Persian (Gulf)

Highlights While not exactly conciliatory, Russian officials are signaling they will re-consider the declaration of a market-share war with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). KSA upped its shock-and-awe rhetoric promising to lift maximum sustainable capacity to 13mm b/d, which has kept prices under pressure (Chart of the Week) and will resonate into 3Q20, even if a market-share war is averted. Failure to stop a market-share war will fill global oil storage, and Brent prices again will trade with a $20 handle by year-end. Demand forecasts by the IEA and prominent banks are tilting toward the first contraction in global oil demand since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Central banks and governments are rolling out fiscal and monetary stimulus to counter the expected hit to global aggregate demand in the wake of COVID-19. Given the extraordinary uncertainty surrounding global oil supply and demand, our balances and prices forecasts are highly tentative. We are reducing our 2020 Brent forecasts to $40/bbl for 2Q-3Q20, and $50/bbl for 4Q20. For 2021, we are expecting Brent to average $60/bbl. WTI trades $3-$4/bbl below Brent in our estimates. Feature Russian officials appear to be seeking a resumption of talks with OPEC. Since the declaration of a market-share war following the breakdown of OPEC 2.0 negotiations to agree a production cut to balance global oil markets, Russian officials appear to be seeking a resumption of talks with OPEC.1 Putting such a meeting together before the expiration of OPEC 2.0’s 1.7mm b/d production-cutting deal at the end of this month will be a herculean lift for the coalition, but it can be done. All the same, it may require a quarter or so of re-opened floodgates from KSA and its GCC allies to focus everyone’s attention on the consequences of market-share wars. To that end, the Kingdom announced it will lift production above 12mm b/d, and supply markets out of strategically placed storage around the world. It was joined by the UAE with a pledge to raise output to 4mm b/d. Chart of the WeekMessy OPEC 2.0 Breakdown Crashes Benchmark Crude Prices Messy OPEC 2.0 Breakdown Crashes Benchmark Crude Prices Messy OPEC 2.0 Breakdown Crashes Benchmark Crude Prices Assessing Uncertain Fundamentals While the dramatis personae on the supply side maneuver for advantage, markets still are trying to form expectations on the level of demand destruction in EM and DM wrought by COVID-19. Given the elevated uncertainty around this issue, modeling our ensemble forecast has become more complicated. On the demand side, we are modeling three scenarios for 2020: Global demand growth falls 200k b/d y/y, flat growth, and growth of 600k b/d. Our previous expectations had growth increasing 1mm b/d in 2020 and 1.7mm b/d in 2021. We maintain the rate of growth for next year – 1.7mm b/d – but note it is coming off a lower 2020 base for consumption. On the supply side, it’s a bit more complicated. We have three scenarios: In Scenario 1, we model the OPEC 2.0 breakdown, i.e., OPEC 2.0 gradually increases production by 2.5mm b/d between Apr20 and Dec20. Compared to our previous estimates it also removes the 600k b/d we previously expected would be added to the cuts in 2Q20, which produces a supply increase of 2.5mm b/d + expectation of 600k b/d vs. our previous balances. In Scenario 2, we run our previous balances expectation, which cuts production by a total of 2.3mm b/d in 2Q20, 1.7mm b/d in 2H20, and 1.2mm b/d in 2021.2 Scenario 3 models the additional cuts as recommended by OPEC last in week in Vienna of 1.5mm b/d on top of the 1.7mm b/d already agreed on for 1Q20. These cuts are realized gradually, moving to 2.3mmm b/d in 2Q20 and 3.2mm b/d in 2H20. For 2021, our supply assumptions revert to the OPEC 2.0 production cuts of 1.2mm b/d that prevailed last year. The price expectations generated by these scenarios can be seen in Table 1 and in Charts 2A, 2B, and  2C, which show our supply-side scenarios with the three demand-side scenarios above. We show our balances estimates given these different scenarios in Charts 3A, 3B, and 3C, and our inventory estimates in Charts 4A,  4B, and  4C. Table 1Unstable Brent Price Forecasts Russia Regrets Market-Share War? Russia Regrets Market-Share War? It may require a quarter or so of re-opened floodgates from KSA and its GCC allies to focus everyone’s attention on the consequences of market-share wars. Chart 2AOil Price Scenarios Driver: OPEC vs. Russia Price War Oil Price Scenarios Driver: OPEC vs. Russia Price War Oil Price Scenarios Driver: OPEC vs. Russia Price War Chart 2BOil Price Scenarios Driver: Pre-OPEC 2.0 Breakdown Oil Price Scenarios Driver: Pre-OPEC 2.0 Breakdown Oil Price Scenarios Driver: Pre-OPEC 2.0 Breakdown Chart 2COil Price Scenarios Driver: Proposed OPEC Cuts Oil Price Scenarios Driver: Proposed OPEC Cuts Oil Price Scenarios Driver: Proposed OPEC Cuts Chart 3AOil Balances Scenarios Driver: OPEC vs. Russia Price War Oil Balances Scenarios Driver: OPEC vs. Russia Price War Oil Balances Scenarios Driver: OPEC vs. Russia Price War Chart 3BOil Balances Scenarios Driver: Pre-OPEC 2.0 Breakdown Oil Balances Scenarios Driver: Pre-OPEC 2.0 Breakdown Oil Balances Scenarios Driver: Pre-OPEC 2.0 Breakdown Chart 3COil Balances Scenarios Driver: Proposed OPEC Cuts Oil Balances Scenarios Driver: Proposed OPEC Cuts Oil Balances Scenarios Driver: Proposed OPEC Cuts Chart 4AOECD Inventory Scenarios Driver: OPEC vs. Russia Price War OECD Inventory Scenarios Driver: OPEC vs. Russia Price War OECD Inventory Scenarios Driver: OPEC vs. Russia Price War Chart 4BOECD Inventory Scenarios Driver: Pre-OPEC 2.0 Breakdown OECD Inventory Scenarios Driver: Pre-OPEC 2.0 Breakdown OECD Inventory Scenarios Driver: Pre-OPEC 2.0 Breakdown Chart 4COECD Inventory Scenarios Driver: Proposed OPEC Cuts OECD Inventory Scenarios Driver: Proposed OPEC Cuts OECD Inventory Scenarios Driver: Proposed OPEC Cuts Given all of the moving parts in our forecast this month, we will only be publishing a summary of these estimates (Table 1). We will publish our global balances table next week after we have had time to process the EIA’s and OPEC’s historical demand estimates. Given the dynamics of supply-demand and storage adjustments these different scenarios produce, we use them to roughly estimate forecasts for 2Q and 3Q20, 4Q20 and 2021. We are reducing our 2020 Brent forecasts to $40/bbl for 2Q-3Q20, and $50/bbl for 4Q20. For 2021, we are expecting Brent to average $60/bbl. WTI trades $3-$4/bbl below Brent in our estimates. The implicit assumption here is COVID-19 is contained by 3Q20 and is in the market’s rear-view mirror by 4Q20. Obviously, such an assumption is fraught with uncertainty. Russia May Be Re-Thinking Strategy I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia. It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest. Winston Churchill, BBC Broadcast, October 1, 1939.3 Russia appears to be sending up trial balloons to indicate to OPEC it would not be averse to renewing the OPEC 2.0 dialogue. It is worthwhile noting Russian officials immediately responded to KSA’s first mention of sharply higher output – going to 12.3mm bd from 9.7mm b/d – with their own assertion they will lift current output of ~ 11.4mm b/d by 200k – 300k b/d, and ultimately take that to +500k b/d. Of course, as Churchill’s observation makes plain, it is difficult to interpret Russia’s overtures in this regard, particularly in light of the growing popular dissatisfaction with President Vladimir Putin’s regime within Russia itself. At the outset, it seems to us that the cause of the breakdown in OPEC 2.0 was the collapse in demand from China following the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan Province, and Putin’s attempt to secure a longer stay in power.4 The former focused Russia’s oil oligarchs on shoring up market share, and focused Putin on maintaining the support of these important oligarchs. The basis for Russo-Saudi cooperation under the OPEC 2.0 umbrella was rising oil demand, and the simple fact that both sides had exhausted their ability to sustain low prices brought on by the 2014-16 oil-price collapse ushered in by OPEC’s previous market-share war amid the global manufacturing downturn. The slowdown in global demand due to China’s slow-down and the Sino-US trade war in 2019 weakened Russian commitment to OPEC 2.0 by end of year. Putin faced domestic popular discontent and grumbling among the oligarchs (e.g. Igor Sechin, the head of Rosneft), just as he was preparing to extend his term in power. The possibility of a drastic loss of Russian influence over global oil markets – and hence of its own economic independence – emerged at a time when Putin still has the ability to maneuver ahead of the 2021 Duma election and 2024 presidential election which are essential to his maintenance of power. Going into 2020, Russia also had gained monetary and fiscal ammunition over preceding three years that would allow them to challenge KSA within OPEC 2.0, while KSA’s reserves stagnated (Chart 5). The Wuhan Coronavirus pushed things over the edge by hitting Chinese oil demand directly in the gut. Putin gave into the oil sector’s demands for prioritizing market share. As is apparent, this is the critical issue for him and the oligarchs running Russia’s oil and gas companies. Chart 5Foreign Exchange Reserves Foreign Exchange Reserves Foreign Exchange Reserves Russia’s US Focus The fact that US President Donald Trump and Iran are harmed by the oil price collapse is secondary. The Russians may have known that the US and Iran would suffer collateral damage, but their primary objective was not to unseat Trump and definitely not to increase the chances of regime collapse in Iran. It is not unthinkable that President Putin would attempt to upset the US election yet again. Regardless of the relationship between Putin and Trump, Russia benefits from promoting US polarization in general. And the Democrats will impose stricter regulations on US resource industries (including shale). All the same, Russia will suffer from Democrats taking power and strengthening NATO and the trans-Atlantic alliance. A knock on shale is a short-term benefit to Russia, but the loss of Trump as a president who increases geopolitical “multipolarity,” which is good for Russia, would be a long-term loss. President Putin would not have triggered the conflict with Saudi over such a mixed combination. The breakdown of OPEC 2.0 happened after Super Tuesday, so it was clear Biden was leading the US Democratic Party’s bid for the Oval Office come November. Biden is hawkish on Russia and is more likely than Trump to get the Europeans to reduce their energy dependence on Russia. Also, it is possible Trump will benefit from lower oil prices anyway, since it will reduce prices at the pump by November and also help China recover – thus allowing it to boost global demand and follow through on Phase 1 of the Sino-US trade deal. As noted above, market share is primary. The US election, if it is relevant at all, is subsidiary. The Trump administration is furious because the turmoil threatens to upset the US election. As for Iran, Russia does at least consider its position, but is driven by its own needs and, as usual, threw Iran under the bus when necessary. Russia will continue to support the Iranian regime in other ways. And if the consequence of the market-share war is government change in the US, then Iran has its reward. Clearly President Putin was willing to throw President Trump under the bus, as well. It was not surprising to see US officials singling out Russia when discussing the oil-price collapse last week and earlier this week, when US Treasury Secretary Steve Mnuchin and Russia’s foreign minister, Anatoly Antonov, met in Washington. This blame game is consistent with what we think we know: Russia wavered on the deal presented by OPEC. Saudi Arabia was not the instigator.5 Saudi Arabia massively reacted to retaliate against Russia’s declared price war, but it was Russia that refused to agree to more cuts.6 The Trump administration is furious because the turmoil threatens to upset the US election. From Trump’s perspective, oil and gasoline prices weren’t too high, but, now that they are lower, the risk of higher unemployment in key electoral states – even Texas – is elevated. Trump wanted more oil production but not oil market chaos.  Trump wanted more oil production but not oil market chaos. This short-term thinking is likely to drive US policy in advance of the election, although from a long-term point of view the US has little reason to regret Russia’s actions as Russia is ultimately shooting itself in the foot. From an international point of view, the breakdown shows that Russia and KSA are fundamentally competitive, not cooperative, and the fanfare over improving relations was dependent on stronger oil demand, not vice versa. Russia’s strategy for decades – in the Middle East and elsewhere – has been to take calculated risks, not to undertake reckless adventures that expose its military and economic weaknesses relative to the United States and Europe. This strategic logic applies to the market-share war as well as to Russia’s various conflicts with the West. The oil price collapse is bad for Russia’s economy and internal stability and hence the door to talks is still open. The immediate risk to both KSA and Russia is a forward oil curve that stays lower for longer, regardless of what the Russian Finance Ministry says. A reconciliation between KSA and Russia to restore the production-management deal would limit the negative fallout. The immediate risk to both KSA and Russia is a forward oil curve that stays lower for longer, regardless of what the Russian Finance Ministry says.7 Bottom Line: The COVID-19 pandemic and the breakdown of OPEC 2.0 last week in Vienna dramatically heightened uncertainty and volatility in oil markets. Although it appears Russian officials are trying to walk back the market-share war declared at the end of last week, events already in train could keep oil prices lower for longer. We lowered our oil-price forecasts for 2020 to reflect the demand destruction and a possible supply surge this year. The underlying assumption of our modeling on the demand side is the COVID-19 pandemic will be contained and the global economy will be back in working order by 4Q20. On the supply side, nothing is certain, but we are leaning to a re-formation of OPEC 2.0, which ultimately restores the production-management regime that prevailed until last week. Both of these assumptions are highly unstable. We lowered our 2020 Brent forecasts to $40/bbl for 2Q-3Q20, and to $50/bbl for 4Q20. For 2021, we are expecting Brent to average $60/bbl. WTI trades $3-$4/bbl below Brent in our estimates. These forecasts will be constantly reviewed as new information becomes available. Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight Total stocks of crude oil and products in the US drew another 7.6mm barrels in the week ended March 6, 2020, led by distillates, the EIA reported. Crude and product inventories finished the week at close to 1.3 billion barrels (ex SPR barrels). Total product demand – what the EIA called “Product Supplied” – was up close to 600k b/d, led by distillates (e.g., heating oil, diesel, jet and marine gasoil). Commercial crude oil inventories rose by 7.7mm barrels (Chart 6). Base Metals: Neutral After falling almost to the daily downside limit early on Monday, Singapore ferrous futures staged a recovery on Tuesday when iron ore jumped 33%, as declining inventories of the steelmaking material sparked supply concerns among investors. SteelHome Consultancy reported this week Chinese port-side iron ore stocks dropped to 126.25mm MT, down 3.4% for the year. In addition, China’s General Administration of Customs reported iron ore imports rose 1.5% in the January and February relative to the same period a year ago. The decreasing number of new COVID-19 cases in China should help iron ore and steel going forward as construction and infrastructure projects resume. Precious Metals: Neutral Gold prices are up 9% YTD, supported by accommodative monetary policy globally in the wake of the rapid spread of COVID-19 cases outside of China. Fixed income markets are pricing in 80bps cuts in the Fed funds rate over the next 12 months. Additionally, negative-yielding debt globally – which is highly correlated with gold prices – increased 26% since January 2020. Continued elevated uncertainty stemming from the spread of the coronavirus keeps demand for safe assets buoyant. We estimate the risk premium in gold prices related to this persistent uncertainty is ~$140/oz (Chart 7). Nonetheless, positioning and technical signal it is overbought and vulnerable to a short-term pullback. Ags/Softs:  Underweight In its World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE), the USDA lowered its season-average price expectations for the current crop year for corn to $3.80/bu, down 5 cents, and for soybeans to $8.70/bu, a decrease of 5 cents. The USDA kept its expectation for wheat at $4.55/bu. The Department estimates global soybean production will increase 2.4mm MT, with most of this stemming from increases in Argentina and Brazil. CONAB, Brazil’s USDA equivalent, confirmed this projected increase, saying the country’s soybean output is poised to rise 8% to a record 124.2 Mn Tons this year. May soybean futures were up slightly, as were corn and wheat on Tuesday. Chart 6 US Crude Inventories Are Rising US Crude Inventories Are Rising Chart 7 Russia Regrets Market-Share War? Russia Regrets Market-Share War?   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Please see Russia keeps door open for OPEC amid threats to raise output, published by worldoil.com; Russian ministry, oil firms to meet after OPEC talks collapse -sources, published by reuters.com March 10, 2020, and Russia says it can deal with pain of a Saudi oil price war published by ft.com March 9, 2020. 2     For non-OPEC 2.0 countries, we also included downward adjustments to Libya and US shale production vs. our previous balances 3    Please see “The Russian Enigma,” published by The Churchill Society. See also Kitchen, Martin (1987), “Winston Churchill and the Soviet Union during the Second World War,” The Historical Journal, Vol. 30, No. 2), pp. 415-436. 4    We also would observe Russian producers never fully abided by the output cuts voluntarily in every instance. Often, compliance was due to (1) seasonal maintenance; (2) extreme temperatures in the winter, and (3) the pipeline contamination incident. Thus, producers were probably close to full capacity most of the time OPEC 2.0's production cuts were in place. This implies that for a minor voluntary production cut, Russia enjoyed prices close to $70/bbl, vs. mid $30s currently. This begs the question why they would provoke a market-share war when they would have been better off continuing to flaut their quotas instead of collapsing prices. 5    Please see Mnuchin wants ‘orderly’ oil markets in talk with Russian ambassador published by worldoil.com March 9, 2020. 6    One could argue that while the Saudis reacted quickly and threatened a massive response, they may have been less fearful of a breakdown given the recognition that it could seriously damage Iran’s economy. 7     The Financial Times noted Russia’s confidence that its National Wealth Fund of ~ $150 billion, equivalent to ~ 9% of GDP, which officials believe allows it “to remain competitive at any predicted price range and keep its market share” – i.e., the state will draw down the fund to cover any difference between low oil prices and domestic oil company’s breakeven prices. Energy Minister Alexander Novak said Russia would “pay special attention to providing the domestic market with a stable supply of oil products and protecting the sector’s investment potential.” Please see Russia says it candDeal with the pain of a Saudi price war, published by ft.com March 9, 2020.  

Highlights Oil prices fell 30% when markets opened Monday morning, following a split between OPEC 2.0’s putative leaders – the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – over production cuts to balance global oil markets (Chart 1). If KSA and Russia are able to repair the break in what OPEC Secretary General Mohammad Barkindo once called their “Catholic Marriage” the sudden collapse in prices could serve a useful purpose in reminding producers, consumers and investors of the need for full-time management of production and inventories, and restore prices to the $60/bbl neighborhood in 2H20.1 If not, markets could be in for a drawn-out market-share war lasting the better part of this year, with damaging consequences for all involved, with Brent prices remaining closer to $30/bbl (Chart 2). Feature Much as we rely on modeling to guide our expectations, this is purely political at the moment. How Long Will The Oil Price Rout Last? That’s the question that repeatedly is being asked by clients following the breakdown in Vienna last week, and news over the weekend that KSA would engage a market-share war opened by Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak prior to departing Vienna. Novak gave every impression of renewing a market-share war after Russia rejected the plan put forth by OPEC to remove an additional 1.5mm b/d of production from the market, to combat the demand destruction expected in the wake of COVID-19. The only answer we have to the question: No one knows with certainty. Chart 1Oil Sell-Off Accelerates, As Market-Share War Looms Oil Sell-Off Accelerates, As Market-Share War Looms Oil Sell-Off Accelerates, As Market-Share War Looms Chart 2A Market-Share War Will Keep Oil Prices Depressed A Market-Share War Will Keep Oil Prices Depressed A Market-Share War Will Keep Oil Prices Depressed Neither of the principal actors responsible for the 30% rout in oil prices on Monday morning when markets opened for trading – KSA and Russia – are providing guidance at present. Prices since recovered slightly and were down ~ 20% Monday afternoon. Much as we rely on modeling to guide our expectations, this is purely political at the moment. There are two large personalities involved – Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud and Russian President Vladimir Putin – who have staked out opposing positions on the level of production cuts needed to balance markets in the short term, as the COVID-19 outbreak spreads beyond China leaving highly uncertain demand losses in its wake.2 If a meeting of OPEC 2.0’s leadership can be arranged before the end of March, a hope expressed by Iran's Oil Minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh in a Bloomberg interview over the weekend,3 the stage could be set for a rapprochement between KSA and Russia allowing them to repair the rupture in the OPEC 2.0 leadership. Should that occur, the rally in prices could be dramatic – maybe not as dramatic as today's price collapse when markets awoke to the opening rounds of a full-on market-share war between OPEC and Russia. But, over the course of the next few weeks, prices for 2H20 Brent and WTI would begin recovering and moving back toward $60/bbl as markets price in lower inventories on the back of a return to production discipline by OPEC 2.0. If we do not see such a meeting next week, markets will be forced to price in a prolonged price-war that could extend into the end of this year, which will not be easy to arrest. If, as seems to be the case, the Russians' goal is to directly attack shale-oil production in the US with a market-share/price war, the effort most likely will fail. True, there will be an increase in bankruptcies among the shale producers and their services companies. This will set up another round of industry consolidation – i.e., more M&A in the US shales – with the large integrated multinational oil companies that now dominate these provinces adding to their holdings. It is worthwhile remembering that US bankruptcy law recycles assets; it does not retire them permanently. In addition, the acquirers of bankrupt firms’ assets get them at a sharp discount, which greatly helps their cost basis. So, shale assets will change hands, stronger balance sheets will take control of these assets, and a leaner, more efficient group of E+Ps will emerge from the wreckage. What’s Being Priced? It is in neither KSA’s nor Russia’s interest to engage in a prolonged market-share war that keeps Brent prices closer to $30/bbl than to $70/bbl. We estimate oil markets now have to price in the return of ~ 2.8mm b/d of OPEC 2.0 production at the end of this month – i.e., a 10% increase of GCC output, led by KSA’s production getting up to 11mm b/d by year-end; ~ 600k b/d of cuts we were assuming would be approved in last week’s Vienna meetings; and ~ 260k b/d from Russia (Chart 3). This could be understated, as KSA claims 12.5mm b/d of capacity (including its spare capacity). Unchecked supply growth would force inventories to build this year (Chart 4).  In fact, absent a return to production-management by OPEC 2.0, oil markets will extrapolate the higher production and low demand into an expectation for steadily rising inventories, that will – once it becomes apparent the supply of storage globally will be exhausted – force prices toward $20/bbl. Weaker-than-expected demand growth would accelerate this process. Chart 3Higher Production Will Overwhelm Demand In Market-Share War Higher Production Will Overwhelm Demand In Market-Share War Higher Production Will Overwhelm Demand In Market-Share War Chart 4Market-Share War Could Exhaust Storage Forcing Production Out of The Market Market-Share War Could Exhaust Storage Forcing Production Out of The Market Market-Share War Could Exhaust Storage Forcing Production Out of The Market It is in neither KSA’s nor Russia’s interest to engage in a prolonged market-share war that keeps Brent prices closer to $30/bbl than to $70/bbl. The apparent unwillingness of Putin and the Russian oligarchs running the country’s oil companies to make relatively small additional production cuts – vis-à-vis what KSA already has delivered – to support prices has not been well explained by Russian producers. The revenue benefits from small production cuts almost surely exceed the additional revenue that would accrue from a 200-300k b/d increase in  output and keeping prices in the $30-$40/bbl range, a level that is below Russian producers' cost of production onshore and offshore, according to the Moscow Times.  KSA's costs are ~ $17/bbl on the other hand.4 Russia’s economy was wobbly going into the Vienna meetings, which makes sorting this out even more complicated. One thing that can be said for certain is that over the past six months Vladimir Putin has entered into another consolidation phase in attempting to quell public unrest, improve the government’s image, and tighten up control over the country, while preparing for another extension of his time as Russia’s supreme leader. A Battle For Primacy? At one level, it would appear the Russians were pushing back against an apparent demand by OPEC (the old cartel led by KSA) to fall in line. Russia’s rejection of the OPEC proposal could be read as an assertion of their position to show they were, at the very least, KSA’s equal in the coalition. A stronger read of the rejection, given the Russian Energy Minister’s comments following the breakdown in Vienna at the end of last week – "... neither we nor any OPEC or non-OPEC country is required to make (oil) output cuts” – would be Russia was attempting to assert itself as the leader of OPEC 2.0. Giving Russia what amounted to a take-it-or-leave-it ultimatum on production cuts was a high-stakes gamble on KSA’s part. On KSA’s side, it is likely the Saudis grew irritated with the Russian failure to get on board to address a global oil-demand emergency that was spreading beyond China, when they were discussing extending and deepening production cuts in the lead-up to last week’s meetings. Giving Russia what amounted to a take-it-or-leave-it ultimatum on production cuts was a high-stakes gamble on KSA’s part, to say the least. However, as OPEC’s historic kingpin, KSA may have believed its role was to lead the coalition.  Russia’s in a better position now relative to KSA in the short term vis-à-vis foreign reserves ($446 billion), budget surplus (~ $8 billion), and its lower fiscal breakeven price for oil ($50/bbl) vs KSA’s ($84/bbl), as we discussed in our Friday alert (Chart 5). However, with Russian per-capita GDP at ~ half that of KSA’s, it is highly likely – if this market-share war is prolonged – its citizens are going to be hit with the consequences of the oil-price collapse in short order: FX markets are selling ruble heavily today, and, in short order this will feed through into higher consumer prices and inflation. Indeed, we estimate a 1 percentage-point (pp) depreciation in the ruble vs. the USD y/y leads to a 0.14pp increase in Russian inflation (Chart 6). Chart 5Foreign Exchange Reserves Foreign Exchange Reserves Foreign Exchange Reserves Chart 6Russian Ruble Sell-Off Presages Inflation Russian Ruble Sell-Off Presages Inflation Russian Ruble Sell-Off Presages Inflation The Saudi riyal is pegged to the USD, and does not move as much as the ruble. However, KSA’s citizens also will be buffeted once again by a collapse in oil prices, as they were during the 2014-16 market-share war when government revenues came under severe stress. Things To Watch The OPEC 2.0 joint market-monitoring committee could meet again next week in Vienna, but that is not a given. If they do meet, the agenda likely will be dominated by trying to find a face-saving way for both sides to resume production management. Arguably, the presumptive target of the Russian strategy – US shale producers – will be severely damaged by this week’s price collapse, and both could argue the short-term tactic of threatening a price war was a success. The Saudis could also go for a quick solution, if their primary objectives are to sort things out with Russia, stabilize the global economy, and keep President Trump in office, rather than to push down prices in an adventurous attempt to escalate Iran’s internal crisis. We believe Russia badly miscalculated, and was too early in making a play for dominance in OPEC 2.0, if that was its intent. If, on the other hand, these large personalities cannot agree, the price collapse begun today will continue until global oil storage – crude and products – is filled, forcing prices through cash costs of all but the most efficient producers in the world. This level is below $20/bbl. These lower prices could redound to the benefit of China, as fiscal and monetary stimulus provided by policymakers there in the wake of COVID-19 to get the economy back on track for 6% p.a. growth gets super-charged by low oil prices. Bottom Line: We believe Russia badly miscalculated, and was too early in making a play for dominance in OPEC 2.0, if that was its intent. Russian GDP has twice the sensitivity to Brent prices that KSA does, which means such a tactic takes a toll on it as well as the shale producers (Chart 7). Capital markets had the US shale producers on the ropes, so it is difficult to argue there was a need to accelerate the process and shock the world. We again note a full-blown market-share war will set up another round of industry consolidation in the US shales, but, over the medium to longer term, the shale assets of bankrupt companies will only be re-cycled to more efficient operators, as we saw following the last market-share war. This will contribute to a stronger shale sector in the US in the medium term. Chart 7Russian GDP More Sensitive to Brent Prices Russian GDP More Sensitive to Brent Prices Russian GDP More Sensitive to Brent Prices The only other consolation for Russia is a higher likelihood of regime change in the US (more political polarization in the US benefits Russia), and yet the Trump administration has been the most pro-Russian administration in years so this is not at all a clear objective. We will be watching very closely for a meeting of OPEC 2.0’s joint committee next week. If we get it and a face-saving resolution is agreed by KSA and Russia we would expect stronger demand growth in 2H20 to absorb whatever unintended inventory accumulation a still-born price war causes. If not, we will expect a price war into the end of the year, after which the economies of oil producers globally will have been sufficiently battered to naturally force production lower and investment in future production to contract sharply. At that point, oil and oil equities will be an attractive investments for the medium and long term.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Please see Russia and Saudi Arabia Hold 'Catholic Marriage' with Poem and Badges, Form Enormous Oil Cartel published by Newsweek July 3, 2019. 2     We will be updating our demand estimates in Thursday’s publication, after we get fresh historical data from the principal providers (EIA, IEA, OPEC). 3     Please see Iran's Oil Minister Wants OPEC+ Output Cut, Hopes for Russia Meeting Soon published by Bloomberg, March 8 2020. 4     Please see Russian Oil Production Among Most Expensive in World published November 12, 2019 by The Moscow Times.  

