Populism/Inequality

Executive Summary With the fourth Taiwan Strait crisis materializing, the odds of a major war between the world’s great powers have gone up. Our decision trees suggest the odds are around 20%, or double where they stood from the Russian war in Ukraine alone. The world is playing “Russian roulette” … with a five-round revolver. Going forward, our base case is for Taiwan tensions to flatten out (but not fall) after the US and Chinese domestic political events conclude this autumn. However, if China escalates tensions after the twentieth national party congress, then the odds of an invasion will rise significantly. If conflict erupts in Taiwan, then the odds of Russia turning even more aggressive in Europe will rise. Iran is highly likely to pursue nuclear weapons. Not A Lot Of Positive Catalysts In H2 2022 Roulette With A Five-Shooter Roulette With A Five-Shooter Tactical Recommendation Inception Date Return LONG US 10-YEAR TREASURY 2022-04-14 1.3% LONG GLOBAL DEFENSIVES / CYCLICALS EQUITIES 2022-01-20 13.8% Bottom Line: Investors should remain defensively positioned at least until the Chinese party congress and the US midterm election conclude this fall. Geopolitical risk next year will depend on China’s actions in the Taiwan Strait. Feature Chart 1Speculation Rising About WWIII Roulette With A Five-Shooter Roulette With A Five-Shooter Pessimists who pay attention to world events have grown concerned in recent years about the risk that the third world war might break out. The term has picked up in online searches since 2019, though it is the underlying trend of global multipolarity, rather than the specific crisis events, that justifies the worry (Chart 1).1 What are the odds of a major war between the US and China, or the US and Russia? How might that be calculated? In this report we present a series of “decision trees” to formalize the different scenarios and probabilities. If we define WWIII as a war in which the United States engages in direct warfare with either Russia or China, or both, then we arrive at a 20% chance that WWIII will break out in the next couple of years! Those are frighteningly high odds – but history teaches that these odds are not unrealistic and that investors should not be complacent. Political scientist Graham Allison has shown that the odds of a US-China war over the long term are about 75% based on historical analogies. The takeaway is that nations will have to confront this WWIII risk and reject it for the global political environment to improve. Most likely they will do so as WWIII, and the risk of nuclear warfare that it would bring, constitutes the ultimate constraint. But the current behavior of the great powers suggests that they have not recognized their constraints yet and are willing to continue with brinksmanship in the short term. The Odds Of A Chinese Invasion Of Taiwan The first question is whether China will invade Taiwan. In April 2021 we predicted that the fourth Taiwan Strait crisis would occur within 12-24 months but that it would not devolve into full-scale war. This view is now being tested. In Diagram 1 we provide a decision tree to map out China’s policy options toward Taiwan and assign probabilities to each option. Diagram 1Decision Tree For Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis (Next 24 Months) Roulette With A Five-Shooter Roulette With A Five-Shooter While China has achieved the capability to invade Taiwan, the odds of failure remain too high, especially without more progress on its nuclear triad. Hence we give only a 20% chance that China will mobilize for invasion immediately. Needless to say any concrete signs that China is planning an invasion should be taken seriously. Investors and the media dismissed Russia’s military buildup around Ukraine in 2021 to their detriment. At the same time, there is a good chance that the US and China are merely testing the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, which will be reinforced after the current episode. After all, this crisis was the fourth Taiwan Strait crisis – none of the previous crises led to war. If Presidents Biden and Xi Jinping are merely flexing their muscles ahead of important domestic political events this fall, then they have already achieved their objective. No further shows of force are necessary on either side, at least for the next few years. We give 40% odds to this scenario, in which the past week’s tensions will linger but the status quo is reinforced. In that case, the structural problem of the Taiwan Strait would flare up again sometime after the US and Taiwanese presidential elections in 2024, i.e. outside the time frame of the diagram. Unfortunately we are pessimistic over the long run and would give high probability to war in Taiwan. For that reason, we give equal odds (40%) to a deteriorating situation within the coming two years. If China expands drills and sanctions after the party congress, after Xi has consolidated power, then it will be clear that Xi is not merely performing for his domestic audience. Similarly if the Biden administration continues pushing for tighter high-tech export controls against China after the midterm election, and insists that US allies and partners do the same, then the US implicitly believes that China is preparing some kind of offensive operation. The danger of invasion would rise from 20% to 40%. Even in that case, one should still believe that crisis diplomacy between the US and China will prevent full-scale war in 2023-24. But the risk of miscalculation would be very high. The last element of this decision tree holds that China will prefer “gray zone tactics” or hybrid warfare rather than conventional amphibious invasion of the kind witnessed in WWII. The reasons are several. First, amphibious invasions are the most difficult military operations. Second, Chinese forces are inexperienced while the US and its allies are entrenched. Third, hybrid warfare will sow division among the US allies about how best to respond. Fourth, Russia has demonstrated several times over the past 14 years that hybrid warfare works. It is a way of maximizing strategic benefits and minimizing costs. The world knows how the West reacts to small invasions: it uses economic sanctions. It does not yet know how the West reacts to big invasions. So China will be incentivized to take small bites. And yet in Taiwan’s case those tactics may not be sustainable. Our Taiwan decision tree does not account for the likelihood that a hybrid war or “proxy war” will evolve into a major war. But that likelihood is in fact high. So we are hardly overrating the risk of a major US-China war. Bottom Line: Over the next two years, the subjective odds of a US-China proxy war over Taiwan are about 32% while the odds of a direct US-China war are about 4%. The true test comes after Xi Jinping consolidates power at this fall’s party congress. We expect Xi to focus on rebooting the economy so we continue to favor emerging Asian markets excluding China and Taiwan. The Odds Of Russian War With NATO The second question is whether Russia’s war in Ukraine will morph into a broader war with the West. The odds of a major Russia-West war are greater in this case than in China’s, as a war is already raging, whereas tensions in the Taiwan Strait are merely shadow boxing so far. An investor’s base case should hold that the Ukraine war will remain contained in Ukraine, as Europeans do not want to fight a devastating war with Russia merely because of the Donbas. But things often go wrong in times of war. The critical question is whether Russia will attack any NATO members. That would trigger Article Five of the alliance’s treaty, which holds that “an armed attack against one or more [alliance members] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all,” justifying the use of armed force if necessary to restore security. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine this year, President Biden has repeatedly stated that the US will “defend every inch of NATO territory,” including the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, which joined NATO in 2004. This is not a change of policy but it is the US’s red line and highly likely to be defended. Hence it is a major constraint on Russia. In Diagram 2 we map out Russia’s different options and assign probabilities. Diagram 2Decision Tree For Russia-Ukraine War (Next 24 Months) Roulette With A Five-Shooter Roulette With A Five-Shooter We give 55% odds that Russia will declare victory after completing the conquest of Ukraine’s Donbas region and the land bridge to Crimea. It will start looking to legitimize its conquests by means of some diplomatic agreement, i.e. a ceasefire. This is our base case for 2023. There is evidence that Russia is already starting to move toward diplomacy.2 The reason is that Russia’s economy is suffering, global commodity prices are falling, Russian blood and treasure are being spent. President Putin will have largely achieved his goal of hobbling Ukraine as long as he controls the mouth of the Dnieper river and the rest of the territory he has invaded. Putin needs to seal his conquests and try to salvage the economy and society. The sooner the better for Russia, so that Europe can be prevented from forming a consensus and implementing a full natural gas embargo in the coming years. However, there is a risk that Putin’s ambition gets the better of him. So we give 35% odds that the invasion expands to southwestern Ukraine, including the strategic port city of Odessa, and to eastern Moldova, where Russian troops are stationed in the breakaway region of Transdniestria. This new campaign would render Ukraine fully landlocked, neutralize Moldova, and give Russia greater maritime access. But it would unify the EU, precipitate a natural gas embargo, and weaken Russia to a point where it could become desperate. It could retaliate and that retaliation could conceivably lead to a broader war. We allot only a 7% chance that Putin attacks Finland or Sweden for attempting to join NATO. Stalin failed in Finland and Putin’s army could not even conquer Kiev. The UK has pledged to support these states, so an attack on them will most likely trigger a war with NATO. A decision to attack Finland would only occur if Russia believed that NATO planned to station military bases there – i.e. Russia’s declared red line. Any Russian attack on the Baltic states is less likely because they are already in NATO. But there is some risk it could happen if Putin grows desperate. We put the risk of a Baltic invasion at 3%. In short, if Russia uses its energy stranglehold on Europe not to negotiate a favorable ceasefire but rather to expand its invasions, then the odds of a broader war will rise. Bottom Line: The result is a 55% chance of de-escalation over the next 24 months, a 35% chance of a small escalation (e.g. Odessa, Moldova), and a 10% chance of major escalation that involves NATO members and likely leads to a NATO-Russia war. Tactically, investors should buy developed-market European currency and assets if the global economy rebounds and Russia makes a clear pivot to halting its military campaign and pursuing ceasefire talks. Cyclically, there needs to be a deeper US-Russia understanding for a durable bull market in European assets. The Odds Of US-Israeli Strikes On Iran The third geopolitical crisis taking place this year could be postponed as we go to press – if President Biden and Ayatollah Ali Khamenei agree to rejoin the 2015 US-Iran nuclear deal. But we remain skeptical. The Biden administration wants to rejoin the 2015 nuclear deal and free up about one million barrels per day of Iranian crude oil to reduce prices at the pump before the midterm election. US grand strategy also wants to engage with Iran and stabilize the Middle East so that the US can pivot to Asia. The EU is proposing the deal since it has even greater need for Iranian resources and wants to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons. Russia and China are also supportive as they want to remove US sanctions for trading with Iran and do not necessarily want Iran to get nukes. There is only one problem: Iran needs nuclear weapons to ensure its regime’s survival over the long run. The question is whether Khamenei is willing to authorize a deal with the Americans a second time. The first deal was betrayed at great cost to his regime. President Ebrahim Raisi, who hopes to replace the 83-year-old Khamenei before long, is surely staunchly opposed to wagering his career and personal security on whether Republicans win the 2024 election. Iran has already achieved nuclear breakout capacity – it has enough 60%-enriched uranium to construct nuclear devices – and it is unclear why it would achieve this capacity if it did not ultimately seek to obtain a nuclear deterrent. Especially given that it may someday need to protect its regime from military attacks by the US and its allies. However, our conviction level is medium because President Biden wants to lift sanctions and can do so unilaterally. The Biden administration has not taken any of the preliminary actions to make a deal come together but that could change.3 There is a good cyclical case to be made for short-term, stop-gap deal. According to BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategist Bob Ryan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE only have about 1.5 million barrels of spare oil production capacity between them. The EU oil embargo and western sanctions on Russia will force about two million barrels per day to be stopped, soaking up most of OPEC’s capacity. Hence the Biden administration needs the one million barrels that Iran can bring. We cannot deny that the Iranians may sign a deal to allow Biden to lift sanctions. That would benefit their economy. They could allow nuclear inspectors while secretly shifting their focus to warhead and ballistic missile development. While Iran will not give up the long pursuit of a nuclear deterrent, it is adept at playing for time. Still, Iran’s domestic politics do not support a deal – and its grand strategy only supports a deal if the US can provide credible security guarantees, which the US cannot do because its foreign policy is inconsistent. US grand strategy supports a deal but only if it is verifiable, i.e. not if Iran uses it as cover to pursue a bomb anyway. Iran has not capitulated after three years of maximum US sanctions, a pandemic, and global turmoil. And Iran sees a much greater prospect of extracting strategic benefits from Russia and China now that they have turned aggressive against the West. Moscow and Beijing can be strategic partners due to their shared acrimony toward Washington. Whereas the US can betray the Raisi administration just as easily as it betrayed the Rouhani administration, with the result that the economy would be whipsawed again and the Supreme Leader and the political establishment would be twice the fools in the eyes of the public. Diagram 3 spells out Iran’s choices. Diagram 3Decision Tree For Iran Nuclear Crisis (Next 24 Months) Roulette With A Five-Shooter Roulette With A Five-Shooter If negotiations collapse (50% odds), then Iran will make a mad dash for a nuclear weapon before the US and Israel attack. If the US and Iran agree to a deal (40%), then Iran might comply with the deal’s terms through the 2024 US election, removing the issue from investor concerns for now. But their long-term interest in obtaining a nuclear deterrent will not change and the conflict will revive after 2024. If talks continue without resolution (10%), Iran will make gradual progress on its nuclear program without the restraints of the deal (though it may not need to make a mad dash). In short, Russia and China need Iran regardless of whether it freezes its nuclear program, whereas the US and Israel will form a balance-of-power Abraham Alliance to contain Iran even if it does freeze its nuclear program. Bottom Line: Investors should allot 40% odds to a short-term, stop-gap US-Iran nuclear deal. The oil price drop would be fleeting. Long-term supply will not be expanded because the US cannot provide Iran with the security guarantees that it needs to halt its nuclear program irreversibly. The Odds Of World War III Now comes the impossible part, where we try to put these three geopolitical crises together. In what follows we are oversimplifying. But the purpose is to formalize our thinking about the different players and their options. Diagram 4 begins with our conclusions regarding the China/Taiwan conflict, adjusts the odds of a broader Russian war as a result, and adds our view that Iran is highly likely to pursue nuclear weapons. Again the time frame is two years. Diagram 4Decision Tree For World War III (Next 24 Months) Roulette With A Five-Shooter Roulette With A Five-Shooter The alternate conflict scenario to WWIII consists of “limited wars” – a dangerous concept that refers to hybrid and proxy wars in which the US is not involved, or only involved indirectly. Or it could be a conflict with Iran that does not involve Russia and China. We begin with China because China is the most capable and most ambitious global power today. China’s strategic rise is upsetting the global order and challenging the United States. We also start with China because we have some evidence this year that Russia does not intend to expand the war beyond Ukraine. Either China takes further aggressive action in Taiwan – creating a unique opportunity for Russia to take greater risks – or not. If not, then the odds of WWIII fall precipitously over the two-year period. This scenario is our base case. But if China attacks Taiwan and the US defends Taiwan, we give a high probability to Russia invading the Baltics. If China stages hybrid attacks and the US only supports Taiwan indirectly, then we increase the odds of Russian aggression only marginally. The result is 20% odds of WWIII, i.e. a direct war between the US and Russia, or China, or both. Whether this war could remain limited is debatable. War gaming since 1945 shows that any war between major nuclear powers will more likely escalate than not. But nuclear weapons bring mutually assured destruction, the ultimate constraint. The nuclear escalation risk is why we round down the probability of WWIII in our decision trees. The more likely 59% risk scenario of “limited wars” may seem like a positive outcome but it includes major increases in geopolitical tensions from today’s level, such as a Chinese hybrid war against Taiwan. Bottom Line: According to this exercise the odds of WWIII could be as high as 20%. This is twice the level in our Russia decision tree, which is appropriate given that our Taiwan crisis forecast has materialized. The critical factor is whether Beijing continues escalating the pressure on Taiwan after the party congress this fall. That could unleash a dangerous chain reaction. The global economy and financial markets still face downside risk from geopolitics but 2023 could see improvements if Russia moves toward a ceasefire and China delays action against Taiwan to reboot its economy. Investment Takeaways When Russia invaded Ukraine earlier this year, our colleague Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist, argued that the odds of nuclear Armageddon were 10%. At very least this is a reasonable probability for the odds that Russia and NATO come to blows. Now the expected Taiwan crisis has materialized. We guess that the odds of a major war have doubled to 20%. The corollary is an 80% chance of a better outcome. Analytically, we still see Russia as pursuing a limited objective – neutralizing Ukraine so that it cannot be prosperous and militarily powerful – while China also pursues a limited objective – intimidating Taiwan so that it pursues subordination rather than nationhood. Unless these objectives change, we are still far from World War III. The world can live with a hobbled Ukraine and a subordinated Taiwan. However, there can be no denying that the trajectory of global affairs since the 2008 global financial crisis has followed a pathway uncomfortably similar to the lead up to World War II: financial crisis, economic recession, deflation, domestic unrest, currency depreciation, trade protectionism, debt monetization, military buildup, inflation, and wars of aggression. If roulette is the game, then the odds of a global war are one-sixth or 17%, not far from the 20% outcome of our decision trees. Even assuming that we are alarmist, the fact that we can make a cogent, formal argument that the odds of WWIII are as high as 20% suggests that investors should wait for the current tensions over Ukraine and Taiwan to decrease before making large new risky bets. A simple checklist shows that the global macro and geopolitical context is gloomy (Table 1). We need improvement on the checklist before becoming more optimistic. Table 1Not A Lot Of Positive Catalysts In H2 2022 Roulette With A Five-Shooter Roulette With A Five-Shooter Chart 2Stay Defensively Positioned In H2 2022 Stay Defensively Positioned In H2 2022 Stay Defensively Positioned In H2 2022 Specifically what investors need is to be reasonably reassured that Russia will not expand the war to NATO and that China will not invade Taiwan anytime soon. This requires a new diplomatic understanding between the Washington and Moscow and Washington and Beijing that forestalls conflict. That kind of understanding can only be forged in crisis. The relevant crises are under way but not yet complete. There is likely more downside for global equity investors before war risks are dispelled through the usual solution: diplomacy. Wait for concrete and credible improvements to the global system before taking a generally overweight stance toward risky assets. Favor government bonds over stocks, US stocks over global stocks, defensive sectors over cyclicals, and disfavor Chinese and Taiwanese currency and assets (Chart 2).     Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      See Graham Allison, Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (New York: Houghton Miffin Harcourt, 2017). 2     For example, the Turkish brokered deal to ship grain out of Odessa, diplomatic support for rejoining the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, referendums in conquered territories like Kherson, and attempts to build up leverage in arms reduction talks. Cutting off Europe’s energy is ultimately a plan to coerce Europe into settling a ceasefire favorable for Russia. 3     Iran is still making extraneous demands – most recently that the IAEA drop a probe into how certain manmade uranium particles appeared in undisclosed nuclear sites in Iran. The IAEA has not dropped this probe and its credibility will suffer if it does. Meanwhile Biden is raising not lowering sanctions on Iran, even though sanction relief is a core Iranian demand. Biden has not removed the Iranian Revolutionary Guards or the Qods Force from the terrorism list. None of these hurdles are prohibitive but we would at least expect to see some movement before changing our view that a deal is more likely to fail than succeed. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix "Batting Average": Geopolitical Strategy Trades ()

Executive Summary Biden Taps China-Bashing Consensus Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan reflects one of our emerging views in 2022: the Biden administration’s willingness to take foreign policy risks ahead of the midterm elections. Biden’s foreign policy will continue to be reactive and focused on domestic politics through the midterms. Hence global policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk will remain elevated at least until November 8.  Biden is seeing progress on his legislative agenda. Congress is passing a bill to compete with China while the Democrats are increasingly likely to pass a second reconciliation bill, both as predicted. These developments support our view that President Biden’s approval rating will stabilize and election races will tighten, keeping domestic US policy uncertainty elevated through November. These trends pose a risk to our view that Republicans will take the Senate, but the prevailing macroeconomic and geopolitical environment is still negative for the ruling Democratic Party. We expect legislative gridlock and frozen US fiscal policy in 2023-24. Close Recommendation (Tactical) Initiation Date  Return Long Refinitiv Renewables Vs. S&P 500 Mar 30, 2022 25.4% Long Biotech Vs. Pharmaceuticals Jul 8,  2022 -3.3% Bottom Line: While US and global uncertainty remain high, we will stay long US dollar, long large caps over small caps, and long US Treasuries versus TIPS. But these are tactical trades and are watching closely to see if macroeconomic and geopolitical factors improve later this year. Feature President Biden’s average monthly job approval rating hit its lowest point, 38.5%, in July 2022. However, Biden’s anti-inflation campaign and midterm election tactics are starting to bear fruit: gasoline prices have fallen from a peak of $5 per gallon to $4.2 today, the Democratic Congress is securing some last-minute legislative wins, and women voters are mobilizing to preserve abortion access.  These developments mean that the Democratic Party’s electoral prospects will improve marginally between now and the midterm election, causing Senate and congressional races to tighten – as we have expected. US policy uncertainty will increase. Investors will see a rising risk that Democrats will keep control of the Senate – and conceivably even the House – and hence retain unified control of the executive and legislative branches. This “Blue Sweep” risk will challenge the market consensus, which overwhelmingly (and still correctly) expects congressional gridlock in 2023-24. A continued blue sweep would mean larger tax hikes and social spending, while gridlock would neutralize fiscal policy for the next two years. Investors should fade this inflationary blue sweep risk and continue to plan for disinflationary gridlock. First, our quantitative election models still predict that Democrats will lose control of both House and Senate (Appendix). Second, Biden’s midterm tactics face very significant limitations, particularly emanating from geopolitics – the snake in this report’s title. Pelosi’s Trip To Taiwan Raises Near-Term Market Risks One of Biden’s election tactics is our third key view for 2022: reactive foreign policy. Initially we viewed this reactiveness as “risk-averse” but in May we began to argue that Biden could take risky bets given his collapsing approval ratings. Either way, Biden is using foreign policy as a means of improving his party’s domestic political fortunes. In particular, he is willing to take big risks with China, Russia, Iran, and terrorist groups like Al Qaeda. The template is the 1962 congressional election, when President John F. Kennedy largely defied the midterm election curse by taking a tough stance against Russia in the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chart 1). If Biden achieves a foreign policy victory, then Democrats will benefit. If he instigates a crisis, voters will rally around his administration out of patriotism. Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei is the prominent example of this key view. The trip required full support from the US executive branch and military and was not only the swan song of a single politician. It was one element of the Biden administration’s decision to maintain the Trump administration’s hawkish China policy. Thus while Congress passes the $52 billion Chips and Science Act to enhance US competitiveness in technology and semiconductor manufacturing, Biden is also contemplating tightening export controls on computer chip equipment that China needs to upgrade its industry.1 Biden is reacting to a bipartisan and popular consensus holding that the US needs to take concrete measures to challenge China and protect American industry (Chart 2). This is different from the old norm of rhetorical China-bashing during midterms. Chart 1Biden Provokes Foreign Rivals Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Chart 2Biden Taps China-Bashing Consensus Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Reactive US foreign policy will continue through November and possibly beyond – including but not limited to China. The US chose to sell long-range weapons to Ukraine and provide intelligence targeting Russian forces, prompting Russia to declare that the US is now “directly” involved in the Ukraine conflict. The US decision to eradicate Al Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri also reflects this foreign policy trend. Reactive foreign policy will increase the near-term risk of new negative geopolitical surprises for markets. Note that the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis analogy is inverted when it comes to the Taiwan Strait. China is willing to take much greater risks than the US in its sphere of influence. The same goes for Russia in Ukraine. If US policy backfires then it may assist the Democrats in the election – but not if Biden suffers a humiliation or if the US economy suffers as a result. Chart 3US Import Prices Will Stay High From Greater China US Import Prices Will Stay High From Greater China US Import Prices Will Stay High From Greater China US import prices will continue to rise from Greater China (Chart 3), undermining Biden’s anti-inflation agenda. Supply kinks in the semiconductor industry will become relevant again whenever demand rebounds  (Chart 4). Global energy prices will also remain high as a result of the EU’s oil embargo and Russia’s continued tightening of European natural gas supplies. Chart 4New Semiconductor Kinks Will Appear When Demand Recovers New Semiconductor Kinks Will Appear When Demand Recovers New Semiconductor Kinks Will Appear When Demand Recovers OPEC has decided only to increase oil production by 100,000 barrels per day, despite Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia cap in hand. We argued that the Saudis would give a token but would largely focus on weakening global demand rather than pumping substantially more oil to help Biden and the Democrats in the election. The Saudis know that Biden is still attempting to negotiate a nuclear deal with Iran that would free up Iranian exports. So the Saudis are not giving much relief, and if Biden fails on Iran, oil supply disruptions will increase. Bottom Line: Price pressures will intensify as a result of the US-China and US-Russia standoffs – and probably also the US-Iran standoff. Hawkish foreign policy is not conducive to reducing inflationary ills. Global policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk will remain high throughout the midterm election season, causing continued volatility for US equities. Abortion Boosts Democratic Election Odds Earlier this year we highlighted that the Supreme Court’s overturning of the 1972 Roe v. Wade decision would lead to a significant mobilization of women voters in favor of the Democratic Party ahead of the midterm election. The first major electoral test since the court’s ruling, a popular referendum in the state of Kansas, produced a surprising result on August 2 that confirms and strengthens this thesis. Kansas is a deeply religious and conservative state where President Trump defeated President Biden by a 15% margin in 2020. The referendum was held during the primary election season, when electoral turnout skews heavily toward conservatives and the elderly. Yet Kansans voted by an 18% margin (59% versus 41%) not to amend the constitution, i.e. not to empower the legislature to tighten regulations on abortion. Voter turnout is not yet reported but likely far higher than in recent non-presidential primary elections. Kansans voted in the direction of  nationwide opinion polling on whether abortion should be accessible in cases where the mother’s health is endangered. They did not vote in accordance with more expansive defenses of abortion, which are less popular (Chart 5). If the red state of Kansas votes this way then other states will see an even more substantial effect, at least when abortion is on the ballot. Chart 5Abortion Will Mitigate Democrats’ Losses Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake The question is how much of this Roe v. Wade effect will carry over to the general congressional elections. The referendum focused exclusively on abortion. Voters did not vote on party lines. Voters never like it when governments try to take away rights or privileges that have previously been granted. But in November the election will center on other topics, including inflation and the economy. And midterm elections almost always penalize the incumbent party. Our quantitative election models imply that Democrats will lose 22 seats in the House and two seats in the Senate, yielding Congress to the Republicans next year (Appendix). Still, women’s turnout presents a risk to our models. Women’s support for the Democratic Party has not improved markedly since the Supreme Court ruling, as we have shown in recent reports (Chart 6). But the polling could pick up again. Women’s turnout could be a significant tailwind in a year of headwinds for the Democrats. Bottom Line: Democrats’ electoral prospects have improved, as we anticipated earlier this year (Chart 7). This trend will continue as a result of the mobilization of women. Republicans are still highly likely to take Congress but our conviction on the Senate is much lower than it is on the House. Chart 6Biden’s And Democrats’ Approval Among Women Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Chart 7Democrats’ Odds Will Improve On Margin Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Reconciliation Bill: Still 65% Chance Of Passing Ultimately Democrats’ electoral performance will depend on inflation, the economy, and cyclical dynamics. If inflation falls over the course of the next three months, then Democrats will have a much better chance of stemming midterm losses. That is why President Biden rebranded his slimmed down “Build Back Better” reconciliation bill as the “Inflation Reduction Act.” We maintain our 65% odds that the bill will pass, as we have done all year. There is still at least a 35% chance that Senator Kyrsten Sinema of Arizona could defect from the Democrats, given that she opposed any new tax hikes and the reconciliation bill will impose a 15% minimum tax on corporations. A single absence or defection would topple the budget reconciliation process, which enables Democrats to pass the bill on a simple majority vote. We have always argued that Sinema would ultimately fall in line rather than betraying her party at the last minute before the election. This is even more likely given that moderate-in-chief, Senator Joe Manchin of West Virginia, negotiated and now champions the bill. But some other surprise could still erase the Democrats’ single-seat majority, so we stick with 65% odds. Most notably the bill will succeed because it actually reduces the budget deficit – by an estimated $300 billion over a decade (Table 1). Deficit reduction was the original purpose of lowering the number of votes required to pass a bill under the budget reconciliation process. Now Democrats are using savings generated from new government caps on pharmaceuticals (a popular measure) to fund health and climate subsidies. Given deficit reduction, it is conceivable that a moderate Republican could even vote for the bill. Table 1Democrats’ Inflation Reduction Act (Budget Reconciliation) Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Bottom Line: Democrats are more likely than ever to pass their fiscal 2022 reconciliation bill by the September 30 deadline. The bill will cap some drug prices and reduce the deficit marginally, so it can be packaged as an anti-inflation bill, giving Democrats a legislative win ahead of the midterm. However, its anti-inflationary impact will ultimately be negligible as $300 billion in savings hardly effects the long-term rising trajectory of US budget deficits relative to output. The bill will add to voters’ discretionary income and spur the renewable energy industry. And if it helps the Democrats retain power, then it enables further spending and tax hikes down the road, which would prove inflationary. The reconciliation bill, annual appropriations, and the China competition bill were the remaining bills that we argued would narrowly pass before the US Congress became gridlocked again. So far this view is on track.   Investment Takeaways Companies that paid a high effective corporate tax rate before President Trump’s tax cuts have benefited relative to those that paid a low effective rate. They stood to suffer most if Trump’s tax cuts were repealed. But Democrats were forced to discard their attempt to raise the overall corporate tax rate last year. Instead the minimum corporate rate will rise to 15%, hitting those that paid the lowest effective rate, such as Big Tech companies, relative to high-tax rate sectors such as energy (Chart 8, top panel). Tactically energy may still underperform tech but cyclically energy could outperform and the reconciliation bill would feed into that trend. Similarly, companies that faced high foreign tax risk, because they made good income abroad but paid low foreign tax rates, stand to suffer most from the imposition of a minimum corporate tax rate (Chart 8, bottom panel). Again, Big Tech stands to suffer, although it has already priced a lot of bad news and may not perform poorly in the near term. Chart 8Market Responds To Minimum Corporate Tax Market Responds To Minimum Corporate Tax Market Responds To Minimum Corporate Tax Chart 9Market Responds To New Climate Subsidies Market Responds To New Climate Subsidies Market Responds To New Climate Subsidies Renewable energy stocks have rallied sharply on the news of the Democrats’ reconciliation bill getting back on track (Chart 9). We are booking a 25.4% gain on this tactical trade and will move to the sidelines for now, although renewable energy remains a secular investment theme. Health stocks, particularly pharmaceuticals, have taken a hit from the new legislation as we expected. However, biotech has not outperformed pharmaceuticals as we expected, so we will close this tactical trade for a loss of 3.3%. The reconciliation bill will cap drug prices for only the most popular generic drugs and does not pose as much of a threat to biotech companies (Chart 10). Biotech should perform well tactically as long bond yields decline – they are also historically undervalued, as noted by Dhaval Joshi of our Counterpoint strategy service. So we will stick to long Biotech versus the broad market. US semiconductors remain in a long bull market and will be in heavy demand once global and US economic activity stabilize. They are also likely to outperform competitors in Greater China that face a high and persistent geopolitical risk premium (Chart 11).  Chart 10Market Responds To Drug Price Caps Market Responds To Drug Price Caps Market Responds To Drug Price Caps Chart 11Market Responds To China Competition Bill Market Responds To China Competition Bill Market Responds To China Competition Bill Tactically we prefer bonds to stocks, US equities to global equities, defensive sectors to cyclicals, large caps to small caps, and growth stocks to value stocks (Chart 12). The US is entering a technical recession, Europe is entering recession, China’s economy is weak, and geopolitical tensions are at extreme highs over Ukraine, Taiwan, and Iran. The US is facing an increasingly uncertain midterm election. These trends prevent us from adding risk in our portfolio in the short term. However, much bad news is priced and we are on the lookout for positive economic surprises and successful diplomatic initiatives to change the investment outlook for 2023. If the US and China recommit to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, if Russia moves toward ceasefire talks in Ukraine, if the US and Iran rejoin the 2015 nuclear deal, then we will take a much more optimistic attitude. Some political and geopolitical risks could begin to recede in the fourth quarter – although that remains to be seen. And even then, geopolitical risk is rising on a secular basis. Chart 12Tactically Recession And Geopolitics Will Weigh On Risk Assets Tactically Recession And Geopolitics Will Weigh On Risk Assets Tactically Recession And Geopolitics Will Weigh On Risk Assets Matt Gertken Senior Vice President Chief US Political Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com       Footnotes 1     Alexandra Alper and Karen Freifeld, “U.S. considers crackdown on memory chip makers in China,” Reuters, August 1, 2022, reuters.com.   Strategic View Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Table A2Political Risk Matrix Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Table A3US Political Capital Index Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Chart A1Presidential Election Model Third Quarter US Political Outlook: Last Ditch Effort Third Quarter US Political Outlook: Last Ditch Effort Chart A2Senate Election Model Third Quarter US Political Outlook: Last Ditch Effort Third Quarter US Political Outlook: Last Ditch Effort  Table A4House Election Model Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Table A5APolitical Capital: White House And Congress Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Table A5BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Table A5CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake Biden's Midterm Tactics Bear Fruit… But There's A Snake

Executive Summary Italy’s right-wing alliance, led by Brothers of Italy, will likely outperform in  the upcoming election. The new government will prioritize the economy, posing a risk to the EU’s united front against Russia. It is conducive to an eventual ceasefire, which is marginally positive for risk assets in 2023. We recommend investors underweight Italian assets on a tactical basis. China’s political risks will remain elevated until Xi consolidates power this fall, positive news will come after, if at all. Geopolitical risk in the Taiwan Strait will remain high and persistent until China and the US reach a new understanding. Separately, we are booking a 9% gain on our long US equities relative to UAE equities trade. Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Tactical Recommendation Inception Date Return LONG US / UAE EQUITIES (CLOSED) 2022-03-11 9.0% Bottom Line: Italy’s political turmoil suggests a more pragmatic policy toward Russia going forward. Europe’s energy cutoff will also motivate governments to negotiate with Russia. Feature In this report we update our GeoRisk Indicators, with a special focus on Italy’s newest political turmoil. Italy Over the past several months, we have argued that Italy was a source of political risk within the European Union and that the market underestimated the probability of an early Italian election. In the past two weeks, this forecast has become a reality (Chart 1). Chart 1Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator The grand coalition under Prime Minister Mario Draghi had fulfilled its two main purposes – to distribute EU recovery funds and secure an establishment politician in the Italian presidency. At the same time, headline inflation hit 8.5% in June, the highest since 1986, even as the Italian and global economy slowed down, Italian government bonds sold off, and Russia induced an energy crisis. The stagflationary economic environment is biting hard and the different coalition members are looking to their individual interests ahead of election season. On July 14, Giuseppe Conte, the former prime minister, pulled its populist Five Star Movement (M5S) out of Mario Draghi’s national unity government, triggering a new round of political turmoil in Italy. Draghi’s first resignation was rejected by Italian President Mattarella later that day. However, on July 21, the League and Forza Italia also defected from the grand coalition. After Draghi’s plan of reviving the coalition collapsed, President Mattarella accepted his resignation and called for a snap election to be held on September 25, ten months ahead of the original schedule. Based on the latest public opinion polls, right-wing political parties are well-positioned for the upcoming election. The far-right Brothers of Italy is now the front runner in the election race and is expected to win around 23% of the votes. Another far-right party, the League, is the third most popular party, with nearly 15% support despite a drop in support during its time within the grand coalition. In addition, the center-right Forza Italia receives 8.5% of the support. Together, the right-wing conservative bloc amounts to 46.5% of voting intentions. There is still positive momentum for Brothers of Italy to harvest more support given that they are the flag-bearer for anti-incumbent sentiment amid the stagflationary economy. By contrast, the left-wing parties – the Democrats, the Left, and the Greens – only command about 27%. The possibility of an extended left-wing coalition, even with the inclusion of the M5S, is looking slim. On July 25, Enrico Letta, the leader of the Democratic Party, publicly expressed his anger against party leader Giuseppe Conte and ruled out any electoral pact with the M5S because of the recent political chaos they caused. He stressed that the Democratic Party would seek ties with parties that had remained loyal to Draghi’s national unity. However, there are not many parties left for the Democrats to partner with. Apart from the Left and the Greens, the Democrats’ best chance would be the center-left Action Party and Italia Viva, which is led by Matteo Renzi, who served as the secretary of the Democratic Party from 2013 to 2018. However, these four parties are small and will not enable the Democrats to form a government. Courting M5S is the Democrats’ only chance to set up an alternative to the right-wing bloc, but that will require the election to force the two parties together. Related Report  Geopolitical StrategyLe Pen And Other Hurdles (GeoRisk Update) The Democratic Party was the biggest supporter of Draghi’s government, while the Brothers of Italy were the sole major opposition. Thus the September 25 election will be a race between these two major parties. Both are expected to outperform current polling, as they will attract the most supporters from each side. The other right-wing parties, Forza Italia and the League, will at least perform in line with their polling, while the other left-wing parties will underperform. In the meantime, M5S’ popularity will continue to decline – the party is bruised over its role in Draghi’s coalition and divided over how to respond to the Ukraine war. Foreign policy is a major factor in this election. Italy has the highest share of citizens in the Eurozone who support solving the Russia-Ukraine conflict through peaceful dialogue (52% versus the Eurozone average of 35%). Italy has long maintained pragmatic relations with Russia, including the Putin administration, as it imported 40% of its natural gas from there prior to 2022. The EU is struggling to maintain a united front against Russia, and war policy will be a key focal point among the different parties. Draghi and the Democratic Party are the strongest supporters of the EU’s oil embargo on Russia and decision to send arms to support Ukraine. On the other side, the right-wing Forza Italia and the League have been more equivocal due to their traditional friendship with Russia. What’s more important is the stance of the Brothers of Italy on Russia, as it is the largest party now and will probably lead a right-wing government after the election. On July 27, the three right-wing parties struck a deal to officially form an alliance in the upcoming election and whichever party wins the most votes would determine the next prime minister if the alliance wins. This deal puts Giorgia Meloni, the leader of Brothers of Italy, one step closer to becoming Italy’s first female PM. Giorgia Meloni, unlike her right-wing peers, has endorsed Draghi’s hawkish stance towards Russia. Recently, she stressed that Italy would keep sending arms to Ukraine if her party forms a government after the election. However, Meloni’s speech could be a tactical move to win the election more than an unshakeable policy position. First, like the other two right-wing parties, the Brothers of Italy have had close connections with Russia. After the 2018 Russian presidential election, Meloni congratulated Putin and claimed his victory was “the unequivocal will of Russians.” In addition, she is close to Prime Minister Viktor Orban of Hungary and National Rally leader Marine Le Pen of France, both of whom have criticized the EU’s decision to provide military support to Kyiv. Hence her sharp change of stance this year seems calculated to avoid accusations of being pro-Russian. But that does not preclude a more pragmatic approach to Russia once in office. Second, Meloni has compromised other far-right positions to broaden her voter base. She has reversed the party’s original anti-EU stance and claimed it does not seek to leave the EU, as most European anti-establishment parties have had to do in order to make themselves electable. Being the only female in the election race, Meloni also pledged to protect women’s access to safe abortions in Italy, also a softer stance than before. Even if the Brothers of Italy distance themselves from some unpopular right-wing positions, including on Ukraine, they probably cannot form a government on their own. They will need to court Forza Italia and the League. These two parties prefer a more pragmatic approach to Russia and a peaceful resolution to the war. Thus while it will be hard to find a middle ground on the issue of Ukraine, the election will likely prevent Italy from taking a more confrontational stance toward Russia. It will probably do the opposite. Consider the context in which the next Italian government will operate. Russia declared on July 25 that it will further reduce natural gas supplies to Europe through Nord Stream 1, as we expected, bringing pipeline flows to 20% of its full capacity.  Energy prices will go up even as European economic activity and industry will suffer greater strains. If Meloni is elected as the new prime minister this September, she will have to keep talking tough on Russia while simultaneously seeking a solution to soaring energy prices and economic crisis. This solution will be diplomacy – unless Russia seeks to expand its invasion all the way to Moldova. A right-wing victory is the most likely outcome based on opinion polling, the negative cyclical economy, and the underlying structural factors supporting populism in Italy that we have monitored for years. Such a coalition will not be pro-Russian but it will be pragmatic and focused on salvaging Italy’s economy, which means it will be highly inclined toward diplomacy. If Russia halts its military advance – does not attempt to conquer southwestern Ukraine to Moldova – then this point will be greatly reinforced. Italy will become a new veto player within the European Union when it comes to any major new sanctions on Russia. While Europeans will continue diversifying their energy mix away from Russia, it will be much harder for the EU to implement a natural gas embargo in the coming years if Italy as well as Hungary oppose it. Even if we are wrong, and the Democratic Party or other left-wing parties surprise to the upside in the election, the new coalition will most likely have to focus on mitigating the economic crisis and thus pursuing diplomacy with Russia. That is, as long as Russia pushes for a ceasefire after it achieves its military aims in Donetsk, the last holdout within the south-southeastern territories Russia is trying to conquer. Bottom Line: Due to persistent political uncertainty, we recommend investors underweight Italian stocks and bonds at least until a new government takes shape, which could take months even after the election. However, government bonds will remain vulnerable if a right-wing coalition assumes power, since it will pursue loose fiscal policies and will eschew structural reforms. Overall Italy’s early elections will lead to a new government that is focused on short-term economic growth, likely including pragmatism toward Russia. From an investment point of view that will not be a negative development, though much depends on whether Russia expands its invasion or declares victory after Donetsk. Russia Market-based measures of Russian geopolitical risk are rebounding after subsiding from peak levels hit during the invasion of Ukraine in February (Chart 2). Chart 2Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia’s continued tightening of natural gas supplies (and food exports) this week is precisely what we predicted would happen despite a wave of wishful thinking from investors over the past month. The optimists claimed that Russia would resume Nord Stream 1 pipeline flows after a regular “maintenance” period. They also said that Canada’s cooperation in resolving some “technical” issues around turbines would stabilize natural gas supply. The truth is that Russia is seeking to achieve its war aims in Ukraine. Until it has achieved its aims, it will use a range of leverage, including tightening food and energy supplies. Most likely Russia will halt the advance after completing the conquest of the Donbas region and land-bridge to Crimea. Then it will seek to legitimize its conquests through a ceasefire agreement. However, it could launch a new phase of the war to try to take Odessa and Transniestria, which would cement European resolve, even in Italy, and trigger a new round of sanctions. Bottom Line: Russia faces a fork in the road once it completes the conquest of Donetsk. Most likely it will declare victory and start pushing for a ceasefire late this year or early next year. Movement toward a ceasefire would reduce geopolitical risk for global financial markets in 2023. But there is still a substantial risk that Russia could expand the invasion to eastern Moldova, which would escalate the overarching Russia-West conflict and sustain the high level of geopolitical risk for markets. China Chinese political and geopolitical risk will continue to rise and the bounce in Chinese relative equity performance is faltering as we expected (Chart 3). Chart 3China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator China’s leaders will hold their secretive annual meeting at Beidaihe in August ahead of the critical Communist Party national congress this fall. General Secretary Xi Jinping is attempting to cement himself as the paramount leader in China, comparable to Chairman Mao Zedong, transforming China’s governance from that of single-party rule to single-person rule. The reversion to autocratic government is coinciding with a historic economic slowdown consisting of cyclical factors (weak domestic demand, weakening foreign demand, draconian Covid-19 restrictions) and structural factors (labor force contraction, property sector bust, social change and unrest). Both Xi and US President Biden face major domestic political challenges in the coming months with the party congress and the US midterm election. Hence they are holding talks to try to stabilize relations. But we do not think they will succeed. China cannot reject Russia’s strategic overture, while the US cannot afford to re-engage with a China that is partnering with Russia in a challenge to the liberal-democratic world order. In addition, US policies are erratic and the US cannot credibly promise China that it will not pursue a containment strategy even if China offers trade concessions. Bottom Line: China-related political and geopolitical risks will remain very high until at least after the twentieth party congress. At that point we expect President Xi to loosen a range of policies to stabilize the economy and foreign trade relations. These policies may bring positive news in 2023, though China’s biggest macroeconomic and geopolitical problems remain structural in nature and we remain underweight Chinese assets. Taiwan For many years we have warned of a “fourth Taiwan Strait crisis” due to the unsustainable geopolitical situation between China, Taiwan, and the United States. After the war in Ukraine we argued that the US would try to boost its strategic deterrence around Taiwan, since it failed to deter Russia from invading Ukraine, but that the increased commitment to Taiwan would in fact provoke China (Chart 4). Chart 4Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Until the US and China reach a new understanding over Taiwan, we argued that the region would be susceptible to rising tensions and crisis points that would send investors fleeing from risky assets, especially risky regional assets. It is possible that we have arrived at this crisis now, with House Speaker Nancy Pelosi making preparations to visit Taiwan, China pledging “forceful” countermeasures if she does, President Biden suggesting that the US military thinks Pelosi should not visit, and Biden and Xi preparing for a phone conversation. In essence China is giving an ultimatum and setting a new bar, and a very low bar, for taking some kind of action on Taiwan, i.e. the mere visit of a US House speaker, which has happened before (House Speaker Newt Gingrich in 1997). China’s purpose is to lay the groundwork for preventing the US from upgrading Taiwan relations in any more substantial way, whether political or military. If the Biden administration calls off the Pelosi visit, then American relations with Taiwan will have been curtailed, at least for this administration. If Biden goes forward with the visit, then Beijing will need to respond with an aggressive show of force to prevent any future president from repeating the exercise or building on it. And if this show threatens US personnel or security, a full-blown diplomatic or military crisis could ensue. While we doubt it would lead to full-scale war, it could lead to a frightening confrontation. Biden may want to stabilize relations with China, since he is primarily focused on countering Russia, but his options are limited. China cannot save him from inflation but it can solidify the public perception that he is weak. Hence he is more likely to maintain his administration’s hawkish approach. Biden’s approval rating is 38% and his party faces a drubbing in the midterm elections. A confrontation with Russia, China, Iran, or anyone else would likely help his party by producing a public rally around the flag. Any unilateral concessions will merely strengthen Xi’s power consolidation at the party congress, which is detrimental to US interests. Only if the Biden administration pursues a dovish policy of re-engagement that is subsequently confirmed by the 2024 presidential election will there be potential for a substantial US-China economic re-engagement. We are pessimistic. Bottom Line: Taiwan-related geopolitical risk will rise in the short run. If there is a new US-China understanding over Taiwan, then regional and global geopolitical risk will decline over the medium term. But we remain short Taiwanese assets. Investment Takeaways Investors should remain defensively positioned until the US midterm election ends with congressional gridlock; the Chinese party congress is over and Xi Jinping launches a broad pro-growth policy; and Russia starts pushing for a ceasefire in Ukraine. We also expect that markets will need to get over new, unexpected oil supply shocks arising from the failure of US-Iran nuclear negotiations, which remains off the radar and therefore a source of negative surprises. Any US-Iran nuclear deal would be a major positive surprise that postpones this risk for a few years. Having said that, we are booking a 9% gain on our long US versus UAE equity trade for technical reasons. Democrats have reached a deal to pass a budget reconciliation bill in an effort to mitigate midterm election losses. This development reinforces the 65% odds of passage that we have maintained for this bill’s passage in our US Political Strategy reports since last year.   Yushu Ma Research Analyst yushu.ma@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Appendix UK Chart 5UK: GeoRisk Indicator United Kingdom: GeoRisk Indicator United Kingdom: GeoRisk Indicator Germany Chart 6Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France Chart 7France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Spain Chart 8Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Canada Chart 9Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Australia Chart 10Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Korea Chart 11Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil Chart 12Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey Chart 13Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator South Africa Chart 14South Africa: GeoRisk Indicator South Africa: GeoRisk Indicator South Africa: GeoRisk Indicator Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix "Batting Average": Geopolitical Strategy Trades Geopolitical Calendar

Executive Summary Russia Squeezes EU Natural Gas Russia Squeezes EU Natural Gas Russia Squeezes EU Natural Gas Major geopolitical shocks tend to coincide with bear markets, so the market is getting closer to pricing this year’s bad news. But investors are not out of the woods yet. Russia is cutting off Europe’s natural gas supply ahead of this winter in retaliation to Europe’s oil embargo. Europe is sliding toward recession. China is reverting to autocratic rule and suffering a cyclical and structural downshift in growth rates. Only after Xi Jinping consolidates power will the ruling party focus exclusively on economic stabilization. The US can afford to take risks with Russia, opening up the possibility of a direct confrontation between the two giants before the US midterm election. A new strategic equilibrium is not yet at hand. Tactical Recommendation Inception Date Return LONG GLOBAL DEFENSIVES / CYCLICALS EQUITIES 2022-01-20 18.3% Bottom Line: Maintain a defensive posture in the third quarter but look for opportunities to buy oversold assets with long-term macro and policy tailwinds. Feature 2022 is a year of geopolitics and supply shocks. Global investors should remain defensive at least until the Chinese national party congress and US midterm election have passed. More fundamentally, an equilibrium must be established between Russia and NATO and between the US and Iran. Until then supply shocks will destroy demand. Checking Up On Our Three Key Views For 2022 Our three key views for the year are broadly on track: 1.  China’s Reversion To Autocracy: For ten years now, the fall in Chinese potential economic growth has coincided with a rise in neo-Maoist autocracy and foreign policy assertiveness, leading to capital flight, international tensions, and depressed animal spirits (Chart 1). Related Report  Geopolitical StrategyWill China Let 100 Flowers Bloom? Only Briefly. Rising incomes provided legitimacy for the Communist Party over the past four decades. Less rapidly rising incomes – and extreme disparities in standards of living – undermine the party and force it to find other sources of public support. Fighting pollution and expanding the social safety net are positives for political stability and potentially for economic productivity. But converting the political system from single-party rule to single-person rule is negative for productivity. Mercantilist trade policy and nationalist security policy are also negative. China’s political crackdown, struggle with Covid-19, waning exports, and deflating property market have led to an abrupt slowdown this year. The government is responding by easing monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policy, though so far with limited effect (Chart 2). Economic policy will not be decisive in the third quarter unless a crash forces the administration to stimulate aggressively. Chart 1China's Slowdown Leads To Maoism, Nationalism China's Slowdown Leads To Maoism, Nationalism China's Slowdown Leads To Maoism, Nationalism ​​​​​​ Chart 2Chinese Policy Easing: Limited Effect So Far Chinese Policy Easing: Limited Effect So Far Chinese Policy Easing: Limited Effect So Far ​​​​​ Chart 3Nascent Rally In Chinese Shares Will Be Dashed Nascent Rally In Chinese Shares Will Be Dashed Nascent Rally In Chinese Shares Will Be Dashed Once General Secretary Xi Jinping secures another five-to-ten years in power at the twentieth national party congress this fall, he will be able to “let 100 flowers bloom,” i.e. ease policy further and focus exclusively on securing the economic recovery in 2023. But policy uncertainty will remain high until then. The party may have to crack down anew to ensure Xi’s power consolidation goes according to plan. China is highly vulnerable to social unrest for both structural and cyclical reasons. The US would jump to slap sanctions on China for human rights abuses. Hence the nascent recovery in Chinese domestic and offshore equities can easily be interrupted until the political reshuffle is over (Chart 3). If China’s economy stabilizes and a recession is avoided, investors will pile into the rally, but over the long run they will still be vulnerable to stranded capital due to Chinese autocracy and US-China cold war. If the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee are stacked with members of Xi’s faction, as one should expect, then the reduction in policy uncertainty will only be temporary. Autocracy will lead to unpredictable and draconian policy measures – and it cannot solve the problem of a shrinking and overly indebted population. If the Communist Party changes course and stacks the Politburo with Xi’s factional rivals, to prevent China from going down the Maoist, Stalinist, and Putinist route, then global financial markets will cheer. But that outcome is unlikely. Hawkish foreign policy means that China will continue to increase its military threats against Taiwan, while not yet invading outright. Beijing has tightened its grip over Tibet, Xinjiang, and Hong Kong since 2008; Taiwan and the South China Sea are the only critical buffer areas that remain to be subjugated. Taiwan’s midterm elections, US midterms, and China’s party congress will keep uncertainty elevated. Taiwan has underperformed global and emerging market equities as the semiconductor boom and shortage has declined (Chart 4). Hong Kong is vulnerable to another outbreak of social unrest and government repression. Quality of life has deteriorated for the native population. Democracy activists are disaffected and prone to radicalization. Singapore will continue to benefit at Hong Kong’s expense (Chart 5). Chart 4Taiwan Equity Relative Performance Peaked Taiwan Equity Relative Performance Peaked Taiwan Equity Relative Performance Peaked ​​​​​​ Chart 5Hong Kong Faces More Troubles Hong Kong Faces More Troubles Hong Kong Faces More Troubles ​​​​​​ Chart 6Japan Undercuts China Japan Undercuts China Japan Undercuts China China and Japan are likely to engage in clashes in the East China Sea. Beijing’s military modernization, nuclear weapons expansion, and technological development pose a threat to Japanese security. The gradual encirclement of Taiwan jeopardizes Japan’s vital sea lines of communication. Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is well positioned to lead the Liberal Democratic Party into the upper house election on July 10 – he does not need to trigger a diplomatic showdown but he would not suffer from it. Meanwhile China is hungry for foreign distractions and unhappy that Japan is reviving its military and depreciating its currency (Chart 6). A Sino-Japanese crisis cannot be ruled out, especially if the Biden administration looks as if it will lose its nerve in containing China. Financial markets would react negatively, depending on the magnitude of the crisis. North Korea is going back to testing ballistic missiles and likely nuclear weapons. It is expanding its doctrine for the use of such weapons. It could take advantage of China’s and America’s domestic politics to stage aggressive provocations. South Korea, which has a hawkish new president who lacks parliamentary support, is strengthening its deterrence with the United States. These efforts could provoke a negative response from the North. Financial markets will only temporarily react to North Korean provocations unless they are serious enough to elicit military threats from Japan or the United States. China would be happy to offer negotiations to distract the Biden administration from Xi’s power grab. South Korean equities will benefit on a relative basis as China adds more stimulus. 2.  America’s Policy Insularity: President Biden’s net approval rating, at -15%, is now worse than President Trump’s in 2018, when the Republicans suffered a beating in midterm elections (Chart 7). Biden is now fighting inflation to try to salvage the elections for his party. That means US foreign policy will be domestically focused and erratic in the third quarter. Aside from “letting” the Federal Reserve hike rates, Biden’s executive options are limited. Pausing the federal gasoline tax requires congressional approval, and yet if he unilaterally orders tax collectors to stand down, the result will be a $10 billion tax cut – a drop in the bucket. Biden is considering waiving some of former President Trump’s tariffs on China, which he can do on his own. But doing so will hurt his standing in Rust Belt swing states without reducing inflation enough to get a payoff at the voting booth – after all, import prices are growing slower from China than elsewhere (Chart 8). He would also give Xi Jinping a last-minute victory over America that would silence Xi’s critics and cement his dictatorship at the critical hour. Chart 7Democrats Face Shellacking In Midterm Elections Third Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning Third Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning ​​​​​​ Chart 8Paring Trump Tariffs Won't Reduce Inflation Much Paring Trump Tariffs Won't Reduce Inflation Much Paring Trump Tariffs Won't Reduce Inflation Much ​​​​​​ Chart 9Only OPEC Can Help Biden - And Help May Come Late Only OPEC Can Help Biden - And Help May Come Late Only OPEC Can Help Biden - And Help May Come Late Biden is offering to lift sanctions on Iran, which would free up 1.3 million barrels of oil per day. But Iran is not being forced to freeze its nuclear program by weak oil prices or Russian and Chinese pressure – quite the opposite. If Biden eases sanctions anyway, prices at the pump may not fall enough to win votes. Hence Biden is traveling to Saudi Arabia to make amends with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. OPEC’s interest lies in producing enough oil to prevent a global recession, not in flooding the market on Biden’s whims to rescue the Democratic Party. Saudi and Emirati production may come but it may not come early in the third quarter. Lifting sanctions on Venezuela is a joke and Libya recently collapsed again (Chart 9). Even in dealing with Russia the Biden administration will exhibit an insular perspective. The US is not immediately threatened, like Europe, so it can afford to take risks, such as selling Ukraine advanced and long-range weapons and providing intelligence used to sink Russian ships. If Russia reacts negatively, a direct US-Russia confrontation will generate a rally around the flag that would help the Democrats, as it did under President John F. Kennedy in 1962 – one of the rare years in which the ruling party minimized its midterm election losses (Chart 10). The Cuban Missile Crisis counted more with voters than the earlier stock market slide. 3.  Petro-States’ Geopolitical Leverage: Oil-producing states have immense geopolitical leverage this year thanks to the commodity cycle. Russia will not be forced to conclude its assault on Ukraine until global energy prices collapse, as occurred in 2014. In fact Russia’s leverage over Europe will be greatly reduced in the coming years since Europe is diversifying away from Russian energy exports. Hence Moscow is cutting natural gas flows to Europe today while it still can (Chart 11). Chart 10Biden Can Afford To Take Risks With Russia Third Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning Third Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning ​​​​​​ Chart 11Russia Squeezes EU's Natural Gas Russia Squeezes EU's Natural Gas Russia Squeezes EU's Natural Gas ​​​​​​ Chart 12EU/China Slowdown Will Weigh On World Third Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning Third Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning Russia’s objective is to inflict a recession and cause changes in either policy or government in Europe. This will make it easier to conclude a favorable ceasefire in Ukraine. More importantly it will increase the odds that the EU’s 27 members, having suffered the cost of their coal and oil embargo, will fail to agree to a natural gas embargo by 2027 as they intend. Italy, for example, faces an election by June 2023, which could come earlier. The national unity coalition was formed to distribute the EU’s pandemic recovery funds. Now those funds are drying up, the economy is sliding toward recession, and the coalition is cracking. The most popular party is an anti-establishment right-wing party, the Brothers of Italy, which is waiting in the wings and can ally with the populist League, which has some sympathies with Russia. A recession could very easily produce a change in government and a more pragmatic approach to Moscow. The Italian economy is getting squeezed by energy prices and rising interest rates at the same time and cannot withstand the combination very long. A European recession or near-recession will cause further downgrades to global growth, especially when considering the knock-on effects in China, where the slowdown is more pronounced than is likely reported. The US economy is more robust but it will have to be very robust indeed to withstand a recession in Europe and growth recession in China (Chart 12). Russia does not have to retaliate against Finland and Sweden joining NATO until Turkey clears the path for them to join, which may not be until just before the Turkish general election due in June 2023. But imposing a recession on Europe is already retaliation – maybe a government change will produce a new veto against NATO enlargement. Russian retaliation against Lithuania for blocking 50% of its shipments to the Kaliningrad exclave is also forthcoming – unless Lithuania effectively stops enforcing the EU’s sanctions on Russian resources. Russia cannot wage a full-scale attack on the Baltic states without triggering direct hostilities with NATO since they are members of NATO. But it can retaliate in other ways. In a negative scenario Moscow could stage a small “accidental” attack against Lithuania to test NATO. But that would force Biden to uphold his pledge to defend “every inch” of NATO territory. Biden would probably do so by staging a proportionate military response or coordinating with an ally to do it. The target would be the Russian origin of attack or comparable assets in the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, Ukraine, Belarus, or elsewhere. The result would be a dangerous escalation. Russia could also opt for cyber-attacks or economic warfare – such as squeezing Europe’s natural gas supply further. Ultimately Russia can afford to take greater risks than the US over Kaliningrad, other territories, and its periphery more broadly. That is the difference between Kennedy and Biden – the confrontation is not over Cuba. Russia is also likely to take a page out of Josef Stalin’s playbook and open a new front – not so much in Nicaragua as in the Middle East and North Africa. The US betrayal of the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran opens the opportunity for Russia to strengthen cooperation with Iran, stir up the Iranians’ courage, sell them weapons, and generate a security crisis in the Middle East. The US military would be distracted keeping peace in the Persian Gulf while the Europeans would lose their long-term energy alternative to Russia – and energy prices would rise. The Iranians – who also have leverage during a time of high oil prices – are not inclined to freeze their nuclear program. That would be to trade their long-term regime survival for economic benefits that the next American president can revoke unilaterally. Bottom Line: Xi Jinping is converting China back into an autocracy, the Biden administration lacks options and is willing to have a showdown with Russia, and the Putin administration is trying to inflict a European recession and political upheaval. Stay defensive. Checking Up On Our Strategic Themes For The 2020s As for our long-term themes, the following points are relevant after what we have learned in the second quarter: 1.  Great Power Rivalry: The war in Ukraine has reminded investors of the primacy of national security. In an anarchic international system, if a single great nation pursues power to the neglect of its neighbors’ interests, then its neighbors need to pursue power to defend themselves. Before long every nation is out for itself. At least until a new equilibrium is established. For example, Russia’s decision to neutralize Ukraine by force is driving Germany to abandon its formerly liberal policy of energy cooperation in order to reduce Russia’s energy revenues and avoid feeding its military ambitions. Russia in turn is reducing natural gas exports to weaken Europe’s economy this winter. Germany will re-arm, Finland and Sweden will eventually join NATO, and Russia will underscore its red line against NATO bases or forces in Finland and Sweden. If this red line is violated then a larger war could ensue. Chart 13China Will Shift To Russian Energy China Will Shift To Russian Energy China Will Shift To Russian Energy Until Russia and NATO come to a new understanding, neither Europe nor Russia can be secure. Meanwhile China cannot reject Russia’s turn to the east. China believes it may need to use force to prevent Taiwan independence at some point, so it must prepare for the US and its allies to treat it the same way that they have treated Russia. It must secure energy supply from Russia, Central Asia, and the Middle East via land routes that the US navy cannot blockade (Chart 13). Beijing must also diversify away from the US dollar, lest the Treasury Department freeze its foreign exchange reserves like it did Russia’s. Global investors will see diversification as a sign of China’s exit from the international order and preparation for conflict, which is negative for its economic future. However, the Russo-Chinese alliance presents a historic threat to the US’s security, coming close to the geopolitical nightmare of a unified Eurasia. The US is bound to oppose this development, whether coherently or not, and whether alone or in concert with its allies. After all, the US cannot offer credible security guarantees to negotiate a détente with China or Iran because its domestic divisions are so extreme that its foreign policy can change overnight. Other powers cannot be sure that the US will not suffer a radical domestic policy change or revolution that leads to belligerent foreign policy. Insecurity will drive the US and China apart rather than bringing them together. For example, Russia’s difficulties in Ukraine will encourage Chinese strategists to go back to the drawing board to adjust their plans for military contingencies in Taiwan. But the American lesson from Ukraine is to increase deterrence in Taiwan. That will provoke China and encourage the belief that China cannot wait forever to resolve the Taiwan problem. Until there is a strategic understanding between Russia and NATO, and the US and China, the world will remain in a painful and dangerous transitional phase – a multipolar disequilibrium. Chart 14Hypo-Globalization: Globalizing Less Than Potential Third Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning Third Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning 2.  Hypo-Globalization: If national security rises to the fore, then economics becomes a tool of state power. Mercantilism becomes the basis of globalization rather than free market liberalism. Hypo-globalization is the result. The term is fitting because the trade intensity of global growth is not yet in a total free fall (i.e. de-globalization) but merely dropping off from its peaks during the phase of “hyper-globalization” in the 1990s and early 2000s (Chart 14). Hypo-globalization is probably a structural rather than cyclical phenomenon. The EU cannot re-engage with Russia and ease sanctions without rehabilitating Russia’s economy and hence its military capacity – which could enable Russia to attack Europe again. The US and China can try to re-engage but they will fail. Russo-Chinese alliance ensures that the US would be enriching not one but both of its greatest strategic rivals if it reopened its doors to Chinese technology acquisition and intellectual property theft. Iran will see its security in alliance with Russia and China. China has an incentive to develop Iran’s economy so as not to depend solely on Russia and Central Asia. Russia has an incentive to develop Iran’s military capacity so as to deprive Europe of an energy alternative. Both Russia and China wish to deprive the US of strategic hegemony in the Middle East. By contrast the US and EU cannot offer ironclad security guarantees to Iran because of its nuclear ambitions and America’s occasional belligerence. Thus the world can see expanding Russian and Chinese economic integration with Eurasia, and expanding American and European integration with various regions, but it cannot see further European integration with Russia or American integration with China. And ultimately Europe and China will be forced to sever links (Chart 15). Globalization will not cease – it is a multi-millennial trend – but it will slow down. It will be subordinated to national security and mercantilist economic theory. 3.  Populism/Nationalism: In theory, domestic instability can cause introversion or extroversion. But in practice we are seeing extroversion, which is dangerous for global stability (Chart 16). Chart 15Global Economic Disintegration Global Economic Disintegration Global Economic Disintegration ​​​​​​ Chart 16Internal Sources Of Nationalism Internal Sources Of Nationalism Internal Sources Of Nationalism ​​​​​​ Russia’s invasion of Ukraine derived from domestic Russian instability – and instability across the former Soviet space, including Belarus, which the Kremlin feared could suffer a color revolution after the rigged election and mass protests of 2020-21. The reason the northern European countries are rapidly revising their national defense and foreign policies to counter Russia is because they perceive that the threat to their security is driven by factors within the former Soviet sphere that they cannot easily remove. These factors will get worse as a result of the Ukraine war. Russian aggression still poses the risk of spilling out of Ukraine’s borders. China’s Maoist nostalgia and return to autocratic government is also about nationalism. The end of the rapid growth phase of industrialization is giving way to the Asian scourge: debt-deflation. The Communist Party is trying to orchestrate a great leap forward into the next phase of development. But in case that leap fails like the last one, Beijing is promoting “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and blaming the rest of the world for excluding and containing China. Taiwan, unfortunately, is the last relic of China’s past humiliation at the hands of western imperialists. China will also seek to control the strategic approach to Taiwan, i.e. the South China Sea. China’s claim that the Taiwan Strait is sovereign sea, not international waters, will force the American navy to assert freedom of passage. American efforts to upgrade Taiwan relations and increase deterrence will be perceived as neo-imperialism. The United States, for its part, could also see nationalism convert into international aggression. The US is veering on the brink of a miniature civil war as nationalist forces in the interior of the country struggle with the political establishment in the coastal states. Polarization has abated since 2020, as stagflation has discredited the Democrats. But it is now likely to rebound, making congressional gridlock all but inevitable. A Republican-controlled House will find a reason to impeach President Biden in 2023-24, in hopes of undermining his party and reclaiming the presidency. Another hotly contested election is possible, or worse, a full-blown constitutional crisis. American institutions proved impervious to the attempt of former President Trump and his followers to disrupt the certification of the Electoral College vote. However, security forces will be much more aggressive against rebellions of whatever stripe in future, which could lead to episodes in which social unrest is aggravated by police repression. If the GOP retakes the White House – especially if it is a second-term Trump presidency with a vendetta against political enemies and nothing to lose – then the US will return to aggressive foreign policy, whether directed at China or Iran or both. In short, polarization has contaminated foreign policy such that the most powerful country in the world cannot lead with a steady hand. Over the long run polarization will decline in the face of common foreign enemies but for now the trend vitiates global stability. Chart 17Germany And Japan Rearming Third Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning Third Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning It goes without saying that nationalism is also an active force in Iran, where 83-year-old Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei is attempting to ensure the survival of his regime in the face of youthful social unrest and an unclear succession process. If Khamenei takes advantage of the commodity cycle, and American and Israeli disarray, he can make a mad dash for the bomb and try to achieve regime security. But if he does so then nationalism will betray him, since Israel and/or the US are willing to conduct air strikes to uphold the red line against nuclear weaponization. If any more proof of global nationalism is needed, look no further than Germany and Japan, the principal aggressors of World War II. Their pacifist foreign policies have served as the linchpins of the post-war international order. Now they are both pursuing rearmament and a more proactive foreign policy (Chart 17). Nationalism may be very nascent in Germany but it has clearly made a comeback in Japan, which exacerbates China’s fears of containment. The rise of nationalism in India is widely known and reinforces the trend. Bottom Line: Great power rivalry is intensifying because of Russia’s conflict with the West and China’s inability to reject Russia. Hypo-globalization is the result since EU-Russia and US-China economic integration cannot easily be mended in the context of great power struggle. Domestic instability in Russia, China, and the US is leading to nationalism and aggressive foreign policy, as leaders find themselves unwilling or unable to stabilize domestic politics through productive economic pursuits. Investment Takeaways BCA has shifted its House View to a neutral asset allocation stance on equities relative to bonds (Chart 18). Chart 18BCA House View: Neutral Stocks Versus Bonds BCA House View: Neutral Stocks Versus Bonds BCA House View: Neutral Stocks Versus Bonds Geopolitical Strategy remains defensively positioned, favoring defensive markets and sectors, albeit with some exceptions that reflect our long-term views. Tactically stay long US 10-year Treasuries, large caps versus small caps, and defensives versus cyclicals. Stay long Mexico and short the UAE (Chart 19). Strategically stay long gold, US equities relative to global, and aerospace/defense sectors (Chart 20). Among currencies favor the USD, EUR, JPY, and GBP. Chart 19Stay Defensive In Q3 2022 Stay Defensive In Q3 2022 Stay Defensive In Q3 2022 ​​​​​​ Chart 20Stick To Long-Term Geopolitical Trades Stick To Long-Term Geopolitical Trades Stick To Long-Term Geopolitical Trades ​​​​​​ Chart 21Favor Semiconductors But Not Taiwan Favor Semiconductors But Not Taiwan Favor Semiconductors But Not Taiwan ​​​​​ Chart 22Indian Tech Will Rebound Amid China's Geopolitical Risks Indian Tech Will Rebound Amid China's Geopolitical Risks Indian Tech Will Rebound Amid China's Geopolitical Risks ​​​​​ Chart 23Overweight ASEAN Overweight ASEAN Overweight ASEAN Go long US semiconductors and semi equipment versus Taiwan broad market (Chart 21). While we correctly called the peak in Taiwanese stocks relative to global and EM equities, our long Korea / short Taiwan trade was the wrong way to articulate this view and remains deeply in the red. Similarly our attempt to double down on Indian tech versus Chinese tech was ill-timed. China eased tech regulations sooner than we expected. However, the long-term profile of the trade is still attractive and Chinese tech will still suffer from excessive government and foreign interference (Chart 22). Go long Singapore over Hong Kong, as Asian financial leadership continues to rotate (see Chart 5 above). Stay long ASEAN among emerging markets. We will also put Malaysia on upgrade watch, given recent Malaysian equity outperformance on the back of Chinese stimulus and growing western interest in alternatives to China (Chart 23).     Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix

Executive Summary Autocracy Hurts Productivity Autocracy Hurts Productivity Autocracy Hurts Productivity Over the next six-to-18 months, the Xi Jinping administration will “let 100 flowers bloom” – i.e., relax a range of government policies to secure China’s economic recovery from the pandemic. The first signs of this policy are already apparent via monetary and fiscal easing and looser regulation of Big Tech. However, investors should treat any risk-on rally in Chinese stocks with skepticism over the long run. Political risk and policy uncertainty will remain high until after Xi consolidates power this fall. Xi is highly likely to remain in office but uncertainty over other personnel – and future national policy – will be substantial. Next year China’s policy trajectory will become clearer. But global investors should avoid mistaking temporary improvements for a change of Xi’s strategy or China’s grand strategy. Beijing is driven by instability and insecurity to challenge the US-led world order. The result will be continued economic divorce and potentially military conflicts in the coming decade. Russia’s reversion to autocracy led to falling productivity and poor equity returns. China is also reverting to autocratic government as a solution to its domestic challenges. Western investors should limit long-term exposure to China and prefer markets that benefit from China’s recovery, such as in Southeast Asia and Latin America. Image Bottom Line: The geopolitical risk premium in Chinese equities will stay high in 2022, fall in 2023, but then rise again as global investors learn that China in the Xi Jinping era is fundamentally unstable and insecure. Feature Chart 1Market Cheers China's Hints At Policy Easing Market Cheers China's Hints At Policy Easing Market Cheers China's Hints At Policy Easing In 1957, after nearly a decade at the helm of the People’s Republic of China, Chairman Mao Zedong initiated the “Hundred Flowers Campaign.” The campaign allowed a degree of political freedom to try to encourage new ideas and debate among China’s intellectuals. The country’s innovative forces had suffered from decades of foreign invasion, civil war, and repression. Within three years, Mao reversed course, reimposed ideological discipline, and punished those who had criticized the party.  It turned out that the new communist regime could not maintain political control while allowing liberalization in the social and economic spheres.1 This episode is useful to bear in mind in 2022 as General Secretary Xi Jinping restores autocratic government in China. In the coming year, Xi will ease a range of policies to promote economic growth and innovation. Already his administration is relaxing some regulatory pressure on Big Tech. Global financial markets are cheering this apparent policy improvement (Chart 1). In effect, Xi is preparing to let 100 flowers bloom. However, China’s economic trajectory remains gloomy over the long run – not least because the US and China lack a strategic basis for re-engagement. Chinese Leaders Fear Foreign Encroachments Mao’s predicament was not only one of ideology and historical circumstance. It was also one of China’s geopolitics. Chinese governments have always struggled to establish domestic control, extend that control over far-flung buffer territories, and impose limits on foreign encroachments. Mao reversed his brief attempt at liberalization because he could not feel secure in his person or his regime. In 1959, the Chinese economy remained backward. The state faced challenges in administration and in buffer spaces like Tibet and Taiwan. The American military loomed large, despite the stalemate and ceasefire on the Korean peninsula in 1952. Russia was turning against Stalinism, while Hungary was revolting against the Soviet Union. Mao feared that the free exchange of ideas would do more to undermine national unity than it would to promote industrialization and technological progress. The 100 flowers that bloomed – intellectuals criticizing government policy – revealed themselves to be insufficiently loyal. They could be culled, strengthening the regime. However, what followed was a failed economic program and nationwide famine. Fast forward to today, when circumstances have changed but the Chinese state faces the same geopolitical insecurities. Xi Jinping, like all Chinese rulers, is struggling to maintain domestic stability and territorial integrity while regulating foreign influence. Although the People’s Republic is not as vulnerable as it was in Mao’s time, it is increasingly vulnerable – namely, to a historic downshift in potential economic growth and a rise in international tensions (Chart 2). The Xi administration has repeatedly shown that it views the US alliance system, US-led global monetary and financial system, and western liberal ideology as threats that need to be counteracted. Chart 2China: Less Stable, Less Secure China: Less Stable, Less Secure China: Less Stable, Less Secure In addition, Russia’s difficulties invading Ukraine suggest that China faces an enormous challenge in attempting to carve out its own sphere of influence without shattering its economic stability. Hence Beijing needs to slow the pace of confrontation with the West while pursuing the same strategic aims. Xi Stays, But Policy Uncertainty Still High In 2022  2022 is a critical political juncture for China. Xi was supposed to step down and hand the baton to a successor chosen by his predecessor Hu Jintao. Instead he has spent the past decade arranging to remain in power until at least 2032. He took a big stride toward this goal at the nineteenth national party congress in 2017, when he assumed the title of “core leader” of the Communist Party and removed term limits from its constitution. This year’s Omicron outbreak and abrupt economic slowdown have raised speculation about whether Xi’s position is secure. Some of this speculation is wild – but China is far less stable than it appears. Structurally, inequality is high, social mobility is low, and growth is slowing, forcing the new middle class to compromise its aspirations. Cyclically, unemployment is rising and the Misery Index is higher than it appears if one focuses on youth employment and fuel inflation (Chart 3). The risk of sociopolitical upheaval is underrated among global investors. Chart 3AStructurally China Is Vulnerable To Social Unrest Will China Let 100 Flowers Bloom? Only Briefly. Will China Let 100 Flowers Bloom? Only Briefly. Chart 3BCyclically China Is Vulnerable To Social Unrest Cyclically China Is Vulnerable To Social Unrest Cyclically China Is Vulnerable To Social Unrest Yet even assuming that social unrest and political dissent flare up, Xi is highly likely to clinch another five-to-ten years in power. Consider the following points: The top leaders control personnel decisions. The national party congress is often called an “election,” but that is a misnomer. The Communist Party’s top posts will be ratified, not elected. The Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee select the members of the Central Committee; the national party congress convenes to ratify these new members. The Central Committee then ratifies the line-up of the new Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee, which is orchestrated by Xi along with the existing Politburo Standing Committee (Diagram 1). Xi is the most important figure in deciding the new leadership. Diagram 1Mechanics Of The Chinese Communist Party’s National Congress Will China Let 100 Flowers Bloom? Only Briefly. Will China Let 100 Flowers Bloom? Only Briefly. There is no history of surprise votes. The party congress ratifies approximately 90% of the candidates put forward. Outcomes closely conform to predictions of external analysts, meaning that the leadership selection is not a spontaneous, grassroots process but rather a mechanical, elite-driven process with minimal influence from low-level party members, not to mention the population at large.2  The party and state control the levers of power: The Communist Party has control over the military, state bureaucracy, and “commanding heights” of the economy. This includes domestic security forces, energy, communications, transportation, and the financial system. Whoever controls the Communist Party and central government exerts heavy influence over provincial governments and non-government institutions. The state bureaucracy is not in a position to oppose the party leadership. Xi has conducted a decade-long political purge (“anti-corruption campaign”). Upon coming to power in 2012, Xi initiated a neo-Maoist campaign to re-centralize power in his own person, in the Communist Party, and in the central government. He has purged foreign influence along with rivals in the party, state, military, business, civil society, and Big Tech. He personally controls the military, the police, the paramilitary forces, the intelligence and security agencies, and the top Communist Party organs. There may be opposition but it is not organized or capable. Chart 4China: Big Tech Gets Relief ... For Now China: Big Tech Gets Relief ... For Now China: Big Tech Gets Relief ... For Now There are no serious alternatives to Xi’s leadership. Xi is widely recognized within China as the “core” of the fifth generation of Chinese leaders. The other leaders and their factions have been repressed. Xi imprisoned his top rivals, Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang, a decade ago. He has since neutralized their followers and the factions of previous leaders Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin. Premier Li Keqiang has never exercised any influence and will retire at the end of this year. None of the ousted figures have reemerged to challenge Xi, but potential rivals have been imprisoned or disciplined, as have prominent figures that pose no direct political threat, such as tech entrepreneur Jack Ma (Chart 4).  Additional high-level sackings are likely before the party congress. China’s reversion to autocracy grew from Communist Party elites, not Xi alone. China’s slowing potential GDP growth and changing economic model raise an existential threat to the Communist Party over the long run. The party recognized its potential loss of legitimacy back in 2012, the year Xi was slated to take the helm. The solution was to concentrate power in the center, promoting Maoist nostalgia and strongman rule. In essence, the party needed a new Mao; Xi was all too willing to play the part. Hence Xi’s current position does not rest on his personal maneuvers alone. The party has invested heavily in Xi and will continue to do so. Characteristics of the political elite underpin the autocratic shift. Statistics on the evolving character traits of Politburo members show the trend toward leaders that are more rural, more bureaucratic, and more ideologically orthodox, i.e. more nationalist and communist (Chart 5). This trend underpins the party’s behavior and Xi’s personal rule. Chart 5China: From Technocracy To Autocracy Will China Let 100 Flowers Bloom? Only Briefly. Will China Let 100 Flowers Bloom? Only Briefly. Chart 6China: De-Industrialization Undermines Stability China: De-Industrialization Undermines Stability China: De-Industrialization Undermines Stability Xi has guarded his left flank. By cornering the hard left of the political spectrum Xi has positioned himself as the champion of poor people, workers, farmers, soldiers, and common folk. This is the political base of the Communist Party, as opposed to the rich coastal elites and westernizing capitalists, who stand to suffer from Xi’s policies. Ultimately de-industrialization – e.g. the sharp decline in manufacturing and construction sectors (Chart 6) – poses a major challenge to this narrative. But social unrest will be repressed and will not overturn Xi or the regime anytime soon. Xi still retains political capital. After centuries of instability, Chinese households are averse to upheaval, civil war, and chaos. They support the current regime because it has stabilized China and made it prosperous. Of course, relative to the Hu Jintao era, Xi’s policies have produced slower growth and productivity and a tarnished international image (Chart 7). But they have not yet led to massive instability that would alienate the people in general. If Chinese citizens look abroad, they see that Xi has already outlasted US Presidents Obama and Trump, is likely to outlast Biden, and that US politics are in turmoil. The same goes for Europe, Japan, and Russia – Xi’s leadership does not suffer by comparison.  Chart 7China’s Declining International Image Will China Let 100 Flowers Bloom? Only Briefly. Will China Let 100 Flowers Bloom? Only Briefly. External actors are neither willing nor able to topple Xi. Any outside attempt to interfere with China’s leadership or political system would be unwarranted and would provoke an aggressive response. The US is internally divided and has not developed a consistent China policy. This year the Biden administration has its hands full with midterm elections, Russia, and Iran, where it must also accept the current leadership as a fact of life. It has no ability to prevent Xi’s power consolidation, though it will impose punitive economic measures. Japan and other US allies have an interest in undermining Xi’s administration, but they follow the US’s lead in foreign policy. They also lack influence over the political rotation within the Communist Party. The Europeans will keep their distance but will not try to antagonize China given their more pressing conflict with Russia. Russia needs China more than ever and will lend material support in the form of cheaper and more secure natural resources. North Korean and Iranian nuclear provocations will help Xi stay under the radar.  There is no reason to expect a new leader to take over in China. The Xi administration’s strategy, revealed over the past ten years, will remain intact for another five-to-ten years at least. The real question at the party congress is whether Xi will be forced to name a successor or compromise with the opposing faction on the personnel of the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee. But even that remains to be seen – and either way he will remain the paramount leader. Bottom Line: Xi Jinping has the political capability to cement another five-to-ten years in power. Opposing factions have been weakened over the past decade by Xi’s domestic political purge and clash with the United States. China is ripe for social unrest and political dissent but these will be repressed as China goes further down the path of autocracy. Foreign powers have little influence over the process. Policy Uncertainty Falls In 2023 … Only To Rise Again What will Xi Jinping do once he consolidates power? Xi’s administration has weighed heavily on China’s economy, foreign relations, and financial markets. The situation has worsened dramatically this year as the economy struggles with “A Trifecta Of Economic Woes” – namely a rampant pandemic, waning demand for exports, and a faltering housing market (Chart 8). In response the administration is now easing a range of policies to stabilize expectations and try to meet the 5.5% annual growth target. The money impulse, and potentially the credit impulse, is turning less negative, heralding an eventual upturn in industrial activity and import volumes in 2023. These measures will give a boost to Chinese and global growth, although stimulus measures are losing effectiveness over time (Chart 9).  Chart 8China's Trifecta Of Economic Woes China's Trifecta Of Economic Woes China's Trifecta Of Economic Woes Chart 9More Stimulus, But Less Effectiveness More Stimulus, But Less Effectiveness More Stimulus, But Less Effectiveness This pro-growth policy pivot will continue through the year and into next year. After all, if Xi is going to stay in power, he does not want to bequeath himself a financial crisis or recession at the start of his third term. Still, investors should treat any rally in Chinese equity markets with skepticism. First, political risk and uncertainty will remain elevated until Xi completes his power grab, as China is highly susceptible to surprises and negative political incidents this year (Chart 10). For example, if social unrest emerges and is repressed, then the West will impose sanctions. If China increases its support of Russia, Iran, or North Korea, then the US will impose sanctions.     Chart 10China: Policy Uncertainty And Geopolitical Risk To Stay High In 2022, Might Improve In 2023 China: Policy Uncertainty And Geopolitical Risk To Stay High In 2022, Might Improve In 2023 China: Policy Uncertainty And Geopolitical Risk To Stay High In 2022, Might Improve In 2023 Chart 11China Needs To Court Europe China Needs To Court Europe China Needs To Court Europe The regime will be extremely vigilant and overreact to any threats this year, real or perceived. Political objectives will remain paramount, above the economy and financial markets, and that means new economic policy initiatives will not be reliable. Investors cannot be confident about the country’s policy direction until the leadership rotation is complete and new policy guidance is revealed, particularly in December 2022 and March 2023. Second, after consolidating power, investors should interpret Xi’s policy shift as “letting 100 flowers bloom,” i.e., a temporary relaxation that aims to reboot the economy but does not change the country’s long-term policy trajectory. Economic reopening is inevitable after the pandemic response is downgraded – which is a political determination. Xi will also be forced to reduce foreign tensions for the sake of the economy, particularly by courting Europe, which is three times larger than Russia as a market (Chart 11). However, China’s declining labor force and high debt levels prevent its periodic credit stimulus from generating as much economic output as in the past. And the administration will not ultimately pursue liberal structural reforms and a more open economy. That is the path toward foreign encroachment – and regime insecurity. The US’s sanctions on Russia have shown the consequences of deep dependency on the West. China will continue diversifying away from the US. And, as we will see, the US cannot provide credible promises that it will reduce tensions. US-China: Re-Engagement Will Fail The Biden administration is focused on fighting inflation ahead of the midterm elections. But its confrontation with Russia – and likely failure to freeze Iran’s nuclear program – increases rather than decreases oil supply constraints. Hence some administration officials and outside observers argue that the administration should pursue a strategic re-engagement with China.3  Theoretically a US-China détente would buy both countries time to deal with their domestic politics by providing some international stability. Improved US-China relations could also isolate Russia and hasten a resolution to the war in Ukraine, potentially reducing commodity price pressures. In essence, a US-China détente would reprise President Richard Nixon’s outreach to China in 1972, benefiting both countries at the expense of Russia.4  This kind of Kissinger 2.0 maneuver could happen but there are good reasons to think it will not, or if it does that it will fall apart in one or two years. In 1972, China had nowhere near the capacity to deny the US access to the Asia Pacific region, expel US influence from neighboring countries, reconquer Taiwan, or project power elsewhere. Today, China is increasingly gaining these abilities. In fact it is the only power in the world capable of rivaling the US in both economic and military terms over the long run (Chart 12). Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently outlined the Biden administration’s China policy and declared that China poses “the most serious long-term challenge” to the US despite Russian aggression.5  Chart 12US-China Competition Sows Distrust, Drives Economic Divorce Will China Let 100 Flowers Bloom? Only Briefly. Will China Let 100 Flowers Bloom? Only Briefly. While another decade of US engagement with China would benefit the US economy, it would be far more beneficial to China. Crucially, it would be beneficial in a strategic sense, not just an economic one. It could provide just the room for maneuver that China needs – at this critical juncture in its development – to achieve technological and productivity breakthroughs and escape the middle-income trap. Another ten-year reprieve from direct American competition would set China up to challenge the US on the global stage. That would be far too high of a strategic price for America to pay for a ceasefire in Ukraine. Ukraine has limited strategic value for the US and it does not steer US grand strategy, which aims to prevent regional empires from taking shape. In fact Washington is deliberately escalating and prolonging the war in Ukraine to drain Russia’s resources. Ending the war would do Russia a strategic favor, while re-engaging with China would do China a strategic favor. So why would the defense and intelligence community advise the Biden administration to pursue Kissinger 2.0? Chart 13US Unlikely To Revoke Trump Tariffs US Unlikely To Revoke Trump Tariffs US Unlikely To Revoke Trump Tariffs Biden could still pursue some degree of détente with China, namely by repealing President Trump’s trade tariffs, in order to relieve price pressures ahead of the midterm election. Yet even here the case is deeply flawed. Trump’s tariffs on China did not trigger the current inflationary bout. That was the combined Trump-Biden fiscal stimulus and Covid-era supply constraints. US import prices are rising faster from the rest of the world than they are from China (Chart 13). Tariff relief would not change China’s Zero Covid policy, which is the current driver of price spikes from China. And while lifting tariffs on China would not reduce inflation enough to attract voters, it would cost Biden some political credit among voters in swing states like Pennsylvania, and across the US, where China’s image has plummeted in the wake of Covid-19 (Chart 14).   Chart 14US Political Consensus Remains Hawkish On China Will China Let 100 Flowers Bloom? Only Briefly. Will China Let 100 Flowers Bloom? Only Briefly. If Biden did pursue détente, would China be able to reciprocate and offer trade concessions? Xi has the authority to do so but he is unlikely to make major trade concessions prior to the party congress. Economic self-sufficiency and resistance to American pressure have become pillars of his support. Promises will not ease inflation for US voters in November and Xi has no incentive to make binding concessions because the next US administration could intensify the trade war regardless.  Bottom Line: The US has no long-term interest, and a limited short-term interest, in easing pressure on China’s economy. Continued US pressure, combined with China’s internal difficulties, will reinforce Xi Jinping’s shift toward nationalism and hawkish foreign policy. Hence there is little basis for a substantial US-China re-engagement that improves the global macroeconomic environment over the coming years. Investment Takeaways Chart 15Autocracy Hurts Productivity Autocracy Hurts Productivity Autocracy Hurts Productivity Xi Jinping will clinch another five-to-ten years in power this fall. To stabilize the economy, he will “let 100 flowers bloom” and ease monetary, fiscal, regulatory, and social policy at home. He will also court the West, especially Europe, for the sake of economic growth. However, he will not go so far as to compromise his ultimate aims: self-sufficiency at home and a sphere of influence abroad. The result will be a relapse into conflict with the West within a year or two. Ultimately a closed Chinese economy in conflict with the West will result in lower productivity, a weaker currency, a high geopolitical risk premium, and low equity returns – just as it did for Russia (Chart 15). Any short-term improvement in China’s low equity multiples will ultimately be capped. Over the long run, western investors should hedge against Chinese geopolitical risk by preferring markets that benefit from China’s periodic stimulus yet do not suffer from the break-up of the US-China and EU-Russia economic relationships, such as key markets in Latin America and Southeast Asia (Charts 16 & 17). Chart 16China Stimulus Creates Opportunity For … Latin America China Stimulus Creates Opportunity For ... Latin America China Stimulus Creates Opportunity For ... Latin America Chart 17China Stimulus Creates Opportunity For … Southeast Asia China Stimulus Creates Opportunity For ... Southeast Asia China Stimulus Creates Opportunity For ... Southeast Asia     Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Modern scholarship has shown that Mao intended to entrap the opposition through the 100 Flowers Campaign. For a harrowing account of this episode, see Jung Chang and Jon Halliday, Mao: The Unknown Story (New York: Anchor Books, 2006), pp. 409-17. 2     “At least 8% of CPC Central Committee nominees voted off,” Xinhua, October 24, 2017, english.www.gov.cn. 3    Christopher Condon, “Yellen Says Biden Team Is Looking To ‘Reconfigure’ China Tariffs,” June 8, 2022, www.bloomberg.com. 4       Niall Ferguson, “Dust Off That Dirty Word Détente And Engage With China,” Bloomberg, June 5, 2022, www.bloomberg.com. 5    See Antony J Blinken, Secretary of State, “The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China,” George Washington University, Washington D.C., May 26, 2022, state.gov. Additionally, see President Joe Biden’s third assertion of US willingness to defend Taiwan against China, in a joint press conference with Japan’s Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, “Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio of Japan in Joint Press Conference,” Akasaka Palace, Tokyo, Japan, May 23, 2022, whitehouse.gov.

Executive Summary EU Embargoes Russian Oil Energy Cutoff Continues (GeoRisk Update) Energy Cutoff Continues (GeoRisk Update) The EU imposed an embargo on 90% of Russian oil imports, which will provoke retaliation. Russia will squeeze Europe’s economy ahead of critical negotiations over the coming 6-12 months. Russian gains on the battlefield in Ukraine point to a ceasefire later, but not yet – and Russia will need to retaliate against NATO enlargement. The Middle East and North Africa face instability and oil disruptions due to US-Iran tensions and Russian interference. China’s autocratic shift is occurring amid an economic slowdown and pandemic. Social unrest and internal tensions will flare. China will export uncertainty and stagflation.  Inflation is causing disparate effects in South Asia – instability in Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and fiscal populism in India.   Asset Initiation Date Return Long Brazilian Financials / Indian Equities (Closed) Feb 10/22 22.5%  Bottom Line: Markets still face three geopolitical hurdles: Russian retaliation; Middle Eastern instability; Chinese uncertainty. Feature Global equities bounced back 6.1% from their trough on May 12 as investors cheered hints of weakening inflation and questioned the bearish consensus. BCA’s Global Investment Strategy correctly called the equity bounce. However, as BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy service, we see several sources of additional bad news. Throughout the Ukraine conflict we have highlighted two fundamental factors to ascertain regarding the ongoing macroeconomic impact: Will the war cut off the Russia-EU energy trade? Will the war broaden beyond Ukraine? Chart 1Russian-Exposed Assets Will Suffer More Russian-Exposed Assets Will Suffer More Russian-Exposed Assets Will Suffer More In this report we update our views on these two critical questions. The takeaway is that the geopolitical outlook is still flashing red. The US dollar will remain strong and currencies exposed to Russia and geopolitical risk will remain weak (Chart 1). In addition, China’s politics will continue to produce uncertainty and negative surprises this year. Taken together, investors should remain defensive for now but be ready to turn positive when the market clears the hurdles we identify. The fate of the business cycle hangs in the balance.  Energy Ties Eroding … Russia Will Retaliate Over Oil Embargo Chart 2AEU Embargoes Russian Oil Energy Cutoff Continues (GeoRisk Update) Energy Cutoff Continues (GeoRisk Update) Europe is diversifying from Russian oil and natural gas. The European Union adopted a partial oil embargo on Russia that will cut oil imports by 90% by the end of 2022. It also removed Sberbank from the SWIFT banking communications network and slapped sanctions on companies that insure shipments of Russian crude. The sanctions will cut off all of Europe’s seaborne oil imports from Russia as well as major pipeline imports, except the Southern Druzhba pipeline. The EU made an exception for landlocked eastern European countries heavily dependent on Russian pipeline imports – namely Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Bulgaria (Chart 2A).  Focus on the big picture. Germany changed its national policy to reduce Russian energy dependency for the sake of national security. From Chancellors Willy Brandt to Angela Merkel, Germany pursued energy cooperation and economic engagement as a means of lowering the risk of war with Russia. Ostpolitik worked in the Cold War, so when Russia seized Crimea in 2014, Merkel built the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. But Merkel’s policy failed to persuade Russia that economic cooperation is better than military confrontation – rather it emboldened President Putin, who viewed Europe as divided and corruptible. Chart 2BRussia Squeezes EU’s Natural Gas Energy Cutoff Continues (GeoRisk Update) Energy Cutoff Continues (GeoRisk Update) Russia’s regime is insecure and feels threatened by the US and NATO. Russia believed that if it invaded Ukraine, the Europeans would maintain energy relations for the sake of preserving overall strategic stability. Instead Germany and other European states began to view Russia as irrational and aggressive and hence a threat to their long-term security. They imposed a coal ban, now an oil ban the end of this year, and a natural gas ban by the end of 2027, all formalized under the recently announced RePowerEU program. Russia retaliated by declaring it would reduce natural gas exports to the Netherlands and probably Denmark, after having already cut off Finland, Poland, and Bulgaria (Chart 2B). As a pretext Russia points to its arbitrary March demand that states pay for gas in rubles rather than in currencies written in contracts. This ruble payment scheme is being enforced on a country-by-country basis against those Russia deems “unfriendly,” i.e. those that join NATO, adopt new sanctions, provide massive assistance to Ukraine, or are otherwise adverse. Chart 3Russia Actively Cutting Gas Flows Russia Actively Cutting Gas Flows Russia Actively Cutting Gas Flows Russia and Ukraine are already reducing natural gas exports through the Ukraine and Turkstream pipelines while the Yamal pipeline has been empty since May – and it is only a matter of time before flows begin to fall in the Nord Stream 1 pipeline to Germany (Chart 3). German government and industry are preparing to ration natural gas (to prioritize household needs) and revive 15 coal plants if necessary. Europe is attempting to rebuild stockpiles for the coming winter, when Russian willingness and capability to squeeze natural gas flows will reach a peak. The big picture is demonstrated by game theory in Diagram 1. The optimal situation for both Russia and the EU is to maintain energy exports for as long as possible, so that Russia has revenues to wage its war and Europe avoids a recession while transitioning away from Russian supplies (bottom right quadrant, each side receives four points). The problem is that this solution is not an equilibrium because either side can suffer a sudden shock if the other side betrays the tacit agreement and stops buying or selling (bottom left and top right quadrants). Diagram 1EU-Russia Standoff: What Does Game Theory Say? Energy Cutoff Continues (GeoRisk Update) Energy Cutoff Continues (GeoRisk Update) The equilibrium – the decision sets in which both Russia and the EU are guaranteed to lose the least – is a situation in which both states reduce energy trade immediately. Europe needs to cut off the revenues that fuel the Russian war machine while Russia needs to punish and deter Europe now while it still has massive energy leverage (top left quadrant, circled). Once Europe diversifies away, Russia loses its leverage. If Europe does not diversify immediately, Russia can punish it severely by cutting off energy before it is prepared.   Russian energy weaponization is especially useful ahead of any ceasefire talks in Ukraine. Russia aims for Ukrainian military neutrality and a permanently weakened Ukrainian state. To that end it is seizing territory for the Luhansk and Donetsk People’s Republics, seizing the southern coastline and strategic buffer around Crimea, and controlling the mouth of the Dnieper river so that Ukraine is forever hobbled (Map 1). Once it achieves these aims it will want to settle a ceasefire that legitimizes its conquests. But Ukraine will wish to continue the fight. Map 1Russian Invasion Of Ukraine, 2022 Energy Cutoff Continues (GeoRisk Update) Energy Cutoff Continues (GeoRisk Update) Russia will need leverage over Europe to convince the EU to lean on Ukraine to agree to a ceasefire. Something similar occurred in 2014-15 when Russia collaborated with Germany and France to foist the Minsk Protocols onto Ukraine. If Russia keeps energy flowing to EU, the EU not only gets a smooth energy transition away from Russia but also gets to keep assisting Ukraine’s military effort. Whereas if Russia imposes pain on the EU ahead of ceasefire talks, the EU has greater interest in settling a ceasefire. Finally, given Russia’s difficulties on the battlefield, its loss of European patronage, and potential NATO enlargement on its borders, Moscow is highly likely to open a “new front” in its conflict with the West. Josef Stalin, for example, encouraged Kim Il Sung to invade South Korea in 1950. Today Russia’s options lie in the Middle East and North Africa – the regions where Europe turns for energy alternatives. Not only Libya and Algeria – which are both inherently fertile ground for Russia to sow instability –  but also Iran and the broader Middle East, where a tenuous geopolitical balance is already eroding due to a lack of strategic understanding between the US and Iran. Russia’s capabilities are limited but it likely retains enough influence to ignite existing powder kegs in these areas.   Bottom Line: Investors still face a few hurdles from the Ukraine war. First, the EU’s expanding energy embargo and Russian retaliation. Second, instability in the Middle East and North Africa. Hence energy price pressures will remain elevated in the short term and kill more demand, thus pushing the EU and the rest of the world toward stagflation or even recession. War Contained To Ukraine So Far … But Russia To Retaliate Over NATO Enlargement At present Russia is waging a full-scale assault on eastern and southern Ukraine, where about half of Donetsk awaits a decision (Map 2). If Russia emerges victorious over Donetsk in the summer or fall then it can declare victory and start negotiating a ceasefire. This timeline assumes that its economic circumstances are sufficiently straitened to prevent a campaign to the Moldovan border.1   Map 2Russia May Declare Victory If It Conquers The Rest Of Donetsk Energy Cutoff Continues (GeoRisk Update) Energy Cutoff Continues (GeoRisk Update) There are still ways for the Ukraine war to spill over into neighboring areas. For example, the Black Sea is effectively a Russian lake at the moment, which prevents Ukrainian grain from reaching global markets where food prices are soaring. Eventually the western maritime powers will need to attempt to restore freedom of navigation. However, Russia is imposing a blockade on Ukraine, has more at stake there than other powers, and can take greater risks. The US and its allies will continue to provide Ukraine with targeting information against Russian ships but this assistance could eventually provoke a larger naval conflict. Separately, the US has agreed to provide Ukraine with the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), which could lead to attacks on Russian territory that would prompt a ferocious Russian reaction. Even assuming that the Ukraine war remains contained, Russia’s strategic conflict with the US and the West will remain unresolved and Moscow will be eager to save face. Russian retaliation will occur not only on account of European energy diversification but also on account of NATO enlargement. Finland and Sweden are attempting to join NATO and as such the West is directly repudiating the Putin regime’s chief strategic demand for 22 years. Finland shares an 830 mile border with Russia, adding insult to injury. The result will be another round of larger military tensions that go beyond Ukraine and prolong this year’s geopolitical risk and uncertainty. Russia’s initial response to Finland’s and Sweden’s joint application to NATO was to dismiss the threat they pose while drawing a new red line. Rather than forbidding NATO enlargement, Russia now demands that no NATO forces be deployed to these two states. This demand, which Putin and other officials expressed, may or may not amount to a genuine Russian policy change. Russia’s initial responses should be taken with a grain of salt because Turkey is temporarily blocking Finland’s and Sweden’s applications, so Russia has no need to respond to NATO enlargement yet. But the true test will come when and if the West satisfies Turkey’s grievances and Turkey moves to admit the new members. If enlargement becomes inevitable, Russia will respond. Russia will feel that its national security is fundamentally jeopardized by Sweden overturning two centuries of neutrality and Finland reversing the policy of “Finlandization” that went so far in preventing conflict during the Cold War. Chart 4Military Balances Stacking Up Against Russia Energy Cutoff Continues (GeoRisk Update) Energy Cutoff Continues (GeoRisk Update) Russia’s military options are limited. Russia has little ability to expand the war and fight on multiple fronts judging by the army’s recent performance in Ukraine and the Red Army’s performance in the Winter War of 1939. This point can be illustrated by taking the military balance of Russia and its most immediate adversaries, which add up to about half of Russian military strength even apart from NATO (Chart 4). Russian armed forces already demonstrated some pragmatism in April by withdrawing from Kyiv and focusing on more achievable war aims. Unless President Putin turns utterly reckless and the Russian state fails to restrain him, Russia will opt for defensive measures and strategic deterrence rather than a military offensive in the Baltics. Hence Russia’s military response will come in the form of threats rather than outright belligerence. However, these threats will probably include military and nuclear actions that will raise alarm bells across Europe and the United States. President Dmitri Medvedev has already warned of the permanent deployment of nuclear missiles in the Kaliningrad exclave.2 This statement points to only the most symbolic option of a range of options that will increase deterrence and elevate the fear of war. Otherwise Russia’s retaliation will consist of squeezing global energy supply, as discussed above, including by opening a new front in the Middle East and North Africa. Instability should be expected as a way of constraining Europe and distracting America. Higher energy prices may or may not convince the EU to negotiate better terms with Russia but they will sow divisions within and among the allies. Ultimately Russia is highly unlikely to sacrifice its credibility by failing to retaliate for the combination of energy embargo and NATO enlargement on its borders. Since its military options are becoming constrained (at least its rational ones), its economic and asymmetrical options will grow in importance. The result will be additional energy supply constraints. Bottom Line: Even assuming that the war does not spread beyond Ukraine – likely but not certain – global financial markets face at least one more period of military escalation with Russia. This will likely include significant energy cutoffs and saber-rattling – even nuclear threats – over NATO enlargement.   China’s Political Situation Has Not Normalized China continues to suffer from a historic confluence of internal and external political risk that will cause negative surprises for investors. Temporary improvements in government policy or investor sentiment – centered on a relaxation of “Zero Covid” lockdowns in major cities and a more dovish regulatory tone against the tech giants – will likely be frustrated, at least until after a more dovish government stance can be confirmed in the wake of the twentieth national party congress in October or November this year. At that event, Chinese President Xi Jinping is likely to clinch another ten years in power and complete the transformation of China’s governance from single-party rule to single-person rule. This reversion to autocracy will generate additional market-negative developments this year. It has already embedded a permanently higher risk premium in Chinese financial assets because it increases the odds of policy mistakes, international aggression, and ultimately succession crisis. The most successful Asian states chose to democratize and expand free markets and capitalism when they reached a similar point of economic development and faced the associated sociopolitical challenges. But China is choosing the opposite path for the sake of national security. Investors have seen the decay of Russia’s economy under Putin’s autocracy and would be remiss not to upgrade the odds of similarly negative outcomes in China over the long run as a result of Xi’s autocracy, despite the many differences between the two countries. China’s situation is more difficult than that of the democratic Asian states because of its reviving strategic rivalry with the United States. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken recently unveiled President Biden’s comprehensive China policy. He affirmed that the administration views China as the US’s top strategic competitor over the long run, despite the heightened confrontation with Russia.3 The Biden administration has not eased the Trump administration’s tariffs or punitive measures on China. It is unlikely to do so during a midterm election year when protectionist dynamics prevail – especially given that the Xi administration will be in the process of reestablishing autocracy, and possibly repressing social unrest, at the very moment Americans go to the polls. Re-engagement with China is also prohibited because China is strengthening its strategic bonds with Russia. President Biden has repeatedly implied that the US would defend Taiwan in any conflict with China. These statements are presented as gaffes or mistakes but they are in fact in keeping with historical US military actions threatening counter-attack during the three historic Taiwan Strait crises. The White House quickly walks back these comments to reassure China that the US does not support Taiwanese independence or intend to trigger a war with China. The result is that the US is using Biden’s gaffe-prone personality to reemphasize the hard edge (rather than the soft edge) of the US’s policy of “strategic ambiguity” on Taiwan. US policy is still ambiguous but ambiguity includes the possibility that a president might order military action to defend Taiwan. US attempts to increase deterrence and avoid a Ukraine scenario are threatening for China, which will view the US as altering the status quo and penalizing China for Russia’s actions. Beijing resumed overflights of Taiwan’s air defense identification zone in the wake of Biden’s remarks as well as the decision of the US to send Senator Tammy Duckworth to Taiwan to discuss deeper economic and defense ties. Consider the positioning of US aircraft carrier strike groups as an indicator of the high level of strategic tensions. On January 18, 2022, as Russia amassed military forces on the Ukrainian border – and the US and NATO rejected its strategic demands – the US had only one publicly acknowledged  aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean (the USS Harry Truman) whereas it had at least five US carriers in East Asia. On February 24, the day of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the US had at least four of these carriers in Asia. Even today the US has at least four carriers in the Pacific compared to at least two in Europe – one of which, notably, is in the Baltics to deter Russia from attacking Finland and Sweden (Map 3). The US is warning China not to take advantage of the Ukraine war by staging a surprise attack on Taiwan. Map 3Amid Ukraine War, US Deters China From Attacking Taiwan Energy Cutoff Continues (GeoRisk Update) Energy Cutoff Continues (GeoRisk Update) Of course, strategic tensions are perennial, whereas what investors are most concerned about is whether China can secure its economic recovery. The latest data are still disappointing. Credit growth continues to falter as the private sector struggles with a deteriorating demographic and macroeconomic outlook (Chart 5). The credit impulse has entered positive territory, when local government bonds are included, reflecting government stimulus efforts. But it is still negative when excluding local governments. And even the positive measure is unimpressive, having ticked back down in April (Chart 6). Chart 5Credit Growth Falters Amid Economic Transition Credit Growth Falters Amid Economic Transition Credit Growth Falters Amid Economic Transition Chart 6Silver Lining: Credit Impulse Less Negative Silver Lining: Credit Impulse Less Negative Silver Lining: Credit Impulse Less Negative Bottom Line: Further monetary and fiscal easing will come in China, a source of good news for global investors next year if coupled with a broader policy shift in favor of business, but the effects will be mixed this year due to Covid policy and domestic politics. Taken together with a European energy crunch and Middle Eastern oil supply disruptions, China’s stimulus is not a catalyst for a sustainable global equity market rally this year. South Asia: Inflation Hammers Sri Lanka And Pakistan Since 2020 we have argued that the global pandemic would result in a new wave of supply pressures and global social unrest. High inflation is blazing a trail of destruction in emerging markets, notably in South Asia, where per capita incomes are low and political institutions often fragile. Chart 7South Asia: Surging Inflation Energy Cutoff Continues (GeoRisk Update) Energy Cutoff Continues (GeoRisk Update) Sri Lanka has been worst affected (Chart 7). Inflation surged to an eye-watering 34% in April  and is expected to rise further. Surging inflation has affected Sri Lanka disproportionately because its macroeconomic and political fundamentals were weak to begin with. The tourism-dependent Sri Lankan economy suffered a body blow from terrorist attacks in 2019 and the pandemic in 2020-21. Then 2022 saw a power struggle between Sri Lanka’s President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and members of the national assembly including Prime Minister (PM) Mahinda Rajapaksa. The crisis hit a crescendo when the country defaulted on external debt obligations last month. These events weigh on Sri Lanka’s ability to transition from a long civil war (1983-2009) to a path of sustained economic development. While the political crisis has seemingly stabilized following the appointment of new Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, we remain bearish on a strategic time horizon. This is mainly because the new PM is unlikely to bring about structural solutions for Sri Lanka’s broken economy. Moreover, Sri Lanka holds more than $50 billion of foreign debt, or 62% of GDP. Another country that has been dealing with political instability alongside high inflation in South Asia is Pakistan, where inflation hit a three-year high in April (see Chart 7 above). The latest twist in Pakistan’s never-ending cycle of political uncertainty comes from the ousted Prime Minister Imran Khan. The former PM, who commands an unusual popular support group due to his fame as a cricketer prior to entering politics, is demanding fresh elections and otherwise threatening to hold mass protests. Pakistan’s new coalition government and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, who came to power amid parliamentary intrigues, are refusing elections and ultimatums. From a structural perspective Pakistan is characterized by a weak economy and an unusually influential military. Now it faces high inflation and rising food prices – indeed it is one of the countries that is most dangerously exposed to the Russia-Ukraine war as it depends on these two for over 70% of its grain imports. Bottom Line: MSCI Sri Lanka has underperformed the MSCI EM index by 58.3% this year to date. Pakistan has underperformed the same index by 41.6% over the same period. Against this backdrop, we remain strategic sellers of both bourses. Instability in these countries is also one  of the factors behind our strategic assessment of India as a country with a growing domestic policy consensus. South Asia: India’s Fiscal Populism And Geopolitics Inflation is less rampant in India, although still troublesome. Consumer prices nearly jumped to an 8-year high in April (see Chart 7). With a loaded state election calendar due over the next 12-18 months, the jump in inflation naturally triggered a series of mitigating policy responses. Ban On Wheat Exports: India produces 14% of the world’s wheat and 11% of grains, and exports 5% and 7%, respectively. India’s exports could make a large profit in the context of global shortages. But Prime Minister Narendra Modi is entering into the political end of the business cycle, with key state elections due that will have an impact on the ruling party’s political standing two years before the next federal election. He fears political vulnerability if exports continue amid price pressures at home. The emphasis on food security is typical but also bespeaks a lack of commitment to economic reform. Chart 8India's Real Interest Rates Fall India's Real Interest Rates Fall India's Real Interest Rates Fall Surprise Rate Hikes: The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) increased the policy repo rate by 40 basis points at an unscheduled meeting on May 4, thereby implementing its first rate hike since August 2018. With real rates in India lower than those in China or Brazil (Chart 8), the RBI will be forced to expedite its planned rate hikes through 2022. Tax Cuts On Fuel: India’s central government also announced steep cuts in excise duty on fuel. This is another populist measure that reduces political pressures but fails to encourage the private sector to adjust.  These measures will help rein in inflation but the rate hikes will weigh on economic growth while the tax cuts will add to India’s fiscal deficit. Indeed, India is resorting to fiscal populism with key state elections looming. Geopolitical risk is less of a concern for India – indeed the Ukraine war has strengthened its bargaining position. In the short run, India benefits from the ability to buy arms and especially cheap oil from Russia while the EU imposes an embargo. But over the long run its economy and security can be strengthened by greater interest from the US and its allies, recently highlighted by the fourth meeting of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and the launch of the US’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). These initiatives are modest but they highlight the US’s need to replace China with India and ASEAN over time, a trend that no US administration can reverse now because of the emerging Russo-Chinese strategic alliance. At the same time, the Quad underscores India’s maritime interests and hence the security benefits India can gain from aligning its economy and navy with the other democracies. Bottom Line: Fiscal populism in the context of high commodity prices is negative for Indian equities. However, our views on Russia, the Middle East, and China all point to a sharper short-term spike in commodity prices that ultimately drives the world economy deeper into stagflation or recession. Therefore we are booking a 22.5% profit on our tactical decision to go long Brazilian financials relative to Indian equities.   Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist ritika.mankar@bcaresearch.com   Chart 9Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 10Other Measures Of Russian Geopolitical Risk Other Measures Of Russian Geopolitical Risk Other Measures Of Russian Geopolitical Risk Chart 11China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 12United Kingdom: GeoRisk Indicator United Kingdom: GeoRisk Indicator United Kingdom: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 13Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 14France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 15Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 16Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 17Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 18Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 19Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 20Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 21Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 22South Africa: GeoRisk Indicator South Africa: GeoRisk Indicator South Africa: GeoRisk Indicator Chart 23Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator   Footnotes 1     Recent diplomatic flaps between core European leaders and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky reflect Ukraine’s fear that Europe will negotiate a “separate peace” with Russia, i.e. accept Russian territorial conquests in exchange for economic relief. 2     Dmitri Medvedev explicitly states ‘there can be no more talk of any nuclear-free status for the Baltic - the balance must be restored’ in warning Finland and Sweden joining NATO. Medvedev is suggesting that nuclear weapons will be placed in this area where Russia has its Kaliningrad exclave sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania. Guy Faulconbridge, ‘Russia warns of nuclear, hypersonic deployment if Sweden and Finland join NATO’, April 14, 2022, Reuters. 3    See Antony J Blinken, Secretary of State, ‘The Administration’s Approach to the People’s Republic of China’, The George Washington University, Washington D.C., May 26, 2022, state.gov. Additionally, see President Joe Biden’s remarks on China and getting involved military to defend Taiwan in a joint press conference with Japan’s Prime Minister Kishida Fumio. ‘Remarks by President Biden and Prime Minister Kishida Fumio of Japan in Joint Press Conference’, Akasaka Palace, Tokyo, Japan, May 23, 2022, whitehouse.gov.   Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Executive Summary Favor ASEAN And The Philippines Favor ASEAN And The Philippines Favor ASEAN And The Philippines Southeast Asia is suffering from fading macro and geopolitical tailwinds but there are still investment opportunities on a relative basis. The peace dividend, globalization dividend, and demographic dividend are all eroding and will continue to erode, though there are relative winners and losers. The Philippines and Thailand are most secure; the Philippines and Indonesia are least dependent on trade; and the Philippines and Vietnam have the highest potential GDP growth. Geopolitical risk premiums have risen for Russia, Eastern Europe, China, and will rise for the Middle East. This leaves ASEAN states as relatively attractive emerging markets. Trade Recommendation Inception Date Return LONG PHILIPPINES / EM EQUITIES 2022-05-12   LONG ASEAN / ACW EQUITIES 2022-05-12   Bottom Line: ASEAN’s geopolitical outlook is less ugly than many other emerging markets. Cyclically, go long ASEAN versus global equities and long Philippine equities versus EM. Feature Chart 1Hypo-Globalization A Headwind For Trading States Hypo-Globalization A Headwind For Trading States Hypo-Globalization A Headwind For Trading States The Philippines elected its second “strongman” leader in a row on May 9, provoking the usual round of editorials about the death of liberalism. Investors know well by now that such political narratives do as much to occlude economic reality as to clarify it. Still, there is a fundamental need to understand the changing global political order since it will ultimately impact the investment landscape. If the global order stabilizes – e.g. US-Russia and US-China relations normalize – then trade and investment may recover from recent shocks. A new era of “Re-Globalization” could ensue. Asia Pacific would be a prime beneficiary as it is full of trading economies (Chart 1). Related Report  Geopolitical StrategySecond Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours By contrast, if Great Power Rivalry escalates further, then trade and investment will suffer, the current paradigm of Hypo-Globalization will continue, and East Asia’s frozen conflicts from 1945-52 will thaw and heat up. Asian states will have to shift focus from trade to security and their economies will suffer relative to previous expectations. How will Southeast Asia fare in this context? Will it fall victim to great power conflict, like Eastern Europe? Or will it keep a balance between the great powers and extract maximum benefits? Three Dividends Three dividends have underpinned Southeast Asia’s growth and prosperity in recent decades: 1.  Peace Dividend – A relative lack of war and inter-state conflict. 2.  Globalization Dividend – Advantageous maritime geography and access to major economies. 3.  Demographic Dividend – Young demographics and strong potential GDP growth. All three of these dividends are eroding, so the macro and geopolitical investment case for ASEAN has weakened relative to twenty years ago. Nevertheless in a world where Russia, China, and the Gulf Arab markets face a higher and persistent geopolitical risk premium, ASEAN still offers attractive investment opportunities, particularly if the most geopolitically insecure countries are avoided. Peace Dividend Favors The Philippines And Thailand Since the end of the US and Chinese wars with Vietnam, military conflicts in Southeast Asia have been low intensity. Lack of inter-state conflict encouraged economic prosperity and security complacency. The five major Southeast Asian nations saw military spending decline since the 1990s and only Vietnam spends more than 2% of GDP (Chart 2). Chart 2Peace Brought Prosperity Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Unfortunately that is about to change. China has large import dependencies, an insufficient tradition of sea power, and feels hemmed in by its geography and the US alliance system. Beijing’s solution is to build and modernize its navy and prepare for potential conflict with the US, particularly over Taiwan. The result is rising tension across East Asia, including in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea. The ASEAN states fear China will walk over them, China fears they will league with the US against China, and the US tries to get them to do exactly that. Hence ASEAN’s defense spending has not kept up with its geopolitical importance and will have to rise going forward. Consider the following: Vietnam risks conflict with China. Vietnam has the most capable and experienced naval force within ASEAN due to its sporadic conflicts with China. Its equipment is supplied mainly by Russia, pitting it squarely against China’s Soviet or Soviet-inspired equipment. But Russia-China ties are tightening, especially after Russia’s divorce with Europe. While Vietnam will not reject Russia, it is increasingly partnering with the United States. The pandemic added to the Vietnamese public’s distrust of China, which is ancient but has ramped up in recent years due to clashes in the South China Sea. While Vietnam officially maintains that it will never host the US military, it is tacitly bonding with the US as a hedge against China. Yet Vietnam does not have a mutual defense treaty with the US, so it is vulnerable to Chinese military aggression over time. Indonesia distances itself from China. Rising security tensions are also forcing Indonesia to change its strategy toward China. Indonesia lacks experience in naval warfare and is not a claimant in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. It is reluctant to take sides due to its traditionally non-aligned diplomatic status, its military culture of prioritizing internal stability (which is hard to maintain across thousands of islands), and China’s investment in its economy. However, China is encroaching on Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone and Indonesia has signaled its displeasure through diplomatic snubs and high-profile infrastructure contracts. Indonesia is trying to bulk up its naval and air capabilities, including via arms purchases from the West. Malaysia distances itself from China. Malaysia and the Philippines have the weakest naval forces and both face pressure from China’s navy and coast guard due to maritime-territorial disputes. But while the Philippines gets help from the US and its allies and partners, Malaysia has no such allies. Traditionally it was non-aligned. Instead it utilizes economic statecraft, as it has often done against more powerful countries. It recently paused Chinese economic projects in the country to conduct reviews and chose Ericsson over Huawei to build the 5G network. Ongoing maritime and energy disputes will motivate defense spending. The Philippines preserves alliance with United States. Outgoing President Rodrigo Duterte tried but failed to strengthen ties with China and Russia. Beijing continued to swarm the Philippines’ economic zone with ships and threaten its control of neighboring rocks and reefs. Ultimately Duterte renewed his country’s Visiting Forces Agreement with the US in July 2021. The newly elected President “Bong Bong” Marcos is even less likely to try to pivot away from the US. Instead the Philippines will work with the US to try to deter China. Thailand preserves alliance with United States. Thailand is the most insulated from the South China Sea disputes and often acts as mediator between China and other ASEAN states. However, Thailand is also a formal US defense ally and assisted with logistics during the Korean and Vietnamese wars. While US military aid was suspended after the 2014 military coup, non-military aid from the US continued. The State Department certified Thailand’s return to democracy in 2019, relations were normalized, and the annual Cobra Gold exercise resumed in 2020. The US’s hasty normalization shows Thailand’s importance to its regional strategy. On their own, the ASEAN states cannot counter China – they are simply outgunned (Chart 3). Hence their grand strategy of balancing Chinese trade relations with American security relations. Chart 3Outgunned By China Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Chart 4Opinion Shifts Against China Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines In recent decades, with the US divided and distracted, they sought to entice China through commercial deals, in hopes that it would reduce its encroachments on the high seas. This strategy failed, as China’s expansion of economic and military influence in the region is driven by China’s own imperatives. Beijing’s lack of transparency about Covid-19 also sowed distrust. As a result, public opinion became more critical of China and defensive of national sovereignty (Chart 4). Southeast Asia will continue trading with China but changing public opinion, the US-China clash, and tensions in the South China Sea will inject greater geopolitical risk into this once peaceful and prosperous region. Military weakness will also lead the ASEAN states to welcome the US, EU, Japan, and Australia into the region as economic and security hedges against China. This trend risks inflaming regional tensions in the short run – and China may not be deterred over the long run, since its encroachments in the region are driven by its own needs and insecurities. Decades of under-investment in defense will result in ASEAN rearmament, which will weigh on fiscal balances and potentially economic competitiveness. Investors should not take the past three decades of peace for granted. Bottom Line: Vietnam (like Taiwan) is in a geopolitical predicament where it could provoke China’s wrath and yet lacks an American security guarantee. The Philippines and Thailand benefit from American security guarantees. Indonesia and Malaysia benefit from distance from China. All of these states will attempt to balance US and China relations – but in the future that means devoting more resources to national security, which will weigh on fiscal budgets and take away funds from human capital development. Waning Globalization Dividend Favors Indonesia And The Philippines All the ASEAN states rely heavily on both the US and China for export markets. This reliance grew as trade recovered in the wake of the global pandemic (Chart 5). Now global trade is slowing down cyclically, while US-China power struggle will weigh on the structural globalization process, penalizing the most trade-dependent ASEAN states relative to their less trade-dependent neighbors. So far US-China economic divorce is redistributing US-China trade in a way that is positive for Southeast Asia. China is rerouting exports through Vietnam, for example, while the US is shifting supply chains to other Asian states (Chart 6). The US will accelerate down this path because it cannot afford substantively to reengage with China’s economy for fear of strengthening the Russo-Chinese bloc. Chart 5Trade Rebounded But Hypo-Globalization Will Force Domestic Reliance Trade Rebounded But Hypo-Globalization Will Force Domestic Reliance Trade Rebounded But Hypo-Globalization Will Force Domestic Reliance ​​​​​ Chart 6ASEAN’s Exports To US Surge Ahead Of China’s ASEAN's Exports To US Surge Ahead Of China's ASEAN's Exports To US Surge Ahead Of China's Hence the US will become more reliant on Southeast Asian exporters. Whatever the US stops buying from China will have to be sourced from other countries, so countries that export a similar basket of goods will benefit from the switch. Comparing the types of goods that China and ASEAN export to the US, Thailand is the closest substitute for China, whereas Malaysia is the farthest (Chart 7). That is not to say that Malaysia will suffer from US-China divorce. It is already ahead of China in exporting high-tech goods to the US, which is the very reason its export profile is so different. In 2020, 58% of Malaysia’s exports to the US are high-tech versus 35% for China’s. At the same time, Southeast Asian exports to China may not grow as fast as expected – cyclically China’s economy may accelerate on the back of current stimulus efforts, but structurally China is pursuing self-sufficiency and import substitution via a range of industrial policies (“Made in China 2025,” “dual circulation,” etc). These policies aim to make Chinese industrials competitive with European, US, Japanese, and Korean industrials. But they will also make China more competitive with medium-tech and fledging high-tech exports from Southeast Asia. Thus while China will keep importing low value products and commodities, such as unrefined ores, from Southeast Asia, imports of high-tech products will be limited due to China’s preference for indigenous producers. US export controls will also interfere with ASEAN’s ability to export high-tech goods to China. (In order to retain their US trade, in the face of Chinese import substitution, ASEAN states will have to comply with US export controls at least partially.) Even the low-to-medium tech goods that China currently imports from Southeast Asia may not grow as fast in the coming years as they have in the past. The ten provinces in China with the lowest GDP per capita exported a total of $129 billion to the world in 2020, whereas China’s imports from the top five ASEAN states amounted to $154 billion USD in 2020 (Chart 8). If Beijing insists on creating a domestic market for its poor provinces’ exports, then Southeast Asian exports to China will suffer. China might do this not only for strategic sufficiency but also to avoid US and western sanctions, which could be imposed for labor, environmental, human rights, or strategic reasons. Chart 7The US Sees Thailand And Vietnam As Substitutes For China Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines ​​​​​​ Chart 8China Threatens ASEAN With Import Substitution Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines ​​​​​​ Chart 9Trade Rebound Increased Exposure To US, China Trade Rebound Increased Exposure To US, China Trade Rebound Increased Exposure To US, China China, unlike the US during the 1990s and 2000s, cannot afford to open up its doors and become a ravenous consumer and importer of all Asia’s goods. This would be a way to buy influence in the region, as the US has done in Latin America. But China still has significant domestic development left to do. This development must be done for the sake of jobs and income – otherwise the Communist Party will face sociopolitical upheaval. Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand are the most vulnerable to China’s dual circulation strategy because of their sizeable exports to China, which stand at 12%, 15% and 7.6% of GDP respectively (Chart 9). Even though the Southeast Asian states have formed into a common market, and have joined major new trade blocs such as the CPTPP and RCEP, they will not see unfettered liberalization within these agreements – and they will not be drawn exclusively into China’s orbit. Instead they will face a China that wishes to expand export market share while substituting away from imports. The US and India, which are not part of these new trade blocs, will still increase their trade with ASEAN, as they will seek to substitute ASEAN for China, and ASEAN will be forced to substitute them for China. Thus globalization will weaken into regionalization and will not provide as positive of a force for Southeast Asia as it did over the 1980s-2000s. Going forward, the new paradigm of Hypo-Globalization will weigh on trade-dependent countries like Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand relative to their neighbors. Within this cohort, Malaysia and the Philippines will benefit from selling high-tech goods to the US, while Thailand and Vietnam will benefit from selling low- and mid-tech goods. China will remain a huge and critical market for ASEAN states but its autarkic policies will drive them to pursue other markets. Those with large and growing domestic markets, like Indonesia and the Philippines, will weather hypo-globalization better than their neighbors. Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand are all extremely dependent on foreign trade and hence vulnerable if international trade linkages weaken. Bottom Line: Global trade is likely to slow on a cyclical basis. Structurally, Hypo-Globalization is the new paradigm and will remove a tailwind that super-charged Southeast Asian development over the past several decades. Indonesia and the Philippines stand to suffer least and benefit most. Potential Growth Dividend Favors The Philippines And Vietnam Countries that can generate endogenous growth will perform the best under hypo-globalization. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam have the largest populations within ASEAN. But we must also take into account population growth, which contributes directly to potential GDP growth. A domestic market grows through population growth and/or income growth. For example, China benefitted from its growing population but now must switch to income generation as its population growth is stagnating. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia have the highest population growth, while Thailand has the lowest. Thai population growth is even weak compared to China. The total fertility rate reinforces this trend – it is highest in Philippines but lowest in Thailand (Chart 10). A population that is too young or too old needs significant support that diverts resources away from the most productive age group. Philippines and Indonesia have the lowest median age, while Thailand has the highest. The youth of Indonesia and Philippines will come of age in the next decade, augmenting labor force and potential GDP growth. By contrast, Vietnam and especially Thailand, like China, will be weighed down by a shrinking labor force in the coming decade (Chart 11). Chart 10Fertility Rates Robust In ASEAN Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines ​​​​​​ Chart 11Falling Support Ratio Weighs On Thailand, Vietnam Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines Southeast Asia: Favor The Philippines ​​​​​​ Hence Indonesia and Philippines will prosper while Thailand, and to some extent Vietnam, lack the ability to diversify away from trade through domestic market growth. Malaysia sits in the middle: it is trade dependent and has the smallest population, but it has a young and growing population, and its labor force is still growing. Yet falling population growth is not a disaster if productivity and income growth are high. Productivity trends often contrast with population trends: Indonesia had the weakest productivity growth despite having a large, young, and growing population, while Vietnam had the strongest growth, despite a population slowdown. In fact Vietnam has the strongest productivity growth in Southeast Asia, at a 5-year, pre-pandemic average of 6.3%, followed by the Philippines (Chart 12A). By comparison China’s productivity growth averaged between 3%-6.6%, depending on the data source. Chart 12AProductivity And Potential GDP Productivity And Potential GDP Productivity And Potential GDP ​​​​​​ Chart 12BProductivity And Potential GDP Productivity And Potential GDP Productivity And Potential GDP ​​​​​​ Chart 13Capital Formation Favors Philippines Capital Formation Favors Philippines Capital Formation Favors Philippines Productivity growth adds to labor force growth to form potential GDP. In 2019, Philippines had the highest potential GDP growth at 6.9%, followed by the Vietnam at 6.8%, Indonesia at 5.6%, Malaysia at 3.9% and Thailand at 2.3%. In comparison China’s potential GDP growth was 3.6%-5.9%, again depending on data. Thailand is undoubtedly the weakest from both a population and productivity standpoint, while the Philippines has strength in both (Chart 12B). Countries invest in their economies to increase productivity. In 2019, Vietnam recorded the highest growth in grossed fixed capital formation at around 10.6%, followed by Indonesia at 6.9%, Philippines at 6.3%, and Thailand at 2.2%. Gross fixed capital formation has rebounded from the contractions countries suffered during the pandemic lockdowns in 2020 (Chart 13). Bottom Line: The Philippines has strong potential GDP growth, but Indonesia is not far behind as it invests in its economy. Vietnam has the highest investment and productivity growth, but its demographic dividend is waning. Malaysia is slightly better than Thailand because it has a growing population, but it has stopped investing and it is as trade dependent as Thailand. Thailand is weak on all accounts: it is trade dependent, has a shrinking population, and has a low potential GDP growth. Investment Takeaways Bringing it all together, ASEAN is witnessing the erosion of key dividends (peace, globalization, and demographics). Yet it offers attractive investment opportunities on a relative basis, given the permanent step up in geopolitical risk premiums for other major emerging markets like Russia, eastern Europe, China, and (soon) the Gulf Arab states (Charts 14A & 14B). Indeed the long under-performance of ASEAN stocks as a bloc, relative to global stocks, has recently reversed. As investors recognize China’s historic confluence of internal and external risks, they increasingly turn to ASEAN despite its flaws. Chart 14AASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China ASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China ASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China The US and China will use rewards and punishments to try to win over ASEAN states as strategic and economic partners. Those that have a US security guarantee, or are most distant from potential conflict, will see a lower geopolitical risk premium. Chart 14BASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China ASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China ASEAN Will Continue To Outperform China ​​​​​​ Chart 15Favor The Philippines Favor The Philippines Favor The Philippines The Philippines is the most attractive Southeast Asian market based on our criteria: it has an American security guarantee, domestic-oriented growth, and high productivity. Populism in the Philippines has come with productivity improvements and yet has not overthrown the US alliance. Philippine equities can outperform their emerging market peers (Chart 15). Indonesia is the second most attractive – it does not have direct territorial disputes with China, maintains defense ties with the West, is not excessively trade reliant, and keeps up decent productivity growth. It is vulnerable to nationalism and populism but its democracy is effective overall and the regime has maintained general political stability after near-dissolution in 1998. Thailand is geopolitically secure but lacking in potential growth. Vietnam has high potential growth but is geopolitically insecure over the long run. Investors should only pursue tactical investments in these markets. We maintain our long-term favorable view of Malaysia, although it is trade dependent and productivity has weakened. In future reports we will examine ASEAN markets in greater depth and with closer consideration of their domestic political risks.   Jesse Anak Kuri Associate Editor Jesse.Kuri@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix

Executive Summary The Ukraine war reinforces our key view that commodity producers will use their geopolitical leverage this year. The market is growing complacent again about Russian risks. Iran is part of the same dynamic. If US-Iran talks fail, as we expect, the Middle East will destabilize and add another energy supply risk on top of the Russian risk. The Ukraine war also interacts with our other two key views for 2022: China’s reversion to autocracy and the US’s policy insularity. Both add policy uncertainty and weigh on risk sentiment. The war also reinforces our strategic themes for the 2020s: Great Power Rivalry, Hypo-Globalization, and Populism/Nationalism. Stagflation Cometh Stagflation Cometh Stagflation Cometh Trade Recommendation Inception Date Return Cyclically Long Global Defensives Versus Cyclicals 2022-01-20 10.8% Bottom Line: Tactically stay long global defensives and large caps. Cyclically stay long gold, US equities, aerospace/defense, and cyber security. Feature In our annual outlook, “The Gathering Storm,” we argued that the post-pandemic world economy would destabilize due to intensifying rivalry among the leading nations. We argued that China’s reversion to autocracy, US domestic divisions, and Russia’s commodity leverage would produce a toxic brew for global investors in 2022. By January 27 it was clear to us that Russia would invade Ukraine, so the storm was arriving sooner than we thought, and we doubled down on our defensive and risk-averse market positioning. We derived these three key views from new cyclical trends and the way they interact with our underlying strategic themes – Great Power Rivalry, Hypo-Globalization, and Populism/Nationalism (Table 1). These themes are mutually reinforcing, rooted in solid evidence over many years, and will not change easily. Table 1Three Geopolitical Strategic Themes Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Related Report  Geopolitical Strategy2022 Key Views: The Gathering Storm The Ukraine war reinforces them: Russia took military action to increase its security relative to the US and NATO; the West imposed sanctions that reduce globalization with Russia and potentially other states; Russian aggression stemmed from nationalism and caused a spike in global prices that will spur more nationalism and populism going forward. In this report we examine how these trends will develop in the second quarter and beyond. We see stagflation taking shape and recommend investors prepare for it by continuing to favor defensive sectors, commodities, and value plays. Checking Up On Our Russia View For 2022 Our third key view for 2022 – that oil producers like Russia and Iran possessed immense geopolitical leverage and would most likely use it – is clearly the dominant geopolitical trend of the year, as manifested in the Russian invasion of Ukraine.1 Russia first invaded Ukraine in 2014 and curtailed operations after commodity prices crashed. It launched a new and larger invasion in 2022 when a new commodity cycle began (Chart 1). Facing tactical setbacks, Russia has begun withdrawing forces from around the Ukrainian capital Kyiv. But it will redouble its efforts to conquer the eastern Donbas region and the southern coastline. The coast is the most strategic territory at stake (Map 1). Chart 1Russia's Commodity-Enabled Aggression Russia's Commodity-Enabled Aggression Russia's Commodity-Enabled Aggression Map 1Russian Invasion Of Ukraine, 2022 Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours The most decisive limitation on Russia’s military effort would come from a collapse of commodity exports or prices, which has not happened yet. Europe continues to buy Russian oil and natural gas, although it is debating a ban on the $4.4 billion worth of coal that it imports. With high energy prices making up for a drop in export volumes, Russian armed forces can still attempt a summer and fall campaign (Chart 2). The aim would be to conquer remaining portions of Donetsk and Luhansk, the “land bridge” to Crimea, and potentially the stretch of land between the Dnieper river and eastern Moldova, where Russian troops are already stationed. Chart 2Russia’s War Financing Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Ukraine’s military neutrality is the core Russian objective. Ukraine is offering neutrality in exchange for security guarantees in the current ceasefire talks. Hence a durable ceasefire is possible if the details of neutrality are agreed – Ukraine forswears joining NATO and hosting foreign military infrastructure while accepting limitations on military exercises and defense systems. The security guarantees that Ukraine demands are mostly symbolic, as the western powers that would be credible guarantors are already unwilling to use military force against Russia (e.g. the US, UK, NATO members). However, Russia’s withdrawal from Kyiv will embolden the Ukrainians, so we do not expect a durable ceasefire in the second quarter. Global investors will be mistaken if they ignore Ukraine in the second quarter, at least until core problems are resolved. What matters most is whether the war expands beyond Ukraine: The likelihood of a broader war is low but not negligible. So far the Russian regime is behaving somewhat rationally: Moscow attacked a non-NATO member to prevent it from joining NATO; it limited the size of the military commitment; and it is now accepting reality and withdrawing from Kyiv while negotiating on Ukrainian neutrality. But a major problem emerges if Russia’s military fails in the Donbas while Ukraine reneges on offers of neutrality. Any ceasefire could fall apart and the war could re-escalate. Russia could redouble its attacks on the country or conduct a limited attack outside of Ukraine to trigger a crisis in the western alliance. Moreover, if sanctions keep rising until Russia’s economy collapses, Moscow could become less rational. Finland and Sweden have seen a shift of public opinion in favor of joining NATO. Any intention to do so would trigger a belligerent reaction from Russia. These governments are well aware of the precarious balance that must be maintained to prevent war, so war is unlikely. But if their stance changes then Russia will threaten to attack. Russia would threaten to bomb these states since it cannot now credibly threaten invasion by land (Charts 3A & 3B). Chart 3ANordic States Joining NATO Would Trigger Larger War Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours ​​​​​ Chart 3BNordic States Joining NATO Would Trigger Larger War Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours ​​​​​​ The Black Sea is vulnerable to “Black Swan” events or military spillovers. Russia is re-concentrating its military efforts in the Donbas and land bridge to Crimea. Russia could expand its offensive to Odessa and the Moldovan border. Or Russia could attempt to create a new norm of naval dominance in the Black Sea. Or ships from third countries could hit mines or become casualties of war. For these and other reasons, investors should not take on additional risk in their portfolios on the basis that a durable ceasefire will be concluded quickly. Russia’s position is far too vulnerable to encourage risk-taking. Moscow could escalate tensions to try to save face. It is also critical to ensure that Russia and Europe maintain their energy trade: Neither side has an interest in total energy cutoff. Russia needs the revenue to finance its war and needs to discourage Europe from fulfilling its pledges to transition rapidly to other sources and substitutes. Europe needs the energy to avoid recession, maintain some tie with Russia, and enable its energy diversification strategy. So far natural gas flows are continuing (Chart 4). Chart 4Natural Gas Flows Continuing (So Far) Natural Gas Flows Continuing (So Far) Natural Gas Flows Continuing (So Far) ​​​​​​ Chart 5Global Oil Supply/Demand Balance Global Oil Supply/Demand Balance Global Oil Supply/Demand Balance ​​​​​​ However, risks to energy trade are rising. Russia is threatening to cut off energy exports if not paid in rubles, while the EU is beginning to entertain sanctions on energy. Russia can reduce oil or gas flows incrementally to keep prices high and prevent Europe from rebuilding stockpiles for fall and winter. Partial energy cutoff is possible. Europe’s diversification makes Russia’s predicament dire. Substantial sanction relief is highly unlikely, as western powers will want to prevent Russia from rebuilding its economy and military. Russia could try to impose significant pain on Europe to try to force a more favorable diplomatic solution. A third factor that matters is whether the US will expand its sanction enforcement to demand strict compliance from other nations, at pain of secondary sanctions: Secondary sanctions are likely in the case of China and other nations that stand at odds with the US and help Russia circumvent sanctions. In China’s case, the US is already interested in imposing sanctions on the financial or technology sector as part of its long-term containment strategy. While the Biden administration’s preference is to control the pace of escalation with China, and thus not to slap sanctions immediately, nevertheless substantial sanctions cannot be ruled out in the second quarter. Secondary sanctions will be limited in the case of US allies and partners, such as EU members, Turkey, and India. Countries that do business with Russia but are critical to US strategy will be given waivers or special treatment. Russia is not the only commodity producer that enjoys outsized geopolitical leverage amid a global commodity squeeze. Iran is the next most critical producer. Iran is also critical for the stability of the Middle East. In particular, the consequential US-Iran talks over whether to rejoin the 2015 nuclear deal are likely to come to a decision in the second quarter. Chart 6Failure Of US-Iran Talks Jeopardizes Middle East Oil Supply Failure Of US-Iran Talks Jeopardizes Middle East Oil Supply Failure Of US-Iran Talks Jeopardizes Middle East Oil Supply If the US and Iran agree to a strategic détente, then regional tensions will briefly subside, reducing global oil disruption risks and supply pressures. Iran could bring 1.3 million barrels per day of oil back online, adding to President Biden’s 1 million per day release of strategic petroleum reserves. The combination would amount to 2.3% of global demand and more than cover the projected quarterly average supply deficit, which ranges from 400k to 900k barrels per day for the rest of 2022 (Chart 5). If the US and Iran fail to agree, then the Middle East will suffer another round of instability, adding a Middle Eastern energy shock on top of the Russian shock. Not only would Iran’s 1.3 million barrels per day be jeopardized but so would Iraq’s 4.4 million, Saudi Arabia’s 10.3 million, the UAE’s 3.0 million, or the Strait of Hormuz’s combined 24 million per day (Chart 6). This gives Iran leverage to pursue nuclear weaponization prior to any change in US government that would strengthen Israel’s ability to stop Iran. We would not bet on an agreement – but we cannot rule it out. The Biden administration can reduce sanctions via executive action to prevent a greater oil shock, while the Iranians can accept sanction relief in exchange for easily reversible moves toward compliance with the 2015 nuclear deal. But this would be a short-term, stop-gap measure, not a long-term strategic détente. Conflict between Iran and its neighbors will revive sooner than expected after the deal is agreed, as Iran’s nuclear ambitions will persist. OPEC states are already producing more oil rapidly, suggesting no quick fix if the US-Iran deal falls apart. While core OPEC states have 3.5 million barrels per day in spare capacity to bring to bear, a serious escalation of tensions with Iran would jeopardize this solution. Finally, if commodity producers have geopolitical leverage, then commodity consumers are lacking in leverage. This is clear from Europe’s inability to prevent Russia’s attack or ban Russian energy. It is clear from the US’s apparent unwillingness to give up on a short-term deal with Iran. It is clear from China’s inability to provide sufficient monetary and fiscal stimulus as it struggles with Covid-19. Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan are geopolitically significant importers of Russian and Ukrainian grain that are likely to face food insecurity and social unrest. We will address this issue below under our Populism/Nationalism theme. Bottom Line: Investors should not be complacent. Russia’s military standing in Ukraine is weak, but its ability to finance the war has not yet collapsed, which means that it will escalate the conflict to save face. What About Our Other Key Views For 2022? Our other two key views for 2022 are even more relevant in the wake of the Ukraine re-invasion. China’s reversion to autocracy is a factor in China’s domestic and foreign policy: Domestically China needs economic and social stability in the advance of the twentieth national party congress, when President Xi Jinping hopes to clinch 10 more years in power. In pursuit of this goal China is easing monetary and fiscal policy. However, with depressed animal spirits, a weakening property sector, and high debt levels, monetary policy is proving insufficient. Fiscal policy will have to step up. But even here, inflation is likely to impose a limitation on how much stimulus the authorities can utilize (Chart 7). Chart 7China Stimulus Impaired By Inflation China Stimulus Impaired By Inflation China Stimulus Impaired By Inflation ​​​​​​ Chart 8Chinese Supply Kinks To Persist Due To Covid-19 Chinese Supply Kinks To Persist Due To Covid-19 Chinese Supply Kinks To Persist Due To Covid-19 China is also trying but failing to maintain a “Covid Zero” policy. The more contagious Omicron variant of the virus is breaking out and slipping beyond the authorities’ ability to suppress cases of the virus to zero. Shanghai is on lockdown and other cities will follow suit. China will attempt to redouble its containment efforts before it will accept the reality that the virus cannot be contained. Chinese production and shipping will become delayed and obstructed as a result, putting another round of upward pressure on global prices (Chart 8). Stringent pandemic restrictions could trigger social unrest. China is ripe for social unrest, which is why it launched the “Common Prosperity” program last year to convince citizens that quality of life will improve. But this program is a long-term program that will not bring immediate relief. On the contrary, the economy is still suffering and the virus will spread more widely, as well as draconian social restrictions. The result is that the lead up to the national party congress will not be as smooth as the Xi administration had hoped. Global investors will remain pessimistic toward Chinese stocks. In foreign affairs, China’s reversion to autocracy is reinforced by Russia’s clash with the West and the need to coordinate more closely. Xi hosted Putin in Beijing on February 4, prior to the invasion, and the two declared that their strategic partnership ushers in a “new era” of “multipolarity” and that their cooperation has “no limits,” which really means that military cooperation is not forbidden. China agreed to purchase an additional 10 billion cubic meters of Russian natural gas over 30-years. While this amount would only replace 3% of Russian natural gas exports to Europe, it would mark a 26% increase in Russian exports to China. More importantly it acts as a symbol of Chinese willingness to substitute for Europe over time. There is a long way to go for China to replace Europe as a customer (Chart 9). But China knows it needs to convert its US dollar foreign exchange reserves, vulnerable to US sanctions, into hard investments in supply security within the Eurasian continent. Chart 9Long Way To Go For China NatGas Imports To Replace EU Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours China is helping Russia circumvent sanctions. China’s chief interest is to minimize the shock to its domestic economy. This means keeping Russian energy and commodities flowing. China could also offer military equipment for Russia. The US has expressly warned China against taking such an action. China could mitigate the blowback by stipulating that the assistance cannot be used in Ukraine. This would be unenforceable but would provide diplomatic cover. While China is uncomfortable with the disturbance of the Ukraine war – it does not want foreign affairs to cause even larger supply shocks. At the same time, China does not want Russia to lose the war or Putin’s regime to fall from power. If Russia loses, Taiwan and its western allies would be emboldened, while Russia could pursue a détente with the West, leaving China isolated. Since China faces US containment policy regardless of what happens in Russia, it is better for China to have Putin making an example out of Ukraine and keeping the Americans and Europeans preoccupied. Chart 10China Strives To Preserve EU Trade Ties China Strives To Preserve EU Trade Ties China Strives To Preserve EU Trade Ties China must also preserve ties with Europe. Diplomacy will likely succeed in the short run since Europe has no interest or desire to expand sanctions to China. The Biden administration will defer to Europe on the pace of sanctions – it is not willing or able to force Europe to break with China suddenly. Eventually Europe and China may sever relations but not yet – China has a powerful incentive to preserve them (Chart 10). China will also court India and other powers in an attempt to hedge its bets on Russia while weakening any American containment. Beyond the party congress, China will be focused on securing the economic recovery and implementing the common prosperity agenda. The first step is to maintain easy monetary and fiscal policy. The second step is to “let 100 flowers bloom,” i.e. relaxing social and regulatory controls to try to revive entrepreneurship and animal spirits, which are heavily depressed. Xi will have the ability to do this after re-consolidating power. The third step will be to try to stabilize economic relations with Europe and others (conceivably even the US temporarily, though no serious détente is likely). The remaining key view for 2022 is that the Biden administration’s domestic focus will be defensive and will invite foreign policy challenges. The Ukraine war vindicates this view but the question now is whether Biden has or will change tack: The Biden administration is focused on the midterm elections and the huge risk to the Democratic Party’s standing. Biden has not received a boost in opinion polls from the war. He is polling even worse when it comes to handling of the economy (Chart 11). While he should be able to repackage his budget reconciliation bill as an energy security bill, his thin majorities in both houses make passage difficult. Chart 11Biden And Democrats Face Shellacking In Midterm Election Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Biden’s weak standing – with or without a midterm shellacking – raises the prospect that Republicans could take back the White House in 2024, which discourages foreign nations from making any significant concessions to the United States in their negotiations. They must assume that partisanship will continue to contaminate foreign policy and lead to abrupt policy reversals. In foreign policy, the US remains reactive in the face of Russian aggression. If Russia signs a ceasefire, the US will not sabotage it to prolong Russian difficulties. Moreover Biden continues to exempt Europe and other allies and partners from enforcing the US’s most severe sanctions for fear of a larger energy shock. Europe’s avoidance of an energy ban is critical and any change in US policy to try to force the EU to cut off Russian energy is unlikely. China will not agree to structural reform or deep concessions in its trade negotiations, knowing that former President Trump could come back. The Biden administration’s own trade policy toward China is limited in scope, as the US Trade Representative Katherine Tai admitted when she said that the US could no longer aim to change China’s behavior via trade talks. Biden’s only proactive foreign policy initiative, Iran, will not bring him public kudos if it is achieved. But American inconstancy is one of the reasons that Iran may walk away from the 2015 nuclear deal. Why should Iran’s hawkish leaders be expected to constrain their nuclear program and expose their economy to future US sanctions if they can circumvent US sanctions anyway, and Republicans have a fair chance of coming back into power as early as January 2025? Biden’s unprecedented release of strategic petroleum reserves will not be able to prevent gasoline prices from staying high given the underlying supply pressures at home and abroad. This is especially true if the Iran talks fail as we expect. Even if inflation abates before the election, it is unlikely to abate enough to save his party from a shellacking. That in turn will weaken the global impression of his administration’s staying power. Hence Biden will focus on maintaining US alliances, which means allowing Europe, India, and others to proceed at a more pragmatic and dovish pace in their relations with Russia and China. Bottom Line: China’s reversion to autocracy and America’s policy insularity suggest that global investors face considerable policy uncertainty this year even aside from the war in Europe. Checking Up On Our Strategic Themes For The 2020s Russia’s invasion strongly confirmed our three strategic themes of Great Power Rivalry, Hypo-Globalization, and Populism/Nationalism. These themes are mutually reinforcing: insecurity among the leading nation-states encourages regionalization rather than globalization, while populism and nationalism encourage nations to pursue economic and security interests at the expense of their neighbors. First, the Ukraine war confirms and exacerbates Great Power Rivalry: Chart 12China And Russia Both Need To Balance Against US Preponderance Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Russia’s action vindicates the “realist” school of international relations (in which we count ourselves) by forcing the world to wake up to the fact that nations still care primarily about national security defined in material ways, such as armies, resources, and territories. The paradox of realism is that if at least one of the great nations pursues its national self-interest and engages in competition for security, then all other nations will be forced to do the same. If a nation neglects its national security interests in pursuit of global economic engagement and cooperation, then it will suffer, since other nations will take advantage of it to enhance their security. Hence, as a result of Ukraine, nations will give a higher weight to national security relative to economic efficiency. The result will be an acceleration of decisions to use fiscal funds and guide the private economy in pursuit of national interests – i.e. the Return of Big Government. Since actions to increase deterrence will provoke counteractions for the same reason, overall insecurity will rise. For example, the US and China will take extra precautions in case of future sanctions and war. But these precautions will reduce trust and cooperation and increase the probability of war over the long run. For the same reason, China cannot reject Russia’s strategic overture – it cannot afford to alienate and isolate Russia. China and Russia have a shared interest in countering the United States because it is the only nation that could conceivably impose a global empire over all nations (Chart 12). The US could deprive Beijing and Moscow of the regional spheres of influence that they each need to improve their national security. This is true not only in Ukraine and Taiwan but in other peripheral areas such as Belarus, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. China has much to gain from Russia. Russia is offering China privileged overland access to Russian, Central Asian, and Middle Eastern resources and markets. This resource base is vital to China’s strategic needs, given its import dependency and vulnerability to US maritime power (Chart 13). Chart 13China’s Maritime Vulnerability Forces Eurasian Strategy, Russian Alliance Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Investors should understand Great Power Rivalry in a multipolar rather than bipolar sense. As Russia breaks from the West, investors are quick to move rapidly to the bipolar Cold War analogy because that is what they are familiar with. But the world today has multiple poles of political power, as it did for centuries prior to the twentieth. While the US is the preponderant power, it is not hegemonic. It faces not one but two revisionist challengers – Russia and China. Meanwhile Europe and India are independent poles of power that are not exclusively aligned with the US or China. For example, China and the EU need to maintain economic ties with each other for the sake of stability, and neither the US nor Russia can prevent them from doing so. The same goes for India and Russia. China will embrace Russia and Europe at the same time, while hardening its economy against US punitive measures. India will preserve ties with Russia and China, while avoiding conflict with the US and its allies (the maritime powers), whom it needs for its long-term strategic security in the Indian Ocean basin. Ultimately bipolarity may be the end-game – e.g. if China takes aggressive action to revise the global order like Russia has done – but the persistence of Sino-European ties and Russo-Indian ties suggest we are not there yet. Second, the Ukraine war reinforces Hypo-Globalization: Since the pandemic we have argued that trade would revive on the global economic snapback but that globalization – the deepening of trade integration – would ultimately fall short