Protectionism/Competitive devaluation

Highlights So What? China’s January credit data suggest that stimulus is here. Why? January credit growth was a blowout number. Trade uncertainty is likely to be prolonged with an extension of talks. Equity bourses in South Korea and Russia are the most likely to benefit from Chinese stimulus. Industrial metals such as copper will also benefit – with a delay. Feature New credit data for China in January improves the chances that Beijing’s stimulus measures will overshoot this year, causing China’s economy to bottom in 2019 and jumpstart global growth. In our annual outlook for this year we argued that while China was stimulating the economy, the magnitude of stimulus would be the decisive factor for the global macro environment in 2019. We argued that the type of stimulus would remain primarily fiscal – tax cuts for households and small and medium-sized enterprises – and hence that it would be modest as fiscal easing would merely offset relatively weak credit growth. This view stemmed from our assessment of the Xi Jinping administration, highlighted in April 2017, as an “elitist” (not populist) administration. Its policy priorities are to discipline the Chinese economy, and in particular to contain systemic financial risk, which President Xi has cited as a national security threat. This view is not wrong, but the latest data clearly show that Xi has decided to pause these painful efforts at limiting leverage and rebalancing China’s economy. Witness January’s decisive uptick in both total social financing (total private credit) and local government bond issuance (Chart 1). Chart 1Higher Risk Of An Overshoot Higher Risk Of An Overshoot Higher Risk Of An Overshoot A massive spike in new credit is the single most important criterion in our “Checklist For A Stimulus Overshoot.” Thus, from a policy perspective, we are now at higher risk of an overshoot (Table 1). Not only credit as a whole but also informal lending saw a surge in January, implying that the government is relenting in its crackdown on the shadow banks. The approval of local government bond issuance for early in the year – and the People’s Bank of China’s announcement of a “Central Bank Bills Swap” program – reinforce this policy shift.1 Table 1Checklist For A Chinese Stimulus Overshoot In 2019 China: Stimulating Amid The Trade Talks China: Stimulating Amid The Trade Talks   A stimulus overshoot is positive for Chinese demand in the short run but negative for potential GDP in the long run. A “traditional” credit surge of this nature cannot be surgically targeted at SMEs or households. It will go to state-owned enterprises, privileged corporations, property developers, and the like, which have always had the advantage in China’s financial system. SOEs have taken a much larger share of new loans than private companies in recent years,2 and the only silver lining of this trend was the possibility that tighter credit controls would discipline the SOEs. That silver lining is now fading, barring some new and surprising development on the reform front. China needs to create 26 trillion renminbi in new credit over the course of the year to avoid a corporate earnings contraction. These January numbers put China on track to do just that (Chart 2), assuming that President Xi and U.S. President Donald Trump agree to a short-term, framework trade deal this year. Chart 2On Track To Avoid An Earnings Contraction On Track To Avoid An Earnings Contraction On Track To Avoid An Earnings Contraction Of course, a few caveats are in order. First, January’s credit number is only one data point and credit growth is always abnormally strong in the first month of the year. Early in the year, banks seek to expand their assets rapidly in a bid to get as much market share as possible before administrative credit quotas kick in. Because of Chinese New Year, it is best to combine January and February data to get a sense of the rate of credit expansion in the first part of the year. To do that, investors will have to wait for mid-March when the February data is out. This year’s January numbers are very strong relative to previous Januaries (Chart 3) and the context is more accommodative than the 2017 January credit surge, when authorities were beginning to tighten rather than ease macroprudential policy. Still a rapid rate of credit expansion will have to be sustained in the coming months in order to meet the 26 trillion RMB requirement highlighted above. Chart 3 Second, there is some risk that China’s households and private businesses will not respond as positively today as in the past. The intensification of Communist Party control over the society and economy, President Xi’s cancellation of term limits, and the strategic confrontation with the United States have created a bearish sentiment in the private sector. Our Emerging Markets Strategy would point out that if the propensity to consume, and money velocity,3 do not accelerate, then a surge in new credit may fail to ignite a reacceleration in China (Chart 4). Chart 4Chinese Are Holding On To Their Money Chinese Are Holding On To Their Money Chinese Are Holding On To Their Money Still, what we now know is that Xi Jinping and his top economic adviser, Vice Premier Liu He, are not initiating the “assault phase of reform” that their predecessors initiated in the late 1990s in order to cleanse China’s economy of bad loans and zombie companies. Instead, they are likely reestablishing the “Socialist Put” in order to reverse the current deceleration, demonstrate China’s continued economic might and face down the United States’ threat of tariffs. Bottom Line: China’s stimulus measures are increasingly likely to overshoot, with positive implications for both Chinese and global growth. China is still facing a corporate earnings recession, but the odds of averting it are increasing.    Trade Deadline More Likely To Be Extended What of the trade war? First, we would warn clients that China’s annual credit origination is a much bigger factor for the global economy than China’s exports to the United States (Chart 5). The trade war can escalate from here and yet, if China’s stimulus works as it has in the past, the results will be manageable for China’s economy save for Chinese companies expressly exposed to the U.S. economy through exports. In reality, both the U.S. and China are now effectively stimulating their economies and in this sense global trade as a whole will benefit regardless of bilateral tariffs. Chart 5Watch China Credit, Not So Much The Trade War Watch China Credit, Not So Much The Trade War Watch China Credit, Not So Much The Trade War But it is possible that just as global equity markets ignored China’s economic slowdown and only sold off when the tariffs were levied (Chart 6), they may not continue to rally much on China’s credit data. Given the already considerable rally in global risk assets since October, markets may not be satisfied merely with one or two months of solid credit data out of China without a clear resolution to the trade conflict. After all, if a collapse in U.S.-China trade talks portends a new Cold War, then institutional investors may be justified in taking a wait-and-see approach despite China’s credit cycle upswing. Chart 6Will Equities Ignore China Data (Again)? Will Equities Ignore China Data (Again)? Will Equities Ignore China Data (Again)? In the past, we have highlighted that the U.S. and China are not economically prohibited from engaging in a trade war – the export exposure is too small – and China’s new stimulus reinforces this point. However, President Trump is concerned about causing a sell-off in the tech sector and hence the broad equity market which could translate into a bear market and raise the probability of a recession occurring prior to November 2020. Meanwhile, in China, given Beijing’s reported trade concessions, there is apparently a desire to pacify the relationship and discourage U.S. unilateral tariffs and sanctions that could become seriously destabilizing for the Chinese economy and society. The need to have a happy 2021 centenary celebration for the Communist Party may factor into policymakers’ thinking. The latest news flow is mildly positive for the odds of getting a framework deal sometime this year. President Trump visited the Chinese negotiators in Washington, D.C. while President Xi reciprocated with the American negotiators in Beijing. Trump has signaled that an extension of the March 1 deadline is possible, and a two-month extension is being bandied about in the press. China’s National People’s Congress is likely to pass a new Foreign Investment Law that ostensibly guarantees many of the American demands on forced tech transfer, intellectual property theft, and discriminatory treatment of U.S. companies (Table 2). Even the second Trump summit with Kim Jong Un, this time in Vietnam, should be seen as a mild positive for U.S.-China negotiations. Table 2New Foreign Investment Law Would Be A Positive For U.S.-China Negotiations China: Stimulating Amid The Trade Talks China: Stimulating Amid The Trade Talks However, Presidents Trump and Xi have yet to schedule a new summit, which is probably necessary for a final deal. And there are murmurs from the press suggesting that China’s new law and other concessions are not going to satisfy the U.S. negotiators on the critical point of “structural changes” and a verification process. This leaves us inclined to change our trade war probabilities to increase the odds of an extension (Table 3). The improvement in U.S. financial conditions and China’s stimulus, if anything, make it more likely that negotiations will be extended, as both sides feel their economic and financial constraints less acutely. Table 3Updated Trade War Probabilities China: Stimulating Amid The Trade Talks China: Stimulating Amid The Trade Talks Bottom Line: Global and Chinese risk assets should rally on China’s credit uptick, but the lack of resolution of the trade war could continue to inhibit animal spirits – and the odds of a March 1 resolution are declining. Who Are The Equity Winners Of China’s Stimulus? China’s strong January credit number is supportive of global equity markets. That much is obvious. But which equity markets will benefit the most? In what follows we examine the relationship between Chinese credit and MSCI equity returns of various countries. We find that Malaysian, Australian, South Korean, and Indonesian equities are the most highly correlated with Chinese credit growth and are thus most likely to benefit from the recent upturn (Chart 7). On the other hand, France and Italy stand out as countries whose bourses are more insulated. Chart 7 Out of the markets that are positively correlated, South Korea and Russia stand out as relatively cheap (Chart 8). Thus we expect these equities to do especially well. By contrast, while Indonesia and the Philippines are highly leveraged to China, these markets are currently relatively expensive. BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy is currently overweight Korean and Russian equities within the EM space, neutral Turkey (although recently upgraded from underweight), and underweight Indonesia and the Philippines. Chart 8 In addition to credit stimulus, we expect Chinese household consumption to also gain support going forward. This will likely be driven by policy stimulus targeting the consumer specifically and is best exemplified by the recently announced tax cuts (Chart 9), which we expect to trickle down to greater consumer demand and growth in retail sales. Our base case calls for 8%-10% growth in household consumption over the coming 12 months, up from the current 3.5%. Chart 9 However, consumer sentiment in China is weak. BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy’s proxy for household marginal propensity to spend ticked up recently, after falling since early last year (see Chart 4 above). A resumption in the decline would highlight that households are increasingly unwilling to spend, which would translate into weaker retail sales despite policy efforts to boost consumption. Such a scenario – in which credit growth accelerates without a substantial uptick in consumer spending – is plausible, given that it occurred between mid-2015 and mid-2016 (Chart 10). In any case, whether Chinese stimulus comes in the form of the traditional credit channel, or instead in the form of fiscal stimulus to household consumption, the same equity markets will generally benefit the most (Chart 11). Chart 10...But Flattish Retail Sales Are Also A Possibility ...But Flattish Retail Sales Are Also A Possibility ...But Flattish Retail Sales Are Also A Possibility Chart 11 Indeed, global equity markets react the same way regardless of the type of stimulus implemented. For instance, MSCI returns for the Philippines, Sweden, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Turkey are more closely correlated to both Chinese credit growth and retail sales growth compared to Italy, Japan, and France.  The same conclusion is reached when we look at the correlations between Chinese credit growth or consumption growth and individual MSCI sectors such as industrials and consumer discretionary (Chart 12). Chart 12 The relatively stronger correlation between Chinese credit growth and equity returns – as opposed to Chinese retail sales and equity returns – can be put down to the nature of Chinese imports. While industrial goods account for the bulk of China’s purchases of foreign goods, consumer goods excluding autos make up only 15% of China’s imports (Table 4). However, as Chart 12 illustrates, the relationship between China’s retail sales growth and global equities is much tighter in the case of the consumer discretionary sector, whether the latter is compared to global industrials sectors or the overall MSCI index. Table 4Import Composition Of Chinese Imports China: Stimulating Amid The Trade Talks China: Stimulating Amid The Trade Talks Equity market exposure to China is not always in line with the extent of each country’s trade exposure to China (Chart 13). Chart 13 There are some clear exceptions – most notably Mexico, which has the highest correlation coefficient with Chinese credit and consumption variables since 2010. However, this is likely due to idiosyncratic factors.4 Correlation does not imply causation, and we cannot conclude with certainty that Mexican equities will outperform amid China’s new round of stimulus. Nevertheless, given that Mexico is a very deeply liquid market that benefits amid EM bull markets, this may not be entirely coincidental. The correlations between global equity markets and Chinese credit peak two months after the stimulus measures are first implemented (Chart 14). This is more or less in line with adjusted total social financing’s correlation versus industrial metals. However BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy has shown that copper’s correlations versus other measures of Chinese money and credit peak after roughly three quarters (Chart 15).5 This is evident in both the 2012 and 2015-16 stimulus episodes in which the bottom in copper prices lagged the bottom in China’s credit growth. Thus we may witness a rebound in equity markets on the back of China’s credit splurge before we see an improvement in annual returns on copper prices.  Chart 14 Chart 15Copper Rallies Lag China Credit Stimulus Copper Rallies Lag China Credit Stimulus Copper Rallies Lag China Credit Stimulus Bottom Line: South Korean and Russian equities are best positioned to benefit from the positive surprise in China’s credit data. France and Italy are the worst positioned. Copper prices will rebound with a delay.  Investment Implications BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy recommends that investors stay long Chinese equities ex-tech relative to the emerging market benchmark. This is a tactical call initiated in August 2018 that is now becoming a cyclical call on the basis of the credit upswing. We also remain long the “China Play Index,” a basket of China-sensitive assets, and long China’s “Big Five” banks relative to other banks. A rebound in China’s credit data and stronger global growth will support copper demand. Prices are still 15% below the mid-2018 peak and are poised to benefit in this environment, especially given that global inventories are already falling. BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy recommends that investors go long copper. Meanwhile, BCA’s China Investment Strategy recommends (for now) staying only tactically overweight Chinese equities relative to the global benchmark, pending higher conviction that the pace of credit growth will be strong enough to overwhelm the negative ramifications of a continued deceleration in actual activity over the coming few months on sentiment and 12-month forward earnings expectations. Over the long run, Geopolitical Strategy would look to underweight Chinese equities, as we are not optimistic about China’s productivity and potential GDP. This is because of the negative structural consequences of continuing the Socialist Put (i.e., bad loans, zombie companies, trade protectionism).  We would expect CNY/USD to remain relatively buoyant in the context of both trade negotiations with the U.S. and fiscal-and-credit stimulus. The trade talks can hardly succeed if CNY/USD is falling. Depending on whether and how soon China’s stimulus results in a durable economic bottom, global growth could stabilize and the USD could see a substantial countertrend selloff.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist roukayai@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1          Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled “China: Prepping A Bazooka?” dated February 14, 2019 available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2      Please see Nicholas Lardy, “The State Strikes Back: The End Of Economic Reform In China?” Peterson Institute For International Economics, January 29, 2019, available at piie.com. 3          Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report titled “Dissecting China’s Stimulus,” dated January 17, 2019 available at ems.bcaresearch.com 4       The 2012 election of President Enrique Peña Nieto caused Mexican equities to outperform their EM counterparts. Similarly in 2015-16, U.S. outperformance relative to EM also supported Mexico relative to EM because Mexico’s economy is highly leveraged to its northern neighbor. In both periods Mexico’s outperformance was not caused by – but instead coincided with – Chinese credit stimulus. These idiosyncratic events biased the correlation between Mexico’s equity markets and Chinese credit growth to the upside. 5      Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report titled “Trade Wars, China Credit Policy Will Roil Global Copper Markets,” dated June 21, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com.                  

Highlights So What? The late-cycle rally faces non-trivial political hurdles. Why? The rally is based on a too-sanguine view of the Fed, China, and the trade war. Other issues – like Brexit and the U.S. border showdown – are also problematic. Venezuela still has the potential to push oil prices sharply upwards. Feature All is well. Global equities are on the path of recovery, as should be the case at the end of an economic cycle. The U.S. S&P 500 has gained 16% since the bottom on December 24, with healthy technicals suggesting a breakout is ahead (Chart 1). The S&P 500 may be entering one of its typical late-cycle rallies, which tend to be the second best-performing decile of a bull market (Chart 2).1 Meanwhile, emerging market equities and currencies are outperforming developed market peers (Chart 3), a reversal from 2018 Chart 1Late Cycle Rally Ahead? Late Cycle Rally Ahead? Late Cycle Rally Ahead?   Chart 2 Chart 3...As Does Current Global Outperformance ...As Does Current Global Outperformance ...As Does Current Global Outperformance Typically, global risk assets outperform American risk assets at the end of an economic cycle. While institutional investors can use these rallies to lighten the load ahead of a recession, most investors cannot afford to miss such a rally. As such, BCA (and others) are calling for investors to play what is expected to be a yearlong rally in global risk assets and the S&P 500. Our view at BCA Geopolitical Strategy is more cautious, perhaps because it is informed by a methodological bias rooted in geopolitics. We believe that the reversal in U.S. outperformance relative to global risk assets rests on three pillars: The Federal Reserve remains dovish throughout 2019; China begins a major reflationary effort;  The U.S.-China tariff truce results in a trade deal. In addition, a consensus is emerging that a “no deal” Brexit will not occur, that U.S. polarization cannot get worse, and that President Trump eschews foreign interventionism. While we hold a nuanced view on each of these assertions, the mix is far less bullish than investors may think. We see a witches’ brew of factors that is murky at best and bearish at worst. The Three Pillars Of The Bullish View Before we turn to geopolitics, let us examine the three pillars underpinning the bullish view. Our colleague Peter Berezin, BCA’s Chief Global Strategist, remains bullish on the U.S. economy and expects the Fed to resume hiking rates by mid-year.2 The Conference Board’s Leading Credit Index remains in expansionary territory (Chart 4). While business capex intention surveys have come off their highs, they still point to robust spending plans over the next few quarters (Chart 5). Chart 4Little Sign Of A Looming Credit Crunch Little Sign Of A Looming Credit Crunch Little Sign Of A Looming Credit Crunch Chart 5Capex Plans Still Solid Capex Plans Still Solid Capex Plans Still Solid It is no surprise that the BCA Fed Monitor continues to suggest that “tighter monetary policy is required” (Chart 6). This is a far cry from 2016, when our indicator was in deeply “tightening” territory and the Fed paused for 12 months. If we compare 2019 to 2016, it is difficult to see how the market expectation of 4.72 bps of rate cuts will occur over the next 12 months (Chart 7). Of the three components that make up the BCA Fed Monitor, only the financial conditions have fallen into “easing required” territory (Chart 8), and they are already shifting back to “tightening required” territory with the stock market rally underway (Chart 9). Chart 6A Hawkish Fed Is Needed A Hawkish Fed Is Needed A Hawkish Fed Is Needed Chart 7 Chart 8BCA Fed Monitor Calls For Tighter Policy BCA Fed Monitor Calls For Tighter Policy BCA Fed Monitor Calls For Tighter Policy Chart 9Financial Conditions Starting To Ease Financial Conditions Starting To Ease Financial Conditions Starting To Ease In addition, in 2016 the Fed was not contracting its balance sheet. Today it is doing so, although the pace has moderated. As such, the Fed’s rate hike pause is occurring amidst an ongoing effort to normalize monetary policy and to transfer rate risks back to the private sector. By chance, this is also occurring at a time when the Treasury Department must issue more debt to cover a larger deficit, a process that could significantly pull U.S. rates higher and, by extension, yields on assets further down the risk curve. This would be a particular problem for global risk assets given the exposure of several EM economies to dollar-denominated debt.  The bottom line for investors is that a rate hike pause is not a pause in the overall hawkish policy of the U.S. Fed, which acts as a global central bank. The fall in the amount of dollars available for the international financial system acts as a brake on growth. Over the past 10 years, each time money supply growth fell below the loan uptake of the U.S. corporate sector, BCA’s Global Industrial Activity Nowcast, BCA’s Global Leading Economic Indicator, Korean exports, and global export prices all deteriorated considerably (Chart 10). Chart 10Deteriorating Excess Liquidity Hurts Global Growth Deteriorating Excess Liquidity Hurts Global Growth Deteriorating Excess Liquidity Hurts Global Growth Our muted view on Chinese reflation is unnecessary to repeat here. There is no doubt that Chinese policymakers are stimulating the economy, but the question is whether they are willing to pull the credit lever as aggressively as they have done in the past (Chart 11).So far, all of the evidence we have reviewed point to a cautious effort to stabilize growth, not reflate the entire planetary economy as Beijing did in 2016. If our BCA House View on the Fed is correct, a tepid Chinese effort to stimulate the domestic economy will fall short of lighting the flame of a global risk rally in 2019. Chart 11Compare Any Stimulus To Previous Efforts Compare Any Stimulus To Previous Efforts Compare Any Stimulus To Previous Efforts The BCA China Play Index, which in the past has tracked EM vs. DM equity outperformance, is sending mixed signals today (Chart 12). Enthusiasm for global risk assets has not been confirmed by the most China-sensitive plays. Chart 12Mixed Signals From China-Sensitive Plays Mixed Signals From China-Sensitive Plays Mixed Signals From China-Sensitive Plays Finally, there is the trade truce that should produce a trade deal. The logic is clear: President Trump sets aside the political constraints working against a deal and focuses on ensuring that he wins 2020 by avoiding a recession. The near bear market in the S&P 500 was a game changer that focused the White House on averting any further downside to markets and the economy from the trade war. But if the current rally proves that the selloff in December was a temporary pullback, the White House may be emboldened to play hard-to-get with China. After all, the electorate is generally supportive of getting tough on China (Chart 13) and there is no demand from either Trump voters or Democrats for a quick deal. The Fed pause and lower oil prices also give Trump some space to push negotiations a bit harder. Chart 13 Already there are leaks from the negotiations that the U.S. is asking for a lot from China, which could prolong the talks. This includes genuine structural changes to the economic relationship that would address long-standing U.S. concerns of forced technology transfers, intellectual property theft, and foreign investor access to the Chinese domestic market. It also includes U.S. demands that these changes be verifiable and enforceable. China is likely to balk at some of the U.S. demands, particularly if the U.S. is indeed pushing for regular reviews of China’s progress, a condition that implicitly creates a hierarchy between the two economies and would thus represent a loss of face for Beijing.3 Table 1 presents our latest expectations of where the U.S. and China will be on March 1. We assign only 10% each to “black and white” outcomes, a “Grand Compromise” and “No deal, with major escalation.” The remaining 80% is divided between “mushy” outcomes, including a 25% probability that negotiations simply continue. Table 1Updated U.S.-China Trade War Probabilities Witches' Brew: How Geopolitical Risks May Short-Circuit The Late-Cycle Rally Witches' Brew: How Geopolitical Risks May Short-Circuit The Late-Cycle Rally How would the market react to such uncertain outcomes? We think that almost anything other than a “Grand Compromise” would be greeted with limited relief, if not outright market correction. A vaguely positive meeting between Presidents Trump and Xi, and a memorandum of understanding, would not remove long-term risks in the relationship, especially if the parallel “tech war” is not resolved. On top of the ongoing U.S.-China negotiations, there is one remaining trade issue that investors should keep in mind: auto tariffs. The Section 232 investigation into whether auto imports are a national security threat is ongoing and U.S. authorities are expected to present their conclusions on February 17. We fear that the Trump administration could still stage a surprise and impose tariffs on auto imports. This is because the just-concluded NAFTA deal likely raised the cost of vehicle production within the trade bloc, necessitating import tariffs in order for the deal to make sense from President Trump’s set of political priorities. An extended truce with China could provide the opportunity. The Trump administration may not have the stomach for a long-term trade war with Europe, but the timing of this decision could upset the market’s perception of Trump’s commitment to free trade once again. Bottom Line: The conventional narrative is that global markets are experiencing a late-cycle rally, one that is worth playing given its usual duration and amplitude. This view rests on three pillars: that the Fed has backed off from tightening, that China is stimulating in earnest, and that the trade deal will produce a definitive outcome. We fear that all three pillars are shaky. First, the Fed is not easing. Its balance sheet contraction process, which is ongoing, is a form of tightening. And the U.S. economy remains healthy. As such, the expectation of a 12-month Fed pause is overly optimistic. Second, China is stimulating, but only tepidly. Third, “black and white,” definitive outcomes are unlikely in the U.S.-China negotiations. In fact, more protectionism could be around the corner if U.S.-China tech issues continue to flare or if the U.S. announces the conclusion of its investigation into auto imports. Geopolitical Factors To Monitor Aside from shaky pillars, markets will also have to contend with several uncertain geopolitical processes this year. While we are not necessarily bearish on each one, we are concerned that the collective investment community is overly bullish. Take Brexit. We agree with the conventional view that the chances of a no-deal Brexit outcome are below 10%. Political betting markets have only priced in an actual exit on March 29, which is in ink in British legislation, at just above 30% (Chart 14). Chart 14Online Betters Expect A Brexit Delay Online Betters Expect A Brexit Delay Online Betters Expect A Brexit Delay The problem is not with the conventional view but with its timing. While Prime Minister Theresa May will ultimately be forced to extend the Article 50 deadline, it may take a lot of brinkmanship and eleventh hour negotiations to do so. Getting from here – collective bullishness – to there – an actual extension of Article 50 – may require a downturn in GBP/USD or other U.K. assets. Furthermore, several scenarios could produce a downturn in GBP/USD (Diagram 1). For example, the Labour Party remains neck-and-neck with the Tories in the polls, despite being led by the most left-leaning leader since the 1970s. Although a new election that produces a Labour government would likely reduce the odds of Brexit eventually occurring, it would raise the odds of Corbyn pursuing unorthodox economic policy while also trying to negotiate his own version of Brexit with the EU. Diagram 1Brexit: The Path To Salvation Remains Fraught With Dangers Witches' Brew: How Geopolitical Risks May Short-Circuit The Late-Cycle Rally Witches' Brew: How Geopolitical Risks May Short-Circuit The Late-Cycle Rally The point is that it is tough to recommend that investors close their eyes and buy GBP/USD, no matter how cheap the currency may look, unless one has a very long time horizon and a high threshold for pain. The second issue where we take a more nuanced position is the ongoing U.S. executive-legislative standoff over the border. The government shutdown is only on pause until February 15. The House Democrats are demanding that a solution be found by Friday, February 8 if it is to be voted on in time. Meanwhile President Trump’s popularity is in the doldrums (Chart 15). His supporters note that President Reagan was even less popular at this point in his term, but that is because unemployment hit 10.4% in January 1983 (Chart 16). The grave risk for President Trump is that he is as unpopular as Reagan, even though unemployment is at 4% and the U.S. economy is on fire. Chart 15President Trump Is Unpopular... President Trump Is Unpopular... President Trump Is Unpopular... Chart 16...And It Can't Be Blamed On Unemployment ...And It Can't Be Blamed On Unemployment ...And It Can't Be Blamed On Unemployment As such, the real risk is not another shutdown, but rather political dysfunction in Congress that imperils the legislative process. The current two-year budget deal, which raised spending levels in January 2018, is set to expire when the FY2019 ends. Democrats and Trump have to come to an agreement to avert the “stimulus cliff” expected in 2020 (Chart 17). If they cannot conclude the border issue and the FY2019 appropriations, then Trump may declare a national emergency (or act unilaterally in other ways) and spark a new conflict with the courts. He could also threaten not to raise the debt ceiling in spring or summer. This is not an atmosphere in which a FY2020 deal looks very easy. Chart 17Stimulus Cliff Ahead Stimulus Cliff Ahead Stimulus Cliff Ahead Ultimately, we expect Democrats to succumb to the pressure from their voters for more spending. But a total failure to cooperate is a risk. Furthermore, the greatest political risk in the U.S. is that the 2020 election will not be contested on the same issues as in 2016: trade and immigration. Instead, income inequality is rearing its head, as Democratic candidates jostle for attention and as they test various messages on focus groups. If income inequality catches fire as the issue of 2020, we will know it soon. And it may begin to impact the markets as Democrats begin to campaign on, for instance, reversing President Trump’s income tax cuts. While the market may ignore headline election risks for some time, we do not think that non-financial corporates can do the same. Any hint that President Trump’s pro-business policies will be reversed could send shivers down the spines of CEOs and negatively impact capex intentions, hurting the real economy well before the next election. Finally, there is the issue of foreign policy. President Trump has abandoned his maximum pressure tactic on Iran and has begun withdrawing the remaining troops in the Middle East. These trends are likely to continue in 2019 as President Trump focuses on China and lesser issues like Venezuela. There is one important area of alignment between him and the defense and intelligence community, notwithstanding recent scuffles: less focus on the Middle East means more focus on Asia and specifically China. However, President Trump is facing a dilemma. Despite an extraordinary economic performance, his popularity remains in the doldrums. When faced with similar situations in the past, presidents far more orthodox than Trump have sought relevance abroad, by means of military interventions. A convenient opportunity has presented itself in Venezuela, where a revolution against Chavismo could give the U.S. an opening to intervene. On paper, we see how such a scenario could look appealing for a quick, and relatively painless, intervention. The problem is that it could also get messy and, in the analysis of BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy, raise oil prices to nearly $100 per barrel by mid-year if a total loss of Venezuelan production ensues (Chart 18). This is a non-negligible risk. Chart 18A Venezuela Collapse Could Send Brent Crude Prices Toward $100/Bbl A Venezuela Collapse Could Send Brent Crude Prices Toward $100/Bbl A Venezuela Collapse Could Send Brent Crude Prices Toward $100/Bbl Bottom Line: Geopolitical risks still abound. We are not alarmist. However, there is little reason to believe that Brexit, U.S. polarization, U.S.-China tensions, or a potential U.S. intervention in Venezuela will end painlessly for the market. An unpopular U.S. president is seeking to remain relevant and a global populist wave is continuing to create unorthodox and anti-establishment policy prescriptions. Given that the current rally is supported by three shaky pillars, any one of these geopolitical risks could catalyze a relapse, the history of late-cycle rallies be damned.   Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see BCA U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Late-Cycle Blues,” dated October 29, 2018, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2      Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Patient Jay,” dated January 18, 2019, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 3      Please see Reuters, “Exclusive: U.S. demands regular review of China trade reform,” dated January 18, 2019, available at reuters.com.   Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights Our leading indicator for China’s “old economy” remains weak, and the beneficial trade front-running effect that has supported some of China’s macro data over the past year is beginning to wane. Our "earnings recession" model for Chinese investable stocks suggests that a trade deal alone is not enough to prevent a contraction in earnings growth over the coming year. A meaningful rebound in credit relative to GDP would also be required, one that would retrace roughly 50% of the decline that has occurred since late-2017. An overweight cyclical stance (i.e. over a 6-12 month period) towards Chinese stocks versus their global peers remains premature. The equity market is conceptually supported until the beginning of March if trade talks continue to make progress, but will face (potentially severe) headwinds thereafter until credit durably accelerates at some point in the second half of the year. Feature China’s macro data remains at the forefront of investor attention, and December’s updates did not provide market participants with much comfort. Our leading indicator for China’s “old economy” deteriorated anew in December after a shallow three-month rise (Chart 1), driven by a currency-driven retracement in monetary conditions, as well as slowing growth in both M3 and adjusted total social financing (TSF). The flow of adjusted TSF relative to GDP technically ticked higher in December, but only because of a material slowdown in nominal GDP growth from 9.6% in Q3 to 8.1% in Q4 (Chart 2). This decline in nominal GDP means that it has retraced 70% of its rise from 2015 to 2017. Chart 1A Relapse In Our Leading Indicator For China's Old Economy A Relapse In Our Leading Indicator For China's Old Economy A Relapse In Our Leading Indicator For China's Old Economy Chart 2A 70% Retracement In Chinese Nominal GDP Growth A 70% Retracement In Chinese Nominal GDP Growth A 70% Retracement In Chinese Nominal GDP Growth On the housing front, sales volume growth ticked slightly higher but remains negative (and well below the pace of construction growth), and pledged supplementary lending from the PBOC, a factor that we have identified as a core driver of China’s housing market since 2015,1 decelerated further. Finally, December’s trade data was uniformly negative, with import and export growth decelerating 6-7 percentage points even on a smoothed basis, depending on whether measured in U.S. dollars or local currency. Revisiting The Measurement Of China’s “Old Economy” One notable exception to the weak data was the Bloomberg Li Keqiang index (LKI) itself, which rose from 8.4 in November to 9.3 in December. Our alternative LKI rose to exactly the same level, closing the gap with Bloomberg’s measure that had existed earlier this year (Chart 3). Chart 3Our Coincident Measures Of The Old Economy Are Trending Higher... Our Coincident Measures Of The Old Economy Are Trending Higher... Our Coincident Measures Of The Old Economy Are Trending Higher... In fact, the LKI has been providing a different message than our LKI leading indicator for several months, and the apparent uptrend in the series raises the question of whether the Chinese economy is actually strengthening rather than weakening. With high conviction, our answer to this question is no. As we have highlighted in previous reports, our view is that the gap can be explained by the (anomalous and only temporary) positive impact that the trade war has had on economic activity since March last year, as Chinese exporters rushed to front-load the production and shipment of goods to the U.S. in advance of the imposition of tariffs. Panel 1 of Chart 4 makes this point explicitly, by showing the percentile rank of the two most cyclical components of the LKI. From 2010 to early-2018, electricity production and railway freight volume moved closely together, with the former leading the latter somewhat from 2017 to early-2018. While the trade war-driven bounce in electricity production has since rolled off, railway cargo volume remains elevated and is only now rolling over. December’s extremely poor trade data suggests that a material further decline is likely in Q1 of this year. Chart 4...Because Of A (Temporarily) Beneficial Trade War Effect ...Because Of A (Temporarily) Beneficial Trade War Effect ...Because Of A (Temporarily) Beneficial Trade War Effect Panel 2 shows that bank lending, the third component of the LKI, has begun to pick up over the past few months. However, this reflects, at least in part, the goal of policymakers to shrink the size of shadow banking in the economy and reorient the provision of credit back to traditional financial institutions (Chart 5). A sustainable rise in bank loan growth that overwhelms a shrinking shadow banking sector will almost certainly show up in our preferred measure of aggregate credit growth (adjusted total social financing), which for now remains in a clear downtrend. From a bigger picture perspective, it is worth revisiting why we focus on the LKI at all. Our use of the index to represent China’s investment-relevant economic activity dates back to a November 2017 Special Report,2 in which we noted that it correlated well with China’s nominal import growth and led the growth in earnings for the MSCI China index ex-technology. Real GDP growth, by contrast, has shown barely any cyclicality over the past four years in the face of large changes in Chinese import growth and the prices of China-related assets (Chart 6). This underscores that aggregate Chinese real GDP is not, by and large, investment-relevant. Chart 5A Stunning Collapse In Shadow Banking Activity A Stunning Collapse In Shadow Banking Activity A Stunning Collapse In Shadow Banking Activity Chart 6Chinese Real GDP Growth Is Not Relevant For Investors Chinese Real GDP Growth Is Not Relevant For Investors Chinese Real GDP Growth Is Not Relevant For Investors What can we infer about the trend in China’s old economy if the LKI is combined with other closely correlated measures of investment-relevant economic activity? Panel 1 of Chart 7 answers this question by presenting the standardized LKI alongside standardized nominal import growth and nominal manufacturing output, the measure of Chinese coincident activity preferred by BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy service. Panel 2 of the chart shows an equally-weighted average of all three measures alongside our leading indicator for the LKI. We note four key observations from Chart 7: Chart 7China's Investment-Relevant Economic Activity Is Trending Lower China's Investment-Relevant Economic Activity Is Trending Lower China's Investment-Relevant Economic Activity Is Trending Lower Since 2010, the primary trend in the LKI, nominal import growth, and nominal manufacturing output has been the same The modest uptrend in the LKI since early-2018 is not corroborated by imports or manufacturing output Economic activity in China has been stronger over the past year than our leading indicator would have suggested, even after abstracting from the anomalous uptrend in the LKI The gap between our leading indicator and China’s actual economic activity is now beginning to close. These observations support the conclusion that we reached when analyzing the components of the LKI itself: a temporary boost from trade front-running has masked an underlying slowdown over the past year. But this boost has now begun to wane, implying that actual activity will continue to slow in the coming months. Is A Trade Deal Enough To Prevent An Earnings Contraction? While most global investors would acknowledge that China’s domestic economy is slowing, the performance of China-related assets over the past year highlights that the market views the trade war with the U.S. as being at least equally important as slowing Chinese money & credit growth. Chart 8 highlights that our market-based China growth indicator did not break down until the second quarter of 2018, when the threat of tariffs from the Trump administration became a reality. The indicator’s prior resilience was in contrast to a steady deterioration in our LKI leading indicator, which peaked at the beginning of 2017. Chart 8Investors Are Largely Focused On The U.S./China Trade War Investors Are Largely Focused On The U.S./China Trade War Investors Are Largely Focused On The U.S./China Trade War The surge in the indicator since early-December underscores that investor expectations of a trade deal with the U.S. have materially improved sentiment about China’s growth profile, despite the fact that Chinese money & credit growth have yet to meaningfully improve. Given that our geopolitical strategy team assigns odds as high as 45% of a framework deal emerging by the March 1 deadline,3 how can investors gauge the net impact of an improving external outlook and still-weak domestic demand? Chart 9 illustrates one method of approaching this question, using a model of Chinese investable earnings growth that we introduced in our January 16 Special Report.4 The model is designed to predict the likelihood of a serious investable earnings contraction over the coming 12-months, and includes data on credit, trade, and forward earnings momentum as predictors. The chart shows what would have to happen to the flow of adjusted total social financing as a share of GDP in a trade deal scenario, calibrated in a way that the odds of a major earnings contraction fall to 33% (the highest historical reading of the model that did not correspond to a major earnings decline). Chart 9A Trade Deal Is Not Enough To Avoid An Earnings Recession In China A Trade Deal Is Not Enough To Avoid An Earnings Recession In China A Trade Deal Is Not Enough To Avoid An Earnings Recession In China The chart shows that a meaningful rebound in credit flow to GDP would be required, one that would retrace roughly 50% of the decline that has occurred since late-2017. In short, our analysis shows that a trade deal alone is likely not enough to prevent a contraction in Chinese earnings growth over the coming year. Importantly, Chart 10 shows what this would imply for the volume of credit that would need to be created over the coming several months in order for the scenario shown in Chart 9 to come to pass (assuming an 8% growth rate in nominal GDP). The chart highlights that China would need to create approximately RMB 26 trillion in new credit over the coming 12 months (nearly US$ 4 trillion at current exchange rates), which would exceed the prior high set in late-2017 by a non-trivial amount. While this goal looks on its way to being achieved based on a 6-month annualized rate of change (panel 2), this largely reflects a one-month surge in local government bond issuance in September. Over the past 3-months, the annualized pace of credit creation has fallen well below the RMB 26 trillion mark, implying that either traditional credit growth, shadow credit, or local government bond issuance will have to pick up significantly over the coming several months in order for the domestic demand situation to stabilize. We expect this to occur, but it has not occurred yet. Chart 10China Needs To Create 26 Trillion RMB In Credit In 2019 China Needs To Create 26 Trillion RMB In Credit In 2019 China Needs To Create 26 Trillion RMB In Credit In 2019 Investment Conclusions The key conclusion of our analysis above is that an overweight cyclical stance (i.e. over a 6-12 month period) towards Chinese stocks versus their global peers remains premature. We noted in our December 5 weekly report that a tactical (0-3 month) overweight was probably warranted due to the prospect of a framework trade deal with the U.S. on March 1, but Chart 9 makes it clear that an improving external demand outlook is not a sufficient basis to expect that Chinese stocks will avoid an earnings recession. In this regard, investors should conceptualize the absence of a significant pickup in the volume of credit as a “gap” in a bridge representing the market support for Chinese stocks over the course of the calendar year (Chart 11). Assuming leaks from the negotiations continue and are consistent with the agreement of a framework deal, the market is conceptually supported until the beginning of March. However, following March 1, a gap in support emerges until credit durably accelerates at some point in the second half of the year. Chart 11 In our view, investors who go long Chinese stocks today with a 6-12 month time horizon are betting not only on the success of trade negotiations, but that this gap will close by the time that a deal is announced. This is a risky gamble given the still-relevant desire of policymakers to avoid another major credit overshoot, and as such our cyclical recommendation remains unchanged: wait. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report “China's Property Market: Where Will It Go From Here?”, dated September 13, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report “The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle”, dated November 30, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Geopolitical Strategy and China Investment Strategy Special Report “Is China Already Isolated?”, dated January 23, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report “Six Questions About Chinese Stocks”, dated January 16, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights So What? It is too soon to adopt a cyclical overweight position on Chinese equities. Remain overweight only tactically. Why? China is still maintaining a disciplined approach to economic stimulus. The US-China trade talks are making tentative progress, but there is still a 30% chance of tariff rate hikes this year. The House Democrats show that the US’s tougher approach to China is a bipartisan policy consensus. Feature China released preliminary 2018 GDP data on January 21. The annual real growth rate was recorded at 6.6%, a fall from the 6.9% of 2017, although the latter has now been revised down to 6.8% (Chart 1). The big picture in 2018 is the slowest credit growth on record, the slowest retail sales growth since 2003, the weakest manufacturing output since 2014, and a negative export shock due to trade war (Chart 2). Chart 1China’s Slowdown In Perspective China's Slowdown In Perspective China's Slowdown In Perspective Chart 2A Rocky Road For Beijing A Rocky Road For Beijing A Rocky Road For Beijing The immediate question for investors in 2019 is whether the downside risk has become so pressing that President Xi will shift the policy gear from growth stabilization to total reflation. So far the evidence suggests that the policy stance has not changed from last July. Official rhetoric continues to eschew opening the stimulus floodgates. This disciplined approach is clear when examining the most recent reflationary actions: Fiscal Easing: Local governments are allowed to start issuing 1.39 trillion RMB in new bonds from the beginning of the year, rather than waiting until April or May like usual (Chart 3). This will create a substantial new fiscal boost in the first half of the year that could help stabilize the economy in the second half.1 This 1.39 trillion RMB is not the full-year quota (last year’s was 2.18 trillion RMB). If the government had wanted to create a “big bang” effect, it would have announced a very large new quota for the full year all at once – something approaching 3.4 trillion RMB. This is what the year’s total would be if new issuance grew at the average 55% growth rate since 2015 (Chart 4). But so far the government is focusing on “frontloading” rather than “expanding” the amount of new bonds allowed to be issued. The full-year quota is important to watch in March. Anything above 2.9 trillion RMB would mean a looser fiscal stance from last year. Chart 3 Chart 4 Otherwise, fiscal easing is focusing on tax cuts for households, small businesses, and consumers rather than new loans to SOEs as in the past. The new tax cuts in 2019, for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), amount to about 200 billion RMB, according to government statements. This comes on top of a 1.3 trillion RMB tax cut that took effect at the end of last year. Therefore the minimum tax relief in 2019 is 1.5 trillion RMB or 2% of GDP. The impact is positive for consumer demand but unlikely to produce a rapid V-shaped turnaround in the growth rate, as was once the case with huge bursts of new loans to the corporate sector. Finally, depending on monetary policy, increases to fiscal spending will mostly serve to offset weak credit growth and the resulting drag on economic activity. Monetary Easing: The People’s Bank of China is, on balance, injecting liquidity into the system (net negative sterilization). Injections via the medium-term lending facility are also growing (Chart 5). However, the interbank rate had increased recently, so that recent central bank injections are mostly maintaining the easy conditions of H2 2018 (Chart 6). The extraordinary liquidity injections of January are preemptive attempts to ensure ample liquidity ahead of the Lunar New Year, when funds are tight. Chart 5PBoC Remains Supportive PBoC Remains Supportive PBoC Remains Supportive Chart 6Interbank Rates Pushed Back Down Interbank Rates Pushed Back Down Interbank Rates Pushed Back Down   Cuts in banks’ required reserve ratios (RRRs) have not yet triggered a clear revival in credit growth. The twelve-month credit impulse has not yet bottomed, even though broad money impulses are positive or moving into positive territory (Chart 7). Shadow financing remains weak. Regulatory tightening is suppressing non-bank lenders while private business sentiment remains troubled (Chart 8). Chart 7No Clear Bottom In Credit Impulse Yet bca.gps_sr_2019_01_23_c7 bca.gps_sr_2019_01_23_c7 Chart 8Shadow Financing Still Under Pressure Shadow Financing Still Under Pressure Shadow Financing Still Under Pressure ​​​​​​​ Once the credit impulse bottoms and turns upward, there will likely be a 6-9 month lag before it lifts overall economic activity. In March at the National People’s Congress session, Premier Li Keqiang is expected to set the official GDP growth target at a range of 6%-6.5% for 2019, lower than 2018’s “around 6.5%.” Several of China’s provinces are downgrading their growth targets for this year (Chart 9). The various stimulus measures are apparently seen as limiting downside risks rather than creating a new upside risk. Chart 9 ​​​​​​​ As a result of the policy easing that is taking place, our Global Investment Strategy expects Chinese growth to stabilize and global growth to recover after H1.2 Bottom Line: The clear implication is that the Xi administration remains disciplined in its use of macroeconomic tools to ease fiscal and monetary conditions. We have not yet seen a “whatever it takes” moment. Nevertheless, the accumulation of easing measures suggests that the economy could stabilize by mid-year. A Sign Of Progress In The Trade Talks The most likely basis for a “whatever it takes” moment is either a sudden and sharp deterioration in the economy despite the various easing measures, or a renewed escalation of the trade war. For the moment we will assume that the economy will respond to stimulus measures, albeit with a lag, which would be conducive to a bottoming in mid-2019. In this case, what is the likelihood that the trade war will escalate again, with President Trump increasing the Section 301 tariffs from their current level of 10% on $200 billion worth of imports? We maintain that the odds of the two sides agreeing to a framework trade deal by the March 1 negotiation deadline are about 45%. We upgraded the odds of a deal in December given the tariff ceasefire reached on December 1. Since then the news flow has generally suggested that the two sides are making progress in the 90-day talks: a US delegation in Beijing went into an extra day of talks, and was attended by Vice Premier Liu He, the top economics adviser of President Xi Jinping. However, given the difficulty of the negotiations – the thorny issues like forced tech transfer – we also give 25% odds to an extension of negotiations, prolonging the tariff ceasefire beyond March 1. This adds up to a 70% chance that tariffs will not increase this year. The remaining 30% is the chance that the trade war escalates again (Table 1). Table 1Updated Trade War Probabilities Is China Already Isolated? Is China Already Isolated? ​​​​​​​ The key question going forward: How pragmatic are Donald Trump and Xi Jinping? We have evidence that President Trump is pragmatic. He rapidly shifted his approach to Iran, by issuing the waivers on oil sanctions in November, and to China, by agreeing to the tariff ceasefire. He softened his stance to avoid an oil price shock and equity bear market in Q4 last year. Equity bear markets tend to coincide with recessions (Chart 10). And a recession would dramatically reduce Trump’s chances of reelection in November 2020 (Chart 11). Hence Trump is pushing for a short-term trade deal. He is now reportedly even considering a rollback of some tariffs in return for Chinese concessions.3 Chart 10   Chart 11… And Presidents Lose Reelection Amid Recession ...And Presidents Lose Reelection Amid Recession ...And Presidents Lose Reelection Amid Recession What about Xi? We have argued that Xi is somewhat pragmatic – at least, more so than the consensus holds. It is undeniable that Xi is a hardliner who has reasserted his personal control, and Communist Party dominance, to a degree not seen in recent memory. He is also aggressive on foreign policy, unlike his predecessors. These trends are deeply concerning both for China’s governance and for relations with the West. They help to support our view that US-China relations are worsening on a secular basis. Nevertheless, as things currently stand, the weak domestic economy and negative sentiment seem to be encouraging Xi to play for time – which is, after all, the traditional Chinese play in trade tensions with the United States. His administration has offered a handful of concessions – on soybeans, auto tariffs, and goods imports – in order to push the negotiations along. The most important potential concession, however, is the new draft law on foreign investment. This is the one concession so far that addresses the US’s structural demands on technology transfer and intellectual property (the grievances that motivate the tariffs). China has one of the most restrictive environments for foreign investment in the world (Chart 12) and this is one of the US’s chief complaints: both because of the inherent denial of market access and because FDI restrictions are used as leverage to extract technology. Chart 12 The National People’s Congress released a new draft law on December 26, 2018, updating a draft law issued by the Ministry of Commerce in 2015 that was never passed.4 An extraordinary meeting of the Standing Committee occurred in January to speed this draft along. The law would ostensibly: Protect intellectual property rights of foreign firms; Prohibit forced technology transfers – including by replacing earlier laws that required companies to operate as “joint ventures,” often exposing them to forced tech transfer. Grant equal treatment to foreign-invested enterprises within China, compared to state-owned and state-controlled enterprises; Implement a negative investment list so that foreign investors could assume that they are free to invest in areas not explicitly proscribed; Allow foreign firms to raise funds, including through initial public offerings on China’s domestic equity market. This law confirms our view that the 90-day negotiation period is tied to the Trump administration’s emphasis on the implementation of any agreements: in early March, China’s National People’s Congress can enact new laws that will ostensibly address US concerns and thus put its concessions in ink. On paper this law would go some way in assuaging US and other foreign investor concerns. However, without a strong central government commitment to enforce the law, it is doubtful that it would reduce the trade and investment practices in China that offend the United States. After all, China’s methods of tech transfer and IP theft are mostly executive rather than legislative in nature – they stem from positive actions by central and local governments, and state-controlled companies, rather than from gaps or loopholes in the legal framework. Even taking the law at face value, its implementation – which is slated for a period of no fewer than five years – could be a mixed blessing for foreign investors.5 For instance, companies with a small foreign ownership stake will now be qualified as foreign-invested companies, which could bring difficulties if the new law is not implemented fairly or in good faith. Many foreign-invested enterprises would have to restructure their ownership and operations in order to fit into the new foreign investment framework (e.g. variable interest enterprises). While foreign enterprises are supposed to receive equal treatment even in government procurement, it is not clear whether they will in the quasi-government sector. Expropriation of foreign assets may still be justified very broadly. The law could also be used as a substitute for lifting the caps on foreign equity ownership in enterprises and for resolving problems with intellectual property licensing and payment of royalties. Moreover, the law is likely to enshrine a tougher regime for national security risk reviews. The US has tightened scrutiny of Chinese investments through the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) over the past year, and China may wish to toughen its own stance. Ultimately China does not need a law to strike down foreign investments that it believes jeopardize national security, but the law could provide justification for retaliation when the US strikes down Chinese investment on similar grounds. Nevertheless, in general, this law is an example of the kind of concession that is necessary for Trump to save face if he is determined to agree to a short-term framework trade deal to help prevent a bear market. Will the US accept this new law as a substantial concession, worthy of rolling back tariffs? So far the feedback is not encouraging. The chief US negotiator, Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer, has reportedly told Senator Chuck Grassley that China has not made any “structural” concessions yet – which suggests that Lighthizer is not impressed by the mere rubber-stamping of a new law.6 Much will depend on the next round of negotiations, dated January 30-31, when Vice Premier Liu He will come to DC for the first time since his humiliation in May last year. At that time he negotiated a deal and the US and China released a joint statement, only to have Trump renege on it three days later. He would not be going back to the US if there were not a substantial commitment on both sides to seek progress. Ultimately Trump, not Lighthizer, will determine whether to pause or roll back the tariff rates. Trump may decide he needs a deal and therefore accept the new law as a sufficient concession. He would still have the possibility of disputing its implementation (or lack thereof) at a later date – for instance, just before the 2020 election. The durability of any framework deal will be measured in the irreversibility of China’s concessions and the extent to which Trump moderates the tariffs. At least some rollback would seem necessary to reciprocate China’s concessions if a framework deal is to be done. The tariffs were imposed in separate tranches with adjustable rates, so Trump can reduce the tariffs in various ways. Bottom Line: There is room for a short-term, tactical trade deal that allows for some tariff rollback, given that China is tentatively making concessions on core US demands. Talks could also be extended, with tariff rates remaining at their current levels. These two possibilities mean that a hike in tariff rates is not the likeliest scenario for most of 2019. However, the new law on foreign investment only tentatively answers what the US is really demanding. We continue to believe that US-China relations are getting worse on a secular basis and that improvements will be tactical (or at best cyclical) in nature. Democrats Are Not Pro-China One of the main reasons for thinking that Xi may offer short-term concessions to get a deal with Trump is also one of the main reasons for thinking that long-term concessions are out of reach: there is an across-the-board policy consensus taking shape in Washington demanding tougher policy on China. We have emphasized that this policy consensus is apparent not only from Trump’s election – as an avowed protectionist and China-basher within the Republican Party – but also from the hardening position of the US defense establishment, and the disillusionment of the corporate lobby, over the past decade (Chart 13). Chart 13 ​​​​​​​ It is also a bipartisan consensus in Congress. For instance, last year, the House draft of the aforementioned FIRRMA Act, tightening foreign investment scrutiny on China, passed by a 398-vote margin in June. The final version passed by a large margin in the House (359-54) and Senate (87-10) in the form of the John S. McCain Defense Authorization Act. The Taiwan Travel Act and the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, which offended Beijing, both passed with unanimous consent in the Senate (and voice vote in the House). Now the new Democrat majority in the House is confirming that tougher rules on China are something that everyone can agree on. For example, the new Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Representative Richard Neal (D, MA), has struck a hawkish tone on the 90-day trade talks. He has warned that the US Trade Representative has “an obligation to look beyond the political pressures of the moment and the easy, one-off transactions, and secure real and lasting change to China’s anti-competitive behavior.”7 Furthermore, Senator Chris Van Hollen (D, MD) and Representative Ruben Gallego (D, AZ) have joined with Republicans Tom Cotton (R, AR) and Mike Gallagher (R, WI) to propose legislation that would give “the death penalty” to Chinese tech companies such as Huawei and ZTE if they violate US sanctions laws or export controls.8 This is an extremely aggressive piece of legislation that President Trump will have to contain if he is to keep a deal with President Xi. This bipartisan effort should come as no surprise. The Democrats were the more skeptical party about both global free trade and China in recent decades. This is because they positioned themselves as the defenders of workers, wages, and manufacturing, notably in the Midwestern Rustbelt States. Democrats have also always criticized China’s human rights record, with President Bill Clinton famously calling China’s leaders “the Butchers of Beijing” during the 1992 presidential campaign (Chart 14). Chart 14 In the post-Cold War context, this protectionist strain was subdued as the free market consensus prevailed across the political spectrum. It was President Clinton who negotiated for China to enter the World Trade Organization – despite the opposition of many within his party, including current House Speaker Nancy Pelosi – in order to smooth the process of globalization underway. This context began to change after the Great Recession, as the US debt supercycle ended, China emerged as a major competitor, and the Barack Obama administration attempted to develop a Democrat response to new challenges. President Obama supported “Buy America” provisions in the crisis-era stimulus package and engaged in tit-for-tat tariffs with China. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) multilateral trade deal deliberately excluded China, particularly if it could not embrace the liberal reforms, and trade and cyber-security standards, included in the TPP’s provisions. Finally, President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton initiated the “Pivot to Asia,” an attempt to reduce US military commitments in the Middle East and reposition for a long-term strategic competition with China in the Asia Pacific. The Trump administration has continued the pivot to Asia in all but the TPP. Trump reportedly even considered naming Jim Webb, a Democratic former navy secretary and China hawk, as his new Secretary of Defense, to replace Secretary James Mattis. But the new policy consensus is best encapsulated by Mattis’s interim replacement, Pat Shanahan, who began his job as acting Defense Secretary this month by telling his staff to focus on “China, China, China.”9 Trump is now considering keeping Shanahan for a “long time.” Now, with Democrats coming back into power in the House, it is becoming even clearer that China faces hawkish trade policies from the Left as well as the Right. This has important implications. In the short term, this process suggests that President Xi may be incentivized to offer some concessions to President Trump, who wants to protect the business cycle and position himself as a successful dealmaker before 2020, rather than stonewalling and fueling the rise of the new anti-China consensus. In the long term, however, this process also suggests that Xi is unlikely to offer deep structural concessions, given that either Trump or a new Democratic administration could ultimately reject the terms of the deal. After all, if the stock market avoids a bear market and the economy strengthens, Trump could turn his back on the deal. In particular, the fired-up US economy is likely to widen the deficit, forcing Trump to give an explanation on the campaign trail (Chart 15).10 But if the economy goes into recession, Trump may have no other policy option to rally voters other than aggressive foreign policy – which could mean aggressive trade policy against China. Chart 15Trump Will Have To Explain This In 2020 Trump Will Have To Explain This In 2020 Trump Will Have To Explain This In 2020 ​​​​​​​ Subsequent to 2020, Trump will either have a renewed election mandate to pursue trade war – in which he is less vulnerable to recession timing – or a new Democratic administration will pick up where President Obama left off, with the Pivot to Asia … including the TPP and other multilateral initiatives. It is also entirely likely that the US and China could adhere to a framework trade deal and yet heighten their strategic standoff in other areas. First, the US is making progress in forming a coalition of nations against Huawei’s participation in 5G networks – China’s relations with Canada are deteriorating rapidly and now Germany, a critical swing player, is even considering a ban on Huawei.11 Second, Taiwan and the South China Sea could see more saber-rattling or incidents even as trade tensions stagnate. (North Korean diplomacy, by contrast, is continuing to progress as long as the US-China trade talks are progressing – Trump and Kim Jong Un are set to hold a second summit in late February.) Bottom Line: The “anti-China” turn in US policy is not limited to Trump. Rather, Trump was the catalyst for a new policy consensus that was already emerging in the Obama years. Democrats will likely take a tough stance on China trade, including pressuring Trump if he strikes a deal with Xi Jinping, in order to woo voters in the Midwest. Any future Democratic White House should be expected to continue pressing China on issues ranging from national security to cyber-security to human rights, while likely pursuing a more multilateral diplomatic approach than the current White House. Investment Implications BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy is tactically overweight Chinese equities ex-tech relative to emerging markets. We are closing our short China-exposed US companies relative to the S&P 500 for a gain of 1.7%. Meanwhile China Investment Strategy is tactically overweight Chinese equities relative to the MSCI World index. Tariffs remaining at their current level now appears to be the most likely scenario for this year. Holding all else constant, this scenario is positive for Chinese growth and China-related assets. But beyond a near-term pop for financial markets, we still need to see hard evidence that the accumulation of China’s easing measures will indeed stabilize its domestic economy. This suggests that it is too soon to give the “all clear” sign from a cyclical perspective. On the other hand, a verified failure of the current, substantive US-China attempt to negotiate a truce would have a deeper negative impact on sentiment and trade than the original outbreak of trade war in 2018, as there will no longer be a basis for optimism. The market will have to price an ultimate 25% tariff on $500 billion worth of goods. This will likely cause the CNY-USD exchange rate to plummet (Chart 16). This would, at least at first, send a deflationary impact across emerging markets and the world, causing another negative hit to global trade and hence a flight to quality. Chart 16A Trade War Escalation Will Send The Yuan Reeling A Trade War Escalation Will Send The Yuan Reeling A Trade War Escalation Will Send The Yuan Reeling ​​​​​​​ The PBoC would most likely have to stage a defense of the currency while the State Council, judging by its actions in July 2018, would likely launch a large stimulus package of the sort that it has thus far avoided for fear of credit excesses. This would come at the cost of a still larger debt burden and misallocation of capital – undoing overnight the work that President Xi has put into mitigating these structural imbalances – but it would prevent a precipitous slowdown for the time being. A trade war-induced stimulus would ostensibly help reaccelerate the Chinese economy and global growth, but in our view financial markets would not respond all that happily to such a huge dose of volatility, trade uncertainty, and policy uncertainty at a time when the cycle will be very late anyway. The risk premium would go up sharply, at least for a time, raising the odds of a very sizeable earnings contraction before the economy begins to recover.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “Dissecting China’s Stimulus,” January 17, 2019, available at www.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Patient Jay,” January 18, 2019, and “Low Odds Of An FCI Doom Loop,” January 4, 2019, available at www.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Steve Holland, Tom Brown, and Leslie Adler, “Trump says deal ‘could very well happen’ with China,” Reuters, January 19, 2019, available at af.reuters.com. 4 Please see “Foreign Investment Law of the People’s Republic of China (Draft) for comments,” National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, December 26, 2018, available at www.npc.gov.cn. See also “Public Comments Sought on the Foreign Investment Law of the People’s Republic of China,” Ministry of Commerce, January 19, 2015, available at www.troutman.com. 5 Please see Lester Ross, Kenneth Zhou, and Tingting Liu, “China Rolls Out New Draft Foreign Investment Law,” January 10, 2019, available at www.wilmerhale.com. See also Manuel Torres and Diego D’Alma, “China Publishes New Draft Of Foreign Investment Law,” Garrigues, Commentary: Corporate China, January 17, 2019, available at www.garrigues.com. 6 Please see Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. trade chief saw no progress on key issues in China talks: Senator,” Reuters, January 15, 2019, available at www.reuters.com. 7 Please see James Politi, “Washington’s China hawks fear Trump will yield in trade war,” Financial Times, January 12, 2019, available at www.ft.com. 8 Please see Diane Bartz and Christian Shepherd, “U.S. legislation steps up pressure on Huawei and ZTE, China calls it ‘hysteria,’” Reuters, January 16, 2019, available at ca.reuters.com. Note that Democrats have also joined proposals “to condemn gross human rights violations of ethnic Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang” and to restore Taiwan’s observer status in the World Health Organization in the first month of the congressional session. 9 Please see Robert Burns, “New Pentagon leader Shanahan says he is focusing on China,” Associated Press, January 2, 2019, available at www.pbs.org. 10 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “The Next U.S. Recession: Waiting For Godot?” dated October 5, 2018, available at www.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see Elizabeth Schulze, “Huawei could be banned from 5G in Germany,” CNBC, January 18, 2019, available at www.cnbc.com.  

