Protectionism/Competitive devaluation

Highlights Undue pessimism about global growth is giving way to unbridled optimism. Chinese growth has accelerated. However, there is a risk that the economy hits a speed bump later in 2017, as fiscal policy becomes less accommodative, monetary policy is tightened in an effort to curb capital outflows, and recent steps by the authorities to crack down on rampant speculation in the property sector begin to bite. The threat of a trade war will also loom large. U.S. fiscal policy will remain stimulative, but may fail to live up to expectations: There is little appetite among Republicans for increasing infrastructure spending; the multiplier effects from the proposed tax changes are likely to be small; and many GOP leaders are already chomping at the bit to take an ax to government spending. Fortunately, the U.S. economy has enough momentum to continue growing solidly above trend, even if fiscal policy disappoints. This will allow the Fed to raise rates three times this year, one more hike than the market is currently pricing in. Developed market equities are overbought and vulnerable to a correction, but will be higher 12 months from now. Favor Europe and Japan over the U.S. in local-currency terms. Stay underweight EM. Feature Global Growth Is Accelerating, But Headwinds Persist The global economy is on the mend. Measures of current activity are rebounding, as are a variety of leading economic indicators (Charts 1 and 2). Chart 1Global Economy ##br##Springing Back To Life Global Economy Springing Back To Life Global Economy Springing Back To Life Chart 2Global Leading Economic ##br##Indicators Are Improving Global Leading Economic Indicators Are Improving Global Leading Economic Indicators Are Improving Investors have taken notice: Market-based inflation expectations have risen, as have growth-sensitive commodity prices. Earnings growth expectations have surged, rising in the U.S. to nearly the highest level in a decade. Cyclical stocks have also bounced back, after having lagged the overall market for five years (Chart 3). We agree with the market's positive re-rating of global growth prospects, but worry that undue pessimism is starting to give way to excessive optimism. Two potential developments in particular could end up giving investors pause: A slowing of China's economy later this year. The possibility that U.S. fiscal policy will end up being less stimulative than expected. China: Living On Borrowed Time? Chinese growth has been surprising to the upside of late (Chart 4). Timely indicators such as excavator sales and railway freight traffic, which are well correlated with industrial activity, have been rising at a fast clip. Manufacturing inventory levels have come down, corporate profitability has improved, and producer price inflation has turned positive. The labor market has also picked up steam, as evidenced by the expansion in the employment subcomponents of the PMI indices. Chart 3Market's Positive Re-Rating Of Growth Prospects Market's Positive Re-Rating Of Growth Prospects Market's Positive Re-Rating Of Growth Prospects Chart 4Chinese Growth Has Been Surprising To The Upside Chinese Growth Has Been Surprising To The Upside Chinese Growth Has Been Surprising To The Upside Looking out, however, there are reasons to worry that the economy will weaken anew. Growth in government spending slowed from a high of 25% in November 2015 to nearly zero in December (Chart 5). Recent efforts by policymakers to clamp down on rampant property speculation could also cause the economy to cool. Meanwhile, capital continues to flee the country (Chart 6). This has put the government in a no-win situation: Raising domestic interest rates could entice more people to keep their money at home, but such a step could increase debt-servicing costs and undermine the country's creaky financial system. Chart 5China: Fiscal Stimulus Is Running Off China: Fiscal Stimulus Is Running Off China: Fiscal Stimulus Is Running Off Chart 6China: Ongoing Capital Outflows China: Ongoing Capital Outflows China: Ongoing Capital Outflows A Problem Of Inadequate Demand There is no shortage of commentary discussing the problems that ail China. Much of the analysis, however, has focused on the country's inefficient allocation of resources and other supply-side considerations. While these are obviously important issues, they overlook what has actually been the most significant binding constraint to growth: a persistent lack of aggregate demand. It has been this deficiency of demand - the flipside of a chronic excess of savings - that has kept the economy teetering on the edge of deflation. If a country suffers from excess savings, there are only three things that it can do. First, it can try to reduce savings by increasing consumption. The Chinese government has been striving to do that by strengthening the social safety net in the hopes that this will discourage precautionary savings. However, this is a slow process which will take many years to complete. Second, it can export those excess savings abroad by running a current account surplus. This would allow the country to save more than it invests domestically through the famous S-I=CA identity. The problem here is that no one wants to have a large current account deficit with China. Certainly not Donald Trump. Third, it can channel those excess savings into domestic investment. This is what China has done by pressing its banks to extend credit to state-owned companies and local governments. Remember that debt is the conduit through which savings is transformed into investment. From this perspective, China's high debt stock is just the mirror image of its high savings rate. The problem is that China already invests too much. Chart 7 shows that capacity utilization has been trending lower over the past six years and is back down to where it was during the Great Recession. The good news is that as long as there is plenty of savings around, Chinese banks will have enough liquid deposits on hand to extend fresh credit. The bad news is that there is no guarantee that borrowers taking on this debt will be able to repay it. This has made the Chinese economy increasingly sensitive to changes in financial conditions. And that sensitivity has, in turn, made global financial markets more fragile. Chart 8 shows that global equities have sold off whenever China stresses have flared up. The risk of another such incident remains high. Chart 7China: Capacity Utilization Back ##br##To Pre-Recession Levels China: Capacity Utilization Back To Pre-Recession Levels China: Capacity Utilization Back To Pre-Recession Levels Chart 8When China Has a Cold, ##br##Global Equities Sneeze When China Has a Cold, Global Equities Sneeze When China Has a Cold, Global Equities Sneeze China Trade War: The U.S. Holds The Trump Card Chart 9China Would Suffer More ##br##From A Trade War With The U.S. China Would Suffer More From A Trade War With The U.S. China Would Suffer More From A Trade War With The U.S. Adding to the pressure on China is the prospect of a trade war with the United States. Donald Trump has flip-flopped on almost every issue over the years, but he's been perfectly consistent on one: trade. Trump has always been a mercantilist at heart, and nothing that has happened since the election suggests otherwise. It is sometimes argued that the damage to the U.S. economy from a trade war with China would be so grave that Trump would not dare initiate one. This is wishful thinking. Chinese exports to the U.S. account for 3.5% of Chinese GDP, while U.S. exports to China account for only 0.6% of U.S. GDP (Chart 9). And much of America's exports to China are intermediate goods that are processed in China and then re-exported elsewhere. Blocking these exports would only hurt Chinese companies. Yes, China could threaten to dump its huge holdings of U.S. Treasurys. However, this is a hollow threat. The yield on Treasurys is largely determined by the expected path of short-term interest rates, which is controlled by the Federal Reserve. To be sure, the dollar would weaken if China started selling Treasurys. But why exactly is that a problem for the U.S.? Donald Trump wants a weaker dollar! In short, the U.S. would not lose much by provoking a trade war with China. Where does this leave us? The most likely outcome is that China blinks first and takes more concerted steps to open up its market to U.S. goods. This would hand Donald Trump a major political victory. However, the path from here to there is likely to be a very rocky one, which means that the reflation trade could suffer a temporary setback. A Trumptastic Fiscal Policy? Getting tough with China was one of Trump's key campaign promises; increasing infrastructure spending and cutting taxes was another. Unfortunately, investors may end up being disappointed both by how much fiscal stimulus is delivered and by the bang for the buck that it generates. For starters, much of Trump's proposed infrastructure program may never see the light of day. The $1 trillion ten-year program that he touted during the campaign was scaled back to $550 billion on his transition website. And even that may be too optimistic. Most Republicans in Congress have little interest in expanding public infrastructure spending. They opposed a big public works bill in 2009 when millions of construction workers were out of a job, and they will oppose one now. The public-private partnership structure that Trump's plan envisions will also limit the universe of projects that can be considered. Most of America's infrastructure needs consist of basic maintenance, rather than the sort of marquee projects that the private sector would be keen to invest in. Granted, the definition for what counts as public infrastructure could be expanded to include such things as hotels and casinos, to cite two completely random examples. But even if one ignores the obvious governance problems that this would raise, such a step could simply crowd out private investment that would otherwise have taken place. The reason that governments invest in infrastructure to begin with is because there are certain categories of public goods that do not lend themselves well to private ownership. To purposely exclude such goods from consideration, while devoting public funds to projects that the private sector is already perfectly capable of doing, is the height of folly. Trump And Taxes House Republicans are pursuing a sweeping tax reform agenda. There is much to like about their proposal. In particular, the shift to a cash flow destination-based tax system could encourage new investment over time, while making it more difficult for firms to carry out a variety of tax-dodging strategies. However, as with many major policy initiatives, the Republican tax proposal could generate significant near-term economic dislocations. Most notably, as we discussed in detail last week, the inclusion of a border adjustment tax could lead to a sharp appreciation in the dollar.1 This would benefit foreign holders of U.S. assets, but hurt debtors with dollar-denominated loans. Such an outcome could put stress on emerging markets, potentially undermining the global reflation trade. Trump's proposed cuts to personal income taxes may not boost spending by as much as some might hope. The Tax Policy Center estimates that the top one percent of income earners will see their after-tax incomes increase by 13.5%, while those in the middle quintile of the distribution will receive an increase of only 1.8% (Table 1). Since the very rich tend to save much of their income (Chart 10), measures which boost their disposable income may not translate into a substantial increase in spending. In fact, cutting the estate tax, as Trump has proposed, could actually depress spending by reducing the incentive for older households to blow through their wealth before the Grim Reaper (and The Taxman) arrive. Table 1Trump's Proposed Tax Cuts Would Largely Favor The Rich Two Speed Bumps For The Global Reflation Trade Two Speed Bumps For The Global Reflation Trade Chart 10Savings Heavily Skewed Towards Top Earners Savings Heavily Skewed Towards Top Earners Savings Heavily Skewed Towards Top Earners Spending Cuts On The Horizon? Then there is the question of whether Congressional Republicans will try to take an ax to government spending. The Hill reported last week that several senior members of Trump's transition team have proposed a plan to cut federal spending by $10.5 trillion over the next 10 years.2 The plan contains many of the same elements as the Republican Study Committee's Blueprint for a Balanced Budget, which called for $8.6 trillion in cuts over the next decade. Separately, Representative Sam Johnson of Texas, the chairman of the House Ways and Means subcommittee on Social Security, has introduced legislation seeking large cuts to pension benefits. Under his plan, workers in their mid-thirties earning $50,000 per year would see a one-third reduction in lifetime Social Security payments.3 Paul Ryan and other Congressional Republicans have also begun to argue that the goal of health care reform should be to guarantee "universal access" to high-quality medical care, rather than "universal coverage." This is a bit like arguing that the goal of transportation policy should be to ensure that everyone has access to a Bentley, provided that they can pony up $200,000 to buy one. It remains to be seen whether President Trump will acquiesce to these changes. He has repeatedly insisted that no one will lose medical coverage under his administration. However, one of his first actions in office was to loosen the mandate that requires healthy individuals to purchase insurance under the Affordable Care Act. Such a measure, however well intentioned, could greatly undermine the Act. If healthy people can wait until they are sick to sign up for insurance, only sick people will sign up. In order to cover their costs, insurance providers would have to raise premiums, ensuring that even fewer healthy people sign up. Such a vicious "adverse selection cycle," as economists call it, could lead to the collapse of health insurance exchanges, which currently provide coverage for 12.7 million Americans. Our guess is that Trump will ultimately put the kibosh on any plan to radically cut government spending or curtail Medicare and Social Security benefits. Say what you will of Trump, he has proven to be a skilled political operator for someone who has never been elected to public office. He knows that people were chanting "build the wall" at his rallies, not "cut my Medicare." Indeed, it is possible that Trumpcare will ultimately look a lot like Obamacare but with more generous subsidies for health care providers. Nevertheless, the path to this more benign investment outcome will be a bumpy one, suggesting that market volatility could rise in the months ahead. Investment Conclusions Chart 11DM Stocks Are Overbought DM Stocks Are Overbought DM Stocks Are Overbought Markets tend to swing from one extreme to another. This time last year, investors were fixated on secular stagnation. Now they are convinced that we are on the edge of a new global economic boom. Neither position is justified. Global growth has picked up, and this should provide a tailwind to risk assets over the next 12 months. However, as this week's discussion makes clear, there are still plenty of headwinds around. This suggests that the recovery will be a halting affair, with plenty of setbacks along the way. The surge in developed market equities since the U.S. presidential election has pushed stocks deep into overbought territory (Chart 11). A correction is likely over the next few weeks. We expect global equities to fall by 5%-to-10%, paving the way for higher returns over the remainder of the year. Once that recovery begins, European and Japanese stocks will outperform their U.S. counterparts in local-currency terms. We continue to expect EM equities to lag DM. In contrast to stocks, bond yields have already moved off their highs. As we discussed in our Strategy Outlook in early January, the transition from deflation to inflation will be a protracted one.4 Nevertheless, the path of least resistance for yields is to the upside. The Fed is likely to raise rates three times this year, one more hike than the market is currently pricing in. This should be enough to keep the dollar bull market intact. We expect the trade-weighted dollar to rise another 5% by year-end, with the risk tilted to the upside if Congress ends up approving a border adjustment tax. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue For 2017," dated January 20, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Alexander Bolton, "Trump Team Prepares Dramatic Cuts," The Hill, dated January 19, 2017. 3 Please see Stephen C. Goss memorandum to Sam Johnson, "Estimates Of The Financial Effects On Social Security Of H.R. 6489, The 'Social Security Reform Act Of 2016,' Introduced On December 8, 2016 By Representative Sam Johnson," Social Security Administration, Office Of The Chief Actuary (December 8, 2016). 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy, "Strategy Outlook First Quarter 2017: From Reflation To Stagflation," dated January 6, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights The evolution of U.S. tax policy - chiefly the border-adjustment tax (BAT) proposed by House Republicans - will preoccupy commodity markets for the balance of the year. Our House view gives 50-50 odds to the passage of a BAT, which, even though these are coin-toss odds, still are significantly higher than the consensus view of 20ish percent. While oil and apparel likely will be exempted from the BAT, steel, bulks, base metals, and ags probably won't be. The BAT's effect on the USD and EM commodity demand could be deflationary longer term. Energy: Overweight. The likelihood of crude oil and refined products being exempted from the BAT exceeds 50%, in our view, which means oil-market fundamentals likely will continue to be dominated by the supply-side adjustments. Base Metals: Neutral. Chinese reflationary policies will dominate pricing short term. Longer term, markets will have to price in the effects of the U.S. BAT. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold could trade higher in the near term (i.e., until Congress is done with the BAT), as the Fed holds off on any adjustments to policy rates until the Trump administration's fiscal policies come more clearly into view. Passage of a BAT will complicate monetary policy by lifting the broad trade-weighted USD and tightening monetary conditions in the U.S. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Heavy rains in Argentina could support soybeans. We remain underweight. Longer term, the BAT will be an important driver of prices. Feature We give 50-50 odds of BAT legislation passing in the U.S. Congress and being signed into law by President Trump this year. The BAT would tax imports into the U.S. and subsidize U.S. exports. This scheme would replace existing corporate income taxes.1 While apparel and energy products likely would be exempt, we think other commodities - chiefly base metals and ags - would be taxed, and would thus alter global trade flows in these commodities over the short run. Longer term, depending on how onerous the BAT legislation is, we would expect retaliatory taxes ex U.S., which could negate the initial benefits to U.S. commodity exporters. In addition, we would expect a stronger USD following passage of a BAT, which would be bearish for commodities generally. At this point it is impossible to know the tax rate that will be imposed on imports, as U.S. Congressional negotiations have yet to begin. President Trump, however, did tell business leaders he met with earlier this week to prepare for a "very major" border tax and significant deregulation, according to the Financial Times.2 The price effects for commodities subject to it are fairly straightforward: domestic prices will increase by the inverse of (1 - Tax Rate). A 20% tax would increase domestic prices by 25%, which would benefit domestic commodity producers, and disadvantage commodity importers. The BAT would incentivize U.S. exports and narrow the U.S. trade deficit, as a result. This would, in theory, rally the USD as well. If the BAT were set at 20%, the USD would, in theory, appreciate by 25%.3 It is early days on the BAT. Based on our in-house assessment, we think the BAT scheme could rally the USD by as much as 15%. This 15% includes the 5% increase in the USD's trade-weighted value we expect this year, absent any BAT effects. A stronger USD would raise the price of commodities subject to the U.S. BAT outside the U.S. in local-currency terms, thus crimping international demand, but encouraging output ex U.S. to increase as local-currency production costs fall. Both effects are decidedly bearish longer term for commodities subject to the BAT. Servicing of USD-denominated debt would become more expensive for EM borrowers, as the USD appreciated, which also would negatively affect income growth. Oil Markets Handle The BAT While we believe oil and apparel will be exempt from a BAT, if such a tax did gain traction in Congress, West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil futures, the U.S. benchmark, likely would trade at a premium to the global Brent benchmark, reversing years-long discount pricing. Indeed, markets already started pricing this potential outcome toward year-end 2016 (Chart of the Week), taking WTI delivering in Dec/17 from a roughly $2.00/bbl discount to parity with Brent, before retreating a bit in recent sessions. Clearly, markets have been attempting to discount the BAT, as the WTI - Brent differential shows, and this will continue as the debate and negotiations on the measure pick up in the near future. A BAT that included oil would super-charge U.S. exports, which already are growing, and domestic production (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekDeferred WTI Trades Flat To Brent Deferred WTI Trades Flat to Brent Deferred WTI Trades Flat to Brent Chart 2A BAT Applied To Oil ##br##Would Super-Charge U.S. Exports A BAT Applied to Oil Would Super-Charge U.S. Exports A BAT Applied to Oil Would Super-Charge U.S. Exports Bottom Line: We would fade any rally in the WTI - Brent spread toward the end 2017, or in the 2018 and '19 deliveries - selling the spread if it rallies significantly above flat (i.e., $0.00/bbl in the differential), given our expectation oil will be exempt from the BAT scheme. A BAT's USD Impact Will Matter For Commodities Generally Odds favor a USD rally - even if apparel and oil are excluded - given the BAT scheme would shrink the U.S. trade deficit. Our House view is the USD was on course to appreciate 5% this year anyway, on the back of the economy's relative performance and a continuation of the Fed's effort to normalize monetary policy. Even with a BAT becoming law in a somewhat watered down form, as our colleagues at BCA's Global Investment Strategy service anticipate, the USD could rally another 10%, based on our assessment of the impact of the tax scheme. This would encourage higher production ex U.S., where local-currency drilling costs once again would fall (think Russia). And it would seriously dent EM commodity demand, particularly oil and base metals demand, as a stronger USD makes commodities more expensive in local-currency terms ex U.S. (Chart 3). The combination of higher output due to lower costs ex U.S., and lower EM consumption brought about by a stronger USD could unravel the production-cutting accord KSA and Russia agreed last year, as prices weaken once again and producers scramble to make up for lost revenue with higher volumes. Given these effects, there's a good chance the U.S. would see deflationary blowback from this, if oil and base metals prices resume their downtrend (Chart 4). Chart 3A Stronger USD Once Again ##br##Will Weaken Global Oil Prices A Stronger USD Once Again Will Weaken Global Oil Prices A Stronger USD Once Again Will Weaken Global Oil Prices Chart 4Lower Oil Prices Could Drag ##br##Inflation Expectations Lower Lower Oil Prices Could Drag Inflation Expectations Lower Lower Oil Prices Could Drag Inflation Expectations Lower BAT Effects On EM Commodity Demand Oil and base-metals demand are closely aligned with EM income growth. Indeed, the evolution of EM income maps closely to EM oil and base metals demand. This is important for the evolution of the Fed's preferred U.S. inflation gauge, the core PCEPI. Indeed, the co-movement between the core personal consumption expenditures index and EM demand for industrial commodities is extremely high. In earlier research, when we modeled EM oil demand as a function of U.S. financial variables, we found a 1% increase (decrease) in the USD broad trade-weighted index (TWI) is consistent with a 23bp decrease (increase) in consumption. For global base metals, we found a 1% increase (decrease) in the USD TWI corresponds with a 27bp drop (increase) in demand. From this, our general rule of thumb is each 1% increase (decrease) in the USD TWI is roughly corresponds to a 25bp drop (increase) in EM demand for oil and base metals. We also found a 1% decrease in EM oil demand corresponds to nearly a 50bp decrease in the core PCEPI, the Fed's preferred inflation gauge.4 If the USD appreciates by 15% this year following the imposition of a BAT consistent with our in-house view, the effect on commodity demand and EM economic growth prospects would be unambiguously negative. If this was fully passed through to the core PCEPI, the gauge's yoy rate of change could drop more than 1.5%, pushing the yoy change in the Fed's preferred inflation index to just above zero, from its current level of ~ 1.65% yoy growth. We will be exploring the implications for this on the Fed's monetary policy in next week's publication, when we cover gold markets. However, it is worthwhile noting here that the BAT's effect on commodity prices and EM income could significantly restrain the Fed in its desire to normalize monetary policy. BAT Would Raise Volatility Following passage of a BAT consistent with our aforementioned expectations, higher commodity-price volatility would ensue: A sharply higher USD would crush EM oil and base metals demand. The import tax side of the scheme would incentivize additional supply (and exports) to come on line in the U.S. - domestic prices would rise faster than costs under the BAT - while, ex U.S., local-currency production costs would fall, leading to increased supplies. The import tax side of the BAT will create an umbrella for domestic oil and metals producers to lift prices to U.S. customers, since their only other choice for charging stocks and ore supplies are imports, which would be taxed under the scheme. In and of itself, this would be inflationary for the domestic U.S. economy. The only party that unambiguously wins in the short run in this scenario would be U.S. shale producers and domestic base-metals producers. In the case of the latter, copper, nickel and aluminum producers already supply more than 60% of domestic requirements, suggesting they have room to expand production at the margin, as tax-induced price hikes outpace cost increases (Charts 5 and 6). Chart 5U.S. Base Metal Production Could Expand Under A BAT Scheme U.S. Nickel and Copper Exports Could Expand Initially Under A BAT Scheme U.S. Nickel and Copper Exports Could Expand Initially Under A BAT Scheme Unstable Equilibrium At the end of the day, the BAT-induced changes in trade flows represent an unstable equilibrium. Second-round effects following the passage of the BAT - i.e., after the initial lift to domestic U.S. prices arising from the imposition of the BAT - are bearish. Chart 6U.S. Nickel And Copper Exports ##br##Could Expand Initially Under A BAT Scheme Taking A BAT To Commodities Taking A BAT To Commodities Recall that in the first round of price adjustment to the BAT, prices theoretically increase by the inverse of (1 - Tax Rate), which most likely will be faster than the increase in domestic production costs. In the second round of price adjustment, production costs catch up to prices, narrowing profit margins and reducing the free cash flow that supports higher production. Domestic demand in the U.S. for refined products - oil and metals - will fall, as prices to consumers rise (e.g., gasoline prices will increase at the margin in line with the BAT tax rate). Meanwhile, ex U.S., as the local-currency costs of production fall, supply is increasing at the margin. And, the stronger USD will raise the local-currency cost of commodities ex U.S., thus reducing demand. The supply- and demand-side effects combine to lower prices, all else equal. In the case of oil, producers ex U.S. - most likely KSA and the Gulf Arab states, and Russia - would once again find themselves in a fight for market share as U.S. production and exports increased. Markets would, once again, have to contend with rising storage levels and lower prices, as supplies increase at the margin and demand falls. This likely happens in 2018, and would return oil prices to our lower trading range of $40 to $65/bbl. In addition, our central tendency for WTI prices would return to $50/bbl from $55/bbl now. Depending on how OPEC and non-OPEC producers respond to rising U.S. production and falling global demand, the downside volatility we saw in 2016 could easily be repeated in 2018 - 2020. In the case of base metals, China still accounts for ~ 50% of total demand. If the USD strengthens significantly, China's demand - along with other EM demand - will fall as local-currency prices rise. Potentially higher U.S. base metal exports on the back of higher domestic prices supporting expanded U.S. supplies will be competing for market share against, e.g., copper volumes from Chile and Peru displaced from the U.S. market. Bottom Line: The BAT scheme could incentivize higher U.S. production and exports, and rally the USD. Together, these effects would pressure commodity prices lower - particularly oil and base metals - as supply increased and demand decreased. This would lower inflation and inflation expectations, complicating the Fed's policymaking later this year. We will develop these themes in subsequent research. Next week, we take up gold markets and how they are likely to respond to the evolution of BAT legislation. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Our colleague Peter Berezin last week published a Special Report entitled "U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue For 2017" in BCA Research's Global Investment Strategy, which examined the BAT in depth, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see "Investors seek clarity from Trump on tax changes and trade restrictions" in the January 24, 2017, issue of the FT. 3 Please see p. 3 of the BCA Research Global Investment Strategy Special Report entitled "U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue for 2017" cited above, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see pp. 3 and 4 issue of BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Commodities Could Be Hit Hard By Fed Rate Hikes" in the September 1, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Taking A BAT To Commodities Taking A BAT To Commodities

Highlights Trump administration will likely at least initially negotiate with China on trade issues rather than rush to meaningful punitive measures. Bilateral negotiations will likely focus on correcting China's allegedly unfair trade practices and increasing market access for American firms. It is, however, not difficult to find common ground that China is able or even willing to accommodate. A more inward looking U.S. generates a mutual desire among China and other economies to work more closely, potentially creating a new "globalization process" with distinct Chinese characteristics. Feature Fears of a trade war between the U.S. and China are now firmly on investors' radar screens, with President Donald Trump's inauguration speech last week doing little to assuage concerns. Even though he fell short of his campaign promise to label China as a currency manipulator in his first days in office, there is little doubt that trade tensions between the world's two largest economies will rise going forward. The challenge for investors is that U.S. trade policy under the new administration has simply become unpredictable. This week's report lays out our base case scenario for how things might evolve. Threat Or Policy? The biggest unknown at the moment is whether President Trump's threats to impose sanctions on Chinese goods are a mere negotiating tactic in order to gain concessions, or a real policy choice and direction. Unless one assumes that Trump will completely resort to radical and reckless policies that intentionally lead to a loss-loss situation for both the U.S. and China, we suspect the Trump administration will at least initially negotiate with China on trade issues rather than rush to meaningful punitive measures. Chart 1Exports Also Matter For the U.S. Exports Also Matter For the U.S. Exports Also Matter For the U.S. First, the grand strategy of President Trump on trade is to reduce America's massive and growing current account deficit. However, basic economics suggests that a country's current account deficit is fundamentally determined by its domestic savings and domestic capital spending. A deficit country, like the U.S., means its domestic savings fall short of its domestic investment, and therefore it needs to import capital from abroad to fill the gap. On the contrary, surplus countries, like China, have domestic savings in excess of their domestic investments, and therefore "export" capital abroad. In the U.S.'s case, the fact that the dollar is the main global reserve currency has allowed it to run chronic current account deficit without experiencing a balance-of-payments crisis. Unless 'Trumponomics' fundamentally changes the savings and investment balance in the U.S. economy, protectionism will not shrink the U.S. current account deficit. Punitive tariffs against Chinese goods will only shift America's deficit to China's competitors, often higher-cost producers, thus likely jacking up prices and hurting American consumers. Second, the U.S., although much less dependent on global trade than most countries, is not as isolated as commonly perceived. Exports of goods and services account for about 13% of U.S. GDP, compared with 22% for China and a global average of 30% (Chart 1). Moreover, exports as a share of the Chinese economy have almost halved since the global financial crisis, while exports' share in the U.S. economy has continued to climb to near all-time high levels. Major disruptions in global trade certainly hurt China more, but they would have also removed a major economic driver for the U.S. in recent years, which contradicts Trump's pro-growth objective. Chart 2China's Growing ATP Demands Offers Potential ##br##For U.S. Manufacturing Jobs China's Growing ATP Demands Offers Potential For U.S. Manufacturing Jobs China's Growing ATP Demands Offers Potential For U.S. Manufacturing Jobs Third, Trump's economic white paper released in September prepared by Peter Navarro and Wilbur Ross,1 both now senior administration staff, explicitly states that "tariffs will be used not as an end game but rather as a negotiating tool to encourage our trading partners to cease cheating," and "If, however, the cheating does not stop, Trump will impose appropriate defensive tariffs to level the playing field." Moreover, in the confirmation hearing process, Treasury Secretary nominee Steven Mnuchin hinted that he would go through the existing statutory process on the currency manipulation issue, which reduces the odds of naming China as a manipulator, as China currently does not fit the Treasury's criteria.2 All of this means the Trump administration will at least try to negotiate with the Chinese on trade-related issues. Finally, creating manufacturing jobs is one of President Trump's primary goals, and some advanced-technology products (ATP) and industries have been singled out in the September economic white paper that the administration intends to promote, such as aerospace, chemicals, electronics, motor vehicles, pharmaceuticals, railroad rolling stock, and robotics. On the other hand, high-tech products have been a growing share in China's total imports, and its demand for global ATP will continue to increase as its economy becomes more sophisticated (Chart 2). Since the early 2000s, however, the U.S. has been losing market share in China's high-tech imports. In this vein, re-gaining market share for American ATP goods in Chinese imports may be a crucial part of Trump's job creation plan. Bottom line: Cooperation rather than confrontation is the rational policy choice of President Trump, given the prevailing economic circumstances. What Trump Wants, And Can China Budge? If tariffs are indeed used as a negotiation chip, it is important to understand what specific concessions the Trump administration will seek from China, which so far have not been made clear. In the September economic white paper, Trump's senior advisors laid out the "sins" that China has committed to gain unfair trade advantages, including "currency manipulation, theft of intellectual property, forced technology transfers, a widespread reliance upon both 'sweat shop' labor and pollution havens, illegal export subsidies, and massive dumping of select products such as aluminum and steel below cost." Moreover, President Trump has openly complained that Chinese tariffs on certain goods are prohibitively high for foreign producers, and that American firms have been much more restricted in doing business in certain industries in China than vice versa. Therefore, bilateral negotiations, if any, will likely focus on correcting China's allegedly unfair trade practices and increasing market access for American firms. It is, however, not difficult to find common ground that China is able or even willing to accommodate on the issues. On currency manipulation. The RMB is now under significant downward pressure, and the People's Bank of China may not be against the idea of cooperating with the U.S. to support the yuan and weaken the greenback. On intellectual property and technology transfers. China's attitude towards technology and intellectual property rights has changed dramatically in recent years, not only because of improving legal procedures, but more importantly because of the growing awareness of IPR protection among the Chinese business community. China's patent applications have skyrocketed in recent years, which naturally pushes the country's IPR practices towards the western standard (Chart 3). Chinese patent applications topped 1 million in 2015, by far the largest in the world and almost as many as the next three largest applicants, the U.S., Japan and Korea, combined. In short, China has developed a keen self-interest for better IPR protection, simply because it now has a lot more to protect than in the past. On "sweat shop" and pollution havens. There is little doubt among Chinese leadership that China has long passed the "sweat shop" model. Cheap labor-intensive sectors account for an increasingly smaller share in China's total industrial output and exports, and they will be further marginalized as the country's income level continues to rise (Chart 4). In fact, Chinese entrepreneurs have been leading the exodus of moving production capacities in these industries to lower-cost countries. Moreover, pollution has become an overwhelming social issue in major metropolitan centers, and there is a growing sense of urgency in Chinese society to take immediate action on environmental protection. In other words, there is not much interest among the Chinese leadership to protect these "sweat shops" and pollution havens that the Trump administration is complaining about. Chart 3China's Developing Self-Interest In IPR protection China's Developing Self-Interest In IPR protection China's Developing Self-Interest In IPR protection Chart 4"Sweat Shops" Are Already Marginalized "Sweat Shops" Are Already Marginalized "Sweat Shops" Are Already Marginalized On illegal export subsidies and dumping of base metals. It is an open secret that the Chinese government subsidizes certain labor-intensive industries in growth downturns to prevent excessive job losses. It is important to note, however, that the government has systemically phased out subsidies as a lifeline for the corporate sector. Government subsidies for loss-generating enterprises, which accounted for over 20% of fiscal expenditures in the early 1990s, have now essentially disappeared (Chart 5). In addition, the Chinese government has also been trying to weed out excess capacity in the base metal industries such as steel and aluminum that President Trump has singled out for "massive dumping." Moreover, the anti-dumping measures adopted by the Obama administration targeting these Chinese products have already dramatically curtailed Chinese sales in the U.S. market in recent years. For example, the U.S. accounts for a mere 1% of Chinese steel exports, down from almost 10% in 2010 (Chart 6). It is possible that the Trump administration will continue to target industries it perceives as illegally subsidized by the Chinese government. However, the macro implications of such measures should not be significant. On further market access and lower tariffs for American goods. Even though state-owned enterprises still enjoy a monopoly in certain industries, the big picture of China's economic progress has been characterized by deregulation, privatization and increasing openness. Last week, the State Council released a new plan to further open up to foreign investment, removing or easing restrictions on foreign investment in rail equipment, motorbikes, ethanol fuel, shale gas, oil sands and other mineral resources sectors. It is also aiming to lower restrictions on foreign investment in financial services, such as the banking, securities, investment management, futures, insurance, credit ratings and accounting sectors, as well as in telecom, the Internet, culture, education and transportation. The latest push on "opening up" appears to be timed to supplement President Xi Jinping's speech at the Davos World Economic Forum last week - and possibily to offer an olive branch to the newly inagurated U.S. president - it nonetheless fits with the long-standing strategy of China's economic reforms. Chart 5Subsidies Are ##br##No Longer Vital Subsidies Are No Longer Vital Subsidies Are No Longer Vital Chart 6Chinese Steels Are No Longer ##br##Dumped In The U.S. Chinese Steels Are No Longer "Dumped" In The U.S. Chinese Steels Are No Longer "Dumped" In The U.S. Meanwhile, China's average tariff rate has declined dramatically in the past two decades (Chart 7), and is now not much higher than the global average and developed nation levels (Chart 8). Chinese tariffs on certain consumer goods are indeed punitively high. However, excessively high tariffs have only pushed Chinese consumers to travel overseas to buy these products, which has done little to help domestic producers. There have long been proposals among Chinese policy circles to cut tariffs and taxes to boost consumption and create local jobs. Chart 7Chinese Tariffs Have Already Collapsed... Chinese Tariffs Have Already Collapsed... Chinese Tariffs Have Already Collapsed... Chart 8...But Still Room For Improvement Dealing With The Trump Wildcard Dealing With The Trump Wildcard In short, on all the pressure points that could lead to trade disputes between the U.S. and China, the positions on both sides are not as deeply divided as perceived. China may have different perspectives by varying degrees, and may push back on specific issues, but the country's economic reform is not fundamentally against what Trump demands. This offers a hopeful starting point of bilateral engagement and negotiations. The primary risk to the negotiations is that Trump attempts to punish China retroactively for the cumulative effect of its past transgressions on the above issues, or makes ultimatums on the speed of the reform process that China either cannot or will not accept. Globalization With Chinese Characteristics? Regardless of whether the Trump's administration simply wants to deal "fairly" or intends to start a trade war, China will inevitably continue to push for a more predictable global growth environment for its exporters. A more inward-looking U.S. casts a long shadow on global trade, but it will also generate a mutual desire among China and other economies to work more closely, potentially creating a new "globalization process" with distinct Chinese characteristics. First, similar to existing trade agreements that intend to eliminate tariffs and other trade and investment barriers, China will continue to explore bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements (FTA) with its main trade partners. China currently has 19 FTAs under construction, among which 14 agreements have been signed and implemented. President Trump's decision to withdraw from the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) will also push other countries to participate in China-led free-trade initiatives as the only other viable alternative. In fact, China is a far bigger trade partner of TPP signatories than the U.S. (Chart 9). It will not be surprising to see the pace of negotiations for the "Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)" accelerate. Second, besides tariff reductions, China also aims to extend its trade reach through expansion of transportation infrastructure via the ambitious "One Belt One Road" (OBOR) mega project. The OBOR promises to link China, Eurasia, South Asia, Oceania and North Africa with railway, highway and seaports, and has been quietly gaining momentum since it was unveiled in October 2013. Routine railway freight between China and western European countries has already been established, adding to existing air and maritime trade routes. The Silk Road Fund, a state-owned fund of the Chinese government to foster investment in countries along the OBOR, is already in operation. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a China-led international financial institution to aid the OBOR strategy, was established in December 2015 with 57 member countries, and is expected to add another 25 soon. With promises of improving infrastructure, it should be easier for China to sell its version of "globalization" to other countries. The impact of the OBOR will likely become increasingly visible going forward. Finally, China has been offering capital and technical aid to lesser-developed resource-rich countries, particularly in Africa (Chart 10). Unlike financial aid from other developed countries, which is often associated with governance and human right demands, Chinese investment in these regions is mostly offered with no political conditions attached, something that has generated a great deal of controversy. Some have accused China of being "neo-colonialist" to exploit the continent's natural resources, while others support the initiatives to build and upgrade local infrastructure such as roads, railways and telecom systems, as they will benefit Africa's manufacturing sector and the welfare of the local population. Regardless, China is likely to continue to push forward on these investment projects, which will also intensify the trade links between China and these countries. Chart 9China Matters More For TPP Countries China Matters More For TPP Countries China Matters More For TPP Countries Chart 10China's Strengthening Ties With Africa China's Strengthening Ties With Africa China's Strengthening Ties With Africa How Will The Market Respond? Brewing trade tensions between the world's two largest economies are undoubtedly negative for both the global economy and financial markets. A full-fledged trade war conjures up dreadful images of the 1930s Great Depression, which is full-stop bearish for risk assets. Investors should certainly hedge against such a scenario with a small portion of their portfolios, with long positions on the dollar, gold, and the VIX. Chart 11Industrial Stocks Will Remain Depressed Industrial Stocks Will Remain Depressed Industrial Stocks Will Remain Depressed Table 1Chinese H Shares Are Mostly Domestic Driven Dealing With The Trump Wildcard Dealing With The Trump Wildcard Barring such an extreme scenario, targeted tariffs and low-profile trade disputes will hurt specific industries and companies, but the impact on the broader market should not be significant. Specifically, Chinese H share-listed companies are heavily concentrated in domestic businesses (Table 1). Some heavyweights in the H-share index such as financials, telecom and utilities are mostly domestic driven. The industrial sector, which is more exposed to global demand, has already been chronically underperforming (Chart 11), and will likely continue to struggle amid growing global uncertainty. However, industrials are only about 5% of total China investable market cap, much smaller than both the Chinese A-share index and the U.S. market (Table 2). From this perspective, A shares are more vulnerable to trade disruptions given their higher weight in industrial stocks. The IT sector accounts for almost a third of the MSCI China Free index, but the largest constituents of the Chinese tech sector such as Alibaba, Tencent and Baidu derive almost all of their revenue from domestic sources (Table 2). Some smaller Chinese hardware producers with heavy exposure to global markets are vulnerable, but they represent a negligible share in the Chinese investable index. Table 2Top Ten Chinese Tech Firms And Their Foreign Exposure Dealing With The Trump Wildcard Dealing With The Trump Wildcard Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com 1 "Scoring the Trump Economic Plan: Trade, Regulatory, & Energy Policy Impacts" available at https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/Trump_Economic_Plan.pdf 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China As A Currency Manipulator?" dated November 24, 2016 available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights U.S. policy uncertainty has increased again early in the New Year. President Trump's inaugural speech highlighted that he has not tempered his "America First" policy prescription. The Trump/GOP agenda is still a moving target, but three key risks have emerged for financial markets. A border tax could see a 10% rise in the U.S. dollar. It would also be bearish for global bonds and EM stocks. Position accordingly. Second, President Trump has his sights on China. U.S. presidents face few constraints on the trade and foreign policy side. Investors seem to be under-appreciating the risk of a trade war. Third, the plan to slash Federal government spending could completely offset the fiscal stimulus stemming from the proposed tax cuts and infrastructure spending. The good news is that the major countries, including China, appear to have entered a synchronized growth acceleration. There is more to the equity market rally than a "sugar high". The global profit recession is over and the rebound has been even more impressive than we predicted. As long as any U.S. protectionist policies do not derail the growth acceleration, corporate EPS in the major countries should rival (traditionally overly-optimistic) bottom-up expectations in 2017. The Fed will hike three times this year, one more than is discounted. The Bank of Japan will continue to target a 10-year JGB yield of 0%, but the ECB will begin hinting at another taper in the fall. Our bond team tactically took profits on a short-duration position, but expect to move back to below-benchmark duration before long. The U.S. policy backdrop is very fluid but, for now, the new Administration has boosted confidence and thereby reinforced a global cyclical upswing. As long as protectionist policies implemented this year do not unduly undermine U.S. growth (our base case), then stocks will beat bonds by a wide margin. Investors should consider long VIX positions, but add to equity exposure on dips. Feature It has become a cliché to describe the economic and financial market outlook as "unusually uncertain". Since 2007, investors have had to deal with rolling financial crises, deleveraging, recession, deflation pressures, quantitative easing, negative interest rates, re-regulation, a collapse in oil prices and Brexit. Chart I-1Stocks Decouple From Policy Uncertainty Stocks Decouple From Policy Uncertainty Stocks Decouple From Policy Uncertainty Now, there is Donald Trump. The new President's inaugural speech highlighted that he has not tempered his "America First" policy prescription. Protectionism, de-regulation and tax reform are high on the agenda but details are scant, leaving investors with very little visibility. There are many policy proposals floating around that have conflicting potential effects on financial markets. Which ones will actually be pursued and how will they be prioritized? Is the U.S. prepared to fight a trade war? Is a border tax likely? Will President Trump push for a "Plaza Accord" deal with China? Even the prospect for fiscal stimulus is a moving target because the Trump Administration is reportedly considering a plan to slash Federal spending by $10 trillion over the next decade! Some have described the global equity rally as just a "sugar high" that will soon fade. No doubt, some of the potentially growth-enhancing parts of the Trump agenda have been discounted in risk assets. Given the highly uncertain policy backdrop, it would be easy to recommend that investors err on the side of caution if the U.S. and global economies were still stuck in the mud. The level of the S&P 500 appears elevated based on its relationship with the policy uncertainty index (shown inverted in Chart I-1). Nonetheless, what complicates matters is that there is more to the equity rally than simply hope. Both growth and profits are surprising to the upside in what appears to be a synchronized global upturn. If one could take U.S. policy uncertainty out of the equation, risk assets are in an economic sweet spot where the deflation threat is waning, but inflation is not enough of a threat to warrant removing the monetary punchbowl. Indeed, the Fed will proceed cautiously and official bond purchases will continue through the year in Japan and the Eurozone. We begin this month's Overview with two key protectionist policies being considered that could have important market implications. We then turn to the good news on the economic and earnings front. The conclusion is that we remain positive on risk assets and bearish bonds on a 6-12 month investment horizon. It will likely be a rough ride, but investors should use equity pullbacks to add exposure. Protectionism Risk #1 A U.S. border tax has suddenly emerged on the U.S. policy program. More formally, it is called a destination-based cash flow tax. Under current U.S. law, corporate income taxes are assessed on worldwide profits, which are the difference the between worldwide revenues and worldwide costs. The introduction of a border tax adjustment would change the tax system to one where taxes are assessed only on the difference between domestic revenues and domestic costs (i.e., revenues derived in the U.S. minus costs incurred the U.S.). The mechanics are fairly complicated and we encourage interested clients to read a Special Report on the topic from BCA's Global Investment Strategy service.1 The result would be a significant increase in taxes on imported goods and a reduction in taxes paid by exporters. One benefit is that the border tax would generate a large amount of revenue for the Treasury, which could be used to offset the cost of corporate tax cuts. Another benefit is that the tax change would eliminate the use of international "transfer pricing" strategies that allow American companies to avoid paying tax. In theory, the dollar would appreciate by enough to offset the tax paid by importers and the tax advantage gained by exporters, leaving the trade balance and the distribution of after-tax corporate profits in the economy largely unchanged. A 20% border tax, for example, would require an immediate 25% jump in the dollar to level the playing field! In reality, there are reasons to believe that the dollar's adjustment would not be fully offsetting. First, much depends on how the Fed responds. Second, some central banks would take steps to limit the dollar's ascent. To the extent that the dollar did not rise by the full amount (25% in our example), then the border tax would boost exports and curtail imports. The resulting tailwind for U.S. growth would eventually be reflected in higher inflation to the extent that the economy is already near full employment. The result is that a border tax would be bullish the dollar and bearish for bonds. Our base case is that a 20% border tax would lift the dollar by about 10% over a 12-month period, above and beyond our current forecast of a 5% gain. The 10-year Treasury yield could reach 3% in this scenario. Subjectively, we assign a 50% probability to a border tax being introduced in some form or another, although our sense is that it will be somewhat watered down so as not to generate major dislocations for the economy. It appears that investors are underestimating the likelihood that the U.S. proceeds with this new tax, suggesting that the risks to the dollar and bond yields are to the upside. This is another reason to underweight U.S. bonds relative to Bunds on a currency-hedged basis. For stocks, any growth boost from the border tax would benefit corporate profits, at least until the Fed responded with a faster pace of rate hikes. It is another story for EM equities as a shrinking U.S. trade deficit implies less demand for EM products and shrinking international dollar liquidity. A border tax could be seen as the first volley in a global trade war, souring investor sentiment towards EM stocks. Another major upleg in the U.S. dollar could also spark a financial crisis in some EM countries with current account deficits and substantial dollar-denominated debt. Protectionism Risk #2 Chart I-2Trade War Risk Is Elevated Trade War Risk Is Elevated Trade War Risk Is Elevated While President Trump wants a smaller trade deficit generally, he has his sights on China because of the elevated U.S. bilateral trade deficit (Chart I-2). His choices for Commerce Secretary, National Trade Council and U.S. Trade Representative are all China critics. U.S. presidents face few constraints on the trade and foreign policy side. He can order tariffs on specific goods, or even impose a surcharge on all dutiable goods, as Nixon did in 1971. Congress is unlikely to be a stumbling block. Trump's election was a signal that the U.S. populace wants protectionist policies. His electoral strategy succeeded in great part because of voter demand for protectionism in key Midwestern states. We expect the Trump Administration to give a largely symbolic "shot across China's bow" in the first 100 days, setting the stage for formal trade negotiations in the subsequent months. The initial shot will likely rattle markets. A calming period will follow, but this will only give a false sense of security. The U.S. is in a relatively good negotiating position because China's exports to the U.S. are much larger than U.S. exports to China. However, tensions over the "One China" policy and international access to the South China Sea will greatly complicate the trade negotiations. The bottom line is that there is little hope that U.S./China relations will proceed smoothly.2 A long position in the VIX is prudent given that the market does not appear to be adequately discounting the possibility of a trade war. Synchronized Global Growth Upturn While the U.S. policy backdrop has become more problematic for investors, the global economic and profit picture has brightened considerably. We were predicting a pickup in global growth before last November's election based on our leading indicators and the ebbing of some headwinds that had weighed on economic activity early in 2016. As expected, the manufacturing sector is bouncing back after a protracted inventory destocking phase. The stabilization in commodity prices has given some relief to emerging market manufacturers. The drag on global growth from capex cuts in the energy patch is moderating even though the level of capital spending will contract again in 2017. Moreover, the aggregate fiscal thrust for the advanced economies turned positive in 2016 for the first time in six years. The major countries, including China, appear to have entered a synchronized growth acceleration. The pick-up is confirmed by recent data on industrial production, purchasing managers' surveys and the ZEW survey (Chart I-3). The global ZEW composite has been a good indicator for world earnings revisions and the global stock-to-bond return ratio. The synchronized uptick in global coincident and leading economic data, including business and consumer confidence, suggests that there is more going on than a simple post-election euphoria. Euro Area sentiment measures hooked up at the end of 2016 and the acceleration in growth appears to be broadly based (Chart I-4). A simple model based on the PMI suggests that Eurozone growth could be as much as 2% this year, which is well above trend. Chart I-3Positive Global Indicators bca.bca_mp_2017_02_01_s1_c3 bca.bca_mp_2017_02_01_s1_c3 Chart I-4Euro Area To Beat Growth Estimates Euro Area To Beat Growth Estimates Euro Area To Beat Growth Estimates While Japan will not be a major contributor to overall global growth given its well-known structural economic impediments, the most recent data reveal a slight uptick in consumer confidence, business confidence and the leading economic indicator (Chart I-5). We have noted the impressive rebound in China's leading and coincident growth indicators for some time. Some indicators are consistent with real GDP growth well in excess of the 6.7% official growth figure for 2016 Q4. Both the OECD leading indicator and our proprietary GDP growth model are calling for faster growth in 2017 (Chart I-6). A potential increase in trade or even military tensions between China and the U.S. is a potential risk to this sunny picture. Nonetheless, given what we know about the underlying economy at the moment, China looks poised to deliver another year of solid growth. Chart I-5Even Japanese Sentiment Is Turning Up Even Japanese Sentiment Is Turning Up Even Japanese Sentiment Is Turning Up Chart I-6Upside Risk To China's Growth Upside Risk To China's Growth Upside Risk To China's Growth In the U.S., President Trump appears to be stirring long-dormant animal spirits. CEOs are much more upbeat and several regional Fed surveys indicate a surge in investment intentions (Chart I-7). Spending on capital goods has the potential to soar given the historical relationship with the survey data shown in Chart I-8 (the caveat being that Congress will need to deliver). Even the long depressed small business sector is suddenly more optimistic. The December reading of the NFIB survey showed a spike in confidence, with capital expenditures, hiring plans and overall optimism returning to levels not seen in this expansion. Chart I-7Animal Spirits Reviving In The U.S.... Animal Spirits Reviving In The U.S.... Animal Spirits Reviving In The U.S.... Chart I-8...Which Will Spark Capital Spending ...Which Will Spark Capital Spending ...Which Will Spark Capital Spending There is a good chance that a deal between the White House and Congress on tax reform will occur in the first half of 2017, including a major tax windfall for the business sector that would boost the after-tax rate of return on equity. Nonetheless, past research shows that sustainable capital spending cycles only get underway once businesses see clear evidence that consumer demand is on the upswing. In other words, consumers need to move first. On that score, a number of cyclical tailwinds have aligned for household spending. Credit scores have largely been repaired since the recession and income growth is on track to accelerate (Chart I-9). Despite a moderation in monthly payrolls, overall income growth is likely to stay perky, now that wage gains are on an upward path. And, importantly, various surveys highlight an improvement over the past year in consumer confidence about long-term job prospects. The propensity to spend rather than save is higher when households feel secure in their jobs. Chart I-10 highlights that the saving rate tends to decline when confidence is elevated. The wealth effect from previous equity and housing price gains has been a tailwind for some time but, until now, consumers have held back because it seemed to many that the recession had never ended. Chart I-9Share Of Home Mortgage Borrowers ##br##Who Recovered Pre-Delinquency Credit Score After Foreclosure February 2017 February 2017 Chart I-10Room For U.S. Consumer To Spend Room For U.S. Consumer To Spend Room For U.S. Consumer To Spend In other words, there are increasing signs that the scar tissue from the Great Recession is finally fading, at a time when tax cuts are on the way. We expect that U.S. real GDP growth will be in the 2½-3% range this year with risks to the upside, as long as the Trump Administration does not start a trade war that undermines confidence. Corporate Earnings Liftoff Chart I-11Profits Are Bouncing Back Profits Are Bouncing Back Profits Are Bouncing Back The good news on the economy carries over to corporate earnings. The profit recession is over and the rebound has been even more impressive than we predicted (Chart I-11). Eurozone EPS "went vertical" near the end of 2016. Blended S&P 500 Q4 bottom-up estimates reveal a huge increase in EPS last year to $109 (4-quarter trailing), providing an 8.5% growth rate for 2016 as a whole. The 4-quarter trailing growth figure will likely surge again to 16% in 2017 Q1, even if the sequential EPS figure is flat. Some of the growth acceleration is technical, reflecting a particularly sharp drop in profits at the end of 2015 (which will eventually fall out of the annual growth calculation). Of course, a spike in energy earnings on the back of higher oil prices made a major contribution to the overall growth rate, but there is more to it than that. Consumer Discretionary, Financials and Health Care all posted solid earnings figures last year. Earnings momentum has also picked up in Materials, Real Estate and Utilities, although profit growth in these sectors is benefiting from favorable comparisons. Dollar strength has pushed the U.S. earnings revisions ratio slightly into negative territory, while revisions have surged into positive terrain in the other major markets (Chart I-12). The sharp upturn in our short-term EPS indicators corroborates the more upbeat earnings outlook for at least the next few months (Chart I-13). Chart I-12Earnings Revisions Earnings Revisions Earnings Revisions Chart I-13Short-Term EPS Indicators Are Bullish Short-Term EPS Indicators Are Bullish Short-Term EPS Indicators Are Bullish Our medium-term profit models also paint a constructive picture for equities. These are top-down macro models that include oil prices, exchange rates, industrial production (to capture top-line dynamics), and the difference between nominal GDP and labor compensation (to capture margin effects). Given our more optimistic economic view, the model forecasts for 2017 EPS growth have been revised higher for the global aggregate and each of the major developed markets (Chart I-14). The U.S. is tricky because of the impact of comparison effects that will add volatility to the quarterly growth profile as we move through the year. We are now calling for a 10% gain for 2017 as a whole, which is just shy of the roughly 12% increase expected by bottom-up analysts. This is impressive because actual market expectations are typically well below the perennially-optimistic bottom-up estimates. A 10% EPS growth figure might seem overly optimistic in light of the dollar appreciation that has occurred since last November. Some CEOs will no doubt guide down 2017 estimates during the current earning season. However, in terms of EPS growth, the annual change in the dollar matters more than its level. Chart I-15 shows that the year-over-year rate of change in the dollar is moderating despite the recent rise in the level. This is reflected in a diminishing dollar drag on EPS growth as estimated by our model (bottom panel in Chart I-15). We highlighted in the December 2016 monthly report that it does not require a major growth acceleration to overwhelm the negative impact of a rising dollar on earnings. Chart I-14Medium-Term Profit Models Are Also Bullish Medium-Term Profit Models Are Also Bullish Medium-Term Profit Models Are Also Bullish Chart I-15Dollar Effect On U.S. EPS Dollar Effect On U.S. EPS Dollar Effect On U.S. EPS The models for Japan and the Eurozone point to 2017 EPS growth in the mid-teens. Both are roughly in line with bottom-up estimates which, if confirmed this year, would be quite bullish for stock indexes. Keep in mind that these projections do not include our base case forecast that the U.S. dollar will appreciate by another 5% this year (more if a border tax is enacted). Incorporating a 5% dollar appreciation would trim U.S. EPS growth by 1 percentage point and add the same amount to profit growth in Japan and the Eurozone. The bottom line is that we expect corporate profits to be constructive for global bourses this year. Within an overweight allocation to equities in the advanced economies, we continue to favor the European and Japanese markets versus the U.S. As we discussed in the 2017 Outlook, political risks in the Eurozone are overblown. Currency movements and relative monetary policies will work against U.S. stocks on a relative (currency hedged) basis. FOMC: Hawks Gradually Winning The Debate Fed officials are in a state of quandary over how the policies of the incoming Administration will affect the growth and inflation outlook. Nevertheless, the last FOMC Minutes confirmed that the consensus on the Committee is still shifting in a less dovish/more hawkish direction. The tone of the discussion was decidedly upbeat, especially on the manufacturing and capital spending outlook. "Most" of the meeting participants felt that the U.S. economy has reached full employment, although there is still an ongoing debate on the benefits and costs of allowing the unemployment rate to temporarily move below estimates of full employment. Running the economy "hot" for a while might draw more discouraged workers back into the workforce and thereby expand the supply side of the economy. Other members, however, highlight that past attempts by the Fed to fine tune the economy in this way have always ended in recession. Our view is that the FOMC will not follow the Bank of Japan's example and explicitly target a temporary inflation overshoot. Conversely, the Fed will not attempt to pre-emptively offset any forthcoming fiscal stimulus either (if indeed there is any net fiscal stimulus). Policymakers will watch the labor market and, especially, wage and price inflation to guide them on the appropriate pace of rate hikes. Core PCE inflation is roughly 30 basis points below target and has only edged erratically higher over the past year. The pickup in shelter inflation has been largely offset by falling core goods prices, reflecting previous dollar strength. We expect shelter inflation to soon flatten off, but goods prices will continue to contract if the dollar rises by another 5% this year. Year-ago comparison effects will also depress the annual rate of change over the next couple of months. However, the key to the underlying inflation trend will be wage pressures, which are most highly correlated with the non-shelter part of the service component. Up until recently, the structural and cyclical forces acting on wage gains were pulling in the same downward direction. Structural factors include automation and population aging; as high-paid older workers leave the workforce, the vast majority of new entrants to full-time employment do so at below-median wages, putting downward pressure on median earnings growth.3 These structural factors will not disappear anytime soon, but the cyclical forces have clearly shifted. The main measures of U.S. wage growth are all trending higher. Excess labor market slack appears to have been largely absorbed. Only the number of people working part time for economic reasons suggests that there is some residual slack remaining. To what extent will cyclical wage pressures exert upward pressure on inflation? That will depend on the ability of companies to raise prices in order to protect profit margins. Wage inflation trends do not lead, and sometimes diverge from, inflation in goods and services. Theory suggests that there is a two-way relationship between wages and prices. Sometimes inflation starts in the labor market and spills over into consumer prices (cost-push inflation), and sometimes it is the other way around (demand-pull inflation). At the moment, the corporate sector appears to have limited ability to pass on rising wage costs. Balancing off the opposing factors, we believe that core PCE inflation will grind higher and should be near the 2% target by year end. This would end the Fed's debate over whether to run the economy hot, helping to keep upward pressure on Treasury yields. Bond Bear To Return Chart I-16Watch Bond Technicals To Short Again Watch Bond Technicals To Short Again Watch Bond Technicals To Short Again Global yields troughed a full four months before the U.S. election. As discussed above, the U.S. and global economies were showing signs of increased vigor even before Trump won the Presidency. The new President's policies reinforce the bond-bearish backdrop, especially protectionism and fiscal stimulus, at a time when the economy is already near full employment. Long-term inflation expectations imbedded in bond yields have shifted up in recent months across the major markets. Real yields have been volatile, but generally have not changed much from late last year. We remain modest bond bears over a 6-12 month horizon. Inflation and inflation expectations will continue to grind higher in the major markets and we expect the FOMC to deliver three rate hikes in 2017, one more than is discounted in the Treasury market. A rise in 10-year TIPS breakevens into a range that is consistent with the Fed's 2% inflation target (2.4%-2.5% based on history) would be a strong signal that the Fed will soon lift the 'dot plot.' ECB bond purchases will limit the increases in the real component of core European yields, but any additional weakness in the euro would result in a rise in European inflation. The ECB was able to announce a tapering of monthly purchases last year while avoiding a bond rout by extending the QE program to the end of 2017, but this will be more difficult to pull off again if inflation is on the rise and growth remains above-trend this year. We expect the ECB to provide hints in September that it will further taper its QE program early in 2018. Thus, the Eurozone bond market could take over from U.S. Treasurys as the main driver of the global bond bear market late in 2017. The Japanese economy is also performing impressively well, reducing the probability of a "helicopter drop" policy. The dollar's surge has depressed the yen and lifted inflation expectations, relieving some pressure on PM Abe to ramp up fiscal spending beyond what is already included in the supplementary budgets. In any event, the BoJ will keep the 10-year yield pinned near to zero, limiting the upside for bond yields to some extent in the other major bond markets. That said, we are neutral on JGBs, not overweight, because most of the yield curve is in negative territory. We remain overweight Bunds versus both Treasurys and JGBs on a currency-hedged basis. In terms of the duration call, our bond strategists felt in early December that the global bond selloff had progressed too far, too fast (Chart I-16). They recommended temporarily taking profits on short-duration positons and shifting to benchmark, which turned out to be excellent timing. Yields have drifted lower since then and the technicals have improved enough to warrant shifting back to below-benchmark duration. Investment Conclusions Chart I-17A Better Growth ##br##Backdrop For USD Strength A Better Growth Backdrop For USD Strength A Better Growth Backdrop For USD Strength Equity markets have gone into a holding pattern as investors weigh heightened U.S. policy risk against the improving profit and global macro backdrop. The latter appears to have broken the Fed policy loop that had been in place for some time. Expectations for a less dovish Fed helped to drive the dollar and Treasury yields higher late in 2016. But, rather than sparking a correction in risk assets as has been the case in recent years, stock indexes surged to new highs (Chart I-17). The difference this time is that there has been a meaningful improvement in the growth and profit outlook that has overwhelmed the negative impact of a stronger dollar and higher borrowing rates. The protectionist policies currently being considered are clearly dollar bullish, and bearish for global bonds and EM stocks. Investors should be positioned accordingly. It is more complicated for stocks. The passing of a major tax reform package would no doubt buttress the budding revival in private sector animal spirits, but a nasty trade war has the potential to do the opposite. The multitude of policy proposals floating around greatly complicate asset allocation. It is a very fluid situation but, for now, the new Administration has boosted confidence and thereby reinforced a global cyclical upswing. As long as protectionist policies implemented this year do not unduly undermine global growth (our base case), then corporate earnings growth will be solid in 2017 and stocks will beat bonds by a wide margin. We wish to be clear, though, that equities are on the expensive side in most of the main markets. This means that overweighting equities and underweighting cash and bonds in a balanced global portfolio is essentially playing an equity overshoot. It may end badly, but the overshoot is likely to persist for as long as the economic and profit upswing persists. Investors should consider long VIX positions, but add to equity exposure on dips. Our view on corporate bonds is unchanged this month. Poor value and deteriorating corporate balance sheet health make it difficult to recommend anything more than a benchmark position in the U.S. relative to Treasurys. However, investors can pick up a little spread in the Eurozone corporate bond market, where balance sheet health is better and the ECB is soaking up supply. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst January 26, 2017 Next Report: February 23, 2017 1 U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue for 2017. BCA Global Investment Strategy service, January 20, 2017. 2 For more information, please see: Trump, Day one: Let the Trade War Begin. BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, January 18, 2017. 3 For more information in the structural and cyclical wage pressures, please see: U.S. Wage Growth: Paid in Full? U.S. Investment Strategy Service, November 28, 2016. II. Global Debt Titanic Collides With Fed Iceberg? The spike in bond yields since the U.S. election has focussed investor attention on the economic implications of higher borrowing costs. In this world of nose-bleed debt levels, it seems self-evident that certain parts of the global economy will be ultra-sensitive to rising rates. The "cash flow" effect on debt service is a headwind for growth as rising interest payments trim the cash available to spend on goods and services. Some market commentators believe that the Fed will not be able to raise interest rates much because the cash-flow effect will be so severe this time that it will quickly derail the economic expansion. However, a number of factors make projecting interest payments complicated, such that back-of-the-envelope estimates are quite misleading. In order to provide a sense of the size of the cash-flow effect, in this Special Report we estimate the sensitivity of interest payments to changes in borrowing rates in the corporate, household and government sectors for four of the major economies. The key finding is that interest burdens will rise only modestly, and from a low level, over the next couple of years even if borrowing rates increase immediately by 100 basis points from today's levels. It would require a 300 basis point jump to really "move the dial". Interest rate shocks are more dramatic for the Japanese government interest burden due to the size of the JGB debt mountain, but much of the interest payments would simply make the round trip to the Bank of Japan and back again. We are not downplaying the risks posed by the rapid accumulation of debt since the Great Recession. Rather, our aim is to provide investors with a sense of the debt-service implications of a further rise in borrowing rates. Our main point is that the cash-flow effect of higher interest rates should not be included in the list of reasons for believing that Fed officials will be quickly thwarted if they proceed with their rate hike plan over the next couple of years. Investors are justifiably worried that the bond selloff will get ahead of itself, spark an economic setback and a corresponding flight out of risk assets. After all, there have been several head fakes during this recovery during which rising bond yields on the back of improving data and optimism were followed by an economic soft patch and a risk-off phase in financial markets. In this world of nose-bleed debt levels, it seems self-evident that certain parts of the global economy will be ultra-sensitive to rising rates. Indeed, global debt has swollen by 41½ percentage points of GDP since 2007 (Chart II-1). Households, corporations and governments tried to deleverage simultaneously to varying degrees in the major countries since the Great Recession and Financial Crisis, but few have been successful. Households in the U.S., U.K., Spain and Ireland have managed to reduce the level of debt relative to income. U.K. and Japanese corporations are also less geared today relative to 2007. Outside of these areas, leverage has generally increased in the private and public sectors (see Chart II-2 and the Appendix Charts beginning on page 37). The astonishing pile-up of debt in China has been particularly alarming for the investment community (Chart II-3). Chart II-1Leverage Has Increased Since 2007 Leverage Has Increased Since 2007 Leverage Has Increased Since 2007 Chart II-2Leverage In Advanced Economies Leverage In Advanced Economies Leverage In Advanced Economies Chart II-3China's Alarming Debt Pile-Up China's Alarming Debt Pile-Up China's Alarming Debt Pile-Up Governments can be excused to some extent for continuing to run fiscal deficits because automatic stabilizers require extra spending on social programs when unemployment is high. Fiscal policy was forced to at least partially offset the drain on aggregate demand from private sector deleveraging, or risk a replay of the Great Depression. More generally, history shows that it is extremely difficult for any one sector or country to deleverage when other sectors and countries are doing the same. The slow rate of nominal income growth makes the job that much harder. Borrowing Rates And The Economy There are several ways in which higher borrowing rates can affect the economy. Households will be incentivized to save rather than spend at the margin. Borrowing costs surpass hurdle rates for new investment projects, causing the business sector to trim capital spending. Uncertainty associated with rising rates might also undermine confidence for both households and firms, reinforcing the negative impact on demand. Banks, fearing a growth slowdown ahead and rising delinquencies, may tighten lending standards and thereby limit credit availability. These negative forces are normally a headwind for growth, but not something that outweighs the positive Keynesian dynamics of rising wages, profits and employment until real borrowing rates reach high levels. However, if the neutral or "equilibrium" level of interest rate is still extremely low today, then it may not require much of a rise in market rates to tip the economy over. A lot depends on confidence, which has been quite fragile in the post-Lehman world. The "cash flow" effect on debt service is another headwind for growth as rising interest payments trim the cash available to spend on goods and services. For the government sector, a swelling interest burden will add to the budget deficit and may place pressure on the fiscal authorities to cut back on spending in other areas. Some market commentators believe that the Fed will not be able to raise interest rates much because the cash-flow effect will quickly derail the expansion in the U.S. and potentially in other countries as the Treasury market selloff drags up yields across the global bond market. This is an argument that has circulated at the beginning of every Fed tightening cycle as far back as we can remember. Some even predict that central banks will be forced to use financial repression for an extended period to prevent the interest burden from skyrocketing and thereby short-circuiting the economic expansion. Back-of-the-envelope estimates that simply apply a 100 or 200 basis point increase in borrowing rates to the level of outstanding debt, for example, imply a shocking rise in the debt service burdens. Fed rate hikes could be analogous to the iceberg that took down the Titanic in 1912. Key Drivers Of Interest Sensitivity However, back-of-the-envelope calculations like the one described above paint an overly pessimistic picture for three reasons. First, the starting point for debt service burdens in the corporate, household and government sectors is low (Chart II-4). These burdens have generally trended down since 2007 because falling interest rates have more than offset debt accumulation, with the major exception of China.1 Second, the maturity distribution of debt means that it takes time for interest rate shifts to filter into debt servicing costs. For example, the average maturity of corporate investment-grade bond indexes in the major economies is between 3 and 12 years (Chart II-5). The average maturity of government indexes range from 7½ to 16 years. Moreover, the majority of household debt is related to fixed-rate mortgages. Even a significant portion of consumer debt is fixed for 5-years and more in some countries. Households have been extending the maturity structure of their debt in recent decades (Chart II-5, bottom panel). Chart II-4Debt Service Has Generally Declined Debt Service Has Generally Declined Debt Service Has Generally Declined Chart II-5Average Maturity Of Debt Is Long Average Maturity Of Debt Is Long Average Maturity Of Debt Is Long Third, even following the backup in yield curves since the U.S. election, current interest rates on new loans are still significantly below average rates on outstanding household loans, corporate debt and government debt. The implication is that most older loans and bonds coming due over the next few years will be rolled over at a lower rate compared to the loans and bonds being replaced. This will even be true if current yield curves shift up by 100 basis points in many cases (except for the U.S. where current yields are closer to average coupon and loan rates). In this Special Report, we estimate the sensitivity of interest payments to changes in borrowing rates in the corporate, household and government sectors for four of the major economies. We could not include China in this month's analysis because data limitations precluded any degree of accuracy, but the sheer size of China's debt mountain justifies continued research in this area. The key finding is that interest burdens will rise only modestly, and from a low level, over the next couple of years even if borrowing rates rise immediately by 100 basis points from today's levels. It would require a 300 basis point rise in yield curves to really "move the dial" in terms of the cash-flow impact on spending. An interest rate shock of that size would be particularly dramatic for the Japanese government interest burden given the size of its debt mountain, but much of the interest payments would simply make the round trip to the Bank of Japan and back again. Consumer Sector U.S. households have worked hard at deleveraging since their net worth was devastated by the housing bust. Still, the overall debt-to-income level is elevated by historical standards. U.S. household leverage has generally trended higher since the Second World War and has been a source of angst for investors as far back as the late 1950s. Yet, we find no evidence that U.S. consumers have become more sensitive to changes in borrowing rates over the decades.2 This counter-intuitive result partially reflects the fact that consumers have partially insulated themselves from rising interest rates by adopting a greater proportion of fixed-rate debt. The bottom panel of Chart II-6 presents the two-year change in debt service payments expressed as a percent of income (i.e. the swing or the "cash flow" effect). The fact that these swings have not grown over time suggest that the cash-flow effect of changes in interest rates on debt service has not increased.3 Chart II-6U.S. Consumers Have Not Become More Sensitive To Interest Rates U.S. Consumers Have Not Become More Sensitive To Interest Rates U.S. Consumers Have Not Become More Sensitive To Interest Rates Another way to demonstrate this point is to compare disposable income growth with a measure of "discretionary" disposable income that subtracts debt service payments (Chart II-6, top panel). This is the amount of money left over after debt servicing to purchase goods and services. The annual rate of growth in disposable income and discretionary income are nearly identical. In other words, growth in spending power is determined almost exclusively by changes in the components of income (wages, hours and employment). Moreover, the fact that some households are net receivers of interest income provides some offset to rising interest payments for other households when rates go up. This conclusion applies to households in the other major countries as well. Charts II-7 to II-10 present projections for household interest payments as a percent of GDP under three scenarios: no change in yield curves, an immediate 100 basis point parallel shift up in the yield curve and a 300 basis point shift. Assuming an immediate increase in yields across the curve is overly blunt, but the scenarios are only meant to provide a sense of how much interest payments could rise on a medium-term horizon (say, one to five years). The exact timing is less important. Chart II-7U.S. Household Sector Interest Payment Projection U.S. Household Sector Interest Payment Projection U.S. Household Sector Interest Payment Projection Chart II-8U.K. Household Sector Interest Payment Projection U.K. Household Sector Interest Payment Projection U.K. Household Sector Interest Payment Projection Chart II-9Japan Household Sector Interest Payment Projection Japan Household Sector Interest Payment Projection Japan Household Sector Interest Payment Projection Chart II-10Eurozone Household Sector Interest Payment Projection Eurozone Household Sector Interest Payment Projection Eurozone Household Sector Interest Payment Projection Unsurprisingly, household interest payments as a fraction of GDP are flat-to-slightly lower in "no change" interest rate scenario for the major countries. The interest burden increases by roughly 1 percentage point in the 100 basis point shock, although the level remains well below the pre-Lehman peak in the U.S., U.K. and Eurozone. In Japan, the interest payments ratio returns to levels last seen in the late 1990s, although this is not particularly onerous. A 300 basis point shock would see interest burdens ramp up to near, or above, the pre-Lehman peak in all economies except in the U.K. For the latter, borrowing rates would still be below the 2007 peak even if they rise by 300 basis points from current levels. This scenario would see the household interest burden surge well above 3% of GDP in Japan, a level that exceeds the entire history of the Japanese series back to the early 1990s. Also shown in the bottom panel of Chart II-7, Chart II-8, Chart II-9, Chart II-10 is the associated 2-year swing in interest expense as a percent of GDP under the three scenarios. The 2-year swing moves into positive (i.e. restrictive) territory for all economies under the 100 basis point shock, although they remain in line with previous monetary tightening cycles. It is only for the 300 basis point scenario that the cash-flow effect appears threatening in terms of consumer spending power over the next two years. Corporate Sector The starting point for interest payments and overall debt-service in the corporate sector is also quite low by historical standards, although less so in the U.S. Falling interest rates have been partially offset by the rapid accumulation of American company debt in recent years. We modeled national accounts data for non-financial corporate interest paid using the stock of corporate bonds, loans and (where relevant) commercial paper, together with the associated interest or coupon rates. The model simply sums interest payments across these types of debt to generate a grand total, after accounting for the maturity structure of the loans and debt. Chart II-11, Chart II-12, Chart II-13 and Chart II-14 present the three yield curve scenarios for corporate interest payments. The interest burden is flat-to-somewhat lower if yield curves are unchanged, as old loans and bonds continue to roll over at today's depressed levels. Even if market yields jump by 100 basis points tomorrow, the resulting interest burdens would rise roughly back to 2012-2014 levels in the U.S., Eurozone and the U.K., which would still be quite low by historical standards. The resulting two-year cash-flow effect is modest overall. The rate increase feeds into corporate interest payments somewhat more quickly in the Eurozone and Japan because of the relatively shorter average maturity of the corporate debt market, but a shock of this size does not appear threatening to either economy. Chart II-11U.S. Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection U.S. Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection U.S. Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection Chart II-12U.K. Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection U.K. Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection U.K. Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection Chart II-13Eurozone Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection Eurozone Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection Eurozone Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection Chart II-14Japan Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection Japan Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection Japan Corporate Sector Interest Payment Projection It is a different story if yields rise by 300 basis points. The interest ratio approaches previous peaks set in the 2000s in the U.S. and Eurozone. The interest ratio rises sharply for the U.K. corporate sector as well, although it stays below the 2000 peak because interest rates were even higher 17 years ago. Japanese companies would also feel significant pain as the interest ratio rises back to where it was in the late 1990s. Government Sector Government finances are not at much risk from a modest increase in bond yields either (Chart II-15). We focus on the level of the interest burden rather than the cash-flow effect for the government sector since changes in interest payments probably have less impact on governments' near-term spending plans than is the case for the private sector. Chart II-15Government Sector Interest Payment Projection Government Sector Interest Payment Projection Government Sector Interest Payment Projection As discussed above, Treasury departments in the U.K., Eurozone and Japan have taken advantage of ultra-low borrowing rates by extending the average maturity of public debt. The average maturity of the Barclays U.K. government bond index has extended to 16 years, while it is close to 10 years in Japan and the Eurozone (Chart II-5). The U.S. Treasury has not followed suit; the Barclays U.S. index is about 7½ years in maturity. The lengthy average maturity means that index coupon rates will continue to fall for years to come if rates are unchanged in the U.K., Japan and the Eurozone, resulting in a declining interest burden. Even if rates rise by another 100 basis points, the interest burden is roughly flat as a percent of GDP for the U.K. and Eurozone, and rises only modestly in Japan. The limited impact reflects the fact that the starting point for current yields is well below the average coupon on the stock of government debt. In contrast, the U.S. interest burden is roughly flat in the "no change" scenario, and rises by a half percentage point by 2025 in the 100 basis point shock scenario. Keep in mind that we took the neutral assumption that the stock of government debt grows at the same pace as nominal GDP growth. This assumes that governments deal effectively with the impact of aging populations on entitlement programs in the coming years. As many studies have shown, debt levels will balloon if entitlements are not adjusted and/or taxes are not raised to cover rising health care and pension costs. We do not wish to downplay this long-term risk, but we are focused on the impact of higher interest rates on interest expense over the next five years for the purposes of this Special Report. As with the household and corporate sectors, the pain becomes much more serious in the event of a 300 basis point rise in interest rates. Interest payments rise by about 1 percentage point of GDP in the U.S. and U.K. to high levels by historically standards. It takes a decade for the full effect to unfold, although the ratios rise quickly in the early years as the short-term debt adjusts rapidly to the higher rate environment. For the Eurozone, the roughly 100 basis points rise takes the level of the interest burden back to about 2003 levels (i.e. it does not exceed the previous peak). Given Japan's extremely high government debt-to-GDP ratio, it is not surprising that a 300 basis point rise in interest rates would generate a whopping surge in the interest burden from near zero to almost 5% of GDP by the middle of the next decade. Nonetheless, this paints an overly pessimistic picture for two reasons. First, the Bank of Japan is likely to hold short-term rates close to zero for years as the authorities struggle to reach the 2% inflation target. This means that only long-term JGB yields have room to move higher in the event of a continued global bond selloff. Second, 40% of the JGB market is held by the central bank and this proportion will continue to rise until the Bank of Japan's QE program ends. Interest paid to the BoJ simply flows back to the Ministry of Finance. The net interest payments data used in our analysis are provided by the OECD. These data net out interest payments made between all arms of the government except for the central bank. The implication is that rising global bond yields in the coming years will not place the Japanese government under any fiscal strain. The same is true in the U.S., U.K. and Eurozone, where the respective central banks also hold a large portion of the stock of government debt (although this conclusion does not necessarily apply to the peripheral European governments). Conclusion The spike in bond yields since the U.S. election has focussed investor attention on the economic implications of higher borrowing costs given the sea of debt that has accumulated. As discussed in our 2017 BCA Outlook, we believe that the secular bond bull market is over but foresee only a gradual uptrend in yields in the coming years. Inflation is likely to remain subdued in the major countries and bond supply will continue to be absorbed by the ECB and Bank of Japan. The stock of government bonds available to the private sector will drop by $750 billion in 2017 for the U.S., Eurozone, Japan and the U.K. as a group. This follows a contraction of $546 billion in 2016. Forward guidance from the BoJ and ECB will also help to cap the upside for global bond yields. Still, we believe that the combination of gradually rising U.S. inflation, Fed rate hikes and the Trump fiscal stimulus plan will push Treasury yields above current forward rates in 2017. Other bond markets will outperform in local currency terms, but will suffer losses via contagion from the U.S. Despite the dizzying amount of debt accumulated since the Great Recession, it does not appear that debt service will sink the economies of the advanced economies as the Fed continues to normalize U.S. monetary policy. Debt service will rise from a low starting point and the swing in interest payments as a percent of GDP is unlikely to exceed previous cycles on a 2-year horizon for a 100 basis point rise in yields. The level of the interest payments/GDP ratio should not exceed previous peaks in most cases. The picture is much more threatening if yields were to surge by 300 basis points over the next couple of years, although this scenario would require an unexpected acceleration of inflation in the U.S. and/or the other advanced economies. We are not making the case that the buildup of debt is benign. Academic research has linked excessive leverage with slower trend economic growth and a higher risk of financial crisis. For governments, elevated debt can result in a rising risk premium that will crowd out spending in important areas, such as health and pensions, in the long run. For consumers and the corporate sector, excessive leverage could result in financial distress and a spike in defaults in the next downturn, reinforcing the contraction in output. The Bank for International Settlements agrees: "Increased household indebtedness, in and of itself, is not likely to be the source of a negative shock to the economy. Rather the primary macroeconomic implication of higher debt levels will be to amplify shocks to the economy coming from other sources, particularly those that affect household incomes, most notably rises in unemployment." 4 Debt lies at the heart of BCA's longstanding Debt Supercycle thesis. For several decades, the willingness of both lenders and borrowers to embrace credit was a lubricant for economic growth and rising asset prices and, importantly, underpinned the effectiveness for monetary policy. During times of economic and/or financial stress, it was relatively easy for the Fed and other central banks to improve the situation by engineering a new credit upcycle. That all ended with the 2007-09 meltdown. Since then, even zero policy rates have been unable to trigger a strong revival in private credit growth in the major developed countries because the starting point for leverage is already elevated. Growth headwinds finally appear to be ebbing, at least in the U.S., prompting the FOMC to begin the process of "normalizing" short-term interest rates. The U.S. economy could suffer another setback in 2017 for a number of reasons. Nonetheless, the key point of this report is that the cash-flow effect of rising interest rates should not be included in the list of reasons for believing that Fed officials will be quickly thwarted if they proceed with their rate hike plan over the next couple of years. Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst 1 For China, the BIS only provides an estimate of the debt service ratio for the household and non-financial corporate sectors combined. 2 See: U.S. Consumer Titanic Meets the Fed Iceberg? The BCA U.S. Fixed Income Analyst, July 2004. 3 The absence of a rise in volatility of the cash flow effect is partly due to the decline in, and the volatility of, interest rates after the 1980s. 4 Guy Debelle, "Household Debt and the Macroeconomy," BIS Quarterly Review, March 2004. Appendix Charts Chart II-16, Chart II-17, Chart II-18, Chart II-19 Chart II-16U.S. Debt By Sector U.S. Debt By Sector U.S. Debt By Sector Chart II-17U.K. Debt By Sector U.K. Debt By Sector U.K. Debt By Sector Chart II-18Japan Debt By Sector Japan Debt By Sector Japan Debt By Sector Chart II-19Euro Area Debt By Sector Euro Area Debt By Sector Euro Area Debt By Sector III. Indicators And Reference Charts Global equities have been in a holding pattern so far in 2017, consolidating the gains made at the end of last year. Our key equity indicators are mixed at the moment. The Valuation indicator continues to hover at about a half standard deviation on the expensive side. The effect of the rise in global equity indexes late last year on valuation was offset by a surge in profits. Stocks are not cheap but, at this level, valuation not a roadblock to further price gains. Our Monetary indicator deteriorated further over the past couple of months, driven by a stronger dollar and higher bond yields. A shift in this indicator below the zero line would be negative for stock markets. Sentiment is also frothy, which is bearish from a contrary perspective, although our Technical indicator is positive. Our Willingness-to-Pay (WTP) indicators continue to send a positive message for stock markets. These indicators track flows, and thus provide information on what investors are actually doing, as opposed to sentiment indexes that track how investors are feeling. Investors often say they are bullish but remain conservative in their asset allocation. The WTP indicators have all turned higher from a low level for the Japanese, the European and the U.S. markets. This suggests that investors, after loading up on bonds last year, have "dry powder" available to buy stocks as risk tolerance improves. The U.S. WTP has risen the fastest and is closing in on the 0.95 level. Our tests show that, historically, investors would have reaped impressive gains if they had over-weighted stocks versus bonds when the WTP was rising and reached 0.95. The WTPs suggest that the U.S. market should outperform the Eurozone and Japanese markets in the near term, although for macro reasons we still believe the U.S. will lag the other two. We expect the global stock-to-bond total return ratio to rise through this year. The latest selloff has pushed U.S. Treasurys slightly into "inexpensive" territory based on our Valuation model. Bonds are still technically oversold and sentiment remains bullish, suggesting that the consolidation phase may last a little longer. Nonetheless, we expect to recommend short-duration positions again once the overbought conditions unwind. The U.S. dollar is near previous secular peaks according to our valuation measure. Nonetheless, policy divergences are likely to drive the U.S. dollar to new valuation highs before the bull market is over. Technically overbought conditions have almost unwound, clearing the way for the next leg of the dollar bull run. Commodities have been on a tear on the back of improving and synchronized growth across the major countries (and some dollar weakness very recently). The commodity price outlook is clouded by the prospect of a border tax, which could send the U.S. dollar soaring. The broad commodity market is also approaching overbought levels. The cyclical growth outlook is positive for commodity demand, although supply factors favor oil to base metals. EQUITIES: Chart III-1U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators U.S. Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators U.S. Equity Sentiment Indicators Chart III-4U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation U.S. Stock Market Valuation Chart III-5U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings U.S. Earnings Chart III-6Global Stock Market And Earnings: ##br##Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: ##br##Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance FIXED INCOME Chart III-8U.S. Treasurys And Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations U.S. Treasurys and Valuations Chart III-9U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators U.S. Treasury Indicators Chart III-10Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Selected U.S. Bond Yields Chart III-1110-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-12U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor U.S. Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-13Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-14Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets CURRENCIES: Chart III-15U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP U.S. Dollar And PPP Chart III-16U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator U.S. Dollar And Indicator Chart III-17U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals U.S. Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-18Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-19Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals COMMODITIES: Chart III-22Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-23Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-26Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning ECONOMY: Chart III-27U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop U.S. And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-28U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot U.S. Macro Snapshot Chart III-29U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook U.S. Growth Outlook Chart III-30U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending U.S. Cyclical Spending Chart III-31U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market U.S. Labor Market Chart III-32U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption U.S. Consumption Chart III-33U.S. Housing U.S. Housing U.S. Housing Chart III-34U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging U.S. Debt And Deleveraging Chart III-35U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions U.S. Financial Conditions Chart III-36Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Mark McClellan Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst

Highlights President Trump is as protectionist as Candidate Trump; USD shortage to tighten global financial conditions; Go Long MXN/RMB as a tactical play on U.S.-China trade war; Brexit risks are now overstated; EU will not twist the knife. EUR/GBP is overbought; go short. Feature "We assembled here today are issuing a new decree to be heard in every city, in every foreign capital, and in every hall of power. From this day forward, a new vision will govern our land. From this moment on, it's going to be America First." U.S. President Donald Trump, January 20, 2017, Inaugural Address What are the investment implications of an "America First" world? First, it may be useful to visualize the "America Second" world that President Trump is looking to leave in the rear-view mirror. Chart 1 shows the cost of hegemony. Since the Nixon shock in 1971, the U.S. has seen its trade balance deepen and its military commitments soar, in absolute terms. For President Donald Trump, the return on American investment has been low. Wasteful wars, crumbling infrastructure, decaying factories, stagnant wages, this is what the U.S. has to show for two decades of hegemony. Chart 1United States: The Cost Of Hegemony The "What Can You Do For Me" World? The "What Can You Do For Me" World? On the other hand, the U.S. has enjoyed the exorbitant privilege of its hegemonic position. In at least one major sense, America's allies (and China) are already paying for American hegemony: through their investments in U.S. dollar assets. Chart 2 illustrates this so-called "exorbitant privilege." Despite a deeply negative net international investment position, the U.S. has a positive net investment income.1 Chart 2The "Exorbitant Privilege" The "What Can You Do For Me" World? The "What Can You Do For Me" World? Being the global hegemon effectively lowers U.S. borrowing costs and domestic interest rates, giving U.S. policymakers and consumers an "interest rate they do not deserve." That successive administrations decided to waste this privilege on redrawing the map of the Middle East and giving the wealthiest Americans massive tax cuts, instead of rebuilding Middle America, is hardly the fault of the rest of the world! Foreigners hold U.S. assets because of the size of the economy, the sustainability and deep liquidity of the market, and the perceived stability of its political system. More importantly, they hold U.S. assets because the U.S. acts as both a global defender and a consumer of last resort. If Washington were to raise barriers to its markets and become a doubtful provider of security, states may gradually see less of a payoff in holding U.S. assets and decide to diversify more rapidly. Investors can interpret Trump's "America First" agenda broadly as an effort to dramatically reduce the U.S. current account deficit. Certainly we see his statements on renegotiating NAFTA, facing off against China on trade, and encouraging U.S. exports with tax legislation as parts of a broad effort aimed at improving the U.S. trade balance. If the U.S. were to pursue these protectionist policies aggressively, the end result would be a massive shortage of U.S. dollars globally, a form of global financial tightening. The rest of the world is not blind to the dangers of an America focused on reducing its current account deficit. According to the reporting of Der Spiegel magazine, Chancellor Angela Merkel sent several delegations to meet with the Trump team starting in 2015! No doubt Berlin was nervous hearing candidate Trump's protectionist talk, given that Germany runs one of the largest trade surpluses with the U.S. (Chart 3). In the last such meeting, taking place after the election was decided, Trump's son-in-law and White House advisor, Jared Kushner, asked the Germans a point-blank question, "What can you do for us?"2 In the 1980s, the U.S. asked West Germany and Japan the same question. The result was the 1985 Plaza Accord that engineered the greenback's depreciation versus the deutschmark and the yen (Chart 4). Recent comments from Donald Trump suggest that he would like to follow a similar script, where dollar depreciation does the heavy lifting in adjusting the country's current account deficit.3 Chart 3Trump's Black List Trump's Black List Trump's Black List Chart 4The Impact Of The Plaza Accord The Impact Of The Plaza Accord The Impact Of The Plaza Accord The Trump administration may have dusted off the Reagan playbook from the 1980s, but the world is playing a different game in 2017. First, the Soviet Union no longer exists and certainly no longer has more than 70,000 tanks ready to burst through the "Fulda Gap" towards Frankfurt. President Trump will find China, Germany, and Japan less willing to help the U.S. close its current account deficit, particularly if Trump continues his rhetorical assault on everything from European unity to Japanese security to the One China policy. Second, China, not U.S. allies Germany and Japan, has the largest trade surplus with the U.S. It is very difficult to see Beijing agreeing to a coordinated currency appreciation of the RMB, particularly when it is being threatened with a showdown over Taiwan and the South China Sea. Third, even if China wanted to kowtow to the Trump administration, it is not clear that RMB appreciation can be engineered. The country's capital outflows have swelled to a record level of $205 billion (Chart 5) and the PBoC has continued to inject RMB into the banking system via outright lending to banks and open-market operations (Chart 6). Unlike Japan in 1985, China is at the peak of its leveraging cycle and thus unwilling to see its currency - and domestic interest rates - appreciate. At best, Beijing can continue to fight capital outflows and close its capital account. But even this creates a paradox, since the U.S. administration can accuse it of currency manipulation even if such manipulation is preventing, not enabling, currency depreciation!4 Chart 5China: Unrecorded Capital Outflows China: Unrecorded Capital Outflows China: Unrecorded Capital Outflows Chart 6PBoC Injects Massive Liquidity PBoC Injects Massive Liquidity PBoC Injects Massive Liquidity To conclude, the world is (re)entering a mercantilist era and sits at the Apex of Globalization.5 The new White House is almost singularly focused on bringing the U.S. current account deficit down. It intends to do this by means of three primary tools: Protectionism: The Republicans in the House of Representatives have proposed a "destination-based border adjustment tax," which would effectively subsidize exports and tax imports. (It would levy the corporate tax on the difference between domestic revenues and domestic costs, thus giving a rebate to exporters who make revenues abroad while incurring costs domestically.)6 While the proponents of the new tax system argue it is equivalent to the VAT systems in G7 economies, the change would nonetheless undermine America's role as "the global consumer of last resort." In our view, it would be the opening salvo of a global trade war. Dirigisme: President Trump has not shied away from directly intervening to keep corporate production inside the U.S. He has also insisted on a vague proposal to impose a 35% "border tax" on U.S. corporates that manufacture abroad for domestic consumption. (Details are scant: His Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin has denied an across-the-board tax of this nature, but has confirmed that one would apply to specific companies.) Structural Demands: Trump's approach suggests that he wishes to force structural changes on trade surplus economies in order to correct structural imbalances in the American economy - and in this process he is not adverse to lobbing strategic threats. While he holds out the possibility of charging China with currency manipulation, in fact he can draw from a whole sheet of American trade grievances not limited to the currency to demand major changes to their trade relationship. The fundamental problem for the global economy is that in order to reduce the U.S. current account deficit, the world must experience severe global tightening. Dollars held by U.S. multinationals abroad, which finance global credit markets, will come back to the U.S. and tighten liquidity abroad. And emerging market corporate borrowers who have overextended themselves borrowing in U.S. dollars will struggle to repay debts in appreciating dollars. These structural trends are set to exacerbate an already ongoing cyclical process. As BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy has recently pointed out, global demand for U.S. dollars is rising faster than the supply of U.S. dollars.7 Our EM team's first measure of U.S. dollar liquidity is "the sum of the U.S. monetary base and U.S. Treasury securities held in custody for official and international accounts." The second measure "is the sum of the U.S. monetary base and U.S. Treasury securities held by all foreign residents." As Chart 7 and Chart 8 illustrate, both calculations indicate that dollar liquidity is in a precipitous decline already. Meanwhile, foreign official holdings of U.S. Treasury securities is contracting, while the amount of U.S. Treasury securities held by all foreigners has stalled (Chart 9). Chart 7Dollar Liquidity Declining... Dollar Liquidity Declining... Dollar Liquidity Declining... Chart 8... Any Way You Look At It ... Any Way You Look At It ... Any Way You Look At It Chart 9Components Of U.S. Dollar Liquidity Components Of U.S. Dollar Liquidity Components Of U.S. Dollar Liquidity Chart 10It Hurts To Borrow In USD It Hurts To Borrow In USD It Hurts To Borrow In USD Concurrently, U.S. dollar borrowing costs continue to rise (Chart 10). Our EM team expects EM debtors with U.S. dollar liabilities to either repay U.S. dollar debt or hedge it. This will ultimately increase the demand for U.S. dollars in the months ahead. Near-term U.S. dollar appreciation will only reinforce and accelerate the mercantilist push in the White House and Congress. President Trump and the GOP in the House will find common ground on the border-adjustment tax, which Trump recently admitted he did not understand or look favorably upon. The passage of the law, or some such equivalent, has a much greater chance than investors expect. So does a U.S.-China trade war, as we argued last week.8 How should investors position themselves for the confluence of geopolitical, political, and financial factors we have described above? The world is facing both the cyclical liquidity crunch that BCA's Emerging Markets Team has elucidated and the potential for a secular tightening as the Trump administration focuses its efforts on closing the U.S. current account deficit. Five investment implications are top of our mind: Chart 11Market Response To Trump Win On High End Market Response To Trump Win On High End Market Response To Trump Win On High End Chart 12Market Is Priced For 'Magnificent' Events Market Is Priced For 'Magnificent' Events Market Is Priced For 'Magnificent' Events Buy VIX. The S&P 500 has continued to power on since the election, buoyed by positive economic surprises, strong global earnings, and the hope of a pro-business shift in the White House. The equity market performance puts the Trump presidency in the upper range of post-election market outcomes (Chart 11). However, with 10-year Treasuries back above fair value, the VIX near 12, and EM equities near their pre-November high, the market is pricing none of the political and geopolitical risks of an impending trade war between the U.S. and China, nor is it pricing the general mercantilist shift in Washington D.C. (Chart 12). As a result, we recommend that clients put on a "mercantilist hedge," like deep out-of-the-money S&P 500 puts, or VIX calls. For instance, a long VIX 20/25 call spread for March expiry. Long DM / Short EM. Mercantilism and the U.S. dollar bull market are the worst combination possible for EM risk assets. We therefore reiterate our long-held strategic recommendation of being long developed markets / short emerging markets. Overweight Euro Area Equities. Investors should overweight euro area equities relative to the U.S. As we have discussed in the 2017 Strategic Outlook, political risks in Europe this year are a red herring.9 We will expand on the upcoming French elections in next week's report. Meanwhile, investors appear complacent about protectionism and what it may mean for the S&P 500, which sources 44% of its earnings abroad. European companies, on the other hand, could stand to profit from a China-U.S. trade war. Chart 13Peso Is A Buy Versus Trump's Enemy #1 Peso Is A Buy Versus Trump's Enemy #1 Peso Is A Buy Versus Trump's Enemy #1 Chart 14Peso As Cheap As During Tequila Crisis Peso As Cheap As During Tequila Crisis Peso As Cheap As During Tequila Crisis Long MXN/RMB. As a tactical play on the U.S.-China trade war, we recommend clients go long MXN/RMB (Chart 13). The peso is now as cheap as it was in early 1995, at the heights of the Tequila Crisis, as per the BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy model (Chart 14). While Mexico remains squarely in Trump's crosshairs on immigration and security, the damage to the currency appears to be done and has ironically made the country's exports more competitive. In addition, Trump's pick for Commerce Secretary, Wilbur Ross, has informed his NAFTA counterparts that "rules of origin" will be central to NAFTA re-negotiation. This can be interpreted as the U.S. using every tool at its disposal to impose punitive measures on China, including forcing NAFTA partners to close off the "rules of origin" loophole.10 But the reality is that the U.S. trade deficit with its NAFTA partners is far less daunting than that with China (Chart 15). Meanwhile, we remain negative on the RMB for fundamental reasons that we have stressed in our research. Small Is Beautiful. We continue to recommend that clients find protection from rising protectionism in small caps. Small caps are traditionally domestically geared irrespective of their domicile. Anastasios Avgeriou, Chief Strategist of BCA's Global Alpha Sector Strategy, also points out that small caps in the U.S. will benefit as the new administration follows through with promised corporate tax cuts, which will benefit small caps disproportionally to large caps given that the effective tax rate of multinationals is already low. Moreover, small companies will benefit most from any cuts in regulations, most of which have been written by multinationals in order to create barriers to entry (Chart 16). Of course, we could just be paranoid! After all, much of Trump's proposed policies - massive tax cuts, infrastructure spending, major rearmament, the border wall - would increase domestic spending and thus widen the current account deficit, not shrink it. And all the protectionism and de-globalization could just be posturing by the Trump administration, both to get a better deal from China and Europe and to give voters in the Midwest some political red meat. Chart 15China, Not NAFTA, In Trump's Crosshairs China, Not NAFTA, In Trump's Crosshairs China, Not NAFTA, In Trump's Crosshairs Chart 16Small Is Beautiful Small Is Beautiful Small Is Beautiful But Geopolitical Strategy analysts get paid to be paranoid! And we worry that much of Trump's promises that would widen U.S. deficits are being watered down or pushed to the background. Yes, we have held a high conviction view that infrastructure spending would come through, but now it appears that it will be complemented with significant spending cuts. The next 100 days will tell us which prerogatives the Trump Administration favors: rebuilding America directly, or doing so indirectly via protectionism. If the former, then the current market rally is justified. If the intention is to reduce the current account deficit, look out. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President marko@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri, Research Analyst jesse.kuri@bcaresearch.com Brexit: A Brave New World Miranda: O brave new world! Prospero: 'Tis new to thee. — Shakespeare, The Tempest The U.K. Supreme Court ruled on January 24 that parliament must have a say in triggering Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, which enables the U.K. to "exit" the European Union. This decision, as well as Theresa May's January 17 "Brexit means exit" speech, caught us in London while visiting clients. Reactions were mixed. The pound continues to rally. January 16 remains the low point in the GBP/USD cross since the vote to leave on June 23 last year (Chart 17). Chart 17Has Brexit Uncertainty Bottomed? Has Brexit Uncertainty Bottomed? Has Brexit Uncertainty Bottomed? Should investors expect more downside to the pound or do the recent events mark a bottom in political uncertainty? The market consensus suggests that further volatility in the pound is warranted for three reasons: Europeans will seek to punish the U.K. for Brexit, to set an example to their own Euroskeptics; Prime Minister May's assertion that the U.K. would seek to exit the common market is negative for the country's economy; Legal uncertainties about Brexit remain. We disagree with this assessment, at least in the short and medium term. Therefore, the pound rally on the day of May's speech was warranted, although we agree that exiting the EU Common Market will ultimately be suboptimal for the country's economy. First, by setting out a clean break from the EU, including the common market, Prime Minister May has removed a considerable amount of political uncertainty. As we pointed out in our original net assessment of Brexit, leaving the EU while remaining in its common market is illogical.11 Paradoxically, the U.K. stood to lose rather than regain sovereignty if it left the EU yet remained in the common market (Diagram 1). Diagram 1The Quite Un-British Lack Of Common Sense Behind Soft Brexit The "What Can You Do For Me" World? The "What Can You Do For Me" World? Why? Because membership in the common market entails a financial burden, full adoption of the acquis communautaire (the EU body of law), and acceptance of the "Four Freedoms," including the freedom of movement of workers. Given that the Brexit vote was largely motivated by concerns of sovereignty and immigration (Chart 18), it did not make sense to vote to leave the EU and then seek to retain membership in the common market. Apparently May and her cabinet agree. Chart 18It's Sovereignty, Stupid! The "What Can You Do For Me" World? The "What Can You Do For Me" World? Second, now that the U.K. has chosen to depart from the common market, the EU no longer needs to take as hostile of a negotiating position as before. The EU member states were not going to let the U.K. dictate its own terms of membership. That would have set a precedent for future Euroskeptic governments looking for an alternative relationship with the bloc, i.e. the so-called "Europe, à la carte" that European policymakers dread. But now that the U.K. is asking for a clean exit, with a free trade agreement to be negotiated in lieu of common market membership, the EU has less reason to punish London. An FTA arrangement will be beneficial to EU exporters, who want access to the U.K. market, and it will send a message to Euroskeptics on the continent that there is no alternative to full membership. Leaving the EU means leaving the market and falling back - at best - to an FTA-level relationship that the EU shares with Mexico and (most recently) Canada. Third, leaving the EU and the common market are political, not legal, decisions, and the lingering legal battles are neither avoidable nor likely to be substantive. Theresa May had already stolen thunder when she said that the final deal with the EU would be put to a vote in parliament. The Supreme Court ruling - as well as other legal hangups - could conceivably give rise to complications that bind the government's hands, but most likely parliament will pass a simple bill or motion granting permission for the government to invoke Article 50. That is because the referendum, and public opinion since then, speak loud and clear (Chart 19). The Conservative Party remains in a comfortable lead over the Labour Party (Chart 20), which itself is not opposing the referendum outcome. In addition, the House of Commons has already approved the government's Brexit timetable by a margin of 372 seats in a 650-seat body - with 461 ayes. That is a stark contrast with a few months ago when around 494 MPs were said to be against Brexit. Chart 19No 'Bremorse' Or 'Bregret' The "What Can You Do For Me" World? The "What Can You Do For Me" World? Chart 20Tories Still Triumphant Tories Still Triumphant Tories Still Triumphant The bigger question comes down to the parliamentary vote on the deal that is to be negotiated over the next two years. Could the Parliament vote down the final agreement with the EU? Absolutely. However, it is unlikely. The economic calamity predicted by many commentators has not happened, as we discuss below. Bottom Line: The combination of the Supreme Court decision and Prime Minister May's speech has reduced political uncertainty regarding Brexit. The EU will negotiate hard with the U.K., but the main cause of consternation - the U.K. asking for special treatment with respect to the common market - is now off the table. Yes, the EU does hold all the cards when it comes to negotiating an FTA agreement, and the process could entail some alarming twists and turns (given the last-minute crisis in the EU-Canada FTA). But we do not expect EU-U.K. negotiations to imperil the pound dramatically beyond what we've already seen. Will Leaving The Common Market Hurt Britain? Does this mean that Brexit is "much ado about nothing?" In the short and medium term, we think the answer is yes. In the long-term, leaving the EU Common Market is a suboptimal outcome for three reasons: Trade - Net exports rarely contribute positively to U.K. growth (Chart 21) and the trade deficit with the EU is particularly deep. As such, proponents of Brexit claim that putting up modest trade barriers against the EU could be beneficial. However, the U.K. has a services trade surplus with the EU (Chart 22). While it is not as large as the trade deficit, there was hope that the eventual implementation of the 2006 EU's Services Directive would have opened up new markets for U.K.'s highly competitive services industry and thus reduced the trade deficit over time. As the bottom panel of Chart 22 shows, the U.K.'s service exports to the rest of the world have outpaced those to the EU, suggesting that there is much room for improvement. This hope is now dashed and the EU may go back to putting up non-tariff barriers to services that reverse Britain's modest surplus with the bloc. Free Trade Agreements rarely adequately cover services, which means that the U.K.'s hope of expanding service exports to a new high is probably gone. Chart 21U.K. Is Consumer-Driven U.K. Is Consumer-Driven U.K. Is Consumer-Driven Chart 22Service Exports At Risk After Brexit Service Exports At Risk After Brexit Service Exports At Risk After Brexit Foreign Investment - FDI is declining, whether for cyclical reasons or because foreign companies fear losing access to Europe via the U.K. It remains to be seen how FDI will respond to the U.K.'s renunciation of the common market, but it is unlikely to be positive (Chart 23). The U.K.'s financial sector will also be negatively impacted since leaving the common market will mean that London will no longer have recourse to the EU judiciary in order to stymie European protectionism.12 This is unlikely to destroy London's status as the global financial center, but it will impact FDI on the margin. Labor Growth - The loss of labor inflow will be the biggest cost of Brexit. A decrease of immigration from the EU could reduce the U.K.'s labor force growth by a maximum of two-thirds, translating to a 25% loss in the potential GDP growth rate (Chart 24). While the U.K. is not, in fact, closing off all immigration, labor-force growth will decline, and potential GDP with it. Chart 23FDI To Suffer From Brexit? FDI To Suffer From Brexit? FDI To Suffer From Brexit? Chart 24Labor Growth Suffers Most From Brexit The "What Can You Do For Me" World? The "What Can You Do For Me" World? In addition, the EU Common Market forces companies to compete for market share in the developed world's largest consumer market. This competition is supposed to accelerate creative destruction and thus productivity, while giving the winners of the competition the spoils, i.e. a better ability to establish "economies of scale." In a 2011 report, the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) published an econometric study that compared four scenarios: the U.K. remains in the common market as the EU fully liberalizes trade; the U.K. remains in the EU's single market, but does not fully liberalize trade with the rest of the EU; the U.K. leaves the common market; the U.K. enters NAFTA.13 Of the four scenarios, only the first leads to an increase in wealth for the U.K., with 7.1% additional GDP over ten years. U.K. exports would increase by 47%, against 38.1% for its imports. Wages of both skilled and unskilled workers would increase as well. Meanwhile, the report finds that closer integration with NAFTA would not compensate for looser U.K. ties with the EU. In fact, the U.K. national income would be 7.4% smaller if the U.K. tied up with NAFTA instead of taking part in further trade liberalization on the continent. Why rely on a 2011 report for the assessment of benefits of the common market? Because it was written by a competent, relatively unbiased international body and predates the highly politicized environment surrounding Brexit that has since infected almost all think-tank research. And yet the more recent research echoes the 2011 report in terms of the negative consequences of leaving the common market.14 In addition, the BIS study actually attempts to forecast the benefit of further removing trade barriers in the single market, which is at least the intention of the EU Commission. That said, our concerns regarding the U.K. economy are long-term. It may take years before the full economic impact of leaving the common market can be assessed. In addition, much of our analysis hinges on the Europeans fully liberalizing the common market and removing the last remaining non-tariff barriers to trade, particularly of services. At the present-day level of liberalization, the U.K. may benefit by leaving. In addition, we do not expect a balance-of-payments crisis in the U.K. any time soon. The U.K. current account is deeply negative, unsurprisingly so given the deep trade imbalance with the EU and world. However, our colleague Mathieu Savary, Vice-President of BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy, has pointed out that the elasticity of imports to the pound is in fact negative, a very surprising result. This reflects an extremely elevated import content of British exports. A lower pound is therefore unlikely to be the most crucial means of improving the current-account position. Certainly leaving the common market will not improve the competitiveness of British exports in the EU. Chart 25The U.K.'s Basic Balance Is Healthy The U.K.'s Basic Balance Is Healthy The U.K.'s Basic Balance Is Healthy But this raises a bigger question: why does the U.K. have to improve its current account deficit? As our FX team points out in Chart 25, despite having a current-account deficit of nearly 6% of GDP, the U.K. runs a basic balance-of-payments surplus of 12%, even after the recent fall in FDI inflows. The reason for the massive balance-of-payments surplus is the financial account surplus of 6.17% of GDP, a feature of the U.K. being a destination for foreign capital, which flows from its status as a global financial center and prime real estate destination. In other words, leaving the common market will not change the fundamentals of the U.K. balance of payments much. The country will remain a global financial center and will still run a capital account surplus, which will suppress the country's interest rates, buoy the GBP, and give tailwinds to imports of foreign goods. Meanwhile, exports will not benefit as they will face marginally higher tariffs as the country exits the EU Common Market. At best, new tariffs will be offset by a cheaper GBP. As such, leaving the common market is not going to be a disaster for the U.K. Nor will it be a panacea for the country's deep current account deficit. And that is okay. The U.K. will not face a crisis in funding its current account deficit. What is clear is that for the time being, the U.K. economy is holding up. Our forex strategists recently argued that U.K.'s growth has surprised to the upside and that the improvement is sustainable: Monetary and fiscal policy are both accommodative (Chart 26); Inflation is limited; Tight labor market drives up wages and puts cash in consumers' pockets (Chart 27); Credit growth remains robust (Chart 28). Chart 26Easy Money Smooths The Way To Brexit Easy Money Smooths The Way To Brexit Easy Money Smooths The Way To Brexit Chart 27British Labor Market Tightening British Labor Market Tightening British Labor Market Tightening Chart 28U.K. Credit Growth Looking Good U.K. Credit Growth Looking Good U.K. Credit Growth Looking Good This means that the political trajectory is set for the time being. "Bremorse" and "Bregret" will remain phantoms for the time being. Bottom Line: Leaving the common market is a suboptimal but not apocalyptic outcome for the U.K. The combination of decent economic performance and lowered political uncertainty in the near term will support the pound. Given the pound's 20% correction since the June referendum, we believe that the market has already priced in the new, marginally negative, post-Brexit paradigm. The Big Picture It is impossible to say whether the long-term negative economic effects of Brexit will affect voters drastically enough and quickly enough for Scotland, or parliament, to act in 2018 or 2019 and modify the government's decision to pursue a "Hard Brexit." It seems conceivable if something changes in the fundamental dynamics outlined above, but we wouldn't bet on it. At the moment even a new Scottish referendum appears unlikely (Chart 29). Scottish voters have soured on independence, perhaps due to a combination of continued political uncertainty in the EU (Scotland's political alternative to the U.K.) and a collapse in oil prices (arguably Scotland's economic alternative to the U.K.). The issue is not resolved but on ice for the time being. Chart 29Brexit Not Driving Scots To Independence (Yet) Brexit Not Driving Scots To Independence (Yet) Brexit Not Driving Scots To Independence (Yet) More likely, the government will get its way on Brexit and the 2020 elections will mark a significant popular test of the Conservative leadership and the final deal with the EU. Then the aftermath will be an entirely new ballgame for the U.K. and all four of its constituent nations. If Britain's new beginning is founded on protectionism and dirigisme - as the government suggests - then the public is likely to be disappointed. The "brave new world" of Brexit may prove to be rather mundane, disappointing, and eerily reminiscent of the ghastly 1970s.15 Hence the Shakespeare quote at the top of this report. The political circumstances of Brexit resemble the U.K. landscape before it joined the European Economic Community in 1973: greater government role in the economy, trade protectionism, tight labor market, higher wages, and inflation. Yet this was a period when the U.K. economy underperformed Europe's. The U.K.'s eventual era of outperformance was contingent on the structural reforms of the Thatcher era and expanded access to the European market (Chart 30). It remains to be seen what happens when the U.K. leaves the market and rolls back Thatcherite reforms. The weak pound and proactive fiscal policy will fail to create a manufacturing revolution. That is because most manufacturing has hollowed out because of automation, not foreign workers stealing Britons' jobs. Moreover, as for the pound, it is important to remember that currency effects are temporary and any boost to exports that the weak pound is generating will be short-lived, as with the case of China in the 1990s and the EU in the past two years (Chart 31). Chart 30U.K. Growth To Lag Europe's Once Again? U.K. Growth To Lag Europe's Once Again? U.K. Growth To Lag Europe's Once Again? Chart 31Export Boost From Devaluation Is Fleeting Export Boost From Devaluation Is Fleeting Export Boost From Devaluation Is Fleeting In addition, we would argue that, in an environment of de-globalization - in which tariffs are rising, albeit slowly for the time being (Chart 32) - the EU Common Market provides Europe with a mechanism by which to protect its vast consumer market. The U.K. may have chosen the precisely wrong time in which to abandon the protection of continental European protectionism. It could suffer by finding itself on the outside of the common market as global tariffs begin to rise significantly. Chart 32Protectionism On The March The "What Can You Do For Me" World? The "What Can You Do For Me" World? What about the restoration of the "Special Relationship" between the U.K. and the U.S.? Could moving to the "front of the queue" on negotiating an FTA with the world's largest economy make a difference for the U.K.? Perhaps, but as the BIS study above indicates, an FTA with North America or the U.S. alone is unlikely to replace the benefits of the common market. In addition, it is difficult to imagine how a protectionist U.S. administration that is looking to massively decrease its current account deficit will help the U.K. expand trade with the U.S. By contrast, Trump's election in the United States poses massive risks to globalization, both through his protectionism and the strong USD implications of his core policies. This will reverberate negatively across the commodities and EM space. In such an environment, the U.K. may not be able to make much headway in its "Global Britain" initiatives to conclude fast trade deals with EM economies that stand to lose the most in the de-globalization era. Bottom Line: As a trading nation, the U.K. is likely to lose out in a prolonged period of de-globalization. Membership in the EU could have served as a bulwark against this global trend. Investment Implications We diverge from our colleagues in the Foreign Exchange Strategy and European Investment Strategy when it comes to the assessment of political risk looming over Brexit.16 The decision to leave the common market will alleviate the pressure on Europeans to seek vindictive punishment. Earlier, the U.K. was forcing them to choose between making an exception to the rules and demonstrating the negative consequences of leaving the bloc. Now the U.K. is self-evidently taking on its own punishment - the economic burden of leaving the common market - and the EU will probably deem that sufficient. Will the EU play tough? Yes, especially since the EU retains considerable economic leverage over Britain (Chart 33). But the stakes are far smaller now. Furthermore, investors should remember that core European states - especially France and Germany - remain major military allies of the U.K. and will continue to be deeply intertwined economically. As such, we believe that the pound has already priced in the new economic paradigm and that the expectations of political uncertainty ahead of the U.K.-EU negotiations may be overdone. We therefore recommend that investors short EUR/GBP outright. Our aforementioned forex strategist Mathieu Savary argues that, on an intermediate-term basis, the outlook for this cross is driven by interest rate differentials and policy considerations. Due to the balance-sheet operations conducted by the BoE and ECB, interest rates in the U.K. and the euro area do not fully reflect domestic policy stances. Instead, Mathieu uses the shadow rates. Currently, shadow rates unequivocally point toward a lower EUR/GBP (Chart 34). In fact, balance-sheet dynamics point toward shorting EUR/GBP. Chart 33EU Holds The Cards In FTA Negotiation EU Holds The Cards In FTA Negotiation EU Holds The Cards In FTA Negotiation Chart 34Shadow Rates Point To Stronger GBP Shadow Rates Point To Stronger GBP Shadow Rates Point To Stronger GBP For full disclosure, Mathieu cautions clients to wait on executing a short EUR/GBP until after Article 50 is enacted. By contrast, we think that political uncertainty regarding Brexit likely peaked on January 16. Matt Gertken, Associate Editor mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President marko@bcaresearch.com 1 While the U.S. runs a massively negative net international investment position, its net international income remains positive. In other words, foreigners receive a much lower return on U.S. assets while the U.S. benefits from risk premia in foreign markets. 2 Please see Spiegel Online, "Donald Trump and the New World Order," dated January 20, 2017, available at Spiegel.de. 3 In a widely-quoted interview with The Wall Street Journal, Donald Trump said that the U.S. dollar is "too strong." He continued that, "Our companies can't compete with [China] now because our currency is too strong. And it's killing us." Please see The Wall Street Journal, "Donald Trump Warns on House Republican Tax Plan," dated January 16, 2017, available at wsj.com. 4 We would note that the Trump administration and its Treasury Department have considerable leeway over how they choose to interpret China's foreign exchange practices. In 1992, when the U.S. government last accused China of currency manipulation, it issued a warning in its spring report before leveling the accusation in the winter report. The RMB did not depreciate in the meantime but remained stable, and Treasury noted this approvingly; however, Treasury chose 1989 as the base level for its assessment, and found manipulation. The Trump administration could use much more aggressive interpretive methods than this to achieve its ends. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Mercantilism Is Back," dated February 10, 2016, and Special Report, "The Apex Of Globalization - All Downhill From Here," dated November 14, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue For 2017," dated January 20, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "The U.S. Dollar's Uptrend And China's Options," dated January 11, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin," dated January 18, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 Critics, including Trump supporters, claim that NAFTA sets too low of a threshold for the domestic content of a good deemed to have originated within the NAFTA countries. Goods that are nearly 40% foreign-made can thus be treated as NAFTA-made. This is one of many contentious points in the trade deal. 11 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and European Investment Strategy Special Report, "With Or Without You: The U.K. And The EU," dated March 17, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 In 2015, the U.K. took the ECB to court over its decision to require financial transactions denominated in euros to be conducted in the euro area, i.e. out of the City, and won. This avenue of legal redress will no longer be available for the U.K., allowing EU member states to slowly introduce rules and regulations that corral the financial industry - or at least to the parts focused on transactions in euros - out of London. 13 Please see Bank of International Settlements, "The economic consequences for the U.K. and the EU of completing the Single Market," BIS Economics Paper No. 11, dated February 2011, available at www.gov.uk. 14 Please see Her Majesty's Government, "H.M. Treasury Analysis: The Long-Term Economic Impact Of EU Membership And The Alternatives," Cmnd. 9250, April 2016, available at www.gov.uk. and Jagjit S. Chadha, "The Referendum Blues: Shocking The System," National Institute Economic Review 237 (August 2016), available at www.niesr.ac.uk. 15 We were going to use "grey" to describe Britain in the 1970s. However, our colleague Martin Barnes, BCA's Chief Economist, insisted that "grey" did not do the "ghastly" 1970s justice. When it comes to the U.K. in the 1970s, we are going to defer to Martin. 16 Please see BCA Research European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “May’s Brexit Speech: No Substance,” dated January 19, 2017, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights Mexico and China are not the only countries that could suffer from U.S. trade protectionism. Malaysia, Korea, Taiwan and Thailand are also at risk. The global inflationary versus deflationary impact of U.S. trade protectionism will depend on the magnitude of exchange rate adjustments. Currencies will adjust to redistribute the inflationary and deflationary impact of U.S. tariffs and Border Adjustment Taxes between the U.S. and the rest of the world. Go long three-month volatility in the KRW, the MYR and the THB. The Turkish lira has approached our target of TRY/USD 3.9. Investors should book profits for now and reinstate short if the lira rebounds to 3.5 Feature Chart I-1Are Share Prices Discounting ##br##U.S. Trade Protectionism? Are Share Prices Discounting U.S. Trade Protectionism? Are Share Prices Discounting U.S. Trade Protectionism? The odds of a considerable rise in U.S. trade protectionism have ratcheted up since President Donald Trump's victory in early November, yet global share prices have been sanguine about it. Equities have instead focused on the positives of Trump's agenda such as fiscal stimulus and deregulation. Does this mean that the marketplace is overly complacent? One can argue that potential trade wars are a well-known risk, and as such are already discounted in share prices. It is also possible to argue that the equity markets did not fall at all ahead of and following Trump's victory to discount potential negatives from trade protectionism. The only market that has reacted to discount looming trade restrictions is Mexico, specifically the peso and its fixed-income markets. However, the ramifications of U.S. trade protectionism will reverberate well beyond Mexico. Global ex-U.S. share prices have not corrected at all to discount the potential negatives (Chart I-1). Unless the U.S. dollar surges, U.S. manufacturers will likely benefit from protectionist measures. However, U.S inflation and interest rates will rise in this scenario, weighing on equity valuation multiples. Overall, the majority of America's trade partners are at risk. In this week's report, we assess the vulnerability of various EM countries to the U.S. trade assault. U.S. trade restrictions will take the form of either import tariffs, a Border Adjustment Tax (BAT),1 or a mix of both. We conclude that buying volatility of select EM currencies is one way to profit from budding U.S. protectionism. Vulnerability To A U.S. Trade Assault Below we analyze which EM economies are most at risk from U.S. import tariffs and BAT. Given it is impossible to know whether the U.S. will adopt import tariffs, a BAT, or some combination of the two, we evaluate the impact on developing countries from both measures. Import tariffs: To assess each country's exposure to potential import tariffs, we examine the size of export shipments to America relative to that country's GDP. Table I-1 shows that Mexico, Canada, Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand have the largest exports to the U.S. as a share of their economy. For Mexico, Canada and Malaysia, we exclude oil shipments to the U.S., as it is not clear whether oil will be subject to import tariffs. BAT: The principal variable gauging a country's vulnerability to a BAT is its trade balance with the U.S. This is because a BAT is both a penalty on imports into the U.S. as well as a subsidy on American exports. Hence, this analysis has to take into consideration not only a country's shipments to the U.S. but also American producers' exports to that country. Table I-2 shows the size of each country's trade balance with the U.S. as a share of its GDP. Table I-1Vulnerability To U.S. Import Tariffs EM Vulnerability To U.S. Trade Protectionism EM Vulnerability To U.S. Trade Protectionism Table I-2Vulnerability To BATs EM Vulnerability To U.S. Trade Protectionism EM Vulnerability To U.S. Trade Protectionism Again, for Mexico, Canada and Malaysia, we exclude the oil trade balance with the U.S. from the calculation. 3. Combined vulnerability ranking. Lack of clarity on trade policy specifics the U.S. is going to adopt means that we may need to synthesize the above analysis, combining the vulnerability ranking on both measures into one. Chart I-2 plots trade balances on the X axis and exports to the U.S. on the Y axis. It appears Malaysia, Mexico, Taiwan and Thailand are the most vulnerable, based on both criteria. Chart I-2Vulnerability To U.S. Import Tariffs And Border Adjustment Taxes EM Vulnerability To U.S. Trade Protectionism EM Vulnerability To U.S. Trade Protectionism Another way to generate a vulnerability ranking is to calculate an aggregate score based on Tables I-1 and I-2 because either import tariffs, a BAT or some combination of the two will be adopted by the U.S. The aggregate vulnerability score is presented in Chart I-3. Chart I-3U.S. Trade Protectionism Vulnerability Ranking EM Vulnerability To U.S. Trade Protectionism EM Vulnerability To U.S. Trade Protectionism According to the overall vulnerability score, Mexico, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand and Korea are the most exposed to potential U.S. trade protectionism measures. By contrast, Turkey, Brazil and Chile are the least exposed. Bottom Line: Mexico and China are not the only countries that could suffer from U.S. trade protectionism. Malaysia, Korea, Taiwan and Thailand are also at risk. On the flip side, Turkey and Brazil are the least exposed to a U.S. trade assault. We remain short many EM exchange rates versus the U.S. dollar including the Malaysian, Korean and Colombian currencies, and reiterate these positions today. Traders who are not positioned this way or have been stopped out should consider reinstating these trades (the full list of our currency recommendations). As for the Mexican peso, it has undershot relative to other EM currencies. We have not been bullish on the MXN versus the USD, though in recent months have recommended going long the MXN versus the BRL and ZAR. These trades have so far produced large losses, but we expect the MXN to recover some of those losses on its crosses. Are Trade Barriers Inflationary Or Deflationary? We consider three scenarios: Chart I-4U.S.: Rising Unit Labor Costs ##br##Warrant Higher Core Inflation U.S.: Rising Unit Labor Costs Warrant Higher Core Inflation U.S.: Rising Unit Labor Costs Warrant Higher Core Inflation 1. Without an exchange rate adjustment (U.S. dollar appreciation), import tariffs and BATs will be inflationary for the U.S. and deflationary for the rest of the world. In this scenario, the prices of imported goods will rise in U.S. dollars and U.S. consumers will end up paying for the tariff/border taxes or exporters will see their U.S. dollar revenues plummet or some combination of the two. U.S. manufacturers will become competitive with higher prices of imported goods, and U.S. employment and resource utilization will mount, heightening domestic inflationary pressures. Even though non-energy imports make up only 11% of U.S. GDP, the inflationary impact of trade protectionism will be pervasive. The reason being that it will tighten the resource utilization in the American economy in general, and the labor market in particular. Currently, the U.S. labor market is tight, wages are accelerating and unit labor costs are rising (Chart I-4). Further strength in demand due to potential fiscal stimulus, import substitution, and a further revival of confidence, will lead to even higher wage inflation and an acceleration in unit labor costs. This, along with rising prices for imported goods, will produce higher inflation. That said, it is likely that American consumers cannot handle a drastic price hike in imported goods, so higher selling prices will entail less demand. For the rest of the world, the same scenario will be very deflationary. Countries with large exports to the U.S. will experience a plunge in their shipments to America, income/profit growth will tank, and domestic demand will dwindle. In aggregate, this scenario will be inflationary for the U.S. and deflationary for the rest of the world - there will be meaningful losses in global output. 2. With "full" exchange rate adjustments, the import tariffs and BATs will be neutral for the U.S. and the rest of the world. But for this to occur, the U.S. dollar has to overshoot. Chart I-5Exchange Rates Have##br## Made A Difference Exchange Rates Have Made A Difference Exchange Rates Have Made A Difference In this scenario, imported goods prices in U.S. dollars will remain the same, given tariffs/BATs are entirely offset by a strong dollar. For exporters, their U.S. dollar revenues will plunge but their currency depreciation will restore the value of shipments to the U.S. in local currency terms (Chart I-5). In brief, the "full" currency depreciation will reflate exporter economies in local currency terms. Given that the rate of tariffs or BATs will likely exceed 15-20%, potential U.S. dollar appreciation will need to be dramatic to produce this scenario. In turn, the considerable dollar appreciation will cap inflationary pressures in the U.S. There will be little, if any, impact on global output. 3. With "partial" exchange rate adjustment (moderate dollar appreciation), the impact of tariffs or BATs will be split between U.S. consumers facing somewhat higher prices for imports and exporters who will suffer declines in revenues in local currency terms, though not as much as in the case of no currency deprecation. Consequently, this scenario will be mildly inflationary for the U.S. and modestly deflationary for the rest of the world. Yet, there will also be a small loss of global output - i.e., global GDP growth will be negatively impacted. Odds favor scenarios two and three - i.e., the greenback is set to appreciate, but it is not clear whether it will rise enough to entirely offset the impact of import tariffs or BATs and preclude decline in global growth. Bottom Line: The inflationary versus deflationary impact of U.S. trade protectionism will depend on exchange rate adjustments and their magnitude - i.e., currencies will move to redistribute the inflationary and deflationary impact of U.S. tariffs and BATs. Overall, the U.S. dollar is set to appreciate meaningfully and probably overshoot before topping out. Go Long EM FX Volatility Given central banks outside the U.S. - both in DM ex-U.S. and EM - are attempting to keep interest rates low, odds favor considerable appreciation in the U.S. dollar, or at least a material rise in exchange rate implied volatility. When monetary authorities control interest rates, the entire burden of adjustment falls on exchange rates. In brief, exchange rates have to move a lot - the U.S. dollar would have to overshoot - to prevent a hit to global output. Investors should consider betting on higher exchange rate volatility. In spite of rising odds of U.S. trade protectionism, EM and DM currency volatility has so far remained surprisingly tame (Chart I-6). We feel there is a trade opportunity here, and today we recommend investors go long select EM exchange rate volatilities. Chart I-7 plots the U.S. trade vulnerability score on the X axis, and exchange rate volatility - more specifically, the standardized 3-month implied currency volatility - on the Y axis. According to Chart I-7, it appears that by historical standards, the current level of volatility of MYR, THB and KRW are low when considering these countries' vulnerability to U.S. trade protectionism. Therefore, investors should go long 3-month implied volatility for the KRW, the MYR and the THB. Chart I-6Exchange Rate Volatility In ##br##Historical Perspective Exchange Rate Volatility In Historical Perspective Exchange Rate Volatility In Historical Perspective Chart I-7Go Long Currency VOLs in Korea, ##br##Malaysia, And Thailand EM Vulnerability To U.S. Trade Protectionism EM Vulnerability To U.S. Trade Protectionism In addition, the volatility in these Asian currencies will rise and the RMB depreciate further. Bottom Line: To capitalize on a potential rise in global currency volatility, traders should go long three-month volatility in the KRW, the MYR and the THB. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Taking Profits On Turkish Shorts For Now In our December 7, 2016 Special Report 2 we argued that the odds of the lira being vigorously defended by the authorities or some sort of capital controls being implemented in Turkey would increase as the exchange rate approached USD/TRY 3.9. Given the exchange rate has come close to that level, we recommend that traders book profits on our Turkish short positions. The idea is to protect profits and capital in the case of capital controls. It is impossible to know whether the Turkish authorities will opt for capital controls, as it is a political decision. Yet, the risk is non-trivial. Furthermore, the rhetoric from Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan suggests3 he views foreign investors as the main culprits for the nation's current financial debacle. President Erdogan will not shy away from hurting foreign investors via the introduction of capital controls and create the perception of financial stability. The central bank has been very active in recent weeks. Apart from hiking the overnight lending rate this week, it has recently curtailed liquidity injections into the banking system: Chart II-1Turkey: A Decline in Liquidity Provision Turkey: A Decline in Liquidity Provision Turkey: A Decline in Liquidity Provision On January 10, the Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) announced that it will place borrowing limits of TRY $22 billion in the Interbank Money Market, effectively limiting the volume of liquidity the central bank provides to commercial banks. Given the lira continued to slide, three days later, the CBT decided to move the interbank money market borrowing limit even lower at TRY $11 billion, effective January 16. That said, since January 10, the CBT has injected TRY $9.5 billion, on average per day, via the overnight window, and TRY $27 billion via the late liquidity window, albeit at higher interest rates than at the overnight window. Hence, the CBT has still injected a meaningful amount of liquidity into the banking system, but it has done so at higher interest rates. All in all, the CBT has curtailed liquidity injections in order to avoid further lira depreciation (Chart II-1, top panel). As a result, interest rates have risen sharply (Chart II-1, bottom panel). Yet, it is not certain that the central bank has tightened liquidity enough. Going forward, there are two main risks: either the CBT's liquidity tightening will be too little, and therefore the lira will continue to plunge, or, there will be considerable liquidity tightening, which will stabilize the exchange rate, but cascade the economy into major recession. Both scenarios are bearish for foreign investors holding Turkish stocks and credit. As we have discussed at length in previous reports, monetary authorities can control either the exchange rate or interest rates, but not both simultaneously. The CBT has been trying unsuccessfully to exercise control over both. To stabilize the exchange rate, the CBT has to drastically curtail its injections of local currency liquidity into the system. In such a case, however, interest rates will surge. Continued attempts to cap interest rates entail a further collapse in the lira's value. The only other option is to introduce capital control (i.e. close the capital account) in order to get control over both interest rates and the currency. Higher interest rates are not politically acceptable, as they will push the economy into deep recession. The reason being that domestic credit growth has been enormous in recent years, and higher interest rates will suffocate the economy. Yet not hiking the policy rate, or allowing interbank interest rates to rise, will all but ensure a deeper crash in the exchange rate. With the industrial sector already showing signs of weakness and the consumer sector flat, a decrease in loan growth will send the already weak economy into recession (Chart II-2). Yet, mushrooming money and credit growth, along with very high inflation in Turkey, justify higher interest rates: Local currency money and credit growth is too strong (Chart II-3). Unless these slow down, the lira will continue to decline. Chart II-2Turkey: Economy Is Heading##br## Into Recession Turkey: Economy Is Heading Into Recession Turkey: Economy Is Heading Into Recession Chart II-3Money/Credit Creation ##br##Has Been Too Rampant Money/Credit Creation Has Been Too Rampant Money/Credit Creation Has Been Too Rampant Genuine inflationary pressures are too ubiquitous: manufacturing and service sector wages have grown by about 20% over the past 12 months (Chart II-4). In brief, such genuinely high inflation, coupled with still low rates, are bearish for the currency. Robust credit and income/wage growth are supporting import demand, and the current account deficit is wide. This is another bearish factor for the exchange rate. In short, the lira has further room to fall. Remarkably, according to the real effective exchange rates based on unit labor costs as well as consumer prices, the lira is still not very cheap, making it vulnerable to further depreciation (Chart II-5) Chart II-4Turkey: 20% Wage Inflation Turkey: 20% Wage Inflation Turkey: 20% Wage Inflation Chart II-5The Turkish Lira Can Get Cheaper The Turkish Lira Can Get Cheaper The Turkish Lira Can Get Cheaper Even more surprising, despite a more than 20% depreciation against the U.S. dollar last year, foreign investors' holdings of Turkish equities and government bonds has not dropped significantly (Chart II-6). Finally, bank share prices in local currency terms have risen despite the spike in interest rates (Chart II-7). This entails that this bourse, which is dominated by bank stocks, is not pricing in risks from higher interest rates. Chart II-6Will Foreigners Capitulate On Turkish Assets? Will Foreigners Capitulate On Turkish Assets? Will Foreigners Capitulate On Turkish Assets? Chart II-7Bank Share Prices Have Held Up So Far Bank Share Prices Have Held Up So Far Bank Share Prices Have Held Up So Far Investment Recommendations: Currency and fixed income traders should take profits on our short TRY / long USD trade, as well as our short 2-year Turkish bond trade. These have returned a 24% and a 20%, respectively, since January 17, 2011 and June 1, 2016. That said, investors should consider shorting the lira versus the U.S. dollar again if the exchange rate rebounds to TRY/USD 3.5. We recommend equity traders book profits on our short Turkish banks position, which has registered a return of 60% since June 4, 2013. Dedicated EM equity and fixed income investors (both credit and local-currency bonds) should continue to underweight Turkey. Absolute-return and non-dedicated EM investors should minimize their exposure to Turkish financial markets. Stephan Gabillard, Research Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Global Investment Strategy Special Report, titled "U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue For 2017", dated January 20, 2017, available at www.gis.bcaresearch.com 2 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, titled "Turkey: Military Adventurism And Capital Controls", dated December 7, 2016 available at ems.bcaresearch.com 3 President Erdogan, speaking at the 34th meeting with village chiefs at the Presidential Palace in Ankara, said "Everyone already sees and knows the attacks that Turkey has been subjected to also have an economic aspect. There is no difference between a terrorist who has a weapon or bomb in his hand and a terrorist who has dollars, euros and interest in terms of aim. The aim is to bring Turkey to its knees, to take over Turkey and to distance Turkey from its goals. They are using the foreign exchange rate as a weapon". Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Dear client, We have received several questions about a potential U.S. border tax adjustment. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President of BCA's Global Investment Strategy service addresses this issue in the attached Special Report titled, "U.S. Border Adjustment Tax: A Potential Monster Issue For 2017". Peter analyses the economic and financial market implications of the plan and concludes it is likely to be an additional support to the dollar bull market should it be implemented in full. We trust you will find this report very interesting and relevant. As always, please do not hesitate if you have further questions. Best regards, Lenka Martinek Highlights House Republicans are pushing for a radical overhaul of the existing tax code, including adding a "border adjustment" mechanism that would effectively subsidize exports and tax imports. Despite President Trump's apparent mixed feelings about border taxation, we see a 50% chance that some version of the proposal will be implemented. This is a higher probability than the market currently is discounting. The trade-weighted dollar will rally by another 5% even in the absence of any tax changes, but could rise by 15% if the border adjustment tax is introduced. If the latter were to happen, it would take some time for the dollar to rise to its new equilibrium level. This, in conjunction with sticky import and export prices, would likely lead to a temporary narrowing of the U.S. trade deficit. Such an outcome could prompt the Fed to raise rates more aggressively than it otherwise would. Investors should underweight U.S. bonds on a currency-hedged basis. A stronger dollar will push down commodity prices and hurt external borrowers with dollar-denominated loans. A protectionist backlash against the U.S. might ensue. We are closing our long Chinese banks trade for a gain of 32%, and our long RUB/USD trade for a gain of 20%. Feature Making The Tax Code Great Again? Republicans in Congress are proposing an ambitious revamp of the tax code. A central element of their plan is the replacement of the existing corporate income tax with a so-called "destination-based cash flow tax." Key features of this plan include: Cutting the current federal corporate tax from a top rate of 35% to 20%. Allowing businesses to depreciate capital expenditures immediately, rather than writing them off over many years. Disallowing businesses from deducting interest expenses when calculating their tax bills. Moving to a system of territorial taxation, meaning that taxes would only be assessed on the value added of goods consumed in the United States. Since not all goods that are produced in the U.S. are consumed in the U.S., and not all goods that are consumed in the U.S. are produced in the U.S., a destination-based system requires what is known as a "border adjustment." Such an adjustment would tax the value added of imports and rebate the value added of exports at an equivalent rate. While border adjustments are routinely used in other settings - most notably by countries that have VATs - their application to corporate income taxes is a novel idea. As such, it is not surprising that the proposal has generated significant confusion among investors. With that in mind, we offer our thoughts on the matter using a Q&A format. Q: How exactly would a border adjustment on corporate income taxes work? A: Under current U.S. law, corporate income taxes are assessed on worldwide profits, which are the difference between worldwide revenues and worldwide costs. The introduction of a border tax adjustment would change the tax system to one where taxes are assessed only on the difference between domestic revenues and domestic costs (i.e., revenues derived in the U.S. minus costs incurred in the U.S.). Table 1 offers a simplified example to illustrate this point. Consider three types of companies: 1) A purely domestic producer whose revenues and costs are realized at home; 2) An exporter whose revenues are entirely derived from abroad but whose costs are all incurred in the U.S.; 3) An importer whose revenues are completely generated in the U.S. but whose costs are all incurred abroad. Suppose that all three companies have revenues of $100 and costs of $60 - implying $40 in pre-tax profits - and face a corporate tax rate of 20%. Before the border adjustment, each company would pay a tax of $8 ($40 times 0.2). The border adjustment is zero for the domestic producer. However, it would impose an additional tax of $12 on the importer ($60 times 0.2), while giving the exporter a rebate of $20 ($100 times 0.2). In the end, the importer and exporter face final tax bills of $20 and -$12, respectively, while the domestic producer continues to pay $8. Note that this conforms with the tax paid on domestic revenues minus domestic costs (for the domestic producer, domestic revenue minus domestic cost is equal to $40; for the exporter it is equal to -$60; and for the importer, it is equal to $100). Q: A tax on imports and a subsidy on exports? Sounds like massive protectionism! A: That depends on the extent to which the dollar appreciates. As Table 1 shows, if the dollar appreciates by 1/(1-tax rate) = 1/(1-0.2) = 25%, there would be no impact on the trade balance or on the distribution of after-tax corporate profits in the economy. This is because the stronger dollar would nullify the subsidy on exports, while reducing import costs by precisely the amount necessary to restore importers' after-tax profits to their original level. Chart Q: This seems like splitting hairs. If a country imposes a 20% tax on imports, most people would still regard this as a protectionist act, even if a currency appreciation offsets the impact. A: That's why a corresponding export subsidy is necessary. That may sound strange since export subsidies are also seen as protectionist measures, but consider the following: Imagine that the government only taxes imports. A tax on imports would curb import demand, implying less demand for foreign currency. This would push up the value of the dollar, leading to lower import prices. How high would the dollar go? Suppose it rose so much that the decline in import prices exactly offset the tariff, thereby restoring import volumes (and importer profits) back to their original level. Is that a stable equilibrium? The answer is no because a stronger dollar would also reduce the demand for U.S. exports, causing the trade deficit to swell. Thus, for the trade balance to remain unchanged, the dollar would have to rise only part of the way, leaving importers worse off than before the tariff was introduced. Such a policy would be protectionist because it would favor U.S.-based companies that produce for the domestic market over foreign exporters. Only in the case where importers are subject to a tax and exporters receive a subsidy will the dollar strengthen to the point that neither exports nor imports change. Intuitively, this is because an export subsidy indirectly benefits importers by pushing up the value of the dollar, while directly benefiting exporters by offsetting the effect of a stronger dollar on profits. Q: If there is no change in the trade balance, what is the advantage of border-adjusting the corporate income tax? A: Contrary to Donald Trump's assertion that border adjustments are "too complicated," their chief advantage is their simplicity. Accurately assessing taxes on worldwide income is hard. Companies routinely engage in practices that purposely lower taxable profits. In particular, importers may overstate the value of their imports and exporters may understate the value of their exports. In a world where many companies have overseas subsidiaries, such "transfer pricing" machinations are easy to pull off. Border adjustments eliminate such incentives in one fell swoop. Recall that with a border adjustment, taxes are assessed on the difference between domestic revenues and domestic costs - both of which the IRS has the means to monitor. Yes, a U.S. company that overstates imports will be able to report a lower gross profit to the IRS, but now it will be on the hook for a higher import tax. What it puts in one pocket it takes from the other. Likewise, an exporter that understates its overseas sales will end up with a lower gross profit, but will now receive a smaller subsidy. Q: And I suppose that because the U.S. imports more than it exports, the border adjustment will end up raising additional revenues? A: That is correct. The annual U.S. trade deficit currently stands at $500 billion. A border adjustment tax rate of 20% would thus raise $100 billion in additional revenue. Given that the corporate income tax brings in about $350 billion, this would allow corporate taxes to be substantially cut without any loss in overall revenue. And this calculation excludes any indirect revenue that would accrue to the Treasury from reducing the incentive for U.S. companies to engage in profit-shifting behavior. Keep in mind, however, that the revenue boost from the border adjustment will decline if the U.S. trade deficit narrows over time. To the extent that the U.S. must finance its trade deficit through the sale of assets such as stocks, bonds, and property, it is possible that foreigners will one day decide to swap all these assets in exchange for U.S. goods. This would lead to an improvement in the U.S. trade balance. Indeed, to the extent that the U.S. is a net debtor to the rest of the world, it is possible that the average future U.S. trade balance will be positive. If that were to happen, the government would lose revenue from the border adjustment over the long haul. Meanwhile, a 25% appreciation in the greenback would reduce the dollar value of the assets that Americans hold abroad, without much of a corresponding decline in U.S. external liabilities. A reasonable estimate is that this would impose a paper loss on the U.S. of about 13% of GDP.1 Q: Ouch! But this assumes that a 20% border adjustment tax will lead to a 25% appreciation in the dollar. That is a mighty big can opener your fellow economists are assuming! What's to say this actually happens? A: Good point. Less than 10% of the turnover in the global foreign exchange market is directly related to the cross-border trade in goods and services. The rest represents financial market transactions. There are many things that can influence the value of the dollar beside trade flows. For example, suppose the government introduces a border adjustment tax, but the Federal Reserve fails to raise rates sufficiently fast in response to rising inflation stemming from a narrowing trade deficit. In that case, U.S. real rates could actually decline, leading to a weaker dollar. Our sense is that this won't happen, but the point is that there is no automatic link between a border tax and the dollar. Much depends on how the Fed responds and the underlying economic conditions. And even if the Fed does hike rates to keep the economy from overheating, two important forces will limit the extent of any dollar appreciation: First, questions about the timing and magnitude of the border adjustment tax - including the possibility that such a measure could be reversed by a future Congress - are likely to lead to only a partial appreciation in the dollar. Second, other central banks - particularly in emerging markets - are liable to take steps to limit the dollar's ascent so as not to place too great a burden on borrowers with dollar-denominated debt. Q: So what happens to countries with hard currency pegs to the dollar? Borrowers with dollar-denominated loans will be spared, but won't these countries end up suffering due to a sharp loss of competitiveness against other economies that have more flexible currencies? A: Correct. It is damned if you do, damned if you don't. Assuming that countries with exchange rate pegs to the dollar are strong enough to fend off a speculative attack, they will still need to engineer an equivalent real depreciation of their currencies via a decline in their nominal wages relative to U.S. wages - what economists call an "internal devaluation." That could impose a deflationary impulse on those economies. Q: You're losing me. A: Think about an extreme case - one where all countries have currency pegs to the dollar. How would the economic adjustment to a U.S. border tax work then? The answer is that initially, a tax on U.S. imports, combined with a subsidy on U.S. exports, would lead to a smaller trade deficit. This would cause the U.S. economy to overheat, putting upward pressure on prices and wages. By definition, an improving trade balance in the U.S. implies a worsening trade balance in the rest of the world. This would sap demand in other countries, putting downward pressure on prices and wages abroad. The adjustment will be complete only after relative wages have shifted enough to restore the U.S. trade balance to its original level. The important point is that in a world where some countries have flexible exchange rates while others have fixed exchange rates or dirty floats, the economic adjustment to a U.S. border tax will come through some combination of a stronger nominal dollar, higher U.S. inflation, and lower inflation abroad. Q: Bullish for the dollar, but bearish for U.S. bonds, correct? A: Precisely. The degree to which bond yields adjust around the world depends on the extent to which nominal exchange rates and domestic prices are sticky. If exchange rates are slow to change, more of the adjustment has to occur through higher inflation in the U.S. and lower inflation everywhere else. But even if nominal exchange rates adjust quickly, sticky goods prices would still push up U.S. bond yields. To see this point, consider what would happen if the dollar appreciated by 25% in response to the introduction of a border adjustment tax, but neither import prices nor export prices (expressed in U.S. dollars) changed. If that were to happen, the profit margins of U.S. importers would tumble because they would now have to pay an import tax but would not benefit from lower import prices. Meanwhile, the margins of U.S. exporters would soar as export prices stayed firm and they received a subsidy from the government. The result would be less imports and more exports, and hence, an improved trade balance. This would raise U.S. aggregate demand and put upward pressure on inflation and Treasury yields. Considering that 97% of U.S. exports and 93% of U.S. imports are denominated in dollars, such an outcome is hardly far-fetched. The bottom line is that in the "real world," the introduction of a border adjustment tax would cause Treasurys to sell off and the dollar to rally. Q: What sort of numbers are we talking about? A: Assuming a 20% border tax is introduced, a reasonable guess is that the trade-weighted dollar would rise by 10% over a 12-month period above and beyond our current forecast of a 5% gain. This would imply 15% upside from current levels. The 10-year Treasury yield would probably rise to about 3%. Q: It still puzzles me how you can claim that bond yields will rise if the dollar strengthens. Wouldn't a stronger dollar normally lead to lower bond yields? A: Your premise is wrong. It is not the stronger dollar that leads to higher bond yields. It is a third factor - namely the improvement in the trade balance arising from the decision to tax imports and subsidize exports - that causes both the dollar and bond yields to rise. This is similar to what happens when the government loosens fiscal policy. Mind you, at some point the positive correlation between the dollar and bond yields could break down. If the dollar rises too much, emerging markets will crumble under the stress. This will trigger safe-haven flows into the Treasury market, leading to a stronger dollar and lower yields. Such an outcome is not our base case, but it cannot be dismissed. Q: Got it. Presuming that the global economy holds up, it sounds like a border tax would be great news for Boeing, but bad news for Walmart? A: Yes, but there are two important qualifications to consider. First, it is possible that the dollar overshoots its new long-term equilibrium level, so that the pain to Boeing from the appreciation of the greenback ends up outweighing the benefits from the export subsidy it receives. Second, given the potential economic and financial dislocations from the shift to a destination-based tax system, there is likely to be some delay between when the tax bill is signed into law and when it is implemented. And even once implementation begins, the adjustment in tax rates may be phased in only gradually. Since the dollar will rise in anticipation of all this, it is possible that exporters will actually suffer initially, while importers receive a temporary boost to profits. Nevertheless, we think that investors will see through the near-term hit to exporter margins and focus on the medium-term gains. As such, equity investors should maintain a preference for exporting companies over those that heavily rely on imports (Chart 1). Chart 1 Q: This assumes that the market has not fully priced in this outcome already. What are the chances that this border adjustment tax proposal actually sees the light of day? A: The border tax idea originated in the House of Representatives and has its strongest support there. There might be more opposition in the Senate, but this could be overcome if enough Democrats with protectionist leanings can be found. President Trump panned the idea in an interview with the Wall Street Journal earlier this week.2 He noted that "Anytime I hear about border adjustment, I don't love it... because usually it means we're going to get adjusted into a bad deal. That's what happens." Trump's comments suggest he may not fully understand how border adjustments work. This implies that he might be persuaded to go along with the idea if Republican legislators are able to reach a "great deal" on adjustments in his eyes, whatever that means. Subjectively, we would assign 50% probability to a border tax being introduced in some form or another, although our sense is that it will be somewhat watered down so as not to generate major dislocations for the economy. This might entail excluding certain types of imports from a border tax if they are consumed disproportionately by the poor or represent an important input for U.S. manufacturing firms. Apparel and energy products would probably be on that list. It might also entail reducing the border adjustment tax to a lower level, say 10%, as Tom Barrack, head of Donald Trump's inaugural committee, has suggested. It is hard to know how much of this is already reflected in asset prices. The dollar fell after the WSJ article was published, but that may have had less to do with border adjustments and more to do with Trump's comment that he prefers a weaker dollar - an unprecedented statement for a U.S. president. Goldman Sachs' securities group has constructed two baskets using firm-level data, one comprised of "destination tax winners" and the other of "destination tax losers."3 The loser basket actually outperformed in the immediate aftermath of the election. While the relative performance of the winner basket has recovered more recently, it still remains below where it was last April (Chart 2). The limited reaction to the prospect of a border adjustment tax has been echoed in the fact that market expectations of the future volatility of the dollar has not changed much since the election, despite the possibility that the coming legislative debate could lead to wild swings in the greenback (Chart 3). Chart 2 Chart 3Dollar Volatility Has Not Escalated Dollar Volatility Has Not Escalated Dollar Volatility Has Not Escalated On balance, we conclude that investors are understating the likelihood of even a watered down border adjustment tax being introduced as part of a comprehensive tax reform program. This is broadly consistent with our client discussions, which have revealed that most investors - with a few notable exceptions - are only vaguely aware of the issue. Q: Won't the WTO rule against a border adjustment tax? That could explain why investors are discounting it. A: Yes, it probably will. The WTO permits border adjustments in the case of "indirect" taxes such VATs, but not in the case of direct taxes such as income or corporate profit taxes. Granted, the U.S. has brushed off WTO decisions in the past, such as when it ignored the trade body's ruling that U.S. laws restricting internet gambling contravened the General Agreement on Trade in Services. Considering that Donald Trump threatened to pull the U.S. out of the WTO during the election campaign, such an outcome cannot be easily dismissed. Nevertheless, given the magnitude of the border tax issue, even the Trump administration is likely to think twice about running afoul of WTO rules. Nevertheless, it might be possible to modify the border adjustment proposal to make it WTO-compliant. The distinction between direct and indirect taxes is one of those things self-styled experts like to pretend is important, but is not. It does not really matter whether a tax is levied on the sale of a good or service, or whether it is levied on income. In the end, someone has to pay the tax - be it a worker or a shareholder. The adoption by the U.S. of a border-adjusted destination tax would move the global economy in the direction of greater harmonization, not away from it. As noted at the outset, most other countries border adjust their value-added taxes. They do this so that their VATs mirror a consumption tax, as Table 2 illustrates with a simple example. Conceptually, a corporate cash flow tax coupled with a payroll tax functions in much the same way as a VAT (bottom part of Table 2). The U.S. already has both a corporate income and a payroll tax, so it is not that far away from having a VAT. All that is missing is a few tweaks to depreciation rules and the addition of the border adjustment. Chart Yes, the dollar would strengthen if that were to happen, but this would put the greenback on par with other currencies. Chart 4 shows that the U.S. has run a trade deficit with the rest of the G7 since 1990, despite the fact that the dollar has traded on average 9% below its Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) over this period. One of the reasons this has occurred is that other G7 economies have a VAT, whereas the U.S. does not (Chart 5). This has kept the dollar weaker than it otherwise would have been. Chart 4The Dollar Was Cheap For A Reason The Dollar Was Cheap For A Reason The Dollar Was Cheap For A Reason Chart 5 Q: Okay, let's wrap this up. What are the main investment implications I should take away from this? A: Our main takeaway is that investors are underestimating the likelihood that the U.S. adopts a destination-based tax system. This suggests that the risks to the dollar are to the upside, as are the risks to U.S. Treasury yields. Global investors should underweight U.S. bonds on a currency-hedged basis. The implications for global equities are more nuanced. It may take some time for the dollar to adjust to the border tax. This, combined with the fact that import and export prices tend to be sticky in the short run, implies that the U.S. trade deficit will decline, boosting U.S. aggregate demand in the process. While that is potentially good news for U.S. corporate profits, the benefits will be curtailed by the fact that the U.S. economy is approaching full employment. This means that any further stimulus could simply result in higher real wages for workers without any offsetting increase in unit sales for U.S. companies. A shrinking U.S. trade deficit will diminish America's role as "the global consumer of last resort." This is problematic for export-dependent emerging markets. While a border adjustment may be justifiable on economic grounds, politically, it could be seen as the first volley in a global trade war. This could sour sentiment towards EM stocks. To make matters worse, a stronger dollar would harm emerging markets with high levels of dollar-denominated debt such as Turkey, Malaysia, and Chile, while also weighing on commodity prices. We recommend that investors underweight EM stocks relative to their DM counterparts. With these considerations in mind, we are closing our long Chinese banks trade for a gain of 32% and our long RUB/USD trade for a gain of 20%. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 U.S. external assets amount to 133% of GDP, while foreign liabilities stand at 175% of GDP. About 68% of U.S. external assets are denominated in foreign currency, compared with only 16% of external liabilities. Thus, the paper loss to the U.S. from a 25% appreciation in the dollar would be (175*0.16-133*0.68)*(1-1/1.25) = 12.5% of GDP. 2 Please see "Donald Trump Warns On House Republican Tax Plan," The Wall Street Journal, dated January 16, 2017, available at www.wsj.com. 3 The Bloomberg tickers for these baskets are GSCBDTW1 and GSCBDTL1. For more information, please see "US Daily: What Policy Changes Is The Equity Market Expecting?" Goldman Sachs Economic Research, dated January 11, 2017.

Highlights House Republicans are pushing for a radical overhaul of the existing tax code, including adding a "border adjustment" mechanism that would effectively subsidize exports and tax imports. Despite President Trump's apparent mixed feelings about border taxation, we see a 50% chance that some version of the proposal will be implemented. This is a higher probability than the market currently is discounting. The trade-weighted dollar will rally by another 5% even in the absence of any tax changes, but could rise by 15% if the border adjustment tax is introduced. If the latter were to happen, it would take some time for the dollar to rise to its new equilibrium level. This, in conjunction with sticky import and export prices, would likely lead to a temporary narrowing of the U.S. trade deficit. Such an outcome could prompt the Fed to raise rates more aggressively than it otherwise would. Investors should underweight U.S. bonds on a currency-hedged basis. A stronger dollar will push down commodity prices and hurt external borrowers with dollar-denominated loans. A protectionist backlash against the U.S. might ensue. We are closing our long Chinese banks trade for a gain of 32%, and our long RUB/USD trade for a gain of 20%. Feature Making The Tax Code Great Again? Republicans in Congress are proposing an ambitious revamp of the tax code. A central element of their plan is the replacement of the existing corporate income tax with a so-called "destination-based cash flow tax." Key features of this plan include: Cutting the current federal corporate tax from a top rate of 35% to 20%. Allowing businesses to depreciate capital expenditures immediately, rather than writing them off over many years. Disallowing businesses from deducting interest expenses when calculating their tax bills. Moving to a system of territorial taxation, meaning that taxes would only be assessed on the value added of goods consumed in the United States. Since not all goods that are produced in the U.S. are consumed in the U.S., and not all goods that are consumed in the U.S. are produced in the U.S., a destination-based system requires what is known as a "border adjustment." Such an adjustment would tax the value added of imports and rebate the value added of exports at an equivalent rate. While border adjustments are routinely used in other settings - most notably by countries that have VATs - their application to corporate income taxes is a novel idea. As such, it is not surprising that the proposal has generated significant confusion among investors. With that in mind, we offer our thoughts on the matter using a Q&A format. Q: How exactly would a border adjustment on corporate income taxes work? A: Under current U.S. law, corporate income taxes are assessed on worldwide profits, which are the difference between worldwide revenues and worldwide costs. The introduction of a border tax adjustment would change the tax system to one where taxes are assessed only on the difference between domestic revenues and domestic costs (i.e., revenues derived in the U.S. minus costs incurred in the U.S.). Table 1 offers a simplified example to illustrate this point. Consider three types of companies: 1) A purely domestic producer whose revenues and costs are realized at home; 2) An exporter whose revenues are entirely derived from abroad but whose costs are all incurred in the U.S.; 3) An importer whose revenues are completely generated in the U.S. but whose costs are all incurred abroad. Suppose that all three companies have revenues of $100 and costs of $60 - implying $40 in pre-tax profits - and face a corporate tax rate of 20%. Before the border adjustment, each company would pay a tax of $8 ($40 times 0.2). The border adjustment is zero for the domestic producer. However, it would impose an additional tax of $12 on the importer ($60 times 0.2), while giving the exporter a rebate of $20 ($100 times 0.2). In the end, the importer and exporter face final tax bills of $20 and -$12, respectively, while the domestic producer continues to pay $8. Note that this conforms with the tax paid on domestic revenues minus domestic costs (for the domestic producer, domestic revenue minus domestic cost is equal to $40; for the exporter it is equal to -$60; and for the importer, it is equal to $100). Q: A tax on imports and a subsidy on exports? Sounds like massive protectionism! A: That depends on the extent to which the dollar appreciates. As Table 1 shows, if the dollar appreciates by 1/(1-tax rate) = 1/(1-0.2) = 25%, there would be no impact on the trade balance or on the distribution of after-tax corporate profits in the economy. This is because the stronger dollar would nullify the subsidy on exports, while reducing import costs by precisely the amount necessary to restore importers' after-tax profits to their original level. Chart Q: This seems like splitting hairs. If a country imposes a 20% tax on imports, most people would still regard this as a protectionist act, even if a currency appreciation offsets the impact. A: That's why a corresponding export subsidy is necessary. That may sound strange since export subsidies are also seen as protectionist measures, but consider the following: Imagine that the government only taxes imports. A tax on imports would curb import demand, implying less demand for foreign currency. This would push up the value of the dollar, leading to lower import prices. How high would the dollar go? Suppose it rose so much that the decline in import prices exactly offset the tariff, thereby restoring import volumes (and importer profits) back to their original level. Is that a stable equilibrium? The answer is no because a stronger dollar would also reduce the demand for U.S. exports, causing the trade deficit to swell. Thus, for the trade balance to remain unchanged, the dollar would have to rise only part of the way, leaving importers worse off than before the tariff was introduced. Such a policy would be protectionist because it would favor U.S.-based companies that produce for the domestic market over foreign exporters. Only in the case where importers are subject to a tax and exporters receive a subsidy will the dollar strengthen to the point that neither exports nor imports change. Intuitively, this is because an export subsidy indirectly benefits importers by pushing up the value of the dollar, while directly benefiting exporters by offsetting the effect of a stronger dollar on profits. Q: If there is no change in the trade balance, what is the advantage of border-adjusting the corporate income tax? A: Contrary to Donald Trump's assertion that border adjustments are "too complicated," their chief advantage is their simplicity. Accurately assessing taxes on worldwide income is hard. Companies routinely engage in practices that purposely lower taxable profits. In particular, importers may overstate the value of their imports and exporters may understate the value of their exports. In a world where many companies have overseas subsidiaries, such "transfer pricing" machinations are easy to pull off. Border adjustments eliminate such incentives in one fell swoop. Recall that with a border adjustment, taxes are assessed on the difference between domestic revenues and domestic costs - both of which the IRS has the means to monitor. Yes, a U.S. company that overstates imports will be able to report a lower gross profit to the IRS, but now it will be on the hook for a higher import tax. What it puts in one pocket it takes from the other. Likewise, an exporter that understates its overseas sales will end up with a lower gross profit, but will now receive a smaller subsidy. Q: And I suppose that because the U.S. imports more than it exports, the border adjustment will end up raising additional revenues? A: That is correct. The annual U.S. trade deficit currently stands at $500 billion. A border adjustment tax rate of 20% would thus raise $100 billion in additional revenue. Given that the corporate income tax brings in about $350 billion, this would allow corporate taxes to be substantially cut without any loss in overall revenue. And this calculation excludes any indirect revenue that would accrue to the Treasury from reducing the incentive for U.S. companies to engage in profit-shifting behavior. Keep in mind, however, that the revenue boost from the border adjustment will decline if the U.S. trade deficit narrows over time. To the extent that the U.S. must finance its trade deficit through the sale of assets such as stocks, bonds, and property, it is possible that foreigners will one day decide to swap all these assets in exchange for U.S. goods. This would lead to an improvement in the U.S. trade balance. Indeed, to the extent that the U.S. is a net debtor to the rest of the world, it is possible that the average future U.S. trade balance will be positive. If that were to happen, the government would lose revenue from the border adjustment over the long haul. Meanwhile, a 25% appreciation in the greenback would reduce the dollar value of the assets that Americans hold abroad, without much of a corresponding decline in U.S. external liabilities. A reasonable estimate is that this would impose a paper loss on the U.S. of about 13% of GDP.1 Q: Ouch! But this assumes that a 20% border adjustment tax will lead to a 25% appreciation in the dollar. That is a mighty big can opener your fellow economists are assuming! What's to say this actually happens? A: Good point. Less than 10% of the turnover in the global foreign exchange market is directly related to the cross-border trade in goods and services. The rest represents financial market transactions. There are many things that can influence the value of the dollar beside trade flows. For example, suppose the government introduces a border adjustment tax, but the Federal Reserve fails to raise rates sufficiently fast in response to rising inflation stemming from a narrowing trade deficit. In that case, U.S. real rates could actually decline, leading to a weaker dollar. Our sense is that this won't happen, but the point is that there is no automatic link between a border tax and the dollar. Much depends on how the Fed responds and the underlying economic conditions. And even if the Fed does hike rates to keep the economy from overheating, two important forces will limit the extent of any dollar appreciation: First, questions about the timing and magnitude of the border adjustment tax - including the possibility that such a measure could be reversed by a future Congress - are likely to lead to only a partial appreciation in the dollar. Second, other central banks - particularly in emerging markets - are liable to take steps to limit the dollar's ascent so as not to place too great a burden on borrowers with dollar-denominated debt. Q: So what happens to countries with hard currency pegs to the dollar? Borrowers with dollar-denominated loans will be spared, but won't these countries end up suffering due to a sharp loss of competitiveness against other economies that have more flexible currencies? A: Correct. It is damned if you do, damned if you don't. Assuming that countries with exchange rate pegs to the dollar are strong enough to fend off a speculative attack, they will still need to engineer an equivalent real depreciation of their currencies via a decline in their nominal wages relative to U.S. wages - what economists call an "internal devaluation." That could impose a deflationary impulse on those economies. Q: You're losing me. A: Think about an extreme case - one where all countries have currency pegs to the dollar. How would the economic adjustment to a U.S. border tax work then? The answer is that initially, a tax on U.S. imports, combined with a subsidy on U.S. exports, would lead to a smaller trade deficit. This would cause the U.S. economy to overheat, putting upward pressure on prices and wages. By definition, an improving trade balance in the U.S. implies a worsening trade balance in the rest of the world. This would sap demand in other countries, putting downward pressure on prices and wages abroad. The adjustment will be complete only after relative wages have shifted enough to restore the U.S. trade balance to its original level. The important point is that in a world where some countries have flexible exchange rates while others have fixed exchange rates or dirty floats, the economic adjustment to a U.S. border tax will come through some combination of a stronger nominal dollar, higher U.S. inflation, and lower inflation abroad. Q: Bullish for the dollar, but bearish for U.S. bonds, correct? A: Precisely. The degree to which bond yields adjust around the world depends on the extent to which nominal exchange rates and domestic prices are sticky. If exchange rates are slow to change, more of the adjustment has to occur through higher inflation in the U.S. and lower inflation everywhere else. But even if nominal exchange rates adjust quickly, sticky goods prices would still push up U.S. bond yields. To see this point, consider what would happen if the dollar appreciated by 25% in response to the introduction of a border adjustment tax, but neither import prices nor export prices (expressed in U.S. dollars) changed. If that were to happen, the profit margins of U.S. importers would tumble because they would now have to pay an import tax but would not benefit from lower import prices. Meanwhile, the margins of U.S. exporters would soar as export prices stayed firm and they received a subsidy from the government. The result would be less imports and more exports, and hence, an improved trade balance. This would raise U.S. aggregate demand and put upward pressure on inflation and Treasury yields. Considering that 97% of U.S. exports and 93% of U.S. imports are denominated in dollars, such an outcome is hardly far-fetched. The bottom line is that in the "real world," the introduction of a border adjustment tax would cause Treasurys to sell off and the dollar to rally. Q: What sort of numbers are we talking about? A: Assuming a 20% border tax is introduced, a reasonable guess is that the trade-weighted dollar would rise by 10% over a 12-month period above and beyond our current forecast of a 5% gain. This would imply 15% upside from current levels. The 10-year Treasury yield would probably rise to about 3%. Q: It still puzzles me how you can claim that bond yields will rise if the dollar strengthens. Wouldn't a stronger dollar normally lead to lower bond yields? A: Your premise is wrong. It is not the stronger dollar that leads to higher bond yields. It is a third factor - namely the improvement in the trade balance arising from the decision to tax imports and subsidize exports - that causes both the dollar and bond yields to rise. This is similar to what happens when the government loosens fiscal policy. Mind you, at some point the positive correlation between the dollar and bond yields could break down. If the dollar rises too much, emerging markets will crumble under the stress. This will trigger safe-haven flows into the Treasury market, leading to a stronger dollar and lower yields. Such an outcome is not our base case, but it cannot be dismissed. Q: Got it. Presuming that the global economy holds up, it sounds like a border tax would be great news for Boeing, but bad news for Walmart? Chart 1 A: Yes, but there are two important qualifications to consider. First, it is possible that the dollar overshoots its new long-term equilibrium level, so that the pain to Boeing from the appreciation of the greenback ends up outweighing the benefits from the export subsidy it receives. Second, given the potential economic and financial dislocations from the shift to a destination-based tax system, there is likely to be some delay between when the tax bill is signed into law and when it is implemented. And even once implementation begins, the adjustment in tax rates may be phased in only gradually. Since the dollar will rise in anticipation of all this, it is possible that exporters will actually suffer initially, while importers receive a temporary boost to profits. Nevertheless, we think that investors will see through the near-term hit to exporter margins and focus on the medium-term gains. As such, equity investors should maintain a preference for exporting companies over those that heavily rely on imports (Chart 1). Q: This assumes that the market has not fully priced in this outcome already. What are the chances that this border adjustment tax proposal actually sees the light of day? A: The border tax idea originated in the House of Representatives and has its strongest support there. There might be more opposition in the Senate, but this could be overcome if enough Democrats with protectionist leanings can be found. President Trump panned the idea in an interview with the Wall Street Journal earlier this week.2 He noted that "Anytime I hear about border adjustment, I don't love it... because usually it means we're going to get adjusted into a bad deal. That's what happens." Trump's comments suggest he may not fully understand how border adjustments work. This implies that he might be persuaded to go along with the idea if Republican legislators are able to reach a "great deal" on adjustments in his eyes, whatever that means. Subjectively, we would assign 50% probability to a border tax being introduced in some form or another, although our sense is that it will be somewhat watered down so as not to generate major dislocations for the economy. This might entail excluding certain types of imports from a border tax if they are consumed disproportionately by the poor or represent an important input for U.S. manufacturing firms. Apparel and energy products would probably be on that list. It might also entail reducing the border adjustment tax to a lower level, say 10%, as Tom Barrack, head of Donald Trump's inaugural committee, has suggested. It is hard to know how much of this is already reflected in asset prices. The dollar fell after the WSJ article was published, but that may have had less to do with border adjustments and more to do with Trump's comment that he prefers a weaker dollar - an unprecedented statement for a U.S. president. Goldman Sachs' securities group has constructed two baskets using firm-level data, one comprised of "destination tax winners" and the other of "destination tax losers."3 The loser basket actually outperformed in the immediate aftermath of the election. While the relative performance of the winner basket has recovered more recently, it still remains below where it was last April (Chart 2). The limited reaction to the prospect of a border adjustment tax has been echoed in the fact that market expectations of the future volatility of the dollar has not changed much since the election, despite the possibility that the coming legislative debate could lead to wild swings in the greenback (Chart 3). Chart 2 Chart 3Dollar Volatility Has Not Escalated Dollar Volatility Has Not Escalated Dollar Volatility Has Not Escalated On balance, we conclude that investors are understating the likelihood of even a watered down border adjustment tax being introduced as part of a comprehensive tax reform program. This is broadly consistent with our client discussions, which have revealed that most investors - with a few notable exceptions - are only vaguely aware of the issue. Q: Won't the WTO rule against a border adjustment tax? That could explain why investors are discounting it. A: Yes, it probably will. The WTO permits border adjustments in the case of "indirect" taxes such VATs, but not in the case of direct taxes such as income or corporate profit taxes. Granted, the U.S. has brushed off WTO decisions in the past, such as when it ignored the trade body's ruling that U.S. laws restricting internet gambling contravened the General Agreement on Trade in Services. Considering that Donald Trump threatened to pull the U.S. out of the WTO during the election campaign, such an outcome cannot be easily dismissed. Nevertheless, given the magnitude of the border tax issue, even the Trump administration is likely to think twice about running afoul of WTO rules. Nevertheless, it might be possible to modify the border adjustment proposal to make it WTO-compliant. The distinction between direct and indirect taxes is one of those things self-styled experts like to pretend is important, but is not. It does not really matter whether a tax is levied on the sale of a good or service, or whether it is levied on income. In the end, someone has to pay the tax - be it a worker or a shareholder. The adoption by the U.S. of a border-adjusted destination tax would move the global economy in the direction of greater harmonization, not away from it. As noted at the outset, most other countries border adjust their value-added taxes. They do this so that their VATs mirror a consumption tax, as Table 2 illustrates with a simple example. Conceptually, a corporate cash flow tax coupled with a payroll tax functions in much the same way as a VAT (bottom part of Table 2). The U.S. already has both a corporate income and a payroll tax, so it is not that far away from having a VAT. All that is missing is a few tweaks to depreciation rules and the addition of the border adjustment. Chart Yes, the dollar would strengthen if that were to happen, but this would put the greenback on par with other currencies. Chart 4 shows that the U.S. has run a trade deficit with the rest of the G7 since 1990, despite the fact that the dollar has traded on average 9% below its Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) over this period. One of the reasons this has occurred is that other G7 economies have a VAT, whereas the U.S. does not (Chart 5). This has kept the dollar weaker than it otherwise would have been. Chart 4The Dollar Was Cheap For A Reason The Dollar Was Cheap For A Reason The Dollar Was Cheap For A Reason Chart 5 Q: Okay, let's wrap this up. What are the main investment implications I should take away from this? A: Our main takeaway is that investors are underestimating the likelihood that the U.S. adopts a destination-based tax system. This suggests that the risks to the dollar are to the upside, as are the risks to U.S. Treasury yields. Global investors should underweight U.S. bonds on a currency-hedged basis. The implications for global equities are more nuanced. It may take some time for the dollar to adjust to the border tax. This, combined with the fact that import and export prices tend to be sticky in the short run, implies that the U.S. trade deficit will decline, boosting U.S. aggregate demand in the process. While that is potentially good news for U.S. corporate profits, the benefits will be curtailed by the fact that the U.S. economy is approaching full employment. This means that any further stimulus could simply result in higher real wages for workers without any offsetting increase in unit sales for U.S. companies. A shrinking U.S. trade deficit will diminish America's role as "the global consumer of last resort." This is problematic for export-dependent emerging markets. While a border adjustment may be justifiable on economic grounds, politically, it could be seen as the first volley in a global trade war. This could sour sentiment towards EM stocks. To make matters worse, a stronger dollar would harm emerging markets with high levels of dollar-denominated debt such as Turkey, Malaysia, and Chile, while also weighing on commodity prices. We recommend that investors underweight EM stocks relative to their DM counterparts. With these considerations in mind, we are closing our long Chinese banks trade for a gain of 32% and our long RUB/USD trade for a gain of 20%. Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 U.S. external assets amount to 133% of GDP, while foreign liabilities stand at 175% of GDP. About 68% of U.S. external assets are denominated in foreign currency, compared with only 16% of external liabilities. Thus, the paper loss to the U.S. from a 25% appreciation in the dollar would be (175*0.16-133*0.68)*(1-1/1.25) = 12.5% of GDP. 2 Please see "Donald Trump Warns On House Republican Tax Plan," The Wall Street Journal, dated January 16, 2017, available at www.wsj.com. 3 The Bloomberg tickers for these baskets are GSCBDTW1 and GSCBDTL1. For more information, please see "US Daily: What Policy Changes Is The Equity Market Expecting?" Goldman Sachs Economic Research, dated January 11, 2017.

Highlights Trump's protectionism supercharges our theme of Sino-American tensions. China is at a stark disadvantage to the U.S. in a trade war. China cannot give concessions easily; it may batten down the hatches. Remain short RMB; but go long "One China," i.e. mainland stocks versus Taiwan/Hong Kong. Feature "Life's short span forbids us to enter on far reaching hopes." - Horace, Odes "Of course, you know, this means war." - Bugs Bunny, Looney Tunes President-elect Trump has said he will not designate China a "currency manipulator" on the first day of his presidency, contrary to what he promised during the campaign. Is this a sign that Trump is "normalizing" after the wild threats of his campaign? What are the real risks of a U.S.-China "trade war"? How should investors prepare? Trade War Is More Likely Than You Think BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has long cautioned investors that geopolitical tensions in East Asia were severely underestimated by the market.1 In 2013, we argued that a Sino-American military conflict was more likely than most of our clients dared to think.2 And over the past several years, in one-on-one conversations and in presentations at numerous conferences, we have stressed that tensions in East Asia could imperil the largest trade relationship. Why so alarmist? We have always based our analysis on three key pillars: Multipolarity: With the U.S. in a relative decline, containing China's rise has become a national security issue. The U.S. "Grand Strategy" operates under the imperative that no regional power is allowed to become a regional hegemon, as that would be a stepping stone to global competition. "Pivot" To Asia: The U.S. geopolitical deleveraging from the Middle East was from the start designed to free up more U.S. resources for Asia. While the Obama Administration pursued the pivot cautiously, it was putting the infrastructure in place for a confrontation with China. Regional dynamics: China is surrounded by neighbors that are cautious about Beijing's intentions for geographic, historical, and strategic reasons. They have therefore sought to balance their increasing economic addiction to China with deeper military and political links to the U.S. Chart 1China, Not NAFTA, In Trump's Crosshairs China, Not NAFTA, In Trump's Crosshairs China, Not NAFTA, In Trump's Crosshairs Trump's victory has made markets considerably less oblivious to the risks we have stressed to clients for the past five years. The idea that a trade war might erupt is now widely discussed. And Trump's repeated statements about Taiwan, North Korea, and the South China Sea have awoken some investors to the reality that a trade conflict could spill over into strategic areas, and vice versa. Nevertheless, judging by the ebullient market reaction relative to previous U.S. presidential transitions, most investors think that cool heads will inevitably prevail. They may be right, but from where we sit it is premature - and imprudent - to bet on it. Make no mistake, China, not NAFTA, will suffer the brunt of Trump's efforts to fulfill his protectionist campaign promises (Chart 1). We see 70% odds that a "crisis event" will affect U.S.-China trade patterns in a significant way over the next four years. How Did We Get Here? The Global Financial Crisis caused a sharp break in Sino-American relations: It interrupted the economic symbiosis between China and American households refused to keep re-leveraging, forcing China to become more internally driven economy (Chart 2). With final demand in the U.S. declining, China decided to re-leverage with credit, injecting its existing overproduction and overcapacity with steroids. But this only accelerated China's capture of global export market share, while supercharging the deflationary global effects (Chart 3). On top of its credit policies, China has struggled to internationalize the RMB. So now, it is not only still washing the world with its industrial overcapacity but also inadvertently - or not so innocently - reducing the prices of its goods with the weakening of its currency (Chart 4). Chart 2U.S.-China Symbiosis Has Died U.S.-China Symbiosis Has Died U.S.-China Symbiosis Has Died Chart 3China's Historic Export Grab China's Historic Export Grab China's Historic Export Grab Chart 4China Still Exporting Deflation China Still Exporting Deflation China Still Exporting Deflation U.S.-China trade disputes have a long history. China's WTO entrance was agreed only with the stipulation that China be treated as a "non-market economy" for 15 years. Punitive trade bills almost passed through Congress in 2005 and 2010-11, for instance, but were held back at the last minute.3 Since 2009, in particular, protectionist policies have emerged. President Obama began his term with an unprecedented use of the authority under Section 421 of the 1974 Trade Act to punish China for "market distorting" exports of car tires, and with protectionist "Buy America" provisions in his economic stimulus package. After that, a sequence of tit-for-tat punitive measures took place affecting a range of goods on both sides, attempted Chinese investments in the U.S., and American companies operating in China. China's meteoric rise, surging trade surpluses with the U.S., and the rapid loss of U.S. manufacturing jobs was the main cause of tension (Chart 5). Americans benefited from China's rise, namely from cheaper goods and lower interest rates, but it caused significant economic dislocations.4 Meanwhile Chinese protectionism discouraged American elites that had endorsed China's rise on the hopes of gradually unfolding market access. Amid the heightened political risks of the global recession and its aftermath, China intensified intellectual property theft, non-tariff barriers, indigenous innovation policies, and cyber-attacks.5 The saving grace, for markets, was that the aforementioned tensions always remained within bounds. The WTO was a mutually recognized adjudicator. Also, the rival American and Chinese commercial authorities played a slow, step-by-step, predictable game, with the punitive measures being mostly proportional. When pressures flared in the U.S., the executive branch stayed Congress's hand; meanwhile China's government could steamroll any internal opposition to its trade policies. No more. Hillary Clinton might have helped contain trade tensions, but the outlook has darkened irrespective of Trump. Notably, American multinational corporations have increasingly decried Chinese protectionism and lobbied for the U.S. government to help persuade China to give them greater market access and a better legal-regulatory climate (Chart 6). As the Obama administration exited the stage in December 2016, the U.S., Japan and others refused to accept China's "market economy" status despite the fifteen-year deadline coming due. This means the U.S. and its allies explicitly wanted to reserve the power to impose anti-dumping duties more easily on China, which is what "Non-Market Economy" status entails (Chart 7).6 China considers this delay an outright violation of U.S. commitments under WTO. Chart 5A Tale Of Two Manufacturers A Tale Of Two Manufacturers A Tale Of Two Manufacturers Chart 6American Business Under Pressure In China Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Chart 7China's Non-Market Status A Liability Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Further, Clinton had promised to create a special prosecutor for trade disputes and to triple the number of enforcement officers. More broadly, she wanted to continue Obama's "Pivot to Asia" policy that had roiled U.S.-China strategic relations. Bottom Line: U.S.-China trade relations had already turned sour as a result of the divergence of interests following the Global Financial Crisis. China has emerged as a trade juggernaut and the U.S. corporate and political establishments have become far more anxious about it recently. Now Trump has supercharged the situation. Will Trump "Normalize" In Office? With Trump, the U.S. is likely to undergo a "regime change" in terms of how trade policy is conducted - the only question is how long-lasting it will be. U.S. presidents have very few constraints on trade and foreign policy (Table 1). Ignore Trump's statements and look at his team: Incoming Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, National Trade Council chief Peter Navarro, and U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer.7 This group, especially Navarro, is stridently hawkish on China and appears ready to bring the full weight of the United States' economic and strategic advantages to the table in order to negotiate a new framework of relations. Table 1Trump Is Not Constrained On Trade Policy Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin The model is the renegotiation of trade relations with an ascendant Japan in the 1980s. And China looks ripe for a crackdown by this yardstick. The penetration of Chinese exports meet or exceed Japan's position at its peak in the 1980s (Chart 8). Meanwhile the RMB has not appreciated nearly as much as the yen had done by this time (Chart 9). Ultimately the two resolved their differences because Japan acceded to major U.S. demands, strengthening its currency after the 1985 Plaza Accord and accelerating financial liberalization. It helped that the two were staunch allies without genuine security tensions (unlike the U.S. and China today). Chart 8China Has Gotten Away ##br##With More Than Japan Did China Has Gotten Away With More Than Japan Did China Has Gotten Away With More Than Japan Did Chart 9Reagan Forced Faster ##br##Appreciation On Japanese Yen Reagan Forced Faster Appreciation On Japanese Yen Reagan Forced Faster Appreciation On Japanese Yen From the Trump administration's point of view, the standard trade remedies have failed given that U.S. trade deficits have deteriorated all along. True, China has made considerable structural adjustments in recent years (Chart 10). But relative to the U.S., China has not really changed its ways. In fact, the current account surplus, which has collapsed from 10% to around 2% since 2008, is now roughly equal to the trade surplus with the United States (Chart 11). Chart 10China's Economic Rebalancing Under Way China's Economic Rebalancing Under Way China's Economic Rebalancing Under Way Chart 11China's Trade Surplus With U.S. Indispensable China's Trade Surplus With U.S. Indispensable China's Trade Surplus With U.S. Indispensable Therefore we do not put much stock in Trump's claim that he will not call China a currency manipulator on day one - this does not signal a "normalization" or softening of Trump's protectionist line. There was always a technical issue with this pledge that made the timing awkward.8 The manipulator charge will remain a Sword of Damocles hanging over China this year and next, but it is also only one tool in Trump's toolkit - and not the most intimidating one either (Diagram 1). Diagram 1Calling China A Currency Manipulator: The Process Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin At a minimum, Trump could easily do what Obama did in February 2009 on tires - simply approve recommendations from his own Treasury Department for tariffs on specific goods. At a more aggressive level, he has the example of Richard Nixon before him. Nixon imposed a 10% surcharge on all dutiable goods in 1971. We would not put it beyond Trump to take arbitrary actions within the four-year term if international economic conflicts heat up dramatically. (We will be especially leery in the lead-up to the 2018 or 2020 elections if Trump's touted deal-making is not going his way.) Congress is not likely to prove a major constraint, at least not at first. Trump's election is a strong signal that the U.S. populace wants more protectionist policies. Congressional Republicans are limited, given the laws empowering the president on trade, and they will face the reality that his electoral strategy succeeded in great part because of voter demand for protectionism in key Midwestern states. Democrats, in these and other competitive states, have to perform verbal gymnastics to oppose Trump's positions on trade that substantially echo their own. And as mentioned, U.S. multinationals are not likely to "domesticate" Trump - rather, they will lobby for relative moderation or tactfulness within his general framework. Bottom Line: Trump is relatively unconstrained on trade policy. We expect his administration to begin with a "shot across the bow" in the first 100 days - a mostly but not entirely symbolic punitive measure against China - and then to seek high-level negotiations toward a framework for the administration's relations with China over the next four years. We expect the initial shot to rattle markets, then for a calming period to ensue, which will give a false sense of security. But given the lack of constraints on Trump, we are not optimistic. What Are China's Options? In a trade war with the U.S., China is outgunned on every front. Its economy is far more vulnerable to a disruption of exports to the U.S. than vice versa (Chart 12). It does not have ready alternatives to the U.S., given that U.S. imports of Chinese goods are roughly equal to Japanese, South Korean, German, Vietnamese and British imports combined. And China is most competitive in goods that the U.S. can easily source elsewhere (Chart 13). Chart 12The Numbers Favor The U.S. In A Trade War The Numbers Favor The U.S. In A Trade War The Numbers Favor The U.S. In A Trade War Chart 13The U.S. Can Find Substitutes For China Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Yes, China can disrupt the supply chain for the iPhone, but no, the Trump administration is not going to confuse Apple's interests with what it views as the "National Interest." Certainly China will favor non-American companies - Airbus over Boeing, etc - but the U.S. growth model is not reliant on exports, so it is not clear that the Trump administration will heed Boeing's cries about long-term competitiveness. The states most exposed to Chinese retaliation - Alaska, Oregon, Washington, Louisiana, and South Carolina - will not harm his electoral base. His Midwestern Rust Belt states could suffer, according to some research, but voters there may approve of his protectionist measures and Trump's other economic policies may blunt the short-term impact of Chinese retaliation.9 Looking at major Chinese export categories to the U.S., like textiles, electrical machinery, and equipment, suggests that 30 million Chinese jobs could be affected - perhaps ten times as many as the comparable U.S. jobs at risk from Chinese retaliation (far more than proportional given population). There is one factor that stands in China's favor. The history of trade wars says something different than the raw balance of trade. Like all wars, trade wars seek political ends, and a government's internal unity and resilience can be critical to its ability to bear out the worst.10 Politically, it is not clear that the U.S. has a better stomach for a full trade war than China: The U.S. remains divided - Polarization will worsen under Trump given his low approval ratings, low favorability, narrow popular victory margin, and controversial policy inclinations. Though China-bashing and economic patriotism can win some support, and we do not expect Congress or the corporate lobby to prevent Trump from launching a trade crusade if he wishes, nevertheless we see a fair chance that Trump would lose credibility and be forced to moderate his stance once negative trade consequences began to be felt at home. China is relatively unified - Xi has set himself up to be the "core" of power in the Communist Party in anticipation of worsening domestic conditions.11 It is worth remembering that the original use of the "core leader" moniker emerged in the wake of the Tiananmen Square crackdown when the Western world imposed sanctions on a newly liberalized China and it was forced to retreat into its shell from 1989-1992 (Chart 14). China's leadership wants to make the country less dependent on the U.S., and more autarkic, but is having difficulty imposing austere changes on itself. Trump may hasten the reforms while giving Chinese leaders a convenient "foreign devil" to distract the populace from the pain of restructuring. Chart 14China Rode Out Western Pressure In 1989 China Rode Out Western Pressure In 1989 China Rode Out Western Pressure In 1989 The above should not suggest that China wants a trade war, however. Trump is threatening to kick the export leg out from under its growth model at a time when the other leg - investment - stands at risk from domestic credit excesses.12 But the recent case study of Russia and economic sanctions is instructive. President Vladimir Putin used sanctions to blame all of the economic ills that befell Russia on the West, even though the Kremlin was often at fault. That policy largely worked. Bottom Line: China stands to suffer the most economically in a trade war with the United States. Chinese policymakers may therefore choose to ride out the economic costs of a trade war while blaming the U.S. for the pain. But closing its economy today would derail global growth and cause a dramatic spike in geopolitical risk, unlike in 1989. Strategic Spillover Trump's approach is likely to increase geopolitical risk because he wants to use the strategic disagreements plaguing Sino-American relations as leverage to get concessions on trade. The three hot spots are: Taiwan - Tensions with Taiwan spiked when Trump revealed that his administration considers the "One China" policy to be up for negotiation. China has engaged in serious saber-rattling in response, both around Taiwan and in the South China Sea. By linking trade disputes with Taiwan, Trump likely made it harder for Xi to compromise on the former without looking weak on the latter. Trump's negotiating style may work in business, but will not work with China on Taiwan, which is a matter of sovereignty and a clear red line. North Korea - Trump has said North Korea will not manage to test an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), which it is preparing to do. He is threatening to hold China to account for not curbing the North's violations of UN resolutions on nuclear proliferation and missile development. This would likely mean an expansion of the practice adopted under Obama of sanctioning Chinese entities for dealing with North Korean partners. This situation would likely shake up markets that have normally been able to ignore North Korea. South China Sea - Trump has repeatedly signaled that China has militarized the South China Sea, and his incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson suggested that China be deprived of access, a policy that would trigger a shooting war if operationalized. Persistent tensions here are unlikely to go away anytime soon and could spark a diplomatic crisis or naval conflict (if not with the U.S. then with regional players like Vietnam). Thus Trump's administration is likely to make serious demands on China regarding its strategic situation and national security even while demanding an overhaul of trade policies that will force difficult economic reforms on China. Bottom Line: China's political strengths at home make it unlikely to compromise on Trump's major strategic demands. Contrary to adding leverage in trade negotiations - where the U.S. already has the upper hand - using these issues as negotiating tools is likely to cause China to fear for its security and thus become more defiant. Risks To The View The risk to this view would be that the U.S. and China manage to negotiate a new framework and actually improve relations, with the U.S. giving more respect to China's legitimate rights and regional initiatives in exchange for Chinese concessions. But is China capable of conceding significantly on Trump's major demands? RMB appreciation? No. Many commentators have pointed out that Trump's view of the RMB is outdated - the PBoC is now propping it up, not suppressing it. The driver of RMB weakness is China's excessive monetary and credit expansion, weakening productivity growth, domestic investors' desires to move capital out, corporate deleveraging, the need for stimulus, tightening Fed policy, and rising geopolitical risks. While it is possible that the PBoC will defend the RMB to the hilt, the near-term path of least resistance is down, and that sets China on a collision course with the Trump administration. Market access and dumping? Yes. Trump complains that China taxes U.S. imports unfairly and dumps goods into the American market, killing jobs. To appease the U.S., China could take concrete steps to remove non-tariff barriers and open wider investment avenues for U.S. businesses - it has recently suggested it might do so.13 Less likely, it could accelerate overcapacity cuts and reduce subsidies to state-owned enterprises. These moves would fit with its avowed reform goals and strengthen Chinese self-sufficiency in the long run, and Xi's administration likely has the power to do them. China could also improve intellectual property protections and declare a ceasefire on cyber-attacks on companies. All of this is possible, but clearly extremely difficult to achieve. Strategic concerns? Maybe. It is conceivable but unlikely that China could de-escalate matters in the South China Sea and agree to a "freedom of navigation" guarantee for the United States, which is not a party to the territorial disputes. A significant compromise on North Korea would be even less likely, since China is unwilling to move beyond the usual, ineffective management and impose real hardship on the regime for its violations of UN resolutions and improving nuclear and missile capabilities. One impetus for China to concede on these points is that it is fearful of creating instability in a politically sensitive year in which it will oversee a major five-year leadership rotation at its National Party Congress. Trump may deliberately threaten to disrupt the transition in order to extract concessions. Bottom Line: We operate on a constraint-based methodology: Trump has very few constraints on trade policy, China has major constraints on making these concessions, so there is no basis for assuming that the two countries will skip conflict and go directly to a new level of cooperation. Investment Recommendations We remain short the RMB. The currency has fallen by 5.62% since we initiated this trade. The trade itself has suffered a bit since the end of last year as a result of the PBoC's efforts to fight speculation. But monetary expansion sans productivity improvements continues apace in China, and we expect USD strength to persist, so we think there is room for the RMB to fall further. In the near term, however, the USD could experience further pullback as investors start pricing the negatives of the Trump administration. Therefore we are closing our long USD/EUR trade for a 4.55% gain. We remain somewhat positive on China relative to EM - because of the relative unity and centralization of its government and financial resources at its disposal - but we would not recommend investing in Chinese assets in the absolute due to the heightened internal and external risks outlined above. Hence we propose going long the "One China" policy, i.e. long Chinese mainland stocks versus Taiwan and Hong Kong (Chart 15). This enables us to play the fact that mainland valuations are depressed while the global trend of de-globalization and the conflicts within Greater China and with the U.S. are likely to increase uncertainties about Hong Kong and Taiwan. These two are particularly vulnerable to tighter regulations or sanctions from Beijing. Yan Wang, Senior Vice-President at BCA's China Investment Strategy, argues that while there is no case for a clear directional move in Chinese stocks - especially given the ongoing tightening of policies on the property sector - nevertheless they should be favored relative to global equities, given that growth is improving, fiscal policy will remain accommodative, and valuations are depressed (Chart 16).14 Meanwhile our negative outlook on China in absolute terms supports a globally negative outlook on cyclical equities relative to defensives. Cyclicals move with EM in general and China in particular. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President in charge of U.S. Equity Strategy, notes that EM performance does not warrant the sharp rise in U.S. cyclicals versus defensives, nor that in globally oriented versus domestically oriented stocks (Chart 17).15 This creates the opportunity for a tactical short. Chart 15Chinese Stocks Are Cheap Chinese Stocks Are Cheap Chinese Stocks Are Cheap Chart 16China Trades With Cyclicals China Trades With Cyclicals China Trades With Cyclicals Chart 17Go Long The 'One China Policy' Go Long The 'One China Policy' Go Long The 'One China Policy' Finally, we caution investors about investing in companies with major exposure to China (Table 2). We would recommend that clients short a "China, Inc" Index of the top 20 S&P 500 stocks exposed to trade with China relative to the rest of S&P 500. The "China, Inc" stocks have been outperforming the market for a while (Chart 18). We fear that China may retaliate against some of these firms as the trade war with the U.S. heats up. Table 2'China, Inc.' May Suffer From Trade War Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Trump, Day One: Let The Trade War Begin Chart 18Short 'China, Inc.' Relative To Market Short 'China, Inc.' Relative To Market Short 'China, Inc.' Relative To Market Matt Gertken, Associate Editor mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President, marko@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kurri, Research Analyst 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?" dated September 25, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think," dated October 4, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Imad Moosa, The U.S.-China Trade Dispute: Facts, Figures And Myths (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2012). 4 For prominent research on this topic, please see David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson, "The China Shock: Learning From Labor-Market Adjustment To Large Changes In Trade," Annual Review of Economics 8 (2016), pp. 205-40, available at www.annualreviews.org; Autor et al., "Foreign Competition And Domestic Innovation: Evidence From U.S. Patents," NBER Working Paper No. 22879, December 2016, available at www.nber.org. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Reports, "Reflections On China's Reforms," dated December 11, 2013, and "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Scholars have shown that countries granting China market economy status have subsequently initiated fewer antidumping cases against it. Please see Francisco Urdinez and Gilmar Masiero, "China And The WTO: Will The Market Economy Status Make Any Difference After 2016?" The Chinese Economy 48:2 (2015), pp. 155-172. Technically speaking, the difference in duty rates can be substantial between market and non-market economies; please see the U.S. Government Accountability Office, "U.S.-China Trade: Eliminating Nonmarket Economy Methodology Would Lower Antidumping Duties For Some Chinese Companies," GAO-06-231, January 2006, available at www.gao.gov. 7 Ross has criticized China more heavily since joining Trump; Navarro is the author of Death By China: Confronting The Dragon, A Global Call To Action (Pearson, 2011); together they criticized China in a paper for Trump's campaign, "Scoring The Trump Economic Plan: Trade, Regulatory, & Energy Policy Impacts," dated September 29, 2016, available at assets.donaldjtrump.com. Lighthizer worked on Ronald Reagan's Treasury Department's team that engaged in the tough trade negotiations with Japan in the mid-1980s. 8 The existing statutory procedure, now enshrined in Title VII of the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, involves the Treasury Department making semi-annual assessments and potentially initiating bilateral or multilateral negotiations. According to the more or less standard time frame since 1988, any charges of currency manipulation would occur in the April report at earliest, and more likely in the October report or thereafter. For Trump to have designated China a manipulator on day one, he would either have had to issue a simple statement of intent or an executive directive that bypassed the formal foreign exchange review process. 9 Please see Andy Kiersz, "Here's Every State's Biggest International Trading Partner," Business Insider, October 20, 2016, available at www.businessinsider.com. See also Marcus Noland et al, "Assessing Trade Agendas In The US Presidential Campaign," Peterson Institute for International Economics, PIIE Briefing 16-6, dated September 2016, available at piie.com. 10 Serbia "defeated" the much larger Austria-Habsburg in their "Pig War" in the early 1900s, while Ireland won most of its key demands from England despite losing the "Economic War" of the 1930s. Russia's attempts over the past decade to bully Ukraine into submission have not succeeded in achieving Russia's political aims. In each of these cases, a far greater economic disparity existed than currently exists between the U.S. and China, and yet even then the weaker country's popular support, and the willingness of neighbors to exploit the new trade opportunities that opened up, enabled the weaker country to win the political clash of wills. 11 Please see "China: Xi Is A "Core" Leader... So What?" in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "De-Globalization," dated November 9, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 12 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Misconceptions About China's Credit Excesses," dated October 26, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 13 Please see "China unveils new plan to further open economy to foreign investment," Reuters, January 17, 2017, available at www.reuters.com. 14 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "China: The 2017 Outlook, And The Trump Wildcard," dated January 12, 2017, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 15 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "2017 High-Conviction Calls," dated January 9, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.

Mr. X is a long-time BCA client who visits our offices towards the end of each year to discuss the economic and financial market outlook. This report is an edited transcript of our recent conversation. Mr. X: What a year it has been. The Brexit vote in the U.K. and the U.S. election result took me completely by surprise and have added to an already uncertain economic environment. A year ago, you adopted the theme of "Stuck In A Rut" to describe the economic and financial market environment and that turned out to be quite appropriate. Consistent with that rut, many issues concerning me for some time have yet to be resolved. Global economic growth has stayed mediocre, debt levels remain elevated almost everywhere, the outlook for China continues to be shrouded in fog, and stimulative monetary policies are still distorting markets. And now we face political shifts that will have major economic and financial effects. Some big changes are underway and I fear that we are more likely to head in a negative rather than positive direction. Therefore, I am very interested to learn how you see things developing. You have recommended a cautious investment stance during the past year and I was happy to go along with that given all my concerns about the economic and policy environment. While stocks have done rather better than I expected, it has all been based on flimsy foundations in my opinion. I have never been comfortable buying an asset just because prices are being supported by excessively easy money policies. The question now is whether looming changes in the policy and economic environment and in global politics will fuel further gains in risk assets or whether a significant setback is in prospect. I hope our discussion will give some clarity on this but, before talking about the future, let's quickly review what you predicted a year ago. BCA: It has indeed been a momentous year and we do seem to be at important turning points in many areas. For example, changing attitudes toward free trade and fiscal policy do have important implications for economic growth and interest rates. And this is being reinforced by cyclical economic trends as labor markets tighten in the U.S. However, it is too soon to know the extent to which political and policy uncertainties will diminish in the U.S. and Europe. You seek clarity on the investment outlook, but that will remain as challenging an objective as ever. You asked to start with a review of last year's predictions and this is always a moment of some trepidation. A year ago, our key conclusions were as follows: The current global economic malaise of slow growth and deflationary pressures reflects more than just a temporary hangover from the 2007-09 balance sheet recession. Powerful structural forces are at work, the effects of which will linger for a long time. These include an ongoing overhang of debt, the peak in globalization, adverse demographics in most major economies, monetary policy exhaustion, and low financial asset returns. Investor expectations have yet to adjust to the fact that sub-par growth and low inflation are likely to persist for many years. The Debt Supercycle is over, but weak nominal GDP growth has made it virtually impossible to reduce debt burdens. Nonetheless, a debt crisis in the advanced economies is not in prospect any time soon because low interest rates are keeping a lid on debt servicing costs. Perhaps high inflation and debt monetization will be the end-point, but that is many years away and would be preceded by a deflationary downturn. Despite ongoing exciting technological advances, the IT boom has lost its edge in terms of boosting economic growth. Even if productivity is understated, the corollary is that inflation is overstated, suggesting that central bankers will continue to face a policy dilemma. The Fed will raise interest rates by less than implied by their current projections. And the European Central Bank and Bank of Japan may expand their QE programs. Yet, monetary policy has become ineffective in boosting growth. Fiscal policy needs to play a bigger role, but it will require another recession to force a shift in political attitudes toward more stimulus. The U.S. economy will remain stuck in sub-2.5% growth in 2016, with risks to the downside. The euro zone's performance has improved recently, but 2016 growth will fall short of the IMF's 1.9% forecast. Japan's growth will continue to disappoint as it will in most other developed economies. China will continue to avoid a hard landing but growth will likely average below 6% in 2016 and beyond. Other emerging economies face a difficult environment of weak commodity prices, declining global trade. Those with excessive foreign-currency debt face additional pressures with weak exchange rates preventing an easing in monetary policy. Bonds offer poor long-term returns from current yields, but sovereign bonds in the major developed countries offer a hedge against downside macro risks and we recommend benchmark weightings. The fundamental backdrop to corporate and EM bonds remain bearish and spreads have not yet reached a level that discounts all of the risks. A buying opportunity in high-yield securities could emerge in the coming year but, for the moment, stay underweight spread product. We have turned more cautious on equities given a deterioration in the earnings outlook and in some technical indicators. No more than benchmark weighting is warranted and we would not argue against a modest underweight. The typical warning signs of a bear market are not in place but risks have risen. The U.S. equity market is expected to underperform that of Europe and Japan. Continue to stay away from emerging equities and commodity-oriented bourses. We continue to favor a defensive sector stance, favoring consumer staples and health care over cyclical sectors such as materials, energy and industrials. The bear market in commodities is not over. The sharp drop in oil prices will eventually restore balance to that market by undermining non-OPEC production and supporting demand, but this could take until the third quarter of 2016. The oil price is expected to average around $50 a barrel for the 2016-2018 period. The strong dollar and deflationary environment create a headwind for gold, offsetting the benefits of negative real interest rates. But modest positions are a hedge against a spike in risk aversion. The dollar is likely to gain further against emerging and commodity-oriented currencies. But the upside against the euro and the yen will be limited given the potential for disappointments about the U.S. economy. As was the case a year ago, geopolitical risks are concentrated in the emerging world. Meanwhile, the new world order of multipolarity and an increased incidence of military conflicts is not yet priced into markets. We do not expect the U.S. elections to have any major adverse impact on financial markets. On the economic front, we suggested that economic risks would stay tilted to the downside and this turned out to be correct with global growth, once again, falling short of expectations. A year ago, the IMF forecast global growth of 3.6% in 2016 and this has since been downgraded to 3.1%, the weakest number since the recovery began (Table 1). The U.S. economy fell particularly short of expectations (1.6% versus 2.8%). The downgrading of growth forecasts continued a pattern that has been in place since the end of the 2007-09 downturn (Chart 1). We cannot recall any other time when economic forecasts have been so wrong for such an extended period. The two big disappointments regarding growth have been the lackluster performance of global trade and the ongoing reluctance of businesses to expand capital spending. Not surprisingly, inflation remained low, as we expected. Table 1IMF Economic Forecasts January 2017 - Shifting Regimes January 2017 - Shifting Regimes Chart 1Persistent Growth Downgrades Persistent Growth Downgrades Persistent Growth Downgrades Given the disappointing economic performance, we were correct in predicting that the Federal Reserve would not raise interest rates by as much as their earlier forecasts implied. When we met last year, the Fed had just raised the funds rate from 0.25% to 0.5% and the median expectation of FOMC members was that it would reach 1.4% by end-2016 and 2.4% by end-2017. As we now know, the Fed is now targeting a funds rate of 0.5% to 0.75% and median FOMC projections are for 1.4% by end-2017 (Chart 2). Meanwhile, as we expected, both the ECB and Bank of Japan expanded their quantitative easing programs in an attempt to stimulate growth. Chart 2Changes In the Fed's Expectations Changes in the Fed's Expectations Changes in the Fed's Expectations Our concerns about the poor prospects for emerging economies were validated. The median 2016 growth rate for 152 emerging economies tracked by the IMF was only 3.1%, a notch below the 2015 pace and, barring 2009, the weakest number since the late 1990s Asia crisis. The official Chinese data overstate growth, but there was no hard landing, as many commentators continued to predict. Turning to the markets, there was considerable volatility during the year (Table 2). For example, U.S. bond yields fell sharply during the first half then rebounded strongly towards the end of the year, leaving them modestly higher over the 12 months. Yields in Europe and Japan followed a similar pattern - falling in the first half and then rebounding, but the level continued to be held down by central bank purchases. Japanese bonds outperformed in common currency terms and we had not expected that to occur, although there was a huge difference between the first and second halves of the year, with the yen unwinding its earlier strength in the closing months of the year. Table 2Market Performance January 2017 - Shifting Regimes January 2017 - Shifting Regimes Our caution toward spread product - corporate and EM bonds - turned out to have been unjustified. Despite worsening fundamentals, most notably rising leverage, the search for yield remained a powerful force keeping spreads down and delivering solid returns for these securities. Spreads are back to very low levels, warning that further gains will be hard to achieve. Equity markets made moderate net gains over the course of the year, but it was a roller coaster journey. A nasty early-year downturn was followed by a rebound, an extended trading range and a late-year rally. While the all-country index delivered a total return of around 8% for the year in common currency terms, almost one-third of that was accounted for by the dividend yield. The price index rose by less than 6% in common currency and 7% in local currency. However, our recommendation to overweight Europe and Japan did not pan out. Once again, the U.S. was an outperformer with the financially-heavy European index weighed down by ongoing concerns about banks, and Japan held back by its lackluster economic performance. Oil prices moved much as we expected, with Brent averaging around $45 over the year. At this time in 2015, prices were below $40, but we argued that a gradual rebalancing would bring prices back into a $45-$60 range in the second half of 2016. We did not expect much of a rise in the gold price and it increased less than 7% over the year. However, we did not try to dissuade you from owning some gold given your long-standing attraction to the asset, subject to keeping the allocation to 5% or less of your portfolio. Industrial commodity prices have been much stronger than we predicted, benefiting from a weak dollar in the first half of the year and continued buoyant demand from China. Finally, the dollar moved up as we had predicted, with the gains concentrated in the second half of the year. The yen's first-half strength was a surprise, but this was largely unwound in the second half as U.S. bond yields climbed. Mr. X: Notably absent has been any mention of the two political shocks of 2016. BCA: We did tell you that the U.K. referendum on Brexit was the key risk facing Europe in 2016 and that the polls were too close to have a strong view. Yet, we did not anticipate that the vote to leave the EU would pass. And when you pushed us a year ago to pick a winner for the U.S. election we wrongly went with Clinton. Our Global Strategist, Peter Berezin, was on record predicting a Trump victory as long ago as September 2015. But it seemed such an outrageous idea that our consensus view stuck to the safer option of Clinton. Interestingly, during our discussion at the end of 2014, we did note that a retreat from globalization was one of the risks in the outlook and we re-emphasized that point last year, pointing to rising populist pressures. However, we underestimated the ability of Brexit campaigners and Donald Trump to capitalize on the anger of disaffected voters. Trade and immigration policies are not the only areas where policy appears to be at a turning point. For example, fiscal conservatism is giving way to stimulus in the U.S. and several other countries, inflation and interest rates are headed higher, at least temporarily, and 2017-2018 should finally arrest the multi-year spectacle of downgrades to global growth projections. Yet, markets have a tendency to overreact and that currently seems to be the case when it comes to discounting prospective changes in the economic environment for the coming year. Turning Points And Regime Shifts: How Much Will Really Change? Mr. X: The U.S. election result and Brexit vote obviously were seismic events with potentially major policy implications. But there seem to be more questions than answers in terms of how policies actually will evolve over the next few years and the extent to which they will be good or bad for growth. The markets are assuming that economic growth will get a big boost from changes in fiscal policy. Do you agree with that view? Chart 3Fiscal Austerity Ended In 2015 Fiscal Austerity Ended in 2015 Fiscal Austerity Ended in 2015 BCA: We need to begin by putting things into perspective. Fiscal austerity came to an end pretty much everywhere a couple of years ago. Data from the IMF show that the peak years for fiscal austerity in the advanced economies were 2011-2013, and the budget cutbacks in those years did not even fully offset the massive stimulus that occurred during the downturn in 2008-10. Since 2013, the fiscal drag on GDP has gradually diminished and policy shifts are estimated to have added to GDP in the U.S., euro area and Japan in 2016 (Chart 3). Nonetheless, with economic growth falling short of expectations and easy money losing its effectiveness, there have been widespread calls for fiscal policy to do more. President-elect Trump has made major tax cuts and increased spending an important part of his policy platform, so the issue is the extent to which he follows through on his plans. Inevitably, there are some challenges: The plan to boost U.S. infrastructure spending is welcome, but the intention seems to be to emphasize private/public partnerships rather than federally-funded projects. Setting up such agreements could take time. Meanwhile, although there is great scope to improve the infrastructure, it is far less clear that a number of "shovel-ready" projects are simply waiting for finance. The bottom line is that increased infrastructure spending is more a story for 2018 and beyond, rather than 2017. And the same also is true for defense, where it may take time to put new programs in place. Turning to the proposed tax cuts, history shows there can be a huge difference between election promises and what eventually is legislated. According to the Tax Policy Center, Trump's plans would add more than $6 trillion to outstanding federal debt over the next decade and more than $20 trillion over 20 years. And that excludes the impact of higher interest costs on the debt. Even if one were to take an optimistic view of a revenue boost from faster economic growth, there would still be a large increase in federal deficits and thus debt levels and this could be problematic for many Republicans. It seems inevitable that the tax plans will be watered down. An additional issue is the distributional impact of the proposed tax cuts. Eliminating the estate tax and proposed changes to marginal rates would disproportionally help the rich. Estimates show the lowest and second lowest quintile earners would receive a tax cut of less than 1% of income, compared to 6.5% for the top 1%. Given that the marginal propensity to consume is much higher for those with low incomes, this would dilute the economic impact. Moreover, there is again the issue of timing - the usual bargaining process means that tax changes will impact growth more in 2018 than 2017. Mr. X: You did not mention the plan to cut the corporate tax rate from 35% to 15%. Surely that will be very good for growth? BCA: According to the OECD, the U.S. has a marginal corporate tax rate of 38.9% (including state and local corporate taxes), making it by far the highest in the industrialized world. The median rate for 34 other OECD economies is 24.6%. However, the actual rate that U.S. companies pay after all the various deductions is not so high. According to national accounts data, the effective tax rate for domestic non-financial companies averaged 25% in the four quarters ended 2016 Q2. Data from the IRS show an average rate of around 21% for all corporations. And for those companies with significant overseas operations, the rate is lower. There certainly is a good case for lowering the marginal rate and simplifying the system by removing deductions and closing loopholes. But special interests always make such reforms a tough battle. Even so, there is widespread support to reduce corporate taxes so some moves are inevitable and this should be good for profits and, hopefully, capital spending. The bottom line is that you should not expect a major direct boost to growth in 2017 from changes in U.S. fiscal policy. The impact will be greater in 2018, perhaps adding between 0.5% and 1% to growth. However, don't forget that there could be an offset from any moves to erect trade barriers. Mr. X: What about fiscal developments in other countries? Chart 4Japan Is A Fiscal Nightmare Japan Is A Fiscal Nightmare Japan Is A Fiscal Nightmare BCA: The Japanese government has boosted government spending again, but the IMF estimates that fiscal changes added only 0.3% to GDP in 2016, with an even smaller impact expected for 2017. And a renewed tightening is assumed to occur in 2018 as postponed efforts to reign in the deficit take hold. Of course, a sales tax hike could be delayed yet again if the economy continues to disappoint. But, with an overall budget deficit of 5% of GDP and gross government debt of more than 250% of GDP, Japan's room for additional stimulus is limited (Chart 4). Although the Bank of Japan owns around 40% of outstanding government debt, the authorities cannot openly admit that this will be written off. While more fiscal moves are possible in Japan, it is doubtful they would significantly alter the growth picture. The euro area peripheral countries have moved past the drastic fiscal austerity that was imposed on them a few years ago. Nevertheless, there is not much room for maneuver with regard to adopting an overtly reflationary stance. It is one thing to turn a blind eye to the fiscal constraints of the EU's Growth and Stability Pact and quite another to move aggressively in the opposite direction. Most of the region's economies have government debt-to-GDP ratios far above the 60% required under the Maastricht Treaty. In sum, a move to fiscal stimulus is not in the cards for the euro area. The U.K. is set to adopt more reflationary policies following the Brexit vote, but this would at most offset private sector retrenchment. In conclusion, looming shifts in fiscal policy will be positive for global growth in the next couple of years, but are unlikely to be game changers. Of course, fiscal policy is not the only thing that might change - especially in the U.S. There also are hopes that an easing in regulatory burdens will be very positive for growth. Mr. X: I am glad you raised that point. I have many business contacts in the U.S. who complain bitterly about regulatory overload and they are desperate for some relief. BCA: There certainly is a need for action on this front as regulatory burdens have increased dramatically in the U.S. in recent years. The monthly survey of small businesses carried out by the National Federation of Independent Business shows that rising health care costs, excessive regulation and income taxes are regarded as the top three problems. According to the Heritage Foundation, new regulations from the Obama administration have added more than $100 billion annually to costs for businesses and individuals since 2009. While the U.S. has a good score in the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business Index (8th best out of 190 countries), it is ranked 51st in the component that measures how easy it is to start a business, which puts it behind countries such as Jamaica, Mongolia and Albania. So we can hope that the new administration will act to improve that situation. We can be confident that there will be major reductions in regulations relating to energy and the environment. Other areas may be more challenging. It did not take long for Trump to back away from his pledge to repeal the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in its entirety. Returning to the previous status quo will not be politically acceptable and devising an alternative plan is no small task. The end result still will be a major modification of the ACA and this should ease health care costs for small businesses. With regard to the financial sector, it is no surprise that the pendulum swung massively toward increased regulation given the pre-crisis credit excesses. The economic and financial downturn of 2008-09 left a legacy of strong populist resentment of Wall Street and the banks, so a return to the previous laissez-faire model is not in the cards. At one stage, Trump indicated that he was in favor of replacing Dodd-Frank with a Glass-Steagall system, requiring commercial banks to divest themselves of their securities' businesses. The large banks would employ legions of lobbyists to prevent a new Glass-Steagall Act. The end result will be some watering down of the Dodd-Frank regulatory requirements, but again, a return to the pre-crisis status quo is not in the cards. The Retreat From Globalization Mr. X: You have challenged the consensus view that fiscal stimulus will deliver a meaningful boost to the global economy over the coming year. Having downplayed the main reason to be more positive about near-term growth, let's turn to global trade, the issue that causes most nervousness about the outlook. The Brexit vote in the U.K. was at least partly a vote against globalization and we are all familiar with Trump's threat to dramatically raise tariffs on imports from China and Mexico. What are the odds of an all-out trade war? BCA: At the risk of sounding complacent, we would give low odds to this. Again, there will be a large difference between campaign promises and actual outcomes. Let's start with China where the U.S. trade deficit ran at a $370 billion annual rate in the first nine months of 2016, up from around $230 billion a decade before (Chart 5). China now accounts for half of the total U.S. trade deficit compared to a 25% share a decade ago. On the face of it, the U.S. looks to have a good bargaining position, but the relationship is not one-sided. China has been a major financer of U.S. deficits and is the third largest importer of U.S. goods, after Canada and Mexico. Meanwhile, U.S. consumers have benefited enormously from the relative cheapness of imported Chinese goods. As for the threat to label China as a currency manipulator, it is interesting to note that its real effective exchange rate has increased by almost 20% since the mid-2000s, and since then, the country's current account surplus as a share of GDP has fallen from almost 10% to around 2.5% (Chart 6). The renminbi has fallen by around 10% against the dollar since mid-2015, but that has been due to the latter currency's broad-based rally, not Chinese manipulation. The fact that China's foreign-exchange reserves have declined in the past couple of years indicates that the country has intervened to hold its currency up, not push it down. Chart 5China-U.S. Trade: ##br##A Symbiotic Relationship? China-U.S. Trade: A Symbiotic Relationship? China-U.S. Trade: A Symbiotic Relationship? Chart 6China Has Not Manipulated ##br##Its Currency Downward China Has Not Manipulated Its Currency Downward China Has Not Manipulated Its Currency Downward Of course, facts may not be the guiding factor when it comes to U.S. trade policy, and we can expect some tough talk from the U.S. This could well involve the imposition of some tariffs and perhaps some concessions from China in the form of increased imports from the U.S. Overall, we are hopeful that rational behavior will prevail and that an all-out trade war will not occur. Mr. X: I also would like to believe that, but nothing in the U.S. election process made me think that rationality is guaranteed. BCA: Of course it is not guaranteed, and we will have to monitor the situation carefully. We should also talk about Mexico - the other main target of Trump's attacks. The U.S. trade deficit with Mexico accounts for less than 10% of the total U.S. deficit and has changed little in the past decade. More than 80% of the U.S. trade deficit with Mexico is related to vehicles and Trump clearly will put pressure on U.S. companies to move production back over the border. Within a week of the election, Ford announced that it had abandoned plans to shift production of its luxury Lincoln SUV from Kentucky to Mexico. And Trump subsequently browbeat Carrier Corporation into cancelling some job transfers across the border. If other companies follow suit, it could forestall major changes to NAFTA. Ironically, the Mexican peso has plunged by 10% against the dollar since the election, boosting the competitiveness of Mexico and offsetting some of the impact of any tariff increase. Not all the news on global trade is bad. After seven years of negotiation, the EU and Canada agreed a free trade deal. This has bolstered the U.K.'s hopes that it can arrange new trade deals after it leaves the EU. However, this will not be easy given the sheer number of bi-country deals that will be required. The time it took to negotiate the EU-Canada deal should be a salutary warning given that there was no particular animosity toward Canada within the EU. That will not be the case when it comes to negotiations with the U.K. Mr. X: Let's try and pull all this together. You have downplayed the risk of an all-out trade war and I hope that you are right. But do you expect trade developments to be a drag on economic activity, perhaps offsetting any positive impact from fiscal stimulus? Chart 7Only Modest Growth In World Trade Only Modest Growth In World Trade Only Modest Growth In World Trade BCA: You might think that trade is a zero-sum game for the global economy because one country's exports simply are another's imports. But expanding trade does confer net benefits to growth in terms of allowing a more efficient use of resources and boosting related activities such as transportation and wholesaling. Thus, the rapid expansion in trade after the fall of the Berlin Wall was very good for the global economy. Trade ceased to be a net contributor to world growth several years ago, highlighted by the fact that global export volumes have been growing at a slower pace than GDP (Chart 7). This has not been due to trade barriers but is more a reflection of China's shift away from less import-intensive growth. A return to import-intensive growth in China is not likely, and technological innovations such as 3-D printing could further undermine trade. If we also add the chances of some increase in protectionist barriers then it is reasonable to assume that trends in global trade are more likely to hinder growth than boost it over the coming couple of years. It really is too soon to make hard and fast predictions about this topic as we need to see exactly what actions the new U.S. administration will take. Nevertheless, we lean toward the optimistic side, and assume the economic impact of fiscal reflation will exceed any drag from trade restrictions. Again, this is a more of a story for 2018 than 2017. What we can say with some confidence is that the previous laissez-faire approach to globalization is no longer politically acceptable. Policymakers are being forced to respond to voter perceptions that the costs of free trade outweigh the benefits and that points to a more interventionist approach. This can take the form of overt protectionism or attempts to influence corporate behavior along the lines of president-elect Trump's exhortations to U.S. companies. Mr. X: What about the issue of immigration? Both the Brexit vote and the U.S. election result partly reflected voter rebellion against unrestrained immigration. And we know that nationalist sentiments also are rising in a number of other European countries. How big a problem is this? Chart 8Immigration's Rising Contribution ##br##To U.S. Population Growth Immigration's Rising Contribution To U.S. Population Growth Immigration's Rising Contribution To U.S. Population Growth BCA: In normal circumstances, immigration represents a win-win situation for all parties. The vast majority of immigrants are prepared to work hard to improve their economic position and in many cases take jobs that residents are not willing to accept. This all works well in a fast-growing economy, but difficulties arise when growth is weak: competition for jobs increases, especially among the unskilled, and the result is downward pressure on wages. The irony is that the U.S. and U.K. labor markets have tightened to the point where wage growth is accelerating. However, this all happened too late to affect the opinions of those who voted for tighter controls over immigration. There is an even more important issue from a big-picture perspective. As you know, an economy's potential growth rate comes from two sources: the growth in the labor force and productivity. According to the Census Bureau, U.S. population growth will average 0.8% a year over the next decade, slowing to 0.6% a year over the subsequent ten years. But more than half of this growth is assumed to come from net migration. Excluding net migration, population growth is predicted to slow to a mere 0.1% a year by the end of the 2030s (Chart 8). Thus, major curbs on immigration would directly lower potential GDP by a significant amount. In Europe, the demographic situation is even more precarious because birth rates are far below replacement levels. Europe desperately needs immigration to achieve even modest population increases. However, the migrant crisis is causing a backlash against cross-border population flows, again with negative implications for long-run economic growth. Even ignoring humanitarian considerations, major curbs on immigration would not be a good idea. Labor shortages would quickly become apparent in a number of industries. Some may welcome the resulting rise in wages, but the resulting pressure on inflation also would have adverse effects. So this is another area of policy that we will have to keep a close eye on. Inflation And Interest Rates Chart 9A Mixed U.S. Inflation Picture A Mixed U.S. Inflation Picture A Mixed U.S. Inflation Picture Mr. X: I am glad that you mentioned inflation. There are good reasons to think that an important inflection point in inflation has been reached. And bond investors seem to agree, judging by the recent spike in yields. If true, this would indeed represent a significant regime shift because falling inflation and bond yields have been such a dominant trend for several decades. Do you agree that the era of disinflation is over, along with the secular bull market in bonds? BCA: Inflation and bond yields in the U.S. have passed a cyclical turning point, but this does not mean that a sustained major uptrend is imminent. Let's start with inflation. A good portion of the rise in the underlying U.S. inflation rate has been due to a rise in housing rental costs, and, more recently, a spike in medical care costs. Neither of these trends should last: changes to the ACA should arrest the rising cost of medical care while increased housing construction will cap the rise in rent inflation. The rental vacancy rate looks to be stabilizing while rent inflation is rolling over. Meanwhile, the inflation rate for core goods has held at a low level and likely will be pushed lower as a result of the dollar's ascent (Chart 9). Of course, this all assumes that we do not end up with sharply higher import tariffs and a trade war. The main reason to expect a further near-term rise in underlying U.S. inflation is the tightening labor market and resulting firming in wage growth. With the economy likely to grow above a 2% pace in 2017, the labor market should continue to tighten, pushing wage inflation higher. So the core PCE inflation rate has a good chance of hitting the Federal Reserve's 2% target before the year is out. And bond investors have responded accordingly, with one-year inflation expectations moving to their highest level since mid-2014, when oil prices were above $110 a barrel (Chart 10). Long-run inflation expectations also have spiked since the U.S. election, perhaps reflecting the risk of higher import tariffs and the risks of political interference with the Fed. When it comes to other developed economies, with the exception of the U.K., there is less reason to expect underlying inflation to accelerate much over the next year. Sluggish growth in the euro area and Japan will continue to keep a lid on corporate pricing power and the markets seem to agree, judging by the still-modest level of one-year and long-run inflation expectations (Chart 11). The U.K. will see some pickup in inflation in response to the sharp drop in sterling and this shows up in a marked rise in market expectations. Chart 10U.S. Inflation Expectations Have Spiked U.S. Inflation Expectations Have Spiked U.S. Inflation Expectations Have Spiked Chart 11Inflation Expectations In Europe And Japan Inflation Expectations In Europe and Japan Inflation Expectations In Europe and Japan Turning back to the U.S., a key question regarding the longer-term inflation outlook is whether the supply side of the economy improves. If the new administration succeeds in boosting demand but there is no corresponding expansion in the supply capacity of the economy, then the result will be higher inflation. That will lead to continued monetary tightening and, as in past cycles, an eventual recession. But, if businesses respond to a demand boost with a marked increase in capital spending then the result hopefully would be faster productivity growth and a much more muted inflation response. Thus, it will be critical to monitor trends in business confidence and capital spending for signs that animal spirits are returning. Mr. X: So you don't think the Fed will be tempted to run a "hot" economy with inflation above the 2% target? BCA: That might have been a possibility if there was no prospect of fiscal stimulus, leaving all the economic risks on the downside. With easier fiscal policy on the horizon, the Fed can stick to a more orthodox policy approach. In other words, if the economy strengthens to the point where inflation appears to be headed sustainably above 2%, then the Fed will respond by raising rates. Unlike the situation a year ago, we do not have a strong disagreement with the Fed's rate hike expectations for the next couple of years. Nothing would please the Fed more than to return to a familiar world where the economy is behaving in a normal cyclical fashion, allowing a move away from unusually low interest rates. At the same time, the Fed believes, as we do, that the equilibrium real interest rate is far below historical levels and may be close to zero. Thus, interest rates may not need to rise that much to cool down the economy and ease inflationary pressures. This is especially true if the dollar continued to rise along with Fed tightening. Another potentially important issue is that the composition of the Federal Reserve Board could change dramatically in the next few years. There currently are two unfilled seats on the Board and it is very likely that both Janet Yellen and Stanley Fischer will leave in 2018 when their respective terms as Chair and Vice-Chair end (February 3 for Yellen and June 12 for Fischer). That means the incoming administration will be able to appoint four new Board members, and possibly more if other incumbents step down. Judging by the views of Trump's current economic advisers, he seems likely to choose people with a conservative approach to monetary policy. In sum, we do not rule out a rise in U.S. inflation to as much as 3%, but it would be a very short-lived blip. Steady Fed tightening would cap the rise, even at the cost of a renewed recession. Indeed, a recession would be quite likely because central banks typically overshoot on the side of restraint when trying to counter a late-cycle rise in inflation. Mr. X: I am more bearish than you on the inflation outlook. Central banks have been running what I regard as irresponsible policies for the past few years and we now also face some irresponsible fiscal policies in the U.S. That looks like a horrendously inflationary mix to me although I suppose inflation pressures would ease in the next recession. We can return to that possibility later when we discuss the economy in more detail. Where do you see U.S. short rates peaking in the current cycle and what does this mean for your view on long-term interest rates? To repeat my earlier question: is the secular bond bull market over? BCA: During the past 30 years, the fed funds rate tended to peak close to the level of nominal GDP growth (Chart 12). That would imply a fed funds rate of over 5% in the current cycle, assuming peak real GDP growth of around 3% and 2-3% inflation. However, that ignores the fact that debt burdens are higher than in the past and structural headwinds to growth are greater. Thus, the peak funds rate is likely to be well below 5%, perhaps not much above 3%. Chart 12The Fed Funds Rate And The Economic Cycle The Fed Funds Rate and the Economic Cycle The Fed Funds Rate and the Economic Cycle With regard to your question about the secular bull market in bonds, we believe it has ended, but the bottoming process likely will be protracted. We obviously are in the midst of a cyclical uptrend in U.S. yields that could last a couple of years. The combination of a modestly stronger economy, easier fiscal stance and monetary tightening are all consistent with rising bond yields. Although yields moved a lot in the second half of 2016, the level is still not especially high, so there is further upside. It would not be a surprise to see the 10-year Treasury yield reach 3% by this time next year. However, there could be a last-gasp renewed decline in yields at some point in the next few years. If the U.S. economy heads back into recession with the fed funds rate peaking at say 3.5%, then it is quite possible that long-term bond yields would revisit their 2016 lows - around 1.4% on the 10-year Treasury. There are no signs of recession at the moment, but a lot can change in the next three years. In any event, you should not be overly concerned with the secular outlook at this point. The cyclical outlook for yields is bearish and there should be plenty of advance notice if it is appropriate to switch direction. Update On The Debt Supercycle Mr. X: I would like to return to the issue of the Debt Supercycle - one of my favorite topics. You know that I have long regarded excessive debt levels as the biggest threat to economic and financial stability and nothing has occurred to ease my concerns. In the past, you noted that financial repression - keeping interest rates at very low levels - would be the policy response if faster economic growth could not achieve a reduction in debt burdens. But the recent rise in bond yields warns that governments cannot always control interest rate moves. Few people seem to worry anymore about high debt levels and I find that to be another reason for concern. BCA: You are correct that there has been very little progress in reducing debt burdens around the world. As we have noted in the past, it is extremely difficult for governments and the private sector to lower debt when economic activity and thus incomes are growing slowly. Debt-to-GDP ratios are at or close to all-time highs in virtually every region, even though debt growth itself has slowed (Chart 13A, Chart 13B). Chart 13ADebt Growth Slows, ##br##But Levels Remain High Debt Growth Slows, But Levels Remain High Debt Growth Slows, But Levels Remain High Chart 13BDebt Growth Slows, ##br##But Levels Remain High Debt Growth Slows, But Levels Remain High Debt Growth Slows, But Levels Remain High As a reminder, our End-of-Debt Supercycle thesis never meant that debt-to-GDP ratios would quickly decline. It reflected our belief that lenders and private sector borrowers had ended their love affair with debt and that we could no longer assume that strong credit growth would be a force boosting economic activity. And our view has not altered, even though government borrowing may show some acceleration. Chart 14The Credit Channel Is Impaired The Credit Channel Is Impaired The Credit Channel Is Impaired The failure of exceptionally low interest rates to trigger a vigorous rebound in private sector credit demand is consistent with our view. In the post-Debt Supercycle world, monetary policy has lost effectiveness because the credit channel - the key pillar of the monetary transmission process - is blocked. The drop in money multipliers and in the velocity of circulation is a stark reminder of the weakened money-credit-growth linkage (Chart 14). You always want to know what the end-point of higher debt levels will be, and we always give you a hedged answer. Nothing has changed on that front! A period of higher inflation may help bring down debt ratios for a while, but not to levels that would ease your concerns. This means that financial repression will be the fallback plan should markets rebel against debt levels. For the moment, there is still no problem because interest rates are still low and this is keeping debt-servicing costs at very low levels. If interest rates are rising simply because economic activity is strengthening, then that is not a serious concern. The danger time would be if rates were to rise while growth and inflation were weak. At that point, central banks would move aggressively to reduce market pressures with massive asset purchases. The ultimate end-point for dealing with excessive debt probably will be significantly higher inflation. But that is some time away. Central banks would not likely embrace a major sustained rise in inflation before we first suffered another serious deflationary downturn. At that point, attitudes toward inflation could change dramatically and a new generation of central bankers would probably be in charge with a very different view of the relative economic risks of inflation and deflation. However, it is premature to worry about a major sustained inflation rise if we must first go through a deflationary downturn. Mr. X: Perhaps you are right, but I won't stop worrying about debt. The buildup in debt was decades in the making and I am convinced that the consequences will extend beyond a few years of subdued economic growth. And central bank efforts to dampen the economic symptoms with unusually low interest rates have just created another set of problems in the form of distorted asset prices and an associated misallocation of capital. BCA: We agree that there may be a very unhappy ending to the debt excesses, but timing is everything. It has been wrong to bet against central banks during the past seven years and that will continue to be the case for a while longer. We will do our best to give you plenty of warning when we see signs that things are changing for the worse. Mr. X: I will hold you to that. Meanwhile, you talked earlier about the possibility of another recession in the U.S. Let's use that as a starting point to talk about the economic outlook in more detail. It seems strange to talk about the possibility of a recession in the U.S. when interest rates are still so low and we are about to get more fiscal stimulus. The Economic Outlook BCA: We do not expect a recession in the next year or two, absent some new major negative shock. But by the time we get to 2019, the recovery will be ten years old and normal late-cycle pressures should be increasingly apparent. The labor market already is quite tight, with wages growing at their fastest pace in eight years, according to the Atlanta Fed's wage tracker (Chart 15). Historically, most recessions were triggered by tight monetary policy with a flat or inverted yield curve being a reliable indicator (Chart 16). Obviously, that is extremely hard to achieve when short-term rates are at extremely low levels. However, if the Fed raises the funds rate to around 3% by the end of 2019, as it currently predicts, then it will be quite possible to again have a flat or inverted curve during that year. Chart 15U.S. Wage Growth In A Clear Uptrend U.S. Wage Growth In A Clear Uptrend U.S. Wage Growth In A Clear Uptrend Chart 16No Sign Of A U.S. Recession No Sign Of A U.S. Recession No Sign Of A U.S. Recession The recent environment of modest growth has kept inflation low and forced the Fed to maintain a highly accommodative stance. As spare capacity is absorbed, the Fed will be forced to tighten, raising the odds of a policy overshoot. And this is all without taking account of the potential threat of a trade war. Mr. X: I have never believed that the business cycle has been abolished so it would not surprise me at all to have a U.S. recession in the next few years, but the timing is critical to getting the markets right. What will determine the timing of the next economic downturn? BCA: As we mentioned earlier, the key to stretching out the cycle will be improving the supply side of the economy, thereby suppressing the cyclical pressures on inflation. That means getting productivity growth up which, in turn will depend on a combination of increased capital spending, global competition and technological innovations. Chart 17Companies Still ##br##Cautious Re: Capital Spending Companies Still Cautious Re: Capital Spending Companies Still Cautious Re: Capital Spending Thus far, there is no indication that U.S. companies are increasing their investment plans: the trend in capital goods orders remains very lackluster (Chart 17). Nonetheless, we have yet to see post-election data. The optimistic view is that the prospect of lower corporate taxes, reduced regulation and a repatriation of overseas earnings will all combine to revive the corporate sector's animal spirits and thus their willingness to invest. Only time will tell. The key point is that it is too soon for you to worry about a recession in the U.S. and for the next year or two, there is a good chance that near-term economic forecasts will be revised up rather than down. That will mark an important reversal of the experience of the past seven years when the economy persistently fell short of expectations. Mr. X: It would be indeed be a welcome change to have some positive rather than negative surprises on the economic front, but I remain somewhat skeptical. I suppose I can see some reasons to be more optimistic about the U.S., but the picture in most other countries seems as bleak as ever. The outlook for the U.K. has worsened following the Brexit vote, the euro area and Japan cannot seem to break out of a low-growth trap and China continues to skirt the edge of a precipice. BCA: The global economy still has lots of problems, and we are a long way from boom-like conditions. The IMF predicts that 2017 growth in the euro area and China will be below the 2016 level, and forecasts for the U.K. have been revised down sharply since the Brexit vote. On a more positive note, the firming in commodity prices should help some previously hard-hit emerging economies. Overall global growth may not pick up much over the coming year, but it would be a significant change for the better if we finally stop the cycle of endless forecast downgrades. Mr. X: Let's talk a bit more about the U.K. I know that it is too early to make strong predictions about the implications of Brexit, but where do you stand in terms of how damaging it will be? I am not convinced it will be that bad because I sympathize with the view that EU bureaucracy is a big drag on growth, and exiting the EU may force the U.K. government to pursue supply-side policies that ultimately will be very good for growth. BCA: The Brexit vote does not spell disaster for the U.K., but adds to downside risks at a time when the global economy is far from buoyant. The EU is not likely to cut a sweet deal for the U.K. To prevent copycat departures, the EU will demonstrate that exit comes with a clear cost. Perhaps, the U.K. can renegotiate new trade deals that do not leave it significantly worse off. But this will take time and, in the interlude, many businesses will put their plans on hold until new arrangements are made. Meanwhile, the financial sector - a big engine of growth in the past - could be adversely affected by a move of business away from London. Chart 18The U.K. Has A Twin Deficit Problem The U.K. Has A Twin Deficit Problem The U.K. Has A Twin Deficit Problem Of course, the government will not simply stand on the sidelines, and it has already announced increased infrastructure spending that will fill some of the hole created by weaker business capital spending. And the post-vote drop in sterling has provided a boost to U.K. competitiveness. Nevertheless, it seems inevitable that there will be a hit to growth over the next couple of years. The optimistic view is that the U.K. will use the opportunity of its EU departure to launch a raft of supply-side reforms and tax cuts with the aim of creating a much more dynamic economy that will be very attractive to overseas investors. Some have made the comparison with Singapore. This seems a bit of a stretch. In contrast to the pre-vote rhetoric, EU membership did not turn the U.K. into a highly-regulated economy. For example, the U.K. already is in 7th place out of 190 countries in the World Bank's Ease Doing Business Index and one of the least regulated developed economies according to the OECD. Thus, the scope to boost growth by sweeping away regulations probably is limited. At the same time, the U.K.'s ability to engage in major fiscal stimulus via tax cuts or increased spending is limited by the country's large balance-of-payments deficit and the poor state of its government finances (Chart 18). Overall, the U.K. should be able to avoid a major downturn in the next couple of years, but we don't disagree with the OECD's latest forecasts that growth will slow to round 1% in 2017 and 2018 after 2% in 2016. And that implies the risks of one or two quarters of negative growth within that period. Mr. X: I am not a fan of the EU so am inclined to think that the U.K. will do better than the consensus believes. But, I am less confident about the rest of Europe. Euro area banks are in a mess, weighed down by inadequate capital, a poor return on assets, an overhang of bad loans in Italy and elsewhere, and little prospect of much revival in credit demand. At the same time, the political situation looks fragile with voters just as disenchanted with the establishment status quo as were the ones in the U.K. and U.S. Against this background, I can't see why any companies would want to increase their capital spending in the region. Chart 19Euro Area Optimism Improves Euro Area Optimism Improves Euro Area Optimism Improves BCA: We agree that euro area growth is unlikely to accelerate much from here. The structural problems of poor demographics, a weak banking system and constrained fiscal policy represent major headwinds for growth. And the political uncertainties related to elections in a number of countries in the coming year give consumers and companies good reason to stay cautious. Yet, we should note that the latest data show a modest improvement in the business climate index, breaking slightly above the past year's trading range (Chart 19). There are some positive developments to consider. The nomination of François Fillon as the conservative candidate in France's Presidential election to be held on April 2017 is very significant. We expect him to beat Marine Le Pen and this means France will have a leader who believes in free markets and deregulation - a marked change from previous statist policies. This truly could represent a major regime shift for that country. Meanwhile, the ECB has confirmed that it will continue its QE program through 2017, albeit at a slightly reduced pace. This has costs in terms of market distortions, but will help put a floor under growth. Mr. X: You noted the fragile state of the region's banks. How do you see that playing out? BCA: Euro area banks have more than €1 trillion of non-performing loans (NPLs) and have provisioned for only about half of that amount. Nevertheless, most countries' banking sectors have enough equity capital to adequately absorb losses from these un-provisioned NPLs. On the other hand, the high level of NPLs is a protracted drag on profitability and thereby increases the banks' cost of capital. The shortage of capital constrains new lending. The biggest concern is Italy, which we estimate needs to recapitalize its banks by close to €100 billion. Complicating matters is that the EU rules on state aid for banks changed at the start of 2016. Now, a government bailout can happen only after a first-loss 'bail-in' of the bank's equity and bond holders. So if an undercapitalized bank cannot raise the necessary funds privately in the markets, there is a danger that its investors could suffer heavy losses before the government is allowed to step in. But once investors have been bailed-in, the authorities will do "whatever it takes" to prevent banking problems turning into a systemic crisis that threaten to push the economy into another recession. Mr. X: I would now like to shift our attention to Asia, most notably Japan and China. Starting with Japan, that economy seems to perfectly describe the world of secular stagnation. Despite two decades of short-term interest rates near zero and major fiscal stimulus, real growth has struggled to get above 1% and deflation rather than inflation has been the norm. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has made a big deal about his "three arrow" approach to getting the economy going again, but I don't see much evidence that it is working. Is there any prospect of breaking out of secular stagnation? BCA: Probably not. A big part of Japan's problem is demographics - an unfortunate combination of a declining labor force and a rapidly aging population. While this means that per capita GDP growth looks a lot better than the headline figures, it is not a growth-friendly situation. Twenty years ago there were 4.6 people of working age for everyone above 64. This has since dropped to 2.2 and within another 20 years it will be down to 1.6. That falling ratio of taxpayers to pensioners and major consumers of health care is horrendous for government finances. And an aging population typically is not a dynamic one which shows up in Japan's poor productivity performance relative to that of the U.S. (Chart 20). Of course, Japan can "solve" its public finances problem by having the Bank of Japan cancel its large holdings of JGBs. Yet that does nothing to deal with the underlying demographics issue and ongoing large budget deficits. Japan desperately needs a combination of increased immigration and major supply-side reforms, but we do not hold out much prospect of either changing by enough to dramatically alter the long-run growth picture. Mr. X: I will not disagree with you as I have not been positive about Japan for a long time. We should now turn to China. It is very suspicious that the economy continues to hum along at a 6% to 7% pace, despite all the excesses and imbalances that have developed. I really don't trust the data. We talked about China at our mid-2016 meeting and, if I remember correctly, you described China as like a tightrope walker, wobbling from time to time, but never quite falling off. Yet it would only take a gust of wind for that to change. I liked that description so my question is: are wind gusts likely to strengthen over the coming year? BCA: You are right to be suspicious of the official Chinese data, but it seems that the economy is expanding by at least a 5% pace. However, it continues to be propped up by unhealthy and unsustainable growth in credit. The increase in China's debt-to-GDP ratio over the past few years dwarves that during the ultimately disastrous credit booms of Japan in the 1980s and the U.S. in the 2000s (Chart 21). The debt increase has been matched by an even larger rise in assets, but the problem is that asset values can drop, while the value of the debt does not. Chart 20Japan's Structural Headwinds Japan's Structural Headwinds Japan's Structural Headwinds Chart 21China's Remarkable Credit Boom January 2017 - Shifting Regimes January 2017 - Shifting Regimes The government would like to rein in credit growth, but it fears the potential for a major economic slowdown, so it is trapped. The fact that the banking system is largely under state control does provide some comfort because it will be easy for the government to recapitalize the banks should problems occur. This means that a U.S.-style credit freeze is unlikely to develop. Of course, the dark side of that is that credit excesses never really get unwound. You asked whether wind gusts will increase, threating to blow the economy off its tightrope. One potential gust that we already talked about is the potential for trade fights with the new U.S. administration. As we mentioned earlier, we are hopeful that nothing serious will occur, but all we can do is carefully monitor the situation. Trends in China's real estate sector represent a good bellwether for the overall economic situation. The massive reflation of 2008-09 unleashed a powerful real estate boom, accompanied by major speculative excesses. The authorities eventually leaned against this with a tightening in lending standards and the sector cooled off. Policy then eased again in 2015/16 as worries about an excessive economic slowdown developed, unleashing yet another real estate revival. The stop-go environment has continued with policy now throttling back to try and cool things off again. It is not a sensible way to run an economy and we need to keep a close watch on the real estate sector as a leading indicator of any renewed policy shifts. Over time, the Chinese economy should gradually become less dependent on construction and other credit-intensive activities. However, in the near-term, there is no escaping the fact that the economy will remain unbalanced, creating challenges for policymakers and a fragile environment for the country's currency and asset markets. Fortunately, the authorities have enough room to maneuver that a hard landing remains unlikely over the next year or two. There are fewer grounds for optimism about the long-run unless the government can move away from its stop-go policy and pursue more supply-side reforms. Mr. X: What about other emerging economies? Are there any developments particularly worth noting? BCA: Emerging economies in general will not return to the rapid growth conditions of the first half of the 2000s. Slower growth in China has dampened export opportunities for other EM countries and global capital will no longer pour into these economies in its previous, indiscriminate way. Nevertheless, the growth outlook is stabilizing and 2017 should be a modestly better year than 2016 for most countries. Chart 22India Has A Long Way To Go India Has A Long Way To Go India Has A Long Way To Go The rebound in oil and other commodity prices has clearly been positive for Russia, Brazil and other resource-dependent countries. Commodity prices will struggle to rise further from current elevated levels but average 2017 prices should exceed those of 2016. On the negative side, a firm dollar and trade uncertainty will represent a headwind for capital flows to the EM universe. The bottom line is that the growth deceleration in emerging economies has run its course but a major new boom is not in prospect. The Indian economy grew by around 7½% in 2016, making it, by far, the star EM performer. Growth will take a hit from the government's recent decision to withdraw high-denomination bank notes from circulation - a move designed to combat corruption. Fortunately, the impact should be relatively short-lived and growth should return to the 7% area during the coming year. Still, India has a long way to go to catch up with China. In 1990, India's economy was almost 90% as big as China's in PPP terms, but 20 years later, it was only 40% as large. Even though India is expected to keep growing faster than China, its relative size will only climb to 45% within the next five years, according to the IMF (Chart 22). Mr. X: Let me try and summarize your economic views before we move on to talk about the markets. The growth benefit from fiscal stimulus in the U.S. is more a story for 2018 than 2017. Nevertheless, a modest improvement in global growth is likely over the coming year, following several years of economic disappointments. The key risks relate to increased trade protectionism and increased inflation in the U.S. if the rise in demand is not matched by an increase in the economy's supply-side capacity. In that event, tighter monetary policy could trigger a recession in 2019. You do not expect any major changes in the underlying economic picture for Europe, Japan or China, although political shifts in Europe represent another downside risk. BCA: That captures our views quite well. Going back to our broad theme of regime shifts, it is important to re-emphasize that shifting attitudes toward fiscal policy and trade in the U.S. raise a red flag over the longer-term inflation outlook. And this of course feeds into the outlook for interest rates. Bond Market Prospects Mr. X: That is the perfect segue for us to shift the discussion to the investment outlook, starting with bonds. You already noted that you believe the secular bull market in bonds has ended, albeit with a drawn-out bottoming process. Given my concerns about the long-run inflation outlook, I am happy to agree with that view. Yet, yields have risen a lot recently and I am wondering if this represents a short-term buying opportunity. BCA: The late-2016 sell-off in bonds was violent and yields rose too far, too fast. So we recently shifted our tactical bond recommendation from underweight (short duration) to neutral. But obviously that is not the same as telling you to buy. The underlying story for bonds - especially in the U.S. - is bearish. The prospect of fiscal stimulus, rising short rates and a pickup in inflation suggests that U.S. yields will be higher over the next 12 months. Although yields may decline somewhat in the very near-term, we doubt the move will be significant enough or last long enough to warrant an overweight position. The outlook is not quite so bad in the euro zone given the ECB's ongoing bond purchases and a continued benign inflation outlook. But, even there, the market will remain highly correlated with trends in U.S. Treasurys so yields are more likely to rise than fall over the coming year. The story is different in Japan given the central bank's new policy of pegging the 10-year yield at zero. That will be a static market for some time. Although global yields may have bottomed from a secular perspective, the upturn will be gradual in the years ahead. A post-Debt Supercycle environment implies that private sector credit growth will remain subdued, and during 2018, the market may start to attach growing odds of a U.S. recession within a year or two. A more powerful bear trend in bonds awaits the more significant upturn in inflation that likely will follow the next economic downturn. Chart 23Treasurys Are High Yielders Treasurys Are High Yielders Treasurys Are High Yielders Mr. X: I am somewhat surprised at how much the spread between U.S. and euro area bonds has widened - it is now at the highest level since the late 1980s. Obviously, a positive spread makes sense given the relative stance of monetary policy and economic outlook. Yet, it is quite amazing how investors have benefited from both higher yields in the U.S. and a stronger dollar. If the dollar stays firm in 2017, will the spread remain at current high levels? BCA: Most of the increased spread during the past year can be attributed to a widening gap in inflation expectations, although the spread in real yields also spiked after the U.S. election, reflecting the prospects for fiscal stimulus (Chart 23). While the spread is indeed at historical highs, the backdrop of a massive divergence in relative monetary and fiscal policies is not going to change any time soon. We are not expecting the spread to narrow over the next year. You might think that Japanese bonds would be a good place to hide from a global bond bear market given BoJ's policy to cap the 10-year yield at zero percent. Indeed, JGBs with a maturity of 10-years or less are likely to outperform Treasurys and bunds in local currency terms over the coming year. However, this means locking in a negative yield unless you are willing to move to the ultra-long end of the curve, where there is no BoJ support. Moreover, there is more upside for bond prices in the U.S. and Eurozone in the event of a counter-trend global bond rally, simply because there is not much room for JGB yields to decline. Mr. X: O.K., I get the message loud and clear - government bonds will remain an unattractive investment. As I need to own some bonds, should I focus on spread product? I know that value looks poor, but that was the case at the beginning of 2016 and, as you showed earlier, returns ended up being surprisingly good. Will corporate bonds remain a good investment in 2017, despite the value problem? BCA: This a tricky question to answer. On the one hand, you are right that value is not great. Corporate spreads are low in the U.S. at a time when balance sheet fundamentals have deteriorated, according to our Corporate Health Monitor (Chart 24). After adjusting the U.S. high-yield index for expected defaults, option-adjusted spreads are about 165 basis points. In the past, excess returns (i.e. returns relative to Treasurys) typically were barely positive when spreads were at this level. Valuation is also less than compelling for U.S. investment-grade bonds. One risk is that a significant amount of corporate bonds are held by "weak hands," such as retail investors who are not accustomed to seeing losses in their fixed-income portfolios. At some point, this could trigger some panic selling into illiquid markets, resulting in a sharp yield spike. On a more positive note, the search for yield that propped up the market in 2016 could remain a powerful force in 2017. The pressure to stretch for yield was intense in part because the supply of government bonds in the major markets available to the private sector shrank by around $547 billion in 2016 because so much was purchased by central banks and foreign official institutions (Chart 25). The stock will likely contract by another $754 billion in 2017, forcing investors to continue shifting into riskier assets such as corporate bonds. Chart 24U.S. Corporate Health Has Deteriorated U.S. Corporate Health Has Deteriorated U.S. Corporate Health Has Deteriorated Chart 25Government Bonds In Short Supply Government Bonds In Short Supply Government Bonds In Short Supply Weighing the poor valuation and deteriorating credit quality trend against the ongoing pressure to search for yield, we recommend no more than a benchmark weighting in U.S. corporate investment-grade bonds and a modestly underweight position in high-yield. There are better relative opportunities in euro area corporates, where credit quality is improving and the ECB's asset purchase program is providing a nice tailwind. We are slightly overweight in both investment-grade and high-yield euro area corporates. Finally, we should mention emerging market bonds, although we do not have much good to say. The prospect of further declines in EM currencies versus the dollar is a major problem for these securities. There is a big risk that global dollar funding will dry up as the dollar moves higher along with U.S. bond yields, creating problems for EM economies running current account and fiscal deficits. You should stay clear of EM bonds. Mr. X: None of this is helping me much with my bond investments. Can you point to anything that will give me positive returns? Chart 26Real Yields Remain Exceptionally Low Real Yields Remain Exceptionally Low Real Yields Remain Exceptionally Low BCA: Not in the fixed-income market. Your concerns about inflation might lead you to think that inflation-indexed bonds are a good place to be, but prices in that market have already adjusted. Moreover, the case for expecting higher inflation rests a lot on the assumption that economic growth is going to strengthen and that should imply a rise in real yields, which obviously is bad for inflation-indexed bonds. Real yields currently are still very low by historical standards (Chart 26). A world of stagflation - weak real growth and rising inflation - would be a good environment for these securities, but such conditions are not likely in the next couple of years. Mr. X: After what you have told me, I suppose I will concentrate my fixed-income holdings in short-term Treasurys. But I do worry more than you about stagflation so will hold on to my inflation-indexed bonds. At the same time, I do understand that bonds will represent a hedge against downside risks rather than providing positive returns. So let's talk about the stock market as a more attractive place to invest. Equity Market Outlook Mr. X: I like to invest in equities when the market offers good value, there is too much pessimism about earnings and investor sentiment is gloomy. That is not the picture at the moment in the case of the U.S. market. I must confess that the recent rally has taken me by surprise, but it looks to me like a major overshoot. As we discussed earlier, the new U.S. administration's fiscal platform should be good for 2018 economic growth but the U.S. equity market is not cheap and it seems to me that there is more euphoria than caution about the outlook. So I fear that the big surprise will be that the market does much worse than generally expected. BCA: Obviously, the current market environment is nothing like the situation that exists after a big sell-off. You are correct that valuations are not very appealing and there is too much optimism about the outlook for earnings and thus future returns. Analysts' expectations of long-run earnings growth for the S&P 500 universe have risen to 12%, which is at the high end of its range over the past decade (Chart 27). And, as you suggested, surveys show an elevated level of optimism on the part of investors and traders. The outlook for earnings is the most critical issue when it comes to the long-run outlook for stocks. Low interest rates provide an important base of support, but as we noted earlier, rates are more likely to rise than fall over the next couple of years, possibly reaching a level that precipitates a recession in 2019. Investors are excited about the prospect that U.S. earnings will benefit from both faster economic growth and a drop in corporate tax rates. We don't disagree that those trends would be positive, but there is another important issue to consider. One of the defining characteristics of the past several years has been the extraordinary performance of profit margins which have averaged record levels, despite the weak economic recovery (Chart 28). The roots of this rise lay in the fact that businesses rather than employees were able to capture most of the benefits of rising productivity. This showed up in the growing gap between real employee compensation and productivity. As a result, the owners of capital benefited, while the labor share of income - previously a very mean-reverting series - dropped to extremely low levels. The causes of this divergence are complex but include the impact of globalization, technology and a more competitive labor market. Chart 27Too Much Optimism On Wall Street? Too Much Optimism On Wall Street? Too Much Optimism On Wall Street? Chart 28Profit Margins: Another Regme Shift Underway? Profit Margins: Another Regme Shift Underway? Profit Margins: Another Regme Shift Underway? With the U.S. unemployment back close to full-employment levels, the tide is now turning in favor of labor. The labor share of income is rising and this trend likely will continue as the economy strengthens. And any moves by the incoming administration to erect barriers to trade and/or immigration would underpin the trend. The implication is that profit margins are more likely to compress than expand in the coming years, suggesting that analysts are far too optimistic about earnings. Long-term growth will be closer to 5% than 12%. The turnaround in the corporate income shares going to labor versus capital represents another important element of our theme of regime changes. None of this means that the stock market faces an imminent plunge. Poor value and over-optimism about earnings raises a red flag over long-term return prospects, but says little about near-term moves. As we all know, market overshoots can move to much greater extremes and last for much longer than one can rationally predict. And the fact remains that the conditions for an overshoot could well persist for another 12 months or even longer. Optimism about the economic benefits of the new administration's policies should last for a while as proposals for tax cuts and increased fiscal spending get debated. Meanwhile, although the Fed plans to raise rates again over the next year, the level of interest rates will remain low by historical standards, sustaining the incentive to put money into stocks rather than interest-bearing assets. Mr. X: So are you telling me to buy U.S. stocks right now? BCA: No we are not. The stock market is vulnerable to a near-term setback following recent strong gains, so this is not a great time to increase exposure. However, we do expect prices to be higher in a year's time, so you could use setbacks as a buying opportunity. Of course, this is with the caveat that long-run returns are likely to be poor from current levels and we have the worry about a bear market some time in 2018 if recession risks are building. Playing market overshoots can be very profitable, but it is critical to remember that the fundamental foundations are weak and you need to be highly sensitive to signs that conditions are deteriorating. Mr. X: I am very well aware of the opportunities and risks of playing market overshoots. I completely underestimated the extent of the tech-driven overshoot in the second half of the 1990s and remained on the sidelines while the NASDAQ soared by 130% between end-1998 and March 2000. But my caution was validated when the market subsequently collapsed and it was not until 2006 that the market finally broke above its end-1998 level. I accept that the U.S. market is not in a crazy 1990s-style bubble, but I am inclined to focus on markets where the fundamentals are more supportive. BCA: The U.S. market is only modestly overvalued, based on an average of different measures. It is expensive based on both trailing and forward earnings and relative to book value, but cheap compared to interest rates and bond yields. A composite valuation index based on five components suggests that the S&P 500 currently is only modestly above its 60-year average (Chart 29). Valuation is not an impediment to further significant gains in U.S. equities over the coming year although it is more attractive in other markets. Chart 29The U.S. Market Is Modestly Expensive The U.S. Market Is Modestly Expensive The U.S. Market Is Modestly Expensive If we use the cyclically-adjusted price-earnings ratio for non-financial stocks as our metric, then Japan and a number of European markets are trading at valuations below their historical averages (Chart 30). The picture for Japan is muddied by the fact that the historical average is biased upwards by the extreme valuations that existed during the bubble years and in the aftermath when earnings were exceptionally weak. Nonetheless, even on a price-to-book basis, Japan is trading far below non-bubble historical averages (Chart 31). Chart 30Valuation Ranking Of Developed Equity Markets January 2017 - Shifting Regimes January 2017 - Shifting Regimes Chart 31Japan Looks Like A Cheap Market Japan Looks Like A Cheap Market Japan Looks Like A Cheap Market With regard to Europe, the good value is found in the euro area periphery, rather than in the core countries of Germany, France and the Netherlands. In fact, these core countries are trading more expensively than the U.S., relative to their own history. As you know, valuation is not the only consideration when it comes to investing. Nonetheless, the direction of monetary policy also would support a better outlook for Japan and the euro area given that the Fed is raising rates while the ECB and BoJ are still implementing QE policies. Exchange rate moves complicate things a bit because further gains in the dollar would neutralize some of the relative outperformance when expressed in common currency. Even so, we would expect the euro area and Japan to outperform the U.S. over the next 12 months. The one important qualification is that we assume no new major political shocks come from Europe. A resurgence of political uncertainty in the euro area would poses the greatest threat to the peripheral countries, which partly explains why they are trading at more attractive valuations than the core. Mr. X: There seem to be political risks everywhere these days. It is a very long time since I could buy stocks when they offered great value and I felt very confident about the economic and political outlook. I agree that value looks better outside the U.S., but I do worry about political instability in the euro area and Brexit in the U.K. I know Japan looks cheap, but that has been a difficult and disappointing market for a long time and, as we already discussed, the structural outlook for the economy is very troubling. Turning to the emerging markets, you have not backed away from your bearish stance. The long-run underperformance of emerging markets relative to the U.S. and other developed bourses has been quite staggering and I am glad that I have followed your advice. Are you expecting to shift your negative stance any time soon? BCA: The global underperformance of EM has lasted for six years and may be close to ending. But the experience of the previous cycle of underperformance suggests we could have a drawn-out bottoming process rather than a quick rebound (Chart 32). Emerging equities look like decent value on the simple basis of relative price-earnings ratios (PER), but the comparison continues to be flattered by the valuations of just two sectors - materials and financials. Valuations are less compelling if you look at relative PERs on the basis of equally-weighted sectors (Chart 33). Chart 32A Long Period Of EM Underperformance A Long Period Of EM Underperformance A Long Period Of EM Underperformance Chart 33EM Fundamentals Still Poor EM Fundamentals Still Poor EM Fundamentals Still Poor More importantly, the cyclical and structural issues undermining EM equities have yet to be resolved. The deleveraging cycle is still at an early stage, the return on equity remains extremely low, and earnings revisions are still negative. The failure of the past year's rebound in non-oil commodity prices to be matched by strong gains in EM equities highlights the drag from more fundamental forces. In sum, we expect EM equities to underperform DM markets for a while longer. If you want to have some EM exposure then our favored markets are Korea, Taiwan, China, India, Thailand and Russia. We would avoid Malaysia, Indonesia, Turkey, Brazil and Peru. Mr. X: None of this makes very keen to invest in any equity market. However, even in poor markets, there usually are some areas that perform well. Do you have any strong sector views? Chart 34Cyclical Stocks Have Overshot Cyclical Stocks Have Overshot Cyclical Stocks Have Overshot BCA: Our near-term sector views reflect the expectation of a pullback in the broad equity market. The abrupt jump in the price of global cyclicals (industrials, materials & energy) versus defensives (health care, consumer staples & telecom services) has been driven solely by external forces - i.e. the sell-off in the bond market, rather than a shift in underlying profit drivers. For instance, emerging markets and the global cyclicals/defensives price ratio have tended to move hand-in-hand. The former is pro-cyclical, and outperforms when economic growth prospects are perceived to be improving. Recent sharp EM underperformance has created a large negative divergence with the cyclical/defensive price ratio. The surging U.S. dollar is a growth impediment for many developing countries with large foreign debts. Meanwhile, the growth impetus required to support profit outperformance for deep cyclicals may be elusive. As a result, we expect re-convergence to occur via a rebound in defensive relative to cyclical sectors (Chart 34). On a longer-term basis, one likely long-lasting effect of the retreat from globalization is that "small is beautiful." Companies with large global footprints will suffer relative to domestically focused firms. One way to position for this change is to emphasize small caps at the expense of large caps, a strategy applicable in almost every region. Small caps are traditionally domestically geared irrespective of their domicile. In the U.S. specifically, small caps face a potential additional benefit. If the new administration follows through with promised corporate tax cuts, then small caps will benefit disproportionately given that the effective tax rate of multinationals is already low. Moreover, small companies would benefit most from any cuts in regulations. When it comes to specifics, our overweight sectors in the U.S. are consumer discretionary, telecoms, consumer staples and health care. We would underweight industrials, technology and materials. For Europe, we also like health care and would overweight German real estate. We would stay away from European banks even though they are trading at historically cheap levels. Commodities And Currencies Mr. X: A year ago, you predicted that oil prices would average $50/bbl over the 2016-18 period. As that is where prices have now settled, do you still stick with that prediction? Chart 35Oil Market Trends Oil Market Trends Oil Market Trends BCA: We have moved our forecast up to an average of $55/bbl following the recent 1.8 million b/d production cuts agreed between OPEC, led by Saudi Arabia, and non-OPEC, led by Russia. The economic pain from the drop in prices finally forced Saudi Arabia to blink and abandon its previous strategy of maintaining output despite falling prices. Of course, OPEC has a very spotty record of sticking with its plans and we expect that we will end up with a more modest 1.1 to 1.2 million b/d in actual output reductions. Yet, given global demand growth of around 1.3 million b/d and weakness in other non-OPEC output, these cuts will be enough to require a drawdown in inventories from current record levels. Even with the lower level of cuts that we expect, OECD oil inventories could drop by around 300 million barrels by late 2017, enough to bring down stocks roughly to their five-year average level (Chart 35). That is the stated goal of Saudi Arabia and the odds are good that the level of compliance to the cuts will be better than the market expects. Mr. X: How does shale production factor into your analysis? What are the odds that a resurgence of U.S. shale production will undermine your price forecast? BCA: We expect U.S. shale-oil production to bottom in the first quarter of 2017, followed by a production increase of around 200,000 b/d in the second half. However, that will not be enough to drive prices back down. The bigger risk to oil prices over the next year or two is for a rise, not a decline given the industry's massive cutbacks in capital spending. More than $1 trillion of planned capex has been cut for the next several years, which translates into more than seven million b/d of oil-equivalent (oil and natural gas) production that will not be developed. And increased shale production cannot fully offset that. In addition to meeting demand growth, new production also must offset natural decline rates, which amount to 8% to 10% of production annually. Replacing these losses becomes more difficult as shale-oil output increases, given its very high decline rates. Shale technology appears to be gaining traction in Russia, which could end up significantly boosting production but capex cuts will constrain the global supply outlook until after 2018. Mr. X: Non-oil commodity prices have shown surprising strength recently, with copper surging almost 30% in the space of a few weeks. Is that just Chinese speculation, or is something more fundamental at work? You have had a cautious long-term view of commodities on the grounds that changing technology and reduced Chinese demand would keep a lid on prices. Do you see any reason to change that view? BCA: Developments in China remain critical for non-oil commodity prices. China's reflationary policies significantly boosted real estate and infrastructure spending and that was the main driver of the rally in metals prices in 2016. As we discussed earlier, China has eased back on reflation and that will take the edge off the commodity price boom. Indeed, given the speed and magnitude of the price increases in copper and other metals, it would not be surprising to see some near-term retrenchment. For the year as a whole, we expect a trading range for non-oil commodities. Longer-run, we would not bet against the long-term downtrend in real commodity prices and it really is a story about technology (Chart 36). Real estate booms notwithstanding, economies are shifting away from commodity-sensitive activities. Human capital is becoming more important relative to physical capital and price rises for resources encourages both conservation and the development of cheaper alternatives. In the post-WWII period, the pattern seems to have been for 10-year bull markets (1972 to 1982 and 2002 to 2012) and 20-year bear markets (1952 to 1972 and 1982 to 2002). The current bear phase is only six years old so it would be early to call an end to the downtrend from a long-term perspective. Chart 36The Long-Term Trend In Real Commodity Prices Is Down The Long-Term Trend in Real Commodity Prices Is Down The Long-Term Trend in Real Commodity Prices Is Down Mr. X: You know that I can't leave without asking you about gold. I continue to believe that bullion provides a good hedge at a time of extreme monetary policies, political uncertainty and, now, the prospect of fiscal reflation. Can you see bullion at least matching its past year's performance over the coming 12 months? Chart 37A Strong Dollar Hurts Bullion A Strong Dollar Hurts Bullion A Strong Dollar Hurts Bullion BCA: It is still a gold-friendly environment. The combination of political uncertainty, rising inflation expectations and continued easy money policies should provide support to bullion prices over the next year. The main negative is the potential for a further rise in the dollar: the strengthening of the dollar clearly was a factor undermining the gold price in the second half of 2016 (Chart 37). Nevertheless, a modest position in gold - no more than 5% of your portfolio - will give you some protection in what is likely to remain a very unsettled geopolitical environment. Mr. X: You mentioned the dollar so let me now delve into your currency views in more detail. The dollar has been appreciating for a few years and it seems quite a consensus view to be bullish on the currency. I know the U.S. economy is growing faster than most other developed economies but it surprises me that markets are ignoring the negatives: an ongoing large trade deficit, a looming rise in the fiscal deficit and uncertainty about the policies of the incoming administration. BCA: It is true that if you just looked at the U.S. economic and financial situation in isolation, you would not be very bullish on the currency. As you noted, the current account remains in large deficit, an increased federal deficit seems inevitable given the new administration's policy platform, and the level of short-rates is very low, despite the Fed's recent move. However, currencies are all about relative positions, and, despite its problems, the U.S. looks in better shape than other countries. The optimism toward the dollar is a near-term concern and suggests that the currency is ripe for a pullback. However, it will not require a major sell-off to unwind current overbought conditions. The main reasons to stay positive on the dollar on a cyclical basis are the relative stance of monetary policy and the potential for positive U.S. economic surprises relative to other countries. Ironically, if the administration follows up on its threat to impose trade barriers, that also would be positive for the currency, at least for a while. Longer-run it would be dollar bearish, because the U.S. probably would lose competiveness via higher inflation. The dollar is enjoying its third major upcycle since the era of floating rates began in the early 1970s (Chart 38). There are similarities in all three cases. Policy divergences and thus real interest-rate differentials were in the dollar's favor and there was general optimism about the U.S. economy relative to its competitors. In the first half of the 1980s, the optimism reflected President Reagan's pro-growth supply-side platform, in the second half of the 1990s it was the tech bubble, and this time it is the poor state of other economies that makes the U.S. look relatively attractive. Chart 38The Dollar Bull Market In Perspective January 2017 - Shifting Regimes January 2017 - Shifting Regimes The bull market in the first half of the 1980s was the strongest of the three but was cut short by the 1985 Plaza Accord when the leading industrial economies agreed to coordinated intervention to push the dollar back down in order to forestall a U.S. protectionist response to its soaring trade deficit. The second upturn ended when the tech bubble burst. There is no prospect of intervention to end the current cycle and policy divergences will widen not narrow over the next year. Thus, the dollar should continue to appreciate over the next 12 months, perhaps by around 5% on a trade-weighted basis. The fiscal policies being promoted by the Trump team promise to widen the U.S. trade deficit but that will not stand in the way of a dollar ascent. The problems will occur if, as we discussed earlier, an overheating economy in 2018 and a resulting Fed response trigger a recession in 2019. At that point, the dollar probably would plunge. But it is far too soon to worry about that possibility. Mr. X: I was very surprised with the yen's strength in the first half of 2016 given Japan's hyper-easy policy stance. What was driving that? Also, I would be interested in your views on sterling and commodity and emerging currencies. BCA: The yen often acts as a safe-haven at times of great economic and political uncertainty and that worked in the yen's favor for much of the year. However, it lost ground when U.S. bond yields headed higher. Also, the U.S. election result did not help because Japan would be a big loser if the U.S. imposed trade restrictions. The policy settings in Japan are indeed negative for the yen and while the currency is oversold in the very short run, we expect the structural bear market to persist in 2017 (Chart 39). Sterling's trade-weighted index fell to an all-time low after the Brexit vote so it does offer good value by historical standards. However, with so much uncertainty about how Brexit negotiations will proceed, we remain cautious on the currency. The economy has performed quite well since the vote, but it is far too soon to judge the long-term consequences of EU departure. And the prospect of increased government spending when the country already has a large trade deficit and high public debt poses an additional risk. Turning to the commodity currencies, the rebound in oil and metals prices has stabilized the Canadian and Australian dollars (Chart 40). With resource prices not expected to make much further headway over the next year, these currencies likely will be range bound, albeit with risks to the downside, especially versus the U.S. dollar. Chart 39More Downside In The Yen More Downside In The Yen More Downside In The Yen Chart 40Commodity Currencies Have Stabilized Commodity Currencies Have Stabilized Commodity Currencies Have Stabilized Finally, we remain bearish on emerging currencies given relatively poor economic fundamentals. And this is particularly true for those countries with chronically high inflation and/or large current account deficits, largely outside of Asia. Mr. X: What about the Chinese currency? The renminbi has dropped by 13% against the dollar over the past three years and president-elect Trump has threatened to label China as a currency manipulator. You already noted that the Chinese authorities have intervened to prop the currency up, but this does not seem to be working. Chart 41Renminbi Weakness Renminbi Weakness Renminbi Weakness BCA: The trend in the USD/RMB rate exaggerates the weakness of the Chinese currency. On a trade-weighted basis, the currency has depreciated more modestly over the past year, and the recent trend has been up, in both real and nominal terms (Chart 41). In other words, a good part of the currency's move has reflected across-the-board strength in the dollar. The Chinese authorities are sensitive to U.S. pressures and have taken some measures to contain private capital outflows. The next step would be to raise interest rates but this would be a last resort. With the dollar expected to rise further in 2017, the RMB will drift lower, but policy interventions should limit the decline and we doubt the U.S. will follow through with its threat to label China as a manipulator. Geopolitics Mr. X: Last, but certainly not least, we must talk about geopolitics. In addition to the new political order in the U.S. we have a very unstable political situation in Europe, most notably in Italy. We cannot rule out an anti-euro party taking power in Italy which would presumably trigger massive volatility in the markets. With elections also due in France, Germany and the Netherlands, 2017 will be a crucial year for determining the future of the single currency and the EU. What is your take on the outlook? Chart 42Europeans Still Support The EU Europeans Still Support The EU Europeans Still Support The EU BCA: Europe's electoral calendar is indeed ominously packed with four of the euro area's five largest economies likely to have elections in 2017. Another election could occur if Spain's shaky minority government collapses. While we expect elevated uncertainty and lots of headline risk, we do not believe the elections in 2017 will transform Europe's future. As BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has argued since 2011, global multipolarity increases the logic for European integration. Crises such as Russian assertiveness, Islamic terrorism, and the migration wave are easier to deal with when countries act together rather than individually. Thus far, it appears that Europeans agree with this assessment: polling suggests that few are genuinely antagonistic towards the euro or the EU (Chart 42). Despite all of its problems, the single currency should hold together, at least over the next five years. Take the recent Spanish and Austrian elections. In Spain, Mariano Rajoy's right-wing People's Party managed to hold onto power despite four years of painful internal devaluations and supply-side reforms. In Austria, the more-establishment candidate for president, Alexander Van der Bellen, won the election despite fears to the contrary. In both cases, the centrist candidates survived because voters hesitated when confronted with an anti-establishment choice. We expect more of the same in the three crucial elections in the Netherlands, France, and Germany. Mr. X: What about Italy? BCA: The country certainly has its problems: it has lagged badly in implementing structural reforms and support for the euro is low compared to the euro area average. Yet, if elections were held today, polls show that the ruling Democratic Party would gain a narrow victory. There are three key points to consider regarding Italy: The December constitutional referendum was not a vote on the euro and thus cannot serve as a proxy for a future referendum. The market will punish Italy the moment it sniffs out even a whiff of a potential "Itexit" referendum. This will bring forward the future pain of redenomination, influencing voters' choices. Benefits of EU membership for Italy are considerable, especially as it allows the country to integrate its unproductive, poor, and expensive southern regions. Outside the EU, the Mezzogiorno is Rome's problem, and it is a big one. The larger question is whether other euro area countries will be content for Italy to remain mired in its fragile and troubling status quo. We think the answer is yes, given that Italy is the definition of "too-big-to-fail." Mr. X: During the past few years you have emphasized the importance of the shift from a unipolar to multipolar world, reflecting the growing power of China, renewed Russian activism and a decline in U.S. influence. How does the policy platform of the incoming Trump administration affect your view of the outlook? It seems as if the U.S. may end up antagonizing China at the same time as it tries to improve relations with Russia. How would that play out? Chart 43Asia Sells, America Rules Asia Sells, America Rules Asia Sells, America Rules BCA: The media is overemphasizing the role of president-elect Trump in Sino-American relations. Tensions have been building between the two countries for several years. The two countries have fundamental, structural, problems and Trump has just catalyzed what, in our mind, has been an inevitable conflict. The Asian state-led economic model was underpinned by the Pax Americana. Two factors were instrumental: America's commitment to free trade and its military supremacy. China was not technically an ally, like Japan and Korea, but after 1979 it sure looked like one in terms of trade surpluses and military spending (Chart 43). For the sake of containing the Soviet Union, the U.S. wrapped East Asia under its umbrella. Japan's economic model and large trade surpluses led it into a confrontation with the U.S. in the 1980s. President Ronald Reagan's economic team forced Japan to reform, but the result ultimately was a financial crisis as the artificial supports of its economic model fell away. Many investors have long suspected that a similar fate awaited China. It is unsustainable for China to seize ever greater market share and drive down manufacturing prices without reforming its economy to match G7 standards, especially if it hinders U.S. access to its vast consumer market. There is a critical difference between the "Japan bashing" of the 1980s and the increasingly potent "China bashing" of today. In the 1980s, the U.S. had already achieved strategic supremacy over Japan as a result of WWII, but that is not the case for the U.S. and China in 2017. Unlike Japan, Korea, or any of the other Asian tigers, China cannot trust the U.S. to preserve its security. Far from it - China has no greater security threat than the U.S. The American navy threatens Chinese access to critical commodities and export markets via the South China Sea. In a world that is evolving into a zero-sum game, these things suddenly matter. That means that when the Trump administration tries to "get tough" on long-standing American demands, these demands will not be taken as well-intentioned or trustworthy. Sino-American rivalry will be the chief geopolitical risk to investors in 2017. Mr. X: Are there any other geopolitical issues that might affect financial markets during the coming year? BCA: Investors are underestimating the risks that the defeat of the Islamic State Caliphate in the Middle East will pose. While the obvious consequence is a spread of terrorism as militants return home, the bigger question is what happens to the regional disequilibrium. In particular, we fear that Turkey will become embroiled in a conflict in both Syria and Iraq, potentially in a proxy war with Iran and Russia. The defeat of Islamic State will create a vacuum in the Middle East that the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds are most likely to fill. This is unacceptable to Turkey, which has intervened militarily to counter Kurdish gains and may do so in the future. The Turkish foray into the Middle East poses the chief risk of a shooting war that could impact global markets in 2017. While there are much greater geopolitical games afoot - such as increasing Sino-American tensions - this one is the most likely to produce military conflict between serious powers. It would be disastrous for Turkey. Conclusions Mr. X: I think we should end our discussions here before you make me more depressed. A year ago, I was very troubled about the economic and financial outlook, and you did not say very much at that time to ease my concerns. And I feel in a similar situation again this year. I do not believe we are at the edge of a major economic or financial crisis, so that is not the issue. The problem for me is that policymakers continue to distort things with excessively easy monetary policies. And now we face fiscal expansion in the U.S., even though the economy is approaching full employment and wages are picking up. Meanwhile, nobody seems worried about debt anymore despite debt-to-GDP ratios that are at all-time highs throughout the world. And if that was not enough, we face the most uncertain political environment that I can remember, both in the U.S. and Europe. It would not be so bad if markets were cheap to compensate for the various risks and uncertainties that we face. But, as we discussed, that is not the case. So I am left with the same dilemma as last year: where to invest when most assets are fully valued. I am sure that you are right when you say that stock prices are well placed to overshoot over the coming year, but that is not a game I like to play. So I am inclined to stay with a cautious investment stance for a while longer, hoping for a better entry point into equities and other risk assets. BCA: We understand your caution, but you risk missing out on some decent gains in equities over the coming year if you remain on the sidelines. The equity market is due for a near-term pullback, but we would use that as a buying opportunity. Markets are not expensive everywhere and the policy backdrop will remain supportive of risk assets. And although we talked about an overshoot, there is plenty of upside before we need to be concerned that valuations have become a major constraint. We are certainly not trying to persuade you to throw caution to the wind. We have not changed our view that long-term returns from financial assets will be a pale shadow of their historical performance. The past 33 years have delivered compound returns of 10.3% a year from a balanced portfolio and we cannot find any comparable period in history that comes even close (Table 3). As we discussed at length in the past, these excellent returns reflected a powerful combination of several largely interrelated forces: falling inflation and interest rates, rising profit margins, a starting point of cheap valuations and strong credit growth. None of these conditions exist now: inflation and interest rates are headed up, profit margins are likely to compress, valuations are not cheap, and in a post-Debt Supercycle world, the days of rapid credit growth are over. Thus, that same balanced portfolio is likely to deliver compound returns of only 4% over the coming decade. Table 3The Past Is Not A Guide To The Future January 2017 - Shifting Regimes January 2017 - Shifting Regimes The bottom line is that the economic and policy regime that delivered exceptional markets is shifting. The end of the Debt Supercycle a few years ago represented one element of regime shift and now we face several other elements such as the end of the era of falling inflation and interest rates, a rebalancing of the income shares going to labor and capital, and politically, in attitudes and thus policies regarding globalization. A world of modest returns is one where it is very important to get the right country and sector allocation, and ideally, catch shorter-term market swings. Of course, that is much more challenging than simply enjoying a rising tide that lifts all boats. As the year progresses, we will update you with our latest thinking on market trends and investment ideas. Mr. X: I am sure we are about to have a very interesting year and I will rely on your research to highlight investment opportunities and to keep me out of trouble. Once again, many thanks for spending the time to take me through your views and let's end with a summary of your main views. BCA: That will be our pleasure. The key points are as follows: A number of important regime shifts will impact the economic and investment outlook over the next few years. These include the end of the era of falling inflation and interest rates, a move away from fiscal conservatism, a policy pushback against globalization, and a rise in the labor share of income at the expense of profit margins. Together with an earlier regime shift when the Debt Supercycle ended, these trends are consistent with very modest returns from financial assets over the next decade. The failure of low interest rates to trigger a vigorous rebound in private credit growth is consistent with our end-of-Debt Supercycle thesis. The end-point for dealing with high debt levels may ultimately be sharply higher inflation, but only after the next downturn triggers a new deflationary scare. The potential for trade restrictions by the incoming U.S. administration poses a threat to the outlook, but the odds of a global trade war are low. Time-lags in implementing policy mean that the fiscal plans of president-elect Trump will boost U.S. growth in 2018 more than 2017. This raises the risk of an overheated economy in 2018 leading to a monetary squeeze and recession in 2019. They key issue will be whether the supply side of the economy expands alongside increased demand and it will be critical to monitor business capital spending. Lingering structural problems will prevent any growth acceleration outside the U.S. The euro area and emerging economies are still in the midst of a deleveraging cycle and demographics remain a headwind for Japan. Not many countries will follow the U.S. example of fiscal stimulus. Nevertheless, for the first time since the recovery began, global growth forecasts are likely to avoid a downgrade over the next couple of years. China remains an unbalanced and fragile economy but the authorities have enough policy flexibility to avoid a hard landing, at least over the year or two. The longer-run outlook is more bearish unless the government moves away from its stop-go policy approach and pursues more supply-side reforms. Inflation has bottomed in the U.S., but the upturn will be gradual in 2017 and it will stay subdued in the euro area and Japan. Divergences in monetary policy between the U.S. and other developed economies will continue to build in 2017 as the Fed tightens and other central banks stay on hold. Unlike a year ago, the Fed's rate expectations look reasonable. Bond yields in the U.S. may fall in the near run after their recent sharp rise, but the cyclical trend is up against a backdrop of monetary tightening, fiscal stimulus and rising inflation. Yields in the euro area will be held down by ongoing QE, while the 10-year yield will stay capped at zero in Japan. The secular bull market in bonds is over although yields could retest their recent lows in the next downturn. The search for yield will remain an important investment theme, but rich valuations dictate only a neutral weighting in investment-grade corporate bonds and a modest underweight in high-yielders. The U.S. equity market is modestly overvalued but the conditions are ripe for an overshoot in 2017 given optimism about a boost to profits from the new administration's policies. Earnings expectations are far too high and ignore the likelihood that rising labor costs will squeeze margins. Nevertheless, that need not preclude equity prices moving higher. There is a good chance of a sell-off in early 2017 and that would be a buying opportunity. Valuations are better in Japan and several European markets than in the U.S. and relative monetary conditions also favor these markets. We expect the U.S. to underperform in 2017. We expect emerging markets to underperform developed markets. The oil price should average around $55 a barrel over the next one or two years, with some risk to the upside. Although shale production should increase, the cutbacks in oil industry capital spending and planned production cuts by OPEC and some other producers will ensure that inventories will have to be drawn down in the second half of 2017. Non-oil commodity prices will stay in a trading range after healthy gains in 2016, but the long-run outlook is still bearish. The dollar bull market should stay intact over the coming year with the trade-weighted index rising by around 5%. Relative policy stances and economic trends should all stay supportive of the dollar. The outlook for the yen is especially gloomy. A stabilization in resource prices will keep commodity prices in a range. We remain bearish on EM currencies. The biggest geopolitical risks relate to U.S.-China relations, especially given president-elect Trump's inclination to engage in China-bashing. Meanwhile, the defeat of ISIS could create a power vacuum in the Middle East that could draw Turkey into a disastrous conflict with the Kurds and Iran/Russia. The coming year is important for elections in Europe but we do not expect any serious threat to the EU or single currency to emerge. Let us take this opportunity to wish you and all of our clients a very peaceful, healthy and prosperous New Year. The Editors December 20, 2016