Highlights Crude oil prices fell ~ 10% Friday after Russia refused to support additional production cuts agreed by OPEC in Vienna (Chart 1). As we go to press, Brent is trading close to $45/bbl and WTI is trading ~ $41/bbl. OPEC producers could implement the go-to strategy they’ve employed in the wake of past demand shocks and cut production on their own, in order to balance the market. That said, there are indications the Saudis will not shoulder the market-balancing role alone. Russian producers have consistently demanded relief from production restraints since 2017, when OPEC 2.0 took over balancing the market. With shale-oil producers on the back foot owing to parsimonious capital markets, Russia could finally be able to deliver the coup de grâce it has been waiting for. This supply shock hits the market as COVID-19 threatens demand globally. Whatever Russia’s intent – be it removing the near-certainty of a production cut, which it always agreed to in the past, or crippling US shale production – two-way risk has returned to these Vienna meetings. Feature Oil markets once again are faced with a possible price collapse – not unlike the swan dive seen when OPEC’s market-share war took Brent from more than $110/bbl in mid-2014 to $26/bbl by early 2016. The proximate aim of that market-share war – led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) – was to significantly reduce the revenue Iran would receive when it returned to export markets, following its agreement with the US to end its nuclear program in 2015. Tanking oil prices was the most expedient way of accomplishing this. Secondarily, shale-oil producers also may have been targeted, although such a goal was never clearly articulated by KSA’s leadership. Chart 1Russia's Supply Shock Craters Brent, WTI Prices Russia's Supply Shock Craters Brent, WTI Prices Russia's Supply Shock Craters Brent, WTI Prices OPEC’s market-share war did thin the US oil-shale herd, but it did not destroy the industry. If anything, it forced shale-oil producers to focus on their best drilling prospects with their best rigs and crews. This produced a leaner more productive technology-driven cohort of drillers, which posted record production levels on a regular basis. Indeed, by the end of 2019, US production topped 12.9mm b/d – 8.2mm b/d of which was accounted for by shale-oil output – making the US the largest oil and gas producer in the world. The market-share war also brought KSA and Russia together in November 2016 as the putative leaders of OPEC 2.0. The sole mission of this unlikely coalition was to clear the global inventory overhang left in the wake of the market-share war by managing OPEC and non-OPEC production. Russia’s Coup de Grâce Managing global production and inventories with KSA – while US shale-oil producers continued to raise their output to new records regularly – never sat well with Russia’s oil producers.   Managing global production and inventories with KSA – while US shale-oil producers continued to raise their output to new records regularly – never sat well with Russia’s oil producers. Ahead of OPEC 2.0 meetings in Vienna, Russian oligarchs could be counted on to demand higher output levels, and President Vladimir Putin could be counted on to deliver something close to agreed production cuts in time to assuage markets. This semi-annual ritual came to resemble a tightly choreographed set-piece, which may have inured market participants to the oligarchs’ resolve to ultimately increase production levels. Russia certainly was well-prepared when it delivered Friday’s supply shock. Time will tell, but Friday’s breakdown in Vienna could be the coup de grâce Russia’s oligarchs have been waiting to deliver to US shale producers since the formation of OPEC 2.0. Or it could be a well-timed reminder that nothing in oil markets is certain – particularly Russian compliance with production-restraint agreements. The once-certain 11th-hour agreement to adhere to whatever production-cutting agreements OPEC 2.0 came up with is now gone. And with it, the high-probability bet that, regardless of the tensions leading up to the Vienna meetings, a production-management agreement would be delivered, and shale-oil producers would live to fight another day. Chart 2Russia, KSA Foreign Exchange Reserves Russia, KSA Foreign Exchange Reserves Russia, KSA Foreign Exchange Reserves Whatever the case, Russia certainly was well-prepared when it delivered Friday’s supply shock. It has steadily built its foreign-exchange reserves since the price collapse begun in 2014, which now stand at $446 billion, up 45% from their nadir of 2015 (Chart 2). KSA’s foreign-exchange reserves, on the other hand, fell sharply in the wake of the 2014 – 2016 market-share war and have languished at lower levels since. Chart 3Russia, KSA Per-Capita Income Russia's Supply Shock To Oil Markets Russia's Supply Shock To Oil Markets Still, the Kingdom is not without stout resources. It’s gross national income per capita is ~ 2x that of Russia’s (Chart 3), and its days-forward import cover expressed in terms of days of foreign reserves is similarly stout (Chart 4). Chart 4Russia, KSA Import Cover Russia's Supply Shock To Oil Markets Russia's Supply Shock To Oil Markets The economies of both KSA and Russia are exquisitely linked to Brent oil prices (Chart 5). So tempting another market-share or price war is a strategy that could not be sustained by either country for an extended period of time. Chart 5Russia, KSA GDP vs Brent Prices Russia, KSA GDP vs Brent Prices Russia, KSA GDP vs Brent Prices Chart 6Russia, KSA GDP Highly Sensitive To Brent Prices Russia, KSA GDP Highly Sensitive To Brent Prices Russia, KSA GDP Highly Sensitive To Brent Prices The End Of OPEC 2.0? Post-GFC, we estimate Russia’s real GDP elasticity to changes in oil prices is close to twice that of Saudi Arabia. This suggests Russia’s strategy could have dismal consequences for its economy. Oil markets will gnaw on Friday’s breakdown in Vienna, sorting out the signals that were missed in Russian messaging, and figuring out what happens next. Neither Russia nor KSA have the resources to wage an indefinite war of attrition with US shale producers. Both are highly dependent on oil revenues to sustain their economies (Chart 6). Of the two, Russia’s economy is more sensitive to Brent oil prices than KSA’s, as it markets more of its output in trading markets. Post-GFC, we estimate Russia’s real GDP elasticity to changes in oil prices is close to twice that of Saudi Arabia. This suggests Russia’s strategy could have dismal consequences for its economy. Russia’s $50/bbl fiscal breakeven price vs. KSA’s $84/bbl price might give Russia more staying power in the short run, but with per-capita income at roughly half that of Saudi citizens, it will not want to revisit the dire days of 2014-16 when its economy last suffered through an oil-price collapse.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com  

Highlights The US election cycle is an understated risk to US equities – and the risk of a left-wing populist outperforming in the Democratic primary election is frontloaded in February. The US-Iran conflict is unresolved and remains market-relevant. Iraq is at the center of the conflict and oil supply disruption there or elsewhere in the region is a substantial risk. Even if war does not erupt, Iran has the potential to give President Trump’s foreign policy a black eye and thus could marginally impact the election dynamic. Feature Stocks have rallied mightily since our August report on Trump’s “tactical trade retreat,” but new headwinds face the market. In this report we call attention to four hurdles arising from US election uncertainty. Then we focus on the status of Iran and Iraq in the wake of this month’s hostilities, which brought the US and Iran to the brink of outright war. We maintain that the Iran risk is unresolved and will remain market-relevant in advance of the US election. Primarily due to the US Democratic primary election, we urge caution on US equities in the near term, along with our Global Investment Strategy, despite our cyclically bullish House View. Four Hurdles In The US Election Cycle The US election cycle is the chief political risk to the bull market this year – and geopolitical risks largely radiate from it. There are four immediate hurdles that financial markets are underestimating: Risks to Trump's re-election: Global investors have come around to our view since 2018 that Trump is slightly favored to win re-election (Chart 1). Bets on the related question of which party will hold the White House have flipped from Democratic to Republican (Chart 2). Everyone now recognizes that Trump will not be removed from office through impeachment. Chart 1Trump Re-election Odds Add To Risk-On Trump Re-election Odds Add To Risk-On Trump Re-election Odds Add To Risk-On Chart 2Republicans Now Favored For White House Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Yet, anecdotally, investors may be becoming complacent about Trump’s chances. He is not a shoo-in. Subjectively we have argued that his odds of victory are 55%. Our quantitative election model shows that Wisconsin has shifted to the Republican camp since November, but it places the odds of winning that state (and Pennsylvania) at less than 52% (Chart 3). This gives Trump 289 electoral votes, only 19 more than necessary. If both of these states tipped in the opposite direction then investors would be facing a major policy reversal in the United States. Chart 3Our US 2020 Election Model Shows Trump Win With 289 Electoral College Votes Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Chart 4The US Economy Is Still A Risk To Trump The US Economy Is Still A Risk To Trump The US Economy Is Still A Risk To Trump Trump’s low approval rating remains a liability – and in this sense impeachment is still relevant, in that it can either help or hurt his approval, or prompt him to seek distractions abroad that could deliver negative surprises. Moreover the US manufacturing sector and labor market are not out of the woods yet (Chart 4). In short, the election is still ten months away and a lot can happen between now and then. We see Trump as only slightly favored. Moreover other hurdles are more immediate than the benefits of policy continuity upon a Trump win. 2. Risks to Biden's nomination: Throughout last year we maintained that former Vice President Joe Biden was the frontrunner for the Democratic nomination, albeit with very low conviction. In particular, after Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders’s poor showing in the third debate and subsequent heart attack, we expected Massachusetts Senator Elizabeth Warren to consolidate the progressive vote and trigger a policy-induced selloff in US equities. This never occurred because Biden held firm, Sanders recovered, and Warren fell. The risk to equities from a left-wing populist Democratic nominee is frontloaded in February and March. Now, however, the risk to equities is back. The Democratic Party faces a last-ditch effort from its left or “progressive” wing and anti-establishment voters to oppose Biden. With the primary election now upon us – the Iowa Caucus is February 3 – national opinion polls show that Sanders is pushing up against Biden (Chart 5). It is less clear if Sanders is breaking through in the primary polling state-by-state, where multiple candidates remain competitive (Chart 6). But online gamblers are reasserting Biden over Sanders at just the moment when progressives are set to launch their biggest push (Chart 7). Meanwhile New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg is finally gaining some traction – and he eats away at Biden’s support from centrist voters. Everything is in flux, which warrants caution. Chart 5Biden Is The Frontrunner, But Sanders Is Challenger Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Chart 6Biden Not A Shoo-In For Early Democratic Primary States Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Biden is still favored to win the nomination, but he has not clinched it. The market faces volatility during the period when Democrats get “cold feet” about nominating another establishment candidate. Moreover the fundamental knock against Sanders – that he is not as “electable” as Biden – is debatable, judging by head-to-head polls against Trump (Chart 8). This means that a shift in momentum – for instance, if Biden lurches from disappointments in early states to underperformance in his bulwark of South Carolina – would have legs. Ultimately a “contested convention” is not impossible. This would be a negative surprise to market participants currently assuming that the world faces the relatively benign choice of two known quantities: an establishment Democrat or a continuation of Trump policies. Chart 7Betting Markets Overlooking Party 'Cold Feet' Over Biden Betting Markets Overlooking Party 'Cold Feet' Over Biden Betting Markets Overlooking Party 'Cold Feet' Over Biden Chart 8Electability Fears May Not Stop Sanders Rally Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Risks to the Republican Senate: Assuming Biden clinches the nomination, he has a 45% chance of winning the election – and in that case, his chance of bringing the Senate over to the Democrats is higher than investors realize. This is another risk that the market will awaken to later this year. Chart 9Democrats Underestimated In Senate Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran The consensus holds that Republicans will hold the Senate, particularly with Republican senators in Maine and Iowa leading their Democratic challengers in polling. The problem is that for Democrats to unseat an incumbent president they will necessarily have generated strong turnout from key demographic groups: young people, suburbanites, women, and minorities. If that is the case, then the election will not be as tight as expected and Republicans will be less likely to hold the Senate. This would require rising unemployment or some other blow that fundamentally damages the Trump administration’s popular support in key swing states. At least until it becomes clear that the manufacturing sector is out of the woods, the Democrats should be seen as far more likely to take the Senate than the Republicans are to retake the House of Representatives – yet this goes against the consensus (Chart 9). Rising odds of a Senate victory would mean that even a “centrist” Democrat like Biden would have fewer political constraints in office – he would pose a greater threat of increasing taxes, minimum wages, and passing legislative regulation than the market currently expects. In short, Biden would be pulled to the left of the political spectrum by his party and expectations of an establishment Democrat posing a minimal threat to corporate profits would be greatly disappointed. Risks of Trump's second term: Finally, assuming the manufacturing sector rebounds and that Trump’s odds of re-election rise above 55%, market complacency becomes an even bigger concern for a long-term investor. For in his second term Trump would become virtually unshackled with regard to economic and financial constraints, since he cannot run for office again. He would still face the senate, the Supreme Court, and other constraints, but these would certainly not preclude a doubling down on trade war (or confrontations with nuclear-aspirants like Iran or North Korea). We have argued that Trump will not instigate a trade war with Europe, at least until the economy has clearly rebounded, and most likely not until his second term. But we fully expect chapter two of the trade war to begin in 2021 – and this could mean China, Europe, or even a two-front war. Re-election could go to Trump’s head and prompt him to overreach on the global stage. Hence we expect the relief rally on Trump’s re-election to be short-lived and would be looking to sell the news. But the S&P 500 faces more immediate hurdles anyway, and that is why we urge caution in the very near term. Iran is still a major geopolitical risk this year. Bottom Line: None of these hurdles are insurmountable, but the US election cycle is now an understated risk to the equity bull market. We agree with our Global Investment Strategy that it is prudent to shift to a neutral position tactically on US equities, especially for the February and March period when uncertainty rises over the Democratic Party primary. This does not change our view that the underlying global economy is improving, largely on China’s rebound, and that the cyclical outlook is positive. Don’t Bet On Regime Collapse In Iran (Yet) The January 8 Iranian attack on US bases in Iraq was intended to serve as a breather for Iranian leaders. It was meant to put on pause the rapid escalation in US-Iran tensions – allowing Iranian leaders to recover from the assassination of top military commander Qassem Suleimani – all the while appeasing the public through a public show of revenge. As fate would have it, however, the Iranian regime was granted no such respite. Days later, domestic unrest descended on the Islamic Republic as protesters returned to the streets across the country, criticizing the regime’s downing of a civilian airliner and re-stating their long-running complaints against the regime. Civil strife is not uncommon in Iran (Table 1). Economic inefficiencies, corruption, and discriminatory policies which serve to reward regime loyalists while suppressing the private sector are only some of the grievances faced by Iranians.1 Table 1Civil Strife Ongoing Problem In Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Today’s strife is relevant, however, because it is fueled by US-imposed “maximum pressure” sanctions that have created an even bleaker economic reality. Iranian exports were down 37% in 2019 following an 18% decline the previous