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Highlights Chinese growth will slow next year, but underlying momentum remains strong. Jerome Powell is the most likely choice for Fed chair. However, no matter who is selected, the general thrust of monetary policy will not change radically next year. The transatlantic interest rate spread is not particularly wide considering that the output gap is larger in the euro area, while the neutral rate and expected inflation are lower. U.S. growth should surprise on the upside over the next few quarters, as already evidenced by the rebound in the economic surprise index. This will give the Fed greater scope to raise rates. We expect EUR/USD to reach $1.15 by the end of the year. Feature China: Let's Get This Party Congress Started China's 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China kicked off this week. As widely expected, President Xi Jinping lauded the successes that China has enjoyed over the past few years in his opening speech, but cautioned that more must be done to reduce corruption, clean up the environment, and expedite market reforms.1 We expect Chinese growth to slow modestly in 2018 from the current above-trend pace, as the government pares back stimulus efforts. Nevertheless, the underlying trend in growth will remain reasonably solid. Chart 1 shows that real-time measures of economic activity such as electricity production, excavator sales, and railway freight traffic are all growing at a healthy pace. Despite the introduction of some tightening measures this spring, the housing market remains resilient. The share of households planning to buy a new home is close to record high levels, while the amount of land purchased by developers - a good leading indicator for housing starts - has continued to accelerate (Chart 2). Chinese property developer stocks have been on a tear this year, outperforming even the red-hot tech sector. With housing inventory levels at multi-year lows, home prices should stay firm. In the industrial sector, rampant producer price deflation last year has given way to modest inflation this year. This has boosted industrial profits, which should support corporate spending in the months ahead (Chart 3). Chart 1Chinese Economy: No Need To Be Pessimistic Chart 2Chinese Housing Market Remains Resilient Chart 3Boost In Industrial Profits Bodes Well For Corporate Spending Both money and credit growth surprised on the upside in September. As we have argued before, copious private-sector savings will forestall a credit crunch and, at least for the foreseeable future, permit the government to run large off-balance sheet budget deficits in an effort to support aggregate demand (Chart 4). Indeed, for all the talk about slowing credit growth, medium- and long-term bank lending to nonfinancial corporations - probably the best single measure of credit flows to the real economy - has continued to accelerate this year (Chart 5). Investors should continue to overweight Chinese stocks relative to the EM aggregate. Chart 4China's Fiscal Deficit Has Been Increasing Chart 5Credit To Real Economy Accelerating Musical (Fed) Chairs News reports indicate that President Trump has winnowed down the list of candidates for Fed chair to five individuals: Chief economic advisor Gary Cohn, current Fed Governor Jerome Powell, former governor Kevin Warsh, Stanford university economist John Taylor, and current chair Janet Yellen. We suspect that Cohn will not make the cut, given his apparent falling out with Trump following the President's remarks about the Charlottesville protests. Warsh and Taylor are likely to be seen as too hawkish. That just leaves Powell and Yellen. Chair Yellen's relatively dovish views on monetary policy would likely sit well with Trump, but she has two major strikes against her. One, she has generally been in favor of more financial sector regulation, which is anathema to Trump. Two, Trump accused her of abetting Hillary Clinton during the election campaign. Keeping her as Fed Chair (assuming she would actually want the job) might convey the message that he is no longer interested in shaking up the existing institutional order in Washington DC. This just leaves Powell as the default candidate, who reportedly has received the blessing of Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin. The prevailing wisdom is that Powell is a moderate who is only slightly more hawkish than Yellen. But the truth is that we don't really know where he stands because he has no academic publication record and has generally steered clear of taking bold views on monetary policy. Such a potentially malleable mind may be exactly what Trump is seeking! Still, the organizational structure of the Fed makes it impossible for the chair to run roughshod over other FOMC members. This suggests that no matter who is selected, the general thrust of monetary policy will not change radically next year. Thoughts On The Transatlantic Yield Spread I have been visiting clients in Europe this week and questions about the relative stance of monetary policy between the U.S. and the euro area have come up in almost every meeting. The gap between U.S. and euro area rate expectations has narrowed since the start of the year, helping to push the euro higher. Nevertheless, most interest rate spreads remain elevated by historic standards. This has led many commentators to speculate that they will continue to shrink, putting further upward pressure on EUR/USD. For example, the U.S. 5-year Overnight Index Swap rate currently stands at 1.82%. This compares to only 0.02% in the euro area. The current level of spreads can be partly explained by the fact that labor market slack is still substantially higher in the euro area than in the U.S. Outside of Germany, labor underutilization is still 6.3 percentage points higher across the euro area than in 2008 (Chart 6). In contrast, our work suggests that the U.S. labor market has returned to full employment.2 Chart 6Euro Area: Labor Market Slack Still High Outside Of Germany This is not to say that transatlantic interest rate spreads won't narrow over the coming years. They will. But what matters for investors is how spreads evolve relative to market expectations. The market is already pricing in roughly 50 basis points of spread compression in five-year rates between now and 2022. If one looks further out to 2027, the spread in expected policy rates stands at 94 basis points.3 That may still seem like a lot, but keep in mind that inflation expectations in the euro area are well below those of the U.S. The CPI swap market is predicting that U.S. inflation will exceed euro area inflation by 67 basis points over the next decade. All things equal, lower inflation in the euro area implies that nominal interest rates should be lower there too. Moreover, many euro area government bond markets trade at a discount due to country-specific default/denomination risks. While these risks have faded, they have not gone away. As such, GDP-weighted euro area government bond yields - which are arguably what the ECB cares most about - are generally higher than swap rates of the same maturity. In Search Of Fair Value Chart 7The Neutral Rate Is Lower In The Euro Area A reasonable estimate is that the market currently sees the real terminal rate in the U.S. as being roughly 40 basis points higher than in the euro area. As it happens, this is almost identical to the gap in the neutral rate between the two regions that Williams, Laubach, and Holston have calculated (Chart 7). Does that mean that the current transatlantic spread is close to fair value? Not quite. One of things that has become apparent over the past eight years is that euro area membership comes at a high price. When countries such as Italy and Spain are hit by adverse economic shocks, they are limited in how they can respond. They cannot devalue their currency because they do not have a currency to devalue; and they cannot loosen fiscal policy for fear of being attacked by the bond vigilantes. All they can do is suffer from grinding deflation in the hopes of regaining competitiveness through weak wage growth. This means that over the long haul, unemployment in the euro area is likely to be above NAIRU more often than in the U.S. This, in turn, implies that euro area policy rates will, on average, be below their neutral value more often than in the U.S. Thus, even if the gap in the real neutral rate between the two regions were 40 basis points, the expected gap in policy rates should be larger than that. Modest Downside For EUR/USD The discussion above suggests that the transatlantic interest rate spread is not especially wide if one looks further out in time. If U.S. growth surprises on the upside over the coming months, while euro area growth flatlines, spreads will widen again. Such an outcome is, in fact, quite likely. U.S. financial conditions have eased significantly relative to those of the euro area since the start of the year (Chart 8). To the extent that changes in financial conditions lead growth by about 6-to-9 months, the U.S. could start outperforming the euro area as we enter 2018. The fact the Goldman's Sachs' U.S. Current Activity Indicator has hooked higher and the economic surprise index has rebounded smartly is early evidence that this process may have already begun (Chart 9). We see EUR/USD falling to 1.15 by the end of the year. Chart 8Diverging Financial Conditions ##br##Favor U.S. Over The Euro Area Chart 9Early Evidence That U.S. May ##br##Outperform Euro Area Next Year Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Geopolitical Strategy / China Investment Strategy Special Report, "How To Read Xi Jinping's Party Congress Speech," dated October 18, 2017. 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "A Secular Bottom In Inflation," dated July 28, 2017; and "What's the Matter With Wages?" dated August 11, 2017. 3 We estimate the expected policy rates ten years out by looking at one-month, 10-year forward OIS rates (i.e., the market's expectation of where one-month OIS rates will be ten years from today). Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
Highlights U.S. credit growth is set to improve as capex has more upside and households benefits from a positive backdrop. The U.S. has substantially more room to increase leverage than the rest of the G10, pointing toward further monetary divergences. The euro is not very cheap and is trading at a significant premium to forward rate differentials. It is thus at risk if U.S. rates can rise vis-à-vis Europe. Chinese underlying inflation is becoming elevated, which could prompt additional tightening by the PBoC. Moreover, Xi Jinping's speech this week suggests a move away from the debt-fueled, investment-led growth model. The AUD is at risk. Feature A general lack of credit growth has been one of the key factors hampering both broader growth and inflation in the U.S. Not only has this muted activity and weak pricing pressure kept the Federal Reserve on the easier side of policy, the absence of lending growth has further depressed real rates as demand for loanable funds remains low. Can credit pick up from here, and what are the implications for the USD? Room For Optimism There are good reasons to lean a bit more on the positive side regarding the U.S. credit growth outlook. As Chart I-1 illustrates, U.S. commercial and industrial loan growth seems to be rebounding. Confirming that this impulse could gain momentum, it follows an easing in lending standards and a pick-up in durable goods orders - two leading indicators of business borrowings. Household debt is also showing some signs of revival. While the annual growth rate of household borrowings from banks has yet to trough, the annualized quarterly growth rate has picked up significantly - a development that tends to precede accelerations in the yearly measure. Moreover, this improvement is broad based among all the key components of household borrowings (Chart I-2). Chart I-1Upside For U.S. C&I Loans... Chart I-2... And For Household Debt As Well This has positive implications for U.S. nonfinancial private credit, which has been in the process of forming a shallow bottom relative to GDP. Moreover, based on the low level of debt servicing costs for both households and businesses, this trend has room to develop (Chart I-3). However, most of the increase in the debt-to-GDP since 1994 has been caused by financial engineering, with firms swapping equity for debt in their capital structure, and has therefore not lifted domestic demand nor created inflationary pressures. However, we posit that this phenomenon is toward its tail end, and that additional debt accretion could have a meaningful impact on growth. Why? On the business front, capex - an essential but volatile component of aggregate demand - is set to accelerate further. Business investment is led by firms' capex intentions, a series that has surged since the summer of 2016 (Chart I-4, top panel). Confirming the message from this indicator, profits from U.S.-listed businesses have also sharply rebounded, a signal that leads capex by a year, as highlighted last Monday by Anastasios Avgeriou, who heads BCA's U.S. Equity Sector Strategy service (Chart I-4, bottom panel).1 Chart I-3The U.S. Has Room To Relever Chart I-4Capex Outlook Looks Good On the household front, three factors support our assessment: First, household nominal and real wages and salaries should enjoy further upside as the labor market remains very healthy. This means more consumption and more capacity to accumulate debt, especially as household financial obligations remain near multi-generational lows (Chart I-5). In fact, U.S. real median household income already hit an all-time high in 2016. Chart I-5Supports To Household Consumption Second, household confidence is still near record-high levels, a factor which tends to lead credit growth and consumption. Optimistic households are more likely to spend their income gains and buy durable goods like houses or apartments, especially as the household formation rate has regained vigor. Third, U.S. net wealth has hit 430% of disposable income, a record, which will keep supporting consumption. As households see their net worth increase, they can boost consumption and debt as their leverage ratios improve, especially when financial obligation ratios are as low as they are today. These factors point toward a continued increase in the indebtedness of the U.S. private sector, one which this time we anticipate will add to demand through investments, real estate purchases and general consumption. This also means that real rates are likely to experience upside. More debt-fueled aggregate demand implies more demand for loanable funds, and thus higher real rates. In an economy operating near full capacity, it can also lift inflation. Tax cuts and fiscal stimulus would only be a bonus in this environment. This should give the Fed room to increase interest rates in line with its dot plot, or more than the two-and-a-half hikes priced into the OIS curve over the next two years. However, as 2017 has vividly demonstrated, movements in U.S. rates alone are not enough to make a call on the U.S. dollar. One needs to have a sense of how U.S. rates could evolve vis-à-vis the rest of the world. In the context of debt accumulation, we are optimistic that the U.S. could experience a re-leveraging relative to the rest of the G10, putting upward pressures on U.S. real rates relative to the rest of the world. To begin with, U.S. non-financial private credit stands at 150% of GDP, a drop of 20% of GDP since its peak in 2009. The rest of the G10 has not experienced the same extent of post-financial crisis deleveraging, and nonfinancial private credit there still hovers around 175% of GDP (Chart I-6). Today, the indebtedness of the U.S. relative to other advanced economies is near its lowest levels of the past 50 years. Debt levels are obviously not the only consideration; the ability to service that debt also must enter the equation to judge the capacity of an economy to accumulate debt relative to the rest of the world. Currently, according to the BIS, the debt-service ratios of the U.S. nonfinancial private sector still stand well below the GDP-weighted average of the rest of the G10 (Chart I-7). This also highlights that the U.S. has plenty of room to have both higher debt accumulation and higher real rates than the rest of the G10. Chart I-6U.S. Vs. G10: Debt Upside Chart I-7Lower Private Sector Debt-Servicing Costs In The U.S. This should support the dollar in 2018. As Chart I-8 shows, 10-year bond yield differentials between the U.S. and other large advanced economies lead tops in the dollar by one year. To highlight this relationship, this chart de-trends the DXY by plotting it as a deviation from its 10-year moving average. Not only does the current trend in real rate differentials already point to a higher dollar, but room for more debt accumulation in the U.S. relative to the rest of the G10 supports the notion that the elevated level of spreads could even expand, implying the era of monetary divergence has yet to end. As we highlighted last week, the dollar may not be as expensive as seems at first glance. We have expanded on our 'modelization' exercise this week, using methods employed by the Swiss National Bank to incorporate the Balassa -Samuelsson effect.2, 3 This metric, which incorporates the relative price of manufactured goods in each economy, further confirm our assessment from last week that the dollar is not expensive enough to warrant a sell-signal (Chart I-9). Thus, with competitiveness a non-issue for the dollar for now, the USD is likely to be able to take advantage of potentially supportive real interest rate spreads. Chart I-8Real Rates Point To A Higher Peak For The USD Chart I-9U.S. Only Sightly Expensive On the technical side, our U.S. Dollar Capitulation Index hit very depressed levels earlier this year, but is now rebounding. Crucially, it has moved meaningfully back above its 13-week moving average, an event which normally characterizes uptrends in the dollar (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Dollar: From Bearish To Bullish Mood Bottom Line: The U.S. economy looks set to enjoy an episode of rising debt supporting increasing economic activity and higher rates as capex should grow further and a supportive backdrop continues to emerge for households - whether or not tax cuts happen. Because the U.S. private sector has comparatively healthy balance sheets relative to the rest of the G10, this means that U.S. re-leveraging should outpace the rest of the world. Even if this U.S. re-leveraging is only a cyclical phenomenon and not a resumption of the debt super-cycle, it would imply that monetary policy divergences have yet to reach their apex, and thus the dollar could experience additional upside. Even Against The Euro? We tend to view the euro as the anti-dollar. It is the main vehicle to play both uptrends and downtrends in the dollar and it is also the most liquid instrument, backed with an economy similarly sized as the U.S. Thus, the views expressed above would imply a negative slant on EUR/USD. Such a framework can give an impetus to a EUR/USD view, but is also not enough. Indeed, factors more specific to this pair argue that EUR/USD does have downside. When it comes to valuations, using the SNB's methodology, the EUR/USD is more or less the mirror image of the DXY. This pair is slightly cheap, essentially within the statistical definition of fairly valued (Chart I-11). Thus, valuations alone are fully neutral for the euro. This means EUR/USD remains prisoner to relative interest rate dynamics. On this front, a key driver of this pair paints a risky picture for euro bulls. The 1-year/1-year forward risk-free rate spread between the euro area and the U.S. has been a reliable guide of the EUR/USD's trend for the past 12 years. Yet, the euro's rally has not been matched by a similar move in this spread. As a result, the gap between the currency pair and its rates-implied fair value is at its highest since the summer of 2014 (Chart I-12). Chart I-11Euro: Not That Cheap Chart I-12Forward Interest Rates Point To Euro Risk But then again, the differential between the European and U.S. 1-year/1-year forward risk-free rate is at its lowest ever over the time frame of this chart. However, it was even lower than current levels in 1999 and 1997. This suggests that if the U.S. can re-leverage relative to the rest of the G10, the spread could grow as negative as it was in these two previous instances. Supporting this assessment, we anticipate U.S. inflation to outperform euro area measures going forward. Last week, we explored the reasons why we see an upcoming uptick in U.S. inflation next year: U.S. financial conditions have eased, American velocity of money has increased, pipeline inflationary pressures are growing and underlying wage growth seems to be improving.4 Meanwhile, European financial conditions have tightened, especially against the U.S., which historically leads to an underperformance of European inflation measures. Very importantly, the euro area core CPI diffusion index has rolled over and is now below 50%, suggesting that euro area core CPI has limited upside (Chart I-13). This means potential downside vis-à-vis the U.S. and room for upside in U.S. rates relative to the euro area, especially as the European Central Bank is likely to craft its message carefully next week when it announces the tapering of its asset purchases, to prevent quick upward movement in interest rate expectations. Additionally, the dollar is still quite under-owned by speculators relative to the euro. Our favorite positioning measure, which sums long bets in the euro with short bets on the DXY - two equivalent wagers - continues to hover near record-high levels, suggesting potential downside in EUR/USD (Chart I-14). This continues to highlight the risks to the euro created by a repricing of the Fed. Chart I-13Euro Area CPI Peaking? Chart I-14Excess Bullishness In Euro Intact Bottom Line: The euro is obviously at risk if the dollar gets lifted by rising economic activity and indebtedness in the U.S., even if this cyclical upswing in debt does not represent a resumption of the debt super-cycle. Moreover, 1-year/1-year forward rates differentials point to heightened EUR/USD vulnerability, especially if U.S. inflation bottoms relative to the euro area. Moreover, long euro bets have yet to be washed out, deepening the EUR/USD's vulnerability. A Few Words On China Chart I-15China: Good Reasons For Policy Tightening Despite a marginal slowdown in Chinese real GDP growth and slightly disappointing industrial production and fixed asset investment numbers for the third quarter, some key Chinese economic activity metrics have been very robust. Imports are growing at a 19% annual pace, credit growth continues to outperform expectations and electricity production and excavator sales remain robust. Should this make investors bullish on China plays? In our view, two key risks lurk on the horizon. The first is monetary tightening. Pricing pressures in China are growing and are looking increasingly genuine. As Chart I-15 shows, core CPI is clocking in at 2.3%, the highest level since 2010-2011, a level which in the past prompted monetary tightening by the Chinese authorities. Additionally, services inflation - a purely domestic sector and thus one reflective of domestic inflationary pressures - is now above 3% and accelerating. Also, PPI has re-accelerated to 6.9%, pointing to a paucity of deflationary forces in the Chinese economy that could potentially give the People's Bank of China the green light to tighten further. We would expect the rise in the Shibor 7-day rate to continue and monetary conditions, which have been tightening since the end of 2016, to become an even bigger handicap in the future. The second risk lies around the Communist Party Congress underway in Beijing. Xi Jinping's marathon speech highlighted his vision for Chinese socialism in a new era. Xi is very clearly dedicated to the primacy of the Chinese communist party. He did highlight, however, that the new principal problem for the Chinese population is the need for a better life, with less imbalances, less inequalities. This fits with his previously revealed policy preferences. As Matt Gertken, who heads the Asian efforts on our Geopolitical Strategy team, has shown, Xi's administration has massively increased spending to protect the environment and increased financial regulation (Table 1).5 These preferences fit in the optic of addressing China's new principal problems: too much pollution and too much debt. Table 1Fiscal Priorities Of Recent Chinese Presidents Moreover, the continued fight against corruption also fits into that mold. It is a key tool to maintain the legitimacy of the Communist party, and a popular way to address some of the inequalities and imbalances plaguing China today. What does this mean? China has continued to accumulate debt over the past 10 years, with debt to GDP increasing by nearly 120% between 2008 and 2017 (Chart I-16). If a window is opening to tighten monetary policy because inflationary pressures are growing while there is political will to combat inflation and imbalances, it is likely that investment - which pollutes heavily - and debt - a byproduct of large capex programs - could be curtailed. Moreover, the Chinese government still has the wherewithal to support aggregate economic activity through fiscal stimulus. In addition, in the context of the above, much fiscal stimulus could be deployed to fight pollution and decrease inequalities by supporting households. This means that while Chinese GDP growth is unlikely to weaken substantially, the capex intensity of the economy could decrease. So would imports of raw materials and capital goods. As a result, this could be a very negative environment for metals. Metals prices have rebounded sharply since 2016 as Chinese investment has increased. But now that policy could be tightened further and that Xi's new administration has more freedom to move away from an investment-heavy, deeply polluting growth model, the rally in metals could be at risk. Copper, a bellwether for the metals complex, has surged nearly 70% since 2016, and bullish sentiment on the red metal is now at levels historically associated with imminent corrections (Chart I-17). Chart I-16Is This What Deleveraging Looks Like? Chart I-17Tighter Policy And A Reform Push Put Metal At Risk This means that currencies for which metals prices are a key driver of terms of trade are at great risk, specifically the BRL, the CLP and the AUD. Moreover, the latter is expensive, having recently been buoyed by some positive economic numbers, and is now widely owned by very bullish investors. We have a short sell AUD/USD at 0.79 and our short AUD/NZD trade at 1.11 was triggered following the Labor/NZ First/Green coalition announced Thursday in New Zealand. Bottom Line: Chinese authorities are set to tighten monetary conditions further as domestic inflationary pressures are growing. Moreover, while short on details, this week's speech by Xi Jinping at the opening of the 19th Communist Party Congress in Beijing seemed to confirm that addressing imbalances, inequalities, and environmental problems will be a key objective of this administration. This points toward a less debt-/investment-driven economic model - at least until deflationary problems re-emerge. While overall GDP growth could be supported by targeted fiscal support, investment plays linked to Chinese capex and real estate could suffer. The AUD is at risk, and we are entering our proposed short AUD/NZD trade. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, titled “Top 5 Reasons To Favor Cyclicals Over Defensives” dated October 16, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 2 The Balassa Samuelson effect is an empirical observation that countries with higher productivity tend to experience an appreciating trend in there real exchange rate. Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled “Is The Dollar Expensive?”, dated October 13, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Samuel Reynard, “What Drives the Swiss Franc?” Swiss National Bank Working Papers (2008 – 14). 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled “Is The Dollar Expensive?”, dated October 13, 2017, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, titled “How To Read Xi Jinping’s Party Congress Speech”, dated October 18, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1 Chart II-2 U.S. data was mixed: Last week's CPI releases showed that inflation disappointed in September, with headline CPI increasing by only 2.2%, below the expected 2.3%; and Core CPI coming in at 1.7%, in line with expectations; However, long-term TIC data showed a large inflow of funds of USD 67.2 bn, much larger than the expected USD 14.3 bn. The labor market continues to tighten with initial jobless claims and continuing claims dropping to 222,000 and 1.888 million respectively. The DXY has rebounded this week on this news, and also helped by a somewhat disappointing ZEW survey from the euro area, but pared its gains on Wednesday. Regardless, positive developments in the U.S. fiscal space and disappearing slack will provide a tailwind for the greenback. Report Links: Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day -August 25, 2017 The Euro Chart II-3 Chart II-4 Data from the euro area has been mixed: Industrial production grew at an annual rate of 3.8% in August; The trade balance contracted to EUR 16.1 bn from EUR 23.2 bn on a non-seasonally-adjusted basis, but improved on a seasonally-adjusted basis. The final estimate for core CPI hit 1.1%, in line with expectations; The ZEW Survey dropped and underperformed expectations; Despite largely weak data, the euro has pared all of last week's losses. Markets may be pricing in Catalan developments as a bullish case. The Spanish government has threatened to enact Article 155 of the constitution if Catalonia does not comply, which will give Spain the authority to take measures to ensure compliance by the rogue region. Report Links: Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 The Yen Chart II-5 Chart II-6 Recent data in Japan has been mixed: Bank lending outperformed expectations, growing at a 3% year-on-year pace. Machinery orders yearly growth also outperformed to the upside, coming in at 4.4% However, the annual growth of both imports and exports underperformed expectations and declined significantly from last month, coming in at 12% and 14.1% respectively. The yen has remained relatively flat these past two weeks. Overall, we expect USD/JPY to have additional upside, given that the U.S. OIS curve is not pricing in enough rate hike over the next 2-years. Ultimately, the driver of USD/JPY will simply be U.S. rates as Japanese 10-year rates are capped near 0%. This situation is not likely to change any time soon, as the Japanese economy is still hampered by very low inflation. Report Links: Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day -August 25, 2017 British Pound Chart II-7 Chart II-8 Recent data in the U.K. has been mixed: Average hourly earnings outperformed expectations, growing at a 2.2% pace from a year ago. Both headline and core inflation came in line with expectations at 3% and 2.7% respectively. However, both retail sales and retail sales ex-fuel growth underperformed expectations, coming in at 1.2% and 1.6% respectively. Overall, we do not expect much more upside for the pound relative to the U.S. dollar, given that there is already a hike priced for November. At this point, the economic situation does not warrant any more hikes beyond just removing the emergency measures implemented after the Brexit fallout. Furthermore inflation has stopped climbing, and could start to come down in the coming months as the effects of the currency dissipate. Finally, Brexit negotiations have hit a bit of a temporary impass. Report Links: Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9 Chart II-10 The AUD has not seen much action this week. The RBA minutes highlighted that "slow growth in real wages and high levels of household debt were likely to be constraining influences". This is largely in line with our argument that spare capacity is limiting wage growth and inflation in the economy. Going forward, China remains a risk to our view, with the most recent import figures having provided a welcomed fillip to the AUD. Nevertheless, remarks by RBA Governors will limit the upside in the AUD. Expectations of a rate hike by the RBA depend upon growth numbers, which are unlikely to be achieved given the current trajectory of wages and consumer spending. Furthermore, high underemployment in the economy also remains a drag on spending, dampening the positive effect of a strong job report. Report Links: Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11 Chart II-12 Recent data in New Zealand has been mixed: Electronic card retail sales year-on-year growth declined form 4.4$ to 2.9%. Business NZ PMI softened from 57.9 to 57.5. However, headline inflation came in at 1.9%, rising from the previous month reading of 1.7% and outperforming expectations. The kiwi sold off by almost 2% yesterday, as Jacinda Ardern was elected as the new prime minister of New Zealand. The market is now pricing the risk that the Labor party, which Ardern leads, could change the mandate of the central bank from just targeting inflation to also seeking full employment. Moreover, Labor and its coalition partner, NZ First, want to curtail immigration, one of the tailwind to New Zealand growth. These development would structurally limit the upside for kiwi rates, acting as a headwinds to the New Zealand dollar. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Bad Breadth - July 7, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13 Chart II-14 The CAD has been somewhat strong recently due to developments in the oil market. KSA-Russia support for an extension of supply cuts to OPEC 2.0, as well as developments in Iraq, have pointed to an increase in prices. While the path for Canadian interest rates seem fairly priced, oil prices could buoy the CAD. Risks surrounding NAFTA remain, as President Trump stays inflexible with regards to tariffs, although this is likely to have a greater effect on Mexico than on Canada. Furthermore, albeit still in its infancy Morneau's tax plan, which is anticipated to mostly affect the richest of small business, could have an effect on investment intentions. Report Links: Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Investors - September 29, 2017 Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15 Chart II-16 Recent data in Switzerland has surprised to the upside: The unemployment rate decreased from 3.2% and 3.1%, outperforming expectations. Producer and import prices yearly growth came in at 0.8%, also surprising to the upside. Finally, the trade balance also outperformed, coming in at 2.918 billion dollars for September. It seems that the fall in the franc has been very positive to the Swiss economy. Overall, it would be difficult to see much more upside in EUR/CHF, as the euro already reflects euro area positives. That being said, we are reticent to be outright bearish on this cross as the economic data is still too weak for the SNB to change its monetary policy stance. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17 Chart II-18 Recent data in Norway has been negative: Manufacturing yearly output growth underperformed expectations, contracting at 5.7%. Both core and headline inflation also surprised to the downside, coming in at 1% and 1.6% against expectations of 1.2% and 1.7% respectively. Finally, the Norwegian trade balance declined from 12.4 billion dollars to 9.2 billion dollars USD/NOK has risen 3% since September, even as oil prices have continued their path upward. This was first and foremost reflective of the higher probability of rate hikes in the U.S. in December. Additionally, the recent Norwegian inflation and trade balance numbers are showing that the krone rebounds has tightened monetary conditions in this Scandinavian economy. Overall, we remain bullish on USD/NOK and bearish on EUR/NOK. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 10 Charts For A Late-August Day - August 25, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19 Chart II-20 The most recent inflation data was slightly weak, with CPI increasing by 0.1% monthly, and 2.1% yearly. Unemployment worsened as the rate rose to 6.2% from 6%. The krona depreciated against the euro on the news, but was flat against the dollar. Despite this temporary setback, PMIs are still perky across the board, and credit is hooking up. China and Europe's recent performance has likely provided a tailwind for growth, which should translate into higher inflation as capacity utilization is extremely tight. Furthermore, the depreciation of the SEK since the beginning of September has eased monetary conditions, making way for the central bank to begin a tightening process in the wake of the ECB's tapering program. Report Links: Updating Our Long-Term Fair Value Models - September 15, 2017 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - August 4, 2017 Who Hikes Next? - June 30, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Special Report One of BCA's long-standing clients, Ms. Mea, recently paid us a visit at our Montreal office. Ms. Mea is an experienced and successful investor who has been reading different BCA products for many years. She noted that over the years she has both agreed and disagreed with our market views, but that she appreciates our thematic approach including themes, analysis and views, as they are important to her investment process. Like many of our clients, Ms. Mea has been disappointed by the Emerging Markets Strategy (EMS) team's EM/China call, which has not been correct over the past 18 months. My team and I spent a few hours with Ms. Mea detailing our views and methodology. Despite some tough discussions, she said she found the dialogue valuable. Reflecting on our meeting, I thought it would be beneficial to share the key points with all of EMS clients. This report is a summary of that. Ms. Mea and I agreed to continue the debate as the story plays out, so I will be meeting with her occasionally in Europe when I travel there. Ms. Mea: Clearly your recommended strategy has been wrong for some time. I am aware that your negative view on EM/China and strategy was right and profitable from 2011 until early 2016. Nevertheless, since early last year EM risk assets have rallied considerably, and not participating in this rally has been painful - not to mention being short EM risk assets. For our global equity funds, underweighting EM within the global universe did not hurt performance in 2016. However, this year the EM equity benchmark has considerably outperformed the global averages (Chart I-1). So, what has gone wrong, and why haven't you changed your view already? Chart I-1EMS's Big Picture Asset Allocation Strategy: EM Relative To DM Stock Prices Answer: My objective today is not to dispute your comments - my view and investment strategy have clearly gone wrong. Rather, I would like to highlight what has gone wrong as well as elaborate on my methodology and thought process. Let me be clear, if I thought in 2016 or early 2017 that the market would rally for more than six months and - in the case of EM equities - by more than 20%, I would have recommended clients to play this rally regardless of my big picture themes and views. The same is true today. My general view has been based on two pillars: Chinese growth and Federal Reserve policy/the U.S. dollar. 1. The first pillar of my argument has been that China's growth improvement would prove unsustainable due to lingering credit imbalances/excesses. In the April 13, 2016 report,1 I laid out the case that China's 2015-16 fiscal stimulus of RMB 850 billion would be offset by a potential slowdown in credit growth from an annual growth rate of 11.5% to 9-9.5%. Chart I-2China: Borrowing Costs Have Been Rising This thesis of credit growth deceleration was based on the natural tendency of credit growth to gravitate toward nominal GDP growth, especially since the credit-to-GDP ratio had massively overshot in the preceding seven years. Besides, since 2013 high-profile policymakers in China had been talking about the need for deleveraging, containing financial excesses, and not repeating the mistakes of 2009-2010, when money and credit was allowed to run at an extremely strong pace. In first half of 2016, I downplayed the recovery in money and credit aggregates arguing that they are temporary and unsustainable. When a country has a lingering credit bubble - which has been the case in China, I am biased to downplay upticks in money and credit growth and easing in monetary policy. At the same time, I put a greater emphasis on both monetary tightening and slowdown in money/credit when the economy suffers from credit excesses. The opposite is also true in cases where there are no excesses/imbalances. Since November 2016, the People Bank of China (PBoC) has been tightening liquidity and pushing money market rates and corporate bond yields higher (Chart I-2). This has been taking place in addition to regulatory tightening on both bank and shadow banking activities. As a result, I have been predicting that regulatory and liquidity tightening amid lingering credit and speculative excesses would weigh on money, credit and capital spending. Importantly, I reckoned that financial markets would be forward-looking and would reverse their rally in anticipation of weaker growth down the road instead of reacting to robust - yet backward looking - growth data. Indeed, money and credit growth have already slowed to all-time lows (Chart I-3). Nevertheless, broad economic growth has not slowed (Chart I-4). This has also been true for China's impact on the rest of the world - the mainland's imports have remained robust (Chart I-5). Chart I-3China: Money And Credit Aggregates Chart I-4China: Business Cycle Perspective Chart I-5China: Money Impulses And Imports Not only have I been surprised by the mainland economy's ability to withstand the slowdown in money/credit so far, but I have also been caught off guard by how financial markets have shrugged off the rise in onshore interest rates and the deceleration in money/credit. That said, liquidity tightening works with a time lag. The fact that it has not yet had an impact on the real economy does not mean it won't going forward. 