Philippines

The relative performance of Philippine equities against the EM benchmark is moving inversely to the direction of relative (Philippines minus EM) local bond yields (Chart I-1). When local Philippine bond yields drop versus those of other EMs, this bourse outperforms, and vice versa. Likewise, Philippine share prices in absolute terms exhibit a negative relationship with local bond yields (Chart I-2). The rationale behind this high sensitivity in share prices to local interest rates is the large presence of banks and property stocks in the Philippines' bourse. Banks account for 20% and real estate stocks another 21% of the local stock exchange. These sectors benefit in a falling interest rate environment and suffer during periods of rising rates. Chart I-1Philippines Vs. EM: Relative Stock Prices And Bond Yields Philippines Vs. EM: Relative Stock Prices And Bond Yields Philippines Vs. EM: Relative Stock Prices And Bond Yields Chart I-2Philippine Stocks Are Inversely Correlated To Domestic Bond Yields Philippine Stocks Are Inversely Correlated To Domestic Bond Yields Philippine Stocks Are Inversely Correlated To Domestic Bond Yields Our underweight position in Philippine equities has not played out because the economy has slowed much more than we had expected, which has also coincided with collapsing US Treasury bond yields. Consequently, Philippine local bond yields have plummeted, supporting the stock market’s absolute and relative performance. Chart I-3Philippine Growth Slowed Due To A Slump In Government Spending Philippine Growth Slowed Due To A Slump In Government Spending Philippine Growth Slowed Due To A Slump In Government Spending Chart I-4Negative Fiscal & Credit Impulse Stabilized The Current Account Deficit Negative Fiscal & Credit Impulse Stabilized The Current Account Deficit Negative Fiscal & Credit Impulse Stabilized The Current Account Deficit The growth rate of the Philippines has decelerated markedly due to sharp slowdowns in both government spending and bank loan growth (Chart I-3). In fact, the combined bank loan and fiscal spending impulse has plunged, leading to a major slowdown in domestic demand, which in turn has stabilized the current account (Chart I-4). The latter effect has supported the currency and allowed the central bank to cut rates. A budget deadlock on a number of items delayed the approval of the 2019 budget, causing government spending to plunge in the first half of 2019. In short, it was unintended fiscal tightening that has wrong-footed our view on the direction of the macro cycle, and consequently Philippine financial markets. Government spending has been instrumental in driving fixed capital formation since President Rodrigo Duterte came to power in May 2016. Philippine local bond yields have plummeted, supporting the stock market’s absolute and relative performance. Going forward, the macro cycle is set to reverse: Chart I-5Philippines: Signs Of A Growth Rebound Philippines: Signs Of A Growth Rebound Philippines: Signs Of A Growth Rebound Government expenditure will rise substantially – infrastructure spending in particular – lifting imports. The 2019 budget was approved back in April, and the House of Representatives has given the green light to extend the shelf-life of the current 2019 budget. Moreover, the fiscal 2020 budget, now approved by Duterte, entails 12% nominal growth in government expenditures in general and 14% growth in capital/infrastructure spending in particular. Duterte will oversee 100 flagship infrastructure projects estimated to cost 4.3 trillion Philippine pesos, or 24% of GDP. More than half of these projects are either ongoing or will commence construction in the next six to eight months. The larger infrastructure expenditure will encourage bank lending. Overall, domestic demand will revive considerably, causing the current account deficit to widen. Importantly, the expected fiscal boost will come on top of already strong consumer spending. The marginal propensity to spend among households and companies is already improving, confirming domestic growth acceleration (Chart I-5, top panel). In particular, both vehicle and machinery sales are recovering (Chart I-5, middle panel). Narrow and broad money impulses have bottomed (Chart I-5, bottom panel). Stronger imports amid still-depressed exports due to sluggish global demand will lead to a widening of the current account deficit. We expect the peso to resume its depreciation. Renewed currency weakness and a domestic demand revival will put a floor under inflation. The central bank is headed by Governor Benjamin Diokno, the former Budget Secretary and an associate of populist President Duterte. The odds are that the central bank will not hike interest rates in the face of a rising current account deficit and modestly rising inflation. This will reinforce currency depreciation. Finally, domestic bond yields are set to rise. A widening fiscal deficit has historically coincided with higher domestic bond yields (Chart I-6). Odds are it will not be different this time. Besides, Philippine banks have been relentlessly purchasing government bonds because credit demand from companies has been sluggish (Chart I-7). As private credit demand begins to recover and banks accelerate their loan origination, they will become net sellers – or will at least ease their pace of government bond purchases – pushing yields higher. Chart I-6Rising Fiscal Deficit Is Bad News For Bonds Rising Fiscal Deficit Is Bad News For Bonds Rising Fiscal Deficit Is Bad News For Bonds Chart I-7Philippine Commercial Banks Have Been Purchasing Government Bonds En Masse Philippine Commercial Banks Have Been Purchasing Government Bonds En Masse Philippine Commercial Banks Have Been Purchasing Government Bonds En Masse Bottom Line: Unintended fiscal tightening has slowed domestic demand, narrowed the current account deficit, supported the currency and induced a drop in local bond yields. This has allowed the Philippines’ interest rate-sensitive bourse to outperform the overall EM equity index. Going forward, the macro cycle is set to reverse. This cycle is about to reverse due to strong fiscal expansion: Domestic demand and imports will grow briskly, and the current account deficit will widen considerably. Widening twin deficits will lead to material currency depreciation and higher domestic bond yields. Investment Recommendations Continue shorting the Philippine peso versus the US dollar. 2-year swap rates are 48 basis points below the policy rate (Chart I-8). The market will price out rate cuts as the business cycle recovers and the currency depreciates. We recommend a new trade: pay 2-year swap rates. Dedicated EM fixed-income investors should underweight the Philippines in their EM domestic currency bonds and sovereign credit portfolios. Chart I-8The Market Is Expecting Rate Cuts The Market Is Expecting Rate Cuts The Market Is Expecting Rate Cuts Chart I-9Philippine Equity Market Is Not Cheap Philippine Equity Market Is Not Cheap Philippine Equity Market Is Not Cheap     Does an upcoming growth revival warrant an overweight stance in Philippine stocks within an EM equity portfolio? As shown in Charts I-1 and I-2, this equity market is more sensitive to interest rates than growth. The growth deceleration did not prevent this stock market from outperforming its EM peers. Hence, higher local bond yields amid renewed currency depreciation will likely lead to a period of underperformance. Finally, Philippine stocks are not cheap in absolute terms or relative to the EM benchmark (Chart I-9). Hence, they will not respond well to rising interest rates. Chart I-10Philippine Property Stocks Will Suffer As Interest Rates Rise Philippine Property Stocks Will Suffer As Interest Rates Rise Philippine Property Stocks Will Suffer As Interest Rates Rise Within this bourse, underweight/short property stocks. These stocks are the most vulnerable to rising bond yields (Chart I-10). The key risks to our strategy are lower global bond yields and continuous flows of foreign capital into EM assets in general, and local bonds in particular.   Ayman Kawtharani Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com

Highlights Analysis on the Chinese property market is available below. In the Philippines, domestic demand is set to accelerate at the hands of the government’s fiscal boost. The current account deficit will widen and the peso and local bonds will likely sell-off. This warrants an underweight stance in this interest rate-sensitive bourse. A new trade: Pay 2-year swap rates. The outlook for China’s property market and construction activity is downbeat. Financial market plays leveraged to mainland construction activity remain at risk. The Philippines: The Cycle Is Turning The relative performance of Philippine equities against the EM benchmark is moving inversely to the direction of relative (Philippines minus EM) local bond yields (Chart I-1). When local Philippine bond yields drop versus those of other EMs, this bourse outperforms, and vice versa. Likewise, Philippine share prices in absolute terms exhibit a negative relationship with local bond yields (Chart I-2). The rationale behind this high sensitivity in share prices to local interest rates is the large presence of banks and property stocks in the Philippines' bourse. Banks account for 20% and real estate stocks another 21% of the local stock exchange. These sectors benefit in a falling interest rate environment and suffer during periods of rising rates. Chart I-1Philippines Vs. EM: Relative Stock Prices And Bond Yields Philippines Vs. EM: Relative Stock Prices And Bond Yields Philippines Vs. EM: Relative Stock Prices And Bond Yields Chart I-2Philippine Stocks Are Inversely Correlated To Domestic Bond Yields Philippine Stocks Are Inversely Correlated To Domestic Bond Yields Philippine Stocks Are Inversely Correlated To Domestic Bond Yields Our underweight position in Philippine equities has not played out because the economy has slowed much more than we had expected, which has also coincided with collapsing US Treasury bond yields. Consequently, Philippine local bond yields have plummeted, supporting the stock market’s absolute and relative performance. Chart I-3Philippine Growth Slowed Due To A Slump In Government Spending Philippine Growth Slowed Due To A Slump In Government Spending Philippine Growth Slowed Due To A Slump In Government Spending Chart I-4Negative Fiscal & Credit Impulse Stabilized The Current Account Deficit Negative Fiscal & Credit Impulse Stabilized The Current Account Deficit Negative Fiscal & Credit Impulse Stabilized The Current Account Deficit The growth rate of the Philippines has decelerated markedly due to sharp slowdowns in both government spending and bank loan growth (Chart I-3). In fact, the combined bank loan and fiscal spending impulse has plunged, leading to a major slowdown in domestic demand, which in turn has stabilized the current account (Chart I-4). The latter effect has supported the currency and allowed the central bank to cut rates. A budget deadlock on a number of items delayed the approval of the 2019 budget, causing government spending to plunge in the first half of 2019. In short, it was unintended fiscal tightening that has wrong-footed our view on the direction of the macro cycle, and consequently Philippine financial markets. Government spending has been instrumental in driving fixed capital formation since President Rodrigo Duterte came to power in May 2016. Philippine local bond yields have plummeted, supporting the stock market’s absolute and relative performance. Going forward, the macro cycle is set to reverse: Chart I-5Philippines: Signs Of A Growth Rebound Philippines: Signs Of A Growth Rebound Philippines: Signs Of A Growth Rebound Government expenditure will rise substantially – infrastructure spending in particular – lifting imports. The 2019 budget was approved back in April, and the House of Representatives has given the green light to extend the shelf-life of the current 2019 budget. Moreover, the fiscal 2020 budget, now approved by Duterte, entails 12% nominal growth in government expenditures in general and 14% growth in capital/infrastructure spending in particular. Duterte will oversee 100 flagship infrastructure projects estimated to cost 4.3 trillion Philippine pesos, or 24% of GDP. More than half of these projects are either ongoing or will commence construction in the next six to eight months. The larger infrastructure expenditure will encourage bank lending. Overall, domestic demand will revive considerably, causing the current account deficit to widen. Importantly, the expected fiscal boost will come on top of already strong consumer spending. The marginal propensity to spend among households and companies is already improving, confirming domestic growth acceleration (Chart I-5, top panel). In particular, both vehicle and machinery sales are recovering (Chart I-5, middle panel). Narrow and broad money impulses have bottomed (Chart I-5, bottom panel). Stronger imports amid still-depressed exports due to sluggish global demand will lead to a widening of the current account deficit. We expect the peso to resume its depreciation. Renewed currency weakness and a domestic demand revival will put a floor under inflation. The central bank is headed by Governor Benjamin Diokno, the former Budget Secretary and an associate of populist President Duterte. The odds are that the central bank will not hike interest rates in the face of a rising current account deficit and modestly rising inflation. This will reinforce currency depreciation. Finally, domestic bond yields are set to rise. A widening fiscal deficit has historically coincided with higher domestic bond yields (Chart I-6). Odds are it will not be different this time. Besides, Philippine banks have been relentlessly purchasing government bonds because credit demand from companies has been sluggish (Chart I-7). As private credit demand begins to recover and banks accelerate their loan origination, they will become net sellers – or will at least ease their pace of government bond purchases – pushing yields higher. Chart I-6Rising Fiscal Deficit Is Bad News For Bonds Rising Fiscal Deficit Is Bad News For Bonds Rising Fiscal Deficit Is Bad News For Bonds Chart I-7Philippine Commercial Banks Have Been Purchasing Government Bonds En Masse Philippine Commercial Banks Have Been Purchasing Government Bonds En Masse Philippine Commercial Banks Have Been Purchasing Government Bonds En Masse Bottom Line: Unintended fiscal tightening has slowed domestic demand, narrowed the current account deficit, supported the currency and induced a drop in local bond yields. This has allowed the Philippines’ interest rate-sensitive bourse to outperform the overall EM equity index. Going forward, the macro cycle is set to reverse. This cycle is about to reverse due to strong fiscal expansion: Domestic demand and imports will grow briskly, and the current account deficit will widen considerably. Widening twin deficits will lead to material currency depreciation and higher domestic bond yields. Investment Recommendations Continue shorting the Philippine peso versus the US dollar. 2-year swap rates are 48 basis points below the policy rate (Chart I-8). The market will price out rate cuts as the business cycle recovers and the currency depreciates. We recommend a new trade: pay 2-year swap rates. Dedicated EM fixed-income investors should underweight the Philippines in their EM domestic currency bonds and sovereign credit portfolios. Chart I-8The Market Is Expecting Rate Cuts The Market Is Expecting Rate Cuts The Market Is Expecting Rate Cuts Chart I-9Philippine Equity Market Is Not Cheap Philippine Equity Market Is Not Cheap Philippine Equity Market Is Not Cheap     Does an upcoming growth revival warrant an overweight stance in Philippine stocks within an EM equity portfolio? As shown in Charts I-1 and I-2, this equity market is more sensitive to interest rates than growth. The growth deceleration did not prevent this stock market from outperforming its EM peers. Hence, higher local bond yields amid renewed currency depreciation will likely lead to a period of underperformance. Finally, Philippine stocks are not cheap in absolute terms or relative to the EM benchmark (Chart I-9). Hence, they will not respond well to rising interest rates. Chart I-10Philippine Property Stocks Will Suffer As Interest Rates Rise Philippine Property Stocks Will Suffer As Interest Rates Rise Philippine Property Stocks Will Suffer As Interest Rates Rise Within this bourse, underweight/short property stocks. These stocks are the most vulnerable to rising bond yields (Chart I-10). The key risks to our strategy are lower global bond yields and continuous flows of foreign capital into EM assets in general, and local bonds in particular.   Ayman Kawtharani Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   China: Making Sense Of The Property Market Real estate activity in general, and property construction volumes in particular, are critical to our thesis of an ongoing growth slowdown in China. The basis is that construction volumes on the mainland have a considerable impact on industrial activity both within and outside China. On the structural front, housing demand is facing major headwinds: Genuine pent-up demand for housing has diminished. Most Chinese households already own at least one property. Based on a recent survey conducted by The Economic Daily,1 nearly 97% of households surveyed own at least one residential property. Last year’s China Household Finance Survey (CHFS), conducted by Southwestern University of Finance and Economics of China, showed about 68% of new homes sold in China’s urban areas in the first quarter of 2018 were purchased for the purpose of investment. In addition, the living area per capita in China’s urban areas has risen to 40 square meters as of the end of last year – larger than in South Korea and Japan. Other structural impediments include low affordability, slowing rural-to-urban migration, demographic changes and the promotion of the housing rental market. The government has been repeatedly stressing that China will not use the property market as a short-term economic growth-booster this time. The authorities will also continue to prevent speculative housing demand. Between late 2015 and 2017, the People's Bank of China undertook outright monetization of excess housing inventories via the Pledged Supplementary Lending (PSL) program. So far, even though the Chinese economy has already slowed considerably, the government has not injected much stimulus into the property market. On the contrary, the government has drastically reduced the number of slum-reconstruction units as well as its PSL injection this year. This year, the government has also started a new long-term project of renovating residential buildings built in 2000 or earlier. The projects involved include adding parking lots, elevators, fiber cable installments, electricity/gas line improvements, and so on. This renovation program will likely delay property purchases from those owners who were considering purchasing new properties instead of living in the older residential buildings. Chart II-1Property Sales In China: A Sustainable Recovery? Property Sales In China: A Sustainable Recovery? Property Sales In China: A Sustainable Recovery? From a cyclical perspective (6-12 months), falling home prices and relatively tight financing for property developers will likely prevent a recovery in construction activity: First, Chart II-1 shows there has recently been a pickup in residential property sales. Our research reveals that this has been the result of aggressive promotion strategies – price reductions – implemented by many real estate developers. Among the promotions being offered by many developers are “buy one property, get the second one at half price,” “buy a house and get a car for free,” or “buy a house and get free furniture and decorations.” Local governments have been “discouraging” outright property price declines. Yet, it seems they have allowed implicit price reductions to take place. In cases where outright price cuts cannot be avoided, the authorities try to limit them. Earlier this month, the government of Maanshan, a third-tier city in the Anhui province, released a rule instructing property developers not to lower prices by more than 10%. The outlook for China’s property market and construction activity is downbeat. As a result, official statistics on new housing prices do not truly reflect price pressures in the marketplace. Official statistics show new housing prices are rising at 9% since last year. Nevertheless, many 1st- and 2nd- tier cities are showing price declines in their secondhand residential property markets (Chart II-2).  Chart II-2China: Secondary Market Property Prices Are Weak China: Secondary Market Property Prices Are Weak China: Secondary Market Property Prices Are Weak Chart II-3Chinese Property Developers: Massive Pre-Sold Homes, But Lack Of Funding To Complete Construction Chinese Property Developers: Massive Pre-Sold Homes, But Lack Of Funding To Complete Construction Chinese Property Developers: Massive Pre-Sold Homes, But Lack Of Funding To Complete Construction   All in all, it seems that falling home prices have begun to spread from 1st tier cities to some 2nd- and 3rd-tier cities. The number of cities reporting declines in residential home prices is on the rise.   Second, in theory, falling property prices should discourage new starts and new construction. Falling prices signal that supply is exceeding demand, with producers typically responding by curtailing output. This holds true for any industry. However, the intricacies of property developers in China may be different. Chart II-4Building Construction Data Is A Broader Measure Than Commodity Buildings Building Construction Data Is A Broader Measure Than Commodity Buildings Building Construction Data Is A Broader Measure Than Commodity Buildings Specifically, property developers have been pre-selling aggressively since 2017 while slowing their completion process due to lack of financing (Chart II-3). Such financial constraints arose due to their rapid expansion in the past 10 years. Having already incurred enormous amounts of leverage, they have resorted to pre-sales as another source of funding. Property developers are currently under pressure to deliver those units that were pre sold about two years ago. Will they be able to secure new funding and ramp up construction? Or will they default or delay delivery of houses? It may well be different for each developer. The ones with strong balance sheets and access to financing will build and deliver. The weakest ones will default, while the average ones will likely delay delivery. Hence, it is difficult to gauge construction trends in the next six months in the residential property market. Even so, it is unlikely to be very strong given the industry is highly fragmented, and many small and medium and even some large developers are financially weak. Finally, there is a large gap between the two construction activity datasets – both published by the National Bureau of Statistics. These datasets are referred to as “commodity buildings” and “building construction” (Chart II-4). “Commodity buildings” – i.e., those developed by real estate developers (the equivalent of homebuilders in the US), are only a subset of “building construction.” The “building construction” dataset is more comprehensive. It includes not only “commodity buildings” but also buildings built by non-real estate developers. For example, companies, universities, and various organizations that can construct both residential and non-residential buildings for their own use. Both datasets include residential and non-residential buildings. From a cyclical perspective (6-12 months), falling home prices and relatively tight financing for property developers will likely prevent a recovery in construction activity. Chart II-5 illustrates that “building construction” floor area started, under construction and completed are all shrinking. They are much weaker than floor area started, under construction and completed of “commodity buildings.” Chart II-5Building Construction Is In Recession Building Construction Is In Recession Building Construction Is In Recession Chart II-6Falling Construction-Related Commodities Prices Reflect The Weakness In China Construction Activity Falling Construction-Related Commodities Prices Reflect The Weakness In China Construction Activity Falling Construction-Related Commodities Prices Reflect The Weakness In China Construction Activity The take-away from these datasets is as follows: Construction activity in China goes beyond property developers and “commodity buildings” statistics do not always paint the complete picture. Companies and organizations have dramatically curtailed their construction activity. Combined with tight financing conditions for real estate developers, this heralds a downbeat outlook for construction activity. Bottom Line: While short-term fluctuations in construction activity are impossible to gauge in China, the cyclical outlook remains negative. The current round of stimulus has avoided the property market, and real estate bubble excesses have not yet been wrung out. This is why we remain negative on China’s construction outlook and continue to recommend underweighting property developers relative to both the A-share and investable equity indexes. Falling steel, iron ore and industrial commodities prices confirm that construction activity in China remains weak (Chart II-6).   Ellen JingYuan He Associate Vice President ellenj@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1    The Economic Daily, administratively managed by the Ministry of Communication, is one of the most influential and authoritative newspapers in China. It is an official outlet for the government to publicize its economic policies. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

Analyses on the Philippines, Colombia and Argentina are available below. Highlights Global growth conditions, especially outside the U.S., remain bond friendly. Nevertheless, U.S. bonds are overbought and technical factors might exert upward pressure on them in the near term. Our ubiquitous premise remains that EM currencies and EM risk assets are primarily driven by cycles in global trade and the Chinese economy rather than U.S. growth and interest rates. There are no signs of investor capitulation that mark a major bottom in EM risk assets. Feature Given the recent plunge in bond yields around the world, we are devoting this week’s report to discussing the implications of low U.S. bond yields on EM risk assets. Our key takeaway is that lower U.S. bond yields are not a reason to be long EM risk assets and currencies. Low Bond Yields: Reflective Or Stimulative? With respect to ultra-low bond yield, investors and commentators generally subscribe to one of the following two arguments: Bond yields are reflective – i.e. they are indicative of an upcoming economic calamity and thereby signal a bearish outlook for equity and credit markets; The current low levels of bond yields signify a dovish monetary policy stance and hence are bullish for global risk assets. In our opinion, it is not a certainty that the bond market always has perfect foresight of the economic outlook. At the same time, falling global bond yields and easing central banks do not automatically ensure a pickup in global economic activity. Hence, low bond yields do not justify a bullish stance on global stocks and credit markets. Like any other financial market, bonds are driven by time-varying forces. In certain times, bond yields signal a correct trajectory for growth, inflation and monetary policy. At other times, bond prices are driven by investor sentiment and momentum-chasing trading strategies. In times where the latter is occurring, the bond market can send the wrong signal on growth and inflation, as well as misprice the future path of interest rates. U.S. bond yields are presently correct in signaling that global growth continues to decelerate. This is corroborated by many other indicators that we have been publishing.  Presently, we have the following observations and reflections on U.S. bond yields: U.S. bond yields are presently correct in signaling that global growth continues to decelerate. This is corroborated by many other indicators that we have been publishing. However, this does not imply that U.S. bond yields will be a reliable leading indicator at the bottom of this business cycle. The basis is that U.S. bond yields did not lead at the top of the cycle. On the contrary, U.S. bond yields lagged the global business cycles by a considerable margin in both 2015-‘16 and in 2018-’19, when the growth slowdown emanated from China/EM. Chart I-1 illustrates that Chinese nominal manufacturing output and import volume growth rolled over in December 2017, yet U.S. bond yields rolled over in October 2018. In recent years, U.S. bond yields have also lagged the global manufacturing PMI index by about six to nine months (Chart I-2, top panel). Chart I-1China’s Business Cycle Led U.S. Bond Yields China's Business Cycle Led U.S. Bond Yields China's Business Cycle Led U.S. Bond Yields Chart I-2Global Manufacturing And EM Stocks Led U.S. Bond Yields Global Manufacturing And EM Stocks Led U.S. Bond Yields Global Manufacturing And EM Stocks Led U.S. Bond Yields   Remarkably, EM financial markets have been leading U.S. bond yields in recent years, not the other way around (Chart I-2, bottom panel). For some time we have held the view that the ongoing growth slump in China would culminate into a global manufacturing and trade recession that would be negative for the rest of the world, especially for EM, Japan, commodities producers, and Germany. This theme has been the main reason for our negative view on global stocks, especially cyclicals, as well as our positive stance on safe-haven bonds and bullish view on the dollar.  Understanding the origins of this global manufacturing and trade downtrend is critical to gauging the evolution of the business cycle. China is the epicenter of this global trade and manufacturing recession. In turn, the root cause of the mainland’s growth slump is money/credit tightening that has occurred in China in both 2017 and early 2018. ​​​​Money and credit growth remain lackluster in the Middle Kingdom, despite ongoing fiscal and monetary policy easing (Chart I-3). Notably, domestic credit growth and its impulse have been muted, especially when issuance of government bonds is excluded (Chart I-4). The aggregate credit and fiscal stimulus have so far been insufficient to engineer a recovery. Chart I-3China: Fiscal Deficit And Broad Money Growth bca.ems_wr_2019_08_22_s1_c3 bca.ems_wr_2019_08_22_s1_c3 Chart I-4China: Private Sector Credit Growth Is Weak China: Private Sector Credit Growth Is Weak China: Private Sector Credit Growth Is Weak Federal Reserve’s policy tightening was not the reason behind the current worldwide manufacturing recession. U.S. domestic demand has not been the source of the ongoing global manufacturing and trade recession. U.S. final domestic demand was robust until Q4 2018 and has so far downshifted only modestly (Chart I-5, top panel). Corroborating this, U.S. manufacturing was the last shoe to drop in the global manufacturing recession (Chart I-5, bottom panel). Accordingly, the Federal Reserve’s policy tightening was not the reason behind the current worldwide manufacturing recession. It follows that lower U.S. interest rates might not be essential to instigate a global economic recovery. Critically, the latest plunge in EM currencies and widening in EM credit spreads has occurred amid falling U.S. bond yields and Fed easing. Chart I-5U.S. Economy And Bond Yields Have Lagged In This Cycle U.S. Economy And Bond Yields Have Lagged In This Cycle U.S. Economy And Bond Yields Have Lagged In This Cycle Chart I-6U.S. Bond Yields And EM: No Stable Correlation U.S. Bond Yields And EM: No Stable Correlation U.S. Bond Yields And EM: No Stable Correlation We have long argued against the consensus view that EM equities, credit markets and currencies are much more sensitive to U.S. interest rates than to the global business cycle. Chart I-6 reveals that there has been no stable correlation between U.S. bond yields and EM credit spreads and currencies. Therefore, a bottom in EM currencies and risk assets will occur when global trade and Chinese demand ameliorate rather than as a result of Fed policy. An important question is whether low bond yields are going to support global share prices. Our hunch is that it is not likely.1  First, if U.S. bond yields had not dropped by as much as they have, global equity prices would be lower. In short, reduced long-term interest rate expectations have led investors to pay higher multiples, especially for non-cyclical and growth stocks. The U.S. equity rally since early this year has been due to multiples expansion, especially among non-cyclical and growth stocks. Chart I-7Global Ex-U.S. Share Prices: No Bull Market Here Global Ex-U.S. Share Prices: No Bull Market Here Global Ex-U.S. Share Prices: No Bull Market Here The latter has allowed the S&P 500 to reach new highs recently at a time when global ex-U.S. share prices are not far from their December lows (Chart I-7). Second, falling interest rates are positive for share prices when profits are growing, even if at a slower rate. When corporate profits are contracting, lower interest rates typically do not preclude equity prices from dropping. Going forward, U.S. equities remain at risk due to a potential profit contraction. We do not foresee a recession in U.S. household spending. However, America’s corporate earnings will be under pressure from a stronger dollar and shrinking profit margins due to rising unit labor costs (Chart I-8), notwithstanding the manufacturing recession that is taking hold. Chart I-8U.S. Corporate Profits Are At Risk From Margins U.S. Corporate Profits Are At Risk From Margins U.S. Corporate Profits Are At Risk From Margins One popular narrative attributes exceptionally low bond yields to excess savings over investments. Yet this is not always accurate. Box I-1 below explains why bond yields have little relation to savings and investments in any economy. Chart I-9U.S. Bonds Are High-Yielders Among DM U.S. Bonds Are High-Yielders Among DM U.S. Bonds Are High-Yielders Among DM Finally, some investors wonder if the low/negative bond yields in DM ex-U.S. could push U.S. Treasury yields lower. Our take is that it is possible. The spread of U.S. Treasury yields over DM ex-U.S. is very wide, which could entice foreign fixed-income investors to purchase Uncle Sam’s bonds (Chart I-9). ​​​​​​What is preventing foreign fixed-income investors from piling into Treasuries is exchange rate risk. If for whatever reason a consensus emerges among global fixed-income investors that the greenback is not going to depreciate in the next 12-18 months, there could be a stampede of foreign investors into U.S. Treasuries, pushing yields considerably lower. In our opinion, the odds are that the broad trade-weighted dollar will stay firm for now and could make new cycle highs. In such a scenario, investor expectations of U.S. currency depreciation will diminish. This could trigger a stampede of foreign fixed-income investors into U.S. bonds. This is not a forecast but a consideration that bond investors should take into account. Bottom Line: Global growth conditions, especially outside the U.S., remain bond friendly. Nevertheless, bonds are overbought and technical factors discussed in Box I-1 below might exert upward pressure on U.S. bond yields in the near term. Implications For EM  We explore three scenarios for the direction of U.S. bond yields in the coming weeks and months and the corresponding potential dynamics for EM risk assets and currencies. Scenario 1: U.S. bond yields continue to fall as the global trade and manufacturing recession endures, suppressing global growth. Outcome: EM currencies will depreciate and EM risk assets will suffer more. Scenario 2: U.S. Treasury yields increase because U.S. domestic demand firms up, even if the global trade contraction persists.  Outcome: EM currencies will weaken and EM risk assets will sell off further. Scenario 3: U.S. bond yields rise because the global manufacturing recession abates and a recovery in China leads to a global trade revival. Outcome: EM currencies will appreciate and risk assets will rally considerably. Please note that Scenario 3 is not our baseline scenario. The ubiquitous premise in these deliberations is that EM currencies and EM risk assets are primarily driven by cycles in global trade and the Chinese economy rather than U.S. growth and interest rates. EM currencies and EM risk assets are primarily driven by cycles in global trade and the Chinese economy rather than U.S. growth and interest rates. Chart I-10Stay With Short EM Equities / Long 30-Year U.S. Bonds Strategy Stay With Short EM Equities / Long 30-Year U.S. Bonds Strategy Stay With Short EM Equities / Long 30-Year U.S. Bonds Strategy To capitalize on our view of weaker global growth emanating from China/EM, we have been recommending the following strategy: short EM stocks / long U.S. 30-year Treasuries. This recommendation has panned out nicely, delivering a 21.5% gain since its initiation on April 10, 2017 (Chart I-10). Barring Scenario 3 above, this trade has more upside. EM Financial Markets: No Capitulation So Far Major bottoms in financial markets typically occur after investor capitulation has already taken place. Having reviewed various financial market variables, we conclude that signposts of capitulation in EM risk assets and global equities are absent: The S&P 500 SKEW index is very low. This index reflects the probability that investors are assigning to downside risk in share prices. The SKEW index is currently at one of its lowest readings of the past 30 years (since its existence), which suggests that investors are not hedging themselves against large price swings (Chart I-11). This usually occurs prior to a heightened period of volatility. Chart I-11Are U.S. Equity Investors Complacent? Are U.S. Equity Investors Complacent? Are U.S. Equity Investors Complacent? The volatility measures for EM and commodity currencies are still very subdued (Chart I-12). The same is true for EM equity volatility (Chart I-12, bottom panel). Even though EM and commodities currencies as well as EM share prices have fallen substantially, the price of buying insurance is still low – meaning investors are still not particularly worried. This habitually is a sign of complacency. Chart I-12Cyclical Risk Markets: Implied Volatility Remains Low Cyclical Risk Markets: Implied Volatility Remains Low Cyclical Risk Markets: Implied Volatility Remains Low Chart I-13No Capitulation Among EM Equity And Currency Investors Investors Are Very Bullish On EM No Capitulation Among EM Equity And Currency Investors Investors Are Very Bullish On EM No Capitulation Among EM Equity And Currency Investors Finally, Chart I-13 shows that asset managers’ and leveraged funds’ net long positions in EM equity index futures and high-beta liquid currencies futures were still elevated as of August 15. Bottom Line: There are no signs of investor capitulation that often mark a major bottom in risk assets.   BOX 1 Do Bond Yields Equilibrate Savings And Investment? Mainstream economic theory regards bond yields as the interest rate that balances desired savings and desired investment. According to mainstream theory, when desired savings rise relative to desired investment, bond yields drop. The latter induces less savings and more investment equilibrating the system. Conversely, when desired investment increases relative to desired savings, bond yields climb, discouraging investment and incentivizing more savings. The fundamental shortcoming of this economic model stems from the misrepresentation of banking. When a commercial bank buys any security from a non-bank, it originates a new deposit “out of thin air.” The bank does not allocate someone’s deposit into bonds. Diagram I-1 below exhibits this point. When a U.S. bank purchases a dollar-denominated bond from a pension fund, it does not use someone’s deposit to do so. Rather, a new deposit in the U.S. banking system (often at another bank) is created “out of thin air” as a result of the transaction. Chart I- The amount of bonds commercial banks can purchase is limited only by regulatory norms, liquidity provision by the central bank as well as its management’s willingness to do so. Nobody needs to save for a bank to buy a bond or make a loan.  We have written in past reports on money, credit and savings that deposits in the banking system have no relationship with national or household savings. When an individual or company saves, the amount of deposits in the banking system does not change. All in all, banks do not intermediate savings/deposits into credit/loans. They create new deposits “out of thin air” when they originate a loan to or buy any security from a non-bank. Provided that banks do not utilize national savings or existing deposits to acquire bonds, fluctuations in bond yields do not reflect changes in national savings. Holding everything else constant, bond yields could drop if commercial banks buy bonds en masse. The opposite also holds true. Chart I-14 demonstrates that U.S. commercial banks have been augmenting their purchases of various types of bonds. This partially explains why bond yields have plunged (bond yields shown inverted on this chart). If U.S. banks’ bonds purchases mean revert, as they often do, U.S. bond yields could rise. Chart I-14Are U.S. Banks' Purchases Of Bonds Driving Bond Yields? Are U.S. Banks' Purchases Of Bonds Driving Bond Yields? Are U.S. Banks' Purchases Of Bonds Driving Bond Yields? This along with more bond issuance by the U.S. Treasury to refill its Treasury’s General Account at the Fed as well as the existing overbought conditions in government bonds could produce a pick-up in yields. Such a rebound in bond yields would be technical and would not signal fundamental changes in the U.S. or global business cycles, or in the savings-investment balance.  Closing Some Positions Long Latin American / short emerging Asian equity indexes. This position has generated a 6% loss since its initiation on October 11, 2018 and we have low confidence that it will generate positive returns going forward. Long Chinese small cap / short EM small-cap stocks. Our bet has been that Chinese private sector companies trading in Hong Kong and represented in the MSCI small-cap index will perform better than the average EM small cap. This strategy has not worked out and has produced a 4.4% loss since its recommendation on November 20, 2013. We are downgrading Colombian equities from neutral to underweight. Please refer to pages 17-20 for a detailed analysis. Instead, we are upgrading the Peruvian bourse from underweight to a neutral allocation within an EM equity portfolio. Our view remains that gold prices will continue outperforming oil.2 Peru benefits from higher gold and silver prices while Colombia is largely an oil play. Consistently, the Peruvian currency will depreciate less than the Colombian peso. These justify this allocation shift between these two bourses.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   Philippines: The Currency Holds The Key Government expenditures, in general, and infrastructure investment, in particular, will rise meaningfully in the next few months. Chart II-1Philippine Current Account Deficit Funded By Volatile Portfolio Flows Philippine Current Account Deficit Funded By Volatile Portfolio Flows Philippine Current Account Deficit Funded By Volatile Portfolio Flows Declining U.S. interest rates coupled with slumping oil prices have supported Philippine financial markets. However, the country’s balance of payments dynamics are still precarious. In particular, Philippine’s wide current account (CA) deficit will need to be funded by volatile foreign portfolio inflows as the basic balance – the sum of CA balance and net FDI – has turned negative (Chart II-1). Critically, the already wide current account deficit is set to balloon even further: First, the 2019 fiscal spending was back-loaded because a Congress impasse delayed the government budget approval to April. Hence, government expenditures, in general, and infrastructure investment, in particular, will rise meaningfully in the next few months. Higher infrastructure spending will drive imports of capital goods higher (Chart II-2). The latter accounts for 32% of total imports. Second, Philippine export growth is likely to contract anew as global trade is not recovering (Chart II-3). Chart II-2Philippine Government Infra Spending Will Accelerate Philippine Government Infra Spending Will Accelerate Philippine Government Infra Spending Will Accelerate Chart II-3Philippine Exports Will Contract Philippine Exports Will Contract Philippine Exports Will Contract We continue to expect broad portfolio capital outflows from EM. Potential for foreign outflows from the Philippines is large. Foreign ownership of local equities is high at 42%. As to foreign ownership of local currency bonds, it stands at around 13%. A renewed decline in the peso will drive away portfolio flows reinforcing additional currency depreciation. The falling peso will prevent the central bank from reducing interest rates further. Even if the central bank does not hike rates to support the peso, market-driven local rates could rise for a period of time. This is bad news for property stocks – which account for about 27% of the MSCI Philippines index. Having rallied considerably, they are at major risk as local interest rates rise. In addition, these stocks have benefited from strong real estate demand emanating from the Philippine Offshore Gaming Operators (POGO) sector – which itself has been largely driven by Chinese capital flows. Both the Chinese and Philippine authorities have begun cracking down fiercely on these operations because they are link to capital flight out of China. This crackdown will curtail capital flows into these areas and depress revenues of Philippine real estate companies. This will occur at a time when the residential market is experiencing weak demand. We continue to recommend shorting/underweighting property stocks. Finally, small cap stocks are in a bear market and are sending an ominous signal (Chart II-4). Furthermore, this bourse is neither attractive in absolute terms nor relative to EM (Chart II-5). Chart II-4Small-Cap Stocks Are In A Bear Market Small-Cap Stocks Are In A Bear Market Small-Cap Stocks Are In A Bear Market Chart II-5Philippine Equities Are Expensive Philippine Equities Are Expensive Philippine Equities Are Expensive Bottom Line: We continue recommending to short the Philippine peso against the U.S. dollar. Overall, EM dedicated investors should continue underweighting the Philippine equity, fixed income and sovereign credit markets within their respective EM universes. Ayman Kawtharani, Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com Colombia: A Top In The Business Cycle? Colombia’s business cycle has reached a top and growth will slow considerably in the next 12 months. Falling oil prices and fiscal tightening will cause the Colombian economy to slow down in the next 12 months. What’s more, a depreciating peso and sticky inflation will prevent the central bank (Banrep) from frontloading rate cuts to mitigate the downtrend. The Colombian peso is making new cyclical lows and more weakness is in the cards. While the currency is slightly cheap according to the real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs (Chart III-1), our negative view on oil prices entails further currency depreciation. Colombia is still very heavily reliant on oil exports – the current account deficit is 4.3% of GDP with oil, but 8.4% excluding it (Chart III-2). Moreover, a chunk of FDIs are destined for the energy sector, and foreign portfolio flows are contingent on exchange rate stability. Therefore, falling oil prices and a weaker peso will result in diminishing FDIs and foreign portfolio flows, reinforcing downward pressure on the currency. Chart III-1The Colombian Peso Is Not That Cheap The Colombian Peso Is Not That Cheap The Colombian Peso Is Not That Cheap Chart III-2Current Account Deficit Is Large And Widening Current Account Deficit Is Large And Widening Current Account Deficit Is Large And Widening Notably, there is a significant pass-through effect from the currency to inflation (Chart III-3). Even though Banrep does not target the exchange rate, having both headline and core inflation above the 3% central target will constrict it from cutting interest rates soon. On the whole, odds are that Colombia’s business cycle has reached a top and growth will slow considerably in the next 12 months. The yield curve is signaling an economic slowdown ahead (Chart III-4). Chart III_3The Exchange Rate And Inflation The Exchange Rate And Inflation The Exchange Rate And Inflation Chart III-4Domestic Demand Is About To Roll Over Domestic Demand Is About To Roll Over Domestic Demand Is About To Roll Over Our credit and fiscal spending impulse might be peaking, signifying a top in domestic demand growth (Chart III-5). The impulse is rolling over primarily due to the substantial fiscal tightening. Duque’s administration has slashed expenditures and the latter are contracting in inflation-adjusted terms (Chart III-6). Chart III-5A Top In The Business Cycle? A Top In The Business Cycle? A Top In The Business Cycle? Chart III-6Severe Fiscal Tightening Severe Fiscal Tightening Severe Fiscal Tightening   Government revenues are highly dependent on oil exports, and the recent fall in oil prices will bring about a contraction in fiscal revenues. This, and the government’s strong adherence to fiscal surplus, implies no loosening up on the fiscal side. Finally, our proxy for marginal propensity to spend for businesses and households is indicating that growth is about to roll over (Chart III-7). Auto sales are also weakening, and housing sales are contracting (Chart III-8). Chart III-7The Business Cycle Is Peaking The Business Cycle Is Peaking The Business Cycle Is Peaking Chart III-8Colombia: Certain Segments Have Turned Over Colombia: Certain Segments Have Turned Over Colombia: Certain Segments Have Turned Over Given that both fiscal and monetary policies are unlikely to be relaxed soon, the peso will come under renewed selling pressure, acting as a release valve for the Colombian economy. Investment Recommendations We are downgrading this bourse from neutral to an underweight allocation within a dedicated EM equity portfolio. In its place, we are upgrading Peruvian stocks from underweight to neutral. Continue shorting COP versus RUB. This trade has generated a 14% return since its initiation on May 31st of last year. Finally, within EM local currency bond and sovereign credit portfolios, Colombia warrants a neutral allocation. We also recommend fixed-income investors continue to bet on further yield curve flattening: receive 10-year / pay 1-year swap rates.   Juan Egaña, Research Associate juane@bcaresearch.com   Argentina: Do Not Catch A Falling Knife The latest rout in Argentine markets has brought fears of another sovereign debt default or restructuring. Are conditions right for buying Argentine markets? Politics complicate the assessment of a debt restructuring and we do not recommend bottom fishing in Argentine financial markets. Looking at the profile of past financial crises and debt defaults, there might be more downside in Argentine asset prices. Sovereign U.S. dollar bond prices remain well above their 2002 and 2008 lows (Chart IV-1). Compared with previous EM financial crises, Argentine stocks might still have considerable downside in U.S. dollar terms (Chart IV-2). Chart IV-1Things Could Get Worse Things Could Get Worse Things Could Get Worse Chart IV-2Historical Patterns Suggest More Downside In Bank Stocks Historical Patterns Suggest More Downside In Bank Stocks Historical Patterns Suggest More Downside In Bank Stocks The equity market index has relapsed below its 2018 lows in dollar terms, which technically qualifies as a breakdown and entails fresh lows ahead (Chart IV-3). Chart IV-3A Technical Breakdown In Argentine Equities A Technical Breakdown In Argentine Equities A Technical Breakdown In Argentine Equities In addition to political uncertainty and rising possibility of a left-wing run government, the nation’s ability to service its foreign currency debt has deteriorated with the currency plunging to new lows. Specifically, the country has large foreign debts of $275 billion. Foreign obligation payments in the next 12 months are about $40 billion. The government lacks foreign currency reserves and export revenues necessary to service its external debt. The central bank’s net foreign exchange reserves (excluding FX swaps and gold) are about $17 billion. The country’s annual exports are $77.5 billion. With agricultural commodities prices falling, exports will likely shrink. By and large, our downbeat stance from April remains intact. Bottom Line: Investors should continue avoiding and underweighting Argentine financial markets.   Andrija Vesic, Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please note this is the view of BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy service and is different from BCA’s house view. Clients can read the debate between various BCA strategists in the report What Goes On Between Those Walls? BCA’s Diverging Views In The Open. Please click on the link to access it. 2    We recommended the long gold / short copper and oil trade on July 11, 2019 and this position remains intact. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Fixed-Income And Credit Recommendations

Chart II-1Philippine Current Account Deficit Funded By Volatile Portfolio Flows Philippine Current Account Deficit Funded By Volatile Portfolio Flows Philippine Current Account Deficit Funded By Volatile Portfolio Flows   Declining U.S. interest rates coupled with slumping oil prices have supported Philippine financial markets. However, the country’s balance of payments dynamics are still precarious. In particular, Philippine’s wide current account (CA) deficit will need to be funded by volatile foreign portfolio inflows as the basic balance – the sum of CA balance and net FDI – has turned negative (Chart II-1). Critically, the already wide current account deficit is set to balloon even further: First, the 2019 fiscal spending was back-loaded because a Congress impasse delayed the government budget approval to April. Hence, government expenditures, in general, and infrastructure investment, in particular, will rise meaningfully in the next few months. Higher infrastructure spending will drive imports of capital goods higher (Chart II-2). The latter accounts for 32% of total imports. Second, Philippine export growth is likely to contract anew as global trade is not recovering (Chart II-3). Chart II-2Philippine Government Infra Spending Will Accelerate Philippine Government Infra Spending Will Accelerate Philippine Government Infra Spending Will Accelerate Chart II-3Philippine Exports Will Contract Philippine Exports Will Contract Philippine Exports Will Contract We continue to expect broad portfolio capital outflows from EM. Potential for foreign outflows from the Philippines is large. Foreign ownership of local equities is high at 42%. As to foreign ownership of local currency bonds, it stands at around 13%. A renewed decline in the peso will drive away portfolio flows reinforcing additional currency depreciation. The falling peso will prevent the central bank from reducing interest rates further. Even if the central bank does not hike rates to support the peso, market-driven local rates could rise for a period of time. This is bad news for property stocks – which account for about 27% of the MSCI Philippines index. Having rallied considerably, they are at major risk as local interest rates rise. In addition, these stocks have benefited from strong real estate demand emanating from the Philippine Offshore Gaming Operators (POGO) sector – which itself has been largely driven by Chinese capital flows. Both the Chinese and Philippine authorities have begun cracking down fiercely on these operations because they are link to capital flight out of China. This crackdown will curtail capital flows into these areas and depress revenues of Philippine real estate companies. This will occur at a time when the residential market is experiencing weak demand. We continue to recommend shorting/underweighting property stocks. Finally, small cap stocks are in a bear market and are sending an ominous signal (Chart II-4). Furthermore, this bourse is neither attractive in absolute terms nor relative to EM (Chart II-5). Chart II-4Small-Cap Stocks Are In A Bear Market Small-Cap Stocks Are In A Bear Market Small-Cap Stocks Are In A Bear Market Chart II-5Philippine Equities Are Expensive Philippine Equities Are Expensive Philippine Equities Are Expensive Bottom Line: We continue recommending to short the Philippine peso against the U.S. dollar. Overall, EM dedicated investors should continue underweighting the Philippine equity, fixed income and sovereign credit markets within their respective EM universes. Ayman Kawtharani, Editor/Strategist ayman@bcaresearch.com

Philippine stocks have outperformed the EM benchmark lately and have risen in absolute terms due to the sharp drop in U.S. rates (Chart II-1). Chart II-1Philippine Stocks Relative Performance Philippine Stocks Relative Performance Philippine Stocks Relative Performance Yet, investors have been ignoring the buildup in genuine inflationary pressures in the economy. Consequently, the latter will carry negative repercussions for Philippine financial markets. In particular, unit labor costs are on the cusp of rising precariously. For instance, the minimum wage in Metro Manila increased by 5% in 2019 – the highest largest hike in six years. Meanwhile, President Rodrigo Duterte issued an executive order raising salaries for government workers and military personnel. Worryingly, President Duterte is also attempting to pass a bill to abolish contractual labor. The latter is a very favorable form of hiring for employers. President Duterte made the successful passing of this bill a top priority and has been urging Congress to fast-track it. In the meantime, President Dueterte issued an executive order banning companies from hiring certain types of contract-based employment. This policy is already starting to take a toll on companies. For instance, Murata Manufacturing, a Japanese electronics parts maker, saw its labor costs surge by 20% in the Philippines as it was ordered to convert 400 of its contract employees to full-time workers. Higher labor costs will push up inflation and/or squeeze companies’ profit margins. In the meantime, the Philippines’ fiscal policy remains extremely stimulative. Government expenditures are currently growing at an 18% rate annually. This is despite the fact that the fiscal deficit is widening sharply (Chart II-2, top panel). Chart II-2The Philippines: A Large Twin Deficit The Philippines: A Large Twin Deficit The Philippines: A Large Twin Deficit Consequently, higher wages and fiscal spending will keep domestic demand robust, worsening the Philippines’ current account deficit (Chart II-2, bottom panel). The latter is a form of hidden inflation as it gauges the level of excess demand relative to the productive capacity of the economy. Crucially, given president Duterte’s reluctance to cut government spending, it will be up to monetary policy to solely contain inflation. Yet the independence of Philippine’s central bank – Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas or BSP – is questionable: In March, president Duterete appointed his former budget secretary Benjamin Diokno as the new governor of the central bank. Therefore, the BSP will continue to err on the side of easy monetary policy and will further fall behind the curve. In particular, the BSP might justify staying on hold by the fact that headline and core inflation are now falling. However, that might prove to be a temporary development. Muted headline and core consumer inflation mainly reflect the crash in oil prices late last year. In particular, core inflation dipped because prices of items sensitive to oil prices – such as transportation costs and electricity – fell. The recent spike in oil prices will push inflation higher in the coming months. Crucially, the Philippines inflation problem is genuine in nature because it emanates from higher wages, rising unit labor costs and credit and fiscal stimulus-driven demand excesses. Genuine inflation coupled with a central bank that is behind the curve is a disastrous recipe for the currency. We recommend shorting the peso versus the U.S. dollar. A plunging Philippine peso will cause local bond yields to rise, hurting the stock market. While the central bank could choose to defend the currency by selling foreign exchange reserves, such policy will shrink the banking system liquidity – excess reserves at the BSP – which will result in higher interbank rates. On the whole, the BSP is facing the Impossible Trinity dilemma: given the nation has an open capital account, it cannot control both interest rates and the exchange rate simultaneously. Commercial banks and property stocks – which make up 15% and 29% of the Philippines MSCI market cap – will sell off hard as the currency depreciates and interest rates come under upward pressure. We continue to recommend shorting property stocks. The previous rise in interest rates is already hurting interest-rate sensitive sectors in the Philippines as credit growth is slowing sharply – albeit from a high level (Chart II-3). Commercial banks will in turn face rising NPLs and will be forced to raise provisions markedly. Both NPLs and provisions are currently too low in light of the relentless credit boom of the past several years. Finally, commercial banks have been lowering their provisions to boost their profits (Chart II-4, top panel). This means provisions will have to rise aggressively and bank earnings will contract severely. This will come on top of low net interest income margins (Chart II-4, bottom panel). Chart II-3Philippine Real Estate Stocks Are Ignoring Slowing Credit Growth Philippine Real Estate Stocks Are Ignoring Slowing Credit Growth Philippine Real Estate Stocks Are Ignoring Slowing Credit Growth Chart II-4Weak Profitability Ahead For Commercial Banks Weak Profitability Ahead For Commercial Banks Weak Profitability Ahead For Commercial Banks   Bottom Line: We are initiating a new trade: short the PHP against the U.S. dollar. Equity investors should continue underweighting Philippine stocks relative to the EM benchmark, and within this bourse short property stocks. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com  

Analysis on the Philippines and Argentina are below. Highlights Analysis on the Philippines starts on page 9 and Argentina on page 12. Relative return on capital for non-financial corporations points to continuous EM equity underperformance versus the U.S. and probably versus other DMs as well. Taking into consideration the poor corporate profitability, EM equity valuations are not attractive in absolute or relative terms. The rationale for continuous U.S. dollar appreciation is a superior return on capital in the U.S. relative to the rest of the world. Short the Korean won and the Philippines peso versus the U.S. dollar. Feature In general, the most important drivers of relative equity performance between emerging and developed markets are corporate profitability and exchange rates. The outlook for corporate earnings and profitability at the current juncture is poor for EM in both absolute terms and versus the U.S. Further, the U.S. dollar is in the process of breaking out. As this breakout transpires, EM equities will continue to underperform their U.S. and probably DM counterparts. The most important drivers of relative equity performance between emerging and developed markets are corporate profitability and exchange rates. Corporate Profitability Chart I-1Relative Corporate Profitability And Share Prices: EM Versus U.S. Relative Corporate Profitability And Share Prices: EM Versus U.S. Relative Corporate Profitability And Share Prices: EM Versus U.S. Chart I-1 shows relative share prices in common currency terms along with the average of relative return on equity (RoE) and return on assets (RoA) for non-financial companies in EM and the U.S. This chart portends that in the medium- and long term, relative RoE and RoA explain relative equity prices in common currency terms reasonably well. Importantly, both RoE and RoA are ratios and are therefore not impacted by exchange rates. Consequently, it is reasonable to use RoE and RoA to gauge both share prices and exchange rates. Critically, relative RoE and RoA are not impacted by currency movements either. Further, we use EBITDA to calculate these profitability ratios for both EM and the U.S. As a result, they are not influenced by last year’s U.S. tax cuts as well as by corporate depreciation and one-off adjustments (Chart I-2). What’s more, we use data for non-financial companies because profitability measures for financial companies, especially banks, are contingent on their recognition of bad loans and provisioning. If banks lend a lot but do not provision, their profitability becomes unjustifiably inflated. Chart I-2Non-Financials Corporate Profitability: EM And U.S. Non-Financials Corporate Profitability: EM And U.S. Non-Financials Corporate Profitability: EM And U.S. Going forward, the outlook for EM versus DM share price performance largely hinges on currency market dynamics. If the dollar experiences a broad-based upsurge, which appears to be emerging, EM will likely underperform not only the U.S., but DM ex-U.S. as well. The rationale is that currency depreciation will be more positive for equity markets in Europe, Japan, Canada and Australia than for EM bourses. The former group does not have U.S. dollar debt, while currency weakness will boost the profits of their non-financial companies. Meanwhile, many EM companies are sitting on U.S. dollar debt, and as such currency depreciation is toxic for them. Bottom Line: Relative RoE and RoA for non-financials point to continuous EM underperformance versus the U.S. Profitability And Equity Valuations Is it possible that EM corporate profitability is currently improving, and valuations are already discounting a lot of the negatives? Shouldn’t relative corporate profitability be compared with relative equity valuations between EM and the U.S.? For now, there are no signs that EM corporate profitability is improving. On the contrary, our best indicator for EM EPS in dollar terms points to continuous profit contraction until the end of this year (Chart I-3). As EM EPS shrinks, RoE and RoA will also decline. Stabilization and potential improvement in China’s growth could benefit EM corporate revenues and profits toward year-end. However, to date, China’s imports from EM and the rest of the world continue to contract. China’s credit and fiscal spending impulse leads its manufacturing PMI's import sub-component by nine months and predicts a bottoming around August (Chart I-4). Chart I-3EM EPS Is ##br##Contracting EM EPS Is Contracting EM EPS Is Contracting Chart I-4Chinese Imports Will Stabilize Around August Chinese Imports Will Stabilize Around August Chinese Imports Will Stabilize Around August Notably, the continued deterioration in EM top and bottom lines implies that EM ex-financials’ RoE and RoA will roll over at their 2008 lows -- reached at the nadir of the global recession (Chart I-5). Investors should elect the multiples they want to pay for companies that cannot deliver RoE and RoA above their 2008 lows. Chart I-5EM Corporate Profitability And Multiples EM Corporate Profitability And Multiples EM Corporate Profitability And Multiples Taking into consideration such historically low RoE and RoA, EM equity valuations do not appear cheap. The bottom panel of Chart I-5 illustrates that, stripping out the 10% of sub-sectors with the highest and lowest multiples, EM equity multiples are at their historical mean. As to U.S. corporate profits, the key risks are a strong dollar and a potential profit margin squeeze. Nevertheless, a rising dollar is an even bigger risk to EM equities than it is to U.S. equity prices. U.S. share prices always outperform EM equities in common currency terms when the greenback is appreciating. Bottom Line: After adjusting for corporate profitability, EM equity valuations are not attractive in absolute or relative terms. Return On Capital Drives Exchange Rates The U.S. dollar is attempting to break out, and odds are that it will succeed. This will again challenge EM risk assets, as the latter typically perform poorly when the greenback appreciates. The rationale for continuous U.S. dollar appreciation is the superior return on capital in the U.S. relative to the rest of the world. Currency markets are often driven by relative return on capital.1 Chart I-6 shows the average of U.S. non-financials’ RoE and RoA relative to the same measure for DM ex-U.S. Broadly, the long-term trends in the narrow trade-weighted dollar have tracked the relative corporate profitability ratios between non-financial companies in the U.S. and other DMs. Relative return on capital at the moment suggests an upleg in the greenback. Chart I-6Relative Return On Capital And U.S. Dollar Relative Return On Capital And U.S. Dollar Relative Return On Capital And U.S. Dollar The thesis that exchange rate gyrations are steered by the relative trajectory of return on capital is especially true in EM. As exhibited in Chart I-7, relative RoE and RoA between EM- and U.S.-listed non-financial companies foreshadows EM exchange rate movements reasonably well, and points to further EM currency depreciation. Chart I-7Relative Return On Capital And EM Currencies Relative Return On Capital And EM Currencies Relative Return On Capital And EM Currencies While interest rate differentials also correlate with exchange rates in DM, the former often reflect a relative return-on-capital differential. For example, when an economy performs well amid rising interest rates, it implies that its potential growth and potential return on capital are sufficiently high. Typically, the currency of that country will tend to appreciate. By contrast, when an economy struggles amid rising interest rates, it is a sign that its potential growth and potential return on capital are poor, and that the current level of interest rates is unsustainably high. In this scenario, the exchange rate will most likely depreciate despite rising interest rates. In a nutshell, return on capital is an important driver of exchange rates. Chart I-8Interest Rates Do Not Drive EM Currencies Interest Rates Do Not Drive EM Currencies Interest Rates Do Not Drive EM Currencies In developing countries, the interest rate differential with the U.S. cannot be used to forecast exchange rates. As can be seen from Chart I-8, high-yielding currencies such as the ZAR and BRL have often been negatively correlated with their respective interest rate spread over U.S. rates. Crucially, in the case of high-yielding EM currencies, exchange rate swings often steer interest rates. When these currencies depreciate, both their interest rates and their spread over U.S. rates rise. In contrast, appreciation of high-yielding EM currencies prompt interest rates in their respective economies to drop, and their spread with U.S. rates to narrow. Bottom Line: U.S. relative return on capital is ascending versus both EM and other DM, heralding further dollar appreciation. Investment Observations And Conclusions The snapshot of the above analysis is that the relative return on capital explains both relative share price performance and exchange rates. Chart I-9 demonstrates that EM relative equity performance tracks the trajectory of EM relative EPS versus the U.S. in both common and local currency terms. Chart I-9EM Versus U.S.: EPS And Stock Prices EM Versus U.S.: EPS And Stock Prices EM Versus U.S.: EPS And Stock Prices It is tempting to bet on a mean reversal in EM relative equity performance against the U.S. However, our indicators do not point to such a reversal in EM underperformance for now. In short, we continue to recommend underweighting EM stocks versus DM in general and versus the U.S. in particular. Finally, the U.S. dollar is poised to stage a meaningful rally. Last week, we showed that currency volatility has dropped to historic lows. Typically, this occurs before a major market move (Chart I-10). Our view has been one of dollar appreciation, and recent market actions vindicate this stance. In our Special Report on Korea published on February 28, we flagged a tapering wedge pattern in the KRW/USD exchange rate and recommended going long the KRW on a breakout, or short on a breakdown. The won seems to have broken down, so we now recommend shorting the KRW versus the U.S. dollar (Chart I-11). In the meantime, we are taking profits on our short KRW/long equal-weighted basket of the U.S. dollar and JPY trade. This trade has generated a 3.9% gain since its initiation on February 14, 2018. Chart I-10The Dollar Is On Verge Of Major Move The Dollar Is On Verge Of Major Move The Dollar Is On Verge Of Major Move Chart I-11The Korean Won Is Breaking Down The Korean Won Is Breaking Down The Korean Won Is Breaking Down ​​​​​​To play EM exchange rate depreciation, we continue to recommend shorting the following basket of EM currencies against the U.S. dollar: ZAR, CLP, IDR, MYR, PHP and KRW. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com   The Philippines: Dovish Central Bank Amid Rising Inflation = Currency Plunge Philippine stocks have outperformed the EM benchmark lately and have risen in absolute terms due to the sharp drop in U.S. rates (Chart II-1). Chart II-1Philippine Stocks Relative Performance Philippine Stocks Relative Performance Philippine Stocks Relative Performance Yet, investors have been ignoring the buildup in genuine inflationary pressures in the economy. Consequently, the latter will carry negative repercussions for Philippine financial markets. In particular, unit labor costs are on the cusp of rising precariously. For instance, the minimum wage in Metro Manila increased by 5% in 2019 – the highest largest hike in six years. Meanwhile, President Rodrigo Duterte issued an executive order raising salaries for government workers and military personnel. Worryingly, President Duterte is also attempting to pass a bill to abolish contractual labor. The latter is a very favorable form of hiring for employers. President Duterte made the successful passing of this bill a top priority and has been urging Congress to fast-track it. In the meantime, President Dueterte issued an executive order banning companies from hiring certain types of contract-based employment. This policy is already starting to take a toll on companies. For instance, Murata Manufacturing, a Japanese electronics parts maker, saw its labor costs surge by 20% in the Philippines as it was ordered to convert 400 of its contract employees to full-time workers. Higher labor costs will push up inflation and/or squeeze companies’ profit margins. Investors have been ignoring the buildup in genuine inflationary pressures in the economy. In the meantime, the Philippines’ fiscal policy remains extremely stimulative. Government expenditures are currently growing at an 18% rate annually. This is despite the fact that the fiscal deficit is widening sharply (Chart II-2, top panel). Chart II-2The Philippines: A Large Twin Deficit The Philippines: A Large Twin Deficit The Philippines: A Large Twin Deficit Consequently, higher wages and fiscal spending will keep domestic demand robust, worsening the Philippines’ current account deficit (Chart II-2, bottom panel). The latter is a form of hidden inflation as it gauges the level of excess demand relative to the productive capacity of the economy. Crucially, given president Duterte’s reluctance to cut government spending, it will be up to monetary policy to solely contain inflation. Yet the independence of Philippine’s central bank – Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas or BSP – is questionable: In March, president Duterete appointed his former budget secretary Benjamin Diokno as the new governor of the central bank. Therefore, the BSP will continue to err on the side of easy monetary policy and will further fall behind the curve. In particular, the BSP might justify staying on hold by the fact that headline and core inflation are now falling. However, that might prove to be a temporary development. Muted headline and core consumer inflation mainly reflect the crash in oil prices late last year. In particular, core inflation dipped because prices of items sensitive to oil prices – such as transportation costs and electricity – fell. The recent spike in oil prices will push inflation higher in the coming months. Crucially, the Philippines inflation problem is genuine in nature because it emanates from higher wages, rising unit labor costs and credit and fiscal stimulus-driven demand excesses. Genuine inflation coupled with a central bank that is behind the curve is a disastrous recipe for the currency. We recommend shorting the peso versus the U.S. dollar. A plunging Philippine peso will cause local bond yields to rise, hurting the stock market. While the central bank could choose to defend the currency by selling foreign exchange reserves, such policy will shrink the banking system liquidity – excess reserves at the BSP – which will result in higher interbank rates. On the whole, the BSP is facing the Impossible Trinity dilemma: given the nation has an open capital account, it cannot control both interest rates and the exchange rate simultaneously. Commercial banks and property stocks – which make up 15% and 29% of the Philippines MSCI market cap – will sell off hard as the currency depreciates and interest rates come under upward pressure. We continue to recommend shorting property stocks. The previous rise in interest rates is already hurting interest-rate sensitive sectors in the Philippines as credit growth is slowing sharply – albeit from a high level (Chart II-3). Commercial banks will in turn face rising NPLs and will be forced to raise provisions markedly. Both NPLs and provisions are currently too low in light of the relentless credit boom of the past several years. Finally, commercial banks have been lowering their provisions to boost their profits (Chart II-4, top panel). This means provisions will have to rise aggressively and bank earnings will contract severely. This will come on top of low net interest income margins (Chart II-4, bottom panel). Chart II-3Philippine Real Estate Stocks Are Ignoring Slowing Credit Growth Philippine Real Estate Stocks Are Ignoring Slowing Credit Growth Philippine Real Estate Stocks Are Ignoring Slowing Credit Growth Chart II-4Weak Profitability Ahead For Commercial Banks Weak Profitability Ahead For Commercial Banks Weak Profitability Ahead For Commercial Banks Bottom Line: We are initiating a new trade: short the PHP against the U.S. dollar. Equity investors should continue underweighting Philippine stocks relative to the EM benchmark, and within this bourse short property stocks. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com   Argentina: A Point Of No Return? The Argentine peso remains vulnerable due to deficient external funding and public debt sustainability concerns. A lack of external funding and a depreciating peso are causing rising inflation and interest rates. The latter are spurring a downfall in the economy diminishing incumbent President Mauricio Macri’s re-election chances. Chart III-1A Point Of No Return? A Point Of No Return? A Point Of No Return? Importantly, a depreciating peso, as well as high and rising external and domestic borrowing costs are making public debt unsustainable. All of these dynamics are feeding into plunging investor confidence creating a powerful negative feedback loop. Argentina may have reached a point of no return (Chart III-1). The odds that the authorities can stabilize financial markets are rapidly diminishing. Foreign currency-denominated public debt currently stands at $250 billion, and the country’s foreign debt service obligations for 2019 alone are $40 billion. We estimate the country will require an additional $10 billion of external funding this year (Table III-1). Chart III- Given worsening investor sentiment, both the public and private sectors will not be able to raise external funding. As icing on the proverbial cake, potential U.S. dollar appreciation and portfolio outflows out of EM will reinforce the turmoil in Argentine markets. Argentina may have reached a point of no return. The odds that the authorities can stabilize financial markets are rapidly diminishing. Hence, without the IMF’s authorization for the central bank to use a large share of its foreign currency reserves to defend the exchange rate, the peso will continue to fall. How much more downside could there be in Argentina’s financial markets and economy? When compared with the major financial crises, bank share prices could drop much more. For example, Argentine banks stocks plunged by 95% in U.S. dollar terms during the nation’s 2001-2002 crisis (Chart III-2, top panel). During the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, bank equities in Korea and Thailand on average dropped by 95% in dollar terms (Chart III-2, bottom panel). Chart III-2History Suggests More Downside In Argentine Equities History Suggests More Downside In Argentine Equities History Suggests More Downside In Argentine Equities Chart III- By comparison, since their peak in January 2018, Argentine banks are down 66% in dollar terms. Hence, more downside should not come as a surprise. As to currency depreciation, the peso’s real effective exchange rate has so far depreciated by 36% and remains undervalued by one standard deviation (Chart III-3). This compares with median and mean of 52% devaluations during previous crises in Argentina (Table III-2). Thus, more downside is likely in the currency in both real and nominal terms. The contraction in economic activity in this recession has so far been 6.5% (Table III-2). This is on par with median and mean contractions of 7% during previous crises but economic activity can undershoot this time. Chart III-3The Currency Can Get Cheaper The Currency Can Get Cheaper The Currency Can Get Cheaper Bottom Line: Investors should continue to avoid Argentine financial markets, as the downside could still be substantial. Do not catch a falling knife.   Andrija Vesic, Research Analyst AndrijaV@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 We herein use the term return on capital in a broader sense. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights So what? EM elections bring opportunities as well as risks. Why?   Emerging market equities will benefit as long as China’s stimulus does not fizzle. Modi is on track to win India’s election – which is a positive – though risks lie to the downside. Thailand’s next cycle of political instability is beginning, but we are still cyclically overweight. Indonesia will defy the global “strongman” narrative – go overweight tactically. Populism remains a headwind to Philippine and Turkish assets. Wait for Europe to stabilize before pursuing Turkish plays. Feature Chart 1Risks of China's Stimulus Have Shifted To The Upside Risks of China's Stimulus Have Shifted To The Upside Risks of China's Stimulus Have Shifted To The Upside China’s official PMIs in March came at just the right time for jittery emerging market investors awaiting the all-important March credit data. EM equities, unlike the most China-sensitive plays, have fallen back since late January, after outperforming their DM peers since October (Chart 1). This occurred amid a stream of negative economic data and policy uncertainties: China’s mixed signals, prolonged U.S.-China trade negotiations, the Fed’s extended “pause” in rate hikes, the inversion of the yield curve, Brexit, and general European gloom. We have been constructive on EM plays since February 20, when we determined that the risks of China’s stimulus had shifted to the upside. However, several of the EM bourses that are best correlated with Chinese stimulus are already richly valued (the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, etc). The good news is that a series of elections this spring provide a glimpse into the internal politics of several of these countries, which will help determine which ones will outperform if we are correct that global growth will find its footing by Q3.  First, A Word On Turkey … More Monetary Expansion On The Way Local elections in Turkey on March 31 have dealt a black eye to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. His ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) has lost control of the capital Ankara for the first time since 2004. Erdogan has also (arguably) conceded the mayoralty of Istanbul, the economic center of the country, where he first rose to power in 1994. Other cities also fell to the opposition. Vote-counting is over and the aftermath will involve a flurry of accusations, investigations, and possibly unrest. Erdogan’s inability to win elections with more than a slim majority is a continual source of insecurity for him and his administration. This weekend’s local elections reinforce the point. The AKP alone failed to cross 45% in terms of popular votes. Combined with its traditional ally – the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) – it received 51.6% of the total vote (in the 2015 elections, the two parties combined for over 60% of the vote). While losing the local elections will not upset the balance in parliament, it is a rebuke to Erdogan over his economic policy and a warning to the AKP for the future. Erdogan does not face general elections until 2023. But judging by his response to the first serious challenge to his rule – the Gezi Park protests of May 2013 – his reaction will be to double down on unorthodox, populist economic policy. Chart 2Erdogan Will Respond With Populist Politics Erdogan Will Respond With Populist Politics Erdogan Will Respond With Populist Politics Back in 2013, the government responded to the domestic challenge through expansive monetary policy. The central bank gave extraordinary liquidity provisions to the banking system. Chart 2 clearly shows that the liquidity injections began with the Gezi protests. These provisions only paused in 2016-17, when global growth rebounded on the back of Chinese stimulus and EM asset prices rose, supporting Turkey’s currency and enabling the central bank to hold off. Today, the severe contraction in GDP (by 3% in Q4 2018), with a negative global backdrop, will likely end Erdogan’s patience with tight monetary policy.1 To illustrate how tight policy has been, note that bank loan growth denominated in lira is contracting at a rate of 17% in real terms. Given the authorities’ populist track record, rising unemployment will likely lead to further “backdoor” liquidity easing. A new bout of unorthodox monetary policy will be negative for domestic bank equities, local-currency bonds, and the lira. As one of the first EM currencies and bourses to begin outperforming in September 2018, Turkey has been at the forefront of the EM mini-rally over the past six months. But with global growth still tepid, this mini-cycle is likely to come to an end for the time being. Watch for the bottoming in Chinese followed by European growth before seeking new opportunities in Turkish assets. Erdogan’s domestic troubles could also prompt him to renew his foreign combativeness, which raises tail risks to Turkish risk assets, such as through U.S. punitive measures. Last year, Erdogan responded to the economic downswing by toning down his belligerent rhetoric and mending fences with Europe and the U.S. However, a reversion to populism may require him to seek a convenient distraction. The U.S. is withdrawing from Syria and the Middle East, leaving Turkey in a position where it needs other relationships to pursue its interests. Russia is a key example. Currently Erdogan is bickering with the U.S. over the planned purchase of a missile defense system from Russia. But the consequence is that relations with the U.S. could deteriorate further, potentially leading to new sanctions. Bottom Line: Turkey is still in the grip of populist politics and will respond to the recession and domestic discontent with easier monetary policy which would bode ill for the lira and lira-denominated assets. The stabilization of the European economy is necessary before investors attempt to take advantage of the de-rating of Turkish assets. India: Focus On Modi’s Political Capital We have long maintained that Modi is likely to stay in power after India’s general election on April 11-May 19. His coalition has recovered in public opinion polling since the Valentine’s Day attack on Indian security forces in Indian Kashmir (Chart 3). The government responded to the attacks by ordering airstrikes on February 26 against Pakistani targets in Pakistani territory for the first time since 1974. The attack was theatrical but the subsequent rally-around-the-flag effect gave Modi and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) a badly needed popular boost. The market rallied on the back of Modi’s higher chances of reelection. Modi is the more business-friendly candidate, as opposed to his chief rival, Rahul Gandhi of the Indian Congress Party. Nevertheless, election risks still lie to the downside: Modi and his party are hardly likely to outperform their current 58% share of seats in the lower house of parliament, since the conditions for a wave election – similar to the one that delivered the BJP a single-party majority in 2014 – do not exist today. While the range of outcomes is extremely broad (Chart 4), the current seat projections shown in Chart 3 put Modi’s coalition right on the majority line. Meanwhile his power is already waning in the state legislatures. Chart 3 Chart 4 Thus Modi’s reform agenda has lost momentum, at least until he can form a new coalition. This will take time and markets may ultimately be disappointed by the insufficiency of the tools at his disposal in his second term. Indian equities are the most expensive in the EM space, and only more so after the sharp rally in March on the back of the Kashmir clash and Modi’s recovering reelection chances (Chart 5). Additional clashes with Pakistan are not unlikely during the election season, despite the current appearance of calm. This is because Modi’s patriotic dividend in the polls could fade. Since even voters who lack confidence in Modi as a leader believe that Pakistan is a serious threat (Chart 6), he could be encouraged to stir up tensions yet again. This would be playing with fire but he may be tempted to do it if his polling relapses or if Pakistan takes additional actions. Chart 5...And Lofty Valuations ...And Lofty Valuations ...And Lofty Valuations Chart 6 Further escalation would be positive for markets only so long as it boosts Modi’s chances of reelection without triggering a wider conflict. Yet the standoff revealed that these two powers continue to run high risks of miscalculation: their signaling is not crystal clear; deterrence could fail. Thus, further escalation could become harder to control and could spook the financial markets.2 Even if Modi eschews any further jingoism, his lead is tenuous. First, the economic slowdown is taking a toll – even the official unemployment rate is rising (Chart 7) and the government has been caught manipulating statistics. There is no time for the economy to recover enough to change voters’ minds. Opinion polls show that even BJP voters are not very happy about the past five years. They care more about jobs and inflation than they do about terrorism, and a majority thinks these factors have deteriorated over Modi’s five-year term (Chart 8). Chart 7Manipulated Stats Can't Hide Deteriorating Economy Manipulated Stats Can't Hide Deteriorating Economy Manipulated Stats Can't Hide Deteriorating Economy   Chart 8 If the polling does not change, Modi will win with a weak mandate at best. A minority government or a hung parliament is possible. A Congress Party-led coalition, which would be a market-negative event, cannot be ruled out. The latter especially would prompt a big selloff, but anything short of a single-party majority for Modi will register as a disappointment. Bottom Line: There may be a relief rally after Modi is seen to survive as prime minister, but his likely weak political capital in parliament will be disappointing for markets. The market will want additional, ambitious structural reforms on top of what Modi has already done, but he will struggle to deliver in the near term. While we are structurally bullish, in the context of this election cycle –  which includes rising oil prices that hinder Indian equity outperformance – we urge readers to remain underweight Indian equities within emerging markets. Thailand: An Outperformer Despite Quasi-Military Rule Chart A new cycle of political instability is beginning in Thailand as the country transitions back into civilian rule after five years under a military junta. However, this is not an immediate problem for investors, who should remain overweight Thai equities relative to other EMs on a cyclical time horizon. The source of Thai instability is inequality – both regional and economic. Regionally, 49% of the population resides in the north, northeast, and center, deprived of full representation by the royalist political and military establishment seated in Bangkok (Map 1). Economically, household wealth is extremely unevenly distributed. Thailand’s mean-to-median wealth ratio is among the highest in the world (Chart 9). Eventually these factors will drive the regional populist movement – embodied by exiled Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his family and allies – to reassert itself against the elites (the military, the palace, and the civil bureaucracy). New demands will be made for greater representation and a fairer distribution of wealth. The result will be mass street protests and disruptions of business sentiment and activity that will grab headlines sometime in the coming years, as occurred most recently in 2008-10 and 2013-14.   Chart 9 Chart 10Social Spending Did Not Hinder Populism Social Spending Did Not Hinder Populism Social Spending Did Not Hinder Populism The seeds of the next rebellion are apparent in the results of the election on March 24. The junta has sought to undercut the populists by increasing infrastructure spending and social welfare (Chart 10), and controlling rice prices for farmers. Yet the populists have still managed to garner enough seats in the lower house to frustrate the junta’s plans for a seamless transition to “guided” civilian rule. The final vote count is not due until May 9 but unofficial estimates suggest that the opposition parties have won a majority or very nearly a majority in the lower house. This is despite the fact that the junta rewrote the constitution, redesigned the electoral system to be proportional (thus watering down the biggest opposition parties), and hand-picked the 250-seat senate. Such results point to the irrepressible population dynamics of the “Red Shirt” opposition in Thailand, which has won every free election since 2001. Nevertheless, the military and its allies (the “Yellow Shirt” political establishment) are too powerful at present for the opposition to challenge them directly. The junta has several tools to shape the election results to its liking in the short run.3 It would not have gone ahead with the election were this not the case. As a result, the cycle of instability is only likely to pick up over time. Investors should note the silver lining to the period of military rule: it put a halt to the spiral of polarization at a critical time for the country. The unspoken origin of the political crisis was the royal succession. The traditional elites could not tolerate the rise of a populist movement that flirted with revolutionary ideas at the same time that the revered King Bhumibol Adulyadej drew near to passing away. This combination threatened both a succession crisis and possibly the survival of the traditional political system, a constitutional monarchy backed by a powerful army. With the 2014 coup and five-year period of military rule (lengthy even by Thai standards), the military drew a stark red line: there is no alternative to the constitutional monarchy. The royalist faction had its bottom line preserved, at the cost of an erosion of governance and democracy. The result is that going forward, there is a degree of policy certainty. Chart 11Thai Confidence Has Bottomed Thai Confidence Has Bottomed Thai Confidence Has Bottomed Chart 12Strong Demand Sans Risk Of Being Overleveraged Strong Demand Sans Risk Of Being Overleveraged Strong Demand Sans Risk Of Being Overleveraged The long-term trend of Thai consumer confidence tells the story (Chart 11). Optimism surged with the election of populist Thaksin in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis in 2001. The long national conflict that ensued – in which the elites and generals exiled Thaksin and ousted his successors, and the country dealt with a global financial crisis and natural disasters – saw consumer confidence decline. However, the coup of 2014 and the royal succession (to be completed May 4-6 with the new king’s coronation) has reversed this trend, with confidence trending upward since then. Revolution is foreclosed yet the population is looking up. Military rule is generally disinflationary in Thailand and this time around it initiated a phase of private sector deleveraging. Yet the economy has held up reasonably well. Private consumption has improved along with confidence and investment has followed, albeit sluggishly (Chart 12). The advantage is that Thailand has had slow-burn growth and has avoided becoming overleveraged again, like many EM peers. Chart 13Thailand Outperformed EM Despite Military Interference Thailand Outperformed EM Despite Military Interference Thailand Outperformed EM Despite Military Interference Furthermore, Thailand is not vulnerable to external shocks. It has a 7% current account surplus and ample foreign exchange reserves. It is not too exposed to China, either economically or geopolitically: China makes up only 12% of exports, while Bangkok has no maritime-territorial disputes with Beijing in the South China Sea. In fact, Thailand maintains good diplomatic relations with China and yet has a mutual defense treaty with the United States (the oldest such treaty in Asia). It is perhaps the most secure of any of the Southeast Asian states from the point of view of the secular U.S.-China conflict. Finally, if our forecast proves wrong and political instability returns sooner than we expect, it is important to remember that Thailand’s domestic political conflicts rarely affect equity prices in a lasting way. Global financial crises and natural disasters have had a greater impact on Thai assets over the past two decades than the long succession crisis. Thailand has outperformed both EM and EM Asia during the period of military interference, though democratic Indonesia has done better (Chart 13). Bottom Line: Thailand’s political risks are domestic and stem from regional and economic inequality, which will result in a revived opposition movement that will clash with the traditional military and political elite. This clash will eventually create policy uncertainty and political risk. But it will need to build up over time, since the military junta has strict control over the current environment. Meanwhile macro fundamentals are positive. Indonesia: Rejecting Strongman Populism We do not expect any major surprises from the Indonesian election. Instead, we expect policy continuity, a marginal positive for the country’s equities. However, stocks are overvalued, overexposed to the financial sector,4 and vulnerable if global growth does not stabilize. Chart 14 The most important trend since the near collapse of Indonesia in the late 1990s has been the stabilization of the secular democratic political system and peaceful transition of power. That trend looks to continue with President Joko Widodo’s likely victory in the election on April 17. President Jokowi defeated former general Prabowo Subianto in the 2014 election and has maintained a double-digit lead over his rival in the intervening years (Chart 14). Prabowo is a nationalist and would-be strongman leader who was accused of human rights violations during the fall of his father-in-law Suharto’s dictatorship in 1998. Emerging market polls are not always reliable but a lead of this size for this long suggests that the public knows Prabowo and does not prefer him to Jokowi. In fact he never polled above 35% support while Jokowi has generally polled above 45%. The incumbent advantage favors Jokowi. Household consumption is perking up slightly and consumer confidence is high (see Chart 11 above). Wages have received a big boost during Jokowi’s term and are now picking up again, in real as well as nominal terms and for rural as well as urban workers. Jokowi’s minimum wage law has not resulted in extravagant windfalls to labor, as was feared, and inflation remains under control (Chart 15). Government spending has been ramped up ahead of the vote (and yet Jokowi is not profligate). All of these factors support the incumbent. Real GDP growth is sluggish but has trended slightly upward for most of Jokowi’s term. Chart 15Favorable Economic Conditions Support Incumbent Jokowi Favorable Economic Conditions Support Incumbent Jokowi Favorable Economic Conditions Support Incumbent Jokowi Chart 16 Jokowi has been building badly needed infrastructure with success and has been attracting FDI to try to improve productivity (Chart 16). This is the most positive feature of his government and is set to continue if he wins. A coalition in parliament has largely supported him after an initial period of drift. The biggest challenge for Jokowi and Indonesia are lackluster macro fundamentals. For instance, twin deficits, which show a lack of savings and invite pressure on the currency, which has been very weak. The twin deficits have worsened since 2012 because China’s economic maturation has forced a painful transition on Indonesia, which it has not yet recovered from. Chart 17 There is some risk to governance as Jokowi has chosen Ma’ruf Amin, the top cleric of the world’s largest Muslim organization, as his running mate. Jokowi wants to counteract criticisms that he is not Islamic enough (or is a hidden Christian), which cost his ally the governorship of Jakarta in 2017. However, Jokowi is not a strongman leader like Erdogan in Turkey, whose combination of Islamism and populism has been disastrous for the country’s economy. As mentioned, Jokowi will be defeating the would-be strongman Prabowo, who has also allied with Islamism. In fact, Indonesia is a relatively secular and modern Muslim-majority country and Amin is the definition of an establishment religious leader. The security forces have succeeded in cracking down on militancy in the past decade, greatly improving Indonesia’s stability and security as a whole (Chart 17). Governance is weak on some measures in Indonesia, but Jokowi is better than the opposition on this front and neither his own policies nor his vice presidential pick signals a shift in a Turkey-like, Islamist, populist direction. Bottom Line: We should see Indonesian equities continue to outperform EM and EM Asia as long as China’s stimulus efforts do not collapse and global growth picks up as expected in the second half of the year. Peaceful democratic transitions and economic policy continuity have been repeatedly demonstrated in Indonesia despite the inherent difficulties of developing a populous, multi-ethnic archipelago. Nationalism is a constant risk but it would be more virulent under Jokowi’s opponent. The Philippines: Embracing Strongman Populism Chart 18 The May 13 midterm elections mark the three-year halfway point in President Rodrigo Duterte’s presidential term. Duterte is still popular, with approval ratings in the 75%-85% range. These numbers likely overstate his support, but it is clearly above 50% and superior to that of his immediate predecessors (Chart 18). Further, his daughter’s party, Faction for Change, has gained national popularity, reinforcing the signal that he can expand his power base in the vote. The senate is the root of opposition to Duterte. His supporters control nine out of 24 seats. But of the twelve senators up for election, only three are Duterte’s supporters. So he could make gains in the senate which would increase his ability to push through controversial constitutional reforms. (He needs 75% of both houses of parliament plus a majority in a national referendum to make constitutional changes.) In terms of the economy, we maintain the view that Duterte is a true “populist” – pursuing nominal GDP growth to the neglect of everything else. His fiscal policy of tax cuts and big spending have supercharged the economy but macro fundamentals have deteriorated (Chart 19). He has broken the budget deficit ceiling of 3%, up from 2.2% in 2017. His reflationary policies have turned the current account surplus into a deficit, weighing heavily on the peso, which peaked against other EM currencies when he came to power in 2016 (Chart 20). Inflation peaked last year but we expect it to remain elevated over the course of Duterte’s leadership. He has appointed a reputed dove, Benjamin Diokno, as his new central banker. Chart 19Reflationary Policies Created Twin Deficits... Reflationary Policies Created Twin Deficits... Reflationary Policies Created Twin Deficits...   Chart 20...And Twin Deficits Weigh On The Peso ...And Twin Deficits Weigh On The Peso ...And Twin Deficits Weigh On The Peso Rule of law has deteriorated, as symbolized by the removal of the chief justice of the Supreme Court for questioning Duterte’s extension of martial law in Mindanao. Duterte also imprisoned his top critic in the senate, Leila de Lima, on trumped-up drug charges. He tried but failed to do so with Senator Antonio Trillanes, a former army officer and quondam coup ring-leader who has substantial support in the military. The army is pushing back against any prosecution of Trillanes, and against Duterte’s ongoing détente with China, prompting Duterte to warn of the risk of a coup.   Duterte’s China policy is to attract Chinese investment while avoiding a conflict in the South China Sea. His administration has failed to downgrade relations with the U.S. thus far, but further attempts could be made. This strategy could make the Philippines a beneficiary of Chinese investment if it succeeds. However, China knows that the Philippine public is very pro-American (more so than most countries) and that Duterte could be replaced by a pro-U.S. president in as little as three years, so it is not blindly pouring money into the country. Pressure to finance the current account deficit will persist. If pro-Duterte parties gain seats in the senate the question will be whether he comes within reach of the 75% threshold required for constitutional changes. His desire to change the country into a federal system has not gained momentum so far. He claims he will stand down at the end of his single six-year term but he could conceivably attempt to use any constitutional change to stay in power longer. If the revision goes forward, it will be a hugely divisive and unproductive use of political capital. Bottom Line: The Philippine equity market is highly coordinated with China’s credit cycle and so should benefit from China’s stimulus measures this year (as well as the Fed’s backing off). Nevertheless, Philippine equities are overvalued and macro fundamentals and quality of governance have all deteriorated. Duterte’s emphasis on building infrastructure and human capital is positive, but the means are ill-matched to the ends: savings are insufficient and inflation will be a persistent problem. We would favor South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia over the Philippines in the EM space. Investment Implications We expect China’s stimulus to be significant and to generate increasingly positive economic data over the course of the year. China is a key factor in the bottoming of global growth, which in turn will catalyze the conditions for a weaker dollar and outperformance of international equities relative to U.S. equities. Caveat: In the very near term, it is possible that China plays could relapse and EM stocks could fall further due to the fact that Chinese and global growth have not yet clearly bottomed. We are structurally bullish India, but recommend sitting on the sidelines until financial markets discount the disappointment of a Modi government with insufficient political capital to pursue structural reforms as ambitious as the ones undertaken in 2014-19. Go long Thai equities relative to EM on a cyclical basis. Stay long Thai local-currency government bonds relative to their Malaysian counterparts. Go long Indonesian equities relative to EM on a tactical basis. Maintain vigilance regarding Russian and Taiwanese equities: the Ukrainian election, Russia’s involvement in Venezuela, and the unprecedented Taiwanese presidential primary election reinforce our view that Russia and Taiwan are potential geopolitical “black swans” this year.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      See BCA Emerging Markets Strategy, “Turkey: Brewing Policy Reversal?” March 21, 2019, available at www.bcaresearch.com. 2      See Sanjeev Miglani and Drazen Jorgic, “India, Pakistan threatened to unleash missiles at each other: sources,” Reuters, March 16, 2019, available at uk.reuters.com.  3      The junta can disqualify candidates and rerun elections in the same district without that candidate if the candidate is found to have violated a range of very particular laws on campaigning and use of social media. Also, the Election Commission is largely an instrument of the Bangkok establishment and can allocate seats according to the junta’s interests. 4      See BCA Emerging Markets Strategy, “Indonesia: It Is Not All About The Fed,” March 7, 2019, available at www.bcaresearch.com.   Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights In the Philippines, inflation is breaking out while the central bank is well behind the curve. Financials markets remain at risk. As a play on surging interest rates: Go short Philippine property stocks. We appraise and modify our investment strategy across all central European markets in general and Hungary in particular - where a monetary policy shift is in the making. A new trade: We recommend paying 3-year swap rates in Hungary and receiving 3-year swap rates in the euro area. Feature The Philippines: Short Real Estate Stocks Philippine stocks are on the verge of a major breakdown (Chart I-1, top panel). Meanwhile, local currency bond yields are surging (Chart I-1, bottom panel). Chart I-1Philippine Stocks Are On The Edge Of A Breakdown Philippine Stocks Are On The Edge Of A Breakdown Philippine Stocks Are On The Edge Of A Breakdown The Philippine economy continues to overheat, and the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) has fallen well behind the curve. The top panel of Chart I-2 shows that both headline and core inflation measures are rising precipitously and have breached the central bank's upper target of 4% by a wide margin. Chart I-2The Central Bank Is Far Behind The Curve The Central Bank Is Far Behind The Curve The Central Bank Is Far Behind The Curve Odds are that inflation will continue to climb higher. Overall domestic demand remains reasonably strong. Noticeably, both the current and fiscal accounts are in deficit and widening (Chart I-3). A current account deficit is a form of hidden inflation. The basis is that it gauges the degree of excess domestic demand relative to the productive capacity of the economy. Chart I-3The Philippines: A Large Twin Deficit The Philippines: A Large Twin Deficit The Philippines: A Large Twin Deficit The roots of these macro problems stem from ultra-easy monetary and fiscal policies pursued by Filipino authorities. The BSP has kept borrowing costs low and for much longer than was warranted, and has been slow to hike rates. As a result, credit has been booming relentlessly (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Bank Loans Have Boomed... Bank Loans Have Boomed... Bank Loans Have Boomed... The fiscal authorities, on the other hand, have vigorously pursued growth-at-all-costs programs. Government spending is now growing at an annual rate of 22% (Chart I-5). Chart I-5...So Have Government Expenditures ...So Have Government Expenditures ...So Have Government Expenditures Consequently, these populist policies have created excessive domestic demand that has stoked an inflation breakout. Given Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte's reluctance to cut back on fiscal expenditures, it will be up to the monetary authorities to tighten sufficiently enough to curb inflation.1 The currency was depreciating against the U.S. dollar in 2017, even as its EM peers rallied. A falling currency amid strong economic growth is generally a symptom of an overheating economy; it signals that real interest rates are low and the central bank is behind the curve. Today, the monetary authorities need to hike borrowing rates aggressively, otherwise the currency will plunge much further. The country's financial markets are quickly approaching a riot point, and local currency bond yields are already selling off as creditors are rebelling (see bottom panel of Chart I-1 on page 1). Another option the BSP could take to defend the peso without hiking rates much is to sell foreign exchange reserves. Doing so, nevertheless, will still lead to higher domestic interest rates - especially at the short end of the curve. When a central bank sells its dollar reserves, it absorbs local currency liquidity - i.e. commercial banks' excess reserves at the central bank decline. Interbank rates then rise, which pushes up short-term rates and potentially long-term ones too. This is how financial markets naturally force macro adjustments on an overheating economy when policymakers are reluctant to act. As such, Filipino share prices are now facing a major risk. Higher domestic rates amid strong loan growth will cause the economy to decelerate significantly. Certain interest rate-sensitive sectors such as vehicle sales are already shrinking. The property sector - the segment of the economy that has benefited the most from the credit binge - will be the next shoe to drop: The supply of residential real estate buildings has been booming - floor space built has risen 2.4-fold since 2003. As interest rates continue to rise, real estate and construction loans - which are still growing at a 19% annual rate - will slump. Higher borrowing costs will hurt real estate prices. Meanwhile, rent growth will decline as the economy decelerates. The slowdown in the property sector will take a heavy toll on real estate development and management companies: First, these firms' revenues and income - property sales, rental and other types of income - will decelerate significantly (Chart I-6, top panel). Chart I-6Listed Real Estate Companies Will Face Major Headwinds Listed Real Estate Companies Will Face Major Headwinds Listed Real Estate Companies Will Face Major Headwinds Second, higher interest rates will raise their interest expenses (Chart I-6, bottom panel). Remarkably, Philippine real estate stocks have remained quite resilient, despite the broad selloff in financial markets. While the former are down by 18% in dollar terms from their early 2018 peak, Chart I-7 suggests rising interest rates herald a much more pronounced drop in their prices. Chart I-7Filipino Property Stocks Are On A Cliff Filipino Real Estate Stocks Have Been Quite Resilient Filipino Real Estate Stocks Have Been Quite Resilient Besides, these property companies are also still expensive. Their price-to-book value (PBV) currently stands at 2.9. Between the years 2000 and 2005, their PBV averaged 1.6. We are therefore initiating a new trade: Short Philippine real estate stocks in absolute U.S. dollar terms. Crucially, the real estate sector makes up 27% of the Philippines MSCI index, and will therefore have a significant impact on the Philippine stock market. As to bank stocks - the other large segment of the equity market - a couple of points are in order. Commercial banks in the Philippines are exposed to the real estate sector. Hence, a slowdown in the property sector will culminate in the form of higher NPLs and provisions for bad loans on banks' balance sheets. Real estate and construction loans account for 25% of total bank loans. Crucially, NPLs and provision levels - at 1.3% and 1.9%, respectively - are very low, and have so far not risen. This is unsustainable given the magnitude of the ongoing credit boom and rising interest rates. Higher provisions will cause banks' profits and share prices to suffer materially. This will come on top of plunging net interest margins (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Philippines Commercial Bank Profits Are Getting Squeezed Philippines Commercial Bank Profits Are Getting Squeezed Philippines Commercial Bank Profits Are Getting Squeezed As to equity valuations, this bourse is not cheap, neither in absolute terms nor relative to the EM equity benchmark - both valuation measures are neutral (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Equity Valuations Are Not Attractive Equity Valuations Are Not Attractive Equity Valuations Are Not Attractive Overall, the outlook for Philippine equities as a whole remains unattractive both in absolute terms, as well as relative to the EM benchmark. Bottom Line: EM equity portfolios should continue underweighting this bourse. We are also initiating a new trade: Going short Philippine real estate stocks in absolute U.S. dollar terms. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com Strategy For Central European Markets Our presiding macroeconomic theme for central Europe - which we first elaborated on in a Special Report titled, Central Europe: Beware Of An Inflation Outbreak2 - has been as follows: An accommodative policy stance in the context of strong growth and tight labor markets warrants higher inflation. Our proxy for labor shortages - calculated as the number of job vacancies divided by the number of unemployed looking for a job - is continuing to surge across all central European countries as well as in Germany. This foreshadows higher wage growth ahead (Chart II-1). Chart II-1Tight Labor Markets Means Higher Wage Growth Tight Labor Markets Means Higher Wage Growth Tight Labor Markets Means Higher Wage Growth Furthermore, monetary policy in central European countries remains accommodative - policy rates are negative in real (inflation-adjusted) terms. Consistently, private credit (bank loan) growth and domestic demand remain robust. Today, we appraise and modify our investment strategy across all central European markets in general and Hungary in particular, where a policy shift is in the making. Hungary: Moving Away From Ultra-Accommodative Monetary Policy? Last month, the NBH (National Bank of Hungary) modified its monetary policy statement to include a new paragraph explaining that the council is prepared for the gradual normalization of monetary policy, depending on the outlook for inflation.3 Given our view that inflation in Hungary will continue to rise, the NBH is likely to move away from ultra-accommodative monetary policy sooner rather than later. Besides mounting inflationary pressures, several factors lead us to believe that the NBH is more comfortable normalizing policy today than in the past: First, after seven years of deleveraging, private credit is finally on the rise, and money supply growth is booming (Chart II-2, top and middle panel). Chart II-2Hungary: Easy Monetary Conditions Will Lift Inflation Hungary: Easy Monetary Conditions Will Lift Inflation Hungary: Easy Monetary Conditions Will Lift Inflation Second, capital expenditures are recovering and business confidence is making new highs (Chart II-3, top and middle panel). Furthermore, construction is firing on all cylinders (Chart II-3, bottom panel). Chart II-3Hungary: Capex Is Robust Hungary: Capex Is Robust Hungary: Capex Is Robust Lastly, core consumer inflation is rising and the real deposit rates is at -2%, the lowest in 20 years (Chart II-2, bottom panel). Given the genuine need for rate normalization in Hungary and the central bank's readiness to do so, we are adjusting our strategy: We are taking profits of 72 basis points on our Hungarian yield curve steepening trade that we initiated on June 21, 2017. Hungary's yield curve is already the steepest yield curve in Europe. The slope of the 10/1-year yield curve is 320 basis points in Hungary, versus 200 in Poland, 100 in the Czech Republic and 105 in Germany. We are closing our long PLN / short HUF trade with a 7.7% gain since its initiation on September 28, 2016 (Chart II-4). The cross rate is close to an all-time high and will likely reverse. Chart II-4Book Profits On Long PLN / Short HUF Book Profits On Long PLN / Short HUF Book Profits On Long PLN / Short HUF A new trade: We recommend paying 3-year swap rates in Hungary and receiving 3-year swap rates in the euro area (Chart II-5). Chart II-5A New Trade: Pay Hungarian / Receive Euro Area 3-year Swap Rates A New Trade: Pay Hungarian / Receive Euro Area 3-year Swap Rates A New Trade: Pay Hungarian / Receive Euro Area 3-year Swap Rates First, not only is final domestic demand in Hungary much more robust than in the euro area, but Hungary's output gap is positive while the euro area's is still negative (Chart II-6,top and middle panel). This foreshadows a widening gap in inflation between Hungary and the euro area (Chart II-6, bottom panel). As this transpires, policy rate expectations will rise faster and by more in Hungary than in the euro area. Chart II-6Hungarian Economy Will Overheat Faster Than Euro Area's Hungarian Economy Will Overheat Faster Than Euro Area's Hungarian Economy Will Overheat Faster Than Euro Area's Second, ultra-accommodative monetary policy in Hungary has served its purpose and has generated an overflow of liquidity. In effect, with broad money supply in Hungary now growing considerably faster than in the euro area, the NBH will likely tighten its policy at a faster pace and by more than the ECB (Chart II-7). This warrants a widening 3-year swap rate differential between Hungary and the euro area. Chart II-7Hungary Vs. Euro Area: Money Growth And Swap Rates Hungary Vs. Euro Area: Money Growth And Swap Rates Hungary Vs. Euro Area: Money Growth And Swap Rates Third, as global trade continues to slump, affecting German manufacturing, the European Central Bank will be fast to reiterate its readiness to keep policy accommodative longer than expected. This could push back expectations of the first ECB rate hike. Finally, Italy remains a risk and European banks are exposed to weakening developing countries. With euro area bank share prices plunging close to their 2008 and 2012 lows, the ECB will be both slow and cautious in signaling rate normalization in the immediate future. While Hungary is a very open economy and will feel the pinch from a slowdown in European manufacturing, its currency may depreciate further against the euro as it typically does amid global risk-off periods. A cheap currency will reduce the NBH's worries about the pass-through of a global slowdown and disinflation into its domestic economy. In short, given that both economies have different inflationary backdrops, Hungarian interest rate expectations will increasingly diverge from those of the euro area. As such, fixed-income investors should bet on a rising 3-year swap rate differential between Hungary and the euro area. Our Other Positions In Central European Markets Within the fixed income and currency space: Stay overweight CE3 within EM dedicated fixed-income portfolios. Predicated on our view that the epicenter of the ongoing global growth slowdown is China, emerging Asian and commodity leveraged markets are at much bigger risk than their Central European counterparts. Consistent with this theme, stay short IDR versus PLN. Book profits of 109 basis points on the following trade initiated on July 26, 2017: Pay Czech / receive Polish 10-year swap rates (Chart II-8). In line with our expectations,4 the Czech National Bank has been responding to rising domestic inflationary pressures and has been tightening monetary policy faster than the National Bank of Poland. There now remains little upside in Czech rates relative to Polish ones, so we are booking profits. Chart II-8Book Profits On Pay Czech / Receive Polish 10-year Swap Rates Book Profits On Pay Czech / Receive Polish 10-year Swap Rates Book Profits On Pay Czech / Receive Polish 10-year Swap Rates Stay long CZK against the EUR. Widening growth and inflation gaps between the Czech Republic and the euro area justify higher rates and a stronger currency in the former relative to the latter. Regarding the equity space: Stay long CE3 banks / short euro area banks. CE3 banks are less leveraged and have a higher return on assets than euro area banks. Continue overweighting CE3 within EM dedicated equity portfolios. CE3 stocks have staged a double bottom relative to their emerging market peers, both in common and local currency terms (Chart II-9). Given emerging markets are saddled with credit excesses, unresolved economic imbalances and looming currency weakness, central Europe is likely to continue outperforming. Chart II-9CE3 Equities Will Outperform EM CE3 Equities Will Outperform EM CE3 Equities Will Outperform EM A summary of all our trades and asset allocations can be found on page 14 and 15. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy/Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Philippines: Duterte's Money Illusion," dated April 25, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "Central Europe: Beware Of An Inflation Outbreak," dated June 21, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 3 http://www.mnb.hu/en/monetary-policy/the-monetary-council/press-releases/2018/press-release-on-the-monetary-council-meeting-of-18-september-2018 4 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report "Follow The Money, Not The Crowd," dated July 26, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations