Policy
Highlights Real Rate "Targeting": Global central bankers are increasingly following the Fed's lead by paying more attention to the appropriate level of real interest rates that will keep inflation stable given low unemployment (r-star). This raises a new potentially bearish element for global bond markets through higher real yields. U.K.: The Bank of England hiked rates last week, despite sluggish growth, slowing inflation and elevated Brexit uncertainties. Additional rate hikes will be difficult to deliver, however, without a change in trend for those factors. Stay overweight Gilts in global hedged bond portfolios. Japan: The conditions for a shift higher in the Bank of Japan's bond yield targets - a weaker yen, core inflation at 1.5% and much higher U.S. bond yields - are still not yet in place. Stay overweight JGBs. Feature Chart Of The WeekA 'New, New Normal' Of Higher Real Rates? Three major central banks met last week and, surprisingly, the most important message did not come from the Federal Reserve. The Bank of England (BoE) and Bank of Japan (BoJ) both delivered policy decisions that appeared more hawkish on the surface, even though the underlying message was far more mixed. The BoE hiked rates by 25bps, while the BoJ tweaked its yield curve control policy by raising the allowable ceiling for the 10-year Japanese Government Bond (JGB) to 0.2%. Yet both central banks signaled - through published research, commentary and outright forward guidance - that the timing of the next policy move is uncertain. This contrasts with the Fed, who continues to signal a slow-but-steady path of U.S. rate hikes over at least the next year. The BoE and BoJ are dealing with the same issues that all the major developed market central banks are facing now - how to reconcile low unemployment and an apparent dearth of spare economic capacity with only modest upward inflation momentum and real interest rates that appear too low (Chart of the Week). Against that backdrop, the communication of central banker strategies to the public, and to the financial markets, is critical to their success, defined by keeping inflation stable around target levels. The Fed has been a leader in introducing nuance into the execution, and communication, of post-crisis policymaking. First, by focusing more on underutilized capacity in the U.S. labor market to justify keeping the funds rate low despite the headline unemployment rate falling below its estimate of "full" employment. Later, by focusing attention on real interest rates and the possibility that the neutral level of that rate (a.k.a. "r-star") can vary cyclically from levels that would previously have been considered consistent with full employment and stable inflation. In both cases, the Fed has provided a framework that allows some wiggle room as it continues to normalize away from crisis-era policy settings. Passionate advocates of the concept like current New York Fed President John Williams have led the Fed's growing focus on r-star. Yet in its latest Inflation Report published last week, the BoE dedicated five full pages to the topic of estimating r-star in the U.K.1 Other central banks have discussed their own estimates of r-star over the past year, as well.2 This is an important point for global bond markets. If other central banks begin to follow the lead of the Fed and elevate the importance of "real rate targeting" into their inflation targeting frameworks, then real bond yields could have significant upside with policy rates still not above realized inflation in the major developed economies. This will especially be true if factors that have kept r-star cyclically depressed in many countries in the post-crisis era - weak productivity growth, fiscal consolidation, excess capacity in labor markets, household deleveraging, among others - continue to slowly dissipate. At the moment, the most important themes for global financial markets relate to the ongoing Fed tightening cycle, the potential for policy stimulus in China in response to slowing domestic growth, and the slowing growth of central bank balance sheets (Chart 2). All three are bond bearish. We could add a fourth item to that list - U.S. protectionism, which can lead to slowing global through diminished trade activity. While there is evidence from many countries that a more uncertain outlook for global trade has negatively affected business confidence, there is also some tentative evidence that the deceleration in global trade activity may be in the process of stabilizing (Chart 3). Yet even if the U.S. - China trade tensions worsen and industrial activity slows further, tariffs and trade barriers represent a supply shock that could result in higher global inflation and prevent a meaningful decline in bond yields. Summing it all up for our government bond investment strategy, we continue to recommend: a below-benchmark overall portfolio duration stance country allocation (Chart 4) with underweight exposure to countries where central banks can credibly raise interest rates (U.S., Canada) and overweight exposure where rate hikes will be more difficult to deliver (U.K., Japan, Australia) Bottom Line: Global central bankers are increasingly following the Fed's lead by paying more attention to the appropriate level of real interest rates that will keep inflation stable given low unemployment (r-star). This raises a new potentially bearish element for global bond markets through higher real yields. Chart 2The Biggest Market Risks Are Bond Bearish Chart 3Tentative Signs Of Global Trade Stabilization? Chart 4Underweight Countries That Can Credibly ##br##Raise Rates (And Vice Versa) Stay Overweight U.K. Gilts, Even After The BoE Rate Hike The BoE delivered a 25bp rate hike last week, bringing its Bank Rate to 0.75%. The growth and inflation forecasts for the next three years were essentially unchanged, however. The hike was described by BoE Governor Mark Carney as a sign of growing confidence by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) in its forecast. Thus, another step towards normalizing the Bank Rate from accommodative levels was appropriate. In the press conference following the MPC meeting, Carney noted that the recent pickup in U.K. wage growth was an important development. Carney said that with the economy at full employment,3 the BoE's job is to "manage demand" to control inflation while nominal wage growth expands. Real wage growth has crept back into positive territory in recent months (Chart 5). Numerous indicators were presented in the August 2018 Inflation Report to suggest that U.K. labor markets are growing increasingly tight - including faster wage growth for those switching jobs than those staying in jobs (bottom panel) and survey data showing greater pay increases in sectors facing recruitment and retention difficulties. The BoE did downplay the recent cooling of realized U.K. inflation, which has been more a product of the stability of the pound than an easing of domestic inflation pressures. While this is true, market-based measures of inflation expectation like CPI swaps have also been following the path of the pound, rather than typical forces like oil prices, since the collapse in the pound after the 2016 Brexit vote (Chart 6). On the margin, however, the more stable pound means that U.K. inflation will be more influenced by domestic factors, like tight labor markets and wage pressures. Chart 5Mixed Signals From The U.K. Labor Market Chart 6U.K. Inflation Following The Pound, Not The Labor Market As discussed earlier, the BoE did devote a significant section of the latest Inflation Report to the topic of the neutral real rate or r-star. The BoE noted that there was a longer-term and shorter-term r-star, and that the latter had to be deeply negative in recent years given the shocks from the 2008 Financial Crisis and recession to the 2016 Brexit vote to the fiscal austerity of recent Conservative governments. As the impacts of those shocks fades, the shorter-term r-star increases, requiring faster BoE rate hikes. Or as it was described in the Inflation Report: "The expected rise in r* over coming years, combined with the absorption of spare capacity over the forecast period, means that - even as inflation is projected to fall back toward 2% - the Bank Rate is likely to need to rise gradually to keep inflation at the target. But the persistence of the fall in the trend real rate means that any rises in the Bank Rate are expected to be limited, and interest rates are likely to need to remain low by historical standards for some time to come." That sounds like the BoE wanting to have its cake and eat it too, talking up rate hikes while making the case for rates to stay low for longer. The longer-run r-star estimates shown in the Inflation Report (between 0.5% and 1.5%) when added to the 2% BoE inflation target, suggests that the neutral nominal Bank Rate is between 2.5% and 3.5%. That does imply that there is a lot of scope for additional BoE rate hikes without even reaching a level that could be considered "'neutral' from a longer-term perspective" (Chart 7). It will be difficult for the BoE to deliver on any additional rate hikes, however, while both the economy and inflation are decelerating. The current pricing in the U.K. Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve shows that there are only 42bps of hikes discounted by the end of 2020. That represents a very low hurdle to overcome, even if the U.K. economy remains sluggish and the Brexit outcome turns ugly. From a strategy perspective, we think that Gilt yields can rise above the current shallow path of the forward curve over the next 6-12 months, suggesting that a below-benchmark duration stance in the U.K. is appropriate. Yet with U.K. growth slowing and leading indicators suggesting more of that is to come, and with still no resolution to the Brexit negotiations with the March 29, 2019 "Brexit Day" looming in the distance, Gilt yields are likely to stay relatively subdued versus global peers. We continue to recommend an overweight stance on Gilts in hedged global bond portfolios (Chart 8). Chart 7U.K. Real Rates Are WAY Below Longer-Run R-Star Chart 8Stay Overweight U.K. Gilts Bottom Line: The Bank of England hiked rates last week, despite sluggish growth, slowing inflation and elevated Brexit uncertainties. Additional rate hikes will be difficult to deliver, however, without a change in trend for those factors. Stay overweight Gilts in global hedged bond portfolios. Bank of Japan: Zero Pressure On The 0% Target Global bond yields got a bit of a jolt recently from the most unlikely of sources - Japan, the place where bond volatility goes to die. Amid media speculation that the Bank of Japan (BoJ) was considering an upward adjustment to its JGB yield target, the 10-year JGB took several runs at breaching the BoJ's implied pain threshold of 0.10%, resulting in the BoJ intervening with offers of "unlimited" purchases to quell the selloff. Yet at the monetary policy meeting last week, the BoJ only delivered modest changes: The allowable range for the 10-year JGB yield was widened to -0.20% to +0.20% New forward guidance was introduced indicating no rate hikes until at least 2020 A shift in the BoJ's equity ETF purchases to favor ETF's that target a broader index We were not surprised by the outcome, given that there was absolutely no reason why the BoJ should have even considered a change in policy settings. Back in February, we outlined the three things that we believed must ALL occur before the BoJ could plausibly raise its yield target for the 10-year Japanese government bond (JGB).4 Five months later, none of those conditions has been met (Chart 9): 1) The USD/JPY exchange rate must at least get back to the 115-120 range. USD/JPY has struggled to reach even the bottom end of our target range, only getting to an intraday high of 113.17 on July 19th. The starting point for the yen must be weaker than that before the BoJ can deliver any sort of more hawkish policy that would likely send the yen roaring higher. 2) Japanese core CPI inflation and nominal wage inflation must both rise sustainably above 1.5%. The extremely tight Japanese labor market (Chart 10) has finally begun to put upward pressure on wage growth, which now sits at 2.2% on a year-over-year basis. There has been no follow through into core inflation, however, which only got as high at 0.5% in March before sliding back to 0.2% in June. Chart 9None Of Our Conditions For A BoJ Hike Have Been Met Chart 10How Does This Job Market Not Produce Inflation? 3) The 10-year JGB yield must reach an overvalued extreme versus U.S. Treasuries. We judge this by looking at the residual from a fundamental model of the 10-year JGB yield published by the BoJ. The model includes both the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield as the proxy for global yields, and the share of outstanding JGBs owned by the central bank to measure the impact of BoJ buying (Table 1). That model suggests that current JGB yields are only at fair value, and that U.S. Treasury yields have to rise by a lot more (to at least 3.5%) to make the current level of JGB yields look "expensive", thus justifying a higher BoJ yield target (USD/JPY would likely be in the 115-120 range if that happened, as well). Yet despite all these factors arguing against any change in the BoJ's policy settings, the topic was seriously discussed at last week's policy meeting, according to Reuters.5 The renewed weakness of Japanese inflation scuttled any chance that a serious policy change could be delivered. The decision to widen the allowable yield range for the 10-year JGB yield not associated with any signaled change to the 0% yield target. Investors got the hint, and yields have calmed down after the late July turbulence. The BoJ is increasingly backed into a corner with its hyper-easy monetary policy. There is no spare capacity in the economy, with the unemployment rate at a 25-year low of 2.4% and the BoJ estimating that the output gap is closed. Our own Japan Central Bank Monitor is no longer in negative territory, indicating that the next policy move should be a tightening (Chart 11). The BoJ has indeed been "tightening", but only by reducing the pace of its bond buying. BoJ purchases now only matches the pace of new JGB - a far cry from when the BoJ was buying more than all new JGBs issued between 2013 and 2017 (bottom two panels). Table 1JGB Yield Model Chart 11BoJ Has Been Quantitatively Tightening There is a reported disagreement within the BoJ over the impact of the negative interest rate and yield curve control policies on Japanese bank profitability and lending capacity. Yet any sort of rate hike, at either end of the yield curve, would result in a sharp increase in the yen. To have that happen now would harm Japanese exporters' competitiveness at the worst possible time. Economic growth is decelerating in two of Japan's major trading partners, China and South Korea. At the same time, U.S. protectionism risks trade wars that would slow global trade at a time when Japanese export growth, and business confidence, may already be peaking (Chart 12). We continue to recommend an overweight position in Japanese government debt within hedged global government bond portfolios. Admittedly, the idea of overweighting a market where nearly half of all bonds still have a negative yield does not sound like a path to riches. Yet the BoJ stands out as the one major central bank that has virtually no chance at credibly talking about, much less delivering, any sort of monetary tightening with core inflation close to 0%. If non-Japanese yields continue to rise over the next 6-12 months, as we expect, then JGBs will once again be a relative outperformer in a global bond bear market (Chart 13). Chart 12Japan Is Vulnerable To A Global Trade War Chart 13Stay Overweight JGBs In Hedged Global Bond Portfolios Bottom Line: The conditions for a shift higher in the Bank of Japan's bond yield targets - a weaker yen, core inflation at 1.5% and much higher U.S. bond yields - are still not yet in place. Stay overweight JGBs. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 The r-star discussion can be found on pages 39-43 of the August 2018 BoE Inflation Report, which can be found here https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/inflation-report/2018/august/inflation-report-august-2018.pdf 2 For example, the BoJ's estimates of Japan's r-star can be found here, https://www.boj.or.jp/en/research/wps_rev/wps_2018/data/wp18e06.pdf, while the Bank of Canada's estimates for Canadian r-star can be found here https://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/boc-review-autumn2017-dorich.pdf 3 The BoE estimates full employment to be around the current unemployment rate of 4.25%, which is well below the OECD's estimate of 5.5% shown in the top panel of Chart 5. 4 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report "What Would It Take For The Bank Of Japan To Raise Its Yield Target?" dated February 13, 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com 5 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-economy-boj-policy-insight/bojs-architect-of-shock-and-awe-plots-retreat-from-stimulus-idUSKBN1KR0TA Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights U.S. Investment Strategy is getting back to basics: We follow last week's report outlining our stance on interest rates with a review of the credit cycle and its current position. The credit cycle is not just about borrowers: Lender willingness is inversely related to loan performance over a five-year horizon, but it amplifies near-term performance swings. Our bond strategists use three broad indicators to track the credit cycle...: Valuation, monetary conditions and credit quality all offer insight into corporate bond performance. ... and we also consider the fed funds rate cycle: The way that lenders interact with the monetary policy backdrop is discouraging for the course of human evolution, but it follows a well-defined pattern that helps demarcate the credit cycle. The cycle is in its latter stages, and investors should be in the process of dialing down credit exposures: Our bond strategists downgraded spread product to neutral in mid-June, and we won't return to overweight until the next recession is well underway. Feature U.S. Investment Strategy is meant to provide analyses and forecasts of financial markets and the economy for the purpose of helping our clients make asset-allocation decisions. This report continues our focus on going back to the basics of meeting that mandate. Next week's Special Report will present a simple indicator for anticipating the onset of a recession and the end of the equity bull market. After Labor Day, we will publish a Special Report updating, and expanding upon, our work on the fed funds rate cycle. By the unofficial end of the summer, then, we will have outlined our positions on rates, credit, the business cycle, and the state of monetary policy. That will provide us with a framework for evaluating incoming data and engaging in an ongoing investment-focused dialogue. It will also hopefully put us in position to identify the first set of major cyclical inflection points since 2007-8 in a timely fashion. 2019 is shaping up as a pivotal year for asset allocation, and we look forward to navigating it alongside our clients. Lenders Never Learn, Part I: Lending Standards Investors typically think of the credit cycle exclusively in terms of borrower performance. After all, cycle peaks and troughs are defined by default-rate troughs and peaks. There are two parties to every loan, though, and a narrow focus on debtors precludes a full understanding of the landscape. The credit cycle encompasses lender willingness as well as borrower performance. Bad loans are made in good times, just as surely as good loans are made in bad times. Skepticism and gloom carry the day in a recession and its immediate aftermath, and the loans that manage to get made early in the credit cycle are tightly underwritten, insulated with a margin of safety that would warm Benjamin Graham's heart. As the cycle stretches on, however, lenders forget about the trauma of the last downturn and focus more on market share than standards. The fact that standards impact performance with a lag much longer than the annual bonus cycle obscures their importance and helps them persist. Like the rest of us, loan officers and their managers learn best when they receive immediate feedback that clearly results from their decisions. Over the three-decade history of the Federal Reserve's senior loan officer survey the last three cycles, however, it appears that lending standards impact loan performance with as much as a five-year lag. The Chart Of The Week shows the net percentage of loan officers tightening standards for commercial and industrial (C&I) loans to large and mid-sized companies, inverted and advanced by 20 quarters. Easy standards line up with peak defaults, and tight standards align with default troughs. Chart of the WeekLending Standards Are Negatively Correlated With Intermediate-Term Loan Performance ... The lag between loan approval and loan performance is far too long to reinforce learning, however. Over the course of five years, factors that could not have been foreseen at origination may well end up precipitating a default. Lenders' response to that long-term uncertainty may help explain the positive short-term correlation (Chart 2). Partially goaded by pro-cyclical loan-loss reserve standards, lenders react to surging default rates by getting more conservative, nudging default rates higher in a feedback loop that plants the seeds for strong intermediate-term performance. Chart 2... But They March In Lockstep With Loan Performance In The Near Term Bottom Line: 2014's cyclical bottom in standards suggests that rising default rates will not peak until late 2019 or 2020. Increased near-term lender caution will reinforce the upward move. Tracking The Credit Cycle: Default Rates When the economy is expanding, borrowers in the aggregate find it easier to service their debts, just as recessions make debt service more onerous. The pro-cyclicality of inflation, which eases debt burdens, helps reinforce the relationship. There is more to tracking the credit cycle than tracking the business cycle, however. While defaults have peaked within five months after the end of the last three recessions, default-rate troughs have varied wildly, occurring anywhere from six years before the recession to the month it began (Chart 3). Our credit strategists try to identify the point at which defaults begin to take off by tracking lending standards, monetary conditions, and credit quality. None of these factors suggests that default rates can make new lows. The loan officer survey could improve, but tight spreads leave almost no room for the bond market to become more receptive (Chart 4). Monetary conditions are steadily becoming less accommodative, helped along by the rate-hike/dollar-strength loop (Chart 5). Our bond strategists expect that credit quality will weaken as soon as upward wage pressure snuffs out pre-tax corporate profits'1 ability to keep up with double-digit debt growth. It's hard to say just when default rates will begin to erode total returns in a meaningful way, but our bond strategists are of a mind that risk is rapidly catching up with reward. Chart 3The Business Cycle Reliably Calls Peaks,##BR##But It's No Help With Troughs Chart 4Little Room##BR##For Improvement Chart 5Tightening,##BR##But Not Yet Tight Tracking The Credit Cycle: Corporate Spreads Chart 6Spreads Aren't Ready To Blow Out Yet High-yield data only exist for the last two spread-widening episodes, but what they lack in quantity they make up for in consistency. Heading into both the dot-com bust and the financial crisis, spreads did not widen in earnest (Chart 6, top panel) until the Fed had completed its tightening cycle (Chart 6, second panel), BCA's proprietary Corporate Health Monitor (CHM) began to deteriorate (Chart 6, third panel), and lenders tightened their standards (Chart 6, bottom panel). That template suggests that spreads are not poised to blow out anytime soon, as we expect the Fed will not be finished tightening before the end of 2019 (or later), and lenders are still actively easing their standards for commercial borrowers. As noted above, we expect that deterioration in the CHM will pick up again, once runaway profit growth ceases to paper over surging leverage. All in all, our bond strategists do not think it is anywhere near time to panic. As with defaults, they think it is still too soon to expect the beginning of sustained spread widening. On balance, however, the indicators suggest that return expectations should be modest, and limited to coupon yields. It is too late to buy bonds with the expectation of realizing capital gains, and prudent return projections should pencil in some minor capital losses. Lenders Never Learn, Part II: The Fed Funds Rate Cycle The fed funds rate cycle has been a U.S. Investment Strategy pillar, informing many of our views on cycles and asset markets. We will publish a Special Report delving into it more fully the first week of September, but a quick summary is sufficient to illustrate its relevance to the credit cycle. We divide the fed funds rate cycle into four phases based on whether the Fed is hiking rates or cutting them, and whether or not the fed funds exceeds our estimate of the equilibrium rate. Per our stylized representation of the cycle (Chart 7), we are currently in Phase I (the Fed is hiking, but policy remains accommodative) and are likely to remain there until the second half of 2019, when we expect that policy will turn restrictive, ushering in Phase II. While we have found that the level of the fed funds rate trumps its direction when it comes to explaining equity and bond returns, loan growth is more sensitive to the direction of rates. Banks expand their loan books more rapidly when the Fed is tightening than they do when it's easing. The effect is most pronounced for C&I loans, which grow five times faster during rake-hiking campaigns than they do during rate-cutting campaigns (Table 1). The conclusion may seem counter-intuitive on its face, but one must remember that the Fed is charged with leaning against the cycle: it tightens when times are good to keep them from becoming too good, and its eases when times are bad to get the economy back on its feet. Chart 7The Fed Funds Rate Cycle Table 1An Example Of What Not To Do Lenders who take a countercyclical tack operate with the policy wind at their back. Those who follow the cycle are actually fighting the Fed. Most lenders short-sightedly follow the crowd aping the cycle, basing future projections on the most recent data samples and hewing to career incentives that encourage herding. Bankers who load up on loans when the cycle is demonstrably old and approaching its peak make two errors: they ignore a well-established cyclical pattern (tightening leads recessions, which lead defaults and higher losses given default), and they deploy capital when it's widely available in the marketplace, but husband it when it's scarce. Bottom Line: Banks reinforce the credit cycle by avidly deploying capital when conditions are about to take a turn for the worse, and withholding it when they're about to get better. We recommend investors reject their example, and limit their exposure to spread product. Investment Implications If our view that the Fed is going to hike rates more than the consensus expects is correct, all bonds will have to contend with a persistent headwind. Thanks to positive carry, and high-yield bonds' structurally shorter duration, spread product will be less vulnerable than Treasuries. Our bond strategists are nonetheless lukewarm on the risk-reward offered by investment-grade and high-yield bonds. The cycle is clearly in its latter stages and spreads are historically tight. We remain constructive on both the business cycle and the monetary policy cycle, and we are not yet ready to throw in the towel on the equity bull market. Although our equity take is more sanguine than the BCA consensus, our optimism does not extend to the credit cycle, which has clearly passed its peak. While neither modest spread widening nor a mild pickup in defaults is likely to wipe out all of spread product's excess returns, we do not expect that they will be large enough to merit more than benchmark weighting in balanced portfolios. Our sister Global ETF Strategy service's model portfolios hold benchmark spread-product positions (while underweighting Treasuries, maintaining below-benchmark duration across all bond categories, and overweighting cash) and that is the way we intend to be positioned in the small basket of ETFs we will recommend once we've completed our review of the most impactful macro drivers. A Note On Payrolls Friday's Goldilocks employment situation report for July reinforced our views on the economy and rates, but it was mixed enough to have satisfied anyone's preconceived notions. July's net payroll gains fell shy of the consensus expectation, but revisions to May and June pushed the 3-month moving average of net gains to over 224,000, slightly above expectations. Neither hours worked nor average hourly earnings set off any alarm bells, but the "hidden" unemployment rate slid 30 basis points to 7.5%, the lowest level since May 2001. We see the seeds of future inflation pressures in the continued absorption of slack, and believe that the Fed does as well. We continue to expect four hikes this year and next, two more than the money market is currently discounting. Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com 1 Annualized profit growth calculated with data from the BEA's National Income and Profit Accounts.
Highlights The 2018 dollar rally is principally the consequence of the slowdown in global industrial activity and global trade, itself a reverberation of China's efforts to de-lever and reform its economy. For China, reforms and deleveraging are here to stay, suggesting the dollar rally and EM rout are not over. However, in response to U.S. President Donald Trump's trade battling, China is stimulating its economy in order to limit its own downside. The chances of miscalculation on the part of Beijing are high. This raises the risk that investors begin pricing in a much more aggressive reflation campaign. Such a reflation campaign would cause a correction in the dollar and give more lift to the current rebound in EM assets. In order to track this risk and hedge it, investors should monitor and buy a portfolio made up of iron ore, Brazilian equities, AUD/JPY, Swedish industrial equities and EM high-yield bonds. Feature Many assign the strength in the dollar this year to the Federal Reserve increasing interest rates at a faster pace than other advanced economies. While monetary divergences seems like both a historically plausible and intuitive explanation, it rings hallow. The Fed was hiking rates at a much faster pace than the rest of the world last year, yet the dollar had a horrendous 2017, falling 10%. In our view, the trend in global growth has had a much more important role in explaining the dollar's performance. When global trade and global industrial production is strong, this normally leads to a period of weakness in the dollar. The opposite also holds true; soft global growth is associated with a strong dollar (Chart I-1). Behind this relationship lies the low-beta nature of the U.S. economy. Since its economy is not as levered to exports and manufacturing as the rest of the world is, the U.S. benefits less when global growth is improving (Chart I-2). As a result, when global growth is on the up and up, investors can upgrade the economic and inflation outlook for Europe faster than they can for the U.S. In the process, long-term rate expectations rise faster in Europe than the U.S., attracting money into Europe and out of the U.S. The process can be replicated across most economies outside the U.S. This hurts the dollar. Chart I-1The Dollar Likes ##br##Poor Global Growth Chart I-2The U.S. Economy Is Less##br## Sensitive To Global Growth To understand the outlook for the greenback, it is crucial to understand the outlook for global economic activity. Many commentators have pinned the blame of slowing global growth on the back of rising protectionism. The problem with this thesis is that global growth began slowing before investors took protectionist risks seriously. Instead, in our view, the key culprit behind the global growth slowdown has been policy tightening in China. Therein lies the issue. China has slowed, and President Xi Jinping is signaling that his administration will continue to push ahead with deleveraging the Chinese economy. This should imply weaker industrial growth in China and in the rest of the world and therefore a stronger dollar. However, with protectionism on the rise, the Chinese authorities are announcing virtually every day new measures to soften the blow to the Chinese economy. This stimulus could support global growth, and hurt the dollar, at least tactically. Our Geopolitical Strategy team believes the desire to reform and de-lever the Chinese economy will ultimately prevail, and thus so will a stronger dollar. However, the growing list of stimulus measures implemented in China supports our thesis, articulated last month, that a counter-trend correction in the dollar will first materialize before the greenback rally begins anew.1 As such, we continue to recommend investors hedge their long USD bets, and that traders with a short-term horizon take advantage of a portfolio we propose in this report. China Drives Growth And Returns Differentials We have long argued that China has a disproportionate role in determining what happens to growth outside the U.S. To some extent, this argument is almost tautological: at PPP exchange rates, China produces 24% of global GDP outside the U.S. But there is more than meets the eye to this argument. China is the world largest investor, with Chinese capital investment accounting for 26% of global capital formation, or 6.5% of the world's GDP. This means that the growth rate of Chinese investment has a large direct impact on global industrial good exports around the world. There is a second-round effect as well: China is also the largest consumer of industrial commodities globally. This implies that China is the marginal consumer and thus the price-setter of many natural resources. However, commodity producers account for a large share of global capex, 10.5% from 2004 to 2017. Thus, through its impact on commodity prices, China also impacts the demand for global industrial and capital goods via the capex needs of commodity exports. This large footprint can result in some counterintuitive relationships. For example, why is it that Chinese economic variables explain so well the gyrations of French exports to Germany, its largest export market (Chart I-3)? This conundrum is explained by the fact that German economic activity is deeply affected by Chinese growth. Since German growth is the key determinant of German imports, it follows that Chinese activity plays a large role in driving French exports. This pattern gets repeated across Europe, as Germany is the leading trading partner of most European nations. China does not have the same impact on the U.S. economy (Chart I-4) as total U.S. exports only represent 13% of GDP and exports to China, a measly 0.6% of GDP. Manufacturing also only represents 11% of U.S. GDP, again limiting the impact of secondary benefits of Chinese growth on the U.S. economy. Chart I-3What Drives French Exports To Germany: China Chart I-4Chinese Growth Has Little Impact On U.S. Growth Thanks to this difference, we can spot one very useful relationship that we have highlighted to our clients for more than a year: when the Chinese authorities stimulate their economy, European growth picks up sharply vis-a-vis the U.S. (Chart I-5).2 In this optic, the growth outperformance of Europe in 2017 made perfect sense; it was a consequence of China's aggressive push to reflate after 2015. 2018 is the mirror image of 2017; European growth is underperforming as a result of China's efforts to limit growth. This also means that wherever China goes going forward, so will the growth gap between the euro area and the U.S. Chart I-5AIf European Growth Beats That ##br##Of The U.S., Thank China (I) Chart I-5BIf European Growth Beats That ##br##Of The U.S., Thank China (II) Since Chinese growth affects the distribution of economic activity around the world, China affects the distribution of rates of returns around the world as well. Nowhere is the influence of China more evident than in the spread between U.S. and global bond yields. If we accept that Chinese growth exerts a limited influence on the domestically driven U.S. economy but exerts a large impact on the rest of the world, Chinese economic fluctuations should have an implication on the relative interest rate outlook between the U.S. and the rest of the world. This is indeed the case. As Chart I-6 shows, when the growth of China's nominal manufacturing GDP slows relative to the U.S., U.S. bond yields rise relative to yields in other major economies. Since money flows where it is best treated, the impact of China on relative rates of returns and interest rates around the world should be felt in the dollar. This is also the case. When Chinese nominal manufacturing GDP growth accelerates, the dollar tends to suffer as money leaves the U.S. and finds its way into Europe, Australia, Canada, EM and so forth to take advantage of rising marginal rates of returns relative to the U.S. (Chart I-7). Chart I-6Treasurys Vs. The World Equals U.S. Nominal GDP ##br##Vs. Chinese Manufacturing Chart I-7The DXY Moves In Opposition##br## To Chinese Manufacturing Bottom Line: The U.S. economy does not benefit as much from rising Chinese economic activity as the rest of the world does. This means that U.S. relative rates of return fall when China booms and rise when China busts. This also implies that China is just as important as the Fed in determining the trend in the dollar: A strong China is associated with a weak dollar, and vice-versa. Chinese Deleveraging Is Dollar Bullish, But... Despite its large debt load, China does not have a debt problem per se. With a savings rate of 46% of GDP and a limited stock of foreign currency debt, China does not exhibit the necessary conditions to end up like Argentina or Asian economies in the late 1990s. Instead, China's problem remains misallocated capital. China's debt load has increased by USD23.6 trillion since 2008. This is a lot of capital to invest in a short time span. Poor investments have been made, resulting in excess capacity in many industries, and most crucially a collapse in total factor productivity (Chart I-8). This decline in productivity represents a real threat to China's long-term viability, especially as China's labor force is set to begin declining and its leadership wants to avoid the middle-income trap that has plagued so many EM economies in the past. In order to avoid this trap, China's long-term growth is dependent on a sustained effort to de-lever and reform. Our Geopolitical Strategy team is adamant that Xi Jinping remains committed to this agenda. Long-term growth is his priority - a luxury now made possible by his "long-term" mandate.3 The impact of reforms is most evident through the evolution of credit growth. As Chart I-9 illustrates, total social financing has been slowing. The bottom panel of Chart I-9 also illustrates that the collapse in the Chinese credit impulse has followed the implosion of bond issuance by small financial institutions. This essentially tells us that the ongoing administrative and regulatory tightening of the shadow banking system is bearing fruit: Financial institutions are curtailing their issuance of exotic instruments, which is hurting overall credit growth - even if old-school bank loans are proving resilient. Chart I-8China: Labor Force And Total Factor ##br##Productivity The Need For Reforms Chart I-9Deleveraging In ##br##Action Since credit growth is so fundamental to generating investment and supporting the country's manufacturing sector, this implies that Chinese manufacturing activity has ample downside. As a result, we would anticipate that China will continue to be a drag on the rest of the world for many more quarters. This implies that the U.S. dollar has upside, and that EM plays as well as commodity currencies are especially vulnerable. While this view seems clear, and most investors now well understand the investment ramifications of Chinese reforms and deleveraging, sand has been thrown in the wheels of this narrative. As a result, the uptrend in the dollar and the downtrend in EM assets may take a pause. Bottom Line: China needs to de-lever further and reform its economy. Without this growth strategy, the country will be stuck in the dreaded middle-income trap, as its productivity has collapsed. Since deleveraging in China means less investment and slower manufacturing sector growth, this also means that the dollar should benefit, and EM-related assets should suffer, but... ... Stimulus Is A Potent Narrative The sand in the wheels of the dollar-bullish scenario created by Chinese reforms and their retardant effect on Chinese industrial growth is, paradoxically, President Trump's trade war with China. China decided to implement reforms last year because stronger growth out of the euro area and the U.S., its two largest export markets, should have buffeted its economy against some of the deflationary consequences of deleveraging. However, if President Trump tries to limit the growth of Chinese exports to the U.S., this create yet another shock that China does not need. This makes it much more difficult for China to deal with the deflationary consequences of its own reform efforts. As a result, not only have the Chinese authorities let the yuan depreciate by 8% since April, the fastest pace of decline since the 1994 devaluation, they have also begun announcing a slew of stimulus measures over the course of recent weeks: The People's Bank of China has engaged in RMB502 billion of liquidity injections, especially through its medium-term lending facility; Three reserve requirement ratio cuts have been implemented, freeing up RMB2.8 trillion of liquidity; Local governments have been allowed to increase net new bond issuance this year by up to RMB2.2 trillion; The issuance of special purpose bonds by local governments has been accelerated; Banks with high credit quality standards can reduce provisioning for NPLs; Individual income tax cuts have been announced; And modifications to the macro prudential assessment's structural component have been announced, which will free up new lending by commercial banks. These stimulus measures are not designed to cause growth to accelerate. In fact, as Jonathan LaBerge argues in our China Investment Strategy service, they pale in comparison to the total amount of stimulus implemented in 2015, especially as back then, RMB5 trillion in credit had also been injected into the economy.4 However, a problem remains for investors. Even if these measures are far from enough to cause Chinese growth to re-accelerate, they can easily foment the following narrative: Chinese policymakers are trying to calibrate their policy response in order to support growth. However, they are human beings, and do not know a priori how much stimulus will be needed to support growth without causing credit growth to actually surge. As a result, they will push stimulus into the system until the economy responds. But once the economy responds, it will be too late, and the lagged impact of stimulus will cause a sharp rebound in credit and capex. The opacity of Chinese policy and data raises the chance that this simplification will take over the investment community. Such reversion to simplicity in the face of ambiguity and intractable complexity is a well-documented phenomenon in sociology.5 Even if this narrative is mistaken and not based in actual reality, investors who view Chinese fundamentals as bullish to the dollar and bearish to EM and commodity plays need to be ready for this eventuality. We are reluctant to close our long dollar trade based on a narrative alone. Instead, we have purchased protection by selling USD/CAD as a hedge. However, we also offer investors a mean to observe if this narrative does take hold of the market, by tracking a portfolio of assets very sensitive to the outlook for Chinese growth, and thus very sensitive to Chinese reflation. These assets are: Chinese Iron ore prices, expressed in USD; Swedish industrial equities, expressed in USD; Brazilian equities, expressed in USD; AUD/JPY; And EM high-yield bond denominated in USD. Chart I-10 illustrates the performance of a portfolio composed of these assets, weighted in such a way that they contribute equally to the variance of the portfolio. As the chart illustrates, not only is this portfolio massively oversold, suggesting there is plenty of negatives already priced into China-linked assets, it has begun to rebound. Chart I-11 illustrates that the Chinese Li-Keqiang Index of industrial activity leads this index.6 The recent rebound in the LKI already supports the idea that this portfolio could have upside in the coming months. Moreover, if investors do extrapolate that additional stimulus measures are likely to come out of Beijing, this will support even greater upside to this portfolio. Chart I-10An Index To Monitor... Chart I-11...Or A Vehicle To Bet On Impactful Stimulus As a result, we would go one step beyond suggesting this portfolio as a tracker for Chinese reflation. Investors should buy it. If you are bearish on the Chinese growth outlook, buying this portfolio offers protection against countertrend moves that would hurt long-dollar and short-EM bets (our preferred strategy). If, however, you are bullish on Chinese reflation, this portfolio should prove a very rewarding vehicle to implement such views. Bottom Line: Chinese reforms are a tailwind for the dollar. However, they are now confronted with the reality of trade wars, which is causing the Chinese authorities to stimulate their economy to put a floor under growth. Nevertheless, this exercise is fraught with calibration errors - a risk that market participants can easily uncover. This raises the probability that a countertrend correction in the dollar will emerge. To monitor this risk, we recommend investors track a portfolio of assets heavily influenced by Chinese growth: Iron ore, Swedish industrial equities, Brazilian stocks, AUD/JPY, and EM high-yield bonds. Moreover, if one is already long the dollar, this portfolio can also be used as a hedge against the risk created by investors pricing in large-scale Chinese stimulus. If one disagrees with our view that reforms will ultimately take primacy on stimulus, one can also use this portfolio as a high-octane way to play Chinese reflation. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Reports, titled "Time To Pause And Breathe", dated July 6, 2018 and "That Sinking Feeling" dated July 13, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "ECB: All About China?" dated April 7, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Reports, titled "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress" dated July 19, 2017, and "China: Party Congress Ends...So What?" dated November 1, 2017, both available at gps.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China Is Easing Up On The Brake, Not Pressing The Accelerator" dated July 26, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 5 Smelser, Neil J. "The Rational and the Ambivalent in the Social Sciences: 1997 Presidential Address." American Sociological Review, vol. 63, no. 1, Feb. 1998, pp. 1-16. 6 The Li-Keqiang index is based on railways freight traffic, bank credit, and electricity output. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.S. has been mixed: Gross Domestic Product growth underperformed expectations slightly, coming in at 4.1%, reflecting a large decline in inventories. In fact, real final sales were strong, growing at a 5.1%. The ISM manufacturing survey also came in slightly below expectations, softening to 58.1 from 60.2 in July. It is still indicative of above-trend growth. However, the Chicago PMI surprised positively, coming in at 65.5. This measure also increased form last month's reading. While the DXY was able to rally this week thanks to growing tensions between the U.S. and China, we expect the dollar to have short-term downside, as the temporary stimulus by the Chinese authorities should give an ephemeral boost to global growth, a development that would hurt the dollar. That being said, impact should ultimately prove to be transient, and the dollar. Report Links: Rhetoric Is Not Always Policy - July 27, 2018 Time To Pause And Breathe - July 6, 2018 What Is Good For China Doesn't Always Help The World - June 29, 2018 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area has been mixed: The yearly growth of GDP underperformed expectations, coming in at 2.1%. This also represented a decrease relative to the previous quarter. However, both core and headline inflation surprised to the upside, coming in at 2.1% and 1.1% respectively. Moreover, the European Commission's economic sentiment indicator also outperformed to the upside, coming in at 112.1. However, this measure decreased from last month's reading. EUR/USD was relatively flat for most of the week until a wave of risk aversion prompted by worries of a Sino-U.S. trade war took hold of the market, lifting the dollar in the process. In a mirror image to our dollar view, we expect the euro to have upside in the next couple of months, but resume its downward trajectory by the end of the year. Report Links: Time To Pause And Breathe - July 6, 2018 What Is Good For China Doesn't Always Help The World - June 29, 2018 Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been mixed: Retail sales yearly growth beat expectations, coming in at 1.5%. Moreover, the jobs-to-applicants ratio also surprised to the upside, coming in at 1.62. However, the unemployment rate surprised negatively, coming in at 2.4% and increasing from last month's number. However, this reflected an increase in the participation rate. Finally, the consumer confidence index also underperformed expectations, coming in at 43.5. USD/JPY has risen by roughly 0.5% this week after it became clear that the BoJ only marginally adjusted its policy, in a way that only confirmed its highly dovish bias. Interestingly, while the spike in JGB yields has reverberated across global bond markets, it has not been able to provide a boost for the yen. While we expect the trade-weighted yen to appreciate by the end of this year as Chinese policymakers still want China to de-lever, a period of interim weakness is possible as the PBoC tries to buffet the Chinese economy against the impact of U.S. protectionism. Report Links: Rhetoric Is Not Always Policy - July 27, 2018 Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Rome Is Burning: Is It The End? - June 1, 2018 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed: The Nationwide house price index yearly growth rate outperformed expectations, coming in at 2.5%. This measure also increased relatively to last month's number. Moreover, PMI construction also surprised to the upside, coming in at 55.8, and increasing from last month's reading. However, Markit manufacturing PMI underperformed expectations, coming in at 54. GBP/USD was relatively flat this week, but ultimately experienced a large fall following the hike by the BoE as investors began to worry that the "old lady" is making a policy error that will need to be reversed. Overall, we remain negative on cable, as the ability for the BoE to continue on their hiking campaign will be limited given the current political turmoil in Britain. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Inflation Is In The Price - June 15, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia has been mixed: Building permit yearly growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 1.6%. Moreover, producer prices also surprised positively, coming in at 1.5%. However this measure decreased compared to last month's reading. Finally, the RBA Commodity Index SDR yearly growth surprised to the downside, coming in at 7.6%. AUD/USD fell this week as market wrestle with the risk to global growth created by the China-U.S. trade war. Overall, we continue to be negative on the Aussie on a cyclical basis, as this currency is the most exposed in the G10 to a slowdown in the Chinese industrial sectors. That said, a bout of stimulus in China could provide some short-term upside to AUD. Report Links: What Is Good For China Doesn't Always Help The World - June 29, 2018 Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand has been mixed: Employment growth surprised to the upside, coming in at 0.5%. However, this measure slowed from last month's reading. Moreover, the participation rate outperformed expectations, coming in at 10.9% and increasing from last month's number. However, the unemployment rate underperformed expectations, coming in at 4.5% and increasing from last month's reading. NZD/USD experienced a large fall this week. We are negative on the NZD on a cyclical basis, as tightening by both China and the U.S. along with trade tensions will provide for a toxic cocktail for small open economies like New Zealand. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada has been mixed: Industrial production month-mon-month growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 0.5%. Moreover, Monthly GDP growth also surprised positively, coming in at an annualized rate of 0.5%. However, the Markit Manufacturing PMI underperformed expectations, coming in at 56.9. This measure also declined relative to last month's number. The CAD is the only currency that managed to appreciate against the USD this week, despite a rather pitiful performance for crude oil. This dynamics comforts in our tactical bullish stance on the loonie. In fact, this pair is our preferred vehicle to play the countertrend correction in the U.S. dollar. Meanwhile, on a cyclical basis we are positive on the Canadian dollar within the commodity complex. Not only do supply constraint within OPEC will help oil outperform base metals, but also, the BoC is the only central bank within this group that is currently lifting interest rates. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Inflation Is In The Price - June 15, 2018 Rome Is Burning: Is It The End? - June 1, 2018 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland has been mixed: The KOF leading indicator underperformed expectations, coming in at 101.1, and declining relatively to last month's reading. However, retail sales yearly growth surprised to the upside, coming in at 0.3%. Finally, the SVME Purchasing Manager's Index also surprised positively, coming in at 61.9, and increasing from last month's number. EUR/CHF has been relatively flat this week. On a long term basis, we are bullish on this cross, as inflationary pressures are still very weak in Switzerland. Therefore, the SNB will maintain its ultra-dovish stance, hurting the franc in the process. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 USD/NOK rallied vigorously this week. While the generalized dollar strength has been key culprit behind the depreciation of the NOK, the fall in oil prices only added fuel to the fire. Overall, we expect this cross to go up by the end of the year, as the interaction of Chinese and U.S. policy will likely push up the USD and weigh on commodities. That being said, the NOK will probably outperform within the commodity space, given that it is cheap and that supply cuts by OPEC should help oil prices on a relative basis. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden has been mixed: Retail sales yearly growth surprised to the downside, coming in at 0.2%, and declining substantially, from 3.1% last month. However, the annual growth rate of GDP outperformed expectations, coming in at very strong 3.3%. This measure stayed flat relative to the first quarter. Finally, Manufacturing PMI came in at 57.4, increasing from last month's number. USD/SEK still rallied this week as the SEK is particularly sensitive to the outlook for global growth. We are positive on the Swedish Krona on a long-term basis, as Sweden is the country in the G10 where monetary policy is most misaligned with economic fundamentals. Thus, if the Sweden continues to show strength, the Riksbank will eventually have to respond. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term FX Fair Value Models - June 22, 2018 Updating Our Intermediate Timing Models - May 18, 2018 Value Strategies In FX Markets: Putting PPP To The Test - May 11, 2018 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights Paradox 1: U.S. growth will slow, and this will force the Fed to raise rates MORE quickly. Paradox 2: China will try to stimulate its economy, and this will HURT commodities and other risk assets. Paradox 3: Global rebalancing will require the euro area and Japan to have LARGER current account surpluses. Feature Faulty Assumptions Investors assume that slower U.S. growth will cause the Fed to turn more dovish; efforts by China to stimulate its economy will boost market sentiment towards risk assets; and global rebalancing requires the euro area and Japan to reduce their bloated current account surpluses. In this week's report, we consider the possibility that all three assumptions are wrong. Let's start with the U.S. growth picture. U.S. Growth About To Slow? The U.S. economy grew by 4.1% in the second quarter, the fastest pace since 2014. The composition of growth was reasonably solid. Net exports boosted real GDP by 1.1 percentage points, but this was largely offset by a 1.0 point drag from a slower pace of inventory accumulation. As a result, domestic final demand increased at a robust rate of 3.9%, led by personal consumption (up 4.0%) and business fixed investment (up 7.3%). Unfortunately, the second quarter is probably as good as it gets for growth. We say this not because we expect aggregate demand growth to falter to any great degree. Quite the contrary. Consumer confidence is high and the labor market is strong, with initial unemployment claims near 49-year lows. The Bureau of Economic Analysis' latest revisions revealed a much higher personal savings rate than had been previously estimated (Chart 1). The savings rate is now well above levels that one would expect based on the ratio of household net worth-to-disposable income (Chart 2). This raises the odds that consumer spending will accelerate. Chart 1Households Are Saving More ##br##Than Previously Thought Chart 2Consumption Could Accelerate ##br##As The Savings Rate Drops Rising consumer demand will prompt businesses to expand capacity (Chart 3). Core capital goods orders surprised on the upside in June, with positive revisions made to past months. Capex intention surveys remain at elevated levels. So far, fears of a trade war have not had a major impact on business investment. Fiscal spending is also set to rise. Federal government expenditures increased by only 3.5% in Q2, far short of the 10%-plus growth rate that some forecasters were projecting. The effect of the tax cuts have also yet to make their way fully through the economy. Supply Matters Considering all these positive drivers of demand, why do we worry that growth could slow meaningfully later this year or in early 2019? The answer is that for the first time in over a decade, demand is no longer the binding constraint to growth - supply is. Today, there are fewer unemployed workers than job vacancies (Chart 4). The number of people outside the labor force who want a job is near all-time lows. Businesses are reporting increasing difficulty in finding qualified labor. Chart 3U.S. Companies Plan To Boost Capex Chart 4Companies Are Struggling To Fill Job Openings New business investment will add to the economy's productive capacity over time, but in the near term, the boost to aggregate demand from new investment spending will easily exceed the contribution to aggregate supply.1 The Congressional Budget Office estimates that potential real GDP growth is running at around 2%. What happens when the output gap is fully eliminated, and aggregate demand growth begins to eclipse supply growth? The answer is that inflation will rise. Instead of more output, we will see higher prices (Chart 5). Chart 5Inflationary Pressures Tend To Increase ##br##When Spare Capacity Is Absorbed Rising inflation will force the Fed to engineer an increase in real interest rates, even in the face of slower GDP growth. Such a stagflationary outcome is not good for equities, which is one reason why we downgraded our cyclical recommendation on risk assets from overweight to neutral in June. Higher-than-expected real interest rates will put upward pressure on the U.S. dollar. A stronger dollar will hurt U.S. companies with significant foreign exposure more than it hurts their domestically-oriented peers. If history is any guide, a resurgent greenback will also cause credit spreads to widen (Chart 6). Chinese Stimulus: Be Careful What You Wish For Chinese stimulus helped reignite global growth after the Global Financial Crisis and again during the 2015-2016 manufacturing downturn. With global growth slowing anew, will China once again come to the rescue? Not quite. China does not want to let its economy falter, but high debt levels, and an overvalued property market plagued by excess capacity, limit what the authorities can do (Chart 7). Chart 6A Stronger Dollar Usually Corresponds ##br##To Wider Corporate Borrowing Spreads Chart 7China: High Debt Levels Make ##br##Credit-Fueled Stimulus A Risky Proposition Granted, the government has loosened monetary policy at the margin and plans to increase fiscal spending. However, our China strategists feel these actions are more consistent with easing off the brake than pressing down on the accelerator.2 They note that the authorities continue to squeeze the shadow banking system, as evidenced by the continued deceleration in money and credit growth, as well as rising onshore spreads for the riskiest corporate bonds (Chart 8). The Specter Of Currency Wars If Chinese growth continues to decelerate, what options do the authorities have? One possibility is to double down on what they are already doing: letting the RMB slide. Chart 9 shows that the Chinese currency has weakened substantially more over the past six weeks than its prior relationship with the dollar would have suggested. Chart 8Chinese Credit Growth Has Been Slowing Chart 9The Yuan Has Weakened More Than Expected ##br##Based On the Broad Dollar Trend Letting the currency weaken is a risky strategy. Global financial markets went into a tizzy the last time China devalued the yuan in August 2015. The devaluation triggered significant capital outflows, arguably only compounding China's problems. This has led some commentators to conclude that the authorities would not make the same mistake again. But what if the real mistake was not that China devalued its currency, but that it did not devalue it by enough? Standard economic theory says that a country should always devalue its currency by enough to flush out expectations of a further decline. Perhaps China was simply too timid? Capital controls are tighter in China today than they were in 2015. This gives the authorities more room for maneuver. China is also waging a trade war with the United States. The U.S. exported only $188 billion of goods and services to China in 2017, a small fraction of the $524 billion in goods and services that China exported to the United States. China simply cannot win a tit-for-tat trade war with the United States. In contrast, China is better positioned to wage a currency war with the United States. The Chinese simply need to step up their purchases of U.S. Treasurys, which would drive up the value of the dollar. Efforts by China to devalue its currency would invite retaliation from the United States. However, since the Trump Administration seems keen on pursuing a protectionist trade agenda no matter what happens, the Chinese may see their decision to weaken the yuan as the least bad of all possible outcomes. Unlike traditional stimulus in the form of additional infrastructure spending and faster credit growth, a currency devaluation would roil financial markets, causing risk asset prices to plunge. Metal prices would take it on the chin, since a weaker RMB would make it more expensive for Chinese businesses to import commodities. China now consumes close to half of the world's supply of copper, zinc, nickel, aluminum, and iron ore (Chart 10). Investors should remain underweight emerging market equities relative to developed markets and shun the currencies of commodity-exporting economies. We are currently short AUD/CAD on the grounds that a China shock would hurt metal prices more than energy prices. The Canadian dollar is highly levered to the latter, while the Aussie dollar is more levered to the former. Global Rebalancing: It's Not About Getting To Zero We have argued before that China's high savings rate explains why the country has maintained a structural current account surplus, despite the economy's rapid GDP growth rate.3 Both the euro area and Japan also have an excessive savings problem, minus the mitigating effect of rapid trend growth. The euro area's excessive savings problem was masked during the nine years following the introduction of the euro by a massive credit boom across much of the region (Chart 11). Germany did not partake in that boom, but it was still able to export its excess savings to the rest of the euro area via a rising current account balance. Chart 10China Is A More Dominant Consumer ##br##Of Metals Than Oil Chart 11Germany Did Not Take Part ##br##In The Credit Boom Germany Needs A Spender Of Last Resort Chart 12 shows that Germany's current account surplus with other euro area members mirrored the country's increasing competitiveness vis-à-vis the rest of the region. In essence, the spending boom in southern Europe sucked in German exports, with German savings financing the periphery's swelling current account deficits. This is the main reason why German banks were hit so hard during the Global Financial Crisis: They were the ones who underwrote the periphery's spendthrift ways. That party ended in 2008. With the periphery no longer the spender of last resort in Europe, Germany had to find a way to export its savings to the rest of the world. But that required a cheaper currency, which Mario Draghi ultimately delivered in 2014 when he set in motion the ECB's own quantitative easing program. So where do we go from here? Germany's excess savings problem is not about to go away anytime soon. The working-age population is set to decline over the next few decades, which means that most domestically oriented businesses will have little incentive to expand capacity (Chart 13). The peripheral countries remain in belt-tightening mode. This will limit demand for German imports. Meanwhile, countries such as Spain have made significant progress in reducing unit labor costs in an effort to improve competitiveness and shift their current account balances back into surplus. Chart 12Competitiveness Gains In The 2000s Allowed ##br##Germany To Increase Its Current Account Surplus Chart 13Germans Need To Have More Children The ECB And The BOJ Can't Afford To Raise Rates The private sector financial balance in the euro area - effectively, the difference between what the private sector earns and spends - now stands near a record high (Chart 14). Fiscal policy also remains fairly tight. The IMF estimates that the euro area's cyclically-adjusted primary budget balance will be in a surplus of 0.9% of GDP in 2018-19, compared to a deficit of 3.8% of GDP in the United States (Chart 15). Chart 14Euro Area: Private Sector ##br##Balance Remains Elevated Chart 15The Euro Area's Fiscal Policy Is Tight If the public sector is unwilling to absorb the private sector's excess savings by running large fiscal deficits, those savings need to be exported abroad in the form of a current account surplus. Failure to do so will result in higher unemployment, and ultimately, further political upheaval. This means that the ECB has no choice other than to keep rates near rock-bottom levels in order to ensure that the euro remains cheap. Japan has been more willing than Europe to maintain large budget deficits, but the problem is that this has resulted in a huge debt-to-GDP ratio. The Japanese would like to tighten fiscal policy, starting with the consumption tax hike scheduled for October 2019. However, this may require the economy to have an even larger current account surplus, which can only be achieved if the yen weakens further. This, in turn, suggests that the Bank of Japan will not abandon its yield curve control policy anytime soon. We were not in the least bit surprised this week when Governor Kuroda poured cold water on the idea that the BoJ was contemplating raising either its short or long-term interest rate targets. The bottom line is that thinking about global imbalances solely in terms of current account positions is not enough. One should also think about the distribution of aggregate demand across the world. Countries with demand to spare such as the United States can afford to run current account deficits, while economies with insufficient demand such as the euro area and Japan should run current account surpluses. The key market implication is that interest rates will remain structurally higher in the United States, which will keep the dollar well bid. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 This is partly because it can take a while for additional capital spending to raise aggregate supply. For example, it may take a few years to build an office tower or a new factory. Corporate R&D investment may not generate tangible benefits for a long time, especially in cases where the research is focused on something complicated (i.e., the design of new computer chips or pharmaceuticals). And even if investment spending could be transformed into additional productive capacity instantaneously, aggregate demand would still rise more than aggregate supply, at least temporarily. Here is the reason: The nonresidential private-sector capital stock is about 120% of GDP in the United States. As such, a one percent increase in investment spending would raise the capital stock by four-fifths of a percentage point. Assuming a capital share of income of 40% of national income, a one percent increase in the capital stock would lift output by 0.4%. Thus, a one-dollar increase in business investment would boost aggregate demand by one dollar in the year it is undertaken, while increasing supply by only 4/5*0.4 = roughly 32 cents. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China Is Easing Up On The Brake, Not Pressing The Accelerator," dated July 26, 2018. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "U.S.-China Trade Spat: Is R-Star To Blame?" dated April 6, 2018. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights Global QE has made bonds as risky as equities. Thereby, global QE has forced investors to accept identically depressed returns from equities and from bonds, requiring equity and other risk-asset valuations to surge. The good news is that record high valuations of risk-assets are fully justified if global bond yields remain at current levels or fall. The bad news is that risk-asset valuations will become dangerously unstable if global bond yields march much higher. The 'rule of 4' for equity/bond allocation: sum the three 10-year yields - the German bund, the U.S. T-bond, and the JGB. Above 3.5 means a neutral stance in equities... ... Above 4 means it's time to go underweight equities and overweight bonds. Feature Chart of the WeekAt Higher Bond Yields, The Correlation With Equity Prices Has Flipped From Positive To Negative The end is nigh for QE. The ECB will exit its asset purchase program at the end of the year. In doing so, it will mark the end of an epoch which began in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, a ten year period in which at least one of the world's major central banks has been buying a defined quantity of assets every month (Chart I-2). Approaching the end of the epoch, it is fitting to ask: how did the global QE stimulant work, and what will be the withdrawal symptoms? Chart I-2The End Is Nigh For QE As far back as 2011, in a provocative report titled QE And Riots we predicted that: "QE... will exacerbate already extreme income inequality and the consequent social tensions that arise from it" Events in the subsequent seven years have fully vindicated our prediction. Simply put, QE has front-loaded asset returns which would ordinarily have accrued in the distant future to the here and now - in the form of sharply higher capital values. So if you were invested in the financial markets or most housing markets, congratulations, you have received a bonanza; if you weren't, bad luck, there's not much left for you (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Equities Are Now Priced To Generate A Measly Long-Term Return To understand why, we need to delve deeper into behavioural economics. QE: Why The Stimulant Was So Powerful Central banks admit that there is a lower bound for interest rates below which there would be an exodus of bank deposits. Once policy rates hit the lower bound, central banks can unleash a 'plan B': a commitment to keep policy rates at this lower bound for an extended period. QE is simply a powerful signalling tool for this commitment. As ECB Chief Economist Peter Praet explains: "There is a signalling channel inherent in asset purchases, which reinforces the credibility of forward guidance on policy rates. This credibility of promises to follow a certain course for policy rates in the future is enhanced by the asset purchases, as these asset purchases are a concrete demonstration of our desire (to keep policy rates at the lower bound)" The credible commitment to keep policy rates near the lower bound for an extended period depresses bond yields towards the lower bound too (Chart I-4). Chart I-4The Credible Commitment To Keep Policy Rates##br## Low Pulls Down Bond Yields Now comes the part of the story that is not well understood, even by central bankers, because it derives from recent breakthroughs in behavioural economics. When bond yields approach the lower bound, the asymmetry in their future direction makes bonds very risky investments. The short-term potential for capital appreciation - nominal or real - vanishes, while the potential for vicious losses increases dramatically (Chart I-5). The technical term for this unattractive asymmetry is negative skew. Years of research in behavioural economics has led Nobel Laureate Professor Daniel Kahneman to conclude: negative skew is the measure that best encapsulates our perception of an investment's risk. Chart I-5Bonds Become Much Riskier ##br## At Low Bond Yields Professor Kahneman's work reveals a profound truth: global QE has made bonds as risky as equities (Chart I-6). The ramification is that equities and other risk-assets no longer need to lure investors with an excess return over bond returns. QE has forced investors to accept identically depressed returns from equities and from bonds, requiring equity and other risk-asset valuations to surge.1 Chart I-6Global QE Has Made Bonds ##br##As Risky As Equities One counterargument we hear is that bonds offer investors a diversification benefit and, because of this, investors will still accept a lower return from bonds. But this argument is flawed. Just as bonds are a diversifier for equity investors, equities are a diversifier for bond investors. Indeed in recent years, equities have protected bond investors during vicious sell-offs in the bond market such as after Trump's shock victory in 2016. So we could equally argue that equities require the lower return. In fact, with the same negative skew and symmetrical diversification properties, both assets must offer the same prospective return. The breakthroughs in behavioural economics provide some good news and some bad news. The good news is that record high valuations of risk-assets are fully justified if bond yields remain at current levels or fall. The bad news is that risk-asset valuations will become dangerously unstable if bond yields march much higher (Chart I-7). Chart I-7At Low Bond Yields The Required Return On ##br##Equities Plunges, So Equity Valuations Surge Financial Markets Dwarf The World Economy One common misunderstanding about QE is that it has been the bond purchasing itself that has held down bond yields. This seems a natural assumption because we connect the act of buying with higher prices (lower yields). Moreover, the $10 trillion of bonds that the 'big four' central banks have bought is not far short of the size of the euro area economy. But let's put this into context. The global bond market exceeds $100 trillion. Long-term bank loans amount to something similar. In this $217 trillion2 global fixed income market, $10 trillion of QE is peanuts. To reiterate, QE's impact came not from the $10 trillion of central bank purchases in itself, but from the signal that interest rates would remain at the lower bound for a long time, mathematically requiring bond yields to approach the lower bound too;3 and from the consequent equalization of negative skew on bonds and risk-assets, mathematically requiring an exponential rerating of all risk-asset valuations (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Equities Are Now Priced To Generate A Measly Long-Term Return Now note that the combination of equities and correlated risk-assets such as corporate and EM debt is worth around $160 trillion, and real estate is worth $220 trillion. World GDP is worth much less, around $80 trillion. So if returns from these richly valued risk-assets were reallocated from the here and now back to the distant future, through lower capital values today, there would be a very real risk that current spending could take a dive. Supporting this broad thesis, central bank measures of 'financial conditions easiness' are just tracking the level of the stock market (Chart I-9). Chart I-9Financial Conditions Are Just##br## Tracking The Stock Market The 'Rule Of 4' For Equities And Bonds On February 1 this year, we advised that the big threat to risk-asset valuations "comes from the global 10-year bond yield rising to 2% - broadly equivalent to the German 10-year bund yield rising to 1% or the U.S. 10-year T-bond yield rising to 3%." This advice has proved to be remarkably prescient. Whenever bond yields have been at the lower end of recent ranges, the correlation with equities has been positive, meaning equities have risen in tandem with bond yields. But whenever bond yields have moved to the upper end of recent ranges, the correlation has abruptly flipped to negative, meaning equities have fallen as bond yields have risen (Chart of the Week). While many strategists and commentators are fixated on the risks from trade wars and/or the global economy, our non-consensus call is that the biggest threat to risk-assets comes from rich valuations which will become dangerously unstable if bond yields march much higher. In this regard the bond yield that matters is the global bond yield. Previously we defined this in terms of the German 10-year bund yield and the U.S. 10-year T-bond yield. But today for completeness, we would like to add another important component: the Japanese 10-year government bond yield. The global bond yield is a weighted average of the three components. But for a useful rule of thumb, just sum the three 10-year yields - the German bund, the U.S. T-bond, and the JGB. A sum above 3.5 means a neutral stance to equities. A sum above 4 - which broadly equates to the global yield rising above 2% - means it's time to go underweight equities and overweight bonds. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Consider what happens to valuations when bond yields decline from 4% to 2%. At a 4% bond yield, equities possess significantly more negative skew than 10-year bonds. So investors will demand a comparatively higher return from equities, let’s say 8% a year. Whereas, at a 2% bond yield, equities and 10-year bonds possess the same negative skew. So investors will demand the same return from equities as they can get from bonds, 2% a year. At the lower bond yield, the bond must deliver 2% a year less for ten years compared to previously, meaning its price must rise by 22%. But equities must deliver 6% a year less for ten years, so the equity market must surge by 80%. 2 Source: The Institute of International Finance (IIF) https://www.iif.com/publication/global-debt-monitor/global-debt-monitor-june-2017 3 In contrast, if the market feared bond purchases would cause inflation and thereby imply a higher path of interest rates, QE would push up bond yields! Fractal Trading Model* This week we note that the underperformance of emerging market versus developed market equities is technically stretched and ripe for at least a brief countertrend reversal. The 65-day trade is long EM versus DM with a profit target of 2.5% and a symmetrical stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Editor's Note: I am pleased to return to U.S. Investment Strategy (USIS). I worked with the service when I joined BCA in 2010, and previously led it from August 2013 through September 2014. Sara Porrello, who has been with the team for over 20 years, and I look forward to re-aligning USIS with its original mandate. We hope you will find it consistently insightful. Best regards, Doug Peta U.S. Investment Strategy is getting back to basics: Today's report, plainly stating our position on the near-term direction of interest rates, is the first in an ongoing series meant to stake out our views on the macro issues that are most important to investors. Rates are headed higher, consistent with a booming economy that may well overheat, ... : Assuming trade tensions don't short-circuit the expansion, the U.S. economy is poised to grow above trend well into 2019. ...thanks to a tightening labor market and dubious fiscal spending, ... : Employers will be forced to bid up wages as the pool of idled and under-utilized workers dries up, and the fiscal stimulus package is all but certain to goose inflation pressures. ... and neither tweets nor testy interviews nor other expressions of presidential pique are likely to stay the Fed from its appointed rounds: The Federal Reserve cherishes its independence, and it is extremely unlikely to bow to presidential pressure. Feature U.S. Investment Strategy is meant to provide analyses of the U.S. economy and its future direction for the purpose of helping our clients make asset-allocation decisions. Starting with this report, we are going back to the basics of meeting that mandate. Over the rest of the summer, we intend to outline our positions on the key macro drivers of financial markets: rates, credit, the business cycle, and the state of monetary policy. Laying out our big-picture views, and the rationale underpinning them, will establish a framework for evaluating incoming data. The goal is to allow our clients to think along with us as new information is disseminated, and to distinguish signals from noise. We also want to make it easier for clients to anticipate the evolution of our views. To that end, will make frequent use of checklists highlighting the specific elements that might lead us to change our take on the evolution of the key cycles. The ultimate goal is to stay on top of cyclical inflection points, and to use them to inform asset-allocation decisions. The Fed Gets Its Way On Rates Monetary policy is a blunt instrument that works with indeterminate lags, and its effect has been roundly questioned. At the ends of the armchair-quarterback continuum, the Fed is mocked as a clueless bumbler, turning dials at random like a fumbling Mr. Magoo, or bemoaned as an omnipotent manipulator of financial markets and real-world activity. Strictly speaking, it controls nothing more than short rates. As its post-crisis communications strategy has shown, however, its reach extends well beyond its official policy-rate dominion. Talk of last decade's "conundrum" aside, changes in the fed funds rate reverberate along the entire yield curve. As the Chart Of The Week demonstrates, the aggregate yield on all outstanding Treasury issues is joined at the hip, directionally, with the fed funds rate. Aggregate weighted-average Treasury duration sits squarely in the belly of the curve, and it is a not-quite-perfect proxy for the long end, where the Fed's gravitational pull wanes (Table 1). Its pull is still powerful, though; the 90% correlation between the fed funds rate and the 30-year bond testifies eloquently to the Fed's significant influence at all points of the curve (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekThe Fed Gets Its Way The investment takeaway is that the Fed gets what it wants across the full spectrum of rates the vast majority of the time. Given the FOMC's repeatedly expressed intention to continue on its normalization course, the path of least resistance for rates at all maturities is higher. Despite the money markets' resistance to extrapolate the 25-bps-a-quarter "gradual pace" across the rest of this year and next (Chart 3), six more quarters of that pace is our baseline expectation provided an economic shock does not occur. Investors should be prepared for a higher peak in the fed funds rate than the consensus expects. Table 1Correlation With The Fed Funds##BR##Rate By Bond Maturity Chart 2The Long Arm##BR##Of The Fed Chart 3Rates Have Room To##BR##Surprise To The Upside Bottom Line: The Treasury curve faithfully reflects changes in the fed funds rate. In the absence of a shock that would cause the FOMC's repeatedly expressed plans to change, monetary policy is a catalyst for higher rates. But What About An Inverted Yield Curve? The yield curve typically inverts in the latter stages of a rate-hiking campaign, so it is more correct to say a higher fed funds rate implies higher Treasury yields until the yield curve inverts. An inverted yield curve is a classic recession indicator, albeit often a very early one (Table 2), and it should not be taken as a signal to immediately de-risk portfolios. The yield curve may be prone to invert even earlier than it otherwise would this time around, given that QE1, QE2, and QE3 may well have depressed the term premium on long-term bonds,1 as The Bank Credit Analyst noted in its August edition. The question of how much the Fed's asset purchases have affected the term premium, if at all, is far from settled within either the Fed or BCA, but its potential to impact the signal from the yield curve reinforces our conviction to look to other indicators to confirm its recession message before declaring the end of the bull markets in equities and spread product. Table 2The Yield Curve Is Early The Inflation Outlook As the tepid post-crisis expansion has stretched on and on, investors have grown accustomed to sleepy inflation readings and begun to regard the prospects for a pickup in inflation with skepticism, if not outright disdain. Even within BCA, there has been spirited debate about the relevance of the Phillips Curve - the formalization of the idea that there is an inverse relationship between wage growth and the unemployment rate. Despite the stagflation of the 1970s and the lengthy post-crisis dry spell that have undermined the Phillips Curve's credibility with the rigorously empirically-minded, we do not find it controversial. The relationship between unemployment and compensation may not be perfectly linear, but the Phillips Curve is nothing more than an extension of the laws of supply and demand to wage negotiations. We can accept that the Phillips Curve is kinked - that compensation growth is utterly indifferent to changes in the unemployment rate when labor supply is glutted (as can be seen in Chart 4 when covering all of the observations below 7%), but rather sensitive to its moves when it is in the neighborhood of full employment (as can be seen when covering all of the observations above 5%). We believe the U.S. labor market has reached the point at which employers will have to compete fiercely to attract new talent. After nine years, the economy has finally worked down nearly all of the hidden slack that had padded the broader U-6 unemployment rate.2 The pool of discouraged workers - those who are not counted as officially unemployed because they're not actively looking for a job, but would start tomorrow if offered one - has shrunk below its 2000 and 2007 levels (Chart 5, top panel). Similarly, the share of the labor force that is working part time but would prefer to be working full time is approaching its pre-crisis bottom (Chart 5, bottom panel). The prospects for inflation gained another boost last December upon the passage of the spending package on the coattails of the tax-cut bill. The U.S. economy is poised to receive a substantial dose of fiscal stimulus this year and next (Chart 6). Mainstream macroeconomic thought holds that stimulus injected into an economy that is already operating at full capacity is prone to kindle inflation.3 Chart 4The Phillips Curve Can't Handle Copious Slack ... Chart 5... But Almost All Of It Has Been Worked Off Chart 6Goosing Inflation Along With Output Bottom Line: The U.S. labor market has tightened considerably and competition between employers to attract scarce talent should soon translate to a pickup in wage growth. Unneeded fiscal stimulus is also likely to push prices higher. There are plenty more inflation green shoots behind the ones that have already begun to emerge. White House-Fed Tension Is Nothing New It is not beyond the realm of possibility that presidential pressure could deter the Fed from following through on its intentions and present a risk to our above-consensus terminal rate estimate. The bond market immediately discounted the potential of a less independent Fed by selling off at the long end after the president stated he was "not thrilled" with ongoing rate hikes in an interview with CNBC. There would seem to be little doubt that a captive Fed would be more reluctant to remove the punch bowl than a Fed which was free to pursue its inflation mandate without outside interference. After all, elected officials would be happy to trade long-term pain for near-term gain (at least through the next campaign). The president may have upended convention by publicly airing his displeasure, but there is a natural tension between the White House and the Fed. There have been dust-ups in the past, and there will be dust-ups in the future for as long as elected officials shudder at the thought of an economic downturn. Alan Greenspan wrote frankly in his memoir about friction with the first Bush administration, which included public criticism from the sitting president. "I do not want to see us move so strongly against inflation that we impede growth," President Bush told the press at the beginning of his term, in response to hawkish congressional testimony from Greenspan.4 By all accounts, however, the conflict between Bush père and Greenspan was of a lower-pressure variety than the conflicts between LBJ and William McChesney Martin, and Nixon and Arthur Burns. The legendarily intimidating LBJ summoned Martin to his ranch following an unwelcome rate hike. According to several accounts (and consistent with his longstanding negotiating practices in the Senate), LBJ backed the smaller Martin up against a wall before giving full voice to his complaints. Martin did not budge, pointing out that the Fed had acted in accordance with the legislation governing its actions.5 If Martin represents the heroic Fed chief, standing his ground in the face of heavy pressure from a larger-than-life figure, Arthur Burns is the poster child for folding like a cheap lawn chair. The Nixon tapes capture Nixon and his proxies repeatedly pressuring Burns to prime the pump ahead of the 1972 election, which Burns ultimately did.6 Our view is that Fed Chair Powell is more likely to follow Martin than Burns. The Fed is more transparent today, and its independence is more firmly established than it was in the 1970s. Even if Powell were amenable to doing the president's bidding, he would be held back by the realization that it would ultimately be self-defeating: any hint of political manipulation in the rate-setting process would risk a bond market riot that would blast rates far beyond the levels where a 3.5% fed funds rate would take them. Bottom Line: We are not concerned that the FOMC will yield to pressure from the White House to back away from their rate hike plans. Attempted influence of the Fed is nothing new, and investors need not worry about it now. Investment Implications If we are correct in our view that rates have not yet peaked, the bond market is likely to face continued headwinds. Long-dated Treasuries will come under more pressure than shorter-maturity issues. Thanks to positive carry, spread product will be less vulnerable to higher rates, but our bond strategists are lukewarm on the risk-reward offered by investment-grade and high-yield bonds given the late stage of the cycle and historically tight spreads. We acknowledge the potential seriousness of the current spate of geopolitical risks, headlined by trade tensions, and advocate temporarily de-risking portfolios in line with the BCA house view (equal weight equities, underweight bonds, overweight cash). We are more constructive than the BCA consensus, however, because we remain constructive on the business cycle, the monetary policy cycle, and the credit cycle. If the key cycles aren't over, the equity bull market probably isn't over, and neither spread widening nor a pickup in defaults is likely to wipe out spread product's excess returns. We will express all of our calls in a basket of ETF recommendations once we have completed our review of the most impactful macro questions, but for now we recommend maintaining below-benchmark positioning in Treasury portfolios while overweighting TIPS at the expense of nominal Treasuries. Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com 1 Long-term bond yields can be decomposed into the expected path of short-term rates and a term premium, which compensates an investor for the uncertainties that can arise over the extended time period that s/he is locking up his/her money by buying a longer-maturity instrument. 2 In the monthly employment report, the headline unemployment rate, which includes only jobless workers who are actively seeking work, is labeled U-3 unemployment. The U-6 series broadens the definition of unemployment to include the jobless who aren't actively searching and those who are working part time only because they cannot find a full-time position. 3 Please see the November 7, 2016 U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Policy, Polls, Probability," available at usis.bcaresearch.com, for a discussion of fiscal multipliers under a range of scenarios. 4 Greenspan, Alan. The Age of Turbulence: Adventures in a New World, Penguin (New York): 2007, p.113. To this day, several members of the G.H.W. Bush administration continue to pin a large measure of blame for its 1992 electoral loss on overly conservative monetary policy. The ex-president himself, in a 1998 television interview, said, "I reappointed him [Greenspan], and he disappointed me." 5 Granville, Kevin. "A President at War With His Fed Chief, 5 Decades Before Trump," New York Times, June 15, 2017, page B3 (updated July 19, 2018). https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/business/economy/a-president-at-war-with-his-fed-chief-5-decades-before-trump.html 6 "How Richard Nixon Pressured Arthur Burns: Evidence from the Nixon Tapes, Vol. 20, No. 4," Journal of Economic Perspectives (Fall 2006). https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/1167/item/2388, accessed on July 24, 2018.