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Highlights Geopolitical conflicts point to energy price spikes and could add to inflation surprises in the near term. However, US fiscal drag and China’s economic slowdown are both disinflationary risks to be aware of.  Specifically, energy-producers like Russia and Iran gain greater leverage amid energy shortages. Europe’s natural gas prices could spike again. Conflict in the Middle East could disrupt oil flows.    President Biden’s $1.75 trillion social spending bill is a litmus test for fiscal fatigue in developed markets. It could fail, and even assuming it passes it will not prevent overall fiscal drag in 2022-23. However, it is inflationary over the long run. China’s slowdown poses the chief disinflationary risk. But we still think policy will ease to avoid an economic crash ahead of the fall 2022 national party congress.  We are closing this year’s long value / short growth trade for a loss of 3.75%. Cyclical sectors ended up being a better way to play the reopening trade. Feature Equity markets rallied in recent weeks despite sharp upward moves in core inflation across the world (Chart 1). Inflation is fast becoming a popular concern and we see geopolitical risks that could drive headline inflation still higher in the short run. We also see underrated disinflationary factors, namely China’s property sector distress and economic slowdown.     Several major developments have occurred in recent weeks that we will cover in this report. Our conclusions: Biden’s domestic agenda will pass but risks are high and macro impact is limited. Congress passed Biden’s infrastructure deal and will probably still pass his signature social spending bill, although inflation is creating pushback. Together these bills have little impact on the budget deficit outlook but they will add to inflationary pressures.  Energy shortages embolden Russia and Iran. Winter weather is unpredictable, the energy crisis may not be over. But investors are underrating Russia’s aggressive posture toward the West. Any conflict with Iran could also cause oil disruptions in the near future. US-China relations may improve but not for long. A bilateral summit between Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping will not reduce tensions for very long, if at all. Climate change cooperation is an insufficient basis to reverse the cold war-style confrontation over the long run. Chart 1Inflation Rattles Policymakers Inflation Rattles Policymakers Inflation Rattles Policymakers The investment takeaway is that geopolitical tensions could push energy prices still higher in the short term. Iran and Russia need to be monitored. However, China’s economic slowdown will weigh on growth. China poses an underrated disinflationary risk to our views. US Congress: Bellwether For Fiscal Fatigue While inflation is starting to trouble households and voters, investors should bear in mind that the current set of politicians have long aimed to generate an inflation overshoot. They spent the previous decade in fear of deflation, since it generated anti-establishment or populist parties that threatened to disrupt the political system. They quietly built up an institutional consensus around more robust fiscal policy and monetary-fiscal coordination. Now they are seeing that agenda succeed but are facing the first major hurdle in the form of higher prices. They will not simply cut and run. Inflation is accompanied by rising wages, which today’s leaders want to see – almost all of them have promised households a greater share of the fruits of their labor, in keeping with the new, pro-worker, populist zeitgeist. Real wages are growing at 1.1% in the US and 0.9% across the G7 (Chart 2). Even more than central bankers, political leaders are focused on jobs and employment, i.e. voters. Yet the labor market still has considerable slack (Chart 3). Almost all of the major western governments have been politically recapitalized since the pandemic, either through elections or new coalitions. Almost all of them were elected on promises of robust public investment programs to “build back better,” i.e. create jobs, build infrastructure, revitalize industry, and decarbonize the energy economy. Thus while they are concerned about inflation, they will leave that to central banks, as they will be loathe to abandon their grand investment plans.  Chart 2Higher Wages: Real Or Nominal? Higher Wages: Real Or Nominal? Higher Wages: Real Or Nominal? Still, there will be a breaking point at which inflation forces governments to put their spending plans on hold. The US Congress is the immediate test of whether today’s inflation will trigger fiscal fatigue and force a course correction.      Chart 3Policymakers Fear Populism, Focus On Employment Policymakers Fear Populism, Focus On Employment Policymakers Fear Populism, Focus On Employment President Biden’s $550 billion infrastructure bill passed Congress last week and will be signed into law around November 15. Now he is worried that his signature $1.75 trillion social spending bill will falter due to inflation fears. He cannot spare a single vote in the Senate (and only three votes in the House of Representatives). Odds that the bill fails are about 35%. Democratic Party leaders will not abandon the cause due to recent inflation prints. They see a once-in-a-generation opportunity to expand the role of government, the social safety net, and the interests of their constituents. If they miss this chance due to inflation that ends up being transitory then they will lose the enthusiastic left wing of the party and suffer a devastating loss in next year’s midterm elections, in which they are already at a disadvantage.   Biden’s social bill is also likely to pass because the budget reconciliation process necessary to pass the bill is the same process needed to raise the national debt limit by December 3. A linkage of the two by party leaders would ensure that both pass … and otherwise Democrats risk self-inflicting a national debt default. The reconciliation bill is more about long-term than short-term inflation risk. The bill does not look to have a substantial impact on the budget outlook: the new spending is partially offset by new taxes and spread out over ten years. The various legislative scenarios look virtually the same in our back-of-the-envelope budget projections (Chart 4). Chart 4 However, given that the output gap is virtually closed, this bill combined with the infrastructure bill will add to inflationary pressures. The fiscal drag will diminish by 2024, not coincidentally the presidential election year 2024, not coincidentally the presidential election year. The deficit is not expected to increase or decrease substantially between 2023 and 2024. From then onward the budget deficit will expand. The increased government demand for goods and services and the increased disposable income for low-earning families will add to inflationary pressures. Other developed markets face a similar situation: inflation is picking up, but big spending has been promised and normalizing budgets will marginally weigh on growth in the next few years (Chart 5). True, growth should hold up since the private economy is rebounding in the wake of the pandemic. But politicians will not be inclined to renege on campaign promises of liberal spending in the face of fiscal drag. The current crop of leaders is primed to make major public investments. This is true of Germany, Japan, Canada, and Italy as well as the United States. It is partly true in France, where fiscal retrenchment has been put on hold given the presidential election in the spring. The effect will be inflationary, especially for the US where populist spending is more extravagant than elsewhere. Chart 5 The long run will depend on structural factors and how much the new investments improve productivity. Bottom Line: A single vote in the US Senate could derail the president’s social spending bill, so the US is now the bellwether for fiscal fatigue in the developed world. Biden is likely to pass the bill, as global fiscal drag is disinflationary over the next 12 months. Yet inflation could stay elevated for other reasons. And this fiscal drag will dissipate later in the business cycle. Russia And Iran Gain Leverage Amid Energy Crunch The global energy price spike arose from a combination of structural factors – namely the pandemic and stimulus. It has abated in recent weeks but will remain a latent problem through the winter season, especially if La Niña makes temperatures unusually cold as expected. Rising energy prices feed into general producer prices, which are being passed onto consumers (Chart 6). They look to be moderating but the weather is unpredictable.   There is another reason that near-term energy prices could spike or stay elevated: geopolitics. Tight global energy supply-demand balances mean that there is little margin of safety if unexpected supply disruptions occur. This gives greater leverage to energy producers, two of which are especially relevant at the moment: Russia and Iran.      Russia’s long-running conflict with the West is heating up on several fronts, as expected. Russia may not have caused the European energy crisis but it is exacerbating shortages by restricting flows of natural gas for political reasons, as it is wont to do (Chart 7). Moscow always maintains plausible deniability but it is currently flexing its energy muscles in several areas: Chart 6Energy Price Depends On Winter ... And Russia/Iran! Energy Price Depends On Winter ... And Russia/Iran! Energy Price Depends On Winter ... And Russia/Iran! Ukraine: Russia has avoided filling up and fully utilizing pipelines and storage facilities in Ukraine, where the US is now warning that Russia could stage a large military action in retaliation for Ukrainian drone strikes in the still-simmering Russia-Ukraine war.    Belarus: Russia says it will not increase the gas flow through the major Yamal-Europe natural gas pipeline in 2022 even as Belarus threatens to halt the pipeline’s operation entirely. Belarus, backed by Russia, is locked in a conflict with Poland and the EU over Belarus’s funneling of migrants into their territory (Chart 8). The conflict could lead not only to energy supply disruptions but also to a broader closure of trade and a military standoff.1 Russia has flown two Tu-160 nuclear-armed bombers over Belarus and the border area in a sign of support. Moldova: Russia is withholding natural gas to pressure the new, pro-EU Moldovan government. Chart 7 Chart 8 Russia’s main motive is obvious: it wants Germany and the EU to approve and certify the new Nord Stream II pipeline. Nord Stream II enables Germany and Russia to bypass Ukraine, where pipeline politics raise the risk of shortages and wars. Lame duck German Chancellor Angela Merkel worked with Russia to complete this pipeline before the end of her term, convincing the Biden administration to issue a waiver on congressional sanctions that could have halted its construction. However, two of the parties in the incoming German government, the Greens and the Free Democrats, oppose the pipeline. While these parties may not have been able to stop the pipeline from operating, Russia does not want to take any chances and is trying to force Germany’s and the EU’s hand. The energy crisis makes it more likely that the pipeline will be approved, since the European Commission will have to make its decision during a period when cold weather and shortages will make it politically acceptable to certify the pipeline.2 The decision will further drive a wedge between Germany and eastern EU members, which is what Russia wants. EU natural gas prices will likely subside sometime next year and will probably not derail the economic recovery, according to both our commodity and Europe strategists. A bigger and longer-lasting Russian energy squeeze would emerge if the Nord Stream II pipeline is not certified. This is a low risk at this point but the next six months could bring surprises. More broadly, the West’s conflict with Russia can easily escalate from here. First, President Vladimir Putin faces economic challenges and weak political support. He frequently diverts popular attention by staging aggressive moves abroad. There is no reason to believe his post-2004 strategy of restoring Russia’s sphere of influence in the former Soviet space has changed. High energy prices give him greater leverage even aside from pipeline coercion – so it is not surprising that Russia is moving troops to the Ukraine border again. Growing military support for Belarus, or an expanded conflict in Ukraine, are likely to create a crisis now or later.   Second, the US-Germany agreement to allow Nord Stream II explicitly states that Russia must not weaponize natural gas supply. This statement has had zero effect so far. But when the energy shortage subsides, the EU could pursue retaliatory measures along with the United States. Of course, Russia has been able to weather sanctions. But tensions are already escalating significantly.  After Russia, Iran also gains leverage during times of tight energy supplies. With global oil inventories drawing down, Iran is in the position to inflict “maximum pressure” on the US and its allies, a role reversal from the 2017-20 period in which large inventories enabled the US to impose crippling sanctions on Iran after pulling out of the 2015 nuclear deal (Chart 9). Iran is rapidly advancing on its nuclear program and a new round of diplomatic negotiations may only serve to buy time before it crosses the “breakout” threshold of uranium enrichment capability as early as this month or next. In a recent special report we argued that there is a 40% chance of a crisis over Iran in the Middle East. Such a crisis could ultimately lead to an oil shock in the Persian Gulf or Strait of Hormuz.  Chart 9Now Iran Can Use 'Maximum Pressure' Now Iran Can Use 'Maximum Pressure' Now Iran Can Use 'Maximum Pressure' Bottom Line: Russia’s natural gas coercion of Europe could keep European energy prices high through March or May. More broadly Russia’s renewed tensions with the West confirm our view that oil producers gain geopolitical leverage amid the current supply shortages. Iran also gains leverage and its conflict with the US could lead to global oil supply disruptions anytime over the next 12 months. Until Nord Stream II is certified and a new Iranian nuclear agreement is signed, there are two clear sources of potential energy shocks. Moreover in today’s inflationary context there is limited margin of safety for unexpected supply disruptions regardless of source. Xi’s Historical Rewrite China continues to be a major source of risk for the global economy and financial markets in the lead-up to the twentieth national party congress in fall 2022. While Chinese assets have sold off this year, global risk assets are still vulnerable to negative surprises from China.  The five-year political reshuffle in 2022 is more important than usual since President Xi Jinping was originally supposed to step down but will instead stick around as leader for life, like China’s previous strongmen Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.3 Xi’s rejection of term limits became clear in 2017 and is not really news. But Xi will fortify himself and his faction in 2022 against any opposition whatsoever. He is extremely vigilant about any threats that could disrupt this process, whether at home or abroad.  The Communist Party’s sixth plenary session this week highlights both Xi’s success within the Communist Party and the sensitivity of the period. Xi produced a new “historical resolution,” or interpretation of the party’s history, which is only the third such resolution. A few remarks on this historical resolution are pertinent: Mao’s resolution: Chairman Mao wrote the first such resolution in 1945 to lay down his version of the party’s history and solidify his personal control. It is naturally a revolutionary leftist document. Deng’s revision of Mao: General Deng Xiaoping then produced a major revision in 1981, shortly after initiating China’s economic opening and reform. Deng’s interpretation aimed to hold Mao accountable for “gross mistakes” during the Cultural Revolution and yet to recognize the Communist Party’s positive achievements in founding the People’s Republic. His version gave credit to the party and collective leadership rather than Mao’s personal rule. Two 30-year periods: The implication was that the party’s history should be divided into two thirty-year periods: the period of foundations and conflict with Mao as the party’s core and the period of improvement and prosperity with Deng as the core. Jiang’s support of Deng: Deng’s telling came under scrutiny from new leftists in the wake of Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. But General Secretary Jiang Zemin largely held to Deng’s version of the story that the days of reform and opening were a far better example of the party’s leadership because they were so much more stable and prosperous.4 Xi’s reaction to Jiang and Deng: Since coming to power in 2012, Xi Jinping has shown an interest in revising the party’s official interpretation of its own history. The central claim of the revisionists is that China could never have achieved its economic success if not for Mao’s strongman rule. Mao’s rule and the Communist Party’s central control thus regain their centrality to modern China’s story. China’s prosperity owes its existence to these primary political conditions. The two periods cannot be separated.  Xi’s synthesis of Deng and Mao: Now Xi has written himself into that history above all other figures – indeed the communique from the Sixth Plenum mentions Xi more often than Marx, Mao, or Deng (Chart 10). The implication is that Xi is the synthesis of Mao and Deng, as we argued back in 2017 at the end of the nineteenth national party congress. The synthesis consists of a strongman who nevertheless maintains a vibrant economy for strategic ends. Chart 10 What are the practical policy implications of this history lesson? Higher Country Risk: China’s revival of personal rule, as opposed to consensus rule, marks a permanent increase in “country risk” and political risk for investors. Autocratic governments lack institutional guardrails (checks and balances) that prevent drastic policy mistakes. When Xi tries to step down there will probably be a succession crisis. Higher Macroeconomic Risk: China is more likely to get stuck in the “middle-income trap.” Liberal or pro-market economic reform is de-emphasized both in the new historical resolution and in the Xi administration’s broader program. Centralization is already suppressing animal spirits, entrepreneurship, and the private sector.  Higher Geopolitical Risk: The return to autocracy and the withdrawal from economic liberalism also entail a conflict with the United States, which is still the world’s largest economy and most powerful military. The US is not what it once was but it will put pressure on China’s economy and build alliances aimed at strategic containment. Bottom Line: China is trying to escape the middle-income trap, like Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, but it is trying to do so by means of autocracy, import substitution, and conflict with the United States. These other Asian economies improved productivity by democratizing, embracing globalization, and maintaining a special relationship with the United States. China’s odds of succeeding are low. China will focus on power consolidation through fall 2022 and this will lead to negative surprises for financial markets.    China Slowdown: The Disinflationary Risk While it is very unlikely that Xi will face serious challenges to his rule, strange things can happen at critical junctures. Therefore the regime will be extremely alert for any threats, foreign or domestic, and will ultimately prioritize politics above all other things, which means investors will suffer negative surprises. The lingering pandemic still poses an inflationary risk for the rest of the world while the other main risk is disinflationary:    Inflationary Risk – Zero COVID: The “Covid Zero” policy of attempting to stamp out any trace of the virus will still be relevant at least over the next 12 months (Chart 11). Clampdowns serve a dual purpose since the Xi administration wants to minimize foreign interference and domestic dissent before the party congress. Hence the global economy can suffer more negative supply shocks if ports or factories are closed.  Inflationary Risk – Energy Closures: The government is rationing electricity amid energy shortages to prioritize household heating and essential services. This could hurt factory output over the winter if the weather is bad. Disinflationary Risk – Property Bust: The country is still flirting with overtightening monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policies. Throughout the year we have argued that authorities would avoid overtightening. But China is still very much in a danger zone in which policy mistakes could be made. Recent rumors suggest the government is trying to “correct the overcorrection” of regulatory policy. The government is reportedly mulling measures to relax the curbs on the property sector. We are inclined to agree but there is no sign yet that markets are responding, judging by corporate defaults and the crunch in financial conditions (Chart 12). Chart 11 Chart 12China Has Not Contained Property Turmoil China Has Not Contained Property Turmoil China Has Not Contained Property Turmoil Evergrande, the world’s most indebted property developer, is still hobbling along, but its troubles are not over. There are signs of contagion among other developers, including state-owned enterprises, that cannot meet the government’s “three red lines.” 5 Credit growth has now broken beneath the government’s target range of 12%, though money growth has bounced off the lower 8% limit set for this year (Chart 13). China is dangerously close to overtightening.   China’s economic slowdown has not yet been fully felt in the global economy based on China’s import volumes, which are tightly linked to the combined credit-and-fiscal-spending impulse (Chart 14). The implication is that recent pullbacks in industrial metal prices and commodity indexes will continue. Chart 13China Tries To Avoid Over-Tightening China Tries To Avoid Over-Tightening China Tries To Avoid Over-Tightening Chart 14China Slowdown Not Yet Fully Felt China Slowdown Not Yet Fully Felt China Slowdown Not Yet Fully Felt ​​​​​​​Until China eases policy more substantially, it poses a disinflationary risk and a strong point in favor of the transitory view of global inflation.    It is difficult for China to ease policy – let alone stimulate – when producer prices are so high (see Chart 6 above). The result is a dangerous quandary in which the government’s regulatory crackdowns are triggering a property bust yet the government is prevented from providing the usual policy support as the going gets tough. Asset prices and broader risk sentiment could go into free fall. However, the party has a powerful incentive to prevent a generalized crisis ahead of the party congress. So we are inclined to accept signs that property curbs and other policies will be eased. Bottom Line: The full disinflationary impact of China’s financial turmoil and economic slowdown has yet to be felt globally.     Biden-Xi Summit Not A Game Changer As long as inflation prevents robust monetary and fiscal easing, Beijing is incentivized to improve sentiment in other ways. One way is to back away from the regulatory crackdown in other sectors, such as Big Tech. The other is to improve relations with the United States. A stabilization of US ties would be useful before the party congress since President Xi would prefer not to have the US interfering in China’s internal affairs during such a critical hour. No surprise that China is showing signs of trying to stabilize the relationship.   The US is apparently reciprocating. Presidents Biden and Xi also agreed to hold a virtual bilateral summit next week, which could lead to a new series of talks. The US Trade Representative also plans to restart trade negotiations. The plan is to enforce the Phase One trade deal, issue waivers for tariffs that hurt US companies, and pursue new talks over outstanding structural disputes. The Phase One trade deal has fallen far short of its goals in general but on the energy front it is doing well. China will continue importing US commodities amid global shortages (Chart 15). Chart 15 Chart 15 The summit alone will have a limited impact. Biden had a summit with Putin earlier this year but relations could deteriorate tomorrow over cyber-attacks, Ukraine, or Belarus. However, there is some basis for the US and China to cooperate next year: Iran. Xi is consolidating power at home in 2022 and probably wants to use negotiations to keep the Americans at bay. Biden is pivoting to foreign policy in 2022, since Congress will not get anything done, and will primarily focus on halting Iran’s nuclear program. If China assists the US with Iran, then there is a basis for a reduction in tensions. The problem is not only Iran itself but also that China will not jump to enforce sanctions on Iran amid energy shortages. And China is not about to make sweeping structural economic concessions to the US as the Xi administration doubles down on state-guided industrial policy. Meanwhile the US is pursuing a long-term policy of strategic containment and Biden will not want to be seen as appeasing China ahead of midterm elections, especially given Xi’s reversion to autocracy. What about cooperation on climate change? The US and China also delivered a surprise joint statement at the United Nations climate change conference in Scotland (COP26), confirming the widely held expectation that climate policy is an area of engagement. These powers and Europe have a strategic interest in reducing dependency on Middle Eastern oil (Chart 16). Climate talks will begin in the first half of next year. However, climate cooperation is not significant enough alone to outweigh the deeper conflicts between the US and China. Moreover climate policy itself is somewhat antagonistic, as the EU and US are looking at applying “carbon adjustment fees” to carbon-intensive imports, e.g. iron and steel exports from China and other high-polluting producers (Chart 17). While the EU and US are not on the same page yet, and these carbon tariffs are far from implementation, the emergence of green protectionism does not bode well for US-China relations even aside from their fundamental political and military disputes. Chart 16 Bottom Line: Some short-term stabilization of US-China relations is possible but not guaranteed. Markets will cheer if it happens but the effect will be fleeting. Chinese assets are still extremely vulnerable to political and geopolitical risks.   Chart 17 Investment Takeaways Gold can still go higher. Financial markets are pricing higher inflation and weak real rates. Gold has been our chief trade to prepare both for higher inflation and geopolitical risk. We are closing our long value / growth equity trade for a loss of 3.75%. We are maintaining our long DM Europe / short EM Europe trade. This trade has performed poorly due to the rally in energy prices and hence Russian equities. But while energy prices may overshoot in the near term, investors will flee Russian equities as geopolitical risks materialize. We are maintaining our long Korea / short Taiwan trade despite its being deeply in the red. This trade is valid over a strategic or long-term time horizon, in which a major geopolitical crisis and/or war is likely. Our expectation that China will ease policy to stabilize the economy ahead of fall 2022 should support Korean equities.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com       Footnotes 1     Over the past year President Alexander Lukashenko’s repression of domestic unrest prompted the EU to impose sanctions. Lukashenko responded by organizing an immigration scheme in which Middle Eastern migrants are flown into Belarus and funneled into the EU via Poland. The EU is threatening to expand sanctions while Belarus is threatening to cut off the Yamal-Europe pipeline amid Europe’s energy crisis. See Pavel Felgenhauer, “Belarus as Latest Front in Acute East-West Standoff,” Jamestown Foundation, November 11, 2021, Jamestown.org. 2     Both Germany and the EU must approve of Nord Stream II for it to enter into operation. The German Federal Network Agency has until January 8, 2022 to certify the project. The Economy Ministry has already given the green light. Then the European Commission has two-to-four months to respond. The EU is supposed to consider whether the pipeline meets the EU’s requirement that gas transport be “unbundled” or separated from gas production and sales. This is a higher hurdle but Germany’s clout will be felt. Hence final approval could come by March 8 or May 8, 2022. The energy crisis will put pressure for an early certification but the EU Commission may take the full time to pretend that it is not being blackmailed. See Joseph Nasr and Christoph Steitz, “Certifying Nord Stream 2 poses no threat to gas supply to EU – Germany,” Reuters, October 26, 2021, reuters.com. 3    Xi is not serving for an “unprecedented third term,” as the mainstream media keeps reporting. China’s top office is not constant nor were term limits ever firmly established. Each leader’s reign should be measured by their effective control rather than technical terms in office. Mao reigned for 27 years (1949-76), Deng for 14 years or more (1978-92), Jiang Zemin for 10 years (1992-2002), and Hu Jintao for 10 years (2002-2012).  4    See Joseph Fewsmith, “Mao’s Shadow” Hoover Institution, China Leadership Monitor 43 (2014), and “The 19th Party Congress: Ringing In Xi Jinping’s New Age,” Hoover Institution, China Leadership Monitor 55 (2018), hoover.org.  5    Liability-to-asset ratios less than 70%, debt-to-equity less than 100%, and cash-to-short-term-debt ratios of more than 1.0x.   Strategic View Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Open Trades & Positions  Image

  Nearly two-thirds of the S&P 500 companies reported their Q3 earnings, and the earnings season is drawing to a close. 83% of companies have beaten the street expectations with an average earnings surprise standing at 11% (40% earnings growth vs. 29% expected on October 1, 2021). Sales beats are only marginally worse: 77% of the companies have exceeded expectations with an average sales surprise of 3%. Quarter-on-quarter earnings growth is 0.25% exceeding expected 6% contraction. Compared to Q3-2019, eps CAGR is 12%. Chart 1 Approaching The Finish Line Approaching The Finish Line Financials, Energy, and Health Care have delivered the largest earnings surprises. Financials have done well on the back of the robust M&A activity, while the unfolding energy crisis has lifted the overall S&P 500 Energy complex. Pent-up demand for the elective medical procedures has translated into strong Health Care earnings.   Industrials and Materials were amongst the worst: China-related headwinds continue to weigh on both of these sectors. However, some analysts expect China to ease in Q1-2022, providing a tailwind for these sectors.  Most companies commented that supply chain bottlenecks and soaring shipping costs are the major headwinds. However, as we see, most have navigated a challenging economic environment swimmingly. Strong pricing power and operating leverage have preserved margins and earnings so far. Looking ahead, companies’ ability to raise prices further is waning (Chart 1), while costs continue marching up. These factors are the ubiquitous reasons for a negative guidance – 52.6% of companies are guiding lower for Q4-2021 (compare that to 32.7% previous quarter). Bottom Line: Companies are exceeding analysts’ expectations both in terms of sales and earnings growth.     Chart

Image The markets were deluged by a lot of information in late October. Several central banks made surprise moves towards tightening (the Bank of Canada, for example, ended asset purchases, and the Reserve Bank of Australia effectively abandoned its yield-curve control). Inflation continued to surprise on the upside (headline CPI in the US is now 5.4% year-on-year). But, at the same time, there were signs of faltering growth with, for example, US real GDP growth in Q3 coming in at only 2.0% quarter-on-quarter annualized, compared to 6.7% in Q2. This caused a flattening of the yield curve in many countries, as markets priced in faster monetary tightening but lower long-term growth (Chart 1). Nonetheless, equities shrugged off the barrage of news, with the S&P500 ending the month at a new high. All this highlights what we discussed in our latest Quarterly: That the second year of a bull market is often tricky, resulting in lower (but still positive) returns from equities and higher volatility. For risk assets to continue to outperform, our view of a Goldilocks environment needs to be “just right”: The economy must not be too hot or too cold. We think it will be – and so stay overweight equities versus bonds. But investors should be aware of the risks on either side. How too hot? Inflation is broadening out (at least in the US, UK, Australia and Canada, though not in the euro zone and Japan) and is no longer limited to items which saw unusually strong demand during the pandemic but where supply is constrained (Chart 2). Chart 1What Is The Message Of Flattening Yield Curves? What Is The Message Of Flattening Yield Curves? What Is The Message Of Flattening Yield Curves? Chart 2Inflation Is Broadening Out In The US Inflation Is Broadening Out In The US Inflation Is Broadening Out In The US There is a risk that this turns into a wage-price spiral as employees, amid a tight labor market, push for higher wages to offset rising prices. We find that wages tend to follow prices with a lag of 6-12 months (Chart 3). The Atlanta Fed Wage Tracker (good for gauging underlying wage pressures since it looks only at employees who have been in a job for 12 months or more) is already at 3.5% and looks set to rise further. On the back of these inflationary moves, the market has significantly pulled forward the date of central bank tightening. Futures now imply that the Fed will raise rates in both July and December next year (Chart 4) and that other major developed central banks will also raise multiple times over the next 14 months (Table 1). Breakeven inflation rates have also risen substantially (Chart 5). Chart 3Wages Tend To Rise After Prices Rise Wages Tend To Rise After Prices Rise Wages Tend To Rise After Prices Rise Chart 4Will The Fed Really Hike This Soon? Will The Fed Really Hike This Soon? Will The Fed Really Hike This Soon?   Table 1Futures Implied Path Of Rate Hikes Monthly Portfolio Update: The Risks To Goldilocks Monthly Portfolio Update: The Risks To Goldilocks Chart 5Breakevens Suggest Higher Inflation Breakevens Suggest Higher Inflation Breakevens Suggest Higher Inflation     We think these moves are a little excessive. There are several reasons why inflation might cool next year. Companies are rushing to increase capacity to unblock supply bottlenecks. For example, semiconductor production has already begun to increase, bringing down DRAM prices over the past few months (Chart 6). Another big contributor to broad-based inflation has been a 126% increase in container shipping costs since the start of the year (Chart 7). But currently the number of container ships on order is at a 10-year high; these new ships will be delivered over the next two years. Such deflationary forces should pull down core inflation next year (though we stick to our longstanding view that for multiple structural reasons – demographics, the end of globalization, central bank dovishness, the transition away from fossil fuels – inflation will trend up over the next five years). Chart 6DRAM Prices Falling As Production Ramps Up DRAM Prices Falling As Production Ramps Up DRAM Prices Falling As Production Ramps Up Chart 7All Those Ships On Order Should Bring Down Shipping Costs All Those Ships On Order Should Bring Down Shipping Costs All Those Ships On Order Should Bring Down Shipping Costs The Fed, therefore, will not be in a rush to raise rates. It does not see the labor market as anywhere close to “maximum employment” – it has not defined what it means by this, but we would see it as a 3.8% unemployment rate (the median FOMC dot for the equilibrium unemployment rate) and the prime-age participation rate back to its 2019 level (Chart 8). We continue to expect the first rate hike only in December next year. The Fed will feel the need to override its employment criterion only if long-term inflation expectations become unanchored – but the 5-year 5-year forward breakeven rate is only at 2.3%, within the Fed’s effective CPI target range of 2.3-2.5% (Chart 5). We remain comfortable with our view of only a moderate rise in long-term rates, with the US 10-year Treasury yield at 1.7% by end-2021, and reaching 2-2.25% at the time of the first Fed rate hike. It is also worth emphasizing that even a fairly sharp rise in long-term rates has historically almost always coincided with strong equity performance (Chart 9 and Table 2). This has again been evident in the past 12 months: When rates rose between August 2020 and March 2021, and then from July 2021, equities performed strongly. Chart 8We Are Not Back To "Maximum Employment" We Are Not Back To "Maximum Employment" We Are Not Back To "Maximum Employment" Chart 9Rising Rates Are Usually Accompanied By A Rising Stock Market Rising Rates Are Usually Accompanied By A Rising Stock Market Rising Rates Are Usually Accompanied By A Rising Stock Market   Table 2Episodes Of Rising Long-Term Rates Since 1990 Monthly Portfolio Update: The Risks To Goldilocks Monthly Portfolio Update: The Risks To Goldilocks But could the economy get too cold? We would discount the weak US GDP reading: It was mostly due to production shortages, especially in autos, which pushed down consumption on durable goods by 26% QoQ annualized, and by some softness in spending on services due to the delta Covid variant, the impact of which is now fading. US growth should continue to be supported by a combination of the $2.5 trillion of excess household savings, strong capex as companies boost their production capacity, and a further 5% of GDP in fiscal stimulus that should be passed by Congress by year-end. Similar conditions apply in other developed economies. Chart 10Real Estate Is A Big Part Of Chinese GDP Real Estate Is A Big Part Of Chinese GDP Real Estate Is A Big Part Of Chinese GDP We see three principal risks to this positive outlook: A new strain of Covid-19 that proves resistant to current vaccines – unlikely but not impossible. Our geopolitical strategists worry about Iran, which may have a nuclear bomb ready by December, prompting Israel to bomb the country. Iran would likely react by hampering oil supplies, even blocking the Strait of Hormuz, through which 25% of global oil flows. Chinese growth has been slowing and the impact from the problems at Evergrande is still unclear. Real estate is a major part of the Chinese economy, with residential investment comprising 10% of GDP (Chart 10) and, broadly defined to include construction and building materials, real estate overall perhaps as much as one-third. Our China strategists don’t expect the government to launch a major stimulus which would bail out the industry, since it is happy with the way that property-related lending has been shrinking in recent years (Chart 11). We expect the slowdown in Chinese credit growth to bottom out over the coming few months, but economic activity may have further to slow (Chart 12), and there is a risk that the authorities are unable to control the fallout from the property market. Chart 11Chinese Authorities Are Happy To See Slowing Property Lending Chinese Authorities Are Happy To See Slowing Property Lending Chinese Authorities Are Happy To See Slowing Property Lending Chart 12When Will Credit Growth Bottom? When Will Credit Growth Bottom? When Will Credit Growth Bottom?       Fixed Income: Given the macro environment described above, we remain underweight bonds and short duration. If we assume 1) a Fed liftoff in December 2022, 2) 100 basis points of rate hikes over the following year, and 3) a terminal Fed Funds Rate of 2.08% (the median forecast from the New York Fed’s Survey of Market Participants), 10-year US Treasurys will return -0.2% over the next 12 months, and 2-year Treasurys +0.3%.1 TIPs have overshot fair value and, although we remain neutral since they a tail-risk hedge against high inflation over the next five years, we would especially avoid 2-year TIPS which look very overvalued. We see some pockets of selective value in lower-quality high-yield bonds, specifically US Ba- and Caa-rated issues, which are still trading at breakeven spreads around the 35th historical percentile, whereas higher-rated bonds look very expensive (Chart 13). For US tax-paying investors, municipal bonds look particularly attractive at the moment, with general-obligation (GO) munis trading at a duration-matched yield higher than Treasurys even before tax considerations (Chart 14). Our US bond strategists have recently gone maximum overweight. Chart 13 Chart 14Muni Bonds Are A Steal Muni Bonds Are A Steal Muni Bonds Are A Steal     Equities: We retain our longstanding preference for US equities over other Developed Markets. US equities have outperformed this year, irrespective of whether rates were rising or falling, or how US growth was surprising relative to the rest of the world, emphasizing the much stronger fundamentals of the US market (Chart 15).  Analysts’ forecasts for the next few quarters look quite cautious, and so earnings surprises can push US stock prices up further (Chart 16). We reiterate the neutral on China but underweight on Emerging Markets ex-China that we initiated in our latest Quarterly. Our sector overweights are a mixture of cyclicals (Industrials), rising-interest-rate plays (Financials), and defensives (Heath Care). Chart 15US Equites Outperformed This Year Whatever Happened US Equites Outperformed This Year Whatever Happened US Equites Outperformed This Year Whatever Happened Chart 16Analysts Are Pessimistic About The Next Couple Of Quarters Analysts Are Pessimistic About The Next Couple Of Quarters Analysts Are Pessimistic About The Next Couple Of Quarters   Currencies: We continue to expect the US dollar to be stuck in its trading range and so stay neutral. Recent moves in prospective relative monetary policy bring us to change two of our currency recommendations. We close our underweight on the Australian dollar. The recent rise in Australian inflation (with both trimmed mean and 10-year breakevens now above 2% – Chart 17) has brought forward the timing of the first rate hike and should push up relative real rates (Chart 18). We lower our recommendation on the Japanese yen from overweight to neutral. The Bank of Japan will not raise rates any time soon, even when other central banks are tightening. This will push real-rate differentials against the yen (Chart 18, panel 2). Chart 17Australian Inflation Is Picking Up Australian Inflation Is Picking Up Australian Inflation Is Picking Up Chart 18Real Rates Moving In Favor Of The AUD And Against The JPY Real Rates Moving In Favor Of The AUD And Against The JPY Real Rates Moving In Favor Of The AUD And Against The JPY Chart 19Chinese-Related Metals' Prices Are Falling Chinese-Related Metals' Prices Are Falling Chinese-Related Metals' Prices Are Falling Commodities: We remain cautious on those industrial metals which are most sensitive to slowing Chinese growth and its weakening property market. The fall in iron ore prices since July is now being followed by aluminum. However, metals which are increasingly driven by investment in alternative energy, notably copper, are likely to hold up better (Chart 19). We are underweight the equity Materials sector and neutral on the commodities asset class. The Brent crude oil price has broadly reached our energy strategists’ forecasts of $80/bbl on average in 2022 and $81 in 2023 (Chart 20). Although the forward curve is lower than this, with December-22 Brent at only $75/bbl, it is a misapprehension to characterize this as the market forecasting that the oil price will fall. Backwardation (where futures prices are lower than spot) is the usual state of affairs for structural reasons (for example, producers hedging production forward). The market typically moves to contango only when the oil price has fallen sharply and reserves are high (Chart 21). We remain neutral on the equities Energy sector.   Chart 20Brent Has Reached Our 2022 And 2023 Forecast Level Brent Has Reached Our 2022 And 2023 Forecast Level Brent Has Reached Our 2022 And 2023 Forecast Level Chart 21Lower Oil Futures Don't Mean Oil Price Is Forecast To Fall Lower Oil Futures Don't Mean Oil Price Is Forecast To Fall Lower Oil Futures Don't Mean Oil Price Is Forecast To Fall Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com GAA Asset Allocation  

Highlights Faced with large excesses in the housing market, we contend that Beijing’s goal is to achieve flat property prices in the coming years. Stable property prices would allow for improved housing affordability over the coming years while precluding debt deflation. However, when authorities fix/control prices, they lose control of volumes/activity. The housing market will not clear. Property sales and construction activity will hit an air pocket. Shrinking construction activity will weigh on China’s economy and China-plays around the world. Feature The recent struggles of several Chinese property developers to service their debt have put the mainland’s real estate market on the radar of global investors. What is the outlook for the Chinese property market and what will be its impact on the mainland and global economies? What does it mean for global financial markets? In contrast to the US housing debacle in 2008, the central pressure point in China’s property market adjustment will not be home prices and mortgage defaults but retrenchment by property developers and a downsizing in construction activity. That is why we are maintaining our negative view on Chinese demand for raw materials and machinery. This will have implications for emerging Asia, developing countries that produce raw materials and machinery stocks worldwide. How Important Is The Property Market? Chart 1Land Sales Revenue And Property Developers Funding Are Sizable Land Sales Revenue And Property Developers Funding Are Sizable Land Sales Revenue And Property Developers Funding Are Sizable In a 2020 paper,1 Kenneth Rogoff and Yuanchen Yang estimate that real estate investment accounted for 12-15% of GDP in China between 2011 and 2018. This compares with a 7% share of GDP in the US at the peak of the housing boom in 2005. Hence, the sheer size of real estate construction in China – which does not include infrastructure investment – implies that real estate investment is very important for the mainland economy. The above numbers do not capture secondary effects from fluctuations in real estate investment. Thereby, the impact of property construction is greater than what is implied by its share of GDP. Further, local governments derive more than 40% of their aggregate revenues – budgetary and off budgetary (managed funds) – from land sales (Chart 1, top panel). As land sales dry up, local government revenues will plummet, undermining their ability to finance infrastructure spending – which is also a major part of the economy. Property developers’ annual funding makes up a very large 20% of GDP, which attests to their importance to the economy and the financial system (Chart 1, bottom panel).  Critically, construction activity drives demand for raw materials and machinery. Granted, Chinese imports of raw materials and machinery used in real estate construction and infrastructure building are non-trivial, the shockwaves from the downturn will spill over to the rest of the world in general and to developing economies in particular. Excesses  The Chinese property market’s vulnerability stems from its excesses. These excesses are apparent on multiple fronts. Table 1Chinese Housing Is Expensive / Unaffordable China: Is The Property Carry Trade Over? China: Is The Property Carry Trade Over? 1. Extreme Overvaluation: Compared to most countries around the world, housing in China is very expensive. The house price-to-household income ratio is 19 in tier-1 cities, 10 in tier-2 and 7 in tier-3 cities (Table 1). For comparison, even after the recent surge in property prices, the house price-to-income ratio is 4 in the US nationwide. Importantly, the mortgage rate in China – currently at 5.4% – is considerably higher than mortgage rates in the US or in other developed economies. The high house price-to-income ratio and relatively high mortgage rate entail that mortgage interest payments account for a larger share of household income in China than in any advanced economy. For new buyers, assuming a 30% down-payment, mortgage interest payments alone make up 28% of household income on average nationwide (Table 1). Chart 2Chinese Households Are As Leveraged As Their US Peers Chinese Households Are As Leveraged As Their US Peers Chinese Households Are As Leveraged As Their US Peers Finally, Chinese household indebtedness is much higher than is often presumed by the global investment community – the household disposable income-to-debt ratio is close to 100%, as high as it is in the US (Chart 2). All this does not mean that China will experience a US-style 2008 credit crisis with households defaulting on their mortgages. As we discuss below, the adjustment process will be different in China than it was in the US. 2. Capital misallocation: Property developers have been building the wrong type of housing at the wrong prices and for the wrong type of buyers. They have been building high-end houses and selling them at very high prices to high-income households who have been buying multiple properties as investments. This represents capital misallocation. Widespread home vacancies confirm this thesis. As of 2017, 21.5% of the housing stock was vacant according to the Survey and Research Center for China Household Finance.  As per the same source, only 11.5% of homebuyers in 2018 were first timers. That compares with 70% of first-time buyers in 2008-2010. In 2018, 22.5% of homebuyers already owned two or more dwellings while 66% owned one. Clearly, housing in China has become an object of speculation which has made it unattainable for first-time homebuyers. Chart 3Property Developers Have Accumulated Massive Assets Property Developers Have Accumulated Massive Assets Property Developers Have Accumulated Massive Assets 3. Speculation and the carry trade: There is nothing wrong with individuals investing in real estate. This practice is widespread all around the world. However, contrary to many other countries, multiple home owners in China do not rent out their properties, but instead keep their houses vacant. For those few owners who rent their houses, the current rental yield on properties rarely exceeds 2%. Given that the mortgage rate is currently 5.4%, the carry costs for individual investors is negative. Therefore, property investors in China can only expect to profit from ever rising prices. This strategy has paid off enormously over the last 20 years. Yet, past performance does not guarantee future gains. A stampede into real estate since 2009 has made housing extremely expensive and has instigated socio-political problems that have made Beijing wary. Critically, property speculation has been prevalent not only among households but also among property developers. The latter have been participating in the largest carry trade of the past 12 years. Facing borrowing costs that were lower than the pace of house price appreciation, property developers in China have done what any business would do: they borrowed as much as they could and accumulated real estate assets in the form of land, incomplete construction as well as completed but unsold properties. Chart 4Property Developers Are Very Leveraged Property Developers Are Very Leveraged Property Developers Are Very Leveraged As long as the rate of annual asset price appreciation exceeds the borrowing costs (the carry), carrying these assets on a balance sheet produces lofty profits. The top panel of Chart 3 demonstrates that housing starts have chronically exceeded completions, i.e., developers have been starting but not completing/delivering properties. The gap between starts and completions – unfinished construction – has ballooned (Chart 3, bottom panel). In short, property developers have been holding on to a lot of land and unfinished construction and have been financing it via debt. The asset-to-equity ratio for property developers trading on the A-share market has surged to 9 (Chart 4).  Overall, the primary reason for real estate asset accumulation in China by individuals and companies has been expectations of continuous price appreciation. When an investor purchases an asset that generates little or no recurrent cash flow and the only rationale for holding onto it is expectations for continuous price appreciation, it qualifies as speculation – not investment. This speculation can continue only as long as there is demand from new buyers. Bottom Line: The property market is suffering from numerous excesses such as extreme overvaluation, capital misallocation and widespread speculative activities. Clouds Are Forming Over Real Estate Odds are that the speculative fever that has held the Chinese housing market in its grip is waning. Chart 5Less Funding = Less Completions = Less Commodity Demand Less Funding = Less Completions = Less Commodity Demand Less Funding = Less Completions = Less Commodity Demand First, the three red lines introduced by authorities a year ago limit property developers’ ability to take on more debt. In fact, many property developers are being forced to reduce their indebtedness to meet these regulatory requirements. These rules mean that property developers will have to reduce new construction at best or sell their assets at worst. When many developers try to offload their assets simultaneously, asset prices will deflate, producing a vicious debt deflation cycle. Second, the reluctance of authorities to bail out large property developers – which are struggling to service their debt – is sending a clear message to both onshore and offshore creditors not to lend to property developers. This is especially true for small and medium banks, trust companies, wealth management products and onshore and offshore bondholders. These lenders along with pre-sales account for the lion’s share of financing options for property developers. Chart 5 illustrates that diminishing funding for property developers weighs down on completion, i.e., less construction work and less demand for raw materials and machinery (Chart 5, bottom panel). Third, the property carry trade does not make sense when the rate of real estate asset price appreciation drops below property developers’ borrowing costs. A negative carry means incurring losses, necessitating the sale of assets, including land and completed properties. A rush to offload assets amid a buyer strike could prompt classic debt deflation. Chart 6Households’ House Buying Intentions Have Plummeted Households' House Buying Intentions Have Plummeted Households' House Buying Intentions Have Plummeted Finally, the upcoming pilot program for a real estate tax and a broader public campaign by Beijing against buying houses as an investment has discouraged individuals from purchasing properties. The proportion of households planning to buy a house has dropped to only 7.7% in Q3 2021 from 11.6% in Q4 2020 (Chart 6). House sales contracted by 16% in September from a year ago and initial reports point to further deterioration in October.     Bottom Line: Central authorities in China are attempting to tackle the property market because they reckon that an expensive and speculative property market could either create socio-political problems down the road or get out of control and crumble of its own accord. Beijing’s objective is to achieve a soft landing by acting preemptively and managing it.  The Role Of Policy Why is Beijing obsessed with taming the property market? We suspect the current hawkish stance is due to the following: Chart 7Housing Prices Correlate With Starts Housing Prices Correlate With Starts Housing Prices Correlate With Starts Housing is becoming unaffordable for low- and some middle-income residents in China. This may give rise to a sense of injustice/inequality and goes against president Xi’s common prosperity goals. This is also negatively affecting family formation and demographics and, ultimately, the nation’s potential growth rate. Beijing believes that the 2019 protests in Hong Kong were to a certain extent due to housing unaffordability. The latter fanned young people’s rage toward authorities and the political system. The Communist party leadership wants to avoid a similar uprising in the mainland. Anytime policymakers have stimulated in the past 12 years, property prices have surged widening the gap between the poor and the rich and making housing even more unaffordable. Presently, they are reluctant to do the same. Also, authorities are clamping down on property developers because historically there was a strong positive correlation between property starts and house prices (Chart 7). The basis for this positive correlation is that whenever property developers start new projects, they raise expectations of higher future prices via aggressive marketing. As a result, people become more inclined to buy houses. In fact, over the years more supply has not precluded property prices from surging and vice versa, as shown in Chart 7. Finally, the central government has learned from its own experience in 2015 and from the US case in 2008 that when a bubble bursts, it is difficult to stop it. Chinese economic policymakers prefer to be proactive than reactive. All of the above does not mean that authorities are planning to instigate a property market crash and will stand by and not stimulate. If and when broad economic conditions deteriorate to the point that income growth and employment are jeopardized, authorities will rachet up their stimulus. Presently, the unemployment rate for the 25-59 age group is very low and the urban labor market is tight (Chart 8). In addition, the nation’s exports are booming, so it is a good time to undertake some deleveraging. In brief, there is now no urgency to stimulate aggressively. Bottom Line: Considering the size of the real estate market and how dire its fundamentals are, we expect economic conditions to get much worse in China. That will ultimately force policymakers to stimulate more aggressively. The End Of The Property Carry Trade Conditions have fallen into place for the property carry trade by developers to unravel: Faced with limited access to funding, a diminished willingness on the part of creditors to rollover their debt as well as plummeting home sales, property developers have already dramatically cut back on land purchases (Chart 9, top panel). Chart 8China's Labor Market Is Strong China's Labor Market Is Strong China's Labor Market Is Strong Chart 9China's Construction Cycle In Perspective China's Construction Cycle In Perspective China's Construction Cycle In Perspective   However, they have so far been completing and delivering pre-sold homes to buyers who had paid in advance. In the last couple of years 90% of homes have been pre-sold. Hence, these completions do not generate new cash inflows for real estate developers. Yet, this completion work has supported construction activity and demand for materials over the past 12 months (Chart 9, bottom panel). Looking forward, reduced funding entails shrinking completions with negative ramifications for the economy (Chart 5 above). Real estate deflation, lack of new sales and restricted financing could turn property developers’ liquidity troubles into a solvency issue. This is how typical financial/credit crises develop – they start with liquidity strains and then turn into solvency problems as the value of collaterals drop, becoming insufficient to cover debt obligation. Defaults ensue. Property development is an extremely fragmented industry in China. There are officially around 100 000 property developers in China. Even the largest ones like Evergrande have a very small share of the market. Therefore, authorities cannot ensure that the sector will function properly by ring fencing or bailing out several large developers. In sum, authorities have very little control over real estate construction because it is quite spread out across the country and involves many private small- and medium-sized developers. We think that Beijing’s goal is to achieve flat property prices in the coming years. Authorities realize that property deflation could be devastating but are also less tolerant of growing excesses and imbalances in this area. Flat home prices and rising incomes will lead to a lower house price-to-income ratio, i.e., will make home ownership more affordable. In short, policymakers are attempting to fix property prices to achive a soft landing. Yet, there is a caveat: when authorities fix/control prices, they lose control of volumes/activity. This will likely be the case in China. Without meaningful drop in house prices, low-and middle-income first-time homebuyers will not become buyers right away and healthy property developers will be unwilling to snap up the assets of their troubled competitors. Hence, the market will not clear and the property sales and construction activity will hit an air pocket. Bottom Line: After more than a decade of speculative excesses, policymakers have embarked on the very difficult task of controlling house prices. They can control house prices via administrative measures. Yet, as expectations of rapidly rising property prices vanish, land sales, home purchases and property construction will likely shrink substantially for a period of time. Investment Recommendations A few market-relevant observations: Chinese non-TMT stocks and China-related plays globally are at risk from shrinking construction activity on the mainland. Critically, EM non-TMT stocks have not priced in the slowdown. Chart 10 illustrates that China’s credit and fiscal spending impulse is back to its previous low, but EM non-TMT stocks have not corrected much. In the past, Chinese onshore property stocks correlated with global material stocks (Chart 11). The basis is that China’s construction accounts for a considerable share of global raw materials consumption. Hence, the bear market in Chinese property stocks is raising a red flag for global material stocks. Chart 10EM Ex-TMT Stocks Are Not Pricing China's Slowdown EM Ex-TMT Stocks Are Not Pricing China's Slowdown EM Ex-TMT Stocks Are Not Pricing China's Slowdown Chart 11A Red Flag For Global Materials A Red Flag For Global Materials A Red Flag For Global Materials   EMs are most vulnerable, and the US is the least exposed to China’s construction and infrastructure investment segments. The basis is that the US is a closed economy and trades very little with China. That is why we believe that the US dollar has more upside and US equities will continue outperforming the global stock index as China’s slowdown persists. Putting it all together, we recommend the following strategies: Avoid EM stocks and underweight EM versus DM in a global equity portfolio. Continue shorting select EM currencies versus the US dollar. Avoid local currency bonds and favor US credit over EM credit markets. Avoid bottom fishing in Chinese offshore corporate bonds, including high-yield ones. As for Chinese equities, investors should stay with the long onshore A shares / short investable index strategy. We also reiterate a strategy we have been recommending for both onshore and offshore stocks since May 9, 2019: short property stocks relative to the benchmark. This has been a very profitable trade. Today, we recommend closing the long position in Chinese insurance stocks given that credit woes will worsen before they improve. One way for global investors to bet on China’s slowdown while hedging the risk of stronger growth in DM is via the following trade: short global materials / long global industrials. Our report from July 30 elaborated the bullish case for global industrials beyond China’s slowdown. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Qingyun Xu, CFA Associate Editor qingyunx@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 See Kenneth S. Rogoff and Yuanchen Yang, "Peak China Housing," National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2020. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations

With 119 S&P 500 companies having reported Q3-2021 earnings, it’s time to take a pulse of the interim results. So far, the blended earnings growth rate is 34.8% while actual reported growth rate is 49.9%. The blended sales growth rate is 14.4%, while the actual reported rate is 16.6%. Analysts expected Q3-2021 earnings to be 6% below the Q2-2021 level. As of now, this quarter’s earnings are only 3% lower. Most of the companies that have reported are beating analysts’ forecasts are surprising to the upside. Currently, 83% of companies reported EPS above expectations, with five out of eleven sectors delivering an impressive 100% beat score. In terms of the magnitude of the beats, the overall number currently stands at 14% with Financials and Technology leading the pack. However, these results are bound to change as more companies report: less than 5% of the market cap has reported within the Energy, Materials, Real Estate, and Utilities sectors. The big theme for the current earnings season is input cost inflation. Many industrial giants, including Honeywell (HON), are complaining about supply-chain cost increases, and their potential adverse effect on margins. As a result, many companies are reducing guidance for the fourth quarter. So far, there are 59 positive pre-announcements, and 45 negative. On the bright side, the majority of companies are reporting that demand for their products remains strong, potentially offsetting some of the cost increases. This is especially the case with consumer demand: a few consumer staples companies, such as P&G, commented that their recent price hikes have not dampened demand for their products and have fortified their bottom line against rising costs. Bottom Line: The earnings season is gaining speed, and so far, it appears that Q3-2021 growth expectations are set at a low bar, that is easy to clear for most companies. Chart

Highlights Inflation in the US and many other countries is likely to follow a “two steps up, one step down” trajectory of higher highs and higher lows over the remainder of the decade. Goods inflation will ease in 2022, while energy price pressures will abate. This suggests that we are currently near the top of those two steps. Any decline in inflation will be short-lived, however. Tight labor markets will bolster wages. Rent inflation is also poised to pick up, especially in the US. The Fed and other central banks will face political pressure to keep interest rates low in order to suppress debt-servicing costs. This could lead to overheating. While we are not as bullish on stocks as we were at the start of the year, the combination of low interest rates and above-trend growth over the next 12 months will support equities. Investors should favor cyclicals, value stocks, small caps, and non-US markets. The Stairway To Higher Inflation In past reports, we argued that global inflation had reached a secular bottom and would begin to reaccelerate (see here, here, and more recently here). While it is still too early to be certain, recent developments appear to have vindicated that view. The path to structurally higher inflation is likely to be a bumpy one. We have generally contended that the shift to a more inflationary regime would follow a “two steps up, one step down” pattern, characterized by a series of higher highs and higher lows for inflation. In thinking about the inflation process, it is useful to distinguish between transitory shocks and structural forces. Unfortunately, much of the recent discussion about inflation has been politically charged, with one camp arguing that high inflation is entirely transitory (mainly due to pandemic disruptions) and another camp arguing that it is entirely structural in nature (big budget deficits, QE, and “dollar debasement” are often cited). The idea that both transitory shocks and structural forces may be driving inflation seems to generate a lot of cognitive dissonance in peoples’ minds. Our view is that transitory shocks have pushed up inflation, but that structural forces (both policy and non-policy related) are playing an important role too. In other words, we think that we are near the top of those metaphorical two steps. The next step for inflation is likely down, even though the longer-term trend is to the upside. Team Transitory Is Right About One Thing During most recessions, cyclically-sensitive durable goods spending falls, while the service sector serves as a ballast for the economy. The pandemic flipped this pattern on its head (Chart 1). While durable goods spending did dip briefly, it came roaring back due to generous stimulus payments and stay-at-home restrictions which cut many households off from the services they normally purchase. In March of this year, US real consumer durable spending was 27% above its pre-pandemic trend (Chart 2A and 2B). Chart 1Unlike During Most Recessions, Durable Goods Spending Spiked Due To Stimulus Checks And Stay-At-Home Restrictions Unlike During Most Recessions, Durable Goods Spending Spiked Due To Stimulus Checks And Stay-At-Home Restrictions Unlike During Most Recessions, Durable Goods Spending Spiked Due To Stimulus Checks And Stay-At-Home Restrictions Chart 2ADurable Goods Spending Has Begun To Normalize, But Durable Goods Prices Keep Rising Due To Supply Bottlenecks (I) Durable Goods Spending Has Begun To Normalize, But Durable Goods Prices Keep Rising Due To Supply Bottlenecks (I) Durable Goods Spending Has Begun To Normalize, But Durable Goods Prices Keep Rising Due To Supply Bottlenecks (I) Chart 2BDurable Goods Spending Has Begun To Normalize, But Durable Goods Prices Keep Rising Due To Supply Bottlenecks (II) Durable Goods Spending Has Begun To Normalize, But Durable Goods Prices Keep Rising Due To Supply Bottlenecks (II) Durable Goods Spending Has Begun To Normalize, But Durable Goods Prices Keep Rising Due To Supply Bottlenecks (II)     Durable goods spending has retreated since then, however. As of August, it was only 8% above its trendline. Supply-chain bottlenecks have curbed durable goods spending over the past eight months. A tell-tale sign of a supply shock is when spending declines and prices nonetheless rise. Between January 2020 and March 2021, durable goods spending increased at an annualized rate of 29% while prices rose at an annualized pace of 2%. Since March 2021, durable goods spending has fallen at an annualized pace of 28%, but price inflation has accelerated to 15% (Chart 3). Chart 3 Even more than other categories of durable goods, vehicle production has been stymied by supply-chain disruptions. Motor vehicles and auto parts represent about 40% of the durable goods sold in the US and accounted for nearly two-thirds of the decline in real durable goods spending between March and August. The downward trend in vehicle sales continued in September, with unit sales declining by 7.2% on the month. In the US, vehicle sales are now back to where they were in 2011 when the unemployment rate was 9%. In the euro area, they are below their sovereign debt crisis lows (Chart 4). The chip shortage hampering vehicle production will abate in 2022. However, vehicle prices are likely to come down only slowly. Auto inventories in the US are only a third of what they were prior to the pandemic (Chart 5). Until dealers are able to rebuild inventories, they will have little incentive to cut prices. Chart 4The Chip Shortage Has Caused Auto Sales To Tumble The Chip Shortage Has Caused Auto Sales To Tumble The Chip Shortage Has Caused Auto Sales To Tumble Chart 5Dealer Inventories Have Collapsed Dealer Inventories Have Collapsed Dealer Inventories Have Collapsed   Energy Price Pressures Should Abate, But Probably Not As Fast As Investors Expect Investors believe the recent surge in energy prices will reverse. The futures curves for oil, natural gas, and coal are all in steep backwardation (Chart 6). We agree that energy price pressures are likely to abate in 2022. However, as we discussed last week, the odds are that prices do not fall as quickly as anticipated. This concern is especially acute in Europe, where La Niña could lead to another cold winter and uncertainty abounds over the status of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. Looking beyond the next 12 months, the risk is that years of declining investment in the oil and gas sector lead to continued energy shortages during the remainder of the decade. In 2020, 12% of global energy production came from renewable sources such as solar, wind, and hydro. The IEA estimates that this share will rise to 20% in 2030. However, the IEA also reckons that the global economy will still need about 5% more oil and natural gas than it consumes now (Table 1). Given the reluctance of many countries to invest in nuclear power generation, the phase-out of carbon-based fuels may take longer than expected. Chart 6 Table 1Oil And Gas Consumption Will Not Peak Until The Next Decade The Inflation Outlook: Two Steps Up, One Step Down The Inflation Outlook: Two Steps Up, One Step Down   Near-Term Upside For Rents Despite increasing home prices in most economies, rent inflation decelerated in the first year of the pandemic (Chart 7). More recently, however, the rental market has begun to heat up. US rents rose by 0.5% in September, the fastest monthly growth since the 2006 housing boom (Chart 8). The Zillow rent index, which looks only at units turning over, has spiked (Chart 9). Chart 7Rent Inflation Is Bouncing Back After Falling During The Pandemic Rent Inflation Is Bouncing Back After Falling During The Pandemic Rent Inflation Is Bouncing Back After Falling During The Pandemic Chart 8More Upside To Rent Inflation More Upside To Rent Inflation More Upside To Rent Inflation   Strong job growth, the end of the nationwide eviction moratorium, and the loosening of regulations freezing rents in a number of US cities and states are all contributing to higher rent inflation. A shortage of homes is also putting upward pressure on home prices and rents. After having surged during the Great Recession, the homeowner vacancy rate has fallen to record low levels (Chart 10). Chart 9Newly Listed Apartments Are Being Marked Up Sharply Newly Listed Apartments Are Being Marked Up Sharply Newly Listed Apartments Are Being Marked Up Sharply Chart 10The Home Vacancy Rate Is Very Low The Home Vacancy Rate Is Very Low The Home Vacancy Rate Is Very Low In addition to encouraging more construction, higher home prices could indirectly boost inflation through the wealth effect. According to the Federal Reserve, homeowner equity increased by $4.1 trillion, or 21%, between 2019Q4 and 2021Q2. Empirical estimates of the wealth effect suggest that consumption rises between 5 and 8 cents for every additional dollar in housing wealth. For the US, this would translate into 0.9%-to-1.4% of GDP in incremental annual consumption since the start of the pandemic. Higher Nominal Income Growth Would Make Housing More Affordable Chart 11Many Developed Economies Feature Overheated Housing Markets Many Developed Economies Feature Overheated Housing Markets Many Developed Economies Feature Overheated Housing Markets The housing wealth effect would turn negative if home prices were to fall. While this is less of a risk in the US where housing is still reasonably affordable in many states, it is more of a risk in countries such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Sweden where home prices have reached stratospheric levels in relation to incomes and rents (Chart 11). Not only would a decline in nominal home prices curb construction and consumer spending, but it would also potentially undermine the financial system by reducing the value of the collateral backing mortgage loans. To support spending and preclude an outright fall in home prices, central banks would likely keep interest rates at fairly low levels. Low rates, in turn, would incentivize governments to maintain accommodative fiscal policies. The IMF expects the cyclically-adjusted primary budget deficit to be 2% of GDP larger in advanced economies in 2022-26 compared to 2014-19 (Chart 12). Chart 12 The combination of low interest rates and loose fiscal policies will help drive nominal income growth, thus allowing for improved home affordability without the need for a disruptive decline in home prices. As Japan’s experience demonstrates, a deflationary environment is toxic for the property market and the financial system. Labor Markets Getting Tighter There is little doubt that the US labor market is heating up. Even though there are 5 million fewer people employed now than at the start of the pandemic, the job vacancy rate is near record high levels and workers are displaying few misgivings about quitting their jobs (Chart 13). Part of the apparent tightness in the US labor market stems from pandemic-related factors. Although enhanced federal unemployment benefits have expired, households are still sitting on $2.4 trillion in excess savings (Chart 14). This cash cushion has allowed workers to be choosy in entertaining job offers. In addition, decreased immigration flows and a spate of early retirements have decreased labor supply. Chart 13 Chart 14 More recently, the introduction of vaccine mandates has caused some disruptions to the labor market. About 100 million US workers are currently subject to the mandates. According to the Census Household Pulse Survey, about 8 million of them are unvaccinated and attest that “they will definitely not get the vaccine.” Although many of them will reconsider, the anecdotal evidence suggests that some will not. In one glaring example, 4.6% of workers resigned from a rural hospital in upstate New York, causing the maternity ward to temporarily suspend operations. Prospects For A Wage-Price Spiral Chart 15Wages At The Bottom End Of The Income Distribution Are Rising Briskly Wages At The Bottom End Of The Income Distribution Are Rising Briskly Wages At The Bottom End Of The Income Distribution Are Rising Briskly So far, much of the pick-up in wage growth has been confined to the bottom end of the income distribution (Chart 15). Wage pressures are likely to become more broad-based over time as the unemployment rate continues to decline. A full-blown wage-price spiral would worry the Fed. However, such a spiral does not appear imminent. While respondents to the University of Michigan survey in October expected inflation to reach 4.8% over the next 12 months, they anticipated inflation of only 2.8% over a 5-to-10-year horizon (Chart 16). This is not much higher than their pre-pandemic expectations and is lower than the 3.0% figure reported for September. Chart 16Long-Term Inflation Expectations Have Risen But Remain At Historically Low Levels Long-Term Inflation Expectations Have Risen But Remain At Historically Low Levels Long-Term Inflation Expectations Have Risen But Remain At Historically Low Levels It is easy to dismiss households’ beliefs about future inflation as being largely irrelevant. However, these beliefs do influence spending decisions. For example, a record share of households say that this is a bad time to buy a car (Chart 17). The top reason given is that prices are too high. In other words, many households are deferring the purchase of a vehicle in the hopes of getting a better deal. Automobile demand would be a lot higher now if households thought that prices would keep rising, as this would incentivize them to buy a car before prices rose even more. Chart 17Households Think That This Is The Worst Time Ever To Buy A Car Households Think That This Is The Worst Time Ever To Buy A Car Households Think That This Is The Worst Time Ever To Buy A Car Chart 18Inflation Started Accelerating Quickly Only When Unemployment Reached Very Low Levels In The 1960s Inflation Started Accelerating Quickly Only When Unemployment Reached Very Low Levels In The 1960s Inflation Started Accelerating Quickly Only When Unemployment Reached Very Low Levels In The 1960s What should be acknowledged is that inflation expectations tend to be governed by complex social feedback loops, which makes the relationship between slack and inflation highly non-linear. The experience of the 1960s provides a pertinent example. The US unemployment rate reached NAIRU in 1962. However, it was not until 1966, when the unemployment rate was two percentage points below NAIRU, that inflation expectations became unhinged. Within the span of ten months, both wage growth and CPI inflation doubled, with the latter reaching 6% by the end of the decade (Chart 18). The lesson is clear: While long-term inflation expectations are well anchored today, there is no guarantee they will stay that way indefinitely. Is this a lesson that the Fed will heed? Like Larry Summers, we have our doubts, suggesting that the long-term risks to inflation are to the upside. Fighting The Last War Just as military generals are prone to fighting the last war, the same is true of economic policymakers. Central bankers have been staring down the barrel of the deflationary gun for over two decades. In the 1960s, policymakers prioritized high employment over low inflation. With memories of the Great Depression still fresh in their minds, they kept policy rates too low for too long. This time around, policymakers have an additional reason to drag their heels in raising rates: government debt is very high. Higher borrowing costs would force governments to shift spending from social programs to pay off bondholders. Needless to say, that would not be very popular with most voters. Reducing debt-to-GDP ratios via higher nominal income growth will prove to be more politically palatable than fiscal austerity. Investment Conclusions The path to high interest rates is lined with low interest rates. Structurally higher inflation will eventually lead to higher nominal interest rates, but not before an extended period of negative real rates. Chart 19Neither The Fed Nor The Markets Think The Neutral Rate Of Interest Is All That High Neither The Fed Nor The Markets Think The Neutral Rate Of Interest Is All That High Neither The Fed Nor The Markets Think The Neutral Rate Of Interest Is All That High Neither the Fed nor the markets think the neutral rate of interest is all that high (Chart 19). We think the neutral rate is higher than widely believed. However, this will not become apparent until the unemployment rate falls well below its full employment level. For now, the Fed’s leadership will want to avoid rocking the boat by turning more hawkish. While the US 10-year Treasury yield will trend higher over time, it will pause at around 1.8% in the first half of next year as the unwinding of pandemic-related bottlenecks leads to a “one step down” for inflation. The ECB and the Bank of Japan are even more reluctant to tighten monetary policy than the Fed. Some developed economy central banks like those of the UK, Norway, Sweden, Canada, and New Zealand are more inclined to normalize monetary conditions. That said, they too will be constrained by the fear that going it alone in raising rates will put undue upward pressure on their currencies. While we are not as bullish on stocks as we were at the start of the year, the combination of low interest rates and above-trend growth over the next 12 months will support equities. As we discussed in our recent strategy outlook, investors should favor cyclicals, value stocks, small caps, and non-US markets. Bitcoin Trade Update After being up as much as 50%, our short Bitcoin trade got stopped out for a loss. We remain bearish on Bitcoin and have decided to reinstate the trade.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist pberezin@bcaresearch.com View Matrix Image Special Trade Recommendations Image Current MacroQuant Model Scores Image

Who Likes A Flattening Yield Curve? Who Likes A Flattening Yield Curve? In a recent daily report, we analyzed relative performance of the S&P 500 sectors and styles under different US 10-year Treasury yield (UST10Y) regimes. Today we expand our analysis and map relative performance of the S&P 500 sectors and styles under the distinct US Treasury yield curve regimes, defined as a three-months change between 10-year and 2-year yields. To analyze sector and style performance by regime, we calculate contemporaneous three-months relative returns of sectors and styles. To summarize the results, we calculate median relative return of each sector/style in each regime. We subtract total period median to remove the sector and style biases in the long-term performance. In a flattening yield curve environment, Defensives, Quality, and Growth tend to outperform, as it indicates scarcity of growth. Accordingly, Real Estate, Technology, Utilities, and Communications Services also outperform. Yield curve steepening is usually associated with growth acceleration. This regime gives boost to more economically sensitive and capex intensive sectors and styles: Value, Small caps, and Cyclicals. Bottom Line: The shape of the US Treasury yield curve will be an important variable to monitor going forward, as it has a substantial effect on relative sector and style performance. ​​​​​​​

Foreword Today we are publishing a charts-only report focused on the S&P 500, and GICS 1 sectors.  Many of the charts are self-explanatory; to some, we have added a short commentary. The charts cover macro, valuations, fundamentals, technicals, and the uses of cash. Our goal is to equip you with all the data you need to make investment decisions along these sector dimensions. We also include performance, valuations and earnings growth expectation tables for all styles, sectors, industry groups, and industries (GICS 1, 2 and 3). We hope you will find this publication useful. We alternate between Styles and Sector chart pack updates on a bi-monthly basis. Changes In Positioning Downgrade Growth to an equal weight and upgrade Value to an equal weight.  Upgrade Small to an overweight and downgrade Large to an underweight. Downgrade Technology to equal weight by reducing overweight in Software and Services.  We remain overweight Semiconductors and Equipment. We are on board with the ongoing market rotation: We were waiting for a decisive shift in rates and a dissipation of the Covid-19 scare as a signal to initiate this repositioning (Chart 1). Chart 1Performance Of S&P 500 Sectors And Styles US Equity Chart Pack US Equity Chart Pack Overarching Investment Themes: Rotation Has Begun! Taper Tantrum 2.0: With tapering imminent and monetary tightening around the corner, both real yields and nominal yields are up sharply over the past couple of weeks (Chart 2A).  Chart 2ARates Are Up Sharply Rates Are Up Sharply Rates Are Up Sharply Chart 2BProbability Of Two Rate Hikes In 2022 Has Been Climbing Probability Of Two Rate Hikes In 2022 Has Been Climbing Probability Of Two Rate Hikes In 2022 Has Been Climbing Market expects two rate hikes by the end of 2022: Although Chairman Powell has explicitly separated the decision to taper from the timing of the first rate hike, which he conditioned on full employment and which is “a long way off,” the market is still spooked by the timing and the speed of rate hikes. Currently, the probability of two rate hikes in 2022 stands at around 40%, rising sharply over the past two weeks (Chart 2B). The BCA house view is that the Fed will start hiking in December of 2022. Market rotation is on: Rising yields and a recent decline in Delta variant infections have triggered a fast and furious style and sector rotation. Higher rates put pressure on rate-sensitive sectors and styles, such as Growth, Technology, Communication Services, and Real Estate. While the “taper tantrum” pullback affects the entire US equity market, areas most geared to rising rates, such as Cyclicals, Financials, and Small Caps fare the best (Chart 3). An easing of the Delta scare has led to the “reopening” trade outperforming the ”work-from-home” trade.   Chart 3Rotation Away From Rate-sensitive Sectors And Styles US Equity Chart Pack US Equity Chart Pack Macro Economic slowdown is finally priced in: At long last, deteriorating economic data is fully digested by investors. The Citigroup Economic Surprise index is still in negative territory (Chart 4A) but has turned decisively. The markets move on the second derivative and a “less bad” economic surprise is a major positive for the markets. Chart 4ADeterioration Of Economic Data Is Finally Priced In Deterioration Of Economic Data Is Finally Priced In Deterioration Of Economic Data Is Finally Priced In Chart 4BSupply Bottleneck Are Not Easing Supply Bottleneck Are Not Easing Supply Bottleneck Are Not Easing Supply-chain disruptions are not abating: Shipping costs continue their ascent. The average delay of cargo ships traveling between the Far East and North America is 12 days – compare that to 1 day in January 2020.1 The ISM PMI Supplier Performance index increased from 69.5 in August to 73.4 indicating that supply bottlenecks are not easing (Chart 4B). There are also significant backlogs of goods (Chart 5A), and plenty of new orders. It will take time for supply chains to normalize, with most industry participants expecting the situation to improve only in 2022. Chart 5AManufacturers Are Overwhelmed Manufacturers Are Overwhelmed Manufacturers Are Overwhelmed Chart 5BA Whiff Of Stagflation? A Whiff Of Stagflation? A Whiff Of Stagflation? Labor shortages: Companies are still struggling to fill job openings. According to the US Census Survey, “pandemic layoff” or “caring for children” were the top reasons for not working. The number of people not working because of Covid-19 infections or fear of Covid spiked at the end of August.2  This explains the August jobs report. The ugly “S” word: With the ubiquitous shortage of input materials and labor, along with transportation delays, suppliers are simply unable to meet demand for goods, pushing prices higher.  Stagflation may be rearing its ugly head: The Dallas Fed manufacturing index is showing a divergence, with prices moving higher while business activity is shifting lower. This is not the case with the ISM PMI index components, but investors need to be vigilant (Chart 5B). Americans are in a worse mood: Consumer confidence survey readings continue on a downward path. The combination of higher prices for everyday goods, the loss of purchasing power, the discontinuation of supplementary unemployment benefits, and paychecks not adjusted for inflation weigh on consumer sentiment. On the positive side, jobs are still plentiful.  Valuation And Profitability Despite recent turbulence and rotations across sectors and styles, consensus is still expecting 15% YoY earnings growth over the next 12 months. However, QoQ growth rates look very different as we remove the base effect: Growth is expected to dip this coming quarter (Q3, 2021), and stay modest for most of 2022. This is a low bar that should be easy for companies to clear, although supply disruptions may dent corporate earnings. In the meantime, valuations remain elevated at 20.7 forward earnings (Chart 6). Chart 6Earnings Growth Expectations Are Modest US Equity Chart Pack US Equity Chart Pack Sentiment There are still inflows into US equities, but they are easing. This can be explained by FOMO (fear of missing out), and lots of cash sitting on the sidelines that many retail investors aim to park in US equities.  (Chart 7A). However, this is changing as rising rates render the TINA (“there is no alternative”) trade much less attractive. Chart 7AInflows Into US Equities Are Easing Inflows Into US Equities Are Easing Inflows Into US Equities Are Easing Chart 7BCapex Is On The Rise Capex Is On The Rise Capex Is On The Rise Uses Of Cash Capex: Capital goods orders are soaring, pointing to robust capex.  The latest S&P estimates suggest that capex will rise 13% this year.3 This points to economic normalization, and attests to corporate confidence in economic growth. It is also a likely byproduct of shortages that plague the US supply chain – companies are expanding their capacity. (Chart 7B). Investment Implications Low for longer is over: The Fed has committed to tapering within the next 2-3 months.  Unless this intention is derailed by another Covid scare or a significant deterioration in economic growth, we are now convinced that rates will move up to hit the BCA house view of 1.7%-1.9% by year-end. S&P 500:  There is plenty of rotation under the hood; yet we expect US equities to hold their own into the balance of the year as, for now, monetary and fiscal policy remain easy, and earnings growth is likely to surprise on the upside. Severe and prolonged supply disruptions are a key risk to this view, as they chip away from economic growth, and cut into companies sales growth and profitability. Growth vs. Value: With rates rising into year-end, interest-rate sensitive stocks, such as Growth and the Technology sector, are under pressure.  Since we opened overweight Growth and underweight Value position on June 14, Growth has outperformed S&P 500 by 4.1%, and Value underperformed by 4.5%.  We do not want to overstay our welcome, and are neutralizing both sides of the trade, bringing positioning to an equal weight.  Technology has beaten the S&P 500 by 2.2%, and we are shifting to an equal weight positioning by reducing overweight of the Software Industry Group. We remain overweight Semiconductors and Equipment. We are closing our overweight to Growth and underweight to Value allocation. We reduce overweight to Technology. Chart 7C US Equity Chart Pack US Equity Chart Pack Cyclicals vs. Defensives:  The onset of the Delta variant is dissipating, and we expect consumer cyclicals to rebound as more people are willing to travel and eat out. We also believe that the parts of the Industrials sector most exposed to restocking of inventories, infrastructure, and construction will perform strongly. Small vs. Large: We are upgrading Small from neutral to an overweight, and downgrade Large to an underweight. Small is highly geared to rising rates. It is also cheaper than Large, and most of the earnings downgrades are already in the price. We are now constructive on this asset class.   Irene Tunkel Chief Strategist, US Equity Strategy irene.tunkel@bcaresearch.com   S&P 500 Chart 8Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 9Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 10Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 11Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Communication Services Chart 12Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 13Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 14Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 15Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Consumer Discretionary Chart 16Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 17Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 18Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 19Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Consumer Staples Chart 20Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 21Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 22Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 23Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Energy Chart 24Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 25Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 26Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 27Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Financials Chart 28Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 29Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 30Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 31Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Health Care Chart 32Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 33Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 34Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 35Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Industrials Chart 36Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 37Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 38Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 39Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Information Technology Chart 40Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 41Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 42Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 43Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Materials Chart 44Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 45Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 46Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 47Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Real Estate Chart 48Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 49Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 50Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 51Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Utilities Chart 52Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Macroeconomic Backdrop Chart 53Profitability Profitability Profitability Chart 54Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Valuations And Technicals Chart 55Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash Uses Of Cash       Footnotes 1     Source: eeSea 2     US Census Household Pulse Survey, Employment Table 3. 3    S&P Global Market Intelligence, S&P Global Ratings; Universe is Global Capex 2000   Recommended Allocation

Chart 1Cyclicals Styels and Sectors Outperform In The Rising Rates Environment Treasury Rates Vs. Sector And Style Performance Treasury Rates Vs. Sector And Style Performance In a recent daily report, we analyzed performance of the S&P 500 sectors before and after the 2013 tapering announcement. Today we expand our analysis and map relative performance of the S&P 500 sectors and styles under the different US 10-year Treasury yields (UST10Y) regimes, i.e., rates rising vs rates falling.1  As expected, deep cyclicals, such as Energy, Financials, and Industrials fare best in a rising rates environment, while Communication Services and Health Care outperform when rates head south (Chart 1, top panel). Styles’ performance across regimes is broadly consistent with the sector performance. Specifically, Small Caps, thanks to their high exposure to deep cyclicals, post the best performance when UST10Y is rising. Meanwhile, defensives are a mirror image of Small Caps and outperform once global growth starts softening (Chart 1, bottom panel). Finally, we bring one more dimension to our analysis and calculate the performance of the long-duration Technology and Health Care sectors, under different rates and yield curve regimes (Chart 2).  To do so, we overlap rates and yield curve regimes and calculate median performance of each cell. Both Technology and Health Care underperform when rates are rising, and the yield curve is steepening: Long end of the curve is most important for discounting cash flows. Chart 2Performance of Technology and Health Care Sectors Is Also A Function Of Changes Of The Yield Curve Treasury Rates Vs. Sector And Style Performance Treasury Rates Vs. Sector And Style Performance The current environment of rising rates and flattening yield curve is empirically a goldilocks scenario for these sectors as a flattening yield curve signifies that the long-term rate, which is more important for discounting future cash flows, is falling and the P/E contraction phase will be limited.  It will also be offset by the growth in earnings as rising long rates indicate higher growth. Falling rates are also good for Tech stocks regardless of the direction of change in the yield curve.  The Health Care sector behaves somewhat differently: It tends to underperform when rates are falling but the yield curve is steepening as such scenario is not dire enough for Defensives to outperform. Bottom Line: Cyclical sectors and high beta styles tend to outperform in a rising rates environment. At the same time, the performance of Technology and Health Care stocks is more nuanced: rising Treasury rates are not necessarily bad for these sectors if the yield curve is flattening.   Footnotes 1 Methodology: We calculate three months change in UST10Y and calculate median of three months contemporaneous relative returns for each sector at each regime.  To remove historical performance biases, we subtract sector median relative return for the whole period.  

Highlights Evergrande has not only crossed regulatory gridlines but also regulators’ bottom lines; the government will use the example of Evergrande to impose discipline on real estate developers. The policy response will likely prioritize domestic homebuyers and suppliers to minimize systemic risks and damage to the real economy. However, a bigger risk stems from the possibility that policymakers overestimate the resilience of the economy and ignore signs of a significant spillover to other segments in the economy. The existing policy restrictions on China’s housing sector will not be reversed; the sector is on a structural downshift and will face risks of further consolidation and profit growth compression. Feature China Evergrande Group continues to stir up the global markets. Last Thursday the company missed a deadline to pay USD $83.5m in bond interest. The firm has now entered a 30-day grace period; it will default if that deadline also passes without payment. Chart 1Roller-Coaster Ride Continues... Roller-Coaster Ride Continues... Roller-Coaster Ride Continues... Evergrande has not remarked on the potential default nor have China’s authorities or state media offered any clues about a potential rescue package. Meanwhile, the PBoC injected large amounts of liquidity into the banking system of late, a clear sign of support for the markets. Evergrande share prices continued their roller-coaster ride (Chart 1). Evergrande’s tumult is indicative of an industry-wide problem.  Real estate developers have expanded their businesses and profits through high-debt growth models. China’s policymakers have been trying to crack down on this business practice since 2017 and their clampdown has significantly intensified since August 2020. In this report, we follow up on last week’s Special Alert and share our thoughts on the potential market implications and policy response to the evolving Evergrande situation. The “Three Red Lines” Versus The “Bottom Lines” Evergrande has not only crossed the “three red lines” – three debt metrics China’s authorities laid out a year ago to reduce the housing sector’s leverage – but it has also crossed the bottom lines of policymakers. Therefore, we do not expect the government to lend a financial hand to bail out the corporation and its shareholders. Meanwhile, as discussed in our Special Alert, we expect that there will be some kind of a rescue plan to help onshore homebuyers and suppliers recover their losses. The authorities’ silence in the past three months as investors’ concerns about Evergrande’s debt situation escalated speaks volumes about plans for the overleveraged company. The Evergrande episode is not idiosyncratic; it represents an industry-wide problem linked to the sector’s high-debt growth model.  However, Evergrande has become China’s and the world’s most indebted property developer; the “three red lines” policy last year has pushed the company into a severe liquidity crunch.  Evergrande not only borrowed heavily to pursue an aggressive expansion strategy (“disorderly expansion of capitals”), but did so as President Xi Jinping famously remarked “houses are for living, not for speculation” in late 2016. Between 2016 and 2020, Evergrande’s total liabilities almost doubled and its stock prices jumped by 460%. Evergrande’s founder was ranked the richest man in China in 2017, building his company’s fortune on excessive leverage. The way that the company accumulated wealth conflicts with the government’s new mantra of building “common prosperity”, a policy shift to reduce income and wealth inequality. Furthermore, Evergrande paid its offshore investors in June this year while it continued to borrow from onshore banks and offload its onshore assets. This move did not bode well for China’s domestic stake- and shareholders, along with policymakers. Chart 2Housing Price Inflation Has Been Subdued Outside Of Top-Tier Cities Housing Price Inflation Has Been Subdued Outside Of Top-Tier Cities Housing Price Inflation Has Been Subdued Outside Of Top-Tier Cities In contrast with policymakers’ silence about the future of Evergrande and its shareholders, the authorities have reportedly urged the company to finish and deliver its housing projects.  Evergrande’s projects are mostly in tier-three cities where post-pandemic home price inflation has been subdued compared with top-tier cities (Chart 2). As such, policymakers will be less concerned about fueling home prices in these cities and more willing to work out a plan to finish and deliver those housing projects. Bottom Line: Beijing may rescue the stakeholders of Evergrande rather than its shareholders. Contagion Risks We discussed our baseline scenario for Evergrande’s bankruptcy and restructuring in last week’s Special Alert. Our message has been that the well-telegraphed Evergrande default might not create an imminent systemic crisis or crash in China’s financial markets. However, it will likely reinforce the credit tightening that has been underway in China over the past 12 months.  This will delay and weaken the transmission of liquidity easing into the real economy. So far things are not bad enough for policymakers to reflate the economy in any meaningful way. Since the contagion risks from Evergrande’s debt crisis to China’s onshore financial markets seem to be contained, policy easing in the coming months will likely be gradual. Regulators have shown no sign of reversing the existing policy restrictions. Therefore, a bigger risk to China’s financial markets stems from the possibility that policymakers overestimate the resilience of the economy and ignore signs of a spillover to other segments in the economy. Real estate activity and investment in China are set to slow structurally (discussed in the section below). If policymakers allow a disruptive deceleration in the sector's growth while being reluctant to ramp up support in other industries, China’s economic growth could downshift much more than policymakers would like to see. A rapid deceleration in the real economic activity and jitters in the financial markets could reinforce each other and spiral out of control. The facts below explain why risks of an imminent systemic crisis in China’s and global financial markets are limited (Table 1): The exposure of China’s banks to real estate developers is small relative to the banks’ total lending.  Although about 40% of total bank loans are property-related, only 6% are in loans to real estate developers. The majority of the 40% is in mortgage loans, construction loans and other loans collateralized by land and property. Evergrande’s outstanding bank debt accounts for less than 0.1% of China’s total onshore loan balances. The company owes about 1% of China’s existing trust loans and 0.04% of domestic bonds. The company has quality assets, as we discussed in last week’s report, that could cover most of its onshore outstanding debt. Widespread mortgage loan defaults are unlikely to happen, even if Evergrande does not strike a debt restructuring deal with the government. Strict housing and home-sale regulations cap the upside and limit the downside in home prices. Moreover, conservative loan-to-value ratio requirements have contributed to China’s low default rates on mortgage loans.1 Evergrande’s overseas liabilities are more significant, with its USD $20 billion bonds accounting for about 10% of China's corporate USD bonds issued by real estate developers. On the other hand, major US financial institutions have minimal direct exposure to China and Hong Kong SAR. Table 1Evergrande Debt, An Overview* The Evergrande Saga Continues The Evergrande Saga Continues Despite limited systemic risks to the financial markets, a lack of government intervention could result in a disruptive bankruptcy of the company, risking substantial ripple effects on other parts of the economy. Evergrande’s accounts payable and bills amount to nearly RMB 700 billion, owed to companies in the upstream and downstream industry supply chains.  In addition, Evergrande’s contract liabilities are as high as RMB 170 billion and are associated with the pre-sold but unfinished residential units in more than 200 cities. We think policymakers and Evergrande will ultimately agree on a debt restructuring plan. Evergrande could transfer some of its hard assets to state-owned banks or enterprises and the banks could either extend or restructure Evergrande’s existing loans to help finish and deliver the company’s housing projects. Regardless of how the debt is restructured, a government-led rescue will likely prioritize domestic homebuyers and suppliers. Evergrande shareholders and investors in offshore, USD-denominated corporate bonds will suffer large losses. Bottom Line: Our base case scenario is that the government will restructure Evergrande’s debt to prevent the company’s crisis from evolving into a systemic financial risk. Will Policymakers Reverse Restrictive Housing Policies? Even though China’s monetary and fiscal policies have eased at margin, policy restrictions on the property market remain in place. The bar for regulators to significantly ease or to reverse policy tightening in the real estate industry is much higher than in past cycles. Furthermore, the government’s efforts to contain the sector’s leverage and home price inflation are structural rather than cyclical. Our view is based on the following observations: Chart 3China's Housing Demand Is On A Structural Downshift China's Housing Demand Is On A Structural Downshift China's Housing Demand Is On A Structural Downshift China’s housing demand is on a structural downshift due to China’s falling birthrate and working-age population.  The decline in demand will likely accelerate in the next four to five years (Chart 3). Therefore, it is unreasonable to expect that the growth in real estate investment in the coming years will continue growing at the same rate as in the past cycles.  The government is determined to improve housing affordability by capping home prices in the coming years while increasing lower-income household wage growth. Previous “big bang” stimulus and soaring home prices have widened rather than narrowed income and wealth inequality. Beijing’s current primary focus is “common prosperity,” which aims to reduce inequality. This overarching policy initiative will prevent policymakers from backtracking on reforms in the property sector. Things are not bad enough for a major shift in policy direction. Demand for housing is down, but from a very elevated level (Chart 4). The growth of home sales is now reverting to its pre-pandemic rate. In a previous report we pointed out that the current policy backdrop resembles that of 2H2018 and 2019, when the stimulus was very measured despite a slowing economy and an escalating trade war with the US. Demand for housing in the first eight months of this year is stronger than in 2018/19, thus policymakers may not feel pressure to loosen restrictions in the housing sector.  Chart 4Post-Pandemic Housing Demand Stronger Than 2018/19 Post-Pandemic Housing Demand Stronger Than 2018/19 Post-Pandemic Housing Demand Stronger Than 2018/19 Chart 5Real Estate Investment Relatively Steady Despite Contracting Housing Starts Real Estate Investment Relatively Steady Despite Contracting Housing Starts Real Estate Investment Relatively Steady Despite Contracting Housing Starts Growth in real estate investment has been steady despite contracting housing starts (Chart 5).  The government’s deleveraging pressure on the sector since August last year has forced developers to hurry and finish their existing projects (Chart 5, bottom panel). This has helped to reduce developers’ project inventories and discourage them from hoarding land reserves, and the policy intention is unlikely to change (Chart 6). Additionally, the government has prioritized home price stability by capping prices and fine-tuning the supply of land (Chart 7). In other words, housing starts have become less market-driven and weaker readings may reflect regulators’ policy intentions to rein in land supplies.2 Local governments may increase the supply of land when real estate investment softens too fast, but home sales and project completions will have to decelerate more significantly. Chart 6Developers Have Been Rushing To Finish Existing Projects Developers Have Been Rushing To Finish Existing Projects Developers Have Been Rushing To Finish Existing Projects Chart 7Government Prioritizes Home Price Stability By Capping Prices And Fine-Tuning Land Supply Government Prioritizes Home Price Stability By Capping Prices And Fine-Tuning Land Supply Government Prioritizes Home Price Stability By Capping Prices And Fine-Tuning Land Supply Funding constraints will not be removed soon and restrictive policies apply to both developers and banks. Banks need to meet the “two red lines” while developers must bring their leverage ratios below the “three red lines” by end-2023. The “two red lines”, which the PBoC unveiled in January this year, set the upper limit on the portion of household mortgages and real estate loans in banks’ total lending.  Despite aggressively scaling back lending to the housing sector, the lending ratio in many banks – including China’s six large banks and various medium-sized banks – still exceeded the upper limit. These banks will have to continue to reduce their property-related lending while the other banks will maintain a lower percentage of loans to the housing sector than in the past. Consequently, binding constraints on developers and banks will continue to weigh on the housing market in the coming years, suggesting that the property market downturn will last longer than in previous cycles. Chinese policymakers are unlikely to have much appetite for more robust construction activity in the current environment with supply-side constraints for both raw materials and energy. More than 10 provinces in China are currently under power rationing and have cut factory production amid electricity supply issues and a push to enforce environmental regulations. We expect supply shortages and production decreases to continue through the winter, limiting the upside potential of the country’s economic activity. Bottom Line: China’s reforms in the property sector are structural and the leadership is much less likely to use housing as counter-cyclical policy support to the economy than in previous cycles. Investment Implications China’s growth and its ever-important property market activity have slowed. Given the policymakers’ higher pain threshold for a slower economy and lower appetite for leverage, policy easing will likely be gradual and piecemeal in the near term. The current monetary, fiscal, and industry policy backdrops resemble China’s response in H2 2018 and early 2019. Chinese stock prices rose briefly in early 2019 on the expectation of a sizable stimulus, but the rally was short-lived (Chart 8). Furthermore, we do not rule out the possibility that policymakers will be overconfident in their capability to stabilize the economy as they balance structural reforms against growth volatility. They may choose to wait until there are signs of a significant spillover to other segments in the economy before backtracking the deleveraging campaign in the property sector and lending more support to the market/economy. In this scenario, the near-term response in the equity market will likely be very negative. China-related asset prices will not stabilize until policymakers decisively and significantly dial-up their reflationary response. Property sector stocks in China’s on- and offshore markets have been beaten down by policy tightening and lately the Evergrande saga (Chart 9). We maintain our view that these stocks have not reached their bottom. The property downturn in China is a structural change and authorities are unlikely to reverse current restrictions on the sector to support the economy. Chart 8Chinese Stock Price Rally In 2019 Was Short-Lived Chinese Stock Price Rally In 2019 Was Short-Lived Chinese Stock Price Rally In 2019 Was Short-Lived Chart 9Chinese Real Estate Stocks Have Not Reached Their Bottom Chinese Real Estate Stocks Have Not Reached Their Bottom Chinese Real Estate Stocks Have Not Reached Their Bottom The real estate sector’s contribution to China’s economic growth is expected to gradually decline in the medium to long term. The industry will be further reformed and consolidated, and more developers will be forced to abandon their high-leverage, high-growth business expansion model. The outlook for the real estate industry’s profit growth will become less certain.  Investors will require higher risk premiums for real estate sector stocks, which means that these stocks’ valuations will be further compressed.   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Chinese homeowners’ down payment ratios on a first property is 30% and 50% on a second property. 2Land auctions were delayed in July and August due to overwhelming demand from developers in the first half of the year. Market/Sector Recommendations Cyclical Investment Stance