Protectionism/Competitive devaluation

Highlights Investors who are betting on a quick resolution to the U.S./China trade war following the "new NAFTA" deal and the U.S. midterm elections have likely been taken in by false hope. Stay neutral China relative to global stocks, and overweight low-beta sectors within the investable equity universe. The relative performance of Chinese industry groups since mid-June has been almost entirely determined by their beta characteristic, with almost all low-beta industry groups outperforming. Energy stocks have been among the top outperformers within the Chinese equity universe, and several factors support our recommendation that investors initiate an outright long position. While it is likely paused rather than stalled, broad "reform" as an investment theme will be less relevant over the coming 6-12 months. Consequently, we are closing our long ESG leaders / short benchmark trade. Feature September's PMI releases, both official and private, confirm that China's export outlook is deteriorating rapidly. Chart 1 highlights that the Caixin PMI is about to fall below the boom/bust line, and the new export orders component of the official PMI has sunk to a 2 ½ year low. Somewhat oddly, investors do not seem to be responding negatively to the de-facto announcement of a 25% rate on the second round of U.S. import tariffs against China. Chart 2 shows that domestic infrastructure stocks have actually been rising relative to global stocks since mid-September, and our BCA China Play Index appears to have entered a (so far very modest) uptrend. Chart 1The Export Shock Is Coming... The Export Shock Is Coming... The Export Shock Is Coming... Chart 2...But Investors Have Been Incrementally Upbeat ...But Investors Have Been Incrementally Upbeat ...But Investors Have Been Incrementally Upbeat One possible explanation for this is that investors are doubling down on the idea that China will have to aggressively stimulate in response to the shock. We have leaned against this narrative, by arguing in past reports that China's policy response to the upcoming export shock is not likely to be heavily credit-based, and that increases in fiscal spending today will involve more "soft infrastructure" than in the past.1 Chart 3 certainly shows no evidence of a spike in broad money or total credit; adjusted total social financing growth barely accelerated in August, against the backdrop of promises to front-run planned fiscal spending over the coming year. Chart 3No Major Acceleration In Credit Growth Evident Yet No Major Acceleration In Credit Growth Evident Yet No Major Acceleration In Credit Growth Evident Yet Chart 4Americans Support A Tough Stance Against China False Hope False Hope But a second explanation of recent investor behavior, one that we have been hearing more loudly from some market participants, is that China is waiting until after the midterm elections in the U.S. to make a deal, in anticipation that Republican losses in Congress will weaken Trump and change the political reality in terms of trade policy towards China. There are three reasons why investors holding this view are likely mistaken, and have been taken in by false hope: In the U.S., the actual implementation of tariffs lies within the control of the Presidency. Congress has delegated substantial authority to the president that would take time to be clawed back. Moreover, the president controls the execution of tariffs, and has a general prerogative over national security issues, which certainly includes the trade war with China. Democratic control of the House or Senate may cause President Trump to act even more forcefully against China, as trade will be among the few relatively unfettered policy options left to him. Chart 4 highlights that a sizeable majority of the American public views Chinese trade policy towards the U.S. as unfair, unlike the U.S.' other major trade partners. Reflecting this point, Democrats themselves maintain a hawkish stance on trade with China. This suggests that Trump will have a strong mandate to continue to demand major concessions from China even after the elections. We agree that Chinese stocks have already priced in a sizeable earnings decline, but we would still characterize buying now as an ill-advised case of trying to catch a falling knife. We highlighted in our September 19 Weekly Report that during the 2014-2016 episode Chinese stocks bottomed several months after stimulus began to take effect,2 because of a delayed decline in forward earnings. A similar situation would appear to be developing this time around: the third round of tariffs against China will likely soon be announced, the shock to Chinese export growth will soon manifest itself in the data, and yet Chinese forward earnings have only fallen 5-6% from their June peak. Bottom Line:Investors who are betting on a resolution to the U.S./China trade war following the U.S. midterm elections have likely been taken in by false hope. Stay neutral China relative to global stocks, and overweight low-beta sectors within the investable equity universe. Recent Sector Performance: A Beta Story, And A New Trade Idea Chart 5Last Week We Closed One Of Our Most Successful Calls Last Week We Closed One Of Our Most Successful Calls Last Week We Closed One Of Our Most Successful Calls We recommended closing one of our most successful trades of the past year in a brief Special Report last week.3 The report outlined major changes to the global industry classification standard (GICS) that took effect this week, as well as the implications for China's stock market. One key change is that Alibaba, one of the "BATs", is now part of the consumer discretionary sector and makes up roughly 60% of its market capitalization. Given this fundamental shift in the risk/reward profile of the position, we recommended closing our long MSCI China Consumer Staples / short MSCI China Consumer Discretionary trade for a profit of 47% (Chart 5). With the goal of identifying new trade ideas that are likely to outperform within the context of a trade war, Chart 6 presents the alpha and beta characteristics of 23 industry groups in the MSCI China index (the investable benchmark) from mid-June to the end of September. The x-axis of the chart represents the group's beta versus the benchmark, whereas the y-axis shows standardized alpha over the period. The chart also distinguishes between out/underperforming sectors. Chart 6Since Mid-June, Sector Performance Has Largely Been Beta-Driven False Hope False Hope Several points are notable: Largely speaking, the relative performance of Chinese industry groups since mid-June has been determined by their beta characteristic (with almost all low-beta industry groups outperforming). This supports our existing position of favoring low-beta sectors within the MSCI China index, a trade that we initiated on June 27.4 Four industry groups that belong to traditionally cyclical sectors have outperformed since mid-June and have had a beta less than 1: energy, capital goods, banks, and consumer durables and apparel. Energy and capital goods have been particularly notable, having outperformed by 24% and 15%, respectively. Technology-related industry groups have underperformed, including the pharma, biotech, and life sciences industry group within health care. Consumer services and retailers have significantly underperformed, due to the heavy influence of travel-related businesses in both indexes. Among the top performing industry groups over the past three months, Chinese energy stocks look like the most compelling trade in absolute terms. While we are normally reluctant to chase performance, several factors support an outright long position: BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy service is bullish on oil prices, and recently increased their 2019 Brent price forecast to $95/bbl based on both supply and demand factors.5 Despite the recent outperformance of Chinese energy companies within the investable universe, they remain cheap versus global energy companies based on cash flow-based valuation metrics (Chart 7). This is true even after accounting for the fact that they are typically discounted relative to their global peers due to heavy state ownership. Chinese energy companies look reasonably priced relative to the value of global oil production (Chart 8). Chinese energy companies largely receive their revenue in U.S. dollars, which is an attractive hedge in an environment where CNY-USD may decline further. Chart 7Chinese Energy Stocks Are Cheap Versus Their Global Peers... Chinese Energy Stocks Are Cheap Versus Their Global Peers... Chinese Energy Stocks Are Cheap Versus Their Global Peers... Chart 8...And Versus The Value Of Global Oil Production ...And Versus The Value Of Global Oil Production ...And Versus The Value Of Global Oil Production Given this, we are updating our trade book and recommend that investors initiate an outright long position in Chinese energy stocks as of today. Chart 9Despite Outperforming, Absolute Capital Goods Performance Has Been Lackluster Despite Outperforming, Absolute Capital Goods Performance Has Been Lackluster Despite Outperforming, Absolute Capital Goods Performance Has Been Lackluster What about Chinese capital goods companies? For now, we are content with relative rather than absolute exposure, which (surprisingly) exists in our low-beta sectors trade. Capital goods companies account for almost 70% of the Chinese industrial sector, and industrial stocks have been less volatile than the broad market over the past year, in large part because they underperformed so significantly in 2017. Given this, they have been included in our low-beta sectors portfolio, despite being typically pro-cyclical. In absolute terms, though, it is far from clear that Chinese capital goods stocks will trend higher (Chart 9). Some investors are hopeful that capital goods producers will benefit from a significant acceleration in infrastructure spending but, as we noted above, the bar is high for the type of stimulus that investors have come to expect. In addition, potential weakness in property construction could be a drag, and could offset gains from a pickup in infrastructure investment.6 We recommend that investors stick with a relative position, until compelling signs of a stimulus overshoot emerge. Bottom Line: The relative performance of Chinese industry groups since mid-June has been almost entirely determined by their beta characteristic, with almost all low-beta industry groups outperforming. Energy stocks have been among the top outperformers within the Chinese equity universe, and several factors support our recommendation that investors initiate an outright long position. A Pause In Broad "Reform" As An Investment Theme Following last November's Communist Party Congress, we noted that China was likely to step up its reform efforts in 2018, and would take meaningful steps to: Pare back heavy-polluting industry Hasten the transition of China's economy to "consumer-led" growth Slow or halt leveraging in the corporate/financial sector Eliminate corruption and graft We argued that Chinese policymakers would have to set the pace of reforms to avoid a significant slowdown in the economy, but we noted that a policy mistake (moving too aggressively) could not be ruled out. We introduced the BCA China Reform Monitor as a way of tracking the intensity of the reforms, which was calculated as an equally-weighted average of the four "winner" sectors that emerged in the month following the Party Congress (energy, consumer staples, health care, and technology) relative to an equally-weighted average of the remaining seven sectors (Chart 10). In particular, we argued that a rise in the monitor that was driven by the underperformance of the denominator would be a warning sign that reforms had become too aggressive for the economy to withstand. Chart 10Reform, As A Broad Theme, Will Be Less Relevant In The Year Ahead Reform, As A Broad Theme, Will Be Less Relevant In The Year Ahead Reform, As A Broad Theme, Will Be Less Relevant In The Year Ahead Chart 10 highlights that the reform monitor rose for the first half of the year, driven by the gains of the numerator rather than losses in the denominator. The message of a sustainable pace of reforms, even against the backdrop of brewing trade tension, was consistent with the relative performance of Chinese stocks and was part of the reason we recommended staying overweight versus the global benchmark in Q1 and the majority of Q2.7 Since mid-June, however, the reform theme has been thrown into reverse: our reform monitor has declined, alongside absolute declines in both "winner" and "loser" sectors. The timing of this inflection point is clearly aligned with President Trump's announcement of the second round of tariffs. Given this, and our view that the U.S./China trade war is likely to get worse over the coming 6-12 months, it is likely that broad "reform" as an investment theme will be less relevant for the foreseeable future, at least relative to policymaker efforts to stabilize the economy. However, for several reasons, we view this as a pause in the theme, rather than an end: On the environmental front, Chart 11 highlights that China continues to pursue a clean air policy, at least in large population centers. Anti-pollution efforts are a signature policy of President Xi Jinping. They affect quality of life and ultimately the legitimacy of the regime, so they cannot be postponed entirely or indefinitely. Chart 11China Continues To Clamp Down On Air Quality China Continues To Clamp Down On Air Quality China Continues To Clamp Down On Air Quality Shifting China's growth model away from primary and secondary industry remains a long-term goal of policymakers. Chart 12 highlights that tertiary industry has already risen non-trivially as a share of GDP. This trend is also clearly visible in the electricity consumption data, which shows that residential and tertiary industry consumption has risen quite materially over the past several years. Chinese policymakers will clearly ease up on the brake over the coming year in terms of deleveraging, but it is far from clear that they will aim for another wave of aggressive private sector debt growth. We highlighted one key reason for this in a recent Special Report: comparing adjusted state-owned enterprise (SOE) return on assets to borrowing costs suggests that the marginal operating gain from debt has become negative for these firms (Chart 13). This implies that further aggressive leveraging of SOEs could push them into a debt trap. In fact, if policymakers do refrain from promoting a major private sector credit expansion over the coming year, that restraint will directly reflect the reform agenda. Chart 12Policymakers Continue To Emphasize A Transition Towards Services Policymakers Continue To Emphasize A Transition Towards Services Policymakers Continue To Emphasize A Transition Towards Services Chart 13SOEs Now Appear To Have A Negative Financial Gain From Debt SOEs Now Appear To Have A Negative Financial Gain From Debt SOEs Now Appear To Have A Negative Financial Gain From Debt Chart 14 highlights that while anti-corruption cases involving gifts and the improper use of public funds are off of their high from early this year, they remain elevated and are not trending lower. As a final point, Chart 15 shows that our long MSCI China environmental, social, and governance (ESG) leaders / short MSCI China trade has been negatively impacted by the pause in reform as an investment theme. While MSCI's ESG indexes aim to generate low tracking error relative to the underlying equity market of each country, technology companies are typically overrepresented in ESG indexes because of the low emissions nature of their business model. In China's case, we noted above that technology industry groups have fared poorly since mid-June, and panel 2 of Chart 15 shows that the underperformance of Chinese investable technology companies since mid-June lines up with the latest leg of ESG underperformance. Chart 14China's Anti-Corruption Drive Is Still In Effect China's Anti-Corruption Drive Is Still In Effect China's Anti-Corruption Drive Is Still In Effect Chart 15Favor ESG Leaders Again When The Reform Theme Reasserts Itself Favor ESG Leaders Again When The Reform Theme Reasserts Itself Favor ESG Leaders Again When The Reform Theme Reasserts Itself It remains unclear how much of tech's underperformance has been due to rich multiples versus concerns that the U.S. crackdown on Chinese technology transfer and intellectual property theft will negatively impact the market share of China's tech companies (via an opening of the market and a rise in the market share of foreign competitors). But we believe that the latter is a factor, and we recommend closing our long ESG leaders / short benchmark trade until "reform", both environmental and otherwise, reasserts itself as a driving factor for the Chinese equity market. Bottom Line: While it is likely paused rather than stalled, broad "reform" as an investment theme will be less relevant over the coming 6-12 months relative to policymaker efforts to stabilize the economy. We are closing our long ESG leaders / short benchmark trade at a loss of 5.5%. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Pease see China Investment Strategy Special Report "China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus?" dated August 8, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Pease see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Investing In The Middle Of A Trade War", dated September 19, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Pease see China Investment Strategy Special Report "GICS Sector Changes: The Implications For China", dated September 26, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Pease see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Now What?", dated June 27, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Pease see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Odds Of Oil-Price Spike In 1H19 Rise; 2019 Brent Forecast Lifted $15 To $95/bbl", dated September 20, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 Pease see China Investment Strategy Special Report "China's Property Market: Where Will It Go From Here?", dated September 13, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 7 The rapidly escalating trade war between China and the U.S. caused us to recommended putting Chinese stocks on downgrade watch at the end of March, and we recommended that investors cut their exposure to neutral on June 20. Pease see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "Chinese Stocks: Trade Frictions Make For A Tenuous Overweight", dated March 28, 2018, and China Investment Strategy Special Report "Downgrade Chinese Stocks To Neutral", dated June 20, 2018, both available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Macro outlook: Global growth will continue to decelerate into early next year on the back of brewing EM stresses and an underwhelming policy response from China. Equities: Stay neutral for now, while underweighting EM relative to DM stocks. Within DM, overweight the U.S. in dollar terms. Bonds: Global bond yields may dip in the near term, but the longer-term path is firmly higher. Currencies: The dollar is working off overbought conditions, but will rebound into year-end. EM currencies will suffer the most. Commodities: Favor oil over industrial metals. Precious metals will also remain under pressure until the dollar peaks next year, before beginning a major bull run as inflation accelerates. Feature I. Economic Outlook The Fed Can Hike A Lot More If 2017 was the year of a synchronized global growth recovery, 2018 is turning out to be a year where desynchronization is once again the name of the game. The U.S. economy continues to fire on all cylinders, while much of the rest of the world is struggling to stay afloat. The divergence in economic outcomes has been mirrored in central bank policy. The Fed is now hiking rates once per quarter whereas most other major central banks are still sitting on their hands. How high can U.S. rates go? The answer is a lot higher than investors anticipate. Market participants currently expect the Fed funds rate to rise to 2.37% by the end of this year and 2.84% by the end of 2019. No rate hikes are priced in for 2020 and beyond. The Fed dots are somewhat higher than market expectations (Chart I-1). The median dot rises to about 3.4% in 2020-21, but then falls back to 3% over the Fed's longer-run horizon. Both investors and the Fed have apparently bought into Larry Summers' secular stagnation thesis. They seem convinced that rates will not be able to rise above 3% without triggering a recession. While we have a lot of sympathy for Summers' thesis, it must be acknowledged that it is a theory about the long-term determinants of the neutral rate of interest. Over a shorter-term cyclical horizon, many factors can influence the neutral rate. Critically, most of these factors are pushing it higher: Fiscal policy is extremely stimulative. The IMF estimates that the U.S. cyclically-adjusted budget deficit will reach 6.8% of GDP in 2019. In contrast, the euro area is projected to run a deficit of only 0.8% of GDP (Chart I-2). The relatively more expansionary nature of U.S. fiscal policy is one key reason why the Fed can raise rates while the ECB cannot. Chart I-1Markets Expect No Fed Hikes Beyond Next Year October 2018 October 2018 Chart I-2Fiscal Policy Is More Expansionary In ##br##The U.S. Than In The Euro Area Fiscal Policy Is More Expansionary In The U.S. Than In The Euro Area Fiscal Policy Is More Expansionary In The U.S. Than In The Euro Area Credit growth has picked up. After a prolonged deleveraging cycle, private-sector nonfinancial debt is increasing faster than GDP (Chart I-3). The recent easing in The Conference Board's Leading Credit Index suggests that this trend will continue (Chart I-4). Chart I-3U.S. Private-Sector Nonfinancial Debt Is ##br##Rising At Close To Its Historic Trend U.S. Private-Sector Nonfinancial Debt Is Rising At Close To Its Historic Trend U.S. Private-Sector Nonfinancial Debt Is Rising At Close To Its Historic Trend Chart I-4U.S. Credit Growth Will Remain Strong U.S. Credit Growth Will Remain Strong U.S. Credit Growth Will Remain Strong Wage growth is accelerating. Average hourly earnings surprised on the upside in August, with the year-over-year change rising to a cycle high of 2.9%. This followed a stronger reading in the Employment Cost Index in the second quarter. A simple correlation with the quits rate suggests that there is plenty of upside for wage growth (Chart I-5). Faster wage growth will put more money into workers' pockets who will then spend it. The savings rate has scope to fall. The personal savings rate currently stands at 6.7%, more than two percentage points higher than what one would expect based on the current level of household net worth (Chart I-6). If the savings rate were to fall by two points over the next two years, it would add 1.5% of GDP to aggregate demand. Chart I-5The Quits Rate Is Signaling Upside For Wage Growth The Quits Rate Is Signaling Upside For Wage Growth The Quits Rate Is Signaling Upside For Wage Growth Chart I-6The Personal Savings Rate Has Room To Fall October 2018 October 2018 A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that these cyclical factors will permit the Fed to raise rates to 5% by 2020, almost double what the market is discounting.1 An Absence Of Major Financial Imbalances Will Allow The Fed To Keep Raising Rates The past three recessions were all caused by financial market overheating rather than economic overheating. The 1991 recession was mainly the consequence of the Savings and Loan crisis, compounded by the spike in oil prices leading up to the Gulf War. The 2001 recession stemmed from the dotcom bust. The Great Recession was triggered by the housing bust. Today, it is difficult to point to any clear imbalances in the economy. True, housing activity has been weak for much of the year. However, unlike in 2006, the home vacancy rate stands near record-low levels (Chart I-7). Tight supply will limit downside risks to both construction and home prices. On the demand side, low unemployment, high consumer confidence, and a rebound in the rate of new household formation should help the sector. Despite elevated home prices in some markets, the average monthly payment that homeowners must make to service their mortgage is quite low by historic standards (Chart I-8). The quality of mortgage lending has also been very high over the past decade, which reduces the risk of a sudden credit crunch (Chart I-9). Chart I-7Low Housing Inventories Will Support ##br##Home Prices And Construction Low Housing Inventories Will Support Home Prices And Construction Low Housing Inventories Will Support Home Prices And Construction Chart I-8Housing Affordabiity Is Not Yet Stretched Housing Affordabiity Is Not Yet Stretched Housing Affordabiity Is Not Yet Stretched Chart I-9Mortgage Lenders Are Being Prudent Mortgage Lenders Are Being Prudent Mortgage Lenders Are Being Prudent Unlike housing debt, there are more reasons to be concerned about corporate debt. The ratio of corporate debt-to-GDP has risen to record-high levels. So-called "covenant-lite" loans now make up the bulk of corporate leveraged loan issuance. While there is no doubt that the corporate debt market is the weakest link in the U.S. financial sector, some perspective is in order. U.S. corporate debt levels are quite low by global standards. Corporate debt in the euro area is more than 30 points higher as a percent of GDP than in the United States (Chart I-10). Moreover, the interest coverage ratio - EBIT divided by interest expense - for U.S. corporates is still above its historic average (Chart I-11). While this ratio will fall as interest rates rise, this will not happen very quickly. Most U.S. corporate debt is at fixed rates and average maturities have been rising. This reduces both rollover risk and the sensitivity of debt-servicing costs to higher short-term rates. Chart I-10U.S. Corporate Debt Not That High By Global Standards U.S. Corporate Debt Not That High By Global Standards U.S. Corporate Debt Not That High By Global Standards Chart I-11Interest Coverage Ratio Is Above Its Historic Average Interest Coverage Ratio Is Above Its Historic Average Interest Coverage Ratio Is Above Its Historic Average An increasing share of U.S. corporate debt is held by non-leveraged investors. Bank loans account for only 18% of nonfinancial corporate sector debt, down from 40% in 1980 (Chart I-12). This is important, because what makes a spike in corporate defaults so damaging is not the direct impact this has on the economy, but the second-round effects rising defaults have on financial sector stability. In any case, we already had a dress rehearsal for what a corporate debt scare might look like. Credit spreads spiked in 2015. Default rates rose, but the knock-on effects to the financial system were minimal. This suggests that corporate America could handle a fair bit of monetary tightening without buckling under the pressure. The Fed And The Dollar If the Fed is able to raise rates substantially more than the market is discounting while most central banks cannot, the short-term interest rate spread between the U.S. and its trading partners is likely to widen. History suggests that this will produce a stronger dollar (Chart I-13). Chart I-12Banks Have Been Reducing Their ##br##Exposure To The Corporate Sector Banks Have Been Reducing Their Exposure To The Corporate Sector Banks Have Been Reducing Their Exposure To The Corporate Sector Chart I-13Historically, The Dollar Has Moved ##br##In Line With Interest Rate Differentials Historically, The Dollar Has Moved In Line With Interest Rate Differentials Historically, The Dollar Has Moved In Line With Interest Rate Differentials Some have speculated that the Trump administration will intervene in the foreign-exchange market in order to drive down the value of the greenback. We doubt this will happen, but even if such interventions were to occur, they would not be successful. Presumably, currency interventions would take the form of purchases of foreign exchange, financed through the issuance of Treasurys. The purchase of foreign currency would release U.S. dollars into the financial system, but the sale of Treasury securities would suck those dollars back out of the system. The net result would be no change in the volume of U.S. dollars in circulation - what economists call a "sterilized" intervention. Both economic theory and years of history show that sterilized interventions do not have lasting effects on currency values. The Fed could, of course, provide funding for the Treasury's purchases of foreign exchange, leading to an increase in the monetary base. This would be tantamount to an unsterilized intervention. However, such a deliberate attempt to weaken the dollar by expanding the money supply would fly in the face of the Fed's efforts to cool growth by tightening financial conditions. We highly doubt the Fed's current leadership would go along with this. Emerging Markets In The Crosshairs The combination of rising U.S. rates and a stronger dollar is bad news for emerging markets. Eighty percent of EM foreign-currency debt is denominated in dollars. Outside of China, EM dollar debt is now back to late-1990s levels, both as a share of GDP and exports (Chart I-14). The wave of EM local-currency debt issued in recent years only complicates matters. If EM central banks raise rates to defend their currencies, this could imperil economic growth and make it difficult for local-currency borrowers to pay back their loans. Rather than hiking rates, some EM central banks may simply choose to inflate away debt. Consider the case of Brazil. The fiscal deficit stands at nearly 8% of GDP and government debt has soared from 60% of GDP in 2013 to 84% of GDP at present (Chart I-15). Ninety percent of Brazilian sovereign debt is denominated in reais. The Brazilian government won't default on its debt per se. However, if push comes to shove, Brazil's central bank can always step in to buy government bonds, effectively monetizing the fiscal deficit. This could cause the real to weaken much more than it already has. Chart I-14EM Dollar Debt Is High EM Dollar Debt Is High EM Dollar Debt Is High Chart I-15Brazil's Perilous Fiscal Position Brazil's Perilous Fiscal Position Brazil's Perilous Fiscal Position Chinese Stimulus To The Rescue? When emerging markets last succumbed to pressure in 2015, China saved the day by stepping in with massive stimulus. Fiscal spending and credit growth accelerated to over 15% year-over-year. The government's actions boosted demand for all sorts of industrial commodities. The stimulus measures in 2015 followed an even greater wave of stimulus in 2009. While these stimulus measures invigorated China's economy and helped put a floor under global growth, they came at a price: China's debt-to-GDP ratio has swollen from 140% in 2008 to over 250% at present, which has endangered financial stability (Chart I-16). Excess capacity has also increased. This can be seen in the dramatic rise in the capital-to-output ratio. It can also be seen in the fact that the rate of return on assets within the Chinese state-owned enterprise sector, which has been the main source of rising corporate leverage, has fallen below borrowing costs (Chart I-17). Chart I-16China: Debt And Capital ##br##Accumulation Went Hand In Hand China: Debt And Capital Accumulation Went Hand In Hand China: Debt And Capital Accumulation Went Hand In Hand Chart I-17China: Rate Of Return On Assets ##br##Below Borrowing Costs For SOEs China: Rate Of Return On Assets Below Borrowing Costs For SOEs China: Rate Of Return On Assets Below Borrowing Costs For SOEs Chinese banks are being told that they must lend more money to support the economy, while ensuring that their loans do not turn sour. Unfortunately, that is becoming an impossible feat. Chart I-18China Saves A Lot China Saves A Lot China Saves A Lot The Chinese economy produces too much and spends too little. The result is excess savings, epitomized most clearly in a national savings rate of 46% (Chart I-18). As a matter of arithmetic, national savings must be transformed either into domestic investment or exported abroad via a current account surplus. Now that the former strategy has run into diminishing returns, the Chinese authorities will need to concentrate on the latter. This will require a larger current account surplus which, in turn, will necessitate a relatively cheap currency. Above-average productivity growth has pushed up the fair value of China's real exchange rate over time. However, the currency still looks expensive relative to its long-term trend line (Chart I-19). Pushing down the value of the yuan against the dollar will not be that difficult. Chart I-20 shows that USD/CNY has moved broadly in line with the one-year swap spread between the U.S. and China. The spread was about 3% earlier this year. Today, it stands at only 0.6%. As the Fed continues to raise rates, the spread will narrow further, taking the yuan down with it. Chart I-19The RMB Is Still Quite Strong The RMB Is Still Quite Strong The RMB Is Still Quite Strong Chart I-20USD/CNY Has Tracked China-U.S. Interest Rate Differentials USD/CNY Has Tracked China-U.S. Interest Rate Differentials USD/CNY Has Tracked China-U.S. Interest Rate Differentials Unlike standard Chinese fiscal/credit easing, a stimulus strategy focused on weakening the yuan would hurt other emerging markets by undermining their competitiveness in relation to China. A weaker yuan would also make it more expensive for Chinese companies to import natural resources, thus putting downward pressure on commodity prices. The Euro Area: Back In The Slow Lane After putting in a strong performance in 2017, the economy in the euro area has struggled to maintain momentum this year. Growth is still above trend, but the overall tone of the data has been lackluster at best, with the risks to growth increasingly tilted to the downside. Weaker growth in China and other emerging markets certainly has not helped. However, much of the problem lies closer to home. Bank credit remains the lifeblood of the euro area economy. The 12-month credit impulse - defined as the change in credit growth from one 12-month period to the next - tends to track GDP growth (Chart I-21).2 Euro area credit growth accelerated over the course of 2017, but has been broadly stable this year. As a result, the credit impulse has fallen, taking GDP growth down with it. It will be difficult for euro area GDP growth to increase unless credit growth starts rising again. So far, there is little sign that this is about to happen. According to the latest euro area bank lending survey, while banks continue to ease standards for business loans, they are doing so at a slower pace than in the past. A net 3% of banks eased lending standards in the second quarter, compared to 8% in the first quarter. Loan demand growth has been fairly stable. This suggests that loan growth will remain positive, but is unlikely to increase much from current levels. Worries about the health of European banks will further constrain credit growth. European banks in general, and Spanish banks in particular, have significant exposure to the most vulnerable emerging markets (Chart I-22). Chart I-21Euro Area Credit Growth Has Flatlined Euro Area Credit Growth Has Flatlined Euro Area Credit Growth Has Flatlined Chart I-22Spain Most Exposed To Vulnerable EMs October 2018 October 2018 Concerns about the ability of the Italian government to service its debt obligations will also restrain bank lending. Investors breathed a sigh of relief last month when the Italian government signaled a greater willingness to pare back next year's proposed budget deficit, in accordance with the dictates of the European Commission. Tensions remain, however, as evidenced by the fact that the ten-year spread between BTPs and German bunds is still 120 basis points higher than in April (Chart I-23). The European political establishment is terrified of the rise in populism across the region and would love nothing more than to see Italy's populist parties implode. This means that any help from the ECB and the European Commission will only arrive once a full-fledged crisis is underway. Anyway, it is far from clear that a smaller budget deficit would actually translate into a lower government debt-to-GDP ratio. Like China, Italy also has a private sector that saves too much and spends too little. A shrinking population has reduced the need for firms to invest in new capacity. The prior government's pension cuts have also incentivized people to save more for their retirement. The result is a private sector savings-investment surplus that stood at 5% of GDP in 2017 compared to close to breakeven a decade ago (Chart I-24). Chart I-23Italian/Bund Spreads Signal Lingering Fiscal Strain Italian/Bund Spreads Signal Lingering Fiscal Strain Italian/Bund Spreads Signal Lingering Fiscal Strain Chart I-24Italy: Private Sector Saves Too Much And Spends Too Little Italy: Private Sector Saves Too Much And Spends Too Little Italy: Private Sector Saves Too Much And Spends Too Little Unlike Germany, Italy cannot export its excess production because it does not have a hypercompetitive economy. Nor does it have the ability to devalue its currency to gain a quick competitiveness boost. This means that the Italian government has to absorb excess private-sector savings with its own dissavings - a fancy way of saying that it has to run a large budget deficit. This has effectively been Japan's strategy for over two decades. However, unlike Japan, Italy does not have a lender of last resort that can unconditionally buy government debt. This raises the risk that Italy's debt woes will resurface, either because the government abandons austerity measures, or because the lack of fiscal support causes nominal GDP to stagnate, making it all but impossible for the country to outgrow its debt burden. Receding Policy Puts The discussion above suggests that many of the "policy puts" that investors have relied on are in the process of having their strike price marked down to deeper out-of-the-money levels. Yes, the Fed will ease off on rate hikes if U.S. growth is at risk of stalling out completely. However, now that the labor market has reached full employment, the Fed will welcome modestly slower growth. Remember that there has never been a case in the post-war era where the three-month average of the unemployment rate has risen by more than a third of a percentage point without a recession taking place (Chart I-25). The further the unemployment rate falls below NAIRU, the more difficult it will be for the Fed to achieve the proverbial soft landing. Chart I-25Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Even A Small Uptick In The Unemployment Rate Is Bad News For The Business Cycle Likewise, the "China stimulus put" - the presumption that most investors have that the Chinese authorities will launch a barrage of fiscal and credit easing at the first sign of slower growth - has become less reliable in light of the government's competing objectives namely reducing debt growth and excess capacity. The same goes for the "ECB put." Yes, the ECB will bail out Italy if the entire European project appears at risk. But spreads may need to blow out before the cavalry arrives. Meanwhile, just as the aforementioned policy puts are receding, new policy risks are rising to the fore, chief among them protectionism. We expect the trade war to heat up, with the Trump administration increasingly directing its ire at China. Trump's macroeconomic policies are completely at odds with his trade agenda. Fiscal stimulus will boost aggregate demand, which will suck in more imports. An overheated economy will prompt the Fed to raise rates more aggressively than it otherwise would, leading to a stronger dollar. All this will result in a wider trade deficit. What will Trump tell voters two years from now when he is campaigning in Michigan and Ohio about why the trade deficit has widened rather than narrowed under his watch? Will he blame himself or Beijing? No trophy for getting that answer right. II. Financial Markets Global Equities The combination of slower global growth, rising economic vulnerabilities outside the U.S., and a more challenging policy environment caused us to downgrade our view on global equities from overweight to neutral in June,3 while reiterating our preference for developed market equities relative to EM stocks. For now, we are comfortable with our bearish view towards emerging market stocks. While EM equities have cheapened, they are not yet at washed out levels (Chart I-26). Bottom fishers still abound, as evidenced by the fact that the number of shares outstanding in the MSCI iShares Turkish ETF has almost tripled since early April (Chart I-27). Chart I-26EM Assets: Valuations Not Yet At Washed Out Levels EM Assets: Valuations Not Yet At Washed Out Levels EM Assets: Valuations Not Yet At Washed Out Levels Chart I-27EM Bottom Fishers Still Abound EM Bottom Fishers Still Abound EM Bottom Fishers Still Abound At some point - probably in the first half of next year - investors will liquidate their remaining bullish EM bets. At that point, EM stocks will rebound. European and Japanese equities should also start to outperform the U.S., given their more cyclical nature. As far as the absolute direction of the S&P 500 is concerned, the next few months could be challenging. U.S. stocks have been able to decouple from those in the rest of the world, but this state of affairs may not last. Recall that the S&P 500 fell by 22% peak-to-trough between July 20 and October 8, 1998, in what otherwise was a massive bull market. We do not know if there is another Long-Term Capital Management lurking around the corner, but if there is, a temporary selloff in U.S. stocks may be hard to avoid. Such a selloff would present a buying opportunity over a horizon of 12-to-18 months. If we are correct that cyclical forces have lifted the neutral rate of interest, it will take a while for monetary policy to reach restrictive territory. This means that both fiscal and monetary policy will stay accommodative at least for the next 18 months. As such, the S&P 500 may not peak until 2020. Appendix A - Chart I presents a stylized diagram of where we think global equities are going. It incapsulates three phases: 1) a challenging period over the next six months, driven by EM weakness; 2) a blow-off rally in equities starting in the middle of next year; 3) and finally, a recession-induced bear market beginning in late-2020. Appendix B also presents our valuation charts, which highlight that long-term return prospects are better outside the United States. Fixed Income After advocating for a long duration strategy for much of the post-crisis recovery, BCA declared "The End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market" on July 5, 2016, the very same day that the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield hit a record closing low of 1.37%. Cyclically and structurally, we continue to expect U.S. bond yields to rise more than the market is discounting. As noted above, the Fed is underestimating how high rates will need to go before they reach restrictive territory. This means that the Fed will end up behind the curve in normalizing monetary policy, causing the economy to overheat and inflation to rise above the Fed's comfort zone. Granted, the Fed is willing to tolerate a modest inflation overshoot. However, a core PCE reading above 2.3%, which is at the top end of the range of the Fed's own forecast, would prompt the Fed to expedite the pace of rate hikes. A bear flattening of the yield curve - a situation where long-term yields rise, but short-term rates go up even more - would be highly likely in that environment. Over a shorter-term horizon spanning the next six months, the outlook for yields is more benign. The combination of a stronger dollar, slower global growth, and flight-to-quality flows into the Treasury market from vulnerable emerging markets can cap yields. Add to this the fact that sentiment towards bonds is currently extremely bearish (Chart I-28), and a temporary countertrend decline in yields becomes quite probable. Chart I-28Bond Sentiment Is Extremely Bearish Bond Sentiment Is Extremely Bearish Bond Sentiment Is Extremely Bearish Developed market bond yields in general are likely to follow the direction of U.S. yields, both on the upside and the downside, but in a more muted manner. Outside the periphery, euro area yields have less scope to fall in the near term given that they are already so low. European yields also have less room to rise once global growth bottoms next year because the neutral rate of interest is much lower in the euro area than in the United States. Ironically, a more dovish ECB would help reduce Italian bond yields, as higher inflation is critical for increasing Italian nominal GDP. Since labor market slack is still elevated in Italy, continued monetary stimulus would also lift wages in core Europe more than in Italy, helping to boost Italy's competitiveness relative to the rest of the euro area. Japanese yields have plenty of scope to rise over the long haul. An aging population is pushing more people into retirement, which will cause the national savings rate to fall further. A decline in the savings pool will increase the neutral rate of interest in Japan. Instead of raising the policy rate, the Japanese authorities will let the economy overheat, generating inflation in the process. This will cause the yield curve to steepen, particularly at the very long end (e.g., beyond 10 years) which is the part of the yield curve that is the least susceptible to the BoJ's yield curve control regime. Appendix A - Chart II shows our expectations for the major government bond markets over the coming years. Turning to credit markets, high-yield credit typically underperforms in the latter innings of business-cycle expansions, a period when the Fed is raising rates. Thus, while we do not think that U.S. corporate debt levels will be a major source of systemic financial risk for the broader economy, this is hardly a reason to be overweight spread-product. A more cautious stance towards credit outside the U.S. is also warranted. Currencies And Commodities The dollar is working off overbought conditions, but will rebound into year-end, as EM tensions intensify and hopes of a massive credit/fiscal-fueled Chinese stimulus package fizzle. EM currencies will weaken the most against the dollar over the next three-to-six months, but the euro and, to a lesser extent, the yen, will also come under pressure. Granted, the dollar is no longer a cheap currency, but if long-term interest rate differentials stay anywhere close to current levels, the greenback will remain well supported. Consider the dollar's value against the euro. Thirty-year U.S. Treasurys currently yield 3.20% while 30-year German bunds yield 1.12%, a difference of 208 basis points. Even if one allows for the fact that investors expect euro area inflation to be lower than in the U.S. over the next 30 years, EUR/USD would need to trade at a measly 82 cents today in order to compensate German bund holders for the inferior yield they will receive.4 We do not expect EUR/USD to get down to that level, but a descent into the $1.10-to-$1.12 range over the next six months is probable. Sterling will remain hostage to Brexit negotiations. It is impossible to know how talks will evolve, but our bias is to take a somewhat pound-positive view. The main reason is that support for Brexit has faded (Chart I-29). Opinion polls suggest that if a referendum were held again, the "bremain" side would almost certainly prevail. Lacking public support for leaving the EU, it is unlikely that British negotiators could simply walk away from the table. This reduces the odds of a "hard Brexit" outcome. Indeed, a second referendum that leads to a "no-Brexit" verdict remains a distinct possibility. The combination of slower global growth and a resurgent dollar is likely to hurt commodity prices. Industrial metals are more vulnerable than oil. China consumes around half of all the copper, nickel, aluminum, zinc, and iron ore produced around the world (Chart I-30). In contrast, China represents less than 15% of global oil demand. Chart I-29When Bremorse Sets In When Bremorse Sets In When Bremorse Sets In Chart I-30China Is A More Dominant Consumer Of Metals Than Oil China Is A More Dominant Consumer Of Metals Than Oil China Is A More Dominant Consumer Of Metals Than Oil The supply backdrop for oil is also more favorable than for metals. Not only are Saudi Arabia and Russia maintaining production discipline, but U.S. sanctions against Iran threaten to weigh on global crude supply. Further reduction in Venezuela's oil output, as well as potential disruptions to Libyan or Iraqi exports, could also boost oil prices. The superior outlook for oil over metals means we prefer the Canadian dollar relative to the Aussie dollar. While AUD/CAD has weakened in recent months, the Aussie dollar is still somewhat expensive against the loonie based on our long-term valuation model (Chart I-31). We also see an increasing chance that Canada will negotiate a revamped trade deal with the U.S., as Trump focuses his attention more on China. Should this happen, it will remove the NAFTA break-up risk discount embedded in the Canadian dollar. Finally, a few words on precious metals. Precious metals typically struggle during periods when the dollar is appreciating (Chart I-32). Consequently, we would not be eager buyers of gold or other precious metals until the dollar peaks, most likely around the middle of next year. As inflation starts to accelerate in late-2019 and in 2020, gold will finally move decisively higher. Chart I-31Canadian Dollar Still Somewhat ##br##Cheap Versus The Aussie Dollar Canadian Dollar Still Somewhat Cheap Versus The Aussie Dollar Canadian Dollar Still Somewhat Cheap Versus The Aussie Dollar Chart I-32Gold Won't Shine Until The Dollar Peaks Gold Won't Shine Until The Dollar Peaks Gold Won't Shine Until The Dollar Peaks Appendix A - Chart III and Chart IV present an illustration of where the major currencies and commodities are heading. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy September 28, 2018 Next Report: October 25, 2018 1 Depending on which specification of the Taylor rule one uses, a one percent of GDP increase in aggregate demand will increase the neutral rate of interest by half a point (John Taylor's original specification) or by a full point (Janet Yellen's preferred specification). Fiscal policy is currently about 3% of GDP too stimulative compared to a baseline where government debt-to-GDP is stable over time. Assuming a fiscal multiplier of 0.5, fiscal policy is thus boosting aggregate demand by 1.5% of GDP. Nonfinancial private credit has increased by an average of 1.5 percentage points of GDP per year since 2016. Assuming that every additional one dollar of credit increases aggregate demand by 50 cents, the revival in credit growth is raising aggregate demand by 0.75% of GDP, compared to a baseline where credit-to-GDP is flat. The labor share of income has increased by 1.25% of GDP from its lows in 2015. Assuming that every one dollar shift in income from capital to labor boosts overall spending on net by 20 cents, this would have raised aggregate demand by 0.25% of GDP. Lastly, if the personal savings rate falls by two points over the next two years, this would raise aggregate demand by 1.5% of GDP. Taken together, these factors are boosting the neutral rate by anywhere from 2% (Taylor's specification) to 4% (Yellen's specification). This is obviously a lot, and easily overwhelms other factors such as a stronger dollar that may be weighing on the neutral rate. 2 Recall that GDP is a flow variable (how much production takes place every period), whereas credit is a stock variable (how much debt there is outstanding). By definition, a flow is a change in a stock. Thus, credit growth affects GDP and the change in credit growth affects GDP growth. Euro area private-sector credit growth accelerated from -2.6% in May 2014 to 3.1% in March 2017, but has been broadly flat ever since. Hence, the credit impulse has dropped. 3 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Three Policy Puts Go Kaput: Downgrade Global Equities To Neutral," dated June 20, 2018. 4 For this calculation, we assume that the fair value for EUR/USD is 1.32, which is close to the IMF's Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) estimate. The annual inflation differential of 0.47% is based on 30-year CPI swaps. This implies that the fair value for EUR/USD will rise to 1.52 after 30 years. If one assumes that the euro reaches that level by then, the common currency would need to trade at 1.52/(1.0208)^30=0.82 today. APPENDIX A APPENDIX A CHART IMarket Outlook: Equities October 2018 October 2018 APPENDIX A CHART IIMarket Outlook: Bonds October 2018 October 2018 APPENDIX A CHART IIIMarket Outlook: Currencies October 2018 October 2018 APPENDIX A CHART IVMarket Outlook: Commodities October 2018 October 2018 APPENDIX B Long-Term Return Prospects Are Slightly Better Outside The U.S. October 2018 October 2018 Long-Term Return Prospects Are Slightly Better Outside The U.S. October 2018 October 2018 Long-Term Return Prospects Are Slightly Better Outside The U.S. October 2018 October 2018 Long-Term Return Prospects Are Slightly Better Outside The U.S. October 2018 October 2018 II. Is It Time To Buy Value Stocks? Per the most commonly referenced growth and value indexes, growth has been outperforming value for over 11 years, the longest stretch in the history of the series. Growth's extended winning streak has split investors into two camps: those who believe that value is finished because of overexposure and shortened investor timeframes, and those who are trying to identify the point at which reversion to the mean will ensue. In this Special Report, we argue that the traditional off-the-shelf indexes are poor proxies for true value. Their methodology strays quite far from the principles enumerated by Benjamin Graham, the father of value investing, and Fama and French, the researchers who demonstrated that lower-priced stocks have outperformed over time. The headline S&P 500 indexes currently differentiate between growth and value stocks using simplistic metrics that introduce considerable sector bias, reducing the difference between growth and value to a binary choice between Tech and Financials. Using tools developed by BCA's Equity Trading Strategy service, we create sector-neutral U.S. value and growth indexes that correct for the off-the-shelf indexes' flaws, and broaden the range of metrics Fama and French employed to make style distinctions. The ETS-derived indexes appear to better distinguish between value and growth stocks. The ETS value-versus-growth portfolio beat its Fama and French counterpart by four percentage points annually over its 22-year life. We join our custom value and growth indexes to Fama and French's to study the impact of macro variables on relative style performance over time for the purpose of gaining insight into the most opportune points to shift between styles. Relative style performance has not corresponded consistently or robustly enough with the business cycle, inflation, interest rates, or broad market direction to support reliable style-decision rules. We find that monetary policy settings, as defined by our stylized fed funds rate cycle, are a consistently reliable predictor of relative style performance. Per the fed funds rate cycle, tight policy is most conducive to value outperformance. From this perspective, value's decade-long slump is not a surprise, given that the ultra-accommodative tide has been lifting all boats. There is no rush to increase value exposure while policy remains easy, but investors should look to load up on value once policy becomes tight, using the metrics in our ETS model to identify true value stocks. We expect that the policy inflection will occur sometime in the second half of 2019, or the first half of 2020. Growth stocks have been on a tear for the longest stretch in the history of the series, based on the most commonly referenced growth and value indexes, even if their gains haven't yet matched the magnitude of the 1990s (Chart II-1). It is no surprise, then, that growth stocks are as expensive as they have ever been, outside of the tech-bubble era in the late 1990s. Many investors are thus wondering if the next "big trade" is to bet on an extended reversion to the mean during which value regains the ground it has given up. Chart II-1A Lost Decade For Value Stocks A Lost Decade For Value Stocks A Lost Decade For Value Stocks In this Special Report, we argue that the traditional off-the-shelf indexes are not very good at differentiating growth from value stocks. Trends in relative performance have much more to do with sector performance than intrinsic value, making the indexes a poor proxy for investors who are truly interested in selecting stocks based on their value and growth profiles. We create U.S. value and growth indexes that are unaffected by sector performance, using stock selection software provided by BCA's Equity Trading Strategy service. The results will surprise readers who are used to dealing with canned measures of value and growth. What Is Value Investing? Value investing principles have been around at least since the days when Benjamin Graham was a money manager himself. Style investing has been a part of the asset-management lexicon for four decades. Yet there is no universally agreed-upon definition of a value stock versus a growth stock. Based on our reading of Graham's Intelligent Investor, we submit that an essential element of value investing is the identification of stocks that are temporarily trading below their intrinsic value. The temporary drag may persist for a while - stock markets can remain oblivious to fundamentals for extended stretches - but it is ultimately expected to dissipate. Value investing is a play on negative overreaction or neglect, and dedicated value investors have to be contrarians, not to mention contrarians with strong stomachs. The temporary nature of undervaluation is a recurring theme in Graham's book. The stock market's ever-present proclivity toward overreaction ensures a steady supply of value opportunities: "The market is always making mountains out of molehills and exaggerating ordinary vicissitudes into major setbacks.1" "[W]hen an individual company ... begins to lose ground in the economy, Wall Street is quick to assume that its future is entirely hopeless and it should be avoided at any price.2" "[T]he outstanding characteristic of the stock market is its tendency to react excessively to favorable and unfavorable influences.3" Graham viewed security analysis as the comparison of an issue's market price to its intrinsic value. He advised buying stocks only when they trade at a discount to intrinsic value, offering an investor a "margin of safety" that should guard against significant declines. His favorite measure for assessing intrinsic value was a sober, objective estimate of average future earnings, grossed-up by an appropriate multiple. A low price-to-average-earnings ratio was the linchpin of his margin-of-safety mantra. Decades after Graham's heyday, University of Chicago professors Eugene Fama and Kenneth French bestowed the academy's seal of approval on value investing. Their landmark 1992 paper found that low price-to-book ("P/B") stocks consistently and convincingly outperformed high P/B stocks.4 Several "growth" and "value" indexes have been developed over the years, but they bear no more than a passing resemblance to Graham's, and Fama and French's, work. It is important to realize that the off-the-shelf indexes are far from an ideal proxy for the value factor that Fama & French tried to isolate. Traditional Growth And Value Indexes Are Wanting The off-the-shelf growth and value indexes shown in Chart II-1 all share similar cyclical profiles, with only small differences in long-term returns. Given the similarity of the indexes, we will focus on Standard & Poor's/Citigroup methodology for the purposes of this report.5 The headline S&P 500 indexes currently differentiate between growth and value stocks using the following metrics: 3-year growth rates in EPS, 3-year growth rates in sales-per-share, and 12-month price momentum; along with valuation yardsticks including price-to-book, price-to-earnings, and price-to-sales. Companies with higher growth rates in earnings and sales, and better price momentum, are classified as growth stocks, while those with lower valuation multiples are considered value stocks. Several stocks are cross-listed in both indexes, which is baffling and counterproductive for an investor seeking to implement a rigorous style tilt.6 Table II-1 contains a summary of the current sector breakdowns for the S&P 500 Growth and Value indexes. Table II-2 sheds light on each index's aggregate geographical and U.S. business cycle exposure, the former of which is based on our U.S. Equity Strategy service's judgment. Table II-1Current S&P 500 Style Index Exposures October 2018 October 2018 Table II-2The Value Index Has Less Global ##br##And Late Cyclical Exposure October 2018 October 2018 Growth is currently heavily weighted in Health Care, Technology and Consumer Discretionary sectors, while value has a high concentration of Financials, Energy and Consumer Staples (Table II-1). Table II-2 shows that the growth index has a clear current bias toward sectors with global economic exposure that typically outperform the broad equity market late in the business cycle. The value benchmark flips growth's global/domestic exposure, and has slightly more exposure to defensive sectors, while splitting its cyclical exposure evenly between early and late cyclicals. Sector Dominance Unfortunately, the reigning methodology creates a major problem - shifts in the relative performance of growth and value indexes are dominated by sector performance. Financials' higher debt loads, and banks' low-margin operations, depress their multiples relative to nonfinancial firms. Thus, Financials hold permanent residency in the off-the-shelf value indexes. Conversely, Tech stocks perennially account for an outsized proportion of most growth indexes' market cap. Value-versus-growth boils down to a binary choice between Financials and Tech.7 The growth/value price ratio has closely tracked the Technology/Financials price ratio since the late 1990s (Chart II-2, top panel). The correlation was much less evident before 1995, when Tech stocks accounted for a much smaller share of market capitalization. Chart II-3 demonstrates that the positive correlation between growth/value and Tech has steadily climbed over the decades to almost 1, while the correlation with Financials has become increasingly negative (currently at -0.75). Chart II-2The S&P 500 Style Indexes Merely Mimic Relative Sector Performance The S&P 500 Style Indexes Merely Mimic Relative Sector Performance The S&P 500 Style Indexes Merely Mimic Relative Sector Performance Chart II-3Style Capture Style Capture Style Capture In contrast, the Fama/French approach, which focuses exclusively on price-to-book while ensuring equal representation for large- and small-market-cap stocks, appears much less affected by sector skews; the growth/value index created from their data has not tracked the Tech/Financials ratio, even after 1995 (Chart II-2, second panel). Moreover, note that the extended downward trend in the Fama/French growth/value ratio is consistent with other academic research that shows that value stocks outperform growth over the long-term. The off-the-shelf indexes show the opposite, but that is because they are merely tracking the long-term outperformance of Tech relative to Financials. The bottom line is that the standard indexes incorporate flawed measures of growth and value that limit their usefulness for true style investing. Conventional Wisdom With respect to style investing and the economic cycle, the prevailing conventional wisdom holds that: Inflation - Growth stocks perform best during times of disinflation and persistently low inflation, whereas value stocks perform best during periods of accelerating inflation; Interest Rates - Periods of high and rising interest rates favor value stocks at the expense of growth; and Business Cycle - It is believed that growth stocks outperform value during recessions, because the latter tend to be more highly leveraged to the economic cycle than their growth counterparts. According to the conventional view, value stocks shine in the early and middle phases of a business cycle expansion. Growth stocks return to favor again in the late states of an expansion, when investors begin to worry about the pending end to the business cycle and are looking for reliable and consistent earnings growth. Do the traditional measures of growth and value corroborate this conventional wisdom? Chart II-4 shows that the S&P value/growth index and headline CPI inflation have both trended lower since the early 1980s, but there has been no tendency for value to outperform when inflation rises. Value has shown some tendency to outperform during rising-rate phases since the mid-1980s, but the relationship with the level of the fed funds rate is stronger than its direction, as we discuss below. The growth-over-value relationship with the business cycle is complicated by the tech bubble in the late 1990s, which heavily distorted relative sector performance. The Citigroup measure of growth began to outperform very late in the cycle and through the subsequent recession in some business cycles (1979-1981, 1989-1991, and 2007-2009; Chart II-5). The early and middle parts of the cycles, however, were a mixed bag. Chart II-4Spiting The Conventional Wisdom Spiting The Conventional Wisdom Spiting The Conventional Wisdom Chart II-5No Consistent Relationship With The Business Cycle No Consistent Relationship With The Business Cycle No Consistent Relationship With The Business Cycle The bottom line is that there appears to be some rough correspondence between the Citigroup index and the interest rate and growth cycles, but it is too variable to point to reliable rules for shifting between styles. Ultimately, determining the direction of the growth and value indexes is more about forecasting relative Tech and Financials performance than it is about identifying cheap stocks. A Better Value Approach We identify four broad shortcomings of off-the-shelf value indexes: They exclusively use trailing multiples, a rear-view mirror metric. They rely on simple price-to-book multiples, which flatter serial acquirers. They rely entirely on reported earnings, which are an imperfect proxy for cash flow. A share of stock ultimately represents a claim on its issuer's future cash flows. They make no attempt to place relative metrics into historical context. Without a mechanism to compare a particular segment's valuation relative to its history, structurally low-multiple stocks will be over-represented and structurally high-multiple stocks will be under-represented. BCA's Equity Trading Strategy (ETS) platform provides a way of differentiating value from growth stocks that avoids these problems. The web-based platform uses 24 quantitative factors to rank approximately 10,000 individual stocks in 23 countries. Users can rank and score individual equities to support a broad set of investment strategies and apply macro and sector views to single-name investments. The ETS approach has an impressive track record. Historically, the top decile of stocks ranked using the "BCA Score" methodology has outperformed stocks in the bottom decile by over 25% a year. The overall BCA Score includes all 24 factors when ranking stocks, but to develop our custom value index, we use only the five valuation measures in the ETS database: trailing P/E, forward P/E, price-to-tangible-book, price-to-sales and price-to-cash flow. Every quarter we rank the stocks within each of the 11 sectors based on an equally-weighted composite of the five valuation measures. Note that we are using the data to rank stocks only against other stocks in the same sector. We calculate the total return from owning the top 30% of stocks by value in each sector. We do the same with the bottom 30% and refer to this as our "growth" index.8 We then compute an equally-weighted average of the total returns for the growth indexes across the 11 sectors. We do the same for the value indexes. By comparing stock valuation only to other stocks in the same sector, this approach avoids the sector composition problem suffered by the off-the-shelf measures. Chart II-6 compares the ETS value/growth total return index to the Fama/French value/growth index. Data limitations preclude comparing the two measures before 1996, but the ETS index confirms the Fama/French result that value trumps growth over the long term. The ETS index follows a similar cyclical profile to the Fama/French index from 1997 to 2009, rising and falling in tandem. The two series subsequently diverge: per the criteria ETS uses to identify value and construct an index, lower-priced stocks have outperformed higher-priced ones for most of this expansion, while the Fama/French methodology suggests the reverse. Chart II-6The ETS Model Builds On Fama And French's Work The ETS Model Builds On Fama And French's Work The ETS Model Builds On Fama And French's Work By avoiding sector composition problems and using a wider variety of value measures, the ETS approach appears to be a superior measure of value. An investor that consistently over-weighted value stocks according to the ETS approach would have outperformed someone who did the same using the Fama methodology by an annual average of four percentage points from 1996 to 2018. The history of our ETS index only covers two recessions, limiting our ability to gauge its performance vis-Ã -vis a variety of macro factors, so we extend the ETS index back to 1926 using the Fama/French index. While joining two indexes with different methodologies is less than ideal, we feel the drawbacks are outweighed by the benefit of observing growth and value relative performance across more business cycles. The top panel of Chart II-7 shows U.S. real GDP growth, shaded for recessions. The bottom panel presents our extended ETS value/growth index, shaded for declines of more than 10%. The shaded periods overlap in many, but not all, cycles (indicated by circles in the chart). That is, growth stocks have tended to outperform during economic downturns, although this is not a hard-and-fast rule. Chart II-7No Hard-And-Fast Relationship With The Business Cycle... No Hard-And-Fast Relationship With The Business Cycle... No Hard-And-Fast Relationship With The Business Cycle... Value-over-growth relative returns exhibit some directionality with the overall equity market when looking at corrections (peak-to-trough declines of at least 10%, as shaded in the top panel of Chart II-8), though it should be noted that it is nearly impossible to flag a correction in advance. The relationship weakens when considering bear markets, i.e. peak-to-trough declines of at least 20%, which can be forecast with at least some reliability.9 The bottom panel is the same as in Chart II-7; the extended ETS index, shaded for periods of significant value stock underperformance. The correspondence between the shaded periods is hardly perfect, and there does not appear to be a practical style exposure message, even if an investor could call corrections in advance. Chart II-8...And Market Directionality Has Been An Imperfect Guide Over The Last 50 Years ...And Market Directionality Has Been An Imperfect Guide Over The Last 50 Years ...And Market Directionality Has Been An Imperfect Guide Over The Last 50 Years Valuation Relative valuation also provides some useful information on positioning, though it is not always timely. Chart II-9 presents an aggregate valuation measure for the stocks in our value index relative to that of the stocks in our growth index. Value stocks are expensive relative to growth when the valuation indicator is above +1 standard deviation, and value is cheap when the indicator is less than -1 standard deviation. Historically, investors would have profited if they had over-weighted value stocks when the valuation indicator reached the threshold of undervaluation, although subsequent outperformance was delayed by as much as a year in two episodes. In contrast, the valuation indicator is not useful as a 'sell' signal for value stocks because they can remain overvalued for long periods. Value was overvalued relative to growth for much of the time between 2009 and 2016. Value stocks have cheapened since then, although they have yet to reach the undervaluation threshold. The Fed Funds Rate Cycle While relative style performance may generally lean in one direction or another in conjunction with the business cycle, inflation, interest rates, or broad equity-market performance, there are no hard-and-fast rules. It is difficult to formulate any sort of rotation view between styles, and history does not inspire confidence that any such rule would generate material outperformance. The monetary policy backdrop offers a path forward. We have found the fed funds rate cycle offers a consistent guide to equity and bond returns in other contexts, and our Global ETF Strategy service has found a robust link between the policy cycle and equity factor performance.10 We segment the fed funds rate cycle into four phases, based on whether or not the Fed is hiking or cutting rates, and whether policy is accommodative or restrictive (Chart II-10). Our judgment of the state of policy is derived from comparing the fed funds rate to our estimate of the equilibrium fed funds rate, the policy rate that neither encourages nor discourages economic activity. Chart II-9Sizeable Undervaluation Flags Turning ##br##Points, But You May Have To Wait A While Sizeable Undervaluation Flags Turning Points, But You May Have To Wait A While Sizeable Undervaluation Flags Turning Points, But You May Have To Wait A While Chart II-10The Fed Funds Rate Cycle October 2018 October 2018 As defined by Fama and French, value stocks outperform growth stocks by a considerable margin when monetary policy is restrictive (Table II-3 and Chart II-11, top panel). Considering value and growth stocks separately, both perform extremely well when policy is easy (Chart II-11, second panel), but growth stocks barely advance when policy is tight, falling far behind their value counterparts. A strategy for generalist investors may be to seek out value exposure when policy is tight, while investing without regard to styles when it is easy. Table II-3The State Of Monetary Policy Is The ##br##Best Guide To Style Performance October 2018 October 2018 Chart II-11The State Of Monetary Policy Drives Style Performance The State Of Monetary Policy Drives Style Performance The State Of Monetary Policy Drives Style Performance Investment Conclusions: U.S. equity sectors that have traditionally been considered "growth" have outperformed value sectors for an extended period. The long slump has led some investors to argue that value investing is finished, killed by a combination of overexposure and short-term performance imperatives. Other investors see value's long drought as an anomaly, and are looking for the opportune time to bet on a reversal. We are in the latter camp. The difficulty lies in finding an indicator that reliably leads value stocks' outperformance. Most macro measures are unhelpful, though broad market direction offers some insight, as stocks with low price-to-book multiples have outperformed their high-priced peers by a wide margin during bear markets. Bear markets aren't the most useful timing guide, however, because one only knows in retrospect when they begin and end. The monetary policy backdrop holds the most promise as a practical guide. Although our determination of easy or tight policy turns on the modeled estimate of a concept and should not be looked to for absolute precision, it has provided a timely, reliable guide to value outperformance. We expect the relationship will persist because of the cushion provided by less demanding multiples. Earnings and multiples surge when policy is easy, lifting all boats. It is only when policy is tight, and the tide is going out, that the margin of safety offered by lower-priced stocks yields the greatest benefit. Per our estimate of the equilibrium fed funds rate, we are still firmly ensconced within Phase I of the policy rate cycle, and expect that we will remain there until sometime in the second half of 2019. We therefore expect that value, in Fama and French terms, will continue to underperform growth for another year. The clock is ticking for growth, though, as the expansion is in its latter stages and building inflation pressures will likely force the Fed to take a fairly hard line in this rate-hiking cycle. Once monetary policy turns restrictive, investors should hunt for value candidates using a range of valuation metrics, and combine them in a sector-neutral way, as we have via our Equity Trading Strategy service's model. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Doug Peta Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy 1 Graham, Benjamin, The Intelligent Investor, Harper Collins: New York, 2005, p. 97. 2 Ibid, p. 15. 3 Ibid, p. 189. 4 Fama, Eugene F. and French, Kenneth R., "The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Market Returns," The Journal of Finance, Volume 47, Issue 2 (June 1992), pp. 427-465. 5 S&P currently brands its Growth and Value Indexes as S&P 500 Dow Jones Indexes, but Citigroup has the longest history of compiling S&P 500 Growth and Value Indexes, beginning in 1975, so we join the Citigroup S&P 500 style indexes to the Standard & Poor's series to obtain the maximum style-index history. We use the terms Citigroup and S&P interchangeably. 6 The Pure Value and Pure Growth indexes include only the top quartile of value and growth stocks, respectively, with no overlap between indexes, and are therefore better gauges of true style investing. 7 The Tech-versus-Financials cast of the indexes endures because all of the other sectors, ex-regulated Telecoms and Utilities, which account for too little market cap to make a difference, regularly move between the indexes as their fundamental fortunes, and investor appetites, wax and wane. The current Early Cyclical/Late Cyclical/Defensive profiles are not etched in stone and should be expected to shift, perhaps considerably, over time. 8 We created a second growth index by taking the top 30% of stocks ranked by earnings momentum. However, it made little difference to the results, so we will use the bottom 30% of stocks by value as our measure of "growth" for the purposes of this report, consistent with Fama/French methodology. 9 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst. September 2017, available on bca.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see the May 17, 2017 Global ETF Strategy Special Report, "Equity Factors And The Fed Funds Rate Cycle," available at getf.bcaresearch.com. III. Indicators And Reference Charts Our equity indicators continue to signal that caution is warranted, but U.S. profits remain potent enough to drown out scattered negative messages. Our Monetary Indicator remains at the low end of a multi-year range, suggesting that liquidity conditions have tightened. Our Composite Technical Indicator is in no-man's land, not far above the zero line that marks a sell signal, but coming close to issuing a buy signal by crossing above its 9-month moving average. Our Composite Sentiment Indicator is in a healthy position that suggests that the current level of investor optimism is sustainable. On the other hand, not one of our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) Indicators is moving in the right direction. The U.S. version is still weak and slowly getting weaker; the European one has flat-lined; and our Japanese WTP extended its decline, albeit from a high level. Our Revealed Preference Indicator (RPI) for stocks continues to issue a sell signal. The RPI combines the idea of market momentum with valuation and policy measures. It provides a powerful bullish signal if positive market momentum lines up with constructive signals from the policy and valuation measures. Conversely, if constructive market momentum is not supported by valuation and policy, investors should lean against the market trend. Momentum remains out of sync with valuation and policy, underlining the idea that caution is warranted. On balance, our indicators continue to suggest that the underlying supports of the U.S. equity bull market are eroding. Surging U.S. profits are papering over the cracks, and may still have some legs. Earnings surprises are at an all-time high, and the net revisions ratio remains elevated. The 10-year Treasury yield's march higher is due to run out of steam. Valuation (slightly cheap) and technicals (oversold by almost 2 standard deviations) imply that a countertrend pullback is not too far around the corner. Beyond a near-term correction, though, complacency about inflation and the Fed's ability to hike rates to at least the level of the FOMC voters' median projection points to looming capital losses. The dollar is quite expensive on a purchasing power parity basis, and its long-term outlook is not constructive, but policy and growth divergences with other major economies will likely keep the wind at its back in the near term. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: ##br##Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: ##br##Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-17U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-28U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-30U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-31U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-32U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market Chart III-33U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption Chart III-34U.S. Housing U.S. Housing U.S. Housing Chart III-35U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-36U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Doug Peta Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy

Highlights We have deciphered global trade linkages to determine which countries are most at risk from a slowdown in EM/China imports. Our analysis takes into account not only the destinations of shipments but also the types of goods. Peru, Chile, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand are the most vulnerable to a slowdown in industrial sectors in EM and China. The least vulnerable emerging economies to this theme are Mexico, Turkey, Colombia, India and Russia. Feature The growth desynchronization1 currently taking place between developing and advanced economies warrants a detailed analysis of trade flows by countries as well as types of goods to assess the vulnerability of various economies to the global trade slowdown. This report's objective is to reveal which countries are most vulnerable to a slowdown in domestic demand in emerging markets, including China. Our main macro theme remains a considerable slowdown in EM/China capital spending, and a moderate slowdown in their consumer spending. We used these macro assumptions to produce a vulnerability ranking for both developing and developed countries. Why Do China And EM Matter? Annual imports by emerging markets including China stand at a combined $7 trillion. This overshadows both U.S. and EU imports, which collectively stand at $4.6 trillion, and underscores the importance of EM and China in global trade (Chart I-1). Chinese imports excluding processing trade - inputs that are imported, then processed and re-exported - make up $1.6 trillion, i.e., constituting 23% of the $7 trillion total of EM plus China imports. Furthermore, the most vulnerable part of the EM/Chinese economies are capital expenditures. The latter represent a significant portion of the global economy (Chart I-2). Aggregate investment expenditures in developing countries including China are as large as those of the U.S. and EU together. China itself accounts for half of EM investment expenditures. Moreover, capital spending is the largest component of the Chinese economy, constituting 42% of GDP. By comparison, Chinese exports to the U.S. and EU together account for only 7% of GDP. Chinese shipments to the U.S. constitute a mere 3.6% of mainland GDP (Chart I-3). Chart I-1EM/China Imports Are Much Larger ##br##Than U.S.'s And EU's Combined EM/China Imports Are Much Larger Than U.S.'s And EU's Combined EM/China Imports Are Much Larger Than U.S.'s And EU's Combined Chart I-2EM/China Capex Is As Large ##br##As U.S.'s And EU's Combined EM/China Capex Is As Large As U.S.'s And EU's Combined EM/China Capex Is As Large As U.S.'s And EU's Combined Chart I-3Structure Of Chinese##br## Economy Structure Of Chinese Economy Structure Of Chinese Economy In turn, Chinese imports are much more leveraged to the country's capital spending than to household expenditures. Table I-1 shows that imports of consumer goods excluding autos account for a mere 15% of total Chinese foreign goods intake. Table I-1Import Composition Of Chinese Imports Deciphering Global Trade Linkages Deciphering Global Trade Linkages With construction and infrastructure spending being a substantial part of mainland capital expenditures, China's investment cycle is very sensitive to the money/credit cycle. This is because no construction or infrastructure investment can be undertaken without credit (loans, bonds and other types of financing). Therefore, China's credit cycle - which drives its domestic capex cycle - is a key predictor of Chinese imports and many commodity prices (Chart I-4). Despite the latest liquidity easing in China, the cumulative effect of previous liquidity tightening as well as the ongoing regulatory clampdown on the financial system are still working their way through the banking and shadow banking systems. Our assessment is that it will take some time before the cumulative effect from the recent liquidity easing takes hold and helps growth recover. China accounts for a significant portion of total EM exports (Chart I-5). Shipments to China constitute 18% of emerging Asia's and 22% of South America's total exports. As the mainland's capex cycle and imports continue to decelerate, EM ex-China exports will slump. This will not only generate a negative income shock in EM economies but will also result in currency depreciation, which will push up local interest rates and tighten banking system liquidity (Chart I-6). Overall, a major downturn in the EM ex-China capex cycle and a moderate slowdown in household consumption will ensue. Chart I-4Chinese Imports ##br##To Decelerate Chinese Imports To Decelerate Chinese Imports To Decelerate Chart I-5Importance China For Emerging Asia ##br##And South America Importance Of China For Emerging Asia And South America Importance Of China For Emerging Asia And South America Chart I-6EM Ex-China: Currency Depreciation##br## = Higher Local Rates EM Ex-China: Currency Depreciation = Higher Local Rates EM Ex-China: Currency Depreciation = Higher Local Rates How are different countries exposed to these forces? Methodology The global marketplace for goods is a complex system. Modern trade is dominated by the exchange of intermediate goods within different supply chains.2 Furthermore, trade flows between countries are dependent on the types of goods that are traded (industrial versus consumption goods, for instance). Our objective is to compute each country's exposure to China and the rest of the EM industrial sectors that are at the epicenter of a slowdown, as we elaborated above. We have developed the following methodology, summing up the following three parameters3 for each major economy in the world: 1) Exports to China that are used for industrial purposes (Table I-2). Table I-2Vulnerability Ranking Of Exports To China Deciphering Global Trade Linkages Deciphering Global Trade Linkages In order to adjust for the sensitivity a certain export has to China's industrial sector, we assigned three coefficients to them: 0, 0.5 and 1. Agricultural commodities and non-durable consumer goods are assigned a coefficient of 0, and are therefore omitted from this aggregation. The basis for this is that agricultural goods are not sensitive to the industrial sector, and we do not expect a slump in China's consumption of non-durable goods. A coefficient of 0.5 is assigned to industrial fuels and semi-durable goods. This entails a moderate slowdown in these imports by China. Our rationale is that demand for industrial fuels is somewhat sensitive to the industrial sector, but not significantly as they are also consumed by the consumer sector. Industrial metals, capital goods and durable consumer goods are assigned a coefficient of 1, meaning maximum vulnerability. The former two are directly tied to the industrial sector, (construction and infrastructure, in particular) while the latter one will suffer as discretionary big-ticket item spending will weaken in the wake of a potential decline in financial assets and real estate values. We also have made an adjustment to account for goods that are exported to China and then re-exported to developed markets for final consumption. We assume these goods are not vulnerable, as we are not negative on U.S. and EU final domestic demand. Based on our estimates, around 30% of intermediate manufacturing goods shipments to China from Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand are actually re-exported from China to developed markets for final consumption. We therefore removed this amount from the aggregation to properly reflect the vulnerable portion of their exports. 2) Exports to EM ex-China that are used for industrial purposes (Table I-3). Table I-3Vulnerability Ranking Of Exports To EM Ex-China Deciphering Global Trade Linkages Deciphering Global Trade Linkages In order to adjust for the sensitivity of certain exports to the EM ex-China industrial sector, we assigned the same coefficients as above. The reason is that agricultural goods and non-durable consumer goods (a coefficient of zero) will not be sensitive to a slowdown in EM ex-China industrial sectors. Industrial metals, capital goods and durable goods, on the other hand, will be very vulnerable (a coefficient of one). Industrial fuels and semi-durable goods will be modestly affected (a coefficient of 0.5). 3) Exports to complex economies4 (i.e. Germany, Japan, Korea, Sweden and Switzerland) that are susceptible of being re-exported to emerging markets. We estimate that 30% of intermediate exports that are shipped to these very advanced economies end up being re-exported to EM and China. So, 30% of any country's intermediate goods exports to the complex economies is considered vulnerable. Vulnerability Ranking Chart I-7 sums up the three variables introduced above - total amount of vulnerable exports - and ranks countries based on their exports that are susceptible to an EM/China industrial slowdown as a share of total imports. Chart I-7Vulnerable Exports To China And EM As A Share Of Total Exports Deciphering Global Trade Linkages Deciphering Global Trade Linkages Chart I-8 lists countries based on the size of their vulnerable exports as a share of their GDP from highest to lowest. Chart I-8Vulnerable Exports To China And EM As A Share Of GDP Deciphering Global Trade Linkages Deciphering Global Trade Linkages Chart I-9 presents our ultimate trade vulnerability ranking which combines both parameters - vulnerable exports as a share of total exports and GDP. Peru, Chile, Korea, Malaysia and Thailand are the most vulnerable to a slowdown in industrial sectors in EM and China. The least vulnerable emerging economies are Mexico, Turkey, Colombia, India and Russia. Chart I-9Overall Vulnerability Assessment Deciphering Global Trade Linkages Deciphering Global Trade Linkages These macro themes and rankings constitute an important but not sole part of our country view formation. There are many other factors - both global and domestic - that enter the formulation of our country views. That is why this ranking is not entirely consistent with our country recommendations. The lists of our overweights and underweights across EM equities, fixed-income, credit and currencies as well as specific trades that we recommend can be found on pages 9-10. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com 1 Pease see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report "Desynchronization Compels Currency Adjustments", dated September 20, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2https://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=2109 3 All values are measured in US$ and are measured as % of total exports. The data is from the United Nations and dated as of December 31, 2017. 4https://www.media.mit.edu/projects/oec-new/overview/ Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights The upcoming changes to the Global Industry Classification Standard will substantially alter the sector composition of the MSCI China Investable index, by hollowing out the information technology sector (to the benefit of consumer discretionary and the new communication services sector). The new communication services sector will become a market-neutral (but barbelled) sector from the perspective of cyclicality, with high- and low-beta components. The inclusion of Alibaba in the consumer discretionary sector warrants the closure of our most successful trade over the past year: long consumer staples / short discretionary. Feature S&P Dow Jones and MSCI Inc. will be implementing major structural changes to the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS), effective after the market close on September 28, 2018. The changes are among the most significant since the GICS was launched in 1999, and there are meaningful implications for investors. In this brief special report, we summarize the key changes as they pertain to the Chinese investable equity benchmark, and provide a counterfactual simulation of historical performance had the upcoming changes been in effect over the past three years.1 For the MSCI China index, the main investable equity benchmark, the changes to the GICS structure will largely impact three sectors: information technology, consumer discretionary, and telecommunication services: The telecommunication services sector will be renamed to "communication services", and this new level 1 sector will be much broader in scope. Communication services will include companies that facilitate transformation in the way of communication, entertainment, and information seeking. In addition to the companies currently classified within telecommunication services, communication services will include media stocks formerly in the consumer discretionary sector, including advertising, broadcasting, cable & satellite, publishing, movies & entertainment sub-sectors. In addition, home entertainment software and some internet software & services companies, currently classified under the information technology sector, will also move to communication services. These include prominent stocks like Baidu, Tencent, Sina, and Sohu. The consumer discretionary sector will include online retailers, such as Alibaba, from information technology sector under its internet & direct marketing retail sub-sector. Chart 1 shows that these changes will have a very substantial impact on the sector composition of the MSCI China index. The weight of the information technology sector will drop dramatically from 37% to 3% after the GICS changes occur, because all three of the BAT stocks (Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent) will move to other sectors. The weight of consumer discretionary is set to rise from 8% to 20%, as the inclusion of Alibaba offsets the removal of media (Alibaba alone will account for 60% of the consumer discretionary sector after the GICS changes). Relative to the current weight of telecommunication services, the new communication services sector weight will be substantially higher, at 27% (versus its 5% current weight). Chart 2 provides both factual and counterfactual perspectives on what relative performance for these three sectors would have looked like since 2016, had the upcoming changes been in effect. The chart shows that the relative performance of consumer discretionary and communication services sector would have been considerably stronger, while the tech sector would have underperformed (in sharp contrast to what has actually occurred). Chart 3 provides some perspective on the cyclicality of China's new communication services sector. The telecommunication services sector is clearly a defensive sector, and has exhibited a beta less than 0.5 over the past year. However, the chart shows that communication services (had it existed), would have basically been a market-neutral sector in terms of market beta because of the offsetting impact of both including high-beta internet software & services companies and low-beta telecommunication services. In effect, the new communication services will become a barbelled sector from the perspective of cyclicality, with high- and low-beta components. Chart 1A Hollowing Out Of The Information Technology Sector A Hollowing Out Of The Information Technology Sector A Hollowing Out Of The Information Technology Sector Chart 2CD And Comm Services Would Have Outperformed Over The Past Three Years CD And Comm Services Would Have Outperformed Over The Past Three Years CD And Comm Services Would Have Outperformed Over The Past Three Years Chart 3Comm Services: A Market-Neutral, Barbelled Sector Comm Services: A Market-Neutral, Barbelled Sector Comm Services: A Market-Neutral, Barbelled Sector Finally, the beta of consumer discretionary sector would have been higher over the past two years in our counterfactual scenario, thanks to the inclusion of Alibaba. Consumer discretionary stocks have fared poorly in response to a trade war with the U.S., but the imminent inclusion of Alibaba in the discretionary sector will substantially alter the character of its future performance. As such, we have decided to close our long MSCI China Consumer Staples / short MSCI China Consumer Discretionary trade at a fantastic return of 47.6%. Qingyun Xu, Senior Analyst qingyunx@bcaresearch.com 1 For China, we proxy the upcoming changes to the GICS structure using a simple set of rules that aims to capture an overwhelming majority (but not all) of the upcoming changes. As such, investors should view our methodology as an approximation, rather than an exact application of the firm-by-firm changes that MSCI will make. Clients who are interested in a similar exercise for the global IMI benchmark should refer to Neeraj Dabake, Craig Feldman. (September, 2018) The New GICS Communication Services Sector. MSCI Research Paper, Retrieved from https://www.msci.com/www/research-paper/the-new-gics-communication/01107886967. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights The Trump administration's decision to effectively tariff the second round of imports at 25% materially raises the odds of another significant uptick in Chinese financial market volatility. Even if China ramps up its stimulus efforts in response, the lesson of the 2014-2016 episode is that investors are likely to wait for earnings clarity before buying stocks aggressively. Stay neutral China, at best, relative to global stocks, and overweight low-beta sectors within the investable equity universe. We have a contrarian view about Chinese corporate bonds, and recommend holding a long but diversified position over the coming 6-12 months. Feature Chart 1The RMB Is Acting As A "Panic Barometer" ##br##For Domestic Stocks The RMB Is Acting As A "Panic Barometer" For Domestic Stocks The RMB Is Acting As A "Panic Barometer" For Domestic Stocks The Trump administration finally announced its decision this week on the second round of tariffs on Chinese imports, essentially applying a 25% rate. While the rate will initially start at 10%, it will rise to 25% by the end of the year, and the administration has threatened to immediately seek public consultation on tariffs on all remaining imports from China if the country retaliates against the second round (which was announced yesterday). With news reports having suggested that China would reject new trade talks merely if the second round moves forward, the prospect of a breakthrough in negotiations seems dim, at best. We have highlighted in past reports that the RMB has acted as a panic barometer for domestic equities (Chart 1), as evidenced by the recent spike in the correlation between the two. During this period, the percent decline in CNY-USD seems to have closely followed the magnitude of proposed tariffs as a percent of Chinese exports to the U.S., as would be implied in a simple open economy model with flexible exchange rates. Based on this framework, Chart 2 suggests that the RMB may come under considerable further market pressure, even if investors only assume a 10% rate on the third round of tariffs. A break above the psychologically-important level of 7 for USD-CNY appears likely barring a major intervention from the PBOC, suggesting that a meaningful uptick in Chinese financial market volatility is forthcoming. Chart 2USDCNY = 7 Is Likely To Be Breached Barring Strong Action From The PBOC USDCNY = 7 Is Likely To Be Breached Barring Strong Action From The PBOC USDCNY = 7 Is Likely To Be Breached Barring Strong Action From The PBOC Stimulus To The Rescue? Given that Chinese policymakers have signaled their willingness to stimulate in response to a negative external environment, some investors have argued that China is actually about to enter a mini-cycle upswing. For now, two points suggest that this conclusion is premature: A 10% tariff rate on all remaining imports from China would imply close to $90 billion in tariffs collected, once the second round rate rises to 25%. As noted above, a simple equilibrium exchange rate framework would imply material further weakness in the RMB to counter protectionism of this magnitude. Besides heralding a further selloff in Chinese stocks, this could lead to competitive currency devaluation amongst China's largest trading partners, a "beggar-thy-neighbor" policy that tends to exacerbate rather than alleviate shocks to aggregate demand. As we have noted numerous times over the past year, China's old economy was slowing in the lead up to the U.S./China trade war, and it is not yet clear whether the announced stimulus will generate enough "lift" to convince investors that the low in economic activity is behind them. Chart 3 shows that the August rise in adjusted total social financing as a share of GDP was extremely muted, and that there is no sign yet of a pickup in government spending. Even if China ramps up its stimulus efforts in response to this week's decision from the Trump administration, Chart 4 highlights an important point for investors: there was a considerable lag between a policy response and the low in stock prices during the 2014-2016 episode (a lag that may re-occur today). The chart shows that despite an ongoing depreciation in the RMB and a rebound in our BCA leading indicator for the Li Keqiang index, Chinese stock prices continued to decline for several months. This gap was caused by a lagged decline in earnings, and underscores that investors may ignore the current efforts by policymakers to stabilize the economy until clarity on the stability of earnings presents itself. Chart 3No Sign Yet Of##br## Major Stimulus No Sign Yet Of Major Stimulus No Sign Yet Of Major Stimulus Chart 4History Suggests Investors Need Both ##br##Stimulus And Earnings Clarity History Suggests Investors Need Both Stimulus And Earnings Clarity History Suggests Investors Need Both Stimulus And Earnings Clarity And for now, several signs point to potentially material downside risk for earnings: While the now considerably larger shock from U.S. tariffs has yet to impact the Chinese economy, trailing earnings growth has already peaked and has recently fallen below its trend (Chart 5, panel 1). Despite the recent deceleration in trailing earnings growth and the sharp decline in stock prices, analysts' 12-month forward growth estimates remain quite elevated (Chart 5, panel 2). This suggests that forward earnings could be vulnerable to a decline above and beyond what occurs to trailing earnings, as a full 1/3rd of the increase in the former since late-2015 has been due to very significant shift in growth expectations. The rise in trailing earnings over the past few years appears to be stretched, based the trend in profit margins (Chart 6). The chart highlights that 12-month trailing earnings have well surpassed sales since late-2016, causing margins to rise to their highest level on record and raising the risk of a significant mean-reversion in response to a meaningful economic shock. Net earnings revisions have done a good job at predicting inflection points in forward earnings growth over the past decade, and have recently fallen into negative territory (Chart 7). Chart 5Lofty Earnings Growth Expectations ##br##Are A Risk To Stocks Lofty Earnings Growth Expectations Are A Risk To Stocks Lofty Earnings Growth Expectations Are A Risk To Stocks Chart 6The Earnings Recovery Has Been Partly ##br##Reliant On A Margin Expansion The Earnings Recovery Has Been Partly Reliant On A Margin Expansion The Earnings Recovery Has Been Partly Reliant On A Margin Expansion Chart 7Earnings Revisions Herald ##br##Slowing Earnings Momentum Earnings Revisions Herald Slowing Earnings Momentum Earnings Revisions Herald Slowing Earnings Momentum It is true that some of the above-average levels for profit margins and 12-month forward growth expectations can be explained by the substantial rise in the share of the tech sector in the MSCI China index, whose constituents are significantly more profitable than ex-tech stocks, may have better longer-term growth prospects, and may be more immunized from the trade war with the U.S. Still, Chart 8 illustrates the high earnings hurdle rate for tech stocks over the coming year. Bottom-up analysts continue to expect tech stocks to grow their earnings more than 20% over the next 12 months, despite: Chart 8Are Chinese Tech Stocks Going To Be##br## Able To Grow Earnings 20+%? Are Chinese Tech Stocks Going To Be Able To Grow Earnings 20+%? Are Chinese Tech Stocks Going To Be Able To Grow Earnings 20+%? A poor economic outlook that is likely to impact consumer spending (even if households "outperform" the business sector), and The fact that tech sector net earnings revisions have fallen deeply into negative territory (panel 2). How should investors allocate capital within China in the middle of a trade war with the U.S? First, despite the fact that Chinese stocks have already fallen significantly from their early-January high, it is clearly too early to bottom fish either domestic or investable stocks. Stay neutral China, at best, relative to global stocks. Second, investors should certainly favor low-beta sectors within the Chinese equity universe. Currently, our low-beta equity portfolio includes industrials, telecom services health care, utilities, and consumer staples, but we update the portfolio weights at the end of every month. Third, as discussed below, investors should ignore the very bearish narrative towards Chinese corporate bonds, and hold a long but diversified position over the coming 6-12 months. Bottom Line: The Trump administration's decision to effectively tariff the second round of imports at 25% materially raises the odds of another significant uptick in Chinese financial market volatility. Even if China ramps up its stimulus efforts in response, the lesson of the 2014-2016 episode is that investors are likely to wait for earnings clarity before buying stocks aggressively. Stay neutral China, at best, relative to global stocks, and overweight low-beta sectors within the investable equity universe. Chinese Corporate Bonds: A Contrarian Long Our analysis of the earnings risk facing equities suggests that it is probably still too early to buy Chinese stocks, but in our (contrarian) view there is still one pro-cyclical asset that investors should favor: Chinese corporate bonds. Headlines about defaults in China's corporate bond market continue to appear in the financial press, with concerns most recently focused on low recovery rates of defaulted issues.1 We last wrote about Chinese corporate bonds in June,2 and took a contrarian (i.e. optimistic) stance towards the market. In the meantime, our long China onshore corporate bond trade has continued to gain ground, and an analysis of the inferred credit rating of the market actually strengthens our conviction to stay long. One key element of the bearish narrative towards Chinese corporate bonds is the fact that investment-grade issues in the market are trading like junk. Table 1 highlights that this is largely true: the table presents the spread-inferred credit rating of the four major rating categories of the ChinaBond Corporate Bond Index, and shows that AAA bonds are trading on the border of equivalent maturity investment- and speculative-grade bonds in the U.S. Bonds rates AA+/AA/AA- in China are trading between lower-B and high-CAA, which is firmly in speculative-grade territory. However, in our view market participants are making a mistake when they assume that de-facto junk ratings on Chinese corporate bonds will translate into U.S. junk-style default rates on bonds over the coming 6-12 months (or, frankly, beyond). Chart 9 presents an estimate of the market-implied default rate for the four rating categories shown in Table 1, and suggests that investors are pricing in roughly a 1% default rate for AAA-rated corporate bonds and a 4-5% default rate for AA+/AA/AA-. Table 1Chinese Corporate Bonds Are Trading##br## Like Speculative-Grade Issues Investing In The Middle Of A Trade War Investing In The Middle Of A Trade War Chart 9Allowing Market-Implied Default Rates##br## To Occur Would Be A Huge Policy Error Allowing Market-Implied Default Rates To Occur Would Be A Huge Policy Error Allowing Market-Implied Default Rates To Occur Would Be A Huge Policy Error There are two important factors to consider when gauging the validity of these expectations: Based on Moody's most recent Annual Default Study, the market's current expectations for Chinese corporate bond defaults are actually above the average historical one-year default rates for their inferred credit ratings. Average default rates almost never actually occur over a given 12-month period. Chart 10 highlights that default rates in the U.S. have a binary distribution that is almost entirely determined by whether the economy is in recession (not just slowing down). The late-1980s and the post-2015 environment have been exceptions to this rule, which in large part can be explained by industry-specific events (namely, a surge of energy-sector defaults due to a collapse in the price of oil). But the key point is that investors are likely to overestimate the actual default rate over a given 12 month period when assuming an average historical rate, unless the economy shifts from an expansion to an outright recession over the period. From our perspective, the combination of the market's default expectations and the fact that China is easing suggests an outright long position in Chinese corporate bonds is warranted over the coming year. In our judgement, there is simply no way that policymakers can allow default rates on the order of what is being priced in to occur, as it would constitute an enormous policy mistake that would risk destabilizing the financial system at a time when officials are attempting to counter the looming shock to the export sector. In fact, we doubt that China's typical policy of gradualism when liberalizing its economy and financial markets would allow default rates to rise from 0% to 5% over a year in any economic environment, particularly the current one. As a final point, Chart 11 highlights why a significant rise in the default rate is required in order for investors to lose money on Chinese corporate bonds. The chart shows the 12-month breakeven spread for the ChinaBond AA- Corporate Bond index, unadjusted for default. The breakeven spread represents the rise in yields that would be required for investors to lose money over a 12-month horizon (i.e. the yield change that exactly erases the income return from the position), assuming no defaults. Chart 10"Average" Default Rates ##br##Do Not Really Occur "Average" Default Rates Do Not Really Occur "Average" Default Rates Do Not Really Occur Chart 11A 2% Rise In Yields From Tighter Policy Is Not##br## Going To Occur Over The Coming Year A 2% Rise In Yields From Tighter Policy Is Not Going To Occur Over The Coming Year A 2% Rise In Yields From Tighter Policy Is Not Going To Occur Over The Coming Year The chart shows that AA- bond yields would have to rise approximately 215 bps over the coming year before investors suffer a negative total return, which would be an enormous rise that has a near-zero probability of occurring due of tighter monetary policy. As such, defaults (or the pricing of default risk) remains the only real credible source of potential capital loss from these bonds over the coming year. Our bet, with high conviction, is that holders of Chinese corporate bonds hold a put option that will prevent this from occurring. Bottom Line: Fade investor concerns about rising defaults, and stay long Chinese corporate bonds over the coming 6-12 months. We acknowledge that idiosyncratic risk is likely to be elevated for this asset class, and we recommend that investors take a diversified, portfolio approach when investing in China's corporate bond market. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 For example, please see "In China, Less Than 20% Defaulted Bonds Have Been Paid Back" by Bloomberg News, August 27, 2018 2 Pease see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "A Shaky Ladder", dated June 13, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights The primary trend for both Chinese stock prices and CNY-USD remains captive to negative surprises related to the trade war between the U.S. and China. Considerable uncertainty remains on this front, but our outlook is that the situation is likely to get worse, not better. It remains too early to forecast a durable stabilization in the exchange rate. It is an open question whether the PBOC will be forced to change short-term interest rates in order to guide the currency in their preferred direction. There is some evidence to suggest that China can control both the interest and exchange rate should it choose to do so, but analyzing the issue is significantly complicated by the approach Chinese policymakers are using to manage the impossible trinity. There is room for Chinese short-term interest rates to rise modestly if the worst of the U.S./China trade war does not materialize. This would be consistent with the goal of avoiding significant releveraging of China's private sector. For now, investors should maintain no more than a benchmark allocation towards Chinese investable stocks within a global equity portfolio, and should continue to favor low-beta sectors within the investable universe. Feature We noted in our August 22 Weekly Report that the persistent weakness of the RMB appeared to be one important factor weighing on Chinese stocks, particularly the domestic market.1 We presented some tentative evidence that part of the decline in CNY-USD since mid-June has been policy-driven (despite the PBOC's statements that it had not been depreciating the currency), but also noted that the RMB had now likely fallen outside the comfort zone of policymakers. The PBOC's re-introduction of its "counter-cyclical factor" when fixing the yuan's daily mid-point supports this view, and suggests that monetary authorities are now aiming for a broadly stable exchange rate (or are aiming to limit further downside). Chart 1 highlights that there have been some, albeit modest, signs of success. Whether they succeed will, first and foremost, be largely determined by what appears to be an imminent decision by the Trump administration to levy tariffs on an additional $200 billion in imports from China. Our previous analysis of potential equilibrium levels for CNY-USD suggests that investors have already priced in the imposition of a second round of tariffs, but the key factor for markets will be whether the tariff rate applied is 10% or 25%. In the first case it is possible that the RMB has overshot to the downside; in the latter case, CNY-USD will very likely come under renewed pressure that would be difficult for the PBOC to fully counter. Chart 1Some Modest Signs Of Currency Stability Some Modest Signs Of Currency Stability Some Modest Signs Of Currency Stability Chart 2Interest Rate Differentials And CNY-USD: A Tight Link Interest Rate Differentials And CNY-USD: A Tight Link Interest Rate Differentials And CNY-USD: A Tight Link But an additional question is whether the PBOC will be forced to change short-term interest rates in order to guide the currency in their preferred direction. Both our Global Investment Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy services have highlighted that USD-CNY has broadly tracked the one-year swap differential between the U.S. and China over the past few years (Chart 2). This suggests that, at a minimum, there is some link between the interbank market and the exchange rate, despite the fact that capital controls are still tight in the Chinese economy. It also seems to imply, ominously, that the PBOC may have to choose between potentially significant releveraging and a significant re-appreciation in the exchange rate. Revisiting The Impossible Trinity "With Chinese Characteristics" The exact nature of this interest/exchange rate link is difficult to analyze, because of how China has chosen to manage the "impossible trinity" following the August 2015 devaluation of the yuan. The upper portion of Chart 3 illustrates the standard view of the impossible trinity, which posits that policymakers must choose one side of the triangle, foregoing the opposite economic attribute. For example, most modern economies have chosen "B", allowing the free flow of capital and independent monetary policy by giving up a fixed exchange rate regime. Hong Kong has chosen "A", meaning that its monetary policy is driven by the Fed in exchange for a pegged exchange rate and an open capital account. Chart 3The Possible Trinity? Moderate Releveraging And Currency Stability: An Impossible Dream? Moderate Releveraging And Currency Stability: An Impossible Dream? China historically has chosen "C", an economy with a closed capital account, a fixed exchange rate, and independent monetary policy. There is no causal link between interest and exchange rates in the world of option C, but following the PBOC's move in 2015 towards a more market-oriented approach for the exchange rate, it was accused by many market participants of trying to pursue all three goals simultaneously. In short, market participants have not been able to clearly discern what option China has chosen following over the past few years. China, in effect, answered these criticisms by arguing that it was not bound by the standard view of the impossible trinity, but rather one "with Chinese characteristics". The lower portion of Chart 3 presents this theory, which posits that policymakers must distribute a 200% adoption rate among three competing choices. The chart depicts a possible scenario where policymakers are relatively tolerant of capital flow, partially adopting two measures in addition to fully independent monetary policy: quasi-floating exchange rates highly subject to the interest rate dynamics shown in Chart 2, and loosely enforced capital controls. The chart also shows what ostensibly occurred in response to significant capital flight in 2014 and 2015, i.e. a crackdown on capital control enforcement and a less market-driven exchange rate. To the extent that this framework still applies, Charts 4 - 7 suggest that this capital flow crackdown has not abated and that the PBOC may be able to prevent significant further weakness in the currency without dramatically raising interest rates: China tightened scrutiny on trade invoicing verifications in 2016 to crack down on "fake" international trades, such as imports from Hong Kong (local firms fabricated import businesses to move money offshore). Based on the recent trend, these restrictions remain in effect (Chart 4). In addition, quarterly net flows of currency and deposits, which turned sharply negative in Q3 2015, have risen back into positive territory (Chart 5). Chart 4Blocking Capital Leakage In Trade... Blocking Capital Leakage In Trade... Blocking Capital Leakage In Trade... Chart 5...And Cash ...And Cash ...And Cash Chart 6 presents Chinese foreign reserves measured in SDRs, and highlights that reserves have been stable for the better part of the past two years. This stability is in sharp contrast to the material decline that occurred in 2015, and is supportive of the view that China can control both the interest and exchange rate, should it choose to do so. Chart 7 highlights that there are a few precedents for a divergence between interbank rates and CNY-USD. One divergence in 2012-2013 is particularly noteworthy: CNY-USD trended higher, but interbank interest rates remained flat for some time. Crucially, this does not appear to have been driven by falling U.S. interest rates, as the 2-year Treasury yield had already fallen close to zero in 2011 and did not begin to rise until mid-2013. Chart 6China Has Stabilized Its ##br##Foreign Reserves China Has Stabilized Its Foreign Reserves China Has Stabilized Its Foreign Reserves Chart 7Short-Term Interest Rates And ##br## CNY-USD Have Diverged Before Short-Term Interest Rates And CNY-USD Have Diverged Before Short-Term Interest Rates And CNY-USD Have Diverged Before Interest Rates And Moderate Releveraging Despite the evidence presented in Charts 4 - 7, the bottom line is that it is not clear whether the PBOC would be forced to raise short-term interest rates (and by how much) if it chooses to stabilize the currency. Would doing so be a death-knell for the Chinese economy? In our view, the answer is no, unless the trade war does indeed metastasize further. We have argued that the magnitude of the decline in the 3-month repo rate has been excessive, and is not currently consistent with a moderately reflationary scenario. We have argued that the repo rate decline is a side-effect of the PBOC's heavy liquidity injections, which were more likely aimed at ensuring financial system stability against the backdrop of struggling small banks. Chart 8Lending Rates Will Decline Substantially ##br## If Repo Rates Don't Rise Lending Rates Will Decline Substantially If Repo Rates Don't Rise Lending Rates Will Decline Substantially If Repo Rates Don't Rise But the current level of liquidity support carries risks to the objective of controlling private-sector leveraging. Chart 8 suggests that unless the PBOC raises the benchmark lending rate (which would be interpreted very hawkishly by the market), the magnitude of the decline in the repo rate will push the weighted average lending back to its 2016 low (when the monetary authority had turned the policy dial to "maximum reflation"). Last week's Special Report explained in detail why this would carry significant risks to China's financial stability.2 We noted that most of the private sector leveraging that has occurred in China since 2010 has occurred on the balance sheet of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the household sector. While the household debt-to-GDP ratio is still low, it is rising rapidly and may accelerate even further if lending rates fall significantly. The picture for SOEs is even more dire: leverage is extremely elevated, and a comparison of adjusted return on assets to borrowing costs suggests that the marginal operating gain from debt has become negative. This suggests that further leveraging of SOEs could push them into a debt trap and/or shackle the monetary authority's ability to meaningfully raise interest rates. As such, it is actually our expectation that short-term interest rates will rise modestly following a 10% rate on the second round of tariffs (instead of 25%), or if it becomes clear that there will be no third round. If the trade war escalates, however, short-term interest rates would not be expected to rise at all, and the drive to control leverage could be downshifted yet again. Investment Conclusions Chart 9Stay Neutral Towards Chinese Stocks, ##br##And Favor Low-Beta Sectors Stay Neutral Towards Chinese Stocks, And Favor Low-Beta Sectors Stay Neutral Towards Chinese Stocks, And Favor Low-Beta Sectors What does this all mean for our view on the RMB, and what are the implications for Chinese stocks? For now, we can draw the following conclusions: The primary trend for both stock prices and the exchange rate remains captive to negative surprises related to the trade war between the U.S. and China. We would expect further financial market weakness in response to a 25% rate on the second round of tariffs, and especially if President Trump moves forward with plans to tariff the remaining $250 billion of imports from China (the "third round"). Conversely, a 10% second-round tariff rate, or convincing signs that there will be no third round, could soon put a floor under the RMB and stock prices. On this front, the lead-up to a possible meeting between Presidents Trump and Xi in November will be important to monitor. But for now, given our view that the trade war between the U.S. and China is likely to get worse, not better, it remains too early to forecast a durable stabilization in the exchange rate, and an overweight stance towards Chinese equities in absolute terms remains premature. A-shares are deeply oversold and we are watching closely for signs to time a reversal, relative to investable stocks (at least at first). Higher Chinese short-term interest rates are not necessarily negative for stock prices, as long as the rise is modest and not in the context of a further, material uptick in trade tensions between the U.S. and China. While a moderate releveraging scenario would clearly imply a weaker earnings growth outlook than if credit accelerated strongly, earnings growth is still positive and yet Chinese equities are 20-30% off of their 1-year high in local currency terms. Modestly higher interest rates, in the context of durable RMB stability and an end to the escalation of trade threats, is likely to be equity-positive. As we wait for more clarity on the trade outlook, we reiterate our core equity investment recommendations: Investors should maintain no more than a benchmark allocation towards Chinese investable stocks within a global equity portfolio, and should continue to favor low-beta sectors within the investable universe (Chart 9). As always, we will be monitoring developments related to the timing and magnitude of the upcoming export shock, as well as further policymaker responses continually over the coming weeks and months. Stay tuned! Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com 1 Pease see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "In Limbo", dated August 22, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Pease see China Investment Strategy Special Report "Chinese Policymakers: Facing A Trade-Off Between Growth And Leveraging", dated August 29, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Barring government interference in foreign exchange markets, the path of least resistance for the U.S. dollar is up. The U.S. Treasury has authority to intervene unilaterally in foreign exchange markets. However, conditions for effective interventions to weaken the dollar exist neither within nor outside the U.S. For the time being, central banks in Europe, Japan, and China will not cooperate with the U.S. to depreciate the dollar. The Federal Reserve will effectively team up with the U.S. Treasury to depreciate the greenback only if economic conditions in the U.S. warrant a weaker currency. This is not currently the case. In this context, the dollar will continue to appreciate, but its rally will be accompanied by substantially higher volatility as the U.S. administration aggressively "talks down" the dollar. To capitalize on this theme, traders should consider going long dollar volatility. A firm dollar is consistent with continuous turmoil in EM financial markets. We continue to recommend staying put on EM. Feature Chart I-1U.S. Core Inflation Will Rise Further U.S. Core Inflation Will Rise Further U.S. Core Inflation Will Rise Further Economics and politics are set for a major clash in foreign exchange markets. Economic fundamentals and crosscurrents worldwide herald U.S. dollar appreciation. Yet, U.S. President Donald Trump wholeheartedly opposes any dollar strength. The higher the greenback rises, the more forceful Trump's jawboning about the exchange rate and interest rates will become. If the dollar does not halt its advance and overshoots, the odds are material that at a certain point the U.S. Treasury will initiate currency market interventions itself. It would do so by selling dollars and buying foreign assets. What will be the outcome of this battle between economics and politics in financial markets? The conclusion of this report is that for government-led currency market interventions to be effective in reversing the dollar's uptrend, the U.S. administration will have to convince the Federal Reserve to cease rate hikes and balance sheet contraction. Without the Fed recalibrating policy to be more consistent with a weaker dollar, the U.S. Treasury may not succeed in weakening the greenback on a sustainable basis. Given core consumer price inflation in the U.S. will likely surprise to the upside (Chart I-1), the Fed will not be willing to halt its tightening campaign. Hence, it will take time for the U.S. administration to wrestle and convince the Fed to accommodate currency interventions in efforts to weaken the greenback. In the meantime, the dollar will likely continue its volatile ascent. The Dollar Will Rally If Left To Market Forces Based on economic fundamentals, the path of least resistance for the greenback is up - for now. U.S. growth and inflation warrant higher interest rates, and the Fed is willing to continue moving short rates higher. In contrast, the unfolding EM/China slowdown is not only negative for their own respective currencies but is also harmful for commodities currencies in the advanced economies. Besides, the German and Japanese economies are much more vulnerable to a slowdown in EM/China than the U.S. (Chart I-2). Consistently, Chart I-3 illustrates that outperformance by the equal-weighted U.S. stock index versus its global peers in local currency terms - a measure of relative domestic demand - still points to a stronger U.S. dollar. On the whole, the growth and interest rate differentials between the U.S. and the rest of the world will likely continue to move in favor of the former and extend the dollar rally. Chart I-2Germany and Japan Are Much More Exposed ##br##To EM/China Than To The U.S. Germany and Japan Are Much More Exposed To EM/China Than To The U.S. Germany and Japan Are Much More Exposed To EM/China Than To The U.S. Chart I-3Relative Share Prices Point ##br##To A Firmer Dollar Relative Share Prices Point To A Firmer Dollar Relative Share Prices Point To A Firmer Dollar The dollar is typically a counter-cyclical currency. It depreciates when global trade is improving and appreciates when the global business cycle is slowing (the dollar is shown inverted on this chart) (Chart I-4). Odds are that global trade will continue to decelerate due to the slowdown in EM/China and trade protectionism - even if U.S. domestic demand growth remains robust. Furthermore, U.S. trade protectionism is positive for the dollar. The basis is that exporters to the U.S. could opt for weaker currencies to offset the negative impact of tariffs on their local currency revenues. Financial markets are often self-regulating, and they move to rebalance the global economy and amend economic excesses. A stronger dollar is the right medicine for the global economy for now. A firmer dollar is required to rebalance growth away from the U.S. and towards the rest of the world. In particular, dollar appreciation is needed to cap budding U.S. inflationary pressures. In addition, a stronger greenback will compel unraveling of excesses within the developing economies. While it will cause growth retrenchment and will be painful for EM in the medium term, cheapened currencies and deleveraging (an unwinding of credit excesses) will ultimately create a foundation for stronger and healthier growth in the years ahead. U.S. dollar liquidity is tightening, supporting the greenback (the latter is shown inverted on this chart) (Chart I-5). Continued shrinkage of the Fed's balance sheet entails tighter U.S. dollar liquidity going forward. With respect to currency market technicals, the broad trade-weighted U.S. dollar is not yet overbought, and trader sentiment on the U.S. currency is not extremely bullish (Chart I-6). Hence, conditions for an ultimate cyclical top in the dollar do not yet exist. Chart I-4The Global Business Cycle and The Dollar The Global Business Cycle and The Dollar The Global Business Cycle and The Dollar Chart I-5Upside Risks To The Dollar bca.ems_sr_2018_08_30_s1_c5 bca.ems_sr_2018_08_30_s1_c5 Chart I-6The Dollar: Market Technicals The Dollar: Market Technicals The Dollar: Market Technicals Finally, the U.S. dollar is not expensive. Our favored currency valuation measure - the real effective exchange rate-based on unit labor costs - currently suggests that the greenback is only slightly above its fair value (Chart I-7). This measure is superior to the real effective exchange rate based on consumer and producer prices because it considers both wages and productivity. Ultimately, competitiveness is not a function of wages (or prices) but wages adjusted for productivity.1 Besides, labor costs typically constitute the largest share of business costs. Hence, the unit labor cost-based real effective exchange rate is the best measure of currency competitiveness. This currency valuation yardstick does not corroborate the widely circulating narrative in the investment community that the U.S. currency is very expensive. The greenback is also not expensive according to the real broad trade-weighted dollar index. The latter is only slightly above its historical mean, and well below its previous highs (Chart I-8). Chart I-7AThe Dollar Is Not Expensive The Dollar Is Not Expensive The Dollar Is Not Expensive Chart I-7BThese Currencies Are Expensive These Currencies Are Expensive These Currencies Are Expensive Chart I-8Trade-Weighted Dollar in Real Terms Trade-Weighted Dollar in Real Terms Trade-Weighted Dollar in Real Terms To be sure, we are not implying the dollar is cheap. It is not. Rather, our point is that the greenback is not yet expensive. When valuations are not extreme, they usually do not prevent a rally or selloff. Odds are that the dollar could become more expensive in this cycle before topping out. Bottom Line: Barring government interference in foreign exchange markets, the path of least resistance for the U.S. dollar is up. The Main Risk To The Dollar Is Trump Chart I-9U.S. Monetary Conditions Are ##br##About To Become Tight U.S. Monetary Conditions Are About To Become Tight U.S. Monetary Conditions Are About To Become Tight Will the U.S. administration invoke the "nuclear" option - currency market interventions - to eclipse the dollar's fundamentals and reverse the greenback's rally? President Trump fiercely opposes a stronger dollar. He prefers a structurally weaker currency to bring back manufacturing jobs to the U.S. Besides, from a cyclical perspective, President Trump has been explicit that higher U.S. interest rates and a stronger dollar are negating his economic stimulus. Trump's worry is that tightening monetary conditions, if they persist, will depress growth by late 2019 when the next presidential election season begins in earnest (Chart I-9). President Trump is a genuine economic populist and is ready to cross boundaries that many presidents refused to. This leaves us little doubt that the U.S. administration will escalate its calls both for a weaker currency and a halt in Fed tightening. The U.S. Treasury is in charge of foreign exchange policy, and it can intervene in currency markets. The Fed can, but is not obliged by law, to supplement the Treasury's interventions in foreign exchange markets. In theory, the U.S. Treasury has a special fund (the Exchange Stabilization Fund) and could opt for unilateral currency market interventions even if the Fed does not cooperate. In such a case, a pertinent question is: What are the essential conditions for currency interventions to succeed in reversing the dollar's uptrend? Conditions For Effective Currency Interventions There have been two major interventions conducted by the U.S. authorities to depreciate the dollar: the 1971 Smithsonian Agreement and the 1985 Plaza Accord. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service has discussed the political and trade backdrops of these interventions in past reports, and we will not detail them here.2 There was also the Louvre Accord in 1987, but it was aimed at propping up the U.S. dollar, not weakening it. All of these interventions were successful and achieved their objective (Chart I-10). We list below the stipulations that secured the success of these interventions and examine whether conditions for effective interventions are present today. Chart I-10The Smithsonian And Plaza Accords Were Successful The Smithsonian And Plaza Accords Were Successful The Smithsonian And Plaza Accords Were Successful Currency interventions accompanied by congruent monetary and fiscal policies tend to be more successful. The previous currency interventions conducted by the U.S. Treasury would not have been successful without the Fed simultaneously adjusting monetary policy. Not only did the Fed join the U.S. Treasury's efforts to depreciate the greenback following the Smithsonian Agreement and the Plaza Accord, but it also altered its monetary policy stance - it pursued a policy of lower-than-otherwise called for real interest rates. Academic literature on this issue is straightforward. Bordo (2010) contends the following about the efficacy of currency interventions: "If intervention were to have anything other than a fleeting, hit-or-miss effect on exchange rates, monetary policy had to support it ... Most of the movements in exchange rates over the Plaza and Louvre period seem attributable to policy changes, not intervention."3 Given current economic conditions in the U.S. economy - a very tight labor market and the prospect of higher inflation - the Fed is unlikely to easily agree to altering its current policy stance to accommodate the Treasury's preferred exchange rate policy. Academic literature finds that sterilized interventions are less effective than non-sterilized ones.4 For the Fed not to sterilize currency interventions aimed at weakening the dollar, it would need to allow commercial banks' reserves to rise. This would conflict with its current explicit objective of reducing commercial banks' reserves and shrinking its balance sheet (Chart I-11). Chart I-11U.S. Banks' Reserves and The Dollar U.S. Banks' Reserves and The Dollar U.S. Banks' Reserves and The Dollar Hence, the bar is presently very high for the Fed to agree to non-sterilized currency interventions to weaken the dollar, as it would go against its current policy objective of tightening and shrinking its balance sheet. Going on the Treasury's leash would substantially damage the Fed's creditability. Bilateral currency interventions are much more effective in achieving the desired objective than unilateral ones. Hence, for interventions to succeed it is critical to involve counterparts in other countries. Back in the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. used its hegemonic leadership over Europe and Japan as well as tariffs (in 1971) and the threat of tariffs (1980s) to force its allies to agree to bilateral interventions to weaken the dollar. However, it is difficult to envision either Europe or Japan agreeing to allowing their respective currencies to strengthen a lot at this time. First, both Europe and Japan are actively fighting latent deflationary forces at home. Given the high-beta, export-dependent nature of both economies, a strong currency would negatively impact growth. Geopolitically speaking, Europe is not as dependent on the U.S. today as it was at the height of the Cold War. Russia is a "poor man's" Soviet Union, with the combined defense budget of the EU economies dwarfing its own. Besides, in the 1970s and 1980s, the U.S. was "the only market in town." Crossing American policymakers upped the threat of being evicted from the most lucrative global middle class consumer market. This is no longer the case with the rise of emerging markets, China and the common European market. Prominently, Trump's main objective is to depreciate the dollar versus the Chinese RMB. Yet, there is no chance that in the foreseeable future China will agree with the U.S. to engineer considerable yuan appreciation against the dollar. In fact, Beijing has been actively using CNY depreciation to offset the impact of tariffs imposed on its exports by the Trump administration. Chart I-12China: Exchange Rate and Interest Rate##br## Differential Are Correlated China: Exchange Rate and Interest Rate Differential Are Correlated China: Exchange Rate and Interest Rate Differential Are Correlated Notably, this week there was an article published by China's Xinhua news agency referring to the "... Plaza Accord, in which Tokyo agreed to strengthen the currency against the dollar, as cause of the country's economic woes. ... Rapid and steep yen appreciation and Japan's domestic policy mistakes eventually brought about the nation's "lost decade."5 Chinese policymakers have carefully studied and internalized Japan's mistakes in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The mainland will not accept a considerably stronger yuan at times when deleveraging remains an important policy objective - and the latter is bound to weigh on domestic demand. Amid deleveraging, China requires a weaker - not stronger - currency to mitigate deflationary pressures in the economy. For interventions to be effective, foreign counterparts need to also agree to adjust their monetary and fiscal policy stances to be in sync with exchange rate policy. Presently, both the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan are still conducting QE and expanding their balance sheets. These policies are compatible with weaker - not stronger - currencies. It is highly unlikely these central banks will abruptly reverse their current policies to accommodate President Trump's economic preferences. With time, if the U.S. dollar overshoots on the strong side and the euro and yen plunge substantially, it is probable that the ECB and BoJ will become willing to support the U.S. administration's efforts to depreciate the dollar. However, conditions for bilateral interventions do not exist at the moment. As to China, policymakers are unlikely to push local rates higher to promote a major currency rally. Chart I-12 illustrates the tradeoff between the exchange rate and interest rates in China might be weak but exist - the CNY/USD rate broadly correlates with the China-U.S. interest rate differential. The PBoC may not be able to appreciate the yuan without tolerating higher money market rates. Yet China's corporate debt burden is enormous, and requires low - not high - borrowing costs to smooth the deleveraging process. Bottom Line: Conditions for effective foreign exchange market interventions do not presently exist in the U.S. For the time being, neither the Fed nor central banks in Europe, Japan and China will cooperate with the U.S. Treasury to depreciate the dollar. Can The U.S. Intervene In CNY/USD Market? Chart I-13Trade-Weighted RMB And Dollar Move Together Trade-Weighted RMB And Dollar Move Together Trade-Weighted RMB And Dollar Move Together The U.S. can intervene in the euro, yen and other currency markets, but the focus of President Trump is the dollar's exchange rate with the Chinese yuan. Provided China has capital controls, its government decides which foreign institutions/organizations can buy local currency and assets, and how much. It is highly unlikely the Chinese government will grant permission to the U.S. authorities to freely operate in the RMB market. In short, China will not allow the Fed and other U.S. institutions to act on behalf of the government and push around the exchange rate. The ongoing trade confrontation between the U.S. and China has not produced any agreement. There is, at this time, zero chance that China will agree to appreciate its currency considerably under U.S. pressure. In fact, our geopolitical strategy team still expects the Trump administration to impose tariffs on the announced $200 billion of Chinese imports at some point in September. While the ultimate figure may be smaller than $200 billion, the point remains that the trade war between the U.S. and China continues to heat up, not cool off. The only feasible option for the U.S. authorities is to devalue the dollar against the European and Japanese currencies, triggering a broad-based selloff in the dollar. In this scenario, the RMB might appreciate versus the greenback, but only moderately. The CNY/USD rate is tightly controlled by the PBoC, and the yuan typically depreciates (appreciates) in trade-weighted terms when the greenback weakens (strengthens), respectively (Chart I-13). Consequently, U.S. intervention in currency markets that does not directly embrace the yuan will likely lead to a weaker trade-weighted RMB and make China even more competitive versus other nations. In fact, such an effort would be welcomed by Chinese policymakers, as it would stabilize and even lift the yuan versus the dollar (fostering financial stability in China), but allow the renminbi to depreciate in trade-weighted terms (boosting China's overall trade competitiveness). Bottom Line: There is currently no effective way for the U.S. to intervene and achieve material RMB appreciation in trade-weighted terms. Investment Conclusions Chart I-14Go Long U.S. Dollar Volatility Go Long U.S. Dollar Volatility Go Long U.S. Dollar Volatility The global macro landscape warrants a continued dollar rally. Yet the U.S. administration will use frequent verbal attacks to halt the greenback's ascent. President Trump is likely to continue to publically oppose the Fed and its interest rate policy. At some point, potentially in the near future, his criticism could become a full-on assault. In this context, the U.S. currency will continue to appreciate, but its rally will be accompanied by large dips, i.e., substantially higher volatility. To capitalize on this theme, traders should consider going long dollar volatility (Chart I-14). The trajectory of the U.S. dollar is critical for many financial markets in general and EM in particular. A firm dollar is consistent with continuous turmoil in EM financial markets. We continue to recommend staying put on EM in absolute terms and underweighting EM versus DM for stocks, credit and currencies. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy continues to recommend shorting a basket of the following EM currencies versus the U.S. dollar: the Brazilian real, the South African rand, the Chilean peso, the Malaysian ringgit and the Indonesian rupiah. Potential dynamics that would persuade the Fed to arrest its tightening campaign include escalating EM turmoil that spills into U.S. financial markets. An intensifying EM selloff is our baseline view, and the dollar will spike materially in this scenario. Only after this occurs will the Fed likely contemplate halting its tightening, and only then will the dollar peter out. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Unit labor cost = (wage per person per hour) / (productivity per person per hour). 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Understated In 2018," dated April 12, 2017, and "The Dollar May Be Our Currency, But It Is Your Problem," dated July 25, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Bordo, M. et al (2010), "U.S. Foreign-Exchange-Market Intervention during the Volcker-Greenspan", NBER Working Paper, September 2010 4 Bordo, M., Humpage, O. & Schwartz, A. (2011), "U.S. Monetary-Policy Evolution and U.S. Intervention", Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Working Paper, October 2011 5 South China Morning Post: Chinese state media cites Japan's 'lost decade' when warning of risks of giving in to US demands; https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2160196/chinese-state-media-cites-japans-lost-decade-when Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

This Special Report examines the impact of a NAFTA cancelation on 21 level-three GICs industries. While the latest news on the NAFTA renegotiation with Mexico is positive as we go to press, there is still a non-negligible risk that the existing trilateral deal will not survive. The U.S.-Mexico bilateral deal is an "agreement in principle" and will take time to ratify. Meanwhile, a framework deal with Canada would leave many thorny issues to be resolved. President Trump can still revert to his tough tactics on Canada ahead of the U.S. mid-term elections. If the President does not gain major concessions that can be presented as "victories" to voters, he is likely to take an aggressive stand in order to fire up his political base. The probability of Trump triggering Article 2205 and threatening to walk away from the suspended U.S.-Canada free trade agreement is still not trivial, despite the deal with Mexico. By itself, the cancelation of NAFTA would not be devastating for any particular U.S. industry because the size of the tariff increases would be fairly small as long as all parties stick with MFN tariff levels. That said, the impact would not be trivial, especially for those industries that have extensive supply lines that run between the three countries involved (especially Autos). We approached the issue from four different perspectives; international supply chains, a model-based approach, and an analysis of foreign revenue exposure and input cost exposure. The broad conclusion is that there are no winners from a NAFTA cancelation for the U.S. manufacturing GICs industries. Pharmaceuticals, Health Care Equipment & Supplies, Personal Products and Construction Materials are lower on the risk scale, but cannot be considered beneficiaries of a NAFTA collapse. The remaining industries are all moderately-to-highly exposed. Considering the four perspectives as a group, the most vulnerable industries are Automobiles, Automobile Components, Metals & Mining, Food Products, Beverages, and Textiles & Apparel. Our U.S. equity sector specialists recommend overweight positions in Defense and Financials; while neither stands to benefit from a NAFTA abrogation, they should at least be relative outperformers. They recommend underweight positions on Auto Components, Steel and Electrical Components & Equipment as relative (and probably absolute) underperformers should NAFTA disappear. While the latest news on the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is positive as we go to press, there is still a non-negligible risk that President Trump could revert to his tough tactics ahead of the U.S. mid-term elections.1 Even if Canada signs on to a framework deal, a lot of thorny details will have to be worked out. A presidential proclamation triggering Article 2205 of the NAFTA agreement (as opposed to tweeting that the U.S. will withdraw) would initiate a six-month "exit" period. Trump could use this deadline, and the threat of canceling the underlying U.S.-Canada FTA, to put pressure on Canada (if not Mexico) to concede to U.S. demands, just as he could revoke his exit announcement anytime within the six-month period. While some market volatility would ensue upon any exit announcement, even a total withdrawal at the end of the six months would have a limited macro-economic impact as long as the U.S. continued to respect its WTO commitments and lifted tariffs only to Most Favored Nation (MFN) levels. Nonetheless, a modest tariff hike is not assured given the Administration's "America First" policy, its looming threat of Section 232 tariffs on auto imports, its warnings against the WTO itself, and the steep tariffs it has already imposed on Canada, including a 20% tariff on softwood lumber and the 300% tariff on Bombardier CSeries jets. Moreover, even a small rise in tariffs to MFN levels would have a significant negative impact on industries that are heavily integrated across borders. Our first report on the evolving U.S. trade situation analyzed the implications of the U.S.-China trade war for the 24 level two U.S. GICs equity sectors. This Special Report examines the impact of a NAFTA cancelation on 21 level three GICs industries (finer detail is required since NAFTA covers mostly goods industries). We find that there are no "winners" among the U.S. equity sectors because the negative impact would outweigh any positive effects. The hardest hit U.S. industries would be Autos, Metals & Mining, Food Products, Beverages, and Textiles and Apparel, but many others are heavily exposed to a failure of the free trade agreement. Out Of Time President Trump is seeking a new NAFTA deal ahead of the U.S. midterms in November. While this timing may yet prove too ambitious, the U.S. has made progress in recent bilateral negotiations with Mexico, raising the potential that Trump will be able to tout a new NAFTA framework deal by November 6. Yet, investors should be prepared for additional volatility. There are technical issues with the bilateral U.S.-Mexico deal that could delay ratification in Congress until mid-2019. The new Mexican Congress must ratify the deal by December 1 if outgoing President Enrique Peña Nieto is to sign off. Otherwise, the incoming Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador may still want to revise any deal he signs, prolonging the process. Meanwhile, it would be surprising if the Canadians signed onto a U.S.-Mexico deal they had no part in negotiating without insisting on any adjustments.2 The important point is that President Trump's economic and legal constraints on withdrawing from NAFTA have fallen even further with the Mexican deal. If Trump does not get major concessions that can be presented as "victories" to voters, he is likely to take an aggressive stand in order to fire up his political base, as a gray area of "continuing talks" will not inspire voters. This could mean imposing the threatened auto tariffs or threatening to cancel the existing trade agreements with Canada. Thus, the risk of Trump triggering Article 2205 is still not trivial. A bilateral Mexican trade deal is not the same as NAFTA. Announcing withdrawal automatically nullifies much of the 1993 NAFTA Implementation Act. Some provisions of NAFTA under this act may continue, but the bulk would cease to have effect, and the White House could refuse to enforce the rest. The potential saving grace for trade with Canada was that the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA), which took effect in 1989, was incorporated into NAFTA. The U.S. and Canada agreed to suspend CUSFTA's operation when NAFTA was created, but the suspension only lasts as long as NAFTA is in effect. However, Trump may walk away from both CUSFTA and NAFTA in the same proclamation. In that event, WTO rules for preferential trade would require the U.S. and Canada to raise tariffs on trade with each other to Most Favored Nation (MFN) levels. These tariff levels are shown in Charts II-1A and II-1B. The Charts also show the maximum tariff that could potentially be applied under WTO rules. The latter are much higher than the MFN levels, underscoring that the situation could get really ugly if a full trade war scenario somehow still emerged among these three trading partners. Chart II-1AU.S.: MFN Tariff Rates By GICS Industry (2017) September 2018 September 2018 Chart II-1BMexico & Canada: MFN Tariff Rates By GICS Industry (2017) September 2018 September 2018 Current tariffs are set at zero for virtually all of these GICs industries, which means that the MFN levels also indicate how much tariffs will rise at a minimum if NAFTA is cancelled. Tariffs would rise the most for Automobiles, Textiles & Apparel, and Food Products (especially agricultural products), and Beverages. U.S. tariffs under the WTO are not significantly higher than NAFTA's rates; the average MFN tariff in 2016 was 3½%, which compares to 4.1% for the average Canadian MFN tariff. Would MFN Tariffs Be Painful? An increase in tariff rates of 3-4 percentage points may seem like small potatoes. Nonetheless, even this could have an outsized impact on some industries because tariffs are levied on trade flows, not on production. A substantial amount of trade today is in intermediate goods due to well-integrated supply chains. Charts II-2A and II-2B present a measure of integration. Exports and imports are quite large relative to total production in some industries. The most integrated U.S. GICs sectors include Automobiles & Components, Materials, Capital Goods and Electrical & Optical Equipment. Higher tariffs would slam those intermediate goods that cross the border multiple times at different stages of production. For example, studies of particular automobile models have found that "parts and components may cross the NAFTA countries' borders as many as eight times before being installed in a final assembly in one of the three partner countries."3 Tariffs would apply each time these parts cross the border if NAFTA fails. Chart II-2AU.S./Canada Supply Chain Integration September 2018 September 2018 Chart II-2BU.S./Mexico Supply Chain Integration September 2018 September 2018 Appendix Tables II-1 to II-4 show bilateral trade by product between the U.S. and Canada, and the U.S. and Mexico. In 2017, the U.S. imported almost $300b in goods from Canada, and exported $282b to that country, resulting in a small U.S. bilateral trade deficit. The bilateral deficit with Mexico is larger, with $314b in U.S. imports and $243b in exports. The largest trade categories include motor vehicles, machinery, and petroleum products. Telecom equipment and food products also rank highly. As mentioned above, the impact of rising tariffs is outsized to the extent that a substantial portion of trade in North America is in intermediate goods. Box II-1 reviews the five main channels through which rising tariffs can affect U.S. industry. Box II-1 Trade Channels There are at least five channels through which rising tariffs can affect U.S. industry: (1) The Direct Effect: This can be positive or negative. The impact is positive for those industries that do not export much but are provided relief from stiff import competition via higher import tariffs. The impact is negative for those firms facing higher tariffs on their exports, as well as for those firms facing higher costs for imported inputs to their production process. These firms would be forced to absorb some of import tariffs via lower profit margins. Some industries will fall into both positive and negative camps. U.S. washing machines are a good example. Whirlpool's stock price jumped after President Trump announced an import tariff on washing machines, but it subsequently fell back when the Administration imposed an import tariff on steel and aluminum (that are used in the production of washing machines). NAFTA also eliminated many non-tariff barriers, especially in service industries. Cancelling the agreement could thus see a return of these barriers to trade; (2) Indirect Effect: The higher costs for imported goods are passed along the supply chain within an industry and to other industries that are not directly affected by rising tariffs. This will undermine profit margins in these indirectly-affected industries to the extent that they cannot fully pass along the higher input costs. There would also be a loss of economies-of-scale and comparative advantage to the extent that firms are no longer able to use an "optimal" supply network that crosses borders, further raising the cost of doing business; (3) Foreign Direct Investment: Some U.S. imports emanate from U.S. multinationals' subsidiaries outside the U.S., or by foreign OEM suppliers for U.S. firms. NAFTA eliminated many national barriers to FDI, expanded basic protections for companies' FDI in other member nations, and established a dispute-settlement procedure. The Canadian and Mexican authorities could make life more difficult for those U.S. firms that have undertaken significant FDI in retaliation for NAFTA's cancellation; (4) Macro Effect: The end of NAFTA, especially if it were to lead to a trade war that results in tariffs in excess of the MFN levels, would take a toll on North American trade and reduce GDP growth across the three countries. Besides the negative effect of uncertainty on business confidence and, thus, capital spending, rising prices for both consumer and capital goods will reduce the volume of spending in both cases. Moreover, corporate profits have a high beta with respect to economic activity. The macro effect would probably not be large to the extent that tariffs only rise to MFN levels; (5) Currency Effect: To the extent that a trade war pushes up the dollar relative to the Canadian dollar and Mexican peso, it would undermine export-oriented industries and benefit those that import. However, while we are bullish the dollar due to diverging monetary policy, the dollar may not benefit much from trade friction given that tariffs would rise for all three countries. Chart II-3 is a scatter chart of GICs industries that compares the average MFN tariff on U.S. imports to the average MFN tariff on Canadian and Mexican imports from the U.S. A U.S. industry may benefit if it garners significant import protection but does not face a higher tariff on its exports to the other two countries. Unfortunately, there are no industries that fall into the north-west portion of the chart. The opposite corner, signifying low import protection but high tariffs on exports, includes Beverages, Household Durables, Household Products, Personal Products and Machinery. Chart II-3Import And Export Tariffs Faced By U.S. GICS Industries September 2018 September 2018 Model-Based Approach The C.D. Howe Institute has employed a general equilibrium model to estimate the impact of a NAFTA failure at the industrial level.4 The model is able to capture the impact on trade conducted through foreign affiliates. The study captures the direct implications of higher tariffs, but also includes a negative shock to business investment that would stem from heightened uncertainty about the future of market access for cross-border trade. It also takes into consideration non-tariff barriers affecting services. Table II-1Impact Of NAFTA Cancellation By Industry September 2018 September 2018 As with most studies of this type, the Howe report finds that the level of GDP falls by a relatively small amount relative to the baseline in all three countries - i.e. there are no winners if NAFTA goes down. Moreover, the U.S. is not even able to reduce its external deficit. While the trade barriers trim U.S. imports from NAFTA parties by $60b, exports to Canada and Mexico fall by $62b. At the industry level, the model sums the impacts of the NAFTA shock on imports, exports and domestic market share to arrive at the estimated change in total shipments (Table II-1). It is possible that an industry will enjoy a boost to total shipments if a larger domestic market share outweighs the damage to exports. However, the vast majority of U.S. industries would suffer a decline in total shipments according to this study, because the estimated gain in domestic market share is simply not large enough. Beef, Pork & Poultry and Dairy would see a 1-2% drop in total shipments relative to the baseline forecast. Next on the list are textiles & apparel, food products and automotive products. Even some service industries suffer a small decline in business, due to indirect income effects. Foreign-Sourced Revenue And Input Cost Approach Another way to approach this issue is to identify the U.S. industries that garner the largest proportion of total revenues from Mexico and Canada. Unfortunately, few companies provide much country detail on where their foreign revenues are derived. Many simply split U.S. and non-U.S. revenues, or North American and non-North American revenues. Table II-2 presents the proportion of total revenues that is generated from operations outside the U.S. for the top five companies in the industry by market cap (in some cases the proportion that is generated outside of North America was used as a proxy for foreign- sourced revenues). While this approach is not perfect, it does provide a good indication of how exposed a U.S. industry is to Canada and Mexico. This is because any company that has "gone global" will very likely be doing substantial business in these two countries. Table II-2Foreign Revenue Exposure September 2018 September 2018 At the top of the list are the Metals & Mining, Personal Products, and Auto Component industries. Between 62% and 81% of revenues in these three industries is derived from foreign sources. Following that is Household Durables, Leisure Products, Chemicals and Tobacco. Indeed, all of the level three GICs industries we are analyzing are moderately-to-highly globally-oriented, with the sole exception of Construction Materials. Table II-3Import Tariff Exposure September 2018 September 2018 U.S. companies are also exposed to U.S. tariffs that boost the price of imported inputs to the production process. This can occur directly when firm A imports a good from abroad, and indirectly, when firm A then sells its intermediate good to firm B at a higher price, and then on to firm C. In order to capture the entire process, we used the information contained in the Bureau of Economic Analysis' Input/Output tables. We estimated the proportion of each industry's total inputs that would be affected by a rise in tariffs to MFN levels. We then allocated the industries contained in the input/output tables to the 21 GICs level 3 industries we are considering, in order to obtain an import exposure ranking in S&P industry space (Table II-3). All 21 industries are significantly vulnerable to rising input costs, which is not surprising given that we are focusing on the manufacturing-based GICs industries and NAFTA focused on trade in goods. The vast majority of the industries could face a cost increase on 50% or more of their intermediate inputs to the production process. The Automobile industry is at the top of the list, with 72% of its intermediate inputs potentially affected by the shift up in tariffs (Automobile Components is down the list, at 56%). Containers & Packaging, Oil & Gas, Aerospace & Defense, Textiles and Food Products are also highly exposed to tariff increases. The automobile industry is a special case because of the safeguards built into NAFTA regarding rules-of-origin and the associated tracing list. The U.S. is seeking significant changes in both in order to tilt the playing field toward U.S. production, but this could severely undermine the intricate supply chain linking the three countries. Box II-2 provides more details. Box II-2 Automotive Production In NAFTA; Update Required We are focused on two key aspects to the renegotiation of the NAFTA rules that could have far reaching implications for automakers and the auto component maker supply base: the tracing list and country of origin rules. Regarding the first of these, the Trump administration has a legitimate gripe when it comes to automotive production. A tracing list was written in the early-1990's to define automotive components such that the rules of origin (ROO) could be easily met; anything not on the list is deemed originating in North America. As anyone who has driven a vehicle of early-1990's vintage and one of late-2010's vintage can attest, high tech components (largely not included on the tracing list) have grown exponentially as a percentage of the cost of the vehicle and, at least with respect to electronic and display components, are sourced mostly from overseas. Updating the tracing list would force auto makers to source a significantly greater amount of components domestically, almost certainly raising the cost of the vehicle and either hurting margins or hurting competitiveness through higher prices. The current NAFTA ROO require that 62.5% of the content of a vehicle must be sourced in North America, with no distinction between any of the member nations. The result of this legislation has been the creation of a highly integrated supply base that sees components move back and forth across borders through each stage of the manufacturing process. Early proposals from the Trump administration for a NAFTA rework included a country of origin provision for as much as 50% U.S. content. Such a provision would certainly cause a massive disruption in the automotive supply chain with components manufacturers forced to relocate or automakers electing to source overseas and pay the 2.5% MFN tariff on exports within North America. Either scenario presents a headwind to the tightly woven auto components base, underscoring BCA's U.S. Equity Strategy's underweight recommendation on the sector. The recently announced bilateral trade deal with Mexico raises the ROO content requirements to 75% from the 62.5% contemplated under NAFTA but, importantly, no country of origin provisions appear in the new deal. Still, given how quickly this is evolving, a final NAFTA deal could be significantly different. Chart II-4 presents a scatter diagram that compares import tariff exposure (horizontal axis) with foreign revenue exposure (vertical axis). The industries in the north-east corner of the diagram are the most exposed to NAFTA failure. The problem is that there are so many in this region that it is difficult to choose the top two or three, although Metals & Mining stands out from the rest. It is easier to identify the industries that face less risk in relative terms: Pharmaceuticals, Construction Materials, Health Care & Supplies, Leisure Products and, perhaps, Machinery. The rest rank highly in terms of both foreign revenue exposure and import tariff exposure. Chart II-4Foreign Revenue And Import Tariff Exposure September 2018 September 2018 Conclusions: By itself, a total cancelation of NAFTA would not be devastating for any particular U.S. industry because the size of the tariff increases would be fairly small as long as all parties stick with MFN tariff levels. That said, the impact would not be trivial, especially for those industries that have extensive supply lines that run between the three countries involved. The negative impact on GDP growth would likely be worse for Canada (and Mexico if its bilateral somehow fell through), but U.S. exporters would see some loss of business. We approached the issue from four different perspectives; international supply chains, a model-based approach, and an analysis of foreign revenue exposure and import tariff exposure. The broad conclusion is that there are no winners from a NAFTA cancelation for the U.S. manufacturing GICs industries. Pharmaceuticals, Health Care Equipment & Supplies, Personal Products and Construction Materials are lower on the risk scale, but cannot be considered beneficiaries of a NAFTA collapse. The remaining industries are all moderately-to-highly exposed. Considering the four perspectives as a group, the most vulnerable industries are Automobiles, Automobile Components, Metals & Mining, Food Products, Beverages, and Textiles & Apparel. Our U.S. equity sector specialists recommend overweight positions in Defense and Financials; while neither stands to benefit from a NAFTA abrogation, they should at least be relative outperformers. They recommend underweight positions on Auto Components, Steel and Electrical Components & Equipment as relative (and probably absolute) underperformers should NAFTA disappear. As we go to press, rapid developments are taking place in the NAFTA negotiations. The U.S. and Mexico have completed a bilateral agreement in principle and a Canadian team is looking into whether to sign onto the agreement by a U.S.-imposed August 31 deadline. This deadline would enable the current U.S. Congress to proceed to ratification before turning over its seats in January, though it is not a hard deadline. It is possible that the negotiations will conclude this week and the crisis will be averted. But the lack of constraints on President Trump's trade authority gives reason for pause. If Canada demurs, Trump could move to raise the cost through auto tariffs or announcements that he intends to withdraw from existing U.S.-Canada agreements in advance of November 6. While Mexico has now tentatively secured bilaterals with both countries through the new U.S. deal and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (which includes Canada), it still stands to suffer if a trilateral agreement is not in place. Moreover it is technically possible that Canada's refusal to join the U.S.-Mexico bilateral could delay the latter's ratification well into next year. Therefore, we treat Mexico the same as Canada in our analysis, despite the fact that Mexican assets stand to benefit in relative terms from having a floor put under them by the Trump Administration's more constructive posture and this week's framework deal. If Trump does not pursue a hard line with Canada, then it will be an important sign that he is adjusting his trade policy to contain the degree of confrontation with the developed nations and allies and instead focus squarely on China, where we expect trade risks to increase in the coming months. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Matt Gertken Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy Chris Bowes Associate Editor U.S. Equity Strategy APPENDIX TABLE II-1 U.S. Imports From Canada (2017) September 2018 September 2018 APPENDIX TABLE II-2 U.S. Exports To Canada (2017) September 2018 September 2018 APPENDIX TABLE II-3 U.S. Imports From Mexico (2017) September 2018 September 2018 APPENDIX TABLE II-4 U.S. Exports To Mexico (2017) September 2018 September 2018 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "A Mexican Standoff - Markets Vs. AMLO," dated June 28, 2018, and Weekly Report, "Are You 'Sick Of Winning' Yet?" dated June 20, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "NAFTA - Populism Vs. Pluto-Populism," dated November 10, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 3 Working Together: Economic Ties Between the United States and Mexico. Christopher E. Wilson, November 2011. 4 The NAFTA Renegotiation: What if the U.S. Walks Away? The C.D. Howe Institute Working Paper. November 2017.

Highlights Xi Jinping is trying to do two things at once: ease policy while cracking down on systemic financial risk; The trade war with the U.S. is a genuine crisis for China and is eliciting fiscal stimulus; Credit growth is far more likely to "hold the line" than it is to explode upward or collapse downward; The 30% chance of a policy mistake from financial tightening has fallen to 20% only, as bad loan recognition is underway and a critical risk to monitor; Hedge against the risk of a stimulus overshoot. China's policy headwinds have begun to recede, but Beijing is not riding to the rescue for emerging markets; While monetary policy has eased substantively, credit growth will be hampered by the government's financial crackdown; Potential changes to China's Macro-Prudential Assessment framework could be significant, but the impact on credit growth is overestimated at present; The recognition of non-performing loans (NPLs) and cleansing of China's banking system is still in early innings and will weigh on banks' risk appetite; The anti-corruption campaign is another reason to be cautious on EM. Geopolitical Strategy recommends clients stay overweight China (ex-tech) relative to EM. Feature "We have upheld the underlying principle of pursuing progress while ensuring stability." - Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China, October 18, 2017 "Any form of external pressure can eventually be transformed into impetus for growth, and objectively speaking will accelerate supply-side structural reforms." - Guo Shuqing, Secretary of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, July 5 PART I Last year we made the case that China's General Secretary Xi Jinping would double down on his reform agenda in 2018, specifically the bid to control financial risk, and that this would bring negative surprises to global financial markets as policymakers demonstrated a higher pain threshold.1 This view has largely played out, with economic policy uncertainty spiking and a bear market in equities developing alongside an increase in corporate and even sovereign credit default risk (Chart 1). We also argued, however, that Xi's "deleveraging campaign" would be constrained by the Communist Party's need for overall stability. Trade tensions with the U.S., and Beijing's perennial fear of unemployment, would impose limits on how much pain Beijing would ultimately tolerate: The Xi administration will renew its reform drive - particularly by curbing leverage, shadow banking, and local government debt. Growth risks are to the downside. But Beijing will eventually backtrack and re-stimulate, even as early as 2018, leaving the reform agenda in limbo once again.2 Over the past month, China has clearly reached its pain threshold: authorities have announced a series of easing measures in the face of a slowing economy, a trade war, and a still-negative broad money impulse (Chart 2). Chart 1Policy Uncertainty Up, Stocks Down Policy Uncertainty Up, Stocks Down Policy Uncertainty Up, Stocks Down Chart 2PMI Falling, Money Impulse Still Negative PMI Falling, Money Impulse Still Negative PMI Falling, Money Impulse Still Negative How stimulating is the stimulus? Will it lead to a material reacceleration of the Chinese economy? What will it mean for global and China-dedicated investors? We expect policy to be modestly reflationary. A substantial boost to fiscal thrust, and at least stable credit growth, is in the works. Yet Xi's reform agenda will remain a drag on the economy. While this new stimulus will not have as dramatic an effect as the stimulus in 2015-16, it will have a positive impact relative to expectations based on China's performance in the first half of the year. We advise hedging our negative EM view against a rally in China plays and upgrading expectations for Chinese growth in 2019. The policy headwind is receding for now. Xi Jinping's "Three Tough Battles" Chart 3Xi Jinping Caps Government Spending And Credit Xi Jinping Caps Government Spending And Credit Xi Jinping Caps Government Spending And Credit Xi will not entirely abandon the "Reform Reboot" that began last October. From the moment he came to power in 2012-13, he pursued relatively tight monetary and fiscal policy. Total government spending growth has dropped substantially under his administration, while private credit growth has been capped at around 12% (Chart 3). Xi partly inherited these trends, as China's credit growth and nominal GDP growth dropped after the massive 2008 stimulus. But he also embraced tighter policy as a way of rebalancing the economy away from debt-fueled, resource-intensive, investment-led growth. A comparison of government spending priorities between Xi and his predecessor makes Xi's policy preferences crystal clear: the Xi administration has increased spending on financial and environmental regulation, while minimizing subsidies for housing and railways to nowhere (Table 1 and 2). Table 1Central Government Spending Preferences (Under Leader's Immediate Control) China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Table 2Total Government Spending Preferences (Under Leader's General Control) China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? These policies are "correct" insofar as they are driven not merely by Xi's preferences but by long-term constraints: The middle class: Pollution and environmental degradation threaten the living standards of the country's middle class. Broadly defined, this group has grown to almost 51% of the population, a level that EM politicians ignore only at their peril (Chart 4). Asset bubbles: The rapid increase in China's gross debt-to-GDP ratio since 2008 is a major financial imbalance that threatens to undermine economic stability and productivity as well as Beijing's global aspirations (Chart 5). The constraint is clear when one observes that "debt servicing" is the third-fastest category of fiscal spending growth since Xi came to power (Table 2). Chart 4Emerging Middle Class A Latent Political Risk Emerging Middle Class A Latent Political Risk Emerging Middle Class A Latent Political Risk Chart 5The Rise And Plateau Of Macro Leverage China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? The problem is that Xi also faces a different, shorter-term set of constraints arising from China's declining potential GDP, "the Middle-Income Trap," and the threat of unemployment.3 The interplay of these short- and long-term constraints has forced Xi to vacillate in his policies. In 2015, the threat of an economic "hard landing," ahead of the all-important mid-term party congress in 2017, forced him to stimulate the "old" industrial economy and sideline his reforms. Only when he had consolidated power over the Communist Party in 2016-17 could he resume pushing the reform agenda.4 In July 2017, Xi announced the so-called "Three Critical Battles" against systemic financial risk, pollution, and poverty. The three battles are interdependent: continuing on the capital-intensive economic model will overwhelm any efforts to cut excessive debt or pollution (Chart 6), yet sudden deleveraging could derail the Communist Party's basic claim to legitimacy through improving the lot of poor Chinese. The macroeconomic impact of the three battles is broadly deflationary, as credit growth falls and industries restructure. The first battle - the financial battle - will determine the outcome of the other two battles as well as the growth rate of China's investment-driven economy, Chinese import volumes, and emerging market stability (Chart 7). Chart 6Credit Stimulus Correlates With Pollution Credit Stimulus Correlates With Pollution Credit Stimulus Correlates With Pollution Chart 7Credit Determines Growth And Imports Credit Determines Growth And Imports Credit Determines Growth And Imports On July 31, in the midst of worldwide speculation about China's willingness to stimulate, Xi reaffirmed this "Three Battles" framework. Remarkably, despite a general slowdown, a sharp drop in the foreign exchange rate, the revival of capital flight, and a bear market, he announced that the battle against systemic financial risk would continue in the second half of 2018. However, he also admitted that domestic demand needed a boost in the short term. Hence there should be no doubt in investors' minds about the overarching policy framework or Xi Jinping's intentions in the long run. The question driving the markets today is what China will do in the short term and whether it will initiate a material reacceleration in economic activity. Bottom Line: Xi Jinping remains committed to the reform agenda that he has pursued since coming to power in 2012. But he is forced by circumstances to vary the pace and intensity. At the top of the agenda is the control of systemic financial risk. This is a policy driven by the belief that China's economic and financial imbalances threaten to undermine its overall stability and global rise. Why The Shift Toward Easier Policy? The gist of the July 31 Politburo statement was that policy will get more dovish in the short term. It mentioned "stability" five times. The Politburo pledged to make fiscal policy "more proactive" and to find a better balance between preventing financial risks and "serving the real economy." This direct promise from Xi Jinping of more demand-side support gives weight to the State Council's similar statement on July 23 and will have reflationary consequences above and beyond the central bank's marginal liquidity easing thus far. What is motivating this shift in policy, which apparently flies in the face of Xi's high-profile deleveraging campaign? If we had to name a single trigger for China's change of tack, it is not the economic slowdown so much as the trade war with the United States. The war began when the U.S. imposed sanctions on Chinese firm ZTE in April and China depreciated the RMB, but it escalated dramatically when the U.S. posted the Section 301 tariff list in June (Chart 8).5 This is a sea change in American policy that is extremely menacing to China. China runs a large trade surplus and has benefited more than any other country from the past three decades of U.S.-led globalization. Its embrace of globalization is what enabled the Communist Party to survive the fall of global communism! Chart 8More Than Market Dynamics At Work More Than Market Dynamics At Work More Than Market Dynamics At Work Chart 9China Is Less Export-Dependent China Is Less Export-Dependent China Is Less Export-Dependent True, China has already seen its export dependency decline (Chart 9). But Beijing has so far managed this transition gradually and carefully, whereas a not-unlikely 25% tariff on $250-$500 billion of Chinese exports will hasten the restructuring beyond its control (Chart 10). A very large share of China's population is employed in manufacturing (Chart 11). To the extent that the tariffs actually succeed in reducing external demand for Chinese goods, these jobs will be affected. Chart 10Tariffs Will Add More Pain To Factory Workers Tariffs Will Add More Pain To Factory Workers Tariffs Will Add More Pain To Factory Workers Chart 11Manufacturing Unemployment A Huge Threat Manufacturing Unemployment A Huge Threat Manufacturing Unemployment A Huge Threat Unemployment is anathema to the Communist Party. And China is simply not as experienced as the U.S. in dealing with large fluctuations in unemployment (Chart 12). While Chinese workers will blame "foreign imperialists" and rally around the flag, the pain of unemployment will eventually cause trouble for the regime. Domestic demand as well as exports will suffer. It is even possible that worker protests could evolve into anti-government protests. Chart 12China Not Experienced With Layoffs China Not Experienced With Layoffs China Not Experienced With Layoffs Given that Chinese and global growth are already slowing, it is no surprise that the Politburo statement prioritized employment.6 China's leaders will prepare for social instability as the worst possible outcome of the showdown with America - and that will push them toward stimulus. In addition, there will be no short-term political cost to Xi Jinping for erring on the side of stimulus, as there is no opposition party and the public is not demanding fiscal and monetary austerity. Moreover, the main macro implication of Xi's decision last year to remove term limits - enabling himself to be "president for life" in China - is that his reforms do not have to be achieved by any set date. They can be continually procrastinated on the basis that he will return to them later when conditions are better.7 The policy response to tariffs from the Trump administration also signals another policy preference: perseverance. Xi would not be straying from his reform priorities if not for a desire to counter American protectionism. China is not interested in kowtowing but would rather gird itself for a trade war. Still, our baseline view is that the Xi administration will stimulate without abandoning the crackdown on shadow lending or launching a massive "irrigation-style" credit surge that exacerbates systemic risk.8 Policy will be mixed, as Xi is trying to do two things at once. Bottom Line: China's slowdown and the outbreak of a real trade war with the United States is forcing Xi Jinping to ease policy and downgrade the urgency of his attempt to tackle systemic financial risk this year. Can Fiscal Easing Overshoot? Yes. How far will China's policy easing go? China has a low level of public debt, and fiscal policy has been tight, so we fully expect fiscal thrust to surprise to the upside in the second half of the year, easily by 1%-2% of GDP, possibly by 4% of GDP. Chart 13Fiscal Tightening Was The Plan For 2018 China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? A remarkable thing happened this summer when researchers at the People's Bank of China and the Ministry of Finance began debating fiscal policy openly. Such debates usually occur during times of abnormal stress. The root of the debate lay in the national budget blueprint laid out in March at the National People's Congress. There, without changing official rhetoric about "proactive fiscal policy," the authorities revealed that they would tighten policy this year, with the aim of shrinking the budget deficit from 3% of GDP target in 2017 to 2.6% in 2018. The IMF, which publishes a more realistic "augmented" deficit, estimates that the deficit will contract from 13.4% of GDP to 13% (Chart 13). This fiscal tightening coincided with Xi's battle against systemic financial risk. Hence both monetary and fiscal policy were set to tighten this year, along with tougher regulatory and anti-corruption enforcement.9 Thus it made sense on May 8 when the Ministry of Finance revealed that the quota for net new local government bond issuance this year would increase by 34% to 2.18 trillion RMB. This quota governs new bonds that go to brand new spending (i.e. it is not to be confused with the local government debt swap program, which eases repayment burdens but does not involve a net expansion of debt). Local government spending is the key because it makes up the vast majority (85%) of total government spending, which itself is about the same size as new private credit each year. In June, local governments took full advantage of this opportunity, issuing 316 billion RMB in brand new bonds (up from a mere 17 billion in May - an 11.8% increase year-on-year) (Table 3). This spike in issuance is later than in previous years. Combined with the Politburo and State Council pledging to boost fiscal policy and domestic demand, it suggests that net new issuance will pick up sharply in H2 2018 (Chart 14).10 Table 3Local Government Bond Issuance And Quota China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Chart 14Local Government Debt Can Surprise In H2 China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? At the same time, the risk that special infrastructure spending will fall short this year is receding. About 1.4 trillion RMB of the year's new bond allowance consists of special purpose bonds to fund projects. The State Council said on July 23 it would accelerate the issuance of these bonds, since, at most, only 27% of the quota was issued in the first half of the year (Chart 15). The risk of a shortfall - due to stricter government regulations over the quality of projects - is thereby reduced. What is the overall impact of these moves? The Chinese government provides an annual "debt limit" that applies to the grand total of explicit, on-balance-sheet, local government debt. The limit increased by 11.6% for 2018, to 21 trillion RMB (Table 4), which, theoretically, enables local governments to splurge on a 4.5 trillion RMB debt blowout. Should that occur, 2.6 trillion RMB of that amount, or 3% of GDP, would be completely unexpected new government spending in 2018 (creating a positive fiscal thrust).11 Chart 15June Issuance Surged, Special Bonds To Pick Up China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Table 4Local Government Debt Quota Is Not A Constraint China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Such a blowout may not be likely, but it is legally allowed - and the political constraints on new issuance have fallen with the central government's change of stance. This means that local governments' net new bond issuance can move up toward this number. More feasibly, local governments could increase their explicit debt to 19.3 trillion RMB, a 920 billion RMB increase on what is expected, which would imply 1% of GDP in new spending or "stimulus" in 2018.12 The above only considers explicit, on-balance-sheet debt. Local governments also notoriously borrow and spend off the balance sheet. The total of such borrowing was 8.6 trillion RMB at the end of 2014, but there is no recent data and the stock and flow are completely opaque.13 The battle against systemic risk is supposed to curtail such activity this year. But the newly relaxed supervision from Beijing will result in less deleveraging at minimum, and possibly re-leveraging. Similarly, the government has said it is willing to help local governments issue refinancing bonds to deal with the spike in bonds maturing this year.14 This frees them up to actually spend or invest the money they raise from brand new bonds. In short, our constraints-based methodology suggests that the risk lies to the upside for local government debt in 2018, given that it is legal for debt to increase by as much as 2.5 trillion RMB, 3% of GDP, over the 1.9 trillion RMB increase that is already expected in the IMF's budget deficit projections for 2018. What about the central government? Its policy stance has clearly shifted. The central government could quite reasonably expand the official budget deficit beyond the 2.6% target. Indeed, that target is already outdated given that new individual tax cuts have been proposed, which would decrease revenues (add to the deficit) by, we estimate, a minimum of 0.44% of GDP over a 12-month period starting in October.15 Other fiscal boosts have also been proposed that would add an uncertain sum to this amount.16 The total of these measures can quite easily add up to 1% of GDP, albeit with the impact mostly in 2019. Finally, the strongest reason to err on the side of an upward fiscal surprise is that an expansion of fiscal policy will allow the Xi administration to boost demand without entirely relying on credit growth. First, local governments are actually flush with revenues due to strong land sales (Chart 16), which comprise around a third of their revenues. This enables them to increase spending even before they tap the larger debt allowance. Second, China's primary concern about financial risk is due to excessive corporate (and some household) leverage, particularly by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and shadow banking. It is not due to public debt per se. It is entirely sensible that China would boost public debt as it attempts to limit leverage. In fact, this would be the Zhu Rongji playbook from 1998-2001. This was the last time that China announced a momentous three-year plan to crack down on profligate lending, hidden debts, and credit misallocation. The authorities deliberately expanded fiscal policy to compensate for the anticipate credit crunch and its drag on GDP growth (Chart 17).17 Chart 16Land Sales Enable Non-Debt Fiscal Spending Land Sales Enable Non-Debt Fiscal Spending Land Sales Enable Non-Debt Fiscal Spending Chart 17China Boosted Fiscal During Last Bad Debt Purge China Boosted Fiscal During Last Bad Debt Purge China Boosted Fiscal During Last Bad Debt Purge As for the impact on the economy, the money multiplier will be meaningful because the economy is slowing and fiscal policy has been tight. But fiscal spending does operate with a six-to-ten month lag, meaning that China/EM-linked risk assets will move long before the economic data fully shows the impact. Our sense, judging by the unenthusiastic response of copper prices thus far, is that the market does not anticipate the fiscal overshoot that we now do. Bottom Line: The political constraints on local government spending have fallen. Fiscal policy could add as much as 1%-3% of GDP to the budget deficit in H2 2018, namely if local government spending is unleashed by the recently announced policy shift. This is comparable to the 4% of GDP fiscal boost in 2008-09 and 3% in 2015-16. Can Monetary Easing Overshoot? Yes, But Less Likely. Credit is China's primary means of stimulating the economy, especially during crisis moments, and it has a much shorter lag period than fiscal spending (about three months). But Xi's agenda makes the use of rapid, credit-fueled stimulus more problematic. Based on the sharp drop in the interbank rate - in particular, the three-month interbank repo rate that BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy and China Investment Strategy use as a proxy for China's benchmark rate - it is entirely possible that credit growth will increase to some degree in H2 2018. Interbank rates have now fallen almost to 2016 levels, while the central bank never hiked the official 1-year policy rate during the recent upswing (Chart 18). In other words, the monetary setting has now almost entirely reversed the financial crackdown that began in 2017. The sharp drop in the interbank rate is partly a consequence of the three cuts to required reserve ratios (RRRs) this year, which amounts to 2.8 trillion RMB in new base money from which banks can lend.18 One or two more RRR cuts are expected in H2 2018, which could free up another roughly 800 billion-to-1.6 trillion RMB in new base money. With China accumulating forex reserves at a slower pace than in the past, and facing a future of economic rebalancing away from exports and growing trade protectionism, RRRs can continue to decline over the long run (Chart 19). China will not need to sterilize as large of inflows of foreign exchange.19 If China's banks and borrowers respond as they have almost always done, then credit growth should rise. The risk to this assumption is that the banks may be afraid to lend as long as the Xi administration remains even partially committed to its financial crackdown. Moreover, the anti-corruption campaign is continuing to probe the financial sector. While this has only produced a handful of anecdotes so far, they are significant and may have helped cause the decline in loan approvals since early 2017. Critically, China has begun the process of recognizing non-performing loans (NPLs), by requiring that "special mention loans" be reclassified as NPLs, thus implying that NPL ratios will spike, especially among small and regional lenders (Chart 20). This is part of the deleveraging process we expect to continue, but it can take on a life of its own and will almost certainly weigh on credit growth to some extent for as long as it continues. Chart 18Monetary Settings Back To Easy Levels Monetary Settings Back To Easy Levels Monetary Settings Back To Easy Levels Chart 19RRR Cuts Can Continue RRR Cuts Can Continue RRR Cuts Can Continue Chart 20NPL Recognition Underway (!) NPL Recognition Underway (!) NPL Recognition Underway (!) What will be the prevailing trend: monetary easing or the financial crackdown? In Chart 21 we consider three scenarios for the path of overall private credit growth (total social financing, ex-equity) for the rest of the year, with our subjective probabilities: Chart 21Three Scenarios For Private Credit In H2 2018 China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? In Scenario A, 10% probability, we present an extreme case in which Beijing panics over the trade war and the banks engage in a 2009-style lending extravaganza. Credit skyrockets up to the 2010-17 average growth rate. This would mark a massive 11.9 trillion RMB or 13.8% of GDP increase in excess of the amount implied by the H1 2018 data. This size of credit spike would be comparable to the huge spikes that occurred during past crises, such as the 22% of GDP increase in 2008-09 or the 9% of GDP increase in 2015-16. Needless to say, this is not our baseline case, but it could materialize if the trade war causes a global panic. In Scenario B, 70% probability, we assume, more reasonably, that traditional yuan bank loans are allowed to rise toward their average 2010-17 growth rate as a result of policy easing, yet Xi maintains the crackdown on non-bank credit in accordance with this "Three Battles" framework. Credit growth would still decelerate in year-on-year terms, but only just: it would fall from 12.3% in 2017 to 11.5% in 2018. Additional policy measures could easily bump this up to a modest year-on-year acceleration, of course. This scenario would result in a credit increase worth 2.9 trillion RMB or 3.4% of GDP on top of the level implied by H1 2018. In Scenario C, 20% probability, we assume that the 2018 YTD status quo persists: bank credit and non-bank credit continue growing at the bleak H1 2018 rate. The administration's attempt to maintain the crackdown on financial risk could frighten banks out of lending. This would mean no credit increase in 2018 beyond what is naturally extrapolated from the H1 2018 data. Credit growth would slow from 12.3% to 10.7% in 2018. This scenario would be surprising, but not entirely implausible given that the Politburo is insisting on continuing the Three Battles. The collapse in interbank rates and the easing measures already undertaken - such as reports that the Macro-Prudential Assessments will lighten up, and that the People's Bank is explicitly softening banks' annual loan quotas20 - lead us to believe that Scenario B is most likely, and possibly too conservative. This is the scenario most consistent with the latest Politburo statement: that authorities will continue the campaign against systemic risk, namely through the policy of "opening the front door" (traditional bank loans go up) and "closing the back door" (shadow lending goes down), which began in January. The Chinese government has always considered control of financial intermediation to be essential. The only way to reinforce the dominance of the state-controlled banks, while preventing a sharp drop in aggregate demand, is to allow them to grow their loan books while regulators tie the hands of their shadow-bank rivals (Chart 22). Chart 22Opening The Front Door, Closing The Back Opening The Front Door, Closing The Back Opening The Front Door, Closing The Back One factor that could evolve beyond authorities' control is the velocity of money. Money velocity is essentially a gauge of animal spirits. If a single yuan changes hands multiple times, it will drive more economic activity, but if it is deposited away for a rainy day, then the bear spirit is in full force. Thus, if credit growth accelerates, but money in circulation changes hands more slowly, then nominal GDP can still decelerate - and vice versa.21 China's money velocity suffered a sharp drop during the tumult of 2015, recovered along with the policy stimulus in 2016, and has tapered a bit in 2018 in the face of Xi's deleveraging campaign. Yet it remains elevated relative to 2012-16 and clearly responds at least somewhat to policy easing. The implication is that money velocity should remain elevated or even pick up in H2. Again, the risk to this view is that Xi's ongoing battle against financial risk, and anti-corruption campaign in the financial sector, could suppress money velocity as well as credit growth. Bottom Line: We see a subjective 70% chance that the drop in credit growth will be halted or reversed in H2 as a result of the central bank's liquidity easing and the Politburo's willingness to let traditional bank lending grow while it discourages shadow lending. Our baseline case says the impact could amount to new credit worth 3.4% of GDP in H2 2018 that markets do not yet expect. Investment Conclusions Beijing's shift in policy suggests that our subjective probability of a policy mistake this year, leading to a sharp economic deceleration, should be reduced from 30% to 20% (Credit Scenario C above).22 Why is this dire scenario still carrying one-to-five odds? Because we fear that the financial crackdown and rising NPLs could take on a life of their own. Meanwhile the risk of aggressive re-leveraging has risen from 0% to 10% (Credit Scenario A above). Summing up, Table 5 provides a simple, back-of-the-envelope estimate of the size of both fiscal and monetary policy measures as a share of GDP. Table 5Potential Magnitude Of Easing/Stimulus China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Our bias is to expect a strong fiscal response combined with a weak-to-moderate credit response. This would reflect the Xi administration's desire to prevent asset bubbles while supporting growth. A more proactive fiscal policy harkens back to China's handling of its last financial purge in 1998-2001. If banks prove unable or unwilling to lend sufficiently, additional fiscal expansion will pick up the slack. New local government debt can surprise by 1% of GDP or more, while formal bank lending amidst an ongoing crackdown on shadow lending could add new credit of around 3.4% of GDP and hence mitigate or halt the slowdown in credit growth. The combined effect would be an unexpected boost to demand worth 4.4% of GDP in H2 2018, which would exert an unknown, but positive, multiplier effect. We are replacing our "Reform Reboot" checklist, which has seen every item checked off, with a new "Stimulus Checklist" that we will monitor going forward (Appendix). Chart 23How To Monitor The Stimulus Impact How To Monitor The Stimulus Impact How To Monitor The Stimulus Impact Neither the size of this stimulus, nor the composition of fiscal spending, will be quite as positive for EM/commodities as were past stimulus efforts. China's investment profile is changing as the reform agenda seeks to reduce industrial overcapacity and build the foundations for stronger household demand and a consumer society. Increases in fiscal spending today will involve more "soft infrastructure" than in the past. We recommend reinstituting our long China / short EM equity trade, using MSCI China ex-tech equities. We also recommend reinitiating our long China Big Five Banks / short other banks trade, to capture the disparity of the financial crackdown's impact. To capture the new upside risk for global risk assets, our colleague Mathieu Savary at BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy has devised a "China Play" index that is highly sensitive to Chinese growth - it includes iron ore prices, Swedish industrial stocks, Brazilian stocks, and EM junk bonds (all in USD terms), as well as the Aussie dollar-Japanese yen cross. BCA Geopolitical Strategy also recommends this trade as a portfolio hedge to our negative EM view (Chart 23).23 A major risk to the "modest reflation" argument in this report will materialize if the RMB depreciates excessively in response to the escalating trade war (Trump will likely post a new tariff list on $200 billion worth of goods in September).24 This could result in renewed capital outflows breaking through China's capital controls, the PBC appearing to lose control, EM currencies and capital markets getting roiled, EM financial conditions tightening sharply, and global trade and growth slowing sharply. China would ultimately have to stimulate more (moving in the direction of Credit Scenario A above), but a market selloff would occur first and much economic damage would be done. PART II In the first part of this two-part Special Report, we concluded that policy headwinds to China's economic growth have begun to recede, but recent easing measures will likely disappoint the markets. Chart 24Money Growth Bottomed, Credit Still Weak Money Growth Bottomed, Credit Still Weak Money Growth Bottomed, Credit Still Weak In essence, China is girding for a trade war with the United States, which favors stimulus. But it is still attempting to reduce systemic financial risk. As a result, fiscal stimulus may surprise to the upside, but credit growth will be lackluster. The problem for investors - especially for emerging market (EM) assets and the commodity complex - is that Chinese fiscal stimulus typically operates with a six-to-ten month lag, as opposed to credit stimulus which only takes about three months to kick in.25 July statistics confirm our suspicion that credit stimulus will be hampered by the government's crackdown on shadow banking. Total credit growth remains weak, although broad money (M2) does appear to be bottoming (Chart 24). Thus far, BCA's China Investment Strategy has been correct in characterizing the latest developments as "taking the foot off the brake" rather than "pressing down on the accelerator."26 In this part of the report we take a deeper dive into the policy factors that cause us to limit our "stimulus overshoot" scenario to a 10% subjective probability. The three chief reasons are: overstated easing of macro-prudential controls; the continuing process of cleansing the banking sector of non-performing loans; and the anti-corruption campaign in the financial sector. A Preemptive Dodd-Frank Since the Xi administration redoubled its efforts to tackle systemic financial risk last year, we have urged investors to be cautious about Chinese growth.27 The creation of new institutions and new regulatory requirements set in motion processes that would be hard to reverse quickly. While these institutions are now making several compromises for the sake of stability, their operations will continue to weigh on credit growth. In July 2017, China's government held the National Financial Work Conference to address the major issues facing the country's financial system. This conference takes place once every five years and has often occasioned significant shakeups in financial regulation. In 1997, it initiated a sweeping purge of the banking system, and in 2002, it saw the creation of three financial watchdogs that would become critical institutional players throughout the 2000s.28 One of the skeletons in the closet from 2002 was the debate over whether financial regulation should be heavily centralized or divided among different, specialized, state agencies. Former Premier Wen Jiabao won the argument with the creation of the three watchdogs covering banking, securities, and insurance. After a series of controversies and conflicts, the Xi administration decided that these agencies had failed in their primary purpose of curbing systemic risk and ordered a reorganization with greater centralization. At the 2017 financial conference, Xi announced the creation of the Financial Stability and Development Committee (FSDC) to act as a centralized watchdog over the entire financial system. The FSDC would coordinate with the central bank, oversee macro-prudential regulation, and prevent systemic risk. Liu He, Xi's right-hand man on the economy and a policymaker with a hawkish reputation, was soon promoted to the Politburo and given the top job at the FSDC.29 As a second step, the Xi administration announced that it would combine the banking and insurance regulators into a single entity - the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC). The CBIRC, to be headed by Xi ally, and notable hawk, Guo Shuqing, would continue and escalate the crackdown on shadow lending that Guo had begun at the helm of the bank watchdog in 2017 (Chart 25). The merging of the agencies would also close the regulatory gap that had seen the insurance regulator increase its dominion and rent-seeking by encouraging "excessive" financial innovation and risky pseudo-insurance products.30 Chart 25Crackdown On Informal Credit Continues Crackdown On Informal Credit Continues Crackdown On Informal Credit Continues The FSDC was expected, rightly, to bring a more hawkish tilt to Chinese macro-prudential regulation. In reference to the U.S.'s Financial Stability Oversight Council, we dubbed these moves a "Preemptive Dodd-Frank."31 We also argued, however, that the purpose was to bring unified command and control to financial regulation and that China would continue to prize stability above all. Therefore the degree of tightening or loosening should vary in accordance this goal.32 After a series of announcements in July and August, it is clear that China's government has shifted to a more accommodative posture (please refer back to Chart 18 and Chart 19). As usual, there are rumors of high-level political intrigue to go along with the policy shift: some argue that Premier Li Keqiang is making a comeback while Xi's golden boy, Liu He, has been sidelined due to his failure to forestall tariffs during his trade talks with Donald Trump this spring.33 Such rumors are valuable only in revealing the intensity of the policy debate in Beijing. What is certain, however, is that the FSDC, with Liu He as chairman, only met for the first time as a fully assembled group in early July, just before the major easing measures were taken. This implies that any initial conclusions were pragmatic (i.e. not excessively hawkish). Moreover, Guo Shuqing is not only the CBIRC head but also the party secretary of the PBOC, meaning that central bank chief Yi Gang cannot have adopted easing measures without Guo's at least condoning it. Chinese policymakers see the recent easing measures as "fine-tuning" even as they continue the rollout of new regulatory institutions and systems. It is thus too soon to claim that Xi Jinping or any of these government bodies have thrown in the towel on their attempts to contain excessive leverage. Both the Politburo and the State Council - the highest party and state decision-makers - have made clear that they do not intend to endorse a massive stimulus on the magnitude of 2008-09 or 2015-16.34 They have also insisted that the "Tough Battle" against systemic financial risk, and the campaign to "deleverage" the corporate sector, will continue. What does this mean in practical terms? While new regulations will be compromised, they will also continue to be implemented. For example, authorities have watered down new regulations governing the $15 trillion asset management industry, yet the regulations are still expected to go into force by 2020. These rules will weigh on shadow banking activity (e.g. wealth management products) as banks prepare to meet the requirements.35 Two other examples are critical and will be discussed below: first, the potential easing of rules under the Macro Prudential Assessment (MPA) framework for stress-testing banks; second, this year's changes to rules governing non-performing loans (NPLs). In the former case, the degree of financial easing is potentially significant but at present overestimated by investors; in the latter case, the degree of tightening is already significant and widely underestimated. Bottom Line: New financial regulatory institutions will inherently suppress credit growth, especially by dragging on informal or non-bank credit growth. Macro-Prudential Assessments: Less Easing Than Meets The Eye A key factor in determining China's credit growth going forward will be banks' responses to any softening of the Macro Prudential Assessment (MPA) requirements. News reports have suggested that a relaxation of these rules may occur, but authorities have not finalized such a move. Furthermore, the impact on credit growth may be far less than the astronomical sums being floated around the investment community. The MPA framework began in 2016. It is an evaluative system of "stress-testing" China's banks each quarter. As such it is part of the upgrade of macro-prudential systems across the world in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, comparable to the American Financial Stability Oversight Committee or the European Systemic Risk Board.36 It is managed by the PBOC and the FSDC. The MPA divides banks into systemically important financial institutions and common institutions, and subdivides the former into those of national and regional importance. The evaluation method contains seven major criteria for assessing bank stability: Capital adequacy and leverage ratios; Bank assets and liabilities; Liquidity conditions; Pricing behavior for interest rates; Quality of assets; Cross-border financing; Execution of credit policy. The first and fourth of these criteria (capital adequacy and leverage ratios, and pricing behavior for interest rates) are in bold font because they result in a "veto" over the entire assessment: if a bank fails to maintain a sufficient capital buffer, or deviates too far from policy interest rates, it can fail the entire stress-test. Otherwise, failure of any two of the other five categories results in overall failure. A system of rewards and punishments awaits banks depending on how they perform (Diagram 1). Diagram 1China's Macro Prudential Assessment Framework Explained China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? On July 20, the PBOC published a document saying that "in order to better regulate assets of financial institutions, during Macro Prudential Assessment (MPA), relevant parameters can be reasonably adjusted." Subsequently Reuters reported that the PBOC would reduce the "structural parameter" and the "pro-cyclical contribution parameter" of the capital adequacy ratio (CAR) requirements, thereby easing rules on one of the veto items. The structural parameter would fall from 1.0 to 0.5. Rumors suggest that the pro-cyclical parameter could fall from 0.4-0.8 to 0.3. No such changes have been finalized - only a few banks actually claim to have received notification of a change and there are regional differences. Clearly a general change of the rule would reduce regulatory constraints on bank credit. But how big would the impact be? Under the MPA, banks' CARs are not allowed to fall too far below the "neutral CAR," or C*, a variable that is calculated using the formula outlined in Diagram 2. Most of the variables in this formula will not change often: for instance, the minimum legal CAR will be slow to change, as will the capital reserve buffer and the bonus buffer for systemically important institutions. The one factor that can change frequently is the "discretionary counter-cyclical buffer," as it responds to the country's current place in the business cycle. Diagram 2China's Macro-Prudential Assessment Framework: Capital Adequacy Ratios China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? The key input to this factor is broad credit growth. Thus, if authorities should reduce the CAR's cyclical parameter from a simple average of 0.6 to 0.3, broad credit growth could go higher without creating an excessive increase in the pro-cyclical buffer. In other words, at present about 60% of bank credit expansion in excess of nominal GDP growth counts toward a counter-cyclical capital buffer, which is added to other capital buffers. A tweak to this parameter could decrease that proportion to 30%, meaning that bank lending could go twice as high with the same impact on the counter-cyclical buffer. More significantly, if authorities should reduce the CAR's structural parameter from 1.0 to 0.5, any increase in credit growth would have a less dramatic impact on C*. Hence banks would be able to lend more while still keeping their neutral CAR within the appropriate range relative to their actual CAR. Banks could theoretically lend twice as much with the same impact on the assessment.37 On paper these changes could result in unleashing as much as 41.4 trillion RMB in new lending in 2018, or 28 trillion (33% of GDP) on top of what could have been expected without any adjustment to the macro-prudential rules. This is because broad credit growth would theoretically be allowed to grow as fast as 30% instead of 17%.38 But in reality this growth rate is extremely unlikely. Why? Because it assumes that banks will grow their lending books as rapidly as they are allowed. In fact, banks are currently increasing broad credit at a rate of about 10%, which is considerably lower than either today's or tomorrow's permitted rate of growth under the MPA framework (Chart 26). Chart 26Banks Are Not Lending To The Regulatory Maximum China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? If tweaks to the MPA increase this speed limit to 30%, it does not mean that banks will drive any faster than they are already driving. They are lending at the current pace for self-interested reasons (and there is fear of excessive debt, default, or insolvency due to the government's ongoing regulatory and anti-corruption crackdown).39 Chart 27Regulators Can Deprive Banks Of MLF Access Regulators Can Deprive Banks Of MLF Access Regulators Can Deprive Banks Of MLF Access Still, if the MPA rules are tweaked, then it will send a signal that macro-prudential scrutiny is abating and banks can lend more aggressively - this would have some positive effect on credit growth, at least for major banks that are secure in meeting their CARs. Moreover, there will be a practical consequence in that fewer banks will be punished for having insufficient CARs. At present, only rarely do banks fail the evaluations. But a strict CAR requirement during an economic downturn could change that. The proposed MPA adjustment would show that banks are graded on a sliding rule: the authorities would slide the grading scale downward to enable more banks to pass the test. This means fewer failures, which means fewer punitive measures that could upset liquidity or stability in the banking system. Ultimately, in order for the new system to have any credibility at all, punishment will have to be meted out to banks that fail the stress tests. A key punishment within the MPA system is exclusion from medium-term lending facility (MLF) loans from the PBOC. This is a regulatory action with teeth, as this is one of the PBOC's major means of injecting liquidity (Chart 27). A misbehaving bank could face short-term liquidity shortage or even insolvency. Therefore the authorities are opting to soften the rules so that the new regulatory system is preserved yet the harshest implications are avoided (for now). This would be short-term gain for long-term pain, the opposite of what China needs from the standpoint of an investor looking for improvements to productivity and potential GDP growth. But it would not necessarily be a great boon for global risk assets in the near term. While it could help stabilize expectations for China's domestic growth, it is not clear that it would unleash a mass wave of new bank loans that would reaccelerate China's economy and put wings beneath EM assets and commodity prices. Bottom Line: Tweaking the MPA parameters is a clear example of policy easing. Yet the MPA system itself is a fairly rigorous means of stress-testing banks that is part of a much larger expansion of financial sector regulation. The results of the easier rules - if implemented - will not be as reflationary as might be expected from the headline 41 trillion RMB in new loans that could legally be created. Banks are already expanding loans more slowly than they are allowed to do, so increasing the speed limit will have little effect. The real purpose of the macro-prudential tweaks is to make it more difficult for banks to fail their stress tests in a downturn. As such, any tweaks would actually reveal that Chinese policymakers are expecting a more painful downturn, not that they are asking for a credit splurge. NPL Recognition Will Weigh On Credit Growth Another factor that we have highlighted that separates today's easing measures from outright stimulus: the growing recognition of non-performing loans (NPLs) in China's banks and the financial cleansing process. The government's reform push has already led to two trends that are relatively rare and notable in the Chinese context: rising corporate defaults (Chart 28) and rising bankruptcies (Chart 29). While the impact may be small relative to China's economic size, the direction of change is significant in a country that has been extremely averse to recognizing losses. Chart 28Defaults Are Rising China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Chart 29Creative Destruction In China China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? These changes reflect the tightening of financial conditions and restructurings of various industries and as such are evidence of Xi's attempt to make progress on reforms while maintaining stability. They also reflect a general environment that is conducive to the realization of bad loans. Two recent policy decisions are affecting banks' accounting of bad loans. First, the CBIRC issued new guidance that eases NPL provision requirements for "responsible" banks (banks with good credit quality) while maintaining the existing requirements for "irresponsible" banks.40 Since the major state-controlled banks will largely meet the standards, they will be able to lend somewhat more (we estimate around 600 billion RMB or 0.7% of GDP). This would support the recent trend in which traditional bank lending rises as a share of total credit growth. Second, however, the CBIRC is requiring banks to reclassify all loans that are 90-or-more-days delinquent as NPLs, resulting in upward revisions of bank NPL ratios. This will send the official rate on an upward march toward 5%, from current extremely low 1.9% (Chart 30). It is the direction of change that matters, as NPL recognition can take on a life of its own. While many state banks may already have recognized the 90-day delinquent loans, many small and regional banks probably have not. Anecdotally, a number of small banks are reporting large NPL ratios as a result of the regulatory clampdown and definition change. Rural commercial banks, in particular, are in trouble with several showing NPLs in double digits (Chart 31). These small and regional banks will have until an unspecified date in 2019 to reclassify these loans and raise provisions against them. The result will hamper credit growth. Chart 30Bad Loan Ratios Set To Rise Bad Loan Ratios Set To Rise Bad Loan Ratios Set To Rise Chart 31City And Rural Commercial Banks Most At Risk Of Rising Bad Loans China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? To get a more detailed picture of the NPL recognition process, we have updated our survey of 16 commercial banks listed on the A-share market.41 This research reveals that banks have continued to increase the amount of bad loans they have written off. While the NPL ratio has remained roughly the same, cumulative loan-loss write-offs combined with NPLs have reached 7% of total loans and are still rising (Chart 32). This shows that a cleansing process is well underway. It is concerning that write-offs have reached nearly 50% of pre-tax profits. And even as losses mount, the proportion of each year's losses to the previous year's NPLs has fallen, implying that the previous year's NPLs had grown bigger (Chart 33). Chart 32The Bank Cleansing Process Continues China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Chart 33Write-Offs Almost 50% Of Bank Profits Write-Offs Almost 50% Of Bank Profits Write-Offs Almost 50% Of Bank Profits Furthermore, while loan losses grow, the surveyed banks' profit growth has been reduced to virtually zero (Chart 34). Chart 34Write-Offs Almost 50% Of Bank Profits Write-Offs Almost 50% Of Bank Profits Write-Offs Almost 50% Of Bank Profits Our updated "stress test" for Chinese banks, which is based on the same sample of 16 commercial banks, suggests that if total NPLs rise to a pessimistic, but still quite realistic, ratio of 13% (a weighted average of NPL ratio assumptions per sector, ranging from 10%-30%), then total losses could amount to 10.4 trillion RMB, or 12% of GDP (Table 6). Table 6Pessimistic Scenario Analysis##br## For Commercial Bank NPLs China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? In this scenario, banks' net equity would be impacted by 38% as this amount surpasses the buffer of net profits (1.75 trillion RMB) and NPL provisions (3 trillion). China's banks are well provisioned, but they would be less so after a hit of this nature. A similar stress-test by BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy found that equity impairment could range from 33%-49%, implying that Chinese banks were roughly 29% overvalued on a fair price-to-book-value basis.42 Looking at different economic sectors, it is apparent that domestic trade, manufacturing, and mining have seen the highest incidence of loans going sour (Table 7). In all three cases, it is reasonable to conjecture that the NPL ratio can continue to expand - and not only because of the definitional change. First, wholesale and retail (4.7%) consists largely of SMEs, and the government is publicly concerned about their ability to get credit. Second, manufacturing (3.9%) has been hit by changing trade patterns and rising labor costs and has not yet suffered the impact from recently imposed U.S. trade tariffs. Third, mining (3.6%) has felt the first wave of the impact from the government's cuts to overcapacity in recent years, but has seen very extensive restructuring and the fallout may continue. Table 7China: Troubled Sectors Can Produce More Bad Loans China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? More realistic NPL recognition is an important and positive development for China over the long run. Over the short run, banks' efforts to write-off NPL losses will weigh on their willingness to lend and could pose a risk to overall economic activity. Bottom Line: The government's reform and restructuring efforts are initiating a process of creative destruction in the Chinese economy. This is most notable in the government's willingness to recognize NPLs, which will continue to weigh on credit growth. The government is trying to control the pace and intensity of this process, but we expect credit stimulus to be disappointing relative to fiscal stimulus as long as the financial regulatory crackdown is at least half-heartedly implemented. Anti-Corruption Campaign Is Market-Negative Another reason to expect total credit growth to remain subdued comes from the anti-corruption campaign and its probes into local government finances and the financial sector. Chart 35Anti-Corruption Campaign Trudges Onward Anti-Corruption Campaign Trudges Onward Anti-Corruption Campaign Trudges Onward One of the new institutions created in China's 2017-18 leadership reshuffle was the National Supervisory Commission (NSC). This is a powerful new commission that is capable of overseeing the highest state authority (the National People's Congress). It is also ranked above the formal legal system, the Supreme Court and the public prosecutor's office. It is charged with formalizing the anti-corruption campaign and extending it from the Communist Party into the state bureaucracy, including state-owned enterprises.43 Having operated for less than a year, it is not possible to draw firm conclusions about the doings of the NSC, let alone any macro impact. Tentatively, the commission has focused on financial and economic crimes that have the potential to create a "chilling effect" among government officials and bank executives.44 Notably, the NSC has investigated Lai Xiaomin, former chief executive of Huarong, the largest of the big four Asset Management Corporations (AMCs), i.e. China's "bad banks." There is more than one reason for Huarong to attract the attention of investigators, but it is notable that it had extensive investments in areas outside its official duty of acquiring and disposing of NPLs. The implication could be that the government wants the AMCs to focus on their core competency: cleaning up the coming deluge of NPLs. The anti-corruption is also targeting local government officials for misappropriating state funds. These investigations involve punishment of provincial officials for false accounting as well as embezzlement and other crimes. We have noted before that the provinces that revised down their GDP growth targets most aggressively this year were also some of the hardest hit with anti-corruption probes into falsifying data and misallocating capital.45 On several occasions it has appeared as if the anti-corruption campaign was losing steam, but the broadest tally of cases under investigation suggest that it is still going strong despite hitting a peak at the beginning of the year (Chart 35). The campaign remains a potential source of disruption among the very officials whose risk appetite will determine whether central government policy easing actually results in additional bank lending and local government borrowing. Bottom Line: While difficult to quantify, the anti-corruption campaign will dampen animal spirits within local governments and the financial sector as long as the new NSC is seeking to establish itself and the Xi administration remains committed to prosecuting the campaign aggressively. Investment Conclusions Table 8Estimates Of Hidden Local Government Debt China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? We would be surprised if credit growth did not perk up at least somewhat as a result of the past month's easing measures. But as outlined above, these measures may disappoint the markets as a result of the ongoing financial regulatory drive, the baggage of NPL recognition, and any negative impact on risk appetite due to the anti-corruption campaign. And this is not even to mention the dampening effects of ongoing property sector and pollution curbs.46 In lieu of a credit surge, Beijing is likely to rely more on fiscal spending to stabilize growth. Fiscal spending also faces complications, of course. In recent years, China's local governments have built up a potentially massive pool of off-balance-sheet debt due to structural factors limiting local government revenue generation (Table 8). Beijing is now attempting to force this debt into the light. The local government debt maturity schedule suggests a persistent headwind in coming years as hidden debt is brought onto the balance sheet and governments scramble to meet payment deadlines (Chart 36). In addition, the local government debt swap program launched in 2014-15 will wrap up this month. Chart 36Local Governments Face Rising Debt Payments China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Nevertheless Beijing has introduced a new class of "refinancing bonds" in 2018 to help stabilize the fiscal situation. These bonds are separate from brand new bonds that have the potential to increase significantly over the second half of this year. China's Finance Ministry has also reportedly asked local governments to issue 80 percent of net new special purpose bonds by the end of September. Since only about a quarter of the year's 1.35 trillion RMB quota was issued in H1, this order would mean that about half of the quota (675 billion RMB out of 1.35 trillion RMB) would be issued in August and September alone - implying a significant surge to Chinese demand, albeit with a lag of six months or so.47 The latest data releases from July suggest that Beijing is trying to do two things at once: ease liquidity conditions while cracking down on excess leverage. Until we see a spike in credit growth, we will continue to expect the policy turn to be only moderately reflationary, with the ability to offset existing headwinds but not spark a broad-based reacceleration of the economy. Going forward, data for the month of August will be very important to monitor, as many of the easing measures were not announced until late July. For all the reasons outlined in this two-part Special Report, we would view a sharp increase in total credit as a game-changer that would point toward a "stimulus overshoot" (Appendix). Such an overshoot is less likely if the government relies more heavily on fiscal spending this time around, which is what we expect. Meanwhile, turmoil in emerging markets - which we fully anticipated based on China's policy headwinds this year and our dollar bullish view - will only be exacerbated by China's unwillingness to stimulate massively.48 Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Qingyun Xu, Senior Analyst qingyun@bcaresearch.com Yushu Ma, Contributing Editor yushum@bcaresearch.com Appendix Appendix China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? Appendix China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus? 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Understated In 2018," dated April 12, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "A Long View Of China," dated December 28, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 4 The fact that he began tightening financial policy in late 2016 and early 2017 was especially significant because only a very self-assured leader would attempt something so risky ahead of a midterm party congress. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Reports, "Trump, Year Two: Let The Trade War Begin," dated March 14, 2018, and "Trump's Demands On China," dated April 4, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 The statement declared in its first paragraph that China would "maintain the stability of employment," with employment being the first item in a list. A similar emphasis on employment has not been seen in Politburo statements since the troubled year of 2015, and it has not been mentioned substantively in 11 key meetings since the nineteenth National Party Congress last October. 7 Please see footnote 2 above. 8 After the State Council meetings on July 23 and 26, Vice-Minister of Finance Liu Wei elaborated on the government's thinking: "These [measures] further add weight to the overall broad logic at the start of the year ... It isn't at all that the macro-economy has undergone any major volatility, and we are not undertaking any irrigation-style, shock-style measures." Please see "Beijing Sheds Light On Plans For More Active Fiscal Policy," China Banking News, July 27, 2018, available at www.chinabankingnews.com. 9 Our colleagues in BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy service have dubbed this policy "triple tightening." Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "EM And China: A Deleveraging Update," dated November 8, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 This spike in net new issuance in the single month of June is equivalent to 19.8% of the total net new issuance in 2017. It is also much higher than the average monthly issuance in 2014-17 or in 2017 alone. However, since June and July have typically seen the largest spikes in new issuance, it will be critical to see if new issuance in 2018 remains elevated after July. Notably, local government bond issuance is currently divided between brand new bonds, debt swap bonds, and refinancing bonds, but the debt swap program will expire in August, and the refinancing bonds are separate, meaning that a larger share of the allowed new issuance will involve new spending. 11 The IMF expects the change in local government explicit debt this year to be 1.9 trillion RMB. That is, a rise from 16.5 trillion existing to 18.4 trillion estimated. 12 This number is derived by assuming that total debt reaches 92.2% of the debt limit in 2018, which is the share it reached in 2015 (since 2015 the share has fallen to 87.5% in 2017). However, 2015 was a year of fiscal easing, so it is not unreasonable to apply this ratio to 2018 as an upper estimate, now that the government's easing signal is clear. One reason that local governments have been increasing debt more slowly than allowed was that the central government was tightening investment restrictions, for instance on urban rail investment. Many new subway projects of second-tier cities have been suspended, and after raising the qualifications for subway and light rail, the majority of third- and fourth-tier cities were not qualified to build urban rail at all. As a result, local governments' investment intentions were dropping. Now this may change. 13 This estimate comes from the Ministry of Finance. The previous estimate was from the National Accounting Office and stood at 7 trillion RMB as of June 2013. 14 Maturities will spike in the coming years, so this policy signal suggests that further support for refinancing will be forthcoming. There are even unconfirmed rumors of a second phase of the local government debt swap program, which would cover "hidden debt." 15 We say "minimum" because we do not include projections of the impact of tax deductions, lacking details. We only estimate the headline savings to household incomes - loss to government revenues - based on the increase of the individual income tax eligibility threshold and the reduction in tax rates for different income brackets. 16 Additional fiscal measures include corporate tax cuts, R&D expense credits, VAT rebates, and reductions in various fees. 17 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "What Geopolitical Risks Keep Our Clients Awake?" dated March 9, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 18 In fact it is more like 1.9 trillion due to strings attached, but a fourth or even fifth RRR cut could push it 3.5 trillion for the year, assuming the average 800 billion cut. 19 Ultimately this trend will result in tightening liquidity conditions in China, but for now forex reserves are not draining massively, while the RRR cuts are easing domestic liquidity. 20 Please see "China Said To Ease Bank Capital Rule To Free Up More Lending," Bloomberg, July 25, and "China's Central Bank Steps Up Effort To Boost Lending," August 1, 2018, available at www.bloomberg.com. 21 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Ms. Mea Challenges The EMS View," dated October 19, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 22 Please see BCA Research Special Report, "China: Party Congress Ends ... So What?" dated November 2, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 23 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "The Dollar And Risk Assets Are Beholden To China's Stimulus," dated August 3, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 24 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Three Macro Paradoxes Are About To Come True," dated August 3, 2018, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 25 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Data Lab: Testing The Predictability Of China's Business Cycle," dated November 30, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 26 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China Is Easing Up On The Brake, Not Pressing The Accelerator," dated July 26, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 27 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Understated In 2018," dated April 12, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 28 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress," dated July 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 29 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Geopolitics - From Overstated To Understated Risks," dated November 22, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 30 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Politics Are Stimulative, Everywhere But China," dated February 28, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 31 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Wrath Of Cohn," dated July 26, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 32 Please see footnote 31 above. 33 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Italy, Spain, Trade Wars... Oh My!" dated May 30, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 34 Please see Part I of this report. 35 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Now What?" dated June 27, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Note that according to the new asset management rules, financial institutions will be required to have a risk reserve worth 10% of their fee income, or corresponding risk capital provisions. When the risk reserve balance reaches 1% of the product balance, no further risk provision will be required. We estimate that setting aside these funds will be a form of financial tightening worth about 1.2% of GDP. 36 Please see Liansheng Zheng, "The Macro Prudential Assessment Framework of China: Background, Evaluation and Current and Future Policy," Center for International Governance Innovation, CIGI Papers No. 164 (March 2018), available at www.cigionline.com. 37 Recall that the second category of the MPA consists of bank assets and liabilities. This category also has a rule for broad credit growth, which is that it should not exceed broad money (M2) plus 20%-25%. Therefore passing this part of the exam already requires banks to meet a 28%-33% speed limit on new credit. Assuming that that the pro-cyclical parameter of the CAR category remains at its current minimum of 0.4, then the structural parameter cannot be effectively pushed any lower than 0.6-0.8. The bottom line is that pushing the CAR structural parameter lower is not going to yield a significant increase in the allowable rate of credit growth. 38 To reach this estimate, we began with the fact that the outstanding level of broad credit growth was around 207 trillion RMB by the end of 2017 (that is, loans plus bonds plus equities plus wealth management products and other off-balance-sheet assets). The 2017 growth rate was about 10% and is assumed to be the same in 2018. Therefore broad credit should reach 227.7 trillion by the end of the year. Then, if we assume that all banks lend at the maximum weighted growth rate allowed by adjusting the structural parameter in the MPA CAR requirement (which is 30%), outstanding broad credit would reach 269.1 trillion by the end of the year. Hence an extra 41.4 trillion RMB in broad credit growth would be released. For comparison, please see CITIC Bond Investment, "Deep Analysis: Impact of Parameter Adjustments in the MPA Framework," July 30, 2018, available at www.sohu.com. 39 Based on actual CARs in 2017, the limit to broad credit growth was 17%-22% for large state-owned banks, 10%-20% for joint-equity banks, and 15%-20% for city or rural commercial banks. However, the actual broad credit growth for most banks was a lot lower than that. For example, for all five state-owned banks (nationally systemically important financial institutions), it was below 10%, well beneath the 17%-22% determined by their actual CARs and C*. 40 Under current regulations, the loan provision ratio is 2.5% while the NPL provision coverage ratio is 150%. The higher of the two is the regulatory standard for commercial banks. On February 28, 2018, the China Banking Regulatory Commission issued a notice declaring that the coverage requirement would change to a range of 120%-150%, while the loan provision requirement would change to a range of 1.5%-2.5%. Banks would qualify for the easier requirements according to how accurately they classified their loans, whether they disposed of their bad loans, and whether they maintained appropriate capital adequacy ratios. This could result in a release of about 800 billion RMB worth of provisions that can be kept as core tier-1 capital or support new lending. 41 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Special Report, "Stress-Testing Chinese Banks," dated July 27, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 42 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Mind The Breakdowns," dated July 5, 2018, and Special Report, "Long Indian / Short Chinese Banks," dated January 17, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 43 Please see Jamie P. Horsley, "What's So Controversial About China's New Anti-Corruption Body?" The Diplomat, May 30, 2018, available at thediplomat.com. 44 The NSC is operationally very close to the Central Discipline Inspection Commission (CDIC), which is the Communist Party corruption watchdog formerly headed by heavyweight Wang Qishan. It received only a 10% increase in manpower over the CDIC in order to expand its target range by 200% (covering all state agencies and state-linked organizations). It has allegedly meted out 240,000 punishments in the first half of 2018, up from 210,000 during the same period last year and 163,000 in H1 2016. About 28 of these cases were provincial-level cases or higher. The controversy over the "rights of the detained" has been highlighted by the beating of a local government official's limousine driver in one of the organization's first publicly reported actions. The NSC has also arrested local government officials tied to "corruption kingpin" Zhou Yongkang and known for misappropriating budgetary funds, and has secured the repatriation of fugitives who fled abroad and recovered the assets that they stole or embezzled. 45 The provinces include Tianjin, Chongqing, Liaoning, Inner Mongolia, etc. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy "Trump, Year Two: Let The Trade War Begin," dated March 14, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. There is empirical evidence that anti-corruption probes are correlated with debt defaults. Please see Haoyu Gao, Hong Ru and Dragon Yongjun Tang, "Subnational Debt of China: The Politics-Finance Nexus," dated September 12, 2017, available at gcfp.mit.edu. 46 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "China Real Estate: A Never-Bursting Bubble?" dated April 6, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com, and Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Blue Skies Drive China's Steel Policy," dated August 9, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 47 Please see "As economy cools, China sets deadline for local government special bond sales," Reuters, dated August 14, 2018, available at www.reuters.com. For more on local government bond issuance, see Part I of this series in footnote 1 above. Note also rumors in Chinese media suggesting that a new local government debt swap program could be launched with the responsibility of tackling off-balance-sheet debts that are guaranteed by local governments. The program has thus far only swapped debts that local governments were obligated to pay. It is not clear what would happen to a third class of local debt, that which is neither an obligation upon local governments nor guaranteed by them but that nevertheless is deemed to serve a public interest. 48 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The EM Bloodbath Has Nothing To Do With Trump," dated August 14, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Just to be clear: The balance of price risks in oil markets remains to the upside - particularly if we see a supply shock resulting from the loss of as much as 2mm b/d of exports from Iran and Venezuela. Neither the supply side nor the demand side in base metals evidence outsized risks, which keeps us neutral ... for now. Still, downside risks for commodities - mostly via threats to trade - loom. In line with our House view, we believe markets are too complacent re the effects of a global trade war.1 However, focusing only on the trade war obscures growing risks to EM imports and exports arising from the Fed's rates-normalization policy, which is pushing the USD higher. A strong USD retards EM trade growth, which is particularly bearish for metals and oil (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekStronger USD, Slower EM Import Growth##BR##Bearish For Base Metals And Oil Stronger USD, Slower EM Import Growth Bearish For Base Metals And Oil Stronger USD, Slower EM Import Growth Bearish For Base Metals And Oil An oil-supply shock taking prices above $120/bbl, as one of our scenarios does, would generate a short-term inflationary impulse, and would depress aggregate demand, particularly in EM. Ultimately, it would become a deflationary impulse, as higher energy prices consume a larger share of discretionary incomes, and slow growth. A slowdown in EM trade on the back of a strong USD also would generate a deflationary impulse, as EM income growth slows and aggregate demand falls. Either way, the Fed's rates-normalization policy will be put on hold as current inflation risks morph to deflation risks, if the downside becomes dominant. Highlights Energy: Overweight. The U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) will release 11mm of oil from its reserves in the October - November period, to allay concerns over the likely loss of 1mm b/d of Iranian exports to U.S. sanctions. We've been expecting this ahead of U.S. mid-term elections, but don't think it will fill the gap in lost exports. Base Metals: Neutral. Union and management leaders at BHP's Escondida mine in Chile averted a strike, after agreeing a contract at the end of last week. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold rallied more than $35/oz off its lows of last week, as markets took notice of record speculative short positioning, which many view as a bullish contrary indicator. Gold was trading to $1195/oz as we went to press. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA is expected to roll out a $12 billion relief package for farmers on Friday, which includes direct purchases of commodities that were not exported due to tariffs, according to agriculture.com's Successful Farming publication. Feature Overall, the balance of price risks in the industrial commodities are neutral (in base metals) and to the upside (in oil). In the base metals, we think fear of a Sino - U.S. trade war has market participants jittery, and may be getting to the point where it is starting to affect expectations for capex and investment on the production side, and growth on the demand side. Given our expectation EM trade will hold up this year (Chart 2), we continue to expect base metals demand to remain fairly stable, and perhaps pick up as China rolls out modest stimulus measures later this year.2 Chart 2USD Strength Slows EM Trade Growth USD Strength Slows EM Trade Growth USD Strength Slows EM Trade Growth We remain bullish oil demand - expecting growth of ~ 1.6mm b/d on average in 2018 - 19, and continue to expect a supply deficit next year, which will push Brent prices from $70/bbl on average in 2H18 to $80/bbl next year.3 However, if we see continued strength in the USD beginning to degrade actual EM demand, we will be forced to revise our assessment. Downside Risks To Metals And Oil Loom As mentioned above, we are aligned with our House view, and believe markets are all but ignoring the risk of an all-out trade war, spreading from the well-covered Sino - U.S. standoff to the broader global economy. The global economy already appears to be registering the first signs of a trade slowdown, according to the World Bank's July 2018 global outlook, where it observes "softening demand for imports in advanced economies - with the exception of the United States - and weaker exports from Asia."4 We also are picking it up in our modeling (Chart 2). The Bank also notes the slowdown in trade "is accompanied by rising barriers to trade, moderating growth in China, higher energy prices, and elevated policy uncertainty." A prolonged trade war that spreads globally would be especially devastating to EM economies, as two-thirds of them are commodity exporters of one sort or another.5 Fed Policy Is An EM Growth Risk As important as a trade war is for global growth, focusing too heavily on it obscures growing risks to EM imports and exports arising from the Fed's rates-normalization policy, which is pushing the USD higher. Table 1USD Vs. Fed Policy Variables Trade, Dollars, Oil & Metals ... Assessing Downside Risk Trade, Dollars, Oil & Metals ... Assessing Downside Risk Per the Richmond Fed's Summary, the Fed is charged by Congress to "promote effectively the goals of maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long term interest rates."6 One of the models we use to forecast the broad trade-weighted USD is a Fed policy-variables model, which uses lagged U.S. nonfarm payrolls, core PCEPI (the Fed's preferred measure), U.S. 10-year real rates, and U.S. short-term real-rate differentials vs. DM rates as proxies for these policy goals. We throw lagged copper futures prices in to pick up current industrial activity, as well (Table 1). This model highlights the long-term equilibrium between the USD TWIB and the Fed's policy variables going back to 2000.7 We average the output of the policy-variables model with four other models using close-to-real-time variables, and some other proxies for the Fed's policy variables to generate our forecast (Chart 3). Chart 3BCA USD TWIB Forecast BCA USD TWIB Forecast BCA USD TWIB Forecast The USD TWIB and EM trade volumes form a cointegrated system, as shown in Chart 2. Based on our modeling, we expect EM trade to hold up reasonably well over the next year, with y/y growth remaining positive most of the time. But, as close inspection of the chart reveals, the rate of p.a. growth is slowing as a result of the Fed's rates-normalization policy. This means the rate of growth in EM demand for base metals and oil will slow, although the level of demand will remain high following 20 years of solid growth.8 As a House, we expect the USD TWIB to rise another 5% over the next year, which, given the elasticities in our model, would translate into more than 10% declines in copper and Brent prices, all else equal. The Oil Wildcard As regular readers of this service know, we do not believe "all else equal" applies to commodity markets, particularly oil. We have been highlighting the risks of a confluence of negative supply shocks for months - i.e., the loss of up to 2mm b/d of oil exports from Iran and Venezuela - and the implications of this for prices (Chart 4). This is apparent in our ensemble forecasts, which reflect the physical deficit we expect to the end of 2019 (Chart 5). Chart 4U.S. SPR Release Doesn't Cover Lost Iranian Exports Trade, Dollars, Oil & Metals ... Assessing Downside Risk Trade, Dollars, Oil & Metals ... Assessing Downside Risk The U.S. government has taken notice of these risks. However, we believe this week's announcement by the Trump administration to release 11mm barrels of crude oil from the U.S. SPR over the October - November period might hold gasoline prices down ahead of the U.S. midterms, but will do next to nothing to make up for the lost export volumes we are expecting in 2019 (Chart 4). Chart 5BCA Continues To Expect Physical Deficits BCA Continues To Expect Physical Deficits BCA Continues To Expect Physical Deficits An oil-supply shock taking prices above $120/bbl - the projection from one of our scenarios in Chart 4 - would generate a short-term inflationary impulse in U.S. data the Fed follows. This would depress aggregate demand, particularly in EM, as oil is priced in USD. The Fed likely looks through this spike, but, should it misread the inflation impulse and tighten more aggressively, it would be delivering a double-whammy to EM economies: Higher oil prices and a stronger USD. Many EM governments have relaxed or removed subsidies on fuel prices following the 2015 collapse in oil prices engineered by OPEC. While some governments may re-introduce subsidies, not all will cover all of the price increase in such a shock.9 So, even if some subsidies are re-introduced, a price spike likely would hit EM consumers harder than previous high-price epochs. There is a non-trivial likelihood such an oil-price spike would trigger a recession in the U.S. - and likely in DM and EM economies - per Hamilton's (2011) analysis.10 This would force the Fed to change course and resume its accommodative policies. Ultimately, this would become a global deflationary impulse, as higher energy prices erode discretionary incomes, and slow growth. Bottom Line: An oil-supply shock and slower EM trade growth on the back of a strong USD ultimately produce deflationary impulses. Either way, Fed rates-normalization policy will be put on hold if these downside risks become the dominant theme in industrial commodity markets, and the current inflation risks morph to deflation risks. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Senior Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report "How To Trade A Trade War," published July 13, 2018. It is available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 BCA Research's Geopolitical Strategy is expecting policymakers to deploy modest fiscal stimulus and reflationary policies to counter growing threats from the country's trade war with the U.S. This will be supportive, at the margin, for bulks and base metals. Please see "China: How Stimulating Is The Stimulus?" published by our Geopolitical Strategy August 8, 2018. It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "OPEC 2.0 Sailing Close To The Wind," which contains our most recent supply-demand balances and forecasts. It was published August 16, 2018, and is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see The World Bank's Global Monthly, July 2018, p. 2. 5 Please see remarks by World Bank Senior Director for Development Economics, Shantayanan Devarajan, who notes, "two-thirds of developing countries ... depend on commodity exports for revenues." His remarks are in "Global Economy to Expand by 3.1 percent in 2018, Slower Growth Seen Ahead," World Bank press release on June 5, 2018. 6 Please see Steelman, Aaron (2011), "The Federal Reserve's "Dual Mandate": The Evolution Of An Idea," published on the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond's website. 7 We use a cointegration model to estimate these policy-driven regressions. The output is stout (R2 is greater than 0.95), and it has good out-of-sample results. We use a weighted-average of the five forecasts based on root-mean-square-errors to come up with our USD_TWIB forecast. 8 The World Bank estimates the seven largest EM economies - Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, the Russian Federation, and Turkey - accounted for ~ 100% of the increase in metals consumption and close to 70% of the increase in energy demand over the past 20 years. Please see "The Role of Major Emerging Markets In Global Commodity Demand," in the Bank's June 2018 Global Economics Prospects, beginning on p. 61. 9 Please see BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC 2.0 Scrambles To Reassure Markets," published June 28, 2018. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 10 For an excellent discussion of the correlation between oil-price shocks and recessions, please see Hamilton, James D. (2011), "Historical Oil Shocks," Prepared for the Handbook of Major Events in Economic History. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trade, Dollars, Oil & Metals ... Assessing Downside Risk Trade, Dollars, Oil & Metals ... Assessing Downside Risk Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017 Trade, Dollars, Oil & Metals ... Assessing Downside Risk Trade, Dollars, Oil & Metals ... Assessing Downside Risk