Policy

Highlights Our non-consensus inflation and Fed views just got even more non-consensus: Media and sell-side commentators were quick to speculate about an end to the tightening cycle following Wednesday’s FOMC meeting, but we don’t see any basis for changing our stance. December and January have been a wild couple of months, … : It’s not unusual for a swing in one direction to be following by a swing in the other, but the S&P 500 went from the 2nd percentile in December to the 96th percentile in January. … and we’re turning to our equity checklist to regain our bearings: Checklists help us maintain a healthy distance from day-to-day swings and focus on the key swing factors. For now, we don’t think anything much has changed, but the scope for a repricing of the entire Treasury curve has gotten bigger: The wider the disparity between our terminal fed funds rate expectation and the market’s, the greater the potential for yields to readjust. We continue to believe markets are being complacent about inflation pressures; their presence will force the Fed off the sidelines and ultimately spell the end of the expansion. Feature Brutal arctic cold swept the Midwest and the Northeast Corridor last week as the polar vortex clamped down on Canada and the upper U.S. The weather didn’t do anything to cool investors’ revived ardor for stocks, however. After finally taking a break from its nearly uninterrupted four-week sprint from 2,350 to 2,670 (that’s nearly 14% in just 17 sessions), the S&P 500 hung around the 2,640 level that supported it repeatedly during its October, November and early December travails (Chart 1). Then came Wednesday’s FOMC statement and press conference, and the S&P even poked its head above the 2,700 level that would seem to present a fairly stiff challenge (Chart 2). Chart 12,640 Lent Support Once Again …   Chart 2... Will The Next Round Number Offer A Little Resistance? What Goes On One minute born, one minute doomed/ One minute up, and one minute down/ What goes on in your mind?/ I think that I am falling down If the conditions were polar out of doors, they were bipolar on traders’ screens. As much as the clients we spoke with in January were initially skeptical about our inflation view (it’s not dead) and our corresponding Fed call (at least three or four more hikes in response to budding price pressures), several of them seemed to come around before the meeting was over. They had a lot harder time with the two-part investment conclusion that risk assets would rally while the Fed was on hold, and the economy and corporate profits were able to gain a footing, before rolling over once the data become strong enough to bring the Fed back off the sidelines. Why would investors buy into the temporary part one? We offered the view that the selloff had gone too far, and seemed to have been founded upon a premise that the Fed had either already tightened into a recession, or had gotten uncomfortably close to doing so. We expect that a Fed pause will reveal that the market’s neutral-rate estimate had been way too low. Once the economy shows signs of life, and consensus earnings estimates stop declining and begin to rise again, stocks will rise, spreads will compress, and investors will get back to chasing performance. The renewed fundamental vigor could even allow the Fed to hike rates another couple of times without inspiring a new bout of market indigestion. After this week, we are the ones scratching our heads. The committee’s post-meeting statement did change more than it has since the gradual, 25-bps-per-quarter pace of hikes took hold at the end of 2016, but early January’s procession of Fed speakers who repeated “patience” like a mantra already telegraphed an extended pause. We did not read all that much into the substitution of “will be patient as it determines … [appropriate] adjustments” for “some further gradual increases,” even if the media and the markets did. We will have more to say about the Fed’s balance sheet in subsequent research, but suffice it to say for now that we do not think it will be terribly impactful. Bottom Line: While we were surprised by the intensity of the reaction to last week’s FOMC meeting, it remains our view that the pause in the Fed’s monetary tightening campaign will give equities and corporate bonds an opportunity to rally near their late September levels. Checking And Re-Checking Our Views Among our favorite trading-desk maxims is the advice to plan your trade, and trade your plan. Checklists help us plan and help establish a repeatable process. Having a process to fall back on when rapid-fire decisions have to be made allows an investor to react to conditions as they arise without suffering from analysis paralysis, just like a seasoned trader. Checklists aren’t magic, but they can help an investor keep his/her bearings in the midst of market tides that seem to sweep all before them. Confronting the combination of December’s despondency and January’s euphoria, we return to the equity downgrade checklist we rolled out in mid-October, and last formally reviewed in mid-November. The checklist attempts to look out for threats on four fronts: a looming recession, which would bring the curtain down on the bull market; earnings pressure independent of a full-fledged recession; inflation pressures that could compel the Fed to tighten policy with a renewed sense of urgency; and unsustainably positive sentiment, which could set equities up for a fall. At the moment, only the recession category could arguably be said to be flashing yellow. Recession Watch All three factors in our simple recession indicator are moving in the wrong direction, but the yield curve is the only one at a potentially problematic level (Chart 3, top panel). It would not be a disaster for equities or the economy if the curve inverted – it is habitually early, inverting a year before a recession, on average, and six months before the S&P 500 peaks – but we don’t think it will until markets begin pricing in new rate hikes. Assuming the three-month rate won’t move until they do, the curve could only invert if the 10-year Treasury yield were to fall into the 2.40s (Chart 3, bottom panel), which would be incompatible with our constructive economic view. By the time the Fed resumes hiking, the curve should have gained some breathing room, as an economy strong enough to require further tightening merits a 10-year Treasury yield at or above 3%. Chart 3The Curve Isn’t Ready To Invert Just Yet Year-over-year growth in the leading economic indicator decelerated sharply over the last three months of 2018 (Chart 4). It is a ways away from contracting, however, and only a series of hefty month-over-month drops could make it do so this quarter. Our estimate of the equilibrium fed funds rate remains 50 bps above the 2.5% target rate and our model projects that equilibrium will rise throughout the rest of the year. If its 3.25-3.5% year-end estimate is on the money, the Fed would have to hike three or four more times by year end to provide the restrictive backdrop required for a recession. Chart 4Decelerating, But Not Contracting Checking the final item in the recession section of the checklist, a 33-basis-point rise in the three-month moving average of the unemployment rate, would require a sharp hiring slowdown and/or a significant pickup in labor force participation. The January employment report makes a drop-off in hiring appear improbable, and we are skeptical that the participation rate can keep rising in spite of the drag from retiring baby boomers. If the unemployment rate were to rise because of a rising part rate, however, it might well be more likely to extend the expansion than end it. Bottom Line: The elements of our recession indicator are deteriorating, albeit slowly. A recession may not be more than a year away, but we can’t see it occurring until the Fed turns more hawkish. Earnings Pressure We have repeatedly offered our view that the labor market is as tight as a drum in print, calls and meetings. That is good for the economy because it increases households’ ability to consume, but it will eventually squeeze profit margins and induce the Fed to remove monetary accommodation. Compensation costs shouldn’t hurt margins if they grow at or below the sum of the rate of price-level and productivity gains. If inflation grows at the Fed’s 2% target, and productivity maintains its rough 1.25% growth pace, compensation growth of 3.25% shouldn’t pose a problem, but gains exceeding 3.5% might become problematic. The total compensation series of the employment cost index ticked up to 2.9% in the fourth quarter, but an assault on 3.25-3.5% does not appear to be at hand (Chart 5). Chart 5Wages Aren’t Pressuring Margins Yet Dollar strength is a margin headwind for any company competing with multinationals, at home or abroad. After peaking in mid-November and mid-December, the DXY index has rolled over and is back to its early October level (Chart 6). The fourth-quarter blowout in spreads had us poised to check the “rising corporate yields” box, but there’s no need following last month’s reversal (Chart 7). The savings rate has recovered enough to support spending, and there’s currently no sign that consumers are about to pull back (Chart 8). We are monitoring conditions in emerging markets for spillover into the U.S., but the dollar’s decline and the broad recovery in risk assets worldwide have taken pressure off of EM corporate and sovereign borrowers. Chart 6The Dollar's Backed Off …   Chart 7... And Bond Yields Have, Too   Chart 8Ready, Willing And Able Bottom Line: None of our proxy indicators suggests that corporate earnings face meaningful near-term pressure, either from tighter margins or lower revenues. Inflation Pressures Inflation poses a threat to equities if it makes the Fed uncomfortable enough to pull the plug on the expansion to keep the economy from overheating, or if it makes investors uncomfortable enough to apply a significant haircut to earnings multiples. Given the Fed’s “symmetric” target, we don’t think it will get anxious about core PCE inflation unless it threatens to exceed 2.5% (Chart 9). The 10-year and 5-year-on-5-year TIPS inflation breakevens have slid in lockstep with oil prices, and are nowhere near the 2.3-2.5% range that is consistent with the Fed’s 2% core PCE target (Chart 10); they offer no hint that longer-run inflation expectations might become unanchored. CPI is the go-to inflation series for investors and the media, and with both headline and core hanging around 2%, it is well short of levels that would promote anxiety among the public (Chart 11). Chart 9Realized Inflation Remains Contained …   Chart 10... And Expectations Have Only Fallen   Chart 11Nothing To See Here Bottom Line: We expect that unnecessary fiscal stimulus and an extremely tight labor market will eventually produce inflation, but they’re not testing investors’ complacency yet. Overexuberance Runaway sentiment could spark a nasty correction if it sets the bar for expectations so high that stocks inevitably disappoint. BCA’s composite sentiment indicator, which aggregates the results from surveys of individual investors, professional investors and advisors, is at the lower end of its range, though not yet at levels that have often marked equity bottoms (Chart 12, bottom panel). Before falling with the S&P 500 last January, the share of consumers expecting stock prices to rise over the next twelve months had reached a level consistent with past peaks (Chart 13, bottom panel). It has since fallen to the lower end of its range, and would seem to suggest that investors had nearly given up on stocks when the January survey was taken. Chart 12Investor Sentiment Is Muted …   Chart 13... And So Is The General Public’s Bottom Line: The fourth-quarter decline pushed investor sentiment from around the higher reaches of its historical range to a position well below the mean. From a contrarian perspective, washed-out sentiment could help extend the rally. Investment Implications Our equity downgrade checklist gives U.S. equities a clean bill of health. Although potential gains are lower now with the S&P 500 trading above 2,700 than they were when it was trading below 2,500 at the beginning of the year, we do not see a fundamental reason to downgrade equities from overweight. The multiple expansion required to produce a new closing high might be a stretch, but we believe the S&P 500 can advance well into the 2,800s. We upgraded corporate credit last week, and expect that spreads will narrow as the Fed stays on the sidelines. One should not expect new tights in spreads, but there is potential for investors to augment their coupon spreads with some modest capital appreciation. We dislike Treasuries, especially at longer maturities, even more than we did before last week’s bull flattening of the yield curve. With rate hikes fully priced out, the only way the 10-year Treasury yield could fall even further would be if the Fed cut rates, and that scenario is flatly incompatible with our assessment of the economy’s strength.   Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com

Highlights The CAD and AUD have tactical upside; however, this may well prove to be the last hurrah before some serious declines play out. This time domestic – not global – factors will drive the CAD and AUD lower. Canada and Australia are hitting the end game for their respective debt supercycles as rising U.S. rates will lift the global cost of capital. Canadian and Australian house prices and debt loads are too elevated; a reversal of these excesses is likely to push these two countries toward liquidity traps. These liquidity traps will cause the R-star in Canada and Australia to fall, lagging well behind the U.S. Canada and Australia are uncompetitive, suggesting external demand will not come to their respective rescue, at least not until after the CAD and AUD have fallen significantly. The CAD may fall first, but the AUD has more downside ultimately; not only is Australia even less competitive than Canada, but the Aussie is also more expensive than the Loonie. Feature The Canadian and Australian dollars are in the process of rebounding. This is not surprising. By the end of 2018, both these currencies were deeply oversold, and the recent easing in global financial conditions, helped by the Federal Reserve’s pause, is fueling their rebound (Chart 1). Moreover, pessimism toward China has hit an extreme, yet Sino-U.S. trade relations seem on the cusp of improving and Chinese policymakers are increasingly trying to manage the downside in the Chinese economy. This setup is normally supportive for the Canadian and Australian dollars (Chart 2). Chart 1Financial Conditions Point To A Tactical Rebound In The AUD And The CAD...   Chart 2...So Does Chinese Reflation While we have been recommending that our more tactically minded clients play this rally,1  the longer-term outlook for the CAD and AUD remains poor. These countries are getting closer to the end of their respective debt supercycles. Consequently, the CAD and AUD need to trade at much larger discounts to fair value in order to be attractive. Way Too Much Debt Canada and Australia have become victims of their own success. Canada and Australia have seen real estate prices rise for more than two decades. At first, rising prices reflected solid valuations, growing populations and rising prosperity. However, things changed around the Great Financial Crisis. During this traumatic event, the Bank of Canada and the Reserve Bank of Australia both dropped interest rates by 4.25%. Since both countries’ banking sectors escaped the crisis unscathed, and households did not experience similar losses of wealth as those in the U.S., Ireland or Spain, credit growth remained strong. A real estate bubble became the natural consequence of this easy monetary policy. Banks pushed credit to households, and households – impressed by the solid performance of real estate prices, attracted by low interest rates, and enamored with the dream of easy riches – willingly took on mortgages and piled into the property market. A feedback loop ensued, whereby rising collateral values made credit even easier to access, fomenting further house price gains and even-easier credit conditions. Today, we stand at the end of this process. Vancouver and Toronto in Canada, and Sydney and Melbourne in Australia are some of the most expensive real estate markets in world in terms of price-to-income ratios, when one controls for population density (Chart 3). This has created major systemic risks for both countries. Few would care about the systemic risk created by elevated house prices if debt loads were small. However, in both countries, household indebtedness makes Americans circa 2007 look like a frugal bunch. In Canada, household debt has now reached 176% of disposable income, or 100% of GDP, while in Australia, the same ratios are 189% and 121%, respectively. This is well above the levels that prevailed in the U.S. in 2007 (Chart 4). Mortgage debt alone represents 108% and 140% of disposable income in Canada and Australia, respectively. Moreover, Canadian and Australian households also spend 14.5% and 15.6% of their incomes servicing debt, which also compares unfavorably with the U.S. in 2007. Chart 4ACanadians And Australians Make Americans Look Frugal Chart 4BCanadians And Australians Make Americans Look Frugal Canadian and Australian households thus seem close to having reached their maximum debt loads. Moreover, measures taken in Canada and Australia to limit foreign money inflows and constrain bank lending are beginning to bite. In both countries, real estate transactions are slowing, with property sales declining by 20% and 8% in Canada and Australia, respectively. House prices too are being hit. House prices in Vancouver and Toronto peaked by 2018, and in Sydney and Melbourne in 2017. Residential construction is likely to be the first victim. Real estate inventories in both these countries have been rising, courtesy of the frenetic pace of housing starts going on for decades. Today, residential investment represents 7% of GDP in Canada and 5% of GDP in Australia (Chart 5). Thus, slowing real estate activity could curtail Canadian and Australian GDP by 2% if we move back to the real estate environment that prevailed in the mid-1990s. This would also imply large hits to employment as construction, real estate and finance have created 336-thousand and 250-thousand jobs in Canada and Australia since 2009, respectively. Chart 5AA Decline In Construction Activity Would Be A Vicious Hit To Canada And Australia (1) Chart 5BA Decline In Construction Activity Would Be A Vicious Hit To Canada And Australia (2) Consumption too is likely to suffer. Without a growing wealth effect and with declining equity in their houses, Canadian and Australian households are likely to curtail consumption – consumption that has contributed 60% and 30% of Canada’s and Australia’s cumulative GDP growth since 2009. Already, we are seeing slowing Canadian and Australian retail sales – right behind drops in housing activity. The biggest and most dangerous risk is that Canada and Australia teeter on the verge of falling into a liquidity trap, like the U.S. after 2007. As Chart 6 illustrates, propelled by households binging on cheap money in the form of mortgages, Canadian and Australian banks have managed to maintain higher levels of return on equity after the financial crisis. This robust profitability will decline if non-performing loans, which so far remain low, grow in response to weakening house prices and fragile household financial health (Chart 7). Chart 6Canadian And Australian Banks Remain Profitable... Chart 7...As Long As NPLs Do Not Rise Rising NPLs and declining RoEs tend to limit the willingness of banks to lend. Just as crucially, the poor health of households and falling real estate prices is likely to also limit demand for credit. This combination was behind the sharp decline in the U.S. money multiplier in 2008. No matter how much reserves the Federal Reserve would inject in commercial banks via QE programs, broader money would not respond. A similar fate is likely to ensue in Canada and Australia (Chart 8). The velocity of money is also likely to fall if households are not willing to take on debt anymore and instead focus on rebuilding their financial buffers. Chart 8Canada And Australia Have Avoided A Liquidity Trap... So Far The consequence of this monetary constipation will be much lower interest rates. When an economy enters a liquidity trap, as was the case in the U.S. after 2007, in Japan since the 1990s, or in Europe after 2010, the neutral real rate of interest, the so-called R-star, falls to zero or even lower. Essentially, no matter how low interest rates fall, they cannot equilibrate the demand and supply for savings. Everyone wants to save, no one wants to borrow, and banks are unwilling to lend. This fate looks increasingly likely for both Canada and Australia over the coming two years. Bottom Line: The Canadian and Australian real estate markets have enjoyed incredible runs for more than two decades. Now, not only are real estate prices in these two nations very expensive, households have been left with prodigious debt loads. As real estate activity slows, residential construction will suffer, but most importantly, these two countries are likely to teeter toward becoming liquidity traps as banks curtail lending and households curtail borrowing. This will result in structurally lagging interest rates. Why Now? Betting on the end of the Canadian and Australian housing bubbles has so far been mugs games. Why is the situation different now? Because the U.S. economy is stronger. Until now, very low global interest rates have kept the Canadian and Australian housing bubbles afloat, but rising U.S. interest rates are now putting upward pressure on mortgage rates in both Canada and Australia (Chart 9). This simply reflects the fact that U.S. rates represent the ultimate opportunity cost of investing outside the international reserve currency, the U.S. dollar. After years of household deleveraging, the U.S. seems to be able to handle higher rates. However, because Canadian and Australian balance sheets are much weaker, their tolerance for higher rates is substantially lower. Chart 9Higher U.S. Rates Threaten Canadian And Australian Households BCA sees further upside for U.S. rates and thus for the global cost of capital. In other words, we do not anticipate the Fed’s pause to last beyond June. The following reasons underpin this view: The U.S. labor market is increasingly inflationary. The employment-to-population ratio for prime-age workers continues to rise, which historically has boosted labor costs (Chart 10). The New York City Fed Underlying Inflation Gauge points toward higher core inflation (Chart 11). Moreover, Ryan Swift argues in BCA’s U.S. Bond Strategy that an unfavorable base effect will dissipate after February, further reinforcing the upside risk to inflation.2  Being the only component of our Fed Monitor moving toward “easy money required” territory, the tightening in U.S. financial conditions last year was the lynchpin behind the Fed’s pause. The other components of the Fed Monitor have not deteriorated significantly, and they still argue in favor of further rate hikes (Chart 12). Thus, if the recent easing in financial conditions can persist, the Fed will hike again this year.   Chart 11Budding U.S. Inflationary Pressures   Chart 12The Fed Is Pausing Because Of Tightening Financial Conditions, Not The Economy Finally, U.S. productivity is set to pick up over the coming two years. Since a rising capital stock boosts productivity, the recent strength in capex augurs well (Chart 13). Moreover, the demand deficit created by the deleveraging of U.S. households has weighed on productivity. As U.S. credit growth picks up, so will productivity. This is important as rising productivity lifts the neutral rate, and thus creates more room for the Fed to lift interest rates. Chart 13Upside For U.S. Productivity Equals Upside For U.S. Rates Ultimately, all these factors point to higher U.S. rates. As such, it suggests that Canadian mortgage rates, and to a lesser extent Australian ones as well, will experience upward pressure – exactly at the time when households in these two countries are most vulnerable to higher rates. Bottom Line: Higher U.S. rates are the main reason why we expect the Canadian and Australian housing markets and economies to buckle now, finally heeding the call of doomsayers. Higher U.S. rates lift the global cost of capital. While U.S. households are in robust shape and therefore better able to handle higher rates, the same cannot be said about Canadian and Australian households. Can the External Sector Come To The Rescue? This is unlikely. After years of commodity booms and strong domestic demand supported by rising household wealth, the Canadian and Australian manufacturing sectors have been greatly diminished. Much capacity has vanished, and it will be difficult to replace the lost output from falling domestic demand by exports of manufactured goods. The Australian and especially the Canadian corporate sectors are also already heavily indebted, and thus, it could take quite some time before capacity is expanded. Complicating the situation, Canada and Australia are not competitive exporters anymore. As the top panel of Chart 14 shows, since 1980, U.S. unit labor costs have risen by 156%, but they have risen by 183% in Canada and by a stunning 282% in Australia. Productivity trends paint a similar, albeit less dramatic picture. Since 1980, U.S. labor productivity has risen 22% versus its trading partners; in Canada it has declined by 20%, and in Australia, by 5%. Consequently, both Canadian and Australia labor will have to cheapen. Historically, the mechanism through which labor costs decline is higher unemployment, which forces a painful adjustment in wages. These adjustments are likely to force both interest rates and currencies lower. Chart 14Canada And Australia Are Uncompetitive Could China come to the rescue? Via higher commodity prices, both Canada and Australia have been major beneficiaries of the Chinese economic boom. However, while China today is trying to contain its economic deceleration, Chinese policymakers remain fixated on controlling credit growth. This means that China is unlikely to go on another debt binge similar to what transpired in 2009 or in 2015-‘16. As a result, the recent uptick in commodity prices is unlikely to last long. More fundamentally, China is not only trying to move away from its debt-led growth model: It is also trying to move away from its investment-led growth model. This means that the commodity intensiveness of the Chinese economy is likely to decline. China’s emphasis on controlling air pollution will strengthen this trend. As Chart 15 illustrates, when the share of Capex as a percentage of Chinese GDP declines, so does the labor participation rate of Canada and Australia relative to the U.S. This decline in relative participation rates is associated with falling CAD and AUD values versus the U.S. dollar, a consequence of falling growth potential and interest rates. Chart 15AChanging Chinese Growth Model Points To Falling Canadian And Australian Participation Rates (1) Chart 15BChanging Chinese Growth Model Points To Falling Canadian And Australian Participation Rates (2) Bottom Line: Canada’s and Australia’s lack of manufacturing capacity, poor competitiveness, and China moving away from its investment-led growth model suggest that a deflationary environment will ultimately develop in these two nations, at least relative to the U.S. Moreover, the structurally negative outlook on consumption, debt growth and employment suggests that Canadian and Australian neutral rates are likely to fall relative to the U.S. These economic forces point to deeper lows this cycle in the CAD and AUD against the USD. Investment Implications Based on this economic backdrop, both the Canadian and Australian dollar could suffer significant downside in the coming years as their fair value is likely to fall, dragged by interest rates that will lag those in the U.S. However, if an asset is cheap enough, it may nonetheless be an attractive buy. The CAD and AUD do not fall into that camp. Today, the CAD trades in line with our long-term fair-value model, implying that if its fair value falls, the CAD provides zero insulation and will therefore also have to decline. The AUD is in an even worst spot as it currently trades above its fair value (Chart 16). Additionally, the Australian current account deficit is larger than Canada’s. Chart 16The CAD And AUD Are Not Cheap Enough To Compensate For Secular Risks In terms of timing, the Loonie could start weakening before the Aussie. The Canadian housing bubble is likely to collapse first as Canadian mortgage rates are more tightly linked to U.S. ones than Australian rates are. Moreover, the Canadian economy seems even more levered to rising real estate prices than that of Australia. However, a collapse in Vancouver and Toronto housing prices will promptly catalyze similar weaknesses in Sydney and Melbourne. Thus, while the CAD may be the first to take the great plunge, the AUD will not be far behind. Ultimately, the AUD will suffer the greatest decline. Obviously, the more onerous pricing of the AUD contributes to this assessment, but so does the greater lack of competitiveness in Australia than in Canada. Australia is likely to endure deeper deflationary pressures as its labor costs need greater adjustments. Furthermore, Australia already suffers from a larger degree of underutilized labor than Canada. Since the currency – not wages – is likely to withstand the bulk of the competiveness adjustment, this implies that the AUD has more work to do than the CAD. The more expensive valuations of Australian assets also handicap the Aussie versus the Loonie. Australian real estate is pricier than Canadian property, and Australian stocks are more expensive (Chart 17). This means that Australians could end up with deeper holes in their balance sheets than Canadians, and that Australia has scope to witness greater outflows of capital than Canada. Chart 17Canadian Financial Assets Are Cheaper Than Australian Ones... Where Australia shines relative to Canada is in terms of the ability of fiscal authorities to respond to an economic slowdown. Canadian public debt stands at 90% of GDP versus 41% of GDP in Australia. Canada’s cyclically-adjusted primary deficit is already deteriorating, while Australia’s is improving (Chart 18). This means that the Australian governments have deeper pockets and a greater capacity to support domestic demand than Canada’s. This could cushion the deflationary impact in Australia relative to Canada. That being said, the Japanese, Spanish or U.S. experiences argue that once a real estate bubble bursts, fiscal spending can cushion some of the pain, but it cannot eradicate the problem – at least not until banks are recapitalized and the private sector is once again ready to borrow, something that takes years of balance-sheet rebuilding. Chart 18...But Australia Has More Fiscal Space Bottom Line: Both the CAD and AUD are likely to experience substantial downside over the coming years. The CAD and AUD are not cheap enough to compensate for a BoC and RBA that will greatly lag the Fed. While the CAD may weaken first, the AUD will suffer more long-term downside. The Aussie is more expensive, Australia is less competitive than Canada, and it could suffer greater outflows of capital. Continue to underweight Australian and Canadian assets in global portfolios as the AUD and CAD will drag their performance down. Remain short AUD/CAD on a structural basis.   Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled “Global Liquidity Trends Support The Dollar, But…”, dated January 25, 2019, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Buy Corporate Credit”, dated January 15, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades

The hiatus in the Fed’s rates-normalization policy in 1H19 in the wake of its capitulation to financial markets, supports our bullish view on gold prices, as it raises the risk of an inflation overshoot later this year. Per the Fed’s dual mandate, inflation and employment gauges are signaling the need for tighter policy, according to BCA’s proprietary Fed Monitor. The pause in hiking fed funds raises the likelihood the Fed will find itself behind the inflation curve, as the economy enters a late-cycle phase. Gold will outperform other commodities and equities in this phase. We remain long gold as a portfolio hedge. Highlights Energy: The U.S. imposed sanctions on state-owned Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA), including a ban on the company’s Houston-based Citgo remitting earnings back to the parent company.  This raises the likelihood production and exports will fall sharply as we expect.  Separately, Saudi Energy Minister Khalid al-Falih said the country will reduce output below its recently agreed 10.3mm b/d cap in 1H19, in line with our own balances expectation.1 Base Metals/Bulks: Neutral.  Iron ore prices likely will continue to move higher, following the collapse of a wet-processing dam at Vale’s Córrego do Feijão mine.  The company suffered a similar breach at its Samarco mine in March 2016, which still has not re-opened. Output will fall, if it follows through with additional dam closures. Precious Metals: Neutral.  Gold prices will continue to move higher, as the Fed’s near-term capitulation on its rates-normalization policy raises the odds the U.S. central bank will find itself behind the inflation curve.  (See below.) Ags/Softs: Underweight.  USDA reported soybeans inspected for export to China during the week ended January 24 accounted for close to 37% of the total beans inspected.  This made China the No. 1 importer of American soybeans again. Feature In February 2018, we wrote that “price risk in gold will remain skewed to the upside this year, even as our base case scenario calls for limited gains from here.” In line with this expectation, we suggested remaining long gold as a portfolio diversifier and hedge against mounting equity risks. This turned out to be an accurate call. Despite losing 8.4% between January and September 2018 because of an aggressive Fed, gold rose by 7.6% in 4Q18 amid the rising equity volatility and ended the year down a minor -1.5% compared to -6.2%, -11.2% and -7.1% for the S&P 500, global equities and the CRB commodity index. This reflects the convexity in gold returns and is the reason we favored gold in 2018. Gold returns are not simply a function of the U.S. dollar and real interest rates. As highlighted in our 2019 Key Views report last December, in mature economic cycles, gold’s ability to hedge against equity and inflation risks dominate its price formation, while its correlation with the U.S. Treasury yields diminishes (Chart of the Week).2 Chart of the WeekGold's Correlation With U.S. Rates Declines As The Cycle Matures As the current cycle extends to 2019, the skewness in gold return will prove profitable. The Fed’s retreat on its quarterly rate-hike cycle only adds to our positive view, as it increases the probability the U.S. central bank falls behind the curve. Stay long gold as a portfolio hedge. Fed’s Short-Term Capitulation Strengthens Our View The recent downward revision in the Fed’s rate-hike path reinforces our positive stance on gold prices, as risks of an overshoot in inflation rises. The dichotomy in U.S. vs. rest of the world growth puts the Fed in a difficult position. The current capitulation was mainly driven by tightening financial conditions – chiefly, the rising U.S. dollar, declining stock prices, and widening credit spreads. However, under the Fed’s dual mandate, inflation and employment still are signaling “tightening-required” per BCA Research’s Fed Monitor, a model maintained by our U.S. Bond strategists (Chart 2). Since economic growth cannot remain above-trend indefinitely, short-term productive capacity constraints (i.e. capital and labor factors of production) are already binding and will force the Fed to raise rates later this year as inflation creeps up. Chart 2Growth And Inflation Signal Tighter Money Is Required As it reaffirms its data dependence, the Fed is opening the door to falling behind the inflation curve, given inflation is a lagging indicator of the price pressures that are building up in the economy (Chart 3). As a result, we expect gold’s ability to hedge against inflation will support its price in 2H19. Chart 3Inflationary Pressure Will Rise In 2019 Short-term, a Fed pause also supports gold by readjusting investors’ expectations regarding the U.S. dollar and real interest rates lower. Our bond strategists identified two previous periods where similar conditions led to a false start in the Fed hiking cycle, 1997 and 2015. In both cases, the Fed’s capitulation led to a reversal in gold’s downward price trajectory, as the market perceived the central bank was keeping its short-term policy rate at a level that was inconsistent with the so-called R-star rate or natural rate of interest – i.e., “the real interest rate expected to prevail when the economy is at full strength” (Chart 4).3 Chart 4AGold Price's Trajectory Reversed In 1997... Chart 4B Using a conceptual four-quadrant framework developed by our colleagues at The Bank Credit Analyst to describe the Fed’s behavior, we currently believe the outcome with the highest probability of being realized by the Fed’s capitulation is Policy Mistake 2 (Table 1, lower right quadrant). If we’re right, this raises the odds of an inflation overshoot above the Fed’s 2% target later this year.4 Table 1Four Fed Policy Scenarios This is not a foregone conclusion. However, generally speaking, the higher the inflation uncertainty and the higher the perception the Fed will fall behind the curve, the higher gold is bid up. Recent price action seems to corroborate this. Chart 5 shows that the recent downward revision in the median long-term fed funds rate projection coincides with a rise in gold prices. At present, gold investors are signaling that the fed funds rate is below the neutral rate consistent with R-star. Chart 5Gold Markets Signal Monetary Policy Is Accommodative Gold And The U.S. Economic Cycle Gold prices are difficult to model and predict, given the collection of time-varying, often conflicting, components determining their evolution. Its core determinants change as we move through the economic cycle. In their current late-cycle environment, inflation and equity risks – i.e., fears of a sharp correction – usually gain in importance. In this report, we characterize the market’s late-cycle phase using two metrics: (1) the fed funds rate relative to R-star, (2) the phase of the yield curve cycle.5 We have already discussed (1) in our outlook and found that when the fed funds rate is rising yet still below the estimate of R-star, gold returns are highly skewed to the upside (Chart 6).6 For (2), we compared the yellow metal’s return to other assets returns in different phases of the U.S. Treasury yield curve’s evolution. We define these yield-curve phases as follow: Phase 1: Normal (i.e., positively sloped: 10-year rates are greater than 3-month rates). The 3-month/10-year treasury slope is above 75 bps. Phase 2: On its way to flattening and returning to normal. The 3-month/10-year Treasury slope is between 0 bps and 75 bps. We divide this in two sub-phases: (a) steepening, and (b) flattening. Phase 3: Inverted (i.e., negatively sloped). The 3-month/10-year Treasury slopes is below 0 bps (Chart 7).7 Chart 7Phases Of The Yield Curve Cycle We found that: first, DM and EM equities are the best performers in the group we looked at during Phase 1, when the slope of the yield curve is steep (above 75 bps). Second, there is wide difference between the steepening and flattening sections of Phase 2. EM equities and copper experience the largest rebound once the slope’s curve steepens from below zero. Lastly, gold performs best in the flattening section of Phase 2 and, critically, it outperforms oil, copper, broad commodity indices and equities (Table 2). Table 2Gold Returns Are Positive When The Yield Curve’s Slope Flattens Our U.S. Investment and Bond Strategists believe the Fed’s policy rate will remain in the below-r-star-and-rising range, and in Phase 2 of the yield curve cycle for most of 2019. We agree, and believe our analysis indicates gold prices will increase this year on the back of these factors. Recession Fear And Equity Risks Will Drive Gold For most of 2018, investor sentiment and positioning were primarily determined by the U.S. dollar and real rates. As these variables rose last year, investors’ sentiment and positioning turned overly bearish; this pushed our Gold Composite Indicator in the oversold territory (Chart 8).8 In our view, the other (important) drivers of gold prices were ignored during that period. The end-of-year equity selloff led to a reshuffle of the core determinants of the yellow metal’s price, pushing the equity risk factor higher on the list of variables explaining its price. Chart 8Sentiment Collapsed In 1H18 Chart 9 shows gold and the U.S. equity risk premium disconnected in 2018, until the October equity selloff. In general, these variables are positively linked. When risk aversion is elevated, investors demand higher compensations for holding risky assets, and increase their demand for safe-haven assets. This pushes up both the equity risk premium and gold prices. Chart 9Gold And Equity Risk Premium Correlation Picked Up Gold’s performance in 4Q18 supports our recommendation for holding it as a portfolio diversifier in 2018, and why we continue to do so this year (Chart 10). Separately, our U.S. dollar and rates-only model moved up recently, easing the downward pressure on gold (Chart 11). While we believe these two variables’ marginal impact diminished since 4Q18, they are included in our gold “fair-value” model, which currently indicates it is fairly valued and that its support remains intact. Chart 11Upside Pressures Are Building Bottom Line: The Fed’s near-term capitulation raises the odds the U.S. economy will experience an inflation overshoot. Our fair-value model also is supportive of gold prices. We remain long as a diversification and portfolio hedge. Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please see “Saudis Pledge Deeper Oil Cuts in February Under OPEC+ Deal,” published by bloomberg.com January 29, 2019.  See also “OPEC Starts Cutting Oil Output; Demand Fears Are Overdone” published January 24, 2019, for our latest supply-demand balances and price forecasts.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2      Please see BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled “2019 Key Views: Policy-Induced Volatility Will Drive Markets,” published December 13, 2018. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3      Please see John C. Williams’s remarks delivered to the Economic Club of Minnesota May 15, 2018, entitled “The Future Fortunes of R-Star: Are They Really Rising?”  Williams was president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco at the time, and now has the same role at the NY Fed..  We explore this further below.  See also BCA Research’s U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report titled “An Oasis Of Prosperity,” published August 21, 2018. It is available at usb.bcaresearch.com. 4      Please see BCA Research’s The Bank Credit Analyst January 2019 Monthly Report published December 21, 2018. It is available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 5      The San Francisco Fed defines R-star as the inflation-adjusted “natural” rate of interest consistent with a fully employed economy, with inflation close to the Fed’s target. R-star is used to guide interest-rate policy consistent with long-term macro goals set by the Fed. Please see “R-star, Uncertainty, and Monetary Policy,” by Kevin J. Lansing, published in the FRBSF Economic Letter May 30, 2017. 6      We presented this analysis in BCA Research’s Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled “2019 Key Views: Policy-Induced Volatility Will Drive Markets,” published December 13, 2018. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7      For a similar analysis applied to different asset classes, please see BCA Research’s U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report titled “2019 Key Views: Implication For U.S. Fixed Income,” published December 11, 2018, and The Bank Credit Analyst January 2019 Monthly Report published December 21, 2018. These reports are available at usb.bcaresearch.com and bca.bcaresearch.com. Our approach is slightly different from our colleagues’ methodology. We used a threshold of 75 bps instead of 50 bps in order to increase the sample size of the Phase 2, flattening section. This improves the accuracy of using the average as our main descriptive statistic. Note that the yield curve can remain inverted for some time before a recession occurs, this explains why equity returns are positive in Phase 3 (curve inversion). 8      Our Gold Composite Indicator has three components: (1) Sentiment, (2) Speculative positioning and (3) Technical. It is meant to assess if there is any mismatch between our fundamental analysis and investors’ sentiment and expectations. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades TRADE RECOMMENDATION PERFORMANCE IN 4Q18 Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Summary Of Trades Closed In 2018

Highlights Global equity markets have managed to recoup some of last year’s plunge since we upgraded stocks to overweight in late December. The equity rally has been tentative, however, and so far feels more like a technical bounce from oversold levels than a resumption of the bull market. One driving factor behind last year’s market swoon was that policy uncertainty spiked at a time when the last pillar of global growth, the U.S., was showing signs of cracking. Investors thus welcomed the Fed’s signal that it would pause in March. Nonetheless, shrinkage in the Fed’s balance sheet is proving to be troublesome. Quantitative tightening does not necessarily imply permanently higher risk premia, but it will be a source of volatility. There are hopeful but tentative signs that a U.S. slowdown is not the precursor to a recession. The hit to GDP from the U.S. government shutdown will be reversed next quarter. The FOMC has also signaled that policymakers are attuned to the economic risks associated with tightening financial conditions, and that the calm inflation backdrop provides room to maneuver. The FOMC will stand pat in March, but should restart rate hikes in June as the economic soft patch ends. We still see only a modest risk of a U.S. recession this year. In contrast, our outlook for growth outside the U.S. remains downbeat for at least the first half of the year. Among the advanced economies, Japan and Europe are being the most affected by the Chinese economic slowdown and global trade tensions. This means that monetary policy divergence will continue to be a tailwind for the dollar. China continues to stimulate at the margin, but efforts so far have been insufficient to put a floor under growth. The contraction in Chinese exports has just begun. It is still too early to upgrade EM assets or base metals. Despite the cloud still surrounding Brexit, sterling is beginning to look attractive as a long-term punt. Our decision to upgrade corporate bonds to overweight this month, similar to our reasoning for upgrading equities in December, is based on improved value and a sense that investor pessimism had become excessive. Just as the selloff in risk assets was overdone, so too was the rally in government bonds. It is highly unlikely that the Fed is done tightening, as is currently discounted in the money market curve. A resumption of Fed rate hikes around mid-year means that the 10-year Treasury yield will move back above 3% by year end. Feature Global equity markets have managed to recoup some of last year’s plunge since we upgraded the asset class back to overweight in the latter half of December. A decline in the VIX and high-yield bond spreads are also positive signs that global risk appetite is recovering, following an overdone investor ‘panic attack’ last quarter. The equity rally has been tentative, however, and so far feels more like a simple technical bounce from oversold levels than a resumption of the bull market. One problem is that policy uncertainty has spiked at a time when the last pillar of global growth, the U.S., is showing signs of cracking (Chart I-1). Investors are skittish while they await a clear de-escalation of U.S./China trade tensions, an end to the U.S. economic soft patch, an end to the U.S. government shutdown, and signs that global growth is bottoming (especially in China). There has only been some modestly positive news on a couple of these issues. Chart I-1Policy Uncertainty Has Spiked Another factor that appeared to play a role in last quarter’s market swoon is the fear that the end of asset purchases by the European Central Bank and the normalization of the Fed’s balance sheet necessarily imply a structural de-rating for all risk assets. A related worry is that the de-rating might intensify the global economic slowdown, resulting in a self-reinforcing negative feedback loop. Does QT Imply Lower Multiples? The question of balance sheet normalization is a difficult one because there is widespread disagreement on how, or even whether, quantitative easing (QE) works. We have always maintained that QE was not about creating a wave of central bank liquidity that flowed into asset prices. Central banks did not “print money” – they created bank reserves. These reserves did not result in a major acceleration in broader measures of money growth, including M1 and M2, largely because there was little demand for loans and because banks tightened lending standards. In other words, the credit channel of monetary policy was broken. The implication is that investors should not worry that quantitative tightening (QT) implies a withdrawal of central bank liquidity that must mechanically come from the sale of risk assets. Rather, we believe that QE operates mostly through the portfolio balance effect. There are two ways to think about this channel. First, the central bank forced investors to move into riskier assets by purchasing large amounts of “safe” assets, such as government bonds. Investors had little choice but to redeploy the capital into other riskier areas, pushing up asset prices. The second perspective is that central bank purchases of government bonds depressed both the yield curve and bond volatility. Volatility fell because investors could forecast the policy rate with certainty – it would be glued to zero (or negative) for the foreseeable future in most of the advanced economies. This is akin to strong forward guidance that flattened the yield curve. Aggressive monetary stimulus, such as QE, also helped to reduce the perceived risk that the economy would succumb to secular stagnation or fall back into recession. Reduced bond volatility, lower bond yields, and less economic risk all increased the attractiveness of the riskier asset classes. These explanations represent two sides of the same coin. Either way, QE boosted a broad array of asset prices. If this is true, then unwinding QE must be bearish for risk assets, all else equal. In the case of the U.S., the fed funds rate is much more difficult to forecast than was the case when the Fed was buying bonds. Higher yields and bond volatility imply a lower equilibrium multiple in the equity market and wider equilibrium corporate bond spreads. Nonetheless, all else is not equal. If interest rates and bond volatility are rising in the context of healthy economic and profit growth, then it is likely that the perceived risk of secular stagnation is falling. It would be a sign that the economy has finally put the financial crisis firmly in the rear-view mirror. It could be the case that the upgrade in economic confidence overwhelms the negative impact of the reverse portfolio balance effect related to quantitative tightening, allowing risk assets to rise. No one can prove this thesis one way or the other and we are not making the case that unwinding the Fed’s balance sheet will necessarily go smoothly, especially since interest rates are rising at the same time. The problem is that both investors and the Fed are trying to figure out where the neutral fed funds rate lies. If the so-called level of R-star is still very low, then the Fed might have already made a policy mistake by raising rates too far. We discussed in last month’s Overview the market implications of four scenarios for the level of R-star and the Fed’s success in correctly guessing it. If the economy holds up and the economic soft patch ends in the coming months as we expect, then investors will revise their estimate of the neutral rate higher and risk assets will rally even as bond yields rise. The Doom Loop One risk to our base-case scenario is the so-called financial conditions “doom loop”. Irrespective of whether or not QT is playing a role, the doom loop scenario involves a shock to investor confidence that leads to a tightening in financial conditions and market liquidity as stock prices fall and credit spreads widen. More onerous financial conditions, in turn, undermine economic activity, which then feeds back into even tighter financial conditions. One could make the argument that risk assets are even more exposed to this type of negative feedback loop today than in past monetary tightening cycles because of program trading, the Fed’s balance sheet shrinkage and investors’ lingering shell shock from the Great Recession and financial crisis. Nonetheless, there are a few mitigating factors to consider. We believe that a doom loop is more likely to unfold when economic growth becomes very sensitive to changes in financial conditions. This normally happens when economic and financial imbalances are elevated. On a positive note, unlike in the lead-up to the last two recessions, the U.S. private sector is a net saver whose income outstrips spending by 2.1% of GDP (Chart I-2). The highly cyclical parts of the U.S. economy are not stretched to the upside as a share of GDP, reducing the risk that overspending in one part of the economy will required a deep contraction to correct the imbalance (Chart I-3). Chart I-2U.S. Private Sector: A New Saver Chart I-3U.S. Cyclical Spending Not Extended In terms of financial excesses, the good news is that the U.S. household sector is in its best shape in decades. Our main concern is debt accumulation in the corporate sector. We reviewed the related risks in a Special Report published in the November 2018 issue.1 We concluded that corporate leverage will not cause the next U.S. recession, because high levels of debt will only become a problem when profits begin to contract (i.e. when the economic downturn is already underway). Nonetheless, when a recession does occur, corporate spreads will widen by more than in the past for any given degree of economic contraction (see below). ‘Fed Put’ Still In Play Another factor that tempers the risk of a doom loop is that the so-called ‘Fed Put’ is still operating. The December FOMC Minutes and comments by various FOMC members communicated to investors that the Fed is attuned to the economic risks associated with tightening financial conditions, and that the calm inflation backdrop provides policymakers with room to maneuver. Chair Powell even said he was willing to adjust the Fed’s balance sheet run-off if necessary. One important reason for policymakers’ willingness to be flexible is that the fed funds rate is still not far from the zero-lower-bound, making it potentially more difficult for the FOMC to respond adequately in the event of a recession this year because the fed funds rate can only be cut by 250 basis points. Several U.S. data releases have been delayed due the government shutdown, but what has been released has been mixed. The downdraft in the January reading of the manufacturing ISM was eye-opening, highlighting that the global manufacturing slowdown has reached U.S. shores. The good news is that the non-manufacturing ISM and the small business survey, although off their peaks, remain consistent with solid underlying growth. The December U.S. payroll report revealed that wage growth continued to accelerate on the back of gangbusters job creation at the end of the year. There have also been some recent hints that the soft patch in capital spending and housing is ending (Chart I-4). Existing home sales fell sharply in December, but extremely low inventories suggest that it is more of a supply than a demand problem. The impressive bounce in home mortgage applications for purchases is a hopeful sign. U.S. commercial and industrial loan growth is also accelerating. Chart I-4Some Tentative Signs These tentative signs that the economic soft patch is close to an end will not be enough to get the FOMC to tighten in March, after so many members have gone out of their way to signal a pause in recent weeks. Nonetheless, we believe the economy will remain strong enough for the Fed to resume hiking in June. The U.S. government shutdown will complicate interpreting incoming economic data. Ultimately, while its impact on Q1 real GDP growth will be non-trivial, it will be reversed the following quarter and we do not expect any permanent damage to be done. U.S. inflation should edge higher by mid-year, supporting our view that the Fed will resume tightening in June. The decline in oil prices will continue to feed into a lower headline inflation rate in the coming months, but that does not mean that the core rate will fall. Indeed, core CPI has increased by roughly 0.2% in each of the past three months, translating into an annualized rate of approximately 2.4%. Base effects will depress annual core inflation in February but, thereafter, this effect will begin to reverse. The acceleration in wage growth according to measures such as average hourly earnings and the Employment Cost Index highlights that underlying inflationary pressures continue to percolate (Chart I-5). The implication is that the Treasury bond market is overly complacent in discounting that the fed funds rate has peaked for the cycle. Chart I-5U.S. Wage Pressure Is Percolating Looking further ahead, our base case remains that the next U.S. recession will not occur until 2020, and will be the result of tighter fiscal policy and further Fed tightening that takes short-term rates a step too far. No Bottom Yet For Global Growth Our outlook for growth outside the U.S. remains downbeat for at least the first half of the year. Our global economic indicators still show no sign of a turnaround, except for a bottoming in the diffusion index based on BCA’s Global Leading Economic Indicator (Chart I-6). The global ZEW economic sentiment index continued to fall in January, while business and consumer confidence readings in the advanced economies eroded heading into year end. Chart I-6Global Leading Indicators Still Deteriorating A better global growth dynamic awaits more serious policy stimulus in China. Real GDP growth decelerated further to 6.4% year-over-year in the last quarter of 2018. This is no disaster, but the point is that there are still no signs of stabilization. The Chinese authorities continue to tweak the policy dials at the margin, most recently providing some tax cuts and a liquidity injection into the banking system. Nonetheless, the central government has so far abstained from stimulating the property market due to existing speculative excesses. This is very different from the previous two policy easing episodes, including 2015/16 (Chart I-7). Chart I-7China: No Property Market Stimulus... The stimulus undertaken so far has been insufficient in terms of putting a floor under growth according to our 12-month Credit Impulse (Chart I-8). It is a hopeful sign that broad money growth is trying to bottom, but this does not guarantee that the credit impulse is about to turn. The latter is required to confirm that Chinese import demand will accelerate, providing a lift to EM exporters, EM asset prices and commodity prices. Without a positive credit impulse, China’s investment and construction activity will continue to moderate, leading to lower imports of machinery and raw materials. Chart I-8...And No Credit Impulse The economic situation in China is likely to get worse before it gets better. Dismal trade figures in December confirmed that the trade war is beginning to bite. The period of export ‘front-running’ related to higher U.S. tariffs is over as total exports fell by 4.4% year-over-year. Last year’s collapse in export orders indicates that the woes are just beginning. In turn, moderating production related to the Chinese export sector will bleed into domestic consumption and imports, suggesting that it is too early to expect a durable rally in EM assets or commodity prices. Lackluster Chinese demand and growing trade concerns have weighted on global business confidence, contributing to the pullback in capital goods orders, manufacturing PMIs and industrial production in the advanced economies (Chart I-9). Even the average service sector PMI and consumer confidence index in the advanced economies have fallen in recent months, although both remain at a high level. Chart I-9The Fallout From Trade Europe and Japan, in particular, are feeling the pinch. German GDP only grew 1.5% in 2018, implying that Q4 GDP growth was in the vicinity of just 0.2% QoQ. Meanwhile, European industrial production contracted by 3.3% year-over-year in December. The German Ifo and ZEW surveys do not point to any significant improvements in this trend. A few idiosyncratic factors explain some of this poor performance, including new emissions testing standards that have weighted on the German auto industry, a tightening in financial conditions in Italy, and the ‘gilets jaunes’ protests in France. Nonetheless, the euro area slowdown cannot be fully explained by one-off factors. The economy is highly sensitive to global trade fluctuations given that 18% of the euro area’s gross value added is generated in the manufacturing sector. Hence, China’s poor economic health has been painful for Europe, and the trend in Chinese credit does not bode well for the near term (Chart I-10). The European Central Bank (ECB) is likely to stay on the defensive as a result, especially as euro area core inflation, which has been stuck near 1% for three years, is unlikely to pick up if growth remains on the back foot. The ECB stuck with the view that the economic soft patch is temporary after the January policy meeting, but policymakers will consider providing more stimulus in March if the economy does not pick up (using forward guidance or a new TLTRO). This will weigh on the euro. Chart I-10China's Woes Are Infecting Europe Japan is suffering from similar ills. Exports are no longer growing, and foreign machinery and factory orders are contracting at a 4.1% and 4.3% pace, respectively. This weakness is not mimicked in domestic growth, but the disproportionate contribution of the external sector to Japan’s overall economic health means that this country is also falling victim to the malaise witnessed in China and emerging markets, the destination of 19% and 45% of Japanese shipments, respectively (Chart I-11). Collapsing oil prices and a firming trade-weighted yen have amplified this deflationary backdrop. It is therefore far too early to bet that the Bank of Japan will tighten the monetary dials. Chart I-11Japan Hit By The Chinese Cold As Well If we are correct that the U.S. economic soft patch will soon end, then the dollar will once again look to be the best of a bad lot. Interest rate expectations will move in favor of the dollar. We expect the dollar to rise by about 6% this year on a trade-weighted basis, appreciating most strongly against the AUD and SEK. As for sterling, it is beginning to look attractive as a long-term punt. Brexit Deadlock We are a month closer to the end-March deadline and a Brexit deal seems even farther out of reach. It could play out in one of three ways: (1) a “no deal” where the U.K. leaves the EU with no alternative in place; (2) a “soft Brexit” involving an agreement to form a permanent customs union or some sort of “Norway plus” arrangement; or (3) a decision to reverse the results of the original referendum and stay in the EU. There is no support for the “no deal” option in Parliament, which means that it won’t happen. We do not have a strong view on which of the latter two scenarios will occur. The odds of another referendum are rising and the polls are swinging away from any sort of Brexit, suggesting that the original referendum result may be over-turned via another referendum (Chart I-12). Nonetheless, for investors, it does not matter much whether it is scenario 2 or 3; either outcome would be welcomed by markets. Overweight sterling positions are attractive as a long-term play, although it could be some time before the final solution emerges. Chart I-12Brexit Result May Be Overturned Upgrade Corporate Bonds To Overweight Given the recent global economic dynamics, it is perhaps surprising that U.S. corporate financial health actually improved in 2018 according to our Corporate Health Monitors (CHM). We highlighted in the aforementioned Special Report the risks facing U.S. corporate bonds when the economic expansion ends. High levels of corporate leverage mean that the interest coverage ratio for the median corporation in the Barclays-Bloomberg index will plunge to near or below all-time historic lows. The potential for a large wave of fallen angels implies that downgrade activity will be particularly painful for corporate bond investors. The surge in lower-quality issuance has led to a downward trend in the average credit rating and has significantly raised the size of the BBB-rated bonds relative to the IG index and relative to the broader universe of corporate bonds. Moreover, poor market liquidity and covenant erosion will intensify pressure for corporate spreads to widen when the bear market arrives. Rapid debt accumulation is reflected in our bottom-up Corporate Health Monitors (CHM) for the U.S. investment-grade and high-yield sectors (Chart I-13). The CHMs are constructed from six financial ratios that the rating agencies use when rating individual companies. The companies in our bottom-up sample were chosen so as to mimic the sector and quality distribution in the Bloomberg-Barclay’s corporate bond index. Chart I-13U.S. Corporate Health The debt-to-book-value of equity ratio for both the U.S. IG and HY sample of companies has risen to nose-bleed levels, although the ratio appears to have flattened off for the latter. Despite rising leverage, the HY CHM has shifted into “improved health” territory and the IG CHM is on the verge of doing the same. Last year’s upturn in the profitability measures, such as the return on capital, overwhelmed the deteriorating leverage trend. In Europe, where we distinguish between domestic and foreign issuers, rising leverage has been concentrated among the latter until recently (Chart I-14). In any event, the CHM for both types of issuers is close to the neutral zone. Chart I-14Euro Area Corporate Health Improving U.S. corporate health on its own would not justify increasing exposure to corporate bonds within balanced portfolios or moving down in quality. Profit growth is likely to moderate this year, especially in Europe, such that last year’s improvement in corporate health is likely to reverse. And, as previously discussed, the economic cycle is well advanced and this sector is particularly vulnerable to a recession. Nonetheless, value has improved enough to warrant a tactical upgrade to overweight within fixed-income portfolios, at a time when the FOMC has signaled a pause and the next recession is at least a year away. Implied volatility should continue to moderate and spreads should narrow, similar to dynamics in 2016, the last time that the Fed signaled patience following a period of market turmoil (Chart I-15). Chart I-15Fed Patience To Narrow Spreads Spreads have already narrowed from the peak in late December, but 12-month breakeven spreads for most credit tiers are all still close to or above their historical means, except for AA-rated issues (Chart I-16). For example, the 12-month breakeven spread2 for the Baa credit tier is 46%. This means that the spread has been tighter than its current level 46% of the time since 1988 and wider than its current level 54% of the time. Historically, spreads tend to hover within the tight-end of their historical range during this phase of the credit cycle, and only cheapen significantly when the yield curve inverts and the default rate moves higher. Chart I-16Value Restored In IG Corporates... For U.S. high yield, our estimate of the spread adjusted for expected defaults has risen to 237 bps (Chart I-17). This implies that investors are discounting a 2019 default rate of 3.2%, in line with Moody's forecast. Since we do not foresee recession this year, high-yield bonds are not expensive enough to be avoided within a portfolio. Chart I-17...And In HY Too Value has also improved in the European corporate bond market, but our global fixed-income team still recommends favoring the U.S. market for global credit investors. Leverage is higher in the U.S., especially relative to domestic issuers in Europe, but the U.S. economic and profit outlook for 2019 is better. Conclusions Our decision to upgrade corporate bonds this month, similar to our reasoning for upgrading equities to overweight in December, is based on improved value and a sense that investor pessimism had become excessive. For the equity market, the S&P 12-month forward P/E is an attractive 15.4 as we go to press, and bottom-up estimates for 2019 EPS have been slashed to a very reasonable 8%. Just as the selloff in risk assets late last year was overdone, so too was the rally in government bonds. It is highly unlikely that the Fed is done tightening. A resumption of Fed rate hikes, probably in June, means that the 10-year Treasury yield will move back above 3% by year end. Across the major countries, market expectations for yields 5-10 years from now are close to current levels, which is extremely complacent (Chart I-18). Investors should keep duration short of benchmark. Chart I-18Forward Rates Far Too Low Our shift to overweight in both equities and corporate bonds is tactical in nature. We fully expect to move back to neutral and then to underweight later this year or into 2020, as the peak in U.S. GDP draws nearer. Timing will be difficult as always, which means that investors should be prepared to trim risk exposure earlier than implied by our base-case economic timeline.  