Persian (Gulf)

Highlights So What? The Trump administration’s decision to apply maximum pressure to Iran fundamentally changes the investment landscape in 2019-20. Why? The impact of the Iran sanctions on a stand-alone basis can easily be handled given OPEC 2.0’s current spare capacity. However, not only Iranian and Venezuelan oil but also Iraqi oil could be pulled off the market in a full-fledged conflict. Policy-induced volatility and the oil risk premium will rise. Geopolitical tail risks have gotten fatter and the odds of a recession have also increased. Feature What are the Trump administration’s foreign policy objectives? First, to confront the U.S.’s greatest long-term competitor, China, by demanding economic reforms and greater market access. Second, to force a decision-point upon rogue regimes with significant ballistic missile programs and nuclear-weapon aspirations: North Korea and Iran. Third, to maintain credible deterrence in Russia’s periphery. Fourth, to reassert the Monroe Doctrine through regime change in Venezuela. The common thread, even with Russia, is confrontation. It is not necessary for President Trump to pursue all of these objectives at once. So his decision last November to issue waivers for eight importers of Iranian oil suggested to us that he was prioritizing – and becoming more risk averse ahead of the 2020 election. Full enforcement of the oil sanctions at that time threatened to push oil prices up at the same time as the Fed was raising rates, a pernicious combination late in the cycle (Chart 1). Thus, after walking away from the 2015 nuclear accord with Iran, it made sense for Trump to delay any confrontation with Iran until his hoped-for second term in office. He could focus on building the border wall, resolving trade tensions with China, and making peace with North Korea instead. Chart 1Full Sanctions Enforcement Was Too Risky Last November Full Sanctions Enforcement Was Too Risky Last November Full Sanctions Enforcement Was Too Risky Last November Chart 2Sanctions Will Raise Risk Sanctions Will Raise Risk Sanctions Will Raise Risk   This view has now been proved wrong. The oil waivers apparently represented only a temporary delay in the administration’s hawkish Iran policy. Now that financial conditions have eased and growth has stabilized, Trump has declared the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps a foreign terrorist organization and announced that he will discontinue the waivers, demanding full compliance on energy sanctions from all states by the end of May. Volatility will move higher (Chart 2). Trump is emboldened by America’s newfound energy independence (Chart 3). While the shale boom can be used to reduce U.S. strategic commitments in the Middle East, it can also encourage Washington to believe it is invulnerable to traditional Middle Eastern risks. Trump’s advisers, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and National Security Adviser John Bolton, apparently have won the Iran policy debate on this basis. Since Trump’s reelection is far from guaranteed, it would appear his advisers view re-imposing sanctions against Iran as a rare opportunity to achieve long-term strategic objectives. They may not have the chance in 2021. Chart 3The U.S. Is Energy Independent The U.S. Is Energy Independent The U.S. Is Energy Independent Chart 4Trump's Reelection At Risk If Oil Spikes Trump's Reelection At Risk If Oil Spikes Trump's Reelection At Risk If Oil Spikes All the same, the problem for Trump is that, while the U.S. will survive any chaos ensuing from an Iran confrontation, his presidency may not. Full enforcement of the sanctions could spiral out of control and, through the oil price channel, come back to hurt Trump’s economy – and hence his re-election odds (Chart 4). The implication is that Trump has either been misled about the risks of his Iran policy, or he does not care as much about his re-election odds as we believed. Either way, the result is aggressive policy, which increases the geopolitical risk premium in oil prices. We can see this in our simulations (below), which are based entirely on spare capacity and compliance by consumers to the sanctions. We did not include an Iran-retaliation scenario in this modeling. Therefore, any threat to Iraqi supplies, or talks of disrupting the Strait of Hormuz will add to our prices forecasts. U.S. Administration Sailing Close To The Wind From their public comments, it would appear the U.S. administration has convinced itself the global oil market can absorb a disruption from the loss of production in Iran and Venezuela. For the Trump administration, this view is supported by growing U.S. shale-oil supplies, and the administration’s belief the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and its Gulf allies stand ready to increase production to cover any losses arising from the re-imposition of Iranian oil-export sanctions by the U.S. This belief supports the administration’s end-game, which appears to be regime change in Iran, a position long favored by Trump’s national security advisor John Bolton. Frank Fannon, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Energy Resources, succinctly captured the administration’s view when he declared, “We are doing this ... in a favorable market condition with full commitment from producing countries.” He further stated, “We think this is the right time.”1 We believe the Trump administration is sailing close to the wind here. The U.S. administration has convinced itself the global oil market can absorb a disruption from the loss of oil production in Iran and Venezuela. While increasing U.S. shale output does provide something of a cushion to global oil markets, it is not a substitute for the heavy-sour crude produced by Iran and Venezuela (and others), which is favored by refiners with complex units. The loss of Iranian exports hits these refiners harder than those able to process lighter, sweeter crude of the sort exported by the U.S. (Chart 5).2 As Iranian and Venezuelan barrels are lost to the market, these heavier crudes are getting more scarce relative to the crude produced in U.S. shales – typically classified as West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil. This can be seen in tighter light-versus-heavy crude oil spreads, and the wider Brent-WTI spreads, which indicate WTI is relatively more plentiful (Charts 6A & 6B). Chart 5 Chart 6AWTI Relatively More Plentiful… WTI Relatively More Plentiful... WTI Relatively More Plentiful... Chart 6B…As Heavier Crudes Become More Scarce ...As Heavier Crudes Become More Scarce ...As Heavier Crudes Become More Scarce It is true U.S. production continues to grow, which is causing crude oil inventories to increase as sanctions on Iran are being re-imposed. We expect U.S. shale-oil output to grow 1.2mm b/d this year – taking it to a record 8.4mm b/d on average – and 800k b/d next year. Caution is required regarding inventories, however: U.S. refiners are in the thick of their plant maintenance – known as turn-around season – and have loaded a lot of the maintenance they would normally have done in the Fall into Spring. As a result, U.S. refiners are running at reduced rates preparing for the Northern Hemisphere’s summer driving season and the January 1, 2020, implementation of the U.N. IMO 2020 regulations, which will require shippers to use lower-sulfur fuel to power their vessels worldwide.3 OPEC 2.0 Gains Control Of Brent Forward Curve Growing U.S. production and inventories might give the Trump administration comfort the market can absorb the loss of Iran’s exports – some 1.3mm b/d at present. However, our base case holds that Iran’s exports will stabilize at ~ 600k b/d after sanctions fully kick in. In most of the scenarios we run (Table 1), the impact of Iran sanctions on a stand-alone basis can easily be handled given OPEC 2.0’s current spare capacity (Chart 7).4 Indeed, many of the low-probability scenarios we run – including the “maximum pressure” scenario, in which the Trump administration succeeds in removing all of Iran’s exports – can be accommodated by current supply and spare capacity without sending Brent prices through $100/bbl (Chart 8). OPEC 2.0 holds ~ 1.5mm b/d of what we would describe as readily available spare capacity – mostly in KSA – that can be brought to market fairly quickly, as the ramp-up last year ahead of the first round of sanctions in November amply demonstrated. Another 1.5mm b/d or so is held by the Kingdom and its GCC allies, but it would take longer to bring on line. Table 1BCA Oil Market Scenarios U.S.-Iran: This Means War? U.S.-Iran: This Means War? Chart 7OPEC 2.0 Can Handle Iranian Losses OPEC 2.0 Can Handle Iranian Losses OPEC 2.0 Can Handle Iranian Losses Chart 8Brent Unlikely To Surpass $100 Brent Unlikely To Surpass $100 Brent Unlikely To Surpass $100 In reality, once refiners are up and running at max capacity in the U.S. in a few weeks, U.S. inventories will begin to draw hard. This will support what we believe to be OPEC 2.0’s goal of backwardating the Brent curve – perhaps sharply. This will allow it some breathing space to gradually add barrels to the market in 2H19 as needed, as our balances and forecasts assume. It is important to remember OPEC 2.0 was formed to drain the massive storage overhang that resulted from the 2014-16 market-share war launched by KSA. The Kingdom’s energy minister, Khalid al-Falih, is in no hurry to reverse OPEC 2.0’s strategy now. Throughout the ramp to renewed sanctions, he has steadfastly maintained the Kingdom will provide oil as Aramco’s customers need it, following the blind-side hit KSA took from the Trump administration in November when it granted Iran’s largest customers waivers on its export sanctions. U.S. Pressure On OPEC To Raise Output Will Grow We expect the Trump administration to continue to pressure OPEC – the old cartel, not OPEC 2.0 – to boost production post-sanctions. However, it is not entirely clear that this time OPEC’s – particularly KSA’s – interests are 100% aligned with President Trump’s. KSA and other producers were shocked by the administration’s decision to grant waivers after lifting supply sharply in response to Trump’s demands. This time around, we believe OPEC – KSA in particular – will be more cautious lifting output, even as the U.S. Navy very publicly displays its ability to project and sustain force in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf regions (Map 1). With good reason: The U.S. holds ~ 650mm barrels of oil in its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR), which can be released at a rate of 1mm to 1.3mm b/d for a year or so. Realistically, it is probably more like six to nine months, since, by the time much of the oil has been released to the market the reserves that are left likely will have higher concentrations of contaminants (e.g., metals and solids that migrated to the bottom of the storage while it was sitting idle), making buyers way more leery of using it. Chart After the shock of the waivers, KSA likely will minimize its exposure to another surprise from the U.S. as sanctions take hold. The risk to OPEC – KSA in particular – is that Trump again will pull a fast one as the U.S. general election approaches. Given Trump’s demonstrated sensitivity to U.S. gasoline prices approaching elections, it is not unlikely that he would hold on to the SPR barrels until mid to late summer 2020, then release them in time to reduce prices further. If, in the run-up to U.S. elections, OPEC has steadily increased production to build precautionary inventories then it runs a non-trivial risk the crude oil price would once again crash as SPR barrels are released. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s energy minister, Khalid al-Falih, is in no hurry to reverse OPEC 2.0’s strategy now. In this iteration of Iranian export sanctions, we expect KSA to adopt a just-in-time inventory management strategy, so that it is not caught out once again over-supplying the market ahead of a U.S. surprise. U.S. Shales Will Figure Into OPEC 2.0’s Calculus Chart 9U.S. Export Capacity Is Constrained U.S. Export Capacity Is Constrained U.S. Export Capacity Is Constrained The other big fundamental OPEC 2.0 will be considering is the rate at which U.S. shale oil can be exported. Export capacity still is constrained by the shortage of deep-water harbor facilities in the U.S. Gulf. This is being addressed, but it has been slowed by additional requests for environmental impact statements from the federal and state governments. If prices start moving higher because KSA and OPEC 2.0 are responding to tightening markets with caution (and slowly), we’d likely see WTI production increase – it’ll have 2mm b/d of new pipe in the Permian to fill by end-2019 – but that crude could start backing up as storage in the U.S. Gulf fills. This would again widen the Brent vs. WTI - Houston spread, which will benefit refiners in the U.S. Gulf, but will lower prices received by U.S. shale producers (again) (Chart 9). Bottom Line: Trump’s decision not to extend the Iranian oil waivers suggests that he has plenty of risk appetite ahead of the 2020 election. His Iran policy is now the biggest geopolitical risk to the late-cycle bull market. It also risks tightening the oil market considerably as the election approaches. Can Iran’s Regime Withstand The Sanctions? Iran’s economic weakness was an added inducement for the Trump administration to take an aggressive turn. The sanctions against Iran’s crude oil exports have not yet been implemented in full force, but the economy is already showing signs of distress. For one, inflation is back near 40% – levels only reached during the previous round of sanctions (Chart 10). Given that food, beverages, and transportation are among the sectors experiencing the fastest growing prices, lower income groups – which the World Bank estimates spend almost half their income on food alone – will suffer disproportionately. Economic dissatisfaction has catalyzed protests in Iran in the past, and the squeeze from the U.S. sanctions could propel further unrest. Chart 10Iran's Economy Already Showing Signs Of Distress Iran's Economy Already Showing Signs Of Distress Iran's Economy Already Showing Signs Of Distress Chart 11 Moreover, soaring prices are coinciding with a slowdown in activity and consumption. On the surface Iran appears relatively well protected given that its economy is not as directly correlated with oil exports as some of its peers (Chart 11). However, Iran’s oil and non-oil sectors are actually closely intertwined. This is evident from weakness in the non-oil sector during the previous round of sanctions (Chart 12). The IMF expects the economy to contract by 6% this year – faster than its 3.9% estimate for last year – leaving Iranians to face a period of deepening stagflation. Chart 12 The jump in consumer prices is a reflection of the ongoing collapse of the currency. Despite the government’s best efforts to stabilize the foreign exchange market, heightened demand for foreign currencies caused a nearly 30% depreciation in the unofficial exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar since the beginning of the year (Chart 13). Chart 13Unofficial Exchange Rate Continues To Weaken Unofficial Exchange Rate Continues To Weaken Unofficial Exchange Rate Continues To Weaken Chart 14Debt Burden Is Manageable Debt Burden Is Manageable Debt Burden Is Manageable To soften the impact of the weaker currency and the potential shortage of essential goods, authorities have introduced a three-tier exchange rate system, and banned the export of several products including grains and seeds, powdered milk, butter, and tea. Since the level of external debt remains manageable (Chart 14) the weak currency will pressure the economy through its impact on prices (highlighted above), with imported inflation eroding purchasing power. Furthermore, Iran will not benefit from any additional export competitiveness due to currency depreciation. The current account surplus is expected to deteriorate and eventually flip to a deficit amidst weak exports, and despite declining imports (Chart 15). The fact that Iran runs a non-energy trade deficit does not help. Chart 15Trade Surplus At Risk Trade Surplus At Risk Trade Surplus At Risk Chart 16Rising Budget Deficit Is A Constraint Rising Budget Deficit Is A Constraint Rising Budget Deficit Is A Constraint In terms of the fiscal purse, under normal circumstances, a weaker rial would raise government revenue from oil exports. However, given the restrictions on oil exports, the fiscal budget will not benefit from this relationship. Instead, the dominant impact will be greater government spending. Historically, expenditures tend to be countercyclical, aiming to mitigate the impact of the deteriorating economic environment on Iranian households (Chart 16). In the past, the Iranian government’s healthy fiscal balance allowed policymakers to implement social protection schemes to combat poverty and revitalize the economy. Now, however, the fiscal coffers are no longer so well-cushioned and the deficit will constrain this option. Stimulative fiscal policy in this environment would only raise inflation further. Furthermore, given that the lion’s share of Iran’s imports are capital and intermediate goods, the currency depreciation will spill over into the domestic industry and weaken demand, even for domestically produced goods. Investments have been lacking in many of the most essential services. The electricity sector is a prime example: while demand is rising, spare capacity is dwindling and causing recurring outages. Similarly, foreign direct investment will likely fall in this uncertain political environment. With the economy on the brink, Iran is not in a position to confront the United States directly. It must take total sanctions enforcement as a very grave risk and seek delaying actions and negotiations. However, this vulnerability will turn into desperation if the Trump administration proceeds with a full embargo without any “off ramp” for negotiations. Bottom Line: Full enforcement of sanctions threatens to destabilize Iran’s already vulnerable economy. Inflation is soaring, the currency is plunging, and the economy will likely be plagued by a twin deficit going forward. The implication is that Iran will eschew direct confrontation unless forced. Will Iran Retaliate In Iraq? Iran is also at risk of losing one of its great sources of leverage: Iraqi stability. Given its gloomy economic outlook, Iran is looking to expand ties with its neighbors in an attempt to soften the blow from the sanctions. Earlier this year president Hassan Rouhani and Iraqi prime minister Adel Abdul Mahdi signed several preliminary trade deals, with the ultimate aim to boost bilateral trade to $20 billion from its current ~$12 billion. However, natural gas exports to Iraq – a major traded good – are covered by the sanctions, so this target is probably unattainable. Although Iran is currently the only foreign supplier of natural gas and electricity to Iraq, the temporary halt in electricity supplies last summer coincided with violent protests in Southern Iraq.5 Growing anger over Iran’s inability to satisfy its commitments to Iraq highlights the tensions in the Iraq-Iran relationship. What’s more, the U.S. is pressuring Iraq to turn to other neighbors such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait for its electricity needs.6 In March, it renewed a three-month waiver allowing Iraq to import Iranian gas. Then Saudi Arabia promised to connect Iraq to the Saudi electricity grid during a visit by its economic delegation to Baghdad on April 4.7 At that meeting, the Saudi delegation also agreed to provide Iraq with $1 billion in loans, $500 million to boost exports, and a sporting complex as a gift. Additionally, the Saudi consulate in Baghdad – which had been closed for almost 3 decades – reopened last month. Saudi Arabia and Iraq are starting to cooperate. Iraq’s new government is clearly taking a pragmatic approach to its regional relationships. This is also largely in line with growing domestic opposition to Iranian interference within Iraq. Influential Shia leaders such as Muqtada al-Sadr and Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani have been voicing concerns about Iran’s influence in Iraqi politics. As such, the new Iraqi government is attempting to walk a tight rope between placating Iran and taking advantage of new opportunities with its Arab neighbors to rebuild its economy. This trend raises the risk that Iran will strike rapidly in Iraq if it believes Trump’s maximum pressure strategy is succeeding in bringing oil exports to zero. Iraq is the logical target as Iran has great political and sectarian influence there, it is the geographic buffer with Saudi Arabia, and it is the necessary launchpad for Iran’s strategic opponents to undermine or attack the Iranian regime (Map 2). Chart Thus, not only Iranian and Venezuelan oil but also Iraqi oil could be pulled off the market in a fullfledged conflict. Chart 17 Thus, not only Iranian and Venezuelan oil but also Iraqi oil could be pulled off the market in a full-fledged conflict. About 85% of Iraq’s crude exports flow through the southern port city of Basra (Chart 17). It is already home to recurrent protests and any disruptions there threaten around 3.5mm bbl shipping to international markets daily. Bottom Line: Iraq is caught in the strategic tug-of-war between Iran and Saudi Arabia, with the latter gaining influence at present. Sanctions could compel Iran to retaliate in Iraq, jeopardizing up to 3.5mm b/d of supply. What Comes Next? The latest data suggest that Japan is in full compliance with the U.S. sanctions against Iran as of April and that China has been front-running the sanctions and is now reducing imports, as it was at the time the waivers were first introduced. China may not go to zero, but it is apparently complying. This is important given that the Trump administration has essentially introduced a bold new demand – cut off all energy imports from Iran – at the eleventh hour of the U.S.-China trade negotiations. Our projections of spare capacity suggest that the Trump administration will believe it has room to enforce the sanctions fully (Chart 18). This is a risky approach, as a fairly standard unplanned outage anywhere else in the world could bring spare capacity much lower, but the data suggest that Trump’s team will not see it as a hard constraint. If necessary, the administration can later choose to soft-pedal enforcement on black market activity so as to calibrate the global impact. Chart 18 The Iranians, for their part, are unlikely to leap to the most aggressive forms of retaliation immediately – such as fomenting unrest in Iraq – because of their economic vulnerability. Small acts of sabotage or subversion are a way to send the U.S. a warning signal, but generally Iran will want to signal defiance while shifting the emphasis to negotiations. Hence it will primarily retaliate through diplomatic actions and calculated displays of force. A limited response enables Iran to appear innocent, divide the U.S. and EU, and thus isolate the U.S. over its belligerent policies. Previously, Trump has sought to negotiate with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. The Iranians have so far rebuffed him, but Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif’s initial response to the waiver announcement was to blame Trump’s advisers, instead of Trump himself, and offer an exchange of prisoners (And release of detained Americans happen to be one of the Trump administration’s key demands – see Table 2.) Negotiations could begin through back channels and an uneasy period of tensions could thus ensue without a full-blown war. Table 2Trump Administration’s 12 Demands On Iran U.S.-Iran: This Means War? U.S.-Iran: This Means War? The problem is that negotiations cannot work if Trump fully and immediately enforces the sanctions without offering Iran an “off ramp.” If the administration backs Iran into a corner it will have no option but to strike out forcefully. Negotiations also cannot work if Iran joins the U.S. in withdrawing from the 2015 deal and reactivating its nuclear program, specifically the suspected military dimensions of that program. This would force Trump to respond (Diagram 1). Diagram 1Iran-U.S. Tensions Decision Tree U.S.-Iran: This Means War? U.S.-Iran: This Means War? In short, a period of “fire and fury” is about to ensue between Trump and Rouhani. It will be even more uncertain and disruptive than the summer 2017 showdown between Trump and Kim Jong Un of North Korea (Chart 19), which drove a 35 bps decline in the 10-year Treasury yield. Chart 19Upcoming "Fire And Fury" Will Be More Disruptive Than 2017 Trump-Kim Showdown Upcoming "Fire And Fury" Will Be More Disruptive Than 2017 Trump-Jong Un Showdown Upcoming "Fire And Fury" Will Be More Disruptive Than 2017 Trump-Jong Un Showdown There is a pathway for Trump’s pressure tactics to succeed: Iran is vulnerable and the United States and its allies are in a position of relative strength in terms of global oil supply. Therefore, it is possible that Trump could fully enforce the sanctions and yet avoid any uncontrollable crisis or oil shock. However, this pathway, at a subjective 26% probability, is less likely than the combined 48% probability of the alternatives: either escalation short of war, or ultimatums leading to Middle Eastern instability and much higher odds of war. Bottom Line: The geopolitical risk of U.S.-Iran confrontation is not contained. But we do not expect Iran to overreact unless Trump plows forward with full and immediate sanctions enforcement and offers no realistic “off ramp” for negotiations. At that point Iranian retaliation will be concrete and escalation could spiral out of control. Investors should keep in mind that Iran is not North Korea. Unlike the hermit kingdom, Iran has the ability to retaliate with a number of different levers. Indeed, it has threatened to shut the Strait of Hormuz in the past, and could, at the limit, be backed into that corner. While the risk of this is extremely low, should it occur the consequences would be huge – close to 20% of the world’s daily oil supply passes through the Strait daily. Indeed, just this week Iran’s Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh again threatened to take action against any OPEC member working against its interests. Following a meeting with the Cartel’s president, he is reported to have said, “Iran is a member of OPEC because of its interests, and if other members of OPEC seek to threaten Iran or endanger its interests, Iran will not remain silent.”8 Investment Conclusions The Trump administration’s decision to apply maximum pressure to Iran is a significant and unexpected injection of geopolitical risk that we believe fundamentally changes the investment landscape in 2019-20. While our base case is that the U.S. will enforce the oil sanctions gradually and in such a way as to avoid causing an oil shock, policy-induced volatility and the oil risk premium will rise. Geopolitical tail risks have gotten fatter and the odds of a recession have also increased. Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist roukayai@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see Humeyra Pamuk and Timothy Gardner, “How Trump’s hawkish advisors won debate on Iran oil sanctions,” Reuters, May 1, 2019, available at reuters.com. 2 Heavy-sour crudes are those with low API gravity (a measure of how easily a crude flows) and higher sulfur content. Light-sweet crudes have higher API gravity and lower sulfur content. 3 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, “IMO 2020: The Greening Of The Ship-Fuel Market,” February 28, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the producer coalition led by KSA and Russia, which was formed in 2016 to manage global crude oil output. Its goal is to drain the massive storage overhang caused by the market-share war launched by KSA in 2014. 5 Iran cited dissatisfaction with Iraq over the accumulation of unpaid bills as the cause of the halt in electricity exports to Iraq. This prompted Iraqi authorities – under pressure from domestic unrest – to send a delegation to Saudi Arabia in attempt to negotiate an electricity agreement. 6 Please see Edward Wong, “Trump Pushes Iraq to Stop Buying Energy From Iran,” The New York Times, February 11, 2019, available at nytimes.com. 7 Please see Geneive Abdo and Firas Maksad, “Iraq’s Place in the Saudi Arabian-Iranian Rivalry,” The National Interest, April 15, 2019, available at nationalinterest.org. 8 Please see Babk Dehghanpisheh, “Iran will respond if OPEC members threaten its interests: oil minister,” Reuters, May 2, 2019, available at reuters.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 2019 Q1 Image Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades Image