2. The second pillar of my view has been that the Fed's dovish stance would prove transitory. The global market rally began in February 2016 when the Fed sounded dovish in the face of a surging U.S. dollar, collapsing commodities prices, very weak global trade and plunging global risk assets. Remarkably, global growth and corporate profits have recovered very strongly, the U.S. dollar has weakened considerably and commodities and global tradable goods prices have rebounded. As such, I expected that U.S. interest rate expectations would move higher, dampening the carry trade. Unfortunately, markets' reactionary functions does not always follow a symmetrical logic. The decline in U.S. inflation rate amid a weak dollar, rising import prices and robust U.S. growth - especially the tight labor market and some wages pressures (Chart I-6) - has puzzled me. Ms. Mea: Why have you disregarded the clear improvements in EM profits and global trade in 2017? Answer: I have been aware of improving economic data and corporate profits. Yet, these types of data are backward looking and are not a guarantee of future trends. Even though the released economic data and corporate profits have been strong, our forward-looking indicators for both EM and China have been heralding and continue to point to a major downtrend in EM profits (Chart I-7). Chart I-6Subtle Upside Risks To U.S. Inflation Chart I-7EM Profits Are At Risk Importantly, I presume stock prices lead profits. Hence, it is dangerous to turn bullish when forward-looking indicators that lead profits are already flashing red. These are empirical indicators and have a great track record. As such, I have placed substantial weight on them rather than on backward-looking economic and profit data. Since early 2017, I have been facing the following dilemma: Should I change my view based on strong, yet backward-looking, profit data, or remain cautious based on forward-looking growth indicators as well as our big-picture themes. I chose the latter, which in retrospect was wrong. Looking back, the biggest mistake I made was putting little weight on how markets have been trading. EM and global stocks continue to trade as they would in a genuine bull market: they have looked past negative news and rallied a lot in response to positives. Ms. Mea: You mentioned big-picture themes. Can you elaborate on your framework and methodology? Answer: At the core of my analytical framework lies investment themes. I formulate these themes based on a series of in-depth research reports. These themes have multi-year relevance - I expect them to have staying power beyond one year. These themes represent an anchor to my view and strategy. Without anchor themes, I would tend to change my views back and forth based on fluctuations in economic data or swings in financial markets. Having established themes, my team and I monitor cyclical data, market dynamics/signposts and any type of evidence to prove or refute those established themes. Clients have recently been asking why I only show charts/evidence that confirm my view, and rarely entertain the alternative scenario. Indeed, there are always contradictory signals, signposts and data that I identify every week. Yet, I still choose to show those that support my ongoing themes and views. Why? Because I opt to convey a well-argued coherent message to my clients. In this context, I use the limited client-time allocated to reading our reports to highlight the reasons supporting my current themes and high-conviction views. It would also be unhelpful for readers if I demonstrate several charts that herald a bullish stance, and then conclude the opposite. If I were to utilize the alternative approach, i.e., present data and evidence on both sides of the debate, the report would be ambiguous. As a result, readers would gain little conviction and would likely be left confused. Each of these approaches has advantages and disadvantages: when the view plays out, investors see the correct angle and, thereby, develop a strong conviction on the strategy, and hopefully act upon it. Conversely, when the view goes wrong, investors typically wish they had seen the opposite side as well. Chart I-8China: No Deleveraging So Far In short, my goal is to leave clients with a clear and well-argued message when I have high conviction. As to conviction level, like all investors, I am dealing with a black box when gauging the outlook for financial markets. I am never 100% certain; I make investment recommendations only when my conviction level is somewhere around 65-75%. Generally, I do not discuss the areas where my conviction level is less than 60%. Less than 60% means "I do not know". An example of this is whether the current tech rally will persist. Importantly, I try to bring to clients' attention data and evidence that they may not be aware of and analytical points that differ from commonly known market narratives. Investors are aware of overall global financial market dynamics and ongoing narratives. My goal is to add value to their knowledge with the framework of thematic investment research, and to highlight new and potentially market moving charts, data and evidence. My major theme on China in the past several years has been the following: Chinese banks have originated too much money, and the corporate sector has taken on a large amount of leverage. This, in tandem with speculative excesses in the shadow banking and property markets, pose considerable downside risks to capital spending growth in the mainland. This is especially the case given that both liquidity and regulatory tightening of banks and non-banks already begun in late 2016. While financial markets, economic data and corporate profits have gone against this theme, this does not mean credit/money excesses in China have disappeared or do not exist. On the contrary, they have gotten even bigger now (Chart I-8, top panel). The Chinese economy has recovered and benefited commodities prices and the rest of EM due to another round of substantial money/credit injection. Broad money and broad credit have surged by about RMB 45-50 trillion since the middle of 2015 - depending on which measure one uses (Chart I-8, bottom panel). In the context of mushrooming leverage, ongoing policy tightening entails a poor risk-reward profile for bullish bets on mainland growth. This is why I am reluctant to abandon this theme and the bearish view. Ms. Mea: What would it take to change your big picture theme on China? To fundamentally reverse my view on China and commodities on a multi-year time line, I would need to reject my theme that China has meaningful credit excesses and imbalances, or buy into the view that these imbalances are a natural outcome of China's excess savings and will never correct. I have strong conviction in my big picture theme and I have not seen convincing arguments to change it. That said, if I come to the conclusion that EM risk assets and China-related plays will rally for six months or longer, I will change the investment strategy and recommend playing that rally. In this case my market strategy will change even though the big picture theme remains intact. As to the relationship between national and household savings, credit, and money, I have elaborated at great length that money creation and credit excesses do not originate from excess savings.2 Hence, it is simply not natural for a country with excess savings to experience and sustain credit bubbles. Importantly, adjustments in terms of credit excesses/deleveraging in China have not even started (Chart 8, top panel). This does not imply that investors should wait until deleveraging ends before turning positive on mainland growth. Markets are forward looking and will bottom when they see the light at the end of tunnel. But it is very dangerous to be positive when the adjustment has not yet began. It appears China's capital spending in general and construction in particular - the most vulnerable and credit-dependent segments - have in recent years been fluctuating in mini-cycles, similar to what played out in Japan during the 1990s and 2000s. I am not suggesting that China resembles Japan entirely, but comparing their mini cycles is a worthwhile exercise. Chart I-9 shows that the Japanese economy, money, credit and share prices were on a rollercoaster ride in the 1990s and 2000s. Notably, the profile of Chinese H shares fits the profile of Japan's stock market during that period (Chart I-10). On average, the recovery phase of these mini-cycles/equity rallies lasted about 20-24 months. Chart I-9Mini-Cycles In Japan In The 1990-2000s Chart I-10Chinese H-Shares Now And Nikkei In 1990s My judgment is that the recovery in the Chinese economy and related financial markets over the past 18 months resembles the mini cycles Japan experienced in the 1990s and 2000s. If so, after the rally in the past 18 months, forward-looking investment strategy should be focused on identifying signposts of a reversal. Consistently, given my bias stemming from our core themes and the fact that financial markets are forward looking and have already rallied a lot, I have been looking for signs of a top in China's business cycle and Asia's trade flows. It is pointless for me to change the view if my bias is that markets will reverse their trend in the next couple of months. Investors who are bullish and long but are somewhat concerned about China's growth sustainability still may want to monitor and be aware when the business cycle and markets will reverse. This is where I believe our research is helpful and relevant to investors with a bullish bias. It is hard to forecast what would be an inflection point to overturn the current financial market trend. It could be an unambiguous message from China's Communist Party Congress in the coming days that containing financial risks - a code word for deleveraging - is a major policy priority, or it could be weak economic data in China, or lower commodities prices and weaker EM currencies, being the flipside of a stronger dollar. Chart I-11China: Beware Of Rising Inflation Ms. Mea: It seems there is no silver lining in your view. Does this mean Chinese policymakers cannot do much to generate a positive outcome for the economy and financial markets? Answer: Chinese policymakers are in a very tough position. Yet it does not mean there is no silver lining. I assign a 20-25% probability that policymakers can stabilize leverage in the economy and financial system without a meaningful growth slump. If this scenario transpires, my negative view on EM and China-related plays will continue to be wrong. There is a 40-45% probability that growth will slump as the authorities focus on deleveraging and structural reforms (allowing markets to play a greater role in resource/capital allocation), and that policy tightening will begin biting. This heralds a deflationary outcome from a cyclical perspective, but it also represents a necessary adjustment to ensure efficiency gains and productivity-led growth over the long run. In fact, this would make me structurally bullish on China's growth again. There is also a 30-35% probability that policymakers - having no tolerance for any kind of growth slump - will continue to stimulate via money/credit and fiscal deficits. The outcome of this scenario will be an inflation outbreak Notably, as I argued in the October 4th 2017 report,3 underlying inflationary pressures are rising, as shown in Chart I-11. Unless growth decelerates meaningfully, inflation will need to be tackled. If not, capital outflows from residents will escalate again, and the currency will come under depreciation pressure given that the deposit rate is at a very low 1.5%. Rising inflation limits policymakers' maneuvering room: they have to tighten and cannot stimulate rapidly and considerably when growth slows. In short, a silver-lining scenario - which would include the authorities curbing out excesses while preserving overall growth, and especially capital spending growth - is always there and is a well-known narrative in the investment community. I do not write about it because I assign a 20-25% probability of it actually panning out. Why not more? Because the imbalances and excesses are currently so large that it will be difficult to contain them without jeopardizing growth. Finally, my view on China does not spread to the entire economy - our focal point has been and remains capital expenditures in general and construction in particular. These areas are being financed by credit, and consume a lot of raw materials and capital goods. Mainland imports - which are heavy in commodities and capital goods (the two account for 95% of total imports) - are the link between mainland investment expenditures and the rest of the world in general, and EM in particular. The latter will suffer if Chinese imports contract. Ms. Mea: It seems your big-picture themes have considerable influence on your views and strategy. How have your big-picture investment themes evolved over time? Last decade, my overreaching theme was that EM and China were structurally sound and that EM/China/commodities were in a bull market. So, I went from being a staunch bull to a resolute bear. I took over the EMS strategy service in 2005, and was bullish on EM, China and commodities up until 2010 (Chart I-1 on page 1). In 2005, I published an in-depth report arguing that commodities were in secular bull market due to demand from China.4 In April 2006, I pioneered a new theme that in the case of a U.S./DM recession, EM could stimulate and boost domestic demand - an out-of-consensus thesis5 at the time. Having these themes in mind, I recommended upgrading/accumulating Chinese stocks amid the Lehman crisis in the fall of 2008.6 The message was that Chinese policymakers could and would stimulate, and that such stimulus would succeed in lifting Chinese growth, corporate profits, commodities prices and EM risk assets. That was a non-consensus trade at the time, and the exact opposite of my current view. Following the credit boom in EM/China in 2009-10, excesses and imbalances emerged, and I shifted to a negative stance on EM/China in 2010 (Chart I-1 on page 1). Furthermore, in our June 8, 2010 Special Report titled, 'How to Play EM This Decade,' I made a call on a major top and forthcoming bear market in commodities arguing that the 2010-decade leaders in terms of growth and share price performance would be the healthcare and technology sectors. I speculated that during the current decade mania will unfold either in the technology or heath care sectors or some combination of both. Since 2010, the technology and healthcare equity sectors have been the best equity sectors, while commodities have been the worst performing ones within both the global and EM equity space. Consistent with this theme, I have been overweighing EM technology stocks and bourses where tech has a large weight, such as Taiwan, China and Korea. Besides, since 2010 I have maintained a pair strategy recommendation of being long tech and short materials. Ms. Mea: It seems you have been changing the goalposts lately, using new data on Chinese money and credit instead of relying on traditional ones. Our research is an ongoing effort to understand the macro landscape better. Our objective is always to find new variables and indicators that better lead business cycles and corporate profits while continuing to track the existing ones. Thus, it is not about changing goalposts but refining existing indicators or examining alternative ones that have a better track record. The following aspects have led usintroduce new broad money measures in China: Over the past two years, official M2 has been much weaker than various credit and money measures, as illustrated in the top panel of Chart I-8 on page 8. Broad money, and hence new purchasing power, is created when banks originate credit - by lending to or buying claims on non-bank entities. Therefore, properly measuring broad money is vital to assessing the new purchasing power that is created in the economy. In brief, in 2016 and early this year I relied on China's official broad money M2 measure, but it has underestimated the amount of new purchasing power created in the past two years. This was one of the reasons we misjudged the duration and magnitude of this equity rally. In addition, the regulatory clampdown on banks and non-banks may have prompted them to shift credit assets from off balance sheet to on balance sheet, or vice versa. Banks and shadow bank entities can obscure or hide credit by classifying it differently, but the banking system cannot conceal the amount of money in the system. Therefore, by tracing broad money creation, one can trail new purchasing power originated by banks. For these reasons, we have begun calculating new broad money aggregates for China - we produced our measure of M3 (M2 plus some other banks liabilities that are not included in M2) and credit-money (broad money calculated using the asset side of commercial banks' balance sheets). Chart I-3 on page 3 illustrates that all measures of money and credit have slowed in late 2016 and this year. On balance, having examined various measures of money and credit, including official M2, we have concluded that in the past 12 months money/credit creation has been slowing in China, irrespective of which aggregate we focus on (please refer to Chart I-3 on page 3). Ms. Mea: How do you explain strong September money and credit numbers out of China? Money, credit and business activity data for September were indeed strong, but they should be adjusted for working days. In China, the annual Mid-Autumn Festival fell in October this year versus September over the past several years. During this festival, business activity grinds to a halt for several days. I conjecture that money, credit and growth data out of China and Asia in general was strong in September partially due to the increase in the number of business days in September this year versus September a year ago. We need to wait for October data and average the two months to get a better picture of the trajectory of the business cycle in Asia. Chart I-12China: Velocity Of Money Has Been Declining Ms. Mea: Your view on China, commodities and EM is largely contingent on very weak money growth. Is it possible that the correlation between money and economic growth has diminished or completely broken down in China? The only reason why broad money growth could deviate from nominal GDP growth is due to the rising velocity of money. Let's remind ourselves: Nominal GDP = Money Supply x Velocity of Money. For nominal GDP growth to rise, a considerable decelaration in money supply growth needs to be offset by an even larger acceleration in the velocity of money. It is extremely difficult to forecast velocity of money. I assume money velocity will be steady (constant) and, consequently, nominal GDP growth to be affected primarily by changes in broad money growth. Chart I-12 demonstrates that the velocity of money in China has been declining over the past eight years. So, it would be odd for the velocity of money to suddenly rise going forward, in turn making money growth a less reliable indicator for nominal GDP growth. Overall, while it is always possible that the correlation between money growth and economic activity can break down, it is not something that one can forecast or bet on with high conviction. Chart I-13EM Ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: ##br##Broad Money And Bank Loan Growth Is Weak Ms. Mea: What about other emerging markets? How dependent are they on China? Where are they in the business cycle? The link from China to other emerging markets is via commodities and EM countries' other exports to the mainland. Even non-commodity countries like Korea and Taiwan sell a lot to China. If Chinese growth decelerates, commodities prices relapse, the U.S. dollar rallies or the RMB comes under selling pressure, the outlook for other EM countries and their risk assets will be dim. I argued that EM currencies, credit, and stocks on aggregate levels are not cheap.7 Segments that appear attractively valued are cheap for a reason, while healthy segments (countries/sectors/companies) are rather expensive. Money and bank loan growth also remain lackluster in the majority of EM, excluding China, Korea and Taiwan (Chart I-13). The reason is that the banking systems in many of these developing countries have not been restructured and remain sick following years of overextended credit and rising non-performing loans. Therefore, even though EM exports to China and the rest of the world have picked up, there has been little recovery in their domestic demand. If external conditions - exports, exchange rates and borrowing costs - deteriorate anew, EM domestic demand recovery will be derailed. Investors often refer to Russia and Brazil when they cite macro adjustments in developing economies. It is true that Russia and Brazil have already gone through a lot of pain and adjustment, including provisioning for NPLs in their respective banking systems. Nevertheless, financial markets in both countries remain dependent on commodities prices and the U.S. dollar outlook. Barring external shocks, both economies will continue to revive. That said, my big-picture view entails a negative shock to EM sentiment due to China and a rally in the greenback so I cannot turn bullish on them yet. In addition, Brazil's public debt is rising in an unsustailable manner, and political risks remain significant, particularly ahead of next year's elections. It will be hard to boost nominal growth and contain the explosion of public debt without meaningful currency depreciation that reflates the economy. That cannot not bode well for foreign investors in Brazilian markets. Credit excesses continue to linger in some other EM economies, and there has been little adjustments in their leverage even when we remove China, Korea and Taiwan from the aggregate (Chart I-14). All in all, while some EM economies have undergone necessary macro adjustments, the largest economy - China - has not. When China begins its own macro adjustments, shockwaves will likely hit Asian economies and commodities producers. There are not many large developing countries outside Asia that are not raw materials exporters. Ms. Mea: What about the technology sector? It alone has been responsible for a substantial portion of price gains in the EM equity benchmark in this rally. Does your view on China's credit cycle also influence your outlook for technology stocks? Indeed, EM tech stocks have exploded in recent years, accounting for a significant portion of EM share price appreciation. Excluding tech stocks, EM equities have not rallied nearly as much (Chart I-15). Chart I-14EM Ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: ##br##Leverage Has Not Diminished Chart I-15EM Equities: Tech Versus Non-Tech Also, Table I-1 reveals that eight out of 11 equity sectors have underperformed the benchmark. Meanwhile, a large share of tech gains has been produced by five or so companies. Table I-1EM Sectors: Only Three Out Of 11 Sectors ##br##Outperformed The Benchmark I have no strong view on the technology sector's absolute performance following the exponential price gains of past years. Overweighting the technology sector has been my recommendation since 2010, as we discussed above, and it has panned out quite well. I still maintain this overweight call, but within the technology sector we prefer semis to internet and social-media stocks. On the second part of your question, my negative view on China's credit cycle does not have direct ramifications for technology stocks, including Chinese ones. Critically, the call on internet- and social media-related companies is a bottom-up call. On the macro level, I can only state the following: It is essential to realize that in the past nine years a lot of new purchasing power in China has been created because of explosive money origination by banks. If money/credit growth structurally downshifts in China in the years ahead, nominal income growth for both households and companies will slow and the growth in their spending power will also moderate. That said, I am not in a position to assess and comment on business model viability and equity valuation levels of internet and social media-related companies like Alibaba, Tencent or Baidu. As to the other two tech heavyweights - Samsung Electronics and TSMC - I continue to recommend an overweight position in semis and other tech stocks that stand to benefit from DM growth. However, I am less certain about their absolute performance given their exponential rally. Chart I-16EMS's Fully-Invested Equity Portfolio ##br##Performance Versus The Benchmark Finally, regardless of my view on EM absolute performance, we always add value to dedicated EM equity and fixed-income investors by selecting countries to overweight and underweight relative to their respective benchmarks. Our country equity allocation strategy has been very successful. Chart I-16 illustrates our country fully-invested equity portfolio performance versus the EM benchmark. The portfolio is built based on our overweight and underweight recommendations on individual bourses, and is assumed to be fully invested. Our country calls have done quite well in the past nine years, producing 58% outperformance versus the benchmark with extremely low volatility. This translates into 520 basis points of annual compound outperformance for nine years. Our recommended country allocation and other equity positions as well as fixed income and currency recommendations are published at the end of each week's report. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled "Revisiting China's Fiscal And Credit Impulses," dated April 13, 2016, link available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Reports from October 26, 2016, November 23, 2016 and January 18, 2017; available on ems.bcaresearch.com 3 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled, " China: Deflation Or Inflation?," dated October 4, 2017; link available on page 21. 4 Please refer to the International Bank Credit Analyst Special Report titled, "Commodities: Buy On Dips," dated April 2005. 5 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled, "Global Monetary Tightening And Emerging Markets: Is It Different This Time?"dated April 19, 2006. 6 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled, "Upgrade/Accumulate Chinese Stocks,"dated September 29, 2008. 7 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled "Is The Dollar Expensive, And Are EM Currencies Cheap?" dated October 11, 2017, link available at ems.bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Special Report Highlights Chinese politics is shifting from a tailwind to a headwind for the economy; Policy implementation should improve in Xi's second five-year term; Tighter financial and environmental controls will continue to bite next year; Key internal and external risks are structural in nature - volatility will rise; Re-initiate our long China volatility and long Big Bank trades; stay overweight Chinese H-shares in EM portfolios Feature Xi Jinping is slated to deliver his "work report" as we go to press, at the opening of China's nineteenth National Party Congress.1 The speech will be filled with communist slogans and jargon and will not give clear "answers" to the questions so heavily debated about China. But it will be the most authoritative distillation of the party's thinking in five years and will bear Xi Jinping's imprimatur as the "core" of the Communist Party. Hence investors will need to read the tea leaves to try to get a sense of the country's policy preferences over the next five years. In this Special Report, we offer a guide to interpreting the work report and the likely changes to the party constitution. Broadly, we think the party congress will herald a period of more effective domestic policy reforms in 2018-19. The nature of these reforms is an open question, but they likely entail that government policy will shift from being a tailwind for Chinese growth, as it has been since 2015, to being a headwind. While the party will aim to maintain stability as always, more effective policy execution will in itself probably increase the risks to stability. At present levels, Chinese political risks are understated by the market (Chart 1). The Stability Imperative Xi's speech is an authoritative party document drafted over the past year. It will be part of the running narrative laid out by his predecessors, particularly former President Hu Jintao's report at the eighteenth party congress in 2012, which Xi himself drafted and which marked the transition of power from Hu to Xi.2 Going back to 1992, the reports tell a story of China's shift from focusing on rapid, market-oriented "catch-up" economic growth to focusing on social stability and consumer-led growth. Analysis of the words most often used in the speeches reveals this critical policy evolution, with terms like "rural" and "security" gaining considerable ground recently (Chart 2). Chart 1Stability Achieved For Party Congress Chart 2The Shifting Emphasis In Key Speeches Broadly, Xi is pre-committed to the following key points about the economy: Primacy of the party and state: The idea of building a "socialist market economy" means maintaining the primacy of the party and the state in the economy. State resources will still be used to prop up economic growth and public ownership will remain dominant in strategic industries. Any debate about reform must occur within this context. Reform and opening up: The period after Chairman Mao is broadly defined as a period of market reform and globalization. China, as a major exporter and growing global investor and consumer, continues to benefit from these forces, as Xi highlighted in his speech at the Davos Forum earlier this year.3 Recently, however, productivity growth has declined, and foreign companies and governments have grown resentful of China's attempts to protect its market while encroaching on their markets and capturing their technology. Foreign direct investment is at the lowest point since the height of the global financial crisis.4 Xi's administration will re-commit to reform and opening up, but the proof will be in the actual policies issued forth in the coming months. Two "Centenary Goals": China has long committed to two overriding "centenary goals" of building a "moderately prosperous society" by 2020 and becoming a "modern socialist" developed country by 2049. The essence of these goals is not only to meet middle-income GDP and income targets by 2020 (Chart 3) but also to avoid getting stuck in the "middle-income trap." The first deadline coincides with the end of the thirteenth Five-Year Plan and is integral to the symbolic hundredth anniversary of the Communist Party in 2021 - another politically sensitive year in which economic stability will be paramount.5 China's global influence: China's global influence is rising along with its economic and military heft. Hu Jintao's 2012 party congress report was the first to emphasize China's emerging status as a "maritime power" and to introduce the concept of a "new type of great power relations."6 The latter would require the U.S. to concede a much greater global leadership role for China in order to avoid conflicts as China carves out a sphere of influence. The 2012 report also focused on building closer economic ties with Asia and the emerging world. Xi is doubling down on these global trends, notably by his assertive foreign policy in the South China Sea and promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative.7 He may make tactical adjustments but the strategic path is set for him. Maintaining stability and balance: China had a tumultuous history under foreign domination and Maoist revolution for most of the past two centuries. Whatever new initiatives its policymakers undertake, they will stress the need to keep the ship of state on an even keel. This applies to the nature of the policies themselves (e.g. rebalancing growth away from investment toward consumption) as well as to the principle of cautious execution. What is the economic implication of these inherited party goals? Looking at the low growth rate in China's various monetary aggregates presents a risk that the country could face a cyclical slowdown next year (Chart 4).8 This risk could be compounded by Xi's tougher policy stance this year (for instance, his imposing curbs on the property market).9 Yet the next politically sensitive deadline is not until 2020-21, implying that Xi still has some wiggle-room to push "reforms," which for us means deleveraging and industrial restructuring. Chart 3Political Deadlines For Xi Jinping Chart 4Money Growth In China Is Slowing Over the long term, the "Socialist Put" will remain in place and growth rates will not be allowed to collapse, as long as the party can help it.10 If policy continues tightening in 2018, as we expect, it will become more accommodative as the 2020 political deadline approaches. Bottom Line: Xi's speech will not change the fact that the Communist Party remains committed to regime survival and national stability above all. The Evolution Of The Anti-Corruption Campaign The consensus view of the current party congress is that it marks Xi's consolidation of power. This is true, but it only matters if policymaking becomes more purposeful and effective. If so, then the market is in for some surprises next year, as Xi's policy agenda is ambitious. Chart 5Anti-Corruption Campaign Still Going Events over the past year suggest that surprises are coming. First, Xi has continued the sweeping anti-corruption campaign that defined his first five years. This campaign - more so than Xi's accrual of official titles - epitomizes his consolidation of power over the party and military. The latest probes culminated with the sacking of Politburo member Sun Zhengcai, heretofore the likeliest candidate to succeed Premier Li Keqiang in 2022.11 Thus Xi is actively manipulating the post-2022 leadership of China, and this process will continue in the coming years. Regardless of whether Xi overstays his term in office in 2022, he is lining himself up to be the most powerful man in China well into the 2020s. Second, while the anti-corruption campaign appears, on paper, to have passed peak intensity (Chart 5), it is apparently morphing into broader policy enforcement.12 In particular, Xi is using the Central Discipline and Inspection Commission (CDIC), the party's anti-corruption watchdog, to supercharge his policy efforts in financial and environmental regulation. Since last fall, Xi has launched a series of financial tightening and anti-pollution efforts that have proved to be fairly aggressive, especially given the need for overall stability ahead of the party congress. This aggressiveness is partly because of his use of the CDIC, and it looks to be part of the game plan for next year: Anti-corruption officials appointed to top financial regulatory bodies: In late September, the leadership put two leading anti-corruption officials in charge of overseeing anti-corruption efforts within the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC).13 These are two of the three top financial regulating bodies (the other being the China Securities Regulatory Commission). The timing of these appointments, along with other key appointments earlier this year, suggests that the "financial regulatory crackdown" will continue apace in 2018.14 Local government officials to be held accountable for debt: In June and July, Chinese authorities, including Xi, highlighted that local government officials should be held accountable for excessive debt creation - not only in their current office but over the course of their entire lives.15 The implication is that they could get expelled from the party or even imprisoned, rather than simply demoted. Moreover, officials could be punished for accruing illegal debts, and promotions could be tied to fiscal sustainability rather than just economic growth. The implication is that there will be legal ramifications, as well as financial restrictions, for local government officials who add to the country's systemic risks. Tackling systemic financial risk is a clear policy priority. Xi emphasized this at an extraordinary Politburo meeting in April as well as at the National Financial Work Conference in July.16 Not only has China accumulated more debt as a share of its GDP than any other country since the global financial crisis, but also it has done so faster than most other countries (Chart 6 A&B). Regardless of China's high national savings rate, China's top leadership sees leverage as a threat to stability and is taking action. Chart 6AChina Has Added Massive Debt... Chart 6B... And Done So Faster Than Others Something similar is taking place in the realm of environmental regulation. This is also a clear priority for the party: Hu Jintao included an "ecological" section in the work report for the first time in 2012; environmental spending grew faster than any other central government category in the beginning of Xi's first five years (Table 1). Table 1Fiscal Priorities Of Recent Chinese Presidents Here again, the powers that Xi amassed in his anti-corruption campaign are paying off. In August, the anti-pollution teams that fanned out across the country to enforce tougher environmental standards included anti-corruption watchdogs as well. This helps explain why production cuts and factory closures have been so effective in recent months, for instance cutting steel supply (Chart 7). Managers are not only facing environmental fines but also arrest and jail time. Meanwhile, ministerial-level ranking officials accompanied each environmental inspection team, giving them greater clout.17 It is unclear, so far, whether the CDIC or other tools will be brought to bear on the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). SOE reform is one of the major unknowns of Xi's second term. So far, it has moved slowly, with the 2013 broad overview only put into a concrete plan in late 2015, which has since resulted in pilot projects of questionable value and little general implementation. The 2015-16 stimulus gave state companies some breathing space, as they were at last able to build up cash faster than they were borrowing it (Chart 8); but this period has ended and they are still plagued with inefficiencies (Chart 9). Chart 7Cutting Steel Supply, And Iron Demand Chart 8Stimulus Helped Corporate Balance Sheets... Chart 9...But SOEs Are Still Inefficient Chinese authorities have recently been emphasizing that reform is set to "deepen."18 If this effort is to have any teeth, it must include real encouragement to private and foreign capital, as well as real creative destruction - the sale of loss-making assets plus bankruptcies and layoffs (however carefully managed by the state). It will not suffice merely to continue the ongoing process of debt-for-equity swaps, mergers and acquisitions, and the creation of national champions. Anecdotal evidence suggests that bankruptcies are rising, but the proof will be in the pudding.19 What are the macro implications of the above? Assuming that we are right and deleveraging intensifies, the standard policy move in China would be to boost fiscal spending at the National People's Congress in March in order to compensate for the resulting slowdown in credit growth (Chart 10). This is precisely how President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji approached the negative growth effects of supply-side structural reforms after the fifteenth party congress in 1997: more fiscal spending. Xi's recent emphasis on poverty alleviation would seem to call for such spending as part of the broader effort to build a social safety net, reinforce social stability, and boost consumption as a driver of growth (Chart 11). There is a risk, however, as our colleagues at BCA's Emerging Market Strategy have argued, that fiscal spending may not offset a significant drop in credit growth in China. This is not the baseline case of China Investment Strategy, but it is a legitimate concern: it is not clear that any decrease in credit growth will go off seamlessly (Chart 12).20 Chart 10Two Sides Of The Same Coin Chart 11High Savings Rate Suppresses Consumer Demand Chart 12Credit Growth As Large As Government Spending If Xi seriously addresses China's long-festering financial systemic risks he could create a drag on growth that would be negative for emerging markets and certain commodity prices, like copper and iron ore.21 More broadly, the gradual transition away from China's investment-led growth model toward consumption-led growth is a headwind for the economies that have benefited the most from the status quo over the past two decades. Bottom Line: Xi's anti-corruption campaign is the clearest measure of his consolidation of power, and the party congress puts the capstone on it. Policy implementation will be more effective going forward. If Xi continues to prioritize deleveraging and industrial-environmental restructuring next year, he could create a drag on growth that is negative for the assets of EM exporters and key commodity producers. Xi Jinping Theory... What Does It Mean? Aside from Xi's big speech, the Communist Party will amend its constitution at the party congress. It is not clear what amendments may be made. The current debate is about whether and how Xi Jinping's ideas will be incorporated into the constitution and what this might mean for policy. Currently, the party constitution highlights the thinking of Marx and Lenin as well as China's top leaders since 1949. Each of China's leaders is said to have contributed something essential to the party's guiding philosophy: namely, "Mao Zedong Thought," "Deng Xiaoping Theory," "the important thinking of the Three Represents" (Jiang Zemin's contribution), and "the Scientific Outlook on Development" (Hu Jintao's contribution). These theories are outlined in Table 2. Table 2Xi Jinping Theory It is hard to draw strict correlations between these theories and economic policy, but the broad trends are well enough known: Mao founded the People's Republic and put a personal stamp on its Marxist-Leninist foundations. Deng Xiaoping brought pragmatism, enabling China to pursue a "socialist market economy," or "socialism with Chinese characteristics," thus opening the door to private and foreign capital, and profit incentives for households and businesses. National and household income surged (Chart 13). Jiang Zemin brought entrepreneurialism, building on Deng's achievement, particularly by phasing out many of the bloated SOEs and "command-style" economic controls and opening the real estate sector for consumers to buy houses (Chart 14). Hu Jintao brought social responsibility into greater focus, emphasizing the need to invest in infrastructure in undeveloped regions, reduce rural and urban disparities, and build out the social safety net (Chart 15). Chart 13Deng Unleashed China's Economic Potential Chart 14Jiang Rebooted Growth, Launched Housing Boom Chart 15Hu Jintao Sought 'Harmonious Society' If Xi's ideas are incorporated into this section, it will be notable since that honor usually occurs at the end of a general secretary's term. The precise wording will be heavily studied: e.g. whether Xi is named personally (like Mao and Deng), whether his ideas are referred to as "Thought" or "Theory" (like Mao or Deng respectively), which of his slogans are included, and what they actually mean. The real takeaway for investors is that the party is demanding a return to centralization and Xi is fulfilling this demand.22 Structurally, Xi's anti-corruption campaign has put him at the top of a more disciplined party. He has simultaneously reasserted the party's primacy over the military, which has been extensively reshuffled and reformed, and civil society, which has been muzzled. Re-centralization is also apparent in fiscal and financial management. The previous administration decentralized economic control in order to accelerate growth in the face of the global recession. This specifically meant freeing up the state banks and the provincial governments to borrow, invest, and build to their heart's content. Comparing the trajectory of central and local government spending, it is clear that Xi is overseeing a marginal re-concentration of taxation and spending into the hands of the central government vis-à-vis the provincial governments (Chart 16 A&B). Chart 16ALocal Government Gap Widened Post-Crisis... Chart 16B...But Gap Narrowed Under Xi Jinping Similarly, he is overseeing a marginal re-concentration of lending back into traditional state-owned bank loans, after nearly a decade of rapid growth in the non-bank, "shadow lending" sub-sector (Chart 17 A&B). Chart 17AShadow Loans Outpaced Bank Loans... Chart 17B...But Gap Has Narrowed Under Xi However, re-centralization is not the result of any "coup" by Xi Jinping so much as the Communist Party's strategic response to the fact that the country stands at a historic juncture with serious systemic risks: The "Thucydides Trap": The world has not seen the contest of a fully established world empire (the U.S.) and a newly emergent peer competitor (China) since the Cold War, and strictly speaking since the late 1800s, when Germany emerged as a challenger to the U.K. (Chart 18). The CPC's founding myth is the rejection of a "century of humiliation" at the hands of western powers, so there is no moment more critical than now, when China is emerging as a rival to the greatest western power. Economic reform: China's economic model is slowly evolving, and the outgoing model has left imbalances that are key vulnerabilities to China and could undermine its global emergence. The corporate debt pile is the clearest, but by no means the only, example of this internal threat (Chart 19). Lack of political reform: The country faces an inherent contradiction between its single-party system and the emergent middle class, which is still denied political participation (Chart 20). This is a source of socio-political imbalances that could also undermine China's emergence. Chart 18The 'Thucydides Trap' Chart 19An Outstanding Economic Imbalance Chart 20Not Your Father's China True, China has a single authoritative leader (with no alternative) at the head of a unified ruling party (with no alternative). Thus, it faces fewer domestic political constraints, in the strict sense, than any major country in the world. Nevertheless, the challenges themselves are structural and could outstrip any leadership's ability to address them. The policy responses to the crises of 2015-16 - when Beijing committed a series of blunders - do not suggest that Xi is nearly as omnipotent or omniscient as the media will make it sound this week.23 Of crucial importance going forward will be the deteriorating U.S.-China relationship, since the next 12 months will provide at least two major occasions for clashes: North Korea, where diplomacy is balking, and Trump's need to look tough on China ahead of midterm elections.24 Bottom Line: The possible incorporation of Xi's ruling philosophy into the Communist Party's constitution would be a symbolic nod to the concrete executive power that Xi has already achieved. However, only when new structural risks materialize will Xi's capabilities - and the Communist Party's capabilities as a ruling party - truly be put to the test in a way that yields significant information for investors. Investment Conclusions On the brink of the party congress, Xi looks to be continuing his double game of centrally driven internal reforms and external assertiveness. But between these, the key to watch is the extent to which he re-emphasizes internal reforms. Over the next few years, rebooting reforms could help Xi to waylay the Trump administration's threatened punitive measures; to use Trump as a foil to excuse the painful consequences of necessary reforms at home; and to win goodwill among other countries, which would see greater opportunities in a China that is recommitting to opening up to them (and investing more in them). Our "Reform Reboot" checklist, which focuses on deleveraging, is designed for the post-party congress period. As such, most of the points are yet to be determined (see Appendix). We would remind readers to watch for the following: Chart 21Volatility Will Go Up The composition of the next Politburo, Politburo Standing Committee, and Central Committee, expected to be revealed on October 25, for a sense of whether reformers will hold key posts and whether Xi's faction will gain the upper hand - we will report on this in subsequent weeks;25 Post-party congress leaks or discussions in state media covering new policy priorities, particularly on financial regulation, the property sector, and SOE reform; Any hints at who will replace Zhou Xiaochuan as governor of the central bank, who will be the first head of the new Financial Stability and Development Committee, and how the National Financial Work Conference's goals are implemented; Outcomes of U.S. President Donald Trump's visit to China and Asia Pacific, November 3-14 - particularly on North Korea and trade frictions; How far the latest property market curbs advance, and whether recently promised "long-term" curbs are implemented, including any nationwide property tax; Whether the financial crackdown spreads further into state-owned and domestic-oriented financial institutions; When and how the tougher scrutiny on local government debt is implemented - and whether local government budget balances rise or fall after the congress; Whether SOE "mixed ownership" and "state capital management" reforms accelerate - and whether asset sales and operational restructuring begin occurring more frequently across multiple provinces; How the party implements its recent proposals to increase the role of entrepreneurs and provide easier access to credit for small and medium-sized enterprises; Priorities for domestic reforms, especially those affecting household registration (hukou) reforms, the urbanization rate, social safety net expansion, and household credit; How foreign investment is attracted, including the implementation of the nationwide foreign investment negative list; When and how capital controls will be lifted; if the government wants "de-risking" reforms in the financial sector, it will have to do that first, before pursuing any capital account reforms. We continue to believe that Xi's second term provides a window of opportunity for rebooting reforms, within the Communist Party's stability constraint, due to his consolidation of power and the currently robust domestic and global economic backdrop. This window will likely close as the term progresses due to political deadlines in 2020 and the likelihood of the external backdrop worsening. Both internal and external risks will rise from here (Chart 21). Xi's initial attack over the next six-to-eight months will determine whether we remain optimistic about incremental progress on reforms. We are re-initiating our long China CBOE volatility ETF trade, and our long Big Five banks relative to smaller banks trade. We also remain overweight Chinese equities versus EM equities. We are adjusting this trade to include Chinese H-shares only. Xi's political recapitalization lessens domestic political constraints, and China's shift to more domestically driven growth will disfavor China-exposed, export-reliant, and commodity-producing EMs. Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer," dated September 13, 2017. 2 For this transition, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "China: Two Factions, One Party," dated September 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Xi Jinping, "Jointly Shoulder Responsibility Of Our Times, Promote Global Growth," dated January 17, 2017, available at america.cgtn.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Moreover, Xi's term officially ends the following year, in 2022, which will require arrangements for a smooth transition regardless of whether Xi retains power. 6 The term is not used precisely in this way in the report but has been developed in official policy outlets since then. Please see Hu Jintao, "Firmly March On The Path Of Socialism," Report to the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, November 8, 2012, available at www.china.org.cn, and Timothy Heath, "The 18th Party Congress Work Report: Policy Blueprint For The Xi Administration," China Brief 12:23, Jamestown Foundation, November 30, 2012, available at jamestown.org. 7 Please see BCA Frontier Markets Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China's Belt And Road Initiative: Can It Offset A Mainland Slowdown?" dated September 13, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "China: Deflation Or Inflation?" dated October 4, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Chinese Real Estate: Which Way Will The Wind Blow?" dated September 28, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "The Socialism Put," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 For our take on factional struggles in anticipation of Sun's fall, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Five Myths About Chinese Politics," dated August 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 There is much speculation about whether anti-corruption chief Wang Qishan will make it onto the next Politburo Standing Committee (to be revealed around October 25) despite having passed the retirement age. This topic is a red herring: age limits have always been arbitrarily enforced, while Xi will maintain a hardline toward corruption even if he replaces Wang. If Xi wishes to stay in power beyond 2022, it will not depend on Wang. 13 Please see Wu Hongyuran, Yang Qiaoling and Leng Cheng, "Two Determined Graft-Busters Put In Senior Posts At Banking, Insurance Watchdogs," Caixin, dated October 11, 2017, available at www.caixinglobal.com. 14 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Northeast Asia: Moonshine, Militarism, And Markets," dated May 24, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 15 Please see Huang Ge, "China's First Lifelong Accountability System To Prevent Local Officials From Accruing Mountainous Debt," Global Times, dated July 24, 2017, available at www.globaltimes.cn. 16 Notably, authorities pledged to give the People's Bank of China greater regulatory powers going forward, coinciding with a generational change at the top of the central bank. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The Wrath Of Cohn," dated July 26, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 17 See Barry Naughton, "The General Secretary's Extended Reach: Xi Jinping Combines Economics And Politics," dated September 11, 2017, available at www.hoover.org. 18 Please see Fran Wang, "China To Take Flexible Approach To SOE Reform," Caixin, September 29, 2017, available at www.caixinglobal.com. 19 See "China bankruptcies rise steadily in 2017 amid 'zombie firm' crackdown," August 3, 2017, available at www.reuters.com. 20 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Revisiting China's Fiscal And Credit Impulses," dated April 13, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 21 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Slow-Down In China's Reflation Will Temper Steel, Iron Ore In 2018," dated September 7, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 22 We have long highlighted this theme as critical to Xi's reforms, along with governance and productivity. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 23 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Annus Horribilis," dated January 20, 2016, and "China: Eye Of The Storm," dated September 9, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 24 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Understated In 2018," dated April 12, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 25 This will be the subject of our party congress post-mortem pieces in coming weeks. Appendix
Highlights The economic momentum of China's "mini-cycle" appears to have peaked earlier this year. A benign moderation in growth is the most likely outcome, but this report reviews some factors to watch over the coming year to track the character of the slowdown. This month's Party Congress will hopefully provide investors with some clues whether policymakers have learned from their past mistakes of failing to combine any painful structural reforms with an appropriate amount of fiscal support. Shorter-term measures of money & credit in China are hooking up, and most measures of global growth are still signaling robust export demand. An eventual stabilization in the housing market will be an important signal confirming the benign nature of China's economic slowdown. Investors should remain overweight the MSCI China Free index versus the emerging market benchmark. Feature We reiterated the case for a benign cyclical slowdown of the Chinese economy in last week's report, by highlighting several forces that are working to support stable economic activity.1 Specifically, we noted that: There is presently little risk of aggressive policy tightening on the horizon. There is likely to be reduced downside cyclicality in China's industrial and real estate sectors, owing to the past imposition of "supply side" constraints. External demand will continue to support the Chinese economy, even if global growth momentum moderates. Chart 1 presents a stylized view of the Chinese economy over the past three years, which illustrates our framework of how cyclical growth conditions have evolved over this "mini-cycle". It also highlights three possible outcomes for the coming 6-12 months. Chart 1A Stylized View Of China's Recent 'Mini-Cycle' The chart shows how the Chinese economy began to operate below what investors and market participants considered to be a "stable" pace of growth in early-2015, owing to a "double whammy" of excessively tight monetary conditions and a synchronized global downturn. Policy easing succeeded in sparking a V-shaped rebound in some sectors of the economy (particularly housing), and caused an attendant rally in Chinese relative equity performance (vs EM), emerging market relative performance (vs global), and industrial metals prices. However, based on a number of "hard" growth indicators, the economic momentum of the "mini-cycle" appears to have peaked earlier this year. This raises the question of what is likely to be the character of Chinese economic growth over the coming year, with Chart 1 presenting three distinct scenarios: 1) a re-acceleration of the economy and a continuation of the V-shaped rebound profile, 2) a benign, controlled deceleration and settling of growth into the "stable" growth range, and 3) an uncontrolled and sharp deceleration in the economy that threatens a return to the conditions that prevailed in early-2015 (or worse). Our bet is clearly on scenario 2, but this week's report reviews some factors to watch over the coming year in order to monitor the end of China's mini-cycle and its implications for investment strategy. Policy Risk And The Party Congress China's 19th Party Congress is likely to dominate media headlines about China over the coming two weeks. While it is unlikely that a major, explicit policy announcement will emerge from the Congress, investors are likely to focus on the policy implications of the leadership rotation, as well as any signals from President Xi Jinping's opening speech. Indeed, the next two reports of this publication will be devoted to the Party Congress and our assessment of the economic and financial market impact of the event. Chart 2Bold Action Can Follow ##br##Midterm Congresses We recently published a primer explaining the Party Congress,2 and noted that major new policy initiatives can emerge during the March National People's Congress that follows a "midterm" Party Congress. For instance, Premier Zhu Rongji was appointed to launch the "assault stage" of President Jiang Zemin's reforms of state-owned enterprise at the National People's Congress in March 1998 (Chart 2). Similarly, Hu Jintao's Premier Wen Jiabao launched extensive administrative reforms at the NPC meeting in early 2008. When forecasting the character of Chinese economic growth over the coming year, the relevance of the Party Congress comes into play when assessing whether policymakers have learned from their past mistakes by combining any painful structural reforms with the appropriate amount of fiscal support to manage demand in the economy during the adjustment phase. In the past, policymakers have been preoccupied with the idea that the economy needs painful but eventually rewarding economic reforms, and have viewed short term policy easing as endangering reforms and as a contributor to further structural imbalances. In essence, authorities have in the past cornered themselves into a self-imposed 'either/or' choice between supply-side reforms and demand-side countercyclical policies, rather than pursuing a sensible balance between structural reforms and policy easing to mitigate headwinds. For example, the main pillars of "Likonomics", named after the Chinese premier, were touted as "deleveraging, structural reforms and no stimulus", in stark contrast to the three arrows of Japan's "Abenomics", including fiscal stimulus, monetary easing and structural reforms. For now, our view is that policymakers will provide the fiscal support required for the economy to avoid a potentially sharp downturn were they to aggressively pursue structural reform initiatives, given what occurred in 2015. But this assessment remains a key risk to our view of a benign cyclical slowdown, and we will be watching the Party Congress closely for any indications to the contrary. Domestic Demand Momentum Chart 3Shorter-Term Measures Of ##br##Money & Credit Growth Are Positive We noted above that China's domestic growth momentum is unlikely to decelerate materially, owing to the lack of aggressive policy tightening and the fact that some of China's industries have not experienced a major cyclical upswing (and thus are less likely to experience a major downswing). Supporting this view, shorter-term measures of money & credit in China are hooking up, suggesting that year-over-year measures may soon stabilize (or even accelerate modestly). Chart 3 presents the growth in M2 and two measures of credit, both on a year-over-year and 3-month annualized basis.3 While the latter measure is highly volatile and dependent on a seasonal-adjustment process that may not perfectly capture the seasonal component of Chinese economic data, it should be noted that all three shorter-term measures are at or above their year-over-year rates of change. Despite this, an outsized slowdown in non-supply constrained industries cannot be ruled out, even if it is far from our base case scenario. At a minimum, the potential for severe data disappointments exists, as Chart 4 highlights that the Chinese economy has already been surprising modestly to the downside over the past three months. Disappointing readings from industrial production, retail sales, and fixed-asset investment were particularly noticeable last month, which is in contrast to the steady uptrend in the surprise index that has prevailed since mid-2015. One recent trend that bears particular attention over the coming months is that of a weakening housing market. Chart 5 shows that house prices are beginning to decelerate on a year-over-year basis, and the pace of appreciation in home sales continues to decline. Worryingly, a 70-city diffusion index of house prices is also falling sharply, and to a level that would tend to imply a significant further deceleration in aggregate prices. A moderation in house price appreciation was all but inevitable given the magnitude of the boom over the past 2 years, and is not concerning in isolation (in fact, it reduces risk of escalating tightening measures). But given that home sales and prices were a key bellwether of the efficacy of policymakers' reflationary efforts over the past two years, and given the sharp decline in a broadly measured diffusion index, an eventual stabilization will be an important signal confirming the benign nature of China's economic slowdown. Chart 4Recently Surprising Modestly To The Downside Chart 5A Warning Sign From House Prices Trade, And Global Growth In last week's Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, our colleague Mathieu Savary explored the potential for "yellow flags" that may herald a slowdown in global growth. A slowdown in global narrow money growth was the most notable of the potential warning signs that he highlighted, which historically has been a leading indicator of global industrial production (Chart 6). It is possible that the deceleration in narrow money growth may correctly forecast a mild slowdown in global trade, which would be negative for Chinese economic growth at the margin. Still, it is very unlikely that a gentle pullback in global growth momentum would be sufficient for China's "mini-cycle" to end in the 3rd scenario highlighted in Chart 1 above (an uncontrolled and sharp deceleration in activity). In addition, narrow money growth is but one global growth indicator among many, several of which are still painting a rosy picture for China's external demand outlook: A GDP-weighted average of our consumer and capital spending indicators for the U.S., U.K., euro area, and Japan are suggesting that global GDP growth will continue to accelerate over the coming year (Chart 7). Barring a decline in global import intensity, this would imply that the acceleration in global export activity is just getting started. Chart 6A 'Yellow Flag' From Narrow Money Growth Chart 7Stronger G4 Growth Will Support China's Export Sector A recent update of our global LEI diffusion index suggests that the LEI itself is unlikely to significantly moderate (Chart 8). This is a notable development, as it somewhat reverses the concerning loss of momentum in the diffusion index that had occurred over the past year. Excluding the U.S., the improvement in the LEI diffusion index is still present, and the uptrend since late-2013 / early-2014 is more clearly defined (panel 2). Finally, both the EM and global PMIs remain in an uptrend, and are either at or near multi-year highs (Chart 9). The resilience of the EM PMI is particularly noteworthy, as much of the improvement in the index reflects the strength of the Caixin China PMI (despite the most recent tick down in the index). In addition, it is an underappreciated point among global investors that the EM PMI correctly forecast the onset of China's "mini-cycle" in 2015, and bottomed several months before the global PMI. The improvement of the EM PMI was sufficient to help catalyze a synchronized global economic recovery, despite having persistently lagged the global PMI in level terms. Chart 8A Positive Sign From Our Global LEIs Chart 9Manufacturing PMIs Are Not Heralding ##br##A Sharp Decline In Activity The Investment Strategy Implications Of A Benign Slowdown In China Taken together, the evidence noted above is more consistent with a benign end of China's mini-cycle than an uncontrolled and sharp deceleration in the economy. We will continue to track the pace of moderating economic activity, and will adjust our investment recommendations accordingly if China slows more aggressively than we expect. But for now, we see no reason to alter our constructive view on Chinese equities, suggesting that investors should remain overweight the MSCI China Free index versus the emerging market benchmark. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Pease see China Investment Strategy Special Report "On A Higher Note," dated October 5, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 2 Pease see China Investment Strategy Special Report "China's Nineteenth Party Congress: A Primer," dated September 14, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 3 For the latter measure we use a seasonal-adjustment methodology employed by the U.S. Census Bureau to adjust all three series prior to calculating the 3-month annualized rate of change. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights Looking into 2018, the major risk factors driving gold - inflation and inflation expectations; fiscal and monetary policy; and geopolitics - will, on balance, continue to favor gold as a strategic portfolio hedge. We expect gold will provide a good hedge against rising inflation. However, this will be partially mitigated by Fed rate hikes next year. On the back of tighter U.S. monetary policy, our macroeconomists expect a recession by 2H19, possibly earlier in 2019, which likely would be sniffed out by equity markets as early as 2H18. Our analysis indicates gold will provide a good hedge against this expected recession and the associated equity bear market.1 Lastly, geopolitical risks from (1) U.S.-North Korea tensions, (2) trade protectionism of the Trump administration and (3) ongoing conflicts in the Middle East will support gold prices next year, given the metal's safe-haven properties. Energy: Overweight. At the end of 3Q17, our open energy recommendations were up 45%, led by our long Dec/17 WTI $50/bbl vs. $55/bbl Call spread. We closed out our long Brent recommendations in 3Q17 for an average gain of 116%. (Please see p. 13 for a summary of trades closed in 3Q17). Base Metals: Neutral. Our tactical short Dec/17 copper position ended 3Q17 up 6%. We are placing a trailing stop at $3.10/lb. Precious Metals: Neutral. Our long gold portfolio hedge ended 3Q17 up 4.3%. The balance of risks continues to favor this as a strategic position, which we discuss below. Ags/Softs: Neutral. We lifted our weighting on ags - particularly grains - to neutral last week. Our long corn/short wheat position is up 1.2%. Feature Chart of the WeekInflation And U.S. Financial Variables##BR##Explain Gold Prices Inflation and U.S. financial variables - particularly the USD broad trade-weighted index (TWIB), and real rates - are the main factors explaining the evolution of gold prices (Chart of the Week).2 Subdued inflation and low unemployment - a decoupling of the so-called Phillips Curve relationship that drives central-bank models of the macroeconomy - have dominated the macro landscape this year (Chart 2). We expect that current low inflation, positive growth, and low interest rates will remain in place for the next 12 months (Chart 3). Although economies such as the U.S. are growing above trend, inflation has remained weak due to a redistribution of demand through imports from countries with spare capacity, according to BCA's Global Investment Strategy.3 This is expected to continue in the near term to end-2018. However, we expect the USD to gradually strengthen, as the Fed cautiously normalizes policy rates, while other systemically important central banks remain accommodative relative to the U.S. central bank (Chart 4). Further falls in the unemployment rate will push the U.S. economy into the steep end of the Phillips Curve. Weak capex in the post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) era means demand for labor will increase as low unemployment - and associated higher wages - encourage higher consumer spending. This will cause inflation to lift next year or early 2019. Chart 2A Decoupling Of The Phillips Curve Relationship? In such an environment, any U.S. tax cuts - which we still expect by the end of 1Q18 - will simply add fuel to the inflationary fire, and lift inflation expectations for next year and beyond. As BCA's Geopolitical Strategy team puts it, the tax cuts are a "form of modest stimulus ... (which), this far into the economic cycle, could have a significant effect."4 With unemployment at or below levels consistent with full employment in the U.S. and little slack of any sort, it would not take much in the way of fiscal stimulus to further pressure inflation. Chart 3No Pressure From Inflation Or U.S. Financial##BR##Variables...For Now Chart 4A Strengthening U.S. Dollar Will##BR##Keep The Pressure Off Gold Inflation vs. Fed Hikes In the face of the rising inflation we expect next year, gold's appeal will increase. As our previous research reveals, gold's correlation with inflation is strengthened during periods of low real rates, i.e., the difference between nominal rates and inflation. This is a perfect context for gold. However, gold's ability to hedge inflation risks to portfolios will be partially hampered by a more-hawkish Fed. As inflation finally takes off, the Fed will feel confident to hike rates more aggressively. More than anything, this will put a bid under the USD, as U.S. interest-rate differentials vs. other currencies rise in favor of the dollar. In addition, real rates will rise as the Fed gains confidence it can lift policy rates without doing serious harm to the U.S. economy, and follows thru with its normalization. Thus, the gold market will be facing two opposing forces: On the one hand, gold will be an attractive inflation hedge as inflationary pressures build up. On the other, as the Fed begins to tighten to respond to those inflationary pressures, gold will lose its appeal in the face of rising real rates and a strong dollar. Chart 5Fed Will Ease Pressure Off Gold##BR##If It Gets Ahead Of Inflation The timing of the Fed's rate hikes will be critical to the evolution of gold prices next year and beyond. We previously assumed that rate hikes will remain behind wage growth, which would be supportive of gold prices as inflation picks up. However, if the Fed begins hiking ahead of any realized uptick in inflation, this would create a stronger-than-expected headwind for gold (Chart 5). While we expect inflation to take off in 2H18, our House view calls for 2 to 3 hikes by then. This is a risk to our gold view. Longer term, Fed rate hikes could trigger a feedback loop that will make it difficult for the U.S. central bank policy to support low unemployment rates. As real rates rise, increased unemployment will lead households to spend less. Lower demand will force firms to reduce hiring. The accompanying slowing of U.S. growth will disseminate to the rest of the world, pushing the global economy into a shallow recession as early as 2H19. In all likelihood, this higher-inflation/higher-policy-rate period will be sniffed out by equity markets before the economy actually enters a recession, leading to a bear market. Somewhat counterintuitively, this will favor gold as a portfolio hedge, as we discuss below. Bottom Line: As U.S. unemployment continues falling, inflation will re-emerge, as predicted by the Philips Curve trade-off so important to central-bank policy. Gold then will face two opposing forces. Its inflation hedging properties will be partially hamstrung by rising real U.S. rates and a strengthening USD. Nevertheless, we will turn bullish gold towards the end of next year as signs of an equity bear market emerge. Gold Will Outperform In An Equity Bear Market Our modelling indicates gold is an exceptional safe-haven during downturns in equity markets.5 It is especially attractive in equity bear markets because its returns during such episodes are negatively correlated with the U.S. stock market. This relationship with equities does not hold in bull markets -- gold prices typically rise during such periods, but at a slower rate than equities (Table 1). Table 1Gold's Ability To Hedge U.S. Equities In a Special Report titled "Safe Havens: Where To Hide Next Time?" BCA's Global Asset Allocation Strategy team looked at the performance of nine safe-haven assets and found, on average, they are negatively correlated with equities in every bear market since 1972.6 Although the current equity bull market still has room to run, recessions and bear markets tend to coincide (Chart 6). If the economy goes into recession in 2H19, equities could peak as early as the end of next year.7 Chart 6Bear Markets Usually Precede Recessions Gold's role as a global portfolio hedge during bear markets would thus support the hypothesis that the metal could enter a bull market as soon as end-2018 when equity markets start pricing in a recession (Chart 7). Things could get interesting at this point, since a clear indication the economy is entering into a recession likely will cause "traumatized" central bankers to turn overly dovish. This would add support to the gold market longer term.8 Chart 7Gold Outperforms During Recessions##BR##And Geopolitical Crises Correlations between safe havens decline during bear markets, as our GAA strategists found when they compared correlations by dividing the assets into three "buckets": currencies, inflation hedges, and fixed-income instruments. In this analysis, our GAA team found that gold outperformed TIPS and Farmland in the inflation-hedge bucket.9 Bottom Line: Gold is an exceptional hedge against downturns in equity markets. The bear market preceding the late-2019 recession we expect will put a bid under gold. The eventual turn to the dovish side by central bankers will further support the metal. Gold Will Hedge Geopolitical Risks A confluence of elevated geopolitical risks next year will drive part of gold's performance. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy (GPS) group has highlighted the following three themes investors need to track going into next year: U.S.-China Tensions: Our geopolitical strategists believe that the Korean conflict is a derivative of a more important secular trend of U.S.-China tensions. They estimate the risk of total war on the Korean peninsula at less than 3% and believe that the market impact of North Korea's provocations has peaked in the late summer. Nevertheless, they warn against complacency, as the underlying tensions over Pyongyang's nuclear program remain unresolved and North Korea could break with its past patterns.10 If the North stages attacks against U.S. or Japanese assets, or international shipping or aircraft, for instance, it could cause a larger safe-haven rally than what we witnessed earlier this year. At the very least, geopolitically induced volatility may return as U.S. President Trump tries to convince the world that war is a real option - a critical condition for establishing a "credible threat" of war with which to influence North Korean behavior - and as the U.S. and China spar over other issues. Trump's protectionism: Trump's campaign promised significant trade-protectionism. While he has not yet acted on those promises, the risk is that he returns to them next year.11 These policies could impact the gold market by: a. Feeding fears that the United States is abandoning the global liberal order; b. Intensifying U.S. trade tensions and strategic distrust with China; c. Pressuring U.S. domestic inflation via higher import prices. This risk will become even more elevated if the Trump administration and Congress fail to pass any tax legislation this year. Our geopolitical strategists believe that such a failure, while not their baseline scenario, would drive Trump to focus on his foreign policy and trade agenda more intently, especially ahead of the midterm elections in November next year, which would increase safe-haven flows. 3. Mideast Troubles: While we are not alarmist about the Middle East, the risk of market-relevant conflicts will be higher over the coming 12 months than over the previous year, following the fall of ISIS. The latter gave reason for various regional powers to cooperate, while its absence will revive their grievances with each other. Kurdish assertiveness is a key consequence, highlighted by last month's Kurdish independence referendum.12 Iraqi forces have pushed ISIS out of major Iraqi cities and the slowdown in the fight against ISIS could push Iraqi forces to focus on regaining the province of Kirkuk. Kirkuk, which is home to major oil fields and reserves, has been under Kurdish control since 2014 when the Peshmerga forces there captured it from ISIS. As ISIS ceases to be a threat, Baghdad will try to regain control of these precious oil fields. The Kurdish conflict, as well as Trump's pressure tactics against Iran, will increase geopolitical risks in oil-producing (hence market-relevant) areas. Chart 82017 Risks Were Overstated In a recent study investigating how different "safe-havens" assets react to political and financial events, our GPS colleagues found that gold provides the best average returns following a major geopolitical event (Chart 7).13 Our House geopolitical view has maintained that political risks in 2017 were overstated. This was particularly the case in Europe, where much of the risk was exaggerated and merely the product of linear extrapolation from the outcomes of the U.K. referendum on EU membership and the U.S. presidential election. As such, we do not expect any European break-up risk to support gold prices next year. Although elevated Italian Euroscepticism is one lingering European risk that could impact gold markets, we see this as a long-term risk rather than a market catalyst arising from the Italian general election in May next year. Reflecting our view, the policy uncertainty index has fallen drastically in the last two months (Chart 8). Bottom Line: Elevated political risks in 2018 will further support the gold market. Most notable on our geopolitical strategists' minds are continued U.S.-China tensions (most notably over Korea), Trump's protectionist policies, and potential conflicts in the Middle East. Roukaya Ibrahim, Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Assistant HugoB@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Go Long Gold As A Strategic Portfolio Hedge," dated May 4, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 Our results show 1% increase in U.S. YoY CPI, 5 year real rates, and USD TWI are associated with a 4% increase, 0.18% decline and a 0.21% decline in gold prices, respectively. The adjusted R2 is 0.88. 3 Please see the Global Investment Strategy Outlook "Fourth Quarter 2017: Goldilocks And The Recession Bear," dated October 4, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report "Is King Dollar Back," dated October 4, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 We use the S&P 500 Total Return (TR) index as a proxy for U.S. equities. 6 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report "Safe Havens: Where To Hide Next Time?," dated April 21, 2017, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see Global Asset Allocation Quarterly Portfolio Outlook, dated October 2, 2017, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see the Global Investment Strategy Outlook "Fourth Quarter 2017: Goldilocks And The Recession Bear," dated October 4, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report "Safe Havens: Where To Hide Next Time?," dated April 21, 2017, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World," dated September 6, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Understated In 2018," dated April 12, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Armed conflict in the Middle East usually lead to a sharp rally in gold prices. Please see Table 1 from Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market?," dated August 16, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 13 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Geopolitics And Safe Havens," dated November 11, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016
Dear Client, This week, in addition to this regular Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, we decided to send you a collaborative report we penned with BCA's Energy Sector Strategy. My colleague Matt Conlan runs the service, which blends BCA's macroeconomic framework with his bottom-up expertise in the energy sector. Matt's service is one of the few that our firm publishes with specific company recommendations. In the report titled "King Salman Goes To Moscow, Bolsters OPEC 2.0," Matt argues that the emerging détente between Russia and Saudi Arabia will strengthen OPEC 2.0 and provide a structural tailwind for BCA's bullish view on energy. I highly recommend that you check out the research Matt and his team produce at nrg.bcaresearch.com. All the very best, Marko Papic Senior Vice President, Geopolitical Strategy Highlights Easier fiscal policy and tighter monetary policy is bullish for U.S. equities; The Dec. 12 Alabama Senate race could be a game changer in U.S. politics; Trump's anti-immigration policies could boost inflation; Our Catalan view is bearing out. Go long Spain's IBEX 35 / short Eurostoxx 50. Separately, book profits on our China volatility trade and our long China big bank trade. Feature "Buy In May And Enjoy Your Day!" has been our mantra throughout the summer. Despite the doom and gloom in the media surrounding the Mueller investigation, North Korea, Trump's legislative agenda, the French elections, Brexit, and so on, the S&P 500 is up 16% and global equities are up 10.8%. Our April 23 Weekly Report bearing the same cheery title focused on three overstated risks:1 European politics - massively overstated; U.S. politics - all noise, no signal; Brexit - irrelevant for global investors. We have also cautioned investors throughout the year to worry, but not to obsess, about North Korea. Yes, it is a risk.2 Yes, it will continue to buoy safe haven assets on occasion.3 But it is extremely unlikely to produce total war and therefore has lost some market relevance as assets have adjusted to the higher geopolitical volatility on the Korean Peninsula under the Trump regime.4 We are not reiterating these calls just to pat ourselves on the back. Rather, our point is to emphasize that there is nothing supernatural about the ongoing bull market. It has not "ignored" geopolitical risks. Rather, geopolitical risks on hand have not developed in a market-relevant way. The bottom line here is that geopolitics is not voodoo. It is not an "error term," a disturbance in an elegant model that can go awry at any moment because "one cannot forecast politics." Investors can systematically analyze geopolitics just as they do the economy or the markets. When geopolitical risks are overstated, as they have been since the beginning of the year, recognizing the mispricing can generate significant alpha. Going forward, however, geopolitics will likely play a headwind for the market. We are particularly concerned with three dynamics: The upcoming party congress in China may signal a shift towards more growth-stalling reforms, as we have been writing all year. The Trump administration could make a hard turn towards a more populist agenda, particularly on trade, if it fails to enact any legislative successes this year. A plethora of political risks in emerging markets (EM) - with the usual suspects of Brazil, South Africa, and Turkey on top of our list - could re-surface in 2018 if China is not firing on all cylinders. We will be focusing on these three risks to markets until the end of 2017 and beyond. This week, however, we focus on upcoming tax legislation in the U.S. First, a reason to be optimistic ("easier fiscal policy, tighter monetary policy" is a winning policy combination). Then, a reason to be pessimistic (Alabama). Finally, a few words about inflation from a political perspective and a quick word on Catalonia. Easy Fiscal, Tighter Monetary Policy Mix - What Does It Mean? If our base case view on tax legislation is correct, U.S. equities should gain double-digit returns from current levels. Our colleague Anastasios Avgeriou, Chief Strategist of BCA's U.S. Equity Strategy, believes that the passage of stimulative tax legislation would serve as a catalyst to further fuel the blow-off phase in equities. In his latest Weekly Report, Anastasios presents empirical evidence suggesting that easy fiscal policy outweighs the drag from Fed interest rate tightening.5 Filtering the post-World War Two era for periods of easing fiscal and tightening monetary policies during economic expansions is revealing. Anastasios defines easy fiscal policy as periods with a positive fiscal thrust and tight monetary policy as a rising fed funds rate. Fiscal thrust is the year-over-year change in the cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance as a percentage of potential GDP (shown inverted on the bottom panel of Chart 1). While such a policy mix is a rare occurrence, it has happened seven times since the mid-1950s (shaded areas, Chart 1).6 All iterations resulted in positive returns, with the SPX rising on average by over 16%. Table 1 details all seven periods that have an average duration of 16 months. For sectoral implications of such an "easier fiscal, tighter monetary" policy mix, we encourage our clients to peruse the work of BCA's U.S. Equity Strategy. On the other hand, the demand for fiscal stimulus usually rises during times of high volatility, unlike today (Chart 2). Investors have become acutely aware of the political difficulties of stimulating the economy late in the economic cycle. We now turn to some emerging risks to our sanguine view on tax policy. Chart 1Easy Fiscal + Tight Money##br## = Buy SPX Table 1SPX Returns During Periods Of Loose##br## Fiscal And Tight Monetary Policy Chart 2Fiscal Stimulus Usually##br## Comes With High Volatility Bottom Line: If our base case view holds, and Republicans pass mildly stimulative tax legislation, the blow-off phase in equities should continue. "Alabama, You Got The Weight On Your Shoulders" The market continues to doubt that the Trump administration can pass significant tax legislation over the next six-to-nine months. The gap in the probabilities assigned to such an outcome by the market and ourselves has narrowed over the past two weeks, generating alpha on several of our "Trump Reflation" trades (Chart 3). But skepticism abounds. Chart 3Signs Of Life For 'Trump Reflation' Trades We have spent the entire year pushing against the skepticism, but there is now an actual reason to worry. The December 12 Alabama Senate special election - being held to elect a replacement for former Senator Jeff Sessions, now the U.S. Attorney General - has become a premier league event. Former Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore won the Republican primary against a candidate backed by the Republican establishment and President Trump. The reason the Alabama special election is of global significance is because the Republicans are already down to essentially 50 votes in the Senate. The rhetorical war between President Donald Trump and Senator Bob Corker (R - Tennessee) has reached epic proportions, with the latter insinuating via twitter that the president was an adult baby. Corker has announced his retirement from the Senate, which increases the probability that he will go out by refusing to support the president's agenda across all fronts.7 This now makes two GOP senators that want nothing to do with President Trump's agenda. John McCain (R - Arizona) has harbored ill will since the presidential campaign and has twice played the spoiler in the effort to repeal Obamacare. Further complicating matters is the role of former White House Chief Strategist Steve Bannon, who strongly backed Moore when nobody in the Republican establishment would. If Moore should remain loyal to Bannon beyond the election, it would mean that Trump's former campaign strategist would become the kingmaker on tax legislation. Bannon's departure from the White House was cheered by the markets, as it signaled victory for the "Goldman Sachs clique" and the trio of generals managing President Trump's foreign policy over Bannon's populist "Breitbart clique." We do not think that Bannon is opposed to stimulative tax policy. Yes, he has branded his ideology "economic nationalism," but his media empire, Breitbart, has so far stayed away from attacking the Republican tax plan. Instead, Bannon and Moore could hold out on supporting tax policy until they see movement on other pillars of the populist agenda, namely on immigration policy. As such, Moore's Alabama victory would complicate the horse-trading surrounding tax legislation, and elevate Bannon's standing on Capitol Hill, but it would not be a death knell for stimulus. The actual death knell for tax reform would be if Moore actually lost the December 12 Alabama special election. Moore's views are generally considered to be staunchly conservative, even for Alabama, and therefore a shock defeat cannot be ignored.8 Polls are limited, but most show Moore leading the Democratic candidate Doug Jones by only 5%-8%. This in a state where Republican Senate candidates have defeated their Democrat counterparts by an astounding average of 36% in the last decade! If Jones were to win, Republicans would be down to 51 Senators. Given the staunch opposition to Trump by Corker and McCain, this would effectively end the tax legislation push. Not all is negative for the tax push in Washington. The U.S. House of Representatives has passed a budget resolution that includes steep spending cuts as well as reconciliation instructions for tax legislation. This now sets in motion the reconciliation process by which Republicans can pass tax legislation with merely 51 votes in the Senate. Of the 18 GOP representatives who voted against the budget resolution, only three were from the 31-member Freedom Caucus, which is rhetorically committed to fiscal conservativism. This is very bullish for tax cuts as it means that the Freedom Caucus is toeing the line of its Chair Mark Meadows (R - North Carolina) who has been hinting since the spring that he would have no problem with budget-busting tax cuts. The majority of Republicans who voted against the budget resolution were from highly-taxed "Blue States," suggesting that the real point of contention for Republicans in the House was the proposal to end the state and local tax deduction. Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin has already signaled that the White House is willing to compromise on this particular revenue offset. Bottom Line: The December 12 Alabama special election now has global market relevance. A defeat for GOP candidate Roy Moore would be a massive game changer. It would reduce the Republican majority in the Senate to 51 votes, putting in danger President Trump's tax agenda given the staunch opposition from Senators Corker and McCain. What Can Politics Do To Inflation? The greatest surprise to the markets this year has been lackluster inflation data in the U.S. Both headline and core data have been disappointing (Chart 4). This is particularly puzzling as the U.S. has closed its output gap and unemployment has fallen below the low reached in 2007 (Chart 5). Chart 4U.S. Inflation Has Disappointed... Chart 5...Which Is Puzzling At Full Employment One possible explanation is that the U.S. has been importing deflation from abroad. The U.S. imports around 12.5% of GDP worth of goods and 2.8% of GDP worth of services (Chart 6). However, the import price deflator has been growing at 2.7% so far this year and yet inflation has been nonexistent (Chart 6, bottom panel). Export prices have grown by 5% in 2017, from the lows of -15% amidst the commodity bust in 2015 (Chart 7). Chart 6The U.S. Is Not Importing Deflation Chart 7Global Export Prices Are Rising Another explanation is that structural changes in the labor market - globalization and the fall in the unionization rate - have eroded the bargaining power of workers (Chart 8). When combined with the shock of the 2008 Great Recession, workers may simply be happy to have a job and are therefore delaying asking of a raise or switching to a higher-paying, but higher-risk, job. As a result, the economy may have closed its output gap, but with no inflationary effects coming from the low unemployment figures. Chart 8Globalization Suppressed U.S. Wages Further restricting wage gains may be the high number of migrants - legal or illegal (Chart 9). The foreign born population in the U.S. is at an all-time high of 43.2 million, although unauthorized migration has come down from around 12 million prior to the GFC to 11.3 million in 2016. The conventional wisdom is that most immigrants are uneducated, competing with blue collar laborers and suppressing wages at the lower income levels. However, this is a stereotype stuck in the 1980s. Today's migrants are as educated as Americans: 29.7% have a Bachelor's degree or higher, compared with just over 30% Americans in general (Chart 10). Chart 9Immigration Helps Explain Weak Wage Growth Chart 10Immigrants Not Stealing Low-Skill Jobs The point is that immigration has evolved along with the U.S. economy. With 78% of the U.S. economy based in services, the modern migrant has had to keep up with the educational requirements of the American job market. The Trump administration could be a game-changer for the skilled, legal immigration into the U.S. First, President Trump ordered a full review of the high-skilled, H-1B immigration visa in April. Second, President Trump asked Congress in August to curb legal migration by sharply curtailing family reunification while keeping immigration based on job skills roughly the same. Third, anti-immigrant rhetoric - as well as restrictions to family reunification down the line - could influence highly-skilled migrants to choose job opportunities in countries like Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, instead of in the U.S. Bottom Line: Investors often think of fiscal policy as the main vehicle through which politicians can influence inflation. However, the U.S. economy has been enjoying, since the 1980s, the combined effect of rapidly expanding immigration and a parallel increase in the educational attainment of incoming migrants. In a way, the influx of skilled migrants has been an important supply side reform for the U.S. economy. The Trump administration could influence immigration either directly, through policies to curb it, or indirectly, through creating a general atmosphere that redirects some of the flows to other developed economies. Spain: Fade Catalan Risks As we have expected since 2014, the prospects for Catalan independence remain slim.9 As we go to press, Catalan President Carles Puigdemont has backed away from his earlier hints toward a unilateral declaration of independence. Instead, he has succumbed to domestic and international pressure and told the regional parliament that he has "suspended" any declaration in order to begin negotiations with Madrid. Puigdemont's decision to suspend something that has not happened is not only illogical but also ineffectual. The Catalan pro-independence government is trying to force Madrid to be the "bad guy" and refuse negotiations; Spain has refused any discussion of independence. But slight narrative shifts and "gotcha" politics will not work in this case. While Puigdemont is playing checkers with Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, the rest of Europe is playing chess. International recognition of Catalan independence is not forthcoming. And without it, Catalonia will not become independent. As we have extensively written, we strongly believe that investors should fade secessionism risk in Spain. First, the independence process in Catalonia falls far short of the democratic ideals established in similar referendums in the developed world, particularly in Scotland (2014), Montenegro (2006), and Quebec (1980 and 1995) (Table 2). The pro-independence government has been unable to significantly boost turnout figures from 2014, no doubt due to interference by the federal authorities. However, even if the pro-independence Catalans were to receive mediation from the EU, the outcome would likely be to strengthen Madrid's hand. For example, when the EU negotiated the 2006 divorce between Serbia and Montenegro, it required a supermajority of 55% in order to recognize the result of the Montenegro independence referendum. As an integrationist project, the EU has an anti-secession bias. Table 2Catalan Independence Demand Exaggerated By Low Voter Turnout Second, the French government has come out forcefully against Catalan independence, as we suspected it would. This is particularly important for Catalonia as it is nestled between Spain and France.10 It is quite likely that, were Catalans somehow to enforce their independence, both European powers would close their borders to Catalan travel and trade. In addition, French European Affairs Minister Nathalie Louiseau has repeated Madrid's assertion that by choosing independence Catalonia would automatically be kicked out of the EU. Third, Madrid is unlikely to make another mistake as the disastrous attempt to disrupt the independence referendum. Images of civilians being dragged through the streets of an advanced European economy while attempting to vote - even if the referendum was constitutionally illegal - shocked the world. Spanish officials have already offered rather tepid apologies for the police action, suggesting that a re-run of the heavy-handed actions is not to be expected. For investors who disagree with us, we suggest an empirical way to test our thesis. Chart 11 shows that only 34.7% of Catalans support independence. These are not pro-Madrid polls. They are the product of the Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió, which is affiliated with the Catalan (currently staunchly pro-independence) government and has been conducting polls on the issue of independence since 2005. Even if the level of support for independence is off in this data, the direction gives us valuable insight into the support for secession. The data clearly suggests that (A) the majority of Catalans have never supported independence and that (B) support for independence peaked in 2013, at the height of Spain's economic crisis, and has been in steady decline since then. That said, Chart 11 also shows that the other 57.5% of Catalans are not necessarily "pro-Spain." In fact, 30.5% support Catalonia remaining in its current form of an autonomous region, with considerable sovereignty devolved to the province. Another 21.7% favor a federal state, which would be a step in the direction of even greater sovereignty. Investors should watch the polls to see whether voters who previously favored federal or autonomous status have begun to shift towards independence, especially in light of the crackdown against the referendum by Madrid. Centre d'Estudis d'Opinió normally releases its third series of polls in October, which would mean that investors will have an update from the official polling agency soon. That said, we are willing to put our geopolitical views on the line. An unwarranted selloff in Spanish equities on the back of increased Catalonia-related geopolitical risk has created an opportunity for a market neutral trade: long Spanish IBEX 35/short Eurostoxx 50. This is a market neutral way to express our view that Catalonia does not pose a grand geopolitical risk as it will remain an integral part of Spain and thus the EU. Importantly, adding a hedge to this pair trade would also make sense for certain investors. Chart 12 shows that EUR/USD and relative Spanish equity performance are joined at the hip. Currently an uncharacteristically wide gap has opened. Thus, putting on this equity pair trade and simultaneously going short EUR/USD on the expectation of a convergence, should generate alpha, as the geopolitical dust settles. Chart 11The Silent Majority Fears Independence Chart 12Expect A Convergence Bottom Line: Fade geopolitical risks in Spain. For those with risk appetite, buy Spanish equities at any sign of geopolitical risk premium. Housekeeping With the Communist Party convening for the nineteenth National Party Congress over the next week, we think the time is opportune to book profits on two trades: our long China ETF volatility index, for a gain of 17.72%, and our long Chinese Big Five state-owned banks versus small and medium-sized banks, for a gain of 11.63%. We will revisit these trades in an upcoming report. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri, Research Analyst jesse.kuri@bcaresearch.com Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy & Global Alpha Sector Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Buy In May And Enjoy Your Day," dated April 26, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire," dated April 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market?" dated August 16, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Insights From The Road - The Rest Of The World," dated September 6, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Easy Fiscal Offset Tighter Monetary Policy?" dated October 9, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 6 Omitted from the sample are brief periods in the early-1960s, early-1970s, and twice in the early-1980s as they were very close to the end of recessions. 7 We suspect that Senator Corker is planning a centrist challenge to President Trump in the 2020 GOP presidential primaries. 8 "Staunchly conservative" does not do justice to Moore's ideological orientation. He was removed from his position as Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court twice for failing to follow federal law. In both cases, Moore chose to inform his actions as the Chief Justice through Biblical scripture, rather than the U.S. Constitution. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and European Investment Strategy Special Report, "Secession In Europe: Scotland And Catalonia," dated May 14, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 Yes, we are aware that Catalonia also borders Andorra. However, given that French President Emmanuel Macro is the co-prince of Andorra, and that Andorra is a microstate, this fact is largely irrelevant and would in no way aid Catalan independence. However, you have now learned that the French President is automatically a co-prince of another country. And that there is such a thing as a "co-prince." Therefore, this footnote has not been a complete waste of your time.
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Go long industrials/short discretionary. Leading indicators of interest rates, relative sentiment, relative demand and relative exports all signal that industrials stocks will outperform their consumer discretionary peers. A price war is gripping airlines anew, and it will suck the air out of the industry. Recent Changes Long S&P Industrials/Short S&P Consumer Discretionary - Initiate this pair trade today. Table 1 Feature Tax relief euphoria propelled the S&P 500 to fresh all-time highs last week. While such exuberance has rekindled the "Trump trade" with small caps outshining mega caps and banks soaring (as a reminder we have a small cap size bias and are overweight financials/banks1), it will likely prove fleeting unless the tax bill becomes law. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service believes that a tax bill passage is likely in Q1/2018.2 Were that to materialize, it would serve as a catalyst to further fuel the blow off phase in equities. Why? Empirical evidence suggests that easy fiscal policy outweighs the drag from Fed interest rate tightening. Filtering the post WWII era for periods of easing fiscal and tightening monetary policies during expansions is revealing. We define easy fiscal policy as increasing fiscal thrust (year-over-year change in cyclically-adjusted fiscal balance as a percentage of potential GDP, shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 1) and tight monetary policy as a rising fed funds rate. Chart 1Easy Fiscal + Tight Money = Buy SPX While this is a rare occurrence, it has clearly happened seven times since the mid-1950s (shaded areas, Chart 1). As a clarification, we omitted the brief periods in the early-1960s, early-1970s and twice in the early-1980s as they were very close to the end of those recessions and positively skewed the results. All iterations resulted in positive stock returns with the SPX rising on average by over 16%. Table 2 details all seven periods that have an average duration of 16 months. There are high odds that a tax bill enactment coupled with a potential infrastructure spending bill will more than cushion the blow from the Fed's interest rate hikes in 2018, and sustain the overshoot phase in equities. As we recently showed in our equity market indicator White Paper, the business cycle stays intact during Fed tightening cycles, and historically a peak in the fed funds rate presages a recession.3 Importantly, the highly cyclical part of the U.S. economy is humming. The latest ISM manufacturing survey showed that new orders are running 20% higher than inventories, with the headline number soaring to a 13 year high (third panel, Chart 2). Prices paid also spiked to above 70, signaling that commodity inflation is looming. And, were the capex revival to gain steam as most of the leading indicators we track suggest (see Chart 8 from the October 2nd Weekly Report), then late cyclicals will continue to benefit from end-demand resurgence. Table 2SPX Returns During Periods Of Loose##br## Fiscal And Tight Monetary Policy Chart 2It's Deep##br## Cyclicals' Time As a result, we reiterate last week's upgrade of the S&P industrials sector to overweight, and this week we add more deep cyclical exposure to our portfolio by initiating a market-neutral pair trade to benefit from this enticing macro backdrop. Industrials Will Outmuscle Consumer Discretionary In the past few weeks, we have tweaked our cyclical portfolio exposure by downgrading early-cyclical consumer discretionary stocks to a benchmark allocation and lifting the late cyclical industrials complex to overweight. In fact, a once-in-a-generation opportunity to buy industrials at the expense of discretionary stocks has surfaced, and we recommend a new long S&P industrials/short S&P consumer discretionary sector pair trade to exploit this tradable opportunity. Chart 3 shows that relative share prices recently bounced near the early-1970s all-time lows and a mini V-shaped recovery is taking root. The industrials/discretionary price ratio has been in a downtrend for the better part of the past decade and the most recent peak-to-trough collapse has been a 4 standard deviation move (Chart 3). Even a modest relative performance renormalization near the historical mean would translate into impressive returns. Chart 3Compelling Entry Point Four key drivers underpin our warming up to this late over early cyclical pair trade: interest rates, relative sentiment, relative demand and relative export backdrop. The Fed embarked on a fresh tightening interest rate cycle almost two years ago and is on track to lift the fed funds rate another 100bps by the end of 2018 according to the FOMC's median dot forecast. Interest rate-sensitive stocks suffer when the Fed tightens monetary policy, whereas deep cyclicals disproportionately benefit from accelerating economic growth. Chart 4 confirms that over the past four decades a rising fed funds rate has been synonymous with an increase in the relative share price ratio and vice versa. Chart 4Tight Money Is Good For Industrials But Weighs On Discretionary The framework we use on the interest rate front is that higher interest rates represent a sizable hindrance to consumer spending (top and second panel Chart 5). Not only does the price of housing-related credit rise in lockstep with fed hikes, but also auto and credit card interest rates, two major consumer loan categories, increase on the back of the Fed's tighter monetary backdrop. True, C&I loan pricing also suffers a setback, but capital goods producers can bypass banks and raise debt in the bond markets. In fact, this cycle, the global hunt for yield and unconventional monetary policies have suppressed interest rates to the benefit of corporate borrowers. One final relative advantage industrials outfits have this cycle is rising pricing power in the form of firming commodity prices (third panel, Chart 5), while wage growth/median income (a proxy for consumer pricing power) has been subpar. Taken together, higher interest rates and rising commodity prices should continue to underpin relative share price momentum (Chart 5). Relative sentiment readings also suggest that industrials manufacturers have the upper hand versus consumer discretionary companies (Chart 6). The overall ISM manufacturing survey is easily outpacing consumer confidence readings. Importantly, the ISM survey and most of the subcomponents are making multi-year highs, while both the University of Michigan's consumer sentiment survey and The Conference Board's consumer confidence reading peaked in early 2017. Chart 5Commodity Inflation Is A Boon For##br## Industrials But Bane For Discretionary Chart 6Manufacturing Flexing ##br##Its Muscles With regard to the relative demand landscape, a sustained capital expenditure upcycle is promising for capital goods producers (second panel, Chart 7), at a time when personal consumption expenditures (PCE) are anemic at best. Notably, real capital outlays have been rising at a faster clip than real PCE, signaling that the upward trajectory in relative forward EPS estimates is sustainable (middle panel, Chart 7). Our relative pricing power gauge has recently come out of its funk reflecting this improving relative demand backdrop. The implication is that a rerating phase is likely in the coming months (bottom panel, Chart 7). Finally, the relative export backdrop suggests that industrials come out on top of discretionary stocks (top panel, Chart 8). According to FactSet the S&P consumer discretionary sector's foreign revenue exposure stands at 24% of total sales, and it is roughly 60% higher for the S&P industrials sector at 38% of revenues.4 While the year-to-date breakdown in the greenback is stimulative for industrials exporters, it is, at the margin, restrictive for the more domestically oriented consumer discretionary companies (trade-weighted dollar shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 8). Our relative EPS growth models best capture all of these moving parts and suggest that the path of least resistance for relative profit growth is higher in the coming quarters (Chart 9). Chart 7Capex##br## Upcycle... Chart 8... And Export Markets Benefit Industrials##br## At The Expense Of Discretionary Chart 9Relative Profit Growth Models Also Say##br## Buy The Relative Share Price Ratio Adding up, all four key macro variables (interest rates, relative sentiment, relative demand and relative export exposure) signal that the time is ripe for a new industrials versus discretionary pair trade. Bottom Line: Initiate a long S&P industrials/short S&P consumer discretionary sector pair trade. Airlines Update: Mayday While we have turned positive on the broad industrials complex and remain constructive on most transports, we continue to recommend investors avoid the S&P airlines index. This decade has seen a huge recovery in consumer confidence, rising from the depths of the Great Recession. The consumer's revival has been matched by equally steep growth in airline passenger traffic (Chart 10). However, the resurgence in passenger demand has not had the expected uplift in pricing. Rather, the opposite has happened; consumers have not seen a sustainable price increase in years and airline pricing power has collapsed, even in the face of soaring jet fuel costs that eat into profits (Chart 11). The costly price war between the low cost carriers and the largely-restructured legacy airlines the industry is currently embroiled in explains deflating airfares (Chart 12). Chart 10More Passengers... Chart 11... But Higher Fuel Costs... Chart 12... And Price Concessions Crash Profits The industry has been here before, and recently too. 2015 was a tumultuous year that saw pricing collapse as the ultra-low cost carriers entered the traditional hubs, triggering a scramble for market share. Brave airline investors have been whipsawed as the industry recovered and then stumbled again earlier this year. From a profit perspective, airlines have been able to hide poor pricing with efficiency gains (Chart 13). Industry load factors have been steadily moving upward, though those gains appear to have plateaued at peak levels. The implication is that this current price war will hit profit margins and thus the bottom line worse than in the past (Chart 13). Expanding international air travel could provide some relief to the besieged legacy carriers as international airfares look to have pulled out of deflation (Chart 14). However, the sustainability of positive pricing is questionable as international no-frills carriers are gaining greater penetration and often have significantly lower cost structures. Once unheard of trans-Atlantic travel for below $200 is now widely available. Chart 13Masking Poor Pricing Backdrop Chart 14Analysts Ignore Positives At the same time as cash generation appears most threatened, the industry is in the midst of an expensive fleet renewal as airlines seek to replace declining prices and aging fleets with higher volume and more efficient aircraft. In fact, capex as a percentage of sales has nearly tripled since 2012. The result is predictable; the hard deleveraging work the industry put in over the course of this decade is being unwound (Chart 13). An increasingly geared balance sheet, combined with weakening margins should translate directly into a higher risk premium and lower valuation multiples. However, while multiples have fallen from the sky-high levels earlier this decade, they remain well above the lows of 2015-16 (Chart 14). This implies further downside risk should risk premiums expand as we expect. With sell-side analysts jumping on board the bear story, as evidenced by net forward earnings revisions falling off a cliff (Chart 14), this should probably happen sooner rather than later. Bottom Line: With no end in sight to the price war and outsized capacity additions likely to throw fuel on the fire, we think investors should stay away from the S&P airlines index. Accordingly, we reiterate our underweight recommendation. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5AIRL - DAL, LUV, AAL, UAL, ALK. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy & Global Alpha Sector Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report,"Girding For A Breakout?" dated May 1, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report,"Can Equities And Bonds Continue To Rally?" dated September 20, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Chart 55 of BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, "White Paper: U.S. Equity Market Indicators (Part I)", dated August 7, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 https://www.factset.com/earningsinsight Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and stay neutral growth over value.
Special Report Highlights China's growth momentum is unlikely to continue to accelerate, but the downside risk is low. Some more recent developments suggest economic momentum remains fairly robust. The heated debate on a "soft or hard landing" in recent years has disproportionally diverted investors' attention to China's cyclical growth fluctuations, while some larger picture changes have gone unnoticed. The Chinese economy will undoubtedly continue to experience cyclical swings; it is equally important to keep in mind some mega trends that hold the potential to reshape the world in profound ways. Feature The Chinese economy has likely ended the third quarter on a slightly higher note, according to "nowcast" types of models using high-frequency data (Chart 1). The latest PMI surveys, focusing on both the manufacturing and service sectors, accelerated in September from the prior month, and remain comfortably in expansionary territory, heralding positive surprises in the macro numbers to be released in the coming weeks. China's mini-cycle acceleration since early last year has been fairly modest by historical standards, but it has been a key component driving synchronized improvement in global growth. Moreover, the resilience of the Chinese economy has led to a quick repricing of risk assets that were deeply depressed in previous years due to China "hard landing" concerns. Stock prices of both Chinese investable equities and the emerging market benchmark have rallied massively since the 2016 bottom. Total returns of Chinese equities and EM stocks, price appreciation and dividend payments combined, have both broken out to all-time highs (Chart 2). Chart 1Chinese Q3 GDP Should Have Remained Strong Chart 2Breakout In China And EM Equities Looking forward, Chinese growth momentum is unlikely to continue to accelerate, but the downside risk remains low in the near term, as we have argued in recent months. In fact, some more recent developments suggest economic momentum remains fairly robust. More importantly, the heated debates among investors and analysts in recent years on China's macro stability have disguised some dramatic changes in the Chinese economy, which will have a profound and long-lasting impact on the global economy and financial markets from a big-picture standpoint. Given China's rising economic significance, getting China right will become all the more important for investors going forward. Near-Term Growth Outlook Remains Solid The Chinese economy will likely continue to surprise to the upside in the coming months. First, there is little risk of aggressive policy tightening that would prematurely choke off the economy, as economic growth is within the government's target, consumer price inflation is exceedingly low and financial excesses have been reined in.1 The latest decision of the People's Bank of China (PBoC) to lower reserve requirement ratios (RRR) for banks offering loans to small-sized enterprises should not be confused as a broad attempt to boost credit and growth. The move certainly reflects the authorities' preference for offering credit to smaller private borrowers, but it also reflects the PBoC's continued fine-tuning of its liquidity management.2 The PBoC has significantly ramped up direct lending to banks since 2015 to offset the liquidity drainage from capital outflows from the country's financial sector - the pace of PBoC direct lending has slowed since early this year (Chart 3, top panel). This means that the central bank will need to resort to other tools to manage interbank liquidity should stress increase - releasing required reserves being one of them. Taken together, the PBoC's liquidity injection has almost precisely matched the liquidity withdrawal due to capital outflows, as can be seen in the bottom panel of Chart 3. The key point here is that the PBoC's latest decision is not to encourage a lending spree, but it certainly does not indicate intentions of aggressive tightening. Second, some view China's lukewarm industrial activity as a sign of weak growth momentum, and argue for a pending relapse. In fact, some sectors have been under strict government scrutiny to cut capacity and production in recent years - a key reason behind the exceptional weakness in these industries despite massive improvement in their sales, pricing power and profits. In other words, these sectors have not been responding to market signals due to government restrictions of "supply side reforms" to cut excess capacity and reduce pollution. For example, some sectors that are subject to "supply side" constraints such as coal, base metals and cement producers have chronically underperformed in recent years, and have also hurt the overall performance of the industrial sector (Chart 4). Similarly, capital spending in the mining sector, historically highly sensitive to moves in global metals prices, have continued to contract, despite the sharp increase in metals prices since 2016. Without these regulations, the performance of the industrial sector should have been a lot stronger. In addition, without aggressive expansion in the "good times," the odds of another major relapse in these highly cyclical industries when the "bad times" do come are also lower. Chart 3The PBoC Liquidity Operation Chart 4Policy Constraints Weigh Heavy On Some Sectors Third, the Chinese authorities' tightening measures on the real estate sector pose a growth risk, and should continue to be monitored; the impact is unlikely to be significant, as discussed in detail in last week's report.3 Developers have also been subject to "supply side" constraints and have not increased construction in this cycle, despite rising home prices, increasing transactions and booming profits (Chart 5). Tighter policies imposed by local governments will probably keep developers in dormancy, but a major downturn is highly unlikely, simply because there is not much excess to begin with. Finally, while China has been a key component of the synchronized global growth improvement, the country has also benefited from a pickup in global demand.4 Korean exports, a harbinger of global trade, jumped by a whopping 35% in dollar terms in September versus a year ago. It is certainly unrealistic to expect such strong momentum to last, but the benign global demand situation is unlikely to immediately falter without some sort of extreme external shock. Similarly, our model expects Chinese export growth to moderate, but there are no signs of a sharp contraction anytime soon (Chart 6). Chart 5Real Estate Investment May Surprise To The Upside Chart 6Exports: Moderating, Not Relapsing Bottom Line: China's near-term growth outlook will remain resilient, providing a supportive macro backdrop for global risk assets. The China Debate: Seven Years On Ever since the Chinese economy recovered from the aftermath of the global financial crisis, with the help of a massive government stimulus package, investors' opinions on China's macro situation have been deeply divided.5 To be sure, sensational predictions of an imminent China collapse have always existed, ever since the country's economic reform, but they were mostly rooted in ideological bashing and were largely ignored by global investors. In recent years, however, predictions of a Chinese "hard landing" have been taken much more seriously by the mainstream media, as well as investors and policymakers. Amid mounting doubts about its long term sustainability, the Chinese economy has experienced some remarkable achievements and dramatic changes in the past several years. The Chinese economy continues to gain global significance, accounting for 16% of global economic output currently versus 9% in 2010. More importantly, its contribution to global economic growth is far larger, given its faster growth rate (Chart 7). China's nominal GDP currently stands at about US$11.5 trillion, a distant second to the mighty US$19.2 trillion U.S. economy. However, 7% of nominal growth in China feasibly amounts to an increase of US$800 billion in gross output, compared with US$770 billion for the U.S., assuming the latter is to grow by 4% in nominal terms. Although China's growth rate has downshifted since the global financial crisis, the increase in the country's total output in value terms has become even greater, given the economy's much larger size. China remains the dominant factor in driving global commodities demand, especially base metals. China's base metals consumption accounts for over 50% of the global total, higher than the rest of the world combined (Chart 8). More importantly, China's base metal consumption has continued to climb in recent years, while demand from the rest of the world has stagnated. In recent years, "sluggish" Chinese metals consumption has been blamed for commodities woes by some analysts; in reality, the country has been the only source of demand increase for base metals. China's role in driving the supply/demand balance of raw materials has increased significantly since the global financial crisis. Chart 7China's Growing Significance In World Economy Chart 8China And Base Metals The country's heavy investment on infrastructure has massively changed its urban landscape, leading to a significant improvement in the country's transportation system, with massive expansion in high-speed railway, urban metro and light-rail system, and further extensions of the highway network (Chart 9). This has significantly narrowed the country's infrastructure gap with more advanced countries, facilitating both international trade and domestic demand (Chart 10). Chinese car sales have jumped from about 10 million per year in 2010 to 25 million currently, by far the largest car market in the world. Without improvement in logistical infrastructure, there is little doubt the country's growth trajectory would have faced severe bottlenecks. Chart 9Massive Expansion Of ##br##Transportation Infrastructure... Chart 10...Has Narrowed The Gap ##br##With Developed Economies Finally, the impact of Chinese consumers has become all the more visible on the global stage. Even though China still ranks as a middle-income country with a per-capita GDP of about US$8000, a fraction of the US$57,000 in the U.S., the sheer size of the Chinese population, the rapid increase in household income and the country's very high savings rate have fundamentally shifted the wealth distribution of the global population. Currently, only about 20% of the world population has a per-capita GDP higher than China, a rapid change within a short period of time (Chart 11). This dramatic shift has profoundly redefined the global economic landscape, affecting the spectrum of essentially all businesses, from manufacturers' cost structures to luxury goods markets to tourism and education to financial services. Chart 11China's Rising Income In Perspective The list can easily be extended, but the point here is that the heated debate on a "soft or hard landing" in recent years has disproportionally diverted investors' attention to China's cyclical growth fluctuations, while some larger picture changes have gone unnoticed. Of course, financial markets are an emotional discounting mechanism, and stock prices always exaggerate any subtle changes in growth fundamentals, which can in turn impact economic reality through a complex web of reflexivity relationships. Chinese equities lagged significantly behind developed markets, particularly the U.S. bourses, between 2011 and 2015, which apparently validated the bears' views. In reality, however, multiples of Chinese equities, and emerging market in general, were deeply compressed compared with their developed market peers (Chart 12). In other words, it is largely multiples compression associated with heightened risk aversion and greater risk premium that was behind the woes of Chinese and EM markets before 2015. Since 2016, China's mini-cycle upturn has progressively raised investors' risk appetite towards China and EM, lifting their multiples and prices - essentially a positive re-rating of these markets. Chart 12Positive Rerating Of China ##br##And EM Has Further To Run The debate on China's growth sustainability will likely remain firmly in place in the coming years, which will continue to create cross-currents and outsized volatility. As an investor, it is futile to argue with "Mr. Market." Even with strong convictions on the fundamental case, investors should be nimble and avoid standing in front of an oncoming train - however ill-informed the market consensus could be. For now, Chinese and EM equities are still much more attractively valued compared with the developed world, and the train of the positive re-rating of these bourses will likely have further to run. It is too soon to bet on a trend reversal. Whither China: The Big Picture Fundamentally the China debate boils down to the country's growth model, which invests a much greater share of its output than most other major economies. The "bears" conclude this amounts to capital misallocation and propose a "rebalancing" towards consumption. Some even claim China's massive savings, essential for financing domestic capital spending, are byproducts of banks' "out of thin air" money printing - to me, if "thin air" money was indeed such a magical silver bullet, the world would have solved its poverty problems a long time ago. Over the years I have argued firmly against these assertions. In economics, it is well known that a country's income level is fundamentally determined by its productivity, which is in turn determined by the level and sophistication of its capital stock. Chart 13 shows a clear positive correlation between a country's per capita output, a measure of productivity, and its per capita capital stock. In general, industrialized countries enjoy much higher levels of per capita capital stock than developing economies, leading to much higher productivity, income as well as living standards. Therefore, the industrialization process, by definition, is the process of accumulation of capital stock through investment, which has been proven by many economies that have successfully industrialized. China's growth path in the past several decades is simply repeating these success stories. As shown in Chart 14, despite some remarkable achievements, the productivity level of the average Chinese worker is still just a fraction of the level in more advanced countries. If China remains on the path of accumulation of capital stock through savings and investment, the country will continue to progress on the productivity and income ladder. If, however, it abandons its current growth model and "rebalances" towards a consumption-driven one, odds are much higher that the country will stagnate and fail to advance beyond the "middle income trap." Chart 13Productivity Is Positively ##br##Correlated With Capital Stock Chart 14China's Catchup Process ##br##Has A Lot Further To Run In my 15 years of covering China for BCA, the country has dramatically shifted beyond recognition - the pace of changes are still accelerating. Looking forward, the Chinese economy will undoubtedly continue to experience cyclical swings; it is equally important to keep in mind some mega trends that hold the potential to reshape the world in profound ways. The following are a few worth highlighting. Chart 15China's Tech Boom The first mega trend is the explosive growth of the Chinese technology sector, which will increasingly challenge players in more advanced economies. The tech boom is reflected in the dramatic expansion of e-commerce and mobile payments, spectacular price gains in the BAT giants (Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent) and surging patent applications among the corporate sector (Chart 15). With a massive and homogenous domestic market and increasingly affluent consumers, China has rapidly become the testing ground of all new high-tech sectors - from big data and artificial intelligence to industrial robotics and additive manufacturing, to genetic analysis and quantum computing - with numerous startups and venture capitalists as well as government support on basic research and development. This is bound to create exciting investment opportunities with winners and losers far beyond Chinese borders. The second major development is the "Belt & Road Initiative" (BRI), also known as "One Belt One Road," or OBOR, that links China with some less developed nations. The project, initially proposed by President Xi Jinping in 2013 but met with heavy doubts, has been quietly gaining momentum. Some commentators have viewed the BRI as an attempt by the Chinese authorities to export excess domestic industrial capacity and have tried to quantify the impact, which is shortsighted and likely useless. China's vision of the BRI is an ambitious open-ended geo-strategic, economic and social undertaking to promote globalization with distinct "Chinese characteristics." There is no doubt that BRI will face tremendous challenges, and its ultimate destiny is simply an "unknowable unknown" at the moment. However, some solid progress has been made, and foreign authorities are increasingly taking the BRI seriously. Even with limited success, the BRI holds the promise of redefining the balance of geopolitics, global trade and international finance. The role of the RMB in international finance will inevitably grow at the expense of other majors, particularly the dollar. Investors will be well served to closely follow this mega development. Finally, how China's governance and political system will evolve remains a major question mark for investors, especially from a long-term perspective. Democracy has increasingly become the norm of world politics since the early 1990s, with over half of the global population currently living in democratic regimes, while China's political system is decisively foreign (Chart 16). Investors are ideologically skeptical on the long-term sustainability of China's essentially meritocratic authoritarian regime. Investors mostly see democracy as China's ultimate future, and expect the country to progressively move in this direction, along with rising economic prosperity. In reality, however, the ruling Communist Party has tightened its grip over the country in recent years, apparently reverting the trend of political liberalization that was underway in previous years. Chart 16Is Democracy China's Future? In essence, China, with over 20% of the world population, is conducting a mega-political experiment by searching for an alternative to open democracy, the prospect of which remains unknown. The majority of the Chinese population have been content with the existing system, and have been adapting to drastic social and economic changes with ease in the past several decades. Numerous previous predictions of an imminent collapse of the Chinese regime have repeatedly proven wrong, but the underlying anxiety will remain, especially when China's economic growth further downshifts. Political and social stability is crucial for the country's continued economic development. A major social upheaval, on the other hand, would have devastating consequences, not only for China but also for the entire world. Stay tuned. Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Chinese Financial Tightening: Passing The Phase Of Maximum Strength," dated June 22, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report "More On The Chinese Debt Debate," dated April 20, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Chinese Real Estate: Which Way Will The Wind Blow?" dated April 20, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "China Outlook: A Mid-Year Revisit," dated July 13, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "The China Debate," dated April 14, 2010, and China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "The China Debate: Four Years On," dated April 30, 2014, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations