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Highlights After the March FOMC Meeting, market pricing for short-term rates is largely consistent with the Fed's forecasts. For investors and the Fed, the health of the economy and earnings matter more than Trump's political woes. However, the U.S. / China trade disputes will now take center stage. How can investors prepare for the trough in Citigroup Economic Surprise Index? Investors remain skeptical that the unemployment rate can fall to 3.5% and wonder what pace of monthly payroll growth would be required to get it there. Feature The S&P 500 fell more than 2% last Thursday after President Trump announced a new round of tariffs aimed at China. Treasury yields drifted modestly lower, and the trade weighted dollar fell 1%. Credit spreads widened. The trade tensions and the softer dollar drove gold up by nearly 3%. Meanwhile, another drawdown in oil inventories drove WTI oil nearly 5% higher. The VIX climbed last week, and has more than doubled since the start of the year. The market largely ignored last week's FOMC meeting. Fed Chair Powell stuck to the script at his first post-meeting press conference, but noted that trade was a topic of discussion. The "...For Inflation" section of this week's report provides more detail on Fed's view of the economy and rates. U.S. risk assets also sold off last week as market participants reacted negatively to Trump's political woes and trade policies. BCA's view is that investors should fade the former and focus on the later. We discuss Trump's political situation, as well as the trade tensions in the second section of this week's report ("...For the Next Tweet"). Nearly all the data in last week's sparse economic calendar exceeded expectations. At 1.8%, the Atlanta Fed GDPNow estimate for Q1 finished the week where it started. An unusual run of harsh winter weather in the Northeastern U.S. in March will keep downward pressure on the Citigroup Economic Surprise Index for the next month or so. We provide more detail on the Citigroup Economic Surprise Index and the performance of risk assets as the index rises and falls in the "...For The Washout" section of this week's report. Moreover, in the final section of the report ("...For The Labor Market"), we discuss how the unemployment rate can get to BCA's target of 3.5% in the next 12 months. ... For Inflation As widely expected, the FOMC last week delivered its sixth rate hike of the cycle and Fed members were more optimistic on the economic outlook. However, U.S. trade policy is a cloud over the outlook. The Fed downgraded its assessment of current economic conditions, but upgraded the outlook. The current pace of economic activity was described as "moderate" and opposed to "solid" in the previous FOMC statement. This reflects some disappointing data releases, which is also apparent in the Atlanta Fed's GDPNow model forecasting just 1.8% growth in Q1. But the Fed does not expect the softness to persist and noted that "the economic outlook has strengthened" (details below in "...For the Washout"). This was reflected in the updated economic projections. GDP growth forecasts were revised to 2.7% and 2.4% for 2018 and 2019, respectively (Chart 1). That's up from 2.5% and 2.1%, and comfortably above the Fed's 1.8% estimate for potential growth. As a consequence, the Fed expects the unemployment rate to drop to 3.6% in 2019, which would be well below the Fed's revised 4.5% estimate of full employment (details below in "...For the Labor Market"). Despite growth being above-trend and the jobless rate falling far below NAIRU, FOMC participants are not forecasting a major acceleration in inflation. From 1.9% in 2018, core PCE inflation is seen fairly steady at 2.1% in 2019 and 2020. To some degree, the upward pressure on inflation will be mitigated by a higher path for the Fed funds rate. Although the median projection remains for three rate hikes this year, the Fed expects slightly faster rate hikes in 2019 and 2020 (Chart 2). The Fed funds rate is now expected to end 2020 at 3.375%, up from 3.125% expected in December. This will put monetary policy on the tighter side of the Fed's 2.875% estimate of the neutral rate. Chart 1The FOMC'S Latest Forecasts Chart 2Market And The Fed In Agreement On Rates Of course, the path of the Fed funds rate will depend on the degree of slack in the economy and the resulting inflationary pressures. The Fed could be underestimating the inflationary pressures associated with a jobless rate that will be nearly 1% below NAIRU. Alternatively, a rising participation rate could slow the decline in the unemployment rate, or the Fed's estimate of NAIRU could get revised much lower. Finally, while the fiscal stimulus is behind the Fed's more optimistic outlook, U.S. trade policy is a growing downside risk (details below in "...For the Next Tweet"). During his press conference, Fed Chair Powell said that FOMC members were aware of the risk, but it was not incorporated into their forecasts. President Trump announced tariffs on China last week. China may then retaliate with its own tariffs. As we've said before, nobody wins from trade wars. Economic activity will be weaker and prices will be higher. A full blown trade war could jeopardize the Fed's rosy forecasts. Bottom Line: Market pricing for short-term rates is largely consistent with the Fed's forecasts. Therefore, the outcome of last week's FOMC meeting is not very market relevant. Investors are more focused on trade policy for now. ... For The Next Tweet BCA is looking beyond any market volatility induced by President Trump's political scandals.1 The decision to impeach President Trump is a purely political decision that rests with the House of Representatives. Under GOP control, Trump will not likely be impeached if he continues to fire his White House aides or members of his cabinet. That is his purview as President. However, relieving Special Counsel Mueller of his duties would probably be a red line for House Republicans and lead to impeachment. That said, it is very difficult to see the impeachment in the House lead to Trump's removal by the Senate, given his elevated approval ratings among GOP voters (Chart 3). Trump's support with GOP voters, our Geopolitical Strategy service's critical measure of whether Trump can stay in power, is back at 2016 election levels with GOP voters (Chart 3). Furthermore, conviction in the Senate (and removal from office), requires 67 votes. If the Democrats take the House, they are likely to impeach Trump in 2019. But even if the Democrats retake the Senate this fall, they would fall far short of that 67-vote threshold for conviction. For investors and the Fed, the health of the economy and earnings matter more than Trump's political woes. Equity markets performed well when the economy and earnings backdrop was favorable during presidential scandals in the 1920s and the 1990s. In the early 1970s, amid soaring inflation and the worst recession since the Great Depression, there was a bear market in equities (Chart 4A). Likewise, surges in equity market volatility amid political scandals were related more to economic and financial events than politics (Chart 4B). Chart 4AFor Markets,##BR##Economy Matters More Than Politics Chart 4BMarket Volatility During##BR##U.S. Political Scandals Today's environment - while not as robust as in the 1920s or late 1990s - provides support for higher stock prices, above-trend economic growth, escalating inflation, three more Fed rate hikes this year, and higher Treasury bond yields. Moreover, none of the issues that investors care about (tax cuts, deregulation, lifting of the spending caps, etc.) can be reversed by Trump's impeachment. Even a Democratic wave in this fall's mid-term Congressional elections will not deliver the opposition party a veto-proof majority (Chart 5). Thus, in the current economic cycle, we expect pro-market forces at the legislative and executive branches of government to persist. Chart 5Democrats's Lead in Generic Congressional##BR##Ballot Has Moved Lower This Year However, Trump's political scandals may cost the GOP the House in this fall's mid-term elections. Table 1 and Chart 6 show that political gridlock is not positive for stock prices after controlling for important macro factors.2 The average monthly return on the S&P 500 is considerably higher when the executive and legislative branches are unified. The worst outcome for equity markets, by far, is when the President faces a split legislature. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service noted that while the market has cheered the limited scope of tariffs imposed earlier this month, investors may be underestimating the political shifts that underpinned Trump's move. There is little reason to think that protectionism will fade when Trump leaves office. The Administration's decision late last week to introduce sanctions aimed at China represents another escalation of the trade spat initiated in early March. Increased trade tensions with China represent a near-term risk to the markets.3 However, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy team notes that the latest round of tariffs suggests that Trump has made a bid to increase negotiation leverage with China rather than launch a protectionist broadside. This is good news in the short term, relative to the worst fears given Trump's lack of legal/constitutional constraints. But in the long term, Trump's latest move on trade policy support's our view that geopolitical risk is moving to East Asia and the U.S. / China conflict is a high-risk scenario that markets are now going to have to start pricing in.4 Table 1Divided Government Is, In Fact, Bad For Stocks Chart 6A Unified Congress Is A Boon For Stocks Bottom Line: Investors should dismiss the risk of domestic political scandals interrupting the market-friendly policy back drop. However, U.S. / China trade disputes will take center stage. China is motivated to prevent a trade war through significant compromises that Trump can advertise as wins to his audience this November. If Trump accepts these concessions, then the risk of a trade war with China will likely be removed until the next race for President in 2020. ... For The Washout The U.S. economic data have disappointed so far this year, as illustrated by Citigroup Economic Surprise Index (Chart 7). The Index peaked at 84.5 in December 2017 and subsequently has moved lower for 64 days. Since early 2011, there were six other episodes when the Surprise Index behaved similarly. These phases lasted an average of 86 days; the median number of days from peak to trough was 66 days. The implication is that the trough in the Citigroup Economic Surprise reading may be a month or two away. However, the relatively low economic expectations at end-2017 suggest that the disappointment may be truncated. On the other hand, the Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017, along with the lifting of budgetary spending caps in early 2018, have likely raised economists' near-term projections. Chart 7U.S. Financial Markets As Economic Surprise Index Declines The performance of key financial markets and commodities since the Economic Surprise Index crested in December 2017 matches the historical record, with a few notable exceptions (Table 2 and Charts 7 and 8). As the Index rolled over in late 2017, stocks beat bonds, credit outperformed Treasuries and the dollar fell, matching previous episodes. However, counter to the historical trend, gold and oil prices have increased and small caps have underperformed in the past three months. Table 2Financial Market Performance As The Economic Surprise Index Falls Chart 8Economic Surprise Approaching A Turning Point Based on BCA's research,5 tactical investors should add to their risk positions as the Citigroup Economic Surprise Index bottoms and begins to climb. As the Economic Surprise Index rises, stocks beat bonds by an average of 8700 bps and in six of the seven episodes since 2011 (Table 3). Furthermore, the performance of stock-to-bond ratio is better when the Economic Surprise Index is accelerating. Table 3 again shows that all asset classes also perform better when the Index climbs. After briefly moving above zero in early 2017 - indicating that inflation data was stronger than analysts projected - the Citigroup Inflation Surprise index rolled over again (Chart 9, top panel) through year end 2017. Reports on the CPI, PPI and average hourly earnings continued to fall short of consensus forecasts despite tightening of the labor and product markets. The disappointment on price data relative to consensus forecasts is not new. Although there were brief periods when prices exceeded forecasts in 2010 and 2011, the last time that inflation exceeded market consensus in this business cycle was in late 2009 and early 2010. In the last few years of the 2001-2007 economic expansion through early 2009, the price data eclipsed forecasts more than half of the time. During this interval, economists underestimated the impact of surging energy prices on inflation readings. Table 3Financial Market Performance As The Economic Surprise Index Rises Chart 9The Fed Cycle And Inflation Surprise Moreover, the Citigroup Inflation Surprise index escalated during previous tightening regimes when the economy was at full employment and the Fed funds rate was in accommodative territory (Chart 9). The last time those conditions were in place, which was in 2005, the Fed was wrapping up a rate increase campaign that began in mid-2004. An increase in the Citigroup Inflation Surprise Index also accompanied most of the Fed's rate hikes from mid-1999 through mid-2000. In late 2015, as the current set of rate hikes commenced, the inflation surprise index was on the upswing, the economy was close to full employment and the Fed funds rate was accommodative. Bottom Line: The disappointing run of economic data will not end for another few months. The unusually harsh winter weather in March in the Northeastern exacerbates the situation. However, the weakness in the economic data is not a sign that a recession is at hand. We expect that the inflation surprise index will continue to grind higher, as unemployment dips further into 'excess demand' territory (details below in "...For The Labor Market"). After the Citigroup Economic Surprise Index forms a bottom and starts to rise, history suggests that stocks will beat bonds, investment-grade and high-yield corporate bonds will outpace Treasuries, and gold and oil will climb. Stay overweight stocks versus bonds, long credit and underweight duration. ... For The Labor Market BCA expects the unemployment rate to hit 3.5% by late 2018 or early next year, the first time since December 1969. Our base case assumes that the economy will generate 200,000 nonfarm payroll jobs per month and that the labor force participation rate will remain at 63%. The unemployment rate was 4.1% in February 2018 and bottomed at 4.4% in 2006 and 2007; the rate reached a 30-year low at 3.8% in 2000. As noted in the first section of this week's report, at the conclusion of last week's meeting, the FOMC nudged down its view of this year's unemployment rate to 3.8%. The FOMC also slightly adjusted its long-term forecast of the unemployment rate to 4.5%. The implication is that BCA and the FOMC expect the U.S. economy to continue to run below full employment this year. Nonetheless, investors remain skeptical that the unemployment rate can fall to 3.5% and wonder what pace of monthly payroll growth would be required to get it there. In Table 4 we look at various scenarios (monthly increases in payrolls, annual percentage change in participation rate) to show when the unemployment rate will dip below 3.5%. In the past three months, total nonfarm payroll employment increased by 242,000 per month, and in the past year, the average monthly increase was 190,000. The participation rate was 63% in February, little changed from a year ago as an improved labor market offset demographic factors that continue to drive down this rate. Our calculations assume that the labor force will expand by 0.9% per year, matching the growth rate in the past 12 months. Chart 10 shows the history of the unemployment rate and several scenarios in the next two years that assume the participation rate stays at 63%. Table 4Dates When 3.5% Unemployment Rate Threshold Is Reached Chart 10The Unemployment Rate Under Various Monthly Job Count Scenarios Bottom Line: BCA's view is that the FOMC's forecast for the unemployment rate at the end of 2018 (3.8%) is too high and only marginally lower than the current 4.1% rate. This is inconsistent with real GDP growth well in excess of its supply-side potential. The macro backdrop will likely justify the FOMC hiking more quickly than the March 2018 dots forecast. The risks are skewed to the upside. BCA expects the 2/10 Treasury yield curve to steepen through mid-year and then flatten by year-end, spending most of 2018 between 0 and 50 bps. Stay underweight duration. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Break Glass In Case Of Impeachment," dated May 17, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Policies Are Stimulative Everywhere But China," dated February 28, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump, Year Two: Let The Trade War Begin," dated March 14, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report "The South China Sea: Smooth Sailing?," dated March 28, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Reports, "Solid Start," dated January 8, 2018 and "The Revenge Of Animal Spirits," dated October 30, 2017. Both available at usis.bcaresearch.com.
Special Report Dear Client, I am visiting clients in Asia this week and working on our Quarterly Strategy Outlook, which we will be publishing next week. As such, instead of our Weekly Report, we are sending you this Special Report written by my colleague Mathieu Savary, BCA's Chief Foreign Exchange Strategist. Mathieu discusses the current economic situation in Switzerland. While the Swiss economy has healed, the Swiss franc continues to exert structural deflationary pressures on the country. The SNB will do its utmost to engineer further depreciation in the franc versus the euro, but will lag behind the ECB when it comes time to increase interest rates. I hope you will find this report both interesting and informative. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Feature Switzerland is experiencing a meaningful economic rebound. The Swiss economy is enjoying real and nominal growth of 1% and 1.4%, respectively, and PMIs are hovering near eight-year highs. As a result, after hitting nadirs of -1.4% and -0.95%, headline and core inflation have both recovered and are clocking in at 0.6% and 0.5%, respectively. Moreover, thanks to economic and political improvements in the euro area, capital has begun to make its way back into the euro. As a result, EUR/CHF has rallied, creating a weaker trade-weighted Swiss franc. This means that while global monetary conditions are beginning to tighten, Swiss monetary conditions have eased in 2017 and 2018. As the Swiss economy improves, will the Swiss National Bank follow in the footsteps of many other major central banks and dial down its accommodative monetary policy? Is it time to sell EUR/CHF? In our view, Swiss domestic economic dynamics remain too fragile to let the Swiss franc appreciate meaningfully. Hence, the SNB will not be able to tighten policy much so long as the European Central Bank keeps rates at current levels. Thus, we would continue to bet on an appreciation of EUR/CHF, punctuated with periodic rallies in the Swiss franc when global volatility occasionally spikes. The Domestic Situation Switzerland's current domestic situation can be traced back to the botched abandonment of the currency peg in 2015. On January 15th, 2015, markets were caught off guard by the sudden removal of the 1.20 floor underpinning EUR/CHF. The SNB provided no forward guidance nor any explanation, and the franc surged 20% against the euro in just one day, tightening monetary conditions severely. Fearing a massive deflationary shock to the Swiss economy, the SNB responded with a large-scale injection of liquidity, expanding its assets from 80% of GDP to more than 120% today, the highest ratio in the G10. To enforce an unofficial floor placed under EUR/CHF of 1.08, Swiss foreign exchange reserves grew rapidly. This expansion in liquidity along with negative policy rates caused 10-year yields to decline to -0.6%. A weak franc and falling yields greatly eased monetary conditions (Chart 1). The current strength in the Swiss economy is a direct response to this extraordinarily accommodative policy setting: In response to loose monetary policy, the velocity of money has accelerated over the past three years, supporting nominal growth (Chart 2); Stronger global growth and a healing banking sector have lifted economic activity in the Eurozone. As a large exporter to both Europe and emerging Asia, Switzerland was a prime beneficiary of this development, providing a tailwind to the SNB's reflationary efforts; Swiss real GDP growth has stabilized and is forecast to accelerate further this year, as highlighted by the vigor of the KOF Composite Leading Indicator (Chart 3); Nominal GDP growth has also picked up due to positive developments in inflation and the reflationary boom of 2017; Improving economic activity has caused the Swiss unemployment rate to decline to 2.9%. Chart 1The SNB Eased Monetary##br## Conditions After January 2015 Chart 2The Velocity Of ##br##Money Has Risen Chart 3Swiss Growth Will ##br##Continue To Recover Based on these improvements, it is natural for investors to question whether the SNB needs to remain an aggressive agent of reflation going forward. However, we do still believe that the Swiss franc will continue to hamper the SNB's ability to tighten policy. Bottom Line: When the SNB scrapped its currency cap against the euro in 2015, the action yielded a near-disastrous outcome for the Swiss economy. However, the Swiss central bank soon eased policy massively in response to this self-inflicted shock, limiting its adverse impact on the Swiss economy and ultimately helping growth recover once global growth rebounded. Now that inflation is also perking back up, the SNB could have to tighten policy. However, the Swiss franc will remain the crucial impediment to doing so. The Swiss Franc Is Still Overvalued Chart 4Basic Balance: Providing Long-Term ##br##Support For The Franc Since Switzerland is a small, open economy - total trade amounts to 118.8% of GDP - the Swiss franc is a powerful determinant of domestic monetary conditions. Last year's 9.7% depreciation of the CHF against the euro and 5.3% decline against its major trading partners allowed the economy to climb out of its deflationary funk. However, the Swiss currency has a secular tendency to appreciate, creating a major problem for the SNB. This currency strength puts downward pressure on inflation and impedes the achievement of inflation targets. Officials are therefore forced to fight off any appreciation in order to stave off disinflationary pressures. While its role as a global safe haven contributes to the natural strength of the franc, several important factors supercharge it: First, the country's consistently low rate of inflation puts upward pressure on the CHF's Purchasing Power Parity fair value. This exacerbates demand for the Swiss franc as a global store of value. This creates a virtuous feedback loop of inflows, a stronger currency, lower inflation, and further inflows. Second, Switzerland sports a large positive net international investment position of 125% of GDP, which generates a net positive international income for Switzerland: 5.3% of GDP annually. Not only does this net positive income generate demand for the franc, but countries with much more international assets than liabilities historically experience appreciating real exchange rates. Third, at 8.5% of GDP, Switzerland has the largest basic balance-of-payments surplus in the G10. It has sported a favorable basic balance vis-à-vis the euro area over the past nine years, generating significant upward pressure on the currency (Chart 4). This basic balance-of-payments advantage is set to remain in place as Switzerland runs a current account surplus, and long-term capital continues to be attracted by Switzerland's low tax rates and investor-friendly climate. Brexit jitters are an additional factor favoring FDI inflows into Switzerland. Fourth, the euro area crisis, its associated double-dip recession and long periods of political risk generated a perception that the euro would break up. This stimulated large capital outflows out of the euro area into stable Switzerland. This created a cyclical boost to the Swiss franc beyond the normal structural positives. The strong upward bias to the CHF is not leaving the SNB unmoved. The Swiss central bank has been vocal in expressing its discontent, arguing that the franc is expensive. However this expensiveness does not seem evident when one looks at EUR/CHF against its Purchasing Power Parity equilibrium (Chart 5). EUR/CHF is only trading at marginal discount to its fair value, implying a small premium for the CHF. The reality is that PPP models do not tell the full story for the franc. When looking at Swiss labor costs, the expensiveness of the Swiss franc becomes obvious (Chart 6). By 2015, Swiss unit labor costs converted into euros had risen by 80% compared to 2000 levels. Even after the recent rally in EUR/CHF, Swiss ULCs are still 60% above their 2000 levels, implying a great loss of competitiveness than that experienced by Italy or France over the same timeframe. The Swiss franc may be attractive as a store of value, but this is now hurting the Swiss economy. Chart 5Modest Apparent Overvaluation##br##On A PPP Basis... Chart 6...But An Evident Overvaluation ##br##On A Labor Costs Basis Bottom Line: Thanks to Switzerland's low inflation, large positive net international investment position and basic balance-of-payments surplus, and its safe-haven status, the Swiss franc has been on an appreciating secular trend. Moreover, this long-term strength has been supercharged by the euro area crisis. The CHF has now made Switzerland uncompetitive. Avoiding The Specter Of Irving Fisher If the CHF is expensive, making the Swiss economy uncompetitive, why does Switzerland still have a trade surplus of 11% of GDP, and why is the Swiss unemployment rate not greater than 2.9%? One side of the answer relates to the behavior of Swiss export prices. When the franc is strong, Swiss exporters cut down the price of their products in order to remain competitive abroad (Chart 7). However, the story does not end there. The flexible nature of the Swiss labor market provides an offset to buffer corporate profitability. According to the World Economic Forum, Switzerland has the most efficient labor market in the world, well ahead of other major continental European economies (Chart 8). Swiss employers therefore hold the upper hand in labor negotiations. Chart 7A Strong Swiss Franc Hurts Selling Prices Chart 8The Swiss Labor Market Is Very Flexible In order to contain labor costs, companies have shifted the composition of the labor force. Full-time employment has been contracting since 2016 while all the jobs created have been part-time positions (Chart 9), resulting in elevated labor underutilization. Additionally, employers have been able to exact important concessions from workers, further depressing wage growth, which has averaged 0.5% per annum over the past three years (Chart 9, bottom panel). Low wage growth and labor underemployment have weighed on inflation through two channels: First, the Phillips curve is alive and well in Switzerland, and the current level of unemployment is consistent with low inflationary pressures (Chart 10). Chart 9The Swiss Job Market Is Weaker Than It Looks Chart 10The Swiss Phillips Curve Is Alive Second, low wage growth has translated into subdued household income gains. But at 216% of disposable income, Swiss households have one of the highest debt levels in the OECD. Without income growth, consumption growth has been limited. Swiss real retail sales have been falling more or less in a straight line since 2014 (Chart 11). In essence, the Swiss economy is experiencing a deflationary adjustment similar to the one undergone by Germany in the wake of the Hartz IV reforms implemented in 2005. These reforms put downward pressure on German wages and domestic demand, and fomented deflationary forces. However, 2005 was another era. The negative impact on German demand was buffeted by the extraordinary strength of the global economy, which boosted German exports. Switzerland does not enjoy this luxury: Since the Great Financial Crisis, global growth has been more muted, and global trade is not expanding anymore (Chart 12). Chart 11Regaining Competitiveness ##br##Is Hurting Domestic Demand Chart 12Germany Had ##br##It Easy Because of this lack of a foreign relief valve, weakness in the domestic economy has had another pernicious impact: Switzerland has not experienced any productivity growth since the Great Financial Crisis (Chart 13). As a consequence, the Swiss output gap remains in negative territory, further exacerbating the deflationary pressures created by the expensive Swiss franc (Chart 14). It is unsurprising that despite a massive surge in the central bank's balance sheet, generating inflation remains difficult in Switzerland. Chart 13No Productivity Growth Since 2008 Chart 14Swiss Output Gap Is Negative Finally, even the Swiss price measures theoretically unaffected by the output gap are declining. Owner-occupied home prices are contracting at a pace of 1% per annum (Chart 15). Since 2013, net migration in Switzerland has been declining, weighing on demand for housing. The 2014 referendum to curb immigration, put forward by the right-wing Swiss People's Party, has only added further downward impetus to immigration. Chart 15Real Estate Is Deflationary When deflationary forces are as strong and well-entrenched as they are in Switzerland, and when the economy is burdened by a large debt load - Swiss nonfinancial debt stands at 248% of GDP, the highest in the G10 - a nation runs the risk of entering into the debt-deflation spiral described by Irving Fisher in 1933.1 Falling prices can force a liquidation of debt, which forces further contraction in nominal output, forcing more debt liquidation, and so on. Calling a great depression in Switzerland is too radical, but the country could experience a Japanese scenario of many lost decades if inflation does not return. Therefore, it is no wonder that the SNB is obsessed with keeping monetary conditions as accommodative as possible. Since the exchange rate has a disproportionate impact on monetary conditions for economies as open as Switzerland, this means the SNB is likely to continue to target a weaker Swiss franc for longer. Bottom Line: An expensive Swiss franc has not caused the Swiss economy to experience a trade deficit because the Swiss labor market is so flexible. Instead, an expensive CHF has generated acute downward pressures on wages, domestic demand, and prices. This deflationary environment is especially dangerous for Switzerland as its private sector is massively over-indebted, raising the specter of the debt-deflation spiral described by Irving Fisher. The SNB will keep fighting these dynamics. What's In Store For The SNB? Chart 16Bern Is Tight-Fisted If Swiss fiscal policy was very easy, monetary policy would not have to be as accommodative. After all, Switzerland has fiscal legroom. Government net debt stands at 23% of GDP, the overall fiscal balance is at zero, and Bern enjoys a small cyclically-adjusted primary surplus of 0.3% of GDP. Moreover, after having purchased massive amounts of euros, the SNB is expecting to generate a profit of CHF54 billion in 2017 in the wake of the rally in EUR/CHF. Each canton is set to receive an additional windfall of CHF1 billion in addition to the normal CHF1 billion dividend they normally receive. The country's conservative fiscal management, however, means that the fiscal spigot will not be opened. The so-called "debt brake" rule introduced in 2003 requires a balanced cyclically-adjusted federal budget on an ex ante basis, and in cases of ex post over- and under-spending, offsetting surpluses and deficits in subsequent years as required. As a result, the IMF forecasts that the fiscal thrust will remain near zero for the coming years (Chart 16). Fiscal policy will therefore not come to the rescue. This means the SNB will want to ease monetary conditions further to push demand and inflation back up. Therefore, the SNB will continue to target a weaker CHF in the coming years. Chart 17The SNB Will Keep Rates Below The ECB... Despite this outcome, life for the SNB is getting easier, and its balance sheet will not expand much further. Euro area growth has been recovering, and European political instability has declined. As a result, the probability of a euro breakup has dropped, and rate of returns in the Eurozone have increased. Consequently, hot money flows into Switzerland have abated and the SNB has not had to increase its sight deposits - a key measure of its involvement in the FX market - to push the Swiss franc down. However, to ensure the CHF enjoys a structural downtrend, the SNB will have to keep interest rates across the yield curve below euro area levels, especially as the Swiss leading economic indicator is currently outpacing that of the Eurozone's, which normally coincides with a weaker EUR/CHF (Chart 17). This does not mean that the SNB will cut rates further. European bond yields are moving up and the ECB is slated to increase rates in the summer of 2019. This means that the SNB will not adjust policy until after the ECB does. Doing otherwise would put upward pressure on the Swiss franc - exactly what the SNB wants to avoid at all costs. The SNB is likely to keep this policy in place until the Swiss franc trades at a significant discount to the euro. In our assessment, this means a EUR/CHF exchange rate of around 1.30. Bottom Line: The various levels of the Swiss government have no inclination to ease fiscal policy. The burden of stimulating growth and inflation will continue to rest squarely on the SNB's shoulders, which means it will keep targeting a lower CHF. Thanks to economic and political improvements in the euro area, the SNB can curtail its direct involvement in the FX market. However, creating a negative carry against the CHF will remain the main tool in the SNB's arsenal, so Swiss policy rates will lag the euro area. This policy will remain in place until EUR/CHF trades closer to 1.30. Investment Implications At this juncture, the primary trend in EUR/CHF continues to point upward. The ECB is giving firmer signals that its asset purchasing program will end this September. The implementation of this program was associated with massive outflows of long-term capital out of the euro area (Chart 18). Its end is likely to limit outflows to Switzerland. Additionally, lower Swiss interest rates will continue to hurt the trade-weighted Swiss franc. While the primary trend for EUR/CHF points north, we worry that it will not be a one-way street as it was in 2017. As we have highlighted, Switzerland enjoys a large net international investment position, and its incredibly low interest rates have made the Swissie a funding currency. These attributes also make the CHF a safe-haven currency. Therefore, the franc is likely to rally each time global volatility picks up.2 While BCA expects risk assets to continue to appreciate through most of 2018, prices are likely to become more volatile: China is tightening policy and global central banks are progressively removing monetary accommodation in response to a slow return of inflation.3 These bouts of volatility will cause the occasional selloff in EUR/CHF along the way. The surge in the VIX on February 5th of this year provided a good template for the kind of gyrations that EUR/CHF will likely experience. Nonetheless, despite these occasional surges in volatility, we do expect EUR/CHF to end the year closer to 1.30. In fact, the return of volatility will further ensure that the SNB will lag the ECB in tightening policy. Finally, investors looking to buy EUR/CHF but who worry about these occasional bouts of volatility may hedge this trade by buying put options on AUD/CHF. This cross tends to experience more violent selloffs than EUR/CHF when global volatility rises, and it is furiously expensive on a long-term basis (Chart 19). Moreover, the balance-of-payments picture is very attractive for shorting this pair, as Australia runs a current account deficit of 2.3% of GDP, while Switzerland runs a surplus of 10%. Chart 18...But It Will Be Less Active In The FX Market Chart 19Short AUD/CHF As A Hedge Bottom Line: EUR/CHF is likely to appreciate to 1.30 this year as the SNB will lag the ECB when it comes to removing monetary accommodation. This trend is likely to be punctuated by violent selloffs associated with the return of volatility in global financial markets. Buying puts on AUD/CHF is an attractive way to hedge this risk. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Haaris Aziz, Research Assistant haarisa@bcaresearch.com 1 Irving Fisher (1933), “The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions,” Econometrica, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Oct., 1933), pp. 337 - 357. 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Carry Trades: More Than Pennies And Steamrollers," dated May 6, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Take Out Some Insurance," dated February 2, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com; and Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "The Return Of Macro Volatility," dated March 16, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Special Report Feature Switzerland is experiencing a meaningful economic rebound. The Swiss economy is enjoying real and nominal growth of 1% and 1.4%, respectively, and PMIs are hovering near eight-year highs. As a result, after hitting nadirs of -1.4% and -0.95%, headline and core inflation have both recovered and are clocking in at 0.6% and 0.5%, respectively. Moreover, thanks to economic and political improvements in the euro area, capital has begun to make its way back into the euro. As a result, EUR/CHF has rallied, creating a weaker trade-weighted Swiss franc. This means that while global monetary conditions are beginning to tighten, Swiss monetary conditions have eased in 2017 and 2018. As the Swiss economy improves, will the Swiss National Bank follow in the footsteps of many other major central banks and dial down its accommodative monetary policy? Is it time to sell EUR/CHF? In our view, Swiss domestic economic dynamics remain too fragile to let the Swiss franc appreciate meaningfully. Hence, the SNB will not be able to tighten policy much so long as the European Central Bank keeps rates at current levels. Thus, we would continue to bet on an appreciation of EUR/CHF, punctuated with periodic rallies in the Swiss franc when global volatility occasionally spikes. The Domestic Situation Switzerland's current domestic situation can be traced back to the botched abandonment of the currency peg in 2015. On January 15th, 2015, markets were caught off guard by the sudden removal of the 1.20 floor underpinning EUR/CHF. The SNB provided no forward guidance nor any explanation, and the franc surged 20% against the euro in just one day, tightening monetary conditions severely. Fearing a massive deflationary shock to the Swiss economy, the SNB responded with a large-scale injection of liquidity, expanding its assets from 80% of GDP to more than 120% today, the highest ratio in the G10. To enforce an unofficial floor placed under EUR/CHF of 1.08, Swiss foreign exchange reserves grew rapidly. This expansion in liquidity along with negative policy rates caused 10-year yields to decline to -0.6%. A weak franc and falling yields greatly eased monetary conditions (Chart 1). The current strength in the Swiss economy is a direct response to this extraordinarily accommodative policy setting: In response to loose monetary policy, the velocity of money has accelerated over the past three years, supporting nominal growth (Chart 2); Stronger global growth and a healing banking sector have lifted economic activity in the Eurozone. As a large exporter to both Europe and emerging Asia, Switzerland was a prime beneficiary of this development, providing a tailwind to the SNB's reflationary efforts; Swiss real GDP growth has stabilized and is forecast to accelerate further this year, as highlighted by the vigor of the KOF Composite Leading Indicator (Chart 3); Nominal GDP growth has also picked up due to positive developments in inflation and the reflationary boom of 2017; Improving economic activity has caused the Swiss unemployment rate to decline to 2.9%. Chart 1The SNB Eased Monetary##br## Conditions After January 2015 Chart 2The Velocity Of ##br##Money Has Risen Chart 3Swiss Growth Will ##br##Continue To Recover Based on these improvements, it is natural for investors to question whether the SNB needs to remain an aggressive agent of reflation going forward. However, we do still believe that the Swiss franc will continue to hamper the SNB's ability to tighten policy. Bottom Line: When the SNB scrapped its currency cap against the euro in 2015, the action yielded a near-disastrous outcome for the Swiss economy. However, the Swiss central bank soon eased policy massively in response to this self-inflicted shock, limiting its adverse impact on the Swiss economy and ultimately helping growth recover once global growth rebounded. Now that inflation is also perking back up, the SNB could have to tighten policy. However, the Swiss franc will remain the crucial impediment to doing so. The Swiss Franc Is Still Overvalued Chart 4Basic Balance: Providing Long-Term ##br##Support For The Franc Since Switzerland is a small, open economy - total trade amounts to 118.8% of GDP - the Swiss franc is a powerful determinant of domestic monetary conditions. Last year's 9.7% depreciation of the CHF against the euro and 5.3% decline against its major trading partners allowed the economy to climb out of its deflationary funk. However, the Swiss currency has a secular tendency to appreciate, creating a major problem for the SNB. This currency strength puts downward pressure on inflation and impedes the achievement of inflation targets. Officials are therefore forced to fight off any appreciation in order to stave off disinflationary pressures. While its role as a global safe haven contributes to the natural strength of the franc, several important factors supercharge it: First, the country's consistently low rate of inflation puts upward pressure on the CHF's Purchasing Power Parity fair value. This exacerbates demand for the Swiss franc as a global store of value. This creates a virtuous feedback loop of inflows, a stronger currency, lower inflation, and further inflows. Second, Switzerland sports a large positive net international investment position of 125% of GDP, which generates a net positive international income for Switzerland: 5.3% of GDP annually. Not only does this net positive income generate demand for the franc, but countries with much more international assets than liabilities historically experience appreciating real exchange rates. Third, at 8.5% of GDP, Switzerland has the largest basic balance-of-payments surplus in the G10. It has sported a favorable basic balance vis-à-vis the euro area over the past nine years, generating significant upward pressure on the currency (Chart 4). This basic balance-of-payments advantage is set to remain in place as Switzerland runs a current account surplus, and long-term capital continues to be attracted by Switzerland's low tax rates and investor-friendly climate. Brexit jitters are an additional factor favoring FDI inflows into Switzerland. Fourth, the euro area crisis, its associated double-dip recession and long periods of political risk generated a perception that the euro would break up. This stimulated large capital outflows out of the euro area into stable Switzerland. This created a cyclical boost to the Swiss franc beyond the normal structural positives. The strong upward bias to the CHF is not leaving the SNB unmoved. The Swiss central bank has been vocal in expressing its discontent, arguing that the franc is expensive. However this expensiveness does not seem evident when one looks at EUR/CHF against its Purchasing Power Parity equilibrium (Chart 5). EUR/CHF is only trading at marginal discount to its fair value, implying a small premium for the CHF. The reality is that PPP models do not tell the full story for the franc. When looking at Swiss labor costs, the expensiveness of the Swiss franc becomes obvious (Chart 6). By 2015, Swiss unit labor costs converted into euros had risen by 80% compared to 2000 levels. Even after the recent rally in EUR/CHF, Swiss ULCs are still 60% above their 2000 levels, implying a great loss of competitiveness than that experienced by Italy or France over the same timeframe. The Swiss franc may be attractive as a store of value, but this is now hurting the Swiss economy. Chart 5Modest Apparent Overvaluation##br##On A PPP Basis... Chart 6...But An Evident Overvaluation ##br##On A Labor Costs Basis Bottom Line: Thanks to Switzerland's low inflation, large positive net international investment position and basic balance-of-payments surplus, and its safe-haven status, the Swiss franc has been on an appreciating secular trend. Moreover, this long-term strength has been supercharged by the euro area crisis. The CHF has now made Switzerland uncompetitive. Avoiding The Specter Of Irving Fisher If the CHF is expensive, making the Swiss economy uncompetitive, why does Switzerland still have a trade surplus of 11% of GDP, and why is the Swiss unemployment rate not greater than 2.9%? One side of the answer relates to the behavior of Swiss export prices. When the franc is strong, Swiss exporters cut down the price of their products in order to remain competitive abroad (Chart 7). However, the story does not end there. The flexible nature of the Swiss labor market provides an offset to buffer corporate profitability. According to the World Economic Forum, Switzerland has the most efficient labor market in the world, well ahead of other major continental European economies (Chart 8). Swiss employers therefore hold the upper hand in labor negotiations. Chart 7A Strong Swiss Franc Hurts Selling Prices Chart 8The Swiss Labor Market Is Very Flexible In order to contain labor costs, companies have shifted the composition of the labor force. Full-time employment has been contracting since 2016 while all the jobs created have been part-time positions (Chart 9), resulting in elevated labor underutilization. Additionally, employers have been able to exact important concessions from workers, further depressing wage growth, which has averaged 0.5% per annum over the past three years (Chart 9, bottom panel). Low wage growth and labor underemployment have weighed on inflation through two channels: First, the Phillips curve is alive and well in Switzerland, and the current level of unemployment is consistent with low inflationary pressures (Chart 10). Chart 9The Swiss Job Market Is Weaker Than It Looks Chart 10The Swiss Phillips Curve Is Alive Second, low wage growth has translated into subdued household income gains. But at 216% of disposable income, Swiss households have one of the highest debt levels in the OECD. Without income growth, consumption growth has been limited. Swiss real retail sales have been falling more or less in a straight line since 2014 (Chart 11). In essence, the Swiss economy is experiencing a deflationary adjustment similar to the one undergone by Germany in the wake of the Hartz IV reforms implemented in 2005. These reforms put downward pressure on German wages and domestic demand, and fomented deflationary forces. However, 2005 was another era. The negative impact on German demand was buffeted by the extraordinary strength of the global economy, which boosted German exports. Switzerland does not enjoy this luxury: Since the Great Financial Crisis, global growth has been more muted, and global trade is not expanding anymore (Chart 12). Chart 11Regaining Competitiveness ##br##Is Hurting Domestic Demand Chart 12Germany Had ##br##It Easy Because of this lack of a foreign relief valve, weakness in the domestic economy has had another pernicious impact: Switzerland has not experienced any productivity growth since the Great Financial Crisis (Chart 13). As a consequence, the Swiss output gap remains in negative territory, further exacerbating the deflationary pressures created by the expensive Swiss franc (Chart 14). It is unsurprising that despite a massive surge in the central bank's balance sheet, generating inflation remains difficult in Switzerland. Chart 13No Productivity Growth Since 2008 Chart 14Swiss Output Gap Is Negative Finally, even the Swiss price measures theoretically unaffected by the output gap are declining. Owner-occupied home prices are contracting at a pace of 1% per annum (Chart 15). Since 2013, net migration in Switzerland has been declining, weighing on demand for housing. The 2014 referendum to curb immigration, put forward by the right-wing Swiss People's Party, has only added further downward impetus to immigration. Chart 15Real Estate Is Deflationary When deflationary forces are as strong and well-entrenched as they are in Switzerland, and when the economy is burdened by a large debt load - Swiss nonfinancial debt stands at 248% of GDP, the highest in the G10 - a nation runs the risk of entering into the debt-deflation spiral described by Irving Fisher in 1933.1 Falling prices can force a liquidation of debt, which forces further contraction in nominal output, forcing more debt liquidation, and so on. Calling a great depression in Switzerland is too radical, but the country could experience a Japanese scenario of many lost decades if inflation does not return. Therefore, it is no wonder that the SNB is obsessed with keeping monetary conditions as accommodative as possible. Since the exchange rate has a disproportionate impact on monetary conditions for economies as open as Switzerland, this means the SNB is likely to continue to target a weaker Swiss franc for longer. Bottom Line: An expensive Swiss franc has not caused the Swiss economy to experience a trade deficit because the Swiss labor market is so flexible. Instead, an expensive CHF has generated acute downward pressures on wages, domestic demand, and prices. This deflationary environment is especially dangerous for Switzerland as its private sector is massively over-indebted, raising the specter of the debt-deflation spiral described by Irving Fisher. The SNB will keep fighting these dynamics. What's In Store For The SNB? Chart 16Bern Is Tight-Fisted If Swiss fiscal policy was very easy, monetary policy would not have to be as accommodative. After all, Switzerland has fiscal legroom. Government net debt stands at 23% of GDP, the overall fiscal balance is at zero, and Bern enjoys a small cyclically-adjusted primary surplus of 0.3% of GDP. Moreover, after having purchased massive amounts of euros, the SNB is expecting to generate a profit of CHF54 billion in 2017 in the wake of the rally in EUR/CHF. Each canton is set to receive an additional windfall of CHF1 billion in addition to the normal CHF1 billion dividend they normally receive. The country's conservative fiscal management, however, means that the fiscal spigot will not be opened. The so-called "debt brake" rule introduced in 2003 requires a balanced cyclically-adjusted federal budget on an ex ante basis, and in cases of ex post over- and under-spending, offsetting surpluses and deficits in subsequent years as required. As a result, the IMF forecasts that the fiscal thrust will remain near zero for the coming years (Chart 16). Fiscal policy will therefore not come to the rescue. This means the SNB will want to ease monetary conditions further to push demand and inflation back up. Therefore, the SNB will continue to target a weaker CHF in the coming years. Chart 17The SNB Will Keep Rates Below The ECB... Despite this outcome, life for the SNB is getting easier, and its balance sheet will not expand much further. Euro area growth has been recovering, and European political instability has declined. As a result, the probability of a euro breakup has dropped, and rate of returns in the Eurozone have increased. Consequently, hot money flows into Switzerland have abated and the SNB has not had to increase its sight deposits - a key measure of its involvement in the FX market - to push the Swiss franc down. However, to ensure the CHF enjoys a structural downtrend, the SNB will have to keep interest rates across the yield curve below euro area levels, especially as the Swiss leading economic indicator is currently outpacing that of the Eurozone's, which normally coincides with a weaker EUR/CHF (Chart 17). This does not mean that the SNB will cut rates further. European bond yields are moving up and the ECB is slated to increase rates in the summer of 2019. This means that the SNB will not adjust policy until after the ECB does. Doing otherwise would put upward pressure on the Swiss franc - exactly what the SNB wants to avoid at all costs. The SNB is likely to keep this policy in place until the Swiss franc trades at a significant discount to the euro. In our assessment, this means a EUR/CHF exchange rate of around 1.30. Bottom Line: The various levels of the Swiss government have no inclination to ease fiscal policy. The burden of stimulating growth and inflation will continue to rest squarely on the SNB's shoulders, which means it will keep targeting a lower CHF. Thanks to economic and political improvements in the euro area, the SNB can curtail its direct involvement in the FX market. However, creating a negative carry against the CHF will remain the main tool in the SNB's arsenal, so Swiss policy rates will lag the euro area. This policy will remain in place until EUR/CHF trades closer to 1.30. Investment Implications At this juncture, the primary trend in EUR/CHF continues to point upward. The ECB is giving firmer signals that its asset purchasing program will end this September. The implementation of this program was associated with massive outflows of long-term capital out of the euro area (Chart 18). Its end is likely to limit outflows to Switzerland. Additionally, lower Swiss interest rates will continue to hurt the trade-weighted Swiss franc. While the primary trend for EUR/CHF points north, we worry that it will not be a one-way street as it was in 2017. As we have highlighted, Switzerland enjoys a large net international investment position, and its incredibly low interest rates have made the Swissie a funding currency. These attributes also make the CHF a safe-haven currency. Therefore, the franc is likely to rally each time global volatility picks up.2 While BCA expects risk assets to continue to appreciate through most of 2018, prices are likely to become more volatile: China is tightening policy and global central banks are progressively removing monetary accommodation in response to a slow return of inflation.3 These bouts of volatility will cause the occasional selloff in EUR/CHF along the way. The surge in the VIX on February 5th of this year provided a good template for the kind of gyrations that EUR/CHF will likely experience. Nonetheless, despite these occasional surges in volatility, we do expect EUR/CHF to end the year closer to 1.30. In fact, the return of volatility will further ensure that the SNB will lag the ECB in tightening policy. Finally, investors looking to buy EUR/CHF but who worry about these occasional bouts of volatility may hedge this trade by buying put options on AUD/CHF. This cross tends to experience more violent selloffs than EUR/CHF when global volatility rises, and it is furiously expensive on a long-term basis (Chart 19). Moreover, the balance-of-payments picture is very attractive for shorting this pair, as Australia runs a current account deficit of 2.3% of GDP, while Switzerland runs a surplus of 10%. Chart 18...But It Will Be Less Active In The FX Market Chart 19Short AUD/CHF As A Hedge Bottom Line: EUR/CHF is likely to appreciate to 1.30 this year as the SNB will lag the ECB when it comes to removing monetary accommodation. This trend is likely to be punctuated by violent selloffs associated with the return of volatility in global financial markets. Buying puts on AUD/CHF is an attractive way to hedge this risk. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com Haaris Aziz, Research Assistant haarisa@bcaresearch.com 1 Irving Fisher (1933), “The Debt-Deflation Theory of Great Depressions,” Econometrica, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Oct., 1933), pp. 337 - 357. 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, "Carry Trades: More Than Pennies And Steamrollers," dated May 6, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Take Out Some Insurance," dated February 2, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com; and Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "The Return Of Macro Volatility," dated March 16, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights Fed preview: The Fed will hike rates again this week, and may signal a faster pace of future hikes given signs that U.S. inflation is starting to accelerate. Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance and stay underweight U.S. Treasuries in global hedged bond portfolios. Oversold U.S. Treasuries: While most indicators of positioning and momentum for U.S. Treasuries show a deeply oversold market, an analysis of past such episodes shows that it can take 4-6 months before bond yields correct an oversold condition in the absence of slowing growth or inflation - with yields potentially hitting new highs in the interim. ECB Tapering: The ECB strongly believes that the "stock effect" of its asset purchases matters more for European bond yields than the "flow effect". This suggests that the odds of a European "Taper Tantrum" later this year are low, although bond yields there are still headed higher. Feature Chart of the WeekThis Time Is Different? Global bond markets have calmed down after the big surge that started the year. The 10-year U.S. Treasury yield has traded in a relatively narrow 2.80-2.95% range since the VIX spike in early February, despite a string of weaker-than-expected U.S. economic data prints that has triggered sharp downgrades to Q1/2018 U.S. GDP growth forecasts. At the same time, 10-year benchmark yields for other major government bond markets (Germany, France, U.K., Canada) have been drifting lower, but remain above levels that began the year. In the case of U.S. Treasuries, the overall level of yields is being held up by the steady climb at the short-end of the yield curve. Recent hawkish comments from new Fed Chairman Jay Powell and long-time Fed dove Lael Brainard have raised expectations for a rate hike at this week's FOMC meeting, which is now priced as a certainty. The 2-year Treasury yield has climbed to a 10-year high of 2.3%, which is helping keep a floor underneath longer-term Treasury yields despite positioning indicators showing that traders and bond managers already have significantly reduced duration exposure (Chart of the Week). The other factor that is likely holding up global bond yields is the incremental move by the European Central Bank (ECB) towards a tapering of its asset purchases. The market has already repriced both future interest rate expectations and the term premia embedded in European government bond yields, although recent comments from ECB officials suggest that they believe that there will not be a "Taper Tantrum 2.0" in Europe similar to the Treasury market sell-off in 2013. This week, we tackle those two critical issues for bond markets head-on: the implications of large short positions in the U.S. Treasury market versus the ECB taper impact on global bond yields. Our conclusion is that the impact of both is likely overestimated by investors. How To Think About A Technically Oversold Treasury Market The Fed will deliver another rate hike this week. That outcome has already been fully discounted by the market, which should not be considered surprising given the current U.S. economic backdrop: Inflation: Underlying inflation has clearly bottomed out and has begun to accelerate, with the 3-month annualized growth rate of core CPI inflation now up over 3% (Chart 2). That trend should continue in the next several months: our model for CPI Shelter inflation is calling for a pickup (2nd panel), core goods inflation is showing signs of responding to the weakening U.S. dollar (3rd panel), and the big plunge in U.S. wireless phone prices that severely dampened inflation in 2017 is about to wash out of the year-over-year CPI data and boost core services inflation (bottom panel). Growth: Despite some recent signs of softening momentum in the Q1 data, the underlying trend in U.S. growth remains upbeat. Labor demand is accelerating and our payrolls growth model suggests further gains are coming (Chart 3). Corporate profit growth remains solid and the impact of the Trump tax cuts will only boost earnings momentum and business confidence. Leading economic indicators are also accelerating and suggest that any loss of growth momentum in Q1 - which seems to be an annual occurrence despite the seasonal adjustment of data - will be short-lived (bottom panel). Chart 2U.S. Inflation Is Starting To Perk Up Chart 3No Reason For Any Dovish Fed Surprises Financial Conditions: U.S. equity prices have recovered much of the losses suffered during the February VIX-driven correction, while corporate credit spreads remain narrow from a historical perspective (Chart 4). Add in the weaker U.S. dollar - the impact of which is already boosting import prices and potentially following through into the shorter-term inflation expectations of households (bottom panel) - and overall financial conditions remain highly accommodative. Against this positive backdrop, the Fed can feel confident that its growth and inflation forecasts for 2018 will be achieved, and that inflation expectations can continue to climb back to levels consistent with the Fed's inflation target. There is even a chance that the Fed could accelerate its planned pace of rate hikes (Chart 5), particularly if there is an upgrade to the FOMC growth and inflation projections, which will be updated for this week's meeting. Chart 4U.S. Financial Conditions##BR##Remain Accommodative Chart 5All Eyes On##BR##The Dots This Week Yet for all the positive economic, bond-bearish news, one fact stands out - the U.S. Treasury market is deeply oversold from a technical perspective. This should, in theory, limit the ability for bond yields to continue rising and could set up a short-covering bond rally if there is a more meaningful and prolonged slowing of economic growth or inflation. The technical indicators that we regularly monitor for the U.S. Treasury market are all at or near the extremes of the ranges observed since 2000 (Chart 6). Chart 6U.S. Treasuries Are Very Oversold The 10-year Treasury yield is 43bps above its 200-day moving average The 26-week total return of the Bloomberg Barclays U.S. Treasury index is -4.3% The J.P. Morgan client survey of bond managers and traders showed the largest underweight duration positioning since the mid-2000s, although there has been some recent reduction of those positions The Market Vane index of sentiment for Treasuries is now at 49, near the bottom of the range since 2000 The CFTC data on positioning in 10-year Treasury futures shows a large net short of -8%, scaled by open interest Given this degree of investor negativity toward U.S. Treasuries, some pullback in yields seems inevitable. However, a look back at past episodes where Treasuries were this oversold shows that the timing of such a pullback is highly variable - anywhere from one month to seven months. The determining factor is the growth and inflation backdrop in the U.S. To show this, we did a simple study using two series from our list of Treasury technical indicators. Specifically, we looked at "oversold episodes" since 2000 where the Market Vane Treasury sentiment index dipped below 50 and where the 10-year Treasury yield was trading at least 30bps above its 200-day moving average. We then defined the end of the oversold episode as simply the point when the 10-year Treasury yield fell back below its 200-day moving average. We then looked at the duration (in days), and change in bond yields, for each oversold episode. There were eleven such episodes since the year 2000, not counting the current one which has not yet ended. In Table 1, we list them ranked by the number of days it took to complete each episode as we defined it. The longest correction of an oversold Treasury market since 2000 took place between July 2003 and February 2004, where 203 days passed before the 10-year yield dipped back below its 200-day moving average. The shortest correction was in May 2000, where only 28 days were needed. Table 1A Look At Prior Episodes Of An Oversold U.S. Treasury Market To determine what the U.S. economic backdrop was during each episode, we then simply asked if economic growth was rising or falling, or if inflation was stable/rising or falling, using the ISM Manufacturing index and core PCE inflation as the relevant data series. The answers to those questions are found in the final two columns of Table 1. All the positioning and economic indicators used in our historical study, shaded for the oversold episodes, are shown in Charts 7, 8 and 9. Chart 7U.S. Treasury Market##BR##Oversold Episodes 2000-2005 Chart 8U.S. Treasury Market##BR##Oversold Episodes 2006-2011 Chart 9U.S. Treasury Market##BR##Oversold Episodes 2011 To Today The simplest conclusion that we reached from our study is that the shortest corrections of an oversold Treasury market occurred, unsurprisingly, during the two episodes where both growth and inflation were slowing, with an average length of each episode of 42 days. The four episodes where growth and inflation were both rising had a more variable performance, lasting anywhere from 98 days to 203 days, averaging 156 days per episode. The five episodes where growth was slowing but inflation was stable or rising were also of varying length, averaging 140 days. In other words, it has taken around five months, on average, to correct an oversold Treasury market when inflation was stable or rising, and about 1.5 months when inflation was falling. In the current environment, where the ISM Manufacturing index is in an uptrend and core PCE inflation is rising, we should expect a longer period of time before the Treasury market corrects its oversold condition. If we mark the start of the current episode on February 20th of this year, using the definition described above, then the 10-year Treasury yield may return to its 200-day moving average of 2.4% by August (five months from now). A word of warning for traders and investors looking to play for that move by flipping to a long duration position now, though - the primary trend of the market, defined by that 200-day moving average, is currently rising. It was also rising during the two longest oversold correction episodes 2003-04 and 2013-14. The 10-year Treasury yield only declined -14bps and -17bps, respectively, over those entire episodes. During the 2013-14 episode, also a period similar to today when growth and inflation were both rising, yields actually climbed to new cyclical highs before finally peaking. In other words, betting on a reversal of an oversold bond market without any deterioration in growth and inflation dynamics may generate only modest returns over a lengthy period, and with substantial mark-to-market volatility in the meantime. In the current cycle, with leading indicators for U.S. growth and inflation accelerating and the Fed becoming more hawkish, we recommend maintaining below-benchmark duration positions in the U.S. rather than positioning now for a short-covering rally. Bottom Line: The Fed will hike rates again this week, and may signal a faster pace of future hikes given signs that U.S. inflation is starting to accelerate. While most indicators of positioning and momentum for U.S. Treasuries show a deeply oversold market, an analysis of past such episodes shows that it can take 4-6 months before bond yields correct an oversold condition in the absence of a slowing of economic growth or inflation - with yields potentially hitting new highs in the interim. Maintain a below-benchmark duration stance and stay underweight U.S. Treasuries in global hedged bond portfolios. The ECB Is Betting On A Tantrum-Free Taper Several key ECB officials have been giving speeches over the past week, spelling out a consistent message to the markets on the future of euro area monetary policy. Most notably, ECB President Mario Draghi and ECB Chief Economist Peter Praet gave speeches last week at a conference in Frankfurt. Both of them used nearly identical language to highlight how the ECB's main policy tool going forward will no longer be net asset purchases, but instead will be interest rates and forward guidance on changes to rates.1 This echoes the message sent after the ECB's policy meeting earlier this month, when the commitment to increase the pace of asset purchases was dropped from the ECB policy statement. Both Draghi and Praet repeated the ECB's official stance on the end of asset purchases, which requires a "sustained adjustment" in the path of inflation. This was described by Draghi as: Specifically, a sustained adjustment requires three conditions to be in place. [...] The first is convergence: headline inflation has to be on course to reach our aim over a meaningful definition of the medium term. The second is confidence: we need to be sure that this upward adjustment in inflation has a sufficiently high probability of being realized. The third condition is resilience: the adjustment in inflation has to be self-sustained even without additional net asset purchases. Draghi then went on to add these comments on the sequencing of rate hikes after the asset purchases are completed, with our emphasis added: [...] when progress towards a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation is judged to be sufficient, net purchases will come to an end. At that point, next to our forward guidance, appropriate financial conditions will be maintained by our reinvestment policy. [...] as regards the evolution of our policy rates beyond the end of our net purchases, we will maintain the sequencing that is currently set out in our forward guidance, namely our pledge to keep key interest rates at their current levels "well past" the end of net purchases. This time-based element of our guidance is already vital today, in particular to ensure that our policy stimulus is not weakened by premature expectations of a first rate rise, and so financial conditions remain consistent with inflation convergence. That last line can be roughly translated from policymaker-speak as "we want to avoid a Fed-style Taper Tantrum when we stop buying euro area government bonds." Chart 10An Orderly Repricing Of ECB Expectations Praet made similar comments in his speech, discussing how the first rate hike after the end of asset purchases must only take place once there is a "durable convergence" of euro area inflation with the ECB target of just below 2% on headline inflation. So far, the markets have been heeding the ECB's communication and policy guidance. The timing of the ECB's first full 25bp rate hike, taken from our "months-to-hike" indicator, shows that the market does not expect the ECB to adjust rates until November of 2019 (Chart 10). At the same time, the market is only slowly repricing the term premium on longer-dated euro area government bonds, which would be expected if the ECB were to take its time in fully tapering its asset purchases. With realized euro area inflation, and market-based inflation expectations, still well short of the ECB's target, the market appears to be "correctly" following the ECB's guidance on the timetable for future policy moves. This is keeping euro area bond yields at low levels and dampening interest rate volatility. There may be another factor at work holding down bond yields, however. In a speech given at the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum in New York last month - an event attended by numerous academic and Wall Street economists, as well as several current FOMC members - ECB Executive Board Member Benoit Coeure discussed the importance of the "stock" effect of central bank asset purchases compared to the "flow" effect.2 Or as Coeure described it: [...] the "stock effect" - that is, the persistence of the effects of the stock of bonds held by the central bank on its balance sheet under a commitment of reinvestment. If the effects of purchases dissipate quickly, a shorter purchase horizon could lead to term premia rising even as interest rate expectations remain well anchored by forward guidance. Financial conditions would then tighten. But if the effectiveness of asset purchases rises with the stock of assets already acquired - if there is some "crossover point" where the stock effect becomes more important than the continued flow of purchases - then a reduced pace of purchases would not unduly decompress the term premium. This brings up an interesting point about the ECB's policy strategy as it prepares to taper its asset purchase program. If the ECB can effectively communicate that it will continue to reinvest the maturing bonds on its balance sheet after the new asset purchases have stopped, then the market will not price in a bigger term premium on longer-dated bonds since the ECB will continue to own a huge share of the stock of euro area government debt. The stock effect will dominate the diminishing flow effect. Coeure noted in his speech that the experience of the U.S. in 2013, when Ben Bernanke surprised markets with talk that the Fed was planning on cutting back its asset purchases, is different than Europe today. The biggest reason is that the ECB owns a far bigger share of the European bond market than the Fed did at that time. That is because the ECB asset purchases since its bond buying program began in 2015 have dwarfed the net issuance of euro area government debt (Chart 11). At no point during the Fed's quantitative easing (QE) era did the central bank ever buy more U.S. Treasuries than the U.S. government was issuing. According to the logic of Benoit Coeure, the smaller Fed "footprint" in the Treasury market relative to the ECB's ownership share of euro area government bonds (Chart 12) should mean that the Treasury term premium will be more volatile than that for German bunds (and other euro area debt). That is because a greater share of Treasury issuance must be sold to private investors who are more price-sensitive than central banks. In other words, the flow effect dominates the stock effect. Chart 11ECB & BoJ Have Been Absorbing##BR##All Net Government Bond Issuance Chart 12The 'Stock Effect' Of QE##BR##Should Be Bigger In Europe & Japan In Chart 13, we try and visually prove Coeure's thesis. The chart plots the gap between central bank asset purchases and net government bond issuance (the blue solid line proxying the "flow effect", using IMF data) for the U.S., euro area and Japan versus our estimates of the term premium (the black dotted line). The correlation appears to be very strong for the euro area and Japan during the era of asset purchases for those central banks, perhaps due to the "stock effect" dominating the "flow effect". This differs from the experience seen in the U.S. during the Fed QE era, when there was no stable relationship between the term premium and the amount of Treasuries the Fed was purchasing relative to net issuance. Looking ahead, there are important implications of this "stock vs. flow" argument for the future direction of euro area (and Japanese) bond yields, both in absolute terms and relative to U.S. Treasuries. In Chart 13, we also added BCA's forecasts for net government bond issuance over the next two years relative to our projections for the pace of asset purchases from the ECB and BoJ (both new purchases and reinvestments), and the Fed's own projections for the runoff of Treasuries from its balance sheet. Our estimates show that there will still be no new government bond issuance for the private sector to absorb in the euro area and Japan in 2018 and 2019, even with the ECB expected to fully taper new buying to zero by the end of this year and the BoJ dramatically cutting back its pace of buying. This contrasts to the U.S., where the private sector will be forced to absorb an extra US$1 trillion (!) of Treasuries this year and next, thanks to the huge Trump fiscal stimulus and the diminished buying by the Fed. U.S. private investors may require a higher yield (i.e. term premium) to absorb that additional debt, especially if inflation expectations are rising and the Fed is hiking interest rates at the same time. The implication is that the spread between Treasuries and euro area debt (and Japanese bonds, for that matter) could stay stubbornly wide - at least until there is more decisive evidence that the U.S. economy is in a cyclical slowdown that would put the Fed rate hiking cycle on hold (Chart 14). Chart 13The 'Flow Effect' Of##BR##QE Does Still Matter Chart 14The 'Stock Effect' Could Keep The##BR##UST-Bund Spread Wider For Longer From the point of view of euro area debt, however, the existence of a "stock effect" means that those investors expecting a Taper Tantrum 2.0 will likely be disappointed in the size of any upward move in euro area bond yields this year. Bottom Line: The ECB strongly believes that the "stock effect" of its asset purchases (how much they already own) matters more for European bond yields than the "flow effect" (how much they are buying). This suggests that the odds of a European "Taper Tantrum" later this year are low, although bond yields there are still headed higher. Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 The Draghi speech can be found at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2018/html/ecb.sp180314_1.en.html, while the Praet speech can be found at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2018/html/ecb.sp180314_2.en.html 2 Coeure's speech can be found at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2018/html/ecb.sp180223.en.html Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Synchronized global growth, a soft U.S. dollar, our resurgent Boom/Bust Indicator and avoidance of a Chinese economic hard landing, are all signaling that it still pays to overweight cyclicals at the expense of defensives. Economically hyper-sensitive transports also benefit from synchronous global growth and capex. We expect a rerating phase in the coming months. Within transports, we reiterate our overweight stance in the key railroads sub-index as enticing macro tailwinds along with firming operating metrics underscore that profits will exit deflation in calendar 2018. Recent Changes There are no portfolio changes this week. Table 1 Feature The S&P 500 continued to consolidate last week, still digesting the early February tremor. Policy uncertainty is slowly returning and sustained Administration reshufflings are becoming slightly unnerving (bottom panel, Chart 1). Nevertheless, the dual themes of synchronized global growth and budding evidence of coordinated tightening in global monetary policy, i.e. rising interest rate backdrop, continue to dominate and remain intact. Importantly in the U.S., the latest non-farm payrolls (NFP) report was a goldilocks one. Month-over-month NFPs surpassed the 300K hurdle for the first time since late-2014, on an as-reported-basis, while wage inflation settled back down. The middle panel of Chart 2 shows that both in the 1980s and 1990s expansions, NFPs were growing briskly, easily clearing the 300K mark. The 2000s was the "jobless recovery" expansion and likely the exception to the rule. In all three business cycle expansions wage growth touched the 4%/annum rate before the recession hit. The yield curve slope also supports this empirical evidence, forecasting that wage inflation will likely attain 4%/annum before this cycle ends (wages shown inverted, Chart 3). Chart 1Watch Policy Uncertainty Chart 2Goldilocks NFP Report... Chart 3...But Wage Growth Pickup Looms One key element in the current cycle is that the government is easing fiscal policy to the point where both NFPs and wages will likely surge in the coming months as the fiscal thrust gains steam, likely extending the business cycle. This is an inherently inflationary environment, especially when the economy is at full employment and the Fed in slow and steady tightening mode. Last autumn, we showed that the SPX performs well in times of easy fiscal and tight money iterations, rising on average 16.7% with these episodes, lasting on average 16 months (Table 2).1 The latest flagship BCA monthly publication forecasts that the current fiscal impulse will last at least until year-end 2019, contributing positively to real GDP growth. Thus, if history at least rhymes, SPX returns will be positive and likely significant for the next couple of years (Chart 4). With regard to the composition of the equity market's return, we reiterate our view - backed by empirical evidence - that EPS will do the heavy lifting whereas the forward P/E multiple will continue to drift sideways to lower.2 Not only will rising fiscal deficits cause the Fed to remain vigilant and continue to raise interest rates and weigh on the equity market multiple (Chart 5), but also heightened volatility will likely suppress the forward P/E multiple. Table 2SPX Returns During Periods Of Loose##br## Fiscal And Tight Monetary Policy Chart 4Stimulative Fiscal Policy##br## Extends The Business Cycle... Chart 5...But Weighs On ##br##The Multiple This week we revisit our cyclical versus defensive portfolio bent and update the key transportation overweight view. Cyclicals Thrive When Global Growth Is Alive And Well... While retaliatory tariff wars are dominating the media headlines, global growth is still resilient. Our view remains that the odds of a generalized trade war engulfing the globe are low, and in that light we reiterate our cyclical over defensive portfolio positioning, in place since early October.3 Global growth is firing on all cylinders. Our Global Trade Indicator is probing levels last hit in 2008, underscoring that cyclicals will continue to have the upper hand versus defensives (Chart 6). Synonymous with global growth is the softness in the U.S. dollar. In fact, the two are in a self-feeding loop where synchronized global growth pushes the greenback lower, which in turn fuels further global output growth. Tack on the rising likelihood that the trade-weighted dollar has crested from a structural perspective, according to the 16-year peak-to-peak cycle4 (Chart 7) and the news is great for cyclicals versus defensives (Chart 8). Chart 6Global Trade Is Alright Chart 7Dollar The Great Reflator... Chart 8...Is A Boon For Cyclicals Vs. Defensives Related to the greenback's likely secular peak is the booming commodity complex, as the two are nearly perfectly inversely correlated. Commodity exposure is running very high in the deep cyclical sectors and thus any sustained commodity price inflation gains will continue to underpin the cyclicals/defensives share price ratio. BCA's Boom/Bust Indicator (BBI) corroborates this upbeat message for cyclicals versus defensives. The BBI is on the verge of hitting an all-time high and, while this could serve as a contrary signal, there are high odds of a breakout in the coming months if synchronized global growth stays intact as BCA expects, rekindling cyclicals/defensives share prices (Chart 9). Finally, if China avoids a hard landing, and barring an EM accident, the cyclicals/defensives ratio will remain upbeat. Chart 10 shows that China's LEI is recovering smartly from the late-2015/early-2016 manufacturing recession trough, and the roaring Chinese stock market - the ultimate leading indicator - confirms that the path of least resistance for the U.S. cyclicals/defensive share price ratio is higher still. Chart 9Boom/Bust indicator Is Flashing Green Chart 10China Is Also Stealthily Firming Bottom Line: Stick with a cyclical over defensive portfolio bent. ...As Do Transports, Thus... Transportation stocks have taken a breather recently on the back of escalating global trade war fears. But, we are looking through this soft-patch and reiterate our barbell portfolio approach: overweight the global growth-levered railroads and air freight & logistics stocks at the expense of airlines that are bogged down by rising capacity and deflating airfare prices (Chart 11). Leading indicators of transportation activity are all flashing green. Transportation relative share prices and manufacturing export expectations are joined at the hip, and the current message is to expect a reacceleration in the former (top panel, Chart 12). Similarly, capital expenditures, one of the key themes we are exploring this year, are as good as they can be according to the regional Fed surveys, and signal that transportation profits will rev up in the coming months (middle panel, Chart 12). The possibility of an infrastructure bill becoming law later this year or in 2019 would also represent a tailwind for transportation EPS. Not only is U.S. trade activity humming, but also global trade remains on a solid footing. The global manufacturing PMI is resilient and sustaining recent gains, suggesting that global export volumes will resume their ascent. This global manufacturing euphoria is welcome news for extremely economically sensitive transportation profits (Chart 13). All of this heralds an enticing transportation services end-demand outlook. In fact, industry pricing power is gaining steam of late and confirms that relative EPS will continue to expand (Chart 12). Under such a backdrop, a rerating phase looms in still depressed relative valuations (bottom panel, Chart 13). Chart 11Stick With Transports Exposure Chart 12Domestic... Chart 13...And Global Growth/Capex Beneficiary ...Stay On Board The Rails Railroad stocks have worked off the overbought conditions prevalent all of last year, and momentum is now back at zero. In addition, forward EPS have spiked, eliminating the valuation premium and now the rails are trading on par with the SPX on a forward P/E basis (Chart 14). The track is now clear and more gains are in store for relative share prices in the coming quarters. Despite trade war jitters, we are looking through the recent turbulence. If the synchronized global growth phase endures, as we expect, then rail profits will remain on track. In fact, BCA's measure of global industrial production (hard economic data) is confirming the euphoric message from the global manufacturing PMI (soft economic data) and suggests that rails profits will overwhelm (Chart 15). Our S&P rails profit model also corroborates this positive global trade message and forecasts that rail profit deflation will end in 2018 (bottom panel, Chart 15). Beyond these macro tailwinds, operating industry metrics also point to a profit resurgence this year. Importantly, our rails profit margin proxy (pricing power versus employment additions) has recently reaccelerated both because selling prices are expanding at a healthy clip and due to labor restraint (second panel, Chart 15). Demand for rail hauling remains upbeat and our rail diffusion indicator has surged to a level last seen in 2009, signaling that there is a broad based firming in rail carload shipments (second panel, Chart 16). Chart 14Unwound Both Overbought Conditions And Overvaluation Chart 15EPS On Track To Outperform Chart 16Intermodal Resilience The significant intermodal segment that comprises roughly half of all shipments is on the cusp of a breakout. The retail sales-to-inventories ratio is probing multi-year highs on the back of the increase in the consumer confidence impulse and both are harbingers of a reacceleration in intermodal shipments (Chart 16). Coal is another significant category that takes up just under a fifth of rail carload volumes and bears close attention. While natural gas prices have fallen near the lower part of the trading range in place since mid-2016 and momentum is back at neutral, any spike in nat gas prices will boost the allure of coal as a competing fuel for energy generation (middle panel, Chart 17). Keep in mind that coal usage is highly correlated with electricity demand and the industrial business cycle, and the current ISM manufacturing survey message is upbeat for coal demand. Tack on the whittling down in coal inventories at utilities and there is scope for a tick up in coal demand (third panel, Chart 18). Finally, the export relief valve has reopened for coal with the aid of the depreciating U.S. dollar, and momentum in net exports has soared to all-time highs, even surpassing the mid-1982 peak (bottom panel, Chart 18). Chart 17Key Coal Shipments Underpin Selling Prices Chart 18Upbeat Leading Indicators Of Coal Demand All of this suggests that coal shipments will make a comeback later in 2018, and continue to underpin industry pricing power, which in turn boost rail profit prospects (bottom panel, Chart 17). Bottom Line: Continue to overweight the broad S&P transportation index, and especially the heavyweight S&P railroads sub-index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5RAIL - UNP, CSX, NSC, KSU. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Easy Fiscal Offset Tighter Monetary Policy?" dated October 9, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "EPS And 'Nothing Else Matters'," dated December 18, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, "Top 5 Reasons To Favor Cyclicals Over Defensives," dated October 16, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "The Euro's Tricky Spot," dated February 2, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth. Stay neutral small over large caps (downgrade alert).
Highlights Financial market volatility in general and FX market volatility in particular is set to increase because of the following three factors: Rising U.S. inflation will make the Federal Reserve increasingly hawkish, and the European Central Bank is moving away from maximum accommodation; The Chinese economy is not accelerating; And geopolitical tensions are growing. While EM and commodity currencies will suffer, safe havens like the yen and Swiss franc will benefit. The euro may correct at first, but it remains on an upward trajectory. Feature Chart I-1Low And High Growth Sentiment##br## Are Linked A defining feature of global financial markets over the past two years has been the outright collapse of volatility. However, in late January the VIX rebounded, recording readings not seen since 2015. Currency volatility also hit three-year lows before the same wake-up call, causing a sharp but temporary increase in FX volatility. It is important to understand whether this recent rebound in volatility was just a blip or a symptom of something more profound - a sign that volatility is back on an uptrend and will continue to rise as it did from 1996 to 2002, or again from 2007 to 2009. This matters because volatility is an important determinant of FX returns. High-yielding carry currencies perform well when volatility is low. While low-yielding funding currencies like the Swiss franc or the yen suffer in periods of calm, their returns improve once volatility rises. Moreover, low-volatility environments are often associated with buoyant expectations about global growth among international investors (Chart I-1). Thus, a return of volatility could fray the edges of global growth sentiment, which is currently ebullient. This would hurt EM and commodity currencies. Our view is that volatility is making a comeback as global monetary policy is becoming less accommodative, China's path is becoming rockier and global geopolitical risks are rising. These dynamics will hurt EM and commodity currencies, while at the margin, help safe-haven currencies like the yen and Swiss franc. Monetary Policy In DM Economies Monetary policy in the advanced economies is not yet tight, but is moving away from the large accommodation implemented in the wake of the Great Financial Crisis. Historically, a removal of accommodative policy tends to be associated with rising volatility, especially in the FX space. The link is not that clear-cut though. Policy tightening tends to lead to higher volatility. However, it only does so once we enter the latter innings of the business cycle. Only when inflation begins to gain enough momentum to force the Fed to increase rates fast enough to raise the specter that policy will soon begin to hurt growth, does volatility start rising durably. We are getting closer to this moment in the U.S. The U.S. is increasingly showing signs of late-stage business expansion. For one, the yield curve has flattened to 53 basis points. This level of slope has historically been associated with full employment and rising wage pressures. Surveys corroborate this picture. The NFIB survey of U.S. small businesses shows that the gap between the difficulties of finding qualified labor versus demand problems is close to record highs. This normally marks rising wage pressures, the hallmark of full employment (Chart I-2). Moreover, the ISM manufacturing survey shows that companies are paying more for the price of their inputs and experiencing delays with suppliers. Normally, this also describes a late-cycle environment marked with rising inflationary pressures (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Late Cycle Dynamics##br## In The U.S. Chart I-3Firms Are Facing Budding##br## Inflationary Pressures Other variables are generally pointing toward an acceleration of U.S. inflation. Because aggregate U.S. capacity utilization - which incorporates both labor market conditions and the Fed's own capacity utilization measure - highlights a notable absence of slack, and because the change in the velocity of money in the U.S. is accelerating, our models forecast a sustained uptick in U.S. core inflation to 2% and above (Chart I-4). U.S. CPI excluding food and energy data for February is also pointing toward budding inflationary pressures. While the annual core inflation rate was flat compared to January, the annualized three-month rate of change has surged to 3%. The muted year-on-year comparison is being depressed by some base effect. In 2017, inflation started to weaken significantly in March. Therefore, beginning in March 2018, consumer price inflation in the U.S. will likely accelerate more noticeably than it has until now. Shelter inflation too is moving from a headwind to a tailwind. Shelter inflation represents 42% of the core CPI basket, and it has been on a decelerating trend for 14 months. However, the model developed by our U.S. Bond Strategy colleagues shows that U.S. shelter inflation is now set to start bottoming (Chart I-5, top panel). Chart I-4Core Inflation Will Rise Chart I-5Other Inflationary Pressures Core goods prices are also regaining some vigor. This is not much of a surprise. The strength of the global economy along with the weakness of the U.S. dollar have filtered through to higher import prices. Historically, import prices tend to lead core goods prices in the U.S. (Chart I-5, bottom panel). We could see rising inflationary pressures on the services front as well. The employment cost index - the cost component used to compute unit labor costs - is still displaying a tight positive correlation with the employment-to-population ratio for prime-age workers (Chart I-6). BCA estimates that employment gains above 123,000 new jobs a month will push this ratio up, and consequently labor costs. But as Chart I-7 illustrates, the strength in the Conference Board Leading Credit Index highlights that employment growth in the U.S. is likely to remain robust. This suggests the key driver of service inflation - wages - will continue to improve. Chart I-6Wages Will Keep Rising... Chart I-7...As Employment Growth Will Stay Strong Thus, it seems the stars are already aligning to foment a rise in U.S. core CPI. The Trump administration throwing in some large-scale fiscal stimulus into the mix is only akin to throwing fuel on a fire. Accordingly, we expect the Fed to upgrade its interest rate forecasts for 2019. Markets are not yet ready for this scenario, anticipating only five rate hikes between now and the end of 2019. Thus, the most important central bank for setting the global cost of capital will likely surprise in a hawkish fashion over the coming 21 months. But what about the other big DM central bank, the ECB? The ECB too has begun to remove monetary accommodation, as it has started to taper its purchases of securities. It aims to be done this in September. Moreover, the narrowing gap between the unemployment rate and NAIRU in the euro area points to budding inflationary pressures (Chart I-8). This would argue that the ECB will begin lifting interest rates toward the summer of 2019. In fact, the shadow policy rate for the euro area has already begun to turn higher (Chart I-9), suggesting European policy is already starting to move away from its accommodative extremes. This combination is very important for volatility. As Chart I-10 illustrates, the average shadow policy rate for the U.S., the euro area, the U.K., and Japan leads financial markets and FX volatility. While Japanese rates may remain at low levels, the path for Europe and the U.S. is clearly up, suggesting volatility will rise. Chart I-8Growing Wage Pressures In Europe Chart I-9ECB Policy Is Already Less Accommod Chart I-10Tighter Global Policy Leads To Higher Volatility Bottom Line: The U.S. is increasingly displaying symptoms that its business cycle expansion is at an advanced stage. With inflationary pressures growing more intense, the Fed will need to ratchet up its tightening path. The ECB too has begun removing accommodation. This means that two of the three most important price setters for the cost of money are either fully tightening policy or beginning to remove accommodation. This has historically marked the point when global financial market volatility begins to rise. China Uncertainty China is another factor pointing toward a rise in global financial volatility. China has exerted a benign influence on global growth from the second half of 2016 and through most of 2017. In response to a large easing in monetary conditions and a hefty dose of fiscal stimulus, Chinese growth had until recently regained vigor, with the Li Keqiang index - our preferred measure of Chinese industrial activity - swinging from -2.6 sigma to 0.5 sigma in 15 months. A key gauge of Chinese activity - the average of the new orders and backlog of order subcomponents of the PMIs surveys - captured these dynamics very well. This indicator also explains the gyrations in various measures of asset markets volatility well (Chart I-11). Currently, it points to a rise in global financial market volatility. Going forward, the key question for investors is whether or not Chinese orders continue to deteriorate, flagging a further rise in volatility. We are inclined to say yes. Chinese monetary conditions have continued to deteriorate, and administrative measures to slow down the growth of total social financing are starting to bite. Chart I-12 shows that the issuance of bonds by small financial intermediaries has slowed significantly. Based on this message, the early slowdown in total debt growth should continue over the coming months. Optimists about China often highlight that this should have a limited impact on economic activity. After all, 62% of fixed asset investments in China are financed by internally generated funds. However, the biggest problem for China is the misallocation of capital. As Chart I-13 shows, construction as a percentage of total capex has been linked to population growth. However, after 2008, these two series decoupled: population growth has been stagnating while construction activity has been skyrocketing, despite a slowdown in the rate of migration from rural to urban areas. This suggests that post-2008, China has been building too many structures. Chart I-11China To Affect ##br##Volatility Chart I-12Administrative Tightening Will ##br##Weigh On Chinese Credit Chart I-13After The GFC, Chinese ##br##Construction Took Off When capital is misallocated, even if the share of debt financing is low, tight monetary conditions and administrative measures to limit excesses in the economy can bite sharply. This raises the risk that Chinese growth will not pick up much going forward, and that in fact, capex and industrial activity will struggle. Jonathan LaBerge, who writes BCA's Chinese Investment Strategy, has built a list of some of the key indicators he follows to track the evolution of the Chinese economy. Table I-1 shows that all but the Caixin/Markit manufacturing PMI index are in a downtrend, and that 11 out of the 14 variables have been deteriorating in recent months.1 Moreover, as Chart I-14 illustrates, the strength in the Caixin PMI is likely to be an aberration. When the spread between the Caixin and the official measure is as wide as it currently is, the following quarters tend to be followed by a fall in the average of the two series. Table I-1No Convincing Signs Of An Impending##br## Upturn In China's Economy Chart I-14The Caixin PMI Is Probably##br## The Noise, Not The Signal We would therefore expect Chinese economic momentum to slow further. Since Chinese policymakers still want to engineer some deleveraging, the Chinese industrial sector will decelerate. This will contribute to the rise in financial market volatility for the remainder of the business cycle, especially as global monetary policy in the G-10 is becoming less accommodative. Bottom Line: The Chinese economy contributed to low levels of volatility in financial markets from 2016 to late 2017. However, China still suffers from a large misallocation of capital, which is making its economy vulnerable to both monetary and administrative tightening. With most key gauges of Chinese economic activity still pointing south, industrial activity could deteriorate further. This will contribute to a rise in global financial market volatility, especially as DM central banks are removing monetary accommodation. Rising Geopolitical Tensions The last factor pointing toward rising financial market volatility are growing global geopolitical tensions. As Marko Papic has highlighted in BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service, the world's unipolar moment under the umbrella of U.S. dominance is over. The world is increasingly becoming a multi-polar environment, where multiple powers vie for local dominance. As the early 20th century and the 1930s showed, when the world becomes multi-polar, geopolitical risks rise (Chart I-15). Chart I-15Geopolitical Risk Is The Outcome Of Global Multipolarity Today's increasingly multi-polar world may not be headed for an imminent global war, but tensions are likely to increase. This means policies could become more erratic. Additionally, domestic politics are under stain as well. Rising inequality and social stagnation in the U.S. are fomenting public discontent (Chart I-16). Moreover, U.S. citizens are not champions of free trade; in fact, they view unfettered trade with a rather suspicious eye, as do the citizens of Italy, Japan or France (Chart I-17). Chart I-16The U.S. Is Unequal And Ossified Chart I-17America Belongs To The Anti-Globalization Bloc Practically, this means tensions such as those experienced two weeks ago around the imposition of tariffs on steel and aluminum imports into the U.S. are likely to continue. The White House is already discussing the possibility of imposing a 15% tariff on Chinese imports to the U.S. totaling US$60 billion. As we highlighted last week, alleged intellectual property theft by China will likely remain a hot-button topic that could result in painful sanctions, prompting swift retaliation by Beijing. Additionally, NAFTA negotiations are not over, pointing to continued headline risk in the space. Moreover, relations with Russia are tense, and the Iran deal looks increasingly fraught with uncertainty. These two spots could easily morph into yet another source of risk. Bottom Line: The global geopolitical environment has become a multi-polar system - an environment historically prone to serious tensions. The rise of populism in the U.S. only makes this risk more salient, especially with respect to global trade. As a result, the threat of a trade war, especially between the U.S. and China, is increasing. This means shocks to global trade and global growth could become more frequent. This will likely create another source of financial market volatility, compounding the impact of economic fundamentals like global monetary policy and China's economic risks. Investment Implications Carry trades should fare especially poorly in this environment, as they abhor rising volatility.2 Hence, the performance of EM high-yielders like the BRL, TRY, and ZAR could progressively deteriorate. Moreover, because rising volatility often hurts economic sentiment, this increase in volatility could weigh on growth-sensitive currencies like the KRW in the EM space or the AUD and the NZD in the DM space. The SEK would normally suffer when global growth sentiment deteriorates. Yet this time may play out differently. Swedish short rates are -0.5%, making the SEK a funding currency. If carry trades do suffer, the need to buy back funding currencies could put a bid under the SEK. In this context, the JPY and the CHF could be the great winners. Both currencies have been used as funding vehicles. Moreover, both Switzerland and Japan sport outsized net international investment positions equal to 126% and 65% of their respective GDPs. If volatility does rise, some Swiss and Japanese investors will likely repatriate funds from abroad, generating purchases of yen and Swiss francs in the process. Moreover, from an empirical perspective, both these currencies continue to react well when global volatility spikes. Chart I-18The Euro Is Vulnerable To Higher Vol However, both Japan and Switzerland are still experiencing weak inflation. The BoJ and the SNB will therefore try to lean against currency strength caused by exogenous volatility shocks. The JPY and the CHF could be caught between these forces. The currency depreciation these central banks try to engineer will be occasionally interrupted by sharp rallies when financial market volatility spikes. This means that monetary policy in these two countries will have to stay extremely accommodative. For now, it is still too early to bet against the yen's current strength. Finally, the impact of rising volatility on the euro's outlook is more nebulous. The euro is neither a carry currency nor a funding currency, but it generally appreciates when global growth sentiment improves. Thus, since long positioning in the euro is very stretched, a renewed spike in volatility would likely hurt the euro, especially as European economic surprises are plummeting relative to the U.S. (Chart I-18). Nonetheless, this pain will be a temporary phenomenon. The euro is still cheap, and one of the factors driving global volatility higher is the ECB abandoning its accommodative monetary policy stance. Moreover, as terminal interest rate expectations in Europe are still well below their historical average relative to the U.S., there is still ample room for investors to upgrade their assessment of where the European policy rate will end up vis-à-vis the U.S. at the end of the cycle. Bottom Line: Any negative impact of rising global financial markets volatility will be felt most acutely by carry and growth-sensitive currencies like the BRL, TRY, ZAR, AUD, and KRW. Contrastingly, funding currencies underpinned with large positive net international investment positions such as the JPY and the CHF will be beneficiaries. The impact on the euro may be negative at first, as speculators are massively long the euro despite a collapse in euro area economic surprises. However, the long-term impact should prove to be more muted as the euro's fundamentals are still improving. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China And The Risk Of Escalation", dated March 7,2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Special Report, titled "Carry Trades: More than Pennies And Steamrollers", dated May 6, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 U.S. data was generally positive for the dollar: Headline and core CPI came in line with expectations, growing at 2.2% and 1.8% annually, respectively; NFIB Business Optimism Index was hit 107.6, beating expectations of 107.1; Continuing jobless claims came in at 1.879 million, beating the expected 1.9 million; Initial jobless claims came in line with expectations at 226,000; However, retail sales came in weaker than expected, contracting by 0.1% monthly. Despite this generally positive tone to the data, the dollar was still soft this week. However, downward momentum has slowed, paving the way for a short-term counter trend rally. This is consistent with a global growth slowdown. Report Links: Are Tariffs Good Or Bad For The Dollar? - March 9, 2018 The Dollar Deserves Some Real Appreciation - March 2, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 European data was disappointing: Industrial production contracted in monthly terms by 1% and also grew at only 2.7% yearly, less than the expected 4.7% pace; German CPI grew at a 1.4% yearly pace, with the harmonized index growing by 1.2%, both in line with expectations. In a speech on Wednesday, President Draghi clarified that "monetary policy will remain patient, persistent and prudent" as there is still a need for "further evidence that inflation dynamics are moving in the right direction". As global growth is downshifting, the euro could experience a significant correction before resuming its bull market. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 The Euro's Tricky Spot - February 2, 2018 From Davos To Sydney, With a Pit Stop In Frankfurt - January 26, 2018 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been mixed: Machinery orders yearly growth came in at 2.9%, outperforming expectations. However, domestic corporate goods inflation surprised to the downside, coming in at 2.5%. Moreover, the tertiary industry Index month-on-month growth also underperformed expectations, coming in at -0.6%. Finally, labor cash earnings yearly growth came in line with expectations at 0.7%. Last Friday, the BoJ decided to leave its interest rate benchmark unchanged at 0.1%. In its minutes, the board members shared the view that CPI will reach their 2% in fiscal 2019. Overall, we expect that rising global interest rates will cause a rise in currency volatility. This will result in a positive environment for the yen for now, but one that could prevent Japanese inflation from hitting that 2% objective in 2019. Report Links: The Yen's Mighty Rise Continues... For Now - February 16, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed: Industrial production yearly growth underperformed expectations, coming in at 1.6%. Manufacturing production also underperformed expectations, coming in at 2.7%. However, the trade balance outperformed expectations, coming in at -3.074 billion pounds. The pound has been relatively flat this week against the U.S. dollar. Overall, we believe that the upside to the British pound against the dollar is limited, as there are already 40 basis points of interest rate hikes priced for the BoE this year. Given that inflation is set to ease following last year's rally in the pound, it is unlikely that the pound will raise rates more than what is currently priced. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 The Euro's Tricky Spot - February 2, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Australian data was mixed: Home loans fell by 1.1%; Investment lending for homes increased by 1.1%; The NAB Confidence survey declined to 9 from 11 but was in line with expectations; The NAB Conditions survey increased to 21, outperforming expectations; The Westpac Consumer Confidence increased from -2.3% to 0.2%. Elevated Household debt and the absence of wage growth are still at the forefront of Australian policymaker's minds. The RBA is reluctant to raise rates in order to avoid a deflationary spiral which would set the economy back severely. The AUD will most likely suffer this year because of this. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 From Davos To Sydney, With a Pit Stop In Frankfurt - January 26, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand has been negative: The current account surprised to the downside, coming in at -2.7% of GDP. Moreover, GDP yearly growth also underperformed expectations, coming in at 2.9%. However, it did improve from last quarter growth of 2.7%. Finally, Food Price Index monthly growth decline from last month, coming in at -0.5%. The New Zealand dollar has been flat this week against the U.S. dollar. We believe that NZD/USD and NZD/JPY are likely to suffer moving forward, as financial markets volatility is set to rise in the coming months due to the rise in global interest rates and the possibility of a slowdown in China. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Canadian employment figures remain strong, with the ADP employment change coming in at 39,700, above the 10,700 experienced last month. Canada's export growth should improve further as the White House is adding large amounts of fiscal stimulus in the U.S. economy, Canada's largest trading partner. This will help the BoC stick to its hiking path. However, risks are high. While Canada has so far been able to avoid the U.S. steel and aluminum tariffs, NAFTA negotiations still remain a danger for the Canadian economy. Furthermore, the housing market still remains overheated and the debt load is at risk of spiraling when mortgages begin to be refinanced at higher rates. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 The SNB left its reference rate unchanged at -0.75%. The Swiss central bank reiterated that the negative rates as well as foreign exchange intervention "remain essential". Moreover, the SNB decreased its inflation forecast for this year form 0.7% to 0.6%. The SNB also changed its forecast for 2019 from 1.1% to 0.9%. Overall, the SNB is likely to maintain a very dovish stance, given the headwinds to Swiss inflation. This will continue to put upward pressure on EUR/CHF. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway has been positive: Headline inflation surprised to the upside, coming in at 2.2%. It also increased from 1.6% the previous month. Meanwhile, core inflation also outperformed expectations, coming in at 1.4%. It also increased from 1.1% the previous month. USD/NOK has depreciated by roughly 1.4% this week. On Thursday, the Norges Bank left its policy rate unchanged at 0.5%. In its monetary policy report the central bank highlighted that the outlook for the Norwegian economy suggests that "it will soon be appropriate to raise rates". Overall, we believe that the krone is likely to outperform other commodity currencies, given that there are only 18 basis points priced for the next 12 months, which is less than is warranted given the strength of the economy and BCA's outlook for oil prices in 2018. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 While Swedish inflation came in line with expectations, with consumer prices growing at a 0.7% monthly pace and a 1.6% yearly pace, Sweden's unemployment came in at a much lower level than anticipated. The krona is finally strengthening after EUR/SEK traded above the critical 10.00 level. This trend should continue as the euro weakens from overbought levels. Furthermore, the eventual resurgence of inflation in Sweden will propel the SEK to stronger levels as markets reprice the Riksbank's likely policy path. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth - December 15, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights There are many things that central bankers know they don't know. "Known unknowns" include the outlook for growth (both actual and potential), NAIRU, the neutral rate of interest, and the true shape of the Phillips curve. "Unknown unknowns" are, by definition, unknowable, but are often at the heart of economic downturns. Central bankers, like military leaders, tend to fight the last war. They have tirelessly waged a battle against deflation over the past decade, so it is logical to conclude that they will err on the side of keeping monetary policy too loose rather than too tight. This will prolong the recovery, but it also means that economic and financial imbalances will be greater by the time the next downturn rolls around, most likely in 2020. Keep a close eye on credit spreads. Stay overweight risk assets for now, but look to move to neutral later this year and outright underweight in the first half of 2019. Bond yields will fall as the next recession approaches, but they will do so from higher levels than today. Feature Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns - the ones we don't know we don't know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones. - Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense under George W. Bush Uncertainty Galore Central bankers know many things. They know that growth is currently strong across most of the world, unemployment is falling and inflation, while still low, has been slowly trending higher. Unfortunately, there are also many things they don't know. These include things they know they don't know, as well as things that are not even on their radar screens - the "unknown unknowns" that Donald Rumsfeld famously warned about. Known Unknowns Let's start with five "known unknowns." 1. Will Growth Stay Strong? Global growth has likely peaked, but should remain comfortably above-trend over the remainder of this year (Chart 1). The OECD's Global Leading Economic Indicator (LEI) has leveled off, while the diffusion index, which tabulates the share of countries with rising LEIs, has dropped below 50 percent. A fall in the diffusion index has often foreshadowed outright declines in the composite LEI. Consistent with this prognosis, the Citi global Economic Surprise Index has swooned, the Chinese Keqiang index has decelerated, and Korean export growth - a leading indicator for global trade - has slowed. Global manufacturing PMIs have also edged off their highs (Chart 2). The one exception is the U.S., where the ISM index continues to power higher. Despite the occasional blip such as this week's retail sales report - which was probably depressed by tax refund delays - recent U.S. economic data have been reasonably upbeat. Goldman Sachs' Current Activity Indicator remains near cycle highs, implying strong momentum going into the second quarter. Chart 1Global Growth Has Peaked ##br##But Will Remain Above Trend Chart 2Global Manufacturing PMIs ##br##Are Off Their Highs Changes in financial conditions tend to lead growth by about six-to-nine months. U.S. financial conditions have eased a lot more since the start of 2017 than elsewhere (Chart 3). In addition, U.S. fiscal policy is likely to be much more expansionary over the next two years than in the rest of the world (Chart 4). All this suggests that the composition of global growth will shift in favor of the U.S. over the coming months. Chart 3Composition Of Global ##br##Growth Will Shift To The U.S. ... Chart 4U.S. Fiscal Policy Will Become More ##br##Expansionary Than In R.O.W. 2. Will Potential Growth Accelerate? The U.S. unemployment rate has declined from a high of 10% in 2009 to 4.1% in February 2018, even though real GDP growth has averaged a meager 2.2% over this period. Extremely weak productivity growth explains why the output gap has managed to contract in the face of subdued GDP growth. Sluggish capital spending has exacerbated the productivity downturn, but probably did not cause it. Chart 5 shows that productivity growth began to decelerate well before the financial crisis erupted. The slowdown has been pervasive across countries and sectors. Economists have a poor track record of predicting productivity trends. Not only did they fail to predict the productivity revival in the late 1990s, but because of data lags and subsequent revisions, they did not even know it had happened until the early 2000s. It is too early to say whether robotics and AI will yield the same sort of productivity windfall that the Internet did. My colleagues, Mark McClellan and Brian Piccioni, have cast a skeptical eye on some of the alleged revolutionary breakthroughs in both fields.1 If it turns out that the late 1990s was the exception rather than the rule, and that we are going back to the lackluster productivity performance of the 1970s, this will make life more challenging for central bankers. 3. What Is The True Level Of NAIRU? Spare capacity has diminished in most countries, but questions linger over how much slack remains. No one truly knows where NAIRU - the so-called Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment - really stands. The Fed and the Congressional Budget Office believe that NAIRU has fallen from over 6% in the late 1970s to around 4.5%-to-4.7% today (Chart 6). Chart 5Productivity Growth Slowdown ##br##Has Been Pervasive Chart 6NAIRU Is Low By Historic Standards An aging workforce has reduced frictional unemployment because older workers are less likely to switch jobs than younger ones. The internet has also made it easier for employers to find suitably qualified workers. On the flipside, globalization, automation, and the opioid crisis have likely made it difficult for a growing list of workers to hold down a job for long. Our best guess is that the U.S. economy is operating at close to full employment. This is confirmed by various employer surveys, which show that companies are struggling to find qualified workers (Chart 7). The fact that the share of people outside the labor force who want a job has fallen to pre-recession levels also suggests that labor slack is running thin (Chart 8). Chart 7U.S. Economy: Operating At ##br##Close To Full Employment Chart 8Few People Left Who Are Eager ##br##To Rejoin The Labor Force There is more slack outside the United States. Labor underutilization is still 2.5 percentage points higher in the euro area than it was in 2008. Taking Germany out of the picture, labor underutilization is nearly six points higher (Chart 9). A number of major emerging markets, most notably Brazil and Russia, also have a lot of excess cyclical unemployment. The Japanese labor market has tightened significantly in recent years, but there is probably a fair amount of hidden underemployment left, particularly in the service sector (factoid of the week: there are more police officers in Tokyo than in New York City).2 4. Where Is The Neutral Rate Of Interest? One of the most vexing questions facing central banks is how high interest rates can go before they move into restrictive territory. There are a variety of reasons for thinking that the neutral real rate of interest - the rate consistent with full employment and stable inflation - is lower today than it was in the past. Trend real GDP growth has fallen. This has reduced the need for firms to expand capacity. The shift to a capital-lite economy - where value-added increasingly takes the form of bits and bytes rather than factory output - has further reduced the need for fresh investment. Meanwhile, a reluctance to take on new debt has restrained spending. Rising inequality has shifted more wealth into the hands of people who tend to save a lot. Globally, savings must equal investment. If desired savings go up and desired investment goes down, interest rates must fall to push down the former and push up the latter (Chart 10). Chart 9Euro Area: There Is Still Labor ##br##Market Slack Outside Of Germany Chart 10Interest Rates Must Fall If Desired Savings ##br##Increase And Desired Investment Declines None of these forces are immutable, however. Investment demand appears to be picking up, as judged by capex intention surveys (Chart 11). Consumer credit is rising anew. The U.S. personal saving rate is back near an all-time low (Chart 12). A tighter labor market is likely to cause labor's share of income to rise, just like it did in the late 1990s (Chart 13). This should boost aggregate demand. An unprecedented increase in the U.S. budget deficit should help absorb much of the savings from cash-rich corporations (Chart 14). Meanwhile, savings are likely to decline over the long haul as well-paid baby boomers retire en masse. All this is causing the neutral rate to move higher. Chart 11Upswing In Global Capex Is Underway Chart 12U.S. Consumer Credit Revival Chart 13Tight Labor Market And Rising Labor ##br##Share Of Income: A Replay Of The 1990s? Chart 14Now Is The Time For Fiscal Consolidation, Not Profligacy 5. What Is The Shape Of The Phillips Curve? Central bankers assume that dwindling spare capacity will lead to higher inflation, a relationship immortalized by the so-called Phillips curve. The fact that inflation has barely risen over the past few years is an obvious challenge to this theory. It may simply be that the Phillips curve is "kinked" at very low levels - it only steepens when the economy has gone beyond full employment. The fact that it has taken this long to reach the kink could explain why inflation has not taken off sooner. The success that central banks have enjoyed in anchoring long-term inflation expectations is another reason why the Phillips curve has become flatter. Chart 15An Overheated Economy Led To ##br##Rising Inflation In The 1960s The problem is that there is no God-given reason why inflation expectations should stay well anchored. Core inflation was remarkably low and stable in the first half of the 1960s. However, the combination of low real interest rates and increased fiscal spending associated with Lyndon Johnson's Great Society programs and the Vietnam War led to a surge in inflation starting in 1966 (Chart 15). Inflation kept climbing thereafter, rising to 6% in 1970. This was three years before the first oil shock occurred, suggesting that an overheated economy, rather than OPEC, was the main inflationary culprit. Unknown Unknowns Then there are the things central bankers are not even thinking about, or even worse, the things they think are true but aren't.3 In the lead-up to the Great Recession, U.S. policymakers blithely assumed that house prices could not fall at the nationwide level. This caused them to turn a blind eye to soaring home prices and the deterioration of underwriting standards in the mortgage market. Warren Buffet once said, "Only when the tide goes out do you discover who's been swimming naked." Our guess is that rising rates will expose a lot of things one would rather not see in the corporate debt market. In the latest issue of the Bank Credit Analyst, my colleague Mark McClellan estimated that the interest coverage ratio for U.S. companies would drop from 4 to 2.5 if rates increased by 100 basis points across the corporate curve. Such a move would take the coverage ratio to the lowest level in the 30-year history of our sample (Chart 16A and Chart 16B).4 Consumer staples, tech, and health care would be the most adversely affected. Chart 16AU.S. Interest Coverage Ratio ##br##Breakdown By Sector (I) Chart 16BU.S. Interest Coverage Ratio ##br##Breakdown By Sector (II) Political shocks are also very difficult for policymakers to foresee. President Trump's decision to impose steel and aluminum tariffs spooked the markets. NAFTA negotiations remain stalled and the odds are high that the U.S. will pursue trade sanctions against China for alleged intellectual property theft. That said, as we noted last week, an all-out trade war would cause equities to crater.5 Trump remains focused on the value of the stock market as a gauge of the success of his presidency. This will curb his hawkishness. Unemployment is also very low these days, which limits the attractiveness of protectionist policies. The specter of trade wars will escalate if a recession causes stocks to tumble and unemployment to rise in key midwestern swing states. Other "unknown unknowns" include another flare-up in sovereign debt markets in Europe, a hard landing in China, and a supply-induced spike in oil prices. Investment Conclusions It may be tempting to think that central banks can calibrate monetary policy as events unfold in order to keep economies on an even keel. If only it were so easy. Monetary policy affects the economy with a lag of 12-to-24 months. By the time it is clear that either more or less monetary stimulus is needed, it is often too late to act. Central bankers have to work with incomplete or inaccurate data. One of the reasons that inflation spiraled out of control in the 1970s was because the Federal Reserve systematically overstated the size of the output gap (Chart 17). This led the Fed to falsely conclude that slower growth was the result of inadequate demand rather than a deceleration in the economy's supply-side potential. It is impossible to know what mistakes central banks will make in the future, but it is almost certain that something will go awry. Central bankers, like military leaders, tend to fight the last war. They have tirelessly waged a battle against deflation over the past decade, so it is logical to conclude that they will err on the side of keeping monetary policy too loose rather than too tight. This will prolong the recovery, but it also means that economic and financial imbalances will be greater by the time the next downturn rolls around. As we discussed several weeks ago, the next recession is most likely to arrive in 2020.6 Investors should stay overweight risk assets for now, but look to move to neutral later this year and outright underweight in the first half of 2019. Bond yields will fall as the next recession approaches, but they will do so from higher levels than today. Similar to the 1970s, investors should expect inflation and bond yields to make a series of "higher highs" and "higher lows" with every boom/bust episode (Chart 18). Chart 17The Fed Continuously Overstated The ##br##Magnitude Of Economic Slack In The 1970s Chart 18A Template For The Next Decade? Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Technology Sector Strategy Special Report, "The Coming Robotics Revolution," dated May 16, 2017; The Bank Credit Analyst, "Did Amazon Kill The Phillips Curve?" dated August 31, 2017; and The Bank Credit Analyst, "The Impact Of Robots On Inflation," dated January 25, 2018. 2 "As crime dries up, Japan's police hunt for things to do," The Economist, May 18, 2017. 3 Mark Twain is often credited for saying that "It ain't what you don't know that gets you into trouble. It's what you know for sure that just ain't so." It's a great quote, but there's only one problem: There is no evidence that he ever said it. 4 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Leverage And Sensitivity To Rising Rates: The U.S. Corporate Sector," dated February 22, 2018. 5 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump's Tariffs: A Q&A," dated March 9, 2018. 6 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Next Recession: Later But Deeper," dated February 23, 2018. Tactical Global Asset Allocation Recommendations Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights Escalating trade tensions - most notably between the U.S. and China, and the U.S. and its NAFTA partners - threaten the outperformance ags posted in 1Q18, which was driven by unfavorable weather and transportation disruptions in major producing regions, along with a weak dollar. Energy: Overweight. The IPO of Saudi Aramco apparently will be delayed into 2019, according to various press reports. New York, London and Hong Kong remain in contention for the foreign listing of KSA's national oil company. Base Metals: Neutral. China's iron ore and copper imports in January - February 2018 were up 5.4% and 9.8% y/y, respectively. China's year-to-date (ytd) steel product exports are down 27.1% y/y, while ytd aluminum exports are up 25.8% y/y. The aluminum data are consistent with our assessment that the global aluminum deficit will likely ease this year.1 Precious Metals: Neutral. A global trade war would boost gold's appeal, and we continue to recommend it as a strategic portfolio hedge. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Weather and transport disruptions boosted global ag markets in 1Q18. However, this outperformance is under threat as global trade tensions build (see below). Feature Chart of the WeekAgs Are Off To A Good Start Weather concerns in highly productive regions of South America as well as the U.S. have supported ag prices since the beginning of the year (Chart of the Week). Corn and wheat bottomed in mid-December, and have since gained 14.8% and 25.4%, respectively, while soybeans bottomed mid-January and have since gained 10.6%. This pushed the Grains and Oilseed CCI up 12.6% since the beginning of the year. Drought ... And Flooding In The U.S. Erratic weather in the U.S. could affect yields. The chief areas of concern are the U.S. mid-South and lower Midwest, which have recently experienced flooding, and are raising fears of lower yields of winter wheat. At the same time, the area from Southwestern Kansas to Northern Texas experienced unusually dry weather, causing winter grains to suffer. On top of that, high water levels in the Ohio River also led to shipping disruptions. Although the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) did not lower its 2017/18 estimates of U.S. wheat yields in its latest World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE), yield estimates stand significantly lower than those of the last crop year (Chart 2). In addition, American wheat farmers are expected to harvest the smallest area recorded in the history of the series, which dates back to the 1960/61 crop year. U.S. wheat production is expected to be the lowest since 2002/03 - a 25% year-on-year (y/y) drop in output. As a result, the U.S. supply surplus will likely be the smallest since 2002, weighing on U.S. exports. The U.S. generally accounts for only ~8% of global wheat production, and increases elsewhere, primarily in Russia and India, are expected to more than offset the fall in U.S. output. Despite the poor conditions in the U.S., global supply is expected to continue growing this year with the wheat market in surplus and inventories swelling to record levels (Chart 3). Chart 2Depressed Yield, Record Low Acreage In U.S. Chart 3World Remains Well Supplied Drought In Argentina Supporting Soybean, And To A Lesser Extent Corn Prices In addition to the unfavorable North American weather, warm and dry weather in Argentina have resulted in a fall in estimated yields of Argentine corn and soybeans.2 Argentina accounts for 14% and 3% of global soybean and corn production, respectively. The USDA cut back its estimate of Argentine soybean production by 13% in the latest WASDE, causing a downward revision of ~4 mm MT in global inventories (Chart 4). Although Argentina's estimated corn output was also reduced, the resulting decline in its exports is expected to be picked up by U.S. exports. American farmers thus are benefitting from the unfavorable weather in Argentina. As is the case with soybeans, the net effect on corn is a 4 mm MT downwards revision to global inventories. In addition, grain exports from Argentina's main agro-export hub of Rosario were stalled last month due to a truckers' strike. While the strike has now eased, it led to transportation bottlenecks and contributed to limited global supply earlier this year. Back in the U.S., the Trump administration's lack of clarity regarding where it stands on the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), which mandates refiners blend biofuels like corn-based ethanol into the nation's fuels, is worrying farmers. While the energy industry is unsatisfied with the current policy, claiming that the RFS is unfair and costly, it gives a lifeline to corn farmers with excess stock. Bottom Line: Unfavorable weather and transportation disruptions, primarily in the U.S. and Argentina, have been bullish for ags since the beginning of the year. Lower production is expected to push both soybeans and corn to deficits in 2017/18 (Chart 5). The longevity of the impact of these forces hinges on whether the weather will improve between now and harvest, causing yields to come in better-than-expected. Chart 4Weather Weighs On Soybean And Corn Yields Chart 5Corn And Soybeans In Deficit This Year "We Can Also Do Stupid"3 In addition to the impact of his domestic immigration policy on the availability of farm workers, President Trump's controversial trade policies are threatening to spill into ags.4 In direct response to the 25% and 10% tariff Trump slapped on steel and aluminum imports, several of America's key ag trading partners have already reacted by communicating the possibility of imposing similar tariffs on their imports of American goods - chiefly agricultural goods. Among the commodities rumored to be at risk are Chinese soybean, sorghum and cotton imports, and EU agriculture imports including corn and rice imports. While President Trump's stated aim is to make America great again by reviving industries hurt by cheap imports and unfair trade, his strategy is proving risky as many of the trade partners he is threatening to rock ties with are in fact major consumers of U.S. agricultural products (Chart 6). In fact, the top three importers of U.S. ag products - collectively accounting for 42%, or $58.7 billion worth of U.S. ag exports in 2017 - are Canada, China, and Mexico (Charts 7A and 7B). Chart 6Risky Strategy, Mr. President Chart 7ASoybeans Appear To Be At Risk... Chart 7B... As Is Cotton However, when it comes to the bulk commodities we cover, China is by far the U.S. ag industry's biggest customer - importing more than 30% of all U.S. exports, equivalent to $14.9 billion. Thus, China appears to have significant leverage in the case of a trade war, and U.S. farmers are worried of the impact from trade disputes. China has already indicated that it is investigating import restrictions on sorghum. Chinese trade restrictions - if implemented - will have a significant impact on U.S. sorghum farmers. In value terms, sorghum exports contributed less than 1% to U.S. agricultural product exports last year, but exports to China made up more than 80% of all U.S. sorghum exports. Sino-American Trade Dispute Would Hurt U.S. Ags...But Not As Much As Is Feared Chart 8Relatively Low Soybean Inventories The biggest fear among U.S. farmers is not the loss of sorghum exports, but that China will impose restrictions on its imports of U.S. soybeans. Soybeans are the U.S.'s largest ag export - contributing 16% to the value of all agricultural product exports. Nearly 60% of U.S. soybean exports, and more than a third of U.S. soybeans, end up in China. Thus it may appear that China has some leverage there. In fact, Brazil, which is already China's top soybean supplier, has already communicated that it would be willing to supply China with more soybeans. However, China's ability to find alternative suppliers is questionable. While China imported ~32 mm MT of soybeans from the U.S. last year, Brazil's total soybean inventories stand at ~22 mm MT. Brazil simply does not have enough excess supply to cover all of China's needs. In fact, global soybean inventories are ~95 mm MT - only three times the amount of China's annual imports from the U.S. On top of that, although China generally tries to shield itself from supply shocks by building large inventories, its soybean inventories - measured as stocks-to-use - are significantly lower than that of other ags (Chart 8). In fact, Beijing has already tightened its scrutiny on U.S. soybeans, announcing at the beginning of the year that it would no longer accept shipments with more than 1% of foreign material. Half of last year's shipments reportedly would have failed this criterion, and the net effect of this new policy is higher costs for U.S. farmers. Cotton is another agricultural commodity that China has indicated may be caught up in a trade dispute. 16% of U.S. cotton exports went to China last year, but although the U.S. is the dominant global cotton exporter, its value accounts for less than 5% of total U.S. agricultural products exports. Given that China's inventories are extremely high - enough to cover a year's worth of consumption - and that Chinese imports from the U.S. are equivalent to ~3% of global inventories, there is significant opportunity for China to diversify its imports and find an alternative supplier to the U.S. Bottom Line: Although China would be better able to implement restrictions on cotton imports from the U.S. compared to soybeans, the impact on U.S. farmers would be less painful given that they are not as dependent on China as U.S. soybean farmers are. U.S. Ags Dominate Exports, But Substitutes Abound The U.S. is the world's top exporter of corn and cotton, and the second largest exporter of wheat and soybeans. While it remains a dominant player in global export markets, its share of global agriculture exports has been declining sharply over time (Chart 9). While in levels, the general trend for U.S. agriculture exports - with the exception of wheat - appears to be upward, the share of U.S. exports as a percentage of global exports has actually been falling. Compared to the year 2000, the global share of U.S. corn and wheat exports has almost halved, going from 64% to 36%, and 29% to 14%, respectively. In the soybean market, U.S. soybean exports now account for 37% of exports, down from half of global trade. Lastly, U.S. rice exports now account for 7% of global exports, a fall from 11% in 2000. Unlike most other ag commodities, U.S. cotton has captured a larger share of the global market - currently at almost 50%, from 26% in 2000. Russian, Canadian, and European wheat farmers have been tough competitors. This crop year, Russia is expected to surpass the U.S. as the top wheat exporter for the first time (Chart 10). In addition, while the U.S. was the dominant wheat exporter just 10 years ago, more recently, Canada and the EU have on some occasions exported more wheat than the U.S. Chart 9U.S. Exports Relatively Less Attractive Chart 10U.S. Exports Face Growing Competition In the case of soybeans, Brazilian exports have grown significantly since 2010, consistently exporting more than the U.S. since 2012. Brazilian corn exports are also catching up to the U.S., as are Argentine corn exports which have been growing steadily. If these trade disputes prove to be an ongoing trend, we see two potential scenarios panning out: U.S. farmers could move away from farming crops most impacted by trade restrictions, and instead increase the farmland allocated to crops that are consumed domestically, and thus insulated from the Trump administration's trade policy decisions. In this scenario, the longer term impact would be an increase in the supply of locally consumed ags and a decrease in the U.S. supply of exportable ags. Global ag trade flows could shift, such that U.S. allies begin importing more of their ag products from the U.S., while countries that are in trade disputes with the U.S. switch to other ag suppliers. NAFTA Is Still At Risk The ongoing re-negotiation of NAFTA ultimately could lead to an abrogation of the treaty. Should this evolve with no superseding bilateral trade agreements, it would mark a significant blow to the U.S. agricultural industry. Mexico is the second-largest destination for U.S. agricultural exports after China, accounting for 13% of all U.S. exports of agricultural bulks, while Canada makes up a much smaller 2% share. Nearly 30% of U.S. corn exports and 23% of U.S. rice exports end up in Mexico. As a result, these two bulks are especially vulnerable in the event of a treaty abrogation. Wheat, cotton and soybeans - Mexico accounts for 14%, 7%, and 7% of these exports, respectively - would also be impacted by a trade dispute. In the interest of diversifying its sources of ag imports, Mexico has already started exploring other suppliers from South America. Its corn imports from Brazil are reported to have increased 10-fold last year. Furthermore, government officials and grain buyers have been visiting Brazil and Argentina to investigate other ag suppliers for Mexico. BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy service assign a 50/50 probability to a breakdown in the NAFTA negotiations. In the event of a NAFTA abrogation, they assign a 25% chance of a failure to strike bilateral agreements - resulting in a conditional probability of only 12.5%. Bottom Line: The shrinking role of the U.S. as a global ag supplier at a time when global storage facilities are well-stocked will - in most cases - allow its global consumers to diversify away from U.S. exports. In the case of soybeans, however, this is less certain. A Weaker USD Also Helped Buoy Ag Prices In 1Q18 Chart 11A Stronger Dollar Would Weigh On Ags A weaker dollar has been supportive of commodities prices so far this year (Chart 11). The recent bout of U.S. import restrictions has investors expecting the USD to further weaken on the back of a trade war. However, our FX Strategists believe the current set of tariffs will have a muted effect on the dollar.5 In fact, given that the U.S. economy is currently at full employment, and their expectation that the Fed will be proactive, tariffs will likely generate inflationary pressures, causing the tighter monetary policy, which does not support further weakening of the USD. Bottom Line: A pick-up in the dollar along with an escalation in trade disputes or the scrapping of NAFTA would be bearish for ags. For now, bullish weather forecasts prevail, and are keeping prices well supported. Roukaya Ibrahim, Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled "Global Aluminum Deficit Set To Ease," dated March 1, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 Soybean and corn plantings are reported to be half their typical height. Please see "Argentina Drought Bakes Crops Sparks Grain Price Rally," available at reuters.com. 3 As expressed by EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker's about the potential tit-for-tat retaliatory measures in response to steel and aluminum import tariffs. 4 According to Chuck Conner, president of the National Council of Farm Cooperatives, and former deputy agriculture secretary during the George W. Bush administration, roughly 1.4 million undocumented immigrants work on U.S. farms each year, or roughly about 60% of the agriculture labor force. 5 Please see BCA Research's Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report titled "Are Tariffs Good Or Bad For the Dollar?," dated March 9, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017
Highlights The global economic mini-cycle is set to weaken while the euro is set to grind higher. Upgrade Telecoms to overweight. Also overweight Healthcare and Airlines. Underweight Banks, Basic Materials and Energy. Overweight France, Ireland, U.K., Switzerland and Denmark. Underweight Italy, Spain, Sweden and Norway. The Eurostoxx50 will struggle to outperform the S&P500. Feature We are strong believers in Investment Reductionism, a philosophy synthesized from the Pareto Principle and Occam's Razor.1 Investment reductionism offers a liberating thesis - the incessant barrage of investment research, newsfeeds and ten thousand word commentaries is largely superfluous to the investment process. What seems like a complexity of investment choice usually reduces to getting a few over-arching decisions right. Chart of the WeekIn Quadrant 4, Overweight Domestic Defensives And Underweight International Cyclicals For equity sector and country allocation, two over-arching decisions dominate: Whether the global economic mini-cycle is set to strengthen or weaken (Chart I-2). Whether the domestic currency is set to strengthen or weaken. Chart I-2The Empirical Evidence For Credit And Economic Mini-Cycles Is Irrefutable The four permutations of these two decisions create the four quadrants of cyclical investing (Chart of the Week). Right now, European investors find themselves in quadrant four: the global economic mini-cycle is set to weaken while the euro is set to grind higher. This favours an overweight stance to defensives, especially domestic-focused defensives. Therefore today, we are upgrading Telecoms to overweight. We also recommend an underweight stance to the most cyclical sectors, especially international-focused cyclicals such as Basic Materials and Energy. Country allocation then just drops out of this sector allocation. The Global Economic Mini-Cycle Is Set To Weaken We can predict the changes of the seasons and the tides of the sea with utmost precision. How? Not because we have an ingenious leading indicator for the seasons and tides, but because we recognise that these phenomena follow perfectly regular cycles. Regular cycles create predictability. Significantly, global bank credit flows also exhibit remarkably regular cycles with half-cycle lengths averaging around eight months. Recognizing these mini-cycles is immensely powerful because, just as for the seasons and the tides, it creates predictability. Furthermore, if most investors are unaware of these cycles, the next turn will not be discounted in today's price - providing a compelling investment opportunity for those who do recognise the predictability. The empirical evidence for credit mini-cycles is irrefutable. The theoretical foundation is also rock solid, based on an economic model called the Cobweb Theory.2 This states that in any market where supply lags demand, both the quantity supplied and the price must oscillate. Given that credit supply clearly lags credit demand, the quantity of credit supplied and its price (the bond yield) must experience mini-cycles (Chart I-3). And as the quantity of credit supplied is a marginal driver of economic activity, economic activity will also experience the same regular oscillations. Today, the global 6-month credit impulse is turning from mini-upswing to mini-downswing, with all three subcomponents - the euro area, the U.S. and China - now in decline (Chart I-4). This is exactly in line with prediction. Mini half-cycles average eight months, and the latest mini-upswing started eight months ago. Chart I-3The Global Economic Mini-Cycle##br## Is Set To Weaken Chart I-4All Three Subcomponents Of The Global 6-Month ##br##Credit Impulse Are Now Declining More importantly, as we enter a mini-downswing, we can also predict that global growth is likely to experience at least a modest deceleration through the coming two to three quarters. The Euro Is Set To Grind Higher, Except Versus The Yen Chart I-5Lost In Translation Nowadays, mainstream stock markets tend to be eclectic collections of multinational companies which happen to be quoted on bourses in Frankfurt, Paris, New York, and so on. For example, BASF is not really a German chemical company, it is a global chemical company headquartered in Germany. For operational hedging, multinational companies like BASF will intentionally diversify their sales and profits across multiple major currencies, say euros and dollars. But of course, the primary stock market quotation will be in the currency of its home bourse, euros. Therefore, when the euro strengthens, the company's multi-currency profits, translated back into a stronger euro, will necessarily weaken (Chart I-5). Clearly, more domestic-focused companies like telecoms will not experience such a strong currency-translation headwind. We expect the main euro crosses to continue strengthening over the next 8 months, with the exception being the cross versus the Japanese yen. Our central thesis is that the payoff profile for a foreign exchange rate just tracks the bond yield spread. This means that when a central bank has already taken bond yields close to their lower bound, its currency possesses a highly attractive asymmetry called positive skew. In essence, as the ECB is at the realistic limit of ultra-loose policy, long-term expectations for the ECB policy rate possess an asymmetry: they cannot go significantly lower, but they could go significantly higher. Exactly the same applies to long-term expectations for the BoJ policy rate. In contrast, long-term expectations for the Fed policy rate possess full symmetry: they could go either way, lower or higher. This stark asymmetry of central bank 'degrees of freedom' favours the euro and the yen over the dollar. Which Sectors And Countries To Own And Which To Avoid? Pulling together the preceding two sections, the global economic mini-cycle is set to weaken while the euro is set to grind higher. This puts Europe in quadrant four of our four quadrant framework for cyclical investing. Unsurprisingly, the relative performance of the most cyclical sectors - Banks, Basic Materials and Energy - very closely tracks the regular mini-cycles in the global 6-month credit impulse. In a mini-downswing these cyclical sectors always underperform (Chart I-6, Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Accordingly, underweight these three sectors on a two to three quarter horizon. Chart I-6In A Mini-Downswing, ##br##Banks Always Underperform Chart I-7In A Mini-Downswing,##br## Basic Materials Always Underperform Chart I-8In A Mini-Downswing,##br## Energy Always Underperforms Conversely, overweight the relatively defensive Healthcare sector. Also overweight the Airlines sector. Airlines' performance is a mirror-image of the oil price cycle, given that aviation fuel comprises the sector's main variable cost. Furthermore, as aviation fuel is priced in dollars, it also insulates European Airlines against a strengthening euro. Today, we are also upgrading the Telecoms sector to overweight given its relative non-cyclicality (Chart I-9), its domestic-focus, and the excessively negative groupthink towards it (Chart I-10). Chart I-9In A Mini-Downswing, ##br##Telecoms Always Outperform Chart I-10Telecoms Are Due ##br##A Trend Reversal In summary: Overweight: Healthcare, Telecoms, and Airlines Underweight: Banks, Basic Materials and Energy Then to arrive at a country allocation, just combine the cyclical view on the major sectors with the country sector skews in Box 1. The result is the following unchanged European equity market allocation. Overweight: France, Ireland, U.K., Switzerland and Denmark Neutral: Germany and Netherlands Underweight: Italy, Spain, Sweden and Norway Lastly, what is the prognosis for the Eurostoxx50 relative to the S&P500? Essentially, this reduces to a battle between the multinational cyclicals - especially banks - that dominate euro area bourses and the multinational technology giants that dominate the U.S. stock market. With the global economic mini-cycle set to weaken and the euro set to grind higher, the Eurostoxx50 will struggle to outperform the S&P500. Box 1: The Vital Few Sector Skews That Drive Country Relative Performance For major equity indexes in the euro area, the dominant sector skews that drive relative performance are as follows: Germany (DAX) is overweight Chemicals, underweight Banks. France (CAC) is underweight Banks and Basic Materials. Italy (MIB) is overweight Banks. Spain (IBEX) is overweight Banks. Netherlands (AEX) is overweight Technology, underweight Banks. Ireland (ISEQ) is overweight Airlines (Ryanair) which is, in effect, underweight Energy. And for major equity indexes outside the euro area: The U.K. (FTSE100) is effectively underweight the pound. Switzerland (SMI) is overweight Healthcare, underweight Energy. Sweden (OMX) is overweight Industrials. Denmark (OMX20) is overweight Healthcare and Industrials. Norway (OBX) is overweight Energy. The U.S. (S&P500) is overweight Technology, underweight Banks. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 The Pareto Principle, often known as the 80-20 rule, says that 80% of effects come from just 20% of causes. Occam's Razor says that when there are many competing explanations for the same effect, the simplest explanation is usually the best. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report 'The Cobweb Theory And Market Cycles' published on January 11, 2018 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model* This week's recommended trade is to short the Helsinki OMX versus the Eurostoxx600. Apply a profit target of 3% with a symmetrical stop-loss. In other trades, we are pleased to report that short Japanese Energy versus the market achieved its 8% profit target at which it was closed. This leaves four open positions. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart 11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights The protectionist option in U.S. policy is here to stay; President Trump is likely to impose punitive measures on China before the U.S. midterm elections; The U.S. Section 301 investigation into China's intellectual property theft is about national security more than trade; China's NPC session suggests the Communist Party is downshifting growth rates; The North Korean diplomatic breakthrough is real ... stay focused on U.S.-China tensions. Feature "I won't rule out direct talks with Kim Jong Un. I just won't ... As far as the risk of dealing with a madman is concerned, that's his problem, not mine." - U.S. President Donald J. Trump, March 4, 2018 Two of our key 2018 views came to the fore over the past two weeks. First, U.S. President Donald Trump took protectionist action that rattled the markets.1 Second, North Korean diplomacy surprised to the upside, with Trump accepting an invitation to meet with Kim Jong Un by this May.2 The nuclear program is allegedly up for discussion. Markets recovered quickly from Trump's steel and aluminum tariffs, with the VIX falling and American and global equities continuing to rally (Chart 1). Trump's formal tariff proclamation was not as disruptive as some had feared. He provided exemptions for entire countries - rather than merely companies - based on an appeals process that will include economic as well as geopolitical criteria. But while he struck an optimistic note on NAFTA (on which Canada's and Mexico's exemptions will depend), he struck a pessimistic note on trade talks with China. Chart 1Markets Shrugged Off Protectionism China is quickly becoming the foremost political and geopolitical risk of the year, as we discuss in this report. First, diplomacy with North Korea will not remove the risk of serious U.S. protectionism toward China.3 Second, China's domestic reforms are proceeding, posing downside risks to Chinese imports and hence global growth. We conclude with a brief word on why investors should take the North Korean diplomacy as a hugely positive development. There may be some volatile episodes during the upcoming negotiations, but U.S.-China relations are the real risk and North Korea remains largely a derivative of the emerging "Warm War" between the two global behemoths. "Death By China" In the past few weeks, the Trump administration has moved swiftly to begin implementing its protectionist platform.4 Trump's formal announcement of global tariffs on steel and wrought and unwrought aluminum products marked the shift, although investors got a foreshadowing with the January announcement of washing machine and solar panel tariffs. The latest tariffs are insignificant in macroeconomic terms. They will affect less than 0.3% of global exports and less than 2% of U.S. imports.5 The market has thus far cheered the limited scope of the tariffs and the numerous exemptions that will surely follow. But the danger is that investors are underestimating the political shifts that underpin Trump's move. In fact, there is little reason to think that protectionism will fade when Trump leaves office: Americans are susceptible to it, according to opinion polling (Chart 2). Now that the seal has been broken - and that by a president who hails from the "pro-free trade" Republican Party - the danger is what happens when the next recession occurs. Politicians of all stripes will be more likely to propose protectionist solutions. The long trend of decline in U.S. tariffs since the 1930s may gradually begin to reverse (Chart 3), confirming our key decade theme that globalization has reached its apex. Chart 2Americans Not Immune To Protectionism Chart 3U.S. Tariffs: Nowhere To Go But Up! How far will the protectionist threat go in the short term? Investors should focus on two bellwethers. First, the outcome of NAFTA re-negotiations.6 Second, a decision by the Trump administration on how to respond to the U.S. Trade Representative Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 investigation into China's practices on technology transfer, intellectual property, and innovation, discussed below. China is an industrial powerhouse that is becoming more technologically adept, which threatens the core advantage of the United States in what could soon become a "Warm War" between the two global hegemons. Trump was elected on a pledge to get aggressive on China and is relatively unconstrained on trade policy (Table 1). U.S.-China economic interdependency has declined, reducing the two countries' ability to manage tensions.7 Table 1Trump Lacks Legal Constraints On Trade Issues Moreover, Trump is relatively unpopular - which jeopardizes the GOP Congress in November - and he will need to take actions to remain relevant ahead of the November 6 midterm elections (Chart 4). The U.S. and China are currently bickering about the size of the trade imbalance (Chart 5), not to mention the causes and solutions. What will the U.S. demand? This was the question of Xi Jinping's top economic adviser, Politburo member Liu He, when he visited Washington D.C. on March 1-3 for emergency meetings with the U.S. administration. He was rebuffed with the announcement on tariffs. Washington has been arguing that high-level dialogues with China - that investors cheered after the Mar-a-Lago Summit - have failed and that punitive measures will go forward unless China makes quick and concrete improvements to the trade balance, starting with $100 billion worth of new imports.8 Chart 4Trump's Low Approval Jeopardizes Control Of Congress In November Chart 5U.S.-China: Disagreeing Even On The Facts In response, Liu has promised that China will redouble its economic "reform and opening up" process and has asked the United States for an official list of demands. Our sense is that there are broadly two types of demands: Cyclical demands: Beijing often does one-off purchases of big-ticket items to ally Washington's ire over trade. This time, it would have the added benefit for Trump of coming right ahead of the midterm election. Trump's request on March 8 for an immediate $100 billion reduction in the trade deficit could fall in this category. Structural demands: If Trump seeks to be a game changer in the U.S.-China relationship, then he will demand accelerated structural reforms: for instance, a lasting decrease in the deficit due to a permanent opening of market access. He could also begin pushing a "mirror tax" on trade (reciprocal tariffs) so as to reduce the gap between the U.S. and China, which is less justifiable now that China is an economic juggernaut (Chart 6). Trump could also demand action on several long-standing U.S. requests: Chart 6Not All That Much Daylight On U.S.-China Tariff Rates Opening foreign investment access to a broad range of sectors (beyond finance), such as transportation, logistics, information technology, or even telecommunications; The right to operate wholly U.S.-owned companies in China; An open capital account and truly free-floating currency; Subsidy cuts for state-owned enterprises (SOEs); Full digital access for U.S. tech companies; An improved arbitration system for legal disputes. Since rapidly implementing many of these demands could threaten China's stability or even undermine the Communist Party, Trump may have to use the threat of sweeping tariffs to try to force them through. The current news flow suggests that Trump is favoring cyclical solutions. At the same time, we expect China to make at least some significant structural compromises: China does not want a trade war. China is more exposed to the U.S. than the U.S. is to China (Chart 7). Moreover, China's political system is rigid and opposed to mass unemployment. The last time China allowed mass layoffs was in 1999, and even then the state controlled the process. A trade war, by contrast, would threaten 223 million manufacturing employees with uncontrolled job losses. The central government is focused on stability; while it will insist on "saving face" internationally through tit-for-tat measures, it will go to great lengths to avoid a negative spiral. This will require compromises. China wants structural reform. Xi Jinping is rebooting a reform agenda that requires transitioning away from old industries. These reforms are long overdue and Xi can parlay many of them to pacify Trump. For instance, China has improved the market-orientation of the renminbi, causing Trump to cease his complaints about currency manipulation (Chart 8). China currently claims it is about to increase imports and open its financial sector further to foreign investment. Chart 7China More Exposed To U.S., But Not By Much Chart 8China: Structural Reform As Trade Concession The jury is still out on the deepest structural issues. We expect Xi's latest reform push to surprise to the upside, but it is not clear how far he will go. For instance, while Beijing might begin to ease capital controls imposed in 2016, it would be a shock if it agreed to rapidly liberalize the capital account. The same goes for granting extensive access to strategic sectors, downgrading state support for SOEs, or moderating cyber controls that punish U.S. companies. Any promises of gradual progress on these issues will likely be seen by the U.S. as no different from past promises to past presidents. Hence everything depends on whether Trump will be satisfied by token Beijing actions that look good ahead of the midterms. It is ominous that China has already drastically cut steel and aluminum overcapacity, and yet Trump imposed tariffs anyway. This kind of delayed retribution could become a pattern. Bottom Line: China has the means to prevent a trade war through significant compromises that Trump can advertise as "wins" to his domestic audience this November. If Trump accepts these concessions, the risk of trade war will effectively be removed until the next major electoral test in 2020. However, Trump lacks constitutional and legal constraints on the use of tariffs, which means that he can override China's offers and instigate a trade war anyway. This risk has a fair probability, given midterm politics and the fact that overall U.S.-China interdependency, the key economic constraint to conflict, has eroded over the past decade. A Bellwether: The Intellectual Property Investigation The immediate bellwether for the Trump administration's appetite for trade war will be Trump's handling of the Section 301 investigation on technology transfer, intellectual property (IP), and innovation. A ruling is due no later than August 18, but reports indicate action could come quickly.9 Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974 is the prime law by which the U.S. seeks to enforce trade agreements, resolve disputes, and open markets. Under this law, the U.S. executive - i.e. the president - can impose trade sanctions against countries deemed to be violating trade agreements or engaging in unreasonable or discriminatory trade practices. The law is specific in addressing intellectual property violations and closed market access, and yet broad in giving the executive leeway to interpret "unjustifiable" practices and mete out punishment. It does, however, require negotiations with the foreign trading partner to remedy the situation before the U.S. imposes duties or other remedies. We expect the U.S. to draw a hard line. A close look reveals that this Section 301 probe is primarily addressing strategic problems, not trade problems. To be fair, the U.S.'s trade grievances have merit. Clearly there is room for China to improve the IP trade balance. The ratio of IP receipts versus IP payments shows that the U.S. is a world-leader, while China is an extreme IP laggard, as one would expect (Chart 9). And yet the U.S. barely runs a trade surplus with China in IP, and far less of a surplus than with Taiwan and Korea, which are more advanced than China and thus ought to be more competitive with the U.S. than China (Chart 10). The U.S. appears particularly disadvantaged in the Chinese market when it comes to computer software and trademarks (Chart 11), judging by its IP exports to similar Asian partners. Chart 9China Is An Innovation Laggard... Chart 10... Yet Its IP Deficit With U.S. Is Small Also, in many cases Chinese companies have gained a dominant share of new markets, like e-commerce, where the U.S. would have a larger share if it had been allowed to compete fairly in the nascent stages. The U.S. wants to prevent this from happening again. The "Made In China 2025" program, for example, combines ambitious goals in supercomputers, robotics, medical devices, and smart cars, while setting domestic localization targets that would favor Chinese companies over foreigners (Chart 12). China will have to compromise on this program to stave off tariffs. Chart 11China Skirting Fees On U.S. Software? Chart 12China's High-Tech Protectionism Nevertheless, China is a large and growing market for U.S. high-tech goods, intellectual property, and services exports (Chart 13). A comparison with Taiwan and South Korea suggests that China could open up greater access to these U.S. exports (Chart 14). The truth is that, unlike with staunch ally Japan, the U.S. harbors deep misgivings about China's strategic intentions. This is why it limits high-tech exports to China - which, as Beijing often points out, creates an abnormal imbalance in this column of the trade book (Chart 15). Chart 13U.S. Tech And IP Exports To China Growing Chart 14China Could Give U.S. More Market Share Chart 15U.S. Deficit Due To Security Concerns Thus while the trade concerns above are not to be scoffed at, the Section 301 probe is clearly about U.S. security. The main practices under investigation are: Forced technology transfer by means of joint-venture (JV) requirements, ownership caps, government procurement, and administrative or regulatory interventions; Unfair licensing and contracting pricing, and abuses of proprietary technology; State-backed investment and/or acquisitions in the U.S. to acquire cutting-edge tech and IP; Cyber-espionage and intrusion to acquire tech and IP. Only one of these is about market pricing. The others speak to the U.S. belief that the Communist Party has orchestrated a "techno-nationalist" agenda that combines aggressive and illegal acquisitions with domestic protectionism. In particular, Chinese companies have made strategic acquisitions in the U.S. through shell companies with state funds or state guidance to access critical technologies and IP, while forcing American companies operating in China to transfer over the same as a precondition to operate there.10 Washington fears that if Beijing' strategy continues unabated, high-tech Chinese companies will be able to gain the best western technology, grow uninhibited in the massive domestic market with state financial support, and then launch competitive operations on a global scale. Moreover, the lack of division between China's ruling party, state apparatus, and corporate sector means that technologies acquired by Chinese companies can be directly appropriated by the country's military and intelligence apparatus to the detriment of the strategic balance with the U.S. How will the U.S. retaliate? We are unsure, and therein lies the risk for the market.11 Trump has floated the idea of levying a large "fine" or indemnity on China for past IP violations. The U.S. believes that IP theft amounts to a "second trade deficit" with China, with estimates of annual losses ranging from $200 billion to nearly $600 billion.12 U.S. remedies will become clearer when the USTR offers its recommendations. Bottom Line: The Section 301 probe is not about the trade deficit alone. It is about the growing tension between U.S. and China in a broader strategic context. We would expect the USTR to propose trade remedies that are more significant than the recent steel and aluminum tariffs. And we would expect Trump to impose some punitive measures. This is a source of near-term risk to markets, as the U.S. and China are less likely to manage their disputes smoothly than in the past. We are short China-exposed U.S. stocks relative to their domestic-oriented peers. China's NPC Session: On Track For Downside Risk Surprises Chart 16Downward Revisions In Chinese Growth China's NPC session is not yet over but some preliminary takeaways are in order. The headlines focused on Xi Jinping's power grab, but for us the real relevance was economic policy. Signs of economic policy tightening are not as hawkish as we expected, but the bias remains in favor of slower growth and tighter monetary, fiscal, and financial policy. The 6.5% GDP growth target was not a surprise. China has various economic targets to meet in 2020 under existing economic plans; only after that does it say it will scrap GDP targets altogether. The GDP target is a fabrication but the point is that the direction is down. Local government GDP targets suggest downward revision as well (Chart 16). To put a point on it, there is no evidence that China's cyclical slowdown is on the cusp of reversing (Table 2).13 Table 2No Convincing Signs Of An Impending Upturn In China's Economy In this context, it is notable that the government got rid of official targets for monetary growth (M2). This confirms the view of our colleagues at BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy that China has been targeting interest rates instead of the quantity of money since 2015 (Chart 17).14 This means that M2 growth can rise or fall as high or as low as necessary to meet the PBoC's interest rate targets. The takeaway for now is that M2 growth can go lower than the recent 8%-9% range in which it has been moving, since the current policy is to "control" money growth and avoid systemic risk. The new leadership at the People's Bank of China will have a challenge to establish its credibility, which means that accommodative compromises may not come as quickly as some expect. Chart 17A New Monetary Policy Regime On the fiscal front, China implied some tightening by lowering its official budget deficit target to 2.6%. Past reports show that China always meets its budget deficit targets perfectly (Chart 18), suggesting that the target is either meaningless or Beijing has a steely discipline unseen in the rest of the world. The IMF publishes an augmented budget deficit which, at 12% of GDP, gives a better indication of why authorities want to maintain control, if not outright tighten the reins (Chart 19).15 The Finance Ministry rushed to dampen speculation that this budget deficit reduction would amount to austerity. Approximately 550 billion yuan of additional "special purpose bonds" - issued by local governments to finance infrastructure projects - will be issued in 2018. This could amount to new spending worth 2% of last year's total spending, i.e. not a negligible sum. The purpose may be to smooth over the conclusion of the local government debt swap program that began in 2014. The debt swap program was a "game changer" by allowing local governments to exchange high-interest or short-term debt for low-interest, long-term, government-backed debt. Now Beijing is winding down the program and telling local governments that new bond issuance will not have the implicit guarantee of the central government, and will face higher interest rates. Chart 18China's Budget Deficit Target Is Meaningless Chart 19China's Real Budget Deficit Is Large Similarly, Beijing has been attempting to provide formal banks more freedom to lend to offset its crackdown on shadow banks. Pursuant to this goal, it announced that required provisions for non-performing loans (NPLs) will be reduced from 150% of NPLs to 120%. Banks are already holding excess provisions, and provisions have been trending upwards. Meanwhile China's official NPL count is unbelievably low, warranting higher provisions. So it is not clear to what extent banks will lend more as a result of lower requirements. January and February credit numbers imply that credit policy remains tight even aside from the wind-down of the local government debt swap (Chart 20). The dust has not yet settled on the NPC session and we will soon examine some of the other policy announcements, like tax cuts for small businesses and infrastructure spending reductions. However, the implication so far is that the Communist Party wants to keep the fiscal deficit and total social financing flat this year. If this policy were executed faithfully, the fiscal and credit impulse would be zero this year. Simultaneously, new data revealed that, in keeping with the reform reboot, the Xi administration is allowing creative destruction to improve efficiency in the corporate sector. Bankruptcies rocketed upward in 2017 and this trend should continue (Chart 21). This is a notable development given the widespread perception that China does not know how to deal with social consequences of structural reforms. It suggests that policymakers have a higher threshold for economic pain. Chart 20Credit Growth Is Slowing Chart 21Creative Destruction Is Rising Finally, the new anti-corruption super-ministry, the National Supervisory Commission, has now received legislative clearance. It is still unclear how the new body will operate in practice. We maintain that on the margin it should be negative for economic growth due to the micro-level impact of corruption probes on local government officials and local state enterprises. Notably, some of the provinces whose GDP-weighted economic growth targets were the most aggressively revised downwards (Tianjin, Chongqing, Inner Mongolia) are also provinces that have been hit heavily with anti-corruption probes, accusations of falsifying data, and canceled infrastructure projects over the past year. The anti-corruption campaign is a tool for enforcing central party dictates more effectively, and at present those dictates call for minimizing systemic financial risk, including misallocation of capital by local authorities (Chart 22). Chart 22Anti-Corruption Campaign Encourages Downward GDP Revisions? Bottom Line: Policy settings in China will continue to constrain growth this year. Now that the policy shift toward accelerated reform is more evident, the downside risks of that move will become apparent. We are closing our long China H-shares versus EM trade for a gain of 3%. North Korea: This Time Is Different A brief concluding word on North Korea. While we did not expect that Trump and Kim would arrange to meet so soon, we are not surprised by the fact that the diplomatic track is moving forward. As we wrote in January, Trump demonstrated a credible military threat, forcing China to implement sanctions, which subsequently caused North Korea to stop testing missiles. Trump effectively called Kim Jong Un's bluff, daring him to go beyond missile and nuclear device tests. Instead of ratcheting up tensions, Kim declared victory on the nuclear deterrent and proclaimed the end of the crisis. This is the "Arc of Diplomacy" about which we have written (Chart 23).16 We reject the view in the media that Trump's policy has been erratic and that China is getting left on the sidelines of a Trump-Kim meet-up. China has cut off exports to North Korea (Chart 24), which in turn has cut off the regime's access to hard currency. Because of China, Kim literally cannot afford not to negotiate. Chart 23Credible Threat Cycle: North Korea Mirrors Iran Chart 24China Gives Kim To Trump For the same reason, Kim is not likely to be bluffing or stalling: with limited conventional military capabilities, Kim cannot dial up and dial down the level of tensions at will. If he provokes the U.S. anew, he risks provoking a war that would destroy his regime. Moreover, from the moment he came to power, Supreme Leader Kim established a desire to elevate the importance of economic reforms within state policy, which is impossible without dealing with China and the U.S. to create a favorable international setting. From the U.S. side, Trump has likely notched up a major national security victory that will enhance his credibility in the 2018 midterms and especially 2020 elections. A clear risk to our view that Trump will take protectionist action toward China this year is that he will need China's continued cooperation, as it could relax sanctions enforcement. However, the strategic significance of the Section 301 investigation means that Trump cannot afford to sacrifice his trade agenda so soon. While bad news from North Korea seldom has a substantial impact on markets, our South Korean curve steepener benefited. So far it has returned 2.9%. The JPY/EUR has fallen back from a strong February rally, but we remain long. Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Understated In 2018," dated April 12, 2017, Weekly Report, "Geopolitics - From Overstated To Understated Risks," dated November 22, 2017, and Special Report, "Three Questions For 2018," dated December 13, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 In September we highlighted that the North Korean threat cycle had peaked. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Equities And Bonds Continue To Rally?" dated September 20, 2017, and Special Report, "BCA Geopolitical Strategy 2017 Report Card," dated December 20, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Five Black Swans In 2018," dated December 6, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 The Apprentice-style personnel reshuffle that has seen Peter Navarro, director of the National Trade Council, elevated above the departed Gary Cohn, has signaled the return of the protectionist agenda. 5 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump's Tariffs: A Q&A," dated March 9, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "NAFTA - Populism Vs. Pluto-Populism," dated November 10, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think, Part II," dated November 6, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Not $1 billion, as Trump erroneously tweeted! 9 One year after the date of initiation is likely August 18, the date used in the USTR's description in the Federal Register, although President Trump signed off on August 14 which could mark an earlier deadline. Please see Andrew Restuccia and Adam Behsudi, "Trump Eyes Another Trade Crackdown," Politico, March 7, 2018, available at www.politico.com. Note that according to the text of the law, by late May, the U.S. Trade Representative could report that China is making sufficient progress and further action unnecessary (but this is unlikely). The recent handling of the Section 232 investigation into steel and aluminum suggests that punitive measures will be foreshadowed by public statements from U.S. officials. 10 For detailed assessments, please see USTR, "2017 Special 301 Report," which puts China at the top of the priority watch list; USTR, "2017 Report To Congress On China's WTO Compliance," January 2018; U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, "2017 Report To Congress," November 2017. 11 As a frame of reference, in the dispute over U.S. beef exports to the EU, a prominent Section 301 case, the U.S. imposed 100% ad valorem tariffs on 34 products from the EU in 1999 until 2009. However, Trump's actions are likely to go well beyond this due to the strategic nature of the dispute. Not only can he impose tariffs on 100 or more specific goods - since Chinese IP violations run the gamut - but also he can impose restrictions on Chinese investment through the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S. (CFIUS), which is tightening scrutiny on China in general. 12 The $600 billion "high water mark" estimate comes from the former Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair and former director of the National Security Agency Keith Alexander. They also emphasize that the U.S. has additional retaliatory options (outside of the 1974 trade law) under the Economic Espionage Act, Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the National Defense Authorization Act. Please see "China's Intellectual Property Theft Must Stop," The New York Times, August 15, 2017, available at www.nytimes.com. 13 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China And The Risk Of Escalation," dated March 7, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 14 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB," dated November 23, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 15 At the same time, the government issued guidelines suggesting that scrutiny of local government budgets, and specifically expenditures, will get stricter. The cancellation of subway/metro projects is already a trend that is well underway, but other inefficient projects and capital misallocation could be targeted next. 16 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire," dated April 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Geopolitical Calendar