Persian (Gulf)

Highlights The EU’s €750 billion fiscal package, along with another round of US stimulus likely exceeding $1 trillion, will support global oil demand. On the supply side, OPEC 2.0’s production discipline likely holds, and US shale output will remain depressed. These fundamentals, along with a weakening USD, will continue to support Brent prices, which are up 129% from their lows in April. China’s record-setting crude-oil-import surge during the COVID-19 pandemic – averaging 12.7mm b/d in 1H20, up 28.5% y/y – is at risk of slowing in 2H20, as domestic storage fills. Supply-side risks are acute: Massive OPEC 2.0 spare capacity – which could exceed 6mm b/d into 2021 – will tempt producers eager to monetize these to boost revenue. On the demand side, COVID-19 infection rates are surging in the US. Progress on vaccines notwithstanding, politically intolerable public-health risks in big consuming markets could usher in demand-crushing lockdowns again. Economic policy uncertainty remains elevated globally, but the balance of risks continues to favor the upside: We expect 2H20 Brent prices to average $44/bbl, and 2021 prices to average $65/bbl, unchanged from last month’s forecast. Feature We are marginally lifting our forecast of average 2020 Brent prices to $43/bbl, with 2H20 expected to average $44/bbl, and $65/bbl next year, unchanged from June. Marginal improvements to preliminary supply and demand estimates earlier in the COVID-19 pandemic support the thesis that fundamentals will not derail the massive oil-price rally that lifted Brent 129% from its April 21 low of $19.30/bbl. A weakening US dollar, and the expectation this trend will continue, also is supportive to commodities in general, oil in particular. As a result, we are marginally lifting our forecast of average 2020 Brent prices to $43/bbl, with 2H20 expected to average $44/bbl, and $65/bbl next year, unchanged from June (Chart of the Week). The three principal oil-market data providers – the US EIA, IEA and OPEC – raised demand estimates at the margin for 1H20, particularly for 2Q20, the nadir for global oil consumption. The EIA’s estimate for 2Q20 demand shows an upward revision of 550k b/d from last month’s estimate. On the supply side, the EIA estimates global output fell -8.1mm b/d in 2Q20, a -300k b/d downward revision vs. its estimate from last month (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekOil Price Rally Remains Intact Oil Price Rally Remains Intact Oil Price Rally Remains Intact Chart 2OPEC 2.0, US Shale Production Cuts Deepen OPEC 2.0, US Shale Production Cuts Deepen OPEC 2.0, US Shale Production Cuts Deepen We continue to expect the drawdown in storage levels to flatten – and then backwardate – the forward curves for Brent and WTI. After accounting for this better-than-expected fundamental performance, we now expect global supply to fall 5.9mm b/d in 2020 and to increase 4.2mm b/d in 2021. On the demand side, we now expect 2020 demand to fall 8.1mm b/d vs. 8.9mm b/d last month, and for 2021 demand to rise 7.8mm b/d vs 8.5mm b/d in June (Chart 3). This will keep the physical deficit we’ve been forecasting for 2H20 and 2021 in place, allowing OECD storage to fall to 3,026mm barrels by year-end and to 2,766mm barrels by the end of next year (Chart 4). Chart 3Supply-Demand Balances Tighten ... Supply-Demand Balances Tighten ... Supply-Demand Balances Tighten ... Chart 4... Leading To Deeper Storage Draws ... ... Leading To Deeper Storage Draws ... ... Leading To Deeper Storage Draws ... We continue to expect the drawdown in storage levels to flatten – and then backwardate – the forward curves for Brent and WTI (Chart 5). One caveat, though: We are watching floating storage levels closely, particularly in Asia: The current structure of the Brent forwards does not support carrying floating inventory, but it’s been slow moving lower (Chart 6). This could reflect a slowing in China’s crude-oil import surge, which hit record levels in May and June. Chart 5... And More Backwardation In Brent And WTI Forwards ... ... And More Backwardation In Brent And WTI Forwards ... ... And More Backwardation In Brent And WTI Forwards ... Chart 6… Even As Floating Storage In Asia Remains Elevated Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside China’s Crude-Import Binge Ending? There is a non-trivial risk China’s crude-buying binge during the COVID-19 pandemic, which supported prices during the brief Saudi-Russian market-share war in March and the collapse in global demand in 2Q20, may have run its course (Chart 7).1 At the depths of the global pandemic in 2Q20, China’s year-on-year (y/y) crude imports surged 15%. According to Reuters, China’s crude oil imports totaled 12.9mm b/d in June, a record level for the second month in a row.2 Much of this was converted to refined products – chiefly gasoline and diesel fuel – as China’s demand recovered from the global pandemic (Chart 8). China’s 208 refineries can process 22.3mm b/d of crude, according to the Baker Institute at Rice University in Houston.3 Refinery runs in June were estimated at just over 14mm b/d by Reuters. Chart 7China's Crude Import Binge Stalls China's Crude Import Binge Stalls China's Crude Import Binge Stalls Chart 8China's Refiners Lift Runs As Imports Surge China's Refiners Lift Runs As Imports Surge China's Refiners Lift Runs As Imports Surge A reduction in China’s crude imports would force barrels to either remain on the water until refiners find a need for it, or demand for refined products increases in the region. China imports its oil into 59 port facilities, which can process ~ 16mm b/d. Storage is comprised of 74 crude oil facilities holding ~ 706mm barrels, and 213 refined-product facilities with capacity to hold ~ 357mm barrels of products (Map 1). By Reuters’s count, ~ 2mm b/d of crude went into storage in the January-May period, while close to 2.8mm b/d was stored in June. Official storage data is a state secret, so it is not possible to determine whether China’s crude and product storage is full. However, if crude oil imports remain subdued – and floating storage in Asia remains elevated – we would surmise the Chinese storage facilities are close to full. Additionally, any sharp and sustained increase in refined product exports would indicate storage is brimming. Map 1Baker Institute China Oil Map Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside A reduction in China’s crude imports would force barrels to either remain on the water until refiners find a need for it, or demand for refined products increases in the region. We expect the latter condition to obtain, in line with our expectation of a global recovery in demand, even though China remains out of sync with the rest of the world presently. China was the first state to confront the pandemic and first to emerge out of it; its trading partners still are in various stages of recovery (Chart 9). Chart 9China's Demand Recovery Likely Will Be Choppy China's Demand Recovery Likely Will Be Choppy China's Demand Recovery Likely Will Be Choppy OPEC 2.0’s Remains Sensitive To Demand Fluctuations OPEC 2.0’s leaders – the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – also managed to secure additional “compensation” cuts from members that have missed their targets in previous months. The asynchronous recovery in global oil demand poses a unique problem for OPEC 2.0 this year and next. OPEC 2.0 will be easing production curtailments to 7.7mm b/d beginning in August from 9.6mm b/d in July, on the advice of its Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC). This is a decision that will be closely monitored, amid rising concern over the speed of demand recovery in the US and EM economies, due to mounting COVID-19 cases (Chart 10). The surge in US infections relative to its trading partners is of particular concern, given the size of US oil demand (Chart 11). In 2H20, we expect US demand will account for close to 20% of global demand, much the same level it was prior to the pandemic (Table 1). Chart 10COVID-19 Infections Surge In The US Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside Chart 11US COVID-19 Infections Are A Risk To Global Commodity Demand Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside OPEC 2.0’s leaders – the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – also managed to secure additional “compensation” cuts from members that have missed their targets in previous months, bringing the actual increase in production closer to 1-1.5mm b/d. Together, Iraq, Nigeria, Kazakhstan, and Angola, over-produced versus their May and June targets by ~ 760k b/d. In our balances estimates, as is our normal practice, we haircut these estimates and use a lower compliance level that those stated in the official OPEC 2.0 agreement. In the case of these producers, we assume they will compensate for ~ 70% of their overproduction, bringing the adjusted cuts to ~ 8.3mm b/d. This should be sufficient to maintain the current supply deficit in oil markets that continues to support Brent prices above $40/bbl. However, the reliance on laggards’ extra cuts to balance markets adds instability. There is a lot of supply on the sidelines from the OPEC 2.0 cuts and the restart of the Neutral Zone shared by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The JMMC is continually assessing supply-demand balances and remains focused on making sure the totality of the cuts does not fall on a small group of countries. It reiterated its position that “achieving 100% conformity from all participating Countries is not only fair, but vital for the ongoing rebalancing efforts and to help deliver long term oil market stability.” In June, OPEC 2.0’s overall compliance was 107% – mostly reflecting over-compliance from KSA, the UAE, and Kuwait.4 There is a lot of supply on the sidelines from the OPEC 2.0 cuts and the restart of the Neutral Zone shared by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The US EIA estimates that within the original OPEC cartel spare capacity will average close to 6mm b/d this year, the first time since 2002 that it has exceeded 5mm b/d. On top of this, there’s the looming downside risk of a new Iran deal if Democrats win the White House and Congress in US elections in November, and a possible restart of Libyan exports this year. Watch The DUCs In The US With WTI prices averaging $41/bbl so far in July, we continue to expect part of previously shut-in US production to come back on line in July, August and September. Nonetheless, the negative effect of the multi-year low rig count will be felt heavily in 4Q20 and 1Q21 and will push production lower. The rig count appears to be bottoming but is not expected to increase meaningfully until WTI prices move closer to $45-50/bbl. On average it takes somewhere between 9-12 months for the signal from higher prices to result in new oil production flowing to market in the US. As the rig count moves back up in 2021, its effect on production will be apparent only in late-2021. However, the massive inventory of drilled-but-uncompleted (DUC) wells in the main US tight-oil basins will provide a source of cheaper new supply, if WTI prices remain above $40/bbl. DUCs are 30-40% cheaper to complete compared to drilling a new well from start. We expect DUCs completion will begin adding to US crude output in 1Q21, and that this will continue to be a source of supply beyond 2021. Bottom line: Global economic policy uncertainty remains elevated, albeit off its recent highs (Chart 12). We expect this uncertainty to continue to wane, which will allow the USD to continue to weaken. This will spur global oil demand, and will augment the fiscal and monetary stimulus to the COVID-19 pandemic undertaken globally. Chart 12Global Policy Uncertainty Remains High, Which Could Support USD Demand Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside Nonetheless, the global recovery remains out of sync, which complicates OPEC 2.0’s production management, and markets’ estimation of supply-demand balances. Uneven success in combating the pandemic keeps the risk of lockdowns on the radar in the US. Policy is driving oil production at present, and, given the temptation to monetize spare capacity, the supply side remains a risk to prices. We continue to see upside risk dominating the evolution of prices and are maintaining our expectation Brent prices will average $44/bbl in 2H20 – lifting the overall 2020 average to $43/bbl – and $65/bbl next year. Our expectation WTI will trade $2-$4/bbl below Brent also remains intact.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Fernando Crupi Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy FernandoC@bcaresearch.com     Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight Canadian oil production averaged 4.6mm b/d in 2Q20 vs. 5.5mm b/d in 2Q19, based on EIA estimates. The lack of demand from US refiners – crude imports from Canada fell by 420k b/d y/y during the quarter – and close to maxed-out local storage facilities pushed prices below cash costs, forcing the shut-ins of more than 1mm b/d of crude production. Canadian energy companies started releasing their 2Q20 earnings this week and analysts expect the results to be one of the worst ever recorded, reflecting the extent of the pain producers felt during the COVID-19 shock. Base Metals: Neutral High-grade iron ore prices (65% Fe) were trading above $120/MT this week, on the back of forward guidance from the commodity’s top exporter, Brazilian miner Vale, which suggested exports will be lower than had been previously estimated this year, according to Fastmarkets MB, a sister service of BCA Research. This is in line with an Australian Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources analysis in June, which noted, “The COVID-19 pandemic appears to have affected both sides of the iron ore market: demand disruptions have run up against supply problems localised in Brazil, where COVID-19-related lockdowns have derailed efforts to recover from shutdowns in the wake of the Brumadinho tailings dam collapse” (Chart 13). Precious Metals: Neutral Our long silver position is up 17.5% since it was recommended July 2. We are placing a stop-loss on the position at $21/oz, our earlier target, given the metal was trading ~ $22/oz as we went to press. The factors supporting gold prices – chiefly low real rates in the US, a weakening dollar and global monetary accommodation, also support silver prices. However, silver also will benefit from the recovery in industrial activity and incomes we anticipate in the wake of global fiscal and monetary stimulus, which will drive demand for consumer products (Chart 14). Ags/Softs:  Underweight Lumber prices have more than doubled since April lows. The uncertainty brought by the COVID-19 health emergency altered the perception of future housing demand and, by extension, lumber demand, to the point that mills responded by substantially decreasing capacity utilization rates. However, in the wake of global monetary and fiscal stimulus, housing weathered the storm better than expected. Furthermore, a surge in DIY projects from individuals working from home at a time of reduced supply contributed to the current state of market shortage. Chart 13Lower Supply Supports Iron Ore Prices Lower Supply Supports Iron Ore Prices Lower Supply Supports Iron Ore Prices Chart 14Silver Favored Over Gold Silver Favored Over Gold Silver Favored Over Gold         Footnotes 1     In our reckoning, a non-trivial risk is something greater than Russian roulette odds – i.e., a 1-in-6 chance of an event occuring. Re the ever-so-brief Saudi-Russian market-share war, please see KSA, Russia Will Be Forced To Quit Market-Share War, which we published March 19, 2020. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2     Please see COLUMN-China's record crude oil storage flies under the radar: Russell published by reuters.com July 20, 2020. 3    The Baker Institute’s Open-Source Mapping of China's Oil Infrastructure was last updated in March 2020. The map is “a beta version and is likely missing some pieces of existing infrastructure. The challenge of China’s geographic expanse — it is roughly the same area as the U.S. Lower 48 — is compounded by a lack of transparency on the part of China’s government,” according to the Baker Institute. 4    In our supply-side estimates, we used IEA estimates of cuts for June this month. This doesn’t change the overall estimate of cuts from our earlier analysis; however, it slightly changes how the 9.7mm b/d was split between OPEC 2.0 members. the official eased cuts are 7.7mm b/d from 9.7mm b/d in May-June-July, but it actually is closer to 8.3mm b/d accounting for the compensation from the countries mentioned above.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2020 Q2 Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2020 Summary of Closed Trades Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside

Highlights The bull market in US-Iran tensions was never resolved, and now a series of suspicious explosions in Iran raises the possibility that tensions will re-escalate. Iran’s interest lies in waiting out Trump so that a Democratic victory in the US election can restore the US-Iran strategic détente agreed in 2015. However, both the Trump administration and US ally Israel are applying “maximum pressure” on Iran and could go on the offensive at a time when Trump’s odds of re-election are collapsing. Israel cannot engage in a full-fledged war with Iran alone but it would have American backing for pressure tactics through the duration of Trump’s term. A “wag the dog” scenario is not inconceivable because the US and Israel have long-term national security interests at stake while Iran is on the verge of economic collapse. Investors should prepare for near-term global equity volatility and safe-haven demand for a number of reasons but a major escalation in Iran would add to the list. Stay long Brent crude oil. Feature Since May 2018 we have argued that US-Iran tensions will remain market-relevant. We downgraded the odds of US air strikes from 40% in June 2019 to 20% in January of this year after Iran’s lackluster retaliation to the US assassination of its top military commander. Now things are heating up again due to a series of extremely suspicious explosions in Iran that may or may not be linked to Israel and the United States. The COVID-19 pandemic, oil price rout, and global recession have reinforced this bull market in US-Iran tensions by weakening and destabilizing the entire Shia Crescent, from Lebanon to Iran. They have also pushed President Trump dangerously close to “lame duck” status, which reduces the constraints on conflict with Iran for the remainder of his term. In this report we update our Iran view by looking at whether the Trump administration or Israel could attempt to “wag the dog,” i.e. provoke a conflict with Iran to boost Trump’s re-election odds or achieve some long-term strategic objectives while Trump is still in power. We have long held the view that Iran poses a market-relevant geopolitical risk and now the mysterious attacks in Iran suggest it could be materializing. Nothing is confirmed, but it is wise for investors to monitor these developments in case they escalate. Geopolitical incidents often cause buying opportunities but they can create substantial equity drawdowns first. Cyber-Rattling In The Middle East A string of mysterious explosions and fires at military and economic facilities have rocked Iran in recent days (Table 1). Table 1Iran Hit By A String Of Mysterious Attacks Cyber-Rattling In The Middle East Cyber-Rattling In The Middle East The most significant of these incidents is the July 2 explosion at the Natanz nuclear facility – Iran’s main uranium enrichment facility, which houses a new centrifuge assembly center.1 The fire resulted in a significant setback to the development and production of advanced IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuges used to enrich uranium – by up to two years. Iranian officials initially downplayed the incidents as unsuspicious accidents. However the Natanz explosion was too significant to cast off. Iran’s state-run news agency IRNA declared that the Natanz incident may be the work of foreign countries, “especially the Zionist regime [Israel] and the US,” and vowed Iranian retaliation if sabotage is proven to be the case. Similarly, the New York Times reported that an anonymous Middle Eastern intelligence official – rumored to be Mossad chief Yossi Cohen – called the incident the work of Israel.2 Israel’s response to these allegations has been oblique, but the accusation is not far-fetched. Israel has a successful history of halting the advancement of nuclear programs in the region. Mossad’s Operation Opera destroyed Iraq’s only known nuclear facility in 1981, and Operation Outside the Box bombed a suspected nuclear reactor at the Kibar site in Syria in 2007. Israeli intelligence has also previously been accused of targeting Iran’s missile program – with the assassination of four Iranian nuclear scientists between 2010 and 2012. Israel is also believed to be involved, with the US, in Operation Olympic Games, the Stuxnet cyber attacks that stunted Iran’s uranium enrichment program circa 2010. Iran’s ballistic missile program and alleged nuclear weapons ambitions remain Israel’s greatest long-term strategic threat in the region. More recently, Iran and Israel have been locked in a series of cyber-attacks. Israel claims to have foiled an Iranian attack on its water facilities in April which attempted a cyber break on water control systems. A May 9 cyberattack on Iranian shipping hub Shahid Rajaae – through which half of Iran’s maritime trade traverses – is seen as Israeli retaliation. Most recently, Israel’s Mossad revealed that it thwarted Iranian attempts to attack Israeli diplomatic missions in Europe. These attacks come as the US increases pressure on UN Security Council members to support the indefinite extension of the UN arms embargo against Iran, which is scheduled to expire on October 18.3 But other signatories to the 2015 Iranian nuclear agreement – China, Russia, Germany, Britain, and France – argue that since the US withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA), its threat to invoke a “snapback” provision of the deal to reimpose former UN sanctions on Iran is not legally valid. The other JCPA signatories remain committed to the deal, arguing for its necessity in order to continue IAEA inspections that prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. They are biding their time to see if Trump is re-elected before deciding anything. Iran has moved further from the JCPA’s requirements since announcing, on January 5, 2020, that it will no longer comply with restrictions to its nuclear program (Table 2). The risk is that unless controlled, this will eventually significantly reduce Iran’s “breakout time” – the time required to acquire enough fissile material for one bomb. The nuclear deal aimed to maintain at least a one-year breakout time, and this is generally understood to be the US’s “red line.” Table 2Iran No Longer Complying With 2015 Nuclear Deal Cyber-Rattling In The Middle East Cyber-Rattling In The Middle East Despite some non-compliance, Iran is still permitting IAEA inspectors to monitor and verify its nuclear activities. Yet the IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution, requesting Iran’s cooperation in the investigation into possible undeclared nuclear materials and sites.4 Chart 1Iran's Sphere Of Influence In Collapse Iran's Sphere Of Influence In Collapse Iran's Sphere Of Influence In Collapse As tensions with US and Israel escalate, Tehran has been keen to highlight its military capabilities. Revolutionary Guard Navy Commander Rear Admiral Alireza revealed the existence of onshore and offshore underground missile sites along the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman, holding advanced long-range missiles and new weapons, more capable of launching attacks against enemies. Escalating tensions raise the likelihood of retaliation as Iran reconsiders its “strategic patience” policy.5 Tehran had been playing the waiting game, especially since Trump’s decision to assassinate Quds Force chief Qassem Soleimani in January. Iran has an interest in avoiding confrontation in the months ahead of the US election on November 3. Iran’s attack on Saudi Arabia in September 2019 led to a boost in Trump’s approval rating. A major conflict today would cause a patriotic rally around the president at a time when he is beset with negative opinion over the coronavirus response and poor race relations. Iran has an interest in Joe Biden winning the presidency in November. Biden would likely restore the US-Iran deal, which would remove sanctions and allow Iran to open its economy. However, neither the Trump administration nor the Israeli government share that interest. The latest attacks raise the possibility that the US and/or Israel are going on the offensive. This could force Iran to retaliate. Iranian moderates are already suffering domestically. Iran’s hardline parliamentarians were never on board with the nuclear deal and criticized President Hassan Rouhani when President Trump pulled out of it in May 2018. This past weekend Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, an ally of Rouhani whose reputation also rests on the deal, was heckled as he addressed the parliament. As of February, parliament is mostly comprised of hardliners.6 Iran is also on shaky ground in the Shia Crescent. Lebanon and Iraq – the two countries most entrenched in Iran’s sphere of influence – have been experiencing civil unrest. Protesters in both countries initially took to the streets last fall in demonstration of anger over government corruption, the sectarian based political system, and poor economic conditions. The pandemic and recession have breathed new life into these movements. The Lebanese pound collapsed on the parallel market since October, and some groups have called for the disarmament of Iran-backed Hezbollah (Chart 1). Meanwhile a June cabinet decision in Iraq to cap the amount and number of state salaries and pension payments collected – in attempt to buttress the country’s ailing finances – fueled outrage. Iraq’s Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi is also in a tussle with Iran-backed paramilitary forces as he attempts to curb their influence and bring them under state control.7 Chart 2Iran Has Little To Lose Iran Has Little To Lose Iran Has Little To Lose Thus a timid stance by Iran in face of foreign attacks will not go down well. Instead, with oil production having collapsed, the economy in shambles, and its sphere of influence in turmoil, Tehran has little to lose in protecting what is left of its nuclear program and deterring American or Israeli aggression (Chart 2). With few options left, Iran is likely to move further away from its “strategic patience” in response to the uptick in “maximum pressure.” Bottom Line: Tensions are escalating between Tehran and Washington/Tel Aviv. Cyber attacks are likely to increase in the lead up to the expiration of the arms embargo on October 18 and US elections this fall. Iran may be forced to abandon its policy of “strategic patience” if its foes sabotage its nuclear capabilities. Expect the conflict to spillover to Iran’s proxies in the region – Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. So What? Massive monetary and fiscal stimulus and continued commitment from OPEC 2.0 on the supply side will keep oil prices moving higher this year. Barring a second COVID-19 wave, our Commodity & Energy Strategists expect oil markets to rebalance beginning in 3Q2020, with Brent prices averaging $40/bbl this year and $65/bbl in 2021 (Chart 3). We remain long Brent which is up 70.55% since initiation in March.   The escalation in tensions in the Persian Gulf is an upside risk to this assessment. That said, with major oil producers now operating significantly below capacity in compliance with the OPEC 2.0 production agreement, the net impact on oil prices will likely be muted and short-lived. Production can be increased to fill gaps. As demonstrated by the recent acts of sabotage in Iran and Israel, the increase in geopolitical tensions globally will manifest in cyberattacks, supporting cyber stocks. Our strategically long ISE Cyber Security Index relative to the S&P500 Info Tech sector trade is up 2% since initiation in April (Chart 4). Chart 3Oil Markets On The Way To Recovery Oil Markets On The Way To Recovery Oil Markets On The Way To Recovery Chart 4Buy Cybersecurity Stocks Buy Cybersecurity Stocks Buy Cybersecurity Stocks Finally, we should note that Iran is not the only geopolitical risk that could explode amid the US election cycle. China is the greater risk. But President Trump faces fewer financial and economic constraints in a conflict with Iran than he does in a conflict with China. A conflict with Iran could change the game ahead of the election at a time when Trump is beset with the coronavirus and social unrest. His opinion polling would benefit from a rally around the flag, as it did in September 2019. The risk for Trump is that this bump may not last long. Americans are less concerned about Iran than China and Russia and Trump himself has benefited from American weariness of Middle Eastern wars. All we can say for certain is that the US election is of critical strategic importance to several major and minor powers. Trump’s allies and enemies know that the next six months offer their best chance to take actions that either affect the election or exploit the current alignment of US foreign policy relative to a Democratic Party alignment. While China probably prefers Biden, it can deal with either ruling party. Whereas Israel has a unique opportunity to advance its objectives under Trump and Iran has a clear imperative to remove Trump from office.   Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The damaged building was constructed in 2013 to be a site for the development of advanced centrifuges. Work there was stopped in 2015 as per requirements of the JCPA, but was restarted when the US withdrew from the deal in 2018. 2 Meanwhile a group of dissidents from within Iran’s military and security forces, calling themselves Homeland Cheetahs, claimed responsibility for the Natanz attack. However, it is possible that the claim was made with the intention to mislead. Please see Jiyar Gol, "Iran blasts: What is behind mysterious fires at key sites?" BBC News, July 6, 2020. 3 The draft US resolution bans Iran from supplying, selling, or transferring weapons after the October 18 expiration of the embargo. It bans UN member states from purchasing Iranian arms or permitting citizens to train or provide financial resources or assistance to Iran without Security Council approval. 4 This resolution, introduced by France, Germany, and the UK, refers to an undeclared uranium metal disc, potential fuel-cycle-related activities such as uranium processing and conversion, and suspected storage of nuclear material. Iran’s parliament responded by issuing a statement signed by 240 out of the 290 members which called the resolution excessive and requested that Iran halt voluntary implementation of additional protocol and change inspections 5 Iran’s state-run news agency IRNA published the following commentary in response to the Natanz explosion: "The Islamic Republic of Iran has so far tried to prevent intensifying crises and the formation of unpredictable conditions and situation … the crossing of red lines of the Islamic Republic of Iran by hostile countries, especially the Zionist regime and the US, means that strategy … should be revised." 6 In addition, 120 out of the 290 parliamentarians signed and delivered a motion to the presiding board of the assembly, requesting that Rouhani be summoned for questioning. The presiding board may not issue the summons and is unlikely to result in Rouhani’s impeachment as Khamenei has requested unity amid high foreign tensions. It nonetheless reflects Rouhani’s weakened position ahead of next year’s elections. 7 Hisham al-Hashemi, an advisor to Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi who had advised the government on reducing the influence of Iran-backed militias in Iraq, was killed on July 6, days after receiving threatening telephone calls from militias.

Highlights If the current low oil price environment is transitory, temporary fiscal tightening can be used to preserve the exchange rate peg. In our view, low oil prices are structural - crude prices will likely average $40 and lower in the coming years. In such a scenario, fiscal tightening cannot be a solution because it will unleash eternal economic malaise. Hence, currency devaluation will become necessary. Even though Saudi Arabia’s currency devaluation is not imminent, the risk-reward of selling the SAR/USD in the forward market is attractive. We recommend investors sell Saudi Arabian riyals in the forward market as a long-term bet. Feature The plunge in oil prices has revived the debate on the sustainability of the Saudi currency peg. This report argues that currency devaluation is not imminent, given that Saudi authorities have sufficient foreign currency reserves to fund balance of payment (BoP) deficits for some time. Beyond that, if oil prices average $40 and lower, Saudi’s exchange rate peg will come under pressure. Depleting Foreign Exchange Reserves Chart I-1Saudi Arabia: Oil Prices And Balance Of Payments Saudi Arabia: Oil Prices And Balance Of Payments Saudi Arabia: Oil Prices And Balance Of Payments In this section, we estimate how oil prices will impact the level of Saudi Arabia’s gross foreign exchange (FX) reserves. Odds are that oil prices have experienced a structural breakdown and will average no more than $40 per barrel in the next three years.1 To preserve the riyal’s peg to the US dollar, the Saudi authorities will have to plug the gap in foreign funding requirements (FFR). We define the FFR as the sum of the current account balance and the capital account balance without taking into account government external borrowing. The nation’s current account balance and FFR along with oil prices are shown in Chart I-1. For the purpose of this simulation, we assume an average oil price of $40, $40, and $35 a barrel in 2020, 2021 and 2022, respectively. Our full set of assumptions for Table I-1 are provided in Box I-1. Our findings from the simulation are as follows: Saudi Arabia’s FFR deficits will amount to $94 billion in 2020, $96 billion in 2021 and $82 billion in 2022 (Table I-1, row G). We assume the government’s external (US dollar) borrowing will cover 50% of FFR in 2020, 2021, and 2022. The rest will be financed by drawdowns from the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority’s (SAMA) gross FX reserves. The latter will decline by $47 billion in 2020, $48 billion in 2021 and $41 billion in 2022. Indeed, over the first three months of this year, the monetary authorities’ FX reserves have already dropped by around $26 billion. Hence, our forecasts for annual change in the central bank’s FX reserves are reasonable. Saudi Arabia’s gross FX reserves will drop to $360 billion by the end of 2022 from the current $471 billion (Table I-1, row J). This roughly represents a 23% decline. In terms of fiscal dynamics, the fiscal balance will register deficits of 14%, 16% and 17% of GDP in 2020, 2021 and 2022, respectively (Table I-1, row C). Assuming the government decides to fund 75% of the deficits by issuing bonds and the other 25% by drawing on FX reserves at SAMA, the public debt-to-GDP ratio will rise from around 23% currently to 61% by the end of 2022 (Table I-1, row D). Box I-1Simulation: Estimating Potential Drawdowns In Foreign Currency Reserves Saudi Riyal Devaluation: Not Imminent But Necessary Saudi Riyal Devaluation: Not Imminent But Necessary The Money Supply Coverage Ratio The Saudi Currency Law of 1959 stipulates that currency issued by SAMA must be backed by foreign currencies and gold. Indeed, Chart I-2 reveals that SAMA is in compliance with that law. Its holdings of gold and foreign currencies closely track the sum of currency in circulation and the cash stored in SAMA’s and banks’ vaults. This monetary construct made sense in the 1960s when much of the money supply was made up of cash currency, meaning that electronic money/bank deposits were still too small to matter. Odds are that oil prices have experienced a structural breakdown and will average no more than $40 per barrel in the next three years. Currently, currency in circulation makes up only 11% of the broad local currency money supply, hereafter referred to as the broad money supply. The latter is calculated as M3 minus foreign currency deposits and includes cash in circulation and all local currency deposits (electronic money). Demand deposits make up 63% of the broad money supply, while savings and time deposits account for 25% (Chart I-3). In a nutshell, the currency in circulation amounts to SAR 199 billion, while the broad money supply stands at SAR 1866 billion. Chart I-2The Monetary Rule That SAMA Follows The Monetary Rule That SAMA Follows The Monetary Rule That SAMA Follows Chart I-3Composition Of Broad Money Supply Composition Of Broad Money Supply Composition Of Broad Money Supply   Individuals, companies and foreigners can use the entire broad money supply - cash in circulation and all local currency deposits (electronic money) - to buy foreign currency in Saudi Arabia. In nutshell, time and savings deposits can be converted into demand deposits upon the expiration of their term or immediately after the payment of a penalty. Therefore, the proper formula for calculating the international FX reserves-to-money supply coverage ratio is as follows: Money coverage ratio = (central bank’s foreign exchange reserves) / (broad local currency money supply). For the reasons elaborated above, the denominator should be the broad money supply, not just the amount of currency in circulation. To calculate the Saudi Arabia’s money coverage ratio, we use not only SAMA’s holdings of gold and foreign currencies, but also all its foreign currency securities, including bonds, stocks and other foreign assets, including private equity investments. The top panel of Chart I-4 illustrates that the broad money supply is now equal to the central bank’s gross foreign exchange reserves, i.e., the nation’s money coverage ratio is currently close to one. Hence, in short, the level of FX reserves is currently adequate. Chart I-4Saudi Arabia: FX Reserves And Broad Money Supply Saudi Arabia: FX Reserves And Broad Money Supply Saudi Arabia: FX Reserves And Broad Money Supply Crucially, if SAMA chooses to maintain the economy’s broad money supply such that it is equal to its holdings of gross international FX reserves, then it will have to shrink the money supply substantially as its foreign exchange reserves are depleted considerably over the course of the next three years. Our projections in Table I-1 suggest that SAMA’s gross foreign exchange reserves will likely drop by about 25% between January 1, 2020 and the end of 2022. If Saudi authorities attempt to maintain the money coverage ratio at around one, the broad money supply will also have to shrink by the same order of magnitude. We reckon that it will be very painful economically and, thereby, socially and politically undesirable to follow a monetary regime that requires a 25% contraction in the nominal broad money supply over the next three years. Money supply will likely be allowed to exceed the authorities’ gross foreign exchange reserves. This will prompt doubts about the sustainability of the exchange rate peg. For instance, in 2015-2016, the broad money supply in Saudi Arabia actually expanded by 6% over a two year period even though gross international FX reserves declined by 27% (please refer to Chart I-5 on page 7). The difference between then and now is that gross international reserves in the 2015-2016 period were greater than the broad money supply, which means that the money coverage ratio was well above one (Chart I-4, bottom panel). Chart I-5Bank Credit/Money Growth Can Diverge From FX Reserves Bank Credit/Money Growth Can Diverge From FX Reserves Bank Credit/Money Growth Can Diverge From FX Reserves In brief, in 2015-16, SAMA had leeway to tolerate a major drop in its gross foreign exchange reserves without needing to shrink the broad money supply. However now with the money coverage ratio close to one, SAMA does not have that much room to maneuver. Odds are that the money supply will not be allowed to drop as low as the forthcoming drop in the central bank’s gross foreign exchange reserves given the enormous deflationary pressures that would be unleashed. Consequently, the nation’s money coverage ratio will likely drop well below one. This will likely prompt doubts about the sustainability of Saudi Arabia’s exchange rate peg. Bottom Line: Attempts by SAMA to maintain the money coverage ratio at or close to one – to ensure a solid currency peg –will entail a substantial shrinkage in the broad money supply. The latter will herald immense contractionary and deflationary pressures in the real economy. This scenario is economically, socially and politically unviable. Hence, money supply will likely be allowed to exceed the authorities’ gross foreign exchange reserves. This will prompt doubts about the sustainability of the exchange rate peg. A New Era Of Higher Currency Risk Premiums The simulation in Table I-1 projects that KSA’s foreign exchange reserves will drop by about 25% by the end of 2022. If the broad money supply grows even 5% per annum over the next three years (the current annual growth rate being 11%), the money coverage ratio will drop from its current 0.95 to about 0.61. As Saudi Arabia’s foreign exchange reserves increasingly fall short of its broad money supply, the currency peg will enter a new era where doubts about the currency peg’s sustainability will begin to grow. Consequently, currency forwards will start pricing in higher chances of devaluation. Given that a central bank’s sale of international FX reserves to non-banks shrinks the banks’ excess reserves and broad money supply,2 a pertinent question is: how and why can broad money supply still grow? The broad money supply can still expand even when the central bank sells its foreign exchange reserves. The local currency money supply expands when the central bank or commercial banks lend to or purchase assets from non-bank entities. This includes their purchases of government bonds on both the primary and secondary markets. Chart I-5 reveals that broad money supply growth in Saudi Arabia correlates with commercial banks’ assets and is not always aligned with SAMA’s gross FX reserves. Chart I-6Money Multiplier = Broad Money Supply / Banks' Excess Reserves Money Multiplier = Broad Money Supply / Banks' Excess Reserves Money Multiplier = Broad Money Supply / Banks' Excess Reserves Overall, it is possible for the broad money supply to expand in Saudi Arabia even if SAMA depletes its FX reserves to fund BoP deficits. For this to occur, banks and/or SAMA need to lend to or purchase securities from non-banks (including from the government) in greater amounts than SAMA’s sales of its FX reserves. Besides, the central bank may or may not need to provide funding (excess reserves) to the banking system to accommodate an expanding money supply (Chart I-6). Going forward, KSA’s broad money supply will be shaped by the following dynamics. On the one hand, sales of SAMA’s foreign exchange reserves will reduce its broad money supply. On the other hand, commercial banks’ lending to non-banks, alongside their purchase of government securities, will expand the money supply. In aggregate, the money supply might grow modestly even as the country’s foreign currency reserves plummet. However, this implies that the FX reserves-to-money supply coverage ratio will drop well below one. This is unlikely to break the currency peg in the medium term. There is no theory or historical precedent to indicate the level at which the money coverage ratio causes the peg to crumble. It is often much more about confidence in the exchange rate regime than about the precise level of this ratio. Chart I-7 illustrates the money coverage ratio for different economies. KSA has the highest money coverage ratio among emerging markets. Chart I-7The Money Coverage Ratio: A Cross-Country Perspective Saudi Riyal Devaluation: Not Imminent But Necessary Saudi Riyal Devaluation: Not Imminent But Necessary However, there are several reasons why this ratio should structurally be higher in Saudi Arabia than in other EM economies: First, unlike the majority of EMs, KSA runs a currency peg and the latter warrants different standards regarding the money coverage ratio. Foreign exchange reserves falling well below the broad money supply will gradually undermine the integrity of its monetary regime and shake confidence in its sustainability. Chart I-8Saudi Arabia: FX Reserves And Interest Rates Saudi Arabia: FX Reserves And Interest Rates Saudi Arabia: FX Reserves And Interest Rates Second, the Impossible Trinity thesis suggests that in an economy with an open capital account, the central bank is forced to choose between controlling either the currency or interest rates. Since there are no capital controls in Saudi Arabia and the central bank fixes the riyal to the US dollar, SAMA has little control over interest rates. The country is therefore forced to import US interest rates. Provided US interest rates are now close to zero and the plunge in oil revenues has unleashed a recession in Saudi Arabia, the very low interest rates that Saudi Arabia imports from the US are currently adequate. This, however, does not mean that Saudi interest rates cannot deviate from US ones. Chart I-8 illustrates that SAMA’s sales of FX reserve assets could lead to a rise in local interbank rates in absolute terms or relative to US ones. This is because when the central bank is selling US dollars, it tends also to shrink the banking system’s excess reserves, which forces commercial banks to bid the price of inter-bank liquidity higher. Third, a central bank cannot simultaneously control the exchange rate and the quantity of monetary aggregates. In other words, SAMA cannot both peg the currency to the US dollar and have control over the level of money supply. This constraint is similar but not identical to the above point about the relationship between exchange and interest rates. To illustrate this trade-off: when SAMA draws down its international reserves to fund a BoP deficit, the money supply will shrink. If the authorities simultaneously encourage and allow the banks to lend to or purchase securities from non-banks, including the government, the money supply will expand. This newly created money could find its way to the currency market (in the form of greater imports or capital outflows) and could bid up the price of the US dollar versus SAR. To defend the peg, SAMA will have to sell more of its foreign currency reserves and purchase SAR, thereby, contracting the money supply again. In short, because of the currency peg, SAMA might not be able to simultaneously control the level of money supply and defend the peg. Finally, unlike many other EM economies, KSA has little domestic productive capacity and relies heavily on imports to satisfy domestic demand for goods and services. Given the nation’s high propensity to import, new riyals created by the banking system have a higher chance of flowing to the foreign exchange market, weighing on the value of the currency and jeopardizing the peg. In Saudi Arabia, fiscal policy is of paramount importance to upholding the currency peg when oil revenues plunge. Other EM economies like the Brazilian or Russian ones do not face such a constraint because they do not have pegged currency regimes. Other economies such as China’s and Korea’s have substantial domestic productive capacity to meet new domestic demand. So, in the latter economies only a small portion of new money creation flows to the foreign exchange market. Bottom Line: Given that it is operating a fixed exchange rate regime, KSA’s money coverage ratio should structurally be higher than that of many other emerging economies. As this ratio drops well below one in the next couple of years, the risk premium in SAR forwards will rise as the market moves to price a higher probability of devaluation. Fiscal-Monetary Nexus In Saudi Arabia, fiscal policy is of paramount importance to upholding the currency peg when oil revenues plunge (Chart I-9). The basis for this is the fact that in Saudi Arabia fiscal policy plays a larger role than monetary policy in driving domestic demand. Chart I-10 demonstrates that government spending amounts to 36% of GDP annually while new annual credit origination is only about 4% of GDP. Chart I-9Oil Prices And Government Spending Oil Prices And Government Spending Oil Prices And Government Spending Chart I-10Fiscal Spending Is Much More Important Than Credit Creation Fiscal Spending Is Much More Important Than Credit Creation Fiscal Spending Is Much More Important Than Credit Creation   Even though the government has already embarked on a considerable fiscal austerity program, the nation will continue to face very large fiscal deficits. Our simulation forecasts fiscal deficits of 14% of GDP in 2020, 16% in 2021 and 17% of GDP in 2022 (please refer to row C in Table I-1 on page 3). Chart I-11Fiscal Spending Drives Imports Fiscal Spending Drives Imports Fiscal Spending Drives Imports Saudi imports are very sensitive to government spending while government revenues correlate with exports (Chart I-11). Swelling fiscal deficits can be funded by issuing both foreign and local currency bonds. However, each type of borrowing has different implications for the exchange rate, interest rates and the money supply. There are several ways in which the fiscal-monetary nexus can play out in Saudi Arabia.3 The government can draw down on its FX reserves at SAMA to fund the fiscal deficit. This will quickly erode the central bank’s gross FX reserves and, consequently, undermine confidence in the currency peg. The government can borrow externally (in foreign currency) to cover both the budget and BoP deficits. However, in this case, the government’s foreign currency debt will mushroom and the nation’s sovereign credit risk and, thereby, cost of external borrowing will rise.  The fiscal deficit can be funded by issuing local currency bonds sold to non-banks only. Given the sheer size of required government funding over the next couple of years, local interest rates will rise significantly as the government competes to attract a limited amount of existing deposits. Overall, this will crowd out the private sector which will have negative ramifications on the economy. However, the currency peg will not be jeopardized as the money supply will shrink dramatically in this scenario. The government can fund itself by borrowing from domestic commercial banks, i.e., by issuing local currency paper to be bought by banks. The government will get new local currency deposits and will not compete for existing deposits. This will not produce a crowding out effect and interest rates will not rise. As we have discussed in past reports, commercial banks do not require deposits or savings to lend money or to purchase securities. Everywhere, commercial banks – with regulatory forbearance and shareholder consent – can purchase literally an unlimited amount of government bonds thereby financing the nation’s large fiscal deficits. Critically, when commercial banks buy local currency government bonds, they create new local currency deposits “out of thin air”. This scenario would be equivalent to the monetization of public debt. Money supply will expand briskly and the money coverage ratio will drop. The outcome will produce downward pressure on the currency’s value as new money/deposits created by commercial banks will end up eating into the country’s finite foreign exchange reserves via imports and capital outflows, as discussed above. While commercial banks can easily fund the fiscal deficit by creating money “out of thin air”, the former will likely bolster demand for dollars and endanger the currency peg. Bottom Line: The Saudi government will likely resort to all four mechanisms to fund itself. Given the large size of its fiscal deficit, financing it entirely via external borrowing or the depletion of FX reserves is unattainable. Therefore, issuance of local bonds will continue at a rapid pace, with the following implications: If local bonds are bought by non-banks, local interest rates will be pushed higher, crowding out the private sector with negative ramifications for the economy; or If local bonds are bought by commercial banks, the money supply will expand meaningfully, thereby drastically reducing the money coverage ratio and exerting substantial pressure on the currency peg. Neither of these scenarios can be sustained in the long run. Investment Conclusions Chart I-12SAR/USD Forwards And Oil Prices SAR/USD Forwards And Oil Prices SAR/USD Forwards And Oil Prices If the era of low oil prices is transitory, temporary fiscal tightening can be used to preserve the peg. In our view, low oil prices are structural – crude prices will likely average at most $40 per barrel in the coming years. In such a scenario, fiscal tightening cannot be a solution because it will unleash eternal economic malaise. Hence, currency devaluation will be unavoidable. Critically, the longer the authorities preserve the peg in the face of lower oil prices, the larger the devaluation will ultimately be. Based on historical experiences of other economies that delayed their own currency adjustments, the devaluations that they eventually faced were between 30-50%. Despite the collapse in oil prices, the SAR/USD long-term forwards are underpricing the risk of devaluation (Chart I-12). If the downshift in oil prices is more permanent than the one in 2015 – as we believe it will be – the SAR/USD long-term forwards offer a good opportunity. As a structural trade, we recommend investors to sell the 3-year SAR/USD forward. The current entry point is attractive. Ayman Kawtharani Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes   1  This is the view of BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy service and it differs from the view of BCA’s Commodities and Energy Strategy service. 2  Commercial banks’ excess reserves are not part of the broad money supply. This applies to all economies, regardless of their exchange rate regime. 3  By that we mean the interplay between government financing/borrowing and the resulting changes in money supply, interest rates and the exchange rate.  

Highlights The collapse in oil prices supercharges the geopolitical risks stemming from the global pandemic and recession. Low oil prices should discourage petro-states from waging war, but Iran may be an important exception. Russian instability is one of the most important secular geopolitical consequences of this year’s crisis. President Trump’s precarious status this election year raises the possibility of provocations or reactions on his part. Europe faces instability on its eastern and southern borders in coming years, but integration rather than breakup is the response. Over a strategic time frame, go long AAA-rated municipal bonds, cyber security stocks, infrastructure stocks, and China reflation plays. Feature Chart 1Someone Took Physical Delivery! Someone Took Physical Delivery! Someone Took Physical Delivery! Oil markets melted this week. Oil volatility measured by the Crude Oil ETF Volatility Index surpassed 300% as WTI futures for May 2020 delivery fell into a black hole, bottoming at -$40.40 per barrel (Chart 1). Our own long Brent trade, initiated on 27 March 2020 at $24.92 per barrel, is down 17.9% as we go to press. Strategically we are putting cash to work acquiring risk assets and we remain long Brent. The forward curve implies that prices will rise to $35 and $31 per barrel for Brent and WTI by April 2021. We initiated this trade because we assessed that: The US and EU would gradually reopen their economies (they are doing so). Oil production would be destroyed (more on this below). Russia and Saudi Arabia would agree to production cuts (they did). Monetary and fiscal stimulus would take effect (the tsunami of stimulus is still growing). Global demand would start the long process of recovery (no turn yet, unknown timing). On a shorter time horizon, we are defensively positioned but things are starting to look up on COVID-19 – New York Governor Andrew Cuomo has released results of a study showing that 15% of New Yorkers have antibodies, implying a death rate of only 0.5%. The US dollar and global policy uncertainty may be peaking as we go to press (Chart 2). However, second-order effects still pose risks that keep us wary. Chart 2Dollar And Policy Uncertainty Roaring Dollar And Policy Uncertainty Roaring Dollar And Policy Uncertainty Roaring Geopolitics is the “next shoe to drop” – and it is already dropping. A host of risks are flying under the radar as the world focuses on the virus. Taken alone, not every risk warrants a risk-off positioning. But combined, these risks reveal extreme global uncertainty which does warrant a risk-off position in the near term. This week’s threats between the US and Iran, in particular, show that the political and geopolitical fallout from COVID-19 begins now, it will not “wait” until the pandemic crisis subsides. In this report we focus on the risks from oil-producing economies, but we first we update our fiscal stimulus tally. Stimulus Tsunami Chart 3Stimulus Tsunami Still Building Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Policymakers responded to COVID-19 by doing “whatever it takes” to prop up demand (Chart 3). Please see the Appendix for our latest update of our global fiscal stimulus table. The latest fiscal and monetary measures show that countries are still adding stimulus – i.e. there is not yet a substantial shift away from providing stimulus: China has increased its measures to a total of 10% of GDP for the year so far, according to BCA Research China Investment Strategy. This includes a general increase in credit growth, a big increase in government spending (2% of GDP), a bank re-lending scheme (1.5% of GDP), an increase in general purpose local government bonds (2% of GDP), plus special purpose bonds (4% of GDP) and other measures. On the political front, the government has rolled out a new slogan, “the Six Stabilities and the Six Guarantees,” and President Xi Jinping said on an inspection tour to Shaanxi that the state will increase investments to ensure that employment is stabilized. This is the maximum reflationary signal from China that we have long expected. The US agreed to a $484 billion “fourth phase” stimulus package, bringing its total to 13% of GDP. President Trump is already pushing for a fifth phase involving bailouts of state and local governments and infrastructure, which we fully expect to take place even if it takes a bit longer than packages that have been passed so far this year. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has opened the way for the EU to issue Eurobonds, in keeping with our expectations. Germany is spending 12% of GDP in total – which can go much higher depending on how many corporate loans are tapped – while Italy is increasing its stimulus to 3% of GDP. As deficits rise to astronomical sums, and economies gradually reopen, will legislatures balk at passing new stimulus? Yes, eventually. Financial markets will have to put more pressure on policymakers to get them to pass more stimulus. This can lead to volatility. In the US the pandemic is coinciding with “peak polarization” over the 2020 election. Lack of coordination between federal and state governments is increasing uncertainty. Currently disputes center on the timing of economic reopening and the provisioning bailout funds for state and local governments. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell is threatening to deny bailouts for American states with large, unfunded public pension benefits (Chart 4A). He is insisting that the Senate “push the pause button” on coronavirus relief measures; specifically that nothing new be passed until the Senate convenes in Washington on May 4. He may then lead a charge in the Republican Senate to try to require structural reforms from states in exchange for bailouts. Estimates of the total state budget shortfall due to the crisis stand at $500 billion over the next three years, which is almost certainly an understatement (Chart 4B). Chart 4AUS States Have Unfunded Liabilities Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Chart 4BUS States Face Funding Shortfalls Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Could a local government or state declare bankruptcy? Not anytime soon. Technically there is no provision for states to declare bankruptcy. A constitutional challenge to such a declaration would go to the Supreme Court. One commonly cited precedent, Arkansas in 1933, ended up with a federal bailout.1 A unilateral declaration could conceivably become a kind of “Lehman moment” in the public sector, but state governors will ask their legislatures to provide more fiscal flexibility and will seek bailouts from the federal government first. The Federal Reserve is already committed to buying state and local bonds and can expand these purchases to keep interest rates low. Washington would be forced to provide at least short-term funding if state workers started getting fired in the midst of the crisis because of straightened state finances – another $500 billion for the states is entirely feasible in today’s climate. Constraints will prevail on the GOP Senate to provide state bailout funds. This conflict over state finances could have a negative impact on US equities in the near term, but it is largely a bluff – McConnell will lose this battle. The fundamental dynamic in Washington is that of populism combined with a pandemic that neutralizes arguments about moral hazard. Big-spending Democrats in the House of Representatives control the purse strings while big-spending President Trump faces an election. Senate Republicans are cornered on all sides – and their fate is tied to the President’s – so they will eventually capitulate. Bottom Line: The global fiscal and monetary policy tsunami is still building. But there are plenty of chances for near-term debacles. Over the long run the gargantuan stimulus is the signal while the rest is noise. Over the long run we expect the reflationary efforts to prevail and therefore we are long Treasury inflation-protected securities and US investment grade corporate bonds. We recommend going strategically long AAA-rated US municipal bonds relative to 10-year Treasuries. Petro-State Meltdown Since March we have highlighted that the collapse in oil prices will destabilize oil producers above and beyond the pandemic and recession. This leaves Iran in danger, but even threatens the stability of great powers like Russia. Normally there is something of a correlation between the global oil price and the willingness of petro-states to engage in war (Chart 5). Chart 5Petro-States Cease Fire When Oil Drops Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) When prices fall, revenues dry up and governments have to prioritize domestic stability. This tends to defer inter-state conflict. We can loosely corroborate this evidence by showing that global defense stocks tend to be correlated with oil prices (Chart 6). Global growth is the obvious driver of both of these indicators. But states whose budgets are closely tied to the commodity cycle are the most likely to cut defense spending. Chart 6Global Growth Drives Oil And Guns Global Growth Drives Oil And Guns Global Growth Drives Oil And Guns Russia is case in point. Revenues from Rostec, one of Russia’s largest arms firms, rise and fall with the Urals crude oil price (Chart 7). The Russians launch into foreign adventures during oil bull markets, when state coffers are flush with cash. They have an uncanny way of calling the top of the cycle by invading countries (Chart 8). Chart 7Oil Correlates With Russian Arms Sales Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Chart 8Russian Invasions Call Peak In Oil Bull Markets Russian Invasions Call Peak In Oil Bull Markets Russian Invasions Call Peak In Oil Bull Markets Chart 9Turkish Political Risk On The Rise Turkish Political Risk On The Rise Turkish Political Risk On The Rise In the current oil rout, there is already some evidence of hostilities dying down in this way. For instance, after years of dogged fighting in Yemen, Saudi Arabia is finally declaring a ceasefire there. Turkey, which benefits from low oil prices, has temporarily gotten the upper hand in Libya vis-à-vis Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army, which depends on oil revenues and backing from petro-states like Russia and the GCC. Of course, Turkey’s deepening involvement in foreign conflicts is evidence of populism at home so it does not bode well for the lira or Turkish assets (Chart 9). But it does highlight the impact of weak oil on petro-players such as Haftar. However, the tendency of petro-states to cease fire amid low prices is merely a rule of thumb, not a law of physics. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Already we are seeing that Iran is defying this dynamic by engaging in provocative saber-rattling with the United States. Iran And Iraq The US and Iran are rattling sabers again. One would think that Iran, deep in the throes of recession and COVID-19, would eschew a conflict with the US at a time when a vulnerable and anti-Iranian US president is only seven months away from an election. Chart 10US Maximum Pressure On Iran US Maximum Pressure On Iran US Maximum Pressure On Iran Iran has survived nearly two years of “maximum pressure” from President Trump (Chart 10), and previous US sanction regimes, and has a fair chance of seeing the Democrats retake Washington. The Democrats would restart negotiations to restore the 2015 nuclear deal, which was favorable to Iran. Therefore risking air strikes from President Trump is counterproductive and potentially disastrous. Yet this logic only holds if the Iranian regime is capable of sustaining the pain of a pandemic and global recession on top of its already collapsing economy. Iran’s ability to circumvent sanctions to acquire funds depended on the economy outside of Iran doing fine. Now Iran’s illicit funds are drying up. This could lead to a pullback in funding for militant proxies across the region as Iran cuts costs. But it also removes the constraint on Iran taking bolder actions. If the economy is collapsing anyway then Iran can take bigger risks. Furthermore if Iran is teetering, there may be an incentive to initiate foreign conflicts to refocus domestic angst. This could be done without crossing Trump’s red lines by attacking Iraq or Saudi Arabia. With weak oil demand, Iran’s leverage declines. But a major attack would reduce oil production and accelerate the global supply-demand rebalance. Iran’s attack on the Saudi Abqaiq refinery last September took six million barrels per day offline briefly, but it was clearly not intended to shut down that production permanently. Threats against shipping in the Persian Gulf bring about 14 million barrels per day into jeopardy (Chart 11). Chart 11Closing Hormuz Would Be The Biggest Oil Shock Ever Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Iran-backed militias in Iraq have continued to attack American assets and have provoked American air strikes over the past month, despite the near-war scenario that erupted just before COVID. Iranian ships have harassed US naval ships in recent days. President Trump has ordered the navy to destroy ships that threaten it; Iranian commander has warned that Iran will sink US warships that threaten its ships in the Gulf. There is a 20% chance of armed hostilities between the US and Iran. Why would Iran be willing to confront the United States? First, Iran rightly believes that the US is war-weary and that Trump is committed to withdrawing from the Middle East. But this could prompt a fateful mistake. The equation changes if the US public is incensed and Trump’s election campaign could benefit from conflict. Chart 12Youth Pose Stability Risk To Iran Youth Pose Stability Risk To Iran Youth Pose Stability Risk To Iran Second, the US is never going to engage in a ground invasion of Iran. Airstrikes would not easily dislodge the regime. They could have the opposite effect and convert an entire generation of young, modernizing Iranians into battle-hardened supporters of the Islamic revolution (Chart 12). This is a dire calculation that the Iranian leaders would only make if they believed their regime was about to collapse. But they are quite possibly the closest to collapse that they have been since the 1980s and nobody knows where their pain threshold lies. They are especially vulnerable as the regime approaches the uncharted succession of Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei. Since early 2018 we have argued that there is a 20% chance of armed hostilities between the US and Iran. We upgraded this to 40% in June 2019 and downgraded it back to 20% after the Iranians shied from direct conflict this January. Our position remains the same 20%. This is still a major understated risk at a time when the global focus is entirely elsewhere. It will persist into 2021 if Trump is reelected. If the Democrats win the US election, this war risk will abate. The Iranians will play hard to get but they are politically prohibited from pursuing confrontation with the US when a 2015-type deal is available. This would open up the possibility for greater oil supply to be unlocked in the future, but sanctions are not likely to be lifted till 2022 at earliest. Russia Russia may not be on the verge of invading anyone, but it is internally vulnerable and fully capable of striking out against foreign opponents. Cyberattacks, election interference, or disinformation campaigns would sow confusion or heighten tensions among the great powers. The Russian state is suffering a triple whammy of pandemic, recession, and oil collapse. President Vladimir Putin’s approval rating has fallen this year so far, whereas other leaders in the western world have all seen polling bounces (even President Trump, slightly) (Chart 13). Putin postponed a referendum designed to keep him in office through 2036 due to the COVID crisis. In other words, the pandemic has already disrupted his carefully laid succession plans. While Putin can bypass a referendum, he would have been better off in the long run with the public mandate. Generally it is Putin’s administration, not his personal popularity, that is at risk, but the looming impact on Russian health and livelihoods puts both in jeopardy (Chart 14) and requires larger fiscal outlays to try to stabilize approval (Chart 15). Chart 13Putin Saw No COVID Popularity Bump Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Chart 14Russian Regime Faces Political Discontent Russian Regime Faces Political Discontent Russian Regime Faces Political Discontent Moreover, regardless of popular opinion, Putin is likely to settle scores with the oligarchs. The fateful decision to clash with the Saudis in March, which led to the oil collapse, will fall on Igor Sechin, Chief Executive of Rosneft, and his faction. An extensive political purge may well ensue that would jeopardize domestic stability (Chart 16). Chart 15Russia To Focus On Domestic Stability Russia To Focus On Domestic Stability Russia To Focus On Domestic Stability Chart 16Russian Political Risk Will Rise Russian Political Risk Will Rise Russian Political Risk Will Rise Russian tensions with the US will rise over the US election in November. The Democrats would seek to make Russia pay for interfering in US politics to help President Trump win in 2016. But even President Trump may no longer be a reliable “ally” of Putin given that Putin’s oil tactics have bankrupted the US shale industry during Trump’s reelection campaign. The American and Russian air forces are currently sparring in the air space over Syria and the Mediterranean. The US has also warned against a malign actor threatening to hack the health care system of the Czech Republic, which could be Russia or another actor like North Korea or Iran. These issues have taken place off the radar due to the coronavirus but they are no less real for that. Venezuela We have predicted Venezuela’s regime change for several years but the oil meltdown, pandemic, and insufficient Russian and Chinese support should put the final nail in the regime’s coffin. Hugo Chavez’s rise to power, the last “regime change,” occurred as oil prices bottomed in 1998. Historically the Venezuelan armed forces have frequently overthrown civilian authorities, but in several cases not until oil prices recovered (Chart 17). Chart 17Venezuelan Coups Follow Oil Rebounds Venezuelan Coups Follow Oil Rebounds Venezuelan Coups Follow Oil Rebounds The US decision to designate Nicolas Maduro as a “narco-terrorist,” to deploy greater naval and coast guard assets around Venezuela, to reassert the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary, and to pull Chevron from the country all suggest that Washington is preparing for regime change. Such a change may or may not involve any American orchestration. Venezuela is an easy punching-bag for President Trump if he seeks to “wag the dog” ahead of the election. Venezuela would be a strategic prize and yet it cannot hurt the US economy or financial markets substantially, giving limited downside to President Trump if he pursues such a strategy. Obviously any conflict with Venezuela this year is far less relevant to global investors than one with Iran, North Korea, China, or Russia. Regime change would be positive for oil supply and negative for prices over the long run. But that is a story for the next cycle of energy development, as it would take years for government and oil industry change in Venezuela to increase production. The US election cycle is a critical aggravating factor for all of these petro-state risks. Shale producers are going bankrupt, putting pressure on the economy and some swing states. The risk of a conflict arises not only from Trump playing “wag the dog” after the crisis abates, but also from other states provoking the president, causing him to react or overreact. The “Other Guys” Oil producers outside the US, Canada, gulf OPEC, and Russia – the “other guys” – are extremely vulnerable to this year’s global crisis and price collapse. Comprising half of global production, they were already seeing production declines and a falling global market share over the past decade when they should have benefited from a global economic expansion. They never recovered from the 2014-15 oil plunge and market share war (Chart 18). Angola (1.4 million barrels per day), Algeria (one million barrels per day), and Nigeria (1.8 million barrels per day) are relatively sizable producers whose domestic stability is in question in the coming years as they cut budgets and deplete limited forex reserves to adjust to the lower oil price. This means fewer fiscal resources to keep political and regional factions cooperating and provide basic services. Algeria is particularly vulnerable. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who ruled as a strongman from 1999, was forced out last year, leaving a power vacuum that persists under Prime Minister Abdelaziz Djerad, in the wake of the low-participation elections in December. An active popular protest movement, Hirak, already exists and is under police suppression. Unemployment is high, especially among the youth. Neighboring Libya is in the midst of a war and extremist militants within Libya and North Africa would like to expand their range of operations in a destabilized Algeria. Instability would send immigrants north to Europe. Oil production will be reduced involuntarily as well as voluntarily this year due to regime failures. Brazil is not facing the risk of state failure like Algeria, but it is facing a deteriorating domestic political outlook (Chart 19). President Jair Bolsonaro’s popularity was already low relative to most previous presidents before COVID. His narrow base in the Chamber of Deputies got narrower when he abandoned his political party. He has defied the pandemic, refused to endorse social distancing or lockdown orders by local governments, and fired his Health Minister Luiz Henrique Mandetta. Chart 18Petro-States: 'Other Guys' Face Instability Petro-States: 'Other Guys' Face Instability Petro-States: 'Other Guys' Face Instability Chart 19Brazilian Political Risk Rising Again Brazilian Political Risk Rising Again Brazilian Political Risk Rising Again Brazil has a high number of coronavirus deaths per million people relative to other emerging markets with similar health capacity and susceptibility to the disease. This, combined with sharply rising unemployment, could prove toxic for Bolsonaro, who has not received a bounce in popular opinion from the crisis like most other world leaders. Thus on balance we expect the October local elections to mark a comeback for the Worker’s Party. The limited fiscal gains of Bolsonaro’s pension reform are already wiped out by the global recession, which will set back the country’s frail recovery from its biggest recession in a century. The country is still on an unsustainable fiscal path. Bolsonaro does not have a strong personal commitment to neoliberal structural reform, which has been put aside anyway due to the need for government fiscal spending amid the crisis. Unless Bolsonaro’s popularity increases in the wake of the crisis – due to backlash against the state-level lockdowns – the economic shock is negative for Brazil’s political stability and economic policy orthodoxy. Bottom Line: Our rule of thumb about petro-states suggests that they will generally act less aggressive amid a historic oil price collapse, but Iran may prove a critical exception. Investors should not underestimate the risk of a US-Iran conflict this year. Beyond that, the US election will have a decisive impact as the Democrats will seek to resume the Iranian nuclear deal and Iran would eventually play ball. Venezuela is less globally relevant this year – although a “wag the dog” scenario is a distinct possibility – but it may well be a major oil supply surprise in the 2020s. More broadly the takeaway is that oil production will be reduced involuntarily as well as voluntarily this year due to regime failures. Investment Takeaways Obviously any conflict with Iran could affect the range of Middle Eastern OPEC supply, not just the portion already shuttered due to sanctions on Iran itself. Any Iran war risk is entirely separate from the risk of supply destruction from more routine state failures in Africa. These shortages have been far less consequential lately and have plenty of room to grow in significance (Chart 20). The extreme lows in oil prices today will create the conditions for higher oil prices later when demand recovers, via supply destruction. Chart 20More Unplanned Outages To Come Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Chart 21European Political Risk No Longer Underrated European Political Risk No Longer Underrated European Political Risk No Longer Underrated An important implication – to be explored in future reports – is that Europe’s neighborhood is about to get a lot more dangerous in the coming years, as the Middle East and Russia will become less stable. Middle East instability will result in new waves of immigration and terrorism after a lull since 2015-16. These waves would fuel right-wing political sentiment in parts of Europe that are the most vulnerable in today’ crisis: Italy, Spain, and France (Chart 21). This should not be equated with the EU breaking apart, however, as the populist parties in these countries are pursuing soft rather than hard Euroskepticism. Unless that changes the risk is to the Euro Area’s policy coherence rather than its existence. Finally Russian domestic instability is one of the major secular consequences of the pandemic and recession and its consequences could be far-reaching, particularly in its great power struggle with the United States. We are reinitiating a strategic long in cyber security stocks, the ISE Cyber Security Index, relative to the S&P500 Info Tech sector. Cyberattacks are a form of asymmetrical warfare that we expect to ramp up with the general increase in global geopolitical tensions. The US’s recent official warning against an unknown actor that apparently intended to attack the health system of the Czech Republic highlights the way in which malign actors could attempt to capitalize on the chaos of the pandemic. We also recommend strategic investors reinitiate our “China Play Index” – commodities and equities sensitive to China’s reflation – and our BCA Infrastructure Basket, which will benefit from Chinese reflation as well as US deficit spending. China’s reflation will help industrial metals more so than oil, but it is positive for the latter as well. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 John Mauldin, "Don't Be So Sure That States Can't Go Bankrupt," Forbes, July 28, 2016, forbes.com.   Section II: Appendix : GeoRisk Indicator China China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator Russia Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator UK UK: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Germany Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Canada Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Spain Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Korea Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Appendix Table 1 The Global Fiscal Stimulus Response To COVID-19 Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights A World Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (WOPEC) looks set to emerge after today’s OPEC 2.0 video conference to discuss production cuts in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the market-share war between the leaders of the coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia. WOPEC will not be memorialized by a Declaration of Cooperation as OPEC 2.0 was.  Oil exporters globally will cooperate on harmonizing policy to meet demand. In our latest scenario concentrating on likely supply responses, we show cuts of ~ 8mm b/d will be sufficient to clear the storage overhang caused by COVID-19-induced demand destruction of close to 4mm b/d this year. Based on this modeling, we see Brent prices averaging $36/bbl and $64/bbl this year and next, with WTI trading $2-$6/bbl lower, depending on US Gulf storage availability. This is roughly in line with our previous scenario (Chart of the Week).1 Demand destruction over 4mm b/d would require additional production cuts. Feature The 2020 oil price collapse brought on by COVID-19 – and super-charged by the market-share war declared by Russia following the breakdown of OPEC 2.0’s March 6 meeting – has spurred oil-producing states globally to action. Chart of the WeekExpect A Sharp Oil Price Recovery Expect A Sharp Oil Price Recovery Expect A Sharp Oil Price Recovery Chart 2The Oil-Price Collapse Of 2020 The Oil-Price Collapse Of 2020 The Oil-Price Collapse Of 2020 WOPEC is bigger than OPEC 3.0 – an unofficial grouping we hypothesized at the end of March to encompass the expected future cooperation of KSA, Russia and the Texas Railroad Commission (RRC) – our shorthand for US oil-producing interests – succeeding OPEC 2.0. Today’s OPEC 2.0 video conference originally was called by KSA for Monday, but was moved to today – presumably – to give member states time to agree production cuts. The conference most likely was delayed by the acrimonious public exchange between its leaders this past weekend.2 On the heels of the OPEC 2.0 video conference comes a hastily called video conference on Friday of G20 energy ministers to discuss energy security. The G20 is led by KSA this year.3 The 2020 oil price collapse brought on by COVID-19 – and super-charged by the market-share war declared by Russia following the breakdown of OPEC 2.0’s March 6 meeting – has spurred oil-producing states globally to action (Chart 2). KSA, Russia and their respective OPEC 2.0 allies all are fully invested in this meeting, as are producers in the US, Canada, Norway and Brazil.4 Supply Destruction Vs.Production Cuts Oil producers face a stark choice: Either cut production voluntarily to counter the global demand destruction of a pandemic, or have the market do it for them by driving prices through cash costs toward zero (i.e., $0.00/bbl), as global crude oil and product storage fills. Prices in some basins have fallen close to zero after accounting for the basis differentials to benchmark prices and transport costs (e.g., WTI-Midland), which, in the US has begun to force shut-ins (Chart 3).5 Continued weak pricing close to zero risks shutting older, high-cost landlocked production in permanently, and many states simply cannot afford to lose the critical revenue provided by oil exports. Chief among these states are the non-Gulf members of OPEC, excluding Russia, US onshore, and Canada, which we identify as “The Other Guys” (Chart 4).6 Chart 3Some Crude Grades Priced Close To $0.00/bbl Some Crude Grades Priced Close to $0.00/bbl Some Crude Grades Priced Close to $0.00/bbl Chart 4"The Other Guys" Production Declines Would Moderate With OPEC 2.0 Deal The "Other Guys" Production Declines Would Moderate With OPEC 2.0 Deal The "Other Guys" Production Declines Would Moderate With OPEC 2.0 Deal We expect The Other Guys in OPEC 2.0 will lose 700k b/d, with 400k b/d of that realized over the course of 2021. The chief contribution of The Other Guys to the OPEC 2.0 coalition’s production-management scheme is their managed production decline. These states were only starting to recover from the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) beginning in 2010 when the OPEC market-share war of 2014-16 was declared. The COVID-19 price collapse, coupled with the knock-on effects of the 2020 KSA-Russia market-share war likely accelerates the rate of production decline for the Other Guys, as capital continues to avoid developing their resources. We expect The Other Guys in OPEC 2.0 will lose 700k b/d, with 400k b/d of that realized over the course of 2021. Core OPEC and Russia can increase (and decrease) production, and we expect they will deliver the largest part of the OPEC 2.0 production cuts. In this week’s simulation, we project KSA will cut 2mm b/d, from their April level of from 12mm b/d; and Russia will cut 1.1mm b/d, down from 11.6mm b/d. We then project Iraq will cut 460k b/d; Kuwait 280k b/d; and the UAE 315k b/d. Outside OPEC 2.0, a lot of the production we expect will be cut is out of necessity. Canada, for example, will be forced to either shut in high-cost tar-sands production or go back to pro-rating production as it did last