9 The USD had been rallying as the U.S. domestic economy outperformed the rest of the world, and markets remained concerned over the Fed’s rates-normalization policy, which was pressuring expectations for EM trade growth lower. With the oil-price collapse of 4Q18 in the rear-view mirror, it is not inconceivable the Fed will not feel compelled to raise rates in 1H19, as inflation expectations are re-calibrated in the wake of this most important expectations driver. If this takes some of the steam out of the USD, or even causes it to retreat from its recent highs, oil – and commodities generally – will rally on the tailwind. Indeed, a depreciation in the USD of 5% from current levels could lift prices by ~18%, holding everything else constant (Chart 7). Chart 7USD's Path Will Be Important As Oil Supply and Demand Rebalance USD's Path Will Be Important As Oil Supply and Demand Rebalance USD's Path Will Be Important As Oil Supply and Demand Rebalance Bottom Line: Our intra- and inter-market indicators are throwing off conflicting signals regarding the current state of global oil markets. On the one hand, our WTI Composite indicator shows oil is oversold, which supports our bullish outlook. On the other hand, markets currently are signaling a larger decline in global growth than we currently have in our oil forecast models. A larger-than-expected slowdown in oil demand growth – e.g., an additional loss of 200k b/d that took growth to 1.2mm b/d – would push our Brent forecasts down by ~ $4/bbl to $76/bbl this year. Nevertheless, uncertainty about the future path of oil supply and demand is elevated, and the distribution of possible price outcomes is wide, as our most recent forecast illustrates (Chart 8). We believe the combination of OPEC 2.0 production discipline and robust demand support a rebound in oil prices in 2019. We are keeping our 2019 Brent price target at $80/bbl. Chart 8Elevated Volatility Keeps Range of Expected Prices Wide Elevated Volatility Keeps Range of Expected Prices Wide Elevated Volatility Keeps Range of Expected Prices Wide Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Pavel Bilyk, Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy PavelB@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please see “China buys more U.S. soy as officials meet for trade talks,” published by reuters.com January 7, 2019.com. 2      Each of the individual components is standardized to create the WTI composite indicator. We lack CFTC open-interest data to update the open-interest series, due to the U.S. government’s shutdown. 3      This is in line with our expectation, which is contained in our most recent balances and forecast update published last week.  Please see “Oil Volatility will Persist; 2019 Brent Forecast Lowered to $80/bbl.”  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com.  The World Bank’s latest forecast can be found in its Global Economic Prospects, which is titled “Darkening Skies.”  It can be found at http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects. 4      Clive Granger used standard statistics to show information contained in past realizations of one variable can be used to predict another variable’s value. Two-way causality indicates lagged values of both variables contain statistically significant information that allows past realizations of both to be used to predict the other’s value.  There is a huge literature on this topic.  For an excellent intuitive explanation of Granger causality, please see the discussion beginning on p. 365 of “Time Series Analysis, Cointegration, and Applications,” Clive Granger’s Nobel lecture delivered December 8, 2003 (https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/granger-lecture.pdf). 5      Please see “All Fall Down: Vertigo In The Oil Market ... Lowering 2019 Brent Forecast To $82/bbl,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy November 15, 2018.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6      We would not be at all surprised if OPEC 2.0 overdelivered on production cuts, as it did in 2017 – 1H18. 7      Relative total return (carry included) of four equally weighted EM (ZAR, RUB, BRL and CLP) and three DM (AUD, NZD and CAD) commodities currencies versus an equally weighted average of two safe-haven currencies - the Japanese yen and Swiss franc. 8      These gold ratios are discussed in detail in “Gold Ratios Wave Off ‘Red October’ … Iran Export Waivers Highlight Tight Market,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy November 8, 2018.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 9      For in-depth discussions of these models and our general approach to modeling EM trade volumes, please see “Trade, Dollars, Oil & Metals … Assessing Downside Risk,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy August 23, 2018.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Trade Recommendation Performance In 4Q18 Image Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2018 Image ​​​​​​​