year. Oil exports fell to 129 thousand barrels per day in December 2019, down from an average 2.1 million barrels per day in 2017 (Chart 10). Households are facing the brunt, experiencing a 17% unemployment rate and a whopping 36% inflation rate (Chart 11). Chart 10US 'Maximum Pressure' Sanctions On Iranian Oil Exports US 'Maximum Pressure' Sanctions On Iranian Oil Exports US 'Maximum Pressure' Sanctions On Iranian Oil Exports Chart 11Iranian Households Bear Brunt Of Economic Shock Iranian Households Bear Brunt Of Economic Shock Iranian Households Bear Brunt Of Economic Shock The 2020-21 budget, released in December and described as a weapon of “resistance against US sanctions,” intends to plug the deficit using state bonds and state property sales (Chart 12). However Iran’s fiscal condition is shaky. The International Monetary Fund estimates a fiscal breakeven oil price of $194.6 per barrel for Iran, more than 3 times higher than current oil prices. Chart 12Iran’s Fiscal Condition Is Shaky Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Chart 13Iran Avoiding Devaluation Under Trump Iran Avoiding Devaluation Under Trump Iran Avoiding Devaluation Under Trump Chart 14Iranians Also Blame Their Government For Malaise Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran The solution of former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the populist hawk who led the government during the US’s previous round of sanctions, was to devalue the official exchange rate. The weaker rial raised local currency revenues for each barrel of exported oil and encouraged import substitution in other industries. However devaluation came at a steep political cost and sparked riots and protests. So far President Hassan Rouhani has eschewed this strategy, instead maintaining a stable official exchange rate, used as the reference for subsidized basic goods and medicine (Chart 13). Nevertheless, the unofficial market rate has weakened 68% since the beginning of 2018. It is no surprise then that Iranians all over the country are taking to the streets. The latest bout of unrest is significant in size, geographic reach, and in that protesters are calling on Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to step down as supreme leader. Despite US sanctions, Iranian protesters are partially blaming Khamenei and the government for the country’s malaise (Chart 14). Even prior to the US withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal, Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA), Iranians were angry about economic mismanagement. Nevertheless, according to our checklist for an Iranian revolution, the regime is not yet at risk of collapse (Table 2). Although the street movement is picking up pace, it is not organized or unified. There is no alternative being offered against the all-powerful supreme leader, and the political elite are mostly united in preserving the current system. Table 2Iran Regime Stability Checklist Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran The regime has two main options going forward: seek immediate economic relief through negotiations with the United States, or hunker down and wait to see whether President Trump is reelected and able to sustain his campaign of maximum pressure, and go from there. We fully expect the latter. Domestic dissent can still be suppressed for the time being. The parliamentary – or Majlis – elections scheduled for February 21 could in theory offer Iranians an opportunity to voice their discontent through the ballot box. However this democratic exercise conceals the known political reality that the supreme leader holds supreme authority, even in the selection of parliament or the president (Diagram 1). Thus the election result will not drive major policy change. Diagram 1Supreme Leader Controls Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran A case in point was the regime’s 2016 strategy in the parliamentary election. At that time, the conservative-dominated Guardian Council, responsible for screening potential candidates, rejected well-known reformist applicants (Chart 15). As a result, the reformists who were able to win seats were either lesser-known figures or unaligned with liberals in the reformist movement. Thus while the reformist presence in parliament nominally surged, these lawmakers were ineffective, reneging on campaign promises or collaborating with the conservative faction. The 2016 election serves as a blueprint for what to expect in the upcoming elections in February. The Guardian Council ruled that out of around 15,000 candidates, only 60 (relatively unknown) reformist candidates were qualified to run for the election.2 The elections will not change anything, but this means the grievances of the population will fester in the coming years, especially if the US does not change policies. This is where the medium-term risk to regime stability – namely through elite divisions – becomes apparent. The impending leadership succession is a major source of uncertainty. Supreme Leader Khamenei is the main barrier to political change. At 80 years old and reportedly suffering from poor health, a change in leadership is imminent. However, no one has been officially endorsed as his successor. This is an immense source of uncertainty in the coming years. There are several possibilities for the succession.3 A successor is appointed by the Assembly of Experts. Because we exclude Rouhani as a candidate for supreme leader, the potential candidates for Iran’s top position listed below ascribe to Khamanei’s hardline ideology: Hojjat ol-Eslam Ebrahim Raisi, head of judiciary and of the Imam Reza shrine since March 2019. Raisi is reportedly Khamenei’s favorite for succession. He is a hardliner who lost the May 2017 presidential election to Rouhani.4 Ayatollah Sadeq Larijani, the conservative former head of the judiciary and current chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council, which is responsible for resolving disputes among government branches. Larijani is also a member of the Guardian Council.5 Ayatollah Ahmad Khatemi, hardline Tehran Friday prayer leader and senior member of the Assembly of Experts. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – a military force with immense influence in the regime – may choose to rule itself. We assign a low likelihood of this occurring. The IRGC is more likely to ensure that Khamenei’s successor is someone who supports its hardline ideology and vision for Iran. Some moderate clerics are advocating a change in structure, whereby the position of supreme leader is abolished. This school of thought argues that political leaders should be selected based on popular election rather than appointment.6 We do not assign high odds to this scenario. Until the Assembly of Experts selects the successor, a three-member council made up of the Iranian president, the head of judiciary, and a theologian of the Guardian Council, will assume the functions of supreme leader. Such a “triumvirate” could last longer than expected, or could even be formally decided as an alternative to a new supreme leader. In the context of such extreme uncertainty for the regime’s leadership in the coming decade, it is highly unlikely that the current political leaders will engage in negotiations with President Trump until they are sure of his staying power (Chart 16). First, the Iranians will continue to refuse talks prior to the US election. They will seek to undermine the Trump administration, yet without crossing red lines on the nuclear program (one year till nuclear breakout) or militant activities (killing American citizens). Chart 15Iran’s Guardians Vet Election Candidates Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Second, if Trump wins, then the shift to negotiations may or may not come, but the subsequent diplomatic process will be prolonged. Trump will have to gain the full cooperation of Europe, Russia, and China – and any new US-Iran deal is an open question and will involve tensions flaring up more than once. Chart 16Iranians Opposed To Talks With Trump Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Third, even if the Democrats win, the regime will play “hard to get” and will not immediately return to status quo ante Trump, although eventually there could be a restoration of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or something like it. This process could also involve saber-rattling despite the Democrats’ more dovish disposition toward Iran. Bottom Line: The US maximum pressure campaign is not aimed at regime change in Iran, but if it brings any political change it will be a shift in a more hawkish direction as the regime faces immense internal and external pressures and an uncertain succession in the coming years. Iran’s leaders will continue to suppress unrest and can probably succeed in the near term. The confrontation with the US discredits any political actors who advocate negotiations. The path toward reform and improved relations with the West is closed until after the US election at minimum. Since Iran will seek to undermine both President Trump and the US presence in the Middle East in the meantime, US-Iran tensions remain a market-relevant source of risk in 2020. Iraq Still Poses An Oil Supply Risk Chart 17Iraqis Suffering From Poor Governance Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Iraq is ground zero for the US-Iran showdown, since the two powers have eschewed direct military confrontation. Iraqis have also been suffering the consequences of an ill-functioning political system (Chart 17). Corruption has prevented the trickle down of oil revenues, resulting in endemic poverty and inequality (Chart 18). Yet unlike its neighbor, Iraq is not ruled by a supreme leader who controls a powerful armed forces to which anger can be directed. Instead, protesters have been blaming the deep seated influence of the Iranian regime, which often results in what Iraqis’ argue to be a prioritization of foreign – i.e. Iranian – objectives over national ones. The demonstrations were successful in forcing the resignation of Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi and the passing of a new electoral law. However Iraq remains in a state of chaos as Iraqis have vowed to remain on the street until all their conditions are met, including the appointment of an acceptable prime minister and early elections. Chart 18Poverty, Inequality, Corruption Plague Iraq Poverty, Inequality, Corruption Plague Iraq Poverty, Inequality, Corruption Plague Iraq This batch of reforms has been challenging for politicians to execute. For one, there is a lack of clarity as to which political group holds the majority of seats in Iraq’s Council of Representatives. Both the Iran-backed al-Binaa bloc as well as the al-Islah coalition led by Muqtada al-Sadr claim this position (Chart 19). A list of candidates for the temporary position of prime minister until early elections are held, proposed by Binaa in December, was rejected by President Barham Salih on grounds that it did not include anyone who would possess the support of the demonstrators. Chart 19Iraqi Parliamentary Control Up For Grabs Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Market Hurdles: From Sanders To Iran Iraqi protesters have consistently reiterated their desire for a sovereign state, free from both American and Iranian interference. However, this nationalistic call has been disrupted and overshadowed by the US-Iran conflict. Importantly, the protest movement has now lost its most influential backer within the Iraqi political system: Sadr of the Islah bloc. This year’s Iran tensions and the parliamentary resolution to eject US troops from Iraq have unified the warring Shia political blocs. Sadr has called on the Mahdi army – a notoriously anti-American force also known as the Peace Brigades – to re-assemble. On January 13, in what can only be interpreted as a rapprochement among the main Shia political factions, Sadr met with paramilitary leaders making up the Popular Mobilization Forces in the Iranian city of Qom. They discussed the creation of a “united resistance” and the need jointly to expel foreign troops. Sadr also called for a “million-man march” against US troops in Iraq.7 Sadr’s pivot to Iran has not gone down well in Iraq’s streets, where protesters are accusing him of putting aside national goals for his own personal aspirations. While the protest movement will keep going, it is now largely headless and competing with the unified priorities of the Shia parties. This state of affairs weakens the odds of a sovereign Iraq that curbs Iranian regional influence. The political class is more likely to turn a blind eye to the repression of protesters, which is likely to increase as the system notches up its crackdown on dissent. A return to the status quo ante in Iraq is also now more likely. A new government may be elected. It may include more technocratic politicians in a nod to the protestors, but the pro-Iranian faction has fortified its position as kingmaker. Meanwhile, Sadr has decided that reform should be postponed for a later day. Iraqis who have been camping out on the streets for nearly four months, risking their lives, are unlikely to be easily put down. Instead their frustrations will manifest in more aggressive forms, such as through violence and the sabotage of infrastructure. Saudi Arabia may or may not seek to interfere in Iraq to maintain the pressure on Iranian interests. If it does so, it risks escalating the situation and provoking retaliation from Iran. Iraqi efforts to force a US troop withdrawal will clash with US interests. President Trump wants to reduce commitments but does not want to risk anything remotely resembling a Saigon-style evacuation during an election year. As such, some form of sanctions against Iraq is possible. The US administration may pass up imposing sanctions on oil sales and instead target USD flows to Iraq’s central bank. Blocking or reducing access to Iraqi accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank in New York – to which all revenues from Iraqi oil sales are directed – would debilitate the economy and amplify the risk to stability and hence oil flows. Washington’s decision whether to renew waivers allowing Iraq to import Iranian gas – set to expire mid-February – will signal whether the events earlier this year changed the US’s calculus. Iraq is extremely dependent on Iranian gas to generate power. A decision not to extend the waivers would cause greater friction between the Iraqi street and the ruling elite.8 Bottom Line: Baghdad is getting dragged deeper into chaos. Alignment with Iran, and delays in government formation and economic reform, will aggravate tensions between the street and the political class. Dissent may take on more violent forms going forward. Middle Eastern oil supply will remain vulnerable to instability and sabotage in Iraq and the broader Persian Gulf. Investment Conclusions In the very near term we expect US equities to encounter headwinds due to the over extension of the rally and immediate risks from the US election cycle. We also see global risk appetite suffering due to US uncertainty, as well as to fears about the new coronavirus. These may reach a crescendo in the wake of Chinese New Year travel season. However, China’s stimulative policy trajectory will ultimately be reinforced due to the economic threat from the outbreak. And China’s economy is showing signs of rebounding. This reinforces our constructive view on the global business cycle overall, on commodities, and on select emerging markets that produce oil or are undertaking structural reforms. The US-Iran conflict is ongoing and we expect it to continue injecting a risk premium into oil markets. The two sides are effectively playing Russian roulette.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The IRGC and bonyads – para-governmental organizations that provide funding for groups supporting the Islamic Republic – have access to subsidies, favorable contracts, and cheap loans. Together they run a considerable part of the economy. 2 Questions Loom In Iran As Reformist Factions Lose Hope In Elections," dated January 23, 2020, available at en.radiofarda.com. 3 In an interview with Fars news agency in June 2019, Ayatollah Mohsen Araki, a prominent member of the Assembly of Experts, mentioned that a committee of three members from the Assembly of Experts were working on a list of prospective supreme leaders, which they will present to the full AE when necessary. Please see "Is Iran’s Next Supreme Leader Already Chosen?," dated June 18, 2019, available at en.radiofarda.com. 4 Please see "Ebrahim Raisi: The Cleric Who Could End Iranian Hopes For Change," dated January 5, 2019, available at aljazeera.com. 5 Please see “A Right-Wing Loyalist, Sadeq Larijani, Gains More Power in Iran,” dated January 8, 2019, available at atlanticcouncil.org. 6 Mohsen Kadivar, an unorthodox cleric who was forced to flee Iran due to his political views, and is now an instructor at Duke University is a critic of the system of Velayet-e Faqih, or clerical rule. He claims that since the death of Khomeini, a majority of Iran’s religious scholars hold a “secretive belief” that supreme clerical rule should be abolished as it only leads to despotism. 7 In response to Sadr’s call for a “million man march”, Ayatollah al-Sistani repeated his warning against “those who seek to exploit the protests that call for reforms to achieve certain goals that will hurt the primary interests of the Iraqi people and are not in line with their true values.” 8 The last time Iran reduced electricity exports to Iraq resulted in mass protests in Iraq in July 2018. Thus if the sanction waivers are not renewed the cutoff of gas risks a greater clash between the Iraqi street and government, especially during the hot summer months.

Highlights Remain short the DXY index. The key risk to this view is a US-led rebound in global growth, or a pickup in US inflation that tilts the Federal Reserve to a relatively more hawkish bias. Stay long a petrocurrency basket. The latest flare-up in US-Iran tensions is just a call option to an already bullish oil backdrop. Watch the performance of cyclicals versus defensives and non-US markets versus the S&P 500 as important barometers for maintaining a pro-cyclical stance. Feature The consensus view is rapidly converging to the fact that the dollar is on the precipice of a decline, and cyclical currencies are bound to outperform. This is good news for our forecast but bad news for strategy. The fact that speculators are now aggressively reducing long dollar positions, one of our favorite contrarian indicators, is disconcerting (Chart I-1). The dollar tends to be a momentum currency, so our inclination is to stay the course on short dollar positions (Chart I-2). That said, we are not dogmatic. In FX, momentum investors eventually get vilified, while contrarians get vindicated. This suggests revisiting the core risks to our view, especially in light of recent market developments. Chart I-1A Consensus Trade? A Consensus Trade? A Consensus Trade? Chart I-2The Dollar Is A Momentum Currency The Dollar Is A Momentum Currency The Dollar Is A Momentum Currency An Oil Spike: US Dollar Bullish Or Bearish? The latest story on the global macro front is the possibility of an oil spike, driven by escalation in US-Iran tensions. Our geopolitical strategists believe that while Middle East tensions are likely to remain elevated for years to come, a full-scale war is not imminent.1 This view is fomented by a few key factors. First, the Iranian response to the assassination of Qasem Soleimani was relatively muted, given no US lives were claimed. This was also reinforced by the Iranian foreign minister’s claim that the actions were concluded. As we go to press, the Kyiv-bound Ukrainian aircraft that crashed in Tehran is being characterised as an “act of God” so far. In a nutshell, this suggests de-escalation. Second, sanctions against Iran have been causing real economic pain, given rampant youth unemployment and falling government revenues. This means that Tehran will have to be strategic in any confrontation with the US, since the risks domestically are asymmetrically negative. Renegotiating a new nuclear deal seems like a better bargaining chip than an all-out war. The dollar tends to be a momentum currency, so our inclination is to stay the course on short dollar positions. The biggest risk for oil prices is the possibility of a more marked drop in Iranian production, or possibly the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, though this is a low-probability event for the moment (Chart I-3). Our commodity strategists posit that while a closure of the strait could catapult prices to $100/bbl, there are some near-term offsetting factors.2 These include strategic petroleum reserves in both China and the US, as well as OPEC spare capacity that could benefit from the newly expanded pipeline to the port of Yanbu. This suggests that a flare up in US-Iran tensions remains a call option rather than a catalyst on an already bullish oil demand/supply backdrop. Chart I-3The Risk From Iran The Risk From Iran The Risk From Iran Risks to oil demand remain firmly tilted to the upside. Oil demand tends to follow the ebb and flow of the business cycle. Transport constitutes the largest share of global petroleum demand. Ergo the trade slowdown brought a lot of freighters, bulk ships, large crude carriers, and heavy trucks to a halt (Chart I-4). Any increase in oil demand will be on the back of two positive supply-side developments. First, OPEC spare capacity remains a buffer but is very low, meaning any rebound in oil demand in the order of 1.5%-2% (our base case), will seriously begin to bump up against supply-side constraints. Not to mention, unplanned outages typically wipe out 1.5%-2% of global oil supply. Any such occurrence in 2020 will nudge the oil market dangerously close to a negative supply shock (Chart I-5). Chart I-4Oil Demand And Global Growth Oil Demand And Global Growth Oil Demand And Global Growth Chart I-5Opec Spare Capacity Is Low On Oil, Growth And The Dollar On Oil, Growth And The Dollar Traditionally, a pick-up in oil prices has tended to be bearish for the US dollar. In theory, rising oil prices allow for increased government spending in oil-producing countries, making room for the resident central bank to tighten monetary policy. This is usually bullish for the currency. An increase in oil prices also implies rising terms of trade, which further increases the fair value of the exchange rate. Balance-of-payment dynamics also tend to improve during oil bull markets. Altogether, these forces combine to become powerful undercurrents for petrocurrencies. That said, it is important to distinguish between malignant and benign oil price increases. There have been many recessions preceded by an oil price spike, and rising prices on the back of escalating tensions are not a recipe for being bullish petrocurrencies. That said, absent any escalating tensions or a marked pickup in global demand, which is not our base case, the rise in oil prices should be of the benign variety – pinning Brent towards $75/bbl. OPEC spare capacity remains a buffer but is very low, meaning any rebound in oil demand in the order of 1.5%-2% (our base case), will seriously begin to bump up against supply-side constraints. In terms of country implications, rising oil prices will go a long way towards improving Canada’s and Norway’s trade balances. In the case of Norway, net trade fell in 2019 due to lower exports of oil and natural gas, but still stands at 5.1% of GDP. The trade balance is the primary driver of the current account balance, and the latter now stands at 4.4% of GDP. On the other hand, the Canadian trade deficit has been hovering near -1% of GDP over the past few years. Further improvement in energy product sales will require an improvement in pipeline capacity and a smaller gap between Western Canadian Select (WCS) and Brent crude oil prices (Chart I-6). We are bullish both the loonie and Norwegian krone, but have a short CAD/NOK trade as high-conviction bet on diverging economic fundamentals. Chart I-6NOK Will Outperform CAD NOK Will Outperform CAD NOK Will Outperform CAD Shifting Correlation Even though rising oil prices tend to be bullish for petrocurrencies, being long versus the US dollar requires an appropriate timing signal for a downleg in the greenback. With the US shale revolution grabbing production market share from both OPEC and non-OPEC producing countries, there has been a divergence between the price of oil and the performance of petrocurrencies. In short, as the now-largest oil producer in the world, the US dollar is itself becoming a petrocurrency (Chart I-7).  Chart I-7Shifting Landscape For Petrocurrencies Shifting Landscape For Petrocurrencies Shifting Landscape For Petrocurrencies This is especially pivotal as the US inches towards becoming a net exporter of oil. Put another way, rising oil prices benefit the US industrial base much more than in the past, while the benefits for countries like Canada and Mexico are slowly fading. The strategy going forward will be twofold. First, buying a petrocurrency basket versus the dollar will require perfect timing in the dollar down-leg. Another strategy is to be long a basket of oil producers versus oil consumers. We are long an oil currency basket versus the euro as a dollar neutral way of benefitting from rising oil prices. Chart I-8 shows that a currency basket of oil producers versus consumers has both had a strong positive correlation with the oil price and has outperformed a traditional petrocurrency basket. Chart I-8Buy Oil Producers Versus Oil Consumers Buy Oil Producers Versus Oil Consumers Buy Oil Producers Versus Oil Consumers Risks To The View Above all, the dollar remains a counter-cyclical currency. As such, when global growth rebounds, more cyclical economies benefit most from this growth dividend, and capital tends to gravitate to their respective economies. This holds true for global oil and gas sectors that tend to have a higher concentration outside of US bourses. As such, one key risk is that if the S&P 500 keeps outperforming oil, as has been the case over the past decade, the dollar is unlikely to weaken meaningfully (Chart I-9). We understand this is a call on sectors (US tech especially), rather than relative growth profiles, but what matters for currencies is the impulse of capital flows. That said, improving global growth should allow EM energy consumption (a key driver of oil prices), to pick up. Chart I-9Oil Prices And The Stock Market Oil Prices And The Stock Market Oil Prices And The Stock Market The second risk is a pickup in US inflation expectations that tilts the Fed towards a relatively more hawkish bias. The economic linkage between US inflation and oil is weak, but financial markets assign a strong correlation to the link (Chart I-10). In our view, given that higher gasoline prices tend to hurt US retail sales, and the consumer is the most important driver of the US economy, higher oil prices can only be inflationary if the overall US economy is also robust (Chart I-11). This combination is unlikely to occur if rising oil prices are being driven by a flare-up in geopolitical tensions.   Chart I-10A Rise In Oil Prices Will Help Inflation Expectations A Rise In Oil Prices Will Help Inflation Expectations A Rise In Oil Prices Will Help Inflation Expectations Chart I-11Gasoline Prices And US Consumption Gasoline Prices And US Consumption Gasoline Prices And US Consumption A US inflation spike in 2020 is a low-probability event. There have been two powerful disinflationary forces in the US. The first is the lagged effect from the Fed’s tightening policies in 2018. This is especially important given that the fed funds rate was eerily close to the neutral rate of interest, providing little incentive for firms to borrow and invest. This was further exacerbated by the trade war. Inflation is a lagging indicator, and it will take a sustained rise in economic vigor to lift US inflation expectations. This will not be a story for 2020 (Chart I-12). Meanwhile, the recent rise in the dollar and fall in commodity prices are likely to continue to anchor US inflation expectations downward, which should keep the Fed on the sidelines. Chart I-12Velocity Of Money Versus Inflation Velocity Of Money Versus Inflation Velocity Of Money Versus Inflation The gaping wedge between the US Markit and ISM PMIs remains a cause for concern. Given sampling differences, where the Markit PMI surveys more domestically-oriented firms, it is fair to assume it is also a barometer of US domestic growth relative to global output. Put another way, whenever the US services PMI is outperforming its manufacturing component, the dollar tends to appreciate (Chart I-13). Looking across global PMIs, there has been a notable pickup in Asia, specifically in Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, though weakness in Japan and Europe has persisted. This warrants close monitoring. Chart I-13The Risk To A Bearish Dollar View The Risk To A Bearish Dollar View The Risk To A Bearish Dollar View We continue to view further deceleration in the global manufacturing sector as a tail risk rather than our base case. Trade tensions have receded, global central banks remain very dovish, and Brexit uncertainty has diminished. This should allow global CEOs to begin deploying capital, on the back of pent-up investment spending. More importantly, the slowdown in the global economy has been driven by the manufacturing sector, so it is fair to assume that this is the part of the economy that is ripe for mean reversion. On the political spectrum, it has been historically rare for the Fed to raise interest rates a few months ahead of an election cycle, which should allow a weaker dollar to help grease the global growth supply chain. Any pickup in global manufacturing activity will allow the Riksbank to adopt a more hawkish bias, narrowing interest rate differentials between Norway and Sweden.  Bottom Line: The key risk to a bearish dollar view is a US-led global growth rebound, allowing the Fed to adopt a much more hawkish stance relative to other central banks. This would be an environment in which US inflation would also surprise to the upside. So far, this remains a tail risk. Housekeeping We will soon be taking profits on our long NOK/SEK position. Reduce the target to 1.09 and tighten the stop to 1.06. Any pickup in global manufacturing activity will allow the Riksbank to adopt a more hawkish bias, narrowing interest rate differentials between Norway and Sweden. Most importantly, the cross will approach a profitable technical level in the coming weeks, on the back of our call a few weeks ago to rebuy the pair (Chart I-14). 2020 will be a year of much more tactical calls. Stay tuned. Chart I-14Take Profits On NOK/SEK Soon Take Profits On NOK/SEK Soon Take Profits On NOK/SEK Soon   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1  Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Alert "A Reprieve Amid The Bull Market In Iran Tensions," dated January 8, 2020, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut," dated January 9, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have been robust: ISM manufacturing PMI fell to 47.2 from 48.1 in December. However, Markit and ISM services PMIs both increased to 52.8 and 55, respectively.  The trade deficit narrowed by $3.8 billion to $43.1 billion in November. ADP recorded an increase of 202K workers in December, the largest increase since April. Initial jobless claims fell from 223K to 214K, better than expected. MBA mortgage applications soared by 13.5% for the week ended December 27th. The DXY index recovered by 0.7% this week from its recent decline. Trump's speech has eased tensions between the US and Iran, making an escalation towards a full-scale war unlikely. Moreover, recent data point to a continued expansion in the US through 2020. That being said, we believe that the global growth will outpace the US, which is bearish for the dollar, but this is an important risk to monitor. Tomorrow’s payroll report will be an important barometer. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been positive: Markit services PMI increased to 52.8 from 52.4 in December. Headline inflation jumped to 1.3% year-on-year from 1% in December, while core inflation was unchanged at 1.3%.  Retail sales accelerated by 2.2% year-on-year in November, from 1.7% the previous month. The Sentix investor confidence soared to 7.6 from 0.7 in January. The expectations versus the current situation component continues to point to an improving PMI over the next six months. EUR/USD fell by 0.7% this week. Recent data from the euro area have been consistent with our base case view that the euro area economy is rebounding, and is likely to accelerate in 2020. We remain long the euro, especially against the CAD. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been disappointing: The manufacturing PMI fell slightly to 48.4 from 48.8 in December; the services PMI also fell to 49.4 from 50.3 in December. Labor cash earnings fell by 0.2% year-on-year in November. Consumer confidence increased to 39.1 from 38.7 in December. USD/JPY increased by 1.2% this week. The Japanese yen initially surged on the back of US-Iran headlines, then fell as tensions faded after Trump's speech. While we don't expect a full-scale war between the US and Iran for the moment, geopolitical risks will likely persist before the elections later this year. We continue to recommend the Japanese yen as a safe-haven hedge, though our long position is currently out of the money. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the UK have been positive: Nationwide housing prices increased by 1.4% year-on-year in December. Halifax house prices also grew by 4% year-on-year in December. Markit services PMI surged to 50 from 49 in December. The British pound fell by 0.4% against the US dollar this week. On Thursday, BoE Governor Mark Carney said in a speech that “with the relatively limited space to cut the Bank Rate, if evidence builds that the weakness in activity could persist, risk management considerations would favor a relatively prompt response.” This has been viewed by the market as dovish and the pound fell on the message. In the long term, we like the pound as Brexit risk fades. In other news, the BoE has announced Andrew Bailey as the successor to Mark Carney, scheduled to take over in March 2020. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdon: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been positive: The Commonwealth bank services PMI increased to 49.8 from 49.5 in December. Moreover, the AiG manufacturing index slightly increased to 48.3 from 48.1. Building permits fell by 3.8% year-on-year in November. On a monthly basis however, it increased by 11.8%. Exports increased by 2% month-on-month in November, while imports fell by 3%. The trade surplus widened to A$5.8 billion. The Australian dollar plunged by 1.5% against the US dollar amid broad US dollar strength this week. The Aussie is the weakest currency so far this year.  This is especially the case given demand destruction from the ongoing severe bushfires in Australia. On the positive side, a weaker Australian dollar could support exports and the current account as international trade picks up in 2020. The extent of fiscal stimulus will be an important wildcard for both the RBA and the AUD. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been mostly positive: House prices increased by 4% year-on-year in December.  The ANZ commodity price index fell by 2.8% in December. The New Zealand dollar fell by 1% against the US dollar this week. On January 1st, China's central bank announced that it would inject additional liquidity into the economy. This is bullish for global growth along with a "Phase I" trade deal. As a small open economy, New Zealand is one of the countries that will benefit the most from a global growth recovery. We will be monitoring whether the scope for improvement in agricultural commodity prices is bigger than that for bulks, which underscores our long AUD/NZD position. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been negative: Exports fell slightly by C$0.7 million in November. Imports also fell by C$1.2 million, which led to a narrower trade deficit of C$1.1 billion. Ivey PMI dropped sharply to 51.9 from 60 in December. Housing starts fell to 197K from 204K in December. Building permits also fell by 2.4% month-on-month in November. The Canadian dollar fell by 0.5% against the US dollar along with the decline in energy prices this week, erasing the gains earlier this year. While we expect the Canadian dollar to outperform the US dollar from a cyclical perspective, the CAD is likely to underperform against other cyclical currencies as global growth picks up steam through 2020. Report Links: The Loonie: Upside Versus The Dollar, But Downside At The Crosses Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been positive: The manufacturing PMI rose to 50.2 from 48.8 in December, the first expansion since March 2019, mainly driven by increases in both production and new orders. Headline inflation shifted back to positive territory at 0.2% year-on-year in December, following negative prints for the past two consecutive months.  Real retail sales were unchanged in November on a year-on-year basis. The Swiss franc was little changed against the US dollar this week, while it rose against other major currencies including the euro on the back of positive PMI and inflation data. More importantly, recent Middle East tensions have reignited safe-haven demand, increasing bids for the Swiss franc. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Notes On The SNB - October 4, 2019 What To Do About The Swiss Franc? - May 17, 2019 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been positive: The unemployment rate fell further to 3.8% from 3.9% in October. The Norwegian krone has been fluctuating with the ebb and flow of US-Iran tensions and oil prices. This week it fell by 0.8% against the US dollar after Trump implied that both the US and Iran are backing off from an escalation into war. Moreover, the bearish oil inventory data from EIA managed to pull down oil prices even further. Despite the recent fluctuation in oil prices, we maintain an overweight stance on a cyclical basis based on a global growth recovery in 2020.  Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 There has been scant data from Sweden this week:  Retail sales increased by 1.3% year-on-year in November. On a month-on-month basis however, it fell by 0.4% compared with October. The Swedish krona fell by 0.8% against the US dollar this week amid broad dollar strength. Despite rising geopolitical tensions, we remain optimistic and expect the global economy to recover this year given the US-China trade détente and increasing stimulus from China. The Swedish krona is poised to rise with global growth and a stronger manufacturing sector. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Time For A Breather Time For A Breather Receding trade tensions; diminished risks of a hard Brexit; reduced odds of a victory for Elizabeth Warren in the US presidential elections; liquidity injections by most major central banks; and improved sentiment about the state of the global economy all helped push stocks higher late last year. Some clouds have formed over the outlook since the start of the year, however. The December US ISM manufacturing index fell to the lowest level since 2009, while the PMIs in the euro area, UK, and Japan gave up some of their November gains. The conflict between the US and Iran also flared up. Although tensions have abated in recent days, BCA’s geopolitical strategists worry that the détente may not last. The US is seeking to shift its military focus towards East Asia in order to counter China’s ascendency. They argue that this could create a dangerous power vacuum in the Middle East. Stock market sentiment is quite bullish at the moment, which makes equities more vulnerable to any disappointing news. While we are maintaining our positive 12-month view on global equities and high-yield credit in anticipation that global growth will rebound convincingly later this year, we are downgrading our tactical 3-month view to neutral. Ho Ho Ho After handing investors a sack of coal last Christmas, Santa was back to his true self this past holiday season. Global equities rose 3.4% in December, finishing the year off with a stellar fourth quarter which saw the MSCI All-Country World index surge by 8.6%. Five forces helped push stocks higher: 1) Receding trade tensions; 2) Diminished risks of a hard Brexit; 3) Reduced odds of a victory for Elizabeth Warren in the US presidential elections; 4) Liquidity injections by the Fed, ECB, and the People’s Bank of China; and arguably most importantly 5) Improved sentiment about the state of the global economy. Tarrified No More Trade tensions subsided sharply after China and the US reached a “Phase One” agreement. The deal prevented tariffs from rising on December 15th on $160 billion of Chinese imports. It also rolls back the tariff rate from 15% to 7.5% on about $120 billion in imports that have been subject to levies since September (Chart 1). Chart 1The Evolution Of The US-China Trade War The Evolution Of The US-China Trade War The Evolution Of The US-China Trade War In addition, the Trump Administration allowed the November 13th deadline on European auto tariffs to lapse. This suggests that the US is unlikely to impose tariffs under the Section 232 investigation of auto imports. The auto sector has been at the forefront of the global manufacturing slowdown, so any good news for that industry is welcome. To top it all off, the US House of Representatives ratified the USMCA, the successor to NAFTA, on December 19th. We expect it to be signed into law in the first quarter of this year. Brexit Risks Fading... Chart 2The Majority Of British Voters Aren't Keen On Brexit The Majority Of British Voters Aren't Keen On Brexit The Majority Of British Voters Aren't Keen On Brexit Boris Johnson’s commanding victory in the UK elections has given him the votes necessary to push a withdrawal bill through parliament by the end of the month. The British government will then seek to negotiate a free trade agreement by the end of the year. A “no-deal” Brexit is unacceptable to the majority of British voters (Chart 2). As such, the Johnson government will have no choice but to strike a deal with the EU. ... While Trump Gains On the other side of the Atlantic, President Trump’s re-election prospects improved late last year despite (and perhaps because of) the ongoing impeachment process. There is an uncanny correlation between the probability that betting markets assign to a Trump victory and the value of the S&P 500 (Chart 3). Chart 3An Uncanny Correlation An Uncanny Correlation An Uncanny Correlation Chart 4Who Will Win The 2020 Democratic Nomination? Time For A Breather Time For A Breather It certainly has not hurt market sentiment that Elizabeth Warren’s poll numbers have been dropping recently (Chart 4). Warren’s best hope was to squeeze out Bernie Sanders as soon as possible, thereby leaving the far-left populist lane all to herself. That dream appears to have been dashed, which suggests that even if Trump loses, a centrist like Joe Biden could emerge as president. An Uneasy Truce It remains to be seen how President Trump’s decision to assassinate General Qassem Soleimani, a top Iranian commander, will affect the election outcome. A YouGov/HuffPost poll taken over the weekend revealed that 43% of Americans approved of the airstrike against Soleimani compared to 38% that disapproved.1 History suggests that the public’s patience for war will quickly wear thin if it results in American casualties or significantly higher gasoline prices. Neither side has an incentive to allow the conflict to spiral out of control. Foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif tweeted on Tuesday shortly after Iran lobbed missiles at two US military bases that Iran had “concluded” its retaliatory strike, adding that “We do not seek escalation or war.” Despite claims on Iranian public television that 80 “American terrorists” were killed in the attacks, no US troops were harmed. This suggests that the Iranians may be putting on a show for domestic consumption. The US economy is less vulnerable to spikes in oil prices than in the past. Nevertheless, plenty of things could still go wrong. BCA’s geopolitical team, led by Matt Gertken, has argued that the US is seeking to shift its military focus towards East Asia in order to counter China’s ascendency. This could create a dangerous power vacuum in the Middle East. There is also a risk that President Trump overplays his hand. Contrary to the President’s claims, Soleimani was quite popular in Iran (Chart 5). If Trump begins to mock the Iranian leadership’s feeble response, Iran will have no choice but to take more aggressive action. Chart 5Soleimani Was More Popular In Iran Than Trump Claims Time For A Breather Time For A Breather Chart 6US Economy Is Less Vulnerable To Spikes In Oil Prices Than In The Past US Economy Is Less Vulnerable To Spikes In Oil Prices Than In The Past US Economy Is Less Vulnerable To Spikes In Oil Prices Than In The Past One thing that could embolden Trump is that the US economy is less vulnerable to spikes in oil prices than in the past. US oil output reached as high as 12.9 mm b/d in 2019, allowing the country to become a net exporter of oil for the first time in history (Chart 6). Any increase in oil prices would incentivize further domestic production, which would help bring prices back down. The US economy has also become less energy intensive – it takes less than half as much oil to produce a unit of GDP today than it did in the early 1980s. Finally, unlike in the past, the Fed will not need to raise rates in response to higher oil prices due to the fact that inflation expectations are currently well anchored. In fact, as we discuss below, we expect the Fed and other central banks to continue to provide a tailwind for growth over the course of 2020. The Fed’s “It’s Not QE” QE Program The jump in overnight lending rates in mid-September torpedoed the Federal Reserve’s efforts to shrink its balance sheet. Thanks to a steady stream of Treasury bill purchases since then, the Fed’s asset holdings have swelled by over $400 billion, reversing more than half of the decline observed since early 2018 (Chart 7). Chart 7Fed's Asset Holdings Are Growing Anew Fed's Asset Holdings Are Growing Anew Fed's Asset Holdings Are Growing Anew Chart 8The Fed's Balance-Sheet Expansion Helped Fuel The Dot-Com Bubble The Fed's Balance-Sheet Expansion Helped Fuel The Dot-Com Bubble The Fed's Balance-Sheet Expansion Helped Fuel The Dot-Com Bubble The Fed has insisted that its latest intervention does not amount to a new QE program, stressing that it is buying short-term securities rather than long-dated bonds. In so doing, it is simply creating bank reserves, rather than seeking to suppress the term premium by altering the maturity structure of the private sector’s holdings of government debt. Nevertheless, even such straightforward interventions have proven to be powerful signaling tools. By growing its balance sheet, a central bank is implicitly promising to keep monetary policy very accommodative. It is worth remembering that the run-up in the NASDAQ in 1999 coincided with a significant balance-sheet expansion by the Fed in response to Y2K fears, which came on the heels of three “insurance cuts” in 1998 (Chart 8). Gentle Jay Paves The Way Chart 9Inflation Expectations Remain Muted Inflation Expectations Remain Muted Inflation Expectations Remain Muted In 2000, the Fed moved quickly to reverse the liquidity injection it had orchestrated the prior year. We do not expect such a reversal anytime soon. Moreover, unlike in 2000, when the Federal Reserve kept raising rates – ultimately bringing the Fed funds rate up to 6.5% in May 2000 – the Fed is likely to stay on hold this year. The Fed’s ongoing strategic policy review is poised to move the central bank even closer towards explicitly adopting an average inflation target of 2% over the course of a business cycle. Since inflation tends to fall during recessions, this implies that the Fed will seek to target an inflation rate somewhat higher than 2% during expansions. Realized core PCE inflation has averaged only 1.6% since the recession ended. Both market-based and survey-based measures of long-term inflation expectations remain downbeat (Chart 9). This suggests that the bar for raising rates this year is quite high. More Monetary Easing In The Euro Area And China Chart 10Chinese Monetary Easing Should Help Global Growth Bottom Out Chinese Monetary Easing Should Help Global Growth Bottom Out Chinese Monetary Easing Should Help Global Growth Bottom Out The ECB resumed its QE program in November after a 10-month hiatus. While the current pace of €20 billion in monthly asset purchases is well below the prior pace of €80 billion, the central bank did say it would continue buying assets for “as long as necessary” to bring inflation up to its target. The language harkens back to Mario Draghi’s 2012 “whatever it takes” pledge, this time applied to the ECB’s inflation mandate. Not to be outdone, the People’s Bank of China cut the reserve requirement ratio by 50 basis points last week, a move that will release RMB 800 billion ($US 115 billion) of fresh liquidity into the banking system. Historically, cuts in reserve requirements have led to faster credit growth and ultimately, to stronger economic growth both in China and abroad (Chart 10). The PBOC has also instructed lenders to adopt the Loan Prime Rate (LPR) as the new benchmark lending rate. The LPR currently sits 20bps below the old benchmark rate (Chart 11). Hence, the PBOC’s order amounts to a stealth rate cut. Our China strategists expect further reductions in the LPR over the next six months. In addition, the crackdown on shadow bank lending seems to be subsiding, which bodes well for overall credit growth later this year (Chart 12). Chart 11China: Stealth Monetary Easing China: Stealth Monetary Easing China: Stealth Monetary Easing Chart 12Crackdown On Shadow Banking In China Is Easing Crackdown On Shadow Banking In China Is Easing Crackdown On Shadow Banking In China Is Easing   Rising Economic Confidence Chart 13Recession Fears Amongst Economists Began To Gather Steam At The Start Of Last Year Recession Fears Amongst Economists Began To Gather Steam At The Start Of Last Year Recession Fears Amongst Economists Began To Gather Steam At The Start Of Last Year Chart 14The Wider Public Was Also Worried About A Downturn The Wider Public Was Also Worried About A Downturn The Wider Public Was Also Worried About A Downturn   At the start of 2019, nearly half of US CFOs thought the economy would be in a recession by the end of the year. Similarly, two-thirds of European CFOs and four-fifths of Canadian CFOs expected their respective economies to succumb to recession. Professional economists were equally dire (Chart 13). Households also became increasingly worried about a downturn. Google searches for “recession” spiked to near 2009-highs last summer (Chart 14). The mood has certainly improved since then. According to the latest Duke CFO survey, optimism about the economic outlook has increased. More importantly, CFO optimism about the prospects for their own firms has risen to the highest level in the 18-year history of the survey (Chart 15). Chart 15CFOs Have Become More Optimistic Of Late CFOs Have Become More Optimistic Of Late CFOs Have Become More Optimistic Of Late Show Me The Money Going forward, global growth needs to accelerate in order to validate the improved confidence of CFOs and investors alike. We think that it will, thanks to the lagged effects from the easing in financial conditions in 2019, a turn in the global inventory cycle, a de-escalation in the trade war, easier fiscal policy in the UK and euro area, and re-upped fiscal/credit stimulus in China. For now, however, the economic data remains mixed. On the positive side, household spending is still robust across most of the world, a fact that has been reflected in the resilience of service-sector PMIs (Chart 16). Chart 16AThe Service Sector Has Remained Resilient (I) The Service Sector Has Remained Resilient (I) The Service Sector Has Remained Resilient (I) Chart 16BThe Service Sector Has Remained Resilient (II) The Service Sector Has Remained Resilient (II) The Service Sector Has Remained Resilient (II) Chart 17US Wage Growth Has Picked Up, Especially At The Bottom Of The Income Distribution Time For A Breather Time For A Breather Chart 18US Housing Backdrop Is Solid US Housing Backdrop Is Solid US Housing Backdrop Is Solid The US consumer, in particular, is showing little signs of fatigue. The Atlanta Fed GDPNow estimates that real personal consumption grew by 2.4% in the fourth quarter, having increased at an average annualized pace of 3% in the first three quarters of 2019. Both a strong labor market and housing market have buoyed US consumption. Payrolls have risen by an average of 200K per month for the past six months, double what is necessary to keep up with labor force growth. This week’s strong ADP release – which featured a 29K jump in jobs in goods-producing industries in December, the best since April – suggests that today’s jobs report will remain healthy. In addition, wage growth has picked up, particularly at the bottom of the income distribution (Chart 17). Residential construction has also been strong. Homebuilder sentiment reached the best level since June 1999 (Chart 18). Global Manufacturing: Too Early To Call The All-Clear The outlook for manufacturing remains the biggest question mark in the global economy. The US ISM manufacturing index dropped to 47.2 in December, its lowest level since June 2009. The composition of the report was poor, with the new orders-to-inventory ratio dropping close to recent lows. Chart 19Other US Manufacturing Gauges Are Not As Weak As The ISM Other US Manufacturing Gauges Are Not As Weak As The ISM Other US Manufacturing Gauges Are Not As Weak As The ISM We would discount the ISM report to some extent. The regional Fed manufacturing indices have not been nearly as disappointing as the ISM (Chart 19). The Markit PMI, which tracks US manufacturing activity better than the ISM, clocked in at a respectable 52.4 in December, down only slightly from November’s reading of 52.6. Nevertheless, it is hard to be excited about the near-term outlook for US manufacturing, especially in light of Boeing’s decision to suspend production of the 737 Max temporarily. Most estimates suggest that the production halt will reduce real US GDP growth by 0.3%-to-0.5% in the first quarter. The euro area manufacturing PMI gave up some of its November gains, falling to 46.3 in December. While the index is still above its September low of 45.7, it has been under 50 for 11 straight months now. The UK and Japanese PMI also retreated. Chinese manufacturing has shown clearer signs of bottoming out. Despite dipping in December, the private sector Caixin manufacturing PMI remains near its 2017 highs. The official PMI published by the National Bureau of Statistics is less upbeat, but still managed to come in slightly above 50 in December. The production subcomponent reached the highest level since August 2018. Reflecting the positive trend in the Chinese economy, Korean exports to China rose by 3.3% in December, the first positive growth rate in 14 months (Chart 20). Taiwan’s exports have also rebounded. The manufacturing PMI rose above 50 in both economies in December. In Taiwan’s case, this was the first time the PMI moved into expansionary territory since September 2018. On balance, we continue to expect global manufacturing to recover in 2020. This is in line with our observation that global manufacturing cycles typically last three years, with 18 months of weaker growth followed by 18 months of stronger growth (Chart 21). That said, the weakness in European and US manufacturing (at least judged by the ISM) is likely to give investors pause. Chart 20Some Positive Signs Emerging From Korea And Taiwan Time For A Breather Time For A Breather Chart 21A Fairly Regular Three-Year Manufacturing Cycle A Fairly Regular Three-Year Manufacturing Cycle A Fairly Regular Three-Year Manufacturing Cycle   Investment Conclusions We turned bullish on stocks in late 2018, having temporarily moved to the sidelines during the summer of that year. Global equities have gained 25% since our upgrade. We see another 10% of upside for 2020, led by European and EM bourses. Despite its recent gains, the real value of the MSCI All-Country World Index is only 3% above its prior peak in January 2018. The 12-month forward PE ratio of 16.3 is still somewhat lower than it was back then. The valuation picture is even more enticing if we compare equity earnings yields with bond yields, which is tantamount to computing a rough equity risk premium (ERP). The global ERP remains quite high by historic standards, especially outside the US where earnings yields are higher and bond yields are generally lower (Chart 22). Chart 22The Equity Risk Premium Is Fairly High, Especially Outside The US The Equity Risk Premium Is Fairly High, Especially Outside The US The Equity Risk Premium Is Fairly High, Especially Outside The US Chart 23Stock Market Sentiment Is Quite Bullish Stock Market Sentiment Is Quite Bullish Stock Market Sentiment Is Quite Bullish   Nevertheless, sentiment is quite positive towards stocks at the moment (Chart 23). Elevated bullish sentiment, against the backdrop of ongoing uncertainty about the outlook for global manufacturing and an uneasy truce between the US and Iran, poses a near-term headwind to risk assets. As such, while we are maintaining our positive 12-month view on global equities and high-yield credit, we are downgrading our tactical 3-month view to neutral for the time being. We do not regard this as a major realignment of our views; we will turn tactically bullish again if stocks dip about 5% from current levels.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Ariel Edwards-Levy, “Here's What Americans Think About Trump's Iran Policy,” TheHuffingtonPost.com (January 6, 2020).   MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores   Time For A Breather Time For A Breather Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights Iran responded with missile attacks on Iraqi military bases hosting US troops in retaliation for the assassination of Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force. The post-attack messaging from Iran and the US suggests neither side wants to escalate to a full-on war footing. Global policy uncertainty will remain elevated, which will keep a bid under safe-haven investments – particularly gold and the USD, as it did last year (Chart of the Week). With the Fed expected to remain accommodative, we expect the USD to weaken this year. However, safe-haven demand for the USD will temper that weakening, which will keep the rate of growth in EM economies below potential this year. Commodity demand growth, therefore, will be lower than it otherwise would be. Oil markets remain taut. We expect additional tightening in these markets, as global monetary stimulus revives demand and oil production remains constrained. We remain long 2H20 Brent vs. short 2H21 Brent, in anticipation these fundamentals will push global inventories lower and steepen the backwardation in forward curves. Our trade recommendations open at year-end and closed in 2019 posted an average gain of 48%. Oil recommendations open at year-end and closed in 2019 were up 64% on average. Feature Following the funeral of Quds Force Commander Gen. Qassem Soleimani, Iran’s military responded with missile attacks on Iraqi facilities housing American troops on Wednesday. The Iranian attacks were presaged by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who called for a “direct and proportional attack” against the US by Iranian military forces following the assassination of Soleimani ordered by US President Donald Trump. The Iranian supreme leader’s declaration was highly unusual, as his government typically uses its proxies around the Middle East to carry out military and clandestine operations.1 Oil price jumped ~ 4% in extremely heavy trading after the assassination was reported January 3. This was followed by additional gains of ~ 3%, when trading resumed Monday.  Prices have since given back these gains, as markets continue to anticipate the next iteration of this confrontation. Chart of the WeekHigher Policy Uncertainty Expected; USD, Gold Strength Will Persist Higher Policy Uncertainty Expected; USD, Gold Strength Will Persist Higher Policy Uncertainty Expected; USD, Gold Strength Will Persist Although both sides say they are trying to avoid a kinetic engagement, additional policy uncertainty is being heaped on markets as the New Year opens. This occurs just as it appeared a small respite in the Sino-US trade war was in the offing; trade negotiators from both sides are scheduled to sign “phase one” of a trade deal next week in Washington.2 Policy Uncertainty Will Remain Elevated Geopolitical and economic uncertainty worldwide will remain elevated, keeping a bid under the traditional safe havens – particularly the USD and gold. Even as political leaders work on containing conflicts – e.g., Gulf Arab states’ diplomacy aimed at reducing tensions with Iran, following the failure of the US to retaliate in the wake of attacks on Saudi Arabia’s oil facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais in September; the phase-one deal in the Sino-US trade war – many of the drivers fueling policy uncertainty remain in place.3 Popular discontent with the political status quo is a global political force. It can be seen in the increasing popularity and election of left- and right-wing populists, and in riots in societies that were considered economically and politically placid – e.g., Chile and Hong Kong. Growing discord within NATO; continued tension in Latin America, the Middle East and South China Sea; increasing civil unrest in India; rising debt levels in systematically important economies provide almost daily reminders the post-Cold War political and economic order – also referred to as the Washington Consensus favoring free trade and democracy – is eroding.4 As populists continue in their attempts to dismantle the Washington Consensus, markets will continue to signal their anxiety via gold and USD demand. The coincident rallies of the broad trade-weighted USD and gold are unusual but are emblematic of this uncertainty, as the bottom panel of the Chart of the Week illustrates – gold typically rallies when the USD and real rates weaken. Oil Markets Remain On High Alert In the immediate aftermath of the Soleimani assassination, the oil market’s attention was drawn to the ever-present threat to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. In the immediate aftermath of the Soleimani assassination, the oil market’s attention was drawn to the ever-present threat to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Persian Gulf with Arabian Sea. Some 20% of global oil supply transits the strait daily, most of it bound for Asia (Chart 2). Iran has repeatedly declared it would shut down the Strait in response to threats from the US and its Gulf allies. This is a low-probability risk – even if the strait was closed, we expect traffic would quickly be restored – but it is non-trivial in our estimation.5 A closure that threatened to exceed even a week likely would spike prices through $100/bbl. Chart 2Asia Is Prime Destination For Gulf Crude And Condensates Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut A direct attack that shuts the Strait of Hormuz also would threaten a large share of OPEC’s spare capacity of ~ 2.3mm b/d (Chart 3). Most of this is in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). In order to provide export capacity in the event of a closure of the strait, last year the Kingdom accelerated its expansion of the 750-mile East-West pipeline, which terminates at the Red Sea port of Yanbu. This was expected to lift the pipeline's capacity to 7mm b/d from 6mm b/d by October 2019.6 Loading the huge number of vessels at maximum pipeline throughput at Yanbu likely would present logistical challenges of its own, given the low volumes exported from there presently. In addition, Argus notes the pipeline suffered drone attacks originating from Yemen in May of last year. Lastly, to further complicate matters, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait connecting the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden Indian Ocean also is quite narrow in places, which presents a natural point of disruption. Chart 3OPEC Spare Capacity Threatened If Straits Of Hormuz Are Shut Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut In addition to OPEC’s spare capacity and KSA’s Red Sea outlet, the US can mobilize its 640mm-barrel Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to supply the market with ~ 2mm b/d of crude.7 In addition, member states of the Organization for Economic Development (OECD) maintain close to 3 billion barrels of crude and product inventories that could be drawn down in the event of an emergency (Chart 4). China’s SPR is estimated at ~ 800mm b/d – covering ~ 80 days of consumption – but the rate at which it can be delivered to the market is unknown.8 Chart 4OECD Inventories Remain Elevated, But We Expect Them To Move Lower OECD Inventories Remain Elevated, But We Expect Them To Move Lower OECD Inventories Remain Elevated, But We Expect Them To Move Lower Investment Implications Of Unknown Unknowns At present, the known unknowns – i.e., risks – do not appear to be galloping higher, based on the recent performance of crude oil and gold options’ implied volatilities. At present, the known unknowns – i.e., risks – do not appear to be galloping higher, based on the recent performance of crude oil and gold options’ implied volatilities (Chart 5). But uncertainty – i.e., the unknown unknowns, which are impossible to model – are expanding, in our estimation. In this environment, we are inclined to remain long 2H20 Brent futures vs short 2H21 in expectation that any event affecting shipments of crude through the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el-Mandeb will quickly result in inventory drawdowns, which will be reflected in a steeper backwardation – i.e., the 2H20 Brent futures will trade at a higher premium to 2H21 futures (Chart 6). We recommended this position December 12, 2019, and it was up 78.9% as of Tuesday’s close. Chart 5Known Unknowns - Risk -Under Control Known Unknowns - Risk -Under Control Known Unknowns - Risk -Under Control Chart 6Expect Backwardation To Steepen Expect Backwardation To Steepen Expect Backwardation To Steepen Recap Of 2019 Recommendations Our commodity recommendations – across all markets – returned 48% on average last year. Oil positions still open at year-end and closed during 2019 led the performance, averaging a 64% gain (Tables 1 and 2). By comparison, the S&P GSCI commodity index was up 17.63% last year. Table 1Overall Recommendations Returned 47.5% Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut Table 2Oil Recommendations Led Performance Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut We are leaving the positions we ended the year with open. We are leaving the positions we ended the year with open (Table 3). Absent a war – or even a skirmish – we continue to expect OPEC 2.0’s production restraint will tighten physical markets and force inventories lower resulting in steeper Brent forward curves – i.e., Brent backwardation increasing meaningfully. We remain long the S&P GSCI, given its heavy energy weighting and expected outperformance as the backwardation of crude oil forward curves continues. In addition, we remain long gold, silver and platinum as portfolio hedges. We still also remain long December 2020 high-grade iron ore (65% Fe) vs. short December benchmark iron ore (62% Fe), expecting a revival of industrial commodity demand in China and EM this year. Table 3Year-End 2019 Positions Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     Please see Khamenei Wants to Put Iran’s Stamp on Reprisal for U.S. Killing of Top General published by the New York Times January 6 and updated on January 7, 2020. 2     Unlike risk – the known unknowns that can be gauged using probability measures – uncertainty (unknown unknowns) defies measurement.  However, discussions and mentions of it can be tracked in newspapers as journalists and pundits hold forth on “uncertainty.”  We track uncertainty using the monthly Baker-Bloom-Davis Global Economic Policy Uncertainty (GEPU) index, which is constructed by tracking references to economic uncertainty in newspapers published in 20 economies representing 80% of global GDP on an FX-weighted basis.  See also The Stock Market: Beyond Risk Lies Uncertainty published by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis July 1, 2002. 3    Please see Saudi envoy arrives in Washington amid fear of U.S.-Iran war published by axios.com January 6, 2020. 4     Robert Kagan at the Brookings Institution draws attention to this transformation in The Jungle Grows Back, an extended essay published in 2018 by Alfred A. Knopf arguing in favor of the Washington Consensus.  See also the photo essay Photos: The Year in Protests published by the Council on Foreign Relations in New York on December 17, 2019. 5     A non-trivial risk, in our estimation, is one in which the odds of a highly unfavorable outcome are approximately 1 in 6, the same odds as Russian roulette, with all of its dire connotations. 6     Please see Saudi Aramco fast-tracks East-West pipeline expansion published by Argus Media August 5, 2019. 7     Please see US SPR release in response to Abqaiq, Khurais attacks likely not imminent: analysts published by S+P Global Platts September 15, 2019, following the attacks on KSA’s facilities. 8     Please see RPT-COLUMN-Bearish signal for crude as China closes in on filling oil storage: Russell published by reuters.com September 23, 2019. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q4 Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut Iran Responds To US Strike; Oil Markets Remain Taut

Highlights The US and Iran are not rushing into a full-scale war for the moment – and yet the bull market in US-Iran tensions will continue for at least the next 2-3 years (Chart 1). This means that while global risk assets can take a breather from Iran geopolitical risk – if not other risks to the heady rally – the breather is not a fundamental resolution and Iran will remain market-relevant in 2020. A Reprieve … Chart 1Bull Market In US-Iran Tensions Bull Market In US-Iran Tensions Bull Market In US-Iran Tensions On January 8 President Donald Trump spoke at the White House in response to a barrage of missiles fired by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) at bases with US troops in al-Asad and Erbil, Iraq. Trump remarked that Iran “appears to be standing down,” judging by the fact that the missile strikes did not kill American citizens – Trump’s explicit red line – or cause any significant casualties or damage. Iran’s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif claimed that Iran’s strikes “concluded proportionate measures” in response to the US killing of Quds Force chief Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad on January 3, which itself followed unrest at the US embassy in Baghdad and American strikes on Iran-backed Iraqi militias (Map 1). Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei gave ambivalent comments, saying military operations were not in themselves sufficient but that Iran must focus on removing the US presence from the region. Map 1US And Iran Sparring Across The Region A Reprieve Amid The Bull Market In Iran Tensions A Reprieve Amid The Bull Market In Iran Tensions President Trump’s speech was transparently a campaign speech, not a war speech. He did not imply in any way that the US military would retaliate to the missile strikes, but said Americans should be “grateful and happy” that Iran did a “good thing” for the world by refraining from drawing American blood. Instead Trump focused on Iran’s nuclear program, denouncing the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPA). He implored the parties of that agreement – the UK, Germany, France, Russia, and China – to join him in negotiating a new deal to replace it. The goal of the new negotiations would be to prevent Iran from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon and to halt its sponsorship of regional militants in exchange for economic development and opening up to the outside world. He called for NATO to take a more active role in the Middle East and he highlighted the US’s shared interest with Iran in combating the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The takeaway is that the Trump administration is not pursuing regime change but rather nuclear non-proliferation and a change in Iran’s regional behavior. The administration has often said as much, but the assassination of Soleimani escalated tensions and called into question Trump’s intentions. Financial markets will cheer the successful reestablishment of US deterrence vis-à-vis Iran, as it makes Iran less likely to retaliate to US pressure in ways that lead to a major military confrontation. The near-term risk of a massive oil supply shock will decline. Oil prices have already fallen back to where they stood before Soleimani’s death. … Amid A Bull Market In US-Iran Tensions Yet the saga does not end here. Iran’s ineffectual military strike could have been a feint, or Iran could follow up with more consequential retaliation later. Chart 2US Strategic Deleveraging From The Middle East US Strategic Deleveraging From The Middle East US Strategic Deleveraging From The Middle East Iran has the ability to dial up its nuclear program step by step, sponsor regional attacks with plausible deniability, and foment regional unrest in important oil-producing countries. It can do these things in ways that do not clearly cross America’s red lines but still cause market-relevant tensions or disrupt oil supply. After all, Iran is still under punitive sanctions and desirous of demoralizing the US to hasten its departure from the region. So far Iran has not irreversibly abandoned its nuclear commitments or crossed any red lines regarding levels of uranium enrichment, but we fully expect it to threaten to do so and use its nuclear program to build up negotiating leverage. We doubt any serious US-Iran negotiations will take shape until 2021 at the earliest – and any negotiations could fail and lead to another, more serious round of military exchanges. This means that today’s reprieve may be tomorrow’s negative surprise for the markets. The fundamental basis for this bull market in US-Iran tensions is that the US is seeking to withdraw its strategic commitment to the region to counter China (Chart 2), yet Iran is filling the power vacuum and could conceivably create a regional empire (Map 2). President Trump will not want to appear to have been chased out of Iraq in an election year, even if he is in favor of strategic deleveraging, but Iran may try to do exactly that. Iran will also try to solidify its influence among those left exposed by the US’s deleveraging, namely in Iraq. Map 2Iran's Strategic 'Land Bridge' To The Mediterranean A Reprieve Amid The Bull Market In Iran Tensions A Reprieve Amid The Bull Market In Iran Tensions Chart 3A Succession Crisis Looms A Succession Crisis Looms A Succession Crisis Looms Moreover President Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal sowed deep distrust between the US and Iran and discredited the reformist faction in Tehran, which faces a tough election in February. This makes it difficult for the two countries to find a new equilibrium anytime soon. The Iranian regime is at a crossroads. It has a large and restless youth population (Chart 3), an economy under crippling sanctions, and faces a leadership succession in the coming years that brings enormous uncertainties about economic policy and regime survival. At the same time, President Trump is a historically unpopular president who is being impeached and believes that showing a strong hand against terrorism – under which the US classifies Iran’s Revolutionary Guard as well as the Islamic State – is an important key to being re-elected in November. Terrorism and immigration are in fact the two clearest issues that got him elected (Chart 4). Economic growth is a necessary but not sufficient condition for his reelection. US-Iran tensions will persist at least until the US election is settled and likely beyond. The result is a cyclical increase in tensions between the two countries that will persist at least until after the US election is settled. The Iranians are loathe to reward President Trump for his tactics – it would be better for Tehran if Washington changed parties again. After November, the US and Iran will recalibrate. Ultimately, in the coming years, either President Trump will get a new deal, or a new Democratic administration will reinitiate diplomacy to update the JCPA, or “maximum pressure” tactics will persist and increase the odds of a major military conflict. There is room for many negative surprises in this time frame as the US and Iran jockey for better positioning. The writing on the wall is that the United States is deleveraging and this creates a transition period in which regional instability will rise. Even within 2020 the current de-escalation could prove short-lived. The US president has enormous leeway in foreign policy and even the economic constraint is limited. The US economy is less oil intensive and less dependent on imports for its energy, while households have ample savings and spend less of their disposable income on energy. While this may ultimately serve as a basis for withdrawing from the Middle East, it also enables the US president to take greater risks in the region. Even within 2020 the current de-escalation could prove short-lived. The Iranians would have to create and maintain an oil supply shock the size of the September attack in Saudi Arabia for four months in order to ensure that American voters would feel the negative impact at the gas station by the time of the election. Chart 5 illustrates this point by simulating a 5.7 million barrel-per-day oil outage for different time periods. The chart overstates the impact on gasoline prices because it does not take into account the inevitable release of global strategic petroleum reserves. In other words, Trump may believe he has a sufficient buffer for the economy – and he clearly believes saber-rattling is worth the risk amid impeachment and election campaigning. Chart 4Trump Benefits From Fighting Iran-Backed Militants A Reprieve Amid The Bull Market In Iran Tensions A Reprieve Amid The Bull Market In Iran Tensions Chart 5Gasoline Price Cushion Could Embolden Trump A Reprieve Amid The Bull Market In Iran Tensions A Reprieve Amid The Bull Market In Iran Tensions   Investment Conclusions Chart 6Close Long EM Oil Producer Trade Close Long EM Oil Producer Trade Close Long EM Oil Producer Trade The past month’s events have reached a crisis point and are tentatively de-escalating. We are booking gains on our tactical long Brent crude trade and our long emerging market energy producers trade (Chart 6). We are not changing our constructive view on China stimulus, commodities, and the global business cycle. Following BCA Research’s commodity strategists, we recommend going long Brent crude H2 2020 versus H2 2021 on the expectation that production will remain constrained, inventories will fall, and prices will backwardate further. The underlying US-Iran conflict will persist and create volatility in oil markets in 2020 and beyond. We also remain on guard for ways in which the Iran dynamic could affect Trump’s reelection odds and hence US policy and the markets over the coming year.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com