Highlights In Indonesia, investors are ignoring the weakness in global growth, which is an important driver of the country’s financial markets. The Indonesian currency, equities and local currency bonds all remain vulnerable. We continue to recommend underweighting Indonesian assets for now. In Turkey, additional adjustments in the exchange rate and interest rates are unavoidable. Stay put/underweight Turkish financial markets. In the UAE, the economy is set to improve marginally this year. We recommend overweighting UAE equities and corporate spreads within their respective EM portfolios. Feature Indonesia: The Currency And Bank Stocks Are At Risk  Indonesian financial assets have benefited from the Federal Reserve’s dovish turn and corresponding fall in U.S. bond yields (Chart I-1, top panel). Moreover, the market is cheering President Joko Widodo’s lead in the presidential vote tally. Yet investors are ignoring the budding weakness in industrial metals prices, which has historically been an important driver of Indonesia’s exchange rate (Chart I-1, middle panel). Going forward, the Indonesian currency, equities and local currency bonds all remain vulnerable: Falling global growth in general and Chinese imports in particular will intensify Indonesia’s exports contraction and worsen the country’s already wide current account deficit. In turn, the latter will induce currency depreciation, which will then lead to higher interbank rates (Chart I-2). Chart I-1Global Growth Matters For Indonesian Markets Global Growth Matters For Indonesian Markets Global Growth Matters For Indonesian Markets Chart I-2Falling Current Account Deficit = Higher Local Rates Falling Current Account Deficit = Higher Local Rates Falling Current Account Deficit = Higher Local Rates Upward pressure on local interbank rates will cause a slowdown in domestic private loan growth.   The Indonesian central bank – Bank Indonesia (BI) – has been attempting to lower interbank rates, which have been hovering above the central bank's policy rate (Chart I-3). To achieve this, the central bank has substantially increased excess reserves in the banking system (Chart I-4). It has done so by purchasing central bank certificates from commercial banks, conducting foreign exchange swaps and providing repo lending. Chart I-3A Sign Of Liquidity Strains A Sign Of Liquidity Strains A Sign Of Liquidity Strains Chart I-4Bank Indonesia Is Injecting Liquidity Bank Indonesia Is Injecting Liquidity Bank Indonesia Is Injecting Liquidity   Yet by expanding banking system liquidity so aggressively, BI risks renewed currency depreciation. Like any central bank in a country with an open capital account, BI cannot expect to have full control over the exchange rate while simultaneously targeting local interest rates. The Impossibly Trinity dilemma dictates that a central bank needs to choose between controlling the two. Yet investors are ignoring the budding weakness in industrial metals prices, which has historically been an important driver of Indonesia’s exchange rate. Therefore, if BI continues to inject local currency liquidity to cap or bring down interest rates (interbank rates), the resulting excess liquidity could encourage and facilitate speculation against the rupiah. Scratching below the surface, the recent strong outperformance of Indonesian equities has been entirely due to the surge in the country’s bank share prices (Chart I-5, top panel). Remarkably, the performance of Indonesian non-financial as well as small-cap stocks has been especially dismal (Chart I-5, middle and bottom panels). This is an upshot of poor profitability among Indonesia’s non-financial listed companies (Chart I-6). Chart I-5Indonesian Bank Stocks Are The Only Outperformers Indonesian Bank Stocks Are The Only Outperformers Indonesian Bank Stocks Are The Only Outperformers Chart I-6Falling Non-Financial Corporate Profitability Falling Non-Financial Corporate Profitability Falling Non-Financial Corporate Profitability Furthermore, deteriorating financial health of non-financial corporates, especially small companies, will lead to higher NPLs on banks’ books. Notably, Indonesian banks are more heavily exposed to businesses than to households. As NPLs rise anew, Indonesian commercial banks will need to lift their bad-loan provisioning levels, generating a major profit relapse (Chart I-7). Importantly, Indonesian commercial banks have been boosting their profits by reducing NPL provisions since early 2018. Reversing this will materially affect their earnings. Chart I-7Indonesian Bank Share Prices Are Vulnerable Indonesian Bank Share Prices Are Vulnerable Indonesian Bank Share Prices Are Vulnerable Additionally, bank stocks are vulnerable due to falling net interest income margins. Moreover, their share prices are overbought and not cheap. To be clear, we are not negative on Indonesia’s structural outlook. The above-mentioned alarms are more near-to-medium terms issues. Still, foreign ownership of local currency bonds and stocks – at 38% each – are high, and could be a major source of potential outflows if the rupiah depreciates. This would cause Indonesian stocks and local currency bonds to sell off severely. Bottom Line: The global growth slowdown/commodities downturn and the U.S. dollar upturn are not yet over. Consequently, foreign flows into EM will diminish, which will be particularly negative for Indonesian financial markets. We recommend investors continue underweighting Indonesian equities and avoid Indonesian local currency bonds for now. We continue to recommend a short position in the IDR versus USD. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com Turkey’s Foreign Debt Bubble: The Worst Is Not Yet Behind Us Turkish financial assets, and the currency especially, will remain under selling pressure in the coming months. Additional adjustments in the exchange rate and interest rates - as well as in the real economy and current account balance - appear unavoidable. The key imbalance remains the gap between foreign debt obligations (FDOs) and the availability of foreign currency to meet these debt obligations. Turkey’s FDOs in 2019 are equivalent to $180 billion (Chart II-1). FDOs measure the sum of short-term claims, interest payments and amortization over the next 12 months. This consists of $15 billion in interest payments, $65 billion in debt amortization and $100 billion in maturing short-term (under one year) claims. In theory, these debt obligations can either be rolled over, or the nation should generate current account and capital account surpluses and use these surpluses to pay down FDOs. Even though the current account deficit is shrinking, it is still in a deficit of $18 billion. Net FDI inflows remain weak at US$10 billion. Hence, it appears that Turkey’s only options are either to roll over maturing foreign currency debt or to lure foreign investors into local currency assets and use the surplus in net portfolio inflows to meet these FDOs. The central bank’s foreign currency reserves excluding both commercial banks’ deposits at the Central Bank of Turkey and FX swaps now stand at $13 billion. However, due to a lack of credibility in the Turkish government’s macro policies - in addition to the ongoing deep economic recession and heightened financial market volatility - external creditors will be unwilling to roll over the debt. In fact, net portfolio flows into government debt and equities have tumbled for the same reason. Typically, when foreign funding dries up temporarily, a country can use its foreign exchange reserves to meet its FDOs. However, Turkey’s foreign exchange reserves have already plummeted to extremely low levels (Chart II-2). The central bank’s foreign currency reserves excluding both commercial banks’ deposits at the Central Bank of Turkey and FX swaps now stand at $13 billion. This is negligible compared with the $180 billion FDO figure due in 2019. Chart II-1Turkey: A Large Foreign Debt Servicing Burden Turkey: A Large Foreign Debt Servicing Burden Turkey: A Large Foreign Debt Servicing Burden Chart II-2Foreign Exchange Reserves Are Too Small Foreign Exchange Reserves Are Too Small Foreign Exchange Reserves Are Too Small   The recent plunge in the central bank’s net foreign exchange reserves excluding swaps (i.e. net international reserves) has put many pertinent metrics at record lows. In particular, net international reserves are at a precarious level relative to both total imports and external debt (Chart II-3). Finally, the net international reserves-to-broad money supply ratio has fallen to 7% (from 15% in 2014) despite the fact that the massive lira depreciation reduced the U.S. dollar measure of broad money supply (Chart II-4). Chart II-3FX Reserves Do Not Cover Imports Or External Debt FX Reserves Do Not Cover Imports Or External Debt FX Reserves Do Not Cover Imports Or External Debt Chart II-4Low Coverage Of Broad Money By International Reserves Low Coverage Of Broad Money By International Reserves Low Coverage Of Broad Money By International Reserves The currency will have to depreciate further and interest rates will have to move higher to shrink domestic demand/imports more. This is needed to generate a current account surplus that could be used to service FDOs, or that otherwise entices foreign creditors to be willing to roll over foreign debt or invest in Turkey. Finally, while the adjustment in the real economy is advanced, it is unlikely to be over, due to the large foreign debt bubble. Importantly, with large foreign and local currency debt obligations coming due for both companies and households - in addition to the deterioration in economic activity and higher interest rates - NPLs are bound to rise (Chart II-5). This is especially likely to occur because a lot of borrowing has been used in the property market both for construction and purchases. Notably, real estate volumes are shrinking, and prices are deflating in real terms (Chart II-6). Chart II-5NPLs Will Rise A Lot NPLs Will Rise A Lot NPLs Will Rise A Lot Chart II-6Turkey: Real Estate Is In Free Fall Turkey: Real Estate Is In Free Fall Turkey: Real Estate Is In Free Fall     Bottom Line: The macro adjustment in Turkey is not yet complete. The country still lacks foreign currency supply to service its enormous 2019 FDOs. Further currency depreciation and higher interest rates are required to depress domestic demand/imports and push the current account into surplus. Stay put / underweight Turkish financial markets. The authorities are becoming desperate, and the odds of capital control enforcement are not negligible. While such an outcome is not possible to forecast with any certainty or time frame, investors should consider this very real risk. Andrija Vesic, Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com Overweight UAE Equities And Corporate Bonds Over the next six to nine months, we believe both UAE equities and corporate spreads will outperform their respective emerging market (EM) benchmarks. The UAE economy is set to improve marginally this year (Chart III-1). It will benefit from expansionary fiscal policy, rising oil output, a buoyant tourism sector, a resilient banking sector and less of a drag from the real estate sector. First, sizable fiscal spending will lead to rising non-oil economic growth. The UAE’s federal budget spending for 2019 will increase by 17.3% from a year ago, much higher than the 5.5% year-on-year growth in 2018. Second, UAE oil output could increase by 15% later this year from current levels (Chart III-2). The U.S. announced on April 22 that all Iran sanction waivers will not be extended beyond the early-May expiration date. The U.S. administration also stated that it has secured pledges from Saudi Arabia and the UAE to increase their oil production in order to offset disrupted supply from Iran. Rising oil output will mitigate the negative impact of potentially lower oil prices on the UAE’s economy. Chart III-1Improving UAE Economy Improving UAE Economy Improving UAE Economy Chart III-2Rising Oil Output Rising Oil Output Rising Oil Output   Third, the outlook for the tourism sector is also positive. The number of tourists is set to rise as Expo 2020 approaches. The government is targeting 20 million visitors in 2020, 26% higher than last year’s levels. The UAE is building theme parks, museums, hotels and infrastructure to attract more tourists. The UAE economy is set to improve marginally this year. Fourth, the UAE’s banking sector will enjoy rising credit growth, robust profitability and improved asset quality this year. The banking system has been in consolidation mode since January 2016, with a 15% reduction in branches and a 14% drop in the number of employees. This has improved the banking sector’s profitability by cutting operating costs and increasing efficiency. The improving growth outlook will lift credit growth. The central bank’s most recent Credit Sentiment Survey suggests banks’ lending standards for both business and personal loans are loosening (Chart III-3). In addition, UAE banks enjoy large capital buffers. Despite rising non-performing loans (Chart III-4), UAE banks still reported a Tier-1 capital adequacy ratio of 17% as of December 2018. Chart III-3Credit Growth Is Likely To Increase Credit Growth Is Likely To Increase Credit Growth Is Likely To Increase Chart III-4Rising NPLs, But Still Large Capital Buffers Rising NPLs, But Still Large Capital Buffers Rising NPLs, But Still Large Capital Buffers   Lastly, the real estate markets in both Dubai and Abu Dhabi have suffered from oversupply (from both mushrooming supply and weaker demand) over the past several years. Property prices have already fallen over 20% in both Dubai and Abu Dhabi from their 2014 peaks (Chart III-5). Odds are high that the most dangerous phase of the property market downturn is behind us. Chart III-5Real Estate Adjustment Is Advanced Real Estate Adjustment Is Advanced Real Estate Adjustment Is Advanced In addition, the government’s efforts to attract people to stay in the country longer will somewhat offset the ongoing exodus of expatriates. Last May, the UAE introduced a new visa system that will allow investors, innovators and talented specialists in the medical, scientific, research and technical fields to stay in the country for up to 10 years. Overall, a potential bottom in property demand and restrained supply will likely make the real estate sector less of a drag on this bourse this year. Finally, the authorities are also more open to increasing the foreign ownership cap in the banking sector, albeit not up to 100%. For example, in early April, the largest UAE lender – First Abu Dhabi Bank – obtained regulatory approval to increase its foreign ownership limit to 40% from 25%. This has boosted foreign equity purchases and has supported the equity index. Bottom Line: We recommend an overweight position in UAE equities within an EM portfolio this year (Chart III-6). For fixed income investors, we recommend overweighting UAE corporate credit in an EM corporate credit portfolio. UAE corporate credit is a lower beta market and will outperform as EM corporate spreads widen (Chart III-7). Most UAE-dollar corporate bonds have been issued by banks. Banks in the UAE do not suffer from structural overhangs, and the cyclical downturn in the property market is well advanced. This is why they have been, and will remain, a lower beta sector within an EM corporate credit portfolio. Chart III-6Overweight UAE Equities Within An EM Portfolio Overweight UAE Equities Within An EM Portfolio Overweight UAE Equities Within An EM Portfolio Chart III-7UAE Corporate Credit Will Likely Outperform EM Benchmark UAE Corporate Credit Will Likely Outperform EM Benchmark UAE Corporate Credit Will Likely Outperform EM Benchmark   Ellen JingYuan He, Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com Footnotes Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights So what? Quantifying geopolitical risk just got easier. Why?   In this report we introduce 10 proprietary, market-based indicators of country-level political and geopolitical risk. Featured countries include France, U.K., Germany, Italy, Spain, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, and Brazil. Other countries, and refinements to these beta-version indicators, will come in due time. We remain committed to qualitative, constraint-based analysis. Our GeoRisk Indicators will help us determine how the market is pricing key risks, so we can decide whether they are understated or overstated. Feature For the past three months we have been tracking a “Witches’ Brew” of political risks that threaten the late-cycle bull market. Some of these risks have abated for the time being: the Fed is on pause, China’s stimulus has surprised to the upside, and Brexit has been delayed. Other risks we have flagged, however, are heating up: Iran And Oil Market Volatility: Surprisingly the Trump administration has chosen not to extend oil sanction waivers on Iran from May 2, putting 1.3 million barrels per day of oil on schedule to be removed from international markets by an unspecified time.  It remains to be seen how rapidly and resolutely the administration will enforce the sanctions on specific allies and partners (Japan, India, Turkey) as well as rivals (China, others). Because the decision coincides with rising production risks from renewed fighting in Libya and regime failure in Venezuela, we expect President Trump to phase in the new enforcement over a period of months, particularly on China and India. But official rhetoric is draconian. Hence the potential for full and immediate enforcement is greater than we thought. In the short term, individual political leaders, and very powerful nations like the United States, can ignore material economic and political constraints. Since the Trump administration’s decision exemplifies this point, geopolitical tail risks will get fatter this year and next. Global oil price volatility and equity market volatility will increase with sanction enforcement actions and retaliation. We would think that Trump’s odds of reelection will marginally suffer, though for now still above 50%, as any full-fledged confrontation with Iran will raise the chances of an oil price-induced recession. U.S.-EU Trade War: Neither the Trump administration nor the U.S. has a compelling interest in imposing Section 232 tariffs on imports of autos and auto parts. Nevertheless the risk of some tariffs remains high – we put it at 35% – because President Trump is legally unconstrained. The decision is technically due by May 18 but Economic Council Director Larry Kudlow has said Trump may adjust the deadline and decide later. Later would make sense given the economic and financial risks of the administration’s decision to ramp up the pressure on Iran.1 But the risk that tariffs will pile onto a weak German and European economy will hang over investors’ heads. U.S.-China Talks Not A Game Changer: The ostensible demand that China cease Iranian oil imports immediately and the stalling of U.S. diplomacy with North Korea are not conducive to concluding a trade deal in May. We have highlighted many times that strategic tensions will persist even if Beijing and Washington quarantine these issues to agree to a short-term trade truce. The June 28-29 G20 meeting in Japan remains the likeliest date for a summit between Presidents Trump and Xi Jinping, but even this timeframe could be too optimistic. Continued uncertainty or a weak deal will fail to satisfy financial markets expecting a very positive outcome.   With a 70% chance that U.S. tariffs on China will not increase this year and, contingent on a U.S.-China deal, only a 35% chance that the U.S. slaps tariffs on German cars, we sound optimistic to some clients. But the Trump administration’s decision on Iran is highly market-relevant and portends greater volatility. We expect to see a geopolitical risk premium creep higher into oil markets as well as a greater risk of “Black Swan” events in strategically critical or oil-producing parts of the Middle East. There is limited research devoted to quantifying geopolitical risk. We are late in the business cycle and President Trump has emphatically decided to increase rather than decrease geopolitical risk. Quantifying Geopolitical Risk Geopolitical analysis has taken a bigger role in investors’ decision-making over the last decade. Surveys show that geopolitical risks rank among global investors’ top concerns overall. In the oft-cited Bank of America Merrill Lynch survey, geopolitical and related issues have dominated the “top tail risk” responses for the past half-decade (Chart 1). In other surveys, the most worrisome short-term risks are mostly political or geopolitical in nature, ranking above socio-economic and environmental risks (Chart 2). Chart 1 Chart 2 Despite this high level of concern, there is limited research devoted to quantifying geopolitical risk. Isolating and measuring the range of risks under this umbrella term remains a challenge. As such, for many investors, geopolitics remains an ad hoc, exogenous factor that is often mentioned but rarely incorporated into portfolio construction. For the past four decades the predominant ways of measuring political or geopolitical risk have been qualitative or semi-qualitative. The Delphi technique, developed on the basis of low-quality data sets in social sciences, relies on pooled expert opinions.2 Independently selected experts are asked to provide risk assessments and their responses are then interpreted by analysts to create a measure of risk. Another semi-qualitative method of measuring geopolitical risk ranks countries according to a set of political and socio-economic variables. These variables – such as governance, political and social stability, corruption, law and order, or formal and informal policies – are extremely important but inherently difficult to quantify.3 These results are useful but suffer from dependency on expert opinion, data quality, and institutional biases. More importantly, these methods are slow to react to breaking events in a rapidly changing world. The same goes for bottom-up assessments using political intelligence. The weakness of these methods is that it is highly unlikely that they will produce statistically significant estimates of risk. The odds of getting a “silver bullet” insight from a “key insider” are decent for simple political systems, but not in the complex jurisdictions that host the vast majority of global, liquid investments. Quantitative approaches to measuring geopolitical risk have since become more widespread. The most prominent method is based on quantifying the occurrence of words related to political and geopolitical tensions that appear in international newspapers. These word-counts typically include terms like “terrorism,” “crisis,” “war,” “military action,” etc. As a result, the indices reflect incidents of physical violence or other “Black Swan” events that may not have direct relevance to financial markets. Moreover, while news-based indices accurately capture dramatic one-time peaks at the time of a crisis, they are largely flat aside from these, as they rely on popular topics rather than underlying structural trends (Chart 3). They fail to capture geopolitical developments associated with electoral cycles, protest movements, paradigm shifts in economic policy, or other policy changes.4 Notice, for instance, that the fall of the Soviet Union in late 1991 and the resulting chaos in Russia and many other parts of the emerging world hardly register in Chart 3. Chart 3News-Based Indices Only Capture Crisis Peaks, Not Geopolitical Developments News-Based Indices Only Capture Crisis Peaks, Not Geopolitical Developments News-Based Indices Only Capture Crisis Peaks, Not Geopolitical Developments Introducing BCA’s GeoRisk Indicators The past 70 years have taught BCA Research to listen and respect the market. Why would we suddenly follow the media instead? Most quantitative geopolitical indicators begin with the premise that journalists and the news-reading public have accurately emphasized the most relevant risks and uncertainties. They proceed to quantify the terms of these assessments with increasingly sophisticated methods. This approach solves only part of the puzzle. News-based indices ... fail to capture geopolitical developments associated with underlying policy changes. At BCA Geopolitical Strategy, we aim to generate geopolitical alpha.5 This means identifying where financial media and markets overstate or understate geopolitical risks. We do not primarily aim to predict events or crises. As such, traditional news-based indicators that capture only major events, even those ex post facto, are of little relevance to our analysis. What is needed is a better way to quantify how the market is calculating risks. We start with a simple premise: the market is the greatest machine ever created for gauging the wisdom of the crowd. Furthermore, it puts its money where its predictions are, unlike other methods of geopolitical risk quantification which have no “value at risk.” Chart 4USD/RUB Captures Geopolitical Risk In Russia... USD/RUB Captures Geopolitical Risk In Russia... USD/RUB Captures Geopolitical Risk In Russia... To this end, we have introduced market-based indicators over the years that rely on currency movements, which are often the simplest and most immediate means of capturing the process of pricing risk. In 2015, for instance, we introduced an indicator that measures Russia’s geopolitical risk premium (Chart 4). It is constructed using the de-trended residual from a regression of USD/RUB against USD/NOK and Russian CPI relative to U.S. CPI. We can show empirically that it captures geopolitical risk priced into the ruble, as the indicator increases following critical incidents. These include the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 over eastern Ukraine in 2014; the warnings that Russia aimed to stage a “spring offensive” in Ukraine in 2015; Russian military intervention in the Syrian Civil War later that year; and the poisoning of former intelligence agent Sergei Skripal in the U.K. in 2018 and subsequent tensions. Using similar methods, we created a proxy to capture geopolitical risk in Taiwan, based on USD/JPY and USD/KRW exchange rates and relative Taiwanese/American inflation (Chart 5). The indicator tracks well with previous cross-strait crises. It jumped upon Taiwan’s election of President Tsai Ing-wen and her pro-independence government in January 2016 – and this was well before any tensions actually flared. It even registered a small increase upon her controversial phone call congratulating Donald Trump upon winning the U.S. election. Chart 5...And USD/TWD Captures Geopolitical Risk In Taiwan ...And USD/TWD Captures Geopolitical Risk In Taiwan ...And USD/TWD Captures Geopolitical Risk In Taiwan This year we have expanded on this work, constructing a set of ten standardized GeoRisk Indicators for five developed economies and five emerging economies: U.K., France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Russia, Turkey, Brazil, Korea, and Taiwan. Indicators for the U.S., China, and others will be rolled out in a future report. These indicators attempt to capture risk premiums priced into the various currencies – except for Euro Area countries, where the risk is embedded in equity prices. In each case, we look at whether the relevant assets are decreasing in value at a faster rate than implied by key explanatory variables. The explanatory variables consist of (1) an asset that moves together with the dependent variable while not responding to domestic geopolitical risks, and (2) a variable to capture the state of the economy. This set of indicators differs from our earlier indicators in the following ways: We aim to create a simple methodology that we can apply consistently to all countries, both in the DM and EM universes. We therefore omitted using regression models that can prove to be quite whimsical. Instead, we simply looked at the deviation of the dependent variable from the explanatory variables, all in expanding standardized terms, to create the GeoRisk proxy. We wanted an indicator that would immediately respond to priced-in risks, so we opted for a daily frequency rather than the weekly frequency we used in our initial work. To get as accurate of a signal as possible, we use point-in-time data. Since economic data tends to be released with a one-to-two-month lag, we lagged the economic independent variable to correspond to its release date. All ten indicators are shown in the Appendix. Across all countries, they track well with both short-term events and long-term trends in geopolitical risk. In the case of France, for example, the indicator steadily climbs during the period of domestic tensions and protests in the early 2000s; as the European debt crisis flares up; again during the rise of the anti-establishment Front National and the Russian military intervention in Ukraine; and finally during the U.S. trade tariffs and Yellow Vest protests (Chart 6). Our GeoRisk indicators isolate risks that either originate internally or otherwise affect the country more so than others. Similarly, in Germany, there is a general increase in perceived risk as Chancellor Gerhard Schröder implements structural reforms in the early 2000s; another increase leading up to the leadership change as Angela Merkel is elected Chancellor; another during the global and European financial crises; another during the Ukraine invasion and refugee influx; and finally another with the U.S.-China trade war (Chart 7). Chart 6Our French Indicator Picks Up Domestic And European Unrest Our French Indicator Picks Up Domestic And European Unrest Our French Indicator Picks Up Domestic And European Unrest Chart 7Greater German Risk Amid The Trade War Greater German Risk Amid The Trade War Greater German Risk Amid The Trade War   We have annotated each country’s GeoRisk indicator heavily in the appendix so that readers can see for themselves the correspondence with political events. The indicators are affected by international developments – like the Great Recession – but we have done our best to isolate risks that either originate internally or otherwise affect the country more than other countries. (As a consequence, the Great Recession is muted in some cases.) What are the indicators telling us now? Most obviously, they highlight the extreme risk we have witnessed in the U.K. over the now-delayed March 29 Brexit deadline. We would bet against this risk as the political reality has demonstrated that a “hard Brexit” is very low probability: the U.K. has the ability to back off unilaterally while the EU is willing to extend for the sake of regional stability. In this sense the pound is a tactical buy, which our foreign exchange strategist Chester Ntonifor has highlighted.6 Our U.K. risk indicator has been fairly well correlated with the GBP/USD since the global financial crisis and it suggests that the pound has more room to rally (Chart 8). Chart 8Betting Against A Hard Brexit, the GBP Is A Tactical Buy Betting Against A Hard Brexit, the GBP Is A Tactical Buy Betting Against A Hard Brexit, the GBP Is A Tactical Buy Meanwhile, Spanish risks are overstated while Italy’s are understated. As for the emerging world, Turkish risks should be expected to spike yet again, as divisions emerge within the ruling coalition in the wake of critical losses in local elections and a failure to reassure investors over monetary policy and the currency. Brazilian risks will probably not match the crisis points of the impeachment and the 2018 election, at least not until controversial pension reforms reach a period of peak uncertainty over legislative passage. Both our new Russian indicator and its prototype are collapsing (see Chart 4 above). This captures the fact that we stand at a critical juncture in Russian affairs, where President Putin is attempting to shift focus to domestic stability even as the U.S. and the West maintain pressure on the economy to deter Russia from its aggressive foreign policy. Given that both Putin’s and the government’s approval ratings are low amid rising oil prices, the stage is set for Russia to take a provocative foreign policy action meant to distract the populace from its poor living conditions. Venezuela is the obvious candidate, but there are others. Moscow will want to test Ukraine’s newly elected, inexperienced president; it may also make a show of support for Iran. With Russia equities having rallied on a relative basis over the past year and a half, and with the Iranian waiver decision already boosting oil prices as we go to press, the window of opportunity to buy Russian stocks is starting to close. (We remain overweight relative to EM on a tactical horizon; our Emerging Markets Strategy is also overweight.) Going forward, we will update these risk indicators regularly as needed and publish the full appendix at the end of every month along with our long-running Geopolitical Calendar. We will also fine-tune the indicators as new information comes to light. In other words, here we present only the beta version. We hope that these indicators will help inform investors as to the direction, and even magnitude, of political risks as the market prices them. Our GeoRisk indicators are not predictive, as establishing a trend is not a prediction. The main purpose of this exercise is to answer the critical question, “What is already priced in?” How is the market currently calculating geopolitical risk for a country? After that, it is the geopolitical strategist’s job to unpack this question through qualitative, constraint-based analysis. It is when our qualitative assessments disagree with what is priced in that we can generate geopolitical alpha.    Ekaterina Shtrevensky, Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic Consulting Editor marko@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      See Sean Higgins, “Auto tariffs decision could be delayed, Kudlow says,” Washington Examiner, April 3, 2019, www.washingtonexaminer.com. 2      Norman C. Dalkey and Olaf Helmer-Hirschberg, “An Experimental Application of the Delphi Method to the Use of Experts,” Management Science, Vol. 9, Issue: 3 (April 1963) pp. 458- 467. 3      Darryl S. L. Jarvis, “Conceptualizing, Analyzing and Measuring Political Risk: The Evolution of Theory and Method,” Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy Research Paper No. LKYSPP08-004 (July 2008).  William D. Coplin and Michael K. O'Leary, "Political Forecast For International Business," Planning Review, Vol. 11 Issue: 3 (1983) pp.14-23. The PRS Group, “Political Risk Services”™ (PRS) or the “Coplin-O’Leary Country Risk Rating System”™ Methodology. Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430 (September 2010). 4      Scott R. Baker, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven J. Davis, “Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 131, Issue 4, November 2016 (July 2016) pp.1593–1636. Dario Caldara and Matteo Iacoviello, “Measuring Geopolitical Risk,” Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, Working Paper (January 2018). 5      Please see BCA Research Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “Five Myths On Geopolitical Forecasting,” dated July 9, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6      Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, “Not Out Of The Woods Yet,” April 5, 2019, available at www.bcaresearch.com.   Appendix Appendix France France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Appendix U.K. U.K.: GeoRisk Indicator U.K.: GeoRisk Indicator Appendix Germany Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Appendix Italy Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Appendix Spain Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Appendix Russia Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Appendix Korea Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Appendix Taiwan Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Appendix Turkey Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Appendix Brazil Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator What’s On The Geopolitical Radar? Chart 19      Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights OPEC 2.0 will meet in June to decide whether to continue its production cuts into 2H19. Once again, the leaders are sending conflicting signals – KSA is subtly indicating OPEC 2.0’s 1.2mm b/d of production cuts will need to be extended to year-end. Russia, not so much. Much will depend on whether the U.S. extends waivers on Iran oil-export sanctions when they expire May 2. Not surprisingly, Trump administration officials also are not providing much in the way of forward guidance to markets, other than to insist they want Iran’s exports at zero. Our modeling indicates OPEC 2.0 – the producer coalition led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – will need to raise production in 2H19, as markets tighten on the back of Venezuela’s collapse, continued unplanned outages (most recently in Libya) and still-strong demand. This aligns our view somewhat with that of Russia. That said, OPEC 2.0’s leaders – and member states – all benefit from higher prices, as we show below. Some, like Russia, more so than others – e.g., KSA, hard as that is to reconcile with their respective stances on production cuts. But none benefits if EM demand is crushed by high prices. It’s a delicate balancing act, given the aggregate GDP of EM commodity-importing countries exceeds that of commodity-exporting countries (Chart of the Week).1 Chart of the WeekEM Commodity Importers Dominate Aggregate EM Oil Demand EM Commodity Importers Dominate Aggregate EM Oil Demand EM Commodity Importers Dominate Aggregate EM Oil Demand We continue to expect Brent to trade at $75/bbl this year and $80/bbl next year, given our expectation for global supply and demand. KSA and Russia remain the fulcrum of the oil market, as we argued recently, and anticipating their decision-making process remains the critical task for understanding the new political economy of oil.2 Highlights Energy: Overweight. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo demanded opposing forces in Libya cease fighting this week. The country recently lifted oil production over 1mm b/d, but renewed fighting threatens this output. Base Metals: Neutral. China’s National Development & Reform Commission (NDRC) earlier this week tee’d up markets to expect higher infrastructure and transportation spending, which lifted steel and iron ore markets. Markets continue to tighten on the back of the Vale high-grade iron-ore supply losses, which could lift prices above $100/MT in the short term. Precious Metals: Neutral. Central banks continued buying gold in February, the World Gold Council reported this week. Central-bank holdings rose a net 51 tonnes in February bringing total additions to 90 tonnes in the first two months of the year. Agriculture: Underweight. The USDA lifted its estimate of global ending stocks for corn by 5.5mm tons for the 2018/19 crop year. With total use estimates unchanged at 1.13 billion tons, this raises ending stocks-to-use estimates, which will continue to exert downward pressure on prices. Feature KSA and Russia share a common feature in that both are petro states, and thus heavily dependent on crude and product exports to fund their governments and economies. Both suffered a near-death experience during the 2014-16 oil-market-share war launched by OPEC, and both have seen their GDPs slowly recover, following the successful production-cutting agreements they jointly engineered to drain excess inventories and restore balance to the market beginning in 2017 and renewed this year (Chart 2). Russia’s GDP gets more than twice the lift from higher Brent prices than KSA’s does. At first blush, it would be logical to assume KSA’s and Russia’s GDPs are driven by the same economic forces of oil supply and demand. In broad terms, they are. Both benefit from higher oil prices, given they are predominantly petro-economies, although Russia tends to benefit more as prices rise (Chart 3). In the post-GFC era, we find that a 1% increase in Brent prices lifts Russia’s GDP ~ 0.07%, while KSA’s goes up ~ 0.03%. Another way of saying this is Russia’s GDP gets more than twice the lift from higher Brent prices than KSA’s does. Chart 2KSA, Russia GDPs Recover, Following OPEC 2.0 Production Cuts KSA, Russia GDPs Recover, Following OPEC 2.0 Production Cuts KSA, Russia GDPs Recover, Following OPEC 2.0 Production Cuts Chart 3Russia Benefits More From Higher Brent Prices Russia Benefits More From Higher Brent Prices Russia Benefits More From Higher Brent Prices Looking a bit deeper into KSA’s and Russia’s GDPs’ sensitivities to Brent prices, we modeled income growth for both using our Brent forecast (Table 1), the futures markets’ forward curve and compare both to the World Bank’s expectation (Chart 4, bottom panel). KSA tends to benefit more from higher EM oil demand, with its GDP rising almost 1% for every 1% increase in EM oil demand. Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) Sussing Out OPEC 2.0's Production Cuts, U.S. Waivers On Iran Sanctions Sussing Out OPEC 2.0's Production Cuts, U.S. Waivers On Iran Sanctions Given our expectation for EM GDP growth (Chart of the Week), we expect KSA’s GDP to show relatively strong growth with GDP up ~ 5.4% this year and ~ 3.5% next year, propelled partly by higher oil prices (Chart 4, top panel). KSA tends to benefit more from higher EM oil demand, with its GDP rising almost 1% for every 1% increase in EM oil demand. Russia’s GDP goes up ~ 0.25% for every 1% increase in EM oil demand. We expect Russia’s GDP to dip then recover in 4Q19, then rise 3.5% by the end of 3Q20 before tapering off toward the end of 2020. This is not surprising given the trajectory for Brent prices in our forecasts and in the futures curves, and the sensitivity of Russia’s GDP to oil prices.We found a similar impact of EM oil demand on Russia and KSA GDPs when controlling for EM FX rates instead of Brent prices (Chart 5).3 Chart 4Higher Oil Prices Will Lift KSA's And Russia's GDPs Higher Oil Prices Will Lift KSA's And Russia's GDPs Higher Oil Prices Will Lift KSA's And Russia's GDPs Chart 5While KSA Benefits More From Higher EM Demand While KSA Benefits More From Higher EM Demand While KSA Benefits More From Higher EM Demand U.S. Waivers Dictate OPEC 2.0’s Decision On Production KSA has indicated it sees a need to extend OPEC 2.0’s production-cutting deal into 2H19, when the coalition’s ministers meet in June. Of late, Khalid al-Falih, KSA’s oil minister, is indicating no further cuts in the Kingdom’s output are needed, however. Russia’s a bit of a cipher. President Vladimir Putin this week stated Russia will continue to cooperate with KSA vis-à-vis managing production, although his energy minister, Alexander Novak, has indicated he sees no reason for extending OPEC 2.0’s production deal. Both sides are waiting on fundamental data, and the decision of the U.S. on its waivers on Iranian oil-export sanctions. There’s also the ever-likely collapse of Venezuela to consider, and renewed violence in Libya, both of which argue against letting the waivers expire. The Trump administration has no incentive to risk inducing an oil shock on the global economy. The countries granted waivers on U.S. sanctions against Iranian crude oil imports appear to be exercising their option to lift additional barrels, based on data showing loadings out of Iran increased for the fourth consecutive month (Chart 6 and Table 2).4 Loadings out of Iran rose to 1.30mm b/d in March, from 1.24mm b/d in February. Chart 6 Table 2Iran Exports By Country 2018-2019 (‘000 b/d) Sussing Out OPEC 2.0's Production Cuts, U.S. Waivers On Iran Sanctions Sussing Out OPEC 2.0's Production Cuts, U.S. Waivers On Iran Sanctions Bottom Line: We continue to expect U.S. waivers on Iranian oil sanctions will be extended to year end in some form. The collapse of Venezuela and renewed violence in Libya show how tenuously balanced oil markets are at present. Going into a general election in the U.S. next year, the Trump administration has no incentive to risk inducing an oil shock on the global economy. When they meet in June, ministers from OPEC 2.0 member states will be ideally set up to respond to the Trump administration’s decision on waivers for Iranian oil imports, which expire May 2. We are closing our June 2019 $70 vs. $75/bbl call spread, as the position is close to expiry.   Robert P. Ryan, Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      In the post-GFC world, we find total EM oil demand rises ~ 0.4% for each 1% rise in EM commodity-importers’ GDP, while it only rises ~ 0.3% for each 1% rise in EM commodity exporters’ GDP, based on our modeling. According to World Banks’ constant 2010 USD series, EM commodity importers’ GDP represented 66% of total EM GDP in 2018, up from 56% in 2010. The EM income elasticity of oil demand has remained at roughly ~ 0.60 from 2000 to now, meaning a 1% increase in EM GDP – hence EM income – lifts oil demand by ~ 0.6%. This has been remarkably stable pre-GFC, post-GFC and from 2000 to now. 2      The new political economy of oil is a continuing theme in our research. For an extended discussion of this theme, please see “The New Political Economy of Oil,” and “OPEC 2.0: Oil’ Price Fulcrum,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy on February 21 and March 21, 2019. Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3      When using EM FX rates instead of Brent prices as an explanatory variable, we find KSA’s GDP still increases a little more than 1% for every 1% increase in EM oil demand, but Russia’s rises closer to 0.6%. NB: All GDP measures use historical World Bank data, and BCA Research estimates using the Bank’s projections in constant 2010 USD.  We proxy EM oil demand using non-OECD oil consumption.  KSA’s production is crude oil only, while Russia’s production is crude and liquids. 4      For a discussion of the waivers’ optionality, please see our BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report “OPEC 2.0: Oil’ Price Fulcrum,” published on March 21, 2019, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2019 Q1 Image Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table   Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Closed Trades Image

Political economy – i.e., the interplay between critical nation states’ policies and markets – often trumps straightforward supply-demand analysis in oil. This is because policy decisions affect production and consumption, along with global trade. These decisions, in turn, determine constraints states – central and tangential – confront in pursuit of their interests. Presently, U.S. policies toward Venezuela and Iran dominate oil supply considerations, while Sino – U.S. trade tensions and their effect on EM consumption dominate the demand side. In this month’s balances assessment, we revised some of our supply-side assumptions to include the high probability U.S. waivers on Iranian export sanctions will have to be extended until Venezuela stabilizes. OPEC 2.0 appears to be flexible -- positioning for either an extension of waivers, or sanctions. This keeps our baseline oil-supply assumptions fairly steady this year as the coalition adjusts to changes in Venezuela’s output. Adjustments could be volatile, however. On the demand side, we continue to expect growth of 1.49mm b/d this year and 1.57mm b/d in 2020. Steadier production and unchanged demand assumptions lower our price forecasts slightly to $75/bbl and $80/bbl this year and next for Brent, with WTI trading $7.0/bbl and $3.25/bbl below those levels, respectively (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekExpect OPEC 2.0 To Smooth Venezuelan Production Losses In 2019 Expect OPEC 2.0 To Smooth Venezuelan Production Losses In 2019 Expect OPEC 2.0 To Smooth Venezuelan Production Losses In 2019 Highlights Energy: Overweight. Nigeria’s elections, scheduled for this past weekend, were unexpectedly postponed until Saturday. Political leaders urged Nigerians to “refrain from civil disorder and remain peaceful, patriotic and united to ensure that no force or conspiracy derail our democratic development.”1 Nigeria produces ~ 1.7mm b/d of oil. Base Metals/Bulks: Neutral. Estimated LMEX, CME, SHFE and bonded Chinese warehouse copper inventories are down 29.8% y/y, which will continue to be supportive of prices. Precious Metals: Neutral. Palladium is trading ~ $111/oz over gold, as concerns over supply deficits persist. The last time this occurred was on November, 2002. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Chinese buyers are believed to have cancelled as much as 1.25mm bushels of soybean purchases last week, according to feedandgrain.com. Feature The analytical framework informing global political economy provides a useful augmentation to our standard supply-demand analysis, particularly now, when U.S. policy continues to play a pivotal role in the evolution of oil fundamentals. In particular, we believe the near-term evolution of oil prices hinges on how events in Venezuela play out, following the imposition of U.S. trade and financial sanctions directed against the state-owned PDVSA oil company and the Maduro regime. The evolution of the U.S.’s PDVSA sanctions will directly determine whether waivers on Iranian export sanctions granted by the Trump administration in November are extended when they expire in May.2 These tightly linked evolutions, in turn, will drive OPEC 2.0 production policy, and whether its production-cutting agreement is extended beyond its June 2019 termination. As we discussed recently, we see OPEC 2.0 building its flexibility to adjust quickly to either an extension of the waivers on Iranian sanctions, or to accommodate the termination of these sanctions at the end of May. Given the state of the market, which we discuss below, we believe waivers on Iranian export sanctions almost surely will be extended when they expire in May. Global Oil Markets Are Tightening Our supply assumptions are driven by our assessment that global spare capacity of just over 2.5mm b/d could accommodate the loss of Venezuelan oil exports with little difficulty (in a matter of months), aside from a further tightening at the margin in the heavy-sour crude oil market (Chart of the Week and Table 1). In fact, the loss of up to 1mm b/d or more of Iranian exports – versus the ~ 800k b/d we now expect if waivers are extended until December – could also be accommodated by OPEC 2.0’s spare capacity, given the rebuilding of this potential output on the back of OPEC production cuts, which have the effect of increasing spare capacity (Chart 2).3 Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply – Demand Balances (MMb/d) (Base Case Balances) The New Political Economy Of Oil The New Political Economy Of Oil Chart 2 However, should this combination of events be realized, an unplanned outage similar to the one that removed ~ 1mm b/d of Canadian production due to wildfires in the summer of 2016, with Venezuela production falling toward 650k b/d and Iranian exports even partially constrained, could move the oil market perilously close to the limits of global spare capacity, which now stands just over 2.5mm b/d, based on the EIA’s reckoning. This would increase the risk of dramatically higher prices, simply because the flex in the system would approach zero. Iranian Waivers Hinge On Venezuela The manner in which U.S. sanctions against PDVSA and the Maduro regime evolve – in particular, whether regime change is affected – will determine whether waivers on the oil-export sanctions the U.S. re-imposed on Iran last November are extended beyond their end-May terminal point. In turn, this will affect OPEC 2.0’s production policies, particularly after its production-cutting agreement expires in June. In our current model of OPEC 2.0 production, we now expect its 2019 production to continue to decline in 1H19, to drain the overhang resulting from the ramp-up member states undertook in preparation for U.S. sanctions against Iran. This policy was substantially reversed with the last-minute granting of waivers to eight importing countries by the Trump administration prior to sanctions kicking in in November. This led to a sharp sell-off in crude oil prices in 4Q18, as market participants re-calibrated the supply side of global balances. In 2H19, our base case assumes OPEC 2.0’s production rises by ~ 900mm b/d (December vs. July 2019 level), to smooth out the loss of Venezuelan output as it falls to 650k b/d by the end of this year from just under 1.1mm b/d now. The goal of this policy is to quickly drain global inventories to levels comfortably below the five-year average (in 1H19), and then to keep Brent prices in the $75/bbl to $80/bbl range over 2H19 – end-2020 (Chart 3). We expect core OPEC 2.0 countries, led by KSA, core GCC states and Russia production to rise by more than 500k b/d in 2H19 (vs. 1H19 levels), to maintain inventories at desired levels and prices in the $75/bbl to $80/bbl range. Chart 3Core OPEC And Non-OPEC Output Will Rise To Offset Venezuelan Losses Core OPEC And Non-OPEC Output Will Rise To Offset Venezuelan Losses Core OPEC And Non-OPEC Output Will Rise To Offset Venezuelan Losses To this end, we assume core OPEC 2.0’s production rises in 2020 to 33.52mm b/d from 32.98mm b/d in 2019, led by a ~ 200k b/d increase from KSA – which takes its output to ~ 10.4mm b/d from ~ 10.2mm b/d in 2019. We expect Russian production to rise to 11.7mm b/d from ~ 11.5mm b/d in 2019. Additional output hikes come from core OPEC and other non-OPEC producers (Chart 4, Table 1). Chart 4OPEC 2.0's Goal: Quickly Reduce Inventories In 1H19 OPEC 2.0's Goal: Quickly Reduce Inventories In 1H19 OPEC 2.0's Goal: Quickly Reduce Inventories In 1H19 We do not try to forecast how the sanctions against PDVSA and the Maduro government play out – i.e., whether the incumbent government survives, or whether a peaceful or violent regime change occurs. If Venezuela were to descend into civil war, or were to experience a violent revolution, the outcome would be unpredictable and the rebuilding of that economy – regardless of who emerges to take control of the state – would require years. Likewise, if President Maduro and the military leaders supporting him were to quietly decamp, it still would require years to rebuild that country’s oil industry and economy.4 We view the odds of a confrontation between the U.S. and Venezuela’s benefactors/creditors as extremely low. We believe the U.S. would revive the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and that Russia and China most likely would concede Venezuela is within the U.S.’s sphere of influence, as neither intend to project the force and maintain the supply lines such a confrontation would require.5 Because the resolution of the political uncertainty in Venezuela is unsure and the outcome unknowable – particularly when unplanned outages represent such a non-trivial risk to global supply at the margin – we strongly believe waivers granted on U.S. sanctions against Iranian oil exports will be extended at least by 90 to 180 days when they expire at the end of May. As we discuss above, global spare capacity is insufficient to cover the loss of Venezuelan and Iranian output, and still have the flexibility required to meet a large unplanned outage over the course of this year or next. For this reason, Iranian sanctions will not be immediately re-imposed following the termination of U.S. waivers on exports from that state; importers most likely will be increasing their liftings of Iranian crude, in line with the extension of the waivers we expect over the course of 2H19 (Chart 5). Chart 5 Oil Demand Continues To Hold Up We continue to expect global oil demand to grow by 1.49mm b/d this year and 1.57mm b/d in 2020, led as always by strong EM demand growth, with China and India at the forefront (Table 1). DM demand growth is expected to slow this year, but put in a respectable performance, as well. EM commodity demand growth generally has been trending down at a slow and constant pace since the beginning of 2018, as we discussed last week when we presented our new Global Industrial Activity (GIA) index. The index indicates demand is not as stellar as it was during the synchronized global upturn of 2017, but that it also is not as bad as sentiment and expectations would indicate.6 Pulling It All Together On balance, we expect the combination of stronger OPEC 2.0 output, plus an 800k b/d increase in U.S. shale-oil production, which lifts total U.S. crude-oil output from 12.42mm b/d to 13.49mm b/d next year, is enough to keep Brent prices close to $80/bbl next year, vs. the $75/bbl we expect this year (Chart 6). We revised our expectation for WTI slightly, and now expect it to trade ~ $7.0/bbl under Brent this year and at a $3.75/bbl discount next year. Chart 6Balanced Oil Market Expected This Year and Next ... Balanced Oil Market Expected This Year and Next ... Balanced Oil Market Expected This Year and Next ... The OPEC 2.0 production discipline and lower U.S. shale-oil output, coupled with strong – not stellar – demand growth combine to allow OECD commercial oil inventories (crude and products) to resume drawing and to fall comfortably below OPEC 2.0’s 2010 – 2014 five-year average target (Chart 7). This will be supportive of the Brent backwardation trade we recommended on January 3, 2019 which now is up 265.5%, as of Tuesday’s close. Chart 7... And Oil Inventories Resume Falling ... And Oil Inventories Resume Falling ... And Oil Inventories Resume Falling Bottom Line: We revised our supply estimates, and now expect OPEC 2.0 to cover lost Venezuelan output arising from the imposition of U.S. sanctions on PDVSA and the continued deterioration of that state’s oil industry. Because global spare capacity cannot handle the loss of Venezuelan and Iranian oil exports at the same time and still cover a large unplanned outage, we expect the waivers on U.S. sanctions of Iranian oil exports to be extended for up to 180 days following their termination at the end of May. We expect Brent crude oil prices to average $75/bbl this year and $80/bbl next year as oil markets balance. We expect WTI to trade ~ $7.0/bbl below Brent this year, and $3.25/bbl under in 2020.   Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see “Nigeria Election 2019: Appeal For Calm After Shock Delay,” published February 16, 2019, by bbc.com. 2 OPEC 2.0 is the name we coined for the producer coalition of OPEC states, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and non-OPEC states led by Russia, which recently agreed to cut production by ~ 1.2mm b/d to drain commercial oil inventories and re-balance markets globally. OPEC 2.0’s market monitoring committee meets in April to assess the production-cutting deal it reached in November, which is set to expire in June. The full coalition meets in May to set policy going forward. This is just ahead of the expiration of U.S. waivers on Iranian oil exports. For a discussion of OPEC 2.0’s production optionality, please see “OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone,” published by BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy January 24, 2019.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 We are watching the evolution of the partial closure of the offshore Safaniya field in KSA about two weeks ago closely. With 1mm b/d capacity, this is the world’s largest offshore producing field; no updates have been provided by KSA this week. 4 Please see “What Next For Venezuela,” by Anne Kreuger published by project-syndicate.org on February 15, 2019 for a discussion. 5 We note here that Gazprombank, the Russian bank, froze PDVSA’s accounts over the weekend to avoid running afoul of U.S. sanctions against the company. Please see “Russia’s Gazprombank decided to freeze PDVSA accounts – source,” published by reuters.com February 17, 2019. See also “What Comes Next For Venezuela’s Oil Industry,” published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies February 12, 2019, which details how U.S. sanctions amount to the equivalent of a full-on embargo by forcing payment for Venezuelan oil to be deposited in accounts that cannot be accessed by the government or PDVSA. 6 We discuss our global demand outlook in last week’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, in an article entitled “Oil, Copper Demand Worries Are Overdone.” It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 4Q18 Image Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2019 Summary of Trades Closed in Image