The tactical upgrade does not imply that we have become more sanguine on the economic and geopolitical risks for 2019. We do not believe that quantitative tightening or U.S. corporate leverage will truncate the U.S. expansion prematurely. Nonetheless, there is a plethora of other risks to keep us up at night. These include a Fed policy mistake, a hard economic landing in China, a full-blown financial crisis in Italy and an escalation in U.S./China trade tensions. The last one has diminished marginally in probability. We have a sense that the recent equity market downdraft unnerved President Trump, such that he now has a diminished appetite for upsetting investors with talk of an escalating trade war ahead of next year’s election. Outside of these well-known risks, our geopolitical team has recently published its “Black Swans” report for 2019. These are deemed to be risks that are off of most investors’ radar screens, but that would have profound implications if they were to occur: It is premature to expect armed conflict over Taiwan, but an outbreak of serious tensions between China and Taiwan is possible as Sino-American strategic distrust continues to build. Russia and Ukraine may have a shared incentive to renew hostilities this year. Saudi Arabia has received a “blank cheque” from Donald Trump, and thus it may continue to be provocative. This could boost the geopolitical risk premium in oil prices. Tensions are building in the Balkans. A renewed conflict on Europe’s doorstep could be the next great geopolitical crisis. A “Lame Duck” Trump could stage a military intervention in Venezuela. We encourage interested readers to see our Special Report for details.3 As for emerging market assets and base metals, we continue to shy away until we receive confirmation that China is aggressively stimulating. We expect better news on this front by mid-year, but watch our China Credit Impulse indicator for timing. In contrast, investors should be overweight oil and related assets now because our commodity specialists still see the price of Brent rising above US$80/bbl sometime this year. Recent political turmoil in Venezuela buttresses our bullish oil view. Finally, this month’s fascinating Special Report, penned by BCA’s Chief Global Strategist, Peter Berezin, examines the long-term implications of the peaking in the average IQ in the advanced economies. Average intelligence is falling for both demographic and environment reasons. The impact will be far from benign, potentially leading to lower productivity growth, lower equity multiples, larger budget deficits and higher equilibrium bond yields. The report begins on page 20. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Mathieu Savary Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy January 31, 2019 Next Report: February 28, 2019   II. The Most Important Trend In The World Has Reversed And Nobody Knows Why After rising for thousands of years, human intelligence has begun to decline in developed economies. This can be seen in falling IQ scores and a decline in math and science test scores. Environmental factors appear to account for the bulk of this decline, but no one knows what these factors are. If left unchecked, falling intelligence will severely undermine productivity growth. This could lead to lower equity multiples, larger budget deficits, and ultimately, much higher government bond yields. Technological advances, particularly in the genetic realm, promise to radically raise IQs. In a complete abandonment of its one-child policy, China will combine these controversial technologies with pro-natal measures in order to boost sagging birth rates. The coming Eugenic Wars will be one of the most important economic and geopolitical developments of the 21st century. Part 1: What The Tame Fox Says In 1959, a Soviet scientist named Dmitry Belyaev embarked on an ambitious experiment: to domesticate the silver fox. A geneticist by training, Belyaev wanted to replicate the process by which animals such as cats and dogs came to live side-by-side with humans. It was a risky endeavor. The Soviets had essentially banned the study of Mendelian genetics in favor of the blank slate ideology that is popular in progressive circles today. Belyaev persevered. Working under the guise of studying vulpine physiology, he selected foxes based on only one trait – tamability. Less than 10% of foxes made it to the subsequent generation, with the other 90% being sent off to fur farms. By the fourth generation, the changes were undeniable. Rather than fleeing humans, the foxes sought out their attention with no prompting whatsoever. They even wagged their tails and whined and whimpered like dogs do. The tame foxes also displayed physical changes. Their ears flopped over. Their snouts became shorter and their tails stood upright. "By intense selective breeding, we have compressed into a few decades an ancient process that originally unfolded over thousands of years," wrote Lyudmila Trut, who began as Belyaev’s assistant and took over the project when her boss died in 1985.  Genetically Capitalist? Evolution can broadly proceed in two ways. The first way is through random mutations. This form of evolution, which scientists sometimes refer to as genetic drift, can take thousands of years to yield any discernable changes. The second way is through natural selection, a process that exploits existing variations in genetic traits. As the Russian fox experiment illustrates, evolution driven by selective pressures (either natural or artificial) can occur fairly quickly. Did selective pressures manifest themselves in human evolution in the lead up to the Industrial Revolution? Did humans, in some sense, domesticate themselves? In his book, A Farewell To Alms, economic historian Gregory Clark argued in the affirmative. Clark documented that members of skilled professions in Medieval England had twice as many surviving children as unskilled workers (Chart II-1). Indeed, the fledgling middle class of the time had even more surviving children than the aristocracy, who were often out fighting wars. As a result, the wages of craftsmen declined by a third relative to laborers between 1200 and 1800, implying that the supply of skilled labor was growing more quickly than the demand for skilled workers over this period. In subsequent work, Clark and Neil Cummins argued that the spread of bourgeois values across pre-industrial England was more consistent with a model of genetic transmission than a cultural one (see Box II-1 for details). Similar developments occurred in other parts of the world. For example, in China, the gateway into the bureaucracy for a thousand years was the highly competitive imperial exam. Xi Song, Cameron Campbell, and James Lee showed that high-status men had more surviving children during the eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuries (Chart II-2).4 The 10,000 Year Explosion Stephen Jay Gould famously said that “There’s been no biological change in humans in 40,000 or 50,000 years. Everything we call culture and civilization we’ve built with the same body and brain.” Gould was wrong. Data from the International HapMap Project show that human evolution accelerated by 100-fold starting around 10,000 years ago (Chart II-3). In their book The 10,000 Year Explosion: How Civilization Accelerated Human Evolution, Gregory Cochran and the late Henry Harpending explained why evolution sped up so rapidly.5 The advent of agriculture led to a surge in population levels. This, in turn, increased the absolute number of potentially beneficial genetic mutations that could be subject to selection effects. Farming and the rise of city states also completely reshaped the environment in which people lived. Basic biology teaches us that environmental dislocations of this kind tend to generate selective pressures that cause evolution to accelerate. John Hawks, professor of anthropology and genetics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, put it best: “We are more different genetically from people living 5,000 years ago than they were different from Neanderthals.” Many of the changes to our genomes relate to diet and diseases. The various genetic resistances that people have built up to malaria are all less than 10,000 years old. Mutations to the LCT gene, which confers lactose tolerance into adulthood, occurred independently in three different geographical locations: one in East Asia, one in the Middle East, and one in Africa. The Middle Eastern variant was probably responsible for the rapid enlargement of the Indo-European language group, which now stretches from India to Ireland. The African variant likely facilitated the Bantu expansion, which started near the present-day border of Nigeria and Cameroon, and then spread out across almost all of sub-Saharan Africa. Evolution Of The Human Brain About half of the genes in the human genome regulate some aspect of brain function. Given the rapid acceleration in evolution, it would be rather surprising if our own brains had not been affected. And indeed, there is plenty of evidence that they were. The frontal lobe of the brain has increased in size over the past 10,000 years. This is the part of the brain that regulates such things as language, memory, and long-term planning. Testosterone levels have also declined. That may explain the steady reduction in violent crime rates (Chart II-4). We know that certain genes that are associated with higher intelligence have been under recent selective pressure. For example, the gene that leads to torsion dystonia – a debilitating movement disorder – appears to have increased in frequency. Why would a gene that causes a known disease become more widespread? The answer is that individuals who have this particular mutation tend to have IQs that are around 10-to 20-points above the population average. Why IQ Matters IQ has a long and contentious history. Yet, despite numerous efforts to jettison the concept, it has endured for one simple reason: It has more predictive power than virtually anything else in the psychological realm. A simple 30-minute IQ test can help predict future educational attainment, job performance, income, health, criminality, and fertility choices (Table II-1 and Chart II-5). IQ even predicts trader performance!6   Like most physiological traits, IQ is highly heritable.7 The genetic contribution to IQ increases from 20% in early childhood to as high as 80% by one’s late teens and remains at that level well into adulthood.8 This makes IQ almost as heritable as height (Chart II-6). Although there is a great deal of variation among individuals, on average, more intelligent people earn higher incomes (Chart II-7). If the same relationship existed in the pre-industrial era, as seems likely, then human intelligence probably increased in a way that facilitated the economic explosion that we associate with the Industrial Revolution. The stunning implication is that the emergence of the modern era was a question of “when, not if.” Part 2: The Flynn Effect By the late-19th century, it had become clear that the rich were no longer having as many children as the poor. This realization, together with the growing popularity of Darwin’s theories, helped galvanize the eugenics movement. Contrary to popular belief, this movement was not a product of the far-right. In fact, the most vocal proponents of eugenics were among the progressive left. John Maynard Keynes, for example, served as the Director of the British Eugenics Society between 1937 and 1944. Yet, a funny thing happened on the road to idiocracy: The concerns of eugenicists did not come to pass. Rather than becoming dimmer, people became smarter. This phenomenon is now known as the Flynn Effect, named after James Flynn, a psychologist who was among the first to document it. Chart II-8 shows the evolution of IQ scores in a sample of countries between 1940 and 1990. The average country recorded IQ gains of three points per decade over this period, a remarkably large increase over such a relatively short period of time. Explaining The Flynn Effect The Flynn Effect must have been entirely driven by environmental factors since genetic factors – namely the tendency of less-educated people to have more children, and to have them at an earlier age – would have reduced average IQs over the past two hundred years. But how could environmental factors have played the dominant role in light of the strong role of genes discussed above? The answer was proposed by geneticist Richard Lewontin in the 1970s. Lewontin suggested imagining a genetically-diverse sack of seed corn randomly distributed between two large identical fields. One field had fertilizer added to it while the other did not. Genetic variation would explain all of the differences in the height of corn stalks within each field, while environmental factors (the addition of fertilizer) would explain all of the difference in the average height of corn stalks between the two fields. This logic explains why genes can account for the bulk of the variation in IQs within any demographic group, while environmental effects may explain most of the variation across groups, as well as why average scores have changed over time. And what environmental effects are these? The truth is that no one really knows. Plenty of theories have been advanced, but so far there is still little consensus on the matter. Bigger, Healthier Brains It has long been known that learning increases the amount of grey matter in the brain. For example, a recent study showed that the hippocampi of London taxi drivers tend to be larger due to the need for drivers to memorize and navigate complex routes.9 The emergence of modern societies likely kicked off a virtuous circle where the need to solve increasingly complex tasks forced people to hone their learning skills, leading to higher IQs and further technological progress. The introduction of universal primary education amplified this virtuous circle. Better health undoubtedly helped as well. Early childhood diseases reduce IQ by diverting the body’s resources away from mental development towards fighting off infections. There is a strong correlation between measured IQ and disease burden across countries (Chart II-9). A number of studies have documented a strong relationship between the timing of malaria eradication in the U.S. and other parts of the world and subsequent observed gains in childhood IQs.10 Brain size and IQ are positively correlated. Forensic evidence from the U.S. suggests that the average volume of adult human skulls has increased by 7% since the late 1800s, or roughly the size of a tennis ball.11 Part 3: The End Of A 10,000 Year Trend The problem with environmental effects is that they eventually run into diminishing returns. This appears to have happened with the Flynn Effect. In fact, not only does the recent evidence suggest that the Flynn Effect has ended, but the data suggest that IQs are starting to decline. Chart II-10 shows that average math and science test scores fell in the OECD’s Program For International Scholastic Achievement (PISA) between 2009 and 2015, the latest year of the examination. The drop in math and science test scores has been mirrored in falling IQ scores. Flynn observed a decade ago that IQs of British teenagers were slipping.12 Similar results have been documented in France, the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark, and most recently, Norway. The Norwegian results, published last year, are particularly noteworthy.13 Bernt Bratsberg and Ole Rogeberg examined three-decades worth of data on IQ tests of Norwegian military conscripts. Military duty has been mandatory for almost all men in Norway since 1814, which means that the study’s authors were able to collect comprehensive data on most Norwegian men and their fathers.  Their paper clearly shows that IQ peaked with the generation born in the mid-1970s and declined by about five points, or one-third of a standard deviation, for the one born in 1990 (Chart II-11). For the first time in recorded history, Norwegian kids today are not scoring as well as their parents. A Mystery What caused the sudden reversal of the Flynn Effect in Norway and most other developed economies? Nobody knows. We can, however, offer three possible theories: New Technologies For much of human history, rising intelligence and technological innovation were complementary processes, meaning that the smartest people were the ones who could best exploit the new technologies that were coming their way. Moreover, as noted above, even those who were less gifted benefited from the mental stimulation that a technologically advanced society provided. It remains to be seen how future technological advances such as generalized AI will affect human intelligence, but recent technological advances seem to have had a dumbing down effect.14 For example, the GPS has obviated the need for people to navigate unfamiliar locations, thus blunting the development of their visuospatial skills. Modern word processors have made spelling skills less important. Having all the information in the world just a click away is a wonderful thing, but it has reduced the need for our brains to retain and codify what we learn. Meanwhile, the constant bombardment of information to which we are subject has made it difficult to concentrate on anything for long. How many youth today can read a report of this length without checking their Facebook feed multiple times? My guess is not many. Diminishing Returns To Education The ability to take young bright minds, who would have otherwise spent their lives doing menial labor, and provide them with an education was probably the greatest tailwind to growth that the 20th century enjoyed. There is undoubtedly still scope to continue this process, but the low-hanging fruits have been picked. Educational attainment has slowed dramatically in most of the world (Chart II-12). Economist James Heckman estimates that U.S. high-school graduation rates, properly measured, peaked over 40 years ago.15 Despite billions of dollars spent, efforts to improve school performance have generally fallen flat. A recent high-level report by the U.S. Department of Education concluded that “The panel did not find any empirical studies that reached the rigor necessary to determine that specific turnaround practices produce significantly better academic outcomes.”16 This gets to a point that most parents already know, which is that when people talk about “bad schools," they are really talking about “bad students.” Deteriorating Health Better health probably contributed to the Flynn Effect. But is it possible to have too much of a good thing? More calories are welcome when people are starving, but today’s calorie-rich, nutrient-poor diets have led to a surge in obesity rates. A clean environment reduces the spread of germs, but it also makes children hypersensitive to foreign substances. Following German reunification, researchers observed that allergies were much more common among West German children than their Eastern peers, presumably because of the West’s more salubrious environment.17 All sorts of weird and concerning physiological changes are occurring. Sperm counts have fallen by nearly 60% since the early 1970s.18 Testosterone levels in young men are dropping. Among girls, the age of first menarche has declined by two years over the past century.19 Are chemical agents in the environment responsible? If they are, what impact are they having on cognitive development? Nobody knows. Reported mental illness is also on the rise. The share of U.S. teenagers with a reported major depressive episode over the prior year surged by over 60% between 2010 and 2017 (Chart II-13). The fraction of young adults that made suicide plans nearly doubled.20 More than 20% of U.S. women over the age of 40 are on antidepressants.21 Five percent of U.S. children are receiving ADHD medication.22 Implications For Economic Growth And Asset Markets So far, the reversal of the Flynn Effect has been largely confined to the developed economies. Test scores are still rising in the developing world, albeit from fairly low levels. For example, two recent studies have documented significant IQ gains in Kenya and Brazil.23 In the poorest countries, opportunities for improving health abound. Even small steps such as fortifying salt with iodine (which costs about five cents per person per year) have been shown to boost IQ by nearly one standard deviation.24 Measures to reduce inbreeding are also likely to boost IQ scores.25 Yet, we should not underestimate the importance of falling cognitive skills in developed economies. Chart II-14 shows that there is a clear positive correlation between student score on math and science and per capita incomes. Most technological innovation still takes place in developed economies. There is an extremely tight relationship between visuospatial IQ and the likelihood of becoming an inventor (Chart II-15). Since IQ is distributed along a bell curve, a 0.1 standard deviation drop in IQs across the entire distribution will result in an 8% decline in the share of people with IQs over 100, a 14% decline in those with IQs over 115, and a 21% decline in those with an IQ over 130 (by convention, each standard deviation on an IQ test is worth 15 points). Falling IQs could result in slower productivity growth, which could further strain fiscal balances. Lower IQs are also associated with decreased future orientation.26 People who live for the moment tend to save less. A decline in savings would push up real rates, leading to less capital accumulation. History suggests that a deceleration in productivity growth and higher real rates will put downward pressure on equity multiples (Chart II-16). Part 4: Generation E For 200 years, the environmentally-driven Flynn Effect disguised the underlying genetically-driven decline in IQs that began not long after the dawn of the Industrial Revolution. Flynn has acknowledged this himself, noting at the 2017 International Society For Intelligence Research Conference that “I have no doubt that there has been some deterioration of genetic quality for intelligence since the late Victorian times.”27 Now that the Flynn Effect has reversed, both genes and the environment are working together to reduce cognitive abilities in developed economies. This means that the most important trend in the world – a trend that allowed the human population to increase during the Malthusian era and later allowed output-per-worker to soar following the Industrial Revolution – has broken down. Yet, there may be another twist in the story – one that began just a few months ago: the first members of Generation E were born. E Is For Edited ... Or Eugenics Lulu and Nana will be like most other children, but with one key difference: They will be the first humans ever to have their genomes edited through a procedure know as CRISPR-Cas9. Rogue Chinese scientist He Jiankui deactivated their CCR5 gene, which the HIV virus uses as a gateway into the body. His actions were rightfully condemned around the world for endangering the twins’ health by using a procedure that has not yet been fully vetted in animal studies, let alone in human trials (Lulu and Nana’s father is HIV+ but it is debatable whether the children were at an elevated risk of infection). He Jiankui remains under house arrest at the university where he worked. But whatever his fate, the dam has been broken. For better or for worse, the era of personal eugenics has arrived. The Return Of The Silver Fox It is easier to delete a gene than to add one. It is even more difficult to swap out a large number of genes in a way that achieves a predictable outcome. Thus, the successful manipulation of highly polygenic traits such as intelligence — traits that are linked to hundreds of different genes – may still be decades away.28 Predicting a trait is much simpler than modifying it, however. The cost of sequencing a human genome has fallen by more than 99% since 2001 (Chart II-17). Start-up company Genomic Prediction has already developed a test for fertilized embryos for IVF users that predicts height within a few centimetres and IQ with a correlation of 0.3-to-0.4, roughly as accurate as standardized tests such as the SAT or ACT.29 Other companies are following suit.30 Some will recoil in horror at the prospect of selecting prospective children in this manner. They will argue that such technologies, beyond being simply immoral, will widen social inequality between those who can afford them and those who cannot. Others will counter that screening embryos for certain traits is not that dissimilar to what people already do with prospective romantic partners. They will also point out that mass usage of these technologies will drive down prices to the point that even poor people will be able to access them, thus giving low IQ parents the chance to have high IQ kids. They might also note that such technologies may be the only way to reverse the ongoing accumulation of deleterious mutations within the human germline that has been the unintended by-product of the proliferation of life-saving medicines.31 We will not wade into this thorny debate, other than to note that there will be huge incentives for people to avail themselves of these technologies. The Coming Eugenic Wars And not just individuals either – governments too. While the initial impact of eugenic technologies will be small, the effects will compound over time. Carl Shulman and Nick Bostrom estimate that genetic screening could boost average IQs by up to 65 points in five generations (Table II-2). China has been investing heavily in genetic technologies. As Geoffrey Miller has argued, China’s infatuation with eugenics spans into the modern day.32 Like most other countries, fertility in China is negatively correlated with IQ. Mingrui Wang, John Fuerst, and Jianjun Ren estimate that China is currently losing nearly one-third of a point in generalized intelligence per decade, with the loss having accelerated rapidly between the 1960s and mid-1980s.33 The decline in the genetic component of Chinese IQs is coming at a time when the population itself is about to shrink. According to the UN’s baseline forecast, China will lose 450 million working-age people by the end of the century (Chart II-18). Meanwhile, the country is saddled with debt, the result of an economic model that has, for decades, recycled copious household savings into debt-financed fixed-investment spending in an effort to shore up domestic demand. The authorities may be tempted to tackle all three problems simultaneously by adopting generous pro-natal measures – call it the “at least one-child policy”– which increasingly harnesses emerging eugenic technologies. The resulting baby boom would strengthen domestic demand, thus making the economy less dependent on exports, while ensuring China’s long-term geopolitical viability. The Eugenic Wars are coming, and they will be unlike anything the world has seen before. BOX II-1 The Diffusion Of Bourgeois Values: Culture Or Genes? Higher-income people had more surviving children in the centuries leading up to the Industrial Revolution. Real per capita income was broadly stable during this period. This implies that there must have been downward social mobility, with sons, on average, being less wealthy than their fathers. This downward mobility, in turn, spread the characteristics of higher-income people across the broad swathe of society. What were these characteristics? Cultural values that emphasized thrift, diligence, and literacy were undoubtedly part of what was passed on to future generations. But surprisingly, it also appears that genetic transmission played an important, and perhaps pivotal, role. Models of genetic transmission make very concrete predictions about the correlations in economic status that one would expect to see among relatives. Biological brothers share 50% of their genes, as do fathers and sons. Likewise, first cousins share 25% of their genes, the same as grandfathers and sons. These facts yield two testable predictions: The first is that the correlation coefficient on status measures such as wealth, occupation, and education should be the same for relatives that share the same fraction of genes such as sibling pairs and father-son pairs. Box Chart II-1 shows that this is borne out by the data. The second prediction is that the correlation between status and genetic distance should follow a linear trend so that, for example, the correlation in wealth among brothers is twice that of first cousins and four times that of second cousins. Box Chart II-2 shows that this is also borne out by the data.   Other evidence supports the importance of genes in the transmission of status across generations. The correlation in measures such as wealth, education, and occupation is much higher among identical twins than fraternal twins. Adopted children turn out to be more similar to their biological parents on these measures when they reach adulthood than their adopted parents, even when the children have never met their biological parents. The parent-child correlation also remains the same regardless of family size, suggesting that spreading the same resources over more children may not harm life outcomes to any discernible degree, at least on the measures listed above. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy III. Indicators And Reference Charts Our tactical equity upgrade to overweight last month has still not been confirmed by most of our proprietary indicators. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicator for the U.S. is falling fast. It is also eroding for Europe, although it has ticked higher in Japan. The WTP indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Investors have clearly moved funds away from the U.S. equity market and there is no sign yet that this is reversing. Our Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) for stocks continued to issue a ‘sell’ signal in January. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. While the RPI is still cautious, value has improved significantly according to BCA’s composite valuation indicator. It is a composite of 11 different valuation measures. This indicator almost reached the fair value line in December. Moreover, our Monetary Indicator has suddenly shifted out of negative territory for stocks, rising to the neutral line in December. Calming words from the Fed has improved the monetary backdrop by removing expected rate hikes from the money market curve. Given the improvement in both value and the monetary backdrop, the RPI could generate a ‘buy’ signal next month. Our Composite Technical indicator for stocks broke down last month, providing a clear ‘sell’ signal, and has not yet delivered a ‘buy’. However, sentiment is now washed out and earnings expectations have been revised heavily downward. These signals are bullish from a contrary perspective.  The 10-year Treasury yield is in the neutral range according to our valuation model. Bonds are not overbought, despite the rally in December, because they were still working off oversold conditions. Contrary to the bond valuation model, the 10-year term premium moved further into negative territory in January, suggesting that yields are unsustainably low. Our bond-bearish bias is consistent with the view that the Fed rate hike cycle is not over. The U.S. dollar is somewhat overbought and very expensive on a PPP basis. Nonetheless, we believe it will become more expensive in the first half of 2019, before its structural downtrend resumes in broad trade-weighted terms. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators   Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator   Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields   Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP   Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator   Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals   Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators   Chart III-24Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop   Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot   Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions   Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst   Footnotes 1       Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report "The Long Shadow Of The Financial Crisis," dated October 25, 2018, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2       The amount of spread widening required for corporate returns to break-even with duration-matched U.S. Treasuries on a one-year horizon. 3       Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report "Five Black Swans In 2019," dated January 16, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 4       Xi Song, Cameron Campbell, and James Lee, "Descent Line Growth and Extinction From A Multigenerational Perspective, Extended Abstract," American Sociological Review 80:3, (April 21, 2015): 574-602. 5       Gregory Cochran and Henry Harpending, "The 10,000 Year Explosion: How Civilization Accelerated Human Evolution," Basic Books, (2009). 6       Mark Grinblatt, Matti Keloharju, and Juhani T. Linnainmaa, “IQ, Trading Behavior, and Performance,” Journal of Financial Economics, 104:2, (May 2012): 339-362. 7       Thomas Bouchard, "Genetic Influence On Human Psychological Traits - A Survey," Current Directions in Psychological Science 13:4, (August 2004): 148-151. 8      The tendency for the genetic contribution to IQ to increase until early adulthood and then to remain at high levels until old age is known as the Wilson Effect. There is no consensus on what causes it, but it probably reflects a number of factors: 1) It may take some children longer than normal to reach full intellectual maturity. Testing their IQs at a young age will result in scores that are lower than those expected based on their parents’ IQs. The opposite is true for children whose IQs increase relatively quickly in young age, but possibly top out earlier; 2) Environmental effects are probably more important in young age when a child’s brain is still quite malleable; 3) Self-reinforcing gene-environment interactions tend to increase with age. Children do not have much control over their environment, but as they get older, they will seek out activities that are more in keeping with their genetic predispositions. For example, a studious child may pursue a career that reinforces their love of learning. 9       "Cache Cab: Taxi Drivers' Brains Grow to Navigate London's Streets," Scientific American, (December 2011). 10       Atheendar Venkataramani, "Early Life Exposure to Malaria and Cognition in Adulthood: Evidence from Mexico," Journal of Health Economics 31:5, (July 2012): 767-780; Hoyt Bleakley, "Health, Human Capital and Development," Annual Review of Economics 2, (March 2010): 283-310; Hoyt Bleakley, "Malaria Eradication in the Americas: A Retrospective Analysis of Childhood Exposure," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 2, (April 2010): 1-45. 11       "Anthropologists Find American Heads Are Getting Larger," ScienceDaily, (May 2012). 12       "British Teenagers Have Lower IQs Than Their Counterparts Did 30 Years Ago," The Telegraph, (February 2009). 13     Bernt Bratsberg and Ole Rogeberg, "Flynn Effect And Its Reversal Are Both Environmentally Caused," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115:26, (June 2018): 6674-6678. 14     On the face of it, artificial intelligence would appear to be a substitute for human intelligence. Many applications of AI would undoubtedly have this feature, especially those that allow computers to perform complex mental tasks that humans now must do. However, there are several ways that AI may eventually come to complement human intelligence. First, and most obviously, AI could be used to augment human capabilities either directly by hardwiring it into our brains, or indirectly through the development of drugs or genetic techniques which improve cognition. Second, looking further out, the benefits of highly intelligent AI systems would be limited if humans did not possess the requisite intelligence to understand certain concepts that are currently beyond our mental reach. No matter how well intentioned, trying to explain string theory to a mouse is not going to succeed. There are probably a multitude of ideas that AI could reveal that we simply cannot comprehend at current levels of human intelligence. 15     James Heckman and Paul La Fontaine, "The American High School Graduation Rate: Trends and Levels," The Review of Economics and Statistics 92:2, (May 2010): 244–262. 16     "Turning Around Chronically Low-Performing Schools," The Institute of Education Sciences (IES), (May 2008). 17     E. von Mutius, F.D. Martinez, C. Fritzsch, T. Nicolai, G. Roell, and H. H. Thiemann, "Prevalence Of Asthma And Atopy In Two Areas Of West Germany And East Germany," American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine 149:2, (February 1994): 358-64. 18     "Sperm Counts In The West Plunge By 60% In 40 Years As ‘Modern Life’ Damages Men’s Health," Independent, (July 2017). 19     Kaspar Sørensen, Annette Mouritsen, Lise Aksglaede, Casper P. Hagen, Signe Sloth Mogensen, and Anders Juul, "Recent Secular Trends in Pubertal Timing: Implications for Evaluation and Diagnosis of Precocious Puberty," Hormone Research in Paediatrics 77:3, (May 2012): 137-145. 20     “Results from the 2017 National Survey On Drug Use And Health: Detailed Tables,” Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Center for Behavioral Health Statistics and Quality, Rockville (Maryland), (September, 2018). 21     Laura A. Pratt, Debra J. Brody, and Qiuping Gu, "Antidepressant Use Among Persons Aged 12 and Over: United States, 2011–2014," NCHS Data Brief No. 283, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, (August 2017). 22     Some, but not all, of the increase in reported rates of mental illness may be due to more aggressive diagnosis by health practitioners. For example, a recent study revealed that children born in August were 30% more likely to receive an ADHD diagnosis than those born in September, simply because they were less mature compared to other kids in the first few years of elementary school. See: Timothy J. Layton, Michael L. Barnett, Tanner R. Hicks, and Anupam B. Jena, "Attention Deficit-Hyperactivity Disorder and Month of School Enrollment," New England Journal of Medicine 379:22, (November 2018): 2122-2130. 23     Tamara C. Daley, Shannon E. Whaley, Marian D. Sigman, Michael P. Espinosa, and Charlotte Neumann, "IQ On The Rise: The Flynn Effect In Rural Kenyan Children," Psychological Science 14:3, (June 2003): 215-9; Jakob Pietschnig and Martin Voracek, "One Century of Global IQ Gains: A Formal Meta-Analysis of the Flynn Effect (1909-2013)," Perspectives on Psychological Science 10:3, (May 2015): 282-306. 24     N. Bleichrodt and M. P. Born, “Meta-Analysis of Research on Iodine and Its Relationship to Cognitive Development,” In: ed. J. B. Stanbury, "The Damaged Brain of Iodine Deficiency," Cognizant Communication Corporation, New York, (1994): 195-200; "Iodine status worldwide: WHO Global Database on Iodine Deficiency," World Health Organization, Geneva, (2004). 25     Mohd Fareed and Mohammad Afzal, "Estimating the Inbreeding Depression on Cognitive Behavior: A Population Based Study of Child Cohort," PLOS ONE 9:12, (October 2015): e109585. 26     H. de Wit, J. D. Flory, A. Acheson, M. McCloskey, and S. B. Manuck, "IQ And Nonplanning Impulsivity Are Independently Associated With Delay Discounting In Middle-Aged Adults," Personality and Individual Differences 42:1, (January 2007): 111-121; W. Mischel and R. Metzner, "Preference For Delayed Reward As A Function Of Age, Intelligence, And Length Of Delay Interval," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 64:6, (July 1962): 425-31. 27     James Flynn, “IQ decline and Piaget: Does the rot start at the top?” Lifetime Achievement Award Address, 18th Annual meeting of ISIR, (July 2017). 28     For a good discussion of these issues, please see Richard J. Haier, “The Neuroscience of Intelligence,” Cambridge Fundamentals of Neuroscience in Psychology, (December 2016). 29     "The Future of In-Vitro Fertilization and Gene Editing," Psychology Today, (December 2018). 30     "DNA Tests For IQ Are Coming, But It Might Not Be Smart To Take One," MIT Technology Review, (April 2018). 31     Michael Lynch, "Rate, Molecular Spectrum, And Consequences Of Human Mutation," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 107:3, (January 2010): 961-968. 32     Geoffrey Miller, "What *Should* We Be Worried About?" Edge, (2013). 33     Mingrui Wang, John Fuerst, and Jianjun Ren, "Evidence Of Dysgenic Fertility In China," Intelligence 57, (April 2016): 15-24. EQUITIES:FIXED INCOME:CURRENCIES:COMMODITIES:ECONOMY:

Highlights Our leading indicator for China’s “old economy” remains weak, and the beneficial trade front-running effect that has supported some of China’s macro data over the past year is beginning to wane. Our "earnings recession" model for Chinese investable stocks suggests that a trade deal alone is not enough to prevent a contraction in earnings growth over the coming year. A meaningful rebound in credit relative to GDP would also be required, one that would retrace roughly 50% of the decline that has occurred since late-2017. An overweight cyclical stance (i.e. over a 6-12 month period) towards Chinese stocks versus their global peers remains premature. The equity market is conceptually supported until the beginning of March if trade talks continue to make progress, but will face (potentially severe) headwinds thereafter until credit durably accelerates at some point in the second half of the year. Feature China’s macro data remains at the forefront of investor attention, and December’s updates did not provide market participants with much comfort. Our leading indicator for China’s “old economy” deteriorated anew in December after a shallow three-month rise (Chart 1), driven by a currency-driven retracement in monetary conditions, as well as slowing growth in both M3 and adjusted total social financing (TSF). The flow of adjusted TSF relative to GDP technically ticked higher in December, but only because of a material slowdown in nominal GDP growth from 9.6% in Q3 to 8.1% in Q4 (Chart 2). This decline in nominal GDP means that it has retraced 70% of its rise from 2015 to 2017. Chart 1A Relapse In Our Leading Indicator For China's Old Economy Chart 2A 70% Retracement In Chinese Nominal GDP Growth On the housing front, sales volume growth ticked slightly higher but remains negative (and well below the pace of construction growth), and pledged supplementary lending from the PBOC, a factor that we have identified as a core driver of China’s housing market since 2015,1 decelerated further. Finally, December’s trade data was uniformly negative, with import and export growth decelerating 6-7 percentage points even on a smoothed basis, depending on whether measured in U.S. dollars or local currency. Revisiting The Measurement Of China’s “Old Economy” One notable exception to the weak data was the Bloomberg Li Keqiang index (LKI) itself, which rose from 8.4 in November to 9.3 in December. Our alternative LKI rose to exactly the same level, closing the gap with Bloomberg’s measure that had existed earlier this year (Chart 3). Chart 3Our Coincident Measures Of The Old Economy Are Trending Higher... In fact, the LKI has been providing a different message than our LKI leading indicator for several months, and the apparent uptrend in the series raises the question of whether the Chinese economy is actually strengthening rather than weakening. With high conviction, our answer to this question is no. As we have highlighted in previous reports, our view is that the gap can be explained by the (anomalous and only temporary) positive impact that the trade war has had on economic activity since March last year, as Chinese exporters rushed to front-load the production and shipment of goods to the U.S. in advance of the imposition of tariffs. Panel 1 of Chart 4 makes this point explicitly, by showing the percentile rank of the two most cyclical components of the LKI. From 2010 to early-2018, electricity production and railway freight volume moved closely together, with the former leading the latter somewhat from 2017 to early-2018. While the trade war-driven bounce in electricity production has since rolled off, railway cargo volume remains elevated and is only now rolling over. December’s extremely poor trade data suggests that a material further decline is likely in Q1 of this year. Chart 4...Because Of A (Temporarily) Beneficial Trade War Effect Panel 2 shows that bank lending, the third component of the LKI, has begun to pick up over the past few months. However, this reflects, at least in part, the goal of policymakers to shrink the size of shadow banking in the economy and reorient the provision of credit back to traditional financial institutions (Chart 5). A sustainable rise in bank loan growth that overwhelms a shrinking shadow banking sector will almost certainly show up in our preferred measure of aggregate credit growth (adjusted total social financing), which for now remains in a clear downtrend. From a bigger picture perspective, it is worth revisiting why we focus on the LKI at all. Our use of the index to represent China’s investment-relevant economic activity dates back to a November 2017 Special Report,2 in which we noted that it correlated well with China’s nominal import growth and led the growth in earnings for the MSCI China index ex-technology. Real GDP growth, by contrast, has shown barely any cyclicality over the past four years in the face of large changes in Chinese import growth and the prices of China-related assets (Chart 6). This underscores that aggregate Chinese real GDP is not, by and large, investment-relevant. Chart 5A Stunning Collapse In Shadow Banking Activity Chart 6Chinese Real GDP Growth Is Not Relevant For Investors What can we infer about the trend in China’s old economy if the LKI is combined with other closely correlated measures of investment-relevant economic activity? Panel 1 of Chart 7 answers this question by presenting the standardized LKI alongside standardized nominal import growth and nominal manufacturing output, the measure of Chinese coincident activity preferred by BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy service. Panel 2 of the chart shows an equally-weighted average of all three measures alongside our leading indicator for the LKI. We note four key observations from Chart 7: Chart 7China's Investment-Relevant Economic Activity Is Trending Lower Since 2010, the primary trend in the LKI, nominal import growth, and nominal manufacturing output has been the same The modest uptrend in the LKI since early-2018 is not corroborated by imports or manufacturing output Economic activity in China has been stronger over the past year than our leading indicator would have suggested, even after abstracting from the anomalous uptrend in the LKI The gap between our leading indicator and China’s actual economic activity is now beginning to close. These observations support the conclusion that we reached when analyzing the components of the LKI itself: a temporary boost from trade front-running has masked an underlying slowdown over the past year. But this boost has now begun to wane, implying that actual activity will continue to slow in the coming months. Is A Trade Deal Enough To Prevent An Earnings Contraction? While most global investors would acknowledge that China’s domestic economy is slowing, the performance of China-related assets over the past year highlights that the market views the trade war with the U.S. as being at least equally important as slowing Chinese money & credit growth. Chart 8 highlights that our market-based China growth indicator did not break down until the second quarter of 2018, when the threat of tariffs from the Trump administration became a reality. The indicator’s prior resilience was in contrast to a steady deterioration in our LKI leading indicator, which peaked at the beginning of 2017. Chart 8Investors Are Largely Focused On The U.S./China Trade War The surge in the indicator since early-December underscores that investor expectations of a trade deal with the U.S. have materially improved sentiment about China’s growth profile, despite the fact that Chinese money & credit growth have yet to meaningfully improve. Given that our geopolitical strategy team assigns odds as high as 45% of a framework deal emerging by the March 1 deadline,3 how can investors gauge the net impact of an improving external outlook and still-weak domestic demand? Chart 9 illustrates one method of approaching this question, using a model of Chinese investable earnings growth that we introduced in our January 16 Special Report.4 The model is designed to predict the likelihood of a serious investable earnings contraction over the coming 12-months, and includes data on credit, trade, and forward earnings momentum as predictors. The chart shows what would have to happen to the flow of adjusted total social financing as a share of GDP in a trade deal scenario, calibrated in a way that the odds of a major earnings contraction fall to 33% (the highest historical reading of the model that did not correspond to a major earnings decline). Chart 9A Trade Deal Is Not Enough To Avoid An Earnings Recession In China The chart shows that a meaningful rebound in credit flow to GDP would be required, one that would retrace roughly 50% of the decline that has occurred since late-2017. In short, our analysis shows that a trade deal alone is likely not enough to prevent a contraction in Chinese earnings growth over the coming year. Importantly, Chart 10 shows what this would imply for the volume of credit that would need to be created over the coming several months in order for the scenario shown in Chart 9 to come to pass (assuming an 8% growth rate in nominal GDP). The chart highlights that China would need to create approximately RMB 26 trillion in new credit over the coming 12 months (nearly US$ 4 trillion at current exchange rates), which would exceed the prior high set in late-2017 by a non-trivial amount. While this goal looks on its way to being achieved based on a 6-month annualized rate of change (panel 2), this largely reflects a one-month surge in local government bond issuance in September. Over the past 3-months, the annualized pace of credit creation has fallen well below the RMB 26 trillion mark, implying that either traditional credit growth, shadow credit, or local government bond issuance will have to pick up significantly over the coming several months in order for the domestic demand situation to stabilize. We expect this to occur, but it has not occurred yet. Chart 10China Needs To Create 26 Trillion RMB In Credit In 2019 Investment Conclusions The key conclusion of our analysis above is that an overweight cyclical stance (i.e. over a 6-12 month period) towards Chinese stocks versus their global peers remains premature. We noted in our December 5 weekly report that a tactical (0-3 month) overweight was probably warranted due to the prospect of a framework trade deal with the U.S. on March 1, but Chart 9 makes it clear that an improving external demand outlook is not a sufficient basis to expect that Chinese stocks will avoid an earnings recession. In this regard, investors should conceptualize the absence of a significant pickup in the volume of credit as a “gap” in a bridge representing the market support for Chinese stocks over the course of the calendar year (Chart 11). Assuming leaks from the negotiations continue and are consistent with the agreement of a framework deal, the market is conceptually supported until the beginning of March. However, following March 1, a gap in support emerges until credit durably accelerates at some point in the second half of the year. In our view, investors who go long Chinese stocks today with a 6-12 month time horizon are betting not only on the success of trade negotiations, but that this gap will close by the time that a deal is announced. This is a risky gamble given the still-relevant desire of policymakers to avoid another major credit overshoot, and as such our cyclical recommendation remains unchanged: wait. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report “China's Property Market: Where Will It Go From Here?”, dated September 13, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report “The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle”, dated November 30, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy Special Report “Is China Already Isolated?”, dated January 23, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report “Six Questions About Chinese Stocks”, dated January 16, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights So What? A 70% tax on Americans with income over $10 million is not far-fetched. Why? The median U.S. voter wants higher taxes on the wealthy; Both populism and geopolitics make it impossible to cut spending; The next recession, no matter how shallow, will elicit unconventional policy. Feature The New Year has brought a chill to the investment community. No, it is not the weather, but rather a proposal by U.S. Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (AOC) to create a new top-income bracket, starting at $10,000,000, that would be taxed at 70%. The reaction to the self-described Democratic Socialist has been swift. Her strategy of soaking the rich would not work, would cause an exodus of job-creators out of the U.S., and would slow down the pace of growth. A CNBC headline screamed: “The super rich at Davos are scared of Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s proposal to hike taxes on the wealthy.”1 In these pages, we are not going to discuss the merits of the proposal, although it would not raise enough revenue to fund the Democrats’ other policy proposals. Instead, we are going to forecast that Representative Ocasio-Cortez will get what she wants. Within our investment horizon. Probably following the next recession, which is nigh. However, how she gets what she wants will ultimately matter more than what the tax rate is on every dollar over $10,000,000 of income. The Median American Voter Since before the 2016 U.S. election and the Brexit vote, we have argued that the Median Voter is moving to the Left, particularly in the laissez-faire economies of the U.S. and the U.K. These two Anglo-Saxon economies swerved most enthusiastically to the right of the economic spectrum during the 1980 supply-side revolutions. They embraced both neo-liberal economic policy and globalization. While these reforms allowed them to outperform their less enthusiastically capitalist peers on a number of measures of economic performance, they also produced higher income inequality and a slower pace of social mobility (Chart 1). Over time, and particularly following the 2008 Great Recession, this pernicious mix of factors produced a surge in populism. There has been plenty of evidence that our view is on track. Take for example the performance of the über-left leaning Labour Party in the U.K.’s 2017 election or the breakdown of the Washington Consensus on global trade. Still, many clients have resisted our thesis. This is because President Trump did manage to push a sweeping supply-side tax cut through Congress in 2017. Given that we forecast that Republicans would get their way on tax cuts, our clients were left wondering how our thesis of a shift to the left could coexist with a Reagan-esque lowering of tax rates? The answer is that the move of the Median Voter to the left is a structural geopolitical view. A tax cut policy in 2017 was a tactical/cyclical view that deviated from the long-term trend. Trump was a candidate who promised faster economic growth while the Republican Party was a political machine that sought a low tax regime as a matter of policy and ideology. We expected the GOP, and House leader Paul Ryan, to use the Trump presidency as a way to get one last tax cut while they had control. However, since the tax cuts were passed, much has gone awry for America’s center-right party. First, the Democrats campaigned enthusiastically against the tax cuts in the midterm elections. On the other side of the aisle, Republican members of Congress quickly found out that they got no applause from constituents for their signature piece of legislation. The tax cut therefore disappeared from GOP messaging ahead of the November 2018 election. Steve Bannon, Trump’s political strategist, had apparently predicted this outcome when he cautioned against cutting tax rates for the top income bracket. He suggested a hike on taxes for the wealthy to boost Trump’s populist credentials. (Bannon’s proposal was for a 44% rate on those who earn income over $5,000,000, mathematically on the path towards Ocasio-Cortez’s end-point!).2 Second, the Republicans went on to lose their majority in the House. Granted, presidents usually lose their first midterm. However, with unemployment at 3.7% last November and the economy clocking in at a 3% clip, the GOP had a clear upper hand on economic messaging. And yet it did not avert major losses. The commentary from the right is that the Democrats are going to dig their own grave with their increasingly “Socialist” talk. But will they? We present three reasons that suggest that Ocasio-Cortez (and, ironically, Steve Bannon) are going to get what they want. Income taxes in America will rise over the next decade. Reason #1: The Median Voter Wants Higher Taxes On The Wealthy There is nothing sacred in politics. A society’s volonté générale swings like a pendulum between thesis and antithesis. The idea that Americans embody the laissez-faire spirit, while the French are socialists, is simply a product of linear extrapolation based on the timeline of a single generation.3  Chart 2 suggests a different story. As recently as the early 1970s, the U.S. and France were like peas in a pod when it came to income distribution, while the U.K. – the epicenter of the supply-side revolution — was the most redistributive Western economy. Chart 2France Was Once Less Socialist Than America! Today, Americans are much more in line with AOC than with Paul Ryan, which is why only one of the two has a job in the U.S. Congress. Ryan knew when to take his winnings and go home. According to a poll published merely weeks after AOC’s proposal, 59% of Americans support the 70% marginal tax rate. Democrats support the idea at a 71% clip, which suggests that Ocasio-Cortez is not on the fringes of the party. Independents support it at 60% and even 45% of registered Republicans support the idea. One could argue that the much-cited poll above is merely a flash in the pan, that it signifies nothing. We disagree for two reasons. First, if 60% of Americans – including 45% of Republicans – support a 70% tax rate now, when the economy is firing on all cylinders, GDP growth is above potential, and unemployment is at 3.9%, what will they support 12-36 months from now, when the inevitable recession hits? Or when America’s indebted corporations begin to deleverage by shedding jobs because they took on massive debts in order to buy back equities and return value to shareholders (which, completely coincidentally, includes senior management)? Second, there is evidence that a majority of Americans has thought that “upper-income people” have not been paying their fair share for some time now. A Gallup poll run since the early 1990s shows that the sentiment for higher taxes on upper-income individuals is off its lows in 2010 (Chart 3). We are still far from the early 1990s highs, but the trajectory of the public opinion is clearly going in the Left’s direction and has always hovered around the 60% mark. Bottom Line: It seems like ages ago that Grover Norquist, the anti-tax advocate, dominated the hallways of Congress, prodding legislators into pledging to “oppose any and all efforts to increase the marginal tax rate for individuals and businesses.” As recently as the 2012 election, 238 out of 242 House Republicans and 41 out of 47 Senate Republicans signed Norquist’s “Taxpayer Protection Pledge.” We subscribe to the theory that the median voter is the price maker in the political marketplace, the politician is the price taker. Trump and Ocasio-Cortez are merely vessels for the expression of the volonté générale, the median voter’s policy preference. And that preference runs counter to Norquist’s activism and the GOP’s tax cut policy in 2017. Reason #2: History Is On Ocasio-Cortez’s Side Chart 4 has already made the rounds, suggesting that Ocasio-Cortez is not making a ludicrous proposal given that the U.S. already had much higher marginal tax rates on top incomes in the past. Critics accuse her of simplifying history without considering context. This is an important point. First, defense spending as a percent of GDP was at 37.5% in 1945 and still at an elevated 7.4% in 1965, twenty years later. The U.S. exited World War II and then almost immediately stumbled into two major conflicts, one on the Korean Peninsula and one in Vietnam. Meanwhile, the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union created an existential threat that had to be resisted on land, sea, and space, justifying higher tax rates. Second, while the U.S. did indeed cut its top marginal rates throughout the second half of the century, so did everyone else! Chart 5 shows that the rest of the Western world was largely in lock-step with the U.S. In fact, it was the U.S. that came down to French levels of taxation (!!!) throughout 1960s and 1970s (again, remember Chart 2). As such, Chart 4 by itself is not a reason to excuse higher marginal rates. Of course we are completely disinterested in the merits of the policy. We are merely trying to forecast it. And Chart 4 does help us do so for two reasons. First, the key achievement of the Tax Cuts And Jobs Act of 2017 was the corporate tax cut to 21%. There is some bipartisan support for this policy, at least in the center of the Democratic Party (President Obama tried to cut the corporate tax rate from 35% to 28% in 2012). The last time corporate tax rates were this low, however, the top marginal income tax rate was at 79%. As such, we think that a bipartisan consensus could emerge on keeping corporate tax cuts at or below the OECD average of 24%, but at the cost of higher marginal tax rates for high-income earners. Second, it has been a key structural view of BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy, since inception, that the defining geopolitical feature of the twenty-first century will be the Sino-American conflict. If we are right on this issue, then perhaps an “existential conflict” to justify higher taxes on elites is already here. In other words, it is a fact that global challenges have required the U.S. to tax households and corporations at a higher rate in the past. It is also a fact that the U.S. faces greater global challenges today, specifically with China and Russia, than at anytime since the Cold War. Thus, while AOC may not be motivated by geopolitics, she may represent one aspect of a growing public policy consensus nonetheless. Simply put, with the U.S. facing both populism and geopolitical multipolarity, there is simply no political option for cutting either defense or non-defense spending. The only question is whether the U.S. will simultaneously shore up its ability to service its debts and maintain a reliable currency. AOC may find unlikely allies as geopolitical competition heats up. Reason #3: Policymakers Will Overreact To The Next Recession  President Trump was elected in November 2016, with the recession having ended 88 months prior, with the unemployment rate down 5.6%, and the economy on the path to recovery. But his economic populist message resonated with a lot of voters who did not participate in that recovery. Our concern is that the next recession is close at hand. BCA’s House View is that the next recession will be relatively shallow in the U.S., in part because there aren’t any obvious bubbles. For one, cyclical spending as a percent of GDP is at mid-cycle levels (Chart 6). Corporate debt is elevated, but not by international standards (Chart 7). U.S. banks are in a much sounder position than in 2007. So, from a macroeconomic perspective, the next recession is nothing to fear. Chart 6Are We Even Mid-Cycle Yet?   Chart 7Corporate Debt Load Is Not Excessive Policymakers, however, don’t care about macroeconomics. They care about the policy preferences of the Median Voter. And if that Median Voter elected an anti-establishment populist during relatively good times, who will he or she support when unemployment is high? Whoever is running the U.S. when the next recession happens, they will not wait around to find out. Unorthodox monetary, fiscal, and yes tax policy will overshoot norms and conventions regardless of how shallow the recession is. All bets are off at that point since policymakers will have a “recency bias” due to the trauma of 2008. While the recession may be shallow, the budget deficit will likely be at an elevated level. The U.S. is currently engaged in the first pro-cyclical economic stimulus since the late 1960s (Chart 8). This means that the recession will likely hit with the budget deficit already at around 5%-6% of GDP, compared to just 3%-4% when the last recession occurred. Given that the last four recessions raised the U.S. budget deficit by an average of 5% of GDP, it is safe to say that the U.S. budget deficit may rise to 2010 levels after the next downturn, regardless of how shallow the recession is. Chart 8Budget Deficits Will Be Very High In The Next Recession As with the  Great Recession, the public will demand that the government deals with the deficit. Unlike in the post-2008 environment, however, we think that the Median Voter will abandon the Norquist and Tea Party thesis of cutting spending and adopt the view that higher income brackets should see their taxes increased. That said, extremely high marginal rates at $10,000,000 will impact very few individuals and thus have a negligible revenue impact. What about higher marginal rates across the board? Chart 9 illustrates the evolution of marginal tax rates, using 2012 dollars for income brackets, across decades. The 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s saw multiple tax brackets, all with progressively higher marginal tax rates. In the 1970s, the 70% tax rate started at $460,000 in 2012 dollars, but a 50% rate began at $100,000 in 2012 dollars. The question for investors is whether Ocasio-Cortez’s proposal is merely a branding exercise. A 70% tax rate that begins at $10,000,000 – Option 1 on Diagram 1 – is largely irrelevant, macroeconomically and politically. But if that is an end point of a curve, that is something that investors will want to know. This is because policymakers could draw those curves either by cutting lower-class and middle-class marginal rates – such as in Option 2 – or by simply replicating the 1970s curve, such as in Option 3. The impact of new taxes on the part of society with a higher marginal propensity to consume is an important consideration for policymakers recovering from a recession. Diagram 1Is Ocasio-Cortez’s Proposal An End Point Of A Curve Or Just A Branding Exercise? At the moment, investors are probably not overly concerned about these issues. Options 2 and 3 look unlikely in the current political environment. But, again, they have been acceptable policy options in the past and could be revived if the Democratic Party decides to make income inequality the central issue of the 2020 election. Which makes the 2020 election the most significant U.S. election in a generation. Will Trump-style populism succeed or will Democratic Socialism emerge in the United States? At the moment, most of our clients would likely guess that trade and immigration – policy issues from 2016 – will dominate the debate again in 2020. This is likely incorrect linear extrapolation. Rarely do the same issues carry over from one election to another. As such, a left-leaning presidential candidate could push the Trump administration on its tax reform package and the continued growing income inequality, despite a falling unemployment rate. Throw in a potential recession and you have a witch’s brew. Not only would the rhetoric alarm the markets, but so would the electoral math. Democrats have a solid House majority while Republicans are clinging to a small Senate majority in a year when the electoral math clearly works in Democrats’ favor (20 out of 33 Senate seats up for reelection are held by the GOP). We are not ready to give a high conviction forecast on the presidential election – other than to say that a recession will virtually ensure Trump’s loss – but we do have a high conviction that whoever wins the White House in 2020 will also carry the Senate. As such, a Democratic sweep of both the White House and Congress is a possible scenario. At that point, the Options from Diagram 1 will no longer be an academic question. Finally, even if Trump emerges victorious, he may still have to agree with a Democratic Congress to modify his tax cuts in order to pay for his border wall, immigration reform, and a national infrastructure package. In that case, the median voter would have established the long-term bottom of U.S. tax rates even without a change in political parties. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see CNBC Markets, “The super rich at Davos are scared of Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s proposal to hike taxes on the wealthy,” dated January 22, 2018, available at cnbc.com. 2       Please see “Steve Bannon’s Plan to Raise Taxes on the Rich? Not Happening,” Fortune, dated July 31, 2017, available at fortune.com. 3      Also known as stereotyping.

Highlights Duration: The U.S. economic data show few signs of restrictive monetary policy, despite the fact that the market is now priced for an end to the Fed’s rate hike cycle. Investors should position for further rate hikes this year. Practically, this means keeping portfolio duration low and avoiding the 5-year/7-year part of the Treasury curve. Corporate Spreads: Corporate breakeven spreads are too wide for this phase of the cycle, especially for the Baa and junk credit tiers. Our default-adjusted spread shows that high-yield bonds offer adequate compensation for default losses, in line with the historical average. Corporate Defaults: A simple model using gross nonfinancial corporate leverage pegs fair value for the 12-month speculative grade default rate at 4.1%. This fair value estimate should decline slightly in the months ahead, as long as pre-tax profit growth stays above 7%, the approximate rate of debt growth. Feature Fed rate hikes have been completely priced out of the curve. As of last Friday’s close, the overnight index swap market was priced for 2 basis points of rate hikes during the next 12 months and 9 bps of cuts during the next 24 months (Chart 1). The sharp drop in rate hike expectations is an overreaction, and investors should position for a near-term rise in rate expectations. The Fed’s rate hike cycle still has room to run before interest rates peak. Chart 1Market Says "No More Hikes" In this week’s report we survey the recent economic data, searching for any signal that interest rates are high enough to choke off the recovery. We conclude that monetary conditions remain accommodative, and that the Fed’s rate hike cycle will re-start in the second half of this year. Searching For Signs Of Tight Money Policymakers frequently talk about the concept of the neutral (or equilibrium) fed funds rate. In essence, the neutral rate is the interest rate that is consistent with trend economic growth and stable inflation. If the fed funds rate is set above neutral, then we should expect growth to slow and inflation to fall. Conversely, if the fed funds rate is set below neutral, we should expect growth to accelerate and inflation to rise. The slope of the yield curve can help distill this concept for bond investors. An inverted yield curve signals that the market is priced for interest rate cuts in the future. This is what we would expect to see in an environment where the fed funds rate is above neutral and monetary conditions are restrictive. Conversely, a very steep yield curve means that investors expect rate hikes in the future. This is usually consistent with accommodative monetary policy and an interest rate well below neutral. We find the neutral rate to be a useful concept, though like Fed Chairman Powell we think it is unwise to place too much stock in point estimates of its level.1 Such estimates are very difficult to make in real time, and tend to be heavily revised with hindsight.2 For investors, a wiser strategy is to look for signs in the economic data that interest rates are too high, and to use those signs to decide when interest rates have peaked for the cycle. We review a few of those potential signs below. Nominal GDP Growth One simple signal of restrictive monetary policy is when interest rates rise above the year-over-year growth rate in nominal GDP. In the last cycle, Treasury returns versus cash didn’t move materially higher until after year-over-year nominal GDP growth was below both the 10-year Treasury yield and the 3-month T-bill rate (Chart 2). At present, year-over-year nominal GDP growth is running at 5.5%. Though it is very likely to slow during the next few quarters, it still has a long way to go before it falls below 2.76%, the current 10-year Treasury yield. Chart 2GDP Growth Suggests That Monetary Policy Remains Accommodative Verdict: An assessment of nominal GDP growth shows that monetary policy remains accommodative. The Housing Market Given that the mortgage market provides the most direct link between interest rates and real economic activity, it makes sense that signs of tight money might show up first in the housing data. Empirical investigation backs up this claim. As was observed by Edward Leamer in his 2007 paper, of the ten post-WWII U.S. recessions, eight were preceded by a significant slowdown in residential investment.3 Our own reading of the data is consistent with this message. Downtrends in the 12-month moving averages of both single-family housing starts and new home sales preceded inflection points higher in excess Treasury returns in each of the past two cycles (Chart 3). Chart 3No Signal From Housing While these housing metrics certainly deteriorated during the past nine months, it appears that the worst is now behind us. The recent moderation in mortgage rates has already led to a significant bounce in mortgage purchase applications and a pop in homebuilder confidence (Chart 4). This will translate into increased housing starts and new home sales during the next few months. Chart 4Housing Rebound Underway Verdict: The housing data are most likely consistent with still-accommodative monetary policy. However, if single-family housing starts and new home sales do not respond as expected to the recent drop in the mortgage rate, then we will be forced to re-visit this view. The Labor Market Of all the available labor market statistics, initial unemployment claims tend to be the most leading and have historically provided the best signal of tight monetary conditions. In each of the past two cycles a significant increase in jobless claims has coincided with the inflection point higher in Treasury excess returns (Chart 5). While there was some concern toward the end of last year that claims were trending up, this has now been dashed and claims actually fell below 200k last week. Notice in Chart 5 that the 13-week change in claims remains negative. In prior cycles it rose above zero around the same time that Treasury returns started to improve.. Chart 5No Signal From Labor Market Verdict: The labor market data remain consistent with accommodative monetary policy. Bottom Line: It seems very likely that U.S. monetary policy remains accommodative. Nominal GDP growth and the labor market both strongly support this claim. The housing data have been weaker, but are already showing signs of rebounding. The implication for bond investors is that the Fed is not done lifting interest rates, even though the market is priced for exactly that outcome. Investors should maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration on the view that rate hikes will re-start in the second half of this year. The 5-year/7-year part of the Treasury curve is especially vulnerable to an increase in rate hike expectations. Investors should avoid this part of the curve, focusing on the very long and short maturities.4 The Weakness Is Global The analysis in the above section begs the question: If the economic data do not suggest that monetary policy is restrictive, then why is the market priced for an end to the Fed’s rate hike cycle? The answer is that everything is not rosy in the economic outlook. Specifically, we have already seen a significant slowdown in non-U.S. economic growth that weighed significantly on financial markets near the end of last year and is starting to impact the most externally-exposed segments of the U.S. economy. Chart 6 shows that a slowdown in the Global ex. U.S. Leading Economic Indicator (LEI) is now dragging the U.S. LEI down with it. Chart 6Global Weakness Infects U.S. Not surprisingly, the components of the U.S. LEI that have weakened are those related to financial markets and the corporate sector. Given that corporate profits are determined globally, a slowdown in global growth often shows up first in downward revisions to investors’ corporate profit expectations. This weighs on equity prices and causes business owners to re-assess their future investment plans. Consistent with this narrative, we have seen significant downward moves in ISM New Orders and NFIB Capital Spending Plans, shown averaged together in the top panel of Chart 7. Capital spending plans as reported in regional Fed surveys have also moderated (Chart 7, panel 2), and CEO confidence has plunged (Chart 7, bottom panel). All of these indicators suggest that weaker global growth will weigh on the nonresidential investment component of U.S. GDP during the next few quarters. Chart 7Weaker Nonresidential Investment... But while corporate investment is poised to weaken, the U.S. consumer is in rude health (Chart 8). Core retail sales are growing strongly, though the most recent data only extend through November. For more timely data we can look at the Johnson Redbook measure of same-store sales which has accelerated into the New Year (Chart 8, top panel). The University of Michigan survey of consumers shows that expectations dipped last month (Chart 8, panel 2), but also that consumers still view current conditions as extremely positive (Chart 8, bottom panel). Chart 8...And Resilient Consumer Spending The overall picture is reminiscent of 2015/16. The U.S. consumer and labor market are in good shape, but slowing foreign growth and a strong U.S. dollar are weighing on the corporate profit outlook and U.S. corporate investment spending. As in 2016, the solution is for the Fed to temporarily pause its rate hike cycle. This will allow the dollar’s uptrend to moderate and will take some pressure off the corporate profit and investment outlooks. With a Fed pause discounted in the market, the conditions are already in place for renewed optimism on the corporate sector. It is for this reason that we upgraded our recommended allocation to corporate bonds two weeks ago.5 We expect this optimism will cause financial conditions to ease during the next few months, allowing the Fed to resume its rate hike cycle in the second half of this year. Corporate Bond Valuation Update As mentioned above, we increased our recommended exposure to corporate credit (both investment grade and junk) two weeks ago, partly due to valuations that had become too attractive to pass up. The Breakeven Spread One of our preferred valuation techniques is to look at 12-month breakeven spreads for each corporate credit tier as a percentile rank versus history.6 We like this method for three reasons: First, focusing on each individual credit tier controls for the fact that the average credit rating of bond indexes can change over time. Second, using the breakeven spread instead of the average index option-adjusted spread allows us to control for the changing average duration of the bond indexes. Finally, we find that the percentile rank is often a better representation of credit spreads than the spread itself. This is because credit spreads often tighten to very low levels and then remain tight for an extended period of time. By showing us the percentage of time that a given spread has been tighter than its current level, the percentile rank gives a better sense of this pattern than the actual spread. At present, Baa-rated debt and all junk credit tiers have 12-month breakeven spreads at or above their historical medians. Aa and A rated bonds have breakeven spreads that rank near the 40th percentile, and Aaa-rated debt remains expensive with a 12-month breakeven spread below the 10th percentile since 1989. To appreciate how cheap these spreads are, especially for Baa-rated and junk credits, consider that the current 12-month breakeven spread for a Baa-rated corporate bond is 24 bps (Chart 9). In our analysis of the different phases of the economic cycle, we determined that in an environment where the slope of the 3/10 Treasury curve is between 0 bps and 50 bps (it is 18 bps today), the 12-month Baa-rated breakeven spread averages 18 bps.7 Chart 9Attractive Baa Valuation Given current index duration, if the 12-month Baa-rated breakeven spread returned to the 18 bps level that is typical for this stage of the cycle, it would imply a tightening in the option-adjusted spread from 169 bps to 129 bps – a 40 bps tightening! Default-Adjusted Spread Another valuation measure to consider is our high-yield default-adjusted spread. This is the excess spread available in the high-yield index after subtracting expected default losses. To determine expected default losses we use Moody’s baseline forecast for the 12-month default rate and our own forecast for the 12-month recovery rate. At present, this gives us a default-adjusted spread of 237 bps, right in line with the historical average (Chart 10). In other words, if default losses during the next 12 months match those embedded in our calculation, then investors should expect an excess return that is in line with the historical average, assuming also no capital gains/losses from spread tightening/widening. Chart 10In Line With Historical Average But how likely is it that default losses fall in line with that expectation? In its last Monthly Default Report, Moody’s revised its baseline 12-month default rate forecast up to 3.4%, from 2.6% previously. The new 3.4% forecast seems reasonable to us. A simple model of the 12-month trailing default rate based only on our measure of gross leverage for the nonfinancial corporate sector puts fair value for the 12-month default rate at 4.1% (Chart 11). Our measure of gross leverage is simply total debt divided by pre-tax profits. This measure fell during the past year because pre-tax profits grew by 17% and total debt grew by only 7%. Chart 11Default Expectations Going forward, profit growth will almost certainly moderate during the next 12 months, driven by the combination of weaker global growth and rising wage pressures. However, it needs to fall a long way, to below 7%, before our measure of leverage starts to rise. In other words, a further slight decline in our measure of gross leverage is a reasonable expectation at the current juncture, which would bring the fair value from our simple default rate model close to the current Moody’s projection. All in all, our default-adjusted spread tells us that high-yield bonds offer historically average compensation given reasonable default expectations. Bottom Line: Corporate breakeven spreads are too wide for this phase of the cycle, especially for the Baa and junk credit tiers. Our default-adjusted spread shows that high-yield valuation is in line with the historical average, given a reasonable expectation for default losses. Overall, we conclude that corporate spreads are attractive at current levels and we recommend an overweight allocation to both investment grade and high-yield corporate debt in a U.S. bond portfolio.   Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Powell Doctrine Emerges”, dated September 4, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Chairman Powell cites a few examples of this in his Jackson Hole address from last fall. https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20180824a.htm 3 http://www.nber.org/papers/w13428  4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Don’t Position For Curve Inversion”, dated January 22, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Buy Corporate Credit”, dated January 15, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 The 12-month breakeven spread is the spread widening required on a 12-month investment horizon for a corporate bond to break even with a duration-matched position in Treasury securities. It can be quickly approximated by dividing the bond’s option-adjusted spread by its duration. 7 For a more complete analysis of the economic cycle based on the slope of the yield curve please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

In a report published early last August, I wrote that: “The perfect time for equity investing is when markets are cheap, earnings expectations are overly pessimistic and the monetary environment is highly accommodative. Currently, the opposite conditions exist: valuations are stretched, earnings expectations are euphoric and the Fed is in tightening mode. It does not seem a propitious time to be aggressive.” By the end of the year, the MSCI All-Country Index had declined by around 12%, with the S&P 500 down by a similar amount. Against that background, valuations improved, earnings expectations moderated and the Fed adopted a less hawkish tone. And, not surprisingly, investors and traders became much less bullish about the outlook, a positive development from a contrary perspective. As a result, BCA’s equity stance was upgraded to overweight from both a 3- and 12-month perspective. With no recession imminent and the Fed likely to raise rates by less than previously feared, we took the view that the path of least resistance for equities was up. There is no requirement at BCA for strategists to agree on the outlook. In fact, the opposite is true in that we encourage independent thinking and diverse ways of looking at the world. I have no strong reasons to disagree with the view that equities will end this year higher, and thus outperform bonds and cash. However, my concerns about the longer-run outlook, coupled with the potential for further late-cycle volatility, temper my comfort with an overweight position. Of course, this merely cements my reputation amongst colleagues as the resident BCA bear! What Troubles Me There rarely is a shortage of economic, financial or political issues to worry about. Even in the best of times, one can always find some problems and potential threats to the outlook. Contrary to my current reputation within BCA, I am not always bearish – I turned more positive on equities in the spring of 2009 and embraced the rally for most of the subsequent decade. However, notwithstanding the potential for equity prices to move higher this year, I perceive three particular challenges to an optimistic view of the outlook: The outlook for U.S. corporate earnings given the likelihood that labor’s share of income will rise from current unusually low levels. The financial markets’ addiction to easy money and low interest rates that may delay the normalization of monetary policy and encourage financial imbalances and excessive risk-taking. The unprecedented rise in U.S. federal deficits at a time of strong economic growth. There will be a price to pay down the road. Notably absent from this list is any mention of trade wars, Brexit, China, U.S. political dysfunction, recession risks and the many other issues that feature in news headlines. I do care about these things, but the three topics mentioned above are enough reason to be concerned, without piling on other problems. The Extraordinary Performance Of U.S. Profits, But… One of the most remarkable features of the past decade’s economic environment has been the impressive performance of U.S. corporate earnings. Despite the weakest economic recovery on record, profit margins have soared to an all-time peak (Chart 1). How on earth did companies manage that? Let’s start by noting what strong earnings growth did NOT reflect. Chart 1An Impressive Margin Performance First, there has not been above-trend growth in top-line revenues. The top panel of Chart 2 shows that S&P 500 sales have grown broadly in line with nominal U.S. corporate GDP over the past two decades. Second, related to the above point, there has not been a great environment for corporate pricing power. The corporate sector inflation rate has averaged a measly 1.2% during the past decade. Third, despite ongoing technological innovations, earnings have not benefited from a revival in productivity growth. Corporate sector productivity has grown at only a moderate 1.1% pace during the past 10 years, far below its historical average (third panel of Chart 2). Chart 2No Major Improvements Here! Finally, one other popular explanation – low interest rates - also can be ruled out as a major driver of the profit cycle. The large decline in interest rates since the Great Recession has clearly benefited some companies, but interest payments as a share of pre-tax profits have not shown much net change in the decade (final panel of Chart 2). In recent years, the lower level of rates has been offset by an increase in outstanding debt. We are left with two major drivers of the rise in margins: lower tax rates and, more importantly, tight control over labor costs. The effective tax rate paid by domestic non-financial companies averaged 21.7% between 2010 and 2017 compared with 26.7% between 2000 and 2007 (Chart 3). And the rate plunged further in 2018 in response to the large cut in the federal corporate tax rate from 35% to 21%. Had the effective tax rate continued to average 26.7% after 2010, after-tax profits of domestic non-financial companies would have grown at a much-reduced pace during the past eight years. Chart 3Corporate Tax Burdens Have Declined We finally come to the main explanation of remarkable earnings growth: the corporate sector’s success in capturing much of the benefits of higher productivity, rather than sharing it with labor. Historically, real employee compensation in the corporate sector rose in line with productivity, allowing both employees and the employers to enjoy the rewards of increased efficiencies. As a result, the shares of income going to capital and labor were among the most mean-reverting series in the economy (Chart 4). Chart 4A Major Divergence in Income Shares Everything changed around 2000 when real compensation began to stagnate, even as productivity continued to rise (Chart 5). Labor’s bargaining power was eroded by the combination of globalization and technological innovations, allowing companies to keep a tight grip on wage costs. The returns to capital soared while those to labor collapsed, with both moving to more than four standard deviations away from historical averages – an extraordinary divergence. If real employee compensation had continued to rise in line with productivity after 2000, then EBITD margins1 would be at their historical mean, rather than at a high extreme. Chart 5Labor Gets Left Behind The corporate sector’s ability to expand at the expense of labor has now come to an end. Wage growth has started to rise against the backdrop of an increasingly tight labor market. As a result, the labor share of income bottomed at the end of 2017 and the capital share peaked. Populist pressures against globalization also argue for an increased labor share.  The payoff to earnings growth from the drop in the corporate tax rate also will end this year. It was a one-off event with no further cuts in prospect. The bottom line is that the major tailwind (weak wage growth) behind strong U.S. earnings has turned into a headwind, while the secondary one (lower taxes) is ending. When it comes to S&P earnings (as opposed to the national income measure of profits), an additional supporting factor has been the decline in outstanding share balances that has boosted earnings per share. Many companies have taken advantage of low interest rates to raise debt and use the proceeds to buy back shares. However, with leverage now high and interest rates off their lows, the incentive for such financial engineering is diminishing. Debt growth has slowed and so should the pace of share buybacks (Chart 6). Chart 6Lots Of Financial Engineering The ever-optimistic analyst community remains unfazed about the above trends. According to IBES data, analysts’ individual company estimates imply long-run earnings growth of more than 16% a year for the S&P 500 universe (Chart 7). That is more than double average historical earnings growth. It was exceeded only by the insane optimism at the peak of the tech bubble in the late 1990s/early 2000, and we know how that ended! There can only be disappointment and an eventual marked downgrading of these earnings expectations. In my view, earnings will be lucky to grow at 3% a year over the long run from current elevated levels. Chart 7Euphoric Long-Run Earnings Estimates Some may argue that these long-term earnings estimates are irrelevant because investors pay them little attention. But there is a loose correlation between valuations and these earnings estimates, and while the price-earnings ratio (PER) has declined from its peak, it remains above its historical average. If long-term earnings estimates come down that should undermine the PER. Perhaps the causality is the other way: high valuations encourage analysts to inflate their earnings projections, but that would not be any more encouraging. Either way, it is a bearish chart. The Addiction To Easy Money The Fed’s gradual retreat from its hyper-easy policy stance was well telegraphed, but still unsettled the markets. That is the problem with addictions – the withdrawal period is always difficult. That has put the Fed in a tricky position as it must balance the need to prevent an overheated economy with the need to maintain financial stability. History suggests that the odds of the Fed getting it just right are slim. Adopting a cautious approach to tightening risks the worst of both worlds: falling behind the curve on inflation while encouraging financial speculation and imbalances. The Fed embraced an extended period of easy policy in the first half of the 2000s after the tech bubble burst, with the fed funds rate kept far below the growth in nominal GDP (Chart 8). If money is unusually cheap, then speculation and financial excesses are inevitable. The easy money period of the 1990s helped fuel the tech bubbles and the more extended period of easy money in the 2000s fueled the housing bubble. Once again, we have interest rates far below the growth in GDP and, not surprisingly, this has fed financial euphoria. Chart 8Monetary Policy Still Looks Accomodative The Fed has raised the federal funds rate by 225 basis points over the past three years, with nine increases of 25 basis points each. Four of the moves occurred in 2018 and have been blamed for financial problems in emerging economies and volatility in developed equity markets. Yet, all the Fed has done is bring the real fed funds rate out of negative territory. If a real funds rate of only 0.5% is enough to trigger extreme market volatility and threaten the economic expansion, then the system is much more vulnerable than generally assumed. There is much discussion in economic circles about the level of the real equilibrium interest rate – the rate consistent with the economy growing at trend, currently estimated to be around 2% a year. In the past, a simple rule of thumb was that real rates, over time, would have some approximation to the real growth in the economy. However, some studies (including by the Fed) argue that the real equilibrium rate may now be close to zero, far below the trend growth of the economy. If real rates close to zero are all that the economy can tolerate then that raises interesting questions. Does it mean that the economy’s growth potential could be much lower than 2%? Does it mean that if real rates have to be kept close to zero, then speculative activities in the markets will continue to build, ultimately threatening financial stability? Either way, it does not seem to be a positive story. Some worry that the Fed is making a mistake in both raising rates and unwinding its bloated balance sheet (aka QT or quantitative tightening). I believe this concern is hugely overstated. Contrary to popular opinion, the expansion in the Fed’s balance sheet did not lead to a surge of liquidity that drove asset prices sharply higher. Of course, the Fed’s bond purchases lowered yields and that forced money into riskier assets. However, there was no increased flood of money in the broader financial system. Quantitative easing (QE) led to a dramatic rise in bank reserves at the Fed, but there was no corresponding sustained surge in M2 – the measure of money supply that is more reflective of money available for economic and/or financial transactions. In other words, the money multiplier (the ratio of M2 to the narrow money) collapsed (Chart 9). This is because the credit system was impaired after the 2007-09 meltdown and the Fed was largely pushing on a string in its attempts to bring it back to life. The main way that Fed policy drove asset prices higher was keeping short rates close to zero because that gave investors a massive reason to take on more risk. Chart 9The Monetary Plumbing Has Blockages If QE was not the driving factor behind the bull market in stocks, then we should not be overly concerned about QT. Yes, investors will be forced to absorb more bond issuance as the Fed ceases to be a buyer. However, it is interesting to note that the current 10-year Treasury yield of 2.7% is no higher than five years ago, even though the Fed’s balance sheet has begun to shrink and the Fed has hiked rates nine times over the period (Chart 10). Chart 10Monetary Policy And Bond Yields The bottom line is that the Fed should continue on its path of reducing its balance sheet and not be timid about raising rates if the economy continues to grow in excess of a 2% pace. At some point there will be another recession and the Fed may well be blamed. But that is a lesser evil than feeding the addiction to easy money by prolonging the period of excessively low rates. Fiscal Profligacy The federal deficit is expected to reach around $1 trillion this year, around 5% of GDP. There is no precedent for such a large peacetime deficit during the late stage of an economic expansion (Chart 11). And, assuming current policies remain in place, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) expects the deficit to rise rather than fall over the next few decades given the aging population’s impact on entitlement programs. Chart 11Fiscal Policy Has Become Pro-Cyclical There is no strong support for fiscal discipline in Congress. Neither party has the stomach to tackle the problem of entitlements, those on the right want more spending on defense, while those on the left want more spending on social programs. One should never be surprised that politicians prefer fiscal profligacy to austerity. It is no fun and is injurious to re-election prospects to advocate spending cuts and tax increases. When things start to get of hand, the burden of imposing fiscal discipline falls on the markets. Currently, markets do not appear fazed by fiscal trends. The 10-year Treasury bond yield remains below 3% and the gap between 30- and 10-year yields is low. If markets are worried about government finances, that gap tends to widen as investors demand a fiscal premium to hold longer-duration bonds (Chart 12). Chart 12Bond Investors Unfazed By The Deficit...For Now Presumably, investor complacency about the grim fiscal picture reflects a list of other more important economic and financial concerns that are suppressing yields. There will be a limit to this fiscal tolerance, but we just don’t know exactly where it is. Japan’s gross government debt has exceeded 200% of GDP throughout the past decade without a financial crisis, but that is a poor model for what the U.S. can manage. Japan does not need to borrow from abroad and thus finances its deficits internally. In contrast, the U.S. current account deficit is still running at around $500 billion a year and the country is, by far, the world’s largest international debtor. Yes, the dollar is the international reserve currency of choice and the U.S. receives the exorbitant privilege from that. However, that will not protect the U.S. currency or markets from an eventual loss of investor confidence. I accept that a fiscal-related bond/currency market crisis could be years away, and timing is everything! Nonetheless, the current lack of fiscal discipline does pose a threat to markets because it could limit the authorities’ room to enact stimulus in the next recession. How I Could Be Wrong I have strong convictions about the views I expressed, but that does not mean I will be proved right. Let’s examine some counter arguments. On earnings, my pessimism will be unfounded if the corporate sector manages to keep a tight grip on wages and/or there is a sustained marked improvement in productivity. Of course, we need to exclude subdued wages that arise because of an economic slowdown as that would undermine sales growth. It would be remarkable if the nascent upturn in wage growth suddenly reverses without a renewed rise in unemployment so I would put low odds on that. As far as productivity is concerned, there are lots of interesting innovations these days, but none seem to be game changers within a five-year horizon. Autonomous vehicles will certainly be huge for several sectors but widespread adoption is still some time away. However, it is important to keep an open mind on this and I will certainly change my view if the data improve meaningfully. Turning to monetary policy, I suppose it is possible that the Fed will miraculously calibrate policy to achieve a soft economic landing and maintain financial stability. They have never been able to do this in the past but there is a first time for everything. Needless to say, I am hugely skeptical but time will tell. Finally, on fiscal policy, you would have to be an extreme optimist to believe that politicians will suddenly enact the politically painful measures required to restore order to government finances. The current Administration has shown no signs of fiscal responsibility and the opposition have not raised this as an issue. If anything, there are calls for even more spending. History shows that governments generally skirt to the edge of a severe crisis before they reluctantly embrace austerity. In other words, I do not see much case to be optimistic here. Concluding Thoughts On average, the stock market is more likely to rise than fall. Since 1950, the S&P has recorded monthly gains 60% of the time. In other words, it generally has paid to be bullish. This was particularly true between end-1982 and end-2018 with the S&P 500 delivering above-average compound annual returns of around 11% a year (8% a year in real terms), despite two 50%+ market declines during the period. This was the greatest 36-year period for financial assets in history, driven by falling inflation and interest rates, major corporate restructuring that boosted profit margins, rising equity multiples and a huge expansion in credit growth. Looking ahead, the environment will be very different. Inflation and interest rates are more likely to rise than fall, profit margins will be under pressure, it would imprudent to expect sustained gains in multiples, and broad credit growth will not return to its earlier rapid pace. Thus, future returns will be a pale shadow of the past performance. Against the above background, I don’t think I am being overly pessimistic. However, I understand that many investors do not have the luxury of taking a long-term view. For those who are in a competition to beat their peers, it can be disastrous to stand on the sidelines while the market marches higher. Moreover, if returns are going to be modest by past standards, it puts a premium on market timing, as difficult as that may be. So I do not recommend ignoring the BCA view that equities will outperform bonds and cash this year. My concerns are for the long run. The obvious question is: how should one invest in a world of low returns? I doubt that piling into alternative investments will be the solution as these assets will be affected by the same macro forces as conventional assets. The answer is a rather boring and obvious one. In the absence of being a market-timing and stock/sector-selection genius or investing with such a person, capital preservation has become more important. When returns are low, it takes longer to recover from market losses. This means one should maintain a conservative portfolio bias with higher-than-normal levels of cash.   Martin H. Barnes, Senior Vice President Economic Advisor mbarnes@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 EBITD = earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation. This measure best reflects the performance of earnings as it relates to output, wages, prices and productivity.

Highlights We believe 2019 and 2020 will be a tale of two markets; … : The latter stages of the long post-crisis party may be rewarding, but the inflection points that will herald a bear market and a recession are not too far off. … the first will be broadly favorable for investors in risk assets, … : The combination of ample monetary accommodation and the indiscriminate fourth-quarter markdown in risk assets provides the springboard for one last advance. … but the second will mark the end of the post-crisis bull market, … : Nothing lasts forever, and we wouldn’t be overweight risk assets at this stage were it not for last quarter’s selloff. … as the Fed pulls the plug on the expansion: Our base-case scenario does not call for a deep or lengthy recession, but once Fed policy transits from accommodative to restrictive, the going will become much rougher for stocks, corporate bonds and the economy. Feature We spent the week of January 14th meeting with clients in South Africa. It is always good to exchange views with investors, especially when they are at a distant remove from the echo chamber which inevitably colors our perspective, no matter how much we try to resist it. It was also a pleasure to swap a week of winter at home for summer abroad, where our clients’ golf talk helped boil our views down to a simple analogy. We see the next twelve to twenty-four months as a double-breaker putt. 2019-20’s Double Breaker The undulating terrain of some golf-course greens sets up putts that break one way and then the other on their path to the hole. That is the way we view the next twelve-plus months, following the fourth quarter’s sharp, sudden tightening in financial conditions (Chart 1). The selloff pulled hard on the financial-condition reins, checking some of the pressure on the economy to overheat, and allowing the Fed to pause its rate-hiking campaign. Relieved investors immediately bid stocks higher, and corporate-bond spreads tighter, retracing nearly half of the tightening in financial conditions, but we expect the Fed to remain on the sidelines until June anyway. Chart 1A Swift Tightening In Financial Conditions A Fed pause delays the date when monetary policy will turn restrictive by a few months. We see the monetary policy inflection point as the key event presaging all of the inflection points that matter most to investors: the transition from an equity bull market to a bear market; the point at which credit performance deteriorates, and spreads widen, in earnest; and the transition from expansion to recession. The delay, and the lower entry points provided by the selloff, set the stage for a last hurrah in risk assets over the next six to nine months. With the Fed in the background, investors will be able to focus on the above-trend growth driven by the remaining fiscal thrust (Chart 2) and what we expect will be better calendar 2019 S&P 500 earnings than investors currently anticipate. Chart 2Fiscal Fuel Will Keep 2019 Growth Above Trend Better-than-expected conditions will ultimately prove to be self-limiting, however. The more momentum the economy gathers while the Fed is on hold, the more budding inflation pressures will become evident. The more that inflation pressures reveal themselves, the more forcefully the Fed will have to act to counter them. The upshot for investors is that the last burst of the good times will necessarily bring forth a slowdown, and they therefore confront a putt that will break twice over the next year or two: equities and spread product will outperform Treasuries and cash over the first stretch, but underperform over the next.1 Inflation Pressure Our oft-repeated view that the fiscal stimulus will promote inflation pressures is not at all controversial. Force-feeding stimulus into an economy already operating at capacity should lead to inflation. Businesses and other investors, recognizing that the above-trend boost in aggregate demand is temporary and unsustainable, will not expand capacity to meet it. Imports may relieve some of the pressure, but prices should nonetheless rise as aggregate demand exceeds aggregate supply. Inflation pressures emanating from the labor market provoke much more pushback. Investors, tired of hearing that a pickup in wages is right around the corner, harbor considerable doubts about the Phillips Curve, which posits that there is an inverse relationship between the unemployment rate and wage growth. We acknowledge that the 1960s belief in a mechanical tradeoff between inflation and unemployment – policymakers could have lower inflation if they were willing to tolerate higher unemployment, or lower unemployment if they were willing to tolerate higher inflation – was shattered by the stagflation of the 1970s. We further acknowledge that the relationship between unemployment and compensation is not linear. We continue to believe, however, that the laws of supply and demand apply, and that the relationship between compensation and unemployment has been slow to assert itself this time around because the Phillips Curve is kinked. That is to say that the sensitivity of wage growth to a drop in unemployment is a function of the level of the unemployment rate itself. A decline in unemployment from 10% to 9%, 9% to 8%, or 8% to 7% does not exert upward pressure on wages because there are many more qualified candidates than there are openings at such elevated unemployment rates (Chart 3, top panel). When the unemployment rate is 5% or less, on the other hand, wages do respond to unemployment declines because the lack of labor market slack ensures that employers have to compete to attract qualified candidates (Chart 3, bottom panel). Estimates of the United States’ natural rate of unemployment in recent years have typically hovered around 5%. Over the 50-plus years covered by the average hourly earnings (AHE) series, real AHE growth has tended to peak (Chart 4, bottom panel) following unemployment’s sub-natural-rate trough (Chart 4, top panel). It has not yet reached an elevated level, but wages did begin accelerating sharply a year after the unemployment gap turned negative in early 2017. With the unemployment rate on track to continue to fall throughout 2019 (it only takes about 110,000 net new jobs a month to hold it in place), we expect that real AHE growth has further to run. Chart 4Don't Count Dr. Phillips Out Just Yet Taking the analysis a step further to consider real wage growth relative to productivity growth exhibits an even stronger link with the unemployment gap. From the early ‘70s through 2001, when productivity and real wages grew at the same rate (Chart 5, middle panel), real wages fell behind productivity when the unemployment gap was positive and caught up when it was negative (Chart 5, bottom panel). Capital has seized a disproportionate share of the gains in productivity since 2002, with the real-wages-to-productivity ratio able to stabilize only when the unemployment gap turned negative from 2006 to 2008. Chart 5Productivity-Adjusted Real Wages Rise When Unemployment Bottoms We expect that the coming cyclical trough in the unemployment gap will be consistent with past troughs, which have been associated with cyclical peaks in compensation gains. The linkage between compensation and consumer prices isn’t firmly established, but investors don’t have to sweat it. As long as the Fed perceives a connection, which it clearly does, it can be counted upon to respond to higher wages by tightening policy. A swift recovery in oil prices – our Commodity & Energy Strategy service sees Brent crude averaging $80/barrel, and WTI averaging $74, across 2019 – will also help keep the Fed’s attention squarely focused on price stability after ten years of full-employment fixation. Bottom Line: Unnecessary fiscal stimulus will continue to exert upward pressure on prices, while an extremely tight labor market will place steady upward pressure on wages. The Fed will respond by removing accommodation, pushing the fed funds rate above the neutral level, and bringing down the curtain on the record-long expansion sometime in 2020. Upgrading Corporate Bonds We noted two weeks ago that the spread-widening in high-yield corporate bonds was extreme, and that overweighting spread product would mesh well with our renewed equity overweight. Our U.S. Bond Strategy colleagues have since upgraded credit,2 and we are following their lead. We now recommend that investors overweight equities, underweight fixed income and equal-weight cash. Within fixed income, we recommend that investors significantly underweight Treasuries while overweighting both investment-grade and high-yield corporate bonds. Consistent with our above-consensus inflation expectations, we prefer TIPs to nominal Treasuries. We harbor no illusions that a new credit cycle has begun. It is late in an already lengthy cycle, and we view the projected near-term decline in high-yield default rates as a final unwind of the default spike that accompanied the shale-drilling rout in 2016 (Chart 6). We do not expect a recession in 2019, but the next one is likely not too far off, and defaults begin to pick up well ahead of a recession. Our spread-product upgrade is an opportunistic short-term move, not a change in our cyclical view. Chart 6A New Credit Cycle Has Not Begun High-yield spreads widened so much in the fourth quarter, relative to their history, that their capital-gain prospects have flipped. We had been at equal weight, anticipating an eventual move to underweight, because spreads were unusually tight. The capital-gain stretch of the cycle was long gone, and excess returns over Treasuries were limited to coupon spreads that were likely to be eroded by capital losses as spreads widened ahead of an approaching recession. The lurch in spreads from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile in double-B, B and triple-C bonds (Chart 7) restores potential capital gains as a cushion that should protect the coupon spread against unanticipated economic weakness. Chart 7Irrational Gloom The Fed’s newly conciliatory stance should support spread product just as it should support equities. All three monetary-policy elements of our bond strategists’ peak-spread checklist are issuing the all-clear signal: twelve-month fed funds rate hike projections have collapsed (Chart 8, second panel), gold has revived (Chart 8, third panel), and the dollar’s relentless upward march has finally been halted (Chart 8, bottom panel). Chart 8Monetary Policy Argues For Lower Spreads ... The jury is still out on the global-growth elements of our bond team’s peak-spread checklist. Our China Investment Strategy service’s Market-Based China Growth Indicator looks spry3 (Chart 9, third panel), and industrial mining stocks may be in the midst of bottoming (Chart 9, bottom panel), but the CRB raw industrials index is still scuffling (Chart 9, second panel). A blowout in spreads accompanied by a less-hawkish Fed and rebounding global growth would be a no-brainer reason to own spread product, but two out of three ain’t bad, and spreads would not have blown out in the first place if global growth were poised to surge. The biggest threat to our constructive economic and market views is a slowdown in China, and its uncertain direction is a risk to overweighting credit. On balance, though, we believe the current level of option- and default-adjusted spreads adequately compensate credit investors over the next three to six months, especially after factoring in the Fed’s benign turn. Chart 9... But The Jury's Still Out On Global Growth Bottom Line: We are upgrading spread product to take advantage of its fourth-quarter selloff and a Fed pause that may last until June, despite uncertainty around the global growth outlook.   Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 The wise men and women gathered at the Barron’s annual roundtable foresee a similar setup, but with the direction reversed. They expect markets and the U.S. economy to encounter rough going in the first half of 2019 before conditions become more hospitable in the second half and in 2020, ahead of the next election. “Goodbye to Gloom,” Rublin, Lauren R., Barron’s, January 14, 2019, pp. 21-34. 2 Please see the January 15, 2019 U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Buy Corporate Credit,” available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see the November 21, 2018 China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Trade Is Not China’s Only Problem,” available at cis.bcaresearch.com.