Real Estate

Highlights Portfolio Strategy Operating leverage could surprise on the strong side this year, based on the message from our pricing power and wage growth indicators. REITs are experiencing a playable recovery following the Fed-induced sell-off earlier this year, and overweight positions will continue to pay off. Energy services activity is set to steadily accelerate this year, powering an earnings-led share price outperformance phase. Recent Changes There are no changes to our portfolio this week. Table 1 Operating Leverage To The Rescue? Operating Leverage To The Rescue? Feature Volatility has climbed to the highest level since the U.S. election, signaling that the broad market is not yet out of the woods. As stocks recalibrate to a cooling in economic growth momentum and an escalation in geopolitical threats, downside risks should be reasonably contained by mounting signs of a healthier corporate sector. Last week we posited that stronger top line revenue growth is necessary to sustain the profit upcycle, and provide justification for historically rich valuations. Chart 1 shows sales and EPS growth over the long-term. Chart 1Joined At The Hip Joined At The Hip Joined At The Hip Obviously, the two move closely together, with earnings enjoying more powerful growth phases when revenue accelerates. Since 1960, regression analysis shows that operating leverage for the S&P 500's is 1.4X. In other words, a 5% increase in sales growth typically leads to 7% EPS growth. When sales are initially recovering from a deep slump operating leverage can be even higher, with earnings often rising two to three times as fast as revenue. Clearly, that is not sustainable, but can give the illusion of powerful and sustained growth for brief periods of time. At the current juncture, there are reasons to expect investors to embrace the durability of the profit expansion. Our corporate pricing power proxy has vaulted higher. Importantly, the breadth of this surge has been impressive, which bodes well for its staying power (Chart 2, second panel). On the flip side, rising labor costs look set to take a breather. Compensation growth has crested, and according to our diffusion index, fewer than half of the 18 industries tracked have higher wages than last year. The wage growth diffusion index provides a reliable leading indication for the trend in labor expenses. In other words, pricing power is rising on a broad basis while wage inflation is decelerating on a broad basis. Consequently, there are decent odds that resilient forward operating margin expectations can be matched (Chart 2, bottom panel). Elsewhere, a revival in animal spirits, the potential for easier fiscal policy and prospects for a hiatus in the U.S. dollar bull market bode well for brisk business activity. While the budding recovery in global trade could sputter if protectionism proliferates, our working assumption is that the U.S. Administrations' bark will be worse than its bite. Thus, a self-reinforcing sales and profit upcycle could be materializing. The objective message from our S&P 500 EPS model concurs (Chart 3), underscoring that high single digit/low double digit profit growth could be broadly perceived as attainable this year. Chart 2Profit Margins Can Expand Profit Margins Can Expand Profit Margins Can Expand Chart 3Few Sectors Control The Fate Of S&P 500 EPS Few Sectors Control The Fate Of S&P500 EPS Few Sectors Control The Fate Of S&P500 EPS True, our model has recently shown tentative signs of cresting, but difficult comparisons will only arise later this year. Indeed, Q3 and Q4 2016 were all-time high EPS numbers, implying that 12% estimated growth rates are a tall order (Chart 3, middle panel). Importantly, dissecting the profit growth sectorial contribution is instructive. Calendar 2017 over 2016 S&P 500 earnings growth is concentrated in four sectors: tech, energy, health care and financials comprise over 87% of the incremental profit growth expected (Chart 3, bottom panel). The upshot is that there is a high degree of concentration risk to fulfilling overall profit growth expectations. Energy profits are wholly dependent on the oil price, and financial sector profit optimism appears to have embedded a healthy increase in both interest rates and capital markets activity. In addition, tech sector earnings are heavily influenced by the U.S. dollar. Consequently, it will be critical for monetary conditions to stay loose, otherwise estimates will be at risk of downward revisions. Adding it up, the corporate sector sales pendulum is finally swinging in a positive direction, which should support the cyclical overshoot in stocks for a while longer, notwithstanding our expectation that the current corrective phase has further to run. This week we are updating our high-conviction overweight views on both the lagging energy services index and REIT sector. Revisiting REITs REITs have staged a mini V-shaped rebound after being punished alongside rising bond yields and worries about aggressive Fed rate hikes earlier this year. As outlined in recent Weekly Reports, the reflation theme is likely to lose steam in the second half of the year as economic momentum cools, providing additional impetus for capital inflows into the more stable income profile of REITs. Even if the economy proves more resilient and Treasury yields move higher, there are few barriers to additional outperformance. Our Technical Indicator, a combination of rates of change and moving average divergences, is extremely oversold. Forward intermediate and cyclical relative returns from current readings have been solid, as occurred in 2004, 2008 and 2014 (Chart 4). REIT valuations are more than one standard deviation below normal, according to our gauge. This suggests that poor operating performance and/or higher discount rates are already expected. There may be a limit as to how high bond yields can climb, given that they are already deep in undervalued territory according to the BCA 10-year Treasury Bond Valuation Index (Chart 4). Regardless, history shows that REITs have typically had a more positive than negative correlation with bond yields. The inverse correlation has only been in place since the financial crisis, when zero interest rate policies pushed massive capital flows into all yield generating assets. Chart 5 shows that prior to 2008, REITs outperformed during periods of both rising and falling Treasury yields. Chart 4Unloved And Undervalued Unloved And Undervalued Unloved And Undervalued Chart 5No Concrete Correlation Pre GFC No Concrete Correlation Pre GFC No Concrete Correlation Pre GFC Similarly, REITs have a solid track record during periods of rising inflation pressures. Since 1975, there have been six periods of rising core PCE inflation: REITs have enjoyed meaningful rallies during five of these phases (Chart 6). Hard assets tend to hold their stock market value well when overall inflation moves higher, with REIT net asset values providing solid support to share price performance. Chart 6Buy REITs In Times Of Inflation Buy REITs In Times Of Inflation Buy REITs In Times Of Inflation Looking ahead, REITs should continue to enjoy success in boosting rental rates. Occupancy rates continue to rise (Chart 7). The unemployment rate is low, consumption is decent and businesses are growing increasingly confident. That is a recipe for higher rental demand. Our Rental Rate Composite has crested on a growth rate basis, but the advance in the CPI for homeowner's equivalent rent, a good proxy for REITs, suggests that the path of least resistance remains higher (Chart 7). REIT supply growth has also leveled off, which provides additional confidence that rental inflation will remain solid. Nevertheless, there are some areas of concern. Banks are tightening lending standards on commercial real estate loans. Some sub-categories are experiencing a mild deterioration in credit quality. For instance, Chart 8 shows that delinquency rates in the retail and office spaces have edged higher. Retail and mall REITs are likely under structural pressure owing to online competition from the likes of Amazon. Chart 7Rental Demand##br## Is Solid Rental Demand Is Solid Rental Demand Is Solid Chart 8Watch Delinquencies As ##br##Banks Tighten Credit Standards Watch Delinquencies As Banks Tighten Credit Standards Watch Delinquencies As Banks Tighten Credit Standards Overall vacancy rates are still very low (Chart 8), but if credit becomes too tight, then the relentless advance in commercial property prices may cool. For now, our REIT Demand Indicator is not signaling any imminent stress. In fact, the economy is strong enough to expect occupancy rates to keep climbing, to the benefit of underlying property valuations and rental income (Chart 7, bottom panel). In sum, the budding rebound in REIT relative performance should be embraced as the start of a sustained trend. Total return potential is very attractive on a relative basis. Bottom Line: REITs remain a very attractive high-conviction overweight. Energy Servicers Are Cleaning Up Their Act We put the S&P energy services index on our high-conviction overweight list at the start of the year, because three critical factors that typically lead to a playable rally existed, namely; the global rig count had hit an inflection point, oil supplies were easing and global oil production growth had begun to decelerate. While the pullback in oil prices has undermined relative performance for the time being, there is scope for a full recovery, and more. Oil prices have firmed, underpinned by a revival in the geopolitical risk premium following the U.S. bombing campaign in Syria. There is already a wide gap between share prices and oil prices (Chart 9, top panel), and a narrowing is probable, especially as earnings drivers reaccelerate. There are tentative signs that capital spending cuts are finally reversing. The global rig count has rebounded, and is a good leading indicator for investment (Chart 10). This message is corroborated by our Global Capex Indicator, which has recently surged anew (Chart 10). Chart 9Room For ##br##Margin Improvement... Room For Margin Improvement... Room For Margin Improvement... Chart 10...As Deflation Eases ##br##And Capex Rebounds ...As Deflation Eases And Capex Rebounds ...As Deflation Eases And Capex Rebounds The longer that oil prices can stay in their current trading range, or beyond, the more time E&P balance sheets have to heal and the greater the odds that the cost of capital will be reduced. Against this backdrop, there are high odds that previously mothballed exploration projects will be restored. The V-shaped recovery in the global oil rig count, albeit from a very low base, will eventually absorb excess capacity and allow the industry to escape deflation. A major improvement in day rates is unlikely given the scale of the previous capacity boom, but even a modest pricing power improvement should provide a nice boost given high operating leverage. EBITDA margins have considerable room to improve if pricing power grows anew (Chart 9, bottom panel). Importantly, the shifting composition of global production will allow service companies with domestic exposure to shine. Shale oil producers should recapture lost market share, given that the onus to rebalance markets has been taken on by OPEC. OPEC production is contracting, while non-OPEC output is starting to recover (Chart 11, bottom panel), culminating in a widening in the Brent-WTI oil price spread. Production restraint is helping to rebalance physical oil markets. Total OECD inventory growth is reversing, and anecdotal reports are surfacing that floating storage is rapidly being depleted. Oil supply at Cushing is on the cusp of contracting, which is notable given that this has had a high correlation with relative share price performance for the past decade (oil supply shown inverted, Chart 11). On a global basis, global inventory drawdowns have been correlated with a firming industry relative profitability, and vice versa. OECD oil supply growth is rapidly receding, which augurs well for an extension of budding earnings outperformance (Chart 12, middle panel). Chart 11Receding Inventories ##br##Should Boost Performance... Receding Inventories Should Boost Performance… Receding Inventories Should Boost Performance… Chart 12...EPS And##br## Valuations ...EPS And Valuations ...EPS And Valuations The rise in clean tanker rates reinforces that oil demand is rising quickly enough to expect additional inventory depletion (Chart 12, bottom panel). Typically, tanker rates and energy service relative valuations are positively correlated. Adding it up, a rising global rig count, decelerating inventories and restrained oil production continue to bode well for a playable rally in the high-beta S&P energy services group. Bottom Line: We reiterate our high-conviction overweight stance in the S&P energy services index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5ENRE - SLB, HAL, BHI, NOV, FTI, HP, RIG. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor small over large caps and stay neutral growth over value.

Highlights Recommended Allocation Quarterly - April 2017 Quarterly - April 2017 The sweet spot of non-inflationary accelerating growth is likely to continue. European politics will fade as a risk, and Trump should still be able to get tax cuts through. We continue to be positive on risk assets on a one-year horizon, though returns are unlikely to be as good as in the past 12 months and there is a risk of the next recession arriving in 2019. Our portfolio tilts are generally pro-risk and pro-cyclical. We are overweight equities versus fixed income. We move overweight euro area equities, which should benefit from inexpensive valuations, higher beta and a falling political risk premium. Within fixed income, we prefer credit over government bonds, and raise high-yield debt to overweight on improved valuations. We expect the dollar to appreciate further, which makes us cautious on emerging market assets and industrial commodities. Feature Overview No Reasons To Turn Cautious Markets have paused for breath following the reflation trade that began a year ago and that was given an extra boost by the election of Donald Trump in November. Since the turn of the year, the dollar, U.S. 10-year Treasury yields, credit spreads and (to a degree) equities have all eased back a little (Chart 1). We don't think the risk-on rally is over, but the going will undoubtedly get tougher from here. The momentum of global growth cannot continue to rise at the same pace, with the Global PMI already at its highest level since 2011 (Chart 2). Global equities, therefore, are unlikely to return the 16% over the next 12 months, that they have over the past 12. Chart 1A Pause For Breath A Pause For Breath A Pause For Breath Chart 2Growth Momentum Must Slow From Here Growth Momentum Must Slow From Here Growth Momentum Must Slow From Here Nonetheless, we see nothing that is likely to stop risk assets continuing to outperform over the one-year horizon: Growth is likely to rise further. While the initial pick-up was in "soft" data such as consumer sentiment and business confidence, signs are emerging that "hard" data such as household spending and production are now also improving (Chart 3). Models developed by our colleagues on The Bank Credit Analyst indicate that real GDP growth in the U.S. this year will come in above 3% and in the euro area above 2% (Chart 4),1 compared to consensus forecasts of 2.2% and 1.6% respectively. Chart 3Hard Data Also Not Picking Up Hard Data Also Not Picking Up Hard Data Also Not Picking Up Chart 4GDP Growth Could Beat Consensus GDP Growth Could Beat Consensus GDP Growth Could Beat Consensus For now, this growth is unlikely to prove inflationary. In the U.S. the diffusion index for PCE inflation shows more prices in the basket falling than rising; in the eurozone, the rise to 2% in headline inflation in January was temporary, mainly because of higher oil prices, and core inflation remains at only 0.7%. The U.S. output gap will close soon, but the eurozone's is still deeply negative (Chart 5). We see the Fed raising rates twice more this year, in line with its dots, though it may have to accelerate the pace next year if the Trump administration succeeds in passing fiscal stimulus. The ECB, however, is unlikely to raise rates until 2019 and will taper asset purchases only slowly.2 Misplaced worries that it will tighten more quickly than this have recently dragged on European equities and strengthened the euro. We think the market is wrong to price out the probability of a tax cut in the U.S. just because of the Trump administration's failure to reform healthcare. Our Geopolitical strategists argue that Republicans in Congress (even the Freedom Caucus) are united behind the idea of cutting taxes, even if these are not funded by tax reforms or spending cuts (they can be justified on the grounds of "dynamic scoring").3 We see a cut in corporate and personal taxes passing before year-end to take effect in 2018. And Trump has not abandoned the idea of infrastructure spending. The market no longer expects any of this: the prices of stocks that would most benefit from lower corporate taxes or from government spending have reverted to their pre-election levels. European political risk is likely to wane. The market continues to worry about the possibility of Marine Le Pen winning the French Presidential election, as shown in the spread of OATs over Bunds (which has widened to 60-80 bp from 20 bp last summer). We think this very unlikely: polls show her consistently at least 20 points behind Emmanuel Macron in the second round of voting (Chart 6). While Italian politics remain a risk, the parliamentary election there is unlikely to take place until March 2018. Brexit is a threat to the U.K., but should have minimal impact on the eurozone. We retain, therefore, our pro-cyclical and pro-risk tilts on a 12-month time horizon. We have even added a little more beta to our recommended portfolio by raising high-yield bonds to overweight (since their valuations now look more attractive after a recent sell-off) and by going overweight eurozone stocks (paid for by notching down our double-overweight in U.S. stocks). The eurozone has consistently been a higher beta (Chart 7), more cyclical equity market than the U.S. and, once the political risks (at least temporarily) subside, should be able to outperform for a while. Chart 5Eurozone Output Gap Still Very Negative Eurozone Output Gap Still Very Negative Eurozone Output Gap Still Very Negative Chart 6Can Le Pen Really Win From Here? Can Le Pen Really Win From Here? Can Le Pen Really Win From Here? Chart 7Eurozone Is A High Beta Stock Market Eurozone Is A High Beta Stock Market Eurozone Is A High Beta Stock Market But we warn that the good times may not last for long. Tax cuts in the U.S. would add stimulus to an economy already at full capacity. The Fed might have to raise rates sharply next year (although the timing might depend on how President Trump tries to affect monetary policy, for example whom he appoints as Fed chair to replace Janet Yellen next February). U.S. recessions have typically come two or three years after the output gap turns positive (Chart 5). As Martin Barnes, BCA's chief economist, recently wrote,4 that may point to next recession arriving as soon as 2019. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com What Our Clients Are Asking Chart 8Expensive, But Not At An Extreme Expensive, But Not At An Extreme Expensive, But Not At An Extreme Aren't You Worried About U.S. Equity Valuations? Valuation is a poor timing tool in the short term but, when it reaches extremes, it has historically added value. The valuation metrics we watch show that U.S. equities are expensive, but not at the extreme levels that have historically warranted an outright sell or underweight. First, according to MSCI, U.S. equities are currently trading at 24.4 times 12-month trailing earnings, and 25.7 times 10-year cyclically-adjusted earnings; both measures are about one standard deviation from their 10-year averages. Second, U.S. equities are trading at a premium to global equities, but the premium to the developed markets is in line with the 10-year average (Chart 8, panel 1), while the premium to emerging markets is about 1.5 standard deviations from the 10-year average (panel 2). Third, equities are cheap compared to fixed income: the earnings yield is still higher than the yields on both 10-year government bonds and investment grade corporate bonds, and the yield gaps are currently only slightly lower (more expensive) than their respective 10-year averages (panels 3 and 4). In the long run, the 10-year cyclically-adjusted PE (CAPE) has had relatively good forecasting power for 10 year forward returns. Currently, the regression indicates 143% (9.3% annualized) total returns over the next 10 years. This could be on the optimistic side given that we are no longer in an environment of declining bond yields and margins are elevated compared to the 1990s. That said, we have cut our U.S. equity overweight by half, partly due to valuation concerns. Is EM Debt Attractive? Chart 9Avoid EM Debt Avoid EM Debt Avoid EM Debt Emerging market debt has continued its run from last year, with sovereign and local currency debt providing YTD returns of 3% and 2% respectively. Over long periods, EM debt has displayed the ability to provide substantial returns while also providing robust diversification benefits to a 50/50 DM equity/bond portfolio, even more so than EM equities.5 However, over the cyclical horizon, we remain bearish on EM debt both in absolute terms and relative to global equities. EM fixed income markets have been able to defy deteriorating fundamentals for some time, but this is unsustainable. After years of leveraging, credit excesses will need to be unwound. Decelerating credit growth will be enough to dampen economic growth and damage emerging markets' ability to service their debt. Risks in EM sovereign debt markets are high. Historical returns have shown negative skewness and fat tails, suggesting high vulnerability to large downswings. This is particularly concerning given that yields are one standard deviation lower than their long-term average (Chart 9). While EM local currency debt is more fairly priced and has a more favorable risk/return profile than its sovereign debt counterpart, local currency debt returns are even more heavily influenced by their currencies. Above-trend growth in the U.S. leading to additional rate hikes, as well as rising U.S. bond yields and softer commodity prices will add further downward pressure to EM currencies. For EM dedicated investors, we suggest overweight positions in low beta/defensive markets. Regions that are less susceptible to currency weakness with high yields and low foreign funding requirements include Russia, India and Indonesia. How Will The Fed Shrink Its Balance Sheet, And Does It Matter? After the Fed's third rate hike, attention is turning to when it will begin to reduce its balance sheet. This has grown to $4.5 trillion, up from $900 billion before the Global Financial Crisis. Assets currently include $2.5 trillion of Treasury securities and $1.8 trillion of mortgage-related securities. Since asset purchases ended in October 2014, the Fed has rolled over maturing bonds to maintain the size of the balance sheet. The FOMC statement last December committed to maintaining this policy "until normalization of the level of the federal funds rate is well under way". The market takes this to mean 1-1.5%, a level likely to be reached by year-end. The view of BCA's fixed income team6 is that the Fed will start by ceasing reinvestment of Agency bonds and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) in 2018, at the same time reducing excess bank reserves on the liability side of the balance sheet (Chart 10). This will worry markets to a degree and the Fed will need to be careful how it communicates the policy: for example what size it thinks its balance sheet should ultimately be. It may also need to skip a rate hike or two in the first months of the shrinkage. The MBS market is likely to suffer from the increased supply. But the only historical precedent - the BoJ's unwinding of its 2000-3 QE - is reassuring: this had no discernible effect on rates or the yen (Chart 11). Chart 10Fed Will Cut MBSs First Fed Will Cut MBSs First Fed Will Cut MBSs First Chart 11Nobody Noticed The BoJ Taper Nobody Noticed The BoJ Taper Nobody Noticed The BoJ Taper When Will ECB Taper? Chart 12Recovery Not Permanent Recovery Not Permanent Recovery Not Permanent Euro area growth is recovering and headline inflation has hit the ECB's 2% target (Chart 12). Investors are wondering how rapidly the ECB will taper its asset purchases and when it will raise rates. Our view is that the ECB will move only slowly. The pickup in inflation is mostly driven by the base effect and by the rise in energy prices. The failure of core inflation, which remains below 1%, to pick up appreciably suggests that underlying price pressures are weak. The current program has the ECB purchasing EUR 60 Bn of assets each month until December 2017. Markets have recently become more hawkish with regards to the likely path of policy: currently futures are pricing in the first hike only 19 months away versus an expectations in January of 44 months. We expect the ECB to remain more dovish than that, given weak underlying inflation, political uncertainty, and banking system troubles. We think the ECB will announce around September this year a taper of its asset purchases in 2018. However, it is not clear whether it will cut them to, say EUR 30 Bn a month, or whether it will reduce the amount steadily each month or quarter. But we don't see an interest rate hike soon, since the euro area economy is not expected to reach full employment until 2019. Ewald Novotny, president of the Austrian central bank, spooked markets by suggesting a hike before complete withdrawal of asset purchases but, in our view, that would will send a confusing signal to investors. Nowotny has long been hawkish and we think his view is untypical of ECB council members. If our analysis is correct, ECB policy should be positive for euro area equities and bearish for the euro over the next 12 months. Will REIT Underperformance Continue? Chart 13Underweight REITs Underweight REITs Underweight REITs Relative REIT performance has continued its downtrend, underperforming the broad index by 5% YTD. While valuations have become more attractive and rental income is still robust, we expect the decline to continue given unsupportive macro factors. We previously argued that real estate is in a sweet spot, where economic growth was sufficient to generate sustainable tenant demand without triggering a new supply cycle.7 This is no longer the case. Office completions increased substantially over the past quarter and apartment completions remain in an uptrend. As we expect growth to remain robust in the U.S., the likelihood is that these two trends remain in place. REIT relative performance peaked at the beginning of August, shortly after long-term interest rates bottomed. REITs have historically outperformed when yields are falling and inflation is low (Chart 13). However, long-term rates should continue to rise over the cyclical horizon, primarily due to higher inflation expectations. Additionally, REITs typically benefit from increasing central bank asset purchases, as increased liquidity and lower interest rates boost real estate values. With the Fed clearly in tightening mode and the strong likelihood of ECB tapering next year, slowing asset purchases will be a considerable headwind to REIT performance. Within REITs, we maintain our sector tilts. Continue to favor Industrials, which will benefit in a rising USD environment and provide considerable income. Maintain underweight position in Apartments, due to rising completions and a low absorption ratio. Additionally, we continue to favor trophy over non-trophy markets given more stable rent growth as well as geopolitical risks in Europe and potential Washington disappointments. Global Economy Overview: The global economy has continued to recover from its intra-cycle slowdown in late 2015 and early 2016. Economic surprise indexes have everywhere surprised significantly on the upside since mid-2016 (Chart 14, panel 1). Although "hard" data (consumption, production etc.) have lagged "soft" data (consumer sentiment, business confidence), the former also have begun to recover recently. Although there are few negative indicators, it will get harder to beat expectations. U.S.: Lead indicators continue to improve, with the manufacturing ISM at 57.7 and new orders at 65.1. Sentiment quickly turned bullish after the presidential election, and hard data has now started to follow, with personal consumption expenditure rising 4.7% year on year and capital goods orders (+2.7% YoY in February) growing for the first time since 2014. With steady wage growth, continuing employment improvements, and a likely pick-up in capex, we expect 2017 GDP growth to beat the current consensus expectations of 2.2%. For now inflation remains quiescent, with core PCE inflation stuck at around 1.8%, below the Fed's 2% target. Euro Area: Leading indicators, such as PMIs, have rebounded in Europe too (Chart 15), suggesting that the consensus 2017 GDP forecast of 1.6% is achievable. Inflation has picked up, with the headline CPI 2.0% for the Eurozone in January, but core inflation remains low at 0.7% and headline fell back to 1.5% in February. However, the recent slowdown in bank loan growth (new credit creation is 36% below the level six months ago) suggests that continuing weakness in the banking sector is likely to keep growth sluggish. Chart 14How Long Can Growth Continue To Surprise? How Long Can Growth Continue To Surprise? How Long Can Growth Continue To Surprise? Chart 15A Synchronized Global Growth Rebound A Synchronized Global Growth Rebound A Synchronized Global Growth Rebound Japan is a tale of two segments. International-oriented data have recovered, with IP up 3.7% (Chart 15, panel 2) and exports +5.4% year on year. But domestic demand remains weak: wages are rising only 0.5% YoY (despite a tight labor market), which is holding back household spending (-1.2% YoY in January). Core inflation has shown the first signs of picking up, but remains very low at 0.1% YoY. Emerging Markets: The effects of China's reflationary policies from early 2016 continue to boost activity (Chart 15, panel 3). But the excess liquidity they triggered worries the authorities, who have clamped down on real estate purchases and capital outflows, slowed fiscal spending, and tightened monetary policy. China will prioritize stability until the Party Congress in the fall, but the impact of reflation on commodity prices and on other emerging markets will fade. Interest rates: The Fed is likely to hike twice more this year in line with its "dot plot", unless inflation surprises significantly to the upside. This, plus an acceleration of nominal GDP growth to 4.5-5%, should push the 10-year bond yield above 3% by year end. The ECB will not be as hawkish as the market expects (futures markets indicate a rate hike by end-2018), since Mario Draghi expects headline inflation to fall back once the oil price stabilizes and is concerned about political risk especially in Italy. Consequently, rates are unlikely to rise as quickly as in the U.S. The Bank of Japan will keep its 0% yield target for 10-year JGB for the foreseeable future. Global Equities Global equities continued to make impressive gains in Q1 2017, after a strong 2016. The price appreciation since the low in February 2016 has been driven by both multiple expansion and earnings growth, roughly in equal proportion, as shown in Chart 16, panel 1. Chart 16Earnings Improving But Valuation Stretched Earnings Improving But Valuation Stretched Earnings Improving But Valuation Stretched Equity valuation is expensive by historical standards but, as an asset class, equities are still attractively valued compared to bonds (see the "What Our Clients Are Asking" section on page 6). In this "TINA" (There Is No Alternative) world, we remain overweight equities versus bonds. Within equities, we maintain our call of favoring DM equities versus EM equities despite of the 6% EM outperformance in Q1, which was supported by attractive valuations. About half of that outperformance came from the appreciation of EM currencies versus the USD. Our house view is that the USD will strengthen further versus the EM currencies. Within EM, we have been more positive on China and remain so on a 6-9 month horizon. The only adjustment we make now is to upgrade euro area equities to overweight by reducing half of our large overweight in the U.S. so that now we are equally overweight the U.S. and euro area (see details on the next page). In terms of global sector positioning, we maintain a pro-cyclical tilt. Our largest overweight in Healthcare panned out very well in Q1 but the overweight in Energy did not, due to the drop in oil prices. Our Energy strategists believe this was caused by one-off technical factors on the supply side, and argue that the oil price will soon revert to $55 a barrel. Euro Area Equities: A Cheaper Alternative To The U.S. Political risks related to elections in some eurozone countries are receding. The ECB is likely to maintain its easy monetary policies, while the Fed is on track to normalize interest rates in the U.S. We have had a large overweight of 6 percentage points (ppts) on U.S. equities while being neutral on the euro area. We upgrade the eurozone to overweight by 3 ppts, so that we are now equally overweight the U.S. and the euro area. The following are the reasons: First, the relative performance of total returns between eurozone and the U.S. equities is at its lowest since 1987. Since April 2015, when the most recent brief period of eurozone outperformance ended, eurozone equities have underperformed the U.S. by over 16% in common currency terms (Chart 17, panel 1), while the euro lost only about 4% versus the USD over the same period. Second, eurozone equities are trading at a 22% discount to the U.S., compared to the five-year average discount of 17% (panel 3). Third, eurozone equities have lower margins than the U.S., but the profit margin in the eurozone has been improving (panel 2). Lastly, the PMIs in the euro area have been improving (panel 4) and this improvement is faster than the global aggregate PMI (panel 5), which implies - based on the close correlation between PMIs and earnings growth - that profitability in the eurozone should improve at a faster pace than the global average. Sector Allocation: We have had a relatively pro-cyclical tilt in our global sector positioning, overweight three cyclical sectors (Energy, Industrials and Info Tech) plus Healthcare, while underweight three defensive sectors (Consumer Staples, Telecoms and Utilities) as well as Consumer Discretionary. We have been neutral on Financials and Materials. After very strong performance in 2016, cyclical sectors underperformed in Q1 2017 (Chart 18, panel 1). The underperformance of cyclicals versus defensives can be largely attributed to the polar-opposite performance of Energy and Healthcare (Chart 19). Going forward, we maintain our current sector positioning for the following reasons: Chart 17Earnings Growth At Lower Valuation Earnings Growth At Lower Valuation Earnings Growth At Lower Valuation Chart 18Maintain The Cyclical Tilt Maintain The Cyclical Tilt Maintain The Cyclical Tilt Chart 19Global Sector Performance Quarterly - April 2017 Quarterly - April 2017 First, Energy was the only sector which fell in Q1, largely due to the decline in oil prices. BCA's Energy and Commodity Strategy attributes the oil price weakness to inventory buildup related to the production rush before the OPEC agreement to cut production, and therefore expects the WTI oil price to return to the $50-55 range. Energy stocks should benefit once oil prices turn back up. Chart 20Relative Factor Performance Relative Factor Performance Relative Factor Performance Second, the relative profitability between cyclicals and defensives is underpinned by global economic conditions, as represented by the global PMI. The PMI is on track to recover further, which bodes well for the profit outlook for cyclicals versus defensives. Third, our pro-cyclical tilt in sector positioning is hedged by an overweight in Healthcare (a defensive sector) and underweight in Consumer Discretionary (a cyclical). Smart Beta Update: No Style Bet Q1 2017 saw some significant performance reversals in the five most enduring factors: quality, minimum volatility, momentum, value, and size (Chart 20, panels 2-6). Quality and Momentum performed the best, outperforming the global benchmark by over 200 bps in Q1. The star performer in 2016, the Value factor, performed the worst, underperforming by 190 bps. According to the findings in our Special Report,8 recent factor performance seems to be pricing in a "Goldilocks" environment in which growth is rising and inflation falling. We have shown that it is very difficult to time the shift in factor performance cycles and so have advocated an equal weight in the five factors (Chart 20, panel 1) for long-term investors. We reiterate this view. Government Bonds Maintain slight underweight duration. Our 2-factor model made up of global PMI and U.S. dollar sentiment indicates the current fair value of the 10-year Treasury yield is 2.4% (Chart 21). While this suggests bonds are currently correctly priced, we still expect that long-term yields will rise over a cyclical horizon. The long end should grind higher given improving growth, rising equity prices and renewed "animal spirits." Additionally, large net short positions have been unwound, allowing for another leg higher in yields. Overweight TIPS vs. Treasuries. Diffusion indexes for both PCE and CPI inflation shifted into negative territory, suggesting realized inflation will soften in the near term. Nevertheless, with headline and core CPI readings of 2.7% and 2.2% respectively, U.S. inflation has clearly bottomed for the cycle (Chart 22). This trend should continue as a result of cost-push inflation driven by faster wage growth. Very gradual Fed hikes will not be enough to derail the upward momentum in consumer prices. Euro area growth is stable, but expectations of a rate hike from the ECB are premature (Chart 23). While the central bank opened the door slightly to a less-accommodative policy stance, it is unlikely that the ECB will hike until full employment is reached. Our expectation is for a tapering of asset purchases to occur in 2018. Once tapering is complete, rate hikes will follow by approximately 6-12 months. The implication is upward pressure on European bond yields and wider spreads for peripheral government debt. Chart 2110-Year Treasury Fair Value Model 10-Year Treasury Fair Value Model 10-Year Treasury Fair Value Model Chart 22Inflation Has Bottomed Inflation Has Bottomed Inflation Has Bottomed Chart 23Will the ECB Hike Soon? Will the ECB Hike Soon? Will the ECB Hike Soon? Corporate Bonds The BCA Corporate Health Monitor remains deeply in "Deteriorating Health" territory, indicating weakness within corporate balance sheets (Chart 24). Over the last quarter, the indicator worsened, as profit margins, return-on-capital and liquidity declined. However, leverage did improve slightly. The trend toward weaker corporate health has been firmly established over the past 12 quarters. This is consistent with the very late stages of past credit cycles. Maintain overweight to Investment Grade debt. The U.S. is in a self-reinforcing, low-inflation recovery. Economic growth should accelerate throughout 2017, with strong consumer spending, rising capex intentions, and still accommodative monetary policy. The potential sell-off from rate hikes this year should be fairly mild given that the market is already close to pricing in three. Additionally, credit has historically outperformed in the early stages of the Fed tightening cycle. Expect low but positive excess returns (Chart 25). Shift to overweight in high-yield debt. Our default model is showing improvement due to elevated interest coverage, a robust PMI reading, declining job cut announcements, softening lending standards and a rising sales/inventory ratio. The recent backup in yields has made junk bond valuations more attractive. The default adjusted spread, calculated by subtracting an ex-ante estimate of default losses from the average spread, is now approximately 220bps (Chart 26). Chart 24Balance Sheets Deteriorating Balance Sheets Deteriorating Balance Sheets Deteriorating Chart 25A Supportive Backdrop A Supportive Backdrop A Supportive Backdrop Chart 26High Yield: Valuations Becoming More Attractive High Yield: Valuations Becoming More Attractive High Yield: Valuations Becoming More Attractive Commodities Chart 27Upside To Resource Prices Limited Upside To Resource Prices Limited Upside To Resource Prices Limited Secular Perspective: Bearish A slowdown in Chinese activity, led by its transition to a services economy, coupled with unfavorable global demographics, will continue to constrain demand for commodities. This slack in demand coupled with excess capacity will continue to limit the upside in resource prices and prolong the commodities bear market which began in 2012 (Chart 27). Cyclical Perspective: Neutral Energy markets have moved from excess supply to excess demand, and so we remain positive on oil. But, with the impact of Chinese fiscal stimulus waning, excess supply in the metals market will persist, putting downward pressure on prices. Our divergent outlook for energy vs metals gives us an overall neutral view for commodities over the cyclical horizon. Energy: With a synchronized upturn in global growth and inflation, both OECD and non-OECD demand will remain strong. Following Saudi Arabia's production cuts, we expect the OPEC agreement to be honored by all members, including Russia. With strengthening demand and falling production, storage should draw through the year. We expect the oil-USD divergence to persist as improving fundamentals override the stronger dollar. Base Metals: With Chinese government spending slowing from 24% growth year on year in January 2016 to only 4%, the country's fiscal impulse has ended. Tightening in Chinese liquidity conditions have led to higher borrowing rates for the real estate sector, which is dampening its demand for materials. At the same time, inventories for key metals such as copper and steel have risen. We expect metals prices to correct over the coming months. Precious Metals: Gold has rallied 10% from last December, and another 4% following the Fed's March rate hike. These were responses to the dovish nature of the hike and continuing political risk. We expect the Fed to turn more hawkish in coming weeks, sending the dollar and real yields higher, thereby holding back the gold price from rising much further. Currencies Chart 28Return Of The Dollar Return Of The Dollar Return Of The Dollar USD: The last Fed meeting resulted in a dovish hike, as evidenced by the subsequent fall in the dollar. However, as the U.S. economy nears full employment, we expect a more hawkish tone from FOMC members in the coming weeks which will push the dollar up (Chart 28). The Fed continues to be data dependent, and sees the recent synchronized global upturn as an opportunity to deliver hikes in line with market expectations. Euro: As the economy stabilizes, as evidenced by rising headline inflation, stronger retail sales and improving PMI numbers, the ECB has opened the window for reducing monetary accommodation. However, since the economy is expected to reach full employment only in 2019, we expect rates to be kept low even after the tapering of ECB asset purchases starts next year. This will add further downward pressure on the euro. Yen: The Bank of Japan will continue its highly accommodative monetary policy, centered on its 0% yield target for 10-year government bonds, because Japanese growth and inflation is lagging the global upturn. Japan is benefitting from global growth, as seen in the improvement in its manufacturing PMI, but domestic demand remains weak as consumer confidence and retail sales stagnate. Continued downward pressure on relative interest rates will drive the only reliable source of inflation: a weaker yen. EM: A more hawkish Fed and rising bond yields will tighten global liquidity conditions, making it difficult for emerging nations that run current account deficits. The rising threat of protectionism could affect EM exports and create a new wave of deflationary pressure, forcing central banks to engineer currency devaluation. The fact that commodity prices have risen, yet EM currencies have remained weak, is a clear indications that EM fundamentals are weak. Alternatives Overweight private equity / underweight hedge funds. Leading indicators suggest that global growth continues to improve. In the absence of a recession, private equity typically outperforms as the illiquidity premium should provide a boost to returns. Additionally, surveys suggest that managers are planning on increasing their allocation percentage toward private equity over the rest of the year. Hedge funds, on the other hand, have displayed a negative correlation with global growth. Historically, they have outperformed private equity only during recessions or periods of high credit market stress (Chart 29). Overweight direct real estate / underweight commodity futures. Demand for commercial real estate (CRE) assets remains robust but the increase in completions is worrying. Favor Industrials for its income potential and Retail given resilient consumer spending. Overweight trophy markets, as demand remains robust given multiple macro risks. Commodities have bounced, but remain in a secular bear market caused by a supply glut and exacerbated by a market-share war (Chart 30). Overweight farmland & timberland / underweight structured products. The potential for trade wars, geopolitical risk in Europe and concerns over an equity market correction have increased the importance of volatility reduction. Favor farmland & timberland. Substantial portfolio diversification benefits, resulting from low correlations with traditional assets, coupled with a positive skew, make these assets highly attractive. As the most bond-like alternative, the end of the 35-year bull market in bonds presents a substantial headwind. Structured products also tend to outperform during recessions, which is not our base case (Chart 31). Chart 29PE: Tied To Real Growth PE: Tied To Real Growth PE: Tied To Real Growth Chart 30Commodities: A Secular Bear Market Commodities: A Secular Bear Market Commodities: A Secular Bear Market Chart 31Structured Products Outperform In Recessions Structured Products Outperform In Recessions Structured Products Outperform In Recessions Risks To Our View Our pro-cyclical pro-risk tilts are based on the premise that global growth will remain strong over the next 12 months. We do not see many risks to this view: leading indicators suggest that consumption and capex are likely to continue to rebound. The one major indicator that suggests downside risk is loan growth. In the U.S., loans to firms have slowed to 5.4% from over 10% last summer, and in the euro area the meager pickup in corporate loan growth seems to have faltered (Chart 32). There may be some special factors: oil companies that borrowed in early 2016 when in difficulty no longer need to tap credit lines, and U.S. companies may be holding back to see details of tax cuts. But loan growth needs to be watched closely. More granularly, our country and sector preferences - in particular, our cautious views on Emerging Markets and industrial commodities - are based partly on the expectation that the U.S. dollar will appreciate further. If the global expansion remains highly synchronized (Chart 33) this might instigate all G7 central banks to tighten, allowing the Fed to raise rates without appreciating the dollar. However, we expect continuing divergences in growth and monetary policy to push the dollar up further. Finally, some indicators suggest that investors have become too positive on the outlook for stocks (Chart 34). Sentiment has in the past not been a reliable indicator of stock market peaks, but excess euphoria could trigger a short-term correction. Chart 32Why Is Bank Loan Growth Slowing? Why Is Bank Loan Growth Slowing? Why Is Bank Loan Growth Slowing? Chart 33Could Synchronized Growth Push Down USD? Could Synchronized Growth Push Down USD? Could Synchronized Growth Push Down USD? Chart 34Are Investors Too Euphoric? Are Investors Too Euphoric? Are Investors Too Euphoric? 1 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, March 2017, page 33, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see What Our Clients Are Asking: When Will The ECB Taper? on page 9 of this report for a full explanation of why we think this. 3 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Donald Trump Is Who We Thought He Was", dated March 8, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see BCA Special Report titled "Beware The 2019 Trump Recession", dated March 7, 2017, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Global Asset Allocation Strategy Special Report, "EM Asset Allocation: Is There Any Reason To Own Stocks?," dated November 27, 2012, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "The Way Forward For The Fed's Balance Sheet," dated February 28, 2017, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see Global Asset Allocation Strategy Special Report, "REITs Vs. Direct: How To Get Exposure To Real Estate," dated September 15, 2016, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see Global Asset Allocation Strategy Special Report, "Is Smart Beta A Useful Tool In Global Asset Allocation?," dated July 8, 2016, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. Recommended Asset Allocation Model Portfolio (USD Terms)