year, owing to a lack of storage in Alberta and pipeline takeaway capacity to move their crude south to US refiners. We expect Canada to cut 350k b/d this year, as a result. Brazil’s Petrobras already has shut in 100k b/d, and US producers have begun shutting in shale-oil production.7 US Production Cuts Some of the more efficient producers in The Great State of Texas have been calling for pro-rationing of up to 20%, which would push the cuts in Texas’s Permian and Eagle Ford shale basins alone to 1.23mm b/d. Production cuts most likely will be focused on the US, as this is the most easy-to-adjust output in the world. It also still is higher up the global cost curve, although, as we have noted earlier, this will change in the event bankruptcies pick up.8 In the US, production cuts already have begun. They are and will continue to be focused on the shales. We continue to project cuts in the US shales of ~ 1.5 mm b/d this year. However, this number could be higher: If producers respond to the collapse in prices by not sending any new rigs to the field in the next 12 months, production will fall by 2.9mm b/d from production declines alone. Just to keep production flat, the US shales will need an average of ~ 520 rigs per month (assuming no drilled-uncompleted wells are finished). The risk on our rig-count estimates are straightforward: If rig counts go much lower, we could see a large decline in shale production in the coming months (Chart 5). Chart 5US Shale Output Falls This Year And Next The Birth Of WOPEC The Birth Of WOPEC Some of the more efficient producers in The Great State of Texas have been calling for pro-rationing of up to 20%, which would push the cuts in Texas’s Permian and Eagle Ford shale basins alone to 1.23mm b/d. Including the Anadarko Basin, most of which is in Oklahoma, which also permits pro-rationing, 20% pro-rationing would push TX-OK cuts to ~ 1.33mm b/d. As we have been writing over the past month, we could see a return of pro-rationing in the states of Texas and Oklahoma. In the Great State, producers have filed a petition before the Texas RRC asking the Commission to reprise its 1928-73 production-management role.9 The Texas RRC will hold a video conference Tuesday, April 14, to consider this petition. We’re expecting this petition to be granted, and for pro-rationing to begin in the near future. On the demand side, we are staying with the scenario we presented March 30, with 2Q20 demand falling ~ 12mm b/d (y/y vs. 2Q19). In 2H20, we project demand to grow at a rate of 800k b/d by 4Q20. For all of 2020, we model average demand losses equal to 3.8mm b/d. For 2021, massive fiscal and monetary stimulus globally will lift demand 5.3mm b/d. With the supply cuts projected above and our demand view, we see balances tightening over the course of the year and moving into a physical deficit in 4Q20 (Chart 6). While near-term oversupply will force inventories to grow sharply, we expect them to draw as sharply beginning by September and continuing into next year (Chart 7). Chart 6Supply-Demand Imbalance Will Tighten Into 2021 Supply-Demand Imbalance Will Tighten Into 2021 Supply-Demand Imbalance Will Tighten Into 2021 Chart 7Inventories Will Build Sharply, Then Draw Sharply in 2021 Inventories Will Build Sharply, Then Draw Sharply in 2021 Inventories Will Build Sharply, Then Draw Sharply in 2021 Investment Implications Our projections for supply presented this week and our demand scenario presented at the end of March are evolving into our base case for oil and gas. We still do not know with certainty the OPEC 2.0 coalition will agree to production cuts today, or whether the Texas RRC will return to the business of pro-rationing. If either or both of these outcomes does not materialize, markets will take over and savagely destroy supply. This will be extremely volatile. For our part, we expect OPEC 2.0, the Other Guys outside the coalition, and the US shales to deliver something that looks like voluntary cuts. This will occur via voluntary cuts, “managed” declines, and pro-rationing and shut-ins. Unlike many of our economist colleagues who argue against such jointly coordinated policies – invoking a free-market, pure-competition paradigm that has not existed for any meaningful period in the modern history of the oil market – we believe producers are intelligently pursuing their interests by jointly coordinating the boom-bust mayhem of unfettered oil markets. Similarly, we believe consumers are better served by diversified sources of energy vs. an over-reliance on large concentrated supplies who can use their low-cost endowment to monopolize supply and set up barrier to entry to competition. Given our view, we remain constructive to the oil market, expecting a rally that will look a lot like the Chart of the Week and the balances we show in Chart 7. As a result, we are getting long 2H21 Brent vs. short 2H22 Brent futures.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Fernando Crupi Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy FernandoC@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight Defying the global rush to cut oil production, Mexico apparently is moving toward increasing production. Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) is looking to drill 423 wells this year, according to Bloomberg. A March 26 Journal of Petroleum Technology survey suggests capex by E&P companies will fall by up to 35% this year. Base Metals: Neutral This week Japan’s Nippon Steel became the latest producer to idle blast furnaces, halting about 15% of the company’s total capacity. More generally an iron ore surplus in other parts of Asia and in Europe is expected as steel mills idle furnaces amidst lower demand for their output. However, diminished activities in mines – severely impacted by lockdowns – will offset some of the demand loss. COVID-19 induced shutdown in South Africa, Iran, India and Canada have curtailed exports from those countries until late April. Additionally, bad weather in Brazil led iron ore exports to fall on a yoy basis for the third month in a row in March. A decline of ~ 2% vs. last year’s already depressed – following the Vale dam incident – levels. China’s anticipated infrastructure stimulus will support iron ore demand, drawing down inventories and pushing up prices, but it, too, will be tempered by the pace of the recovery in its export markets. Precious Metals: Neutral A strong US dollar remains an important risk for precious metals. The dollar rose 1.6% since March 28 despite the Fed’s actions to calm the global dollar liquidity squeeze. This signals the funding crisis has not been thoroughly controlled and that swap lines will have to be extended to additional EM central banks. However, a large share of outstanding foreign exchange swaps/forwards resides in non-bank financial corporations and institutions with limited access to dollar funding via central bank swap lines. Over the short-term, our gold price recommendation remains vulnerable to deterioration, due to uncertain liquidity conditions (Chart 8). Ags/Softs:  Underweight This week we begin tracking the lumber market. Lumber consumption fell sharply as the coronavirus spread in the United States, pushing front-month futures down 44% from February highs. With housing starts already weak in February – down 1.5% month on month – and expected to be even weaker in March (Chart 9), continued lumber supply curtailments will stabilize prices in the short term and eventually push prices up once lower interest rates kick in and demand resumes. Chart 8 Global USD Squeeze Could Threaten Gold Again Global USD Squeeze Could Threaten Gold Again Chart 9 Lumber Hammered As COVID-19 Pounds Housing Starts Lumber Hammered As COVID-19 Pounds Housing Starts       1     Please see OPEC 3.0 In the Offing?, published March 30, 2020, which focused on demand destruction. 2     Please see OPEC+ meeting delayed as Saudi Arabia and Russia row over oil price collapse: sources, and G20 energy ministers to hold video conference on Friday: document published by reuters.com April 4 and April 7, 2020. 3    The G20 consists of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, France, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, the UK, the US and the EU. 4    Please see A look at the major players in this week’s “OPEC++” meeting, a Bloomberg analysis published by worldoil.com April 7, 2020. 5    Please see Can the world agree a deal to boost oil prices? Published by Wood MacKenzie April 3, 2020.  6    The Other Guys is our moniker for all producers excluding core-OPEC, US shale, Russia and Canada. Production from this group of producers has been falling as a share of global production for years, due to a lack of domestic and foreign direct investment in their energy sectors. 7     In its latest Short-Term Energy Forecast, the EIA estimates US crude oil production will fall 500k b/d this year and 700k b/d next year, driven by market forces. 8    For a discussion, please see How Long Will The Oil-Price Rout Last?, a Special Report we published with BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy March 9, 2020. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 9    Please see Oil Prorationing in the Spotlight at Texas Railroad Commission, published by Baker Botts, a Texas law firm, on March 30, 2020.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2019 Q4 The Birth Of WOPEC The Birth Of WOPEC Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2020 Summary of Closed Trades The Birth Of WOPEC The Birth Of WOPEC

Highlights The odds of an emergency meeting of OPEC 2.0 to get supply under control are growing, based on the repeated overtures from Russian officials providing the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) an opening to resume talks on their production-management regime. We have developed a not-unreasonable scenario in which global oil consumption falls by ~ 20% y/y in April to assess the COVID-19-induced price impact. Even an aggressive 3.5mm b/d cut from OPEC 2.0 – presuming a rapprochement between KSA and Russia – and an additional 200k b/d market-induced cut by North American producers still sees Brent prices bottoming over the next two months at ~ $18/bbl. OECD inventories surge, reaching ~ 3.6 billion by June 2020, before production cuts and demand restoration start to drain them. Comments from Texas Railroad Commission (RRC) leadership indicate they could be back in the business of pro-rating production in the Lone Star state. If a new OPEC 3.0 described here can move quickly enough, Brent prices could revive to ~ $45/bbl by year end, and clear $60/bbl by 2Q21.  We are getting long Dec20 Brent and WTI at tonight’s close. Feature Refiners worldwide are reducing runs as the COVID-19 pandemic continues to cut through oil demand like a scythe through wheat.1 Refiners’ inability to sell gasoline, diesel and jet fuel, and a host of other products, is forcing crude oil to back up globally in storage facilities, pipelines and, soon, on ships (Chart 1).2  This is occurring while KSA and Russia wage a global market-share war, targeting each others’ refinery customers with lower and lower prices. Without a concerted effort by OPEC 2.0 – the coalition led by KSA and Russia – and the US shales to rein in production, the global supply of storage will be exhausted and oil prices will push well below $20/bbl to force output to shut in.  Indeed, numerous grades of crude oil worldwide already are trading below $20/bbl after factoring in their spreads vs. Brent crude oil as regional takeaway and storage infrastructure are overwhelmed (Chart 2). Chart 1Even With Production Cuts Oil Inventories Will Surge Even With Production Cuts Oil Inventories Will Surge Even With Production Cuts Oil Inventories Will Surge Chart 2Global Crude Prices Trading Below $20/bbl Global Crude Prices Trading Below $20/bbl Global Crude Prices Trading Below $20/bbl Chart 3“The Other Guys” Production Declines Will Accelerate "The Other Guys" Production Declines Will Accelerate "The Other Guys" Production Declines Will Accelerate The consequences for oil producers outside core-OPEC will be disastrous, as they were following the last market-share war led by OPEC in 2014-16.  The producer group we’ve dubbed “The Other Guys” – producers outside core-OPEC – will continue to see production falling, most likely at an accelerating rate, if the market-share war persists (Chart 3).  Even within core-OPEC – principally the GCC states – governments will be required to cut spending on public works, salaries for workers, and services.3 Sovereign wealth funds and foreign reserves will have to be drawn down to fill holes in budgets, as happened during the last market-share war of 2014-16 launched by OPEC.  The IMF last week noted the world economy is in recession, and that EM economies in particular will see growth fall sharply as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.4 “We are in an unprecedented situation where a global health pandemic has turned into an economic and financial crisis. With a sudden stop in economic activity, global output will contract in 2020. … emerging market and developing countries, especially low-income countries, will be particularly hard hit by a combination of a health crisis, a sudden reversal of capital flows and, for some, a sharp drop in commodity prices. Many of these countries need help to strengthen their crisis response and restore jobs and growth, given foreign exchange liquidity shortages in emerging market economies and high debt burdens in many low-income countries.”  For commodity markets, this means the principal source of demand growth is being severely hobbled. The Oil Demand Hit … Estimating the demand destruction caused by COVID-19 is fraught with uncertainty.  Instead of attempting such an estimate, we simulate a sharp drop in oil demand of close to 20% y/y in April 2020, which is consistent with the lockdowns that are bringing the global economy to a standstill.  Specifically, we have 2Q20 demand falling ~ 12mm b/d (y/y vs. 2Q19).  Thereafter, demand picks up rapidly in 2H20, reaching a growth rate of 800k b/d by 4Q20.  For all of 2020, we model average demand losses equal to 3.8mm b/d.  For next year, we expect the combination of massive fiscal and monetary stimulus hitting markets globally will lift demand 5.3mm b/d. Net, we view the COVID-19 demand shock as transitory.  But it leaves a huge amount of unrefined crude oil in storage and massive amounts of unsold products in inventory. Left unaddressed, crude oil will continue to fill storage globally, as will unsold refined products.  This will leave oil producers and refiners in an untenable situation, even after demand returns to normal following the pandemic. Strategists in Riyadh, Moscow and Austin, Texas, know this. … Requires A Supply Offset KSA is forcing its competitors to endure what John Rockefeller, one of the founders of Standard Oil Co., once called a “good sweating.”5  A good sweating was a price-cutting strategy designed to drive competitors out of business and force them to sell to Rockefeller’s company.  This occurred in 2014-16 and in 1986, when KSA had to rein in fellow OPEC members that were free-riding on its production discipline. We believe KSA is well aware it cannot endure a years-long market-share war, nor does it want to.  Its primary goal in the current circumstances is to remind oil producers globally that it can, when it choses, take as much market share as it deems necessary.  After flooding global markets in April 2020 we expect the core-OPEC producers in the Gulf (Kuwait, the UAE, Iraq and, of course, KSA) to reduce production by ~ 2.5mm b/d starting in May 2020, and hold these cuts until 2021 (around the time inventories are drawn down to their 5-year average).  In 2021, we have the group increasing production by 2.5mm b/d in 1Q21. As for Russia, we have them increasing production in April 2020 – contributing to the surge in inventories globally.  However, beginning in May, we believe Russia and its non-OPEC allies will agree to remove ~ 1mm b/d , in line with the cuts we expect from core-OPEC. Russia faces political and geopolitical constraints that work against maintaining the market-share war. First, President Vladimir Putin has already been forced to shift his national strategy over the past three years to address growing concerns with domestic discontent due to the recession caused by the 2014 oil shock and the economic austerity policies his government pursued afterwards. These policies give Putin policy room to fight today’s market-share war, but they also portend another massive blow to the livelihood and wellbeing of the nation. Second, Putin is in the midst of arranging an extension of his term in office through 2036, which requires the constitutional court to approve of constitutional changes as well as a popular referendum. The referendum has been delayed due to the pandemic and need for an emergency response. While Putin is generally popular and has underhanded means of orchestrating the referendum, it would be extremely dangerous for him to compound the pandemic and global recession with an oil market-share war that makes matters even worse for the Russian people while simultaneously preparing for a plebiscite.   Third, internationally, Putin cannot ultimately defeat the Saudis or US shale in terms of market share. Therefore the domestic risks posed above are not compensated by an improvement in Russia’s international standing – neither in oil markets nor in broader strategic influence, given that an economic recession hurts Russia’s ability to maintain and modernize its military and security forces. In the US shales, we are modeling a sharp fall-off in production starting as early as May 2020.  For the rest of 2020, production will gradually decline naturally from low rig counts. In 2H20 – probably in 4Q20 – we expect the Texas Railroad Commission to once again regulate oil production in the state, provided other state regulators (e.g., in North Dakota) and producing countries, (e.g., Russia and KSA) also sign on to take on a similar role.6 In addition to the market-driven shut-ins between now and 4Q20, we expect the RRC to secure production cuts of up to 1.5mm b/d by Dec 2020. As prices pick up next year, shale production will stabilize and slowly move up. The supply-demand assumptions we make in this scenario produce a physical surplus for the better part of 2020 (Chart 4). Chart 4Supply-Demand Imbalance Leads to Physical Surplus Supply-Demand Imbalance Leads to Physical Surplus Supply-Demand Imbalance Leads to Physical Surplus Prices Could Fall Further, Then Take Off Even if we see OPEC 2.0 cut, and sharp drops in US shale output followed by renewed pro-rationing by state regulators in the US led by Texas, the fact that they’ve all increased production for April means storage will inevitably rise drastically in the coming months (Chart 5).  As inventory skyrockets in the wake of both the massive demand and supply shocks in 1Q20 and April 2020, prices will fall to $20/bbl (Chart 6). Chart 5Inventories Swell on Demand Shock, Then Drain on Supply Cuts Inventories Swell on Demand Shock, Then Drain on Supply Cuts Inventories Swell on Demand Shock, Then Drain on Supply Cuts Chart 6Brent Prices Forced Lower, Then Move Above $60/bbl Brent Prices Forced Lower, Then Move Above $60/bbl Brent Prices Forced Lower, Then Move Above $60/bbl Once the large-scale OPEC 2.0 cuts start, prices rebound rapidly. Demand also starts picking up this summer, which also will lift prices. For 2020, we expect Brent prices to average $35/bbl, while in 2021 we expect Brent to average $66/bbl. Over this period, WTI will trade $2-$4/bbl below Brent.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     Please see Global oil refiners shut down as coronavirus destroys demand published by reuters.com March 26, 2020, and S&P Global Platts report Refinery margin tracker: Global refining margins take a severe hit on falling gasoline demand published March 23. 2     This appears to be happening now, as pipeline operators ask shippers to reduce the rate at which they fill the lines.  Please see Pipelines ask U.S. drillers to slow output as storage capacity dwindles published by worldoil.com March 30, 2020.  3    Prominently among the GCC states, KSA cuts public spending 5% and introduced fiscal measures meant to cushion the blow of the COVID-19 shock and to offset the low prices resulting from its market-share war with Russia.  Please see Saudi Arabia announces $32 billion in emergency funds to mitigate oil, coronavirus impact published by cnbc.com March 20, 2020. 4     Please see the Joint Statement by the Chair of International Monetary and Financial Committee and the Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund issued by International Monetary and Financial Committee Chair Lesetja Kganyago and International Monetary Fund Managing Director Kristalina Georgieva March 27, 2020. 5     Please see Daniel Yergin’s The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power, published by Simon & Schuster in 1990, particularly Chapter 2 for a discussion of Rockefeller’s “good sweating,” in which competitors were driven out of business by low prices engineered by Rockefeller if they refused to sell out to Standard Oil. 6     The tone of remarks from TRR Chairman Wayne Christian has become more agreeable to having the TRR Commission return to pro-rating oil production in the Lone Star state.  His recent editorial for worldoil.com notes, “Any action taken by Texas must be done in lockstep with other oil producing states and nations, ensuring that they cut production at similar times and in similar amounts.”  Please see  Christian’s editorial, Texas RRC Chairman Wayne Christian: We must stabilize worldwide oil markets, published by worldoil.com March 25, 2020.  

Highlights Rapidly changing news flows are forcing oil markets to recalibrate supply-demand fundamentals continuously. This will keep volatility at or close to recent record highs (Chart of the Week). The demand shock from COVID-19 accounts for ~ 65% of the oil price collapse, based on our modeling. USD demand is fueling record dollar strength, which could suppress commodity consumption after the COVID-19 shock dissipates. If the Fed’s epic monetary policy response sates USD demand, commodity demand will rebound strongly. Highly uncertain expectations on the supply side – fueled by the market-share war between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia set to begin in earnest April 1 – will keep global policy uncertainty elevated post-COVID-19. Texas regulators are debating the efficacy of re-establishing a long-dormant policy mandating the state’s Railroad Commission (RRC) pro-rate production. The chairman of the RRC and the CEO of Russia’s state oil champion Rosneft both oppose production-management schemes, arguing they allow other producers to steal market share. The Trump administration, however, sees potential in working with KSA to stabilize markets. Feature Sparse information available to markets makes it extremely difficult to estimate the impact of the COVID-19 shock to demand. Oil options’ implied volatility reached record levels following unprecedented price changes – down and up – in the underlying futures markets over the past month, as the Chart of the Week shows.1 This reflects the markets’ profound uncertainty regarding supply, demand and near-term policy outcomes that will affect these fundamentals in the short-, medium- and long-term. Sparse information available to markets makes it extremely difficult to estimate the impact of the COVID-19 shock to demand. The ever-changing evolution of supply dynamics presents its own – unprecedented – difficulties. The usual lags in information on supply and demand are compounded by the near-certain substantial revisions that will accompany these data as a better picture of the fundamentals emerges. Chart of the WeekOil Price Volatility At Record Level Oil Price Volatility At Record Level Oil Price Volatility At Record Level That said, we are attempting to develop models and an intuition for likely turning points on both sides of the fundamentals. We stress up front that these estimates are tentative, particularly on the demand side, as they use commodity prices and financial variables that are difficult to track closely even in the best of times, and are themselves continuously adjusting to highly uncertain fundamentals. COVID-19 Crushes Commodity Demand Oil prices fell 60% YTD after being struck by simultaneous demand and supply exogenous shocks (Chart 2). We capture the effect of the demand shock with a combination of multivariate regressions using various cyclical commodities, the US trade-weighted dollar, and 10-year treasury yields. Global demand for cyclical commodities – including oil – is fundamentally related to global economic activity. By extracting the common information from these commodity prices, we can estimate the proportion of the oil price decline associated with the ongoing demand shock.2 Chart 2Oil-Price Collapse Of 2020 Oil-Price Collapse Of 2020 Oil-Price Collapse Of 2020 We estimate roughly 60% of the crude oil price drop so far this year can be explained by the sharp contraction in global demand caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. To estimate the impact of the demand shock from the COVID-19 pandemic on crude oil prices, we expanded a model developed by James Hamilton in the last market-share war of 2014-16.3 Hamilton’s model uses market-cleared prices outside of oil – copper, the USD and 10-year nominal US treasurys – to estimate the extent of the global aggregate demand shock. We estimate roughly 60% of the crude oil price drop so far this year can be explained by the sharp contraction in global demand caused by the COVID-19 pandemic (Chart 3). Some specific refined-product demand (i.e., air and car travel, marine-fuel consumption) was hit harder, meaning the demand shock would be higher in those sectors. For transportation-related refined products, COVID-19-related impacts could account for as much as 70% of the decline in prices. Chart 3COVID-19 Crushes Oil Demand COVID-19 Crushes Oil Demand COVID-19 Crushes Oil Demand Chinese Demand May Be Recovering News reports suggesting a tentative recovery from the COVID-19 demand shock are emerging in China, where the virus originated late last year. Weekly data indicate inventories in bellwether commodity markets – copper and steel – should begin to fall as demand slowly recovers. While encouraging, this may not be sufficient to offset the massive losses in copper demand that likely will be posted this year as a result of the lockdown imposed in China – and globally – to contain the spread of COVID-19. China accounts for ~ 50% of global demand and ~ 40% of refined copper supply.4 Global copper inventories will be useful indicators of the state of China’s recovery, as they will be sourced early as mining and refining operations are ramped up in response to increasing demand (Chart 4). Chart 4Copper Inventories Will Track Aggregate Demand Recovery Copper Inventories Will Track Aggregate Demand Recovery Copper Inventories Will Track Aggregate Demand Recovery Chart 5China Expected To Roll Infrastructure Investment Into 2020 China Expected To Roll Infrastructure Investment Into 2020 China Expected To Roll Infrastructure Investment Into 2020 China is set to roll a large portion of its multi-year 34-trillion-yuan (~ $5 trillion) investment plan into this year, to secure economic recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. For example, our colleagues at BCA Research’s China Investment Service expect a near 10% increase in infrastructure investments this year, which would take such investment to 198 billion yuan (Chart 5). Local governments already have ramped up their expenditures, frontloading 1.2 trillion yuan of bond issuance in the first two months of 2020, a 53% jump versus the same period last year. This includes 1 trillion yuan of special government bonds (SPBs), which is expected to rise to 3-3.5 trillion yuan by the end of 2020, up 30% from 2019 levels. Additional funding channels likely will be opened to support public spending this year. Aggressive policy easing by the Peoples Bank of China (PBOC) in recent weeks, coupled with likely additional debt issuance and infrastructure spending this year will support revived aggregate demand in China. China’s policy responses will be additive to those of the US, where more than $2.2 trillion of fiscal stimulus could be deployed following Congressional agreement on a massive fiscal package that likely will be endorsed by the White House. For its part, the Fed has gone all-in on fighting the economic, liquidity and credit shocks unleashed by the COVID-19 pandemic.5 The EU also is expected to roll out large fiscal-stimulus packages, led by Germany, which is lining up a 150-billion-euro (~ $162 billion) bond issue this year, and a 156 billion-euro supplementary budget.6 Texas Railroad Commission To The Rescue? Another possible element of a global oil-production-regulation scheme emerged in recent days from America’s Lone Star state: The Texas Railroad Commission (RRC). Based on our modeling, 30% to 40% of the decline in oil prices this year is explained by the expectation of higher supply in the coming months (Chart 6).7 It is worthwhile remembering this is anticipatory, given statements and actions from KSA and Russia regarding steps both are taking to sharply increase future production. KSA, for example, provisionally chartered transport to move close to ~ 38mm barrels of crude to refining centers, 12mm barrels of which will be pointed toward the US.8 This was part of the Kingdom’s plan to boost supplies to the market to 12.3mm b/d beginning in April, most of which will come from higher production, augmented by storage drawdowns. If we get a rapprochement between OPEC 2.0’s leaders – KSA and Russia – and the coalition’s production-management scheme is rebuilt, oil prices could outperform other cyclical commodities post-COVID-19, as a large component of supply uncertainty is removed. However, before that can happen, markets will have to absorb the surge in exports from KSA that are being priced in for April and May. Chart 6Expected Supply Increase From KSA, Russia Accounts For 30-40% Of Oil Price Collapse Expected Supply Increase from KSA, Russia Accounts for 30-40% Of Oil Price Collapse Expected Supply Increase from KSA, Russia Accounts for 30-40% Of Oil Price Collapse Another possible element of a global oil-production-regulation scheme emerged in recent days from America’s Lone Star state: The Texas Railroad Commission (RRC). Texas regulators are openly debating the efficacy of re-establishing a long-dormant policy mandating the RRC pro-rate production. The idea was floated by outgoing RRC Commissioner Ryan Sitton, who earlier this month in an op-ed proposed KSA, Russia and the US could jointly agree to 10% reductions in output to stabilize global oil markets. This would expand the management of oil production and spare capacity globally, a profound shift from earlier eras when the RRC then OPEC took on that role.9 While RRC staff are studying the idea, Sitton’s proposal has not received the endorsement of fellow commissioners, particularly Wayne Christian, the chairman of the RRC.10 Christian’s argument against the scheme is similar to that of Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin’s: Both argue such schemes allow other producers to steal market share. Russian government officials continue to signal they are open to returning to the negotiating table with KSA. The Trump administration, however, sees potential in working with KSA and to stabilize markets. Earlier this month, the administration sent a “senior Energy Department official” to Riyadh to support the State Department and the US’s energy attache.11 For its part, Russian government officials continue to signal they are open to returning to the negotiating table with KSA. The “Russian position was never about triggering an oil prices fall. This is purely our Arab partners initiative,” according to a Reuters report quoting Andrei Belousov, Russia’s first deputy prime minister, in an interview with state news agency TASS. “Even oil companies who are obviously interested to maintain their markets, did not have a stance that the deal (OPEC+) should be dissolved.” According to Reuters, Russia proposed an extension of existing production cuts of 1.7mm b/d, perhaps to the end of this year, but “(our) Arab partners took a different stance.” 12 Investment Implications The big uncertainty at present is the extent of demand destruction that will be caused by COVID-19. At this point, the diplomatic maneuvering among states on the oil-supply side is a distraction. Any substantive action will require drawn-out negotiation, particularly to reconstitute and expand OPEC 2.0 to include the Texas RRC in the management of global oil production and spare capacity. In the here and now, markets are forcing sharp reductions in oil output, particularly in the US shales – e.g., Chevron announced it will be cutting capex and exploratory spending 20% this year on Tuesday.13 This is occurring throughout the industry in the US and around the world. Reuters compiled announcements by oil producers that have indicated they will cut an average 30% reduction in capex in response to the oil-price collapse.14 We are expecting US shale output to grow ~ 650k b/d this year, and to fall by ~ 1.35mm b/d next year on the back of the price collapse this year (Chart 7).15 We do not expect a resurgent shale-producing sector in the short- to medium-term, given the capital markets’ demonstrated aversion to funding this sector until it can demonstrate long-term profitability. The big uncertainty at present is the extent of demand destruction that will be caused by COVID-19, and the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy in supporting national economies during the pandemic. Equally important will be policy responsiveness post-COVID-19, and how quickly economies worldwide return to normal. Chart 7US Shale Output Will Fall Sharply US Shale Output Will Fall Sharply US Shale Output Will Fall Sharply Bottom Line: We expect a re-building of OPEC 2.0, with KSA and Russia restoring their production-management scheme before global storage facilities are filled and markets push prices below cash costs to force production to shut in. The revenue gains from this course of action far exceed any benefit derived from increasing production and prolonging a market-share war.16 Any agreement to include the Texas RRC will occur after demand is bottoming and moving up – i.e., once the outlook for demand is more stable – as happened when OPEC 2.0 was formed.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Fernando Crupi Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy FernandoC@bcaresearch.com     Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight The COVID-19 pandemic produced one undisputed winner: the environment. Limits on movement and factory shutdowns have massively reduced air pollution in countries hit by the pandemic early on (e.g. China and Italy). We expect similar declines elsewhere in Europe. This already is reflected in the ~ 30% drop in Carbon Emission Allowances (EUA) futures this year (Chart 8). Following the GFC, worldwide CO2 emissions dropped by 2.2%, but rapidly rebounded in 2010 – surpassing pre-crisis levels. We expect a similar recovery in global emissions as record stimulus measures kick in and normal traffic resumes post-COVID-19. Therefore, we are going long December 2020 ICE EUA futures. Base Metals: Neutral The LME base metal index is down 20% YTD. Downside risks remain large as lockdowns globally continue to intensify in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. These drastic measures also threaten mine operations for some metals. Copper supply is reportedly reduced in Peru and Chile. Nonetheless, weak economic growth along with a strong US dollar remain the dominant factors. Base metals prices gained from a lower USD on Tuesday, signaling market participants welcomed the Fed’s actions to relieve global liquidity fears. Still, it is too early to confirm these measures will be sufficient to circumvent further deterioration in the global economy. Precious Metals: Neutral Gold, silver, platinum, and palladium rose 12%, 15%, 14%, and 16% from the start of the week, recovering part of the sharp losses from the COVID-19 shock. Metals – especially Gold – were supported by the Fed’s resolve to provide much-needed liquidity to markets. Platinum and palladium were pushed higher following South Africa’s government decision to halt metal and mining operations as part of a 21-day nationwide shutdown to prevent the spread of the virus. Silver prices remain disconnected from their main drivers – i.e. safe-haven and industrial demand – and should rise along with gold once liquidity concerns dissipate (Chart 9). Ags/Softs:  Underweight After being under pressure for the last three sessions, CBOT May Corn futures rose this week, trading above $3.50/bu, as expectations of stronger demand for ethanol were revived by increasing oil prices. Wheat and beans also put in strong showings this week, as demand starts to lift. US grain exports are holding up relatively well versus the competition – chiefly the South America powerhouses Argentina and Brazil – as COVID-19 hampers their exports. Wheat futures remain firm on the back of stronger demand as consumers stockpile during the pandemic. Chart 8 EUA Futures Will Rebound As Traffic Resumes Post Covid-19 EUA Futures Will Rebound As Traffic Resumes Post Covid-19 Chart 9 Silver Prices Should Rise As Liquidity Concerns Dissipate Silver Prices Should Rise As Liquidity Concerns Dissipate   Footnotes 1     The Chart of the Week shows prompt volatility at the end of last week, when it stood at a record 183.22%, and a sharply backwardated volatility forward curve. Implied volatility is a parameter in option-pricing models, which equates the premium paid for options with the principal factors determining its value (i.e., the underlying futures price, the option’s strike price, time to expiry, interest rates and the expected volatility, or standard deviation of expected returns on the underlying). All of the factors other than volatility can be observed in the underlying market and interest rate markets, leaving volatility to be determined using an iterative search. Please see Ryan, Bob and Tancred Lidderdale (2009), Short-Term Energy Outlook Supplement: Energy Price Volatility and Forecast Uncertainty, published by the US Energy Information Administration, for a discussion of volatility as a market-cleared parameter. 2     We estimate our model both in (1) levels given that base metals, the US dollar and oil prices are cointegrated – i.e. these variable follow a common long-term stochastic trend – and (2) log-difference. We include the US dollar and 10-year treasury yields as explanatory variables. These series are closely linked to global growth trends, weakness in global economic activity is associated with a rising dollar and falling treasury yields. We only include treasury yields in the first difference model given that it is not cointegrated with oil and metal prices in levels. 3     Please see Oil prices as an indicator of global economic conditions, posted by Prof. Hamilton on his Econbrowser blog December 14, 2014. Our model uses monthly market inputs – non-oil commodities, the trade-weighted USD, US 10-year treasurys from January 2000 to February 2020, and the last daily close for March 2020. We extend Brian Prest’s 2018 model, which is based on Hamilton but uses monthly data instead of weekly data as in Hamilton. Please see Prest, C. Brian, 2018. "Explanation for the 2014 Oil Price Decline: Supply or Demand?" Energy Economics 74, 63-75. 4    Please see China steel, copper inventories dip as demand recovers from virus and Rupture of copper demand to fuel surplus as industry hit by virus, published March 20 and March 23, 2020, by reuters.com. 5     For an in-depth discussion, please see Life At The Zero Bound published March 24, 2020, by BCA Research’s US Bond Strategy. It is available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 6    Please see Germany expected to announce fiscal stimulus as European death toll rises published by thehill.com March 23, 2020. 7     We estimate the share of the price collapse explained by the supply shock using the residuals from our demand-only Brent price model presented in Chart 3. The difference between actual Brent prices and our demand-only estimates captures oil-specific factors unexplained by global economic growth – mainly supply dynamics. 8    Please see Saudi provisionally charters 19 supertankers, six to U.S. as global oil price war heats up published by reuters.com March 11, 2020. 9    Please see Texas regulator considers oil output cuts for the first time in decades published by worldoil.com on March 20, 2020. We discussed the historic role of the RCC during the 2014-16 OPEC-led market-share war in End Of An Era For Oil And The Middle East, a Special Report published April 9, 2014, with BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy. We noted, “In March of 1972, the (RRC) effectively relinquished control of Texas oil production, when it allowed wells in the state to produce at 100% of their capacity. This signaled the exhaustion of U.S. spare capacity – production no longer had to be pro-rated to maintain prices above marginal costs – and the ascendance OPEC to global prominence in the oil market.” 10   Please see Texas Railroad Commission chairman opposes OPEC-style oil production cuts published by S&P Global Platts March 20, 2020. 11    Please see U.S. to send envoy to Saudi Arabia; Texas suggests oil output cuts published by reuters.com March 20, 2020. 12    Please see Russia: Gulf nations, not us, to blame for oil prices fall -TASS published by reuters.com March 22, 2020. 13   Please see Chevron cuts spending by $4 billion, suspends share buybacks published by worldoil.com March 24, 2020. 14   Please see Factbox: Global oil, gas producers cut spending after crude price crash, published by reuters.com March 23, 2020. Refiners also are cutting runs – particularly in the US and Europe – in the wake of collapsing demand for gasoline and distillates (jet, diesel and marine fuels), as S&P Global Platts reported March 23, 2020: Refinery margin tracker: Global refining margins take a severe hit on falling gasoline demand. 15   This extends to oil-services companies as well, which are anticipating a deeper crash in their businesses than occurred in the 2014-16 market-share war. Please see Shale service leaders warn of a bigger crash this time around published by worldoil.com March 24, 2020. 16   We argued this outcome was more likely than not – given the economic and welfare stakes – in last week’s report, KSA, Russia Will Be Forced To Quit Market-Share War.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q4 Oil-Market Risk At Unprecedented Levels, As Is Uncertainty Regarding Fundamentals Oil-Market Risk At Unprecedented Levels, As Is Uncertainty Regarding Fundamentals Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in Summary of Closed Trades Oil-Market Risk At Unprecedented Levels, As Is Uncertainty Regarding Fundamentals Oil-Market Risk At Unprecedented Levels, As Is Uncertainty Regarding Fundamentals

Feature We closed our short position in EM equities last week but still maintain our short recommendation on EM currencies. Going forward we will be looking for signs of a durable bottom in risk assets. The clash between forthcoming massive economic stimulus around the world and the unprecedented plunge in global economic activity has generated a great deal of uncertainty over the magnitude and duration of the global recession. In turn, enormous ambiguity continues to produce extreme gyrations in financial markets. The unparalleled drop in the level of business activity and uncertainty over the length of lockdowns make it impossible to determine how much stimulus is required to produce a V-shaped recovery. Notably, all these stimuli will have an effect on the real economy with a lag. In the meantime, the real economy will remain in an air pocket. Overall, financial markets will remain very volatile as they try to recalibrate the magnitude and duration of recession as well as the speed of recovery. Chart 1China: Level Of Business Activity Is Still Lower Than A Year Ago China: Level Of Business Activity Is Still Lower Than A Year Ago China: Level Of Business Activity Is Still Lower Than A Year Ago Even in China, where the authorities have been stimulating and trying hard to restart the economy following lockdowns, the level of business activity remains below last year’s levels. In particular, Chart 1 illustrates that residential floor space sold in Shanghai in the past couple of weeks remains 60% lower than a year ago. This reveals how difficult it is to reboot discretionary consumer spending and business investment following a negative income shock. Overall, financial markets will remain very volatile as they try to recalibrate the magnitude and duration of recession as well as the speed of recovery. Such heightened uncertainty warrants a higher risk premium. Given financial markets are already discounting a lot of bad news, incoming economic data will be of little use. In our opinion, investors can only rely on various market indicators to gauge the direction of risk assets. Given financial markets are already discounting a lot of bad news, incoming economic data will be of little use. In our opinion, investors can only rely on various market indicators to gauge the direction of risk assets. Review Of Indicators The following market-based indicators lead us to believe that the selloff is in a late-stage, but not over. Chart 2More Downside In This Risk-On/Safe-Haven Currency Ratio More Downside In This Risk-On/Safe-Haven Currency Ratio More Downside In This Risk-On/Safe-Haven Currency Ratio Our Risk-On/Safe-Haven1 currency ratio is in free fall but has not reached the level that marked its 2011 and 2015 troughs (Chart 2). It is still well above its 2008 level.  Odds are that this indicator will drop to 2011 and 2015 levels before staging a major recovery. EM share prices, commodities and global cyclical stocks correlate closely with this ratio. A further drop in Risk-On/Safe-Haven currency ratio will be consistent with more downside in EM equities, resource prices and global cyclicals. The global stock-to-US 30-year bond ratio has crashed but is still above its 2008 trough (Chart 3). Given this global recession is worse than the one in 2008, it is reasonable to expect the ratio to drop to its 2008 level before recovering. The gold-to-US bonds ratio2 has not yet broken out of its rising channel (Chart 4). Only a decisive breakout above the upper boundary of this channel will confirm a sustainable rally in reflation plays. Chart 3Global Stock-To-Bond Ratio: More Downside Is Likely Global Stock-To-Bond Ratio: More Downside Is Likely Global Stock-To-Bond Ratio: More Downside Is Likely Chart 4The Gold-To-Bond Ratio Is Not Yet Confirming The Reflation Trade The Gold-To-Bond Ratio Is Not Yet Confirming The Reflation Trade The Gold-To-Bond Ratio Is Not Yet Confirming The Reflation Trade Meanwhile, the industrial metals-to-gold ratio has plunged below its 2008 and 2015/16 lows (Chart 5). This qualifies as a structural regime change in this indicator. Odds are that this ratio will continue to fall, heralding further weakness in global cyclicals in general and EM risk assets in particular.   The relative performance of non-financial Swiss stocks versus Swedish non-financials seems to have broken below 2002 and 2008 lows The relative performance of non-financial Swiss stocks versus Swedish non-financials seems to have broken below 2002 and 2008 lows (Chart 6). Such a breakdown typically entails additional decline. The latter will be consistent with more weakness in global cyclicals versus defensives. Chart 5A Noteworthy Breakdown A Noteworthy Breakdown A Noteworthy Breakdown Chart 6Cyclicals Vs Defensives Cyclicals Vs Defensives Cyclicals Vs Defensives Interestingly, Chinese equity indexes have dropped less than their global and EM peers. Nevertheless, cyclical sectors within the Chinese equity universe are exhibiting very disturbing chart patterns. Chinese bank stocks appear to be in a genuine downtrend, with no immediate support (Chart 7, top panel). Property developers in the onshore A-share market have hit key resistance levels and appear to be vulnerable to the downside (Chart 7, middle panel). Finally, Chinese investable small-cap stocks have broken down, and their path of least resistance is down (Chart 7, bottom panel). Overall, the relative resilience of Chinese share prices has been due to tech and “new economy” stocks. The rest of Chinese equities have been quite week in absolute terms. Finally, the net aggregate long position in US equity futures by asset managers and leveraged funds as of March 17 was still above its 2011 and 2016 lows (Chart 8).  It is reasonable to expect that the ultimate capitulation in US stocks will be consistent with a lower reading of this indicator. Chart 7Weak Internals Of Chinese Equity Markets Weak Internals Of Chinese Equity Markets Weak Internals Of Chinese Equity Markets Chart 8No Capitulation Among Investors In US Equity Futures No Capitulation Among Investors In US Equity Futures No Capitulation Among Investors In US Equity Futures     Bottom Line: The recent rebound in EM risk assets is unlikely to be sustainable. Several important indicators are not confirming a durable rally in reflation plays. Investment Strategy Even though EM equities have become cheap and very oversold as we discussed last week, odds are that the bear market in EM risk assets and currencies is not yet over. It might be too late to sell EM stocks, but also too risky to buy them aggressively. Chart 9EM Corporate Credit And Domestic Bonds: A Bear Market, Not A Correction EM Corporate Credit And Domestic Bonds: A Bear Market, Not A Correction EM Corporate Credit And Domestic Bonds: A Bear Market, Not A Correction Provided the selloff in EM fixed-income markets commenced only a couple of weeks ago, it will likely persist as investors facing losses are forced to further trim their positions (Chart I-9). We continue to recommend staying put on EM fixed-income markets. As EM US dollar and local currency bond yields rise, EM share prices will struggle. Finally, EM currencies remain vulnerable against the greenback. We are maintaining our short in a basket of the following EM currencies versus the US dollar: BRL, CLP, ZAR, IDR, PHP and KRW. Reshuffling EM Equity Country Allocation We are making the following changes within a dedicated EM equity portfolio: Upgrading Peru from neutral to overweight, and Colombia from underweight to neutral. Both bourses have underperformed substantially and warrant a one-notch upgrade. Peru will - on the margin - benefit from relative resilience in gold and silver prices. The collapse in Colombia’s relative equity performance is advanced. While we are not bullish on oil prices, we are protecting our gains on the underweight Colombian stocks allocation by moving it to neutral. Reiterating our underweight allocations in both Indonesian and Philippine equities. Both bourses are breaking down relative to the EM benchmark (Chart I-10). More downside is in the cards. Readers can click here to access our latest fundamental analysis on financial markets in Indonesia and the Philippines.  Maintaining our overweight positions in Korean and Thai equities. Underperformance in both bourses relative to the EM benchmark is at a late stage. We expect the relative performance of these markets versus the overall EM equity index to find a support close to current levels (Chart I-11). Chart 10Continue Underweighting Indonesian And Philippines Equities Continue Underweighting Indonesian And Philippines Equities Continue Underweighting Indonesian And Philippines Equities Chart 11Overweight Korean And Thai Stocks Within The EM Universe Overweight Korean And Thai Stocks Within The EM Universe Overweight Korean And Thai Stocks Within The EM Universe Downgrading UAE from overweight to underweight. We have been bearish on oil prices, but the speed of the collapse in crude prices has wreaked havoc on Gulf equity markets. Similarly, the speed of decline in oil prices has caused considerable tremors in Mexican and Russian financial markets. Our overweight position in Russian equities is now back to its breakeven level, but the one in Mexican stocks is deep under water. We are reiterating our overweight in both bourses but have much lower conviction on Mexican stocks versus Russian ones. We will publish an updated analysis on Mexico in the near term. Finally, we have been and remain neutral on the following equity markets relative to the EM benchmark: China, Taiwan, India, Malaysia, Brazil and Chile. We have been negative on Brazil but have not formally downgraded it to underweight. Among our underweights are also Turkey, South Africa and Hong Kong domestic stocks. The complete list of our equity recommendations is available on page 8. Our fixed-income and currencies recommendations are available on page 9 (all of our recommendations are always enclosed at the end of our Weekly Reports and are available on our Website as well).   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1    Average of CAD, AUD, NZD, BRL, IDR, RUB, CLP, MXN & ZAR total return indices relative to the average of CHF & JPY total returns. 2   It is calculated by dividing gold prices by total return on 10-year US government bonds. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Highlights As the global economy moves toward shut-down, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia will be forced to end their market-share war and focus on shoring up their economies and tending to their populations’ welfare. Governments worldwide are rolling out fiscal- and monetary-policy responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. They also are imposing seldom-seen freedom-of-movement and -gathering restrictions on their populations to contain the spread of the virus. A surge in bankruptcies among US shale-oil companies is expected as demand and supply shocks push Brent and WTI below producers’ breakeven prices. In our base case, benchmark prices are pushed toward $20/bbl this year, which will keep volatility elevated. Prices recover in 4Q20 and 2021, as the pandemic recedes, and economies respond to fiscal and monetary stimulus. We have reduced our oil-price forecasts in the wake of the deterioration in fundamentals, expecting Brent to average $36/bbl in 2020, and $55/bbl in 2021. WTI will trade ~ $3-$4/bbl lower. COVID-19 is transitory. Therefore price risk is to the upside in 2021, given the global stimulus being deployed. Feature Brent and WTI prices are down 61.4% and 66.6% since the start of the year (Chart of the Week), taking front-month futures to their lowest levels since 2002. Oil markets are in a fundamental disequilibrium – the expected global supply curve is moving further to the right with each passing day, as the KSA and Russia market-share rhetoric escalates. Global demand curves are moving further to the left on an hourly basis, as governments worldwide impose freedom-of-movement restrictions and lock-downs to contain the spread of COVID-19 seen only during times of war and natural devastation.  These effects combine to swell inventories globally, as rising supply fails to be absorbed by demand. The collapse in crude oil prices since the beginning of this year is lifting volatility to levels not seen since the Gulf War of 1990-91. Chart of the WeekBenchmark Crude Prices Collapse Toward Cash Costs Benchmark Crude Prices Collapse Toward Cash Costs Benchmark Crude Prices Collapse Toward Cash Costs Chart 2Oil-Price Volatility Surges To Wartime Levels Oil-Price Volatility Surges To Wartime Levels Oil-Price Volatility Surges To Wartime Levels Prices, as can be expected under such circumstances, are plunging toward cash costs – i.e., the level at which only operating costs are covered – which are below $20/bbl. The collapse in crude oil prices since the beginning of this year is lifting volatility to levels not seen since the Gulf War of 1990-91 launched by the US and its allies following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait (Chart 2). As inventories rise, the supply of storage globally falls, and prices are forced below cash costs to drive surplus crude oil production from the market. The rapid evolution from backwardation (prompt prices exceed deferred prices) to steep contango (prompt prices at a discount) in the benchmark crudes is how markets signal the supply of storage is falling (Chart 3). Chart 3Markets' Violent Move From Backwardation To Contango Markets' Violent Move From Backwardation To Contango Markets' Violent Move From Backwardation To Contango Chart 4Storage Constraints Drive Price Volatility KSA, Russia Will Be Forced To Quit Market-Share War KSA, Russia Will Be Forced To Quit Market-Share War This strain on global inventory capacity will keep volatility elevated: As physical constraints on storage intensify, only price can adjust to clear the market, which results in massive price moves as markets respond in real time to supply-demand imbalance (Chart 4). Shales Lead US Output Lower At this point, massive increases in supply are not required to keep benchmark oil prices below $30/bbl. Markets are seeing and anticipating a sharp contraction in demand in the near term, with storage building as consumers “shelter in place” around the world. Production is set to increase in April, in the midst of a global exogenous shock to demand. As these fundamentals are worked into prices volatility will remain high. In our updated forecasts, our base case assumes KSA and its allies, and Russia raise production by 1.3mm b/d in 2Q20 and 3Q20.  KSA's and Russia's output increase to ~ 11mm b/d and 11.7mm b/d, respectively. We expect the reality of low prices and a slowing world economy to force these states back to the negotiating table in 2H20, with production cuts being realized in 4Q20 and 2021 (see below). With less capital made available to shale drillers, production growth in the shales literally is forced to slow. While KSA’s and Russia’s budgets almost surely will bear enormous strain in such an environment, we believe it is the US shales that take the hardest hit over the short run, if KSA and Russia maintain their avowed production intensions. The growth in US shale output – Russia’s presumed target – is expected to slow sharply this year under current circumstances, increasing at a rate of just 650k b/d over 2019’s level. Next year, we expect shale production in the US to fall ~ 1.3mm b/d to 7.7mm b/d. Part of this is driven by the on-going reluctance of capital markets to fund shale drillers and hydrocarbon-based energy companies generally, which can be seen in the blowout in high-yield bond spreads dominated by shale issuers (Chart 5). With less capital made available to shale drillers, production growth in the shales literally is forced to slow. Chart 5Low Price Force US Shale Cutbacks Low Price Force US Shale Cutbacks Low Price Force US Shale Cutbacks With funding limited and domestic oil prices well below breakevens – and cash costs – more shale-oil producers will be pushed into bankruptcy or into sharp slowdowns in drilling activity (Charts 6A and 6B). These constraints will force total US output to contract by 1.3mm b/d next year, based on our modeling. This will take US lower 48 output this year and next to 10.5mm b/d and 9.2mm b/d, respectively (Chart 7). Chart 6ALow Prices Force US Shale Cutbacks KSA, Russia Will Be Forced To Quit Market-Share War KSA, Russia Will Be Forced To Quit Market-Share War Chart 6BLow Price Force US Shale Cutbacks KSA, Russia Will Be Forced To Quit Market-Share War KSA, Russia Will Be Forced To Quit Market-Share War Capital markets will not tolerate unprofitable production. When the dust settles next year, US shale-oil output is expected to take the biggest supply hit globally, based on our current assumptions and modeling results. Worthwhile remembering, however, shale-oil production is highly likely to emerge a leaner more efficient sector, as they did in the OPEC-led market-share war of 2014-16.1 Also worthwhile remembering, for shale operators, is capital markets will not tolerate unprofitable production. So, net, a stronger, more disciplined shale-oil producer cohort emerges from the wreckage of the COVID-19 demand shock coupled with the KSA-Russia market-share war of 2020. Chart 7US Shale Contraction Leads US Output Lower In 2021 US Shale Contraction Leads US Output Lower in 2021 US Shale Contraction Leads US Output Lower in 2021 Demand Uncertainty Is Huge We are modeling a shock that reduces global demand – a highly unusual occurrence – by 150k b/d this year versus 2019 levels (Table 1). Most of this shock occurs in 1H20, where a large EM contraction originating in China set the pace. We expect China’s demand to begin recovering in 2Q20. The demand contraction moves into OECD states in 2Q20, which are expected to follow a similar trajectory in demand shedding seen elsewhere (Chart 8). In 2H20, we expect global demand to begin recovering, and, barring another outbreak of COVID-19 (or another novel coronavirus) next winter, for global demand growth to re-accelerate to ~ 1.7mm b/d in 2021. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) KSA, Russia Will Be Forced To Quit Market-Share War KSA, Russia Will Be Forced To Quit Market-Share War The uncertainty around our demand modeling is large. Expectations from the large data providers are all over the map: The EIA expects demand to grow 360k b/d this year, while the IEA and OPEC expect -90k and 60k b/d. In addition, some banks and forecasters make a case for demand falling by 1mm b/d or more in 2020, a scenario we do not expect. Sorting through the evolution of demand this year – i.e., tracking the recovery from China and EM through to DM – will be difficult, particularly as Western states go into lock-down mode and the global economy remains moribund. This makes our forecasts for supply-demand balances and prices highly tentative, and subject to revision. Chart 8Demand Shock + Market-Share War = Imbalance Demand Shock + Market-Share War = Imbalance Demand Shock + Market-Share War = Imbalance Market-Share War: What Is It Good For? As we argue above, the US shale-oil producers will, for a variety of reasons, be forced by capital and trading markets to retrench, and to cut production sharply. They lost favor with markets prior to the breakdown of OPEC 2.0, and this will not change. At this point, it is unlikely KSA and Russia can alter this evolution by increasing or decreasing production – investors already have shown they have little interest in funding their further growth and development. The KSA-Russia market-share war reinforces investors’ predispositions, and decidedly accelerates this retrenchment by the shale producers. As the global economy moves toward shut-down, KSA and Russia will be forced to turn their attention to shoring up their economies and tending to their populations’ welfare. The strain of a global shut-down will absorb governments’ resources worldwide, and self-inflicted wounds – which, at this point, a market-share war amounts to – will only make domestic conditions worse in KSA, Russia and their respective allies. The income elasticity of supply for these producers is such that small adjustments – positive or negative – on the supply side have profound effects on oil producers’ revenues (Table 2). Both KSA and Russia are aware of this. Russia burns through its $150 billion national wealth fund in ~ three years in a market-share war, while KSA burns through ~ 10% of its foreign reserves, when export prices fall $30/bbl and Russia's exports rise 200k b/d and KSA's rise 2mm b/d.2 In a world where demand destruction is accelerating revenue losses, and storage limitations threaten to collapse oil prices below cash costs, production management – even if that means extending the 1Q20 cuts of 1.7mm b/d for the balance of 2020 – is necessary to avoid larger, longer-term economic damage (Chart 9). Table 2Market-Share War Vs. Revenue KSA, Russia Will Be Forced To Quit Market-Share War KSA, Russia Will Be Forced To Quit Market-Share War Chart 9Global Inventories Could Surge Global Inventories Could Surge Global Inventories Could Surge We believe the leadership in both of these states have sufficient reason to return to the negotiating table to figure out a way to re-start their production-management accord, if only to preserve funds to cover imports while global demand recovers. It may take a month or two of unchecked production to make this point clear, however, so volatility can be expected to remain elevated. These fundamental and political assessments compel us to reduce our oil-price forecasts in the wake of the deterioration in fundamentals, expecting Brent to average ~ $36/bbl in 2020, and $55/bbl in 2021. WTI will trade ~ $3-$4/bbl lower. Price risk is to the upside in 2021, given the global fiscal and monetary stimulus being deployed. Bottom Line: The confluence of a true global demand shock and a market-share war on the supply side has pushed benchmark crude oil prices close to cash costs for many producers. The damage to states highly dependent on oil revenues is just now becoming apparent. We expect KSA and Russia to return to the negotiating table, to hammer out a production-management accord that allows them to control as much of the economic damage to their economies as is possible. Capital markets already are imposing a harsh discipline on US shales – Russia’s presumptive target in the market-share war. The consequences of the COVID-19 vis-a-vis demand destruction are of far greater moment for KSA and Russia than their market-share war. They need to shore up their economies and get in the best possible position to benefit from a global economic rebound, not destroy themselves seeking a Pyrrhic victory that devastates both of them.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight Chinese refiner Sinochem International Oil (Singapore) turned down an offer of crude-oil cargoes for May-June deliver from Russian oil company Rosneft PJSC, which is under US sanctions, according to Bloomberg. Sinochem refuses cargoes from Iran, Syria, Venezuela, and Kurdistan, which also are under sanction or are commercially aligned with sanctioned entities. Base Metals: Neutral The downward trend in base metal prices remains,  as the spread of the coronavirus intensifies outside of China, and governments worldwide impose freedom-of-movement restrictions on their populations to contain further spread. Persistent US dollar strength – supported by inflows to safe assets amid the elevated global economic uncertainty – pressures EM economies’ base metal demand. As a result, the LME index is down 18% YTD, reaching its 2016 lows. We were stopped out of our long LMEX recommendation on March 17, 2020 for a 12% loss. Precious Metals: Neutral Gold and silver are caught up in a global selloff of assets that have performed well over the past year as safe havens, as market participants raise cash for liquidity reasons or margin calls. We are waiting for an opportunity to go long gold again after being stopped out earlier in the sell-off. Silver will recover with industrial-commodity demand, which we expect to occur in 4Q20, when the COVID-19 threat recedes, and consumers worldwide are responding to the globally fiscal and monetary stimulus being rolled out now. We are staying on the sidelines for now, as volatility is extremely high for metals (Chart 10). Ags/Softs:  Underweight CBOT May Corn futures were down 3% Tuesday, reaching 18-month lows, driving mostly by high USD levels, which make US exports less competitive. Supplies from South America, where a large harvest is ongoing in Argentina and Brazil, are taking market share. Furthermore, according to a report from the University of Illinois, lower gasoline consumption resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic will reduce the amount of corn needed for ethanol production; demand could fall 120mm to 170mm bushels. Soybeans and wheat futures ended the day slightly higher on the back of bargain buying, after falling to multi-month lows on Monday. USD strength remains a headwind on ags, encouraging production ex-US at the margin and contributing to stifling demand for US exports (Chart 11). Chart 10Gold Is Experiencing Extremely High Volatility Gold Is Experiencing Extremely High Volatility Gold Is Experiencing Extremely High Volatility Chart 11USD Strength Remains A Headwind On AGS USD Strength Remains A Headwind On AGS USD Strength Remains A Headwind On AGS   Footnotes 1     Please see How Long Will The Oil-Price Rout Last?, a Special Report we published March 9, 2020, which discussed US bankruptcy law and the re-cycling of assets. 2     Please see Russia's Supply Shock To Oil Markets and Russia Regrets Market-Share War?, which we published March 6 and March 12, 2020, for additional discussion. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q4 KSA, Russia Will Be Forced To Quit Market-Share War KSA, Russia Will Be Forced To Quit Market-Share War Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2020 Summary of Closed Trades KSA, Russia Will Be Forced To Quit Market-Share War KSA, Russia Will Be Forced To Quit Market-Share War

Highlights Our short EM equity index recommendation has reached our target and we are booking profits on this trade. The halt to economic activity will produce a global recession that will be worse than the one that took place in late 2008. We continue to recommend short positions in a basket of EM currencies versus the US dollar. In EM fixed-income markets, the duration of the ongoing selloff has been short, and large losses will trigger more outflows ensuring further carnage. Stay defensive for now. Russia is unlikely to make a deal with Saudi Arabia to restrain oil output for now. Feature The global economy is experiencing a sudden, jarring halt. The only comparison for such a sudden stop is the one that occurred in the fall of 2008, following Lehman’s bankruptcy. In our opinion, the global economic impact of the current sudden stop is shaping up to be worse than the one that occurred in 2008. That said, we are taking profits on our short position in EM equities. This position – recommended on January 30, 2020 – has produced a 30% gain.   EM share prices have reached the long-term support that acted as the ultimate floor during the bear markets in 1997-‘98, 2001-‘02, 2007-‘08 and 2015. Our decision to take profits reflects investment discipline. The MSCI EM stock index in US dollar terms has reached our target. In addition, this decision is consistent with two important indicators that we follow and respect: 1. EM stocks have become meaningfully cheap. Chart I-1 illustrates that our cyclically-adjusted P/E (CAPE) ratio for EM equities is about one standard deviation below its fair value – the same level when the EM equity market bottomed in 1998, 2008 and 2015. Chart I-1EM Equities Are Cheap According To The Cyclically-Adjusted P/E Ratio EM Equities Are Cheap According To The Cyclically-Adjusted P/E Ratio EM Equities Are Cheap According To The Cyclically-Adjusted P/E Ratio For this EM CAPE ratio to reach 1.5 standard deviations below its fair value – the level that is consistent with EM’s 2001-02 lows – EM share prices need to drop another 15%. 2. In term of the next technical support, EM share prices have reached the long-term support that acted as the ultimate floor during the bear markets in 1997-‘98, 2001-‘02, 2007-‘08 and 2015 (Chart I-2). Chart I-2EM Share Prices Are At Their Long-Term Support EM Share Prices Are At Their Long-Term Support EM Share Prices Are At Their Long-Term Support While share prices are likely to undershoot, it is risky to bet on a further decline amid current extremely elevated uncertainty and market volatility. The Global Downturn Will Be Worse Than In Late 2008 Odds are that the current global downturn is shaping up to be worse than the one that occurred in late 2008. From a global business cycle perspective, the current sudden halt is beginning from a weaker starting point. Global trade growth was positive back in August-September 2008 – just prior to the Lehman bankruptcy – despite the ongoing US recession (Chart I-3A). In comparison, global trade was shrinking in December 2019, before the COVID-19 outbreak (Chart I-3B). Chart I-3AGlobal Trade Growth Was Positive In September 2008… Global Trade Growth Was Positive In September 2008... Global Trade Growth Was Positive In September 2008... Chart I-3B…But Was Negative In December 2019 ...But Was Negative In December 2019 ...But Was Negative In December 2019   This is because growth in EM and Chinese economies was still very robust in the middle of 2008. Moreover, the economies of EM and China were structurally very healthy and were anchored by solid fundamentals. Still, the blow to confidence emanating from the crash in global financial markets and plunge in US domestic demand in the fall of 2008 produced major shockwaves in EM/Chinese financial markets. Provided the ongoing negative confidence shock and lingering uncertainty persist, odds are that the risk premium will initially overshoot before settling down. Consistently, risk markets will undershoot in the interim. This is in contrast with current cyclical growth conditions and structural economic health, both of which are very poor in EM/China going into this sudden stop.   In China, economic growth in January-February 2020 was much worse than at the trough of the Lehman crisis in the fourth quarter of 2008. Chart I-4 reveals that industrial production, auto sales and retail sales volumes all contracted in January-February 2020 from a year ago. The same variables held up much better in the fourth quarter of 2008 (Chart I-4). Business activity in China is recovering in March, but from very low levels. Reports and evidence from the ground suggest that many companies are operating well below their ordinary capacity – the level of economic activity remains well below March 2019 levels. US real GDP, consumer spending and capital expenditure shrunk by 4%, 2.5% and 17% at the trough of 2008 recession (Chart I-5). Odds are that these variables will plunge by an even greater magnitude in the coming months as the US reinforces lockdowns and public health safety measures. Chart I-4China Business Cycle Was Much Stronger In Q4 2008 Than Now China Business Cycle Was Much Stronger In Q4 2008 Than Now China Business Cycle Was Much Stronger In Q4 2008 Than Now Chart I-5US Growth At Trough Of 2008 Recession US Growth At Trough Of 2008 Recession US Growth At Trough Of 2008 Recession   Chart I-6US Small Caps: Overlay Of 2008 And 2020 US Small Caps: Overlay Of 2008 And 2020 US Small Caps: Overlay Of 2008 And 2020 About 50% of consumer spending in the US is attributed to people over 55 years of age. Provided COVID-19’s fatality rate is high among the elderly, odds are this cohort will not risk going out and spending. How bad will domestic demand in the US be? It is impossible to forecast with any certainty, but our sense is that it will plunge by more than it did in the late 2008-early-2009 period, i.e., by more than 4% (Chart I-5, bottom panel). Interestingly, the crash in US small-cap stocks resembles the one that occurred in the wake of the Lehman bankruptcy (Chart I-6). If US small-cap stocks follow their Q4 2008 - Q1 2009 trajectory, potential declines from current levels will be in the 10%-18% range. Bottom Line: The current halt in economic activity and impending global recession will be worse than the one that took place in late 2008. Reasons Not To Jump Into The Water…Yet Even though EM equities have become cheap and oversold and we are booking profits on our short position in EM stocks, conditions for a sustainable rally do not exist yet: So long as EM corporate US dollar bond yields are rising, EM share prices will remain under selling pressure (Chart I-7). Corporate bond yields are shown inverted in this chart. Chart I-7EM Stocks Fall When EM Corporate Bond Yields Rise EM Stocks Fall When EM Corporate Bond Yields Rise EM Stocks Fall When EM Corporate Bond Yields Rise Chart I-8Chinese And Emerging Asian Corporate Bond Yields Are Spiking Chinese And Emerging Asian Corporate Bond Yields Are Spiking Chinese And Emerging Asian Corporate Bond Yields Are Spiking The selloff in both global and EM credit markets began only a few weeks ago from very overbought levels. Many investors have probably not yet trimmed their positions. Hence, EM sovereign and corporate credit spreads and yields will likely rise further as liquidation in the global and EM credit markets persists. Consistently, bond yields for Chinese offshore corporates as well as emerging Asian high-yield and investment-grade corporates are rising (Chart I-8). EM local currency bond yields have also spiked recently as rapidly depreciating EM currencies have triggered an exodus of foreign investors. Rising local currency bond yields are not conducive for EM share prices (Chart I-9). Chart I-9EM Equities Drop When EM Local Bond Yields Rise EM Equities Drop When EM Local Bond Yields Rise EM Equities Drop When EM Local Bond Yields Rise EM ex-China currencies correlate with commodities prices (Chart I-10). Both industrial commodities and oil prices have broken down and have further downside. The path of least resistance for oil prices is down, given anemic global demand and our expectation that Russia and Saudi Arabia will not reach any oil production cutting agreement for several months (please refer to our discussion on this topic below). Finally, our Risk-On/Safe-Haven currency ratio1 is in free fall and will likely reach its 2015 lows before troughing (Chart I-11). This ratio tightly correlates with EM share prices, and the latter remains vulnerable to further downside as long as this ratio is falling. Chart I-10EM Currencies Move In Tandem With Commodities Prices EM Currencies Move In Tandem With Commodities Prices EM Currencies Move In Tandem With Commodities Prices Chart I-11More Downside In Risk-On/ Safe-Haven Currency Ratio More Downside In Risk-On/ Safe-Haven Currency Ratio More Downside In Risk-On/ Safe-Haven Currency Ratio   Bottom Line: Although we are taking profits on the short EM equity position, we continue to recommend short positions in a basket of EM currencies – BRL, CLP, ZAR, IDR, PHP and KRW – versus the US dollar. Liquidation in EM fixed-income markets has been sharp, but the duration has been short –only a few weeks. Large losses will trigger more outflows from EM fixed-income markets. Stay defensive for now. What We Do Know And What We Cannot Know Amid such extreme uncertainty, it is critical for investors to distinguish between what we know and what we cannot know. What we cannot know: With regards to COVID-19: The speed of its spread, the ultimate number of victims it claims and – finally – its impact on consumer and business confidence and psyche. Related to lockdowns: Their duration in key economies. These questions will largely determine this year’s economic growth trajectory: Will it be V-, U-, W-, or L-shaped? Unfortunately, no one knows the answers to the above questions to have any certainty in projecting this year’s global growth. The key factor that gives Russia an advantage over Saudi Arabia in terms of its ability to deal with a negative terms-of-trade shock is not only its better fiscal position but also its ability to depreciate its currency. What we do know: Authorities in all countries will stimulate aggressively so long as financial markets are rioting. Nonetheless, these stimulus measures will not boost growth immediately. With entire countries locked down and plunging consumer and business confidence, stimulus will not have much impact on growth in the near term. In brief, all policy stimulus will boost growth only when worries about the pandemic subside and the economy begins to function again. Both are not imminent. Hence, we are looking at an air pocket with respect to near-term global economic growth. As we argued in our March 11 report titled, Unraveling Of The Policy Put, the pre-coronavirus financial market paradigm – where stocks and credit markets were priced to perfection because of the notion that policymakers would not allow asset prices to drop – has unravelled.   In recent weeks, policymakers around the world have announced plans to deploy massive amounts of stimulus, yet the reaction of financial markets has been underwhelming. The reason is two-fold: Both demand shrinkage and production shutdowns have just started, and they will run their due course regardless of announced policy stimulus measures. Equity and credit markets were priced for perfection before this selloff, and investors are in the process of recalibrating risk premiums. Provided the ongoing negative confidence shock and lingering uncertainty persist, odds are that the risk premium will initially overshoot before settling down. Consistently, risk markets will undershoot in the interim. Bottom Line: DM’s domestic demand downturn is still in its initial phase, and there is little foresight in terms of the pandemic’s evolution. These are natural forces, and any stimulus policymakers enact are unlikely to preclude them from occurring. Reflecting the economic contraction and heightened uncertainty, the selloff in risk assets will likely continue for now. Do Not Bet On An Early Resuscitation Of OPEC 2.0 As we argued in our March 11 report, Russia is unlikely to make a deal with Saudi Arabia to restrain oil output in the immediate term. Russia may agree to restart negotiations, but it will not agree to reverse its position for some time. Both nations will be increasing crude output (Chart I-12). As a result, a full-fledged oil market share war is underway. Consistently, crude prices have experienced a structural breakdown (Chart I-13).  Chart I-12The Largest Oil Producers Are Ramping Up Output The Largest Oil Producers Are Ramping Up Output The Largest Oil Producers Are Ramping Up Output Chart I-13Structural Breakdown In Oil Prices Structural Breakdown In Oil Prices Structural Breakdown In Oil Prices   The key factor that gives Russia an advantage over Saudi Arabia in terms of its ability to deal with a negative terms-of-trade shock is not only its better fiscal position but also its ability to depreciate its currency. Russia has a flexible exchange rate, which will allow the currency to depreciate in order to soften the blow from lower oil prices on the real economy and fiscal accounts. The Russian economy and financial system have learned to operate with recurring major currency depreciations. Saudi Arabia has been running a fixed exchange rate regime since 1986 and cannot use currency depreciation to mitigate the negative terms-of-trade shock on its end. Even though Russia’s fiscal budget break-even oil price is much lower than that of Saudi Arabia’s, it is not the most important variable to consider in this confrontation. The fiscal situation in both Russia and Saudi Arabia will not be a major problem for now. Both governments can issue local currency and US dollar bonds, and there will be sufficient demand for these bonds from foreign and local investors. This is especially true with DM interest rates sitting at the zero-negative territory. Falling oil prices and downward pressure on exchange rates will trigger capital outflows in both countries. Russia has learned to live with persistent capital flight. In the meantime, capital outflows will stress Saudi Arabia’s financial system and, eventually, its real economy. This is in fact the country’s key vulnerability. We will be publishing a Special Report on Saudi Arabia in the coming weeks.  Bottom Line: Do not expect a quick recovery in oil prices. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Average of CAD, AUD, NZD, BRL, RUB, CLP, MXN & ZAR total return indices relative to average of CHF & JPY total returns.   Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations