Real Estate

Feature We spent the past two weeks visiting and exchanging views with our clients in Asia. We presented our view that the ongoing stimulus measures are beginning to bear fruit in terms of stabilizing China’s economic activity, and that we expect the economic slowdown to bottom early next year. In addition, Chinese policymakers are signaling their willingness to accelerate stimulus on both monetary and fiscal fronts, which should mitigate the downside risks and help the economy regain traction in 2020. Interestingly, our view sparked divergent responses: clients outside of China were more upbeat about the state of the Chinese economy than clients from mainland China.  While few investors we spoke to showed concerns over an imminent “hard landing” in China’s economy or systemic risk from China’s financial system, our mainland Chinese clients remain skeptical that the ongoing stimulus will be sufficient to revive the economy. They were also worried that financial regulations may be too restrictive to generate the amount of money growth needed for the economy. Another interesting observation was that while being pessimistic about the economy, our mainland Chinese investors share our assessment that Chinese domestic stocks still have some upside in the coming year. On the other hand, global investors, who are more sanguine about China’s economic recovery, prefer to wait on the sidelines before favoring Chinese investable stocks (Chart 1). Chart 1AA Tale Of Two Markets: Onshore Outperforms Global Markets... Chart 1B...While Offshore Underperforms Below we present some of the top questions that were posed by investors during our trip, along with our answers. We recap the conclusions of our view, and draw out the investment implications of the differences between the sentiments towards China’s equity markets, in the last question of the report. Q: Recent economic data suggests a weakening Chinese economy. Why do you think the economy will reach a bottom in 2020? Historically, China’s credit formation has consistently led economic activity by about three quarters (Chart 2).  Even though credit growth this year has not been as strong as in previous expansionary cycles, a turning point in the credit impulse occurred at the start of 2019. This suggests that economic activity should turn around within the next two quarters. Chart 2Expecting A Turn In Q1 2020 Chart 3Emerging Green Shoots   Furthermore, despite weakening headline economic data, some underlying components indicate promising improvements (Chart 3): Growth in infrastructure investment has ticked up modestly in the past couple months, and is set to improve further. The State Council mandated local governments to allocate the proceeds from special-purpose bond sales to infrastructure projects by the end of October. This, combined with a frontloading of next year’s local government bonds, should lend support to infrastructure spending in the coming months. After fluctuating in and out of contraction for a year, growth in auto manufacturing production picked up in August and remained positive through October. This improvement is due to less contraction in auto sales and a faster reduction in auto inventories. Moreover, electricity output surged in October, which also indicates that growth may be gaining momentum. Chart 4Trade Should Improve Into 2020 Lastly, global financial conditions have eased significantly and credit growth has picked up worldwide, which should help support global demand. Even though Sino-US trade negotiations are ongoing, our baseline view is that a “Phase One” trade deal will be inked in the next couple months. Eased trade tensions and even some rollbacks in the existing tariffs on Chinese export goods, coupled with improved global demand, should provide some tailwinds to China’s external sector (Chart 4). Q: What is your outlook on China’s economic policy for 2020? The Chinese economic growth model remains reliant on credit formation and capital investment. Therefore, the sustainability of an economic recovery depends on whether Chinese policymakers are willing to keep the stimulus wheel turning. Chart 5A Sign Of A Policy Shift For investors favoring China-related assets, the good news is that there has been an increasing urgency in policymakers’ tone to support economic growth since September. Capex growth from state-owned enterprises (SOEs) has increasingly outpaced the private sector, which is significant:  A sustained rotation in the pace of SOE vis-à-vis private sector capex marked a turning point in the 2015-2016 cycle, when Chinese policymakers’ imperative to supporting growth outweighed their desire to continue with structural reforms (Chart 5).  We do not expect a 2016-style drastic rise in SOE capex growth next year, because the current economic slowdown is not as severe or prolonged as in 2015. Nonetheless, the rotation in capex growth is an important signal that Chinese policymakers may be more willing to stimulate the economy by again allowing the state sector to upstage the private sector. In the meantime, we expect that some pro-growth “policy adjustments” will be deployed in 2020: Chart 6Infrastructure Investment Likely To Rise Monetary policy will incrementally ease, with one to two 10-15bps loan prime rate (LPR) cuts in the next 3-6 months. At the same time, China’s central bank (PBoC) will keep bank liquidity ample and commercial banks’ funding costs relatively low, by continuing frequent liquidity injections to stabilize the interbank rate. A further cut in the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) is also highly likely. Keeping banks well capitalized will partially mitigate the pressure commercial banks face from falling profit margins and rising credit defaults. Accommodative monetary conditions will also support more stimulus on the fiscal front. We expect that the National People’s Congress in March 2020 will approve higher quotas on the issuing of local government bonds. Chinese state-owned commercial banks will continue to be the main buyers for local government bonds.  A portion of 2020 local government special-purpose bond issuance will be frontloaded to the remainder of 2019 and into the first months of next year. Relaxed capital requirements will likely boost local governments’ infrastructure project funding and expenditures. Our model suggests infrastructure spending should pick up from the current 3.3% year-on-year, to close to 7.5% in the second and third quarters next year (Chart 6). There are subtle signs that the government is starting to relax restrictions on the real estate sector. Land sales by local governments have increased since mid-2019, and the trend will continue into 2020 (Chart 7).  Income from land sales accounts for 70% of local government revenues, thus allowing more land sales should help fund a larger local government spending budget next year. Declining government subsidies to shantytown renovation (namely the Pledged Supplementary Lending, or PSL) have recently abated and will likely continue to improve (Chart 8). Chart 7Some Improvement To Come In The Real Estate Sector Chart 8Government Subsidies Will Continue   December’s Central Economic Work Conference (CEWC) will set policy priorities for the following year. We think Chinese policymakers will make economic growth a top priority for 2020. Credit growth swelled in the first quarter of 2019 following the December 2018 CEWC, and we expect a surge in early 2020 as well.Due to the unusually high credit growth in January this year and the seasonal factor next year (Chinese New Year will fall in January 2020), the surge in credit growth, on a year-over-year basis, will more likely be muted until towards the end of the first quarter and into the second quarter. Investors should overweight Chinese investable stocks in the next 6-12 months, but need to watch for more positive signs to upgrade tactical stance. Beyond the second quarter, however, the outlook gets cloudier as tension from the US election heats up and President Trump may change his trade negotiation strategies with China.1 This may have implications on China’s domestic policies. But for now, our baseline view is that Chinese policymakers will incrementally accelerate the pace of economic stimulus throughout next year. Q:  Monetary policy has been accommodative for more than a year, but capex this year has fallen below market expectations compared with past cycles. How will further stimulus help to revive investment and economic growth next year? In short, our answer is this: interest rate cuts alone will not be enough to boost economic growth in China. Capex, and growth more generally, will only revive through synchronized policy support from the Chinese authorities. In a previous report2 we discussed that the lack of response to monetary easing has been due to a less effective monetary policy transmission mechanism, a reactive and reluctant central bank, and a debt-loaded corporate sector. More importantly, the “half-measured” stimulus has been preferred by Chinese authorities in this cycle, as they prioritized financial de-risking over growth and have significantly tightened financial regulations since 2016. Given the expected policy pivot to a more pro-growth stance in the coming year, the following underlines our conviction that capex should pick up in 2020.  Modern Money Theory (MMT), with Chinese characteristics:3 local governments will ramp up debt again, and this quasi-fiscal stimulus will be a key support to the economy in 2020. During the 2015-2016 cycle, aggressive interest cuts did not result in a significant uptick in credit growth. Bank lending was not the core driver for economic recovery in 2016. The economy only bottomed following an unprecedented issuance of local government bonds after mid-2015 (Chart 9).  Chinese authorities will keep a “back door” open: even though overall tight financial regulations will remain intact, we expect the PBoC to allow a more moderate contraction in shadow banking (Chart 10). This will provide smaller banks and enterprises access to tap into bank credit. Importantly, this means the government will acquiesce to local governments in providing extra funding through shadow banking. We already see local government financing vehicles (LGFV) making a comeback in recent months. Chart 9A Chinese Version Of MMT Chart 10The "Back Door" May Open Wider     Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) will benefit from lowered financing costs through the new LPR system. As we pointed out in our previous report,4 the new LPR regime is not intended as much to expand bank credit as to help struggling SMEs survive economic hardships. This, along with tax cuts, should provide SMEs some relief from capital constraints. Q. CPI has been rising sharply and is above the government’s inflation target of 3%. Will inflation prevent the PBoC from maintaining an easy monetary policy? Chart 11PBoC Likely To Capitulate To Producer Deflation No. We think deflationary pressure in the industrial sector (measured by producer prices) poses a bigger threat to the economy, and that PBoC is more likely to loosen monetary policy than to tighten (Chart 11). Chart 12 shows that the recent surge in headline consumer prices has almost been entirely driven by soaring pork prices. There is compelling evidence from historical data that, unless core consumer price inflation also rises, climbing food prices alone will have a limited impact on PBoC policy (Chart 13). We think this approach is justified, as the necessity of “core feedthrough” is also what most central banks in the developed world look for when confronted with a detrimental supply shock. Chart 12Rising Pork Prices Have Driven Up Headline Inflation... Chart 13...But Won't Be Driving Up Interest Rates Chart 14A Wild Year For The RMB Core CPI has been trending downwards since February 2018, and there is no evidence to suggest that food prices will drive up core CPI inflation (Chart 13, bottom panel).  This, in combination with deflating producer prices, means that the probability of tighter monetary policy over the coming 6-9 months is extremely low. In fact, we expect, with high conviction, that the PBOC will guide the LPR lower in the coming months. Q: What is your view on the RMB for 2020? The RMB depreciated by 5% against the US dollar from its peak in February this year, mostly driven by market expectations of US tariffs imposed on Chinese export goods. Interest rate differentials, short-term capital flows, and economic fundamentals all have played much smaller roles in the RMB’s value changes (Chart 14). The depreciation in the CNY/USD this year has pushed the RMB close to two sigma below its long-term trend (Chart 15). As we expect a “Phase One” trade deal to be signed and trade tensions abating at least in the near term, the RMB will face upward pressure through the first half of 2020. The appreciation will also be supported by, although to a lesser extent, China’s improved domestic economy, rising demand for RMB-denominated assets, and a weakening US dollar (Chart 16). According to our model, the USD/CNY exchange rate can return to a 6.8-7.0 range, if a significant portion of the existing tariffs is rolled back (Chart 17).  This range seems to be within the “fair value” of the RMB, justifiable by the current China-US interest rate differential (Chart 14, bottom panel). Chart 15Has The RMB Gone Too Far? Chart 16Demand For RMB Assets On The Rise, Despite The Trade War However, it would not be in the PBoC’s best interests to let the RMB appreciate too rapidly, because an appreciating Chinese currency would act as a deflationary force on China’s export and manufacturing sectors.  The large differential in the China-US interest rates would allow PBoC to cut interest and/or RRR rates, to ease upward pressure on the RMB.   Chart 17Tariff Rollbacks Will Push Up RMB   Q: How should equity investors position themselves towards China over the coming year? We are bullish on Chinese investable stocks in the next 6 to 12 months, based on our view that the Chinese economy will bottom in the first quarter next year, policy will be incrementally more supportive, and a “Phase One” trade deal will be signed soon. In the very near term, however, we think downside risks to Chinese equities are not trivial. We remain a neutral tactical stance, but will continue to watch for the following signs before upgrading our tactical call from neutral to overweight.5 Chart 18A (top panel) shows that cyclical stocks remain very depressed relative to defensives, underscoring investors’ lack of confidence in the Chinese economy and trade negotiations. A breakout in cyclicals versus defensives would signify a major improvement in investor sentiment towards Chinese economic growth. An uptick in the relative performance of industrials and consumer staples (Chart 18A, bottom panel). The negative sensitivity of industrials and positive sensitivity of consumer staples to monetary policy suggests that the relative performance between the two sectors may be a reflationary barometer for China’s economy. The relative performance trend remains off its recent low, which suggests that China’s existing policy stance has not yet turned more reflationary. A technical breakdown in the relative performance of healthcare and utility stocks (Chart 18B) would also be a bullish sign. Investable health care and utilities stocks have historically led China’s economic activity, core inflation and stock prices by 1-3 months. A technical breakdown in the relative performance of these sectors would signify that market participants anticipate a bottom in China’s economy. As we mentioned at the outset, we observed an interesting divergence in sentiment among our domestic versus global investors. This divergence is reflected in both the onshore and offshore stock markets; year to date, onshore A shares have outperformed global benchmarks by 5.6% (Chart 1, on page 1 of the report). Chart 18AWaiting For A Telltale Sign... Chart 18B...Before A Tactical Upgrade However, all of the outperformance in A shares occurred before end April, when the trade talks broke down and domestic credit expansion significantly slowed from the first quarter. Since May, the relative performance of A shares in US dollar terms has been mostly flat, reflecting the fact the markets were not expecting a significant stimulus forthcoming.  Chinese investable stocks, on the other hand, have been trading heavily on the day-to-day news surrounding the trade negotiations and have significantly underperformed both domestic A shares and global benchmarks. Therefore, our base case view of a trade truce coupled with an improved Chinese economy and more supportive policy near year, warrant a cyclical overweight stance favoring Chinese investable stocks over their domestic peers. Earnings from both onshore and offshore markets will benefit from a modest improvement in economic activity, but we think the investable market will benefit more from the trade truce and more upside growth potential. Stay tuned.   Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Is China Afraid Of The Big Bad Warren?" dated October 25, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, " Threading A Stimulus Needle (Part 1): A Reluctant PBoC," dated July 10 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 3We call it a “MMT” because China’s state-owned commercial banks own approximately 80% of local government bonds. The commercial banks are essentially backed by China’s central bank, which has a fiat currency system and can make independent monetary policy decisions. 4Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Mild Deflation Means Timid Easing," dated October 9, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 5Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, "A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance," dated October 30, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Underweight Similar to utilities, REITs have come to the forefront lately as they have populated the top return sector ranks. Importantly, today several key factors signal that investors should shed public market real estate exposure. Namely, weakening supply/demand dynamics, pricing pressures, macro headwinds and still pricey valuations (primarily rock bottom cap rates) are all firing warning shots. On the demand front, not only our proprietary real estate demand indicator has sunk recently, but also the latest Fed Senior Loan Officer survey revealed that demand for CRE loans remains feeble (third & bottom panels). Simultaneously, fewer bankers are willing to extend CRE credit according to the same quarterly Fed survey (second panel). This tightening backdrop coupled with decelerating credit growth, will continue to weigh on CRE prices and S&P REITs.  Bottom Line: We reiterate our underweight rating in the S&P real estate sector. For more details, please refer to the most recent Weekly Report. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5RLST – AMT, PLD, CCI, SPG, EQIX, WELL, PSA, EQR, AVB, SBAC, O, DLR, WY, VTR, ESS, BXP, CBRE, ARE, PEAK, MAA, UDR, EXR, DRE, HST, REG, VNO, IRM, FRT, KIM, AIV, SLG, MAC. ​​​​​​​

Dear Client, Instead of our regular weekly report next Monday, this Friday November 22, you will receive our flagship publication “The Bank Credit Analyst” with our annual investment outlook. Our regular publication service will resume on December 2  with our high-conviction calls for 2020. Kind regards, Anastasios Avgeriou Highlights Portfolio Strategy Weakening supply/demand dynamics, pricing pressures, macro headwinds and pricey valuations are all warning that REITs are headed south. Global capex blues and the ongoing manufacturing recession, the resilient US dollar and weak operating metrics all confirm that an underweight stance is still warranted in the S&P communications equipment index. Recent Changes There are no changes to our portfolio this week. Table 1 Feature The S&P 500 made fresh all-time highs again last week, as investors focused on hopes of a US/China trade deal and continued to ignore negative data/news at their own peril. Domestically, unemployment insurance claims jumped to the highest level since June, and none of the major market and industry groups showed a gain in output on a month-over-month basis in October according to the latest Fed industrial production release. Internationally, Korean exports remain in the doldrums, Chinese data releases were weak across the board, and the mighty US dollar is making multi-decade highs versus a slew of EM currencies. Chart 1Disquieting Gap All of this begs the question is global growth going to recover and aid the equity market grow into its lofty valuation? Our indicators suggest that a definitive earnings trough is now pushed out to Q2/2020. Thus, equity market caution is still warranted.   Given all the recent equity market euphoria, we feel more and more like “the lone calf standing on the desolate, dangerous, wolf-patrolled prairie of contrary opinion” as – arguably the greatest trader of all time – Jesse Livermore mused roughly a century ago. Share buybacks have been a key pillar underpinning stocks since the GFC averaging roughly $500bn/annum since 2010. But, last year equity retirement jumped to nearly $1tn/annum. That is clearly unsustainable, warning that there is a disconnect between the S&P 500 and already steeply decelerating share buybacks. Our equity retirement estimate for next year is a return to the 10-year average, signaling that the market may hit a significant air pocket (top panel, Chart 1). Another perplexing recent phenomenon has been the lack of buying on margin that typically confirms SPX breakouts. While this episode may be similar to the 2015/16 episode, if margin debt does not recover soon it will exert downward pull on the broad market (bottom panel, Chart 1). Turning over to earnings, revenues, margins and the forward multiple is instructive. Turning over to earnings, revenues, margins and the forward multiple is instructive. Chart 2 highlights the S&P 500 earnings growth surprise factor. In more detail, this IBES/Refinitiv data show how accurate the sell side analysts’ 12-month forward EPS forecasts have been over time: a reading above zero implies the analyst community was too timid, while a fall below zero signals analysts were too optimistic. Chart 2Unhinged From The EPS Accuracy Signal Equity market momentum moves with the ebb and flow of this factor and given the still downbeat message both from our SPX profit model (please refer to our recent webcast slides) and our simple liquidity indicator (please see Chart 4 from last week’s publication), we doubt 10% profit growth is even plausible for 2020. On the margin front, all four key profit margin drivers are on the brink of turning from tailwinds to headwinds as we recently highlighted in our “Peak Margins?” Special Report. Revenue growth is also at risk of a standstill. Domestic producer prices are deflating, and the ISM prices paid index has been clobbered. German, Japanese, Korean and Chinese wholesale prices are contracting and the OECD’s composite PPI measure is also sinking, suggesting that final demand is anemic at best. Under such a dire global pricing backdrop, it will be challenging for SPX sales to sustain their positive momentum, especially if the greenback remains well bid (Chart 3). Chart 3Top Line Growth Troubles Forward multiples have slingshot higher despite a near 40bps increase in the 10-year yield since Labor Day. When the discount rate rises the multiple should come in and vice versa. Thus, we would lean against the recent spike in the S&P 500 forward P/E (10-year yield shown inverted, Chart 4). This week we are updating our negative views on a niche high-yielding sector and a tech subgroup. Finally, while sifting through market internals, we recently stumbled upon the GICS2 S&P consumer services index. Digging deeper into services was revealing. This relative share price ratio has gapped down of late. One of the reasons is that the services component of the personal consumption expenditure (PCE) data is decelerating (PCE services shown advanced, middle panel, Chart 5). The ISM non-manufacturing survey is also an excellent leading indicator of the S&P consumer services index, and warns that things will likely get worse before they get better (bottom panel, Chart 5).       Chart 4Lofty Valuations Chart 5Market Internals Signal: Sit This One Out This week we are updating our negative views on a niche high-yielding sector and a tech subgroup. Getting Real With Real Estate We would refrain from chasing high yielding real estate stocks higher, and would rather avoid them altogether at the current juncture. Similar to utilities, REITs have come to the forefront lately as they have populated the top return sector ranks. However, real estate stocks, which have split out of the financials sector, are a niche GICS1 sector with a mere 3% market capitalization weight in the SPX, and have not driven the S&P 500 to all-time highs. Instead, tech stocks have, owing to their 23% market capitalization weight, as we have shown in recent research.1 Importantly, several key factors continue to signal that investors should shed public market real estate exposure. Namely, weakening supply/demand dynamics, pricing pressures, macro headwinds and still pricey valuations (primarily rock bottom cap rates) are all firing warning shots. The commercial real estate (CRE) sector is a bubble candidate that exemplifies this cycle’s excesses. As we have highlighted in the past, CRE prices sit at roughly two standard deviations above both the historical time trend and the previous cycle’s peak (not shown).2 Worryingly, CRE demand is waning. Not only our proprietary real estate demand indicator has sunk recently, but also the latest Fed Senior Loan Officer survey revealed that demand for CRE loans remains feeble (third & bottom panels, Chart 6). Simultaneously, fewer bankers are willing to extend CRE credit according to the same quarterly Fed survey (Chart 7). This tightening backdrop is weighing on CRE credit growth and CRE prices (second panel, Chart 6). In fact, absent credit growth providing the necessary fuel to sustain the CRE price inflation frenzy, there are rising odds that investors pull the plug on REITs (top panel, Chart 7). Chart 6Demand Ails Chart 7Time To... Already, occupancy rates have crested and there are increasing anecdotes of credit quality deterioration. As a result, CRE rents are also failing to keep up with inflation which eats into relative cash flow growth prospects (Chart 8). The supply side build up tilts this delicate balance further into deficit. Non-residential construction shows no signs of abating, with multi-family housing starts still running at an historically high rate of roughly 400K/annum (Chart 9). Such relentless overbuilding sows the seeds of the eventual felling in CRE prices and rents, which should also dent the S&P real estate sector. Chart 8...Lighten Up On Real Estate Chart 9Supply Build Up Is Deflationary Meanwhile, interest rate related headwinds will also weigh on this high-yielding sector in coming quarters, especially if the selloff in the bond market gains steam as BCA’s fixed income strategists continue to expect. While in the 2000s REITs were positively correlated with the 10-year Treasury yield, since 2010 this relationship has flipped and is now a tight inverse correlation (Chart 10). Chart 10Rising Yields = Sell REITs Finally, our proprietary Valuation Indicator (VI) has enjoyed an impressive run since the 2017 trough and despite the recent relative selloff remains in overvalued territory. Our Technical Indicator (TI) hit a wall of late near one standard deviation above the historical mean and has only partially unwound the overbought reading since the early 2018 bottom. If our thesis pans out, we expect heightened selling pressure to weigh further on our VI and TI (Chart 11). Chart 11Still Too Pricey Bottom Line: We reiterate our underweight rating in the S&P real estate sector. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5RLST – AMT, PLD, CCI, SPG, EQIX, WELL, PSA, EQR, AVB, SBAC, O, DLR, WY, VTR, ESS, BXP, CBRE, ARE, PEAK, MAA, UDR, EXR, DRE, HST, REG, VNO, IRM, FRT, KIM, AIV, SLG, MAC . Lost Signal The communications equipment rally stalled early in the summer and has since morphed into a bear market. We are sticking with our underweight recommendation, especially given a darkening profit outlook for this niche tech sub-group. Bellwether CSCO’s latest guidance was weak and confirmed that this capex-laden tech sub-index is in for a rough ride. Worryingly, CSCO’s key enterprise segment has no pulse. Historically, this data series has been positively correlated with telecom carrier capital outlays and the current message is grim (second panel, Chart 12). Tack on the ongoing manufacturing recession with CEOs canceling/postponing capital spending plans and the outlook dims further for the revenue prospects of communications equipment vendors (third & bottom panels, Chart 12). Chart 12Heed The CSCO Warning Adding insult to injury, the US/China trade war is further complicating the picture. The ongoing tariffs have exacerbated the global growth slowdown and global capex plans have come under intense scrutiny. The IFO’s World Economic Outlook capex intentions survey has plunged, warning that global exports of telecom gear have ample downside (Chart 13). Chart 13Global Capex Blues Chart 14US Dollar The Deflator The greenback’s resilience is also sapping business purchasing power, especially in the emerging markets, denting final-demand. Therefore, the US dollar’s appreciation robs communications equipment manufacturers’ pricing power, makes their goods more expensive in the global market place, and as a consequence forces market share losses on them (Chart 14). The greenback’s resilience is also sapping business purchasing power, especially in the emerging markets, denting final-demand. The implication of weakening pricing power is that profits will likely underwhelm. Currently, the sell-side is penciling in roughly 10% EPS growth for the S&P communications equipment index over and above the SPX in the next twelve months. This is a tall order and we would lean against such extreme analyst optimism (bottom panel, Chart 15). Operating metrics are quickly losing steam, another harbinger of profit ails for this tech sub-group. In more detail, our productivity proxy has taken a steep turn for the worse and industry executives have also put investment projects on hold (middle panel, Chart 15). Moreover, the communication equipment new orders-to-inventories ratio is contracting and industry resource utilization is probing multi-year lows, according to the Fed’s latest industrial production release. Under such a backdrop, relative top line growth is on track to level off and likely flirt with the contraction zone (Chart 16). Chart 15Operating Metric... Chart 16...Dysphoria Netting it all out, global capex blues, the resilient US dollar and weak operating metrics all confirm that an underweight stance is still warranted in the S&P communications equipment index.    Bottom Line: Continue to avoid the S&P communications equipment index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5COMM – CSCO, JNPR, MSI, ANET, FFIV. Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Insight Report, “Deciphering Sector Returns” dated August 30, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Special Report, “10 Most FAQs From The Road” dated April 8, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Stay neutral cyclicals over defensives (downgrade alert) Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps (Stop 10%)

  Highlights While the Caixin PMI is pointing to improving economic conditions, other data series still reflect weak growth. China’s business cycle is likely to bottom in Q1 of next year, rather than in Q4. The failure of Chinese stocks to significantly outperform the global benchmark and the continued underperformance of cyclical stocks underscore the near-term risks to equities if this month’s trade & manufacturing data disappoint. We continue to recommend a neutral tactical stance (0-3 months) towards Chinese equities versus global stocks, but expect them to outperform on a cyclical (6-12 month) time horizon after economic growth firmly bottoms. Feature Tables 1 and 2 on pages 2 and 3 highlight key developments in China’s economy and its financial markets over the past month. On the growth front, the data remains mixed: the strength in the October Caixin PMI and the September pickup in electricity production are positive signs, but other important datapoints still point to weak conditions. We continue to expect that China’s business cycle is likely to bottom in Q1 of next year, rather than in Q4. We continue to expect that growth will bottom in Q1 of next year, rather than in Q4. Table 1China Macro Data Summary Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary Within financial markets, Chinese stocks have rallied in absolute terms over the past month in response to greatly increased odds of a trade truce between China and the US, but have failed to outperform the global benchmark. This, in combination with the continued underperformance of cyclical stocks, suggests that hard evidence of an economic improvement in China will be required before Chinese stocks begin to rise in relative terms. The risk of near-term underperformance is still present, especially if October’s hard trade and manufacturing data disappoint. We continue to recommend a neutral tactical stance (0-3 months) towards Chinese equities versus global stocks, but expect them to outperform on a cyclical (6-12 month) time horizon after economic growth firmly bottoms. In reference to Tables 1 and 2, we provide below several detailed observations concerning developments in China’s macro and financial market data: Chart 1Not Yet A Clear Change In Trend The Bloomberg Li Keqiang index (LKI) ticked up in September, led by an improvement in electricity production. An improvement in the LKI in lockstep with a rising Caixin manufacturing PMI (discussed below) raises the odds that the Chinese economy may be bottoming earlier than we expect, but for now only modestly so. Chinese economic data is highly volatile, and Chart 1 shows that the improvement in the LKI is very muted when shown as a 3-month moving average. In addition, a slight improvement also occurred earlier this year, but proved to be a false signal. All told, for now we continue to expect that growth will bottom in Q1 of next year, rather than in Q4. Our leading indicator for the LKI was essentially flat in September on a smoothed basis, with sequential declines in M3 growth and the credit components of the indicator offsetting improvements in monetary conditions and M2. From a big picture perspective, the story of our LKI leading indicator remains unchanged: it continues to trend higher, at a much shallower pace than has been the case during previous easing cycles. The uptrend is the basis of our forecast that China’s growth will soon bottom, but the uncharacteristically shallow nature of the rise suggests that the eventual recovery will be modest. On a smoothed basis, Chinese residential floor space sold improved again in September, following a very significant rise in August. Over the past 12-18 months, we had emphasized that the double-digit pace of growth in China’s housing starts was unsustainable because it had entirely decoupled from the trend in sales (which have reliably led construction activity over the past decade). This gap disappeared over the summer due to a significant slowdown in starts, which is what we predicted would occur. However, the recent acceleration in floor space sold represents a legitimate fundamental improvement in the housing market, that for now is difficult to attribute to the recent drivers of housing demand (Chart 2).1 Still, investors should continue to watch China’s housing demand data closely over the coming few months, for further signs of a potential re-acceleration in housing construction. Investors need to see meaningful sequential improvements in China’s October trade and manufacturing data. The October improvement in China’s Caixin PMI was quite notable, as it appears to confirm the full one-point rise in the index that occurred in September and suggests that manufacturing in China’s private-sector is now durably expanding. Still, conflicting signals remain: the official PMI fell in October and remains below 50, and the significant September improvement in the Caixin PMI was not corroborated by an improvement in producer prices or nominal import growth (Chart 3). As PMIs are simply timely coincident indicators that do not generally have leading properties, investors will need to see meaningful sequential improvements in China’s October trade and manufacturing data in order to have confidence that the Caixin PMI improvement is not a false signal. Chart 2It Is Not Yet Apparent What Is Driving A Pickup In Housing Demand Chart 3If The Caixin PMI Is Not A False Signal, A Hard Data Improvement Must Occur Soon Chinese stocks have rallied 6-7% over the past month in absolute terms, but have modestly underperformed global equities. The rally in global stock prices has occurred largely in response to the mid-October announcement of a trade truce between China and the US. The failure of Chinese stocks to outperform during this period suggests hard evidence of an economic improvement in China will be required before Chinese stocks begin to outpace their global peers. At the regional equity level, the other notable development over the past month has been the continued outperformance of the MSCI Taiwan Index versus the global benchmark. Taiwan’s outperformance has been boosted by a rising TWD versus the dollar, but Taiwanese stocks have also outperformed in local currency terms. Taiwan province is highly exposed to global trade, and it is not surprising that equities have reacted positively to the prospect of a trade truce between the US and China. Further meaningful outperformance, however, will likely require a re-acceleration in Taiwanese exports, as export growth has merely halted its contraction (Chart 4). Within China’s investable equity market, cyclicals have underperformed defensives over the past month after having rallied significantly from late-August to mid-September (Chart 5). We noted in our October 30 Special Report that these cyclical sectors have historically been positively correlated with pro-cyclical macroeconomic and equity market variables,2 and their underperformance versus defensives is thus consistent with the failure of Chinese stocks in the aggregate to outperform global equities over the past month. In both cases, outperformance likely requires hard evidence of an upturn in China’s business cycle. Chart 4Export Growth Needs To Improve In Order To Expect Further Taiwanese Relative Outperformance Chart 5Cyclical Underperformance Underscores The Near-Term Risks To Chinese Vs. Global Stocks We do not take the rise in Chinese government bond yields as necessarily indicative of an imminent breakout in relative equity performance. Chart 6Chinese Relative Equity Performance Leads Bond Yields, Not The Other Way Around Chinese 10-year government bond yields have risen roughly 15bps over the past month, and are now 30bps off of their mid-August low. Many market participants view Chinese government bond yields as a leading growth barometer, but 10-year yields have actually lagged Chinese investable stock performance over the past two years (Chart 6). As such, we do not take the rise in yields as necessarily indicative of an imminent breakout in relative equity performance. Chinese onshore corporate bond spreads have declined over the past month as government bond yields have been rising, continuing a pattern of negative correlation between the two that has prevailed since early-2018. A negative correlation between yields and corporate bond spreads is a normal relationship, and it suggests that spreads may narrow over the coming year if the Chinese economy bottoms in Q1, as we expect. Spreads remain elevated despite the substantial easing in monetary conditions that occurred last year, due to persistent concerns about rising onshore defaults. While we acknowledge that defaults are indeed occurring, we have argued on several occasions that the pace of defaults would have to be much faster in order for current spreads to be justified.3 We continue to recommend a long RMB-denominated position in China’s onshore corporate bond market. The RMB has appreciated over the past month in response to news of a likely trade truce between the US and China, with most of the rise having occurred versus the US dollar. USD-CNY is likely to sustainably trade below the 7 mark in a trade truce scenario, but how much further downside is possible in the near-term absent a re-acceleration in Chinese economic activity remains an open question. With the Fed very likely on hold for the next year, stronger than expected economic growth in China would likely catalyze a persistent selloff in USD-CNY barring a re-emergence of the Sino-US trade war. This, however, is not our base-case view, meaning that we expect modest post-deal strength in the RMB.   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com Jing Sima China Strategist JingS@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1. Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report, “China’s Property Market: Where Will It Go From Here?” dated September 13, 2018. 2. Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance,” dated October 30, 2019. 3. Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Reports, “A Shaky Ladder,” dated June 13, 2018, "Investing In The Middle Of A Trade War,” dated September 19, 2018 and "2019 Key Views: Four Themes For China In The Coming Year,” dated December 5, 2018. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights In this report, we build and present models designed to predict the odds of Chinese investable equity sector outperformance, based on a set of macroeconomic and equity market factors. BCA Research's China Investment Strategy service will aim to use our newly developed sector outperformance probability models to help investors to better understand the drivers of performance at any given moment, and to make more active equity sector recommendations in the future. Among the top six factors explaining historical periods of sector performance, three were macroeconomic in orientation, and two were directly related to the broad Chinese equity market. We see this as strongly supportive of the potential returns to be earned from active top-down sector rotation within China’s investable market. Cyclical stocks are very depressed relative to defensives, and we would favor them versus defensives over the coming year if China strikes a trade deal with the US and the Chinese economy incrementally improves, as we expect. Feature In our June 19 Special Report, we reviewed the predictability and cyclicality of equity sector earnings in China's investable & domestic markets, and examined the relevance of earnings in predicting relative sector performance over the past decade. We noted that a few sectors scored highly in terms of earnings predictability and the relevance of those earnings in predicting relative performance. But we also highlighted that most of China's equity sectors, in both the investable and domestic markets, either demonstrated earnings trends that were difficult to predict based on the trend in overall market earnings or exhibited relative performance that was difficult to explain based on the relative earnings profile. Our models are designed to predict equity sector relative performance using a series of macroeconomic and equity market factors. In short, our June report underscored that China’s equity sectors warranted a closer examination, with a particular emphasis on understanding the specific macroeconomic or equity market factors that have historically predicted relative sector performance. Today’s report examines this question in depth, focused on China’s investable equity market. We hope to extend our research to the A-share market in the near future. Our approach focuses on constructing and presenting models that quantify a checklist-based approach to determining the odds of equity sector performance. The aim is to use these models to better understand the drivers of performance at any given moment, and to make more active equity sector recommendations in the future. These recommendations will not mechanically follow the models; rather, we plan to use them as a stand in for what typically would be expected given the macro and financial market environment, and as a basis to investigate “abnormal” relative performance. We conclude by highlighting the substantial underperformance of cyclical vs defensives sectors over the past two years, and argue that it is highly unlikely that cyclicals will underperform defensives over the coming 12 months if China strikes a trade deal with the US and the economy incrementally improves, as we expect. We also explain the importance of monitoring the relative performance of health care & utilities stocks over the coming few months, and present a unique sector-based barometer for gauging China’s reflationary stance. The latter two relative performance trends are likely to assist investors in positioning for the big call: the outperformance of Chinese investable stocks vs the global benchmark. Detailing Our Approach In our effort to better understand historical periods of sector outperformance, we have chosen to model the probability of outperformance of each level 1 GICS sector (plus banks) based on a set of macro and equity market variables. Specifically, we use an analytical tool called a logistic regression, which forecasts the probability of a discrete event rather than forecasting the value of a dependent variable. We utilized this approach when building our earnings recession model for China (first presented in our January 16 Special Report1), and investors will often see it (in its conceptually different but practically similar probit form) employed when analyzing the likelihood of an economic recession. The New York Fed’s US recession model is a notable example of the latter,2 which has received much attention by market participants over the past year following the inversion of the US yield curve. The “events” that we modeled are historical periods of individual Chinese investable sector outperformance from 2010 to 2018, relative to the MSCI China index (the “broad market”). Charts I-1A and I-1B illustrate these periods with shading in each panel. We then attempt to explain these episodes of outperformance with the following macro predictors: Chart I-1AThis Report Builds Models Aimed At... Chart I-1B...Predicting The Shaded Regions Of These Charts Periods of accelerating economic activity, represented by our BCA's China Activity Index Periods of rising leading indicators of economic activity, represented by our BCA Li Keqiang Leading Indicator Episodes of tight monetary policy, defined as periods where China’s 3-month interbank repo rate is rising Periods of accelerating inflation, measured both by headline and core inflation We also include several equity market variables: uptrends in relative sector earnings, periods of rising broad market stock prices, uptrends in broad market earnings, and episodes of extreme technical conditions and relative over/undervaluation for the sector in question. In the case of energy stocks, we also include oil prices as a predictor. Charts I-2A and I-2B illustrate these periods as well as the macro & market variables that we have included as predictors. Chart I-2AWe Use These Macroeconomic And Equity Market Factors... Chart I-2B...To Predict Periods Of Equity Sector Outperformance Our approach also accounts for the existence of any leading or lagging relationships between the macro and market variables we have used as predictors and sector relative performance. In most cases the predictors lead relative sector performance, but in some cases it is the opposite. In the case of the latter, we have limited the lead of any variable in our models to 3 months in order to reduce the need to forecast. The link between tight monetary policy and industrial sector performance is one exception to this rule that we detail below. Finally, our approach also limits the extent to which we consider a leading relationship between our predictors and relative sector performance, in order to avoid picking up overlapping economic cycles. This issue, and the evidence supporting the existence of a 3½-year credit cycle in China, are detailed in Box 1. Box 1 Accounting For China’s 3½-Year Credit Cycle Over the course of the analysis detailed in this report, judgments concerning how much of a lead or lag to allow when accounting for any leading or lagging relationships between sector relative performance and either macroeconomic & stock market predictors were necessary. In cases where sector relative performance led any of our predictors, we capped the lead at 3-months to reduce the need to forecast the predictors when using the models. As explained below, the 8-month lead between industrial sector relative performance and tight monetary policy was the only exception to this rule. We also did not include any leading relationship between relative sector stock performance and the trend in relative sector EPS, and allowed at most a co-incident relationship. Limits were also required in the cases where our predictors led relative sector performance. While more lead time is usually better from the perspective of investment strategy, Chart I-B1 presents strong evidence of a 3½ -year credit cycle in China. Chart I-B2 illustrates the problem with including significant lags between predictors and relative sector performance when economic cycles are short. The chart shows the lead/lag correlation profile of the stylized cycle shown in Chart I-B1, and highlights that lags greater than 12-14 months risk picking up the impact of the previous economic cycle. Given this, we have limited the extent to which our predictors can lead relative sector performance in our models, and in practice lead times are generally less than one year. Chart I-B1Over The Past Decade, China Has Experienced A 3½-Year Credit Cycle Chart I-B2With Short Cycles, Excessive Lags Risk Picking Up The Previous Cycle The Key Drivers Of Chinese Investable Equity Sectors Pages 12-23 present the results of each sector’s outperformance probability model, along with a list of factors that were found to be useful predictors and a summary of the results. The importance of the factors included in the models is shown in each of the tables at the top right of pages 12-23 by a score of 1-3 stars, (loosely representing key levels of statistical significance) as well as each factor’s optimal lead or lag. A minus sign shows that the predictor leads sector relative performance, whereas a plus sign shows that it lags. Rising core inflation in China is the most important signal of sector performance that emerged from our analysis. Chart I-3China’s Sectors Linked Strongly To Core Inflation, Monetary Policy, And Growth Chart I-3 summarizes the significance of the factors in predicting sector performance in general, by summing up each predictor’s number of stars across all of the models. The chart shows that rising core inflation in China is the most important signal of sector performance that emerged from our analysis, followed by tight monetary policy, rising economic activity, rising broad market stock prices, oversold technical conditions, and rising broad market earnings. Chart I-3 highlights two important points: If regarded through the lens of causality alone, the strong relationship between rising core inflation and sector performance is somewhat surprising: normally, pricing power is subordinate to revenue/sales/demand as the primary factor driving fundamental performance. However, given that inflation is a lagging economic variable, we suspect that the significance of inflation in our models actually reflects the middle phase of the economic cycle in which sectors tend to best exhibit meaningful out/underperformance. It is also a stronger predictor of periods of tight monetary policy in China than headline inflation.3 This is an encouraging result for investors, as it suggests good odds that future episodes of meaningful sector outperformance can be identified given a particular macro view. Among the top six factors explaining historical periods of sector performance, three were macroeconomic in orientation, and two were directly related to the broad Chinese equity market. While Chinese equity sector performance can sometimes be idiosyncratic, we see this as strongly supportive of the idea that investors can earn positive excess returns by actively shifting between China’s equity sectors using a top-down approach. Turning to the specific results of our sector models, we present the following big-picture findings of our research: Defining China’s Cyclical & Defensive Sectors From a top-down perspective, the most important element of sector rotation typically involves shifting from defensive to cyclical stocks when economic activity is set to improve (and vice versa). In China, it is clear from the results of our models that the investable energy, materials, industrials, consumer discretionary, and information technology sectors are cyclical sectors. The relative performance of these sectors exhibits a positive relationship to pro-cyclical macro variables, or broad market trends. Following last year’s GICS changes, we also include the media & entertainment industry group (within the new communication services sector) in this list. Correspondingly, investable consumer staples, health care, financials, telecom services, utilities, and real estate are defensive sectors in China. Chart I-4Cyclical Stocks Are Bombed Out Versus Defensives Chart I-4 illustrates how these sectors have performed over the past decade by grouping them into equally-weighted cyclical and defensive stock price indexes, as well as the relative performance of cyclicals versus defensives. The chart makes it clear that cyclical stock performance is essentially as weak as it has ever been relative to defensives over the past decade, with the exception of a brief period in 2013. Panel 2 highlights that all of the underperformance of cyclicals over the past two years has been due to de-rating, rather than due to underperforming earnings. The Atypical Case Of Financials & Real Estate The fact that financial and real estate stocks are defensive in China is somewhat curious. In the case of financials, the abnormality is straightforward: most global equity portfolio managers would consider financials to be cyclical, and our work suggests that this is not true for the investable market. Our explanation for this apparent discrepancy is also straightforward: while small and medium banks in China have obviously grown in prominence over the past decade, large state-owned or state-affiliated commercial banks are still dominant in the provision of credit to China's old economy. In most cases China’s large banks lend to state-owned enterprises with implicit government guarantees, meaning that the earnings risk for Chinese banks has typically been lower than for the investable market in the aggregate. It remains to be seen whether this will remain true in a world where Chinese policymakers are keen to slow the pace at which China’s macro leverage ratio rises and to render the existing stock of debt more sustainable for the non-financial sector. Indeed, over a multi-year time horizon, the risk are not trivial that banks will be forced to recapitalize as a result of forced changes to loan terms (eg: significant increases in the amortization period of existing loans) or the recognition of sizeable loan losses, which would clearly increase the cyclicality of the Chinese investable financial sector. Chart I-5A Seeming Contradiction: Real Estate Is High-Beta, But Defensive On the real estate front, the anomaly is not that real estate stocks respond defensively to macroeconomic and stock market variables, it is that real estate stock prices are considerably more volatile than this defensive characterization would suggest. Globally (and especially in the US), real estate stocks are often viewed as bond proxies and thus are typically low-beta, but Chart I-5 shows that this is not the case in China. In our view, this issue is reconciled by the fact that Chinese investable real estate stocks are also highly positively linked to Chinese house price appreciation, with relative performance typically leading a pickup in house prices by up to 1 year. This strongly leading relationship has meant that real estate stocks have often outperformed the broad market as economic activity is slowing, in anticipation that policy easing will lead to an eventual recovery in house prices. Chart I-6Still Following The Defensive Playbook This Year In effect, investable real estate stocks are a high-beta sector that have acted counter-cyclically due to the historical interplay between economic activity, monetary policy, and the housing market. Real estate performance this year has not deviated from this playbook (Chart I-6), and so for now we are content to include real estate stocks in our defensive index. But similar to the case of financials, we can conceive of scenarios in which ongoing Chinese financial sector reform may change this relationship in the future. The Unique Monetary Policy Sensitivity Of Industrials And Consumer Staples Pages 14 and 16 highlight that industrials and consumer staples stocks have typically been sensitive to periods of tight monetary policy. In the case of industrials the relationship is negative, whereas consumer staples relative performance has been positively linked to these periods. In both cases, relative performance has led periods of tight monetary policy, significantly so in the case of industrials (by an average of 8 months). While the relative performance of banks, tech, and real estate stocks have also been linked to periods of tight monetary policy, industrials and consumer staples are the only sectors that have tended to lead these periods. Chart I-7Diverging Corporate Health Explains Industrials/Staples Monetary Policy Sensitivity This is a revelatory finding, and in our view it is explained by divergences in corporate health and leverage for the two sectors. We reviewed Chinese corporate health in our August 28 Special Report,4 and noted that the food & beverage sub-industry was a clear (positive) outlier based on our corporate health monitors. In particular, Chart I-7 highlights that food & beverage corporate health is markedly better than that for machinery companies or for industrial firms in general, supporting the notion that high (low) leverage is impacting the relative performance of industrials (consumer staples). The Leading Nature Of Health Care & Utilities Health care and utilities exhibit similar key drivers of relative performance: in both cases, periods of rising economic activity, rising core inflation, and rising broad market stock prices are all negatively associated with performance. Health care and utilities relative performance also happens to lead all three of those predictors, by 1-3 months on average depending on the variable in question. Our modeling work highlights that these are the only sectors whose relative performance has led multiple factors, suggesting that health care & utilities stocks are particularly interesting market bellwethers to monitor. Core Inflation Matters More Than Headline, Except For Energy & Real Estate As highlighted in Chart I-3, rising core inflation has been a much more important signal about relative sector performance than headline inflation. Chart I-8In China, Food Prices (Not Energy) Account For Headline/Core Differences The two exceptions to this rule relate to the energy and real estate sectors, with the former positively linked to headline inflation and the latter negatively linked. In both cases, we suspect that the relationship is a behavioral rather than a fundamental one. For energy, while rising headline inflation in developed countries is usually associated with rising energy prices, this is not true in the case of China. Chart I-8 highlights that differences between headline and core inflation over the past decade have almost always been driven by rising food prices. This implies that some investors (incorrectly) view energy stocks as a hedge against increases in consumer prices, even if those increases are not driven by rising fuel costs. In the case of real estate, investor expectations of eroding real disposable income and its impact on the housing market are likely the best explanation for the negative link between real estate relative performance and rising headline inflation. Whereas rising core inflation likely reflects a durable improvement in economic momentum (and thus would be positively correlated with income growth), episodes of rising Chinese headline inflation often reflect supply shocks that investors may perceive to be detrimental to household spending power (and thus expected housing demand). Investment Conclusions Our work aimed at explaining historical periods of Chinese investable sector outperformance has three investment implications in the current environment. Cyclicals will probably outperform defensives over the coming year if China strikes a trade deal with the US and the Chinese economy incrementally improves, as we expect. First, within China’s investable market, Chart I-4 illustrated that cyclical stocks are very depressed relative to defensives. Given our view that Chinese investable stocks are likely to outperform their global peers over a 6-12 month time horizon, we would also favor cyclicals to defensives over that period. For investors who are not yet overweight cyclical stocks in China, we would advise waiting for concrete signs that growth has bottomed (which should emerge sometime in Q1) before putting on a long position as we remain tactically neutral towards Chinese versus global stocks. But the key point is that it is highly unlikely that cyclicals will underperform defensives over the coming year if China strikes a trade deal with the US and the Chinese economy incrementally improves, as we expect. Second, the fact that investable health care and utilities stocks have particularly leading properties suggests that they should be monitored closely over the coming few months. A technical breakdown in the relative performance of these sectors would be an important sign that market participants are anticipating a bottoming in China’s economy, which may give investors a green light to position for a bullish cyclical stance. For now, both of these sectors continue to outperform (Chart I-9), supporting our decision to remain tactically neutral towards Chinese stocks. Third, the heightened negative sensitivity of industrials and positive sensitivity of consumer staples to monetary policy suggests that the relative performance trend between the two sectors may serve as a reflationary barometer for China’s economy. Chart I-10 shows that industrials outperformed staples last year once the PBOC shifted into easing mode, and anticipated the recovery in the pace of credit growth. However, industrials soon began to underperform staples, which also seems to have anticipated the fact that the recovery in credit was set to be less powerful than what has occurred during previous cycles. The fact that the relative performance trend is off its recent low is notable, and may suggest that China’s existing reflationary stance will be sufficient to stabilize economic activity if a trade deal with the US is indeed finalized in the near future. Chart I-9Key Defensive Sectors Are Still Outperforming, Supporting Our Neutral Tactical Stance Chart I-10Industrials Vs. Staples Anticipated That Easing Would Only Be Measured As a final point, BCA Research's China Investment Strategy service will aim to use our newly developed sector outperformance probability models to make more active equity sector recommendations in the future. These recommendations will not mechanically follow the models; rather, we plan to use the models as a stand in for what typically would be expected given the macro and financial market environment, and as a basis to investigate “abnormal” relative performance. We hope you will find these models to be a helpful quantification of the risk versus return prospects of allocating among China’s investable sectors. As always, we welcome any feedback that you may have about our approach.   Energy Chart II-1 Table II-1   Unsurprisingly, our energy sector model highlights that periods of energy outperformance are strongly linked to periods of rising crude oil prices. However, what is surprising is that periods of accelerating headline inflation in China are even more closely linked to periods of energy sector outperformance than episodes of rising oil prices, and that these periods of accelerating inflation are not generally caused by rising energy prices. The lack of a clear economic rationale for this relationship implies that some investors (incorrectly) view energy stocks as a hedge against increases in consumer prices, even if those increases are largely driven by rising food prices. The model also highlights that periods of strong undervaluation have historically been significant in predicting future energy sector outperformance, with a lag of roughly 8 months. The probability of energy sector outperformance has fallen sharply according to our model, but for now we continue to recommend a long absolute energy sector position on a 6-12 month time horizon. BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy service expects oil prices to trade at $70/barrel on average next year,5 Chinese headline inflation continues to rise, and we noted in our October 2 Weekly Report that energy stocks are heavily discounted.6 Barring a durable decline in oil prices below $55/barrel, investors should continue to favor China’s energy sector. Materials Chart II-2 Table II-2 Our model highlights that the materials sector is one of the clearest plays on accelerating industrial activity within the investable universe. Among the macro variables that we tested, periods of investable materials outperformance are strongly positively linked with periods when our BCA Activity Index and our leading indicator for the index have been rising. Periods of materials sector outperformance have also been positively correlated with prior periods of oversold technical conditions and rising broad market stock prices, underscoring that materials are a strongly pro-cyclical sector. We currently maintain no active relative sector trades, but our model suggests that investors should be underweight the investable materials sector relative to the broad investable index. Industrials Chart II-3 Table II-3 Periods of industrial sector outperformance have historically been positively correlated with relative industrial sector earnings, broad market stock prices, and prior oversold technical conditions. They have been negatively correlated with periods of tight monetary policy, rising core inflation, and prior overbought technical conditions. Since 2010, periods of industrial sector performance have led periods of tight monetary policy by 8 months, the longest lead of relative equity performance to any macro variable that we tested in our model (and the longest lead that we allowed). Industrial sector performance has also been strongly negatively linked with periods of rising core inflation. These findings, and the fact that our Activity Index and its leading indicator have not been highly successful at predicting periods of industrial sector outperformance, strongly suggest that industrials, while pro-cyclical, are primarily driven by expectations of easy monetary policy. We noted in an August 2018 Special Report that state-owned enterprises have become substantially leveraged over the past decade,7 and in a more recent report we highlighted that industries such as machinery have experienced a significant deterioration in corporate health over the past decade.8 This helps explain why industrial sector performance is so negatively impacted by tight policy. Our model suggests that the best time to be overweight industrial stocks is the early phase of an economic rebound, when Chinese stock prices are rising but market participants are not yet expecting tighter policy. These conditions may present themselves sometime in Q1, but probably not over the coming 0-3 months. Consumer Discretionary Ex-Internet & Direct Marketing Retail Chart II-4 Table II-4 Besides materials, China’s investable consumer discretionary sector has historically been the most positively associated with coincident and leading measures of industrial activity. Rising core inflation is also highly positively related to consumer discretionary outperformance, which may reflect improved pricing power for the sector. The strong link with industrial activity is in contrast to depictions of China’s consumer sector as being less correlated to money & credit trends than the overall economy, and is supportive of our view that industrial activity forms one of the three pillars of China’s business cycle.9 We ended the estimation period of our model as of December 2018, in order to avoid including the distortive effects of last year’s changes to the global industry classification standard (which resulted in Alibaba’s inclusion and overwhelming representation in the investable consumer discretionary sector). As such, the results of our model apply today to consumer discretionary stocks ex-internet & direct marketing retail. For now, the absence of an uptrend in our Activity Index and in core inflation is signaling underperformance of discretionary stocks outside of internet & direct marketing retail. Outperformance this year largely reflects a significant advance in consumer durable and apparel: by contrast, automobiles & components have underperformed the broad market by roughly 14% year-to-date. Consumer Staples Chart II-5 Table II-5 Historically, periods of consumer staples outperformance have been predicted by a falling Activity Index, periods of tight monetary policy, and over/undervalued conditions. The impact of monetary policy is particularly heavy in the model, suggesting that consumer staples are somewhat the mirror image of industrials in terms of the impact of leverage on relative equity performance. This too is supported by our August 28 Special Report,10 which noted that corporate health for the food & beverage sector was the strongest among the sectors we examined. However, the model failed to capture what has been very significant staples outperformance this year, highlighting the occasional limits of a rule-of-thumb approach to sector allocation. Investable consumer staples are reliably low-beta compared with the broad market, and we are not surprised that investors have strongly favored the sector this year amid enormous economic and policy uncertainty. An eventual improvement in economic activity, coupled with fairly rich valuation, should work against consumer staples stocks sometime in the first quarter of 2020. Investors who are positioned in favor of China-related assets should also be watching closely for any signs of a technical breakdown in the relative performance trend of investable staples. Health Care Chart II-6 Table II-6 Among the macro variables tested in our model, periods of health care outperformance are negatively related to coincident and leading measures of industrial activity and strongly negatively related to rising core inflation.  Health care outperformance is also strongly negatively related to periods of rising broad market stock prices, and positively related to prior oversold technical conditions. These results clearly signify that investable health care is a defensive sector, to be owned when the economy is slowing and when investable stocks in general are trending lower. Our model suggests that health care stocks are likely to continue to outperform, as they have been since the beginning of the year. A substantive US/China trade deal that meaningfully reduces economic uncertainty remains the key risk to health care outperformance over a 6- to 12-month time horizon. Financials Chart II-7 Table II-7 Our model highlights that periods of financial sector outperformance over the past decade have been negatively associated with periods of rising core inflation (a strong relationship), and with periods of rising index earnings. Oversold technical conditions have also helped explain future episodes of financial sector outperformance. The link between core inflation and the outperformance of financials appears to represent a behavioral rather than a fundamental relationship. When modeling periods of rising financial sector relative earnings, the trend in broad market EPS is more predictive than that of core inflation, highlighting that the latter’s explanatory power is due to investor behavior. The results of our model, and the fact that core inflation leads Chinese index earnings, suggests that financials are fundamentally counter-cyclical and that investors see rising Chinese core inflation as confirmation that an economic expansion is underway (and that broad market earnings are likely to rise). Our model is currently predicting financial sector outperformance, but investable financials have modestly underperformed since the beginning of the year. This appears to have been caused by the underperformance of financial sector earnings this year as overall index earnings growth has decelerated, contrary to what history would suggest. We suspect that the ongoing shadow banking crackdown is related to financial sector earnings underperformance, and we would advise against an overweight stance towards investable financials until signs of improving relative earnings emerge. Banks Chart II-8 Table II-8 Our model shows that periods of banking sector outperformance are more linked to macro variables than has been the case for the overall financial sector. Specifically, bank performance is negatively correlated with leading indicators of economic activity and rising core inflation, and especially negatively correlated with periods of tight monetary policy. Banks have also typically outperformed following periods of oversold technical conditions. Similar to financials, bank earnings are typically counter-cyclical, but relative bank earnings have not been good predictors of relative bank performance over the past decade. Still, the negative association of relative stock prices with leading economic indicators, rising core inflation and rising interest rates underscores that investors should normally be underweight banks if they expect overall Chinese stock prices to rise. Also similar to the overall financial sector, our model is currently predicting outperformance for bank stocks, but investable banks have underperformed year-to-date. The shadow banking crackdown is also likely impacting investable bank earnings, leading to a similar recommendation to avoid bank stocks until relative earnings look to be trending higher. “Tech+”   Chart II-9 Table II-9 Our technology model has worked well at predicting periods of tech sector outperformance over the past several years, particularly from 2015 – 2017. The model suggests that, in addition to being negatively related to prior overbought conditions, periods of technology sector outperformance are associated with improving growth conditions, easy monetary policy, and rising prices. In other words, tech stocks are a growth & liquidity play. Owing to last year’s changes to the GICS, the results of our model apply today to Chinese investable internet & direct marketing retail, the media & entertainment industry group (within the new communication services sector), and the now considerably smaller information technology sector (the sum of which could be considered the “tech+” sector). The model has been predicting tech sector outperformance since May (in response to easier monetary policy), which has occurred for the official information technology sector. However, the BAT (Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent) stocks are only up fractionally in relative terms from their late-May low. Our expectation that China’s economy is likely to bottom in Q1 means that we may recommend upgrading “tech+” stocks relative to the investable benchmark in the coming months. Telecom Services Chart II-10 Table II-10 Our model for telecommunication services (now a level 2 industry group within the communication services sector) illustrates that telecom stocks have historically been counter-cyclical. Periods of telecom outperformance have been negatively associated with periods of rising core inflation, rising broad market stock prices, and rising broad market EPS. It is notable that telecom services stocks are driven more by cycles in overall stock prices than by cycles in economic activity. This suggests that investors tend to focus on the fact that telecom stocks are reliably low-beta compared with the overall investable market, causing out(under)performance of telecoms when the broad market is falling(rising). Similar to financials & banks, telecom stocks have not outperformed this year, in contrast to what our model would suggest. Earnings also appear to be the culprit, with the level of 12-month trailing earnings having fallen nearly 10% since the summer. China Mobile accounts for a sizeable portion of the telecom services index, and the company’s recent earnings weakness seems to be due to depreciation charges stemming from forced investment on 5G spending (mandated by the Chinese government). Our sense is that this will have only a temporary effect on telecom services EPS, meaning that investors should continue to expect the sector to behave in a counter-cyclical fashion over the coming year. Utilities Chart II-11 Table II-11 The early performance of our utilities model was mixed, as it generated several false sell signals during the 2011 – 2013 period despite recommending, on average, an overweight stance. However, over the past five years, the model has performed extremely well in terms of explaining periods of relative utilities performance. The model highlights that utilities are straightforwardly counter-cyclical. The relative performance of utilities stocks is positively related to its relative earnings trend, and negatively related to economic activity, rising core inflation, and broad market stock prices.  Consistent with a decline in the overall MSCI China index, the model has correctly predicted utilities outperformance this year. We expect utilities to underperform over a 6-12 month time horizon, but would advise against an aggressive underweight position until hard evidence of a bottom in Chinese economic activity emerges. Real Estate Chart II-12 Table II-12 Our model for the relative performance of investable real estate has been among the most successful of those detailed in this report, which is somewhat surprising given the macro factors that the model shows drive real estate performance. While periods of relative real estate performance are modestly (negatively) associated with periods of tight monetary policy, rising headline inflation is the most important macro predictor of real estate underperformance. Among market factors driving performance, real estate stocks reliably underperform when broad market EPS are trending higher, and they historically outperform for a time after becoming relatively undervalued. Real estate relative performance is also strongly linked to periods of rising house prices, but the former tends to significantly lead the latter. Given that core inflation has better predicted episodes of tight monetary policy than headline inflation, investor expectations of eroding real disposable income is likely the best explanation for the negative link between real estate relative performance and rising headline inflation. Whereas rising core inflation likely reflects a durable improvement in economic momentum (and thus would be positively correlated with income growth), episodes of rising Chinese headline inflation often reflect supply shocks that investors may perceive to be detrimental to household spending power (and thus expected housing demand). Beyond the negative link between higher inflation and interest rates on investable real estate performance, the strong negative association with broad market earnings underscores that investors treat real estate as a defensive sector. We thus expect real estate stocks to continue to outperform in the near term, but underperform over a 6-12 month time horizon.   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President jonathanl@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1. Please see China Investment Strategy, "Six Questions About Chinese Stocks," dated January 16, 2019. 2. Please see Federal Reserve Bank of New York, The Yield Curve as a Leading Indicator at https://www.newyorkfed.org/research/capital_markets/ycfaq.html 3. This is despite frequent concerns among investors that the PBOC is inclined to tighten in response to detrimental supply shocks. 4. Please see China Investment Strategy, "Messages From BCA’s China Industry Watch," dated August 28, 2019. 5. Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy, "Policy Uncertainty Lifts USD, Stifles Global Oil Demand Growth," dated October 17, 2019. 6. Please see China Investment Strategy, "China Macro & Market Review," dated October 2, 2019. 7. Please see China Investment Strategy, "Chinese Policymakers: Facing A Trade-Off Between Growth And Leveraging," dated August 29, 2018. 8. Please see China Investment Strategy, "Messages From BCA’s China Industry Watch," dated August 28, 2019. 9. Please see China Investment Strategy, "The Three Pillars Of China’s Economy," dated May 16, 2018. 10. Please see China Investment Strategy, "Messages From BCA’s China Industry Watch," dated August 28, 2019. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights The banks got the current earnings season off to a good start, … : Lending growth may be running in place, and net interest margins are under pressure, but positive operating leverage helped the banks beat expectations, and they are returning gobs of cash to their shareholders. … are quite constructive about the economy, … : The big banks’ CFOs and CEOs were uniformly bullish about the U.S. economy based on their perceptions of household and corporate health. … expect stellar credit performance to continue for the foreseeable future, … : Net charge-off and non-performing loan ratios are near all-time lows and the banks don’t see them rising any time soon. … and appear to be willing to extend loans in all categories except commercial real estate: Every bank sees unattractive competition in commercial real estate lending and plans to continue shrinking its CRE loan book. Nothing To See Here Two-fifths of the companies in the S&P 500 have now reported their quarterly earnings, and after this week the share will be two-thirds. At the aggregate level, it appears as if investors’ worst fears will not be realized, just as they weren’t in the first two quarters of the year. 2018’s greater than 20% year-on-year growth, powered by the sharp cut in the top corporate income tax rate, has rolled off, but earnings have yet to contract. They were projected to fall by a little over 3% at the beginning of this reporting season, but repeated practice has allowed corporate managements to hone their underpromise-and-overdeliver skills to a fine point, and we won’t be surprised if they avert an outright contraction. Chart 1Profit Margins Are Being Squeezed, ... Chart 2... But Neither Growing Compensation, ... Earnings growth has been stagnant this year (Chart 1, bottom panel), though revenues have grown a little faster than nominal GDP (Chart 1, top panel), with which they should converge over time. Profit margins have finally come under pressure, though it’s not exactly clear why. Employee compensation is businesses’ biggest expense by far, and while it has risen from its lows, its growth decelerated last quarter (Chart 2). Dollar strength is a headwind for U.S.-based multinationals, but the dollar only really moved last quarter, after ending the first half where it started the year (Chart 3). Dollar gains weigh on revenues just as surely as they do on profits, though we would not be at all surprised if the share of non-dollar expenses is a good bit smaller than the widely quoted 33-40% estimate of S&P 500 constituents’ foreign sales. Chart 3... Nor A Stronger Dollar Is A Clear-Cut Culprit Rate cuts have sparked a wave of mortgage refinancings, shifting wealth from mortgage investors to homeowners, who are more likely to spend it. Easier monetary conditions should help grease the skids for future earnings growth, both in the U.S. and abroad, and we expect the Fed will cut the fed funds rate by another 25 basis points when it meets this week. We have sympathy for the argument that since interest rates were not a meaningful constraint on growth, cutting them is not likely to provide much of a catalyst. Falling rates have provoked a wave of mortgage refinancings (Chart 4), however, so even if they don’t drive a big lending increase, they are already on their way to putting more money in the pockets of homeowners. Lower rates also reduce the risk of default by lowering debt-service costs for adjustable-rate borrowers, and by encouraging investors who need income to venture further out the risk curve, providing ample capital for borrowers seeking to extend their maturing obligations. Chart 4Putting More Money In Homeowners' Pockets Follow The Money Chart 5Bank Stocks Are Probing Resistance For two years, beginning in 2014, we reviewed the biggest banks’ earnings calls every quarter. The goal was to observe the give and take between bank management and sell-side analysts to gain some insight into the lending market and where it might be headed. We specifically sought information about banks’ willingness to lend, consumers’ and businesses’ appetite for credit, borrower performance, and the banks’ bottom-up perspective on the economy. We were also trying to glean insight into mortgage lending and what it might imply for residential investment. Studying the banks is a natural pursuit for a firm that was founded upon the insight that following money flows through the banking system would provide us with a window into the future direction of the economy and financial markets, and we return to it today. Our analysis is not meant to evaluate the banks’ own investment potential, though we note that they are testing resistance once again (Chart 5), and our Global Investment Strategy and U.S. Equity Strategy services both recommend overweighting them. This round of calls found bank management teams eager to ramp up their distributions to shareholders and optimistic about their ability to deploy technology to drive further efficiency gains. Big Banks Beige Book As a group, the banks were constructive on the economy. Despite widespread recession concerns, they do not see evidence of a looming slowdown from their interactions with consumers and businesses. Overall loan growth has remained around 5% over the last year and a half (Chart 6), while corporate and industrial (C&I) loan growth has ground to zero over the last thirteen weeks (Chart 7). The CEOs and CFOs do not see the C&I slump as the beginning of a worrisome trend, though, and global corporate bond issuance hit an all-time high in September, led by sizable issues from mega-cap U.S. companies. Businesses seeking credit are having no trouble getting it, though all the banks expressed an intention to continue cutting back their exposure to commercial real estate (CRE) loans. Chart 6Bank Lending Is Supporting Activity Without Risking Overheating Chart 7Lending Momentum Has Slowed, But It's Okay Another commercial real estate issue emerged across the calls: several of the biggest banks are consolidating their branch footprints. Prompted by questioning from one analyst, they touted branch closures as a way to enhance efficiency. We do not know if a reduction in bank demand for branch space would have an observable effect on demand for retail space across the country, but it certainly would in Manhattan. It seems possible that branch closures could pressure some retail lessors’ profitability, and thereby act as a drag on CRE whole-loan and CMBS performance at the margin. The Economy [C]onsumer spend and … confidence continue to be strong. I think business activity continues to be strong. I think it’s moderated somewhat because of … trade policy, but generally, I think the economy is solid. (Dolan, USB CFO) I think it’s fair to say that perhaps marginal investment is being impacted by trade fatigue in terms of the uncertainty, but … [there’s] still growth. … [T]he consumer is incredibly strong, … spending is strong, sentiment is strong, … credit is good. [I]t is true that [the recent ISM manufacturing and non-manufacturing surveys] were disappointing[,] so [there are] cautionary signs, but credit remains very good and there is still very healthy business activity. (Piepszak, JPM CFO) In general, our commercial customers continue to see moderate demand and no widespread issues related to trade uncertainty and interest rate changes. … [W]hile our customers are cautious, the most common concern they identify is their ability to hire enough qualified workers. (Shrewsberry, WFC CFO) Consumer payments up 6% year-to-date … [and 6% year-over-year 3Q growth in both our small business segment and total commercial loans] are tangible examples that the U.S. economy is still in solid shape, despite the worries and concerns about trade wars, capital investment slowdowns or other global macro conditions. (Moynihan, BAC CEO) Borrower Performance [W]e’ve had growth in the United States for the better part of 10 years [a]nd … credit is extraordinarily good. … [C]onsumer credit, commercial credit, wholesale is extraordinarily good, it can only get worse if you have a [turn in the] cycle. [Our guidance relates to expected performance across a full cycle.] We’re at the over-earning part of the cycle [beating the through-the-cycle expectation] in credit today, and [at] one point we’ll be at the under-earning part [pulling the full result down to our expectation]. (Dimon, JPM CEO) Our net charge-off rate remains near historic lows at 27 basis points (Chart 8). (Shrewsberry, WFC) Chart 8C&I Charge-Off Rates Are Near Their Historic Lows Credit quality remains stable, and we are not seeing any early indicators in our portfolio that cause us concern. (Cecere, USB CEO) Banks see no broad credit warning signs, but they're perfectly happy to let non-bank lenders take some commercial real estate share at this point of the cycle. We closely monitor our commercial portfolio for signs of weakness and credit quality indicators remain strong. (Shrewsberry, WFC) Lender Willingness [W]e are mindful that at some point, the industry will experience a credit downturn, and we remain disciplined in terms of origination quality and our long-term strategy of remaining within our defined credit box regardless of the competitive environment. (Cecere, USB) [Commercial] real estate banking [declined] as we remain selective, given where we are in the cycle. (Piepszak, JPM) [Commercial real estate lending] is one market where there’s late cycle behavior, there’s lots of non-bank competitors, … more than bank competitors. And so we really have to pick our spots in order to maintain our risk/reward, credit and pricing in loan terms quality. … I wouldn’t look for it to grow meaningfully until the cycle turns and our best customers have really interesting opportunities to put their own capital to work. (Shrewsberry, WFC) [Our declining commercial real estate lending is] really a function of [competition] that we’re not comfortable with. (Cecere, USB) Banks’ Real Estate Demand [C]ustomer behaviors are changing. The amount of transaction activity that’s happening in the branches is significantly less[.] In fact, … roughly 70, 80% of it goes through the digital channel today. So that gives us the opportunity to really reconfigure the branch network, both in terms of size and numbers[.] I think those trends are going to continue … , and … we may accelerate or increase some of [our right-sizing] activity[.] (Dolan, USB) Teller and ATM transactions declined 6% from a year ago, reflecting continued customer migration to digital channels. We’ve consolidated 130 branches in the first nine months of this year, including 52 branches in the third quarter. (Shrewsberry, WFC) [D]o we continue to work on real estate configurations that were down 50 million square feet from the start of 2010[?] [C]an we push [the occupancy rate] up, can we densify the space[?] (Moynihan, BAC) Investment Implications While rereading the April 2014 U.S. Investment Strategy that reviewed the big banks’ 1Q14 earnings calls, we were struck by how similar the picture is today. Back then, we described the central challenge for investors as choosing between mushy fundamentals and generous monetary policy that might be expected to inspire a valuation overshoot. As we do now, we anticipated that activity would soon pick up, providing markets with a fundamental boost, but we also had the sense that “policy settings are such that no much more than the status quo may be required to keep the party going.” We reiterated our equity overweight and our preference for spread product over Treasuries. Between inflection points, investing is an exercise in trend following, and there's no reason to believe that the monetary policy trend is about to change without clear advance notice. Although we are congenitally optimistic about our species and our country, we are not perma-bulls. We simply recognize that, between inflection points, investing is an exercise in trend following, no matter how uncomfortable it may make an investor to leave the portfolio dials alone for a while. As long as the monetary policy backdrop remains extremely accommodative across all of the major developed economies, and central banks are set to add even more accommodation before they start removing it, the bullish trend will remain in place. The prospective real returns of cash and highly-rated sovereign bonds are likely to remain negative for a while against that backdrop, encouraging investors to direct their marginal investment dollar to risk assets as long as a fundamental reversal is not imminent. We think a fundamental inflection is at least two years away, and therefore continue to believe that it is too early to de-risk investment portfolios. We reiterate our recommendation that investors remain at least equal weight equities in balanced portfolios, and at least equal weight spread product within their fixed-income allocations. Doug Peta, CFA Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com

Highlights The currency market is bifurcated in terms of shorter-term expectations versus longer-term factors. The Swedish krona, Norwegian krone, and British pound are solid long-term buys, but could remain very volatile in the short term. We continue to focus on the crosses rather than outright dollar bets. Remain long SEK/NZD, GBP/JPY, and NOK/SEK. Tighten stops on long GBP/JPY to protect profits. EUR/SEK should top out once global growth improves. Sell the gold/silver ratio at 90, as recommended in last week’s report.1 Feature Chart I-1One Way Street Since 2018 Of all the G10 currencies we follow, the Swedish krona is probably the one that is the most perplexing. The Riksbank is one of the few central banks to have raised rates this year, but the krona remains the weakest G10 currency. Admittedly, the performance of the Swedish manufacturing sector has been dismal, and was especially so in September, but this has not been a story specific to Sweden alone. The euro area, which is also experiencing a deep manufacturing recession, has seen better currency performance despite a more dovish European Central Bank (ECB). The underperformance of the krona begs the question of whether it signals a much prolonged global manufacturing recession, or is indicative of something more endogenous to Sweden. Put another way, has the driver of USD/SEK (and even USD/NOK) strength been an appreciating dollar, or more domestic factors (Chart I-1)? And if it is the latter, what are the important signposts to look out for should a turnaround be around the corner? The Soft Versus Hard Data Debate The big question for Sweden is whether the manufacturing sector is just in a volatile bottoming process, or about to contract much further. Industrial production is currently growing at 4% year-over-year, but the signal from the soft data is that it should be contracting in the double digits (Chart I-2, top panel). As such there is either a big disconnect between the perception of investors and reality, or we are on the verge of a much deeper manufacturing slump. Exchange rates tend to be extremely fluid in discounting a wide swath of economic data, and in the case of Sweden, in discounting the outcome for global growth. However, with EUR/SEK at 10.8 and USD/SEK at 9.7 – the latter well above its 2008 highs – it is fair to assume that anything other than a deep recession will justify a stronger SEK.  One of the more consistent ratios in calling a bottom in the Swedish manufacturing sector in particular (and that of the Eurozone in general) is the manufacturing new orders-to-inventories ratio (Chart I-2, bottom panel). The tick down in September was disconcerting. However, unlike the manufacturing PMI, this ratio is not hitting new lows, tentative evidence that we might be in a volatile bottoming process rather than a protracted slump. The last time we encountered such a divergence was in 2011/2012, at the height of the European debt crisis; in that instance, Swedish hard data ended up sending the right signal for the overall economy. The deterioration in the manufacturing sector has yet to hit domestic consumption in general or the labor market in particular.  The deterioration in the manufacturing sector has yet to hit domestic consumption in general or the labor market in particular. The import component of the PMI index remains well above that of exports. Meanwhile, the employment component of the PMI index began to stabilize around the middle of this year, meaning employment growth should bottom at around 1% or so (Chart I-3). Swedish exports are higher up the manufacturing food chain than in most other developed economies, and autos are quite important. But so far, the Swedish economy has weathered the auto slowdown quite well, with production still clocking in at 7% per year. Chart I-2Soft Data Is Much Worse Chart I-3Domestic Demand Is Holding Up Well The tick up in the Swedish unemployment rate is problematic, but we do not believe it constitutes a major change in labor market dynamics. Sweden has a long history of higher openness toward asylum seekers and refugees than many other European countries. The Syrian crisis a couple of years ago led to an exceptional surge, where the number of asylum seekers skyrocketed to over 150,000 or almost 1.5% of the total population (Chart I-4). Historically, immigration has provided a big labor dividend to Sweden, allowing growth to outpace both the U.S. and the euro area. But this has also been a source of frictional unemployment, as new migrants integrate into the labor force. Chart I-4A New Pool Of Labor That Has To Be Integrated Foreign-born workers now constitute about 20% of the total population, a big portion of which need to learn a new language and adopt new skills (Chart I-5A). This growth dividend will be reaped for many years to come. Integration is a politically contentious issue, and so the highly restrictive asylum and reunification law adopted in mid-2016 probably means the immigration boom is behind us. The rise of the anti-immigration Sweden Democrats in the September 2018 elections is a case in point. However, the pivot of the democratic population towards the right has been a global phenomenon, and so is not as negative for Sweden on a relative basis. All that to say, compared to most developed nations, Sweden still enjoys a relatively positive demographic outlook (Chart I-5B). Chart I-5AA Huge Labor Dividend Chart I-5BNo Apparent Demographic Cliff The inflow of migrants has a mixed impact on inflation. While there is downward pressure on wages, due to an increase in the share of employment that pays lower wages, there is still upward pressure on housing and consumption in response to the increased number of workers. This comes on top of a fiscal boost as the government spends more on social services. Meanwhile, the unemployment rate among foreign-born people is around 15%. This means that the Phillips curve is flat for the first few years, before it starts to steepen. But as the new labor force is finally absorbed into the economy, it should start to generate meaningful wage pressures. The Riksbank clearly understands these dynamics, which is why over the prior years, its stance has been dovish even when the Swedish economy has been holding up well. Interest rates were cut to negative territory in 2015 and held at -0.5% (lower than the ECB policy rate) all through the global recovery in 2016 and 2017. Quantitative easing has also been extended up until 2020, well ahead of the ECB’s renewed asset purchase program announcement. Both have tremendously eased monetary conditions in Sweden, including via a weaker currency. Going forward, there are a few key reasons to believe  the path of least resistance for the krona is now up: A weak krona has typically helped the manufacturing sector with a lag of twelve months.  A weak krona has typically helped the manufacturing sector with a lag of twelve months. Negative divergences only tend to happen ahead of deep recessions. Unless we are in that particular situation now, better demand for relatively cheaper Swedish goods (think Volvo versus BMW) should lead to a stronger krona (Chart I-6). Yes, the Riskbank has been conducting QE, but the pace of expansion in its balance sheet has been slowing in recent quarters. USD/SEK has tended to track relative balance sheet trends between the Riksbank and the Fed, but a gaping wedge has opened up in favor of the krona (Chart I-7). Meanwhile, with the Fed about to re-expand its balance sheet, this should also favor a stronger SEK versus the USD. Chart I-6Swedish Krona And Manufacturing Chart I-7USD/SEK And Relative Balance Sheets The Swedish housing market is becoming a thorn in the Riksbank’s side. When negative rates were introduced in 2015, growth in house prices exploded to the tune of 15% year-on-year (Chart I-8). More recently, a curb on migration has allowed a cooling of sorts, but Swedish household leverage remains very elevated. With the memory of the 1990s housing crisis still fresh in their minds, this is making the Riksbank quite uncomfortable with its current policy stance. The carry cost is lower from being short NZD compared to being short the U.S. dollar. Our bias is that though Governor Stefan Ingves prefers to renormalize policy as quickly as possible, given that he is managing a small-open economy with trade a whopping 45% of GDP, but is held hostage to external conditions. The SEK is the cheapest currency in the G10 universe, and could bounce sharply on even the softest evidence indicating global growth has bottomed. Furthermore, rising global growth will tighten resource utilization, which should begin to boost underlying inflationary pressures in Sweden (Chart I-9) Chart I-8House Prices In Sweden##br## Are Bubbly Chart I-9Resource Utilization And Inflation In Sweden In terms of SEK trading strategy, USD/SEK and NZD/SEK tend to be highly correlated; since the SEK has a higher beta to global growth than the kiwi (Sweden exports 45% of its GDP versus 27% for New Zealand). On a relative basis, the Swedish economy appears to have bottomed relative to that of the U.S., making the SEK/NZD an attractive way to play USD/SEK downside. Meanwhile, the carry cost is lower from being short NZD compared to being short the U.S. dollar (Chart I-10). As for EUR/SEK, the cross could consolidate at current levels before heading lower but will ultimately peak once global growth reaccelerates. Chart I-10Remain Long SEK/NZD Bottom Line: We remain long the SEK/NZD as a relative value play, but the true upside lies in the SEK/USD cross. Our bias is that SEK weakness has been driven by the market’s focus on disappointing soft data, while hard data remains relatively resilient. Once it becomes clearer that the global growth environment is not as precarious as the surveys suggest, the krona could bounce sharply. Housekeeping Our long GBP/JPY position hit 5% this week. We are tightening stops to 138 in order to protect profits. We were also stopped out of short EUR/NOK for a 2% loss. We are standing aside for now. EUR/NOK is now trading above 2008 recession levels, which is only justifiable by a prolonged growth recession, but risk management warrants patience for now. Stay tuned.   Chester Ntonifor, Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled “On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver,” dated October 11, 2019, available at fes.bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.S. have been soft: Retail sales contracted by 0.3% month-on-month in September. Industrial production fell by 0.4% month-on-month. Both export and import prices fell by 1.6% year-on-year in September. Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index grew to 96 in October, up from 93.2 in the previous month. NY Empire State Manufacturing Index increased to 4 in October, up from 2 in September. Building permits and housing starts both fell by 2.7% and 9.4% month-on-month in September, but the housing recovery remains intact. Initial jobless claims increased to 214K for the week ended Oct 11th. The DXY index depreciated by 0.7% this week. The latest Beige Book summarized that the U.S. economy expanded at a slight-to-modest pace. The slowdown in the manufacturing sector remains the biggest risk to the economy, while trade tensions continue to weigh on business sentiment and capex intensions. The most recent “entente” in trade discussions might represent a pivotal shift from heightened uncertainty that has prevailed throughout the summer. Report Links: On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 Preserving Capital During Riot Points - September 6, 2019 Has The Currency Landscape Shifted? - August 16, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area remain subdued: Headline inflation fell to 0.8% year-on-year in September, the slowest in nearly three years. Core inflation however, increased to 1% year-on-year. Industrial production in the euro area continued to contract, by 2.8% year-on-year in August. The ZEW sentiment in the euro area fell further to -23.5 in October, however this is well above expectations of -33. The ZEW sentiment for Germany also fell to -22.8 in October. It is worth noting that expectations continue to improve relative to the current situation. The trade balance in the euro area improved to €20.3 billion in August, up from the downward-revised €17.5 billion in July. However, this is mostly due to a contraction in imports. EUR/USD rose by 0.9% this week, in part helped by broad dollar weakness. The trade dynamics in the euro area remain worrisome: exports fell by 2.2% year-on-year in August, while imports plunged by 4.1% year-on-year. Notably, year-to-date, the EU’s trade surplus with U.S. grew to €103 billion, up from €91 billion a year earlier, while the trade deficit with China widened further to €127 billion from €116 billion. Report Links: On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan continue to disappoint: Industrial production fell by 4.7% year-on-year in August. Capacity utilization decreased by 2.9% month-on-month in August. The Japanese yen fell by 0.8% against the U.S. dollar this week. Kuroda has again emphasized that the BoJ will not hesitate to act if economic developments continue to deteriorate. On the other hand, while the Fed and the ECB are both on course to expand their balance sheets through asset purchases, it is an open question as to how much more the BoJ can do, beyond yield curve control. We remain long the yen in anticipation that it will require a “Lehman moment” for the BoJ to act aggressively. Report Links: A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Has The Currency Landscape Shifted? - August 16, 2019 Portfolio Tweaks Into Thin Summer Trading - July 5, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. have been mostly negative: The ILO unemployment rate slightly increased to 3.9% in August. Average earnings quarterly growth slowed to 3.8%, however this was above expectations of 3.7%. The Retail price index grew by 2.4% year-on-year in September, a slowdown from 2.6% in the previous month. Headline inflation was unchanged at 1.7% year-on-year in September, while core inflation jumped to 1.7% from 1.5%. Retail sales grew by 3.1% year-on-year in September, up from 2.6% in the previous month. GBP/USD surged by 3.3% this week on optimism towards the European Council Summit on Brexit. From a valuation perspective, the pound is trading at a large discount to its fair value. Should positive Brexit news continue to hit the headlines, the pound could continue to soar. We are long GBP/JPY, which is above 5% in the money. Tighten stop to 138. Report Links: A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdon: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been modest: NAB business confidence fell further to -2, while conditions improved to 1 in Q3. On the labor market front, the unemployment rate fell further to 5.2% in September. 14.7K jobs were created, consisting of 26.2K full-time jobs and a loss of 11.4K part-time jobs. AUD/USD increased by 0.4% this week. RBA minutes were released earlier this week. Interestingly, it presents a sharp debate about the effects of low rates. On the one hand, lower rates have been theoretically justified to achieve full employment and the inflation target. On the other hand, some RBA members fear that low rates could fuel already inflated house prices. The probability for another rate cut has thus decreased post RBA minutes. Report Links: A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been negative: Visitor arrivals increased by 1.8% year-on-year in August, slightly down from 2% in the previous month. Headline inflation slowed to 1.5% year-on-year in Q3. NZD/USD has been more or less flat this week. Closely tied to global growth, the New Zealand dollar has been fluctuating with the ebb and flow of the U.S.-China trade headlines. The two countries have agreed on a partial deal last week, however the details remain vague. While the kiwi is a high beta currency, it should unerperform at the crosses. We continue to play the kiwi weakness through the Aussie dollar and the Swedish Krona. Report Links: USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 Where To Next For The U.S. Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been relatively strong: The unemployment rate decreased further to 5.5% in September. Moreover, average hourly wages continued to grow by 4.3% year-on-year, up from 3.8% in the previous month. Lastly, 53.7K jobs were created in September, well above expectations of 10K. Both headline and core inflation were unchanged at 1.9% year-on-year in September. The Canadian dollar has appreciated by 1% against the U.S. dollar, on the back of the positive employment data last Friday. All eyes are on the federal election this month, which could be crucial for the future of the Canadian energy sector and environment policies.  Report Links: Preserving Capital During Riot Points - September 6, 2019 Portfolio Tweaks Into Thin Summer Trading - July 5, 2019 On Gold, Oil And Cryptocurrencies - June 28, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been positive: The trade surplus (excluding precious metals) widened sharply to CHF 2.88 billion in September. Notably, Swiss exports grew by 8.2% month-on-month to CHF 20.3 billion, led by higher sales of chemical and pharmaceutical products. Swiss imports slightly dropped by 1.4% month-on-month to CHF 17.4 billion. Producer and import prices continued to fall by 2% year-on-year in September. USD/CHF fell by 1% this week. The Swiss franc will continue to fight a tug-of-war between being a defensive currency, but a tool of manipulation by the SNB. Our guestimate is that EUR/CHF 1.06 is an ultimate stress point.  Global portfolios should hold the Swiss franc as insurance, for the simple reason that the currency is a structural outperformer. Report Links: Notes On The SNB - October 4, 2019 What To Do About The Swiss Franc? - May 17, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway have been depressed: The trade balance shifted to a deficit of NOK 1.2 billion in September. That’s a decrease of NOK 24 billion year-on-year. The Norwegian krone has depreciated by nearly 1% against the U.S. dollar this week. Energy prices remain subdued over the past few weeks. Moreover, the Norwegian trade balance has shifted to a deficit for the first time since November 2017. Exports plunged by 19.5% year-on-year, due to lower sales of energy products, while imports jumped by 12.9% year-on-year. The message is clear – Norway continues to hold up well domestically, but dependence on petroleum exports is introducing volatility into any growth forecasts. BCA has lowered its oil price projections for 2019, which has dampened the appeal of the Norwegian Krone. Stay tuned. Report Links: A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Portfolio Tweaks Into Thin Summer Trading - July 5, 2019 On Gold, Oil And Cryptocurrencies - June 28, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been neutral: The unemployment rate was unchanged at 7.1% in September. USD/SEK fell by 1.1% this week. As the worst performing G-10 currency this year, the Swedish krona is now trading at a large discount to its fair value. Please refer to our front section this week which presents an in-depth analysis on the Swedish economy and the krona. Report Links: Where To Next For The U.S. Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 201 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights Chinese economic activity is declining at a slower pace, but has not yet bottomed. The September PMIs surprised to the upside, suggesting that activity improved last month. Still, PMIs can provide false signals (as they did earlier this year). Consequently, investors should wait for clearer signs of a “hard data” improvement before concluding that China’s economy has bottomed. Investors should maintain a cyclically overweight stance towards Chinese stocks. Actual evidence of a “hard data” improvement could cause us to upgrade our tactical stance (from underweight); for now, the risks outweigh the potential gains over the very near-term. Feature Tables 1 and 2 highlight key developments in China’s economy and its financial markets over the past month. On the growth front, Chinese economic activity appears to be declining at a slower pace, but it has not yet bottomed. China’s September manufacturing PMIs surprised to the upside, and this legitimately raises the odds that the next update of our China Activity Index will meaningfully improve. However, investors should remember that a similar rebound in the Caixin manufacturing PMI quickly reversed itself earlier this year without leading to a meaningful impact on actual activity. The bottom line is that investors should wait for clearer signs of improvement in the “hard” data before concluding that China’s economic cycle is beginning to turn higher. Table 1China Macro Data Summary Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary From an investment strategy perspective, we continue to recommend that investors maintain a cyclically overweight stance. Two possible scenarios underpin our cyclical view: either China’s existing reflationary effort soon succeeds at stabilizing economic activity, or policymakers will be forced to stimulate even further. In either case, we see good odds that Chinese relative performance (versus global stocks) will be higher in 12-months. Tactically, we remain cautious because of the still-elevated potential for a further escalation in the trade war, and the fact that Chinese activity has yet to decisively bottom. A significant re-acceleration in money & credit growth, actual evidence of a pickup in Chinese economic activity (i.e., a “hard data” improvement), or an agreement between the U.S. and China that removes most or all of the tariffs are likely to be catalysts to upgrade our tactical stance. For now, we continue to believe that the risks outweigh the potential gains over the very near-term. Chart 1Chinese Economic Activity Continues To Decline, At A Slower Pace In reference to Tables 1 and 2, we provide below several detailed observations concerning developments in China’s macro and financial market data: The Bloomberg Li Keqiang index ticked slightly higher in August, but remained in a clear downtrend. Chart 1 illustrates that our BCA China Activity Index, a broader coincident measure of China’s economy that incorporates elements of the Li Keqiang index, remains weak and continued to decline in August. In short, Chinese economic activity is declining at a slower pace, but it has yet to decisively bottom. Our leading indicator for the Li Keqiang index rose fractionally in August, driven by the monetary conditions and money supply components (particularly M3). However, the credit components sequentially declined, weighing on the overall index. Abstracting from month-to-month changes in the indicator, Chart 2 highlights that there continues to be a large gap between the degree of monetary accommodation and the growth in credit and the supply of money. Investors should be especially watching for a decisive pickup in the latter, as it would be a clear sign that China’s reflationary efforts have succeeded in boosting the domestic economy. Chart 2The Gap Between Monetary Conditions and Money & Credit Remains Wide China’s housing data continued to slow in August, with the exception of floor space sold (which stopped contracting). House price appreciation is slowing, and our diffusion indexes point to an even slower pace of appreciation going forward. Following a very sharp slowdown in construction over the past few months, the modest re-acceleration in sales volume has effectively eliminated the previously enormous gap between the pace of floor space started and sold. We argued in several previous reports that this gap would likely close via slower housing starts, as strong construction must ultimately be validated by strong sales. The pickup in sales suggests that China’s housing market fundamentals may be in the very early stages of stabilization, but a sustained rise into high single-digit territory would be needed in order to confirm this view. China’s September manufacturing PMIs surprised to the upside, particularly the Caixin PMI (which is more focused on the private sector). The components of each PMI told conflicting stories; the Caixin PMI reported that total new orders outpaced new export business (implying stronger domestic demand), whereas the official PMI reported a much stronger improvement for new export orders versus the import and overall new orders components. It is possible that the improvement in the PMIs is signaling a meaningful rise in our China Activity Index for September, but investors should recognize that this is no guarantee of a sustainable bottom in economic activity. For example, a similar rebound in the Caixin manufacturing PMI quickly reversed itself earlier this year, and had no meaningful impact on actual activity (Chart 3). The bottom line is that investors should wait for clearer signs of improvement in the “hard” data before concluding that China’s economic cycle is beginning to turn higher. Chart 3An Improving PMI Is No Guarantee Of An Improving Economy In US$ terms, China’s equity markets (both investable and domestic) have been flat in absolute terms over the past month, but have underperformed global equities by 1-2%. Over the past week, investable stocks have been particularly impacted by the reported threat that the Trump administration is considering de-listing Chinese firms from U.S. stock exchanges. Administration officials have since denied the report, but even if it were to occur a shift in listing from the U.S. to Hong Kong is very unlikely to alter the earnings outlooks for these companies over a 6-12 month time horizon. A near-term selloff in response to a de-listing event is highly possible, but it would not likely affect our cyclical stance unless the administration moved towards (and succeeded at) completely prohibiting U.S. ownership of Chinese securities. Chinese financials, technology, and communication services companies have outperformed in both the investable and domestic markets over the past month, with energy, materials, and industrials also outperforming in the investable market. The outperformance of investable energy stocks is clearly linked to the mid-September attack on Aramco’s oil processing facilities, even though Brent oil prices have fallen back to the level that prevailed before the attack. We have maintained a long absolute position in Chinese energy stocks over the past year, with disappointing results (the position is down 28% since initiation on October 3, 2018). Still, we recommend that investors continue to favor Chinese energy stocks over the cyclical horizon on a value basis: the sector is cheap relative to global energy stocks and global oil production (Chart 4). In addition, BCA’s Commodity & Energy Strategy service is forecasting that Brent oil prices will trade at $74/barrel on average next year ($12/barrel higher than prices today), implying that a value catalyst looms over the coming 6-12 months. Chart 4Chinese Energy Stocks Have Rarely Been Cheaper Chart 5Is Stable Real Estate Performance Predicting A Stable Housing Market? The underperformance of the investable real estate sector that began this summer appears to have occurred in anticipation of the slowdown in house price appreciation and housing construction that we highlighted above. This is notable, as real estate relative performance appears to have stabilized since the beginning of September (Chart 5). The implication is that real estate stocks may now be forecasting a stabilization in China’s housing market, which would increase the odds that Chinese domestic demand will soon durably bottom. For now, it remains too early to confidently project that real estate stocks have halted their decline, but the relative performance trend bears monitoring over the coming weeks. Chinese interbank rates and government bond yields have largely been unchanged over the past month, with the exception of the highly volatile 7-day interbank repo rate (which rose). The relative year-to-date stability of Chinese government bond yields is in sharp contrast to the collapse in U.S. 10-year Treasury yields (Chart 6), and reflects (in part) the reluctance of Chinese authorities to ease materially further. There have been no major changes in the onshore Chinese corporate bond market over the past month, and overall onshore corporate spreads continue to trend sideways. While lower-quality spreads have risen modestly since early-June, bonds rated AA and AA- continue to outperform the aggregate onshore corporate bond market (Chart 7). Investors should stay long onshore corporate bonds, in hedged currency terms. Chart 6The Divergence In Bond Yields Reflects China's Policymaker Reluctance Chart 7Own Chinese Onshore Corporate Bonds In Hedged Terms The RMB has gained approximately 0.1% versus the U.S. dollar over the past month, and nearly 1.1% versus the euro. While the latter largely reflects weakness in the euro rather than significant RMB strength, it remains clear that China’s currency is being driven by developments related to the trade negotiations. Besides the negative impact that it would have on global risk assets, investors should expect significant further strength in USD-CNH if the negotiations that are scheduled to begin next weekend result in renewed escalation. Conversely, we would expect a major rally in the RMB in response to any agreement between the U.S. and China that removes most or all of the tariffs. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Sovereign bond yields have cratered over the last few months, … : Over the last three months, 10-year yields in the U.S., France, Germany, Switzerland and Australia have fallen by 71, 64, 53, 54, and 67 basis points, respectively. … and the Treasury curve has experienced a significant bull flattening, … : Month-to-date total returns for the Barclays Bloomberg Long, Intermediate and 1-3-Year Treasury Indexes are 9.2%, 1.6% and 1.1%, respectively. … indicating that the bond market thinks more rate cuts are in store: The textbook interpretation of an inverted curve is that monetary policy is too tight and needs to be loosened, but technical factors have amplified the flattening pressure. Is the bond market reacting to weakening growth prospects, or uber-dovish central banks?: The answer has implications well beyond the fixed-income universe. It could mean the difference between an economic slowdown and a market melt-up. Feature BCA researchers convened last week for our monthly View Meeting, much of which was given over to the global decline in sovereign bond yields. Does their plunge owe more to weakening growth prospects or central banks’ synchronized dovish pivot? There have surely been elements of both; after all, central banks wouldn’t be so dovish if they weren’t concerned about the growth outlook. It is clear to our fixed-income strategists that the yield move has overshot the data, however, and they mainly attribute the overshoot to monetary policy. No central bank wants a stronger currency while confronting a demand deficiency aggravated by trade tensions and a global manufacturing slowdown. The New York Times Business section put the prevailing policy winds into living color in a nearly full-page, four-column graphic spotlighting the 32 central banks that have cut their policy rate so far this year.1 The pell-mell rush to cut rates is emblematic of a global scramble for competitiveness. No central bank wants its economy to be caught without a buffer while other economies are busily reinforcing theirs. The Message From The Bond Market Trade tensions are a legitimate threat to global economic growth already challenged by a downswing in the global manufacturing cycle. A recession is a possibility, but it is hardly a foregone conclusion. We agree with our fixed-income colleagues that the yield selloff has overrun the economic fundamentals. Last week’s preliminary European manufacturing PMIs suggested that manufacturing may finally be stabilizing, and there is still no evidence that the manufacturing downturn has infected the services sector (Chart 1). A recession is hardly a foregone conclusion. 10-year Treasury yields have been falling sharply since their 3.25% peak in early November, and the current leg down is the third in a series of sharp declines (Chart 2, top panel). Global sovereign yields have followed the same pattern (Chart 2, bottom panel), but the latest plunge is as much a reflection of ubiquitous easing biases as it is of new concerns about economic weakness. That may sound like a minor point, of interest only to macro specialists, but it has import for all investors. If the yield decline isn’t signaling new softness, then easier financial conditions will be free to act as a tailwind for risk assets. Chart 1Services Are Holding Up ... Chart 2A Brief Inversion ... But Yields Are Freefalling Neither investment-grade (Chart 3, top panel) nor high-yield corporate bond spreads evince any particular concern about the economy (Chart 3, bottom panel). Although they’ve ticked up, they remain near the bottom of their post-crisis range, and are nowhere near the levels they reached in 2011-12, during the federal budget showdown/U.S. downgrade and the flare-up of the Eurozone crisis, or in 2015-16, during the last manufacturing recession. With banks still easing lending standards for corporate and industrial borrowers (Chart 4), spreads won’t undergo a systematic widening. Borrowers do not default as long as there is a lender willing to roll over their maturing obligations, so tighter credit standards are a precondition for spread-widening cycles. Chart 3No Sign Of Stress Among Corporate Borrowers ... Chart 4... And Banks Aren't Applying Any Pressure The Message From The Housing Market Chart 5Lower Rates Have Yet To Impact Housing ... We have been disappointed by residential investment’s muted response to the significant year-to-date decline in mortgage rates (Chart 5, bottom panel). The trajectory of starts and permits (Chart 5, top panel) hasn’t changed, new and existing home sales haven’t perked up (Chart 5, second panel), and mortgage purchase applications (Chart 5, third panel) appear not to have heard the news that rates are much lower. We thought that the swift fall in mortgage rates would promote more residential investment than it has to date. There is a difference, however, between disappointing growth and a full-on contraction. With affordability remaining high relative to history (Chart 6), and apartment rents exceeding monthly mortgage payments in several locales (Chart 7), housing demand should remain well supported. There are no excesses in the housing market in terms of inventory or oncoming supply that would make housing a source of economic or financial instability. Inventory relative to the number of households is bumping around its all-time lows (Chart 8), and cumulative household formations have easily outstripped housing starts since the crisis broke (Chart 9). Structural factors like a lack of supply geared to first-time and first-move-up buyers, and the ravenous appetite of pools of capital purchasing single-family homes for rent, are squeezing out some would-be buyers, but housing is not about to induce a recession. There are plenty of things for investors to be concerned about, but the housing market isn’t one of them. Chart 6... Though They Have Placed Homeownership In Easier Reach Chart 8... Inventories Are At Record Lows, ... The View From Broad And Wall We concede that stocks are not behaving as if all is well. Big daily swings are not a feature of healthy markets, and eight of this month’s sixteen sessions have registered moves of at least 1%. The second quarter’s 3% year-over-year earnings growth is three percentage points better than the consensus expected when earnings season kicked off, however, and despite the single-day moves, the S&P 500 has spent all but the first day of the month in a well-defined range between 2,825 and 2,945 (Chart 10). The market may be jumpy from one day to the next, but investors have not been concerned enough to engage in sustained selling. The equity market’s verdict on housing is more optimistic than ours. Inspired by earnings reports, the S&P 1500 Homebuilders Index have broken out to a new 52-week high (Chart 11). Retailers were the stars of last week’s earnings releases, with Lowe’s, Nordstrom and Target posting double-digit percentage gains after reporting numbers that failed to live up to investors’ worst fears. Equities are validating the view that the U.S. consumer is alive and kicking. Chart 11Homebuilder Stocks Have Broken Out The GDP Outlook Chart 12Capex Intentions: Elevated But Slipping If consumers are well positioned, the U.S. economy should be, too. Consumption accounts for two-thirds of the U.S. economy, with investment and government spending equally dividing the other third. Federal expenditures amount to about 40% of government spending, and between this year’s fiscal thrust and next year’s hotly contested presidential election, D.C. can be counted upon to do its part for the economy. At the state and local level, healthy household income should support state sales and income tax receipts, while still-rising home prices will provide the property taxes to keep municipal coffers full. That leaves fixed asset investment as the economy’s Achilles heel. We are confident, as noted above, that residential investment will not decline enough to pose a problem for the economy, but corporate investment is in the crosshairs of the uncertainty surrounding the multiple trade squabbles. The NFIB survey and the regional Fed surveys indicate that capital expenditure plans are rolling over, even if they remain at a fairly high level (Chart 12). Our base case remains that investment will not fall enough to offset robust consumption and trend-level government spending, but a marked worsening in trade tensions could erode business confidence enough to drag the economy below stall speed. Busted Thesis In our mutual-fund days, we followed one rule without exception. If our thesis for owning a stock was disproved, we got rid of the stock without a backward glance. We no longer manage money, but our clients do, and we try to set a good example, especially in the inevitable instances when things go wrong. We are closing out our agency mREIT recommendation on the ground that we got the rates call underpinning it very wrong. Things went wrong with our agency mortgage REIT recommendation right from the get-go. In retrospect, we should have waited until the FOMC meeting dust settled before putting on a curve-dependent position. We are closing it out now, though, because we recommended the group in anticipation of a steeper yield curve. Given that we think it will take some time for investors to become convinced that a recession is not imminent, and given that mechanical factors may push yields even lower, we do not expect sustained curve steepening for several months. Although we only held it for four weeks, the recommendation left a mark. Through Thursday’s close, our defined subset of agency mREITs lost 11%, while the S&P 500 is down 3.1% and the Barclays High Yield Index is flat. We’re taking our medicine and moving on, but we will take another look at the group when the curve eventually does begin to steepen. Investment Implications Even if recession fears are overblown, as we and a majority of our colleagues believe, it will likely take some time for investors to overcome their concerns. That leads us to believe that equities may be unable to make new highs in the near term, and that Treasury yields have more downside risk than upside risk in the next few months, as rising convexity2 compels investors following asset-liability management strategies to seek out long-maturity bonds. The yield point may sound complex and esoteric, but our Global Fixed Income Strategy team increasingly believes it’s a key to understanding the negative-yield phenomenon and is researching the issue for an upcoming Special Report. Monetary accommodation is not a silver bullet. If the economy has already flipped from expansion to contraction, modest rate cuts parceled out at a deliberate pace will be insufficient to turn things around, and equities and spread product will suffer. If the expansion remains intact, however, rate cuts will help shore up the economy at the margin and quite possibly fuel a new phase of the bull markets in risk assets. Our money is on the latter, and we expect that this bull cycle has one more burst in it that will allow it to sprint to the finish line like the majority of its predecessors. Doug Peta, CFA Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Smialek, Jeanna and Russell, Karl, “Rates Are Falling Again. That May Be Dangerous.” New York Times, August 17, 2019, p. B1. 2 Duration measures a bond’s sensitivity to changes in interest rates. Convexity measures duration’s sensitivity to changes in interest rates, which increases as rates fall. Investors like life insurers and pension funds, who match the duration of their investment portfolios with the duration of their liabilities, are forced to increase the duration of their bond holdings at an increasing rate as interest rates fall.

Highlights A lot has changed in a week and a half, … : The FOMC meeting that we thought would mark the end of global market-moving news until September turned out to be a prelude for the real fireworks. … as U.S.-China trade tensions escalated, … : The imposition of tariffs on the only remaining subset of Chinese imports that had escaped duties so far inspired China to let the yuan fall below a key technical level. … and other countries braced for the fallout: China’s devaluation opened up a new front in the conflict, turning a bilateral tariff spat into a threat to other countries’ well-being and competitiveness. Asia-Pacific central banks swiftly followed with larger-than-expected rate cuts. Below-benchmark-duration positioning is no longer appropriate in the near term, and we recommend moving to benchmark duration: Interest rates will be hard-pressed to rise with global central banks squarely in easing mode. Although we still believe that inflation and the fed funds rate will surprise to the upside, it’s going to take a while. Feature Dear Client, There will be no U.S. Investment Strategy next week as we take our final summer break. U.S. Investment Strategy will return on Monday, August 26th. Best regards, Doug Peta So much for the idea that the July 30-31 FOMC meeting would be the last market-moving event before Labor Day. By lunchtime on August 1st, the S&P 500 was back to its July 30th close above 3,010; the 10-year Treasury yield had settled around 1.96%, ten basis points (“bps”) lower than its pre-meeting level; and gold had fallen by ten bucks, to $1,420, as markets digested the news that the Fed was less concerned about the economy than they were. Then the trade war reared its ugly head in the form of new tariffs on Chinese imports to the U.S., and the S&P slid to 2,822, the 10-year Treasury yield tumbled to 1.59%, and gold surged to $1,510. The new round would ensnare the subset of goods that had previously been spared from import duties, and Beijing promised to retaliate. It’s hard for rates to rise when every central bank has an easing bias as it nervously eyes the U.S.-China tilt.   Chart 1Beijing Plays The Currency Card The retaliation arrived Sunday night in the U.S., when Chinese officials allowed the renminbi to trade above 7 to the dollar for the first time since 2008 (Chart 1). The move provoked a global equity selloff, and the S&P 500 lost 3% in its worst session of the year. With the currency floodgates opened, the trade war morphed from a bilateral tariff spat into a global battle for competitiveness, and central banks in India, Thailand and New Zealand responded with larger-than-expected rate cuts. India is a comparatively closed economy battling a domestic downturn, but it is clear that countries with any reliance on exports are loath to be saddled with a strong currency that will hamstring their global competitiveness. It turns out that the Fed isn’t the only central bank that sees the appeal of taking out some insurance. That is an unfriendly backdrop for below-benchmark-duration positioning, and we are joining our fixed-income colleagues in raising our duration recommendation from underweight to neutral over the tactical timeframe (0-3 months). While we still believe that the fed funds rate and long yields will surprise to the upside, they cannot do so while bond investors are adamant that the Fed is going to have to adopt an easing bias over the near term. Our rates checklist, discussed in the rest of this report, supports the decision. The shift in the rates backdrop undermines our newly established agency mortgage REIT recommendation, and we are watching it closely. The Rates Checklist: The Fed Table 1Rates View Checklist Turning to our rates view checklist (Table 1), the first item is derived from our U.S. Bond Strategy service’s golden rule of bond investing.1 The golden rule asks one simple question to anchor views on Treasuries: Over the next 12 months, will the Fed move the fed funds rate by more or less than the bond market is currently discounting? Since 1990, when the Fed has surprised dovishly (the fed funds rate has turned out to be lower than the money market implied twelve months earlier), Treasuries have almost always generated positive excess returns over cash. Periods of negative excess returns have occurred nearly exclusively when the Fed has delivered a hawkish surprise. We still think inflation will become a problem, but it certainly isn’t one yet. Since we rolled out the checklist last year, we have consistently expected a hawkish surprise. Though we continue to believe that an extended cycle of rate cuts is not in the cards, markets disagree, and we concede that the Fed now has a near-term easing bias, despite Chair Powell’s demurrals at the post-meeting press conference. We are leaving the box unchecked because we believe that nearly four more 25-bps cuts over the next twelve months, equating to a target fed funds rate of 1.25-1.50% (Chart 2), are unlikely. The spread between our expectations and the market’s expectations is still wide enough to merit a below-benchmark-duration view over the next twelve months, even if benchmark duration makes more sense for the rest of the year. Chart 2Four More Rate Cuts Are A Stretch The yield curve’s inversion has become more pronounced in the wake of the re-escalation of the trade war (Chart 3), and we duly check the second box. As a reminder, we track the 3-month/10-year segment of the yield curve to define inversion because it is less susceptible to estimate error, and has been a timelier indicator of recessions, than the more frequently cited 2-year/10-year segment. We have argued before that the unprecedentedly large negative 10-year term premium makes the curve more prone to invert and makes it a less sensitive economic barometer, but part of the rationale of creating a checklist is to limit one’s discretion in interpreting events. Chart 3More Rate Cuts, Please The Rates Checklist: Inflation Inflation has gone AWOL around the globe. Although the U.S. no longer faces the negative output gaps that remain in other major economies, its main measures of consumer prices (Chart 4) do nothing to counteract the widespread view that the Fed has a free pass to devote its energies to shoring up growth. Inflation break-evens were making progress toward the 2.3-2.5% range consistent with the Fed’s 2% inflation target when we launched the checklist last year, but the plunge in oil prices stopped them in their tracks (Chart 5). Rather than encouraging the Fed to hike, soft inflation expectations helped drive the Fed’s dovish pivot. Chart 4Realized Inflation Is Below Target, ... Chart 5... And So Are Inflation Expectations Our view that the seeds of inflation pressures have been sown has not changed. After slowing on a real final domestic demand basis in the first quarter from the one-two punch of the government shutdown and the fourth quarter’s sharp tightening of financial conditions, the U.S. economy has resumed operating above capacity. Though we check the “sluggish-inflation” boxes, and acknowledge that inflation is not going to inspire a more restrictive turn in Fed policy any time soon, we do think it will become an issue down the road. The Rates Checklist: The Labor Market The labor market remains robust. The headline unemployment rate remains at a level last seen in 1969, and is well below the CBO’s estimate of NAIRU. NAIRU is the minimum structural unemployment rate, and wage gains quicken when the unemployment rate falls below it (Chart 6). The broader definition of unemployment, encompassing discouraged workers and involuntary part-time workers, fell to its lowest level since 2000 in July (Chart 7), and the job openings and job quits rates (Chart 8) indicate that demand for workers remains high. Chart 6Wage Gains Will Accelerate, ... Chart 7... As Slack Has Been Absorbed, ... Chart 8... And Demand Is Robust   3.2% year-over-year growth in average hourly earnings may not be thrilling, but wages do remain in an uptrend. The laws of supply and demand (Chart 9), and the Fed’s best efforts, suggest that the uptrend will continue. We do not check any of the labor market boxes, and expect that we will not over the rest of the year. The Rates Checklist: Instability At Home And Abroad Chart 10No Overheating Yet There continue to be no signs of cyclical overheating in the U.S. economy, as the most cyclical segments of the economy are nowhere near the red end of the tachometer (Chart 10). Financial imbalances have moved to the back burner, but they are part of the Fed’s post-crisis mandate, and we are leaving the imbalances box unticked to reflect that the “low spreads and loosening credit terms” Governor Brainard decried last September2 may stay the Fed from embarking on a full-on easing cycle. We are checking the international duress box, at least for the time being, given the potential for a self-reinforcing rate-cutting cycle that could hold down the entire term structure of rates around the world. Bottom Line: The inverted yield curve, a lack of consumer price inflation, and the cloud cast by the trade war all suggest that bond markets will require some convincing before they allow rates to rise much higher. We conclude that a neutral duration stance is appropriate in the near term. Keeping Score We have been staunch supporters of below-benchmark duration positioning since the end of last July,3 given that we thought the 10-year Treasury yield was too low relative to our assessment of the strength of the U.S. economy and the potential for inflation to begin to rise. It appears that our stronger-than-consensus economic view was correct, but we were myopic in failing to grasp how punk growth in the rest of the world would keep long-maturity Treasury yields from making a sustained move higher. We were way early on inflation’s ETA, and slow to grasp how sensitive the Fed would be to faltering global growth and escalating trade tensions in its absence. In short, both our model of the Fed’s reaction function and the inputs to our model turned out to be faulty. The duration call stings, but our asset allocation recommendations have worked out. The fix we are making is to wait until inflation is a clear and present danger before assuming that the Fed will respond to it. Although we got the duration call wrong, investment-grade and high-yield corporate bonds have outperformed Treasuries in the aggregate since we upgraded them to overweight versus Treasuries at the end of January (Chart 11). BCA as a house niftily sidestepped the fourth-quarter selloff in equities by downgrading them to equal weight, and raising cash to overweight, late last June. We upgraded equities to overweight versus cash and fixed income in our first publication of the year, and the S&P 500 has handily outperformed Treasuries since that date, despite the nasty selloff following the July FOMC meeting and the new round of tariffs (Chart 12). Chart 11Spread Product Has Modestly Outperformed Treasuries, ... Chart 12... But Equities Have Crushed Them Agency Mortgage REIT Implications We recommended agency mortgage REITs a day before the FOMC meeting, suggesting that investors allocate capital away from equities and high yield as a way to reduce equity beta and boost portfolio income away from the herd chasing lower and lower high-yield bond yields. Through Thursday’s close, the Bloomberg Mortgage REIT Index has gained about 35 bps on a total return basis, while the Barclays High Yield Index is off 70 bps and the S&P 500 is down 2.7%. Unfortunately, the agency mREITs we sought out for their yield curve exposure have lagged badly as the yield curve has relentlessly flattened. For now, only the one agency mREIT with a dedicated adjustable-rate mortgage portfolio faces immediate earnings pressure. The rest are subject to refinancing volumes, which are likely to be higher than we expected when we projected that the 10-year Treasury yield wouldn’t fall much below 2%. The specter of increased prepayments makes the agency mREITs a less attractive investment than we thought they would be two weeks ago. On the other hand, their exclusively domestic exposure, and low credit risk, increases their value as a haven from global turmoil. Net-net, we are sticking with them, though they are now on a far shorter leash than they were when we made the recommendation. We will not stick with a position to save face, or to avoid looking irresolute. Flexibility and a willingness to admit mistakes are essential characteristics of successful investors. When the facts change, we change our mind, without the faintest hint of embarrassment. Doug Peta, CFA Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the July 24, 2018 U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing,” available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 2 Brainard, Lael (2018). “What Do We Mean by Neutral And What Role Does It Play in Monetary Policy,” speech delivered at the Detroit Economic Club, Detroit, Mich., September 12, 2018. 3 Please see the July 30, 2018 U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “The Rates Outlook,” available at usis.bcaresearch.com.