of its pre-2020 and pre-2008 trajectory. Instead we would inhabit a new world of “hypo-globalization,” in which trade flows fell short of potential. So far the data support this view (Chart 14). Chart 14Globalization Falling Short Of Potential Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours Second Quarter Outlook 2022: When It Rains, It Pours The Ukraine war has strengthened this thesis not only by concretely reducing Russia’s trajectory of trade with the West – reversing decades of integration since the fall of the Soviet Union – but also by increasing the need for nations to guard against a future Chinese confrontation with the Western world. Trust between China and the West will further erode. China will need to guard against any future sanctions, and thus diversify away from the US dollar and assets, while the US will need to do a better job of deterring China against aggression in Asia, and will thus have to diversify away from Chinese manufacturing and critical resources like rare earths. While China and Europe need each other now, the US and China are firmly set on a long-term path of security competition in East Asia. Eventually either the US or China will take a more aggressive stance and Europe will be forced to react. Since Europe will still need US support against a decaying and aggressive Russia, it will likely be dragged into assisting the US against China. Third, the Ukraine war reflects and amplifies Populism/Nationalism: Populism and nationalism are not the same thing but they both stem from the slowing trend of global income growth, the rise of inequality, the corruption of the elite political establishments, and now the rise in inflation. Nations have to devote more resources to pacifying an angry populace, or distracting that populace through foreign adventures, or both. The Ukraine war reflects the rise in nationalism. First, the collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in a period in which Moscow lost control of its periphery, while the diverse peoples could pursue national self-determination and statehood. The independence and success of the Baltic states depended on economic and military cooperation with the West, which eroded Russian national security and provoked a nationalist backlash in the form of President Putin’s regime. Ukraine became the epicenter of this conflict. Ukraine’s successful military resistance is likely to provoke a dangerous backlash from Moscow until either policy changes or the regime changes. American nationalism has flared repeatedly since the fall of the Soviet Union, namely in the Iraq war. The American state has suffered economically and politically for that imperial overreach. But American nationalism is still a potent force and could trigger a more aggressive shift in US foreign policy in 2024 or beyond. European states have kept nationalism in check and tried to subsume their various nationalist sentiments into a liberal and internationalist project, the European Union. The wave of nationalist forces in the wake of the European debt crisis has subsided, with the exception of the United Kingdom, where it flowered in Brexit. The French election in the second quarter will likely continue this trend with the re-election of President Emmanuel Macron, but even if he should suffer a surprise upset to nationalist Marine Le Pen, Europe’s centripetal forces will prevent her from taking France out of the EU or euro or NATO (Chart 15). Over the coming decade, nationalist forces will revive and will present a new challenge to Europe’s ruling elites – but global great power competition strongly supports the EU’s continued evolution into a single geopolitical entity, since the independent states are extremely vulnerable to Russia, China, and even the US unless they unite and strengthen their superstructure. Chart 15Macron Favored, Le Pen Would Be Ineffective Macron Favored, Le Pen Would Be Ineffective Macron Favored, Le Pen Would Be Ineffective In fact the true base of global nationalism is migrating to Asia. Chinese and Indian nationalism are very potent forces under President Xi Jinping and Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Xi is on the verge of clinching another ten years in power while Modi is still favored for re-election in 2024, so there is no reason to anticipate a change anytime soon. The effects are various but what is most important for investors is to recognize that as China’s potential GDP has fallen over the past decade, the Communist Party has begun to utilize nationalism as a new source of legitimacy, and this is expressed through a more assertive foreign policy. President Xi is the emblem of this shift and it will not change, even if China pursues a lower profile over certain periods to avoid provoking the US and its allies into a more effective coalition to contain China. Chart 16Food Insecurity Will Promote Global Unrest, Populism Food Insecurity Will Promote Global Unrest, Populism Food Insecurity Will Promote Global Unrest, Populism The surge in global prices will destabilize regimes that lack food security and contribute to new bouts of populism and nationalism. Turkey is the most vulnerable due to a confluence of political, economic, and military risks that will unsettle the state. But Egypt is vulnerable to an Arab Spring 2.0 that would have negative security implications for Israel and add powder to the Middle Eastern powder keg. Pakistan is already witnessing political turmoil. Investors may overlook any Indonesian unrest due to its attractiveness in a world where Russia and China are scaring away western investment (Chart 16). All three of these strategic themes are mutually reinforcing – and they tend to be inflationary over the long run. Great powers that redouble the pursuit of national interest – through defense spending and energy security investments – while simultaneously being forced to expand their social safety nets to appease popular discontent, will drive up budget deficits, consume a lot of natural resources, and purchase a lot of capital equipment. They will also more frequently engage in economic or military conflicts that constrain supply (Chart 17). Chart 17War And Preparation For War Are Inflationary War And Preparation For War Are Inflationary War And Preparation For War Are Inflationary Bottom Line: The Ukraine war is a powerful confirmation of our three strategic themes. It is also a confirmation that these themes have inflationary macroeconomic implications. Investment Takeaways Chart 18Global Investors Still Flee To US For Safety Global Investors Still Flee To US For Safety Global Investors Still Flee To US For Safety Now that great power rivalry is intensifying immediately and rapidly, and yet China’s and Europe’s economies are encountering greater difficulties, we expect stagflation to arrive sooner rather than later. High headline and core inflation, the Ukraine war, tacit Chinese support for Russia, persistent Chinese supply kinks, US and EU sanctions, US midterm elections, and a potential US-Iran diplomatic breakdown will all weigh on risk sentiment in the second quarter. In Ukraine, Russia’s position is too weak to give comfort for investors, who should continue to favor defensive over cyclical equities and US stocks over global stocks. Russia’s break with the West, and the West’s use of sanctions to prevent Russia from accessing its foreign exchange reserves, has raised new questions about the global currency reserve system and the dollar’s status within that system. Over the coming years China will redouble the efforts it began in the wake of the Great Recession to reduce its dependency on US dollar assets within its reserve basket, while also recycling new current account surpluses into non-dollar assets. However, the evidence does not suggest that King Dollar will suffer a structural breakdown. First, the world lacks alternative safe-haven assets to US Treasuries – and net foreign purchases of US bonds rose in the face of the Ukraine war (Chart 18). Second, the return of war to Europe will weaken the perceived long-term security of European currency and government bonds relative to US counterparts. Even if the Ukraine war is contained in the short run, as we expect, Russia is in structural decline and will remain a disruptive player for some time. We are not at all bearish on the euro or European bonds but we do not see the Ukraine war as increasing their value proposition, to put it lightly. The same logic extends to Japanese bonds, since China, like Russia, is an autocratic and revisionist state that threatens to shake up the security order in its neighborhood. Japan is relatively secure as a nation and we are bullish on the yen, but China’s de facto alliance with Russia weakens Japan’s security outlook over the very long run, especially relative to the United States. Thus, on a cyclical basis the dollar can depreciate, but on a structural basis the US dollar will remain the dominant reserve currency. The US is not only the wealthiest and most secure country in the world but also the largest oil producer. Meanwhile Chinese potential growth, domestic political stability, and foreign relations are all worsening. The US-Iran talks are the most critical geopolitical dynamic in the second quarter aside from Russia’s clash with the West. The fate of the 2015 nuclear deal will be decided soon and will determine whether an even bigger energy shock begins to emanate from the Middle East. We would not bet on a new US-Iran deal but we cannot rule it out. Any deal would be a short-term, stop-gap deal but would prevent an immediate destabilization of the Middle East this year. As such it would reduce the risk of stagflation. Since we expect the deal to fail, we expect a new energy shock to emerge. We see stagflation as more likely than the BCA House View. It will be difficult to lift productivity in an environment of geopolitical and political uncertainty combined with slowing global growth, rising interest rates, and a worsening commodity shock (Chart 19). We will gladly revise this stance if Biden clinches an Iran deal, China relaxes its Covid Zero policy and stabilizes domestic demand, Russia and Europe maintain energy trade, and commodity prices fall to more sustainable levels for global demand. Chart 19Stagflation Cometh Stagflation Cometh Stagflation Cometh Strategically we remain long gold, overweight US equities, overweight UK equities, long British pound and Japanese yen, long aerospace/defense stocks and cyber security stocks. We remain short Chinese renminbi and Taiwanese dollar and short emerging European assets. Our short Chinese renminbi trade and our short Taiwanese versus Korean equity trade are our worst-performing recommendations. However, the above analysis should highlight – and the Ukraine war should underscore – that these two economies face a fundamentally negative geopolitical dynamic. Both Chinese and Taiwanese stocks have been underperforming global peers since 2021 and our short TWD-USD trade is in the money. While we do not expect war to break out in Taiwan this year, we do expect various crisis events to occur, particularly in the lead up to the crucial Taiwanese and American 2022 midterms and 2024 presidential election. We also expect China to depreciate the renminbi when inflation peaks and commodity prices subside. Cyclically we remain long North American and Latin American oil producers and short Middle Eastern producers, based on our pessimistic read of the Iran situation. The Americas are fundamentally better protected from geopolitical risks than other regions, although they continue to suffer from domestic political risks on a country-by-country basis. Cyclically we continue to take a defensive positioning, overweighting defensive sectors and large cap equities.   Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      That the Russian threat fell under our third key view for 2022 implies that we did not get our priorities straight. However, consider the timing: shortly after publishing our annual outlook on December 15, the Russians issued an ultimatum to the western powers demanding that NATO stop expanding toward Russia. Diplomats from Russia and the West met on January 12-13 but Russia’s demands were not met. We upgraded the odds that Russia would invade Ukraine from 50% to 75% on January 27. Shuttle diplomacy ensued but failed. Russia invaded on February 24. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix "Batting Average": Geopolitical Strategy Trades () Section II: Special (EDIT this Header) Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Executive Summary Major EM’s Defense Spends Will Be Comparable To That Of Developed Countries Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War ​​​​ Tectonic geopolitical trends are taking shape in Emerging Markets (EMs) today that will leave an indelible imprint on the next decade. First, EMs have gone on a relatively unnoticed public debt binge at a time when the economic prospects of the median EM citizen have deteriorated. This raises the spectre of sudden fiscal populism, aggressive foreign policy or social unrest in EMs. China, Brazil and Saudi Arabia appear most vulnerable to these risks. Second, the defense bill of major EMs could be comparable to that of the top developed countries of the world in a decade from now. Investors must brace for EMs to play a central role in the defense market and in wars, in the coming years. To profit from ascendant geopolitical risks in China, we reiterate shorting TWD-USD and the CNY against an equal-weighted basket of Euro and USD. To extract most from the theme of EM militarization, we suggest a Long on European Aerospace & Defense relative to European Tech stocks.   Trade Recommendation Inception Date Return LONG EUROPEAN AEROSPACE & DEFENSE / EUROPEAN TECH EQUITIES (STRATEGIC) 2022-03-18   Bottom Line: Even as EMs are set to emerge as protagonists on the world stage, investors must prepare for these countries to exhibit sudden fiscal expansions, bouts of social unrest or a newfound propensity to initiate wars. The only way to dodge these volatility-inducing events is to leverage geopolitics to foresee these shocks. Feature Only a few weeks before Russia’s war with Ukraine broke out, a client told us that he was having trouble seeing the importance of geopolitics in investing. “It seems like geopolitics was a lot more relevant a few years back, with the European debt crisis, Brexit, and Trump. Now it does not seem to drive markets at all”, said the client. To this we gave our frequent explanation which is, “Our strategic themes of Great Power Struggle, Hypo-Globalization, and Nationalism/Populism are now embedded in the international system and responsible for an observable rise in geopolitical risk that is reshaping markets”. In particular we highlighted our pessimistic view on both Russia and Iran, which have incidentally crystallized most clearly since we had this client conversation. Related Report  Geopolitical StrategyBrazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Globally key geopolitical changes are afoot with Russia at war. In the coming weeks and months, we will write extensively about the dramatic changes we see taking shape in the realm of geopolitics and investing. We underscored the dramatic geopolitical realignment taking place as Russia severs ties with the West and throws itself into China’s arms in a report titled “From Nixon-Mao To Putin-Xi”. In this Special Report we highlight two key geopolitical themes that will affect emerging markets (EMs) over the coming decade. The aim is to help investors spot these trends early, so that they can profit from these tectonic changes that are sure to spawn a new generation of winners and losers in financial markets. (For BCA Research’s in-depth views on EMs, do refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy (EMS) webpage). Trend #1: Beware The Wrath Of EMs On A Debt Binge Chart 1The Pace Of Debt Accumulation Has Accelerated In Major EMs Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Investors are generally aware of the debt build-up that has taken place in the developed world since Covid-19. The gross public debt held by the six most developed countries of the world (spanning US, Japan, Germany, UK, France and Italy) now stands at an eye-watering $60 trillion or about 140% of GDP. This debt pile is enormous in both absolute and relative terms. But at the same time, the debt simultaneously being taken on by EMs has largely gone unnoticed. The cumulative public debt held by eight major EMs today (spanning China, Taiwan, Korea, India, Brazil, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey) stands at $20tn i.e., about 70% of GDP. Whilst the absolute value of EM debt appears manageable, what is worrying is the pace of debt accumulation. The average public debt to GDP ratio of these EMs fell over the early 2000s but their public debt ratios have now doubled over the last decade (Chart 1). EMs have been accumulating public debt at such a rapid clip that the pace of debt expansion in EMs is substantially higher than that of the top six developed countries (Chart 1). These six DMs have a larger combined GDP than the eight EMs with which they are compared. Related Report  Geopolitical StrategyIndia's Politics: Know When To Hold 'Em, Know When To Fold 'Em (For in-depth views on China’s debt, do refer to China Investment Strategy (CIS) report here). Now developed countries taking on more debt makes logical sense for two reasons. Firstly, most developed countries are ageing, and their populations have stopped growing. So one way to prop up falling demand is to get governments to spend more using debt. Secondly, this practice seems manageable because developed country central banks have deep pockets (in the form of reserves) and their central banks are issuers of some of the safest currencies of the world. But EMs using the same formula and getting addicted to debt at an earlier stage of development is risky and could prove to be lethal in some cases. Also distinct from reasons of macroeconomics, the debt binge in EMs this time is problematic for geopolitical reasons. This Time Is Different EMs getting reliant on debt is problematic this time because their median citizen’s economic prospects have deteriorated. Growth is slowing, inflation is high, and job creation is stalling; thereby creating a problematic socio-political backdrop to the EM debt build-up. Growth Is Slowing: In the 2000s EMs could hope to grow out of their social or economic problems. The cumulative nominal GDP of eight major EMs more than quadrupled over the early 2000s but a decade later, these EMs haven not been able to grow their nominal GDP even at half the rate (Chart 2). Inflation Remains High: Despite poorer growth prospects, inflation is accelerating. Inflation was high in most major EMs in 2021 (Chart 3) i.e., even before the surge seen in 2022. Chart 2Major EM’s Growth Engine Is No Longer Humming Like A Well-Tuned Machine Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War ​​​​​ Chart 3Despite Slower Growth, Inflation In Major EMs Remains High Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War ​​​​​ Rising Unemployment: Employment levels have improved globally from the precipice they had fallen into in 2020. But unemployment today is a far bigger problem for major EMs as compared to developed markets (Chart 4). If the economic miseries of the median EM citizen are not addressed, then they can produce disruptive sociopolitical effects that will fan market volatility. This problem of rising economic misery alongside a rapid debt build-up, can also be seen for the next tier of EMs i.e. Mexico, Indonesia, Iran, Poland, Thailand, Nigeria, Argentina, Egypt, South Africa and Vietnam. While the average public debt to GDP ratios of these EMs fell over the early 2000s, the pace of debt accumulation has almost doubled over the last decade (Chart 5). Furthermore, the growth engine in these smaller EMs is no longer humming like a well-tuned machine and inflation remains at large (Chart 5). Chart 4Unemployment - A Bigger Problem In Major EMs Today Unemployment - A Bigger Problem In Major EMs Today Unemployment - A Bigger Problem In Major EMs Today ​​​​​ Chart 5Smaller EMs Must Also Deal With Rising Debt, Alongside Slowing Growth Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War ​​​​​ Chart 6The Debt Surge In EMs This Time, Poses Unique Challenges Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War History suggests that periods of economic tumult are frequently followed by social unrest. The eruption of the so-called Arab Spring after the Great Recession illustrated the power of this dynamic. Then following the outbreak of Covid-19 in 2020 we had highlighted that Turkey, Brazil, and South Africa are at the greatest risk of significant social unrest. We also showed that even EMs that looked stable on paper faced unrest in the post-Covid world, including China and Russia. In this report we take a decadal perspective which reveals that growth is slowing, and debt is growing in EMs. Given that EMs suffer from rising economic miseries alongside growing debt and lower political freedoms (Chart 6), it appears that some of these markets could be socio-political tinderboxes in the making. Policy Implications Of The EM Debt Surge “As it turns out, we don't 'all' have to pay our debts. Only some of us do.” – David Graeber, Debt: The First 5,000 Years (Melville House Publishing, 2011) The trifecta of fast-growing debt, slowing growth and/or low political freedoms in EMs can add to the volatility engendered by EMs as an asset class. Given the growing economic misery in EMs today, politicians will be wary of outbreaks of social unrest. To quell this unrest, they may resort broadly to fiscal expansion and/or aggressive foreign policy. Both of these policy choices can dampen market returns in EMs. Chart 7India's Performance Had Flatlined Post Mild Populist Tilt India's Performance Had Flatlined Post Mild Populist Tilt India's Performance Had Flatlined Post Mild Populist Tilt Policy Choice #1: More Fiscal Spending Despite High Debt Policymakers in some EMs may respond by de-prioritizing contentious structural reforms and prioritizing fiscal expansion. The Indian government’s decision to repeal progressive changes to farm laws in late 2021, launch a $7 billion home-building program in early 2022 and withholding hikes in retail prices of fuel, illustrates how policymakers are resorting to populism despite high public debt levels. As a result, it is no surprise that MSCI India had been underperforming MSCI EM even before the war in Ukraine broke out (Chart 7). Brazil is another EM which falls into this category, while China’s attempts to run tighter budgets have failed in the face of slowing growth. Policy Choice #2: Foreign Policy Aggression EMs may also adopt an aggressive foreign policy stance. Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine, Turkey’s interventions in several countries, and China’s increasing assertiveness in its neighboring seas and the Taiwan Strait provide examples. Wars by EMs are known to dampen returns as the experience of the Russian stock market shows. Russian stocks fell by 14% during its invasion of Georgia in 2008 and are down 40% from 24 February 2022 until March 9, 2022, i.e. when MSCI halted trading. If politicians fail to pursue either of these policies, then they run the risk of social unrest erupting due to tight fiscal policy or domestic political disputes. In fact, early signs of social discontent are already evident from large protests seen in major EMs over the last year (see Table 1). Table 1Social Unrest In Major EMs Is Already Ascendant Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Bottom Line: The last decade has seen major EMs go on a relatively unnoticed public debt binge. This is problematic because this debt surge has come at a time when economic prospects of the median EM citizen have deteriorated. Politicians will be keen to quell the resultant discontent. This raises the specter of excessive fiscal expansion, aggressive foreign policy, and/or social unrest. All three outcomes are negative from an EM volatility perspective. Trend #2: The Rise And Rise Of EM Defense Spends Great Power Rivalry is an outgrowth of the multipolar structure of international relations. This theme will drive higher defense spending globally. In this report we highlight that even after accounting for a historic rearmament in developed countries following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, a decade from now EMs will play a key role in driving global military spends. The defense bill of the six richest developed countries of the world (the US, Japan, Germany, UK, France and Italy) will increasingly be rivaled by that of the top eight EMs (China, Taiwan, Korea, India, Brazil, Russia, Saudi Arabia and Turkey). While key developed markets like Japan and Germany in specific (and Europe more broadly) are now embarking on increasing defense spends, the unstable global backdrop will force EMs to increase their military budgets as well. The combination of these forces could mean that the top eight EM’s defense spends could be comparable to that of the top six developed markets in a decade from now i.e., by 2032 (Chart 8). This is true even though the six DMs have a larger GDP. The assumptions made while arriving at the 2032 defense spend projections include: Substantially Higher Pace Of Defense Spends For Developed Countries: To reflect the fact that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will trigger a historical wave of armament in developed markets we assume that: (a) NATO members France, Germany and Italy (who spent about 1.5% of GDP on an average on defense spends in 2019) will ramp up defense spending to 2% of GDP by 2032, (b) US and UK i.e. NATO members who already spend substantially more than 2% of GDP on defense spends will still ‘increase’ defense spends by another 0.4% of GDP each by 2032 and finally (c) Japan which spends less than 1% of GDP on defense spends today, in a structural break from the past will increase its spending which will rise to 1.5% of GDP by 2032. China And Hence Taiwan As Well As India Will Boost Spends: To capture China’s increasingly aggressive foreign policy stance and the fact that India as well as Taiwan will be forced to respond to the Chinese threat; we assume that China increases its stated defense spends from 1.7% of GDP in 2019 to 3% by 2032. Taiwan follows in lockstep and increases its defense spends from 1.8% of GDP in 2019 to 3% by 2032. India which is experiencing a pincer movement from China to its east and Pakistan to its west will have no choice but to respond to the high and rising geopolitical risks in South Asia. The coming decade is in fact likely to see India’s focus on its naval firepower increase meaningfully as it feels the need to fend off threats in the Indo-Pacific. India currently maintains high defense spends at 2.5% of GDP and will boost this by at least 100bps to 3.5% of GDP by 2032. Defense Spending Trends For Five EMs: For the rest of the EMs (namely Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and Brazil), the pace of growth in defense spending seen over 2009-19 is extrapolated to 2032. For Turkey, we assume that defense spends as a share of GDP increases to 3% of GDP by 2032. Extrapolation Of Past GDP Growth For All Countries: For all 14 countries, we extrapolate the nominal GDP growth calculated by the IMF for 2022-26 as per its last full data update, to 2032. This tectonic change in defense spending patterns has important historical roots. Back in 1900, UK and Japan i.e., the two seafaring powers were top defense spenders (Chart 9). Developed countries of the world continued to lead defense spending league tables through the twentieth century as they fought expensive world wars. Chart 8Major EM’s Defense Spends Will Be Comparable To That Of Developed Countries Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War ​​​​​​ Chart 9Back In 1900, Developed Countries Like UK And Japan Were Top Military Spenders Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War ​​​​​​ Chart 10By 2000, EMs Had Begun Spending Generously On Armament Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War But things began changing after WWII. Jaded by the world wars, developed countries began lowering their defense spending. By the early 2000s EMs had now begun spending generously on armament (Chart 10). The turn of the century saw growth in developed markets fade while EMs like China and India’s geopolitical power began rising (Chart 11). Then a commodities boom ensued, resulting in petro-states like Saudi Arabia establishing their position as a high military spender. The confluence of these factors meant that by 2020 EMs had becomes major defense spenders in both relative and absolute terms too (Chart 12). Going forward, we expect the coming renaissance in DM defense spending in the face of Russian aggression, alongside rising geopolitical aspirations of China, to exacerbate this trend of rising EM militarization. Chart 11The 21st Century Saw Developed Countries’ Geopolitical Power Ebb Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Chart 12EMs Today Are Top Military Spenders, Even In Absolute Terms Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Why Does EM Weaponizing Matter? History suggests that wars are often preceded by an increase in defense spends: Well before WWI, a perceptible increase in defense spending could be seen in Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy (Chart 13). These three countries would go on to be known as the Triple Alliance in WWI. Correspondingly France, Britain and Russia (i.e., countries that would constitute the Triple Entente) also ramped up military spending before WWI (Chart 14). Chart 13Well Before WWI; Austria-Hungary, Germany, And Italy Had Begun Ramping Up Defense Spends Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War ​​​​​​ Chart 14The ‘Triple Entente’ Too Had Increased Defense Spends In The Run Up To WWI Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War ​​​​​​ History tragically repeated itself a few decades later. Besides Japan (which invaded China in 1937); Germany and Italy too ramped up defense spending well before WWII broke out (Chart 15). These three countries would come to be known as the Axis Powers and initiated WWII. Notably, Britain and Russia (who would go on to counter the Axis Powers) had also been weaponizing since the mid-1930s (Chart 16). Chart 15Axis Powers Had Been Increasing Defense Spends Well Before WWII Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War ​​​​​ Chart 16Allied Powers Too Had Been Increasing Defense Spends In The Run Up To WWII Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War ​​​​​ Chart 17Militarily Active States Have Been Ramping Up Defense Spends Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and Gulf Arab states like Iraq have been involved in wars in the recent past and noticeably increased their defense budgets in the lead-up to military activity (Chart 17). Given that a rise in military spending is often a leading indicator of war and given that EMs are set to spend more on defense, it appears that significant wars are becoming more rather than less likely, which Russia’s invasion of Ukraine obviously implies. A large number of “Black Swan Risks” are clustered in the spheres of influence of Russia, China, and Iran, which are the key powers attempting to revise the US-led global order today (Map 1). Map 1Black Swan Risks Are Clustered Around China, Russia & Iran Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Distinct from major EMs, eight small countries pose meaningful risks of being involved in wars over the next. These countries are small (in terms of their nominal GDPs) but spend large sums on defense both in absolute terms (>$4 billion) and in relative terms (>4% of GDP). Incidentally all these countries are located around the Eurasian rimland and include Israel, Pakistan, Algeria, Iran, Kuwait, Oman, Ukraine and Morocco (Map 2). In fact, the combined sum of spending undertaken by these countries is so meaningful that it exceeds the defense budgets of countries like Russia and UK (Chart 18). Map 2Eight Small Countries That Spend Generously On Defense Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Chart 188 Countries Located Near The Eurasian Rimland, Spend Large Sums On Defense Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War ​​​​ Bottom Line: As EM geopolitical power and aspirations rise, the defense bill of top developed countries will be challenged by the defense spending undertaken by major EMs. On one hand this change will mean that certain EMs may be at the epicenter of wars and concomitant market volatility. On the other hand, this change could spawn a new generation of winners amongst defense suppliers. Investment Conclusions In this section we highlight strategic trades that can be launched to play the two trends highlighted above. Trend #1: Beware The Wrath Of EMs On A Debt Binge Investors must prepare for EMs to witness sudden fiscal expansions, unusually aggressive foreign policy stances, and/or bouts of social unrest over the next few years. The only way to dodge these volatility-inducing events in EMs is to leverage geopolitics to foresee socio-political shocks. Using a simple method called the “Tinderbox Framework” (Table 2), we highlight that: Table 2Tinderbox Framework: Identifying Countries Most Exposed To Socio-Political Risks Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Within the eight major EMs; China, Brazil, Russia and Saudi Arabia face elevated socio-political risks. Amongst the smaller ten EMs, these risks appear most elevated for Egypt, South Africa and Argentina. It is worth noting that Brazil, South Africa and Turkey appeared most vulnerable as per our Covid-19 Social Unrest Index that we launched in 2020. We used the tinderbox framework in the current context to fade out effects of Covid-19 and to add weight to the debt problem that is brewing in EMs. Client portfolios that are overweight on most countries that fare poorly on our “Tinderbox Framework” should consider actively hedging for volatility at the stock-specific level. To profit from ascendant geopolitical risks in China, we reiterate shorting TWD-USD and the CNY against an equal-weighted basket of Euro and USD. China’s public debt ratio is high and social pressures may be building with limited valves in place to release these pressures (Table 2). The renminbi has performed well amid the Russian war, which has weighed down the euro, but China faces a confluence of domestic and international risks that will ultimately drag on the currency, while the euro will benefit from the European Union’s awakening as a geopolitical entity in the face of the Russian military threat. Trend #2: EM’s Will Drive Wars In The 21st Century Wars are detrimental to market returns.1 Furthermore, as the history of world wars proves, even the aftermath of a war often yields poor investment outcomes as wars can be followed by recessions. It is in this context that investors must prepare for the rise of EMs as protagonists in the defense market, by leveraging geopolitics to identify EMs that are most likely to be engaged in wars. While we are not arguing that WWIII will erupt, investors must brace for proxy wars as an added source of volatility that could affect EMs as an asset class. To profit from these structural changes underway we highlight two strategic trades namely: 1.  Long Global Aerospace & Defense / Broad Market Thanks to the higher spending on defense being undertaken by major EMs, global defense spends will grow at a faster rate over the next decade as compared to the last. We hence reiterate our Buy on Global Aerospace & Defense relative to the broader market. 2.  Long European Aerospace & Defense / European Tech Up until Russia invaded Ukraine and was hit with economic sanctions, Russia was the second largest exporter of arms globally accounting for 20% global arms exports. With Russia’s ability to sell goods in the global market now impaired, the two other major suppliers of defense goods that appear best placed to tap into EM’s demand for defense goods are the US (37% share in the global defense exports market) and Europe (+25% share in the global defense exports market). Chart 19American Defense Stocks Have Outperformed, European Defense Stocks Have Underperformed Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War ​​​​​​ Chart 20Defense Market: Russia’s Loss Could Be Europe’s Gain Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War Beware EMs That Borrow Too Much Or Wage War ​​​​​ But given that (a) American aerospace & defense stocks have rallied (Chart 19) and given that (b) France, Germany, and Italy are major suppliers of defense equipment to countries that Russia used to supply defense goods to (Chart 20), we suggest a Buy on European Aerospace & Defense relative to European Tech stocks to extract more from this theme. In fact, this trade also stands to benefit from the pursuance of rearmament by major European democracies which so far have maintained lower defense spends as compared to America and UK. This view from a geopolitical perspective is echoed by our European Investment Strategy (EIS) team too who also recommend a Long on European defense stocks and a short on European tech stocks. Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist ritika.mankar@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      Please see: Andrew Leigh et al, “What do financial markets think of war in Iraq?”, NBER Working Paper No. 9587, March 2003, nber.org.  David Le Bris, “Wars, Inflation and Stock Market Returns in France, 1870-1945”, Financial History Review 19.3 pp. 337-361, December 2012, ssrn.com. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix

Executive Summary Brazil: Are Political & Macro Risks Priced-In? Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Presidential elections are due in Brazil on October 2, 2022. While the left-of-center former President Lula da Silva will likely win, the road to his victory will not be as smooth as markets expect. Incumbent President Jair Bolsonaro will make every effort to cling to power, including fiscal populism and attacks on Brazil’s institutions. These moves may roil Brazil’s equity markets as they may provide a fillip to Bolsonaro’s popularity. Bolsonaro’s institutional attacks have triggered down moves in the market before and any fiscal expansion may worry investors as it could prove to be sticky. We urge investors to take-on only selective tactical exposure in Brazil. Equities appear cheap but political and macro risks abound. To play the rally yet stave-off political risk in Brazil, we suggest a tactical pair trade: Long Brazil Financials / Short India. Tactical Recommendation Inception Date Long Brazil Financials / Short India 2022-02-10   Bottom Line: On a tactical timeframe we suggest only selective exposure to Brazil given the latent political and macro risks. On a strategic timeframe, we are neutral on Brazil given that its growth potential coexists with high debt and low proclivity to structural reform. Feature Chart 1Brazil Underperformed Through 2020-21, Is Cheap Today Brazil Underperformed Through 2020-21, Is Cheap Today Brazil Underperformed Through 2020-21, Is Cheap Today Brazil’s equity markets underperformed relative to emerging markets (EMs) for a second consecutive year in 2021 (Chart 1). But thanks to this correction, Brazilian equities now appear cheap (Chart 1). With Brazil looking cheap, China easing policy, and Lula’s return likely, is now a good time to buy into Brazil? We recommend taking on only selective exposure to Brazil on a tactical horizon for now. Brazil in our view may present a near-term value trap as markets are under-pricing political and economic risks. Lula Set For Phoenix-Like Return Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (or popularly Lula) of the Worker’s Party (PT) appears all set to reclaim the country’s presidency in the fall of 2022. The main risk that Lula’s presidency may bring is a degree of fiscal expansion. Despite this markets may ultimately welcome his victory at the presidential elections as Lula is in alignment with the median voter, is expected to be better for Brazil’s institutions, will institute a superior pandemic-control strategy, and may also undertake badly needed structural reforms in the early part of his tenure. Despite these points we urge investors to limit exposure to Brazil for now and turn bullish only once the market corrects further. Whilst far-right President Jair Bolsonaro managed to join a political party (i.e., the center-right Liberal Party) late last year, he is yet to secure something more central to winning elections i.e., a high degree of popularity. To boost his low popularity ratings (Chart 2), we expect Bolsonaro to leverage two planks: populism and authoritarianism. These measures will bump up Bolsonaro’s popularity enough to shake up Brazil’s markets with renewed uncertainty, but not enough to win him the presidency. Chart 2Lula Is Ahead But His Lead Has Narrowed Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Lula is a clear favorite to win. After spending more than a year in jail on corruption charges, Lula is back in the fray and has maintained a lead on Bolsonaro for the first round of polling (Chart 2). Even if a second-round run-off election were to take place, Lula would prevail over Bolsonaro or other key candidates (Chart 3). By contrast, Bolsonaro’s lower popularity means that in a run-off situation he stands a chance only if pitted against center-right candidates like Sergio Moro (his former justice minister) or João Doria (i.e., the center-right Governor of São Paulo) (Chart 4). Chart 3Lula Leads Run-Off Vote Against All Potential Candidates Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ Chart 4In A Run-Off, Bolso Stands Best Chance Of Winning If Pitted Against Moro Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ What has driven the swing to the left in Brazil? After the pandemic and some stagflation, Brazil’s median voter’s priorities have changed. In specific: Brazil’s median voter’s top concerns in 2018 were centered around improving law and order (Chart 5). A right-of-center candidate with concrete law-and-order credentials like Bolsonaro was well placed to tap into this public demand. Chart 5In 2018-19, Law And Order Issues Dominated Voters’ Concerns Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Now, however, Brazil’s voters’ top concerns are focused around improving the economy and controlling the pandemic, where Bolsonaro’s record is dismal (Chart 6). Given this change of priorities, a left-of-center candidate with a solid economic record like Lula is best placed to address voters’ concerns. Lula had the fortune to preside over a global commodity bull market and Brazilian economic boom in the early 2000s (Chart 7). Regarding pandemic control, almost any challenger would be better positioned than Bolsonaro, who initially dismissed Covid-19 as “a little flu” and lacked the will or ability to set up a stable public health policy. Chart 6In 2022, Median Voter Cares Most About Economic Issues, Pandemic-Control Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ Chart 7Lula’s Presidency Overlapped With An Economic Boom Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ A left-of-center candidate like Lula, or even Ciro Gomes (Chart 8), is more in step with the median voter today for two key reasons: Inflation Surge, Few Jobs: Inflation has surged, and the increase is higher than that seen under the previous President Michael Temer (Chart 7). Transportation, food, and housing costs have all taken a toll on voter’s pocketbooks (Chart 9). The cost of electricity has also shot up. For 46% of Brazilian families, expenditure on power and natural gas is eating into more than half of their monthly income, according to Ipec. Chart 8Left-Of-Center Candidates Stand A Better Chance In Brazil In 2022 Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ Chart 9Under Bolso Inflation Has Surged Across Key Categories Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​ Distinct from inflation, unemployment too has been high under Bolsonaro (Chart 10). Chart 10Unemployment Too Has Surged Under Bolsonaro Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ Chart 11Brazil’s Per Capita Income Growth Has Lagged That Of Peers Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ Chart 12Since 2018, Brazil's Economic Miseries Have Grown More Than Those Of Peers Since 2018, Brazil's Economic Miseries Have Grown More Than Those Of Peers Since 2018, Brazil's Economic Miseries Have Grown More Than Those Of Peers Stagnant Incomes: Despite a strong post-pandemic fiscal stimulus, GDP growth in Brazil has been low (Chart 7). In a country that is structurally plagued with high inequalities, the slow growth in Brazil’s per capita income (Chart 11) under a right-wing administration is bound to trigger a leftward shift. It is against this backdrop of rising economic miseries (Chart 12) that Latin America’s largest economy is seeing its ideological pendulum swing leftwards. This phenomenon has played out before too - most notably when Lula first assumed power as the president of Brazil in 2002. Brazil’s GDP growth was low, inflation was high and per capita incomes had almost halved under the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (or popularly FHC) over 1995-2002. This economic backdrop played a key role in Lula’s landslide win in 2002. Brazil’s political differences are rooted in regional as well as socioeconomic disparities. In the 2018 presidential elections, left-of-center candidates like Fernando Haddad generated greatest traction in the economically backward northeastern region of Brazil. On the other hand, Bolsonaro enjoyed higher traction in the relatively well-off regions in southern and northern Brazil (Maps 1 & 2). Now Bolsonaro has faltered under the pandemic and Lula can reunite the dissatisfied parts of the electorate with his northeastern base. Map 1Brazil’s South, Mid-West And North Supported Bolso In 2018 Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Map 2Left-Of-Center 2018 Presidential Candidate Haddad Had Greatest Traction In Regions With Low Incomes Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Bottom Line: The stage appears set for Lula’s return to Brazil’s presidency. But will the road be smooth? We think not. Investors should gird for downside risks that Brazilian markets must contend with as President Bolsonaro fights back. Brace For Bolso’s Fightback The road to Bolsonaro’s likely loss will be paved with market volatility and potentially a correction. Interest rates have surged in Brazil as its central bank combats inflation (Chart 13). Even as BCB’s actions will lend some stability to the Brazilian Real (Chart 13), political events over the course of 2022 will spook foreign investors. Bolsonaro will leverage two planks in a desperate attempt to retain control: Plank #1: Populism Brazil’s financial markets experienced a major correction in the second half of 2021. This was partially driven by the fact that Brazilian legislators approved a rule that allows the government to breach its federal spending cap. Given Bolsonaro’s low popularity ratings today and given that his fiscal stance has been restrained off late, Bolsonaro could well drive another bout of fiscal expansion in the run up to October 2022. Such a move will bump up his popularity but at the same time worry markets given Brazil’s elevated debt levels (Chart 14). Bolsonaro can technically pass these changes in the Brazilian national assembly given that in both houses the government along with the confidence and supply parties has more than 50% of seats. Chart 13Brazil’s Central Bank Has Hiked Rates Aggressively Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ Chart 14Brazil Is One Of The Most Indebted Emerging Markets Today Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​​ Plank #2: Institutional Attacks To rally his supporters, the former army captain could also sow seeds of doubt in Brazil’s judiciary and electoral process. Given the strong support that Bolsonaro enjoys amongst conservatives, he may even mobilize supporters to stage acts of political violence in the run up to the elections. Bolsonaro could make more dramatic attempts to stay in power than former US President Trump, whose rebellion on Capitol Hill did not go as far as it could have gone to attempt to seize power for the outgoing president. Last but not the least, there is a possibility that the Brazilian judiciary presents an unexpected roadblock to Lula’s candidacy. Given the unpredictable path of Brazil’s judicial decisions, investors should be prepared for at least some kind of official impediments to Lula’s rise. Even if Lula is ultimately allowed to run, any ruling that casts doubt on his candidacy or corruption-related track record will upset financial markets. Global financial markets rallied through the Trump rebellion on January 6 last year. But US institutions, however flawed, are more stable than Brazil’s. Brazil only emerged from military dictatorship in 1985. Bolsonaro has fired up elements of the populace that are nostalgic for that period, as we discuss below. Bottom Line: Brazil’s equities look cheap today, but political risks have not fully run their course. President Bolsonaro may launch his fightback soon, which could drive another down-leg in Brazil’s markets. His institutional attacks have triggered down moves before and any potential fiscal expansion that Bolsonaro pursues may worry investors, as this expansion could stick under the subsequent administration. In addition, there is a chance that civil-military relations undergo high strain in the run-up to or immediately after Brazil’s elections. Is A Self-Coup By Bolso Possible? “One uncomfortable fact of the dictatorship is that its most brutal period of repression overlapped with what Milton Friedman called an economic miracle.… Brazil’s economy, nineteenth largest in the world before the coup, grew into the eighth largest. Jobs abounded and the regime then was actually popular.” – Alex Cuadros, Brazillionaires: Wealth, Power, Decadence, and Hope in an American Country (Spiegel & Grau, 2016) It is extremely difficult for President Bolsonaro to win the support of a majority of the electorate. But given his open admiration for Brazil’s dictatorship, is a self-coup possible in 2022? The next nine months will be tumultuous. A coup attempt could occur. However, we allocate a low probability to a successful self-coup because: Bolsonaro’s Popularity Is Too Low: Even dictators need to have some popular appeal. Bolsonaro has lost too much support (Chart 15), he never had full control of any major institutions (including the military), and few institutional players will risk their credibility for his sake. If he somehow clung to power, his subsequent administration would face overwhelming popular resistance. Chart 15Bolsonaro’s Low Approval Ratings - A Liability Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Bolsonaro’s Economy Is Too Weak: The dictatorship in Brazil managed to hold power for more than two decades partially because this period of authoritarianism was accompanied by a degree of economic well-being. Currently the public is shifting to the left because low growth and high inflation have dented the median voter’s purchasing power. The weak economy would make an authoritarian government unsustainable from the start. Lack Of American Support: Some military personnel may be supportive of a coup and several retired military officers are occupying civilian positions in the Brazilian federal government, thanks to Bolsonaro. So why can’t Brazil slip right back into a military dictatorship led by Bolsonaro, say if the election results are narrow and hotly contested? The coup d'état in Brazil in 1964 was a success to a large extent because this regime-change was supported by America. Back then communism was a threat to the US and Washington was keen to displace left-leaning heads of states in Latin America, such as Brazilian President João Goulart. But America’s strategic concerns have now changed. America today is attempting to coalesce an axis of democracies and the Biden administration has no incentive whatsoever to muddy its credentials by supporting dictatorship in Latin America’s largest country. Even aside from ideology, any such action would encourage fearful governments in the region to seek support from America’s foreign rivals, thus inviting the kind of foreign intervention that the US most wants to prevent in Latin America. The Brazilian Military Has Not Been Suppressed Or Sidelined: History suggests that coups are often triggered by a drop in the military’s importance in a country. However, the military’s power in Brazil has remained meaningful through the twenty-first century. Brazil has maintained steady military spends at around 1.5% of GDP over the last two decades. Thus, top leaders of Brazil’s military have no reason to feel aggrieved or disempowered. Having said that, it is not impossible that an extreme faction of junior officers might try to pull off a fantastical plot, even if they have little hope of succeeding, which is why we highlight that markets can be rudely awakened by the road to Brazil’s election this year. In Turkey in July 2016, an unsuccessful coup attempt caused Turkish equities to decline by 9% over a four-day period. Bottom Line: Investors must gird for the very real possibility of civil-military relations undergoing high degrees of strain in Brazil, particularly if a contested election occurs. While Bolsonaro’s supporters and disaffected elements of the Brazilian military could resist a smooth transition of power away from Bolsonaro, the transition will eventually take place because two powerful constituencies – Brazil’s median voter and America – will not support a coup in Brazil. Will Lula Be Good For Brazil’s Markets? Looking over Bolsonaro’s presidency, from a market-perspective, some policy measures were good, some were bad, and some were downright ugly. In specific: The Good: Pension Reforms And Independent Monetary Policy In Bolsonaro’s first year in power, he delivered pension sector reforms. The law increased the minimum retirement age and also increased workers’ pension contributions thereby resulting in meaningful fiscal savings. Bolsonaro passed a law to formalise the BCB’s autonomy and the BCB has been able to pursue a relatively independent monetary policy. BCB has now lifted the benchmark Selic rate by 725bps over 2021 thereby making it one of the most hawkish central banks amongst EMs (Chart 13). This is in sharp contrast to the situation in EMs like Turkey where the central bank cut rates owing to the influence of a populist head of state. The Bad: Poor Free Market Credentials And Fiscal Expansion In early 2021, President Bolsonaro fired the head of Petrobras (the state-owned energy champion) reportedly for raising fuel prices. Bolsonaro then picked a former army general (with no relevant work experience) to head the company. Although Bolsonaro positioned himself as a supporter of privatization in the run up to his presidency, he failed to follow through. Another area where the far-right leader has disappointed markets is with respect to Brazil’s debt levels. Under his presidency, a constitutional amendment to raise a key government spending cap was passed. Shortly afterwards came the creation of the massive welfare program Auxílio Brasil. Bolsonaro embraced fiscal populism to try to save his presidency after the pandemic. Consequently Brazil’s public debt to GDP ratio ballooned from 86% in 2018 to a peak of 99% in 2020. The Ugly: Poor Pandemic Response And Institutional Attacks The darkest hour of Bolsonaro’s presidency came on September 7, 2021, i.e., Brazil’s Independence Day. During rallies with his supporters, Bolsonaro levelled attacks on the Brazilian judiciary and sowed seeds of doubt in Brazil’s electoral process. More concretely, the greatest failing of the Bolsonaro administration has been its lax response to the pandemic. Bolsonaro delayed preventive measures, and this has meant that Brazil was one of the worst hit major economies of the world. The pandemic has claimed more than 630,000 lives in Brazil i.e., the second highest in the world. In relative terms too, Brazil has experienced a high death rate of about 2,960 per million which is even higher than the US rate of 2,720 per million. President Bolsonaro’s poor handling of the pandemic will cost the President in terms of votes in 2022 as the highest Covid-19-related death rates were seen in Southern Brazil (Map 3) i.e., a region that had voted in large numbers for Bolsonaro in 2018 (see Map 1 above). Map 3The Pandemic Has Had A Devastating Impact In Brazil’s South, Mid-West And North Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Given this backdrop, a Lula presidency will be welcomed by global financial markets, potentially for three reasons: Superior Pandemic-Control: An administration headed by Lula will bring in a more scientific and cohesive pandemic-control strategy thereby saving lives and benefiting the economy. Alignment With Institutions: Lula will act in alignment with Brazil’s institutions. He stands to benefit from the existing electoral system, the civil bureaucracy, academia, and the media. He may have rougher relations with the judiciary and parts of the military, but he is a known quantity and not likely to attempt to be a Hugo Chavez. Possibility Of Some Structural Reform: Given Brazil’s unstable debt dynamics, and the “lost decade” of economic malaise in the 2010s, there is a chance that Lula could pursue some structural reforms. Lula is more popular than his Worker’s Party, which is still tainted by corruption, so his strength in Congress will not be known until after the election. But Brazilian parties tend to coalesce around the president and Lula has experience in managing the legislative process. The probability of Lula pushing through some bit of structural reform will be the greatest in 2021. Back in 2019, it is worth recounting that only 4% of the Brazilian public supported pension reforms. Despite this Bolsonaro managed the passage of painful pension reforms in 2019 because market pressure forced the parties to cooperate. Faced with inflation and low growth, Lula may be forced to push through some piecemeal structural financial sector and economic reforms. However, if commodity prices and financial markets are cheering his election, he may spend his initial political capital on policies closer to his base of support, which means that a market riot may be necessary to force action on structural reforms. This dynamic will have to be monitored in the aftermath of the election. Assuming Lula does pursue some structural reforms while he has the political capital, and therefore that his first year is positive for financial markets, there is a reason to be positive on Brazil selectively on a tactical basis. However, electoral compulsions could cause Lula to pursue left-wing populism, fiscal expansion, and to resist privatization over the remaining three years of his presidency. Given Brazil’s already elevated debt levels (Chart 14), such a policy tilt would be market negative. It is against this backdrop that we expect a pro-Lula market rally to falter after the initial excitement. Bottom Line: Once the power transition is complete, a relief rally may follow as markets factor in the prospects of institutional stability and possibly a dash of structural reform in the first year of Lula’s presidency. But given Brazil’s elevated inequalities, even a pro-Lula rally will eventually fade as the administration will be constrained to switch back to the old ways and pursue an expansionary fiscal policy when elections loom. Investment Conclusions Brazil Presents A Value Trap, Fraught with Politico-Economic Risks From a strategic perspective, we are neutral on Brazil. A decade of bad news has been priced in but there is not yet a clear and sustainable trajectory to improve the country’s productivity. History suggests that both left-wing and right-wing presidents are often forced to backtrack on structural reforms and resort to cash-handouts in the run up to elections. This tends to add to Brazil’s high debt levels, prevents the domestic growth engine from revving up, and adds to inflation. Low growth and high inflation then set the wheels rolling for another bout of fiscal expansion (Chart 16). Chart 16The Vicious Politico-Economic Cycle That Brazil Is Trapped In Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Exceptions to this politico-economic cycle occur when a commodity boom is underway or if China, which is Brazil’s key client state, is booming. China today buys a third of Brazil’s exports (Chart 17) and is Brazil’s largest export market. The other reason we remain circumspect about Brazil’s strategic prospects is because of the secular slowdown underway in China. China is not in a position today to recreate the commodity and trade boom that buoyed Lula during his first presidency. China’s policy easing is a tactical boon at best, which can coincide with a Lula relief rally, but afterwards investors will be left with Chinese deleveraging and Brazilian populism. Political Risks Are High, Selective Tactical Exposure Brazil Will Be Optimal We urge investors to buy into Brazilian assets only selectively, even as Brazilian equities appear cheap (Chart 18). Political risks and economic risks such as low growth in GDP and earnings (Chart 19) could contribute to another correction and/or volatility in Brazilian equities. Chart 17China Buys A Third Of Brazil’s Exports Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions ​​​​​ ​​​​​Chart 18Brazil: Are Political & Macro Risks Priced-In? Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Brazil: The Road To Elections Won't Be Paved With Good Intentions Chart 19Brazil's EPS Growth Tracks China's Total Social Financing Growth With A Lag Brazil's EPS Growth Tracks China's Total Social Financing Growth With A Lag Brazil's EPS Growth Tracks China's Total Social Financing Growth With A Lag China’s policy easing is an important macro factor playing to Brazil’s benefit. As we highlighted in our “China Geopolitical Outlook 2022,” Beijing is focused on ensuring stability over the next 12 months. But history suggests that Brazil’s corporate earnings respond to a pick-up in China’s total social financing with a lag of more than six months (Chart 19). Thus, even from a purely macro perspective it may make sense to turn bullish on Brazil after the election turmoil concludes. Given that politically sensitive sectors account for an unusually high proportion of Brazil’s market capitalization (Chart 18), and given the political risks in the offing for Brazil, we suggest taking-on selective exposure in Brazil. To play the rally yet mitigate political risks (that can be higher for capital-heavy sectors), we suggest a pair trade: Long Brazil Financials / Short India. We remain positive on India on a strategic horizon. However, in view of India approaching the business-end of its five-year election cycle, when policy risks tend to become elevated, we reiterate our tactical sell on India. India currently trades at a 81% premium to MSCI EM on a forward P-E ratio basis versus its two year average of 56%. A Quick Note On The Nascent EM Rally Investors should gradually look more favorably on emerging markets, but tactical caution is warranted. MSCI EM and MSCI World are down YTD 1.1% and 4.6% respectively. Despite the dip, we are not yet turning bullish on EM as a whole, owing to both geopolitical and macroeconomic factors. Global geopolitical risks in the new year are high. We recently upgraded the odds of Russia re-invading Ukraine from 50% to 75%. Besides EM Europe, we also see high and underrated geopolitical risks in the Middle East in the short run. Both the Russia and Iran conflicts raise a non-negligible risk of energy shocks that undermine global growth. Once these hurdles are cleared, we will turn more positive toward risky assets. Macroeconomically, the current EM rally can be sustained only if China delivers a substantial stimulus, and the US dollar continues to weaken. The former is likely, as we have argued, but the dollar looks to be resilient and it will take several months before China’s credit impulse rebounds. Hence conditions for a sustainable EM rally do not yet exist. Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist ritika.mankar@bcaresearch.com   Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)