Highlights Renewed deflationary pressures indicate that the Hong Kong dollar may have once again become expensive. The currency peg will stay and domestic prices will adjust as a release valve. Developing deflationary pressures and slowing rent growth may reinforce one other. Rising risk free interest rate calls for higher rental yield, which can only be achieved via lower home prices. Remain short HK government bonds relative to US Treasurys; Remain short HK property investors relative to benchmark. More evidence that China's profit cycle is in an upturn. Feature The election of Hong Kong's Chief Executive this past weekend garnered little coverage among the global mainstream media. Carrie Lam easily beat her competitors, purportedly with blessings from Beijing. However, she will face an uphill battle to reunite the citizens of Hong Kong, who have become increasingly divided in recent years. As a regional financial hub heavily exposed to global forces, local politics barely matter for Hong Kong's economy and financial markets. Nonetheless, the significance of politics has clearly been on an upward trajectory in recent years, which could impact investors' long-term risk perceptions for a market that has historically been largely viewed as an "apolitical" Laissez Faire system. On the economic front, also largely ignored has been Hong Kong's inflation statistics released early last week, which showed that headline consumer price inflation dropped by 0.1% in February, the first negative reading since August 2009. While one single data point certainly does not denote a trend, odds are high that deflationary forces are re-emerging in Hong Kong, with important implications for asset prices, particularly for the currency and local real estate market. Budding Deflation... Chart 1Deflation Is Coming Back Deflation Is Coming Back Deflation Is Coming Back The negative February CPI reading was largely attributed to some poverty relief factors, declining vegetable prices and the base effect due to the Chinese New Year holiday. However, headline CPI has been decelerating since the peak of 2011 (Chart 1). Indeed, after briefly dipping below zero at the height of the global financial crisis and then roaring back in the aftermath on improving growth, consumer prices in Hong Kong have been in a prolonged period of disinflation. In fact, February's negative CPI figure is just a continuation of a well-established trend rather than an anomaly caused by one-off factors. Moreover, falling inflation and developing deflation is rather broad-based. It is true that the nosedive in fresh food prices has clearly played a role in dragging down headline CPI. However, price inflation has been trending lower in almost all major components of the consumption basket such as housing, eating out and other miscellaneous services (Chart 1, bottom panel). Meanwhile, consumer durable goods inflation has been stuck in negative territory for more than 10 years. Interestingly, amid strengthening global growth momentum, most major economies have been experiencing bouts of reflation, particularly in sectors associated with commodities prices - intensifying disinflationary/deflationary pressures in Hong Kong are a notable exception. It means that inflation dynamics in Hong Kong are likely rooted in unique domestic factors. ...Indicates An Expensive Hong Kong Dollar In our view, a key factor behind Hong Kong's budding deflationary pressure is the exchange rate. As the Hong Kong dollar is pegged to the U.S. dollar, the relative shift in price levels between Hong Kong and the rest of the world cannot be adjusted through a change in the nominal exchange rate. Therefore, the adjustment must be achieved in real terms through price changes. Chart 2 shows that prior to 1983 when the currency board system was established, Hong Kong inflation largely followed that in the U.S., while the exchange rate fluctuated against the dollar. Since the 1983 currency peg, Hong Kong inflation has been swinging around the U.S. level, with the economy alternating between inflationary booms and deflationary busts. A new factor that has also become increasingly important in Hong Kong's inflation dynamics is China's price levels, which also relates to the exchange rate. Chart 3 shows Hong Kong headline inflation has outpaced Chinese inflation since 2013, and the RMB's depreciation against the Hong Kong dollar in recent years has put further downward pressure on local Hong Kong price levels. Chart 2Exchange Rate And Inflation Tango Exchange Rate And Inflation Tango Exchange Rate And Inflation Tango Chart 3Hong Kong Inflation: The China Factor Hong Kong Inflation: The China Factor Hong Kong Inflation: The China Factor In short, renewed deflationary pressures indicate that the Hong Kong dollar may have once again become expensive, and therefore domestic price levels have begun to adjust as the release valve. It remains to be seen how long the adjustment process will last. From investors' point of view, a few observations are in order: There is little risk that the Hong Kong dollar peg will break, unless it is a voluntary policy choice by the authorities. Hong Kong's solid banking sector is not prone to financial crises, and its massive fiscal and foreign exchange reserves give the government plenty of fire powder to defend the exchange rate in the event of a speculative attack, let alone the mighty official reserves held in mainland China (Chart 4). We remain convinced that Hong Kong's ultra-low interest rates compared with the U.S. are unjustified and unsustainable (Chart 5). Hong Kong 10-year government bond yields are still 84 basis points lower than their U.S. counterparts, which probably reflects upward pressure on the Hong Kong dollar to appreciate against the U.S. dollar, partially driven by Chinese capital outflows. In this vein, budding deflationary pressures in Hong Kong further diminish the odds of an upward move of the HKD against the U.S. dollar. Remain short Hong Kong government bonds against U.S. Treasurys with comparable durations. Historically Hong Kong's flexible and largely Laissez Faire system has been able to stomach drastic swings in domestic price levels induced by the currency peg. The rising grassroots anti-establishment movement in recent years suggests the side effects of the Hong Kong system may have become increasingly unpopular. It will be interesting to see if any deflationary growth downturn in Hong Kong triggers a populist backlash that leads to a change in Hong Kong's exchange rate scheme. Chart 4Ample Resources To Defend HKD Peg Ample Resources To Defend HKD Peg Ample Resources To Defend HKD Peg Chart 5HK Rates Should Move Higher HK Rates Should Move Higher HK Rates Should Move Higher Real Estate: Sky's The Limit? Another key reason behind Hong Kong's falling CPI inflation is rent, which has also turned sharply lower in recent months (Chart 1, bottom panel). This is in stark contrast to home prices, which have continued to rally strongly. After a temporary pullback last year, Hong Kong real estate prices have roared back to new record highs. Looking forward, the outlook for Hong Kong's real estate sector looks decisively bearish. First, Hong Kong's real estate market has become increasingly detached from economic fundamentals. Home prices have dramatically outpaced household income, in greater proportion than the previous housing bubble peak in the late 1990s (Chart 6). Therefore, it is not surprising that both transactions and construction activity have declined substantially to near-record lows. Thinning transaction activity suggests that ordinary local households may have been priced out, underscoring frothy market conditions. The saving grace is that the dramatic increase in prices has not led to euphoria in housing demand and transactions, which should limit financial sector risk should home prices decline. Second, developing deflationary pressures and slowing rent growth may reinforce one other, potentially creating a downward spiral. Meanwhile, risk-free interest rates, driven by Federal Reserve policy, will likely edge higher. This is an especially poor combination for Hong Kong real estate investors. Historically, higher risk-free yields should lead to higher rental yields (Chart 7). With falling rents, the only way for rental yields to go up is via lower prices. Chart 6Housing Market: Soaring Prices, Falling Volume Housing Market: Soaring Prices, Falling Volume Housing Market: Soaring Prices, Falling Volume Chart 7Rental Yield Will Be Pushed Higher Rental Yield Will Be Pushed Higher Rental Yield Will Be Pushed Higher From a big-picture vantage point, Hong Kong deflation and Fed tightening will lead to much higher real interest rates in Hong Kong, which amounts to significant tightening in monetary conditions. This will create further headwinds for both the Hong Kong domestic economy and property prices. The bottom line is that the risk in Hong Kong home prices is tilted to the downside. The market may have been boosted by an influx of capital from the mainland, which may sustain the bubble for a while longer. However, investors should not chase the market. Chart 8The Widening Valuation Gap The Widening Valuation Gap The Widening Valuation Gap Budding deflationary pressures also bode poorly for profits and equity prices. However, Hong Kong stocks are more heavily exposed to China and the global cycle than local business conditions, and therefore should not be impacted materially. Moreover, Hong Kong stock multiples historically have tracked their U.S. counterparts closely - the valuation gap has widened sharply since 2013 (Chart 8). This should further limit the downside in Hong Kong stocks. Meanwhile, we expect property owners such as REITs to underperform the broader market. A Word On Chinese Profits The latest numbers show Chinese industrial profits jumped by over 30% in the first two months of the year compared with a year ago, a sharp acceleration from recent months, as predicted by our model (Chart 9). The strong profit recovery has important implications. For equity earnings, the upturn in the profit cycle is also confirmed by bottom-up analysts. Net earnings revisions have been lifted, which has historically led to acceleration in forward earnings growth (Chart 10). Remain positive on Chinese H shares. From a macro perspective, rising earnings should lead to stronger investment, especially in the manufacturing and mining sectors. This should further boost domestic demand and prolong the ongoing mini cycle upturn. The profit recovery also helps alleviate financial stress in the banking system, as it will reduce the pace of accumulation of non-performing loans (NPL). Importantly, profits are rising particularly strongly in some of the hardest hit sectors in previous years, such as steelmakers and coal miners, which were precisely where the increase in NPLs were the most rampant. We will follow up on this issue in upcoming reports. Chart 9China's Profit Cycle Upturn China's Profit Cycle Upturn China's Profit Cycle Upturn Chart 10Chinese Equity Earnings Will Accelerate Chinese Equity Earnings Will Accelerate Chinese Equity Earnings Will Accelerate Yan Wang, Senior Vice President China Investment Strategy yanw@bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights A gradual rise in interest rates will not be problematic for the housing market. Throughout the cycle, it has been potential homebuyers' lack of savings, and tougher lending standards, that has held back the housing expansion. A steady improvement in household balance sheets is now allowing more households to qualify for loans. We assign low odds that housing policy reform will have a direct impact on the market over the next year; macroeconomic forces will be the primary driver for residential real estate activity and prices. Feature Since 2013, the U.S. housing market has enjoyed a relative period of calm after the bubble (2004-2007), bust (2008-2011) and prolonged clean-up period (2011-2014). Indeed, since 2013, the residential real estate market has made steady gains both in terms of construction and price returns. Rock-bottom interest rates, an improving labor market, and tight supply have provided good conditions for the housing market to expand. But these conditions are changing. Both residential investment and home prices are procyclical and highly sensitive to interest rates. With the Fed now beginning to deliberate its fourth rate hike of the cycle, investors should wonder whether this poses a risk to housing. Meanwhile, there is much talk about tax reform from Washington. This Special Report focuses on the top questions relating to the U.S. housing market. Question #1: Won't rising mortgage rates kill the nascent recovery in mortgage activity? Throughout this expansion, the level of interest rates has not been the major hurdle to the housing recovery; it was a lack of savings and tighter credit conditions that kept potential homebuyers out of the market. Table 1 is a breakdown of the National Association of Realtors' Affordability of First-time Homebuyers. The median price of a starter home is currently $199,800 and the qualifying income on such a home (assuming 10% down payment) is $42,000. Since the median family income is currently $46,040, this implies that at today's interest rates, potential first-time homebuyers do have the required income to enter the housing market. Earlier in the recovery, the problem had been the 10% down payment. According to the Federal Reserve's triennial survey of Consumer finances in 2014, median net worth for non-homeowners (i.e. renters) was $5,400, i.e. far short of the down payment required. A meaningful rise in the homeownership rate was always going to be difficult to pull off until consumers built sufficient savings for a down payment and/or mortgage lending standards loosened significantly. Table 1Potential Homebuyers: Savings A Bigger Hurdle Than Rates U.S. Housing: What Comes Next? U.S. Housing: What Comes Next? We do not have up-to-date median renter savings data (the next Federal Reserve survey of consumer finances will only be published in September), but the savings rate has risen over the past several years. It is likely that an improvement in renter finances is alleviating the major hurdle that exists for potential home buyers. Outside of the down payment issue, housing affordability is very good even under an aggressive interest rate scenario. In Chart 1, we stress-test housing affordability under different rate scenarios. Even if mortgage rates rise by 200bps, mortgage payments relative to income will remain well below their long-term average. The bottom line is that we do not see a rise in interest rates as overly problematic for the housing market. Throughout the cycle, it has been potential homebuyers' lack of savings, and tougher lending standards that have held back the expansion. A steady improvement in household balance sheets is now allowing more households to qualify for loans. Question #2: And how are lending standards today? Historically, lending standards always swung between very tight at the beginning of an economic cycle and very loose at the height of the expansion. This time, it appears that banks have kept a more cautious attitude toward consumers relative to past cycles (Chart 2). This shouldn't be a surprise, given that this was the area of greatest excesses during the past business cycle. Chart 1Higher Rates Won't Kill ##br##The Housing Recovery Higher Rates Won’t Kill The Housing Recovery Higher Rates Won’t Kill The Housing Recovery Chart 2Improved Household Balance Sheets Mean ##br##More Qualifying Borrowers Improved Household Balance Sheets Mean More Qualifying Borrowers Improved Household Balance Sheets Mean More Qualifying Borrowers As mentioned above, consumers' balance sheets have largely been mended over the course of this cycle. In fact, the average U.S. FICO score is now at an all-time high. This is great news, although still perhaps not great enough for banks. According to Deutsche Bank, the average credit score required is 750, and this number has not changed much since 2007. The average FICO score for the total U.S. population is still considerably below this. However, as scores improve, over time more and more people are qualifying. Overall, while it appears that banks have not drastically changed lending standards, more prospective buyers are meeting the criteria. Question #3: Is there still a supply glut? No- as Chart 3 shows, on a national basis, traditional measures of housing inventory for sale are near-record lows. Of course, geography is very important for real estate and some markets are tighter than others, but aggregate data does not show any meaningful imbalances. If anything, a catch-up building phase may be required in some areas. Question #4: How will Trump affect the housing market? We do not anticipate that any direct policy measures will impact the housing market in 2017. If interest rates rise over the next year because the Fed believes that monetary policy needs to tighten in the face of expansive fiscal policy, then this will surely provide a mild brake on lending activity. We address the impact of higher rates in Question #1. As for direct policy measures, perhaps the most impactful one would be a change to the mortgage interest deduction. Recall that U.S. taxpayers currently can deduct the interest expense on their mortgage to reduce their taxable income. Trump had previously floated the idea to adjust the cap on the amount of eligible debt (currently at $1 million for married couple jointly filing taxes). But earlier this month, Treasury Secretary Mnuchin dismissed this idea. Tax cuts or broader tax reform are unlikely to pass until the second half of the year at earliest. Until the legislation is written it is impossible to know what aspects of the Trump or House GOP proposals will be included. Similarly, Mnuchin has voiced that he is keen to privatize the GSEs. But that is unlikely to occur this year and the implications of such a development are unclear. The bottom line is that we assign low odds that housing policy reform will have a direct impact on the market over the next year; macroeconomic forces will be the primary driver for residential real estate activity and prices. Question #5: How much will residential real estate contribute to GDP? Residential investment currently stands at 4% of GDP (Chart 4). This is way above the low reached in 2009, but is still short of the pre-recession high of 6% of GDP and is still significantly shy of the thirty year average of 5%. Based on the still low level of inventories, and the potential for household formation to rise, a reasonable expectation is that construction climbs back to 5% of GDP over the next several years. If that occurs, then the contribution to GDP growth from construction should rise toward 0.8% this year and stay at a high level. Chart 3Inventory Is Tight Inventory Is Tight Inventory Is Tight Chart 4Construction Will Be A More Significant GDP Contributor Construction Will Be A More Significant GDP Contributor Construction Will Be A More Significant GDP Contributor Question #6: 4% of GDP is pretty small. How else does the housing market contribute to growth? The housing market affects the economy through multiple channels; even a casual observer of the 2008/09 meltdown can attest to that! Besides the banking system, it is especially homeownership that affects consumer spending patterns. First, the overall wealth effect - the change in spending that accompanies a change in perceived wealth - is driven primarily by the change in the value of housing assets, rather than financial assets (Chart 5). On average, a one-dollar decline in housing wealth tends to reduce consumption by 12 cents. This is two-to-four times as large as the impact on consumption from a one-dollar increase in housing wealth, and much larger than the impact from a one-dollar decline in stock market wealth.1 Second, homeownership impacts spending decisions through the collateral effect. Real consumption and real debt growth have been strongly correlated since 1960. As the top panel of Chart 5 shows, greater credit availability for households has been associated with lower saving rates -and thus higher consumption (this process went into reverse during the GFC).2 Since homeownership is the most significant means for households in the U.S. to access credit (over 80% of household debt is held as mortgage debt), it is really the trend in homeownership and its accompanying mortgage debt that drives the changes in household debt positions, and therefore their ability to boost spending above incomes. Now that there are reasons for the homeownership rate to rise, this wealth effect could play a larger role than during the past few years. Question #7: And how much will prices rise? The U.S. housing recovery has closely followed the classic cycle - our stylized roadmap based on the experience of countries that previously recovered from a housing/financial crisis (Chart 6). If the path of home prices continues to follow this roadmap, then real home price appreciation will be around 4% in 2017 (6% in nominal terms). Chart 5Homeownership = Leverage Homeownership = Leverage Homeownership = Leverage Chart 6More Price Gains Ahead More Price Gains Ahead More Price Gains Ahead Lenka Martinek, Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy lenka@bcaresearch.com 1 Case, Quigley and Shiller. "Wealth Effects Revisited". February, 2011. 2 The Fed has done extensive work on this topic. A comprehensive background piece is available here: http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2007/PDF/Muellbauer_0415.pdf

Highlights Chart of the WeekCopper Term Structure, Inventories##br## Are Not Reflecting Scarcity Copper Term Structure, Inventories Are Not Reflecting Scarcity Copper Term Structure, Inventories Are Not Reflecting Scarcity Transitory supply disruptions and financial demand have kept copper prices buoyant, but these influences will wane. A surge in inventories (Chart of the Week), coupled with slower Chinese demand growth as reflationary policies wind down, will prevent a sharp rally in copper prices. A stronger USD also will weigh on base metals in general, copper in particular. Energy: Overweight. We continue to expect oil inventories to draw throughout the rest of this year and next and are positioned for a backwardated forward curve in WTI. We are adding to our long Dec/17 vs. short Dec/18 WTI spread, which, as of our Tuesday mark to market, is up 183.33% since it was elected on Mar 13/17, and going long Dec/17 Brent vs. short Dec/18 Brent position basis tonight's close, as a strategic position. We also are adding a tactical position in WTI, buying $50/bbl calls vs. selling $55/bbl calls for July, August and September delivery basis tonight's close. Base Metals: Neutral. We remain neutral base metals longer term. Transitory supply disruptions in copper markets will subside, while reflationary stimulus in China will wane, keeping a lid on prices near term (see below). Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold rallied 3.7% following the Fed's rate hike last week. We expect this to reverse as the Fed ratchets up its hawkish rhetoric. Our long volatility position in gold - i.e., long a June put spread vs. long a June call spread - is down 27.5%, following the post-FOMC meeting rally. Ags/Softs: Underweight. We remain bearish, and are comfortable on the sidelines going into the month-end planting-intentions report from the USDA. Higher output of corn and beans in South America and a well-supported USD keep us bearish. Feature Actions taken by Chinese policymakers to slow the property market, wind down reflationary policies, and resume the pivot to services- and consumer-led growth will be critical to the evolution of copper demand, hence prices. Near term, we expect transitory supply disruptions in key mines in Chile, Peru and Indonesia will be addressed, and ore output will be restored. A stronger USD will present a headwind to copper demand, and will lower local production costs in Chile, Peru, Indonesia and elsewhere. Supply And Demand Shocks In the short-term (i.e. 2-3, months), copper prices should remain supported by the disruptions at Escondida in Chile, Grasberg in Indonesia, and more recently at Peru's biggest mine, Cerro Verde. Additionally, flooding in Peru is disrupting copper mining and transport operations beyond Cerro Verde, forcing the declaration of force majeure. BHP Billiton's third meeting with union officials at its Escondida mine failed to end to the strike. This is the world's largest mine - producing ~ 1.1mm MT/yr, or 5% of world supply. Escondida hasn't produced any copper since the strike began on Feb 9/17. This has reduced Chilean copper output 12% yoy as of February, and reduced Chile's GDP by ~ 1%. Unions this week showed interest in resuming talks with management, however. A settlement between PT Freeport Indonesia (PT-FI) and the Indonesian government re export permitting for Grasberg output has yet to materialize. PT-FI produced ~ 500k MT last year. As of this week, PT-FI restarted producing around 40% of its capacity. Lastly, strike action at the Cerro Verde mine is set to end today by order of the Peruvian government, but union officials said the strike would resume Friday if no agreement is reached with management. Cerro Verde produced ~ 500k MT of copper last year; the mine currently produces 50% of its capacity, after replacement workers were hired by the company. The lost output of these three mines accounts for ~ 10% of the global copper mine output. These developments clearly represent a transitory, albeit unexpected, supply shock with effects that should start to dissipate as these issues are resolved. It is worthwhile noting that copper is trading lower in the wake of this news, suggesting markets either prepared for labor action ahead of time - building precautionary inventories ahead of the labor-contract negotiations now underway - or that demand growth is slowing. We think a combination of both likely explains the price weakness following the transitory supply disruptions noted above. On the demand side, any optimism about rising copper prices due to an expected $1 trillion fiscal package in the U.S. is misplaced. Indeed, increased U.S. infrastructure spending - a largely unknown demand-side factor in terms of its details and dimensions - does not figure prominently in our assessment of future copper and based metals prices. The U.S contribution to global copper demand, and to base metals consumption in general, remains limited and has been decreasing in the last decades. U.S. copper demand now represents ~ 7.5% of world copper demand. Therefore, the U.S. market has a relatively small influence on copper prices compared to China, which accounts for close to 50% of global demand (Chart 2A and Chart 2B). Chart 2AU.S. Copper Consumption Pales Relatively To China U.S. Copper Consumption Pales Relatively To China U.S. Copper Consumption Pales Relatively To China Chart 2B U.S. Copper Consumption Pales Relatively To China U.S. Copper Consumption Pales Relatively To China We believe recent run-up in copper prices mainly was due to financial demand rather than physical demand (Chart 3). This elevated demand from financial investors could elevate price volatility, as any new fundamental information that provokes a sudden change in the copper outlook - e.g., faster restart to once-sidelined production, say, at Glencore's Katanga Mining facilities in the DRC, which are scheduled to be back on line later this year and next - could lead to an exodus of investors out of their long positions. Copper ETF holdings and copper open interest have been elevated in past weeks, and can have a significant effect on the evolution of copper prices (Chart 4).1 Prices have started to trend lower, a development that bears watching, given the still-high speculative holdings of the red metal. Chart 3Speculators Are Exiting Copper, ##br##Even As Supply Disruptions Mount Speculators Are Exiting Copper, Even As Supply Disruptions Mount Speculators Are Exiting Copper, Even As Supply Disruptions Mount Chart 4China PMI Vs. Copper Net Speculative Positions: ##br##Spec Positioning Matters For The Red Metal China PMI Vs. Copper Net Speculative Positions: Spec Positioning Matters For The Red Metal China PMI Vs. Copper Net Speculative Positions: Spec Positioning Matters For The Red Metal Global Copper Fundamentals Keep Us Neutral Looking at the next 6 to 12 months, we see no clear evidence to be bullish copper given supply-demand fundamentals. On the supply side, Australia's Department of Industry, Innovation and Science (DIIS) estimates mine output will be up 3.1% this year to 21mm MT - roughly in line with our estimates - and 4.1% next year to 21.8mm MT. Refined output hit a record high of almost 23.6mm MT last year, and is expected to increase 2.5% next year to 24mm MT. By 2018, the DIIS expects refined output to be up 4%, at 25mm MT. Large production gains were reported by the International Copper Study Group (ICSG) for Peru, where mine output was up 38% at 650k MT last year, offsetting lower mine production in Chile, where output was down 3.8% to 220k MT. Global production estimates by the DIIS for 2016 were in line with ICSG estimates for both mine production and world refined production. The ICSG estimates were released earlier this week. Global demand was up 3% last year at 23.4mm MT, and is expected to increase 2% this year to 24mm MT and 3% next year to 24.6mm MT, based on DIIS's estimates. These estimates also are in line with the ICSG's assessment of global sage. The ICSG estimated global demand last year was up ~ 2%. As is apparent, global supply and demand for copper have been, and will remain, relatively balanced this year and next (Chart 5).2 This will be supported by countervailing fundamentals: Global economic activity is picking up, especially in the manufacturing sectors of major economies, which will be supportive for copper prices (Chart 6); and, running counter to that, A strong USD, coupled with inventories at close to 3-year-high levels, will keep copper prices from escalating dramatically.3 Chart 5Global Copper Market Is Balanced Global Copper Market Is Balanced Global Copper Market Is Balanced Chart 6Global Growth Synchronization Is Underway Global Growth Synchronization Is Underway Global Growth Synchronization Is Underway China's Reflationary Policies Will Wind Down While reflationary policies launched over the past couple of years will continue to stimulate the Chinese economy in 2017, the fiscal and monetary impulses from them are waning. China's manufacturing sector, fixed-asset investment and the property sector are expected to stay strong during the first half of the year, which will support copper demand (Chart 7). However, this stimulus is winding down, and, following the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party in the autumn, we expect it to decline at a faster pace: These lagged effects of the wind-down of fiscal and monetary stimulus will be apparent - particularly in the property markets. Policymakers likely will reduce and re-direct policy stimulus to support consumer- and services-led growth, and continue to invest in the country's electricity grid, which accounts for about a third of China's copper demand. Net, demand likely will grow, but at a slower pace. Global copper inventories are now at an elevated level, which suggests there is no alarming scarcity in the market. This is corroborated by the contango observed in the copper futures market (Chart of the Week). An important takeaway from last week's People's Congress is that the main objective of Premier Li's work plan is to maintain economic and social stability. This primary objective is now more important than the Communist's Party's growth objective, and can be seen in the lower GDP growth target approved by policymakers (6.5%) going forward. The Chinese fiscal impulse already has started to roll over - government expenditures are now growing at a rate of close to 7.5% versus a peak of 29% in Nov/15 (Chart 8). This poses a risk to the downside for base metals prices, given that much of China's base-metals demand is dependent on government expenditures. Chart 7Fixed Asset Investments Are Resilient Fixed Asset Investments Are Resilient Fixed Asset Investments Are Resilient Chart 8Expansionary Chinese Fiscal Policy Is Slowing Down Expansionary Chinese Fiscal Policy Is Slowing Down Expansionary Chinese Fiscal Policy Is Slowing Down Chart 9China Might Have Reached A Sustainable Growth Path China Might Have Reached A Sustainable Growth Path China Might Have Reached A Sustainable Growth Path That said, recent data from China showing resilient industrial activity and fixed-asset investments despite the roll-over in government expenditures gives hope the economy reached a sustainable growth path and that it will stay buoyant throughout the year (Chart 9). China's Red-Hot Property Market Will Cool China's housing sector has, since the economy's liberalization in the late 1990s, grown into one of the most important drivers of its GDP. Most of the 2002 - 2010 increase in base metal prices - nearly 85% - can be explained by the spectacular growth in the Chinese housing sector.4 Building construction accounts for close to 45% of total copper consumption in China (Chart 10). Within that, residential construction makes up 70% of China's real estate investment, according to Australia's DIIS.5 Globally, China accounts for a third of the copper used in construction, according to the CME Group.6 This equates to ~ 10% of global copper usage. Chart 10Building Construction Is Crucial For Copper Demand Copper's Price Supports Are Fading Copper's Price Supports Are Fading In 2016, the Chinese real estate sector experienced extremely high growth, which was mainly fueled by easy access to credit, interest-rate cuts, easing of mortgage rules and an income effect from reflationary policies. This tendency reversed in late 2016 - early 2017, as can be seen in Chart 11. Looking forward, the evolution of the housing market will rely heavily on the policy path taken by the Chinese government. In the second half of 2016, the high level of speculative demand apparent in the property market red-flagged Chinese authorities that a price bubble was developing, producing an inflated debt load that posed a risk to future economic growth. President Xi repeatedly affirmed that China's priority going forward will be to keep the economy stable. This implies keeping the property market stable by nudging investment behavior and expectations to control the supply-side of the market. This is reflected in President Xi statement: "houses are for living in, not for speculating" during the recent Peoples Congress.7 Chinese authorities will maintain loan restrictions and stricter selling conditions implemented late last year, for first- and second-tier cities, where prices increased dramatically. First-tier newly constructed residential building prices were up on average by 18% year-on-year in February 2017, and the National Bureau of Statistics of China's sales price index of residential buildings in 70 large and medium-sized cities was up 11.3% in 2016. For other cities - where home inventories are still elevated and prices are relatively stable - the government could keep its facilitating policies in place, to encourage consumption and to draw down inventories of unsold homes. These developments will introduce downside risk to copper prices, given the importance of Chinese residential construction. Still, the Chinese government cannot allow real estate prices to drop suddenly, or even to slow too much, given that housing remains the main savings vehicle - directly or indirectly - for households. According to Xi and Jin (2015), Chinese citizens save around 70-80% of their wealth via the property market. It is true that financial innovation and the opening of Chinese financial markets should help households save using alternative strategies. However, changing households' savings behavior is not an instantaneous process. Moreover, we believe reflationary policies in other sectors of the economy will remain accommodative during the first half of the year, as headline and core inflation are still at relatively low levels (Chart 12). And, as mentioned previously, we expect continued investment in China's power grid, which will support copper prices this year and next. As the consumer economy grows, we would expect demand for electricity to continue to grow. Chart 11China's Property Market Peaked In 2016 China's Property Market Peaked In 2016 China's Property Market Peaked In 2016 Chart 12Inflation Close To Six-Year Lows Inflation Close To Six-Year Lows Inflation Close To Six-Year Lows Bottom Line: Combining these opposing effects, Chinese demand should remain high enough to maintain copper prices at a relatively stable level in 2017. However, following the 19th Communist Party later this year, we expect reflationary stimulus to wind down and for fiscal and monetary policy to be directed to supporting consumer- and services-led growth, which is less commodity intensive than heavy industrial and investment-led growth. We strongly believe the Communist Government will strengthen its focus on stronger enforcement of environmental regulations, which will introduce new supply-demand dynamics to the copper market. We will be exploring the "greening" of China in subsequent research, and its implications for base metals demand. Hugo Bélanger, Research Assistant Commodity & Energy Strategy hugob@bcaresearch.com Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 We found that year-on-year variations in copper prices and in speculative long open interest exhibit a feedback loop - there is two-way Granger causality between them (i.e., they are endogenously related and each of their lagged values explain variation in the other's current price). The causality is stronger from copper prices to speculative long open interest; however, it also is significant the other way around. This means that in period of high speculative interest in copper - similar to what we experienced following the U.S. presidential election in late 2016 - the open interest variable is actually driving copper prices in the short term. We have also been able to explain copper prices by modeling year-on-year percentage change in the broad U.S trade-weighted index (TWI), Chinese PMI and in speculative long open interest. We find a 1% increase in the yoy speculative long open interest leads to a 0.19% increase in yoy copper prices. The adjusted R2 of the regression is 0.84. 2 The ICSG estimated there was a 50k MT deficit last year, trivial in a 23.4mm MT market. 3 We estimated the long-term relationship between copper prices, china PMI, world copper consumption and the U.S. TWI using a cointegrating regression. Interestingly, we found that, in equilibrium, a 1% increase in the China PMI variable translates to a 1.17% increase in copper prices. This relation can obviously be thrown out of equilibrium following an exogenous shock to the fundamentals of any of the variables in the model. The adjusted R2 of the regression is 0.71. 4 Please see "The Evolution of The Chinese Housing Market and Its Impact on Base Metal Prices," published by the Bank of Canada, March, 2016. It is available at http://www.bankofcanada.ca/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/sdp2016-7.pdf. Using an approach that accounts for the uncertainty around the official data, the lack of consistency in the data and the high level of seasonality and volatility in the data, the authors concluded that the Chinese GDP would have been around 9% lower at the end of 2010 in a scenario in which the housing market did not grow after 2002. Following this, they estimated two vector-error-correction models (VECM), one with the actual level of global activity, and one where the Chinese activity is 9% lower. 5 Please see "China Resources Quarterly" published by Australia's DIIA. It is available at https://industry.gov.au/Office-of-the-Chief Economist/Publications/Documents/crq/China-Resources-Quarterly-Southern-autumn-Northern-spring-2016.pdf 6 Please see "Copper: Supply and Demand Dynamics," published by the CME Group January 27, 2016. 7 Please see "Xi says China must 'unswervingly' crackdown on financial irregularities" published by Reuters. It is available at http://ca.reuters.com/article/businessNews/idCAKBN1671A0 Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016

Highlights Please note that today we are publishing an abbreviated Weekly Bulletin as tomorrow we will publish Great Debate: Does China Have Too Much Debt Or Too Much Savings? The latter report will elaborate on long-standing view differences on China within BCA. I will be debating my colleagues Peter Berezin and Yan Wang on the issues surrounding China's savings and debt as well as the growth outlook. Arthur Budaghyan Feature Singapore: MAS Will Cap Interest Rates Higher U.S. interest rates will temporarily place upward pressure on Singaporean local interest rates (Chart I-1). However, Singapore is not in position to tolerate higher borrowing costs due to lingering credit excesses and deflationary pressures that currently prevail in its economy. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) will therefore respond by injecting liquidity to keep interbank rates low. The MAS operates monetary policy by guiding the exchange rate - and by default - often allowing interest rates to fluctuate freely. Yet higher interest rates are not an optimal policy option at the moment. If and as U.S. interest rates and the U.S. dollar rise, the MAS will intervene to cap local rates even if it entails a weaker Singapore dollar. While there is a recovery going on in non-oil export volumes and narrow money (M1) (Chart I-2), many other cyclical indicators are still negative. Chart I-1Rising Libor Rates Will Exert ##br##Upward Pressure On Singaporean Rates Rising Libor Rates Will Exert Upward Pressure On Singaporean Rates Rising Libor Rates Will Exert Upward Pressure On Singaporean Rates Chart I-2Singapore: Non-Oil ##br##Exports Are Picking Up Singapore: Non-Oil Exports Are Picking Up Singapore: Non-Oil Exports Are Picking Up The exchange rate-targeting system was introduced in the early 1980s when exports stood at 150% of GDP. Today, exports relative to GDP have fallen substantially to 115% of GDP (Chart I-3). On the other hand, total private non-financial sector debt levels have risen to 180% of GDP (Chart I-3). Therefore, the Singaporean economy has become much more leveraged to interest rates and somewhat less exposed to global trade. Improving exports will not be sufficient to offset the negative impact of rising borrowing costs. Moreover, our proxy for interest payments on domestic debt has also surged and now stands at close to 10% of GDP (Chart I-4). What is precarious is that the rise in interest payments relative to income has occurred in a period when rates are close to record-low levels. Chart I-3Singapore: Debt Is ##br##Overshadowing Exports Singapore: Debt Is Overshadowing Exports Singapore: Debt Is Overshadowing Exports Chart I-4Singapore: Interest Payments Are ##br##Large Despite Record Low Rates Singapore: Interest Payments Are Large Despite Record Low Rates Singapore: Interest Payments Are Large Despite Record Low Rates If borrowing costs rise, it will likely cause major debt deflation concerns. The MAS will not allow this to happen. Employment is stagnating, while employment in the construction and manufacturing sectors is contracting (Chart I-5). Weak employment has weighed on the consumer sector. Retail and department store sales are still shrinking (Chart I-6). Chart I-5Singapore: Employment Is Weak Singapore: Employment Is Weak Singapore: Employment Is Weak Chart I-6Retail Spending Is Contracting Retail Spending Is Contracting Retail Spending Is Contracting Importantly, the real estate sector, one of the major pillars of the Singapore economy, is depressed. Property prices across the board are deflating, while vacancy rates are rising (Chart I-7). Bank loan growth to property developers has also stalled (Chart I-7, bottom panel). Weak economic growth should be reflected on banks' balance sheets. Surprisingly, non-performing loans (NPLs) among Singapore's three largest banks still stands at a low 1.4%. If and as loan losses begin to rise, commercial banks will rush to increase provisioning for these losses, which will hurt their profits and keep credit growth subdued. Furthermore, Singaporean banks are also very exposed to Malaysia. Singapore's largest banks have extended loans to Malaysia of approximately 67 billion Singapore dollars - or 16% of GDP. Aggregate external loans stand at 137% of GDP (Chart I-8). Economic fundamentals are currently very weak and will continue to deteriorate in Malaysia. This warrants more assets write-offs among Singapore banks and less appetite to expand their balance sheet. Chart I-7Property Sector In Singapore Property Sector In Singapore Property Sector In Singapore Chart I-8Singaporean External Loans Are Enormous Singaporean External Loans Are Enormous Singaporean External Loans Are Enormous On the whole, if Singaporean interest rates begin to rise due to either depreciation of the Singapore dollar or higher U.S. interest rates, the central bank will intervene to bring local rates down. It would not be the first time the MAS has intervened to bring down interest rates. In 2015 when EM risks escalated, local interbank rates spiked. The MAS promptly injected liquidity in the banking system by buying back its outstanding MAS bills, and by also purchasing government securities, supplying liquidity to the banking system. This essentially placed a cap on interbank rates. Chart I-9Go Long Singapore Real ##br##Estate Stocks Vs. Hong Kong Go Long Singapore Real Estate Stocks Vs. Hong Kong Go Long Singapore Real Estate Stocks Vs. Hong Kong What is noteworthy is that the Singapore dollar weakened as a result of the intervention, although the MAS's official monetary policy stance was not stimulative - i.e. the monetary authorities did not target to weaken the trade-weighted SGD. In that instance, the MAS decided to focus on interest rates/funding market stability and ignore the exchange rate's response. This highlights that despite the MAS's official monetary policy framework of guiding the exchange rate, it will not allow interest rates to rise. Unlike Singapore, Hong Kong does not operate an independent monetary policy and as such will be forced to import higher U.S. rates. As a bet on higher interest rates in Hong Kong and the U.S. relative to Singapore, investors should consider going long Singaporean real estate stocks and shorting Hong Kong real estate stocks. Chart I-9 shows that Singaporean real estate stocks outperform Hong Kong's when the latter's interest rates/bond yields rise relative to Singapore and when Singapore's M1 growth accelerate relative to Hong Kong. As discussed above, the MAS has the capacity and will to inject liquidity to lower interest rates. Hong Kong, however, does not have this privilege due to the currency's peg to the greenback. Besides, Singapore's property correction is now much more advanced than Hong Kong's. In fact, Hong Kong property prices are still rising, i.e., the real estate market adjustment in Hong Kong has not yet started. While both city states are vulnerable to a potential slowdown in Chinese inflows, Hong Kong real estate prices will ultimately fall from a higher starting point. Bottom Line: A rising U.S. dollar and U.S. interest rates may exert upward pressure on Singaporean local interest rates. However, the Singaporean central bank will respond by injecting liquidity, which will cap rates relative to the U.S. and Hong Kong. This opens a tactical trade opportunity (for the next 3 months): Long Singapore real estate stocks / short Hong Kong real estate shares. Asian equity portfolio investors should have a neutral allocation to Singapore stocks within the EM/emerging Asian benchmarks. Ayman Kawtharani, Research Analyst ayman@bcaresearch.com Colombia: Not Out Of The Woods Yet Even though global economic growth has been improving and commodities prices have rallied, Colombia's growth is still bound to disappoint. We remain structurally bullish on the nation's longer-term prospects. That said, there will still be more downside this year. Credit growth will continue to decelerate, despite the beginning of a rate cut cycle (Chart II-1). Interest rates are still high, both in nominal and real terms (Chart II-2). This along with poor consumer and business confidence (Chart II-3) will depress credit demand and spending. Chart II-1Colombia: Negative Credit Impulse Colombia: Negative Credit Impulse Colombia: Negative Credit Impulse Chart II-2Borrowing Costs Are Still High Borrowing Costs Are Still High Borrowing Costs Are Still High Chart II-3Consumer & Business Confidence Are Weak Consumer & Business Confidence Are Weak Consumer & Business Confidence Are Weak Furthermore, the central bank's liquidity injections into the banking system have dropped considerably (Chart II-4). In the past few years, abundant liquidity provisioning by the central bank had allowed commercial banks to sustain robust credit growth. Hence, a withdrawal of banking system liquidity will cap loan origination. The current account deficit remains wide at $12.5 billion, or 5.2% of GDP. Financing such a wide deficit will prove challenging. Besides, BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy team believes oil prices are at risk of additional declines. Hence, we are bearish on the Colombian peso. Fiscal policy is set to tighten as the budget deficit has ballooned due to strong spending and shrinking revenues (Chart II-5). Recently introduced tax reforms represent a step forward with respect to the country's structural reforms agenda, as it will simplify the tax code and reduce corporate tax rates. Chart II-4Withdrawal Of Liquidity Will Cap Credit Growth Withdrawal Of Liquidity Will Cap Credit Growth Withdrawal Of Liquidity Will Cap Credit Growth Chart II-5Government Fiscal Balance Is Deteriorating Government Fiscal Balance Is Deteriorating Government Fiscal Balance Is Deteriorating However, redistributing the tax burden onto individuals, mainly by increasing the VAT from 16% to 19%, will reinforce the slump in household spending. In terms of high frequency data, there are little signs of economic revival (Chart II-6). Retail sales volume remain tame. The latest bounce in this series most likely reflects consumers front running the impending VAT hike. Furthermore, oil production is likely to decline further, and non-oil exports are still contracting. In terms of financial markets, we recommend the following: We are closing our bet on yield curve flattening - receive 10-year/pay 1-year swap rates. Initiated on September 16, 2015, this trade has produced a 190 basis-point gain (Chart II-7). At the moment, the risk-reward for this position is no longer attractive. Chart II-6Cyclical Economic Activity Remains Subdued Cyclical Economic Activity Remains Subdued Cyclical Economic Activity Remains Subdued Chart II-7Take Profits On The Yield Curve Trade Take Profits On The Yield Curve Trade Take Profits On The Yield Curve Trade We remain neutral on Colombian equities and sovereign credit relative to their respective EM universes. Even though our long Colombian bank stocks/short Peruvian banks bet has been deep in the negative, we are reluctant to cut it. The basis is that Colombia's central bank may opt to cut rates further, even if the peso depreciates anew. In contrast, the Peruvian central bank is more likely to hike rates if its currency comes under downward pressure. Bank share prices will likely react to marginal shifts in relative interest rates between the two countries. Andrija Vesic, Research Assistant andrijav@bcaresearch.com Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Housing-related stocks have delivered positive earnings surprises, but anxiety about rising mortgage rates challenges the outlook. While the latter is a risk, cheap valuations and consumers' underappreciated ability to absorb rising borrowing costs offset these concerns. Importantly, housing market fundamentals are improving. Lumber prices are on fire. Lumber has been the best performing commodity year-to-date. This is a real time indicator of housing demand. Similarly, railroad carloads of lumber are also firming, signaling that the price rise is demand-driven rather than a speculative bet in the trading pits. Sustained house price inflation, solid housing turnover and the acceleration in building permits reinforce that housing activity remains robust. The credit tap to sustain strong activity is still open. According to the latest Fed Senior Bank Loan Officer Survey, banks are willing and able to extend residential mortgage credit. This contrasts with many other credit categories, where banks are tightening the screws and credit demand is faltering: C&I loans have shrunk over the past three months, as has total bank credit. First time home buyers are also reappearing and anecdotes of increased house flipping activity signal a vibrant market with unobstructed access to credit. All of this should continue to support earnings-led outperformance in housing-related equities (see the next Insight). (Part I) Will Housing Stocks Go Through The Roof? (Part I) Will Housing Stocks Go Through The Roof?

Highlights Key Portfolio Highlights Improved world economic growth and rising inflation expectations have buoyed global equities (Chart 1). The downside is that financial conditions are tightening and U.S. dollar-based liquidity is contracting, which is growth restrictive (Chart 2). The massive outperformance of the financials and industrials sectors since the U.S. election implies that U.S. markets have been largely politically-motivated. Positive economic surprises remain mostly sentiment/confidence driven, rather than from upside in hard economic data (Chart 3). That unusually large gap implies that a big jump in 'hard data' surprises is already discounted and represents a latent risk, as it did in the spring of 2011 just before the summertime equity market swoon. Federal income tax receipts are contracting, suggesting that an economic boom is not forthcoming (Chart 4). In fact, there has never been a contraction in tax receipts without a corresponding slump in employment growth. Corporate sector pricing power gains have not been evenly distributed. Deep cyclicals gains came off a low base and may already be experiencing a relapse. Conversely, defensive and interest rate-sensitive sectors are demonstrating the most strength (Chart 5). Our macro models are not signaling that investors should position as if robust and self-reinforcing economic growth lies ahead. Our Deep Cyclical indicators are the weakest, while defensive and interest rate-sensitive models are grinding higher (Chart 6). Deep cyclical sectors are very overvalued and overbought, while defensives are deeply undervalued and oversold (Charts 7 and 8). Mean reversion is an apt theme for the next few months. The most attractive combination of macro, valuation and technical readings are in the consumer staples, health care sectors. The financials sector is a close second, but it is overbought. The least attractive combinations are in energy, materials and industrials. Prospects for elevated market volatility, stronger economic growth in developed vs developing economies, a tighter Fed and expensive U.S. dollar are consistent with maintaining a largely defensive portfolio structure (Charts 9-12). Chart 1Pricing Power Revival... Pricing Power Revival... Pricing Power Revival... Chart 2... But A Liquidity Drain ... But A Liquidity Drain ... But A Liquidity Drain Chart 3Show Me The Money Show Me The Money Show Me The Money Chart 4Yellow Flag Yellow Flag Yellow Flag Chart 5Pricing Recovery Is Not Broad Based Pricing Recovery Is Not Broad Based Pricing Recovery Is Not Broad Based Chart 6Indicator Snapshot Indicator Snapshot Indicator Snapshot Chart 7Focus On Value Focus On Value Focus On Value Chart 8Mean Reversion Ahead Mean Reversion Ahead Mean Reversion Ahead Chart 9Fundamentals Favor Defensives... Fundamentals Favor Defensives... Fundamentals Favor Defensives... Chart 10... As Do Market Signals ... As Do Market Signals ... As Do Market Signals Chart 1112-Month Performance After Fed Hikes Cyclical Indicator Update Cyclical Indicator Update Chart 1224-Month Performance After Fed Hikes Cyclical Indicator Update Cyclical Indicator Update Chart 13Staples Will Cushion A Volatility Resurgence Staples Will Cushion A Volatility Resurgence Staples Will Cushion A Volatility Resurgence Chart 14Media Stocks Like A Strong Currency Media Stocks Like A Strong Currency Media Stocks Like A Strong Currency Chart 15Unduly Punished Unduly Punished Unduly Punished Chart 16Strong Fundamental Support Strong Fundamental Support Strong Fundamental Support Chart 17Less Production... Less Production... Less Production... Chart 18... Means More Rigs ... Means More Rigs ... Means More Rigs Chart 19End Of Sugar High End Of Sugar High End Of Sugar High Chart 20A Toxic Mix A Toxic Mix A Toxic Mix Chart 21Tech Stocks Don't Like Inflation Tech Stocks Don't Like Inflation Tech Stocks Don't Like Inflation Chart 22Time To Disconnect Time To Disconnect Time To Disconnect Feature S&P Consumer Staples (Overweight - High Conviction) The Cyclical Macro Indicator (CMI) has been grinding higher for several months, even climbing through last year's share price shellacking. The CMI has been supported by the uptrend in relative consumer spending on essential items and consumer preference for saving vs. spending. More recently, a pricing power recovery in a number of groups has provided an assist as has a rebound in staples export growth. Booming consumer confidence and business confidence have held the CMI in check. The strong U.S. currency, particularly bilaterally against China, also implies a reduction in the cost of imported goods sold, and has also been an indication of relative valuation expansion because it often signals increased financial market volatility (Chart 13 on page 6). The attractive valuation starting point this cycle, and historic outperformance when the Fed raises interest rates (Chart 13 on page 6), were key factors behind our upgrade to high conviction status in January. Technical conditions are completely washed out. Sector breadth and momentum have reached oversold extremes. That signals widespread bearishness, which is positive from a contrary perspective. Chart 23 S&P Consumer Staples S&P Consumer Staples S&P Consumer Discretionary (Overweight) Our CMI is forming a tentative trough, supported by rebounding relative outlays on media services, low prices at the pump, a budding recovery in mortgage equity withdrawal and firming wage growth. The biggest drags over the past few months have come from higher Treasury yields and consumers increased propensity to save. However, rising job certainty and a vibrant residential real estate market suggest that consumers should loosen their purse strings. The VI has deflated toward the neutral zone, although remains moderately expensive from a long-term perspective. Our TI started to rebound from oversold levels. History shows that a recovery in the TI from one standard deviation below the mean has heralded a playable relative performance rally. Overweight positions should remain concentrated in housing-related equities and the media space, both of which benefit from U.S. dollar appreciation (Chart 14 on page 6). Chart 24 S&P Consumer Discretionary S&P Consumer Discretionary S&P REITs (Overweight - High Conviction) Our new REIT CMI has ticked lower, but the share price ratio has over-exaggerated this small move down. REITs have traded as if the back up in global bond yields will persist indefinitely, and that they are the only factor that drives relative performance. Improving cash flows and cheap valuations suggest that REITs can decouple from bond yields. Banks have tightened standards on commercial real estate loans, but this appears more likely to limit supply growth than create a slowdown. Commercial property prices are hitting new highs and our REIT Demand Indicator (RDI) has climbed into positive territory, signaling higher rental inflation. The latter is already outpacing overall CPI by a wide margin (Chart 15 on page 7). While REITs are back to fair value from a long-term perspective, on a shorter term basis the sector is very undervalued (Chart 15 on page 7), particularly with Treasury yields now in undervalued territory. Our REIT TI is extremely oversold, at a point which forward relative returns typically shine on a 12 and 24 month basis, even excluding the dividend yield kicker. Chart 25 S&P Real Estate S&P Real Estate S&P Health Care (Overweight) Our CMI continues to grind higher, opening a massive divergence with relative performance. This gap can be explained by the political attack on the pharmaceutical industry, the sector's heavyweight, rather than by a downturn in relative earnings drivers. Pharmaceutical shipments are hitting new highs and pricing power continues to grow at a robust mid-single digit rate. Future pricing gains may slow if government gets more heavily involved in setting prices, but this is already discounted. Pricing power in the rest of the sector remains strong, while wage inflation is tame. Health care spending is still growing as a share of total spending, but the pace is decelerating. Typically, this backdrop signals outperformance for health care insurers, who may also receive a risk premium reduction from a potential revamp of the Affordable Care Act, albeit the timing will likely be drawn out. Relative valuations are very attractive. The sector has been used as a source of capital to fund purchases in areas expected to benefit from increased fiscal stimulus. That is an overreaction, and flows should be restored to reflect the sector's appealing investment profile, particularly given the sector's track record during Fed tightening cycles (Chart 16 on page 7). The TI is deeply oversold. Breadth measures are beginning to recover from completely washed out levels. These conditions reinforce that an exploitable undershoot has occurred. Chart 26 S&P Health Care S&P Health Care S&P Financials (Neutral) Our Financial CMI has surged, underscoring that the advance in relative performance reflects more than just a reaction to anticipated sector deregulation by the Trump Administration. Leading indicators of capital formation, such as the stock-to-bond ratio, have jumped sharply. Moreover, the yield curve has steepened in recent months, bolstering the CMI. An improvement in overall profit growth and the tight labor market suggest that the credit cycle may not become a profit drag until the economy begins to cool. While not yet evident, the restrictive move in oil, the dollar and bond yields warn that disappoint may emerge in the coming months. It is notable that bank loan growth has dropped to nil over the last 3 months. C&I loan growth is contracting over that time period. Banks are hiring more aggressively, yet are tightening lending standards, suggesting productivity disappointment ahead. Despite the share price jump, value remains attractive after 8 years of financial repression. Our TI is overbought and breadth is beginning to recede, which is often a precursor to a consolidation phase. We are not willing to move beyond a market weight allocation at this juncture. Chart 27 S&P Financials S&P Financials S&P Energy (Neutral) Our CMI has plunged, probing all-time lows. Rising oil inventories and spiking wage inflation are exerting severe gravitational pull on the CMI, more than offsetting the budding recovery in domestic production. Refining margins are probing six year lows as the Brent/WTI spread has evaporated. Nevertheless, OPEC is finally curtailing production, joining non-OPEC producers (Chart 17 on page 8), which should ultimately help eat into excess global oil supply. History shows that once supply growth peaks, the rig count typically firms. That is a plus for energy services (Chart 18 on page 8), even though rising oil production will prove self-limiting for oil prices. High yield spreads have narrowed significantly from nosebleed levels, but industry balance sheets remain bruised. Net debt is historically elevated, EBITDA has yet to return to its glory days, and interest coverage remains anemic and vulnerable to any downside energy price surprises. The surge in our VI reflects depressed cash flow, and is overstating the degree of overvaluation. The TI has returned to the neutral zone, and will need to hold at current levels otherwise a relapse in the share price ratio toward previous lows is probable. Selectivity is still warranted in the energy complex. We remain underweight refiners and overweight the energy services index. Chart 28 S&P Energy S&P Energy S&P Utilities (Neutral) Our utilities sector CMI is stabilizing. That is a surprise, given the rebound in inflation expectations and firming global leading economic indicators, which are typically bearish for this defensive, fixed-income proxy. The latter negative exogenous factors are being offset by falling wage inflation, better pricing power and rising electricity output growth. Power demand is linked with manufacturing activity, underscoring that there is an element of cyclicality to sector profits. The share price ratio has held up better than most other defensive sectors since the U.S. election, perhaps on the hope that an overhaul of the tax code will benefit this domestic sector. Regardless, valuations have retreated from the extremely expensive zone where we took profits and downgraded to neutral last summer, but are not yet at a level that warrants re-establishing overweight positions. An upgrade could occur once our TI becomes fully washed out, provided that occurs within the context of additional CMI strength and a peak in global growth and inflation momentum. Chart 29 S&P Utilities S&P Utilities S&P Industrials (Underweight - High Conviction) The CMI has edged lower after a modest recovery in recent months. The strong U.S. dollar, relapse in short-term pricing power measures and sector productivity contraction are offsetting improvement in global PMI surveys. The lack of confirmation of an industrial sector revival from emerging markets is also holding back the CMI. There continues to be a deflationary undercurrent in the form of more rapid capacity than industrial sector output growth, suggesting that durable pricing power gains may remain elusive (Chart 19 on page 9). The post-election surge in share prices is slowly being unwound, as the sector was quick to discount expectations for massive domestic fiscal stimulus. Our valuation gauge is not at an extreme, although a number of individual groups are trading at historically rich multiples, such as machinery and railroads. Participation is beginning to fray around the edges, as our relative advance/decline line has rolled over, as has breadth. Our TI is pulling back from overbought levels, warning that a further correction in the share price ratio looms. It would be nearly unprecedented for the share price ratio to trough before our TI hits oversold levels. Industrials fare poorly when the Fed tightens. Chart 30 S&P Industrials S&P Industrials S&P Materials (Underweight) The CMI has nosedived, reflecting China's diminishing fiscal thrust and the recent tightening in monetary policy. Commodity price inflation peaked in mid-December concurrent with the Fed raising rates, signaling that emerging markets end-demand, in general and Chinese in particular, is likely past its prime. The nascent rebound in EM currencies represents a positive offset, but not by enough to turn around the CMI. Select heavyweight EM manufacturing PMIs are still below the boom/bust line. Relative valuations are becoming extended according to our VI, and stretched technical conditions are waving a red flag. Keep in mind the materials sector has an abysmal performance history after the Fed starts tightening (Chart 20 on page 9). The heavyweight chemical index (75% of the sector) bears the brunt of the downside risks owing to excess capacity (Chart 20 on page 9). On the flipside, overweight exposure in gold mining (via the GDX:US ETF) and the niche containers & packaging sub-indexes is recommended. Chart 31 S&P Materials S&P Materials S&P Technology (Underweight) The CMI has rolled over, driven lower by contracting relative pricing power, decelerating new orders-to-inventories growth, lack of capital expenditure traction and the appreciating greenback. Tech stocks thrive in a disinflationary/deflationary environment and suffer during inflationary periods (Chart 21 on page 10). Inflation is making a comeback, so it will be an uphill battle for tech companies to successfully raise selling prices at a fast enough pace to keep profits on a par with the broad corporate sector. While a capital spending cycle would be a welcome development, the narrowing gap between the return on and cost of capital warns against extrapolating improvement in business sentiment just yet. Our S&P technology operating profit model warns that tech profits are likely to trail the broad market as the year progresses, a far cry from what is embedded in analysts' forecasts. The good news is that valuations are not demanding nor are technical conditions overbought, which should cushion the magnitude and sharpness of downside risks. Chart 32 S&P Technology S&P Technology S&P Telecom Services (Underweight) Our CMI for telecom services has gained ground of late, primarily on the back of a sharp decline in wage inflation. However, we recently downgraded exposure to underweight, because of a frail spending backdrop. Our telecom services sales model is extremely weak (Chart 22 on page 10). Softening outlays on telecom services have reinvigorated the industry price war, and our pricing power gauge is sinking like a stone (Chart 22 on page 10). Telecom carrier capital expenditures have been running at a healthy clip, which could further pressure profit margins. Undervaluation exists, but this has been a chronic feature for the sector over the past decade, and does not foretell of cyclical upside or downside risks. Our TI has plunged into the sell zone, but remains above levels that would signal that a countertrend rally is imminent. Chart 33 S&P Telecommunication Services S&P Telecommunication Services Size Indicator (Overweight Small Vs. Large Caps) The small/large cap ratio is correcting short-term overbought conditions. The dip in the U.S. dollar has provided a fundamental reason for corrective action in this domestically-oriented asset class. However, we doubt a trend change is at hand. Our style CMI is climbing steadily. Small company business optimism has soared, partly because of an increase in planned price hikes, but also from an anticipated reduction in the regulatory burden. If small company price hikes persist, then rising labor costs will be more easily absorbed. That is critical to narrowing the profit margin gap between small and large firms. A stronger domestic vs. global economy and the potential for trade barriers is also unambiguously positive for small firms that do the bulk of their business at home. Despite the surge in the share price ratio post-U.S. election, our valuation gauge is not yet at an overvalued extreme. The lack of extreme overvaluation suggests that positive momentum will persist, perhaps similar to the 2004-2006 period, when the share price ratio stayed in overbought territory for years. Chart 34 Size Indicator (Small Vs. Large Caps) Size Indicator (Small Vs. Large Caps)

The Treasury bond sell has undermined the REIT sector, but that has created excellent value. Our REIT valuation gauge is one standard deviation below the mean, an excellent starting point for forward relative returns. Now that Treasury yields are also in undervalued territory, the drag from this source is likely to diminish. Importantly, payouts remain well supported by rising pricing power, as proxied by new cyclical highs in the CPI component for homeowners equivalent rent. Importantly, multifamily housing starts continue to trend lower as a share of total housing starts, underscoring the future residential supply growth should subside. While banks have tightened standards on commercial real estate loans, this appears more likely to limit supply growth than create a slowdown, given that commercial property prices are hitting new highs. The bottom line is that both Net Asset Values and payouts remain well supported, setting the stage for a playable outperformance phase. We reiterate our high conviction overweight. REITs Are On Sale REITs Are On Sale

Feature For the first time since the beginning of the recovery in 2009, the U.S. economy has the potential - and is showing signs - of entering a self-reinforcing phase. After years of expecting that the next recession is just around the corner, economic agents are now optimistic about the strength and longevity of the business cycle. The likelihood of a period of above-trend growth would be a bullish development for risk assets (Chart 1). Our view is that the surge in business confidence is exaggerated due to federal politics, and Trump's election "honeymoon" effect will partially unwind at some point. However, the U.S. consumer is finally well-placed to shake some of the long-term angst that has been in a fixture for almost a decade. This chart-driven Special Report looks at the U.S. economy from several angles and highlights key themes (Chart 2): Chart 1Self-Reinforcing Recovery Finally At Work Self-Reinforcing Recovery Finally At Work Self-Reinforcing Recovery Finally At Work Chart 2U.S. Consumer Is The Bright Light U.S. Consumer Is The Bright Light U.S. Consumer Is The Bright Light Consumption will be the brightest spot in the recovery: The uptrend in consumer confidence has the potential to be lasting, and therefore lead to an acceleration in real consumption over the next several quarters. Most important is that the main driver of consumption trends, income, is on track to accelerate. Despite a moderation in payroll growth, overall income growth is likely to stay perky, now that the labor market has reached full employment and wages are rising. Residential real estate will be resilient despite the threat of higher rates: Residential construction will continue to make a positive contribution to growth, given that the supply of homes is low, especially relative to our expectations for a pick-up in demand. Capex will continue to lag: Non-residential business investment is likely to remain a sore spot for the economy for some time. Capex spending historically follows consumption with a lag; businesses first wait to see a pick-up in demand for their products and services before undertaking capital expansion. Various measures of capital utilization also suggest that there is still ample capacity, especially in the manufacturing sector, although capital spending growth has historically been driven by the direction of capacity utilization, not its level. Fiscal thrust could be positive but only late in the year: Federal, state and local government spending were only a very modest positive contribution to growth in 2016 and that is likely to be the case at least for the first half of 2017. Thereafter, federal spending may have a much larger impact, although there remain many unknowns. Thus, the coming cyclical improvement in growth will be mainly driven by the consumer sector, at least at first. Although our global leading economic indicators are heading higher, we are wary to extrapolate an overly positive view. There are a number of unresolved headwinds in China, Trump's anti-trade rhetoric is a risk, as is U.S. dollar strength for U.S. exporters. Meanwhile, financial markets are in the midst of a "euphoria rally," based on the expectation that a new U.S. federal government will unleash a powerful combination of pro-business reforms and fiscal ease. Thus, although the U.S. economic recovery rests on improving fundamentals, the stretched level of optimism suggests that investors should be prepared for a reality check. Consumer Spending Rising expectations for real household income growth over the next one to two years and improving job security are a result of a tightening labor market. Since income trends are the main driver of consumption growth, an improved labor market should help boost consumer spending growth to over 3% in 2017 (Chart 3). The cost of essential items as a share of income has declined throughout the recovery. In particular, food and energy costs as a share of income are very low and it is only the seemingly incessant climb in medical payments that keeps overall spending on essential items above 40% of disposable income. Still, at 41% of total disposable income, spending on essential items is far from burdensome relative to historical norms. This leaves plenty of room for spending on discretionary items. The combined wealth effect from real estate and financial markets has been positive for some time. Thus, it is not a new driver of consumer spending, but is nonetheless positive that wealth positions continue to improve. If our forecasts for financial markets and house prices pan out - i.e. that the bull market in stocks continues over time, that bonds experience only a mild bear market and that house price appreciation remains in the mid-single digits - then a positive wealth effect will continue to support consumption in 2017. Wages And The Labor Market U.S. wage growth is in a sustainable uptrend now that the bulk of our indicators suggest that the labor market is at full employment (Chart 4). According to the Atlanta Fed's wage tracker, overall median wages are growing at their fastest pace since the 2008. The gains are broad-based: wage gains have occurred for both "job switchers" and "job stayers." Other measures of wage inflation are also turning higher. The Employment Cost Index (ECI) is the most decisive measure for tracking broad developments for employee wages and benefits among geographic divisions, sectors (services vs goods-producing) and industries. The gains in this index are not as robust, but are nonetheless still rising and, according to business surveys, labor compensation is likely to continue to rise. The Fed views wage growth in the range of 3-4% per year as an important signal that consumer price inflation is moving toward the Fed's 2% target. Although the ECI is still below this range, if the current trend pace continues, 3% inflation in the wages and salaries component is reachable later this year. Chart 3Tailwinds For Robust Consumer ##br##Spending Are Firmly In Place Tailwinds For Robust Consumer Spending Are Firmly In Place Tailwinds For Robust Consumer Spending Are Firmly In Place Chart 4Tight Labor Market Will Boost ##br##Further Wage Growth Tight Labor Market Will Boost Further Wage Growth Tight Labor Market Will Boost Further Wage Growth Residential Investment Residential investment as a percent of GDP normally averages about 5% of GDP; it currently stands at 3.7%. However, it should continue to recover, making a significant positive contribution to GDP growth through 2017. Robust long-term fundamentals suggest that residential construction should continue to follow the recovery path experienced by other developed countries when boom/bust cycles occurred (Chart 5). Household formation is a critical measure of new housing demand over the long-term. The number of households formed continues to build towards pre-recession rates. Demographics may help the housing market over the next few years. According to the Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University, over the next ten years, the aging of the Millennial generation will boost the population in their 30s. The growth in this age cohort implies an increase of 2 million new households each year on average.1 Finally, housing supply is no longer a headwind. This suggests that if final demand continues to improve, the lack of inventory overhang implies that the incentive for builders to take on new projects is high. Non-Residential Investment The corporate sector has been loath to undertake capital investment throughout the recovery. Despite rock-bottom interest rates, the lack of confidence in the outlook for final demand has kept businesses from investing (Chart 6). Business confidence has surged in recent months, although the sustainability of this trend is questionable. Survey respondents' optimism has been buoyed by great expectations about pro-business reform in Washington. This excessive optimism is vulnerable to pullbacks should Trump's leadership and policies disappoint. Only once businesses see a clear upswing in demand for their products and services will a new capex cycle emerge. The BCA Model for business investment tracks broad capex swings and has been trending down for several months now and remaining in contractionary territory. Investment in equipment, the largest portion of business investment, has been falling sharply for the past year. Much of the weakness is concentrated in the energy sector following the collapse in oil prices in late-2014. The U.S. dollar has also been a headwind for the manufacturing sector. Chart 5Housing Market Is ##br##Recovering Gradually Housing Market Is Recovering Gradually Housing Market Is Recovering Gradually Chart 6Corporate Sector Has Yet ##br##To Unleash Capex Spending Corporate Sector Has Yet To Unleash Capex Spending Corporate Sector Has Yet To Unleash Capex Spending Exports Net exports were a slight positive to GDP growth at the end of 2016, after being a drag for the past three years. However, the Q3 2016 improvement is due chiefly to one sector - a surge in soybean exports (Chart 7). Indeed, exports to all regions except Asia remain weak. Exports to the rest of North America, Europe, and Central & South America all peaked in 2014. As mentioned above, the exception to this trend is Asia, which now accounts for about 28% of total U.S. exports. Surging soybean exports to China were the major driver of the Q4 trend change. Government Federal spending was a drag on GDP growth from 2011 to 2015. In 2016, federal spending was a modest positive. Looking ahead, hopes are high that a new government in Washington will significantly boost fiscal spending. Our base case is that the Federal fiscal thrust will rise by about 0.5% of GDP, although the timing is uncertain and may not boost GDP growth until 2018 (Chart 8). Tax cuts could provide an earlier lift, but it would show up as increased consumer and capital spending. State and local spending lost momentum in 2016 after finally recovering the previous year. The 2016 decline in state tax revenues was not confined to oil-producing states. A recent report by the Rockefeller Institute compiled state tax revenue forecasts for 2017 and concludes that the decline in tax revenues from all sources (sales, income and corporate) will be slow to recover next year. Chart 7Nominal Exports Led Mainly By Asia Nominal Exports Led Mainly By Asia Nominal Exports Led Mainly By Asia Chart 8Government Spending Will Expand Modestly Government Spending Will Expand Modestly Government Spending Will Expand Modestly Lenka Martinek, Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy lenka@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "The State Of The Nation's Housing 2016," Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University.