Highlights Investors ran for cover in December as they succumbed to a litany of worries regarding the outlook. The key question is whether the pessimism is overdone or an extended equity bear market is underway. Our outlook for the U.S. and global economies has not changed since we published our 2019 Outlook. There are some tentative signs that the two U.S. weak spots, housing and capital spending, are bottoming out. However, our global leading economic indicators continue to herald a soft first half of 2019 outside of the U.S. The dollar thus has more upside in the near term. The political risks facing investors have not diminished either. In particular, we expect turbulence related to the U.S./China trade war to extend well beyond the 3-month “truce” period. The returns to stocks, corporate bonds and commodities historically have not been particularly attractive on average when the U.S. yield curve is this flat. Nonetheless, the risk/reward balance has improved enough as prices fell over the past month to justify upgrading equities in the advanced economies back to overweight. Move to a neutral level of cash, and keep bonds underweight on a 6-12 month investment horizon. The upgrade to stocks in the developed markets does not carry over to emerging markets. The backdrop will remain hostile to EM assets until China pulls out the big policy stimulus guns and the dollar peaks. Stay clear of EM assets and neutral on base metals for now, but be prepared to upgrade sometime in 2019. Global government bonds could rally a little more in the near term if the risk-off phase continues. Nonetheless, with little chance of any more rate hikes discounted in the U.S. yield curve, the risks for U.S. and global yields are tilted to the upside. Bond investors with a 6-12 month horizon should ride out the near-term volatility with a short-duration position. Oil prices have overshot to the downside. Supply is adjusting and, given robust energy demand in 2019, we still expect prices to rise to $82. Feature Investors ran for cover in December as they succumbed to concerns regarding the U.S./China trade war, corporate leverage, global growth, rising U.S. interest rates and the shift toward quantitative tightening. Some equity indexes, such as the Russell 2000, reached bear market territory, having lost more than 20%. Losses have been even worse outside the U.S. Earnings revisions have plunged into the “net downgrade” zone. Implied volatility has spiked and corporate bond spreads are surging (Chart I-1). The key question is whether the pessimism is overdone or an extended equity bear market is underway. Chart I-1A Flight To Quality A Flight To Quality A Flight To Quality We laid out our economic view in detail in the BCA Outlook 2019 report, published in late November. Not enough has changed on the global economic front in the three weeks since then that would justify such a violent shift in investor sentiment. That said, our favorite global leading economic indicators continue to erode (Chart I-2). The only ray of hope is that the diffusion index constructed from our Global Leading Economic Indicator appears to have bottomed. Nonetheless, the actual LEI will keep falling until the diffusion index shifts into positive territory.   Chart I-2Global Leading Indicators Still Weak Global Leading Indicators Still Weak Global Leading Indicators Flashing Red Global Leading Indicators Still Weak Global Leading Indicators Flashing Red For China, a key source of investor angst, the latest retail sales and industrial production reports reinforced that economic momentum continues to recede. We will not be convinced that growth is bottoming until we see an upturn in our credit impulse indicator (Chart I-3). Its continued decline in November suggests that the outlook for emerging market assets and commodity prices is poor for at least the next quarter. Global industrial output appears headed for a mild contraction. The manufacturing troubles are centered in the emerging Asian economies, but Europe and Japan are also feeling the negative effects. Chart I-3China: No Bottom Yet China: No Bottom Yet China: No Bottom Yet In the U.S., November’s bounce in housing starts and permits is a hopeful sign that the soft patch in this sector is ending. However, it is not clear how the devastating wildfires on the west coast have affected the housing data (Chart I-4). The downdraft in capital goods orders may also be drawing to a close, based on the latest reading from the Fed’s survey of capital spending intentions. The U.S. leading economic indicator dipped slightly in November, but remains consistent with above-trend real GDP growth in the months ahead. Chart I-4U.S.: Some Hopeful Signs U.S.: Some Hopeful Signs U.S.: Some Hopeful Signs The bottom line is that our outlook for growth has not been significantly altered. We see little risk of a U.S. recession in 2019. The global economy continues to weaken, but we expect enough policy stimulus out of China to stabilize growth in that economy in the second half of the year. We highlighted in the BCA Outlook 2019 that, while the risks appeared elevated, we would consider shifting back to overweight in stocks if they cheapened sufficiently. Valuation has indeed improved in recent weeks and sentiment has turned more cautious. Global growth will likely continue to decelerate in the first half of 2019, but markets have largely discounted this outcome. In other words, the shift toward pessimism in financial markets appears overdone. The fact that the Fed has signaled a move away from regular quarter-point rate hikes adds to our confidence in playing what will likely be the last upleg in risk assets in this cycle. Fed: Rate Hikes No Longer On Autopilot The Fed lifted rates by a quarter point in December and signaled that any additional tightening will be data-dependent. The FOMC also trimmed the expected peak in the funds rate and its estimate of the long-run, or neutral, level. Policymakers were likely swayed by some disappointing U.S. economic data, the pullback in core PCE inflation, and the sharp tightening in financial conditions (Chart I-5). Chart I-5Financial Conditions Have Tightened Financial Conditions Have Tightened Financial Conditions Have Tightened Monetary conditions are not tight by historical yardsticks, such as the level of real interest rates. The problem is that investors fear that the neutral level of the fed funds rate, the so-called R-star, remains very depressed. If true, it could mean that the Fed is already outright restrictive, which would signal that the monetary backdrop has turned hostile for risk assets. The OIS curve signals that the consensus believes that the Fed is pretty much done the tightening cycle (Chart I-6) Chart I-6Investors Believe The Fed Is Done! Investors Believe The Fed Is Done! Investors Believe The Fed Is Done! We believe that R-star is higher than the current policy setting and is rising, as the growth headwinds related to the Great Financial Crisis fade with the passage of time. The problem is that nobody knows the level of the neutral rate. Thus, we need to watch for signs that the fed funds rate has surpassed that level, such as an inverted yield curve. The 10-year/3-month T-bill spread is still in positive territory, but barely so. Meanwhile, our R-star indicator is also flashing yellow as it sits on the zero line (Chart I-7). It is a composite of monetary indicators that in the past have been useful in signaling that monetary policy had become outright restrictive, leading to slower growth and trouble for risk assets. The lead time of this indicator relative to economic activity and risk asset prices has been quite variable historically, but a breakdown below zero would send a powerful bearish signal for risk assets if confirmed by an inverted yield curve. Chart I-7Worrying Signs Of Tight Money Worrying Signs Of Tight Money Worrying Signs Of Tight Money The Implications Of Four Fed Scenarios It is not surprising that investors are struggling with a number of different possible scenarios on how the R-star/Fed policy nexus will play out. We can perhaps boil down discussion of the Fed and the implications for financial markets to a matrix of four main outcomes, based on combinations related to the level of R-Star (high or low) and the pace of Fed rate hikes in 2019 (pause or continue increasing rates by 25 basis points per quarter). Policy Mistake #1: R-star is still very low, but policymakers do not realize this and the FOMC continues to tighten into restrictive territory in 2019. By definition, the economy begins to suffer in this scenario, inflation and inflation expectations decline and long-bond yields are flat-to-lower. The yield curve inverts. However, current real rates are still so low that the fed funds rate cannot be very far above R-Star, which means it would represent only a small policy mistake. As long as the Fed recognizes the economic slowdown early enough and truncates the rate hike cycle, then there is a good chance that a recession would be avoided. Investors would initially fear a recession, however, which means that risk assets would be hit hard in absolute terms and relative to bonds and cash until recession fears fade. The direction of the dollar is perhaps trickiest part because there are so many potential cross currents. To keep things simple we will assume that global growth follows our base-case view and remains lackluster in the first half of 2019, followed by a modest re-acceleration. We believe the dollar would likely rally a little as the Fed continues tightening, but then would fall back as the FOMC is forced to turn dovish in the face of a U.S. growth scare. Policy Mistake #2: R-Star is high and rising but the Fed fails to hike rates fast enough to keep up. The economy accelerates in this scenario because monetary policy remains stimulative through 2019, at a time when the 2018 fiscal stimulus will still be providing a demand tailwind. Core PCE inflation moves above 2% and long-term inflation expectations shift up, signaling to investors that the Fed has fallen behind the inflation curve. Risk assets rip for a while and the yield curve bear-steepens as the 10-year Treasury yield moves gradually higher at first. Belatedly, the FOMC realizes it has underestimated the neutral rate and signals a hawkish policy shift. A 50-basis point rate hike at one FOMC meeting causes risk assets to buckle on the back of surging Treasury yields. The yield curve begins to bear-flatten. Eventually the curve inverts and the economy enters recession. The dollar weakens at first because higher inflation lowers U.S. real interest rates relative to the rest of the world. Global growth prospects would initially get a boost from the acceleration in U.S. growth, which is also dollar-bearish. However, in the end the dollar would likely rise as global financial markets turn risk-off. Fed Gets It Right (1): R-star is high and rising. The Fed continues to tighten in line with the increase in the neutral rate. Treasurys sell off hard and the yield curve shifts higher, but remains fairly flat (parallel shift). The curve could mildly invert temporarily, but market worries about a recession eventually recede as economic momentum remains robust, allowing the curve to subsequently trade in the 0-50 basis point range. As discussed below, risk assets tend to outperform Treasurys and cash when the yield curve is in this range, but not by much. The Treasury market would suffer significant losses. This is the most dollar-bullish of the four scenarios, given our global growth view (tepid) and the fact that the market is not even priced for a full quarter-point rate hike in 2019. Fed Gets It Right (2): R-Star is actually still quite low, but the Fed correctly sees recent economic data disappointments and the tightening in financial conditions as signs that policy is close to neutral. The Fed pauses the rate hike cycle, followed by a slower and more data-dependent pace of tightening. The yield curve stays fairly flat and flirts with inversion as investors try to figure out if the Fed has overdone it. Risk assets are volatile and deliver little return over cash. Treasurys rally a bit as the chance of any further rate hikes is priced out of the market, but the rally is limited unless the economy falls into recession (which is not part of this scenario because we are assuming the Fed “gets it right”). The dollar fluctuates, but delivers no real trend since U.S. yield differentials versus the rest of the world do not change much. As we go to press, financial markets are moving in a way that is consistent the Policy Mistake #1; the consensus appears to believe that the Fed has already lifted the fed funds rate too far, causing financial conditions to tighten. But if U.S. real GDP growth remains above-trend as we expect, then the market view could eventually transition to a belief in Mistake #2; the Fed falls behind the inflation curve. The curve would re-steepen and risk assets could have one last hurrah before the Fed gets hawkish again and the 2020 recession arrives. The transition from Mistake #1 to Mistake #2 is essentially our base-case outlook. Nonetheless, obviously the risks around this central scenario are high, especially given how late it is in the U.S. economic and policy cycle. Asset Returns And The Yield Curve Our 2018 late-cycle investing theme focussed on historical asset return and policy dynamics after the U.S. unemployment rate fell below the full-employment level in past cycles. We found that risk assets tend to run into trouble once the U.S. S&P 500 operating margin peaks. As we highlighted in the BCA Outlook 2019, our margin proxies are still not heralding that a peak is at hand. Given the recent investor obsession with the U.S. yield curve, this month we look at historical asset returns at different levels of the 10-year/3-month T-bill yield curve slope: Phase I, when the slope is above 50 basis points; Phase II, when the curve is between 0 and 50 basis points; and Phase III, when the curve is inverted (Table I-1). The data are presented as (not annualized) monthly average returns. It may be surprising that risk asset returns are for the most part positive even in when the curve is inverted. However, keep in mind that we are focussing on the curve, not on recession periods. The curve can be inverted for a long time before the subsequent recession occurs. Risk asset returns often remain positive during this period. The broad conclusions are as follows: Unsurprisingly, risk assets perform their best, in absolute terms and relative to government bonds and cash, in Phase I when the yield curve is steep. Returns tend to deteriorate as the curve flattens. This includes equities, corporate bonds and commodities. Small caps underperform large caps when the curve is between 0 and 50 basis points, but the reverse is true when the curve is flatter or steeper than that range. The ratio of cyclical stocks to defensives has not revealed a consistent pattern with respect to the yield curve, although this may reflect the short historical period available. Value stocks shine versus growth when the curve is inverted. Hedge fund and private equity returns have not varied greatly across the three yield curve environments. Structured product, such as CMBS and ABS, have enjoyed their best performance when the curve is inverted. Timberland and Farmland have also rewarded investors during Phase III. We suspected that asset returns when the curve is in the 0-50 basis point range would vary importantly with the direction of the curve. In Table I-I we split Phase II into two parts: when the curve is steepening after being inverted, and when the curve is flattening after being steep. In other words, when the consensus is either transitioning from quite bullish to very bearish, or vice-versa. Chart I- Risk assets such as equities (U.S. and Global) and U.S. investment-grade corporate bonds indeed perform much better in absolute terms when the curve is flat but is steepening rather than flattening. The same is true for U.S. structured product. In terms of excess returns relative to government issues, both U.S. IG and HY corporates have tended to underperform when the curve is in the 0-50 basis point range. Surprisingly, the underperformance is worse when the curve is steepening than when it is flattening. This appears to reflect an anomalous period in early 2006 when the curve was flattening but corporate bonds enjoyed strong excess returns. Emerging market equities show very strong returns in all three curve phases. This reflects the inclusion of the pre-2000 period in the mean calculations, a time when EM equities were much less correlated with U.S. financial conditions. EM equity returns have been significantly lower on average since 2000 when the curve is in the 0-50 basis point range (and especially when the curve is flattening) The bottom line is that risk assets can still reward investors with positive returns during periods when the yield curve is flat. However, it is a dangerous time, especially when the global economy is up to its eyeballs in debt. This month’s Special Report beginning on page 17 argues that, although regulation has made the global financial system more resilient to shocks compared to the pre-Lehman years, the number of potentially destabilizing shocks has increased. Moreover, the trade war and Brexit risks make the investment backdrop all the more precarious. No Quick End To The Trade War The honeymoon following the trade ceasefire between the U.S. and China, agreed at the G20 summit in early December, did not last long. The arrest of the chief financial officer of Chinese telecom maker Huawei and continuing hawkish tweets from the U.S. president dampened hopes that a trade agreement can be negotiated by March. Even news that China intended to cut tariffs on U.S. auto imports did not help much. We highlighted in the BCA Outlook 2019 that negotiations will prove to be protracted and testy. It will take a lot more than some token market-opening action on the part of China to placate the U.S. Our geopolitical team emphasizes that “trade war” is a misnomer for a broader strategic conflict that is centered on the military-industrial balance rather than the trade balance.1 For example, while China is rapidly catching up to the U.S. in research and development spending, it is only spending about half as much as the U.S. relative to its overall economy (Chart I-8). While the U.S. can accept China’s eventually surpassing it in economic output, it cannot accept China’s technological superiority. This would translate into military and strategic supremacy over time. Chart I-8R&D Expenditure By Country R&D Expenditure By Country R&D Expenditure By Country U.S. demands will also be hard for China to swallow. Most importantly, the U.S. is requesting that China rein in its hacking and spying, shift its direct investment to less tech-sensitive sectors, adjust its “Made in China” targets to allow for more foreign competition, and lower foreign investment equity restrictions. These stumbling blocks will make it difficult to strike a deal on trade. We continue to believe that a final trade deal between the U.S. and China will not arrive in the 90-day timeframe of the ceasefire. Thus, global risk assets will be subject to swings in sentiment regarding the likelihood of a trade deal well beyond March. Meanwhile, as previously discussed, Chinese policy stimulus has not yet become aggressive enough to spark animal spirits in the private sector. The Chinese authorities are proceeding cautiously so as to avoid adding significantly to private- and public-sector’s debt mountain. This month’s Special Report also discusses the risks that the surge in debt over the past decade poses for the global financial system, including escalating risk in China’s shadow banking system. Brexit Pain Continues Politics surrounding the torturous Brexit process will also remain a source of volatility for global markets in 2019. Prime Minister May survived a leadership challenge, but this is hardly confidence-inspiring. The question is whether any deal can get through Westminster. The votes appear to be in place for the softest of soft Brexits, the so-called Norway+ option, if May convinces the Labour Party to break ranks. Such a deal would entail Common Market access, but at the cost of having to essentially pay for full EU membership with no ability to influence the regulatory policies that London would have to abide by. The alternative is to call for a new election (which may usher the even less pro-Brexit Labour Party into power), or to delay Brexit for a more substantive period of time, or simply to buckle under the pressure and call for a second referendum. We disagree that the failure of the Tories to endorse May’s proposed agreement means that the “no deal Brexit,” or the “Brexit cliff,” is nigh. Such an outcome is in nobody’s interest and both May and the EU can offer delays to ensure that it does not happen. Whatever happens, one thing is clear; the median voter is turning forcefully towards Bremain (Chart I-9). It will soon become untenable to delay the second referendum. The bottom line is that, while a soft Brexit is the most likely outcome, the path from here to the end result will be punishing. We do not recommend Brexit-related bets on the pound, despite the fact that it is cheap. Chart I-9A Shift Toward Bremain A Shift Toward Bremain A Shift Toward Bremain 2019: A Tale Of Two Halves For EM, Commodities And The Dollar One of our key themes in the BCA Outlook 2019 is that the growth divergence between China and the U.S. will persist at least for the first half of 2019. The result will be weak EM asset prices and currencies, little upside for base metals and a strong U.S. dollar. We expect the Chinese authorities will do enough to stabilize growth by mid-year, providing the impetus for a playable bounce in EM and commodity prices in the second half of 2019, coinciding with a peak in the U.S. dollar. Nonetheless, the dollar still has some upside potential in broad trade-weighted terms in the first half of 2019. Our Central Bank Monitors continue to show a greater need for policy tightening in the U.S. than in the rest of the major countries. The dollar has usually strengthened when this has been the case historically. In particular, the ECB’s Central Bank Monitor has slipped back into “easy money required” territory, reflecting moderating economic momentum and still-depressed consumer price inflation (Chart I-10). Chart I-10Our CB Monitors Support A Stronger Dollar Our CB Monitors Support A Stronger Dollar Our CB Monitors Support A Stronger Dollar The ECB announced the well-anticipated end of its asset purchase program in December. The central bank will now focus on forward guidance as its main policy tool outside of setting short-term interest rates. Lending via targeted LTROs will also be considered under certain circumstances. Policymakers retained the latest forward guidance after the December MPC meeting, that rates are on hold “through the summer of 2019”. The latest reading from our ECB Monitor suggests that the central bank could be on hold for longer than that. We expect Eurozone growth to improve somewhat through the year, but we still believe that interest rate differentials will move further in favor of the dollar relative to the euro and the other major currencies. Periods of slow global growth also tend to favor the greenback. The bottom line is that, while a correction is possible in the very near term, investors with at least a six-month horizon should remain long the dollar. Investment Conclusions: Our outlook for the U.S. and global economies has not changed since we published our 2019 Outlook. The risks facing investors have not diminished either, especially given the precarious nature of late-cycle investing and the uncertainty regarding the neutral level of the fed funds rate. Historically, the returns to stocks, corporate bonds and commodities have not been particularly attractive on average when the yield curve is this flat. Nonetheless, we believe that the risk/reward balance has improved enough as prices fell over the past month to justify upgrading equities in the advanced economies to overweight. Move to a neutral level of cash, and keep bonds underweight on a 6-12 month investment horizon. Despite our more positive view on equities, we remain cautious on credit. Spreads have widened recently to more attractive levels, but we remain concerned about the high leverage of U.S. corporates, whose debt/assets ratio is on average higher now than in 2009. Signs of strain are already showing in the junk bond market, with new issuance having largely dried up since early December. If this continues, borrowers may struggle to refinance maturing debt in early 2019.  Credit is an asset class that is likely to perform particularly poorly in the next recession. Our upgrade to stocks in the advanced markets does not carry over to emerging markets. The backdrop will remain hostile to EM assets until China pulls out the big policy stimulus guns and the dollar peaks. Stay clear of EM assets and neutral on base metals for now. Global government bonds could rally a little more in the near term if the risk-off phase continues. Nonetheless, with little chance of any more rate hikes discounted in the U.S. yield curve, the risks for U.S. and global yields are tilted to the upside. Bond investors with a 6-12 month horizon should ride out the near-term volatility with a short-duration position. Oil markets are still in the process of re-adjusting to an extraordinary policy reversal by the Trump Administration on its Iranian oil-export sanctions in November, as last-minute waivers were granted to Iran’s largest oil importers. We believe that oil prices have overshot to the downside. Following OPEC 2.0’s decision to cut 1.2mm b/d of production to re-balance markets in the first half of the year, we continue to expect prices to recover on the back of solid global energy demand. Canada also mandated energy firms to trim production. Our energy experts expect oil prices to reach $82/bbl in 2019. We also like gold as long as the fed funds rate remains below its neutral level. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst December 21, 2018 Next Report: January 31, 2019 II. (Part II) The Long Shadow Of The Financial Crisis This is the second of a two-part Special Report on the structural changes that have occurred as a result of the Great Recession and financial crisis. We look at three issues: asset correlation, the safety of the financial system, and the level of global debt. First, correlations among financial assets shifted dramatically during the financial crisis and the after-effects lingered for years. Some believe that the underlying level of correlation among risk assets has shifted permanently higher for two main reasons: (1) trading factors such as the increased use of exchange-traded funds and algorithms; and (2) the risk-on/risk-off environment in which trading has become more binary in nature, due to the sharp rise in policy uncertainty, risk aversion and risk premiums in the aftermath of the Great Recession. We have sympathy for the second explanation. The equity risk premium (ERP) was forced higher on a sustained basis by the financial crisis, driven by fears that the advanced economies had entered a ‘secular stagnation’. Elevated correlation among risk assets was a result of a higher-than-normal ERP. The ERP should decline as fears of secular stagnation fade, leading to a lower average level of risk asset correlation than has been the case over the last decade. Second, regulators have been working hard to ensure that the financial crisis never happens again. But is the financial system really any safer today? Undoubtedly, banks have improved balance sheet and funding resilience, and have significantly reduced their involvement in complex financial activities. The propensity for contagion among banks has diminished and there has been a dramatic decline in the volume of complex structured credit securities. The bad news is that the level of global debt has increased at an alarming pace. The third part of this report highlights that elevated levels of debt could cause instability in the global financial system. Choking debt levels boost the vulnerability to negative shocks. The number and probability of potential shocks appear to have increased since 2007, including extreme weather events, sovereign debt crises, large-scale migration, populism, water crises and cyber & data attacks. The lack of a fiscal buffer in most countries means that it will be difficult or impossible to provide any fiscal relief in the event of a negative shock. Moreover, the end of the Debt Supercycle means that the monetary and fiscal authorities will find it difficult to encourage the private sector to spend more in most cases. For EM, deleveraging has not even started and more financial fireworks seem inevitable in the context of a strong dollar and rising global yields. China may avoid a crisis, but the adjustment to a less credit-driven economy is already proving to be a painful process. The Great Recession and Financial Crisis cast a long shadow that will affect economies, policy and financial markets for years to come. Rather than reviewing the roots of the crisis, the first of our two-part series examined the areas where we believe structural change has occurred related to the economy or financial markets. We covered the changing structure of the corporate bond market, the inflation outlook, central bank policymaking and equilibrium bond yields. We highlighted that the financial crisis transformed the corporate bond market in several ways that heighten the risk for quality spreads in the next downturn. We made the case that the prolonged inflation undershoot is sowing the seeds of an overshoot in the coming years, in part related to central bank policymakers that are doomed to fight the last war. Finally, we argued that the forces behind the structural and cyclical bull market in bonds reached an inflection point in 2016/2017. In Part II, we examine the theory that the financial crisis has permanently lifted market correlations among risk assets. Next, we look at whether regulatory changes implemented as a result of the financial crisis have made the global financial system safer. Finally, we highlight the implications of the continued rise in global leverage over the past decade in the context of BCA’s Debt Supercycle theme. The bottom line is that the global financial system still faces substantial risks, despite a more highly regulated banking system. (1) Are Risk Asset Correlations Permanently Higher? Correlations among financial assets shifted dramatically during the financial crisis and the after-effects lingered for years. For example, risk assets became more highly correlated, suggesting little differentiation within or across asset classes. Chart II-1 presents a proxy for U.S. equity market correlations, using a sample of current S&P 100 companies. The average correlation was depressed in the 1990s and 2000s relative to the 1980s. It spiked in 2007 and fluctuated at extremely high levels for several years, before moving erratically lower. It has jumped recently and is roughly in the middle of the post-1980s range. Chart II-1Two Factors Driving Correlation bca.bca_mp_2019_01_01_s2_c1 bca.bca_mp_2019_01_01_s2_c1 Correlations will undoubtedly ebb and flow in the coming years and will spike again in the next recession. But a key question is whether correlations will oscillate around a higher average level than in the 1990s and 2000s. The consensus seems to believe that the underlying level of correlation among risk assets has indeed shifted higher on a structural basis for two main reasons: Market Structure Changes: Many investors point to trading factors such as the increased use of index products (exchange-traded funds for example), and high-frequency/algorithmic trading as likely culprits. Macro “theme” investing has reportedly become more popular and is often implemented through algorithms. The result is an increase in stock market volatility and a tendency for risk-asset prices to move up and down based on momentum because they are all being traded as a group. These factors would likely be evident today even if the financial crisis never happened, but the popularity of algorithm trading may have been encouraged by the fact that the macro backdrop was so uncertain for years after Lehman collapsed. Risk On/Off Trading Environment: Trading has become more binary in nature, due to the sharp rise in policy uncertainty, risk aversion and risk premiums in the aftermath of the Great Recession. Even after the recession ended, the headwinds to growth were formidable and many felt that the sustainability of the recovery hinged largely on the success or failure of unorthodox monetary policies. The general feeling was that either the policies would “work”, the output gap would gradually close and risk assets would perform well, or it would fail and risk assets would be dragged down by a return to recession. Thus, markets traded on an extreme “risk-on/risk-off” basis, as sentiment swung wildly with each new piece of economic and earnings data. While the market structure thesis has merit on the surface, the impact should only be short term in nature. It is difficult to see how a change in the intra-day microstructure of the market could have such a fundamental, wide-ranging and permanent impact on market prices. Previous research suggests that any impact on market correlation beyond the very short term is likely to be small. For the sake of brevity, we won’t present the evidence here, but instead refer readers to two BCA Special Reports.2 The risk on/off trading environment thesis is a more plausible explanation. However, we find it more useful to think about it in terms of the equity risk premium (ERP). A higher ERP causes investors to revalue cash flows from all firms, which, in turn, causes structural shifts in the correlation among stocks. A lower ERP results in less homogenization of the present value of future cash flows, and raises the effect of differentiation among business models. A rise in the ERP could occur for different reasons, but the most obvious are an increase in the perceived riskiness of firms, a shift in investor risk aversion, or both. Shifts in the ERP are sometimes structural in nature, but there is also a strong cyclical element in that persistent equity declines historically have had the effect of temporarily raising the ERP and correlations. A simple model based on the ERP and volatility explains a lot of the historical variation in equity correlation, including the elevated levels observed in the years after 2007 (Chart II-2).3 The shift lower in correlations after 2012 reflects both a lower equity risk premium and a dramatic decline in downside volatility. Chart II-2Simple Model Explains Correlation Simple Model Explains Correlation Simple Model Explains Correlation It is tempting to believe that the lingering shell-shock related to the financial crisis means that the underlying equity risk premium has shifted permanently higher. The ERP is still elevated by historical standards, but this is more reflective of extraordinarily low bond yields than an elevated forward earnings yield. Investors evidently believe that the U.S. and other developed economies are stuck in a “secular stagnation”, which will require low interest rates for many years just to keep economic growth near its trend pace. In other words, the equilibrium interest rate, or R-star, is still very low. The ERP and correlations among risk assets will undoubtedly spike again in the next recession. Nonetheless, in the absence of recession, we expect fears regarding secular stagnation to fade further. If the advanced economies hold up as short-term interest rates and bond yields rise, then concerns that R-star is extremely low will dissipate and expectations regarding equilibrium bond yields will shift higher. The ERP will move lower as bond yields, rather than the earnings yield, do most of the adjustment. The underlying correlations among risk asset prices should correspondingly recede. This includes correlations among a wide variety of risk assets, such as corporate bonds and commodities. While this describes our base case outlook, there is a non-trivial risk that the next recession arrives soon and is deep. This would underscore the view that R-star is indeed very low and the economy needs constant monetary stimulus just to keep it out of recession (i.e. the secular stagnation thesis). The ERP and correlations would stay elevated on average in that scenario. What About The Stock/Bond Correlation? Chart II-3 shows the rolling correlation between monthly changes in the 10-year Treasury bond yield and the S&P 500. The correlation was generally negative between the late-1960s and the early-2000s. Bond yields tended to rise whenever the S&P 500 was falling. Over the past two decades, however, bond yields have generally declined when the stock market has swooned. Chart II-3Structural Shifts In The Stock/Bond Correlation Structural Shifts In The Stock/Bond Correlation Structural Shifts In The Stock/Bond Correlation Inflation expectations can help explain the shift in stock/bond correlation. Expectations became unmoored after 1970, which meant that inflationary shocks became the primary driver of bond yields. Strong growth became associated with rising inflation and inflation expectations, and the view that central banks had fallen behind the curve. Bond yields surged as markets discounted aggressive tightening designed to choke off inflation. And, given that inflation lags the cycle and had a lot of persistence, central banks were not in a position to ease policy at the first hint of a growth slowdown. This was obviously a poor backdrop for stocks. When inflation expectations became well anchored again around the late 1990s, investors no longer feared that central banks would have to aggressively stomp on growth whenever actual inflation edged higher. Central banks also had more latitude to react quickly by cutting rates at the first sign of slower economic growth. Fluctuations in growth became the primary driver of bond yields, allowing stock prices to rise and fall along with yields. The correlation has therefore been positive most of the time since 2003. Bottom Line: A negative correlation between stocks and bond yields reared its ugly head in the last quarter of 2018. The equity correction reflected several factors, but the previous surge in bond yields and hawkish Fed comments appeared to spook markets. Investors became nervous that the fed funds rate had already entered restrictive territory, at a time when the global economy was cooling off. We expect more of these episodes as the Fed normalizes short-term interest rates over the next couple of years. Nonetheless, we see no evidence that inflation expectations have become unmoored. This implies that the stock-bond correlation will generally be positive most of the time over the medium term. In addition, the average level of correlation among risk assets has probably not been permanently raised, although spikes during recessions or growth scares will inevitably occur. (2) Is The Global Financial System Really Safer Today? The roots of the great financial crisis and recession involved a global banking and shadow banking system that encouraged leverage and risk-taking in ways that were hard for investors and regulators to assess. Complex and opaque financial instruments helped to hide risk, at a time when regulators were “asleep at the switch”. In many countries, credit grew at a much faster pace than GDP and capital buffers were dangerously low. Banking sector compensation skewed the system toward short-term gains over long-term sustainable returns. Lax lending standards and a heavy reliance on short-term wholesale markets to fund trading and lending activity contributed to cascading defaults and a complete seizure in parts of the money and fixed income markets. A vital question is whether the financial system is any less vulnerable today to contagion and seizure. The short answer is that the financial system is better prepared for a shock, but the problem is that the number of potential sources of instability have increased since 2007. Since the financial crisis, regulators have been working hard to ensure that the financial crisis never happens again. Reforms have come under four key headings: Capital: Regulators raised the minimum capital requirement for banks, added a buffer requirement, and implemented a surcharge on systemically important banks. Liquidity: Regulators implemented a Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and a Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) in order to ensure that banks have sufficient short-term funds to avoid liquidity shortages and bank runs.4 Risk Management: Banks are being forced to develop systems to better monitor risk, and are subject to periodic stress tests. Resolution Planning: Banks have also been asked to detail options for resolution that, hopefully, should reduce systemic risk should a major financial institution become insolvent. Global systemically-important banks, in particular, will require sufficient loss-absorbing capacity. A major study by the Bank for International Settlements,5 along with other recent studies, found that systemic risk in the global financial system has diminished markedly as a result of the new regulations. On the whole, banks have improved balance sheet and funding resilience, and have significantly reduced their involvement in complex financial activities. Lending standards have tightened almost across the board relative to pre-crisis levels, particularly for residential mortgages. Additional capital and liquid assets provide a much wider buffer today against adverse shocks, allowing most banks to pass recent stress tests (Chart II-4). Financial institutions have generally re-positioned toward retail and commercial banking and wealth management, and away from more complex and capital-intensive activities (Chart II-5). The median share of trading assets in total assets for individual G-SIBs has declined from around 20% to 12% over 2009-16. Chart II-4 Chart II-5 Moreover, the propensity for contagion among banks has diminished. The BIS notes that assessing all the complex interactions in the global financial system is extremely difficult. Nonetheless, a positive sign is that banks are focusing more on their home markets since the crisis, and that direct connections between banks through lending and derivatives exposures have declined. The BIS highlights that aggregate foreign bank claims have declined by 16% since the crisis, driven particularly by banks from the advanced economies most affected by the crisis, especially from some European countries (Chart II-6). It is also positive that European banks have made some headway in diminishing over-capacity, although problems still exist in Italy. Finally, and importantly, there has been a distinct shift toward more stable sources of funding, such as deposits, away from fickle wholesale markets (Charts II-7 and II-8). Chart II-6Less Cross Border Lending (Until Recently) Less Cross Border Lending (Until Recently) Less Cross Border Lending (Until Recently)   Chart II-7 Chart II-8 Outside of banking, many other regulatory changes have been implemented to make the system safer. One important example is that rules were adjusted to reduce the risk of runs on money market funds. What About Shadow Banking? Of course, more could be done to further indemnify the financial system. Concentration in the global banking system has not diminished, and it appears that the problem of “too big to fail” has not been solved. And then there is the shadow banking sector, which played a major role in the financial crisis by providing banks a way of moving risk to off-balance sheet entities and securities, and thereby hiding the inherent risks. Shadow banking is defined as credit provision that occurs outside of the banking system, but involves the key features of bank lending including leverage, and liquidity and maturity transformation. Complex structured credit securities, such as Collateralized Debt Obligations, allowed this type of transformation to mushroom in ways that were difficult for regulators and investors to understand. A recent study by the Group of Thirty6 concluded that securitization has dropped to a small fraction of its pre-crisis level, and that growing non-bank credit intermediation since the Great Recession has primarily been in forms that do not appear to raise financial stability concerns. Much of the credit creation has been in non-financial corporate bonds, which is a more stable and less risky form of credit extension than bank lending. Other types of lending have increased, such as corporate credit to pension funds and insurance companies, but this does not involve maturity transformation, according to the Group of Thirty. There has been a dramatic decline in the volume of complex structured credit securities such as collateralized debt obligations, asset-backed commercial paper, and structured investment vehicles since 2007 (Chart II-9). While the situation must be monitored, the Group of Thirty study concludes that the financial system in the advanced economies appears to be less vulnerable to bouts of self-reinforcing forced selling, such as occurred during the 2008 crisis. Chart II-9Less Private-Sector Securitization Less Private-Sector Securitization Less Private-Sector Securitization One exception is the U.S. leveraged loan market, which has swelled to $1.13 trillion and about half has been pooled into Collateralized Loan Obligations. As with U.S. high-yield bonds, the situation is fine as long as profitability remains favorable. But in the next recession, lax lending standards today will contribute to painful losses in leveraged loans. The Bad News That’s the good news. The bad news is that, while the financial system might have become less complex and opaque, the level of debt has increased at an alarming rate in both the private and public sectors in many countries. Elevated levels of debt could cause instability in the global financial system, especially as global bond yields return to more normal levels by historical standards. We discuss other pressure points such as Emerging Markets and China in the next section, although the latter deserves a few comments before we leave the subject of shadow banking. The Group of Thirty notes that 30% of Chinese credit is provided by a broad array of poorly regulated shadow banking entities and activities, including trust funds, wealth management products, and “entrusted loans.” Links between these entities and banks are unclear, and sometimes involve informal commitments to provide credit or liquidity support. The study takes some comfort that most of Chinese debt takes place between Chinese domestic state-owned banks and state-owned companies or local government financing vehicles. Foreign investors have limited involvement, thus reducing potential direct contagion outside of China in the event of a financial event. Still, the potential for contagion internationally via global sentiment and/or the economic fallout is high. The other bad news is that, while regulators in the advanced economies have managed to improve the ability of financial institutions to weather shocks, potential risks to the financial system have increased in number and in probability of occurrence. The Global Risk Institute (GRI) recently published a detailed comparison of potential shocks today relative to 2007.7 The report sees twice the number of risks versus 2007 that are identified as “current” (i.e. could occur at any time) and of “high impact”. The most pressing risks today include extreme weather events, asset bubbles, sovereign debt crises, large-scale involuntary migration, water crises and cyber & data attacks. Any of these could trigger a broad financial crisis if the shock is sufficiently intense, despite improved regulation. The GRI study also eventuates how the risks will evolve over the next 11 years. Readers should see the study for details, but it is interesting that the experts foresee cyber dependency rising to the top of the risk pile by 2030. The increase is driven by the importance of data ownership, the increasing role of algorithms and control systems, and the $1.2 trillion projected cost of cyber, data and infrastructure attacks. Our computer systems are not prepared for the advances of technology, such as quantum computing. Climate change moves to the number two risk spot in its base-case outlook. Space limitations precluded a discussion of the rise of populism in this report, but the GRI sees the political tensions related to income inequality as the number three threat to the global financial system by 2030. Bottom Line: Regulators have managed to substantially reduce the amount of hidden risk and the potential for contagion between financial institutions and across countries since 2007. Banks have a larger buffer against stocks. Unfortunately, the number and probability of potential shocks to the financial system appear to have increased since 2007. (3) Implications Of The Global Debt Overhang The End of the Debt Supercycle is a key BCA theme influencing our macro view of the economic and market outlook for the coming years. For several decades, the willingness of both lenders and borrowers to embrace credit was a lubricant for economic growth and rising asset prices and, importantly, underpinned the effectiveness of monetary policy. During times of economic and/or financial stress, it was relatively easy for the Federal Reserve and other central banks to improve the situation by engineering a new credit up-cycle. However, since the 2007-09 meltdown, even zero (or negative) policy rates have been unable to trigger a strong revival in private credit growth in the major developed economies, except in a few cases. The end of the Debt Supercycle has severely impaired the key transmission channel between changes in monetary policy and economic activity. The combination of high debt burdens and economic uncertainty has curbed borrowers’ appetite for credit while increased regulatory pressures and those same uncertainties have made lenders less willing to extend loans. This has severely eroded the effectiveness of lower interest in boosting credit demand and supply, forcing central banks to rely increasingly on manipulating asset prices and exchange rates. On a positive note, the plunge in interest rates has lowered debt servicing costs to historically low levels. Yet, it is the level, rather than the cost, of debt that seems to have been an impediment to the credit cycle, contributing to a lethargic economic expansion. The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) publishes an excellent dataset of credit trends across a broad swath of developing and emerging economies. Some broad conclusions come from an examination of the data (Charts II-10 and II-11):8 Chart II-10Advanced Economies: Some Deleveraging Advanced Economies: Some Deleveraging Advanced Economies: Some Deleveraging Chart II-11EM: Deleveraging Has Not Even Started EM: Deleveraging Has Not Even Started EM: Deleveraging Has Not Even Started Private debt growth has only recently accelerated for the advanced economies as a whole. There are only a handful of developed economies where private debt-to-GDP ratios have moved up meaningfully in the past few years. These are countries that avoided a real estate/banking bust and where property prices have continued to rise (e.g. Canada and Australia). The high level of real estate prices and household debt currently is a major source of concern to the authorities in those few countries. Even where some significant consumer deleveraging has occurred (e.g. the U.S., Spain and Ireland), debt-to-income ratios remain very high by historical standards. In many cases, a stabilization or decline in private debt burdens has been offset by a continued rise in public debt, keeping overall leverage close to peak levels. This is a key legacy of the financial crisis; many governments were forced to offset the loss of demand from private sector deleveraging by running larger and persistent budget deficits. Weak private demand accounts for close to 50% of the rise in public debt on average according to the IMF. Global debt of all types (public and private) has soared from 207% of GDP in 2007 to 246% today. The Debt Supercycle did not end everywhere at the same time. It peaked in Japan more than 20 years ago and has not yet reached a decisive bottom. The 2007-09 meltdown marked the turning point for the U.S. and Europe, but it has not even started in the emerging world. The financial crisis accelerated the accumulation of debt in the latter as investors shifted capital away from the struggling advanced economies to (seemingly less risky) emerging markets. Both EM private- and public-sector debt ratios have continued to move up at an alarming pace. The lesson from Japan is that deleveraging cycles following the bursting of a major credit bubble can last a very long time indeed. One key area where there has been significant deleveraging is the U.S. household sector (Chart II-12). The ratio of household debt to income has fallen below its long-term trend, suggesting that the deleveraging process is well advanced. However, one could argue that the ratio will undershoot the trend for an extended period in a mirror image of the previous overshoot. Or, it may be that the trend has changed; it could now be flat or even down. Chart II-12U.S. Household Deleveraging... U.S. Household Deleveraging... U.S. Household Deleveraging... What is clear is that U.S. attitudes toward saving and spending have changed dramatically since the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) (Chart II-13). Like the Great Depression of the 1930s that turned more than one generation off of debt, the 2008/09 crisis appears to have been a watershed event that marked a structural shift in U.S. consumer attitudes toward credit-financed spending. The Debt Supercycle is over for this sector. Chart II-13...As Attitudes To Debt Change ...As Attitudes To Debt Change ...As Attitudes To Debt Change Developing Countries: Debt And Economic Fundamentals BCA’s long-held caution on emerging economies and markets is rooted in concern about deteriorating fundamentals. Trade wars and a tightening Fed are negative for EM assets, but the main headwinds facing this asset class are structural. Excessive debt is a ticking time bomb for many of these countries. EM dollar-denominated debt is now as high as it was in the late 1990s as a share of both GDP and exports (Chart II-14). Moreover, the declining long-term growth potential for emerging economies as a group makes it more difficult for them to service the debt. The structural downtrend in EM labor force and productivity growth underscores that trend GDP growth has collapsed over the past three decades (Chart II-14, bottom panel). Chart II-14EM: High Debt And Slow Growth... EM: High Debt And Slow Growth... EM: High Debt And Slow Growth... The 2019 Key Views9 report from our Emerging Markets Strategy team highlights that excessive capital inflows over the past decade have contributed to over-investment and mal-investment. Much of the borrowing was used to fund unprofitable projects, as highlighted by the plunge in productivity growth, profit margins and return on assets in the EM space relative to pre-Lehman levels (Chart II-15) Decelerating global growth in 2018 has exposed these poor fundamentals. Chart II-15...Along With Deteriorating Profitability ...Along With Deteriorating Profitability ...Along With Deteriorating Profitability As we highlighted in the BCA Outlook 2019, emerging financial markets may enjoy a rally in the second half of 2019 on the back of Chinese policy stimulus. However, this will only represent a ‘sugar high’. The debt overhang in emerging market economies is unlikely to end benignly because a painful period of corporate restructuring, bank recapitalization and structural reforms are required in order to boost productivity and thereby improve these countries’ ability to service their debt mountains. China’s Debt Problem Space limitations preclude a full discussion of the complex debt situation in China and the risks it poses for the global financial system. Waves of stimulus have caused total debt to soar from 140% of GDP in 2008 to 260% of GDP at present (Chart II-16). Since most of the new credit has been used to finance fixed-asset investment, China has ended up with a severe overcapacity problem. The rate of return on assets in the state-owned corporate sector has fallen below borrowing costs (Chart II-17). Chinese banks are currently being told that they must lend more money to support the economy, while ensuring that their loans do not sour. This has become an impossible feat. Chart II-16China's Overinvestment... China's Overinvestment... China's Overinvestment... Chart II-17Has Undermined The Return On Assets Has Undermined The Return On Assets Has Undermined The Return On Assets The previous section highlighted that much of the debt has been created in the opaque shadow banking system, where vast amounts of hidden risk have likely accumulated. Whether or not the central government is willing and/or able to cover a wave of defaults and recapitalize the banking system in the event of a negative shock is hotly debated, both within and outside of BCA. But even if a financial crisis can be avoided, bringing an end to the unsustainable credit boom will undoubtedly have significant consequences for the Chinese economy and the emerging economies that trade with it. Interest Costs To Rise Globally, many are concerned about rising interest costs as interest rates normalize over the coming years. In Appendix Charts II-19 to II-21, we provide interest-cost simulations for selected government, corporate and household sectors under three interest-rate scenarios. The good news is that the starting point for interest rates is still low, and that it takes years for the stock of outstanding debt to adjust to higher market rates. Even if rates rise by another 100 basis points, interest burdens will increase but will generally remain low by historical standards. It would take a surge of 300 basis points across the yield curve to really ‘move the needle’ in terms of interest expense. This does not imply that the global debt situation is sustainable or that a financial crisis can be easily avoided. The next economic downturn will probably not be the direct result of rising interest costs. Nonetheless, elevated government, household and/or corporate leverage has several important long-term negative implications: Limits To Counter-Cyclical Fiscal Policy: Government indebtedness will limit the use of counter-cyclical fiscal policy during the next economic downturn. Chart II-18 highlights that structural budget deficits and government debt levels are higher today compared to previous years that preceded recessions. The risk is especially high for emerging economies and some advanced economies (such as Italy) where investors will be unwilling to lend at a reasonable rate due to default fears. Even in countries where the market still appears willing to lend to the government at a low interest rate, political constraints may limit the room to maneuver as voters and fiscally-conservative politicians revolt against a surge in budget deficits. This will almost certainly be the case in the U.S., where the 2018 tax cuts mean that the federal budget deficit is likely to be around 6% of GDP in the coming years even in the absence of recession. A recession would push it close to a whopping 10%. Even in countries where fiscal stimulus is possible, the end of the Debt Supercycle means that the monetary and fiscal authorities will find it difficult to encourage the private sector to spend and take on more debt. Chart II-18 Growth Headwinds: The debt situation condemns the global economy to a slower pace of trend growth in part because of weaker capital spending. From one perspective this is a good thing, because spending financed by the excessive use of credit is unsustainable. Still, deleveraging has much further to go at the global level, which means that spending will have to be constrained relative to income growth. The IMF estimates that deleveraging in the private sector for the advanced economies is only a third of historical precedents at this point in the cycle. The IMF also found that debt overhangs have historically been associated with lower GDP growth even in the absence of a financial crisis. Sooner or later, overleveraged sectors have to retrench. Vulnerability To Negative Shocks: If adjustment is postponed, debt reaches levels that make the economy highly vulnerable to negative shocks as defaults rise and lenders demand a higher return or withdraw funding altogether. IMF work shows that economic downturns are more costly in terms of lost GDP when it is driven or accompanied by a financial crisis. This is particularly the case for emerging markets. Bottom Line: Although credit growth has been subdued in most major advanced economies, there has been little deleveraging overall and debt-to-GDP is still rising at the global level. Elevated debt levels are far from benign, even if it appears to be easily financed at the moment. It acts as dead weight on economic activity and makes the world economy vulnerable to negative shocks. It steals growth from the future and, in the event of such a shock, the lack of a fiscal buffer in most countries means that it will be difficult or impossible to provide fiscal relief. The end of the Debt Supercycle means that the monetary and fiscal authorities will find it difficult to encourage the private sector to spend in most cases. For EM, deleveraging has not even started and more financial fireworks seem inevitable in the context of a strong dollar and rising global yields. China may avoid a crisis, but the adjustment to a less credit-driven economy is already proving to be a painful process. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst APPENDIX Chart II-19Corporate Interest Cost Scenarios Corporate Interest Interest Cost Scenarios Corporate Interest Interest Cost Scenarios   Chart II-20Government Interest Cost Scenarios Government Interest Cost Scenarios Government Interest Cost Scenarios   Chart II-21U.S. Household Sector Interest Cost Scenarios U.S. Household Sector Interest Cost Scenarios U.S. Household Sector Interest Cost Scenarios   III. Indicators And Reference Charts Our tactical upgrade of equities to overweight this month goes against most of our proprietary indicators. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicators for the U.S., Japan and Europe are all heading lower. The WTP indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Investors are clearly moving funds away from the equity market at the moment. Our Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) for stocks continues to issue a ‘sell’ signal. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. Momentum remains out of sync with valuation and policy, supporting the view that caution is still warranted. The U.S. net earnings revisions ratio has dropped into negative territory. The earnings surprises index has also declined, although it remains above 60%. Finally, our Composite Technical Equity Indicator has broken below the zero line and its 9-month exponential moving average, sending a negative technical signal. On the positive side, our Monetary Indicator has hooked up, although it is still in negative territory for equities. From a contrary perspective, the fact that equity sentiment has turned bearish is positive for stocks. In fact, this is the main reason why we upgraded stocks this month. While it is late in the U.S. economic expansion and the Fed is tightening, sentiment regarding U.S. and global growth has become overly pessimistic. Thus, we are playing a late-cycle bounce in stocks. For bonds, the term premium moved further into negative territory in December, which is unsustainable from a long-term perspective. Long-term inflation expectations are also too low to be consistent with the Fed meeting its 2% target over the medium term. These facts suggest that bond yields have not peaked for the cycle, although at the moment they have not yet worked off oversold conditions according to our technical indicator. The U.S. dollar is overbought and very expensive on a PPP basis. Nonetheless, we believe it will become more expensive in the first half of 2019, before its structural downtrend resumes in broad trade-weighted terms. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators   Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator   Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields   Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP   Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator   Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals   Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators   Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop   Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot   Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing U.S. Housing U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions   Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst   1      For more details, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report "U.S.-China: The Tech War And Reform Agenda," dated December 12, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2      Please see BCA U.S. Investment Strategy Special Report "The Bane Of Investors’ Existence: Why Is Correlation High And When Will It Fall?" dated January 4, 2012, available at usis.bcaresearch.com. Also see BCA Global ETF Strategy Special Report "The Passive Menace," dated September 13, 2017, available at etf.bcaresearch.com 3       We use only below average returns in the calculation of volatility (downside volatility) because we are more concerned with the risk of equity market declines for the purposes of this model. 4       The LCR requires a large bank to hold enough high-quality liquid assets to cover the net cash outflows the bank would expect to occur over a 30-day stress scenario. The NSFR complements the LCR by requiring an amount of stable funding that is tailored to the liquidity risk of a bank’s assets and liabilities, based on a one-year time horizon. 5       Structural Changes in Banking After the Crisis. CGFS Papers No.60. Bank for International Settlements, January 2018. 6       Shadow Banking and Capital Markets Risks and Opportunities. Group of Thirty. Washington, D.C., November 2016. 7       Back to the Future: 2007 to 2030. Are New Financial Risks Foreshadowing a Systemic Risk Event? Global Risk Institute. 8       For more details on public and private debt trends, please see BCA Special Report "The End Of The Debt Supercycle: An Update," dated May 11, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 9       Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report "2019 Key Views: Will The EM Lost Decade End With A Bang Or A Whimper?" dated December 6, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com EQUITIES:FIXED INCOME:CURRENCIES:COMMODITIES:ECONOMY:

Highlights So What? Our best and worst calls of 2018 cast light on our methodology and 2019 forecasts. Why? Our clients took us to task for violating our own methodology on the Iranian oil sanctions. Sticking to our guns would have paid off with long Russian equities versus EM. We correctly called China’s domestic policy, the U.S.-China trade war, Europe, the U.S. midterms, and relative winners in emerging markets. Feature It has been a tradition for BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy, since our launch in 2012, to highlight our best and worst forecasts of the year.1 This will also be the final publication of the year, provided that there is no global conflagration worthy of a missive between now and January 9, when we return to our regular publication schedule. We wish all of our clients a great Holiday Season. And especially all the very best in 2019: lots of happiness, health, and hefty returns. Good luck and good hunting. The Worst Calls Of 2018 A forecasting mistake is wasted if one learns nothing from the error. This is why we take our mistakes seriously and why we always begin the report card with our zingers. Our overall performance in 2018 was … one of our best. The successes below will testify to this. However, we made three notable errors. A Schizophrenic Russia View Our worst call of the year was to panic and close our long Russian equities relative to emerging markets trade in the face of headline geopolitical risks. In early March, we posited that Russia was a “buy” relative to the broad EM equity index due to a combination of cheap valuations, strong macro fundamentals, orthodox policy, and an end to large-scale geopolitical adventurism. This call ultimately proved to be correct (Chart 1). Chart 1Russian Stocks Outperformed In The End Russian Stocks Outperformed In The End Russian Stocks Outperformed In The End What went wrong? The main risk to our view, that the U.S. Congress would pursue an anti-Russia agenda regardless of any Russian sympathies in the Trump White House, materialized in the wake of the poisoning of former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei Skripal with a Novichok nerve agent in the United Kingdom. As fate would have it, the incident occurred just before our bullish report went to clients! The ensuing international uproar and sanctions caused a selloff. Our bullish thesis did not rest exclusively on geopolitics, but a thaw in West-Russia relations did form the main pillar of the view. Our Russia Geopolitical Risk Index, which had served us well in the past, was pricing as low of a level of geopolitical risk as one could hope for in the post-Crimea environment (Chart 2). Naturally the measure jumped into action following the Skripal incident. Chart 2Geopolitical Risk Was Low Prior To Skripal Geopolitical Risk Was Low Prior To Skripal Geopolitical Risk Was Low Prior To Skripal The timing of our call was therefore off, but we should have stuck with the overall view. The U.S. imposed preliminary sanctions that lacked teeth. While Washington accepted the U.K.’s assessment that Moscow was behind the poisoning, the weakness of the sanctions also signaled that the U.S. did not consider the incident worthy of a tougher position. There are now two parallel sanction processes under way. The first round of sanctions announced in August gave Russia 90 days to comply and adopt “remedial measures” regarding the use of chemical and biological weapons. On November 9, the U.S. State Department noted that Russia had not complied with the deadline. The U.S. is now expected to impose a second round of sanctions that will include at least three of six punitive actions: Opposition to development aid and assistance by international financial institutions (think the IMF and the World Bank); Downgrading diplomatic relations; Additional restrictions on exports to Russia (high-tech exports have already been barred by the first round of sanctions); Restrictions on imports from Russia; A ban on landing rights in the U.S. for Russian state-owned airlines; Prohibiting U.S. banks from purchasing Russian government debt. While the White House was expected to have such sanctions ready to go on the November 9 deadline, it has dragged its feet for almost two months now. This suggests that President Trump continues to hold out for improved relations with President Putin. A visit by President Putin to Washington remains possible in Q1 2019. As such, we would expect the White House to adopt some mix of the first five items on the above list, hardly a crushing response from Moscow’s perspective. The U.S. Congress, however, has a parallel process in the form of the Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act of 2018 (DASKAA). Introduced in August by Senator Lindsey Graham, a Russia hawk, the legislation would put restrictions on Americans buying Russian sovereign debt and curb investments in Russian energy projects. The bill also includes secondary sanctions on investing in the Russian oil sector, which would potentially ensnare European energy companies collaborating with Russia in the energy sector. There was some expectation that Congress would take up the bill ahead of the midterm election, but nothing came of it. Even with the latest incident – the seizing of two Ukrainian naval vessels in the Kerch Strait – we have yet to see action. While we expect the U.S. to do something eventually, the White House approach is likely to be tepid while the congressional approach may be too draconian to pass into law. And with Democrats about to take over the House, and likely demand even tougher sanctions against Russia, the ultimate legislation may be too bold for President Trump to sign into legislation. The point is that Russia has acted antagonistically towards the West in 2018, but in small enough increments that the response has been tepid. Given the paucity of Russian financial and trade links with the U.S., Washington’s sanctions would only bite if they included the dreaded “secondary sanction” implications for third party sovereigns and firms – particularly European, which do have a lot of business in Russia. This is highly unlikely without major Russian aggression. We cannot completely ignore the potential for such aggression in 2019, especially with President Putin’s popularity in the doldrums (Chart 3) and a contentious Ukrainian election due for March 31. However, we outlined the constraints against Russia in 2014, amidst the Ukrainian crisis, and we do not think that these constraints have been reduced (they may have only grown since then). Chart 3Non-Negligible Risk Of Russian Aggression Non-Negligible Risk Of Russian Aggression Non-Negligible Risk Of Russian Aggression Regardless of the big picture for 2019, we could have faded the risks in 2018 and stuck to the fundamentals. Russia is up 17.2% against EM year-to-date. The lesson here, therefore, is to find re-entry points into a well-founded view despite market volatility. Chart 1 shows that Russian equities climbed the proverbial “wall of worry” relative to EM in 2018. Doubting Jair Bolsonaro Our list of mistakes keeps us in the EM universe where we underestimated Jair Bolsonaro’s chances of winning the presidency in Brazil. The answer to the question we posed in the title of our September report – “Brazil: Can The Election Change Anything?” – was a definitive “yes.” Since the publication of that report, BRL/USD is up 2.9% and Brazilian equities are up 18.5% relative to EM (Chart 4). Chart 4Bolsonaro Rally Losing Its Luster Already Bolsonaro Rally Losing Its Luster Already Bolsonaro Rally Losing Its Luster Already To our credit, the question of Bolsonaro’s electoral chances elicited passionate and pointed internal debate. But our clients did not see the internal struggle, just the incorrect external output! A bad call is a bad call, no matter how it is assembled on the intellectual assembly line. That said, we still think that our report is valuable. It sets out the constraints facing Bolsonaro in 2019. He has to convince the left-leaning median voter that meaningful pension reform is needed; bully a fractured Congress into painful structural reforms; and overcome an unforgiving macro context of tepid Chinese stimulus and a strong USD. If the Bolsonaro administration wastes the good will of the investment community over the next six months, we expect the market’s punishment to be swift and painful. In fact, Chart 4 notes that the initial Bolsonaro rally has already lost most of its shine. Brazilian assets are still up since the election, but the gentle slope could become a steep fall if Bolsonaro stumbles. The market is priced for political perfection. To be clear, we are not bearish on Bolsonaro. We believe that, relative to EM, he will be a positive for Brazil. However, the market is currently betting that he will win by two touchdowns, whereas we think he will squeak by with a last-second field goal. The difference between the two forecasts is compelling and we have expressed it by being long MXN/BRL.2 Not Sticking To Our Method In The Case Of Iran Throughout late-2017 and 2018 we pointed out that President Trump’s successful application of “maximum pressure” against North Korea could become a market-relevant risk if he were emboldened to try the same strategy against Iran. For much of the year, this view was prescient. As investors realized the seriousness of President Trump’s strategy, a geopolitical risk premium began to seep into oil prices, as illustrated in Chart 5 by the red bar. Chart 5 Every time we spoke to clients or published reports on this topic, we highlighted just how dangerous a “maximum pressure” strategy would be in the case of Iran. We stressed that Iran could wreak havoc across Iraq and other parts of the Middle East and even drive up oil prices to the point of causing a “geopolitical recession in 2019.” In other words, we stressed the extraordinary constraints that President Trump would face. To their credit many of our clients called us out on the inconsistency: our market call was über bullish oil prices, while our methodology emphasized constraints over preferences. We were constantly fielding questions such as: Why would President Trump face down such overwhelming constraints? We did not have a very good answer to this question other than that he was ideologically committed to overturning the Iranian nuclear deal. In essence, we doubted President Trump’s own ideological flexibility and realism. That was a mistake and we tip our hat to the White House for recognizing the complex constraints arrayed against it. President Trump realized by October how dangerous those constraints were and began floating the idea of sanction waivers, causing the geopolitical risk premium to drain from the market (Chart 6). To our credit, we highlighted sanction waivers as a key risk to our view and thus took profit on our bullish energy call early. Chart 6Sanction Waivers Caused A Collapse In Oil Prices Sanction Waivers Caused A Collapse In Oil Prices Sanction Waivers Caused A Collapse In Oil Prices That said, our clients have taken the argument further, pointing out that if we were wrong on Trump’s ideological flexibility with Iran, we may be making the same mistake when it comes to China. However, there is a critical difference. Americans are more concerned about conflict with North Korea than with Iran (Chart 7), while China is the major concern about trade (Chart 8). Chart 7 Chart 8 Second, railing against the Iran deal did not get President Trump elected, whereas his protectionist rhetoric – specifically regarding China – did (Chart 9). Getting anything less than the mother-of-all-deals with Beijing will draw down Trump’s political capital ahead of 2020 and open him to accusations of being “weak” and “surrendering to China.” These are accusations that the country’s other set of protectionists – the Democrats – will wantonly employ against him in the next general election. Chart 9Protectionism, Not Iran, Helped Trump Get Elected Protectionism, Not Iran, Helped Trump Get Elected Protectionism, Not Iran, Helped Trump Get Elected Ultimately, if we have to be wrong, we are at least satisfied that our method stood firm in the face of our own fallibility. We are doubly glad to see our clients using our own method against our views. This is precisely what we wanted to accomplish when we began BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy in March 2012: to revolutionize finance by raising the sophistication with which it approaches geopolitics. That was a lofty goal, but we do not pretend to hold the monopoly on our constraint-based methodology. In the end, our market calls did not suffer due to our error. We closed our long EM energy-producer equities / EM equities for a gain of 4.67% and our long Brent / short S&P 500 for a gain of 6.01%. However, our latter call, shorting the S&P 500 in September, was based on several reasons, including concerns regarding FAANG stocks, overstretched valuations, and an escalation of the trade war. Had we paired our S&P 500 short with a better long, we would have added far more value to our clients. It is that lost opportunity that has kept us up at night throughout this quarter. We essentially timed the S&P 500 correction, but paired it with a wayward long. The Best Calls Of 2018 BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy had a strong year. We are not going to list all of our calls here, but only those most relevant to our clients. Our best 2018 forecast originally appeared in 2017, when in April of that year we predicted that “Political Risks Are Understated In 2018.” Our reasoning was bang on: U.S. fiscal policy would turn strongly stimulative (the tax cuts would pass and Trump would be a big spender) and thus cause the Fed to turn hawkish and the USD to rally, tightening global monetary policy; Trump’s trade war would re-emerge in 2018; China would reboot its structural reform efforts by focusing on containing leverage, thus tightening global “fiscal” policy. In the same report we also predicted that Italian elections in 2018 would reignite Euro Area breakup risks, but that Italian policymakers would ultimately be found to be bluffing, as has been our long-running assertion. Throughout 2018, our team largely maintained and curated the forecasts expressed in that early 2017 report. We start the list of the best calls with the one call that was by far the most important for global assets in 2018: economic policy in China. The Chinese Would Over-Tighten, Then Under-Stimulate Getting Chinese policy right required us, first, to predict that policy would bring negative economic surprises this year, and second, once policy began to ease, to convince clients and colleagues that “this time would be different” and the stimulus would not be very stimulating. In other words, this time, China would not panic and reach for the credit lever of the post-2008 years (Chart 10), but would maintain its relatively tight economic, financial, environmental, and macro-prudential oversight, while easing only on the margin. Chart 10No Massive Credit Stimulus In 2018 No Massive Credit Stimulus In 2018 No Massive Credit Stimulus In 2018 This is precisely what occurred. BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy’s “China Play Index,” which is designed to capture any reflation out of Beijing, collapsed in 2018 and has hardly ticked up since the policy easing announced in July (Chart 11). Chart 11Weak Reflation Signal From China Weak Reflation Signal From China Weak Reflation Signal From China Our view was based on an understanding of Chinese politics that we can confidently say has been unique: From March 2017, we highlighted the importance of the 2017 October Party Congress, arguing that President Xi Jinping would consolidate his power and redouble his attempts to “reform” the economy by reining in dangerous imbalances. We explicitly characterized the containment of leverage as the most market-relevant reform to focus on. We stringently ignored the ideological debate about the nature of reform in China, focusing instead on the major policy changes afoot. We identified very early on how the rising odds of a U.S.-China conflict would embolden Chinese leadership to double-down on painful structural reforms. Will China maintain this disciplined approach in 2019? That is yet to be seen. But we are arming ourselves and clients with critical ways to identify when and whether Beijing’s policy easing transforms into a full-blown “stimulus overshoot”: First, we need to see a clear upturn in shadow financing to believe that the Xi administration has given up on preventing excess debt. Assuming that such a shift occurs, and that overall credit improves, it will enable us to turn bullish on global growth and global risk assets on a cyclical, i.e., not merely tactical, horizon (Chart 12). Chart 12A Shadow Lending Surge Would Mean A Big Policy Shift A Shadow Lending Surge Would Mean A Big Policy Shift A Shadow Lending Surge Would Mean A Big Policy Shift Second, our qualitative checklist will need to see a lot more “checks” in order to change our mind. Short of an extraordinary surge in bank and shadow bank credit, there needs to be a splurge in central and especially local government spending (Table 1). The mid-year spike in local governments’ new bond issuance in 2018 was fleeting and fell far short of the surge that initiated the large-scale stimulus of 2015. Frontloading these bonds in 2019 will depend on timing and magnitude. Table 1A Credit Splurge, Or Government Spending Splurge, Is Necessary For Stimulus To Overshoot BCA Geopolitical Strategy 2018 Report Card BCA Geopolitical Strategy 2018 Report Card Third, we would need to see President Xi Jinping make a shift in rhetoric away from the “Three Battles” of financial risk, pollution, and poverty. Having identified systemic financial risk as the first of the three ills, Xi needs to make a dramatic reversal of this three-year action plan if he is to clear the way for another credit blowout. Trade War Would Reignite In 2018 It paid off to stick with our trade war alarmism in 2018. We correctly forecast that the U.S. and China would collide over trade and that their initial trade agreement – on May 20 – was insubstantial and would not last. In the event it lasted three days. Our one setback on the trade front was to doubt the two sides would agree to a trade truce at the G20. However, by assigning a subjective 40% probability, we correctly noted the fair odds of a truce. We also insisted that any truce would be temporary, which ended up being the case. We may yet be vindicated if the March 1 deadline produces no sustainable deal, as we forecast in last week’s Strategic Outlook. That said, correct geopolitical calls do not butter our bread at BCA. Rather, we are paid to make market calls. To that end, we would point out that we correctly assessed the market-relevance of the trade conflict, fading S&P 500 risks and focusing on the effect on global risk assets. Will this continue into 2019? We think so. We do not see trade conflict as the originator of ongoing market turbulence (Chart 13) and would expect the U.S. to outperform global equities again over the course of 2019 (Chart 14). This view may appear wrong in Q1, as the market digests the Fed backing off from hawkish rhetoric, the ongoing trade negotiations, and the likely seasonal uptick in Chinese credit data in the beginning of the calendar year. Chart 13Yields, Not Trade War, Drove Stocks Yields, Not Trade War, Drove Stocks Yields, Not Trade War, Drove Stocks Chart 14U.S. Stocks Will Resume Outperformance U.S. Stocks Will Resume Outperformance U.S. Stocks Will Resume Outperformance However, any stabilization in equity markets would likely serve to ease financial conditions in the U.S., where economic and inflation conditions remain firmly in tightening territory (Chart 15). As such, the Fed pause is likely to last no more than a quarter, maybe two at best, leading to renewed carnage in global risk assets if our view on Chinese policy stimulus – tepid – remains valid through the course of 2019. Chart 15If Financial Conditions Ease, Tightening Will Be Back On If Financial Conditions Ease, Tightening Will Be Back On If Financial Conditions Ease, Tightening Will Be Back On Europe (All Of It… Again) In 2017, our forecasting track record for Europe was stellar. This continued in 2018, with no major setbacks: Populism in Italy: Our long-held view has been that Europe’s chief remaining risks lay in Italian populists coming to power. We predicted in 2016 that this would eventually happen and that they would then be proven to be bluffing. This is essentially what happened in 2018. Matteo Salvini’s Lega is surging in the polls because its leader has realized that a combination of hard anti-immigrant policy and the softest-of-soft Euroskepticism is a winning combination. We believe that investors can live with this combination. Our only major fault in forecasting European politics and assets this year was to close our bearish Italy call too early: we booked our long Spanish / short Italian 10-year government bond trade for a small loss in August, before the spread between the two Mediterranean countries blew out to record levels. That missed opportunity could have also made it on our “worst calls” list as well. Chart 16 Pluralism in Europe: To get the call on Italy right, we had to dabble in some theoretical work. In a somewhat academic report, we showed that political concentration was on the decline in the developed world (Chart 16), but especially in Europe (Chart 17). Put simply, lower political concentration suggests that a duopoly between the traditional center-left and center-right parties is breaking down. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we argued that Europe’s parliamentary systems would enable centrist parties to adopt elements of the populist agenda, particularly on immigration, without compromising the overall stability of European institutions. As such, political pluralism, or low political concentration, is positive for markets. Chart 17 Immigration crisis is over: For centrist parties to be able to successfully adopt populist immigration policy, they needed a pause in the immigration crisis. This was empirically verifiable in 2018 (Chart 18). Chart 18European Migration Crisis Is Over European Migration Crisis Is Over European Migration Crisis Is Over Merkel’s time has run out: Since early 2017, we had cautioned clients that Angela Merkel’s demise was afoot, but that it would be an opportunity, rather than a risk, when it came. It finally happened in 2018 and it was not a market moving event. The main question for 2019 is whether German policymakers, and Europe as a whole, will use the infusion of fresh blood in Berlin to reaccelerate crucial reforms ahead of the next global recession. Brexit: Since early 2016, we have been right on Brexit. More specifically, we were corrent in cautioning investors that, were Brexit to occur, “the biggest loser would be the Conservative Party, not the EU.” As with the previous two Conservative Party prime ministers, it appears that the question of the U.K.’s relationship with the EU has completely drained any political capital out of Prime Minister Theresa May’s reign. We suspect that the only factor propping up the Tories in the polls is that Jeremy Corbyn is the leader of Her Majesty’s Most Loyal Opposition. We have also argued that soft Brexit would ultimately prove to be “illogical” and that “Bregret” would begin to seep in, as it now most clearly has. We parlayed these rising geopolitical risks and uncertainties by shorting cable in the first half of the year for a 6.21% gain. Malaysia Over Turkey And India Over Brazil Not all was lost for our EM calls this year. We played Malaysia against Turkey in the currency markets for a 17.44% gain, largely thanks to massively divergent governance and structural reform trajectories after Malaysia’s opposition won power for the first time in the country’s history. Second, we initiated a long Indian / short Brazilian equity view in March that returned 27.54% by August. This was a similar play on divergent structural reforms, but it was also a way to hedge our alarmist view on trade. Given India’s isolation from global trade and insular financial markets, we identified India as one of the EM markets that would remain aloof of protectionist risks. We could have closed the trade earlier for greater gain, but did not time the exit properly. Midterm Election: A Major Democratic Victory Our midterm election forecast was correct: Democrats won a substantial victory. Even our initial call on the Senate, that Democrats had a surprisingly large probability of picking up seats, proved to be correct, with Republicans eking out just two gains in a year when Democrats were defending 10 seats in states that Trump carried in 2016. What about our all-important call that the election would have no impact on the markets? That is more difficult to assess, given that the S&P 500 has in fact collapsed in the lead-up to and aftermath of the election. However, we see little connection between the election outcome and the stock market’s performance. Neither do our colleagues or clients, who have largely stopped asking about the Democrats’ policy designs. In 2019, domestic politics may play a role in the markets. Impeachment risk is low, but, if it rears its head, it could prompt President Trump to seek relevance abroad, as his predecessors have done when they lost control of domestic policy. In addition, the Democratic Party’s sweeping House victory may suggest a political pendulum swing to the left in the 2020 presidential election. We will discuss both risks as part of our annual Five Black Swans report in early 2019. U.S. domestic politics was a collection of Red Herrings during much of President Obama’s presidency, and has produced strong tailwinds under President Trump (tax cuts in particular). This may change in 2019, with considerable risk to investors, and asset prices, ahead.     Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist roukayai@bcaresearch.com Ekaterina Shtrevensky, Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      For our 2019 Outlook, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, “2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge,” dated December 14, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. For our past Strategic Outlooks, please visit gps.bcaresearch.com. 2      In part we like this cross because we also think that Mexico’s newly elected president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, is priced to lose by two touchdowns, whereas he may merely lose by a last-second field goal.    

Highlights So What? Our best and worst calls of 2018 cast light on our methodology and 2019 forecasts. Why? Our clients took us to task for violating our own methodology on the Iranian oil sanctions. Sticking to our guns would have paid off with long Russian equities versus EM. We correctly called China’s domestic policy, the U.S.-China trade war, Europe, the U.S. midterms, and relative winners in emerging markets. Feature It has been a tradition for BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy, since our launch in 2012, to highlight our best and worst forecasts of the year.1 This will also be the final publication of the year, provided that there is no global conflagration worthy of a missive between now and January 9, when we return to our regular publication schedule. We wish all of our clients a great Holiday Season. And especially all the very best in 2019: lots of happiness, health, and hefty returns. Good luck and good hunting. The Worst Calls Of 2018 A forecasting mistake is wasted if one learns nothing from the error. This is why we take our mistakes seriously and why we always begin the report card with our zingers. Our overall performance in 2018 was … one of our best. The successes below will testify to this. However, we made three notable errors. A Schizophrenic Russia View Our worst call of the year was to panic and close our long Russian equities relative to emerging markets trade in the face of headline geopolitical risks. In early March, we posited that Russia was a “buy” relative to the broad EM equity index due to a combination of cheap valuations, strong macro fundamentals, orthodox policy, and an end to large-scale geopolitical adventurism. This call ultimately proved to be correct (Chart 1). Chart 1Russian Stocks Outperformed In The End Russian Stocks Outperformed In The End Russian Stocks Outperformed In The End What went wrong? The main risk to our view, that the U.S. Congress would pursue an anti-Russia agenda regardless of any Russian sympathies in the Trump White House, materialized in the wake of the poisoning of former Russian military intelligence officer Sergei Skripal with a Novichok nerve agent in the United Kingdom. As fate would have it, the incident occurred just before our bullish report went to clients! The ensuing international uproar and sanctions caused a selloff. Our bullish thesis did not rest exclusively on geopolitics, but a thaw in West-Russia relations did form the main pillar of the view. Our Russia Geopolitical Risk Index, which had served us well in the past, was pricing as low of a level of geopolitical risk as one could hope for in the post-Crimea environment (Chart 2). Naturally the measure jumped into action following the Skripal incident. Chart 2Geopolitical Risk Was Low Prior To Skripal Geopolitical Risk Was Low Prior To Skripal Geopolitical Risk Was Low Prior To Skripal The timing of our call was therefore off, but we should have stuck with the overall view. The U.S. imposed preliminary sanctions that lacked teeth. While Washington accepted the U.K.’s assessment that Moscow was behind the poisoning, the weakness of the sanctions also signaled that the U.S. did not consider the incident worthy of a tougher position. There are now two parallel sanction processes under way. The first round of sanctions announced in August gave Russia 90 days to comply and adopt “remedial measures” regarding the use of chemical and biological weapons. On November 9, the U.S. State Department noted that Russia had not complied with the deadline. The U.S. is now expected to impose a second round of sanctions that will include at least three of six punitive actions: Opposition to development aid and assistance by international financial institutions (think the IMF and the World Bank); Downgrading diplomatic relations; Additional restrictions on exports to Russia (high-tech exports have already been barred by the first round of sanctions); Restrictions on imports from Russia; A ban on landing rights in the U.S. for Russian state-owned airlines; Prohibiting U.S. banks from purchasing Russian government debt. While the White House was expected to have such sanctions ready to go on the November 9 deadline, it has dragged its feet for almost two months now. This suggests that President Trump continues to hold out for improved relations with President Putin. A visit by President Putin to Washington remains possible in Q1 2019. As such, we would expect the White House to adopt some mix of the first five items on the above list, hardly a crushing response from Moscow’s perspective. The U.S. Congress, however, has a parallel process in the form of the Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act of 2018 (DASKAA). Introduced in August by Senator Lindsey Graham, a Russia hawk, the legislation would put restrictions on Americans buying Russian sovereign debt and curb investments in Russian energy projects. The bill also includes secondary sanctions on investing in the Russian oil sector, which would potentially ensnare European energy companies collaborating with Russia in the energy sector. There was some expectation that Congress would take up the bill ahead of the midterm election, but nothing came of it. Even with the latest incident – the seizing of two Ukrainian naval vessels in the Kerch Strait – we have yet to see action. While we expect the U.S. to do something eventually, the White House approach is likely to be tepid while the congressional approach may be too draconian to pass into law. And with Democrats about to take over the House, and likely demand even tougher sanctions against Russia, the ultimate legislation may be too bold for President Trump to sign into legislation. The point is that Russia has acted antagonistically towards the West in 2018, but in small enough increments that the response has been tepid. Given the paucity of Russian financial and trade links with the U.S., Washington’s sanctions would only bite if they included the dreaded “secondary sanction” implications for third party sovereigns and firms – particularly European, which do have a lot of business in Russia. This is highly unlikely without major Russian aggression. We cannot completely ignore the potential for such aggression in 2019, especially with President Putin’s popularity in the doldrums (Chart 3) and a contentious Ukrainian election due for March 31. However, we outlined the constraints against Russia in 2014, amidst the Ukrainian crisis, and we do not think that these constraints have been reduced (they may have only grown since then). Chart 3Non-Negligible Risk Of Russian Aggression Non-Negligible Risk Of Russian Aggression Non-Negligible Risk Of Russian Aggression Regardless of the big picture for 2019, we could have faded the risks in 2018 and stuck to the fundamentals. Russia is up 17.2% against EM year-to-date. The lesson here, therefore, is to find re-entry points into a well-founded view despite market volatility. Chart 1 shows that Russian equities climbed the proverbial “wall of worry” relative to EM in 2018. Doubting Jair Bolsonaro Our list of mistakes keeps us in the EM universe where we underestimated Jair Bolsonaro’s chances of winning the presidency in Brazil. The answer to the question we posed in the title of our September report – “Brazil: Can The Election Change Anything?” – was a definitive “yes.” Since the publication of that report, BRL/USD is up 2.9% and Brazilian equities are up 18.5% relative to EM (Chart 4). Chart 4Bolsonaro Rally Losing Its Luster Already Bolsonaro Rally Losing Its Luster Already Bolsonaro Rally Losing Its Luster Already To our credit, the question of Bolsonaro’s electoral chances elicited passionate and pointed internal debate. But our clients did not see the internal struggle, just the incorrect external output! A bad call is a bad call, no matter how it is assembled on the intellectual assembly line. That said, we still think that our report is valuable. It sets out the constraints facing Bolsonaro in 2019. He has to convince the left-leaning median voter that meaningful pension reform is needed; bully a fractured Congress into painful structural reforms; and overcome an unforgiving macro context of tepid Chinese stimulus and a strong USD. If the Bolsonaro administration wastes the good will of the investment community over the next six months, we expect the market’s punishment to be swift and painful. In fact, Chart 4 notes that the initial Bolsonaro rally has already lost most of its shine. Brazilian assets are still up since the election, but the gentle slope could become a steep fall if Bolsonaro stumbles. The market is priced for political perfection. To be clear, we are not bearish on Bolsonaro. We believe that, relative to EM, he will be a positive for Brazil. However, the market is currently betting that he will win by two touchdowns, whereas we think he will squeak by with a last-second field goal. The difference between the two forecasts is compelling and we have expressed it by being long MXN/BRL.2 Not Sticking To Our Method In The Case Of Iran Throughout late-2017 and 2018 we pointed out that President Trump’s successful application of “maximum pressure” against North Korea could become a market-relevant risk if he were emboldened to try the same strategy against Iran. For much of the year, this view was prescient. As investors realized the seriousness of President Trump’s strategy, a geopolitical risk premium began to seep into oil prices, as illustrated in Chart 5 by the red bar. Chart 5 Every time we spoke to clients or published reports on this topic, we highlighted just how dangerous a “maximum pressure” strategy would be in the case of Iran. We stressed that Iran could wreak havoc across Iraq and other parts of the Middle East and even drive up oil prices to the point of causing a “geopolitical recession in 2019.” In other words, we stressed the extraordinary constraints that President Trump would face. To their credit many of our clients called us out on the inconsistency: our market call was über bullish oil prices, while our methodology emphasized constraints over preferences. We were constantly fielding questions such as: Why would President Trump face down such overwhelming constraints? We did not have a very good answer to this question other than that he was ideologically committed to overturning the Iranian nuclear deal. In essence, we doubted President Trump’s own ideological flexibility and realism. That was a mistake and we tip our hat to the White House for recognizing the complex constraints arrayed against it. President Trump realized by October how dangerous those constraints were and began floating the idea of sanction waivers, causing the geopolitical risk premium to drain from the market (Chart 6). To our credit, we highlighted sanction waivers as a key risk to our view and thus took profit on our bullish energy call early. Chart 6Sanction Waivers Caused A Collapse In Oil Prices Sanction Waivers Caused A Collapse In Oil Prices Sanction Waivers Caused A Collapse In Oil Prices That said, our clients have taken the argument further, pointing out that if we were wrong on Trump’s ideological flexibility with Iran, we may be making the same mistake when it comes to China. However, there is a critical difference. Americans are more concerned about conflict with North Korea than with Iran (Chart 7), while China is the major concern about trade (Chart 8). Chart 7 Chart 8 Second, railing against the Iran deal did not get President Trump elected, whereas his protectionist rhetoric – specifically regarding China – did (Chart 9). Getting anything less than the mother-of-all-deals with Beijing will draw down Trump’s political capital ahead of 2020 and open him to accusations of being “weak” and “surrendering to China.” These are accusations that the country’s other set of protectionists – the Democrats – will wantonly employ against him in the next general election. Chart 9Protectionism, Not Iran, Helped Trump Get Elected Protectionism, Not Iran, Helped Trump Get Elected Protectionism, Not Iran, Helped Trump Get Elected Ultimately, if we have to be wrong, we are at least satisfied that our method stood firm in the face of our own fallibility. We are doubly glad to see our clients using our own method against our views. This is precisely what we wanted to accomplish when we began BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy in March 2012: to revolutionize finance by raising the sophistication with which it approaches geopolitics. That was a lofty goal, but we do not pretend to hold the monopoly on our constraint-based methodology. In the end, our market calls did not suffer due to our error. We closed our long EM energy-producer equities / EM equities for a gain of 4.67% and our long Brent / short S&P 500 for a gain of 6.01%. However, our latter call, shorting the S&P 500 in September, was based on several reasons, including concerns regarding FAANG stocks, overstretched valuations, and an escalation of the trade war. Had we paired our S&P 500 short with a better long, we would have added far more value to our clients. It is that lost opportunity that has kept us up at night throughout this quarter. We essentially timed the S&P 500 correction, but paired it with a wayward long. The Best Calls Of 2018 BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy had a strong year. We are not going to list all of our calls here, but only those most relevant to our clients. Our best 2018 forecast originally appeared in 2017, when in April of that year we predicted that “Political Risks Are Understated In 2018.” Our reasoning was bang on: U.S. fiscal policy would turn strongly stimulative (the tax cuts would pass and Trump would be a big spender) and thus cause the Fed to turn hawkish and the USD to rally, tightening global monetary policy; Trump’s trade war would re-emerge in 2018; China would reboot its structural reform efforts by focusing on containing leverage, thus tightening global “fiscal” policy. In the same report we also predicted that Italian elections in 2018 would reignite Euro Area breakup risks, but that Italian policymakers would ultimately be found to be bluffing, as has been our long-running assertion. Throughout 2018, our team largely maintained and curated the forecasts expressed in that early 2017 report. We start the list of the best calls with the one call that was by far the most important for global assets in 2018: economic policy in China. The Chinese Would Over-Tighten, Then Under-Stimulate Getting Chinese policy right required us, first, to predict that policy would bring negative economic surprises this year, and second, once policy began to ease, to convince clients and colleagues that “this time would be different” and the stimulus would not be very stimulating. In other words, this time, China would not panic and reach for the credit lever of the post-2008 years (Chart 10), but would maintain its relatively tight economic, financial, environmental, and macro-prudential oversight, while easing only on the margin. Chart 10No Massive Credit Stimulus In 2018 No Massive Credit Stimulus In 2018 No Massive Credit Stimulus In 2018 This is precisely what occurred. BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy’s “China Play Index,” which is designed to capture any reflation out of Beijing, collapsed in 2018 and has hardly ticked up since the policy easing announced in July (Chart 11). Chart 11Weak Reflation Signal From China Weak Reflation Signal From China Weak Reflation Signal From China Our view was based on an understanding of Chinese politics that we can confidently say has been unique: From March 2017, we highlighted the importance of the 2017 October Party Congress, arguing that President Xi Jinping would consolidate his power and redouble his attempts to “reform” the economy by reining in dangerous imbalances. We explicitly characterized the containment of leverage as the most market-relevant reform to focus on. We stringently ignored the ideological debate about the nature of reform in China, focusing instead on the major policy changes afoot. We identified very early on how the rising odds of a U.S.-China conflict would embolden Chinese leadership to double-down on painful structural reforms. Will China maintain this disciplined approach in 2019? That is yet to be seen. But we are arming ourselves and clients with critical ways to identify when and whether Beijing’s policy easing transforms into a full-blown “stimulus overshoot”: First, we need to see a clear upturn in shadow financing to believe that the Xi administration has given up on preventing excess debt. Assuming that such a shift occurs, and that overall credit improves, it will enable us to turn bullish on global growth and global risk assets on a cyclical, i.e., not merely tactical, horizon (Chart 12). Chart 12A Shadow Lending Surge Would Mean A Big Policy Shift A Shadow Lending Surge Would Mean A Big Policy Shift A Shadow Lending Surge Would Mean A Big Policy Shift Second, our qualitative checklist will need to see a lot more “checks” in order to change our mind. Short of an extraordinary surge in bank and shadow bank credit, there needs to be a splurge in central and especially local government spending (Table 1). The mid-year spike in local governments’ new bond issuance in 2018 was fleeting and fell far short of the surge that initiated the large-scale stimulus of 2015. Frontloading these bonds in 2019 will depend on timing and magnitude. Table 1A Credit Splurge, Or Government Spending Splurge, Is Necessary For Stimulus To Overshoot BCA Geopolitical Strategy 2018 Report Card BCA Geopolitical Strategy 2018 Report Card Third, we would need to see President Xi Jinping make a shift in rhetoric away from the “Three Battles” of financial risk, pollution, and poverty. Having identified systemic financial risk as the first of the three ills, Xi needs to make a dramatic reversal of this three-year action plan if he is to clear the way for another credit blowout. Trade War Would Reignite In 2018 It paid off to stick with our trade war alarmism in 2018. We correctly forecast that the U.S. and China would collide over trade and that their initial trade agreement – on May 20 – was insubstantial and would not last. In the event it lasted three days. Our one setback on the trade front was to doubt the two sides would agree to a trade truce at the G20. However, by assigning a subjective 40% probability, we correctly noted the fair odds of a truce. We also insisted that any truce would be temporary, which ended up being the case. We may yet be vindicated if the March 1 deadline produces no sustainable deal, as we forecast in last week’s Strategic Outlook. That said, correct geopolitical calls do not butter our bread at BCA. Rather, we are paid to make market calls. To that end, we would point out that we correctly assessed the market-relevance of the trade conflict, fading S&P 500 risks and focusing on the effect on global risk assets. Will this continue into 2019? We think so. We do not see trade conflict as the originator of ongoing market turbulence (Chart 13) and would expect the U.S. to outperform global equities again over the course of 2019 (Chart 14). This view may appear wrong in Q1, as the market digests the Fed backing off from hawkish rhetoric, the ongoing trade negotiations, and the likely seasonal uptick in Chinese credit data in the beginning of the calendar year. Chart 13Yields, Not Trade War, Drove Stocks Yields, Not Trade War, Drove Stocks Yields, Not Trade War, Drove Stocks Chart 14U.S. Stocks Will Resume Outperformance U.S. Stocks Will Resume Outperformance U.S. Stocks Will Resume Outperformance However, any stabilization in equity markets would likely serve to ease financial conditions in the U.S., where economic and inflation conditions remain firmly in tightening territory (Chart 15). As such, the Fed pause is likely to last no more than a quarter, maybe two at best, leading to renewed carnage in global risk assets if our view on Chinese policy stimulus – tepid – remains valid through the course of 2019. Chart 15If Financial Conditions Ease, Tightening Will Be Back On If Financial Conditions Ease, Tightening Will Be Back On If Financial Conditions Ease, Tightening Will Be Back On Europe (All Of It… Again) In 2017, our forecasting track record for Europe was stellar. This continued in 2018, with no major setbacks: Populism in Italy: Our long-held view has been that Europe’s chief remaining risks lay in Italian populists coming to power. We predicted in 2016 that this would eventually happen and that they would then be proven to be bluffing. This is essentially what happened in 2018. Matteo Salvini’s Lega is surging in the polls because its leader has realized that a combination of hard anti-immigrant policy and the softest-of-soft Euroskepticism is a winning combination. We believe that investors can live with this combination. Our only major fault in forecasting European politics and assets this year was to close our bearish Italy call too early: we booked our long Spanish / short Italian 10-year government bond trade for a small loss in August, before the spread between the two Mediterranean countries blew out to record levels. That missed opportunity could have also made it on our “worst calls” list as well. Chart 16 Pluralism in Europe: To get the call on Italy right, we had to dabble in some theoretical work. In a somewhat academic report, we showed that political concentration was on the decline in the developed world (Chart 16), but especially in Europe (Chart 17). Put simply, lower political concentration suggests that a duopoly between the traditional center-left and center-right parties is breaking down. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we argued that Europe’s parliamentary systems would enable centrist parties to adopt elements of the populist agenda, particularly on immigration, without compromising the overall stability of European institutions. As such, political pluralism, or low political concentration, is positive for markets. Chart 17 Immigration crisis is over: For centrist parties to be able to successfully adopt populist immigration policy, they needed a pause in the immigration crisis. This was empirically verifiable in 2018 (Chart 18). Chart 18European Migration Crisis Is Over European Migration Crisis Is Over European Migration Crisis Is Over Merkel’s time has run out: Since early 2017, we had cautioned clients that Angela Merkel’s demise was afoot, but that it would be an opportunity, rather than a risk, when it came. It finally happened in 2018 and it was not a market moving event. The main question for 2019 is whether German policymakers, and Europe as a whole, will use the infusion of fresh blood in Berlin to reaccelerate crucial reforms ahead of the next global recession. Brexit: Since early 2016, we have been right on Brexit. More specifically, we were corrent in cautioning investors that, were Brexit to occur, “the biggest loser would be the Conservative Party, not the EU.” As with the previous two Conservative Party prime ministers, it appears that the question of the U.K.’s relationship with the EU has completely drained any political capital out of Prime Minister Theresa May’s reign. We suspect that the only factor propping up the Tories in the polls is that Jeremy Corbyn is the leader of Her Majesty’s Most Loyal Opposition. We have also argued that soft Brexit would ultimately prove to be “illogical” and that “Bregret” would begin to seep in, as it now most clearly has. We parlayed these rising geopolitical risks and uncertainties by shorting cable in the first half of the year for a 6.21% gain. Malaysia Over Turkey And India Over Brazil Not all was lost for our EM calls this year. We played Malaysia against Turkey in the currency markets for a 17.44% gain, largely thanks to massively divergent governance and structural reform trajectories after Malaysia’s opposition won power for the first time in the country’s history. Second, we initiated a long Indian / short Brazilian equity view in March that returned 27.54% by August. This was a similar play on divergent structural reforms, but it was also a way to hedge our alarmist view on trade. Given India’s isolation from global trade and insular financial markets, we identified India as one of the EM markets that would remain aloof of protectionist risks. We could have closed the trade earlier for greater gain, but did not time the exit properly. Midterm Election: A Major Democratic Victory Our midterm election forecast was correct: Democrats won a substantial victory. Even our initial call on the Senate, that Democrats had a surprisingly large probability of picking up seats, proved to be correct, with Republicans eking out just two gains in a year when Democrats were defending 10 seats in states that Trump carried in 2016. What about our all-important call that the election would have no impact on the markets? That is more difficult to assess, given that the S&P 500 has in fact collapsed in the lead-up to and aftermath of the election. However, we see little connection between the election outcome and the stock market’s performance. Neither do our colleagues or clients, who have largely stopped asking about the Democrats’ policy designs. In 2019, domestic politics may play a role in the markets. Impeachment risk is low, but, if it rears its head, it could prompt President Trump to seek relevance abroad, as his predecessors have done when they lost control of domestic policy. In addition, the Democratic Party’s sweeping House victory may suggest a political pendulum swing to the left in the 2020 presidential election. We will discuss both risks as part of our annual Five Black Swans report in early 2019. U.S. domestic politics was a collection of Red Herrings during much of President Obama’s presidency, and has produced strong tailwinds under President Trump (tax cuts in particular). This may change in 2019, with considerable risk to investors, and asset prices, ahead.     Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist roukayai@bcaresearch.com Ekaterina Shtrevensky, Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      For our 2019 Outlook, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, “2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge,” dated December 14, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. For our past Strategic Outlooks, please visit gps.bcaresearch.com. 2      In part we like this cross because we also think that Mexico’s newly elected president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, is priced to lose by two touchdowns, whereas he may merely lose by a last-second field goal.    

Highlights So What? Global divergence will persist beyond the near term. Why? China’s stimulus will be disappointing unless things get much worse. U.S.-China trade war will reignite and strategic tensions will continue. European risks are limited short-term, but will surge without reform. U.S. assets will outperform; oil and the yen will rise; the pound is a long-term play; EM pain will continue. Feature The year 2019 will be one of considerable geopolitical uncertainty. Three issues dominate our Outlook, with low-conviction views on all three questions: Question 1: How much will China stimulate? Question 2: Will the trade war abate? Question 3: Is Europe a Black Swan or a Red Herring? U.S. Outperformance Should Be Bullish USD U.S. Outperformance Should Be Bullish USD The main story in 2018 was policy divergence. American policymakers ramped up stimulus – both through the profligate tax cuts and fiscal spending – at the same time that Chinese policymakers stuck to their guns on de-levering the economy. The consequence of this policy mix was that the synchronized global recovery of late 2016 and 2017 evolved into a massive outperformance by the U.S. economy (Chart 1). The Fed responded to the bullish domestic conditions with little regard for the global economy, causing the DXY to rally from a 2018 low of 88.59 in February to 97.04 today. Fiscal Conservatism Melts Away Fiscal Conservatism Melts Away Republicans Change Their Minds When In Power Republicans Change Their Minds When In Power While the policy divergence narrative appears to be macroeconomic in nature, it is purely political. There is nothing cyclical about the ‘U.S.’ economic outperformance in 2018. President Donald Trump campaigned on an economic populist agenda and then proceeded to deliver on it throughout 2017 and 2018. He faced little opposition from fiscal conservatives, mainly because fiscal conservativism melts away from the public discourse when budget deficits are low (Chart 2) and when the president is a Republican (Chart 3). Meanwhile, Chinese policymakers have decided to tolerate greater economic pain in an effort to escape the Middle Income Trap (Chart 4). They believe this trap will envelop them if they cannot grow the economy without expanding the already-massive build-up of leverage (Chart 5). 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge Debt Still Rising Debt Still Rising Geopolitics is not just about “things blowing up somewhere in the desert.” In today’s world, emblematized by paradigm shifts, politicians are more than ever in the driver’s seat. While technocrats respond to macroeconomic factors, politicians respond to political and geopolitical constraints. Few investment narratives last much longer than a year and policy divergence is coming to a close. Will the Fed pause given the turn in global growth? Will China respond with effective stimulus in 2019? If the answer to both questions is yes, global risk assets could light up in the next quarter and potentially beyond. Already EM has outperformed DM assets for a month and some canaries in the coal mine for global growth – like the performance of Swedish economic indicators – signal that the outperformance is real. Global Economic Divergence Will Continue Global Economic Divergence Will Continue 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge We are skeptical that the move is sustainable beyond a quarter or two (Chart 6). As our colleague Peter Berezin has highlighted, the market is pricing less than one hike in 2019 (Chart 7). Regardless, the impact on the U.S. dollar, remains muted, with the DXY at 97.04. This suggests that the backing off that the Fed may or may not have already done is still not enough from the perspective of weakening global growth (Chart 8). Global risk assets need more from the Fed than what the market is already pricing. And with U.S. inflationary pressures building (Chart 9), the BCA House View expects to see multiple Fed hikes in 2019, disappointing investors bullish on EM and global risk assets. Global Growth Leading Indicators Global Growth Leading Indicators Does The Fed Like It Hot? Does The Fed Like It Hot? With our Fed view set by the House View, we therefore turn to where we can add value. To this end, the most important question of 2018 largely remains the same in 2019: How much will China stimulate? Question 1: How Much Will China Stimulate In 2019? bca.gps_sr_2018_12_14_c10 bca.gps_sr_2018_12_14_c10 China is undoubtedly already stimulating, with a surge in local government bond issuance earlier this year and a bottoming in the broad money impulse (Chart 10). M2 is in positive territory. However, the effort can best be characterized as tepid, with a late-year collapse in bond issuance (Chart 11) and a still-negative total social financing (TSF) impulse (Chart 12). TSF is the broadest measure of private credit in China’s economy.   2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge China's Total Credit Is Weak China's Total Credit Is Weak We expect a surge in TSF in Q1, but this is a normal seasonal effect. A typical Q1 credit surge will not be enough to set global risk assets alight for very long, particularly if the market has already priced in as much of a “pause” from the Fed as we are going to get. Investors should specifically focus on new local government bond issuance and whether the “shadow financing” component of TSF gets a bid, since the primary reason for the weakness in TSF over the past year is the government’s crackdown on shadow lending. As Chart 13A & B shows, it was new local government bonds that led the way for stimulus efforts in 2015, followed by a surge in both bank lending and shadow lending in 2016. Don't Focus Just On TSF... Don't Focus Just On TSF... ...But Shadow Financing In Particular ...But Shadow Financing In Particular We would also expect further monetary policy easing, with extra RRR cuts or even a benchmark policy rate cut. However, monetary policy has been easy all year and yet the impact on credit growth has remained muted. This begs two important questions: Is the credit channel impaired? A slew of macroprudential reforms – which we have dubbed China’s “Preemptive Dodd-Frank” – may have impaired the flow of credit in the system. The official policy of “opening the front door, closing the back door” has seen bank loans pick up modestly but shadow lending has been curtailed (Chart 14A & B). This way of controlling the rise of leverage has its costs. For private enterprises – with poor access to the official banking sector – the shadow financial system was an important source of funding over the past several years. Opening The Front Door... Opening The Front Door... ...Closing The Back Door ...Closing The Back Door Is policy pushing on a string? An even more dire scenario would be if China’s credit channel is not technically, but rather psychologically, impaired. Multiple reasons may be to blame: a negative net return on the assets of state-owned enterprises (Chart 15); widespread trade war worries; mixed signals from policymakers; or a general lack of confidence in the political direction of the country. The rising M2/M1 ratio suggests that the overall economy’s “propensity to save” is rising (Chart 16). Old China Is A Zombie China Old China Is A Zombie China Propensity To Save Propensity To Save Why would Chinese policymakers keep their cool despite a slow pickup in credit growth? Are they not concerned about unemployment, social unrest, and instability? Of course, they are. But Chinese policymakers are not myopic. They also want to improve potential GDP over the long run. Table 1China: The Trend In Domestic Demand, And The Outlook For Trade, Is Negative 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge So far, the economy has weathered the storm relatively well. First, eight out of ten of our China Investment Strategy’s housing price indicators (Table 1) are flat-to-up – although it is true that the October deterioration in floor space started and especially floor space sold (Chart 17) is cause for concern. If and when the housing market weakens further, stimulus will be used to offset it, despite the fact that the government is attempting to prevent a sharp increase in prices at the same time. With so much of China’s middle-class savings invested in the housing market, the key pillar of socio-economic stability is therefore real estate. A Possible Clue For China Stimulusr A Possible Clue For China Stimulusr Second, credit has fueled China’s “old economy,” but policymakers want to buoy “new China” (Chart 18). This means that measures to boost consumption and the service sector economy will be emphasized in new rounds of stimulus, as has occurred thus far (tax cuts, tariff cuts, deregulation, etc). This kind of stimulus is not great news for global risk assets leveraged to “old China,” such as EM and industrial metals. Rebalancing Of The Chinese Economy Rebalancing Of The Chinese Economy Third, policymakers are not exclusively focused on day-to-day stability but are also focused on the decades-long perseverance of China’s political model. And that means moving away from leverage and credit as the sole fuel for the economy. This is not just about the Middle Income Trap, it is also about national security and ultimately sovereignty. Relying on corporate re-levering for stimulus simply doubles-down on the current economic model, which is still export-oriented given that most investment is geared toward the export sector. But this also means that China will be held hostage to foreign demand and thus geopolitical pressures, a fact that has been revealed this year through the protectionism of the White House. As such, moving away from the investment-led growth model and towards a more endogenous, consumer-led model is not just good macro policy, it makes sense geopolitically as well. Will the trade war – or the current period of trade truce – change Chinese policymakers’ decision-making? We do not see why it would. First, if the trade truce evolves into a trade deal, the expected export shock will not happen (Chart 19) and thus major stimulative measures would be less necessary. Second, if we understand correctly why policymakers have cited leverage as an “ill” in the first place, then we would assume that they would use the trade war as an excuse for the pain that they themselves have instigated. In other words, the trade war with the U.S. gives President Xi Jinping the perfect excuse for the slowdown, one that draws attention from the real culprit: domestic rebalancing. Trump's Initial Tariffs Soon To Be Felt Trump's Initial Tariffs Soon To Be Felt Bottom Line: Since mid-2018, we have been asking clients to focus on our “Stimulus Overshoot” checklist (Table 2). We give the first item – “broad money and/or total credit growth spike” – a premier spot on the list. If a surge in total credit occurs, we will know that policymakers are throwing in the towel and stimulating in a major way. It will be time to turn super-positive on global risk assets, beyond a mere tactical trade, as a cyclical view at that point. Note that if one had gone long EM in early February 2016, when January data revealed a truly epic TSF splurge, one would not have been late to the rally. Table 2Will China’s Stimulus Overshoot In 2019? 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge Our low-conviction view, at the moment, is that the increase in credit growth that we will see in Q1 will be seasonal – the usual frontloading of lending at the beginning of the year – rather than an extraordinary surge that would signal a policy change. A modest increase in credit growth will not be enough to spark a sustainable – year-long – rally in global risk assets. The Fed has already backed off as far as the market is concerned. As such, a pickup in Chinese credit could temporarily excite investors. But global stabilization may only embolden the Fed to refocus on tightening after a Q1 pause. Question 2: Will The Trade War Abate? The first question for investors when it comes to the trade war is “Why should we care?” Sure, trade policy uncertainty appears to have correlated with the underperformance of global equity indices relative to the U.S. (Chart 20). However, such market action was as much caused by our policy divergence story – being as it is deeply negative for EM assets – as by a trade war whose impact on the real economy has not yet been felt. U.S. Is 'Winning' The Trade War U.S. Is 'Winning' The Trade War Nonetheless, we do believe that getting the trade war “right” is a big call for 2019. First, while the impact of the U.S.-China trade war has been minimal thus far, it is only because China front-loaded its exports ahead of the expected tariffs, cut interbank rates and RRRs, accelerated local government spending, and allowed CNY/USD to depreciate by 10%. A restart of trade tensions that leads to further tariffs will make frontloading untenable over time, whereas further currency depreciation would be severely debilitating for EMs. We doubt the sustainability of the trade truce for three reasons: U.S. domestic politics: The just-concluded midterm election saw no opposition to President Trump on trade. The Democratic Party candidates campaigned against the president on a range of issues, but not on his aggressive China policy. Polling from the summer also shows that a majority of American voters consider trade with China unfair (Chart 21). In addition, President Trump will walk into the 2020 election with a wider trade deficit, due to his own stimulative economic policy (Chart 22). He will need to explain why he is “losing” on the one measure of national power that he campaigned on in 2016. Structural trade tensions: Ahead of the G20 truce, the U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer issued a hawkish report that concluded that China has not substantively changed any of the trade practices that initiated U.S. tariffs. Lighthizer has been put in charge of the current trade negotiations, which is a step-up in intensity from Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, who was in charge of the failed May 2018 round. Geopolitical tensions: The G20 truce did not contain any substantive resolution to the ongoing strategic tensions between the U.S. and China, such as in the South China Sea. Beyond traditional geopolitics, tensions are increasingly involving high-tech trade and investment between the two countries and American allegations of cyber theft and spying by China. The recent arrest of Huawei’s CFO in Canada, on an American warrant, will likely deepen this high-tech conflict in the short term. 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge Trade Deficit To Rise Despite Tariffs Trade Deficit To Rise Despite Tariffs Since the G20 truce with Xi, President Trump has seen no significant pickup in approval ratings (Chart 23). Given that the median American voter has embraced protectionism – against China at least – we would not expect any. Meanwhile, U.S. equities have sold off, contrary to what President Trump, or his pro-trade advisors, likely expected in making the G20 decision to delay tariffs. Appeasing China Doesn't Pay Appeasing China Doesn't Pay At some point, President Trump will realize that he risks considerable political capital on a trade deal with China that very few voters actually want or that the U.S. intelligence and defense community supports. Democrats did not oppose his aggressive China policy in the midterm election because they know that the median voter does not want it. As such, it is guaranteed that Trump’s 2020 Democratic Party opponent will accuse him of “surrender,” or at least “weakness.” If, over the next quarter, the economic and market returns on his gambit are paltry, we would expect President Trump to end the truce. Furthermore, we believe that a substantive, and long-lasting, trade deal is unlikely given the mounting tensions between China and the U.S. These tensions are not a product of President Trump, but are rather a long-run, structural feature of the twenty-first century that we have been tracking since 2012.1 Tensions are likely to rise in parallel to the trade talks on the technology front. We expect 2019 to be the year when investors price in what we have called Bifurcated Capitalism: the segmentation of capital, labor, and trade flows into geopolitically adversarial – and yet capitalist in nature – economic blocs. Entire countries and sectors may become off-limits to Western investors and vice-versa for their Chinese counterparts. Countries will fall into either the Tencent and Huawei bloc or the Apple and Ericsson bloc. This development is different from the Cold War. Note our emphasis on capitalism in the term Bifurcated Capitalism. The Soviet Union was obviously not capitalist, and clients of BCA did not have interests in its assets in the 1970s and 1980s. Trade between Cold War economic blocs was also limited, particularly outside of commodities. The closest comparison to the world we now inhabit is that of the nineteenth century. Almost all global powers were quite capitalist at the time, but they engaged in imperialism in order to expand their economic spheres of influence and thus economies of scale. In the twenty-first century, Africa and Asia – the targets of nineteenth century imperialism – may be replaced with market share wars in novel technologies and the Internet. This will put a ceiling on how much expansion tech and telecommunication companies can expect in the competing parts of Bifurcated Capitalism. The investment consequences of this concept are still unclear. But what is clear is that American policymakers are already planning for some version of the world we are describing. The orchestrated effort by the U.S. intelligence community to encourage its geopolitical allies to ban the use of Huawei equipment in their 5G mobile networks suggests that there are limits to the current truce ever becoming a sustainable deal. So does the repeated use of economic sanctions originally designed for Iran and Russia against Chinese companies. President Trump sets short- and medium-term policies given that he is the president. However, the intelligence and defense communities have “pivoted to Asia” gradually since 2012. This shift has occurred because the U.S. increasingly sees China as a peer competitor, for the time being confined in East Asia but with intentions of projecting power globally. To what extent could President Trump produce a trade deal with Xi that also encompasses a change in the U.S. perception of China as an adversary? We assign a low probability to it. As such, President Xi has little reason to give in to U.S. pressure on trade, as he knows that the geopolitical and technology pressure will continue. In fact, President Xi may have all the reason to double-down on his transformative reforms, which would mean more pain for high-beta global plays. Bottom Line: What may have appeared as merely a trade conflict has evolved into a broad geopolitical confrontation. President Trump has little reason to conclude a deal with China by March. Domestic political pressures are not pushing in the direction of the deal, while America’s “Deep State” is eager for a confrontation with China. Furthermore, with President Trump “blinking” on Iranian sanctions, his administration has implicitly acknowledged the constraints discouraging a deeper involvement in the Middle East. This puts the geopolitical focus squarely on China. Question 3: Is Europe a Black Swan or a Red Herring? The last two years have been a dud in Europe. Since the Brexit referendum in mid-2016, European politics have not been a catalyst for global markets, save for an Italy-induced sell-off or two. This could substantively change in 2019. And, as with the first two questions, the results could be binary. On one hand, there is the positive scenario where the stalled and scaled-back reforms on the banking union and Euro Area budget get a shot in the arm in the middle of the year. On the other hand, the negative scenario would see European-wide reforms stall, leaving the continent particularly vulnerable as the next global recession inevitably nears. At the heart of the binary distribution is the broader question of whether populism in Europe is trending higher. Most commentators and our clients would say yes, especially after the protests and rioting in Paris over the course of November. But the answer is more complicated than that. While populists have found considerable success in the ballot box (Chart 24), they have not managed to turn sentiment in Europe against the currency union (Chart 25). Even in Italy, which has a populist coalition government in power, the support for currency union is at 61%, the highest since 2012. This number has apparently risen since populists took over. Anti-Establishment Parties Are Rising... Anti-Establishment Parties Are Rising... ...But Euroskepticism Is A Failed Strategy ...But Euroskepticism Is A Failed Strategy What explains this divergence? Effectively, Europe’s establishment parties are being blamed for a lot of alleged ills, liberal immigration policy first amongst them. However, European integration remains favored across the ideological spectrum. Few parties that solely focus on Euroskepticism have any chance of winning power, something that both Lega and Five Star Movement found out in Italy. Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini confirmed his conversion away from Euroskepticism by stating that he wants to “reform the EU from the inside” and that it was time to give the “Rome-Berlin axis” another go.2 Salvini is making a bet – correct in our view – that by moderating Lega’s populism on Europe, he can capture the center ground and win the majority in the next Italian election, which could happen as soon as 2019. As such, we don’t think that the “rise of populism” in Europe is either dramatic or market-relevant. In fact, mainstream parties are quickly adopting parts of the anti-establishment agenda, particularly on immigration, in a bid to recoup lost voters. A much bigger risk for Europe than populism is stagnation on the reform front, a perpetual Eurosclerosis that leaves the bloc vulnerable in the next recession. What Europe needs is the completion of a backstop to prevent contagion. Such a backstop necessitates greatly enhancing the just-passed banking union reforms. The watered-down reforms did not include a common backstop to the EU’s single resolution fund nor a deposit union. A working group will report on both by June 2019, with a potential legislative act set for some time in 2024. What could be a sign that the EU is close to a grand package of reforms in 2019? We see three main avenues. First, a political shift in Germany. Investors almost had one, with conservative Friedrich Merz coming close to defeating Merkel’s hand-picked successor Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (also known as AKK) for the leadership of the ruling Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Merz combined a right-leaning anti-immigrant stance with staunch pro-European integration outlook. It is unclear whether AKK will be willing to make the same type of “grand bargain” with the more conservative factions of the CDU electorate. However, AKK may not have a choice, with both Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the Green Party nibbling at the heels of the right-of-center CDU and left-of-center Social-Democratic Party (SPD) (Chart 26). The rise of the Green party is particularly extraordinary, suggesting that a larger portion of the German electorate is radically Europhile rather than Euroskeptic. AKK may have to adopt Merz’s platform and then push for EU reforms. Challengers To The Established Parties Challengers To The Established Parties Second, French President Emmanuel Macron may have to look abroad for relevance. With his reform agenda stalled and political capital drained, it would make sense for Macron to spend 2019 and beyond on European reforms. Third, a resolution of the Brexit debacle. The longer the saga with the U.K. drags on, the less focus there will be in Europe on integration of the Euro Area. If the U.K. decides to extend the current negotiating period, it may even have to hold elections for the European Parliament. As such, we are not focusing on the budget crisis in Italy – our view that Rome is “bluffing” is coming to fruition –or a potential early election in Spain. And we are definitely not focusing on the EU Parliamentary election in May. These will largely be red herrings. The real question is whether European policymakers will finally have a window of opportunity for strategic reforms. And that will require Merkel, AKK, and Macron to expend whatever little political capital they have left and invest it in restructuring European institutions. Finally, a word on Europe’s role in the global trade war. While Europe is a natural ally for the U.S. against China – given its institutional connections, existing alliance, and trade surplus with the latter and deficit with the former (Chart 27) – we believe that the odds are rising of a unilateral tariff action by the U.S. on car imports. EU Surplus With U.S. Pays For Deficit With China EU Surplus With U.S. Pays For Deficit With China This is because the just-concluded NAFTA deal likely raised the cost of vehicle production in the trade bloc, necessitating import tariffs in order for the deal to make sense from President Trump’s set of political priorities. The Trump administration may not have the stomach for a long-term trade war with Europe, but it can shake up the markets with actions in that direction. Bottom Line: In the near term, there are no existential political risks in Europe in 2019. As such, investors who are bullish on European assets should not let geopolitics stand in the way of executing on their sentiment. We remain cautious for macroeconomic reasons, namely that Europe is a high-beta DM play that needs global growth to outperform in order to catch a bid. However, 2019 is a make-or-break year on key structural reforms in Europe. Without more work on the banking union – and without greater burden sharing, broadly defined – the Euro Area will remain woefully unprepared for the next global recession. Question 4: Will Brexit Happen? Given the volume of market-relevant geopolitical issues, we have decided to pose (and attempt to answer) five additional questions for 2019. We start with Brexit. Prime Minister Theresa May has asked for a delay to the vote in the House of Commons on the Withdrawal Treaty, which she would have inevitably lost. The defeat of the subsequent leadership challenge is not confidence-inspiring as the vote was close and a third of Tory MPs voted against her. May likely has until sometime in January to pass the EU Withdrawal Agreement setting out the terms of Brexit, given that all other EU member states have to get it through their parliaments before the Brexit date on March 29. The real question is whether any deal can get through Westminster. The numbers are there for the softest of soft Brexits, the so-called Norway+ option where the U.K. effectively gets the same deal as Norway, if May convinces the Labour Party to break ranks. Such a deal would entail Common Market access, but at the cost of having to pay essentially for full EU membership with no ability to influence the regulatory policies that London would have to abide by. The alternative is to call for a new election – which may usher the even less pro-Brexit Labour Party into power – or to delay Brexit for a more substantive period of time, or simply to buckle under the pressure and call for a second referendum. We disagree that the delay signals that the “no deal Brexit,” or the “Brexit cliff,” is nigh. Such an outcome is in nobody’s interest and both May and the EU can offer delays to ensure that it does not happen. Whatever happens, one thing is clear: the median voter is turning forcefully towards Bremain (Chart 28). It will soon become untenable to delay the second referendum. And even if the House of Commons passes the softest of Soft Brexit deals, we expect that the Norway+ option will prove to be unacceptable when Westminster has to vote on it again in two or three year’s time. Bremain Surging Structurally Bremain Surging Structurally Is it time to buy the pound, particularly cable, which is cheap on a long-term basis (Chart 29)? It is a tough call. On one hand, our confidence that the U.K. ultimately has to remain in the EU is rising. However, to get there, the U.K. may need one last major dose of volatility, either in the form of a slow-burn crisis caused by Tory indecision or in the form of a far-left Labour government that tries its own hand at Brexit while pursuing a 1970s style left-wing economic agenda. Can any investor withstand this kind of volatility in the short and potentially long-ish term? Only the longest of the long-term investors can.  Start Buying The Pound Start Buying The Pound Question 5: Will Oil Prices Rally Substantively In 2019? Several risks to oil supply remain for 2019. First, there is little basis for stabilization in Venezuelan oil production, and further deterioration is likely (Chart 30). Second, sectarian tensions in Iraq remain unresolved. Third, supply risks in other geopolitical hot spots – like Nigeria and Libya – could surprise in 2019. Venezuela: On A Downward Spiral Venezuela: On A Downward Spiral The most pressing geopolitical issue, however, is a decision on the Iranian sanction waivers. President Trump induced considerable market-volatility in 2019 by signaling that he would use “maximum pressure” against Iran. As a result, the risk premium contribution to the oil price – illustrated in Chart 31 by the red bar – rose throughout 2018, only to collapse as the White House offered six-month sanction waivers. Not only did the risk premium dissipate, but Saudi Arabia then scrambled to reverse the production surge it had instituted to offset the Iran sanctions. 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge We agree with BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy that oil market fundamentals are tight and numerous supply risks loom. We also struggle to see why President Trump will seek to pick a fight with Iran in the summer of 2019. Our suspicion is that if President Trump was afraid of a gasoline-price spike right after the midterm election, why would he not “blink” at the end of the spring? Not only will the U.S. summer driving season be in full swing – a time of peak U.S. gasoline demand – but the 2020 election primaries will only be six months away. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that OPEC and Russia will do the U.S. president’s bidding by turning on the taps to offset any unforeseen supply losses in 2019. They did not do so even when President Trump asked, very nicely, ahead of the just-concluded Vienna meeting. Once Trump prioritized domestic politics over Saudi geopolitical interests – by backing away from his maximum pressure tactic against Iran – he illustrated to Riyadh that his administration is about as reliable of an ally as the Obama White House. Meanwhile, his ardent defense of Riyadh in the Khashoggi affair, at a cost of domestic political capital, means that he lost the very leverage that he could have used to pressure Saudi Arabia. We therefore remain cautiously bullish on oil prices in 2019, but with the caveat that a big-bang surge in prices due to a U.S.-Iran confrontation – our main risk for 2019 just a few months ago – is now less likely. Question 6: Will Impeachment Become A Risk In 2019? While we have no way to forecast the Mueller investigation, it is undoubtedly clear that risks are rising on the U.S. domestic front. President Trump’s popularity among GOP voters is elevated and far from levels needed to convince enough senators to remove him from power (Chart 32). However, a substantive finding by Mueller may leave the moderate Democrats in the House with no choice but to pursue impeachment. 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge This may rattle the market for both headline and fundamental reasons. The headline reasons are obvious. The fundamental reasons have to do with the looming stimulus cliff in 2020. A pitched battle between the House Democrats and the White House would make cooperation on another substantive stimulus effort less likely and thus a recession in 2020 more likely. The market may start pricing in such an outcome at some point in 2019. Furthermore, sentiment could be significantly impacted by a protracted domestic battle that impairs Trump’s domestic agenda. President Bill Clinton sought relevance abroad amidst his impeachment proceedings by initiating an air war against Yugoslavia. President Trump may do something similar. There is also an unclear relationship between domestic tensions and trade war. On one hand, President Trump may want a clear win and so hasten a deal. On the other hand, he may want to extend the trade war to encourage citizens to “rally around the flag” and show his geopolitical mettle amidst a distracting “witch hunt.” While we have faded these domestic risks in 2017 and 2018, we think that it may be difficult to do so in 2019. We stick by our view that previous impeachment bouts in the U.S. have had a temporary effect on the markets. But if market sentiment is already weakened by global growth and end of cycle concerns, a political crisis may become a bearish catalyst.  Question 7: What About Japan? Japan faces higher policy uncertainty in 2019, after a period of calm following the 2015-16 global turmoil. We expect to see “peak Shinzo Abe” – in the sense that after this year, his political capital will be spent and all that will remain will be for him to preside over the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. The primary challenge for Abe is getting his proposed constitutional revisions passed despite economic headwinds. Assuming he goes forward, he must get a two-thirds vote in both houses of parliament plus a majority vote in a popular referendum. The referendum is unscheduled but could coincide with the July upper house elections. This will be a knife’s edge vote according to polling. If he holds the referendum and it passes, he will have achieved the historic goal of making Japan a more “normal” country, i.e. capable of revising its own constitution and maintaining armed forces. He will never outdo this. If he fails, he will become a lame duck – if he does not retire immediately like David Cameron or Matteo Renzi. And if he delays the revisions, he could miss his window of opportunity.   This uncertain domestic political context will combine with China/EM and trade issues that entail significant risks for Japan and upward pressure on the yen. Hence government policy will resume its decidedly reflationary tilt in 2019. It makes little sense for Abe, looking to his legacy, to abandon his constitutional dream while agreeing to raise the consumption tax from 8% to 10% as expected in October. We would take the opposite side of the bet: he is more likely to delay the tax hike than he is to abandon constitutional revision. If Abe becomes a lame duck, whether through a failed referendum, a disappointing election, or a consumption tax hike amid a slowdown, it is important for investors to remember that “Abenomics” will smell just as sweet by any other name. Japan experienced a paradigm shift after a series of “earthquakes” from 2008-12. No leader is likely to raise taxes or cut spending aggressively, and monetary policy will remain ultra-easy for quite some time. The global backdrop is negative for Japan but its policy framework will act as a salve. Question 8: Are There Any Winners In EM? We think that EM and global risk assets could have a window of outperformance in early 2019. However, given the persistence of the policy divergence narrative, it will be difficult to see EM substantively outperforming DM over the course of 2019. Mexico Over Brazil That said, we do like a few EM plays in 2019. In particular, we believe that investors are overly bullish on Brazil and overly bearish on Mexico. In both countries, we think that voters turned to anti-establishment candidates due to concerns over violence and corruption. However, Brazilian President-elect Jair Bolsonaro has a high hurdle to clear. He must convince a traditionally fractured Congress to pass a complex and painful pension reform. In other words, Bolsonaro must show that he can do something in order to justify a rally that has already happened in Brazilian assets. In Mexico, on the other hand, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) remains constrained by the constitution (which he will be unable to change), the National Supreme Court of Justice, and political convention that Mexico is right-of-center on economic policy (an outwardly left-wing president has not won an election since 1924). In other words, AMLO has to show that he can get out of his constraints in order to justify a selloff that has already happened. To be clear, we are not saying that AMLO is a positive, in the absolute, for Mexico. The decision to scrap the Mexico City airport plans, to sideline the finance ministry from key economic decisions, and to threaten a return to an old-school PRI-era statism is deeply concerning. At the same time, we are not of the view that Bolsonaro is, in the absolute, a negative for Brazil. Rather, we are pointing out that the relative investor sentiment is overly bullish Bolsonaro versus AMLO. Especially given that both presidents remain constrained by domestic political intricacies and largely campaigned on the same set of issues that have little to do with their perceived economic preferences. They also face respective median voters that are diametrically opposed to their economic agendas – Bolsonaro, we think, is facing a left-leaning median voter, whereas the Mexican median voter is center-right. The macroeconomic perspective also supports our relative call. If our view on China and the Fed is correct, high-beta plays like Brazil will suffer, while an economy that is tied-to-the-hip of the U.S., like Mexico, ought to outperform EM peers. Mexico Finally Has Some Positive Carry Mexico Finally Has Some Positive Carry As such, we are putting a long MXN/BRL trade on, to capture this sentiment gap between the two EM markets. Investors will be receiving positive carry on Mexico relative to Brazil for the first time in a long time (Chart 33). The relative change in the current account balance also favors Mexico (Chart 34). Finally, the technicals of the trade look good as well (Chart 35). Mexico Looks Good On Current Account Mexico Looks Good On Current Account Technicals Look Good Too Technicals Look Good Too South Korea Over Taiwan  Diplomacy remains on track on the Korean peninsula, despite U.S.-China tensions in other areas. Ultimately China believes that peace on the peninsula will remove the raison d’être of American troops stationed there. Moreover, Beijing has witnessed the U.S.’s resolve in deterring North Korean nuclear and missile tests and belligerent rhetoric. It will want to trade North Korean cooperation for a trade truce. By contrast, if Trump’s signature foreign policy effort fails, he may well lash out. We view deeply discounted South Korean equities as a long-term buy relative to other EMs. Taiwan, by contrast, is a similar EM economy but faces even greater short-term risks than South Korea. In the next 13-month period, the Tsai Ing-wen administration, along with the Trump administration, could try to seize a rare chance to upgrade diplomatic and military relations. This could heighten cross-strait tensions and lead to a geopolitical incident or crisis. More broadly, U.S.-China trade and tech tensions create a negative investment outlook for Taiwan. Thailand Over India Five state elections this fall have turned out very badly for Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his National Democratic Alliance (NDA). These local elections have a negative impact, albeit a limited one, on Modi’s and the NDA’s reelection chances in the federal election due in April (or May). Nevertheless, it is entirely possible to lose Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan while still winning a majority in the Lok Sabha – this is what happened to the Indian National Congress in 2004 and 2009. So far federal election opinion polling suggests anything from a hung parliament to a smaller, but still substantial, BJP majority. Modi was never likely to maintain control of 20 out of 29 states for very long, nor to repeat his party’s sweeping 2014 victory. He was also never likely to continue his reform push uninhibited in the lead up to the general election. Nevertheless, the resignation of Reserve Bank of India Governor Urjit Patel on December 10 is a very worrisome sign. Given that Indian stocks are richly valued, and that we expect oil prices to drift upwards, we remain negative on India until the opportunity emerges to upgrade in accordance with our long-term bullish outlook. By contrast, we see the return to civilian rule in Thailand as a market-positive event in the context of favorable macro fundamentals. Thai elections always favor the rural populist “red” movement of the Shinawatra family, but presumably the military junta would not hold elections if it thought it had not sufficiently adjusted the electoral system in favor of itself and its political proxies. Either way, the cycle of polarization and social unrest will only reemerge gradually, so next year Thailand will largely maintain policy continuity and its risk assets will hold up better than most other EMs.   Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor Strategist roukayai@bcaresearch.com Ekaterina Shtrevensky, Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?” dated September 25, 2012, Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “Searing Sun: Japan-China Conflict Heating Up,” dated January 25, 2013, “Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think, Part II,” dated November 6, 2015, and “The South China Sea: Smooth Sailing?” dated March 28, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2      Yes. He literally said that.   Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights So What? Global divergence will persist beyond the near term. Why? China’s stimulus will be disappointing unless things get much worse. U.S.-China trade war will reignite and strategic tensions will continue. European risks are limited short-term, but will surge without reform. U.S. assets will outperform; oil and the yen will rise; the pound is a long-term play; EM pain will continue. Feature The year 2019 will be one of considerable geopolitical uncertainty. Three issues dominate our Outlook, with low-conviction views on all three questions: Question 1: How much will China stimulate? Question 2: Will the trade war abate? Question 3: Is Europe a Black Swan or a Red Herring? Chart 1U.S. Outperformance Should Be Bullish USD U.S. Outperformance Should Be Bullish USD U.S. Outperformance Should Be Bullish USD The main story in 2018 was policy divergence. American policymakers ramped up stimulus – both through the profligate tax cuts and fiscal spending – at the same time that Chinese policymakers stuck to their guns on de-levering the economy. The consequence of this policy mix was that the synchronized global recovery of late 2016 and 2017 evolved into a massive outperformance by the U.S. economy (Chart 1). The Fed responded to the bullish domestic conditions with little regard for the global economy, causing the DXY to rally from a 2018 low of 88.59 in February to 97.04 today. Chart 2Fiscal Conservatism Melts Away Fiscal Conservatism Melts Away Fiscal Conservatism Melts Away Chart 3Republicans Change Their Minds When In Power Republicans Change Their Minds When In Power Republicans Change Their Minds When In Power While the policy divergence narrative appears to be macroeconomic in nature, it is purely political. There is nothing cyclical about the ‘U.S.’ economic outperformance in 2018. President Donald Trump campaigned on an economic populist agenda and then proceeded to deliver on it throughout 2017 and 2018. He faced little opposition from fiscal conservatives, mainly because fiscal conservativism melts away from the public discourse when budget deficits are low (Chart 2) and when the president is a Republican (Chart 3). Meanwhile, Chinese policymakers have decided to tolerate greater economic pain in an effort to escape the Middle Income Trap (Chart 4). They believe this trap will envelop them if they cannot grow the economy without expanding the already-massive build-up of leverage (Chart 5). Chart 4Policymakers Fear The Middle Income Trap 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge Chart 5Debt Still Rising Debt Still Rising Debt Still Rising Geopolitics is not just about “things blowing up somewhere in the desert.” In today’s world, emblematized by paradigm shifts, politicians are more than ever in the driver’s seat. While technocrats respond to macroeconomic factors, politicians respond to political and geopolitical constraints. Few investment narratives last much longer than a year and policy divergence is coming to a close. Will the Fed pause given the turn in global growth? Will China respond with effective stimulus in 2019? If the answer to both questions is yes, global risk assets could light up in the next quarter and potentially beyond. Already EM has outperformed DM assets for a month and some canaries in the coal mine for global growth – like the performance of Swedish economic indicators – signal that the outperformance is real. Chart 6Global Economic Divergence Will Continue Global Economic Divergence Will Continue Global Economic Divergence Will Continue Chart 7The Market Has Already Priced-In A Fed Pause 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge We are skeptical that the move is sustainable beyond a quarter or two (Chart 6). As our colleague Peter Berezin has highlighted, the market is pricing less than one hike in 2019 (Chart 7). Regardless, the impact on the U.S. dollar, remains muted, with the DXY at 97.04. This suggests that the backing off that the Fed may or may not have already done is still not enough from the perspective of weakening global growth (Chart 8). Global risk assets need more from the Fed than what the market is already pricing. And with U.S. inflationary pressures building (Chart 9), the BCA House View expects to see multiple Fed hikes in 2019, disappointing investors bullish on EM and global risk assets. Chart 8Global Growth Leading Indicators Global Growth Leading Indicators Global Growth Leading Indicators Chart 9Does The Fed Like It Hot? Does The Fed Like It Hot? Does The Fed Like It Hot? With our Fed view set by the House View, we therefore turn to where we can add value. To this end, the most important question of 2018 largely remains the same in 2019: How much will China stimulate? Question 1: How Much Will China Stimulate In 2019? Chart 10A Ray Of Hope From Broad Money bca.gps_sr_2018_12_14_c10 bca.gps_sr_2018_12_14_c10 China is undoubtedly already stimulating, with a surge in local government bond issuance earlier this year and a bottoming in the broad money impulse (Chart 10). M2 is in positive territory. However, the effort can best be characterized as tepid, with a late-year collapse in bond issuance (Chart 11) and a still-negative total social financing (TSF) impulse (Chart 12). TSF is the broadest measure of private credit in China’s economy.   Chart 11Fiscal Policy Becomes More Proactive? 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge Chart 12China's Total Credit Is Weak China's Total Credit Is Weak China's Total Credit Is Weak We expect a surge in TSF in Q1, but this is a normal seasonal effect. A typical Q1 credit surge will not be enough to set global risk assets alight for very long, particularly if the market has already priced in as much of a “pause” from the Fed as we are going to get. Investors should specifically focus on new local government bond issuance and whether the “shadow financing” component of TSF gets a bid, since the primary reason for the weakness in TSF over the past year is the government’s crackdown on shadow lending. As Chart 13A & B shows, it was new local government bonds that led the way for stimulus efforts in 2015, followed by a surge in both bank lending and shadow lending in 2016. Chart 13ADon't Focus Just On TSF... Don't Focus Just On TSF... Don't Focus Just On TSF... Chart 13B...But Shadow Financing In Particular ...But Shadow Financing In Particular ...But Shadow Financing In Particular We would also expect further monetary policy easing, with extra RRR cuts or even a benchmark policy rate cut. However, monetary policy has been easy all year and yet the impact on credit growth has remained muted. This begs two important questions: Is the credit channel impaired? A slew of macroprudential reforms – which we have dubbed China’s “Preemptive Dodd-Frank” – may have impaired the flow of credit in the system. The official policy of “opening the front door, closing the back door” has seen bank loans pick up modestly but shadow lending has been curtailed (Chart 14A & B). This way of controlling the rise of leverage has its costs. For private enterprises – with poor access to the official banking sector – the shadow financial system was an important source of funding over the past several years. Chart 14AOpening The Front Door... Opening The Front Door... Opening The Front Door... Chart 14B...Closing The Back Door ...Closing The Back Door ...Closing The Back Door Is policy pushing on a string? An even more dire scenario would be if China’s credit channel is not technically, but rather psychologically, impaired. Multiple reasons may be to blame: a negative net return on the assets of state-owned enterprises (Chart 15); widespread trade war worries; mixed signals from policymakers; or a general lack of confidence in the political direction of the country. The rising M2/M1 ratio suggests that the overall economy’s “propensity to save” is rising (Chart 16). Chart 15Old China Is A Zombie China Old China Is A Zombie China Old China Is A Zombie China Chart 16Propensity To Save Propensity To Save Propensity To Save Why would Chinese policymakers keep their cool despite a slow pickup in credit growth? Are they not concerned about unemployment, social unrest, and instability? Of course, they are. But Chinese policymakers are not myopic. They also want to improve potential GDP over the long run. Table 1China: The Trend In Domestic Demand, And The Outlook For Trade, Is Negative 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge So far, the economy has weathered the storm relatively well. First, eight out of ten of our China Investment Strategy’s housing price indicators (Table 1) are flat-to-up – although it is true that the October deterioration in floor space started and especially floor space sold (Chart 17) is cause for concern. If and when the housing market weakens further, stimulus will be used to offset it, despite the fact that the government is attempting to prevent a sharp increase in prices at the same time. With so much of China’s middle-class savings invested in the housing market, the key pillar of socio-economic stability is therefore real estate. Chart 17A Possible Clue For China Stimulusr A Possible Clue For China Stimulusr A Possible Clue For China Stimulusr Second, credit has fueled China’s “old economy,” but policymakers want to buoy “new China” (Chart 18). This means that measures to boost consumption and the service sector economy will be emphasized in new rounds of stimulus, as has occurred thus far (tax cuts, tariff cuts, deregulation, etc). This kind of stimulus is not great news for global risk assets leveraged to “old China,” such as EM and industrial metals. Chart 18Rebalancing Of The Chinese Economy Rebalancing Of The Chinese Economy Rebalancing Of The Chinese Economy Third, policymakers are not exclusively focused on day-to-day stability but are also focused on the decades-long perseverance of China’s political model. And that means moving away from leverage and credit as the sole fuel for the economy. This is not just about the Middle Income Trap, it is also about national security and ultimately sovereignty. Relying on corporate re-levering for stimulus simply doubles-down on the current economic model, which is still export-oriented given that most investment is geared toward the export sector. But this also means that China will be held hostage to foreign demand and thus geopolitical pressures, a fact that has been revealed this year through the protectionism of the White House. As such, moving away from the investment-led growth model and towards a more endogenous, consumer-led model is not just good macro policy, it makes sense geopolitically as well. Will the trade war – or the current period of trade truce – change Chinese policymakers’ decision-making? We do not see why it would. First, if the trade truce evolves into a trade deal, the expected export shock will not happen (Chart 19) and thus major stimulative measures would be less necessary. Second, if we understand correctly why policymakers have cited leverage as an “ill” in the first place, then we would assume that they would use the trade war as an excuse for the pain that they themselves have instigated. In other words, the trade war with the U.S. gives President Xi Jinping the perfect excuse for the slowdown, one that draws attention from the real culprit: domestic rebalancing. Chart 19Trump's Initial Tariffs Soon To Be Felt Trump's Initial Tariffs Soon To Be Felt Trump's Initial Tariffs Soon To Be Felt Bottom Line: Since mid-2018, we have been asking clients to focus on our “Stimulus Overshoot” checklist (Table 2). We give the first item – “broad money and/or total credit growth spike” – a premier spot on the list. If a surge in total credit occurs, we will know that policymakers are throwing in the towel and stimulating in a major way. It will be time to turn super-positive on global risk assets, beyond a mere tactical trade, as a cyclical view at that point. Note that if one had gone long EM in early February 2016, when January data revealed a truly epic TSF splurge, one would not have been late to the rally. Table 2Will China’s Stimulus Overshoot In 2019? 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge Our low-conviction view, at the moment, is that the increase in credit growth that we will see in Q1 will be seasonal – the usual frontloading of lending at the beginning of the year – rather than an extraordinary surge that would signal a policy change. A modest increase in credit growth will not be enough to spark a sustainable – year-long – rally in global risk assets. The Fed has already backed off as far as the market is concerned. As such, a pickup in Chinese credit could temporarily excite investors. But global stabilization may only embolden the Fed to refocus on tightening after a Q1 pause. Question 2: Will The Trade War Abate? The first question for investors when it comes to the trade war is “Why should we care?” Sure, trade policy uncertainty appears to have correlated with the underperformance of global equity indices relative to the U.S. (Chart 20). However, such market action was as much caused by our policy divergence story – being as it is deeply negative for EM assets – as by a trade war whose impact on the real economy has not yet been felt. Chart 20U.S. Is 'Winning' The Trade War U.S. Is 'Winning' The Trade War U.S. Is 'Winning' The Trade War Nonetheless, we do believe that getting the trade war “right” is a big call for 2019. First, while the impact of the U.S.-China trade war has been minimal thus far, it is only because China front-loaded its exports ahead of the expected tariffs, cut interbank rates and RRRs, accelerated local government spending, and allowed CNY/USD to depreciate by 10%. A restart of trade tensions that leads to further tariffs will make frontloading untenable over time, whereas further currency depreciation would be severely debilitating for EMs. We doubt the sustainability of the trade truce for three reasons: U.S. domestic politics: The just-concluded midterm election saw no opposition to President Trump on trade. The Democratic Party candidates campaigned against the president on a range of issues, but not on his aggressive China policy. Polling from the summer also shows that a majority of American voters consider trade with China unfair (Chart 21). In addition, President Trump will walk into the 2020 election with a wider trade deficit, due to his own stimulative economic policy (Chart 22). He will need to explain why he is “losing” on the one measure of national power that he campaigned on in 2016. Structural trade tensions: Ahead of the G20 truce, the U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer issued a hawkish report that concluded that China has not substantively changed any of the trade practices that initiated U.S. tariffs. Lighthizer has been put in charge of the current trade negotiations, which is a step-up in intensity from Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, who was in charge of the failed May 2018 round. Geopolitical tensions: The G20 truce did not contain any substantive resolution to the ongoing strategic tensions between the U.S. and China, such as in the South China Sea. Beyond traditional geopolitics, tensions are increasingly involving high-tech trade and investment between the two countries and American allegations of cyber theft and spying by China. The recent arrest of Huawei’s CFO in Canada, on an American warrant, will likely deepen this high-tech conflict in the short term. Chart 21Americans Are Focused On China As Unfair 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge Chart 22Trade Deficit To Rise Despite Tariffs Trade Deficit To Rise Despite Tariffs Trade Deficit To Rise Despite Tariffs Since the G20 truce with Xi, President Trump has seen no significant pickup in approval ratings (Chart 23). Given that the median American voter has embraced protectionism – against China at least – we would not expect any. Meanwhile, U.S. equities have sold off, contrary to what President Trump, or his pro-trade advisors, likely expected in making the G20 decision to delay tariffs. Chart 23Appeasing China Doesn't Pay Appeasing China Doesn't Pay Appeasing China Doesn't Pay At some point, President Trump will realize that he risks considerable political capital on a trade deal with China that very few voters actually want or that the U.S. intelligence and defense community supports. Democrats did not oppose his aggressive China policy in the midterm election because they know that the median voter does not want it. As such, it is guaranteed that Trump’s 2020 Democratic Party opponent will accuse him of “surrender,” or at least “weakness.” If, over the next quarter, the economic and market returns on his gambit are paltry, we would expect President Trump to end the truce. Furthermore, we believe that a substantive, and long-lasting, trade deal is unlikely given the mounting tensions between China and the U.S. These tensions are not a product of President Trump, but are rather a long-run, structural feature of the twenty-first century that we have been tracking since 2012.1 Tensions are likely to rise in parallel to the trade talks on the technology front. We expect 2019 to be the year when investors price in what we have called Bifurcated Capitalism: the segmentation of capital, labor, and trade flows into geopolitically adversarial – and yet capitalist in nature – economic blocs. Entire countries and sectors may become off-limits to Western investors and vice-versa for their Chinese counterparts. Countries will fall into either the Tencent and Huawei bloc or the Apple and Ericsson bloc. This development is different from the Cold War. Note our emphasis on capitalism in the term Bifurcated Capitalism. The Soviet Union was obviously not capitalist, and clients of BCA did not have interests in its assets in the 1970s and 1980s. Trade between Cold War economic blocs was also limited, particularly outside of commodities. The closest comparison to the world we now inhabit is that of the nineteenth century. Almost all global powers were quite capitalist at the time, but they engaged in imperialism in order to expand their economic spheres of influence and thus economies of scale. In the twenty-first century, Africa and Asia – the targets of nineteenth century imperialism – may be replaced with market share wars in novel technologies and the Internet. This will put a ceiling on how much expansion tech and telecommunication companies can expect in the competing parts of Bifurcated Capitalism. The investment consequences of this concept are still unclear. But what is clear is that American policymakers are already planning for some version of the world we are describing. The orchestrated effort by the U.S. intelligence community to encourage its geopolitical allies to ban the use of Huawei equipment in their 5G mobile networks suggests that there are limits to the current truce ever becoming a sustainable deal. So does the repeated use of economic sanctions originally designed for Iran and Russia against Chinese companies. President Trump sets short- and medium-term policies given that he is the president. However, the intelligence and defense communities have “pivoted to Asia” gradually since 2012. This shift has occurred because the U.S. increasingly sees China as a peer competitor, for the time being confined in East Asia but with intentions of projecting power globally. To what extent could President Trump produce a trade deal with Xi that also encompasses a change in the U.S. perception of China as an adversary? We assign a low probability to it. As such, President Xi has little reason to give in to U.S. pressure on trade, as he knows that the geopolitical and technology pressure will continue. In fact, President Xi may have all the reason to double-down on his transformative reforms, which would mean more pain for high-beta global plays. Bottom Line: What may have appeared as merely a trade conflict has evolved into a broad geopolitical confrontation. President Trump has little reason to conclude a deal with China by March. Domestic political pressures are not pushing in the direction of the deal, while America’s “Deep State” is eager for a confrontation with China. Furthermore, with President Trump “blinking” on Iranian sanctions, his administration has implicitly acknowledged the constraints discouraging a deeper involvement in the Middle East. This puts the geopolitical focus squarely on China. Question 3: Is Europe a Black Swan or a Red Herring? The last two years have been a dud in Europe. Since the Brexit referendum in mid-2016, European politics have not been a catalyst for global markets, save for an Italy-induced sell-off or two. This could substantively change in 2019. And, as with the first two questions, the results could be binary. On one hand, there is the positive scenario where the stalled and scaled-back reforms on the banking union and Euro Area budget get a shot in the arm in the middle of the year. On the other hand, the negative scenario would see European-wide reforms stall, leaving the continent particularly vulnerable as the next global recession inevitably nears. At the heart of the binary distribution is the broader question of whether populism in Europe is trending higher. Most commentators and our clients would say yes, especially after the protests and rioting in Paris over the course of November. But the answer is more complicated than that. While populists have found considerable success in the ballot box (Chart 24), they have not managed to turn sentiment in Europe against the currency union (Chart 25). Even in Italy, which has a populist coalition government in power, the support for currency union is at 61%, the highest since 2012. This number has apparently risen since populists took over. Chart 24Anti-Establishment Parties Are Rising... Anti-Establishment Parties Are Rising... Anti-Establishment Parties Are Rising... Chart 25...But Euroskepticism Is A Failed Strategy ...But Euroskepticism Is A Failed Strategy ...But Euroskepticism Is A Failed Strategy What explains this divergence? Effectively, Europe’s establishment parties are being blamed for a lot of alleged ills, liberal immigration policy first amongst them. However, European integration remains favored across the ideological spectrum. Few parties that solely focus on Euroskepticism have any chance of winning power, something that both Lega and Five Star Movement found out in Italy. Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister Matteo Salvini confirmed his conversion away from Euroskepticism by stating that he wants to “reform the EU from the inside” and that it was time to give the “Rome-Berlin axis” another go.2 Salvini is making a bet – correct in our view – that by moderating Lega’s populism on Europe, he can capture the center ground and win the majority in the next Italian election, which could happen as soon as 2019. As such, we don’t think that the “rise of populism” in Europe is either dramatic or market-relevant. In fact, mainstream parties are quickly adopting parts of the anti-establishment agenda, particularly on immigration, in a bid to recoup lost voters. A much bigger risk for Europe than populism is stagnation on the reform front, a perpetual Eurosclerosis that leaves the bloc vulnerable in the next recession. What Europe needs is the completion of a backstop to prevent contagion. Such a backstop necessitates greatly enhancing the just-passed banking union reforms. The watered-down reforms did not include a common backstop to the EU’s single resolution fund nor a deposit union. A working group will report on both by June 2019, with a potential legislative act set for some time in 2024. What could be a sign that the EU is close to a grand package of reforms in 2019? We see three main avenues. First, a political shift in Germany. Investors almost had one, with conservative Friedrich Merz coming close to defeating Merkel’s hand-picked successor Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (also known as AKK) for the leadership of the ruling Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Merz combined a right-leaning anti-immigrant stance with staunch pro-European integration outlook. It is unclear whether AKK will be willing to make the same type of “grand bargain” with the more conservative factions of the CDU electorate. However, AKK may not have a choice, with both Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the Green Party nibbling at the heels of the right-of-center CDU and left-of-center Social-Democratic Party (SPD) (Chart 26). The rise of the Green party is particularly extraordinary, suggesting that a larger portion of the German electorate is radically Europhile rather than Euroskeptic. AKK may have to adopt Merz’s platform and then push for EU reforms. Chart 26Challengers To The Established Parties Challengers To The Established Parties Challengers To The Established Parties Second, French President Emmanuel Macron may have to look abroad for relevance. With his reform agenda stalled and political capital drained, it would make sense for Macron to spend 2019 and beyond on European reforms. Third, a resolution of the Brexit debacle. The longer the saga with the U.K. drags on, the less focus there will be in Europe on integration of the Euro Area. If the U.K. decides to extend the current negotiating period, it may even have to hold elections for the European Parliament. As such, we are not focusing on the budget crisis in Italy – our view that Rome is “bluffing” is coming to fruition –or a potential early election in Spain. And we are definitely not focusing on the EU Parliamentary election in May. These will largely be red herrings. The real question is whether European policymakers will finally have a window of opportunity for strategic reforms. And that will require Merkel, AKK, and Macron to expend whatever little political capital they have left and invest it in restructuring European institutions. Finally, a word on Europe’s role in the global trade war. While Europe is a natural ally for the U.S. against China – given its institutional connections, existing alliance, and trade surplus with the latter and deficit with the former (Chart 27) – we believe that the odds are rising of a unilateral tariff action by the U.S. on car imports. Chart 27EU Surplus With U.S. Pays For Deficit With China EU Surplus With U.S. Pays For Deficit With China EU Surplus With U.S. Pays For Deficit With China This is because the just-concluded NAFTA deal likely raised the cost of vehicle production in the trade bloc, necessitating import tariffs in order for the deal to make sense from President Trump’s set of political priorities. The Trump administration may not have the stomach for a long-term trade war with Europe, but it can shake up the markets with actions in that direction. Bottom Line: In the near term, there are no existential political risks in Europe in 2019. As such, investors who are bullish on European assets should not let geopolitics stand in the way of executing on their sentiment. We remain cautious for macroeconomic reasons, namely that Europe is a high-beta DM play that needs global growth to outperform in order to catch a bid. However, 2019 is a make-or-break year on key structural reforms in Europe. Without more work on the banking union – and without greater burden sharing, broadly defined – the Euro Area will remain woefully unprepared for the next global recession. Question 4: Will Brexit Happen? Given the volume of market-relevant geopolitical issues, we have decided to pose (and attempt to answer) five additional questions for 2019. We start with Brexit. Prime Minister Theresa May has asked for a delay to the vote in the House of Commons on the Withdrawal Treaty, which she would have inevitably lost. The defeat of the subsequent leadership challenge is not confidence-inspiring as the vote was close and a third of Tory MPs voted against her. May likely has until sometime in January to pass the EU Withdrawal Agreement setting out the terms of Brexit, given that all other EU member states have to get it through their parliaments before the Brexit date on March 29. The real question is whether any deal can get through Westminster. The numbers are there for the softest of soft Brexits, the so-called Norway+ option where the U.K. effectively gets the same deal as Norway, if May convinces the Labour Party to break ranks. Such a deal would entail Common Market access, but at the cost of having to pay essentially for full EU membership with no ability to influence the regulatory policies that London would have to abide by. The alternative is to call for a new election – which may usher the even less pro-Brexit Labour Party into power – or to delay Brexit for a more substantive period of time, or simply to buckle under the pressure and call for a second referendum. We disagree that the delay signals that the “no deal Brexit,” or the “Brexit cliff,” is nigh. Such an outcome is in nobody’s interest and both May and the EU can offer delays to ensure that it does not happen. Whatever happens, one thing is clear: the median voter is turning forcefully towards Bremain (Chart 28). It will soon become untenable to delay the second referendum. And even if the House of Commons passes the softest of Soft Brexit deals, we expect that the Norway+ option will prove to be unacceptable when Westminster has to vote on it again in two or three year’s time. Chart 28Bremain Surging Structurally Bremain Surging Structurally Bremain Surging Structurally Is it time to buy the pound, particularly cable, which is cheap on a long-term basis (Chart 29)? It is a tough call. On one hand, our confidence that the U.K. ultimately has to remain in the EU is rising. However, to get there, the U.K. may need one last major dose of volatility, either in the form of a slow-burn crisis caused by Tory indecision or in the form of a far-left Labour government that tries its own hand at Brexit while pursuing a 1970s style left-wing economic agenda. Can any investor withstand this kind of volatility in the short and potentially long-ish term? Only the longest of the long-term investors can.  Chart 29Start Buying The Pound Start Buying The Pound Start Buying The Pound Question 5: Will Oil Prices Rally Substantively In 2019? Several risks to oil supply remain for 2019. First, there is little basis for stabilization in Venezuelan oil production, and further deterioration is likely (Chart 30). Second, sectarian tensions in Iraq remain unresolved. Third, supply risks in other geopolitical hot spots – like Nigeria and Libya – could surprise in 2019. Chart 30Venezuela: On A Downward Spiral Venezuela: On A Downward Spiral Venezuela: On A Downward Spiral The most pressing geopolitical issue, however, is a decision on the Iranian sanction waivers. President Trump induced considerable market-volatility in 2019 by signaling that he would use “maximum pressure” against Iran. As a result, the risk premium contribution to the oil price – illustrated in Chart 31 by the red bar – rose throughout 2018, only to collapse as the White House offered six-month sanction waivers. Not only did the risk premium dissipate, but Saudi Arabia then scrambled to reverse the production surge it had instituted to offset the Iran sanctions. Chart 31Trump Sanctions Boosted Risk Premium 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge We agree with BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy that oil market fundamentals are tight and numerous supply risks loom. We also struggle to see why President Trump will seek to pick a fight with Iran in the summer of 2019. Our suspicion is that if President Trump was afraid of a gasoline-price spike right after the midterm election, why would he not “blink” at the end of the spring? Not only will the U.S. summer driving season be in full swing – a time of peak U.S. gasoline demand – but the 2020 election primaries will only be six months away. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that OPEC and Russia will do the U.S. president’s bidding by turning on the taps to offset any unforeseen supply losses in 2019. They did not do so even when President Trump asked, very nicely, ahead of the just-concluded Vienna meeting. Once Trump prioritized domestic politics over Saudi geopolitical interests – by backing away from his maximum pressure tactic against Iran – he illustrated to Riyadh that his administration is about as reliable of an ally as the Obama White House. Meanwhile, his ardent defense of Riyadh in the Khashoggi affair, at a cost of domestic political capital, means that he lost the very leverage that he could have used to pressure Saudi Arabia. We therefore remain cautiously bullish on oil prices in 2019, but with the caveat that a big-bang surge in prices due to a U.S.-Iran confrontation – our main risk for 2019 just a few months ago – is now less likely. Question 6: Will Impeachment Become A Risk In 2019? While we have no way to forecast the Mueller investigation, it is undoubtedly clear that risks are rising on the U.S. domestic front. President Trump’s popularity among GOP voters is elevated and far from levels needed to convince enough senators to remove him from power (Chart 32). However, a substantive finding by Mueller may leave the moderate Democrats in the House with no choice but to pursue impeachment. Chart 32Barometer Of Trump’s Survival 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge 2019 Key Views: Balanced On A Knife’s Edge This may rattle the market for both headline and fundamental reasons. The headline reasons are obvious. The fundamental reasons have to do with the looming stimulus cliff in 2020. A pitched battle between the House Democrats and the White House would make cooperation on another substantive stimulus effort less likely and thus a recession in 2020 more likely. The market may start pricing in such an outcome at some point in 2019. Furthermore, sentiment could be significantly impacted by a protracted domestic battle that impairs Trump’s domestic agenda. President Bill Clinton sought relevance abroad amidst his impeachment proceedings by initiating an air war against Yugoslavia. President Trump may do something similar. There is also an unclear relationship between domestic tensions and trade war. On one hand, President Trump may want a clear win and so hasten a deal. On the other hand, he may want to extend the trade war to encourage citizens to “rally around the flag” and show his geopolitical mettle amidst a distracting “witch hunt.” While we have faded these domestic risks in 2017 and 2018, we think that it may be difficult to do so in 2019. We stick by our view that previous impeachment bouts in the U.S. have had a temporary effect on the markets. But if market sentiment is already weakened by global growth and end of cycle concerns, a political crisis may become a bearish catalyst.  Question 7: What About Japan? Japan faces higher policy uncertainty in 2019, after a period of calm following the 2015-16 global turmoil. We expect to see “peak Shinzo Abe” – in the sense that after this year, his political capital will be spent and all that will remain will be for him to preside over the 2020 Tokyo Olympics. The primary challenge for Abe is getting his proposed constitutional revisions passed despite economic headwinds. Assuming he goes forward, he must get a two-thirds vote in both houses of parliament plus a majority vote in a popular referendum. The referendum is unscheduled but could coincide with the July upper house elections. This will be a knife’s edge vote according to polling. If he holds the referendum and it passes, he will have achieved the historic goal of making Japan a more “normal” country, i.e. capable of revising its own constitution and maintaining armed forces. He will never outdo this. If he fails, he will become a lame duck – if he does not retire immediately like David Cameron or Matteo Renzi. And if he delays the revisions, he could miss his window of opportunity.   This uncertain domestic political context will combine with China/EM and trade issues that entail significant risks for Japan and upward pressure on the yen. Hence government policy will resume its decidedly reflationary tilt in 2019. It makes little sense for Abe, looking to his legacy, to abandon his constitutional dream while agreeing to raise the consumption tax from 8% to 10% as expected in October. We would take the opposite side of the bet: he is more likely to delay the tax hike than he is to abandon constitutional revision. If Abe becomes a lame duck, whether through a failed referendum, a disappointing election, or a consumption tax hike amid a slowdown, it is important for investors to remember that “Abenomics” will smell just as sweet by any other name. Japan experienced a paradigm shift after a series of “earthquakes” from 2008-12. No leader is likely to raise taxes or cut spending aggressively, and monetary policy will remain ultra-easy for quite some time. The global backdrop is negative for Japan but its policy framework will act as a salve. Question 8: Are There Any Winners In EM? We think that EM and global risk assets could have a window of outperformance in early 2019. However, given the persistence of the policy divergence narrative, it will be difficult to see EM substantively outperforming DM over the course of 2019. Mexico Over Brazil That said, we do like a few EM plays in 2019. In particular, we believe that investors are overly bullish on Brazil and overly bearish on Mexico. In both countries, we think that voters turned to anti-establishment candidates due to concerns over violence and corruption. However, Brazilian President-elect Jair Bolsonaro has a high hurdle to clear. He must convince a traditionally fractured Congress to pass a complex and painful pension reform. In other words, Bolsonaro must show that he can do something in order to justify a rally that has already happened in Brazilian assets. In Mexico, on the other hand, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) remains constrained by the constitution (which he will be unable to change), the National Supreme Court of Justice, and political convention that Mexico is right-of-center on economic policy (an outwardly left-wing president has not won an election since 1924). In other words, AMLO has to show that he can get out of his constraints in order to justify a selloff that has already happened. To be clear, we are not saying that AMLO is a positive, in the absolute, for Mexico. The decision to scrap the Mexico City airport plans, to sideline the finance ministry from key economic decisions, and to threaten a return to an old-school PRI-era statism is deeply concerning. At the same time, we are not of the view that Bolsonaro is, in the absolute, a negative for Brazil. Rather, we are pointing out that the relative investor sentiment is overly bullish Bolsonaro versus AMLO. Especially given that both presidents remain constrained by domestic political intricacies and largely campaigned on the same set of issues that have little to do with their perceived economic preferences. They also face respective median voters that are diametrically opposed to their economic agendas – Bolsonaro, we think, is facing a left-leaning median voter, whereas the Mexican median voter is center-right. The macroeconomic perspective also supports our relative call. If our view on China and the Fed is correct, high-beta plays like Brazil will suffer, while an economy that is tied-to-the-hip of the U.S., like Mexico, ought to outperform EM peers. Chart 33Mexico Finally Has Some Positive Carry Mexico Finally Has Some Positive Carry Mexico Finally Has Some Positive Carry As such, we are putting a long MXN/BRL trade on, to capture this sentiment gap between the two EM markets. Investors will be receiving positive carry on Mexico relative to Brazil for the first time in a long time (Chart 33). The relative change in the current account balance also favors Mexico (Chart 34). Finally, the technicals of the trade look good as well (Chart 35). Chart 34Mexico Looks Good On Current Account Mexico Looks Good On Current Account Mexico Looks Good On Current Account Chart 35Technicals Look Good Too Technicals Look Good Too Technicals Look Good Too South Korea Over Taiwan  Diplomacy remains on track on the Korean peninsula, despite U.S.-China tensions in other areas. Ultimately China believes that peace on the peninsula will remove the raison d’être of American troops stationed there. Moreover, Beijing has witnessed the U.S.’s resolve in deterring North Korean nuclear and missile tests and belligerent rhetoric. It will want to trade North Korean cooperation for a trade truce. By contrast, if Trump’s signature foreign policy effort fails, he may well lash out. We view deeply discounted South Korean equities as a long-term buy relative to other EMs. Taiwan, by contrast, is a similar EM economy but faces even greater short-term risks than South Korea. In the next 13-month period, the Tsai Ing-wen administration, along with the Trump administration, could try to seize a rare chance to upgrade diplomatic and military relations. This could heighten cross-strait tensions and lead to a geopolitical incident or crisis. More broadly, U.S.-China trade and tech tensions create a negative investment outlook for Taiwan. Thailand Over India Five state elections this fall have turned out very badly for Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his National Democratic Alliance (NDA). These local elections have a negative impact, albeit a limited one, on Modi’s and the NDA’s reelection chances in the federal election due in April (or May). Nevertheless, it is entirely possible to lose Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan while still winning a majority in the Lok Sabha – this is what happened to the Indian National Congress in 2004 and 2009. So far federal election opinion polling suggests anything from a hung parliament to a smaller, but still substantial, BJP majority. Modi was never likely to maintain control of 20 out of 29 states for very long, nor to repeat his party’s sweeping 2014 victory. He was also never likely to continue his reform push uninhibited in the lead up to the general election. Nevertheless, the resignation of Reserve Bank of India Governor Urjit Patel on December 10 is a very worrisome sign. Given that Indian stocks are richly valued, and that we expect oil prices to drift upwards, we remain negative on India until the opportunity emerges to upgrade in accordance with our long-term bullish outlook. By contrast, we see the return to civilian rule in Thailand as a market-positive event in the context of favorable macro fundamentals. Thai elections always favor the rural populist “red” movement of the Shinawatra family, but presumably the military junta would not hold elections if it thought it had not sufficiently adjusted the electoral system in favor of itself and its political proxies. Either way, the cycle of polarization and social unrest will only reemerge gradually, so next year Thailand will largely maintain policy continuity and its risk assets will hold up better than most other EMs.   Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor Strategist roukayai@bcaresearch.com Ekaterina Shtrevensky, Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, “Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?” dated September 25, 2012, Global Investment Strategy Special Report, “Searing Sun: Japan-China Conflict Heating Up,” dated January 25, 2013, “Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think, Part II,” dated November 6, 2015, and “The South China Sea: Smooth Sailing?” dated March 28, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2      Yes. He literally said that.   Geopolitical Calendar