OPEC 2.0 is building physical optionality, to deal with different possible moves the U.S. can make on Iranian oil export sanctions and waivers. This comes despite an apparent break in the sense of urgency Saudi Arabia and Russia feel re production cuts. The coalition’s market monitoring committee meets in April, followed by a full gathering in May, when U.S. waivers expire. If the U.S. extends waivers, OPEC 2.0 can extend production cuts; if it doesn’t, it can add supply as needed.1 On the demand side, markets appear to be overly concerned about a sharper-than-expected slowdown in China, which, if borne out, would restrain EM growth. We believe these fears are overdone, and expect a slight improvement in EM demand generally this year and next. In our new balances estimates, we see the OECD commercial oil inventory overhang clearing in 1H19, on the back of resilient demand, OPEC 2.0 discipline, and a more moderate level of growth in U.S. shale oil output. This keeps Brent on track to average $80/bbl this year and $85/bbl next year, with WTI trading $74/bbl this year, and $82/bbl next year. Highlights Energy: Overweight. Mandatory cuts of 325k b/d, coupled with additional exports of ~ 190k b/d due to additional train and pipeline capacity out of Canada, will drain the 35mm barrels of excess crude oil inventories targeted by the Alberta government in December by 1H19. The WCS – WTI spread narrowed to -$10/bbl from -$50/bbl on these mandatory cuts. By 2H19, we expect Canadian production cuts to average 95k b/d. Base Metals: Neutral. Aluminum output in China surged 11.3% y/y in December, hitting 3.05mm MT, according to Metal Bulletin. Total output for 2018 was 35.8mm MT, a 7.4% y/y increase. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold is holding its recent gains, as markets become more comfortable with the Fed pausing on its rates-normalization policy until 2H19. Agriculture: Underweight. Hot and dry weather in Brazil is threatening crop yields there. The unfavorable weather is expected to affect three-quarters of cotton-growing regions, half of sugar areas, a third of first-crop corn acreage, and a quarter of soy regions. Feature The first signs of fraying in the relationship between the putative leaders of OPEC 2.0 – the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), which cut production ~ 450k b/d m/m in December, and Russia, which raised output – are emerging, as world leaders meet in Davos. While this casts doubt on the leadership’s carefully cultivated amity, and their shared willingness to abide by the recently agreed output cuts, we do not believe it signals the end of the historic cooperation between these states. Total OPEC output – estimated by production-tracking sources outside the Cartel – stood at 31.6mm b/d in December, a prodigious 751k b/d reduction m/m. We expect continued oil production cuts from core OPEC states and decline-curve losses among non-Gulf OPEC and non-OPEC states within the coalition this year to remove at least 1.2mm b/d from the market, per the quotas agreed by members in December (Chart of the Week, Table 1). On top of this, mandatory Canadian production cuts of 325k b/d in 1H19 and 95k b/d in 2H19 will keep average production cuts at ~ 1.4mm b/d this year. Chart of the WeekOPEC 2.0 Will Resume Production Cuts OPEC 2.0 Will Resume Production Cuts OPEC 2.0 Will Resume Production Cuts Table 1OPEC 2.0 Production Cuts Could Exceed Quotas OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone OPEC 2.0’s cuts could persist into 2020, depending on how the U.S. deals with Iranian oil-export sanctions and waivers. Even though KSA and Russia apparently do not share the same sense of urgency re production cuts right now, we believe OPEC 2.0 is committed to draining oil inventories, particularly in the OECD.2 To do so, they’re increasing their operational flexibility – creating physical options, in a manner of speaking – to deal with a range of uncertain outcomes when U.S. waivers on Iranian export sanctions expire in May. Sanctions And OPEC 2.0’s Physical Options Despite the waivers granted to its eight top consumers shortly after U.S. sanctions took effect in November, Iranian exports plunged below 0.5mm b/d in December. As of December, China had substituted almost all of its Iranian imports for alternative barrels.3 This coincided with a production surge by OPEC 2.0 at the behest of the U.S. leading up to the November sanctions deadline of November 4, 2018, which swelled OECD inventories and took them above their rolling 5-year average level (Chart 2). India retained 30% of its May import levels from Iran, while Europe complied at 100% with U.S. sanctions (Table 2). Chart 3 shows the decrease in exports in preparation for the sanctions over the course of 2018. Chart 2OECD Inventory Overhang Will Draw As OPEC 2.0 Cuts and Losses Kick In OECD Inventory Overhang Will Draw As OPEC 2.0 Cuts and Losses Kick In OECD Inventory Overhang Will Draw As OPEC 2.0 Cuts and Losses Kick In Table 2Iran Exports By Destination 2018 (‘000 b/d) OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone Chart 3 Whether or not the waivers are extended is anyone’s guess. It is possible waivers will be extended for 90 or 180 days, as a way to counter OPEC 2.0 production cuts, and to offset the lag between filling new pipeline takeaway capacity in the Permian. We expect importers to queue up for Iranian barrels as the market tightens in 1H19. OPEC 2.0’s market monitoring committee will meet in April, followed by a ministerial meeting in May, just ahead of the expiration of the waivers.4 If the U.S. extends them, OPEC 2.0 can extend production cuts after it meets in May; if waivers are not extended, the Cartel can calibrate an appropriate supply response. Either way, we expect OPEC 2.0 will closely align its production schedule with any U.S. action on the sanctions and waivers. This will, we believe, keep change in the overall market’s supply side relatively constant, except for the month or two required to adjust OPEC 2.0 output. Permian Will Drive OPEC 2.0 Policy The larger issue for OPEC 2.0 comes in 4Q19, when ~ 2mm b/d of new pipeline takeaway capacity comes on line in the Permian Basin in West Texas. With additional takeaway capacity due to come on in 2020, the Cartel will have its work cut out for it next year.5 Our models show a slight decrease then flattening in U.S. rig counts over the coming months, as a result of the 4Q18 sell-off in WTI, with a rebound around mid-year (Chart 4). This is because rig count lags oil prices by ~4 months. Chart 4U.S. Shales Continue to Drive Lower 48 Production Growth (ex GOM) U.S. Shales Continue to Drive Lower 48 Production Growth (ex GOM) U.S. Shales Continue to Drive Lower 48 Production Growth (ex GOM) We are expecting production in the Big 5 shale basins to average 8.4mm b/d in 2019 and 9.0mm b/d next year, a somewhat higher level than projected by the EIA. Growth in the shales accounts for close to 80% of the 2.3mm b/d of growth in the U.S. over 2019 – 2020. Globally, U.S. shales will continue to provide the bulk of y/y crude oil production growth, accounting for 73% of the 2.5mm b/d of growth we will see over the next two years. Given the near-death experience OPEC 2.0 member states had in the price collapse of 2014 – 2016, we remain convinced OPEC 2.0 member states will once again have to embark on a strategy to backwardate the Brent forward curve as they did in 1H18, to moderate the growth of shale-oil production in the U.S. (Chart 5). Reducing production in the short term will force refiners to draw inventories to supply their units and produce products like gasoline, diesel, jet fuel and a wide range of petrochemicals. Chart 5OPEC 2.0 Needs Backwardated Brent Forwards OPEC 2.0 Needs Backwardated Brent Forwards OPEC 2.0 Needs Backwardated Brent Forwards This will backwardate the Brent forward curve – i.e., prompt-delivery barrels will be more expensive than deferred-delivery barrels. A backwardated forward curve means OPEC 2.0 member states with term contracts indexed to spot prices receive higher prices for their oil than shale producers hedging 2 years forward, all else equal. The trick for OPEC 2.0 will be to keep the Brent forwards backwardated when the Permian takeaway capacity starts to fill, and exports from the U.S. rise in the early 2020s, as deep-water harbors are brought on line. If OPEC 2.0 is successful in keeping the Brent forwards in backwardation, this will, over time, moderate the growth of shale production: Hedgers’ revenue is constrained by lower forward prices.6 We would not be surprised if OPEC 2.0 states started announcing final investment decisions on select investments in spare capacity to augment existing resources, so they are able to quickly bring production to market in the event of unplanned outages that could lift the entire forward curve and incentivize hedging at higher prices. Demand Still Looks Good Oil markets continue to fret over a possible hard landing in China – resulting either from an internal policy error or a ratcheting up of tensions in the Sino – U.S. trade war. This is causing markets to extrapolate into the wider EM space, and take oil-demand projections lower on an almost-daily basis. In a word, markets are overwrought. Chinese policymakers are sensitive to the tight financial conditions that prevailed in 2H18, which, along with the trade war with the U.S., slowed growth and fostered uncertainty among households and firms in China. We agree with our Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy groups that presidents Trump and Xi are pragmatists dealing with restive populations, and want to deliver a deal ahead of U.S. elections and the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 2021.7 We’ve been expecting the government to deploy a modest amount of stimulus in 1H19, which will begin having an effect on the Chinese economy in the second half of this year. Toward the end of the year and into 2020, we expect the larger stimulus to be deployed in the run-up to put a bid under industrial commodities – oil, base metals and bulks in particular. Overall, we are seeing signs global growth may be reviving over the next few months via an apparent bottoming in our Global LEI Diffusion index (Chart 6). The diffusion index measures the proportion of countries where Leading Economic Indicators (LEIs) are rising relative to those in which LEIs are falling. As is apparent in Chart 6, the diffusion index suggests the downturn in the global LEI has bottomed. The index leads the global LEI by a few months. Chart 6BCA's Global LEI Likely Bottoming BCA's Global LEI Likely Bottoming BCA's Global LEI Likely Bottoming In our latest supply-demand balances, we are expecting Chinese oil demand to average 14.3mm b/d this year, and 14.8mm b/d next year. Along with India – expected to consume 5.0mm b/d this year, and 5.2mm b/d next year – these two states account for 36% of the total 54.3mm b/d of EM demand we expect in 2019 and 2020 (Table 3).8 Table 3BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone Overall EM demand, the powerhouse of global oil-demand growth led by China and India, is expected to increase 1.1mm b/d this year – slightly more than we estimated last month – and 1.3mm b/d in 2020. DM demand growth, as always, comes in lower, at 390k b/d this year and 280k b/d next year. Oil Supply-Demand Balances Will Tighten We expect global oil production to average 100.9mm b/d this year and 102.9mm b/d in 2020. Consumption is expected to average 101.8mm b/d this year and 103.4mm b/d next year, respectively (Chart 7). This puts OECD inventories back on a downward trajectory, as storage draws resume (Chart 2). Chart 7Global Oil Balances Will Resume Tightening Global Oil Balances Will Resume Tightening Global Oil Balances Will Resume Tightening On the back of these estimates, we expect Brent to average $80/bbl this year and $85/bbl next year, with WTI averaging $74/bbl and $82/bbl, respectively. Given our expectation for higher prices in Brent and WTI, we continue to favor being long crude oil exposure. We are long outright WTI spot futures; long July 2019 Brent vs. short July 2020 Brent; long call spreads along the 2019 forward Brent curve, and long the S&P GSCI. Bottom Line: Markets will continue to tighten as a combination of lower supply growth and rising consumption allows OECD commercial oil inventories to resume their downward trajectory. The apparent lack of a shared sense of urgency by OPEC 2.0’s leaders – KSA and Russia – will be resolved, in our view. OPEC 2.0 will once again focus on backwardating the Brent forward curve, in order to gain some control over the rate at which U.S. shale oil production grows. We continue to favor long exposures to the crude oil futures.   Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Pavel Bilyk, Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy PavelB@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      In last week’s Commodity & Energy Strategy we noted these upcoming meetings, and OPEC 2.0’s resolve to drain the market.  Please see “Fed’s Capitulation Will Boost Oil,” published by BCA Research January 17, 2019.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2      Bloomberg reported this week KSA’s and Russia’s oil ministers cancelled a planned meeting in Davos, following al-Falih’s criticism of the pace at which Russian oil production is being cut.  Please see “Saudi, Russian Energy Ministers Cancel Planned Davos Meeting,” published by bloomberg.com January 22, 2019.  KSA cut its crude oil output 450k b/d m/m in December to 10.64mm b/d from 11.09mm b/d in November.  Russia increased crude and liquids production to a record 11.65mm b/d in December, an 80k b/d increase m/m, according to OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report published January 17, 2019.  OPEC expects Russian oil output to average 11.47mm b/d in 1H19, and 11.49mm b/d in 2019.  We are carrying something close to this in our balances (11.51mm b/d) for 2019 and 2020. 3      China imported 10.3mm b/d of crude oil in December after posting a record 10.4mm b/d of imports in November 2018, just as sanctions were kicking in. 4      In our base case estimate, we assume Iran’s crude oil output will average ~ 2.8mm b/d, down ~ 1.0mm b/d from its 3.8mm b/d production level in 1H18, which was prior to the U.S.’s announcement it intended to re-impose export sanctions.  One way or another, we expect OPEC 2.0 to adjust production to compensate for whatever production is lost due to sanctions.  5      Please see “Permian tracker: Production growth slowing as pipeline race still on,” published by S&P Global Platts July 2, 2018, for a discussion of the new takeaway capacity planned for the Permian Basin by midstream companies in 2019 and 2020. 6      The Permian basin is closely tied to hedging activity in the WTI futures market.  It is the only basin for which WTI commercial short open interest is an explanatory variable for rig counts in our modeling.  Commercial short open interest in the WTI futures also Granger causes Permian rig counts. 7      Please see the Special Report entitled “Is China Already Isolated,” published by BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy January 23, 2019.  It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com and cis.bcaresearch.com. 8      Our EM demand assumptions are driven by the IMF and World Bank EM GDP forecasts. This week the IMF lowered its global growth forecast for 2019 and 2020 by 0.2 and 0.1 percentage points to 3.5% and 3.6%, respectively. This is only slightly down from our lower estimate last month, but still above the World Bank’s expectation. We are using these variables directly in regressions to estimate prices and EM consumption. This replaced our earlier income-elasticity models used to calculate EM oil consumption.  We proxy EM demand with non-OECD oil consumption. We discuss this in “Fed’s Capitulation Will Boost Oil,” published by BCA Research January 17, 2019.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 4q18 Image Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Insert table images here Summary Of Trades Closed In 2018 Image

Highlights So What? Our “Black Swan” risks for the year reveal several potential wars. Why? While we think it is premature to expect armed conflict over Taiwan, an outbreak of serious tensions is possible. Russia and Ukraine may have a shared incentive to go renew hostilities this year. Saudi Arabia has received a “blank cheque” from Donald Trump, so it may continue to be provocative. Everyone has forgotten about the Balkans … but tensions are building. A “Lame Duck” Trump could stage a military intervention in Venezuela. Feature Over the past three years, we have compiled a list of five geopolitical “Black Swans.” These are low-probability events whose market impact would be significant enough to matter for global investors. Unlike the great Byron Wien’s list of “Ten Surprises for 2018,” we do not assign these events a “better than 50% likelihood of happening.”1 Instead, we believe that the market is seriously underpricing these risks by assigning them only single-digit probabilities when the reality is closer to 10%-15%, a level at which a risk premium ought to be assigned. Furthermore, some of our events below are obscure enough that it is unclear how exactly to price them. But before we get to our list of the five things that keep us up at night,2 a quick note on the question for financial markets in 2019: Will the economic policy divergence between the U.S. and China continue? At the moment, momentum is building behind the narrative that both the U.S. and China have decided to reflate. In anticipation of this narrative switch, we closed our long DM / short EM equity trade on December 3, 2018 for a 15.70% return (originally opened on March 6, 2018). How sustainable is the EM outperformance relative to DM? Will the rest of the world “catch up” to U.S. growth momentum, thus hurting the U.S. dollar in the process? The global central bank – the Fed – is already expected to “back off,” even though members of the FOMC have simply pointed out that they remain data-dependent. Granting our BCA House View that the U.S. economy remains in decent health, U.S. economic data will continue to come in strong through the course of the year. This means that there is scope for a hawkish Fed surprise for the markets, given that the interest rate market already has dovish expectations, anticipating 4.33 basis points and 16.74 basis points of cuts over the next 12 and 24 months respectively (Chart 1). Chart 1 Meanwhile, the global demand engine – China – may disappoint in its reflationary efforts. We refer to China as the “global demand engine” because the combined imports and capex of China and other emerging markets dwarf that of the U.S. and EU (Chart 2 and Chart 3).3 Chinese imports alone make up $1.6 trillion, constituting 23% of the $7 trillion total of EM imports and about half of EM investment expenditures. Given that large swaths of EM are high-beta to the Chinese economy, the EM-plus-China slice of the global demand pie is leveraged to Beijing’s reflationary policies. Chart 2EM/China Imports Are Much Larger Than U.S.'s And EU's Combined EM/China Imports Are Much Larger Than U.S.'s And EU's Combined EM/China Imports Are Much Larger Than U.S.'s And EU's Combined Chart 3EM/China Capex Is As Large As U.S.'s And EU's Combined EM/China Capex Is As Large As U.S.'s And EU's Combined EM/China Capex Is As Large As U.S.'s And EU's Combined Chinese policymakers have gestured toward greater support for the economy. The communiqué published following the Central Economic Work Conference (CEWC) in December called for a broad stabilization of aggregate demand as a focus of macro policy over the course of 2019. The language was still not very expansionary, but Beijing has launched stimulus despite relatively muted communiqués in the past. The massive stimulus of early 2016, for instance, followed a mixed CEWC communiqué in December 2015. So everything depends on the forthcoming data. Broad money and credit growth improved marginally in December, while the State Council announced that local government bond issuance could begin at the start of the year rather than waiting until spring. Meanwhile, a coordinated announcement by the People’s Bank of China, the Ministry of Finance, and the National Development and Reform Commission declares that a larger tax cut is forthcoming – that is, in addition to the roughly 1% of GDP household tax cuts that went into effect starting late last year. Monetary policy remains very lax with liquidity injections and additional RRR cuts. Before investors become overly bullish, however, we would note that Chinese policymakers are focusing their reflationary efforts on fiscal spending and supply-side reforms like tax cuts. The problem with the latter is that household tax cuts will not add much to global demand, given that consumer goods make up just 15% of China’s imports (Table 1). The vast majority of Chinese imports stem from the country’s capital spending. Table 1China’s Consumer-Oriented Stimulus Will Boost Different Imports Than Past Stimulus Five Black Swans In 2019 Five Black Swans In 2019 Fiscal spending, meanwhile, is as large as the overall credit origination in the Chinese economy (Chart 4). But without a revival in credit growth, more spending will mainly serve to stabilize the economy, not light it on fire. It is likely that part of the fiscal pump-priming will be greater issuance of local government bonds. However, even the recently announced 1.39 trillion RMB quota for new bonds this year is not impressive. And even a 2 trillion RMB increase would only be equivalent to a single month of large credit expansion (Chart 5). Chart 4China: Credit Origination Is As Large As Government Spending China: Credit Origination Is As Large As Government Spending China: Credit Origination Is As Large As Government Spending   Chart 5 As such, tactically nimble investors could profit from a reflationary narrative that sees both the global central bank – the Fed – and the global fiscal engine – China – turning more dovish and supportive of growth. However, we agree with BCA’s Emerging Markets Chief Strategist Arthur Budaghyan, who is on record saying that “Going Tactically Long EM Is Akin To Collecting Pennies In Front Of A Steamroller.” The bottom line for investors is that 2019 is the first year in a decade where the collective intention of policymakers – across the world – is to prepare for the next recession, rather than to prevent a deflationary relapse. This cognitive shift may be slight, but it is important. The Fed and Beijing are engaged in a macroeconomic game of chicken. Each camp is trying to avoid having to over-reflate at the end of the cycle. For the Fed, the goal is to have room to cut rates sufficiently when the recession finally hits. For China, the goal is to ensure that its leverage does not get out of hand. Into this uncertain macroeconomic context we now insert the five Black Swans for 2019. To qualify for our list, the events must be: Unlikely: There must be less than a 20% probability that the event will occur in the next 12 months; Out of sight: The scenario we present should not be receiving media coverage, at least not as a serious market risk; Geopolitical: We must be able to identify the risk scenario through the lens of BCA’s geopolitical methodology. Genuinely unpredictable events – such as meteor strikes, pandemics, crippling cyber-attacks, solar flares, alien invasions, and failures in the computer program running the simulation that we call the universe – do not make the cut. Black Swan 1: China Goes To War With Taiwan One could argue that a military conflict between China and Taiwan in 2019 should not technically qualify for our list, as there has been chatter in the media about such an outcome. Indeed, our recent travels across Asia revealed that clients are taking a much greater interest in our longstanding view – since January 2016 – that Taiwan is the premier geopolitical Black Swan. We established this view well before President Trump won the election and received a congratulatory call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, breaking diplomatic practice since 1979. Now, at the beginning of 2019, the exchange of barbs between the Chinese and Taiwanese presidents has raised tensions anew (Chart 6).4 Chart 6Taiwanese Geopolitical Risk Likely To Rise From Here Taiwanese Geopolitical Risk Likely To Rise From Here Taiwanese Geopolitical Risk Likely To Rise From Here Nonetheless, Taiwan makes the cut here because we doubt that most of our global clients take the issue seriously. Furthermore, we are concerned that – with fair odds of a U.S.-China trade truce lasting through 2019 – cross-strait tensions could fall out of sight. The basis of our view is that there is a unique confluence of political developments in Beijing, Washington, and Taipei that is conducive toward a diplomatic or military incident that could escalate tensions: Taiwan’s pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), in addition to taking the presidency in 2016, won control of the legislature for the first time ever (Chart 7). This means that domestic political constraints on President Tsai Ing-wen’s administration are lower than usual. Tsai has angered Beijing by seeking stronger relations with the U.S. and refusing to endorse the 1992 Consensus, which holds that there is only “One China” albeit two interpretations. China’s General Secretary Xi Jinping has removed term limits and placed greater emphasis on the reunification of Taiwan. Xi has consolidated power domestically and has pursued a more aggressive foreign policy throughout his term, including in the South China Sea, where greater naval control would enable China to threaten Taiwan’s supply security. Xi’s blueprint for his “New Era” includes the reunification of China, and some have argued that there is a fixed timetable for reunification with Taiwan by 2050 or even 2035.5 Some recent military drills can be seen as warnings to Taiwan. U.S. President Trump called the One China Policy into question at the outset of his term in office (only later reaffirming it), and has presided over an increase in U.S. strategic pressure against China, such as the trade war and freedom of navigation operations, including in the Taiwan Strait. Trump’s National Security Adviser John Bolton and Assistant Defense Secretary Randall Schriver are seen as Taiwan hawks, while the just-concluded Republican Congress passed the Taiwan Travel Act and the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), which imply an upgrade to the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s democracy and security.6 Chart 7 These three factors suggest that, cyclically, there is larger room than usual for incidents to occur that initiate a vicious cycle of tensions. The odds of a full-fledged war are still very low – the U.S. has reaffirmed the One China Policy in its recent negotiations with Beijing, which seem to be progressing, while China has not changed its official position on Taiwan. Beijing’s reunification timetable still has a comfortable 30 years to go. The Chinese economy has not collapsed, so there is no immediate need for Beijing to dive headlong into a nationalist foreign policy adventure that could bring on World War III. However, the odds of diplomatic incidents, or military saber rattling, that then trigger a dangerous escalation and a multi-month period of extremely elevated tensions are much higher than the market recognizes. This is because the U.S. and China may still see strategic tensions flare even if they make progress on a trade deal, while a failure on the trade front could spark a spillover into strategic areas. Any cross-strait incident would be relevant to global investors – and not just Taiwanese assets, which would suffer the brunt of economic sanctions – because the slightest increase in the odds of a full-scale war would be extremely negative for global risk appetite. Over the next 12 months, we would mostly expect Beijing to eschew high-profile provocations. The reason is that President Tsai is unpopular and the recent local elections in Taiwan saw her DPP lose seats to the more China-friendly Kuomintang (Chart 8). An aggressive posture could revive the DPP ahead of the January 2020 presidential election, the opposite of what Beijing wants.7 Chart 8 On the other hand, Beijing could decide to ignore the 1996 precedent and choose outright military intimidation. Or it could attempt to meddle in Taiwan’s domestic politics, as it has been accused of doing in the recent local elections.8 Meanwhile, the U.S. and Taiwan are the more likely instigators of an incident over these 12 months, knowingly or not. Washington and Taipei have a window of opportunity to achieve a few concrete objectives while Presidents Tsai and Trump are still in office – which cannot be guaranteed after 2020. A similar window of opportunity caused a market-relevant spike in China-South Korea tensions back in 2015-17, when the United States, seeing that the right-wing Park Geun-hye administration was falling out of power, attempted to rush through the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile system in South Korea. As a result, China imposed economic sanctions on its neighbor (Chart 9). Chart 9China Hits South Korea Over THAAD China Hits South Korea Over THAAD China Hits South Korea Over THAAD Something similar could transpire over the next year if the U.S. sends a high-level official – say, Bolton, or Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, or even Vice President Mike Pence – to hold talks in Taiwan. Or if the U.S. stages a major show of force in the Taiwan Strait, as it threatened in October, or U.S. naval vessels call on Taiwanese ports. The U.S. could also announce bigger or better arms packages (Chart 10), such as submarine systems, which have been cleared by the Department of State. Given the elevated U.S.-China and China-Taiwan tensions overall, such an incident could cause a bigger escalation than the different participants expect – and even more so than the market currently expects. Chart 10U.S. Arms Sales To Taiwan Could Provoke Beijing U.S. Arms Sales To Taiwan Could Provoke Beijing U.S. Arms Sales To Taiwan Could Provoke Beijing Bottom Line: Cyclically, the period between now and the inauguration of the next Taiwanese president in May 2020 brings heightened risk of a geopolitical incident. Depending on what happens in 2020, tensions could rise or fall for a time. Yet structurally, as Sino-American strategic distrust continues to build, Taiwan will continually find itself at the center of the storm. Black Swan 2: Russia And Ukraine Agree To Go To War Tensions are mounting between Russia and Ukraine in the run-up to the March 31 Ukrainian presidential election. Incumbent President, Petro Poroshenko, has been trailing in the polls for a year. His rival is the populist Yulia Tymoshenko, who has been leading both first-round and second-round polling. Both Poroshenko and Tymoshenko have, at various points in their careers, been accused of being pro-Russian. Poroshenko’s business interests, as with most successful Ukrainian businesspeople, include considerable holdings in Russia. Tymoshenko, on the other hand, was imprisoned from 2011 to 2014 for negotiating a gas imports contract with Russia that allegedly hurt Ukrainian interests. With the most pro-Russian parts of Ukraine either cleaved off (Crimea) or in a state of lawlessness (Donetsk and Luhansk), the median voter in the country has become considerably more nationalist and anti-Russian. It therefore serves no purpose for any politician to campaign on a platform of normalizing relations with Moscow. In this context, the decision by the Patriarchate of Constantinople – the first-among-equals of the Christian Orthodox churches – to grant autocephaly (sovereignty) to the Orthodox Church of Ukraine in January is part of the ongoing evolution of Ukraine into an independent entity from Russia. This process could create tensions, particularly as parts of the country continue to be engaged in military conflict (Map 1). From Moscow’s perspective, the autocephaly grants Ukraine religious – and therefore some semblance of cultural – independence from Russia. This solidifies the loss of a 43-million person crown jewel from the Russian sphere of influence. Chart Moscow is also not averse to stoking tensions. Although President Putin’s mandate will last until 2024, his popularity is nearly at the lowest level this decade. Orthodox monetary and fiscal policy, along with pension reforms, have sapped his political capital at home. In 2014, tensions over Ukraine spurred nationalist sentiment in Russia, rapidly increased popular support for both Putin and his government (Chart 11). Putin may calculate that another such recapitalization may be needed. Chart 11Non-Negligible Risk Of Russian Aggression Non-Negligible Risk Of Russian Aggression Non-Negligible Risk Of Russian Aggression The danger is therefore that domestic politics in both Ukraine and Russia may create a window of opportunity for a skirmish this quarter. Perhaps something akin to the naval tensions around the Kerch Strait that ultimately cost President Putin a summit with President Trump at the G20 meeting in December. While these incidents may benefit both sides domestically, and may even appear carefully orchestrated, they could also get out of hand in unpredictable ways. Bottom Line: While both Kiev and Russia may see a short-termed conflict as domestically beneficial, such an outcome could have unforeseen consequences. At the very least, it could sap already poor business confidence in neighboring Europe, as it did in 2014-2015. Black Swan 3: Saudi Arabia With A Blank Cheque One of the greatest geopolitical blunders of the twentieth century was Berlin’s decision to give its ally Austro-Hungary a “blank cheque.” Austro-Hungary was an anachronism at the turn of the century – a multiethnic empire held together by allegiance to a royal family. As such, the ideology of nationalism represented an existential threat, particularly given that 60% of the empire’s population was neither Austrian nor Hungarian. Following the assassination of its crown prince Archduke Franz Ferdinand by a pan-Slavist terrorist in Sarajevo, Vienna decided that a total destruction of Serbia was necessary for geopolitical and domestic political reasons. Today, Saudi Arabia is in many ways an anachronism itself. It is the world’s last feudal monarchy. Its leaders understand the risks and have begun an ambitious and multifaceted reform effort. Unlike Austro-Hungary, Saudi Arabia has learned to embrace nationalism. Riyadh is using the war in Yemen, as well as targeted actions against its own royal family and the religious establishment, to build a modern nation-state. The problem is that, much as nationalism was an ideological kryptonite for Vienna, democratic Islamism is an existential problem for Riyadh and its peers among the Gulf monarchies. Neighboring Qatar, a tiny peninsular kingdom enjoying an oversized geopolitical influence due to its natural gas wealth, has supported various groups across the Middle East that believe that democracy and conservative Islam are compatible. Turkey and Qatar have often cooperated in this effort, as the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Turkey has served as a model for many such Islamist parties in the region. Why Qatar hitched its geopolitical wagon to democratic Islamism is not clear. Perhaps its leaders felt that it was the only option unclaimed by an energy-rich sponsor. Regardless, Qatar’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood and other such groups has clearly irked Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies, enough for them to kick Qatar out of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). In 2017, with the pro-Saudi Trump administration ascendant in the White House, Riyadh felt emboldened enough to break off all diplomatic relations with Qatar and impose an economic blockade. Since 2014, another dynamic has emerged in the region that raises further concerns: a scramble for material resources brought on by the end of +$100 per barrel oil prices. Saudi public expenditures have been steadily rising since 2008, both due to population growth, social welfare spending in the wake of Arab Spring rebellions, and astronomical defense spending to counter the rising influence of Iran. And yet, 2014 saw oil prices plunge to decade lows in a matter of months. Saudi Arabia’s fiscal breakeven oil price has doubled, in a decade, from under $40 per barrel to $83 per barrel in 2018 (Chart 12). Meanwhile, Qatar’s GDP is a quarter of that of Saudi Arabia, even though its population is less than 2% of Saudi Arabia’s. Chart 12Saudi Arabia Has A Fiscal Problem Saudi Arabia Has A Fiscal Problem Saudi Arabia Has A Fiscal Problem Rumors that the U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis prevented a Saudi invasion of Qatar in 2018 have largely been dismissed by the mainstream media. But should they be? If allegedly “rogue elements” of the Saudi intelligence establishment can dismember a journalist in a consulate, why couldn’t “rogue elements” of its military stage a coup – or an outright invasion – in neighboring Qatar? Such an outcome would truly be extraordinary, but so was the annexation of Crimea in 2014. Meanwhile, President Trump offered an extraordinary level of support for Riyadh by issuing what we can only refer to as a “blank cheque” following Khashoggi’s murder. In the November 20 statement, President Trump essentially created a new policy doctrine of standing with Saudi Arabia “no matter what.”9 Two weeks later, Riyadh “thanked” the U.S. President by slashing the OPEC oil output by 1.2 million barrels per day. From this dynamic, it appears that Washington has made a similar strategic blunder in 2018 that Berlin did in 1914. A weakened, stressed, and threatened ally has been given a “blank cheque” by its stronger ally. Such a sweeping offer of support may lead to unintended consequences as the weaker ally feels that its material and geopolitical constraints can be overcome. In Saudi Arabia’s case, that could mean a more aggressive policy towards Qatar, or perhaps Iran. Particularly now that the White House has seen several realist members of the Trump cabinet – such as Mattis and former Secretary of State Rex Tillerson – replaced by Iran hawks and Trump loyalists. Bottom Line: A combination of less independent-minded cabinet members in the White House and a clear “blank cheque” from President Trump to Saudi Arabia could cause geopolitical risk to re-emerge in the Middle East. In the near term, this could increase the geopolitical risk premium on oil prices – as measured by the residual in Chart 13. Chart 13 Black Swan 4: The Balkans Become A Powder Keg … Again Bismarck famously said in 1888 – 26 years before the outbreak of the Great War, that “one day the great European War will come out of some damned foolish thing in the Balkans.” The Balkans are far less geopolitically relevant today than in the early twentieth century. They are also exhausted following a decade-long Yugoslav rigor mortis in the 1990s which yielded at least three regional wars and now six (or seven, depending who is counting) independent states. The problem is that tensions have not disappeared. Two frozen conflicts remain. First, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a sovereign country made up of two political entities, with the Serb-dominated Republika Srpska agitating for independence and aligning with Russia. Second, tensions between Serbia and Kosovo took a turn for the worse late last year as Kosovo imposed an economic embargo on trade with Serbia and called for the creation of a military. Has anything really changed over the course of the decade? We think there are three causes for alarm: Tensions between Russia and the West have become serious, with both camps looking to score tactical and strategic wins across the globe. With the Syrian Civil War all but over, a new battleground may emerge. While Republika Srpska is essentially an outright ally of Russia, Serbia continues to try to straddle the fine line between an EU enlargement candidate and geopolitical neutrality. However, this high-wire act is becoming untenable as… Enlargement fatigue sets in the EU. There is no doubt that the EU enlargement process froze Balkan conflicts. Countries like Serbia and Kosovo have an incentive to be on their best behavior so long as the prospect of eventual EU membership remains. But in the current environment of introspection, the EU may not have enough of a coherent geopolitical vision to deal with the Balkans without a crisis. The global economic cycle may be ending, leading to a global recession in the next 12-to-24 months. While our BCA House View remains that the next recession will be a mild one in the U.S., we think that EM and, by extension, frontier markets could be the eye of the storm in the next downturn. As investors abandon their “search for yield” in riskier geographies, they could exacerbate poor governance, political tensions, and geopolitical cleavages that have been frozen in place by the last economic cycle. Finally, U.S. policy towards the Balkans is unclear. In the past, the U.S. asked all countries in the region to accept the status quo and prepare for EU integration. But with the U.S. now adopting an antagonistic view towards the EU bloc, it is unclear what Washington’s message to the Balkans will be. After all, Trump has personally encouraged all other world leaders to don their own version of the “America First” slogan. The only problem in a place like the Balkans is that “Serbia first” – or Croatia and Kosovo first – is unlikely to go down smoothly in the neighborhood, given the last twenty – or even hundred – years. Bottom Line: The powder keg that is the Balkans has not been dried for decades. However, several tailwinds of stability are gone, replaced with macro headwinds. A renewed conflict on Europe’s doorstep could be the next great geopolitical crisis. If this were to occur, we would bank on greater European integration, especially in terms of military and foreign policy. However, it could also mark the first break in U.S.-EU foreign policy if the two decide to pick opposing sides in the region. Black Swan 5: Lame Duck Trump For our final Black Swan, we are sticking with one of our 2018 choices: a “Lame duck” presidency. “Lame duck” presidents – leaders whose popularity late in their terms have sunk so low that they can no longer affect policy – are said to be particularly adventurous in the foreign arena. While this adage has a spotty empirical record, there are several notable examples in recent memory.10 American presidents have few constitutional constraints when it comes to foreign policy. Therefore, when domestic constraints rise, U.S. presidents can seek relevance abroad. President Trump may become the earliest, and lamest, lame duck president in recent U.S. history. While his Republican support remains strong (Chart 14), his overall popularity is well below the average presidential approval rating at this point in the political cycle (Chart 15). Now there is also a Democrat-led House of Representatives to stymie his domestic policy and launch independent investigations into both his administration’s conduct and his personal finances and dealings. Chart 14 Chart 15 We would also add the Senate to the list of problems for President Trump. The electoral math was friendly towards the Republicans in 2018, with Democrats defending 10 Senate seats in states that President Trump won in 2016. In 2020, however, two-thirds of the races will be for Republican-held seats. As such, many Republican senators may begin campaigning early by moving away from President Trump. What kind of adventures would we expect to see President Trump embark on in 2019? Last year, we identified “China-U.S. trade war,” “Iran jingoism,” and “North Korea” as potentials. In many ways, 2018 was the year when all three mattered. Going forward, however, we think that trade war and the Middle East might take a backseat. First, the bear market in equities has raised the odds of a recession. As such, the potential cost of pursuing the trade war further has been increased. So has an aggressive policy towards Iran that dramatically boosts oil prices. Furthermore, President Trump has signaled that he is willing to withdraw from the Middle East, calling for a full withdrawal from Syria and telegraphing one from Afghanistan. Instead, we see President Trump potentially following in the footsteps of previous U.S. administrations and finding relevance in Latin America. A military intervention in Venezuela, to ostensibly support a coup against the current regime, would find little opposition domestically. First, there is no doubt that Venezuela has become a genuine humanitarian disaster. Second, its oil output is on a downward spiral already, with only 1 million b/d of production at risk due to a potential military conflict (Chart 16). Third, the new Bolsonaro administration in Brazil may even support an intervention, as well as neighboring Colombia. This is a change from the last twenty years, in which Latin American countries largely stuck together, despite ideological differences, in opposition to U.S. interference in the continent’s domestic affairs. Chart 16On A Downward Spiral On A Downward Spiral On A Downward Spiral Finally, even the anti-Trump U.S. foreign policy establishment may support an intervention. Not only is there the issue of human suffering, but Russia and China have used Venezuela as an anchor to build out influence in America’s sphere of influence. Furthermore, the potential promise of Venezuela’s eventual energy production is another reason to consider an American intervention (Chart 17). Chart 17 Bottom Line: American presidents rarely decide to go softly into that good night. It is very difficult to see President Trump become irrelevant. With tensions with China carrying a high economic cost and military interventions in the Middle East remaining politically toxic in the wake of Iraq and Afghanistan wars, perhaps President Trump will decide to go “retro,” in the sense of a throwback Latin America intervention.   Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see, Blackstone, “Byron Wien Announces Ten Surprises For 2018,” dated January 2, 2018, available at blackstone.com. 2 A shoutout to another doyen of the financial industry, Alastair Newton! 3 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, “Deciphering Global Trade Linkages,” dated September 27, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see “Highlights of Xi’s speech at Taiwan message anniversary event,” China Daily, January 2, 2019, available at www.chinadaily.com.cn; and “President Tsai Issues Statement On China’s President Xi’s ‘Message To Compatriots In Taiwan,’” Office of the President, Republic of China (Taiwan), January 2, 2019, available at english.president.gov.tw. 5 Please see Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” section 3.12, October 18, 2017, available at www.xinhuanet.com; and Deng Yuwen, “Is China Planning To Take Taiwan By Force In 2020?” South China Morning Post, July 20, 2018, available at beta.scmp.com. 6 Please see United States, H.R. 535, Taiwan Travel Act, 115th Congress (2017-18), available at www.congress.gov and S. 2736, Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018, 115th Congress (2017-18), available at www.congress.gov. 7 This is precisely what occurred when China chose missile tests in 1995-96 and drove voters toward the very candidate, Lee Teng-hui, that Beijing least desired. The popular Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je may run for president in 2020, and Beijing may see him as preferable to President Tsai. He has spoken of China and Taiwan as being part of the same family and he has held city-to-city talks between Shanghai and Taipei despite the shutdown in direct talks between Beijing and Taipei. 8 Please see Andrew Sharp, “Beijing likely meddled in Taiwan elections, US cybersecurity firm says,” Nikkei Asian Review, November 28, 2018, available at asia.nikkei.com. 9 Please see “Statement from President Donald J. Trump on Standing with Saudi Arabia,” The White House, dated November 20, 2018, available at whitehouse.org. 10 President Clinton launched the largest NATO military operation against Yugoslavia amidst impeachment proceedings against him, while President George H. W. Bush ordered U.S. troops to Somalia a month after losing the 1992 election. Ironically, President George H. W. Bush intervened in Somalia in order to lock in the supposedly isolationist Bill Clinton, who had defeated him three weeks earlier, into an internationalist foreign policy. President George W. Bush ordered the “surge” of troops into Iraq in 2007 after losing both houses of Congress in 2006; President Obama arranged the Iranian nuclear deal after losing the Senate (and hence Congress) to the Republicans in 2014.   Geopolitical Calendar

Mr. X and his daughter, Ms. X, are long-time BCA clients who visit our office toward the end of each year to discuss the economic and financial market outlook. This report is an edited transcript of our recent conversation. Mr. X: I have been eagerly looking forward to this meeting given the recent turbulence in financial markets. Our investments have done poorly in the past year and, with hindsight, I wish I had followed my instincts to significantly cut our equity exposure at the end of 2017, although we did follow your advice to move to a neutral stance in mid-2018. I remain greatly troubled by economic and political developments in many countries. I have long believed in open and free markets and healthy political discourse, and this all seems under challenge. As always, there is much to talk about. Ms. X: Let me add that I also am pleased to have this opportunity to talk through the key issues that will influence our investment strategy over the coming year. As I am sure you remember, I was more optimistic than my father about the outlook when we met a year ago but things have not worked out as well as I had hoped. In retrospect, I should have paid more attention to your view that markets and policy were on a collision course as that turned out to be a very accurate prediction. When I joined the family firm in early 2017, I persuaded my father that we should have a relatively high equity exposure and that was the correct stance. However, this success led us to maintain too much equity exposure in 2018, and my father has done well to resist the temptation to say “I told you so.” So, we are left with a debate similar to last year: Should we move now to an underweight in risk assets or hold off on the hope that prices will reach new highs in the coming year? I am still not convinced that we have seen the peak in risk asset prices as there is no recession on the horizon and equity valuations are much improved, following recent price declines. I will be very interested to hear your views. BCA: Our central theme for 2018 that markets and policy would collide did turn out to be appropriate and, importantly, the story has yet to fully play out. The monetary policy tightening cycle is still at a relatively early stage in the U.S. and has not even begun in many other regions. Yet, although it was a tough year for most equity markets, the conditions for a major bear market are not yet in place. One important change to our view, compared to a year ago, is that we have pushed back the timing of the next U.S. recession. This leaves a window for risk assets to show renewed strength. It remains to be seen whether prices will reach new peaks, but we believe it would be premature to shift to an underweight stance on equities. For the moment, we are sticking with our neutral weighting for risk assets, but may well recommend boosting exposure if prices suffer further near-term weakness. We will need more clarity about the timing of a recession before we consider aggressively cutting exposure. Mr. X: I can see we will have a lively discussion because I do not share your optimism. My list of concerns is long and I hope we have time to get through them all. But first, let’s briefly review your predictions from last year. BCA: That is always interesting to do, although sometimes rather humbling. A year ago, our key conclusions were that: The environment of easy money, low inflation and healthy profit growth that has been so bullish for risk assets will start to change during the coming year. Financial conditions, especially in the U.S., will gradually tighten as decent growth leads to building inflationary pressures, encouraging central banks to withdraw stimulus. With U.S. equities at an overvalued extreme and investor sentiment overly optimistic, this will set the scene for an eventual collision between policy and the markets.  The conditions underpinning the bull market will erode only slowly which means that risk asset prices should continue to rise for at least the next six months. However, long-run investors should start shifting to a neutral exposure. Given our economic and policy views, there is a good chance that we will move to an underweight position in risk assets during the second half of 2018. The U.S. economy is already operating above potential and thus does not need any boost from easier fiscal policy. Any major tax cuts risk overheating the economy, encouraging the Federal Reserve to hike interest rates and boosting the probability of a recession in 2019. This is at odds with the popular view that tax cuts will be good for the equity market. A U.S. move to scrap NAFTA would add to downside risks. For the second year in a row, the IMF forecasts of economic growth for the coming year are likely to prove too pessimistic. The end of fiscal austerity has allowed the Euro Area economy to gather steam and this should be sustained in 2018. However, the slow progress in negotiating a Brexit deal with the EU poses a threat to the U.K. economy. China’s economy is saddled with excessive debt and excess capacity in a number of areas. Any other economy would have collapsed by now, but the government has enough control over banking and other sectors to prevent a crisis. Growth should hold above 6% in the next year or two, although much will depend on how aggressively President Xi pursues painful reforms. The market is too optimistic in assuming that the Fed will not raise interest rates by as much as indicated in their “dots” projections. There is a good chance that the U.S. yield curve will become flat or inverted by late 2018. Bonds are not an attractive investment at current yields. Only Greece and Portugal have real 10-year government bond yields above their historical average. Corporate bonds should outperform governments, but a tightening in financial conditions will put these at risk in the second half of 2018. The Euro Area and Japanese equity markets should outperform the U.S. over the next year reflecting their better valuations and more favorable financial conditions. Developed markets should outperform the emerging market index. Historically, the U.S. equity market has led recessions by between 3 and 12 months. If, as we fear, a U.S. recession starts in the second half of 2019, then the stock market would be at risk from the middle of 2018. The improving trend in capital spending should favor industrial stocks. Our other two overweight sectors are energy and financials. The oil price will be well supported by strong demand and output restraint by OPEC and Russia. The Brent price should average $65 a barrel over the coming year, with risks to the upside. We expect base metals prices to trade broadly sideways but will remain highly dependent on developments in China. Modest positions in gold are warranted. Relative economic and policy trends will favor a firm dollar in 2018. Unlike at the start of 2017, investors are significantly short the dollar which is bullish from a contrary perspective. Sterling is quite cheap but Brexit poses downside risks. The key market-relevant geopolitical events to monitor will be fiscal policy and mid-term elections in the U.S., and reform policies in China. With the former, the Democrats have a good chance of winning back control of the House of Representatives, creating a scenario of complete policy gridlock. A balanced portfolio is likely to generate average returns of only 3.3% a year in nominal terms over the next decade. This compares to average returns of around 10% a year between 1982 and 2017. As already noted, the broad theme that policy tightening – especially in the U.S. – would become a problem for asset markets during the year was supported by events. However, the exact timing was hard to predict. The indexes for non-U.S. developed equity markets and emerging markets peaked in late-January 2018, and have since dropped by around 18% and 24%, respectively (Chart 1). On the other hand, the U.S. market, after an early 2018 sell-off, hit a new peak in September, before falling anew in the past couple of months. The MSCI All-Country World index currently is about 6% below end-2017 levels in local-currency terms. Chart 1Our 'Collision Course' Theme For 2018 Played Out Our 'Collision Course' Theme For 2018 Played Out Our 'Collision Course' Theme For 2018 Played Out We started the year recommending an overweight in developed equity markets but, as you noted, shifted that to a neutral position mid-year. A year ago, we thought we might move to an underweight stance in the second half of 2018 but decided against this because U.S. fiscal stimulus boosted corporate earnings and extended the economic cycle. Our call that emerging markets would underperform was on target. Although it was U.S. financial conditions that tightened the most, Wall Street was supported by the large cut in the corporate tax rate while the combination of higher bond yields and dollar strength was a major problem for many indebted emerging markets. Overall, it was not a good year for financial markets (Table 1). Table 1Market Performance OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence As far as the overall macro environment was concerned, we were correct in predicting that the IMF was too pessimistic on economic growth. A year ago, the IMF forecast that the advanced economies would expand by 2% in 2018 and that has since been revised up to 2.4% (Table 2). This offset a slight downgrading to the performance of emerging economies. The U.S., Europe and Japan all grew faster than previously expected. Not surprisingly, inflation also was higher than forecast, although in the G7, it has remained close to the 2% level targeted by most central banks. Table 2IMF Economic Forecasts OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Despite widespread fears to the contrary, the data have supported our view that Chinese growth would hold above a 6% pace in 2018. Nevertheless, a slowdown currently is underway and downside risks remain very much in place in terms of excessive credit and trade pressures. Another difficult year lies ahead for the Chinese authorities and we will no doubt return to this topic later. As far as our other key forecasts are concerned, we were correct in our views that oil prices and the U.S. dollar would rise and that the market would be forced to revise up its predictions of Fed rate hikes. Of course, oil has recently given back its earlier gains, but we assume that is a temporary setback. On the sector front, our macro views led us to favor industrials, financials and energy, but that did not work out well as concerns about trade took a toll on cyclical sectors. Overall, there were no major macro surprises in 2018, and it seems clear that we have yet to resolve the key questions and issues that we discussed a year ago. At that time, we were concerned about the development of late-cycle pressures that ultimately would undermine asset prices. That story has yet to fully play out. It is hard to put precise timing on when the U.S. economy will peak and, thus, when asset prices will be at maximum risk. Nevertheless, our base case is that there likely will be a renewed and probably final run-up in asset prices before the next recession. Late-Cycle Challenges Mr. X: This seems like déjà-vu all over again. Since we last met, the cycle is one year older and, as you just said, the underlying challenges facing economies and markets have not really changed. If anything, things are even worse: Global debt levels are higher, inflation pressures more evident, Fed policy is moving closer to restrictive territory and protectionist policies have ratcheted up. If it was right to be cautious six months ago, then surely we should be even more cautious now. Ms. X: Oh dear, it does seem like a repeat of last year’s discussion because, once again, I am more optimistic than my father. Obviously, there are structural problems in a number of countries and, at some point, the global economy will suffer another recession. But timing is everything, and I attach very low odds to a downturn in the coming year. Meanwhile, I see many pockets of value in the equity market. Rather than cut equity positions, I am inclined to look for buying opportunities. BCA: We sympathize with your different perspectives because the outlook is complex and we also have lively debates about the view. The global equity index currently is a little below where it was when we met last year, but there has been tremendous intra-period volatility. That pattern seems likely to be repeated in 2019. In other words, it will be important to be flexible about your investment strategy. You both make good points. It is true that there are several worrying problems regarding the economic outlook, including excessive debt, protectionism and building inflation risks. At the same time, the classic conditions for an equity bear market are not yet in place, and may not be for some time. This leaves us in the rather uncomfortable position of sitting on the fence with regard to risk asset exposure. We are very open to raising exposure should markets weaken further in the months ahead, but also are keeping careful watch for signs that the economic cycle is close to peaking. In other words, it would be a mistake to lock in a 12-month strategy right now. Mr. X: I would like to challenge the consensus view, shared by my daughter, that the next recession will not occur before 2020, and might even be much later. The main rationale seems to be that the policy environment remains accommodative and there are none of the usual imbalances that occur ahead of recessions. Of course, U.S. fiscal policy has given a big boost to growth in the past year, but I assume the effects will wear off sharply in 2019. More importantly, there is huge uncertainty about the level of interest rates that will trigger economic problems. It certainly has not taken much in the way of Fed rate hikes to rattle financial markets. Thus, monetary policy may become restrictive much sooner than generally believed. I also strongly dispute the idea that there are no major financial imbalances. If running U.S. federal deficits of $1 trillion in the midst of an economic boom is not an imbalance, then I don’t know what is! At the same time, the U.S. corporate sector has issued large amounts of low-quality debt, and high-risk products such as junk-bond collateralized debt obligations have made an unwelcome reappearance. It seems that the memories of 2007-09 have faded. It is totally normal for long periods of extremely easy money to be accompanied by growing leverage and increasingly speculative financial activities, and I don’t see why this period should be any different. And often, the objects of speculation are not discovered until financial conditions become restrictive. Finally, there are huge risks associated with rising protectionism, the Chinese economy appears to be struggling, Italy’s banks are a mess, and the Brexit fiasco poses a threat to the U.K. economy. Starting with the U.S., please go ahead and convince me why a recession is more than a year away. BCA: It is natural for you to worry that a recession is right around the corner. The current U.S. economic expansion will become the longest on record if it makes it to July 2019, at which point it will surpass the 1990s expansion. Economists have a long and sad history of failing to forecast recessions. Therefore, a great deal of humility is warranted when it comes to predicting the evolution of the business cycle. The Great Recession was one of the deepest downturns on record and the recovery has been fairly sluggish by historic standards. Thus, it has taken much longer than usual for the U.S. economy to return to full employment. Looking out, there are many possible risks that could trip up the U.S. economy but, for the moment, we see no signs of recession on the horizon (Chart 2). For example, the leading economic indicator is still in an uptrend, the yield curve has not inverted and our monetary indicators are not contracting. Our proprietary recession indicator also suggests that the risk is currently low, although recent stock market weakness implies some deterioration. Chart 2Few U.S Recession 'Red Flags' Few U.S Recession 'Red Flags' Few U.S Recession 'Red Flags' The buildup in corporate debt is a cause for concern and we are not buyers of corporate bonds at current yields. However, the impact of rising yields on the economy is likely to be manageable. The interest coverage ratio for the economy as a whole – defined as the profits corporations generate for every dollar of interest paid – is still above its historic average (Chart 3). Corporate bonds are also generally held by non-leveraged investors such as pension funds, insurance companies, and ETFs. The impact of defaults on the economy tends to be more severe when leveraged institutions are the ones that suffer the greatest losses. Chart 3Interest Costs Not Yet A Headwind Interest Costs Not Yet A Headwind Interest Costs Not Yet A Headwind We share your worries about the long-term fiscal outlook. However, large budget deficits do not currently imperil the economy. The U.S. private sector is running a financial surplus, meaning that it earns more than it spends (Chart 4). Not only does this make the economy more resilient, it also provides the government with additional savings with which to finance its budget deficit. If anything, the highly accommodative stance of fiscal policy has pushed up the neutral rate of interest, giving the Fed greater scope to raise rates before monetary policy enters restrictive territory. The impetus of fiscal policy on the economy will be smaller in 2019 than it was in 2018, but it will still be positive (Chart 5). Chart 4The U.S. Private Sector Is Helping To Finance The Fiscal Deficit The U.S. Private Sector Is Helping To Finance The Fiscal Deficit The U.S. Private Sector Is Helping To Finance The Fiscal Deficit Chart 5U.S. Fiscal Policy Still Stimulative In 2019 U.S. Fiscal Policy Still Stimulative In 2019 U.S. Fiscal Policy Still Stimulative In 2019 The risks to growth are more daunting outside the U.S. As you point out, Italy is struggling to contain borrowing costs, a dark cloud hangs over the Brexit negotiations, and China and most other emerging markets have seen growth slow meaningfully. The U.S., however, is a relatively closed economy – it is not as dependent on trade as most other countries. Its financial system is reasonably resilient thanks to the capital its banks have raised over the past decade. In addition, Dodd-Frank and other legislation have made it more difficult for financial institutions to engage in reckless risk-taking. Mr. X: I would never take a benign view of the ability and willingness of financial institutions to engage in reckless behavior, but maybe I am too cynical. Even if you are right that debt does not pose an immediate threat to the market, surely it will become a huge problem in the next downturn. If the U.S. federal deficit is $1 trillion when the economy is strong, it is bound to reach unimaginable levels in a recession. And, to make matters worse, the Federal Reserve may not have much scope to lower interest rates if they peak at a historically low level in the next year or so. What options will policymakers have to respond to the next cyclical downturn? Is there a limit to how much quantitative easing central banks can do? BCA: The Fed is aware of the challenges it faces if the next recession begins when interest rates are still quite low. Raising rates rapidly in order to have more “ammunition” for counteracting the downturn would hardly be the best course of action as this would only bring forward the onset of the recession. A better strategy is to let the economy overheat a bit so that inflation rises. This would allow the Fed to push real rates further into negative territory if the recession turns out to be severe. There is no real limit on how much quantitative easing the Fed can undertake. The FOMC will undoubtedly turn to asset purchases and forward guidance again during the next economic downturn. Now that the Fed has crossed the Rubicon into unorthodox monetary policy without generating high inflation, policymakers are likely to try even more exotic policies, such as price-level targeting. The private sector tends to try to save more during recessions. Thus, even though the fiscal deficit would widen during the next downturn, there should be plenty of buyers for government debt. However, once the next recovery begins, the Fed may feel increasing political pressure to keep rates low in order to allow the government to maintain its desired level of spending and taxes. The Fed guards its independence fiercely, but in a world of increasingly political populism, that independence may begin to erode. This will not happen quickly, but to the extent that it does occur, higher inflation is likely to be the outcome. Ms. X: I would like to explore the U.S.-China dynamic a bit more because I see that as one of the main challenges to my more optimistic view. I worry that President Trump will continue to take a hard line on China trade because it plays well with his base and has broad support in Congress. And I equally worry that President Xi will not want to be seen giving in to U.S. bullying. How do you see this playing out? BCA: Investors hoping that U.S. President Donald Trump and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping will reach a deal to end the trade war on the sidelines of the forthcoming G20 leaders' summit in Buenos Aires are likely to be disappointed. President Trump's fiscal policy is completely inconsistent with his trade agenda. Fiscal stimulus in a full-employment economy will suck in imports. It also forces the Fed to raise rates more aggressively than it otherwise would, leading to a stronger dollar. The result will be a larger U.S. trade deficit. Trump will not be able to blame Canada or Mexico for a deteriorating trade position because he just signed a trade agreement with them. The new USMCA agreement is remarkably similar to NAFTA, with the notable exception that it contains a clause barring Canada and Mexico from negotiating bilateral trade deals with China. This means Trump needs a patsy who will take the blame for America's burgeoning trade deficit and China will fill that role. For his part, President Xi knows full well that he will still be China’s leader when Trump is long gone. Giving in to Trump’s demands would hurt him politically. All this means that the trade war will persist. Mr. X: I see a trade war as a major threat to the economy, but it is not the only thing that could derail the economic expansion. Let’s explore that issue in more detail. The Economic Outlook Mr. X: You have shown in previous research that housing is often a very good leading indicator of the U.S. economy, largely because it is very sensitive to changes in the monetary environment. Are you not concerned about the marked deterioration in recent U.S. housing data? BCA: Recent trends in housing have indeed been disappointing, with residential investment acting as a drag on growth for three consecutive quarters. The weakness has been broad-based with sales, the rate of price appreciation of home prices, and builder confidence all declining (Chart 6). Even though the level of housing affordability is decent by historical standards, there has been a fall in the percentage of those who believe that it is a good time to buy a home. Chart 6Recent Softness In U.S. Housing Recent Softness In U.S. Housing Recent Softness In U.S. Housing There are a few possible explanations for the weakness. First, the 2007-09 housing implosion likely had a profound and lasting impact on the perceived attractiveness of home ownership. The homeownership rate for people under 45 has remained extremely low by historical standards. Secondly, increased oversight and tighter regulations have curbed mortgage supply. Finally, the interest rate sensitivity of the sector may have increased with the result that even modest increases in the mortgage rate have outsized effects. That, in turn, could be partly explained by recent tax changes that capped the deduction on state and local property taxes, while lowering the limit on the tax deductibility of mortgage interest. The trend in housing is definitely a concern, but the odds of a further major contraction seem low. Unlike in 2006, the home vacancy rate stands near record levels and the same is true for the inventory of homes. The pace of housebuilding is below the level implied by demographic trends and consumer fundamentals are reasonably healthy. The key to the U.S. economy lies with business investment and consumer spending and these areas are well supported for the moment. Consumers are benefiting from continued strong growth in employment and a long overdue pickup in wages. Meanwhile, the ratio of net worth-to-income has surpased the previous peak and the ratio of debt servicing-to-income is low (Chart 7). Last year, we expressed some concern that the depressed saving rate might dampen spending, but the rate has since been revised substantially higher. Based on its historical relationship with U.S. household net worth, there is room for the saving rate to fall, fueling more spending. Real consumer spending has grown by 3% over the past year and there is a good chance of maintaining that pace during most of 2019. Chart 7U.S. Consumer Fundamentals Are Healthy U.S. Consumer Fundamentals Are Healthy U.S. Consumer Fundamentals Are Healthy Turning to capital spending, the cut in corporate taxes was obviously good for cash flow, and surveys show a high level of business confidence. Moreover, many years of business caution toward spending has pushed up the average age of the nonresidential capital stock to the highest level since 1963 (Chart 8). Higher wages should also incentivize firms to invest in more machinery. Absent some new shock to confidence, business investment should stay firm during the next year. Chart 8An Aging Capital Stock An Aging Capital Stock An Aging Capital Stock Overall, we expect the pace of U.S. economic growth to slow from its recent strong level, but it should hold above trend, currently estimated to be around 2%. As discussed earlier, that means capacity pressures will intensify, causing inflation to move higher. Ms. X: I share the view that the U.S. economy will continue to grow at a healthy pace, but I am less sure about the rest of the world. BCA: You are right to be concerned. We expected U.S. and global growth to diverge in 2018, but not by as much as occurred. Several factors have weighed on CEO confidence outside of the U.S., including trade wars, a strong dollar, higher oil prices, emerging market turbulence, the return of Italian debt woes, and a slowdown in the Chinese economy. The stress has shown up in the global manufacturing PMI, although the latter is still at a reasonably high level (Chart 9). Global export growth is moderating and the weakness appears to be concentrated in capex. Capital goods imports for the major economies, business investment, and the production of investment-related goods have all decelerated this year. Chart 9Global Manufacturing Slowdown Global Manufacturing Slowdown Global Manufacturing Slowdown Our favorite global leading indicators are also flashing yellow (Chart 10). BCA’s global leading economic indicator has broken below the boom/bust line and its diffusion index suggests further downside. The global ZEW composite and the BCA boom/bust indicator are both holding below zero. Chart 10Global Growth Leading Indicators Global Growth Leading Indicators Global Growth Leading Indicators Current trends in the leading indicators shown in Chart 11 imply that the growth divergence between the U.S. and the rest of the world will remain a key theme well into 2019. Among the advanced economies, Europe and Japan are quite vulnerable to the global soft patch in trade and capital spending. Chart 11Global Economic Divergence Will Continue Global Economic Divergence Will Continue Global Economic Divergence Will Continue The loss of momentum in the Euro Area economy, while expected, has been quite pronounced. Part of this is due to the dissipation of the 2016/17 economic boost related to improved health in parts of the European banking system that sparked a temporary surge in credit growth. The tightening in Italian financial conditions following the government’s budget standoff with the EU has weighed on overall Euro Area growth. Softer Chinese demand for European exports, uncertainties related to U.S. trade policy and the torturous Brexit negotiations, have not helped the situation. Real GDP growth decelerated to close to a trend pace by the third quarter of 2018. The manufacturing PMI has fallen from a peak of 60.6 in December 2017 to 51.5, mirroring a 1% decline in the OECD’s leading economic indicator for the region. Not all the economic news has been bleak. Both consumer and industrial confidence remain at elevated levels according to the European Commission (EC) surveys, consistent with a resumption of above-trend growth. Even though exports have weakened substantially from the booming pace in 2017, the EC survey on firms’ export order books remains at robust levels (Chart 12). Importantly for the Euro Area, the bank credit impulse has moved higher.The German economy should also benefit from a rebound in vehicle production which plunged earlier this year following the introduction of new emission standards. Chart 12Europe: Slowing, But No Disaster Europe: Slowing, But No Disaster Europe: Slowing, But No Disaster We interpret the 2018 Euro Area slowdown as a reversion-to-the-mean rather than the start of an extended period of sub-trend growth. Real GDP growth should fluctuate slightly above trend pace through 2019. Given that the Euro Area’s output gap is almost closed, the ECB will not deviate from its plan to end its asset purchase program by year end. Gradual rate hikes should begin late in 2019, assuming that inflation is closer to target by then. In contrast, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) is unlikely to change policy anytime soon. The good news is that wages have finally begun to grow at about a 2% pace, although it required extreme labor shortages. Yet, core inflation is barely positive and long-term inflation expectations are a long way from the 2% target. The inflation situation will have to improve significantly before the BoJ can consider adjusting or removing the Yield Curve Control policy. This is especially the case since the economy has hit a bit of an air pocket and the government intends to raise the VAT in 2019. Japan’s industrial production has stalled and we expect the export picture to get worse before it gets better. We do not anticipate any significant economic slack to develop, but even a sustained growth slowdown could partially reverse the gains that have been made on the inflation front. Ms. X: We can’t talk about the global economy without discussing China. You have noted in the past how the authorities are walking a tightrope between trying to unwind the credit bubble and restructure the economy on the one hand, and prevent a destabilizing economic and financial crisis on the other. Thus far, they have not fallen off the tightrope, but there has been limited progress in resolving the country’s imbalances. And now the authorities appear to be stimulating growth again, risking an even bigger buildup of credit. Can it all hold together for another year? BCA: That’s a very good question. Thus far, there is not much evidence that stimulus efforts are working. Credit growth is still weak and leading economic indicators have not turned around (Chart 13). There is thus a case for more aggressive reflation, but the authorities also remain keen to wean the economy off its addiction to debt. Chart 13China: No Sign Of Reacceleration China: Credit Impulse Remains Weak China: Credit Impulse Remains Weak Waves of stimulus have caused total debt to soar from 140% of GDP in 2008 to about 260% of GDP at present (Chart 14). As is usually the case, rapid increases in leverage have been associated with a misallocation of capital. Since most of the new credit has been used to finance fixed-asset investment, the result has been overcapacity in a number of areas. For example, the fact that 15%-to-20% of apartments are sitting vacant is a reflection of overbuilding. Meanwhile, the rate of return on assets in the state-owned corporate sector has fallen below borrowing costs. Chart 14China: Debt Still Rising China: Debt Still Rising China: Debt Still Rising Chinese exports are holding up well so far, but this might only represent front-running ahead of the implementation of higher tariffs. Judging from the steep drop in the export component of both the official and private-sector Chinese manufacturing PMI, exports are likely to come under increasing pressure over the next few quarters as the headwinds from higher tariffs fully manifest themselves (Chart 15). Chart 15Chinese Exports About To Suffer Chinese Exports About To Suffer Chinese Exports About To Suffer The most likely outcome is that the authorities will adjust the policy dials just enough to stabilize growth sometime in the first half of 2019. The bottoming in China’s broad money impulse offers a ray of hope (Chart 16). Still, it is a tentative signal at best and it will take some time before this recent easing in monetary policy shows up in our credit impulse measure and, later, economic growth. A modest firming in Chinese growth in the second half of 2019 would provide a somewhat stronger demand backdrop for commodities and emerging economies that sell goods to China. Chart 16A Ray Of Hope From Broad Money bca.bca_mp_2018_12_01_c16 bca.bca_mp_2018_12_01_c16 Ms. X: If you are correct about a stabilization in the Chinese economy next year, this presumably would be good news for emerging economies, especially if the Fed goes on hold. EM assets have been terribly beaten down and I am looking for an opportunity to buy. BCA: Fed rate hikes might have been the catalyst for the past year’s pain in EM assets, but it is not the underlying problem. As we highlighted at last year’s meeting, the troubles for emerging markets run much deeper. Our long-held caution on emerging economies and markets is rooted in concern about deteriorating fundamentals. Excessive debt is a ticking time bomb for many of these countries; EM dollar-denominated debt is now as high as it was in the late 1990s as a share of both GDP and exports (Chart 17). Moreover, the declining long-term growth potential for emerging economies as a group makes it more difficult for them to service the debt. The structural downtrend in EM labor force and productivity growth underscores that trend GDP growth has collapsed over the past three decades (Chart 17, bottom panel). Chart 17EM Debt A Problem Given Slowing Supply-Side... EM Debt A Problem Given Slowing Supply-Side... EM Debt A Problem Given Slowing Supply-Side... Decelerating global growth has exposed these poor fundamentals. EM sovereign spreads have moved wider in conjunction with falling PMIs and slowing industrial production and export growth. And it certainly does not help that the Fed is tightening dollar-based liquidity conditions. EM equities usually fall when U.S. financial conditions tighten (Chart 18). Chart 18...And Tightening Financial Conditions ...And Tightening Financial Conditions ...And Tightening Financial Conditions Chart 19 highlights the most vulnerable economies in terms of foreign currency funding requirements, and foreign debt-servicing obligations relative to total exports. Turkey stands out as the most vulnerable, along with Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Chile, and Colombia. In contrast, Emerging Asia appears to be in better shape relative to the crisis period of the late 1990s. Chart 19Spot The Outliers OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence The backdrop for EM assets is likely to get worse in the near term, given our view that the Fed will continue to tighten and China will be cautious about stimulating more aggressively. Our base case outlook sees some relief in the second half of 2019, but it is more of a “muddle-through” scenario than a V-shaped economic recovery. Mr. X: Perhaps EM assets could enjoy a bounce next year if the Chinese economy stabilizes, but the poor macro fundamentals you mentioned suggest that it would be a trade rather than a buy-and-hold proposition. I am inclined to avoid the whole asset class in 2019. Bond Market Prospects Ms. X: Let’s turn to fixed income now. I was bearish on bonds in 2018, but yields have risen quite a bit, at least in the United States. The Fed has lifted the fed funds rate by 100 basis points over the past year and I don’t see a lot of upside for inflation. So perhaps yields have peaked and will move sideways in 2019, which would be good for stocks in my view. BCA: Higher yields have indeed improved bond value recently. Nonetheless, they are not cheap enough to buy at this point (Chart 20). The real 10-year Treasury yield, at close to 1%, is still depressed by pre-Lehman standards. Long-term real yields in Germany and Japan remain in negative territory at close to the lowest levels ever recorded. Chart 20Real Yields Still Very Depressed Real Yields Still Very Depressed Real Yields Still Very Depressed We called the bottom in global nominal bond yields in 2016. Our research at the time showed that the cyclical and structural factors that had depressed yields were at an inflection point, and were shifting in a less bond-bullish direction. Perhaps most important among the structural factors, population aging and a downward trend in underlying productivity growth resulted in lower equilibrium bond yields over the past couple of decades. Looking ahead, productivity growth could stage a mild rebound in line with the upturn in the growth rate of the capital stock (Chart 21). As for demographics, the age structure of the world population is transitioning from a period in which aging added to the global pool of savings to one in which aging is beginning to drain that pool as people retire and begin to consume their nest eggs (Chart 22). The household saving rates in the major advanced economies should trend lower in the coming years, placing upward pressure on equilibrium global bond yields. Chart 21Productivity Still Has Some Upside Productivity Still Has Some Upside Productivity Still Has Some Upside Chart 22Demographics Past The Inflection Point Demographics Past The Inflection Point Demographics Past The Inflection Point Cyclical factors are also turning against bonds. U.S. inflation has returned to target and the Fed is normalizing short-term interest rates. The market currently is priced for only one more rate hike after December 2018 in this cycle, but we see rates rising more than that. Treasury yields will follow as market expectations adjust. Long-term inflation expectations are still too low in the U.S. and most of the other major economies to be consistent with central banks’ meeting their inflation targets over the medium term. As actual inflation edges higher, long-term expectations built into bond yields will move up. The term premium portion of long-term bond yields is also too low. This is the premium that investors demand to hold longer-term bonds. Our estimates suggest that the term premium is still negative in the advanced economies outside of the U.S., which is not sustainable over the medium term (Chart 23). Chart 23Term Premia Are Too Low Term Premia Are Too Low Term Premia Are Too Low We expect term premia to rise for two main reasons. First, investors have viewed government bonds as a good hedge for their equity holdings because bond prices have tended to rise when stock prices fell. Investors have been willing to pay a premium to hold long-term bonds to benefit from this hedging effect. But the correlation is now beginning to change as inflation and inflation expectations gradually adjust higher and output gaps close. As the hedging benefit wanes, the term premium should rise back into positive territory. Second, central bank bond purchases and forward guidance have depressed yields as well as interest-rate volatility. The latter helped to depress term premia in the bond market. This effect, too, is beginning to unwind. The Fed is letting its balance sheet shrink by about $50 billion per month. The Bank of England has kept its holdings of gilts and corporate bonds constant for over a year, while the ECB is about to end asset purchases. The Bank of Japan continues to buy assets, but at a much reduced pace. All this means that the private sector is being forced to absorb a net increase in government bonds for the first time since 2014 (Chart 24). Chart 25 shows that bond yields in the major countries will continue to trend higher as the rapid expansion of central bank balance sheets becomes a thing of the past. Chart 24Private Sector To Absorb More Bonds OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Chart 25QE Unwind Will Weigh On Bond Prices QE Unwind Will Weigh On Bond Prices QE Unwind Will Weigh On Bond Prices Ms. X: I’m not a fan of bonds at these levels, but that sounds overly bearish to me, especially given the recent plunge in oil prices. BCA: Lower oil prices will indeed help to hold down core inflation to the extent that energy prices leak into non-energy prices in the near term. Nonetheless, in the U.S., this effect will be overwhelmed by an overheated economy. From a long-term perspective, we believe that investors still have an overly benign view of the outlook for yields. The market expects that the 10-year Treasury yield in ten years will only be slightly above today’s spot yield, which itself is still very depressed by historical standards (Chart 26). And that also is the case in the other major bond markets. Chart 26Forward Yields Are Too Low Forward Yields Are Too Low Forward Yields Are Too Low Of course, it will not be a straight line up for yields – there will be plenty of volatility. We expect the 10-year Treasury yield to peak sometime in 2019 or early 2020 in the 3.5%-to-4% range, before the next recession sends yields temporarily lower. Duration should be kept short at least until the middle of 2019, with an emphasis on TIPS relative to conventional Treasury bonds. We will likely downgrade TIPS versus conventionals once long-term inflation expectations move into our target range, which should occur sometime during 2019. The ECB and Japan will not be in a position to raise interest rates for some time, but the bear phase in U.S. Treasurys will drag up European and Japanese bond yields (at the very long end of the curve for the latter). Total returns are likely to be negative in all of the major bond markets in 2019. Real 10-year yields in all of the advanced economies are still well below their long-term average, except for Greece, Italy and Portugal (Chart 27). Chart 27Valuation Ranking Of Developed Bond Markets OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Within global bond portfolios, we recommend being underweight bond markets where central banks are in a position to raise short-term interest rates (the U.S. and Canada), and overweight those that are not (Japan and Australia). The first ECB rate hike is unlikely before the end of 2019. However, the imminent end of the asset purchase program argues for no more than a benchmark allocation to core European bond markets within global fixed-income portfolios, especially since real 10-year yields in parts of continental Europe are the furthest below their long-term average. We are overweight gilts at the moment, but foresee shifting to underweight in 2019, depending on how Brexit plays out. Ms. X: What about corporate bonds? I know that total returns for corporates will be poor if government bond yields are rising. But you recommended overweighting corporate bonds relative to Treasurys last year. Given your view that the next U.S. recession is more than a year away, it seems reasonable to assume they will outperform government bonds. BCA: We were overweight corporates in the first half of 2018, but took profits in June and shifted to neutral at the same time that we downgraded our equity allocation. Spreads had tightened to levels that did not compensate investors for the risks. Recent spread widening has returned some value to U.S. corporates. The 12-month breakeven spreads for A-rated and Baa-rated corporate bonds are almost back up to their 50th percentile relative to history (Chart 28). Still, these levels are not attractive enough to justify buying based on valuation alone. As for high-yield, any rise in the default rate would quickly overwhelm the yield pickup in this space. Chart 28Corporate Bond Yields Still Have Upside Corporate Bond Yields Still Have Upside Corporate Bond Yields Still Have Upside It is possible that some of the spread widening observed in October and November will reverse, but corporates offer a poor risk/reward tradeoff, even if the default rate stays low. Corporate profit growth is bound to decelerate in 2019. This would not be a disaster for equities, but slowing profit growth is more dangerous for corporate bond excess returns because the starting point for leverage is already elevated. As discussed above, at a macro level, the aggregate interest coverage ratio for the U.S. corporate sector is decent by historical standards. However, this includes mega-cap companies that have little debt and a lot of cash. Our bottom-up research suggests that interest coverage ratios for firms in the Bloomberg Barclays corporate bond index will likely drop close to multi-decade lows during the next recession, sparking a wave of downgrade activity and fallen angels. Seeing this coming, investors may require more yield padding to compensate for these risks as profit growth slows. Our next move will likely be to downgrade corporate bonds to underweight. We are watching the yield curve, bank lending standards, profit growth, and monetary indicators for signs to further trim exposure. You should already be moving up in quality within your corporate bond allocation. Mr. X: We have already shifted to underweight corporate bonds in our fixed income portfolio. Even considering the cheapening that has occurred over the past couple of months, spread levels still make no sense in terms of providing compensation for credit risk. Equity Market Outlook Ms. X: While we all seem to agree that corporate bonds are not very attractive, I believe that enough value has been restored to equities that we should upgrade our allocation, especially if the next recession is two years away. And I know that stocks sometimes have a powerful blow-off phase before the end of a bull market. Mr. X: This is where I vehemently disagree with my daughter. The recent sell-off resembles a bloodbath in parts of the global market. It has confirmed my worst fears, especially related to the high-flying tech stocks that I believe were in a bubble. Hopes for a blow-off phase are wishful thinking. I’m wondering if the sell-off represents the beginning of an extended bear market. BCA: Some value has indeed been restored. However, the U.S. market is far from cheap relative to corporate fundamentals. The trailing and 12-month forward price-earnings ratios (PER) of 20 and 16, respectively, are still far above their historical averages, especially if one leaves out the tech bubble period of the late 1990s. And the same is true for other metrics such as price-to-sales and price-to-book value (Chart 29). BCA’s composite valuation indicator, based on 8 different valuation measures, is only a little below the threshold of overvaluation at +1 standard deviation because low interest rates still favor equities on a relative yield basis. Chart 29U.S. Equities Are Not Cheap U.S. Equities Are Not Cheap U.S. Equities Are Not Cheap It is true that equities can reward investors handsomely in the final stage of a bull market. Chart 30 presents cumulative returns to the S&P 500 in the last nine bull markets. The returns are broken down by quintile. The greatest returns, unsurprisingly, generally occur in the first part of the bull market (quintile 1). But total returns in the last 20% of the bull phase (quintile 5) have been solid and have beaten the middle quartiles. Chart 30Late-Cycle Blow-Offs Can Be Rewarding OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Of course, the tricky part is determining where we are in the bull market. We have long viewed financial markets through the lens of money and credit. This includes a framework that involves the Fed policy cycle. The historical track record for risk assets is very clear; they tend to perform well when the fed funds rate is below neutral, whether rates are rising or falling. Risk assets tend to underperform cash when the fed funds rate is above neutral (Table 3). Table 3Stocks Do Well When The Fed Funds Rate Is Below Neutral OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence We believe the fed funds rate is still in easy territory. This suggests that it is too early to shift to underweight on risk assets. We may even want to upgrade to overweight if stocks become cheap enough, as long as Fed policy is not restrictive. That said, there is huge uncertainty about the exact level of rates that constitutes “neutral” (or R-star in the Fed’s lingo). Even the Fed is unsure. This means that we must watch for signs that the fed funds rate has crossed the line into restrictive territory as the FOMC tightens over the coming year. An inversion of the 3-month T-bill/10-year yield curve slope would be a powerful signal that policy has become tight, although the lead time of an inverted curve and declining risk asset prices has been quite variable historically. Finally, it is also important to watch U.S. profit margins. Some of our research over the past couple of years focused on the late-cycle dynamics of previous long expansions, such as the 1960s, 1980s and 1990s. We found that risk assets came under pressure once U.S. profit margins peaked. Returns were often negative from the peak in margins to the subsequent recession. Mr. X: U.S. profit margins must be close to peak levels. I’ve seen all sorts of anecdotal examples of rising cost pressures, not only in the labor market. BCA: We expected to see some margin pressure to appear by now. S&P 500 EPS growth will likely top out in the next couple of quarters, if only because the third quarter’s 26% year-over-year pace is simply not sustainable. But it is impressive that our margin proxies are not yet flagging an imminent margin squeeze, despite the pickup in wage growth (Chart 31). Chart 31U.S. Margin Indicators Still Upbeat U.S. Margin Indicators Still Upbeat U.S. Margin Indicators Still Upbeat Margins according to the National Accounts (NIPA) data peaked in 2014 and have since diverged sharply with S&P 500 operating margins. It is difficult to fully explain the divergence. The NIPA margin is considered to be a better measure of underlying U.S. corporate profitability because it includes all companies (not just 500), and it is less subject to accounting trickery. That said, even the NIPA measure of margins firmed a little in 2018, along with the proxies we follow that correlate with the S&P 500 measure. The bottom line is that the macro variables that feed into our top-down U.S. EPS model point to a continuing high level of margins and fairly robust top-line growth, at least for the near term. For 2019, we assumed slower GDP growth and incorporated some decline in margins into our projection just to err on the conservative side. Nonetheless, our EPS model still projects a respectable 8% growth rate at the end of 2019 (Chart 32). The dollar will only be a minor headwind to earnings growth unless it surges by another 10% or more. Chart 32EPS Growth Forecasts EPS Growth Forecasts EPS Growth Forecasts The risks to EPS growth probably are to the downside relative to our forecast, but the point is that U.S. earnings will likely remain supportive for the market unless economic growth is much weaker than we expect. None of this means that investors should be aggressively overweight stocks now. We trimmed our equity recommendation to benchmark in mid-2018 for several reasons. At the time, value was quite poor and bottom-up earnings expectations were too high, especially on a five-year horizon. Also, sentiment measures suggested that investors were overly complacent. As you know, we are always reluctant to chase markets into highly overvalued territory, especially when a lot of good news has been discounted. As we have noted, we are open to temporarily shifting back to overweight in equities and other risk assets. The extension of the economic expansion gives more time for earnings to grow. The risks facing the market have not eased much but, given our base-case macro view, we would be inclined to upgrade equities if there is another meaningful correction. Of course, our profit, monetary and economic indicators would have to remain supportive to justify an upgrade. Mr. X: But you are bearish on bonds. We saw in October that the equity market is vulnerable to higher yields. BCA: It certainly won’t be smooth sailing through 2019 as interest rates normalize. Until recently, higher bond yields reflected stronger growth without any associated fears that inflation was a growing problem. The ‘Fed Put’ was seen as a key backstop for the equity bull market. But now that the U.S. labor market is showing signs of overheating, the bond sell-off has become less benign for stocks because the Fed will be less inclined to ease up at the first sign of trouble in the equity market. How stocks react in 2019 to the upward trend in yields depends a lot on the evolution of actual inflation and long-term inflation expectations. If core PCE inflation hovers close to or just above 2% for a while, then the Fed Put should still be in place. However, it would get ugly for both bonds and stocks if inflation moves beyond 2.5%. Our base case is that this negative dynamic won’t occur until early 2020, but obviously the timing is uncertain. One key indicator to watch is long-term inflation expectations, such as the 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate (Chart 33). It is close to 2% at the moment. If it shifts up into the 2.3%-2.5% range, it would confirm that inflation expectations have returned to a level that is consistent with the Fed meeting its 2% inflation target on a sustained basis. This would be a signal to the Fed that it is must become more aggressive in calming growth, with obvious negative consequences for risk assets. Chart 33Watch For A Return To 2.3%-2.5% Range Watch For A Return To 2.3%-2.5% Range Watch For A Return To 2.3%-2.5% Range Mr. X: I am skeptical that the U.S. corporate sector can pull off an 8% earnings gain in 2019. What about the other major markets? Won’t they get hit hard if global growth continues to slow as you suggest? BCA: Yes, that is correct. It is not surprising that EPS growth has already peaked in the Euro Area and Japan. The profit situation is going to deteriorate quickly in the coming quarters. Industrial production growth in both economies has already dropped close to zero, and we use this as a proxy for top-line growth in our EPS models. Nominal GDP growth has decelerated sharply in both economies in absolute terms and relative to the aggregate wage bill. These trends suggest that profit margins are coming under significant downward pressure. Even when we build in a modest growth pickup and slight rebound in margins in 2019, EPS growth falls close to zero by year-end according to our models. Both the Euro Area and Japanese equity markets are cheap relative to the U.S., based on our composite valuation indicators (Chart 34). However, neither is above the threshold of undervaluation (+1 standard deviation) that would justify overweight positions on valuation alone. We think the U.S. market will outperform the other two at least in the first half of 2019 in local and, especially, common-currency terms. Chart 34Valuation Of Nonfinancial Equity Markets Relative To The U.S. OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Ms. X: It makes sense that U.S. profit growth will outperform the other major developed countries in 2019. I would like to circle back to emerging market assets. I understand that many emerging economies have deep structural problems. But you admitted that the Chinese authorities will eventually stimulate enough to stabilize growth, providing a bounce in EM growth and asset prices next year. These assets seem cheap enough to me to warrant buying now in anticipation of that rally. As we all know, reversals from oversold levels can happen in a blink of an eye and I don’t want to miss it. BCA: We are looking for an opportunity to buy as well, but are wary of getting in too early. First, valuation has improved but is not good enough on its own to justify buying now. EM stocks are only moderately undervalued based on our EM composite valuation indicator and the cyclically-adjusted P/E ratio (Chart 35). EM currencies are not particularly cheap either, outside of Argentina, Turkey and Mexico (Charts 36A and 36B). Valuation should only play a role in investment strategy when it is at an extreme, and this is not the case for most EM countries. Chart 35EM Stocks Are Not At Capitulation Levels... bca.bca_mp_2018_12_01_c35 bca.bca_mp_2018_12_01_c35   Chart 36A…And Neither Are EM Currencies ...And Neither Are EM Currencies ...And Neither Are EM Currencies Chart 36B…And Neither Are EM Currencies ...And Neither Are EM Currencies ...And Neither Are EM Currencies Second, corporate earnings growth has plenty of downside potential in the near term. Annual growth in EM nonfinancial EBITDA, currently near 10%, is likely to turn negative next year, based on our China credit and fiscal impulse indicator (Chart 37). And, as we emphasized earlier, China is not yet pressing hard on the gas pedal. Chart 37EM Earnings Growth: Lots Of Downside EM Earnings Growth: Lots Of Downside EM Earnings Growth: Lots Of Downside Third, it will take time for more aggressive Chinese policy stimulus, if it does occur, to show up in EM stocks and commodity prices. Trend changes in money growth and our credit and fiscal impulse preceded the trough in EM stocks and commodity prices in 2015, and again at the top in stocks and commodities in 2017 (Chart 38). However, even if these two indicators bottom today, it could take several months before the sell-off in EM financial markets and commodity prices abates. Chart 38Chinese Money And Credit Leads EM And Commodities Chinese Money And Credit Leads EM And Commodities Chinese Money And Credit Leads EM And Commodities Finally, if Chinese stimulus comes largely via easier monetary policy rather than fiscal stimulus, then the outcome will be a weaker RMB. We expect the RMB to drift lower in any event, because rate differentials vis-à-vis the U.S. will move against the Chinese currency next year. A weaker RMB would add to the near-term headwinds facing EM assets. The bottom line is that the downside risks remain high enough that you should resist the temptation to bottom-fish until there are concrete signs that the Chinese authorities are getting serious about boosting the economy. We are also watching for signs outside of China that the global growth slowdown is ending. This includes our global leading economic indicator and data that are highly sensitive to global growth, such as German manufacturing foreign orders. Mr. X: Emerging market assets would have to become a lot cheaper for me to consider buying. Debt levels are just too high to be sustained, and stronger Chinese growth would only provide a short-term boost. I’m not sure I would even want to buy developed market risk assets based solely on some Chinese policy stimulus. BCA: Yes, we agree with your assessment that buying EM in 2019 would be a trade rather than a buy-and-hold strategy. Still, the combination of continued solid U.S. growth and a modest upturn in the Chinese economy would alleviate a lot of investors’ global growth concerns. The result could be a meaningful rally in pro-cyclical assets that you should not miss. We are defensively positioned at the moment, but we could see becoming more aggressive in 2019 on signs that China is stimulating more firmly and/or our global leading indicators begin to show some signs of life. Besides upgrading our overall equity allocation back to overweight, we would dip our toes in the EM space again. At the same time, we will likely upgrade the more cyclical DM equity markets, such as the Euro Area and Japan, while downgrading the defensive U.S. equity market to underweight. We are currently defensively positioned in terms of equity sectors, but it would make sense to shift cyclicals to overweight at the same time. Exact timing is always difficult, but we expect to become more aggressive around the middle of 2019. We also think the time is approaching to favor long-suffering value stocks over growth stocks. The relative performance of growth-over-value according to standard measures has become a sector call over the past decade: tech or financials. The sector skew complicates this issue, especially since tech stocks have already cracked. But we have found that stocks that are cheap within equity sectors tend to outperform expensive (or growth) stocks once the fed funds rate moves into restrictive territory. This is likely to occur in the latter half of 2019. Value should then have its day in the sun. Currencies: Mr. X: We don’t usually hedge our international equity exposure, so the direction of the dollar matters a lot to us. As you predicted a year ago, the U.S. dollar reigned supreme in 2018. Your economic views suggest another good year in 2019, but won’t this become a problem for the economy? President Trump’s desire to lower the U.S. trade deficit suggests that the Administration would like the dollar to drop and we could get some anti-dollar rhetoric from the White House. Also, it seems that the consensus is strongly bullish on the dollar which is always a concern. BCA: The outlook for the dollar is much trickier than it was at the end of 2017. As you highlighted, traders are already very long the dollar, implying that the hurdle for the greenback to surprise positively is much higher now. However, a key driver for the dollar is the global growth backdrop. If the latter is poor in the first half of 2019 as we expect, it will keep a bid under the greenback. Interest rates should also remain supportive for the dollar. As we argued earlier, current market expectations – only one more Fed hike after the December meeting – are too sanguine. If the Fed increases rates by more than currently discounted, the dollar’s fair value will rise, especially if global growth continues to lag that of the U.S. Since the dollar’s 2018 rally was largely a correction of its previous undervaluation, the currency has upside potential in the first half of the year (Chart 39). Chart 39U.S. Dollar Not Yet Overvalued U.S. Dollar Not Yet Overvalued U.S. Dollar Not Yet Overvalued A stronger dollar will dampen foreign demand for U.S.-produced goods and will boost U.S. imports. However, do not forget that a rising dollar benefits U.S. consumers via its impact on import prices. Since the consumer sector represents 68% of GDP, and that 69% of household consumption is geared toward the (largely domestic) service sector, a strong dollar will not be as negative for aggregate demand and employment as many commentators fear, unless it were to surge by at least another 10%. In the end, the dollar will be more important for the distribution of U.S. growth than its overall level. Where the strong dollar is likely to cause tremors is in the political arena. You are correct to point out that there is a large inconsistency between the White House’s desires to shore up growth, while simultaneously curtailing the trade deficit, especially if the dollar appreciates further. As long as the Fed focuses on its dual mandate and tries to contain inflationary pressures, the executive branch of the U.S. government can do little to push the dollar down. Currency intervention cannot have a permanent effect unless it is accompanied by shifts in relative macro fundamentals. For example, foreign exchange intervention by the Japanese Ministry of Finance in the late 1990s merely had a temporary impact on the yen. The yen only weakened on a sustained basis once interest rate differentials moved against Japan. This problem underpins our view that the Sino-U.S. relationship is unlikely to improve meaningfully next year. China will remain an easy target to blame for the U.S.’s large trade deficit. What ultimately will signal a top in the dollar is better global growth, which is unlikely until the second half of 2019. At that point, expected returns outside the U.S. will improve, causing money to leave the U.S., pushing the dollar down. Mr. X: While 2017 was a stellar year for the euro, 2018 proved a much more challenging environment. Will 2019 be more like 2017 or 2018? BCA: We often think of the euro as the anti-dollar; buying EUR/USD is the simplest, most liquid vehicle for betting against the dollar, and vice versa. Our bullish dollar stance is therefore synonymous with a negative take on the euro. Also, the activity gap between the U.S. and the Euro Area continues to move in a euro-bearish fashion (Chart 40). Finally, since the Great Financial Crisis, EUR/USD has lagged the differential between European and U.S. core inflation by roughly six months. Today, this inflation spread still points toward a weaker euro. Chart 40Relative LEI's Moving Against Euro Relative LEI's Moving Against Euro Relative LEI's Moving Against Euro It is important to remember that when Chinese economic activity weakens, European growth deteriorates relative to the U.S. Thus, our view that global growth will continue to sputter in the first half of 2019 implies that the monetary policy divergence between the Fed and the ECB has not yet reached a climax. Consequently, we expect EUR/USD to trade below 1.1 in the first half of 2019. By that point, the common currency will be trading at a meaningful discount to its fair value, which will allow it to find a floor (Chart 41). Chart 41Euro Heading Below Fair Value Before Bottoming Euro Heading Below Fair Value Before Bottoming Euro Heading Below Fair Value Before Bottoming Mr. X: The Bank of Japan has debased the yen, with a balance sheet larger than Japan’s GDP. This cannot end well. I am very bearish on the currency. BCA: The BoJ’s monetary policy is definitely a challenge for the yen. The Japanese central bank rightfully understands that Japan’s inability to generate any meaningful inflation – despite an economy that is at full employment – is the consequence of a well-established deflationary mindset. The BoJ wants to shock inflation expectations upward by keeping real rates at very accommodative levels well after growth has picked up. This means that the BoJ will remain a laggard as global central banks move away from accommodative policies. The yen will continue to depreciate versus the dollar as U.S. yields rise on a cyclical horizon. That being said, the yen still has a place within investors’ portfolios. First, the yen is unlikely to collapse despite the BoJ’s heavy debt monetization. The JPY is one of the cheapest currencies in the world, with its real effective exchange rate hovering at a three-decade low (Chart 42). Additionally, Japan still sports a current account surplus of 3.7% of GDP, hardly the sign of an overstimulated and inflationary economy where demand is running amok. Instead, thanks to decades of current account surpluses, Japan has accumulated a positive net international investment position of 60% of GDP. This means that Japan runs a constant and large positive income balance, a feature historically associated with strong currencies. Chart 42The Yen Is Very Cheap The Yen Is Very Cheap The Yen Is Very Cheap Japan’s large net international investment position also contributes to the yen’s defensive behavior as Japanese investors pull money back to safety at home when global growth deteriorates. Hence, the yen could rebound, especially against the euro, the commodity currencies, and EM currencies if there is a further global growth scare in the near term. Owning some yen can therefore stabilize portfolio returns during tough times. As we discussed earlier, we would avoid the EM asset class, including currency exposure, until global growth firms. Commodities: Ms. X: Once again, you made a good call on the energy price outlook a year ago, with prices moving higher for most of the year. But the recent weakness in oil seemed to come out of nowhere, and I must admit to being confused about where we go next. What are your latest thoughts on oil prices for the coming year? BCA: The fundamentals lined up in a very straightforward way at the end of 2017. The coalition we have dubbed OPEC 2.0 – the OPEC and non-OPEC producer group led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – outlined a clear strategy to reduce the global oil inventory overhang. The producers that had the capacity to increase supply maintained strict production discipline which, to some analysts, was still surprising even after the cohesiveness shown by the group in 2017. Outside that core group output continued to fall, especially in Venezuela, which remains a high-risk producing province. The oil market was balanced and prices were slowly moving higher as we entered the second quarter of this year, when President Trump announced the U.S. would re-impose oil export sanctions against Iran beginning early November. The oft-repeated goal of the sanctions was to reduce Iranian exports to zero. To compensate for the lost Iranian exports, President Trump pressured OPEC, led by KSA, to significantly increase production, which they did. However, as we approached the November deadline, the Trump Administration granted the eight largest importers of Iranian oil 180-day waivers on the sanctions. This restored much of the oil that would have been lost. Suddenly, the market found itself oversupplied and prices fell. As we move toward the December 6 meeting of OPEC 2.0 in Vienna, we are expecting a production cut from the coalition of as much as 1.4mm b/d to offset these waivers. The coalition wishes to keep global oil inventories from once again over-filling and dragging prices even lower in 2019. On the demand side, consumption continues to hold up both in the developed and emerging world, although we have somewhat lowered our expectations for growth next year. We are mindful of persistent concerns over the strength of demand – particularly in EM – in 2019. Thus, on the supply side and the demand side, the level of uncertainty in the oil markets is higher than it was at the start of 2018. Nonetheless, our base-case outlook is on the optimistic side for oil prices in 2019, with Brent crude oil averaging around $82/bbl, and WTI trading $6/bbl below that level (Chart 43). Chart 43Oil Prices To Rebound In 2019 Oil Prices To Rebound In 2019 Oil Prices To Rebound In 2019 Ms. X: I am skeptical that oil prices will rebound as much as you expect. First, oil demand is likely to falter if your view that global growth will continue slowing into early 2019 proves correct. Second, U.S. shale production is rising briskly, with pipeline bottlenecks finally starting to ease. Third, President Trump seems to have gone from taking credit for high equity prices to taking credit for low oil prices. Trump has taken a lot flack for supporting Saudi Arabia following the killing of The Washington Post journalist in Turkey. Would the Saudis really be willing to lose Trump’s support by cutting production at this politically sensitive time? BCA: Faltering demand growth remains a concern. However, note that in our forecasts we do expect global oil consumption growth to slow down to 1.46mm b/d next year, somewhat lower than the 1.6mm b/d growth we expect this year.  In terms of the U.S. shale sector, production levels over the short term can be somewhat insensitive to changes in spot and forward prices, given the hedging activity of producers. Over the medium to longer term, however, lower spot and forward prices will disincentivize drilling by all but the most efficient producers with the best, lowest-cost acreage. If another price collapse were to occur – and were to persist, as the earlier price collapse did – we would expect a production loss of between 5% and 10% from the U.S. shales.  Regarding KSA, the Kingdom needs close to $83/bbl to balance its budget this year and next, according to the IMF’s most recent estimates. If prices remain lower for longer, KSA’s official reserves will continue to fall, as its sovereign wealth fund continues to be tapped to fill budget gaps. President Trump’s insistence on higher production from KSA and the rest of OPEC is a non-starter – it would doom those economies to recession, and stifle further investment going forward. The U.S. would also suffer down the road, as the lack of investment significantly tightens global supply. So, net, if production cuts are not forthcoming from OPEC at its Vienna meeting we – and the market – will be downgrading our oil forecast. Ms. X: Does your optimism regarding energy extend to other commodities? The combination of a strong dollar and a China slowdown did a lot of damage to industrial commodities in 2018. Given your view that China’s economy should stabilize in 2019, are we close to a bottom in base metals? BCA: It is too soon to begin building positions in base metals because the trade war is going to get worse before it gets better. Exposure to base metals should be near benchmark at best entering 2019, although we will be looking to upgrade along with other risk assets if Chinese policy stimulus ramps up. Over the medium term, the outlook for base metals hinges on how successfully China pulls off its pivot toward consumer- and services-led growth, away from heavy industrial-led development. China accounts for roughly half of global demand for these base metals. Commodity demand from businesses providing consumer goods and services is lower than that of heavy industrial export-oriented firms. But demand for commodities used in consumer products – e.g., copper, zinc and nickel, which go into stainless-steel consumer appliances such as washers and dryers – will remain steady, and could increase if the transition away from heavy industrial-led growth is successful. Gasoline and jet fuel demand will also benefit, as EM consumers’ demand for leisure activities such as tourism increases with rising incomes. China is also going to be a large producer and consumer of electric vehicles, as it attempts to reduce its dependence on imported oil. Although timing the production ramp-up is difficult, in the long term these trends will be supportive for nickel and copper. Mr. X: You know I can’t let you get away without asking about gold. The price of bullion is down about 5% since the end of 2017, but that is no worse than the global equity market and it did provide a hedge against economic, financial or political shocks. The world seems just as risky as it did a year ago, so I am inclined to hold on to our gold positions, currently close to 10% of our portfolio. That is above your recommended level, but keeping a solid position in gold is one area where my daughter and I have close agreement regarding investment strategy. BCA: Gold did perform well during the risk asset corrections we had in 2018, and during the political crises as well. The price is not too far away from where we recommended going long gold as a portfolio hedge at the end of 2017 ($1230.3/oz). We continue to expect gold to perform well as a hedge. When other risk assets are trading lower, gold holds value relative to equities and tends to outperform bonds (Chart 44). Likewise, when other risk assets are rising, gold participates, but does not do as well as equities. It is this convexity – outperforming on the downside but participating on the upside with other risk assets – that continues to support our belief that gold has a role as a portfolio hedge. However, having 10% of your portfolio in gold is more than we would recommend – we favor an allocation of around 5%. Chart 44Hold Some Gold As A Hedge OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Geopolitics Ms. X: I’m glad that the three of us agree at least on one thing – hold some gold! Let’s return to the geopolitical situation for a moment. Last year, you correctly forecast that divergent domestic policies in the U.S. and China – stimulus in the former and lack thereof in the latter – would be the most investment-relevant geopolitical issue. At the time, I found this an odd thing to highlight, given the risks of protectionism, populism, and North Korea. Do you still think that domestic policies will dominate in 2019? BCA: Yes, policy divergence between the U.S. and China will also dominate in 2019, especially if it continues to buoy the U.S. economy at the expense of the rest of the world. Of course, Beijing may decide to do more stimulus to offset its weakening economy and the impact of the trade tariffs. A headline rate cut, cuts to bank reserve requirements, and a boost to local government infrastructure spending are all in play. In the context of faltering housing and capex figures in the U.S., the narrative over the next quarter or two could be that the policy divergence is over, that Chinese policymakers have “blinked.” We are pushing back against this narrative on a structural basis. We have already broadly outlined our view that China will not be pressing hard to boost demand growth. Many of its recent policy efforts have focused on rebalancing the economy away from debt-driven investment (Chart 45). The problem for the rest of the world is that raw materials and capital goods comprise 85% of Chinese imports. As such, efforts to boost domestic consumption will have limited impact on the rest of the world, especially as emerging markets are highly leveraged to “old China.” Chart 45Rebalancing Of The Chinese Economy Rebalancing Of The Chinese Economy Rebalancing Of The Chinese Economy Meanwhile, the Trump-Democrat gridlock could yield surprising results in 2019. President Trump is becoming singularly focused on winning re-election in 2020. As such, he fears the “stimulus cliff” looming over the election year. Democrats, eager to show that they are not merely the party of “the Resistance,” have already signaled that an infrastructure deal is their top priority. With fiscal conservatives in the House all but neutered by the midterm elections, a coalition between Trump and likely House Speaker Nancy Pelosi could emerge by late 2019, ushering in even more fiscal stimulus. While the net new federal spending will not be as grandiose as the headline figures, it will be something. There will also be regular spending increases in the wake of this year’s bipartisan removal of spending caps. We place solid odds that the current policy divergence narrative continues well into 2019, with bullish consequences for the U.S. dollar and bearish outcomes for EM assets, at least in the first half of the year. Mr. X: Your geopolitical team has consistently been alarmist on the U.S.-China trade war, a view that bore out throughout 2018. You already stated that you think trade tensions will persist in 2019. Where is this heading? BCA: Nowhere good. Rising geopolitical tensions in the Sino-American relationship has been our premier geopolitical risk since 2012. The Trump administration has begun tying geopolitical and strategic matters in with the trade talks. No longer is the White House merely asking for a narrowing of the trade deficit, improved intellectual property protections, and the removal of non-tariff barriers to trade. Now, everything from surface-to-air missiles in the South China Sea to Beijing’s “Belt and Road” project are on the list of U.S. demands. Trade negotiations are a “two-level game,” whereby policymakers negotiate in parallel with their foreign counterparts and domestic constituents. While Chinese economic agents may accept U.S. economic demands, it is not clear to us that its military and intelligence apparatus will accept U.S. geopolitical demands. And Xi Jinping himself is highly attuned to China’s geopolitical position, calling for national rejuvenation above all. We would therefore downplay any optimistic news from the G20 summit between Presidents Trump and Xi. President Trump could freeze tariffs at current rates and allow for a more serious negotiating round throughout 2019. But unless China is willing to kowtow to America, a fundamental deal will remain elusive in the end. For Trump, a failure to agree is still a win domestically, as the median American voter is not asking for a resolution of the trade war with China (Chart 46). Chart 46Americans Favor Being Tough On China OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Ms. X: Could trade tensions spill into rising military friction? BCA: Absolutely. Minor military skirmishes will likely continue and could even escalate. We believe that there is a structural bull market in “war.” Investors should position themselves by being long global defense stocks. Mr. X: That is not encouraging. What about North Korea and Iran? Could they become geopolitical risks in 2019? BCA: Our answer to the North Korea question remains the same as 12 months ago: we have seen the peak in the U.S.’ display of a “credible military threat.” But Iran could re-emerge as a risk mid-year. We argued in last year’s discussion that President Trump was more interested in playing domestic politics than actually ratcheting up tensions with Iran. However, in early 2018 we raised our alarm level, particularly when staffing decisions in the White House involved several noted Iran hawks joining the foreign policy team. This was a mistake. Our initial call was correct, as President Trump ultimately offered six-month exemptions to eight importers of Iranian crude. That said, those exemptions will expire in the spring. The White House may, at that point, ratchet up tensions with Iran. This time, we will believe it when we see it. Intensifying tensions with Iran ahead of the U.S. summer vacation season, and at a time when crude oil markets are likely to be finely balanced, seems like folly, especially with primary elections a mere 6-to-8 months away. What does President Trump want more: to win re-election or to punish Iran? We think the answer is obvious, especially given that very few voters seem to view Iran as the country’s greatest threat (Chart 47). Chart 47Americans Don’t See Iran As A Major Threat OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Ms. X: Let’s turn to Europe. You have tended to dismiss Euroskeptics as a minor threat, which has largely been correct. But don’t you think that, with Brexit upon us and Chancellor Angela Merkel in the twilight, populism in continental Europe will finally have its day? BCA: Let’s first wait to see how Brexit turns out! The next few months will be critical. Uncertainty is high, with considerable risks remaining. We do not think that Prime Minister May has the votes in the House of Commons to push through any version of soft Brexit that she has envisioned thus far. If the vote on the U.K.-EU exit deal falls through, a new election could be possible. This will require an extension of the exit process under Article 50 and a prolonged period of uncertainty. The probability of a no-deal Brexit is lower than 10%. It is simply not in the interest of anyone involved, save for a smattering of the hardest of hard Brexit adherents in the U.K. Conservative Party. Put simply, if the EU-U.K. deal falls through in the House of Commons, or even if PM May is replaced by a hard-Brexit Tory, the most likely outcome is an extension of the negotiation process. This can be easily done and we suspect that all EU member states would be in favor of such an extension given the cost to business sentiment and trade that would result from a no-deal Brexit. It is not clear that Brexit has emboldened Euroskeptics. In fact, most populist parties in the EU have chosen to tone down their Euroskepticism and emphasize their anti-immigrant agenda since the Brexit referendum. In part, this decision has to do with how messy the Brexit process has become. If the U.K. is struggling to unravel the sinews that tie it to Europe, how is any other country going to fare any better? The problem for Euroskeptic populists is that establishment parties are wise to the preferences of the European median voter. For example, we now have Friedrich Merz, a German candidate for the head of the Christian Democratic Union – essentially Merkel’s successor – who is both an ardent Europhile and a hardliner on immigration. This is not revolutionary. Merz simply read the polls correctly and realized that, with 83% of Germans supporting the euro, the rise of the anti-establishment Alternative for Germany (AfD) is more about immigration than about the EU. As such, we continue to stress that populism in Europe is overstated. In fact, we expect that Germany and France will redouble their efforts to reform European institutions in 2019. The European parliamentary elections in May will elicit much handwringing by the media due to a likely solid showing by Euroskeptics, even though the election is meaningless. Afterwards, we expect to see significant efforts to complete the banking union, reform the European Stability Mechanism, and even introduce a nascent Euro Area budget. But these reforms will not be for everyone. Euroskeptics in Central and Eastern Europe will be left on the outside looking in. Brussels may also be emboldened to take a hard line on Italy if institutional reforms convince the markets that the core Euro Area is sheltered from contagion. In other words, the fruits of integration will be reserved for those who play by the Franco-German rules. And that could, ironically, set the stage for the unraveling of the European Union as we know it. Over the long haul, a much tighter, more integrated, core could emerge centered on the Euro Area, with the rest of the EU becoming stillborn. The year 2019 will be a vital one for Europe. We are sensing an urgency in Berlin and Paris that has not existed throughout the crisis, largely due to Merkel’s own failings as a leader. We remain optimistic that the Euro Area will survive. However, there will be fireworks. Finally, a word about Japan. The coming year will see the peak of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s career. He is promoting the first-ever revision to Japan’s post-war constitution in order to countenance the armed forces. If he succeeds, he will have a big national security success to couple with his largely effective “Abenomics” economic agenda – after that, it will all be downhill. If he fails, he will become a lame duck. This means that political uncertainty will rise in 2019, after six years of unusual tranquility. Conclusions Mr. X: This is a good place to conclude our discussion. We have covered a lot of ground and your views have reinforced my belief that 2019 could be even more turbulent for financial markets than the past has been. I accept your opinion that a major global economic downturn is not around the corner, but with valuations still stretched, I feel that it makes good sense to focus on capital preservation. I may lose out on the proverbial “blow-off” rally, but so be it – I have been in this business long enough to know that it is much better to leave the party while the music is still playing! Ms. X: I agree with my father that the risks surrounding the outlook have risen as we have entered the late stages of this business-cycle expansion. Yet, if global growth does temporarily stabilize and corporate earnings continue to expand, I fear that being out of the market will be very painful. The era of hyper-easy money may be ending, but interest rates globally are still nowhere near restrictive territory. This tells me that the final stages of this bull market could be very rewarding. A turbulent market is not only one where prices go down – they can also go up a lot! BCA: The debate you are having is one we ourselves have had on numerous occasions. There is always a trade-off between maximizing short-term returns and taking a longer-term approach. Valuations are the ultimate guidepost for long-term returns. While most assets have cheapened over the past year, prices are still fairly elevated. Table 4 shows our baseline calculations of what a balanced portfolio will earn over the coming decade. We estimate that such a portfolio will deliver average annual returns of 4.9% over the next ten years, or 2.8% after adjusting for inflation. That is an improvement over our inflation-adjusted estimate of 1.3% from last year, but still well below the 6.6% real return that a balanced portfolio earned between 1982 and 2018. Table 410-Year Asset Return Projections OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence OUTLOOK 2019: Late-Cycle Turbulence Our return calculations for equities assume that profit margins decline modestly over the period and that multiples mean revert to their historical average. These assumptions may turn out to be too pessimistic if underlying changes in the economy keep corporate profits elevated as a share of GDP. Structurally lower real interest rates may also justify higher P/E multiples, although this would be largely offset by the prospect of slower economic growth, which will translate into slower earnings growth. In terms of the outlook for the coming year, a lot hinges on our view that monetary policy in the main economies stays accommodative. This seems like a safe assumption in the Euro Area and Japan, where rates are near historic lows, as well as in China, where the government is actively loosening monetary conditions. It is not such a straightforward conclusion for the U.S., where the Fed is on track to keep raising rates. If it turns out that the neutral interest rate is not far above where rates are already, we could see a broad-based slowdown of the U.S. economy that ripples through to the rest of the world. And even if U.S. monetary policy does remain accommodative, many things could still upset the apple cart, including a full-out trade war, debt crises in Italy or China, or a debilitating spike in oil prices. As the title of our outlook implies, 2019 is likely to be a year of increased turbulence. Ms. X: As always, you have left us with much to think about. My father has looked forward to these discussions every year and now that I am able to join him, I understand why. Before we conclude, it would be helpful to have a recap of your key views. BCA: That would be our pleasure. The key points are as follows: The collision between policy and markets that we discussed last year finally came to a head in October. Rather than falling as they normally do when stocks plunge, U.S. bond yields rose as investors reassessed the willingness of the Fed to pause hiking rates even in the face of softer growth. Likewise, hopes that China would move swiftly to stimulate its economy were dashed as it became increasingly clear that the authorities were placing a high emphasis on their reform agenda of deleveraging and capacity reduction. The ongoing Brexit saga and the stalemate between the populist Italian government and the EU have increased uncertainty in Europe at a time when the region was already beginning to slow. We expect the tensions between policy and markets to be an ongoing theme in 2019. With the U.S. unemployment rate at a 48-year low, it will take a significant slowdown for the Fed to stop hiking rates. Despite the deterioration in economic data over the past month, real final domestic demand is still tracking to expand by 3% in the fourth quarter, well above estimates of the sustainable pace of economic growth. Ultimately, the Fed will deliver more hikes next year than discounted in the markets. This will push up the dollar and keep the upward trend in Treasury yields intact. The dollar should peak midway next year. China will also become more aggressive in stimulating its economy, which will boost global growth. However, until both of these things happen, emerging markets will remain under pressure. For the time being, we continue to favor developed market equities over their EM peers. We also prefer defensive equity sectors such as health care and consumer staples over cyclical sectors such as industrials and materials. Within the developed market universe, the U.S. will outperform Europe and Japan for the next few quarters, especially in dollar terms. A stabilization in global growth could ignite a blow-off rally in global equities. If the Fed is raising rates in response to falling unemployment, this is unlikely to derail the stock market. However, once supply-side constraints begin to fully bite in early 2020 and inflation rises well above the Fed’s target of 2%, stocks will begin to buckle. This means that a window exists next year where stocks will outperform bonds. We would maintain a benchmark allocation to stocks for now, but increase exposure if global bourses were to fall significantly from current levels without a corresponding deteriorating in the economic outlook. Corporate credit will underperform stocks as government bond yields rise. A major increase in spreads is unlikely as long as the economy is still expanding, but spreads could still widen modestly given their low starting point. U.S. shale companies have been the marginal producers in the global oil sector. With breakeven costs in shale close to $50/bbl, crude prices are unlikely to rise much from current levels over the long term. However, over the next 12 months, we expect production cuts in Saudi Arabia will push prices up, with Brent crude averaging around $82/bbl in 2019. A balanced portfolio is likely to generate average returns of only 2.8% a year in real terms over the next decade. This compares to average returns of around 6.6% a year between 1982 and 2018. We would like to take this opportunity to wish you and all of our clients a very peaceful, healthy and prosperous New Year. The Editors November 26, 2018 ​​​​​​