Russia

Highlights The tech sector faces mounting domestic political and geopolitical risks. We fully expected stimulus hiccups but believe they will give way to large new fiscal support, given that COVID-19 is weighing on consumer confidence. Europe’s relative political stability is a good basis for the euro rally but any comeback in opinion polling by President Trump could give dollar bulls new life. DXY is approaching a critical threshold below which it would break down further. The US could take aggressive actions on Russia and Iran, but China and the Taiwan Strait remain the biggest geopolitical risk. Feature Near-term risks continue to mount against the equity rally, even as governments’ combined monetary and fiscal policies continue to support a cyclical economic rebound. Chart 1Tech Bubble Amid Tech War Tech Bubble Amid Tech War Tech Bubble Amid Tech War Testimony by the chief executives of Facebook, Apple, Amazon, and Alphabet to the US House of Representatives highlighted the major political risks facing the market leaders. There are three reasons not to dismiss these risks despite the theatrical nature of the hearings. First, the tech companies’ concentration of wealth would be conspicuous during any economic bust, but this bust has left pandemic-stricken consumers more reliant on their services. Second, acrimony is bipartisan – conservatives are enraged by the tendency of the tech companies to side with the Democratic Party in policing the range of acceptable political discourse, and they increasingly agree with liberals that the companies have excessive corporate power warranting anti-trust probes. Executive action is the immediate risk, but in the coming one-to-two years congressional majorities will also be mustered to tighten regulation. Third, technology is the root of the great power struggle between the US and China – a struggle that will not go away if Biden wins the election. Indeed Biden was part of the administration that launched the US’s “Pivot to Asia” and will have better success in galvanizing US diplomatic allies behind western alternatives to Chinese state-backed and military-linked tech companies. US tech companies struggle to outperform Chinese tech companies except during episodes of US tariffs, given the latter firms’ state-backed turn toward innovation and privileged capture of the Chinese domestic market (Chart 1). The US government cannot afford to break up these companies without weighing the strategic consequences for America’s international competitiveness. The attempt to coordinate a western pressure campaign against Huawei and other leading Chinese firms will continue over the long run as they are accused of stealing technology, circumventing UN sanctions, violating human rights, and compromising the national security of the democracies. China, for its part, will be forced to take counter-measures. US tech companies will be caught in the middle. Like the threat of executive regulation in the domestic sphere, the threat of state action in the international sphere is difficult to time. It could happen immediately, especially given that the US is having some success in galvanizing an alliance even under President Trump (see the UK decision to bar Huawei) and that President Trump’s falling election prospects remove the chief constraint on tough action against China (the administration will likely revoke Huawei’s general license on August 13 or closer to the election). Massive domestic economic stimulus empowers the US to impose a technological cordon and China to retaliate. Combining this headline risk to the tech sector with other indications that the equity rally is extended – the surge in gold prices, the fall in the 30-year/5-year Treasury slope – tells us that investors should be cautious about deploying fresh capital in the near term. Republicans Will Capitulate To New Stimulus Just as President Trump has ignored bad news on the coronavirus, financial markets have ignored bad news on the economy. Dismal Q2 GDP releases were fully expected – Germany shrank by 10.1% while the US shrank by 9.5% on a quarterly basis, 32.9% annualized. But the resurgence of the virus is threatening new government restrictions on economic activity. US initial unemployment claims have edged up over the past three weeks. US consumer confidence regarding future expectations plummeted from 106.1 in June to 91.5 in July, according to the Conference Board’s index. Chart 2Global Instability Will Follow Recession A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) Setbacks in combating the virus will hurt consumers even assuming that governments lack the political will to enforce new lockdowns. The share of countries in recession has surged to levels not seen in 60 years (Chart 2). Financial markets can look past recessions, but the pandemic-driven recession will result in negative surprises and second-order effects that are unforeseen. Yes, fresh fiscal stimulus is coming, but this is more positive for the cyclical outlook than the tactical outlook. Stimulus “hiccups” could precipitate a near-term pullback – such a pullback may be necessary to force politicians to resolve disputes over the size and composition of new stimulus. This risk is immediate in the United States, where House Democrats, Senate Republicans, and the White House have hit an all-too-predictable impasse over the fifth round of stimulus. The bill under negotiation is likely to be President Trump’s last chance to score a legislative victory before the election and the last significant legislative economic relief until early 2021. The Senate Republicans have proposed a $1.1 trillion HEALS Act in response to the House Democrats’ $3.4 trillion HEROES Act, passed in mid-May. As we go to press, the federal unemployment insurance top-up of $600 per week is expiring, with a potential cost of 3% of GDP in fiscal tightening, as well as the moratorium on home evictions. Congress will have to rush through a stop-gap measure to extend these benefits if it cannot resolve the debate on the larger stimulus package. If Democrats and Republicans split the difference then we will get $2.5 trillion in stimulus, likely by August 10. Compromise on the larger package is easy in principle, as Table 1 shows. If the two sides split the difference between their proposals in a commonsense way, as shown in the fourth and fifth columns of Table 1, then the result will be a $2.5 trillion stimulus. This estimate fits with what we have published in the past and likely meets market expectations for the time being. Table 1Outline Of Fifth US COVID Stimulus Package (Estimate) A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) Whether it is enough for the economy depends on how the virus develops and how governments respond once flu season picks up and combines with the coronavirus to pressure the health system this fall. A back-of-the-envelope estimate of the amount of spending necessary to keep the budget deficit from shrinking in the second half of the year comes much closer to the House Democrats’ $3.4 trillion bill (Table 2), which suggests that what appears to be a massive stimulus today could appear insufficient tomorrow. Nevertheless, $2.5 trillion is not exactly small. It would bring the US total to $5 trillion year-to-date, or 24% of GDP! Table 2Reducing The Budget Deficit On A Quarterly Basis Will Slow Economy A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) While a compromise bill should come quickly, the Republican Party is more divided over this round of stimulus than earlier this year. Chart 3US Personal Income Looks Good Compared To 2008-09 US Personal Income Looks Good Compared To 2008-09 US Personal Income Looks Good Compared To 2008-09 First, there is some complacency due to the fact that the economy is recovering, not collapsing as was the case back in March. Our US bond strategist, Ryan Swift, has shown that US personal income is much better off, thus far, than it was in the months following the 2008 financial crisis, even though the initial pre-transfer hit to incomes is larger (Chart 3). Second, the Republican Party is reacting to growing unease within its ranks over the yawning budget deficit, now the largest since World War II (Chart 4). Chart 4If Republicans React To Deficit Concerns They Cook Their Own Goose If Republicans React To Deficit Concerns They Cook Their Own Goose If Republicans React To Deficit Concerns They Cook Their Own Goose Chart 5Consumer Confidence Sends Warning Signal To Republicans A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) If Republicans are guided by complacency and fiscal hawks, they will cook their own goose. A failure to provide government support will cause a financial market selloff, will hurt consumer confidence, and will put the final nail in the coffin of their own chance of re-election as well as President Trump’s. Consumer confidence tracks fairly well with presidential approval rating and election outcomes. A further dip could disqualify Trump, whereas a last-minute boost due to stimulus and an economic surge could line him up for a comeback in the last lap (Chart 5). These constraints are obvious so we maintain our high conviction call that a bill will be passed, likely by August 10. But at these levels on the equity market, we simply have no confidence in the market gyrations leading up to or following the passage of the bill. Our conviction level is on the cyclical, 12-month horizon, in which case we expect US and global stimulus to operate and equities to rise. Bottom Line: Political and economic constraints will force Republicans to join Democrats and pass a new stimulus bill of about $2.5 trillion by around August 10. This is cyclically positive, but hiccups in getting it passed, negative surprises, and other risks tied to US politics discourage us from taking an overtly bullish stance over the next three months. Yes, US-China Tensions Are Still Relevant Chart 6Chinese Politburo"s Bark Worse Than Bite On Stimulus Chinese Politburo"s Bark Worse Than Bite On Stimulus Chinese Politburo"s Bark Worse Than Bite On Stimulus Financial markets have shrugged off US-China tensions this year for understandable reasons. The pandemic, recession, and stimulus have overweighed the ongoing US-China conflict. As we have argued, China is undertaking a sweeping fiscal and quasi-fiscal stimulus – despite lingering hawkish rhetoric – and the size is sufficient to assist in global economic recovery as well as domestic Chinese recovery. What the financial market overlooks is that China’s households and firms are still reluctant to spend (Chart 6). China’s Politburo's late July meetings on the economy are frequently important. Initial reports of this year’s meet-up reinforce the stimulus narrative. Hints of hawkishness here and there serve a political purpose in curbing market exuberance, both at home and in the US election context, but China will ultimately remain accommodative because it has already bumped up against its chief constraint of domestic stability. Note that this assessment also leaves space for market jitters in the near-term. The phase one trade deal remains intact as President Trump is counting on it to make the case for re-election while China is looking to avoid antagonizing a loose cannon president who still has a chance of re-election. As long as broad-based tariff rates do not rise, in keeping with Trump’s deal, financial markets can ignore the small fry. We maintain a 40% risk that Trump levels sweeping punitive measures; our base case is that he goes to the election arguing that he gets results through his deal-making while carrying a big stick. At the same time, our view that domestic stimulus removes the economic constraints on conflict, enabling the two countries to escalate tensions, has been vindicated in recent weeks. Chinese political risk continues on a general uptrend, based on market indicators. The market is also starting to price in the immense geopolitical risks embedded in Taiwan’s situation, which we have highlighted consistently since 2016. While North Korea remains on a diplomatic track, refraining from major military provocations, South Korean political risk is still elevated both for domestic and regional reasons (Chart 7). Chart 7China Political Risk Still Trending Upward China Political Risk Still Trending Upward China Political Risk Still Trending Upward The market is gradually pricing in a higher risk premium in the renminbi, Taiwanese dollar, and Korean won, and this pricing accords with our longstanding political assessment. The closure of the US and Chinese consulates in Houston and Chengdu is only the latest example of this escalating dynamic. While the US’s initial sanctions on China over Hong Kong were limited in economic impact, the longer term negative consequences continue to build. Hong Kong was the symbol of the Chinese Communist Party’s compatibility with western liberalism; the removal of Hong Kong’s autonomy strikes a permanent blow against this compatibility. China’s decision to go forward with the imposition of a national security law in Hong Kong – and now to bar pro-democratic candidates from the September 6 Legislative Council elections, which will probably be postponed anyway – has accelerated coalition-building among the western democracies. The UK is now clashing with China more openly, especially after blocking Huawei from its 5G system and welcoming Hong Kong political refugees. Australia and China have fought a miniature trade war of their own over China’s lack of transparency regarding COVID-19, and Canada is implicated in the Huawei affair. Even the EU has taken a more “realist” approach to China. Across the Taiwan Strait, political leaders are assisting fleeing Hong Kongers, crying out against Beijing’s expansion of control in its periphery, rallying support from informal allies in the US and West, and doubling down on their “Silicon Shield” (prowess in semiconductor production) as a source of protection. Intel Corporation’s decision to increase its dependency on TSMC for advanced microchips only heightens the centrality of this island and this company in the power struggle between the US and China. China cannot fulfill its global ambitions if the US succeeds in creating a technological cordon. Taiwan is the key to China’s breaking through that cordon. Therefore Taiwan is at heightened risk of economic or even military conflict. The base case is that Beijing will impose economic sanctions first, to undermine Taiwanese leadership. The uncertainty over the US’s willingness to defend Taiwan is still elevated, even if the US is gradually signaling a higher level of commitment. This uncertainty makes strategic miscalculations more likely than otherwise. But Taiwan’s extreme economic dependence on the mainland gives Beijing a lever to pursue its interests and at present that is the most important factor in keeping war risk contained. By the same token, Taiwanese economic and political diversification increases that risk. A “fourth Taiwan Strait crisis” that involves trade war and sanctions is our base case, but war cannot be ruled out, and any war would be a major war. Thus investors can safely ignore Tik-Tok, Hong Kong LegCo elections, and accusations of human rights violations in Xinjiang. But they cannot ignore concrete deterioration in the Taiwan Strait. Or, for that matter, the South and East China Seas, which are not about fishing and offshore drilling but about China’s strategic depth and positioning around Taiwan. Taiwan is at heightened risk of economic or military conflict. The latest developments have seen the CNY-USD exchange rate roll over after a period of appreciation associated with bilateral deal-keeping (Chart 8). Depreciation makes it more likely that President Trump will take punitive actions, but these will still be consistent with maintaining the phase one deal unless his re-election bid completely collapses, rendering him a lame duck and removing his constraints on more economically significant confrontation. We are perilously close to such an outcome, which is why Trump’s approval rating and head-to-head polling against Joe Biden must be monitored closely. If his budding rebound is dashed, then all bets are off with regard to China and Asian power politics. Chart 8A Warning Of Further US-China Escalation A Warning Of Further US-China Escalation A Warning Of Further US-China Escalation Bottom Line: China’s stimulus, like the US stimulus, is a reason for cyclical optimism regarding risk assets. The phase one trade deal with President Trump is less certain – there is a 40% chance it collapses as stimulus and/or Trump’s political woes remove constraints on conflict. Hong Kong is a red herring except with regard to coalition-building between the US and Europe; the Taiwan Strait is the real geopolitical risk. Maritime conflicts relate to Taiwan and are also market-relevant. Europe, Russia, And Oil Risks Europe has proved a geopolitical opportunity rather than a risk, as we have contended. The passage of joint debt issuance in keeping with the seven-year budget reinforces the point. The Dutch, facing an election early next year, held up the negotiations, but ultimately relented as expected. Emmanuel Macron, who convinced German Chancellor Angela Merkel to embrace this major compromise for European solidarity, is seeing his support bounce in opinion polls at home. He is being rewarded for taking a leadership position in favor of European integration as well as for overseeing a domestic economic rebound. His setback in local elections is overstated as a political risk given that the parties that benefited do not pose a risk to European integration, and will ally with him in 2022 against any populist or anti-establishment challenger. We still refrain from reinitiating our long EUR-USD trade, however, given the immediate risks from the US election cycle (Chart 9). We will reevaluate if Trump’s odds of victory fall further. A Biden victory is very favorable for the euro in our view. Chart 9EUR-USD Gets Boost From EU Solidarity EUR-USD Gets Boost From EU Solidarity EUR-USD Gets Boost From EU Solidarity We are bullish on pound sterling because even a delay or otherwise sub-optimal outcome to trade talks is mostly priced in at current levels (Charts 10A and 10B). Prime Minister Boris Johnson has the raw ability to walk away without a deal, in the context of strong domestic stimulus, but the long-term economic consequences could condemn him to a single term in office. Compromise is better and in both parties’ interests. Chart 10APound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Pound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Pound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Chart 10BPound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Pound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Pound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Two other risks are worth a mention in this month’s GeoRisk Update: Chart 11Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russian Bonds May Face Sanctions Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russian Bonds May Face Sanctions Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russian Bonds May Face Sanctions Russia: In recent reports we have maintained that Russian geopolitical risk is understated by markets. Domestic unrest is rising, the Trump administration could impose penalties over Nordstream 2 or other issues to head off criticism on the campaign trail, and a Biden administration would be outright confrontational toward Putin’s regime. Moscow may intervene in the US elections or conduct larger cyber attacks. US sanctions could ultimately target trading of local currency Russian government bonds, which so far have been spared (Chart 11). Iran: The jury is still out on whether the recent series of mysterious explosions affecting critical infrastructure in Iran are evidence of a clandestine campaign of sabotage (Table 3). The nature of the incidents leaves some room for accident and coincidence.1 But the inclusion of military and nuclear sites in the list leads us to believe that some degree of “wag the dog” is going on. The prime suspect would be Israel and/or the United States during the window of opportunity afforded by the Trump administration, which looks to be closing over the next six months. Trump likely has a high tolerance for conflict with Iran ahead of the election. Even though Americans are war-weary, they will rally to the president’s defense if Iran is seen as the instigator, as opinion polls showed they did in September 2019 and January of this year. Iran is avoiding goading Trump so far but if it suffers too great of damage from sabotage then it may be forced to react. The dynamic is unstable and hence an oil price spike cannot be ruled out. Table 3Wag The Dog Scenario Playing Out In Iran A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) Chart 12Oil Supply Risks Stem From Iran/Iraq, But COVID Threat To Demand Persists Oil Supply Risks Stem From Iran/Iraq, But COVID Threat To Demand Persists Oil Supply Risks Stem From Iran/Iraq, But COVID Threat To Demand Persists Oil markets have the capacity and the large inventories necessary to absorb supply disruptions caused by a single Iranian incident (Chart 12). Only a chain reaction or major conflict would add to upward pressure. This would also require global demand to stay firm. The threat from COVID-19 suggests that volatility is the only thing one can count on in the near-term. Over the long run we remain bullish crude oil due to the unfettered commitment by world governments to reflation. Bottom Line: The euro rally is fundamentally supported but faces exogenous risks in the short run. We would steer clear of Russian currency and local currency bonds over the US election campaign and aftermath, particularly if Trump’s polling upturn becomes a dead cat bounce. Iran is a “gray swan” geopolitical risk, hiding in plain sight, but its impact on oil markets will be limited unless a major war occurs. Investment Implications The US dollar is at a critical juncture. Our Foreign Exchange Strategist Chester Ntonifor argues that if the DXY index breaks beneath the 93-94 then the greenback has entered a structural bear market. The most recent close was 93.45 and it has hovered below 94 since Monday. Failure to pass US stimulus quickly could result in a dollar bounce along with other safe havens. Over the short run, investors should be prepared for this and other negative surprises relating to the US election and significant geopolitical risks, especially involving China, the tech war, and the Taiwan Strait. Over the long run, investors should position for more fiscal support to combine with ultra-easy monetary policy for as far as the eye can see. The Federal Reserve is not even “thinking about thinking about raising rates.” This combination ultimately entails rising commodity prices, a weakening dollar, and international equity outperformance relative to both US equities and government bonds.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 See Raz Zimmt, "When it comes to Iran, not everything that goes boom in the night is sabotage," Atlantic Council, July 30, 2020. Section II: Appendix : GeoRisk Indicator China China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator Russia Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator UK UK: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Germany Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Canada Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Spain Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Korea Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights The implementation of an oil-price hedging strategy by Russia’s government – consisting of put buying a la Mexico’s strategy for putting a floor under government revenues – would force us to re-consider our bullish view. On the one hand, systematically hedging forward revenues when deferred prices met the government’s budget threshold – currently $42.40/bbl for Urals crude oil – would tangibly increase Russia’s impact on forward price discovery.  This could become one of the tools available to OPEC 2.0 that allow it to influence the shape of the forward curve, perhaps supporting a backwardation benefiting member states.  On the other, hedging government revenues could free Russia and its oil companies from supporting the OPEC 2.0 framework, thus returning the swing-producer responsibilities for balancing the market to OPEC. Significant obstacles stand in the way of implementing a hedging program by the Russian government.  Hedging even volumes in futures could overwhelm the supply of liquidity in these markets, particularly in the deferred contracts: Average daily Brent volumes are ~ 700mm b/d for the entire market.1 Feature OPEC 2.0’s mostly successful production management scheme is a key factor driving our bullish view of oil. The coalition led by KSA and Russia is keeping output constrained while global demand recovers from the COVID-19 pandemic. This will tighten global supply-demand balances and reduce inventories (Chart of the Week). This dynamic drives our expectation that prices will remain around current levels for 2H20 – at ~ $44/bbl for Brent – and, based on our modeling, push prices to $65/bbl on average next year. At the end of the day, OPEC 2.0 is a quasi-cartel operating under a Declaration of Cooperation signed by the original cartel and non-OPEC producers led by Russia in late 2016 and renewed and expanded periodically since then. Without this cooperation, it is highly doubtful oil prices would have recovered from the demand-destruction visited upon the market by the COVID-19 pandemic as quickly as they have. Chart of the WeekOPEC 2.0 Production Discipline Underpins Our Bullish Oil View OPEC 2.0 Production Discipline Underpins Our Bullish Oil View OPEC 2.0 Production Discipline Underpins Our Bullish Oil View Nor is it likely the inventory overhang dogging markets since the end of the 2014-16 market-share war launched by KSA, then compounded by waivers on Iranian oil-export sanctions in November 2018 by the US, could have been addressed as effectively as they were prior to the pandemic’s arrival. In all likelihood, a punishing continuation of low prices would have been required to destroy enough production globally – in OPEC and ex-OPEC – into 2017 for prices to finally recover. OPEC 2.0’s Days Numbered? We have long argued the OPEC 2.0 framework benefitted Russia and KSA more than unrestrained production, which, left unchecked, would keep prices closer to $30/bbl than $70/bbl. The leadership of Russia’s oil sector has been a reluctant participant in the coalition’s production-management scheme. This was apparent in every meeting of OPEC 2.0 up to an including it March 2020 meeting in Vienna, where an extension of the coalition’s production cut advanced by KSA was nixed by Russia. A brief market-share war followed just as the COVID-19 pandemic started advancing beyond China’s borders, resulting in lockdowns and unprecedented demand destruction. OPEC 2.0 was then reconstituted, and the production cuts it agreed have restored balance to the market. However, this balance is tentative. On the demand side, a second wave of the pandemic is spreading, and with it the risk widespread lockdowns again are mandated. This would lead to another round of demand destruction if the scale of the lockdowns approached that of the first wave seen in 1H20. This is not our base case, but it is a risk we have been highlighting repeatedly in our reports. We find KSA’s GDP increases ~ 1% when EM oil consumption goes up by one percent, while Russia’s GPD increases by ~ 0.5%. On the supply side, we have long argued the OPEC 2.0 framework benefitted Russia and KSA more than unrestrained production, which, left unchecked, would keep prices closer to $30/bbl than $70/bbl.2 In the current arrangement, KSA and Russia are able to grow their GDPs as they see fit, with KSA apparently targeting EM sales, which will grow as those economies grow, and Russia apparently pursuing a strategy that centers on making its barrels available to trading markets and EM buyers (Charts 2A and 2B).3 Chart 2AKSA Benefits From EM GDP Growth ... KSA Benefits From EM GDP Growth ... KSA Benefits From EM GDP Growth ... Chart 2B... As Does Russia ... As Does Russia ... As Does Russia This arrangement can endure as long as the OPEC 2.0 members' revenues – particularly those of its leadership – are at risk from uncontrolled production – e.g., another market-share war. A New Game? If, however, one or both of OPEC 2.0's leaders is able to hedge its revenue, the game changes. If it is Russia, as President Putin has suggested, and the government is able to hedge the ~ 40% or so of the federal budget covered by oil and gas revenues, the game changes profoundly (Chart 3). The only motive for Russia to participate in the OPEC 2.0 framework is to keep prices from collapsing below the level assumed for budgeting purposes. This is $42.40/bbl for Urals, the benchmark Russian crude traded in global markets (Chart 4). At present, OPEC 2.0 production discipline is contributing to holding prices just above this level, as member states calibrate their output consistent with the recovery in global demand. Chart 3Russia's Budget Relies Heavily On Oil & Gas Revenues Russia's Budget Relies Heavily On Oil & Gas Revenues Russia's Budget Relies Heavily On Oil & Gas Revenues Chart 4OPEC 2.0 Cuts Contribute To Stronger Urals Crude Price OPEC 2.0 Cuts Contribute To Stronger Urals Crude Price OPEC 2.0 Cuts Contribute To Stronger Urals Crude Price Of course, if Russia were able to hedge the oil and gas revenues funding its budget, this production discipline would not be needed in the short term – it could produce at will knowing there is a floor under revenue. Crude-oil futures and options markets cannot handle the volume Russia likely would require to fully hedge the oil and gas revenues funding its budget. That’s a big IF, however. The demand destruction caused by the COVID-19 pandemic in the first five months of this year was responsible for the loss of up to 25% of Russia’s oil, gas and coal exports, which translated into a 50% loss of export revenues and a 25% decline in budget as prices and volumes fell, according to the Carnegie Moscow Center.4 Russia’s GDP is expected to fall by 6% this year, according to the World Bank, in the wake of the pandemic.5 Crude-oil futures and options markets cannot handle the volume Russia likely would require to fully hedge the oil and gas revenues funding its budget. Brent futures and options open interest on the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) total 3.34 billion barrels on July 21, 2020 (Chart 5). This is spread across the whole term structure. Worthwhile considering that just 1mm b/d of production hedged for 1 year = 365mm bbls = ~ 11% of total Brent open interest. Such a large concentration of open interest accounted for by one entity – even if it is a bona fide government – would, perforce, raise regulators concerns over market manipulation.6 Chart 5Russia's Hedging Volumes Likely Would Swamp Futures Markets Russia's Hedging Volumes Likely Would Swamp Futures Markets Russia's Hedging Volumes Likely Would Swamp Futures Markets Broadening OPEC 2.0’s Tool Kit The successful implementation of a hedging strategy by Russia would force us to re-consider our bullish oil view. Even though we view the likelihood Russia’s government will adopt a full revenue hedging program to be low, we think the argument that it – and KSA – could hedge discrete exposures over time makes sense. These markets exist to process information via trading activities. If there are discrete exposures Russia hedges that keep Brent forward curves backwardated, for example, this would affect the hedging economics of US shale producers protecting their revenues one to three years into the future (Chart 6). Hedging in future while keeping production in the prompt-delivery months in line with OPEC 2.0 quotas would support a backwardation. Prices in the deferred part of the curve would be lower than at the front, which would produce less revenue for hedgers, while higher prices in the front of the curve would redound to OPEC 2.0 member states’ benefit, whose term contracts and spot sales typically reference spot prices. Chart 6Discrete Hedging Could Support Backwardation Discrete Hedging Could Support Backwardation Discrete Hedging Could Support Backwardation This would tangibly increase Russia’s impact on forward price discovery. Indeed, hedging could become one of the tools available to OPEC 2.0 that allow it to influence the economics of oil production by US shale producers, among others. Bottom Line: The successful implementation of a hedging strategy by Russia would force us to re-consider our bullish oil view – there would be little or no need for the Russian government to demand its producers adhere to an OPEC 2.0 production quota if the government is able to hedge its revenue. (Whether those producers choose to hedge is another matter entirely.) We do not give a high probability to the Russian government adopting a Mexico-style hedging program to put a floor under its budget revenues. We cannot dismiss the possibility that discrete exposures could be hedged to support a backwardated forward curve structure going forward, however.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com     Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight Brent prices have been remarkably steady at ~ $43/bbl in July, balancing expectations of a sustained global economic recovery and the risk of a second wave of lockdowns. Rising COVID-19 cases in the US pose a risk to oil demand as the US still represents ~ 20% of global demand. Brent futures spreads – 1ST vs. 12th – moved from -$1.38/bbl to -$3.29/bbl, suggesting the pace of drawdowns in inventories slowed in recent weeks. Nonetheless, we continue to expect a persistent supply deficit in 2H20 and 2021, pushing prices above $60/bbl next year.7 Base Metals: Neutral Base metals are mostly flat since last week after moving up 23% since March. A continuation of recent trends is largely dependent on China’s economic outlook as it represents ~ 50% of global BM demand. The IMF expects China’s GDP to reach its pre-crisis level somewhere this quarter and to resume trend growth afterward (Chart 7). Monetary policy needs to remain accommodative for such a recovery to occur. Historically, policymakers in China have favored easy monetary policy for at least three quarters following a crisis. This implies the accommodative stance should be maintained until year-end, supporting metals’ prices.8 Precious Metals: Neutral We are putting a stop-loss of $1,850/oz on our long gold recommendation at tonight’s close (Chart 8). We remain constructive on the gold market, but believe the market is out over its skis presently, as investors have realized central banks globally likely will not move to raise rates this year, or perhaps even next year. The Fed, in particular, has been consistently signaling its intent to remain accommodative in its effort to reflate the US economy.9 Ags/Softs:  Underweight The USDA this week reported 72% of the corn crop was in good to excellent condition for the week ended July 26 in the 19 states accounting for 91% of the crop last year. For beans, 72% of the crop was reported in good to excellent condition, up sharply from last year’s level of 54% in the 18 states accounting for 96% of the crop. Chart 7 Russia Again Examines Oil Hedging Russia Again Examines Oil Hedging Chart 8 Gold Is Due For A Breather Gold Is Due For A Breather   Footnotes 1     Russia came close to setting up an oil-hedging program in 2009, following the collapse of oil prices during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Please see Russia considers oil price hedges modeled on Mexico’s system published by worldoil.com July 22, 2020. 2     See, e.g., How Long Will The Oil-Price Rout Last?, which we published March 9, 2020. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3    In previous research, we found KSA real GDP (in 2010 constant USD published by the World Bank) benefits more than Russia when EM GDP growth expands, while Russia benefits more from increases in Brent prices. For this report we updated that analysis and looked only at EM oil consumption, while including lagged USD and Brent crude oil prices as common regressors. We find KSA’s GDP increases ~ 1% when EM oil consumption goes up by one percent, while Russia’s GPD increases by ~ 0.5%. Please see our earlier research report entitled Sussing Out OPEC 2.0's Production Cuts, U.S. Waivers On Iran Sanctions, which we published on April 11, 2019, when KSA and Russia again were contesting the necessity of production cuts. 4    Please see The Oil Price Crash: Will the Kremlin’s Policies Change?, by Tatiana Mitrova, which was published by the Carnegie Moscow Center July 8, 2020. Russia presently exports ~ 5mm b/d of oil, which is down from earlier levels of ~ 5.5mm b/d due to the OPEC 2.0 cuts it is observing. We do not have the disposition of revenue sources funding Russia’s budget (primarily oil and gas), and therefore cannot calculate the precise hedging volume Russia’s government would need to cover to provide a floor for all of its fiscal obligations. 5    Please see Recession and Growth under the Shadow of a Pandemic published by the Bank July 6, 2020. 6    Russia’s central bank came out against the hedging proposal, citing the lack of liquidity available for large-scale programs. Please see Russia central bank opposes using wealth fund to hedge oil revenues, governor says published by uk.reuters.com July 24, 2020. 7     Please see Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside, which we published last week. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 8    Please see Chinese Stocks: Stay Invested published by BCA Research’s China Investment Strategy July 22, 2020. It is available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 9    Please see What A Weaker US Dollar Means For Global Bond Investors published by BCA Research’s Global Fixed Income Strategy July 28, 2020.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2020 Q2 Russia Again Examines Oil Hedging Russia Again Examines Oil Hedging Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in Summary of Closed Trades Russia Again Examines Oil Hedging Russia Again Examines Oil Hedging

Dear Clients, This month we offer you a Special Report on Russia and cyber security by our colleague and friend, Elmo Wright. Elmo recently retired from US Army civil service after 43 years working in intelligence, either on active duty, reserves, or as a civilian. From 2018 to 2020, he served as the senior civilian executive at the US Army National Ground Intelligence Center.  He has served on five continents and provided analysis of the most pressing global trends in national security and intelligence. In this Special Report with BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy team, Elmo analyzes Russia’s cyber capabilities and argues that structural and cyclical factors, including COVID-19, will ensure the continued salience of Russian and global cyber security challenges in the coming years. His thesis reinforces our recommendation that investors buy cyber security equities. Elmo’s work for this report is in his personal capacity and does not represent any position of the US government. Only publicly available information was used as background research material for Elmo’s contribution to the report. All very best, Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst As the US elections come closer, there will be a return to news about Russia and its potential interference via social media. Russia will continue to use cyber, both state sponsored attacks, and in coordination with criminal groups, to advance Russian national security objectives. In contrast to nuclear doctrine, there is no commonly accepted framework for cyber warfare between Russia and other nations that provides understandable signals for escalation, de-escalation, appropriate targets, or goals. US efforts to conduct military operations against Russia or China would likely be countered by Russian or Chinese cyber operations before any physical military operations could be initiated. Cyber security stocks offer a way for investors to capitalize on our long-term themes of nationalism, multipolarity, and de-globalization. The ISE Cyber Security Index offers value relative to the broad NASDAQ and S&P 500 indexes as well as the S&P tech sector. Chart II-1Russian Cyber Interference Resurfaces Around US Elections Russian Cyber Interference Resurfaces Around US Elections Russian Cyber Interference Resurfaces Around US Elections As the national elections in the US come closer, there will be a return to news about Russia and its potential interference via social media. Indeed Russia is making headlines even as we go to press. This report aims to provide context for Russian cyber capabilities in general as a contributor to overall geopolitical instability (Chart II-1). We forecast Russia will continue to use cyber, both state sponsored attacks, and in coordination with criminal groups, to advance Russian national security objectives. As background, the word cyber is commonly accepted to be derived from cybernetics, a phrase attributed to Norbert Wiener, an MIT scientist. The phrase itself is related to the ancient Greek word for steering or helmsman, in other words, control. Chart II-2Russian Excellence In Math Makes It Competitive In Cybernetics August 2020 August 2020 Russia has a long history of excellence in science, especially theoretical work in mathematics and physics (Chart II-2). Those fields can explain natural phenomena in formulas and mathematical relationships. The Soviets believed that centralized state planning that manipulated data in formulas could lead to better outcomes in all aspects of the society. Although central state economic planning did not work out for the Soviet economy, Soviet military science built on the concept of data relationships in formulas to develop its theory of troop control, a derivative of reflexive control, that is, the presenting of data to the recipient, either friendly or enemy, in order to get that recipient to act in a way favorable to Soviet military plans. One can see the Soviets embraced the idea of cybernetics as very congruent to their desire for top down control. Russia, as the core part of the Soviet Union, retained significant numbers of scientists and mathematicians who were naturally drawn to the ability of computers to take data and manipulate that data according to formulas. Other Russian scientists and mathematicians emigrated to the West where their expertise was rewarded in the rise in the use of computers to manipulate data. Over time, the term cyber has come to be associated with many aspects of computers, especially the intellectual and physical structures hidden behind the direct interface of a person with a keyboard and screen. Russian expertise in the use of computers to do cyber work was not limited to working for the State. As the Soviet Union broke apart and many people lost their jobs working for the State, there were those persons who took their talents to criminal ventures. And in the symbiotic nature of society in Russia, many of those who went into criminal ventures were former intelligence and security personnel who could maintain their connection to the official organizations that were successors to the KGB, the GRU, and others. Russia is the source of the most sophisticated cyber threats to the US. Senior Russian military officials, such as General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation armed forces, equivalent to the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have noted the growth of nonmilitary means of achieving strategic goals, and specifically in the information space. Gerasimov, in an article in 2013, has been widely quoted that all elements of national power have to be harnessed, including cyber capabilities. One Soviet and Russian military concept that relates to the information space is maskirovka, the use of camouflage, deception, and disinformation to confuse the enemy. Maskirovka is intimately connected with the Soviet/Russian concept of “active measures”. Active measures include actions taken generally by intelligence services to provide propaganda, false information, and otherwise sow discord and confusion among the enemy ranks at all levels of war as well as in the political, economic, and social spheres. In today’s time period, cyber, especially social media, offers the opportunity for the wide spread of aspects of maskirovka and active measures to all users, as well as targeted groups (Chart II-3). Reporting indicates a continued Russian emphasis on cyber as a means for active measures concealed by maskirovka. Chart II-3Social Media Offers Russia An Opportunity For The Spread Of Maskirovka August 2020 August 2020 Wikileaks has provided a platform for the dissemination of information normally hidden from the general public. It is noteworthy how much of the information on the Wikileaks platform relates to the US and the West, and relatively little on Russia. Possible factors that explain that characteristic include the disparity in penalties for disclosing information between the US and the West versus Russia; the greater number of journalists and other persons involved in the media, both for profit and personal reasons, in the West; and the language barriers involved in understanding Russian versus English. A final possible factor in Wikileaks greater dissemination of Western information might be an aspect of active measures undertaken by Russia. There are numerous actions attributed to Russian state actors in the cyber field in the recent past (Table II-1). They include a distributed denial of service attack on Estonia (2007); hacking the Ministry of Defense in the country of Georgia during a military conflict (2008); attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure (2015); and the hacking of the Democratic National Committee (2016). Chancellor Angela Merkel recently publicly named and shamed Russia for a cyber-attack on Germany circa 2015 (Appendix). Table II-1Russian State Actors Responsible For Many Of This Year’s Cyber Attacks August 2020 August 2020 Chart II-4Russian Use Of Cyber Is A Top Threat To The US August 2020 August 2020 Senior US officials have cited Russia as the source of the most sophisticated cyber threats to the US, both for espionage and state sponsored attacks against US national security capabilities such as energy, transportation, and telecommunications infrastructure; as well as for criminal activity such as ransom ware and identity theft. Russian use of cyber, both state sponsored and sponsoring criminal actors, has been the top threat to the US in each of the US intelligence community’s annual threat assessments for 2017, 2018, and 2019 (Chart II-4). Although the 2020 annual threat assessment was not made public in Congressional testimony, there’s little reason to suspect that Russian use of cyber would not continue to be cited as the top threat. Other nation states have state sponsored cyber capabilities which are of national security concern to the US, including China, Iran, and North Korea. These nation states are called out in the US intelligence community Annual Threat Assessments. Each of these nation states has been identified as committing intelligence and economic cyber attacks against the US and other Western nations. The recent speech by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation designates China as the top threat. Given the nature of the internet, the pathway of a cyber attack will likely bounce around multiple countries before reaching its intended target. As the Director notes, forensic identification of the source of a cyber attack takes time and expertise. However, there is a clear record of specifically identifying the state sponsored entity that commits attacks on US or Western government information technology and infrastructure. More likely than confusing one state sponsored cyber actor from one country to another would be the potential blending of criminal elements across national boundaries. In this case, cyber criminal elements with Russian backgrounds or connections are clearly the most capable. Cyber-crime is rising despite deterrence. The stages of cyber conflict include reconnaissance, penetration, mapping, exfiltration, and operations. The US National Security Agency has an extensive technical cyber threat framework which goes into much detail. Cyber security professionals note the ongoing actions in cyber space and the attempts by elements suspected to be linked to Russia to gain and maintain access to US networks for potential military operations, or to exfiltrate data for criminal or other purposes. Part of the frustration of cyber security experts is the lack of transparency and timely reporting of those affected by malign cyber activities. Although some cyber activities may go on for multiple months, the exfiltration of data, or the emplacement of malware may only take a few seconds. Many networks lack the ability to detect penetration and mapping. Companies with large resources devoted to cyber security may have that investment negated if they have affiliations with other companies with lax cyber security which can allow for hostile intrusions into the connected network. Chart II-5Unlike Nuclear Doctrine, Cyber Lacks A Framework To Control Escalation August 2020 August 2020 Unfortunately, public and open attribution for cyber attacks has lagged. As an example, although the attack on the Democratic National Committee email servers was noted in 2016, it was not until 2018 that specific Russian individuals were charged with the crime. Factors that cause lags in public and open attribution include the difficulty of tracing specific computer code through cyberspace; the disjointed nature of the internet; the lack of an easy and accepted mechanism for involvement of US intelligence agencies in providing assistance to private sector parties; and the reticence of individuals and organizations negatively affected by cyber attacks to publicly disclose their injuries. Doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons developed over a period of years in the US and the West and in the Soviet bloc. The Soviets developed a coherent doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons that was understandable to the West. Arms control agreements between nuclear powers established mechanisms for controlling escalation of tensions (Chart II-5). The Soviet doctrine was adopted by the Russians after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russia and Western nations continue to have a common understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in military affairs that allows for discussion of escalation and de-escalation. In contrast to nuclear doctrine, there is no commonly accepted framework for cyber warfare between Russia and other nations that provides understandable signals for escalation, de-escalation, appropriate targets, or goals. This is reflected in the Russian information security doctrine of 2016 which notes “The absence of international legal norms regulating inter-State relations in the information space…” The US Director of National Intelligence also noted this lack of agreement in his annual threat assessment testimony of 2017. Chart II-6Rapid Growth Of Internet Raises Vulnerability To Harmful Actions August 2020 August 2020 The rapid growth of the internet, and reliance on it by government and private sectors reflects its founding as an open system, vulnerable to negative actors and actions (Chart II-6). The intermingling of hardware and software, the information infrastructure used both by individuals and states, by the private sector and by government, makes separating doctrine and practice for cyberwar from legitimate use very difficult. Since non-cyber military capabilities, both conventional, and nuclear, rely upon the use of commercial information technology infrastructure, the use of offensive cyber is subject to the problem of blowback. As the NotPetya incident of 2018 indicated, damage from malware installed on one computer can rapidly spread across networks, industries, and international boundaries. The code for StuxNet and the code released by the more recent hack of CIA cyber tools have been noted in other cases of cyber attacks. The view of the international cyber environment by Russia is very similar to views in the US and the West. The Russian national security doctrine of 2015 notes “... An entire spectrum of political, financial-economic, and informational instruments have been set in motion in the struggle for influence in the international arena. Increasingly active use is being made of special services' potential … The intensifying confrontation in the global information arena caused by some countries' aspiration to utilize informational and communication technologies to achieve their geopolitical objectives, including by manipulating public awareness and falsifying history, is exerting an increasing influence on the nature of the international situation.” Although much of the Russian information security doctrine of 2016 is concerned with noting threats to Russia’s information space, what might be called counterintelligence in other documents, there are key comments that note the suitability of using attacks in the information space as an effective means of projecting Russian power, such as “… improving information support activities to implement the State policy of the Russian Federation …” As per usual Soviet and Russian state doctrinal documents, the 2016 doctrine notes all the negative activity of other actors in this field. This practice is consistent with historical Soviet and Russian open press documents which ascribe to other states the activities in which Russia engages or plans to engage. Chart II-7Cyber Attacks Are On The Rise August 2020 August 2020 Unlike other forms of national security alliances, such as for intelligence, there is little public literature on cyber alliances, especially for offensive action. For example, the US and Israel have never publicly acknowledged a government alliance to emplace the StuxNet virus into the Iranian nuclear development program. Should there be offensive cyber alliances in the West, it is likely they fall along traditional intelligence and defense lines. There is no public reporting on any sort of offensive cyber alliances that involve Russia. There are public efforts at common standards for information technology security, but these efforts are foundering on citizen and government concerns over privacy, as well as commercial  proprietary advantage. It is an open question as to whether cyber alliances among friendly nations would deter would-be cyber attackers or hackers. Certainly the growth of complaints to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center would indicate that statements of deterrence and even prosecutions are failing to reduce cyber attacks (Chart II-7). Both the US national intelligence community and private sector cybersecurity companies agree Russia has a sophisticated state sponsored effort to acquire intelligence via hacking and insert favorable themes into cyberspace via the use of social media. There is also agreement that Russia state elements have a close relationship with criminal elements which can provide a plausibly deniable means of engaging in cyber warfare activities favorable to Russia, as well as engaging in activities for illegal economic advantage. For example, see this quote from the CYBEREASON Intel team: “The crossing of official state sponsored hacking with cybercriminal outfits has created a specter of Russian state hacking that is far larger than their actual program. This hybridization of tools, actors, and missions has created one of the most potent and ill-defined advanced threats that the cybersecurity community faces. It has also created the most technically advanced and bold cybercriminal community in the world. When, as a criminal, your patronage is the internal security service that is charged with tracking and arresting cybercrime, your only concern becomes staying within their defined bounds of acceptable risk and not what global norms, laws, or even domestic Russian law states.” The US Department of Justice in June 2020 noted a Russian national was sentenced to prison for malicious cyber activities. Key points of his illegal activity were the operation of websites open only to Russian speakers, and the vetting or recommendation of other criminals before allowing entry to the websites. One analysis of this situation notes the ties to Russian state security organs and personnel which likely held up the Russian national’s extradition for trial in the US. Government leaders in the US have noted the potential for major cyber attacks in the US affecting physical infrastructure and causing significant economic and social damage, including further attacks on the political election process. However, they have been reticent to state any explicit sort of retaliation. The US Cyber Command notes it is actively combatting hostile cyber actors. Therefore, the question remains open as to what level of cyber attacks would be considered serious enough to be treated as an act of war by the US. There has been public speculation of both Russian and Chinese implants of malware into the US information technology infrastructure that might be activated in the case of open hostilities. US efforts to conduct military operations against Russia or China would likely be countered by Russian or Chinese cyber operations before any physical military operations could be initiated, especially since US based forces would have to transit oceans, taking many days, when cyber operations could happen in seconds. China, Russia, and Iran will also increasingly become victims of cyber attacks. Russian “gray zone” tactics, that is, actions short of large scale conventional war, many of which involve cyber attacks, active measures, and maskirovka, are the subject of much Department of Defense planning and action. To combat such gray zone activity analysis from the RAND Corporation notes the need for a spectrum of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic actions, which would involve commercial partners and allied nations. The difficulty of coordinating such counter action is one reason the Russians continue their gray zone efforts. Russia’s unique characteristics, some of which are weaknesses compared to the US and the West, are indicative of why Russia engages in state sponsored as well as criminal cyber activities (Chart II-8). Russian scientific history, the intertwining of state and criminal elements, and continent-spanning location are factors which promote the use of cyber. Russia’s economic position vis-à-vis the US, Russia’s relative lack of military power projection capability beyond the states on its borders (the Near Abroad), except for its nuclear forces, and Russia’s declining demographic situation are negative factors which push Russia to use cyber as a cost effective means of advancing national security and economic policy (Chart II-9). Despite US and Western imposed sanctions on Russia for past misdeeds, none of the factors noted above will be changed in the near future. Therefore, those factors, and published Russian doctrine should indicate to Western governments and businesses that Russia will continue to use cyber as a means to advance Russian national security objectives, as well as a means to siphoning off wealth from the West via criminal activities. Chart II-8Russia's Relative Weakness Drives Engagement In Cyber Activities Russia's Relative Weakness Drives Engagement In Cyber Activities Russia's Relative Weakness Drives Engagement In Cyber Activities Chart II-9Deteriorating Demographics Also Drive Russia’s Cyber Activities August 2020 August 2020   US preparedness for Russian cyber activity in the upcoming months should be greater given several factors. First, there is clearly awareness of a Russian cyber threat to US interests across government and in the private sector. Second, the US has established new organizations, shifted resources of money and people, and had practice defending against cyber attacks since the 2016 US election cycle. However, the US information technology infrastructure is vast and porous, making it hard to protect against every threat. Russian cyber actors, both state sponsored and criminal, are smart and persistent. Investment Takeaways Cyber security companies offer a way for investors to capitalize on major themes arising from the COVID-19 crisis and its aftermath. These themes include not only changes in worker behavior, e-commerce, corporate culture, and network security, but also our major geopolitical themes like nationalism and the retreat from globalization. Reports as we go to press that Russian hackers have targeted vaccine developers in the US, UK, and Canada underscore the point. The trend is not limited to Russia or COVID-19 vaccines. It is all too apparent from the actions of Russia and China – as well as the increasing efforts by the US and its allies to patrol their own cyber realms, IT systems, and ideological discourse – that governments view the Internet as a frontier to be conquered and fortified rather than as a free space of human exchange in which globalization can operate unfettered (Map II-1). Map II-1Governments View The Internet As A Frontier To Be Conquered August 2020 August 2020 Formal measures of country risk are inadequate but provide some perspective as to which countries and companies are least prepared. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations body charged with monitoring information technology and communications. It ranks countries according to their commitment to cyber security and their exposure to cyber security risks (Chart II-10). Chart II-10Countries Have An Imperative To Strengthen Cyber Security August 2020 August 2020 We take these rankings with a grain of salt knowing that advanced countries like the US and UK rank near the top of the list, and yet are the prime targets of hackers and thus face enormous cyber security risks. What is clear is that no country is safe and every country has an economic and national security imperative to strengthen its cyber security. These indexes also suggest that several European countries are less well prepared than one would think and that emerging markets are grossly underprepared. China, Russia and Iran should not be thought of only as aggressors – they will increasingly become targets as the West seeks to counteract them. As Russia expands operations it becomes a target of cyber counter-strikes as well as economic sanctions. And as China accelerates its drive to become a high tech giant, it encourages economic decoupling from the West and retaliation for its use of cyber-theft and state-based hacking. There are two main cyber security equity indexes – the NASDAQ CTA Cybersecurity Index (NQCYBR) and NASDAQ ISE Cyber Security Index (HXR). These indexes trade in line with each other and have rallied extensively since the COVID-19 crisis (Chart II-11). Investors are aware that the surge in working from home and companies conducting operations off-site, as well as geopolitical great power struggle, have created extensive new vulnerabilities and capex requirements. On April 24, we recommended that investors go long the ISE index relative to the S&P 500 information technology sector. We are also going long the ISE index relative to the NASDAQ on a strategic horizon. Tech has been the prime beneficiary of the COVID-19 crisis while the necessary corollary of the tech companies’ continued success is the need for security of their information, property, and customers (Chart II-12). We also favor the ISE index because it has a slightly heavier cyclical component due to the fact that 13% of its companies are in the industrial sector, compared to 10% for the CTA index. The industrial side should benefit more as economies reopen and recover. Chart II-11Cyber Security Stocks Have Benefited From COVID-19 ... Cyber Security Stocks Have Benefited From COVID-19 ... Cyber Security Stocks Have Benefited From COVID-19 ... Chart II-12... But Not So Much Relative To Broad Tech Sector ... But Not So Much Relative To Broad Tech Sector ... But Not So Much Relative To Broad Tech Sector   These indexes are tracked by two ETFs. The First Trust NASDAQ Cybersecurity ETF (CIBR) tracks the NASDAQ CTA index with an emphasis on larger companies, while the ETFMG Prime Cyber Security ETF (HACK) tracks the ISE index, companies with market capitalization lower than $250 million, and a slightly lower exposure to the communications sector as opposed to IT and software. The HACK ETF has lagged the CIBR this year so far and offers an opportunity for investors to invest in data protection and up-and-coming firms. Over the past ten years cyber security has proven to be a volatile investment space with rapidly increasing competition for market share. But the secular tailwinds are powerful and a diversified exposure to the sector will be rewarding for investors positioning for the post-COVID-19 world. Elmo Wright Consulting Editor Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Appendix Appendix Table II-1Major Cyber-Attacks Over The Past Decade August 2020 August 2020 Works Cited Coats, Dan. “Statement For The Record Worldwide Threat Assessment Of The Us Intelligence Community,” May 23, 2017. Coats, Dan. “Statement For The Record Worldwide Threat Assessment Of The Us Intelligence Community,” March 6, 2018. Coats, Dan. “Annual Threat Assessment Opening Statement,” January 29, 2019. CyberReason Intel Team, “Russia And Nation-State Hacking Tactics: A Report From Cybereason Intelligence Group,” cybereason.com, June 5, 2017. Department of Justice, “Russian National Sentenced To Prison For Operating Websites Devoted To Fraud And Malicious Cyber Activities”, June 26, 2020. Department of Justice, “U.S. Charges Russian FSB Officers And Their Criminal Conspirators For Hacking Yahoo And Millions Of Email Accounts, Fsb Officers Protected, Directed, Facilitated And Paid Criminal Hackers”, March 15, 2017. Gerasimov, Vasily. “The Value Of Science In Prediction,” Military Industrial Courier, Feb 27, 2013. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Internet Crime Complaint Center Marks 20 Years From Early Frauds to Sophisticated Schemes, IC3 Has Tracked the Evolution of Online Crime,” May 8, 2020. Fedorov, Yuriy Ye. “Arms Control In The Information Age” Symposium “Emerging Challenges In The Information Age,” 23 January 2002, Arlington, Virginia. Galeotti, Mark. “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ And Russian Non-Linear War,” In Moscow’s Shadows, July 6, 2014. Greenberg, Andy. “The Untold Story Of Notpetya, The Most Devastating Cyberattack In History,” Wired Magazine, August 22, 2018. Krebs, Brian. “Why Were the Russians So Set Against This Hacker Being Extradited?,” Krebs on Security, Nov 18, 2019. Lusthaus, Jonathan.  “Cybercrime in Southeast Asia Combating a global threat locally,” May 20, 2020. Mattis, James. Department of Defense, “Summary Of The 2018 National Defense Strategy Of The United States Of America”. Meakins, Joss. “Living in (Digital) Denial: Russia’s Approach To Cyber Deterrence,” Russia Matters, July 2018. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. “Doctrine Of Information Security Of The Russian Federation,” Dec 5, 2016. Nakasone, Paul.  “Cybercom Commander Briefs Reporters At White House,” Department of Defense video briefing, Aug 2, 2018. National Security Agency, “NSA/CSS Technical Cyber Threat Framework V2”, a report from: Cybersecurity Operations The Cybersecurity Products And Sharing Division, 29 November 2018. Pettijohn and Wasser.  “Competing In The Gray Zone,” RAND Corporation, 2019.  Putin, Vladimir.  “Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation,” Office of the President of the Russian Federation, Dec 31, 2015. Russian National Security Strategy 31 Dec 2015, Russia Matters. Snegovaya, Maria. “Putin’s Information Warfare In Ukraine: Soviet Origins Of Russia's Hybrid Warfare,” Institute for the Study of War, Sep 22, 2015. Tsygichko, V. N. “About Categories of “Correlation Of Forces” for Potential Military Conflicts in the New Era,” Symposium “Emerging Challenges In The Information Age,” 23 January 2002, Arlington, Virginia. Wiener, Norbert, Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, (1948).

Highlights The tech sector is in a manic phase. This mania has further room to run because inflation will remain low for at least the next two years and global central banks will maintain very easy policy conditions, which will cap the upside in bond yields. Tech will have its day of reckoning when inflation can rise and the sector’s weight will drag down the market. Bubbles are prone to severe corrections; this one is no exception. In the near term, tech earnings will probably miss lofty embedded expectations. The falling dollar is a problem for the sector and the election season introduces great risks. In the near term, inflation breakeven rates, the silver-to-gold ratio and the deep cyclicals-to-defensives ratio will all rise further. Industrials have a window to outperform technology. Feature The S&P 500 continues its ascent, increasingly driven higher by surging tech stocks. The extreme resilience of a few tech titans has resulted in an incredibly concentrated equity market, in which the capitalization of Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Apple and Facebook equals that of 224 deep and early cyclical stocks in the S&P 500. Such a narrow market raises three questions: is the tech sector in a bubble? What will pop this bubble? If the tech bubble bursts, will the S&P 500 shrug it off or decline with giant technology firms? We believe that tech stocks are in a bubble and the mania will expand further as long as inflation remains low and monetary conditions stay accommodative, despite occasional pullbacks. Moreover, the broad market will suffer when the bubble eventually bursts. Each Decade Has Its Bubble BCA Research’s Emerging Market Strategy team recently demonstrated that each decade in the past 60 years has experienced its own financial excess (Chart I-1).1 Three forces fueled each of these manias: an extended phase of easy monetary policy; a narrative that drove funds towards fashionable assets; and an extended period of superior returns that accentuated the inevitability of participating in the bubble. Chart I-1Each Decade Has Its Bubble August 2020 August 2020 In the 1960s, the mania surrounded the so-called “Nifty 50” stocks, as exemplified by Disney. The Nifty 50 were large-cap companies with solid franchises and a proven track record of dividend growth. Meanwhile, the period of low inflation from 1960 to 1966 allowed the US Federal Reserve to keep the unemployment rate below NAIRU, which indicated that policy was accommodative. When inflation began to rise in 1966, the Fed lifted interest rates to 7.75% in 1973, and the bubble evaporated with the recession started that year. In the 1970s, the mania involved precious metals, such as gold and silver. Precious metals benefited from the 33% fall in the dollar, the surge in inflation from 2.9% in 1970 to 14.7% in 1980, and the Fed’s incapacity to get ahead of the inflation curve through most of the decade. Then-Fed Chair Paul Volcker burst this bubble when he boosted interest rates to 19% in 1981 to kill off inflation, which also started the 93% dollar rally that culminated in 1985. Tech stocks are in a bubble and the mania will expand further as long as inflation remains low and monetary conditions stay accommodative. In the 1980s, the mania centered on Japan. The Japanese economy experienced a miraculous post-war expansion, with real GDP per capita surging by a cumulative average growth rate of 7% between 1945 and 1980. By the mid-1980s, the prevailing belief was that Japanese firms would dominate every industry. Moreover, after the Ministry of Finance allowed the yen to surge following the September 1985 Plaza Accord, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) cut interest rates by 2.5%, creating very easy domestic monetary conditions. This lax policy setting unleashed a surge in credit and asset valuations that pushed up the Nikkei-225 five times by the end of the decade and resulted in an 860% increase in the value of Japanese banks. The BoJ lifted interest rates by 3.5 percentage points between 1987 and 1990. The market peaked in December 1989 and the Nikkei collapsed by 82% during the next 19 years. In the 1990s, tech stocks and the NASDAQ captured investors’ imagination. The internet, computing power and software, all drove an increase in productivity growth to a two-decade high and investors understood that the sector’s earnings prowess was only beginning. Moreover, as inflation fell through the 1990s, then-Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan kept policy rates more or less flat for four years before cutting the fed funds rate by 75 basis points in 1998. Additionally, around the turn of the millennium, the Fed increased the size of its balance sheet by $90 billion as a precautionary measure against Y2K. Consequently, with the ensuing euphoria, investors pushed the NASDAQ’s valuation to a P/E ratio of 72, extrapolating far into the future much-too-strong earnings growth. The bubble imploded when the Fed normalized policy. We are not even thinking about thinking about raising rates. In the 2000s, the dominant story was the unstoppable upswing of the Chinese economy, the nation’s rapid urbanization and insatiable thirst for commodities. The lack of investment in commodity extraction through the 1990s exacerbated the rally in natural resources. The easy Fed policy implemented in the wake of the tech crash of 2000 to 2003, and the dollar’s 40% plunge between 2002 and 2008 added to the bullish mix in favor of resources. Commodity indices surged and iron ore, which derives a particularly large share of demand from construction in China, increased 12-fold between 2000 and 2011. The rise in the broad trade-weighted dollar that began in 2011 along with a slowdown in Chinese growth initiated in 2010 ultimately quashed commodities. Is The Tech Bubble About To End? Chart I-2The Drivers Of The Tech Bubble The Drivers Of The Tech Bubble The Drivers Of The Tech Bubble Historically, bubbles often abort at the end of the decade in which they materialize. Will the ongoing mania suffer the same fate as its predecessors? For now, the pillars of the tech bubble remain intact. The strength of tech stocks reflects both their superior ability to generate cash flow growth and the structural decline in bond yields (Chart I-2). It is easy to understand why superior cash flow growth would result in strong tech performance, but the role of lower yields is not obvious. Tech stocks derive a large proportion of their intrinsic value from long-term deferred earnings and the terminal value of those cash flows. These distant profits are sensitive to fluctuations in the discount rate and, therefore, their present value soars when bond yields fall. The ability of tech to generate expanding earnings remains intact. Companies have curtailed capital expenditures due to the COVID-19 crisis, but they continue to spend on their software and hardware needs (Chart I-3). The growing prevalence of work-from-home arrangements and the proliferation of global cyberattacks (see Section II) will only feed the tech sector’s profit outperformance. Crucially, easy money and low interest rates will endure for an extended period. As Fed Chair Jerome Powell stated, “We are not even thinking about thinking about raising rates.” Our BCA Fed Monitor confirms this message (Chart I-4). Chart I-3Robust Tech Spending Robust Tech Spending Robust Tech Spending Chart I-4Easy Money As Far As The Eye Can See Easy Money As Far As The Eye Can See Easy Money As Far As The Eye Can See   Chart I-5Inflation Is The Tech Slayer Inflation Is The Tech Slayer Inflation Is The Tech Slayer Ultimately, much will depend on inflation. As BCA Research’s Equity Sector Strategy service recently demonstrated, the tech sector abhors rising inflation.2 Even during the seemingly unstoppable technology surge in the 1990s, the sector’s outperformance ended following an increase in core CPI (Chart I-5). Tech’s business model is optimized for deflationary conditions, especially when compared with other cyclical industries. Moreover, rising inflation puts upward pressure on interest rates and ultimately requires greater real interest rates to control accelerating CPI increases. Climbing real interest rates disproportionally hurt growth stocks, due to their heightened sensitivity to discount rates. Inflation will stay low as long as the labor market remains far from full employment. The slow progress in employment indicators suggests that the unemployment rate will be above NAIRU for at least two to three years (Chart I-6). Moreover, our Global CPI diffusion Index is also consistent with extended muted inflation (Chart I-7, top panels). The slowdown in money velocity and the weakness in the demand (as approximated by the smoothed growth rate of retail sales relative to average weekly earnings) will only exacerbate low inflation in the coming year or two (Chart I-7, bottom panels). Chart I-6Far From Full Employment Far From Full Employment Far From Full Employment Chart I-7For Now, Disinflation Dominates For Now, Disinflation Dominates For Now, Disinflation Dominates   In this context, valuations have room for more expansion. The NASDAQ may be pricey, but it is far from the 1990s’ nosebleed levels when nominal 10-year yields stood at 6.8% compared with today’s 0.55%, and 10-year TIPS yielded 4.3% and not their current -0.9%. In effect, both the equity risk premium and long-term expected growth rates embedded in tech stocks are much more conservative than in the late 1990s. The equity risk premium and long-term expected growth rates embedded in tech stocks are much more conservative than in the late 1990s. Finally, investors have largely missed the rally in stocks, which implies that a large proportion of the gains in tech stocks have not accrued to many investors. Since 2010, companies have been the main buyers of stocks while households and pension plans have constantly sold the asset class (Chart I-8). Additionally, investor sentiment remains firmly bearish and cash holdings of investors and households have surged in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic (Chart I-9). Thus, there is a lot of pent-up demand for financial assets. TINA (‘there is no alternative’) will invite investors to pour funds into equities with 10-year yields stuck near 0.6% and short rates at zero. Tech stocks will benefit from this trend. Chart I-8Households And Pension Plans Have Divested Households And Pension Plans Have Divested Households And Pension Plans Have Divested Chart I-9Not A Generalized Euphoria... Not A Generalized Euphoria... Not A Generalized Euphoria...     Practical Considerations For Investors Bubbles are highly dangerous for investors. A lack of participation in a mania often results in disastrous underperformance for institutional investors, but staying invested in the bubbly asset too long can be even more lethal for a portfolio’s performance. This dichotomy means that as long as there is low inflation and accommodative policy, we cannot underweight or overweight tech stocks. BCA Research’s equity strategists are neutral on tech, but within the sector they overweight the more defensive software and services components relative to the high-beta hardware and equipment industry groups.3 Three potential risks that can crystalize a period of correction in tech stocks over the remainder of 2020. Another risk inherent to bubbles is that they are often volatile; the current tech exuberance will not be different. In the second half of the 1990s, the NASDAQ experienced ten 10% or more corrections and tumbled by more than 20% in 1998 before leaping to new highs. Currently, we monitor three potential risks that can crystalize a period of correction in tech stocks over the remainder of 2020. Risk 1: Tech Earnings Do Not Meet The Hype Chart I-10...But A Localized Euphoria ...But A Localized Euphoria ...But A Localized Euphoria Today, tech stocks are vulnerable to a sharp pullback because investors are willing to bid up these shares in light of their perceived high growth rate (Chart I-10). This sector-specific euphoria increases the likelihood that if second-quarter tech earnings disappoint, then a significant correction will occur in widely held companies. The stock prices of Microsoft, Netflix and Snapchat have been punished following disappointing Q2 results. Retail investors indirectly amplify the risk created by potential earnings disappointments. Users of free trading apps (e.g.: Robinhood) are the marginal buyers, but more importantly their order flows are sold to large institutional houses who front-run these small players. Large investors with immense buying power can swing the price of the stocks popular with retail investors. Hence, when small investors unload due to bad news, a selling deluge ensues. Risk 2: A Weak Dollar Tech stocks thrive with a strong dollar because it is synonymous with low inflation and low yields. Consequently, a rising USD puts upward pressure on tech multiples. Moreover, a depreciating dollar is linked to robust global growth, which lifts the earnings prospects of other deep cyclical stocks more than tech equities, hurting the latter’s relative performance. The US election also creates a serious risk for tech stocks. The dollar is falling prey to a confluence of factors. The outlook for the US balance-of-payments is deteriorating sharply as the twin deficit explodes higher. Moreover, the national savings rate will remain in a downtrend after 2020 (Chart I-11). The US fiscal deficit will narrow from its current level of at least 18% of GDP, but it will not return for many years to the 4.6% of GDP that prevailed in 2019. The unemployment rate will stay above NAIRU for at least two to three years and the median voter increasingly favors economic populism. These two forces will generate high levels of spending. Meanwhile, a negative nominal output gap will weigh on tax revenues. Concerning private savings, the household savings rate will normalize from its April high of 33% of disposable income because consumer confidence will improve, thanks to strong consumer balance sheets and a limited decline in household net worth (Chart I-12). Chart I-11Vanishing US Savings Vanishing US Savings Vanishing US Savings Chart I-12Household Balance Sheets Are Alright Household Balance Sheets Are Alright Household Balance Sheets Are Alright   Chart I-13Forget The Breakup Songs For Now Forget The Breakup Songs For Now Forget The Breakup Songs For Now A poor balance of payments would not be a hurdle for the dollar if US real interest rates were high and foreign investors had confidence in the US economy, but neither of these conditions exists. US real interest rates have fallen relative to the rest of the world and the economic impact of the second wave of COVID-19 infections in the US partly explains the strength in the euro. Moreover, the recently agreed EUR750 billion of common bond issuance by the EU will curtail the probability of a euro breakup, which will compress European risk premia (Chart I-13). This development is highly positive for the euro, which could quickly move toward the 1.20 to 1.25 zone. The global economic recovery amplifies the negative impulse for the dollar. We have often argued that the USD is a countercyclical currency (Chart I-14).4  Hence, the recent uptick in Chinese stimulus and the positive outlook for the global industrial cycle bodes poorly for the US dollar. Moreover, a weak dollar can unleash a feedback loop that supercharges global growth. According to the Bank for International Settlements, foreign issuers have emitted $12-$14 trillion of USD-denominated liabilities. A weak dollar would diminish the cost of servicing this debt and ease global financial conditions, which would boost the world’s economic outlook. The brightening outlook would further feed the dollar’s weakness and underpin its momentum behavior (Chart I-14, bottom panel). Shifting international flows create the last major headwind for the US dollar. Fund repatriation by US economic agents has been a critical driver of the dollar since 2014. The USD rallied in tandem with a surge of repatriation in the wake of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, despite the lack of appetite for US assets by foreigners (Chart I-15). Now that the effect of the tax cuts has passed, repatriations are dwindling from their 2019 peak. Meanwhile, foreign investors’ appetite for dollar assets is not returning, especially as flows into US Treasurys are collapsing (Chart I-15, bottom panel). Chart I-14The Dollar Feedback Loop The Dollar Feedback Loop The Dollar Feedback Loop Chart I-15Flows Are Turning Against The Greenback Flows Are Turning Against The Greenback Flows Are Turning Against The Greenback   The dollar’s recent rally runs the risk of a short-term pause. Our USD Capitulation Index is at a level consistent with a short-term rebound (Chart I-16). Nonetheless, the list of dollar-bearish factors noted above suggests that any rebound in the dollar would be temporary. Risk 3: The Election Run-Up The US election also creates a serious risk for tech stocks. President Trump’s approval rating remains in tatters despite the vigorous rebound in equities since March 23 (Chart I-17). His support at this stage of the presidential cycle clearly lags that of previous presidents who were re-elected (Chart I-17, bottom panel). Consequently, our Geopolitical Strategy team assigns a subjective probability of 35% that he will remain in the White House next January.5 This creates two problems for investors. When cornered, President Trump often lashes out at foreign economies, which leads to geopolitical tensions. The heated rhetoric toward China will likely worsen in the coming three months, which raises the prospect of another leg in the US-Sino trade war, with negative effects for tech firms that extract 58% of their revenues from abroad. Furthermore, if former Vice-President Joe Biden clinches the presidency, then the Senate will turn Democrat. The Democrats will likely reverse Trump’s corporate tax cuts, which would hurt all stocks and prompt some liquidation in tech holdings. Chart I-16A Temporary Dollar Bounce Is Likely A Temporary Dollar Bounce Is Likely A Temporary Dollar Bounce Is Likely Chart I-17President Trump"s Disapproval Rating Is A Danger President Trump"s Disapproval Rating Is A Danger President Trump"s Disapproval Rating Is A Danger   The tech industry remains an attractive target for populist ire because of its wide profit margins and elevated concentration and market power. During the run-up to November 3rd, investors will be reminded that politicians on both sides of the aisle want to regulate tech. Investors will need to raise the equity risk premium for the sector as these voices get louder. Implications For The Broad Market The strength of the tech sector will be tested in the coming two quarters. Any short-term interruption to the mania prompted by the three aforementioned risks will cause a correction in the S&P 500 because the tech sector (including Google, Amazon, Facebook and Netflix) represents 40% of the index’s market capitalization (Chart I-18). As our equity strategist recently highlighted, without its five largest components (Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, Google and Facebook), the S&P 500 would have increased by only 23% in the past five years instead of its current 54% return. To add color to those numbers, these five tech titans have added $4.8 trillion to the S&P 500 market capitalization versus $3.8 trillion added by the next 495 companies.6   Any short-term interruption to the mania will cause a correction in the S&P 500. Despite this risk, we continue to anticipate that the S&P 500 will find a floor between 2800 and 2900.7 Some crucial factors underpin equities. Global monetary policy remains extraordinarily accommodative, China is stimulating aggressively, Washington will not let a large fiscal cliff destroy the recovery ahead of a presidential election, and the weaker dollar has a reflationary impact on global economic activity. Additionally, we still expect the second wave of COVID-19 to be less deadly than the first and result in much more limited lockdowns compared with March and April. BCA’s neutral stance on tech remains appropriate even after the short-term dynamics discussed above are factored in. The absence of inflationary pressures in the next two years or so and the position of global central banks that they will maintain loose monetary conditions until inflation has overshot a 2% target indicate that conditions persist for an expanding tech mania. Moreover, the dollar’s weakness is unlikely to last more than 12 to 18 months. The US still possesses a higher trend growth rate than the rest of the G-10 and sports a higher neutral rate of interest (Chart I-19). Additionally, China will ultimately rein in its ongoing credit expansion, which will hurt the global industrial cycle. Hence, the deterioration of interest rate differentials between the US and the rest of the world is temporary. Chart I-18The 1% Vs The 99% The 1% Vs The 99% The 1% Vs The 99% Chart I-19The US Still Has Stronger Trend Growth The US Still Has Stronger Trend Growth The US Still Has Stronger Trend Growth   The Return Of The Inflation Trade Chart I-20Will Yields Move Up? Will Yields Move Up? Will Yields Move Up? To navigate what will remain a trendless but volatile market until the presidential election, we still favor trades levered to the global economic recovery. Inflation breakeven rates can climb further. The inflation trade is back in fashion, with an increase in gold and commodity prices. The weakness in the dollar and the fall in real interest rates are both reflationary, and they will accelerate the uptick in inflation expectations, especially because global central banks have promised to stay behind the inflation curve as the economy recovers. Mounting inflation expectations will also create some near-term upside risks for nominal bond yields. Since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), an average of the ISM manufacturing survey and its prices paid component have provided useful early signals for yields. This indicator has turned sharply higher (Chart I-20). Moreover, commercial banks are quickly accumulating securities on their balance sheets, which is creating a lot of liquidity. Banks have been able to increase their book value despite generous loan-loss provisions, therefore, they will be able to transform this liquidity into loans when the economic outlook clears enough to ease credit standards. Bond yields will sniff out this situation ahead of time. Central banks want to maintain loose monetary conditions, but there is a limit to how much additional easing they will tolerate as the economy recovers and fiscal support remains generous. Hence, while inflation breakeven rates can move up, the decline in real yields has reached an advanced stage. In this context, if central banks do not provide further accommodation and inflation expectations go up, then real interest rates will cease to decline and nominal rates will start to drift higher. Silver will continue to outperform gold. While we have been positive on gold and gold stocks since June 2019,8 more recently we have strongly favored silver. Industrial uses constitute a larger share of the demand for silver than that of gold. As a result, the silver-to-gold ratio is highly pro-cyclical. While gold is vulnerable to an increased improvement in economic sentiment (Chart I-21), silver will continue to shine in an environment where inflation expectations increase further and economic activity is recovering. We continue to like global deep cyclical equities relative to defensive ones. We continue to like global deep cyclical equities relative to defensive ones. The pickup in China’s economic activity, as captured by our China Economic Diffusion Index, remains consistent with upside to this trade (Chart I-22). Domestic growth will accelerate further in the second half of 2020 because China’s credit flows continue to increase as a share of GDP, especially when companies have yet to spend the funds borrowed in the second quarter. Additionally, infrastructure spending will continue to expand as local governments have only issued 50% of their annual quota of special bonds (Chart I-22, bottom panel). Chart I-21A Risk For Gold A Risk For Gold A Risk For Gold Chart I-22China Is On The Go China Is On The Go China Is On The Go   An outperformance of deep cyclicals relative to defensive equities is also consistent with higher inflation expectations, a rising silver-to-gold ratio and a weaker US dollar (Chart I-23). The near-term outlook also supports buying industrial equities relative to tech stocks. While we have been positive on both materials and industrials, the former has lagged tech. However, our BCA Technical Indicator for US industrial stocks is massively oversold relative to the tech sector (Chart I-24). In light of a declining dollar, rising inflation breakeven rates, strengthening commodity prices and accelerating Chinese credit flows, the probability that industrials outperform tech for three to six months is rapidly escalating. Chart I-23The Inflation Trades The Inflation Trades The Inflation Trades Chart I-24Long Industrials / Short Tech Long Industrials / Short Tech Long Industrials / Short Tech   Our relative profits indicator between the industrial and tech sectors is rebounding from depressed readings. The global economic recovery will lift industrials’ revenues more than it will help the tech sector’s income because it will allow weak industrial production levels to improve relative to stable IT spending. Moreover, the industrial wage bill is well contained compared with the tech wage bill. The probability that industrials outperform tech for three to six months is rapidly escalating. Finally, our valuation indicator also favors industrials. Relative to tech stocks, industrial equities are trading at their largest discount since the aftermath of the GFC, suggesting that there is little downside left in this price ratio, at least as long as the dollar is correcting. Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst July 30, 2020 Next Report: August 27, 2020   II. Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Dear Clients, This month we offer you a Special Report on Russia and cyber security by our colleague and friend, Elmo Wright. Elmo recently retired from US Army civil service after 43 years working in intelligence, either on active duty, reserves, or as a civilian. From 2018 to 2020, he served as the senior civilian executive at the US Army National Ground Intelligence Center.  He has served on five continents and provided analysis of the most pressing global trends in national security and intelligence. In this Special Report with BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy team, Elmo analyzes Russia’s cyber capabilities and argues that structural and cyclical factors, including COVID-19, will ensure the continued salience of Russian and global cyber security challenges in the coming years. His thesis reinforces our recommendation that investors buy cyber security equities. Elmo’s work for this report is in his personal capacity and does not represent any position of the US government. Only publicly available information was used as background research material for Elmo’s contribution to the report. All very best, Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst As the US elections come closer, there will be a return to news about Russia and its potential interference via social media. Russia will continue to use cyber, both state sponsored attacks, and in coordination with criminal groups, to advance Russian national security objectives. In contrast to nuclear doctrine, there is no commonly accepted framework for cyber warfare between Russia and other nations that provides understandable signals for escalation, de-escalation, appropriate targets, or goals. US efforts to conduct military operations against Russia or China would likely be countered by Russian or Chinese cyber operations before any physical military operations could be initiated. Cyber security stocks offer a way for investors to capitalize on our long-term themes of nationalism, multipolarity, and de-globalization. The ISE Cyber Security Index offers value relative to the broad NASDAQ and S&P 500 indexes as well as the S&P tech sector. Chart II-1Russian Cyber Interference Resurfaces Around US Elections Russian Cyber Interference Resurfaces Around US Elections Russian Cyber Interference Resurfaces Around US Elections As the national elections in the US come closer, there will be a return to news about Russia and its potential interference via social media. Indeed Russia is making headlines even as we go to press. This report aims to provide context for Russian cyber capabilities in general as a contributor to overall geopolitical instability (Chart II-1). We forecast Russia will continue to use cyber, both state sponsored attacks, and in coordination with criminal groups, to advance Russian national security objectives. As background, the word cyber is commonly accepted to be derived from cybernetics, a phrase attributed to Norbert Wiener, an MIT scientist. The phrase itself is related to the ancient Greek word for steering or helmsman, in other words, control. Chart II-2Russian Excellence In Math Makes It Competitive In Cybernetics August 2020 August 2020 Russia has a long history of excellence in science, especially theoretical work in mathematics and physics (Chart II-2). Those fields can explain natural phenomena in formulas and mathematical relationships. The Soviets believed that centralized state planning that manipulated data in formulas could lead to better outcomes in all aspects of the society. Although central state economic planning did not work out for the Soviet economy, Soviet military science built on the concept of data relationships in formulas to develop its theory of troop control, a derivative of reflexive control, that is, the presenting of data to the recipient, either friendly or enemy, in order to get that recipient to act in a way favorable to Soviet military plans. One can see the Soviets embraced the idea of cybernetics as very congruent to their desire for top down control. Russia, as the core part of the Soviet Union, retained significant numbers of scientists and mathematicians who were naturally drawn to the ability of computers to take data and manipulate that data according to formulas. Other Russian scientists and mathematicians emigrated to the West where their expertise was rewarded in the rise in the use of computers to manipulate data. Over time, the term cyber has come to be associated with many aspects of computers, especially the intellectual and physical structures hidden behind the direct interface of a person with a keyboard and screen. Russian expertise in the use of computers to do cyber work was not limited to working for the State. As the Soviet Union broke apart and many people lost their jobs working for the State, there were those persons who took their talents to criminal ventures. And in the symbiotic nature of society in Russia, many of those who went into criminal ventures were former intelligence and security personnel who could maintain their connection to the official organizations that were successors to the KGB, the GRU, and others. Russia is the source of the most sophisticated cyber threats to the US. Senior Russian military officials, such as General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation armed forces, equivalent to the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have noted the growth of nonmilitary means of achieving strategic goals, and specifically in the information space. Gerasimov, in an article in 2013, has been widely quoted that all elements of national power have to be harnessed, including cyber capabilities. One Soviet and Russian military concept that relates to the information space is maskirovka, the use of camouflage, deception, and disinformation to confuse the enemy. Maskirovka is intimately connected with the Soviet/Russian concept of “active measures”. Active measures include actions taken generally by intelligence services to provide propaganda, false information, and otherwise sow discord and confusion among the enemy ranks at all levels of war as well as in the political, economic, and social spheres. In today’s time period, cyber, especially social media, offers the opportunity for the wide spread of aspects of maskirovka and active measures to all users, as well as targeted groups (Chart II-3). Reporting indicates a continued Russian emphasis on cyber as a means for active measures concealed by maskirovka. Chart II-3Social Media Offers Russia An Opportunity For The Spread Of Maskirovka August 2020 August 2020 Wikileaks has provided a platform for the dissemination of information normally hidden from the general public. It is noteworthy how much of the information on the Wikileaks platform relates to the US and the West, and relatively little on Russia. Possible factors that explain that characteristic include the disparity in penalties for disclosing information between the US and the West versus Russia; the greater number of journalists and other persons involved in the media, both for profit and personal reasons, in the West; and the language barriers involved in understanding Russian versus English. A final possible factor in Wikileaks greater dissemination of Western information might be an aspect of active measures undertaken by Russia. There are numerous actions attributed to Russian state actors in the cyber field in the recent past (Table II-1). They include a distributed denial of service attack on Estonia (2007); hacking the Ministry of Defense in the country of Georgia during a military conflict (2008); attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure (2015); and the hacking of the Democratic National Committee (2016). Chancellor Angela Merkel recently publicly named and shamed Russia for a cyber-attack on Germany circa 2015 (Appendix). Table II-1Russian State Actors Responsible For Many Of This Year’s Cyber Attacks August 2020 August 2020 Chart II-4Russian Use Of Cyber Is A Top Threat To The US August 2020 August 2020 Senior US officials have cited Russia as the source of the most sophisticated cyber threats to the US, both for espionage and state sponsored attacks against US national security capabilities such as energy, transportation, and telecommunications infrastructure; as well as for criminal activity such as ransom ware and identity theft. Russian use of cyber, both state sponsored and sponsoring criminal actors, has been the top threat to the US in each of the US intelligence community’s annual threat assessments for 2017, 2018, and 2019 (Chart II-4). Although the 2020 annual threat assessment was not made public in Congressional testimony, there’s little reason to suspect that Russian use of cyber would not continue to be cited as the top threat. Other nation states have state sponsored cyber capabilities which are of national security concern to the US, including China, Iran, and North Korea. These nation states are called out in the US intelligence community Annual Threat Assessments. Each of these nation states has been identified as committing intelligence and economic cyber attacks against the US and other Western nations. The recent speech by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation designates China as the top threat. Given the nature of the internet, the pathway of a cyber attack will likely bounce around multiple countries before reaching its intended target. As the Director notes, forensic identification of the source of a cyber attack takes time and expertise. However, there is a clear record of specifically identifying the state sponsored entity that commits attacks on US or Western government information technology and infrastructure. More likely than confusing one state sponsored cyber actor from one country to another would be the potential blending of criminal elements across national boundaries. In this case, cyber criminal elements with Russian backgrounds or connections are clearly the most capable. Cyber-crime is rising despite deterrence. The stages of cyber conflict include reconnaissance, penetration, mapping, exfiltration, and operations. The US National Security Agency has an extensive technical cyber threat framework which goes into much detail. Cyber security professionals note the ongoing actions in cyber space and the attempts by elements suspected to be linked to Russia to gain and maintain access to US networks for potential military operations, or to exfiltrate data for criminal or other purposes. Part of the frustration of cyber security experts is the lack of transparency and timely reporting of those affected by malign cyber activities. Although some cyber activities may go on for multiple months, the exfiltration of data, or the emplacement of malware may only take a few seconds. Many networks lack the ability to detect penetration and mapping. Companies with large resources devoted to cyber security may have that investment negated if they have affiliations with other companies with lax cyber security which can allow for hostile intrusions into the connected network. Chart II-5Unlike Nuclear Doctrine, Cyber Lacks A Framework To Control Escalation August 2020 August 2020 Unfortunately, public and open attribution for cyber attacks has lagged. As an example, although the attack on the Democratic National Committee email servers was noted in 2016, it was not until 2018 that specific Russian individuals were charged with the crime. Factors that cause lags in public and open attribution include the difficulty of tracing specific computer code through cyberspace; the disjointed nature of the internet; the lack of an easy and accepted mechanism for involvement of US intelligence agencies in providing assistance to private sector parties; and the reticence of individuals and organizations negatively affected by cyber attacks to publicly disclose their injuries. Doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons developed over a period of years in the US and the West and in the Soviet bloc. The Soviets developed a coherent doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons that was understandable to the West. Arms control agreements between nuclear powers established mechanisms for controlling escalation of tensions (Chart II-5). The Soviet doctrine was adopted by the Russians after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russia and Western nations continue to have a common understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in military affairs that allows for discussion of escalation and de-escalation. In contrast to nuclear doctrine, there is no commonly accepted framework for cyber warfare between Russia and other nations that provides understandable signals for escalation, de-escalation, appropriate targets, or goals. This is reflected in the Russian information security doctrine of 2016 which notes “The absence of international legal norms regulating inter-State relations in the information space…” The US Director of National Intelligence also noted this lack of agreement in his annual threat assessment testimony of 2017. Chart II-6Rapid Growth Of Internet Raises Vulnerability To Harmful Actions August 2020 August 2020 The rapid growth of the internet, and reliance on it by government and private sectors reflects its founding as an open system, vulnerable to negative actors and actions (Chart II-6). The intermingling of hardware and software, the information infrastructure used both by individuals and states, by the private sector and by government, makes separating doctrine and practice for cyberwar from legitimate use very difficult. Since non-cyber military capabilities, both conventional, and nuclear, rely upon the use of commercial information technology infrastructure, the use of offensive cyber is subject to the problem of blowback. As the NotPetya incident of 2018 indicated, damage from malware installed on one computer can rapidly spread across networks, industries, and international boundaries. The code for StuxNet and the code released by the more recent hack of CIA cyber tools have been noted in other cases of cyber attacks. The view of the international cyber environment by Russia is very similar to views in the US and the West. The Russian national security doctrine of 2015 notes “... An entire spectrum of political, financial-economic, and informational instruments have been set in motion in the struggle for influence in the international arena. Increasingly active use is being made of special services' potential … The intensifying confrontation in the global information arena caused by some countries' aspiration to utilize informational and communication technologies to achieve their geopolitical objectives, including by manipulating public awareness and falsifying history, is exerting an increasing influence on the nature of the international situation.” Although much of the Russian information security doctrine of 2016 is concerned with noting threats to Russia’s information space, what might be called counterintelligence in other documents, there are key comments that note the suitability of using attacks in the information space as an effective means of projecting Russian power, such as “… improving information support activities to implement the State policy of the Russian Federation …” As per usual Soviet and Russian state doctrinal documents, the 2016 doctrine notes all the negative activity of other actors in this field. This practice is consistent with historical Soviet and Russian open press documents which ascribe to other states the activities in which Russia engages or plans to engage. Chart II-7Cyber Attacks Are On The Rise August 2020 August 2020 Unlike other forms of national security alliances, such as for intelligence, there is little public literature on cyber alliances, especially for offensive action. For example, the US and Israel have never publicly acknowledged a government alliance to emplace the StuxNet virus into the Iranian nuclear development program. Should there be offensive cyber alliances in the West, it is likely they fall along traditional intelligence and defense lines. There is no public reporting on any sort of offensive cyber alliances that involve Russia. There are public efforts at common standards for information technology security, but these efforts are foundering on citizen and government concerns over privacy, as well as commercial  proprietary advantage. It is an open question as to whether cyber alliances among friendly nations would deter would-be cyber attackers or hackers. Certainly the growth of complaints to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center would indicate that statements of deterrence and even prosecutions are failing to reduce cyber attacks (Chart II-7). Both the US national intelligence community and private sector cybersecurity companies agree Russia has a sophisticated state sponsored effort to acquire intelligence via hacking and insert favorable themes into cyberspace via the use of social media. There is also agreement that Russia state elements have a close relationship with criminal elements which can provide a plausibly deniable means of engaging in cyber warfare activities favorable to Russia, as well as engaging in activities for illegal economic advantage. For example, see this quote from the CYBEREASON Intel team: “The crossing of official state sponsored hacking with cybercriminal outfits has created a specter of Russian state hacking that is far larger than their actual program. This hybridization of tools, actors, and missions has created one of the most potent and ill-defined advanced threats that the cybersecurity community faces. It has also created the most technically advanced and bold cybercriminal community in the world. When, as a criminal, your patronage is the internal security service that is charged with tracking and arresting cybercrime, your only concern becomes staying within their defined bounds of acceptable risk and not what global norms, laws, or even domestic Russian law states.” The US Department of Justice in June 2020 noted a Russian national was sentenced to prison for malicious cyber activities. Key points of his illegal activity were the operation of websites open only to Russian speakers, and the vetting or recommendation of other criminals before allowing entry to the websites. One analysis of this situation notes the ties to Russian state security organs and personnel which likely held up the Russian national’s extradition for trial in the US. Government leaders in the US have noted the potential for major cyber attacks in the US affecting physical infrastructure and causing significant economic and social damage, including further attacks on the political election process. However, they have been reticent to state any explicit sort of retaliation. The US Cyber Command notes it is actively combatting hostile cyber actors. Therefore, the question remains open as to what level of cyber attacks would be considered serious enough to be treated as an act of war by the US. There has been public speculation of both Russian and Chinese implants of malware into the US information technology infrastructure that might be activated in the case of open hostilities. US efforts to conduct military operations against Russia or China would likely be countered by Russian or Chinese cyber operations before any physical military operations could be initiated, especially since US based forces would have to transit oceans, taking many days, when cyber operations could happen in seconds. China, Russia, and Iran will also increasingly become victims of cyber attacks. Russian “gray zone” tactics, that is, actions short of large scale conventional war, many of which involve cyber attacks, active measures, and maskirovka, are the subject of much Department of Defense planning and action. To combat such gray zone activity analysis from the RAND Corporation notes the need for a spectrum of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic actions, which would involve commercial partners and allied nations. The difficulty of coordinating such counter action is one reason the Russians continue their gray zone efforts. Russia’s unique characteristics, some of which are weaknesses compared to the US and the West, are indicative of why Russia engages in state sponsored as well as criminal cyber activities (Chart II-8). Russian scientific history, the intertwining of state and criminal elements, and continent-spanning location are factors which promote the use of cyber. Russia’s economic position vis-à-vis the US, Russia’s relative lack of military power projection capability beyond the states on its borders (the Near Abroad), except for its nuclear forces, and Russia’s declining demographic situation are negative factors which push Russia to use cyber as a cost effective means of advancing national security and economic policy (Chart II-9). Despite US and Western imposed sanctions on Russia for past misdeeds, none of the factors noted above will be changed in the near future. Therefore, those factors, and published Russian doctrine should indicate to Western governments and businesses that Russia will continue to use cyber as a means to advance Russian national security objectives, as well as a means to siphoning off wealth from the West via criminal activities. Chart II-8Russia's Relative Weakness Drives Engagement In Cyber Activities Russia's Relative Weakness Drives Engagement In Cyber Activities Russia's Relative Weakness Drives Engagement In Cyber Activities Chart II-9Deteriorating Demographics Also Drive Russia’s Cyber Activities August 2020 August 2020   US preparedness for Russian cyber activity in the upcoming months should be greater given several factors. First, there is clearly awareness of a Russian cyber threat to US interests across government and in the private sector. Second, the US has established new organizations, shifted resources of money and people, and had practice defending against cyber attacks since the 2016 US election cycle. However, the US information technology infrastructure is vast and porous, making it hard to protect against every threat. Russian cyber actors, both state sponsored and criminal, are smart and persistent. Investment Takeaways Cyber security companies offer a way for investors to capitalize on major themes arising from the COVID-19 crisis and its aftermath. These themes include not only changes in worker behavior, e-commerce, corporate culture, and network security, but also our major geopolitical themes like nationalism and the retreat from globalization. Reports as we go to press that Russian hackers have targeted vaccine developers in the US, UK, and Canada underscore the point. The trend is not limited to Russia or COVID-19 vaccines. It is all too apparent from the actions of Russia and China – as well as the increasing efforts by the US and its allies to patrol their own cyber realms, IT systems, and ideological discourse – that governments view the Internet as a frontier to be conquered and fortified rather than as a free space of human exchange in which globalization can operate unfettered (Map II-1). Map II-1Governments View The Internet As A Frontier To Be Conquered August 2020 August 2020 Formal measures of country risk are inadequate but provide some perspective as to which countries and companies are least prepared. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations body charged with monitoring information technology and communications. It ranks countries according to their commitment to cyber security and their exposure to cyber security risks (Chart II-10). Chart II-10Countries Have An Imperative To Strengthen Cyber Security August 2020 August 2020 We take these rankings with a grain of salt knowing that advanced countries like the US and UK rank near the top of the list, and yet are the prime targets of hackers and thus face enormous cyber security risks. What is clear is that no country is safe and every country has an economic and national security imperative to strengthen its cyber security. These indexes also suggest that several European countries are less well prepared than one would think and that emerging markets are grossly underprepared. China, Russia and Iran should not be thought of only as aggressors – they will increasingly become targets as the West seeks to counteract them. As Russia expands operations it becomes a target of cyber counter-strikes as well as economic sanctions. And as China accelerates its drive to become a high tech giant, it encourages economic decoupling from the West and retaliation for its use of cyber-theft and state-based hacking. There are two main cyber security equity indexes – the NASDAQ CTA Cybersecurity Index (NQCYBR) and NASDAQ ISE Cyber Security Index (HXR). These indexes trade in line with each other and have rallied extensively since the COVID-19 crisis (Chart II-11). Investors are aware that the surge in working from home and companies conducting operations off-site, as well as geopolitical great power struggle, have created extensive new vulnerabilities and capex requirements. On April 24, we recommended that investors go long the ISE index relative to the S&P 500 information technology sector. We are also going long the ISE index relative to the NASDAQ on a strategic horizon. Tech has been the prime beneficiary of the COVID-19 crisis while the necessary corollary of the tech companies’ continued success is the need for security of their information, property, and customers (Chart II-12). We also favor the ISE index because it has a slightly heavier cyclical component due to the fact that 13% of its companies are in the industrial sector, compared to 10% for the CTA index. The industrial side should benefit more as economies reopen and recover. Chart II-11Cyber Security Stocks Have Benefited From COVID-19 ... Cyber Security Stocks Have Benefited From COVID-19 ... Cyber Security Stocks Have Benefited From COVID-19 ... Chart II-12... But Not So Much Relative To Broad Tech Sector ... But Not So Much Relative To Broad Tech Sector ... But Not So Much Relative To Broad Tech Sector   These indexes are tracked by two ETFs. The First Trust NASDAQ Cybersecurity ETF (CIBR) tracks the NASDAQ CTA index with an emphasis on larger companies, while the ETFMG Prime Cyber Security ETF (HACK) tracks the ISE index, companies with market capitalization lower than $250 million, and a slightly lower exposure to the communications sector as opposed to IT and software. The HACK ETF has lagged the CIBR this year so far and offers an opportunity for investors to invest in data protection and up-and-coming firms. Over the past ten years cyber security has proven to be a volatile investment space with rapidly increasing competition for market share. But the secular tailwinds are powerful and a diversified exposure to the sector will be rewarding for investors positioning for the post-COVID-19 world. Elmo Wright Consulting Editor Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Appendix Appendix Table II-1Major Cyber-Attacks Over The Past Decade August 2020 August 2020 Works Cited Coats, Dan. “Statement For The Record Worldwide Threat Assessment Of The Us Intelligence Community,” May 23, 2017. Coats, Dan. “Statement For The Record Worldwide Threat Assessment Of The Us Intelligence Community,” March 6, 2018. Coats, Dan. “Annual Threat Assessment Opening Statement,” January 29, 2019. CyberReason Intel Team, “Russia And Nation-State Hacking Tactics: A Report From Cybereason Intelligence Group,” cybereason.com, June 5, 2017. Department of Justice, “Russian National Sentenced To Prison For Operating Websites Devoted To Fraud And Malicious Cyber Activities”, June 26, 2020. Department of Justice, “U.S. Charges Russian FSB Officers And Their Criminal Conspirators For Hacking Yahoo And Millions Of Email Accounts, Fsb Officers Protected, Directed, Facilitated And Paid Criminal Hackers”, March 15, 2017. Gerasimov, Vasily. “The Value Of Science In Prediction,” Military Industrial Courier, Feb 27, 2013. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Internet Crime Complaint Center Marks 20 Years From Early Frauds to Sophisticated Schemes, IC3 Has Tracked the Evolution of Online Crime,” May 8, 2020. Fedorov, Yuriy Ye. “Arms Control In The Information Age” Symposium “Emerging Challenges In The Information Age,” 23 January 2002, Arlington, Virginia. Galeotti, Mark. “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ And Russian Non-Linear War,” In Moscow’s Shadows, July 6, 2014. Greenberg, Andy. “The Untold Story Of Notpetya, The Most Devastating Cyberattack In History,” Wired Magazine, August 22, 2018. Krebs, Brian. “Why Were the Russians So Set Against This Hacker Being Extradited?,” Krebs on Security, Nov 18, 2019. Lusthaus, Jonathan.  “Cybercrime in Southeast Asia Combating a global threat locally,” May 20, 2020. Mattis, James. Department of Defense, “Summary Of The 2018 National Defense Strategy Of The United States Of America”. Meakins, Joss. “Living in (Digital) Denial: Russia’s Approach To Cyber Deterrence,” Russia Matters, July 2018. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. “Doctrine Of Information Security Of The Russian Federation,” Dec 5, 2016. Nakasone, Paul.  “Cybercom Commander Briefs Reporters At White House,” Department of Defense video briefing, Aug 2, 2018. National Security Agency, “NSA/CSS Technical Cyber Threat Framework V2”, a report from: Cybersecurity Operations The Cybersecurity Products And Sharing Division, 29 November 2018. Pettijohn and Wasser.  “Competing In The Gray Zone,” RAND Corporation, 2019.  Putin, Vladimir.  “Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation,” Office of the President of the Russian Federation, Dec 31, 2015. Russian National Security Strategy 31 Dec 2015, Russia Matters. Snegovaya, Maria. “Putin’s Information Warfare In Ukraine: Soviet Origins Of Russia's Hybrid Warfare,” Institute for the Study of War, Sep 22, 2015. Tsygichko, V. N. “About Categories of “Correlation Of Forces” for Potential Military Conflicts in the New Era,” Symposium “Emerging Challenges In The Information Age,” 23 January 2002, Arlington, Virginia. Wiener, Norbert, Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, (1948). III. Indicators And Reference Charts We continue to favor stocks at the expense of bonds, but the risk of a tech-led correction has only grown. Moreover, the number of new COVID-19 cases in the US remains elevated and similarly disturbing trends are beginning to take shape in Europe. The recovery could hit a temporary pothole. Finally, as the November election approaches, political and geopolitical risks will come back on investors’ radar screens. Nonetheless, global monetary conditions remain highly accommodative and the risk of inflation in the short-term is minimal. Also, fiscal policy is extremely loose, and despite some procrastination, Congress will pass another large package by August 10, which will protect the economy against a violent relapse. Hence, the worst outcome over the coming three to five months is for the S&P 500 to retest of the 2800-2900 zone. On a cyclical basis, the same indicators that made us willing buyers of stocks since late March remain broadly in place. Stocks are expensive, but monetary conditions are extremely accommodative. Our Speculation Indicator continues to send a benign signal, which indicates that from a cyclical perspective, the market is not especially vulnerable. Finally, our Revealed Preference Indicator continues to flash a strong buy signal. Tactical indicators suggest that equities must digest the gains made since March 23. Both our Tactical Strength Indicator and the share of NYSE stocks trading above their 10-week moving average are elevated. Additionally, positioning in the derivatives market indicates some degree of vulnerability. Nonetheless, these risks must be put into perspective. Our Composite Sentiment Indicator is not flagging a top in the market and the AAII survey shows a predominance of bears over bulls. As a result, any correction should be limited to 10%. According to our Bond Valuation Index, Treasurys remain extremely expensive. Additionally, our Composite Technical Indicator continues to lose momentum. Guided by the FOMC’s communications, the market has decided that the recovery will lift inflation but that the Fed will stand pat. Consequently, yields are not moving up, but real rates are declining as inflation expectations inch higher. This trend is likely to be at a late stage, and the passage of additional fiscal support as well as a weak dollar will put a floor under real yields. In this context, Treasury yields should begin to rise in the closing months of 2020. The dollar breakdown has now fully taken shape. The greenback is expensive and its counter-cyclicality is a major handicap during a global economic recovery. Additionally, the US twin deficits are increasingly problematic. Fiscal deficits remain exceptionally wide and the household savings rate will not remain as elevated as it is today. The current account deficit is therefore bound to widen. The continued low level of real interest rates will complicate financing this deficit and to equilibrate the funding of US liabilities, the dollar will depreciate. Technically, our Composite Technical Indicator for the dollar has also broken down, which warns that a period of cyclical weakness has begun for the greenback. Nonetheless, our Dollar Capitulation Index is now in oversold territory, and a countertrend bounce is very likely in the coming weeks. Commodities are gaining traction. The Advance / Decline line for the Continuous Commodity Index has broken out to the upside, which suggests that the CCI could punch above its pre-COVID levels by yearend. A weak dollar, low real yields and a global industrial recovery are highly positive for natural resource prices. Within that asset class, gold has made new all-time highs. Gold is especially sensitive to lower real rates and a weak dollar. Sentiment and positioning for the yellow metal are stretched. Any rebound in economic sentiment could push real rates higher, which would cause gold to correct meaningfully in the near future, even if it remains in a cyclical uptrend. A dollar rebound is another tactical risk for gold. EQUITIES: Chart III-1US Equity Indicators US Equity Indicators US Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3US Equity Sentiment Indicators US Equity Sentiment Indicators US Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5US Stock Market Valuation US Stock Market Valuation US Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6US Earnings US Earnings US Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9US Treasurys And Valuations US Treasurys And Valuations US Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected US Bond Yields Selected US Bond Yields Selected US Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16US Dollar And PPP US Dollar And PPP US Dollar And PPP Chart III-17US Dollar And Indicator US Dollar And Indicator US Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18US Dollar Fundamentals US Dollar Fundamentals US Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28US And Global Macro Backdrop US And Global Macro Backdrop US And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29US Macro Snapshot US Macro Snapshot US Macro Snapshot Chart III-30US Growth Outlook US Growth Outlook US Growth Outlook Chart III-31US Cyclical Spending US Cyclical Spending US Cyclical Spending Chart III-32US Labor Market US Labor Market US Labor Market Chart III-33US Consumption US Consumption US Consumption Chart III-34US Housing US Housing US Housing Chart III-35US Debt And Deleveraging US Debt And Deleveraging US Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36US Financial Conditions US Financial Conditions US Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China   Mathieu Savary Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst   Footnotes 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report "EM Equities: Concentration And Mania Risks," dated July 16, 2020, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see US Equity Strategy Special Report "Revisiting Equity Sector Winners And Losers When Inflation Climbs," dated June 1, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see US Equity Strategy Special Report “US Dollar Bear Market: What To Buy & What To Sell," dated June 22, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report “January 2020," dated December 20, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report "What Is The Risk Of A Contested US Election?," dated July 27, 2020, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see US Equity Strategy Insight Report "S&P 5 Versus S&P 495," dated July 23, 2020, available at uses.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report "July 2020," dated June 25, 2020, available at bca.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report "June 2019," dated May 30, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com

Highlights The EU’s €750 billion fiscal package, along with another round of US stimulus likely exceeding $1 trillion, will support global oil demand. On the supply side, OPEC 2.0’s production discipline likely holds, and US shale output will remain depressed. These fundamentals, along with a weakening USD, will continue to support Brent prices, which are up 129% from their lows in April. China’s record-setting crude-oil-import surge during the COVID-19 pandemic – averaging 12.7mm b/d in 1H20, up 28.5% y/y – is at risk of slowing in 2H20, as domestic storage fills. Supply-side risks are acute: Massive OPEC 2.0 spare capacity – which could exceed 6mm b/d into 2021 – will tempt producers eager to monetize these to boost revenue. On the demand side, COVID-19 infection rates are surging in the US. Progress on vaccines notwithstanding, politically intolerable public-health risks in big consuming markets could usher in demand-crushing lockdowns again. Economic policy uncertainty remains elevated globally, but the balance of risks continues to favor the upside: We expect 2H20 Brent prices to average $44/bbl, and 2021 prices to average $65/bbl, unchanged from last month’s forecast. Feature We are marginally lifting our forecast of average 2020 Brent prices to $43/bbl, with 2H20 expected to average $44/bbl, and $65/bbl next year, unchanged from June. Marginal improvements to preliminary supply and demand estimates earlier in the COVID-19 pandemic support the thesis that fundamentals will not derail the massive oil-price rally that lifted Brent 129% from its April 21 low of $19.30/bbl. A weakening US dollar, and the expectation this trend will continue, also is supportive to commodities in general, oil in particular. As a result, we are marginally lifting our forecast of average 2020 Brent prices to $43/bbl, with 2H20 expected to average $44/bbl, and $65/bbl next year, unchanged from June (Chart of the Week). The three principal oil-market data providers – the US EIA, IEA and OPEC – raised demand estimates at the margin for 1H20, particularly for 2Q20, the nadir for global oil consumption. The EIA’s estimate for 2Q20 demand shows an upward revision of 550k b/d from last month’s estimate. On the supply side, the EIA estimates global output fell -8.1mm b/d in 2Q20, a -300k b/d downward revision vs. its estimate from last month (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekOil Price Rally Remains Intact Oil Price Rally Remains Intact Oil Price Rally Remains Intact Chart 2OPEC 2.0, US Shale Production Cuts Deepen OPEC 2.0, US Shale Production Cuts Deepen OPEC 2.0, US Shale Production Cuts Deepen We continue to expect the drawdown in storage levels to flatten – and then backwardate – the forward curves for Brent and WTI. After accounting for this better-than-expected fundamental performance, we now expect global supply to fall 5.9mm b/d in 2020 and to increase 4.2mm b/d in 2021. On the demand side, we now expect 2020 demand to fall 8.1mm b/d vs. 8.9mm b/d last month, and for 2021 demand to rise 7.8mm b/d vs 8.5mm b/d in June (Chart 3). This will keep the physical deficit we’ve been forecasting for 2H20 and 2021 in place, allowing OECD storage to fall to 3,026mm barrels by year-end and to 2,766mm barrels by the end of next year (Chart 4). Chart 3Supply-Demand Balances Tighten ... Supply-Demand Balances Tighten ... Supply-Demand Balances Tighten ... Chart 4... Leading To Deeper Storage Draws ... ... Leading To Deeper Storage Draws ... ... Leading To Deeper Storage Draws ... We continue to expect the drawdown in storage levels to flatten – and then backwardate – the forward curves for Brent and WTI (Chart 5). One caveat, though: We are watching floating storage levels closely, particularly in Asia: The current structure of the Brent forwards does not support carrying floating inventory, but it’s been slow moving lower (Chart 6). This could reflect a slowing in China’s crude-oil import surge, which hit record levels in May and June. Chart 5... And More Backwardation In Brent And WTI Forwards ... ... And More Backwardation In Brent And WTI Forwards ... ... And More Backwardation In Brent And WTI Forwards ... Chart 6… Even As Floating Storage In Asia Remains Elevated Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside China’s Crude-Import Binge Ending? There is a non-trivial risk China’s crude-buying binge during the COVID-19 pandemic, which supported prices during the brief Saudi-Russian market-share war in March and the collapse in global demand in 2Q20, may have run its course (Chart 7).1 At the depths of the global pandemic in 2Q20, China’s year-on-year (y/y) crude imports surged 15%. According to Reuters, China’s crude oil imports totaled 12.9mm b/d in June, a record level for the second month in a row.2 Much of this was converted to refined products – chiefly gasoline and diesel fuel – as China’s demand recovered from the global pandemic (Chart 8). China’s 208 refineries can process 22.3mm b/d of crude, according to the Baker Institute at Rice University in Houston.3 Refinery runs in June were estimated at just over 14mm b/d by Reuters. Chart 7China's Crude Import Binge Stalls China's Crude Import Binge Stalls China's Crude Import Binge Stalls Chart 8China's Refiners Lift Runs As Imports Surge China's Refiners Lift Runs As Imports Surge China's Refiners Lift Runs As Imports Surge A reduction in China’s crude imports would force barrels to either remain on the water until refiners find a need for it, or demand for refined products increases in the region. China imports its oil into 59 port facilities, which can process ~ 16mm b/d. Storage is comprised of 74 crude oil facilities holding ~ 706mm barrels, and 213 refined-product facilities with capacity to hold ~ 357mm barrels of products (Map 1). By Reuters’s count, ~ 2mm b/d of crude went into storage in the January-May period, while close to 2.8mm b/d was stored in June. Official storage data is a state secret, so it is not possible to determine whether China’s crude and product storage is full. However, if crude oil imports remain subdued – and floating storage in Asia remains elevated – we would surmise the Chinese storage facilities are close to full. Additionally, any sharp and sustained increase in refined product exports would indicate storage is brimming. Map 1Baker Institute China Oil Map Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside A reduction in China’s crude imports would force barrels to either remain on the water until refiners find a need for it, or demand for refined products increases in the region. We expect the latter condition to obtain, in line with our expectation of a global recovery in demand, even though China remains out of sync with the rest of the world presently. China was the first state to confront the pandemic and first to emerge out of it; its trading partners still are in various stages of recovery (Chart 9). Chart 9China's Demand Recovery Likely Will Be Choppy China's Demand Recovery Likely Will Be Choppy China's Demand Recovery Likely Will Be Choppy OPEC 2.0’s Remains Sensitive To Demand Fluctuations OPEC 2.0’s leaders – the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – also managed to secure additional “compensation” cuts from members that have missed their targets in previous months. The asynchronous recovery in global oil demand poses a unique problem for OPEC 2.0 this year and next. OPEC 2.0 will be easing production curtailments to 7.7mm b/d beginning in August from 9.6mm b/d in July, on the advice of its Joint Ministerial Monitoring Committee (JMMC). This is a decision that will be closely monitored, amid rising concern over the speed of demand recovery in the US and EM economies, due to mounting COVID-19 cases (Chart 10). The surge in US infections relative to its trading partners is of particular concern, given the size of US oil demand (Chart 11). In 2H20, we expect US demand will account for close to 20% of global demand, much the same level it was prior to the pandemic (Table 1). Chart 10COVID-19 Infections Surge In The US Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside Chart 11US COVID-19 Infections Are A Risk To Global Commodity Demand Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside OPEC 2.0’s leaders – the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – also managed to secure additional “compensation” cuts from members that have missed their targets in previous months, bringing the actual increase in production closer to 1-1.5mm b/d. Together, Iraq, Nigeria, Kazakhstan, and Angola, over-produced versus their May and June targets by ~ 760k b/d. In our balances estimates, as is our normal practice, we haircut these estimates and use a lower compliance level that those stated in the official OPEC 2.0 agreement. In the case of these producers, we assume they will compensate for ~ 70% of their overproduction, bringing the adjusted cuts to ~ 8.3mm b/d. This should be sufficient to maintain the current supply deficit in oil markets that continues to support Brent prices above $40/bbl. However, the reliance on laggards’ extra cuts to balance markets adds instability. There is a lot of supply on the sidelines from the OPEC 2.0 cuts and the restart of the Neutral Zone shared by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The JMMC is continually assessing supply-demand balances and remains focused on making sure the totality of the cuts does not fall on a small group of countries. It reiterated its position that “achieving 100% conformity from all participating Countries is not only fair, but vital for the ongoing rebalancing efforts and to help deliver long term oil market stability.” In June, OPEC 2.0’s overall compliance was 107% – mostly reflecting over-compliance from KSA, the UAE, and Kuwait.4 There is a lot of supply on the sidelines from the OPEC 2.0 cuts and the restart of the Neutral Zone shared by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The US EIA estimates that within the original OPEC cartel spare capacity will average close to 6mm b/d this year, the first time since 2002 that it has exceeded 5mm b/d. On top of this, there’s the looming downside risk of a new Iran deal if Democrats win the White House and Congress in US elections in November, and a possible restart of Libyan exports this year. Watch The DUCs In The US With WTI prices averaging $41/bbl so far in July, we continue to expect part of previously shut-in US production to come back on line in July, August and September. Nonetheless, the negative effect of the multi-year low rig count will be felt heavily in 4Q20 and 1Q21 and will push production lower. The rig count appears to be bottoming but is not expected to increase meaningfully until WTI prices move closer to $45-50/bbl. On average it takes somewhere between 9-12 months for the signal from higher prices to result in new oil production flowing to market in the US. As the rig count moves back up in 2021, its effect on production will be apparent only in late-2021. However, the massive inventory of drilled-but-uncompleted (DUC) wells in the main US tight-oil basins will provide a source of cheaper new supply, if WTI prices remain above $40/bbl. DUCs are 30-40% cheaper to complete compared to drilling a new well from start. We expect DUCs completion will begin adding to US crude output in 1Q21, and that this will continue to be a source of supply beyond 2021. Bottom line: Global economic policy uncertainty remains elevated, albeit off its recent highs (Chart 12). We expect this uncertainty to continue to wane, which will allow the USD to continue to weaken. This will spur global oil demand, and will augment the fiscal and monetary stimulus to the COVID-19 pandemic undertaken globally. Chart 12Global Policy Uncertainty Remains High, Which Could Support USD Demand Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside Nonetheless, the global recovery remains out of sync, which complicates OPEC 2.0’s production management, and markets’ estimation of supply-demand balances. Uneven success in combating the pandemic keeps the risk of lockdowns on the radar in the US. Policy is driving oil production at present, and, given the temptation to monetize spare capacity, the supply side remains a risk to prices. We continue to see upside risk dominating the evolution of prices and are maintaining our expectation Brent prices will average $44/bbl in 2H20 – lifting the overall 2020 average to $43/bbl – and $65/bbl next year. Our expectation WTI will trade $2-$4/bbl below Brent also remains intact.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com Fernando Crupi Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy FernandoC@bcaresearch.com     Commodities Round-Up Energy: Overweight Canadian oil production averaged 4.6mm b/d in 2Q20 vs. 5.5mm b/d in 2Q19, based on EIA estimates. The lack of demand from US refiners – crude imports from Canada fell by 420k b/d y/y during the quarter – and close to maxed-out local storage facilities pushed prices below cash costs, forcing the shut-ins of more than 1mm b/d of crude production. Canadian energy companies started releasing their 2Q20 earnings this week and analysts expect the results to be one of the worst ever recorded, reflecting the extent of the pain producers felt during the COVID-19 shock. Base Metals: Neutral High-grade iron ore prices (65% Fe) were trading above $120/MT this week, on the back of forward guidance from the commodity’s top exporter, Brazilian miner Vale, which suggested exports will be lower than had been previously estimated this year, according to Fastmarkets MB, a sister service of BCA Research. This is in line with an Australian Department of Industry, Science, Energy and Resources analysis in June, which noted, “The COVID-19 pandemic appears to have affected both sides of the iron ore market: demand disruptions have run up against supply problems localised in Brazil, where COVID-19-related lockdowns have derailed efforts to recover from shutdowns in the wake of the Brumadinho tailings dam collapse” (Chart 13). Precious Metals: Neutral Our long silver position is up 17.5% since it was recommended July 2. We are placing a stop-loss on the position at $21/oz, our earlier target, given the metal was trading ~ $22/oz as we went to press. The factors supporting gold prices – chiefly low real rates in the US, a weakening dollar and global monetary accommodation, also support silver prices. However, silver also will benefit from the recovery in industrial activity and incomes we anticipate in the wake of global fiscal and monetary stimulus, which will drive demand for consumer products (Chart 14). Ags/Softs:  Underweight Lumber prices have more than doubled since April lows. The uncertainty brought by the COVID-19 health emergency altered the perception of future housing demand and, by extension, lumber demand, to the point that mills responded by substantially decreasing capacity utilization rates. However, in the wake of global monetary and fiscal stimulus, housing weathered the storm better than expected. Furthermore, a surge in DIY projects from individuals working from home at a time of reduced supply contributed to the current state of market shortage. Chart 13Lower Supply Supports Iron Ore Prices Lower Supply Supports Iron Ore Prices Lower Supply Supports Iron Ore Prices Chart 14Silver Favored Over Gold Silver Favored Over Gold Silver Favored Over Gold         Footnotes 1     In our reckoning, a non-trivial risk is something greater than Russian roulette odds – i.e., a 1-in-6 chance of an event occuring. Re the ever-so-brief Saudi-Russian market-share war, please see KSA, Russia Will Be Forced To Quit Market-Share War, which we published March 19, 2020. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2     Please see COLUMN-China's record crude oil storage flies under the radar: Russell published by reuters.com July 20, 2020. 3    The Baker Institute’s Open-Source Mapping of China's Oil Infrastructure was last updated in March 2020. The map is “a beta version and is likely missing some pieces of existing infrastructure. The challenge of China’s geographic expanse — it is roughly the same area as the U.S. Lower 48 — is compounded by a lack of transparency on the part of China’s government,” according to the Baker Institute. 4    In our supply-side estimates, we used IEA estimates of cuts for June this month. This doesn’t change the overall estimate of cuts from our earlier analysis; however, it slightly changes how the 9.7mm b/d was split between OPEC 2.0 members. the official eased cuts are 7.7mm b/d from 9.7mm b/d in May-June-July, but it actually is closer to 8.3mm b/d accounting for the compensation from the countries mentioned above.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trade Recommendation Performance In 2020 Q2 Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2020 Summary of Closed Trades Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside Balance Of Oil-Price Risk Remains To The Upside

Dear Clients, This week we offer you a Special Report on Russia and cyber security by our colleague and friend, Elmo Wright. Elmo recently retired from US Army civil service after 43 years working in intelligence, either on active duty, reserves, or as a civilian. From 2018 to 2020, he served as the senior civilian executive at the US Army National Ground Intelligence Center. He has served on five continents and provided analysis of the most pressing global trends in national security and intelligence. In this Special Report with BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy team, Elmo analyzes Russia’s cyber capabilities and argues that structural and cyclical factors, including COVID-19, will ensure the continued salience of Russian and global cyber security challenges in the coming years. His thesis reinforces our recommendation that investors buy cyber security equities. Elmo’s work for this report is in his personal capacity and does not represent any position of the US government. Only publicly available information was used as background research material for Elmo’s contribution to the report. All very best, Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Highlights As the US elections come closer, there will be a return to news about Russia and its potential interference via social media. Russia will continue to use cyber, both state sponsored attacks, and in coordination with criminal groups, to advance Russian national security objectives. In contrast to nuclear doctrine, there is no commonly accepted framework for cyber warfare between Russia and other nations that provides understandable signals for escalation, de-escalation, appropriate targets, or goals. US efforts to conduct military operations against Russia or China would likely be countered by Russian or Chinese cyber operations before any physical military operations could be initiated. Cyber security stocks offer a way for investors to capitalize on our long-term themes of nationalism, multipolarity, and de-globalization. The ISE Cyber Security Index offers value relative to the broad NASDAQ and S&P 500 indexes as well as the S&P tech sector. Feature   As the national elections in the US come closer, there will be a return to news about Russia and its potential interference via social media. Indeed Russia is making headlines even as we go to press. This report aims to provide context for Russian cyber capabilities in general as a contributor to overall geopolitical instability (Chart 1). We forecast Russia will continue to use cyber, both state sponsored attacks, and in coordination with criminal groups, to advance Russian national security objectives. Chart 1Russian Cyber Interference Resurfaces Around US Elections Russian Cyber Interference Resurfaces Around US Elections Russian Cyber Interference Resurfaces Around US Elections As background, the word cyber is commonly accepted to be derived from cybernetics, a phrase attributed to Norbert Wiener, an MIT scientist. The phrase itself is related to the ancient Greek word for steering or helmsman, in other words, control. Chart 2Russian Excellence In Math Makes It Competitive In Cybernetics Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Russia has a long history of excellence in science, especially theoretical work in mathematics and physics (Chart 2). Those fields can explain natural phenomena in formulas and mathematical relationships. The Soviets believed that centralized state planning that manipulated data in formulas could lead to better outcomes in all aspects of the society. Although central state economic planning did not work out for the Soviet economy, Soviet military science built on the concept of data relationships in formulas to develop its theory of troop control, a derivative of reflexive control, that is, the presenting of data to the recipient, either friendly or enemy, in order to get that recipient to act in a way favorable to Soviet military plans. One can see the Soviets embraced the idea of cybernetics as very congruent to their desire for top down control. Russia, as the core part of the Soviet Union, retained significant numbers of scientists and mathematicians who were naturally drawn to the ability of computers to take data and manipulate that data according to formulas. Other Russian scientists and mathematicians emigrated to the West where their expertise was rewarded in the rise in the use of computers to manipulate data. Over time, the term cyber has come to be associated with many aspects of computers, especially the intellectual and physical structures hidden behind the direct interface of a person with a keyboard and screen. Russian expertise in the use of computers to do cyber work was not limited to working for the State. As the Soviet Union broke apart and many people lost their jobs working for the State, there were those persons who took their talents to criminal ventures. And in the symbiotic nature of society in Russia, many of those who went into criminal ventures were former intelligence and security personnel who could maintain their connection to the official organizations that were successors to the KGB, the GRU, and others. Senior Russian military officials, such as General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation armed forces, equivalent to the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have noted the growth of nonmilitary means of achieving strategic goals, and specifically in the information space. Gerasimov, in an article in 2013, has been widely quoted that all elements of national power have to be harnessed, including cyber capabilities. One Soviet and Russian military concept that relates to the information space is maskirovka, the use of camouflage, deception, and disinformation to confuse the enemy. Maskirovka is intimately connected with the Soviet/Russian concept of “active measures”. Active measures include actions taken generally by intelligence services to provide propaganda, false information, and otherwise sow discord and confusion among the enemy ranks at all levels of war as well as in the political, economic, and social spheres. In today’s time period, cyber, especially social media, offers the opportunity for the wide spread of aspects of maskirovka and active measures to all users, as well as targeted groups (Chart 3). Reporting indicates a continued Russian emphasis on cyber as a means for active measures concealed by maskirovka. Chart 3Social Media Offers Russia An Opportunity For The Spread Of Maskirovka Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Wikileaks has provided a platform for the dissemination of information normally hidden from the general public. It is noteworthy how much of the information on the Wikileaks platform relates to the US and the West, and relatively little on Russia. Possible factors that explain that characteristic include the disparity in penalties for disclosing information between the US and the West versus Russia; the greater number of journalists and other persons involved in the media, both for profit and personal reasons, in the West; and the language barriers involved in understanding Russian versus English. A final possible factor in Wikileaks greater dissemination of Western information might be an aspect of active measures undertaken by Russia. Russia is the source of the most sophisticated cyber threats to the US. There are numerous actions attributed to Russian state actors in the cyber field in the recent past (Table 1). They include a distributed denial of service attack on Estonia (2007); hacking the Ministry of Defense in the country of Georgia during a military conflict (2008); attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure (2015); and the hacking of the Democratic National Committee (2016). Chancellor Angela Merkel recently publicly named and shamed Russia for a cyber-attack on Germany circa 2015 (Appendix). Table 1Russian State Actors Responsible For Many Of This Year’s Cyber Attacks Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Senior US officials have cited Russia as the source of the most sophisticated cyber threats to the US, both for espionage and state sponsored attacks against US national security capabilities such as energy, transportation, and telecommunications infrastructure; as well as for criminal activity such as ransom ware and identity theft. Russian use of cyber, both state sponsored and sponsoring criminal actors, has been the top threat to the US in each of the US intelligence community’s annual threat assessments for 2017, 2018, and 2019 (Chart 4). Although the 2020 annual threat assessment was not made public in Congressional testimony, there’s little reason to suspect that Russian use of cyber would not continue to be cited as the top threat. Chart 4Russian Use Of Cyber Is A Top Threat To The US Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Other nation states have state sponsored cyber capabilities which are of national security concern to the US, including China, Iran, and North Korea. These nation states are called out in the US intelligence community Annual Threat Assessments. Each of these nation states has been identified as committing intelligence and economic cyber attacks against the US and other Western nations. The recent speech by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation designates China as the top threat. Given the nature of the internet, the pathway of a cyber attack will likely bounce around multiple countries before reaching its intended target. As the Director notes, forensic identification of the source of a cyber attack takes time and expertise. However, there is a clear record of specifically identifying the state sponsored entity that commits attacks on US or Western government information technology and infrastructure. More likely than confusing one state sponsored cyber actor from one country to another would be the potential blending of criminal elements across national boundaries. In this case, cyber criminal elements with Russian backgrounds or connections are clearly the most capable. The stages of cyber conflict include reconnaissance, penetration, mapping, exfiltration, and operations. The US National Security Agency has an extensive technical cyber threat framework which goes into much detail. Cyber security professionals note the ongoing actions in cyber space and the attempts by elements suspected to be linked to Russia to gain and maintain access to US networks for potential military operations, or to exfiltrate data for criminal or other purposes. Part of the frustration of cyber security experts is the lack of transparency and timely reporting of those affected by malign cyber activities. Although some cyber activities may go on for multiple months, the exfiltration of data, or the emplacement of malware may only take a few seconds. Many networks lack the ability to detect penetration and mapping. Companies with large resources devoted to cyber security may have that investment negated if they have affiliations with other companies with lax cyber security which can allow for hostile intrusions into the connected network. Unfortunately, public and open attribution for cyber attacks has lagged. As an example, although the attack on the Democratic National Committee email servers was noted in 2016, it was not until 2018 that specific Russian individuals were charged with the crime. Factors that cause lags in public and open attribution include the difficulty of tracing specific computer code through cyberspace; the disjointed nature of the internet; the lack of an easy and accepted mechanism for involvement of US intelligence agencies in providing assistance to private sector parties; and the reticence of individuals and organizations negatively affected by cyber attacks to publicly disclose their injuries. Chart 5Unlike Nuclear Doctrine, Cyber Lacks A Framework To Control Escalation Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons developed over a period of years in the US and the West and in the Soviet bloc. The Soviets developed a coherent doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons that was understandable to the West. Arms control agreements between nuclear powers established mechanisms for controlling escalation of tensions (Chart 5). The Soviet doctrine was adopted by the Russians after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russia and Western nations continue to have a common understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in military affairs that allows for discussion of escalation and de-escalation. In contrast to nuclear doctrine, there is no commonly accepted framework for cyber warfare between Russia and other nations that provides understandable signals for escalation, de-escalation, appropriate targets, or goals. This is reflected in the Russian information security doctrine of 2016 which notes “The absence of international legal norms regulating inter-State relations in the information space…” The US Director of National Intelligence also noted this lack of agreement in his annual threat assessment testimony of 2017. The rapid growth of the internet, and reliance on it by government and private sectors reflects its founding as an open system, vulnerable to negative actors and actions (Chart 6). The intermingling of hardware and software, the information infrastructure used both by individuals and states, by the private sector and by government, makes separating doctrine and practice for cyberwar from legitimate use very difficult. Since non-cyber military capabilities, both conventional, and nuclear, rely upon the use of commercial information technology infrastructure, the use of offensive cyber is subject to the problem of blowback. As the NotPetya incident of 2018 indicated, damage from malware installed on one computer can rapidly spread across networks, industries, and international boundaries. The code for StuxNet and the code released by the more recent hack of CIA cyber tools have been noted in other cases of cyber attacks. Chart 6Rapid Growth Of Internet Raises Vulnerability To Harmful Actions Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 The view of the international cyber environment by Russia is very similar to views in the US and the West. The Russian national security doctrine of 2015 notes “... An entire spectrum of political, financial-economic, and informational instruments have been set in motion in the struggle for influence in the international arena. Increasingly active use is being made of special services' potential … The intensifying confrontation in the global information arena caused by some countries' aspiration to utilize informational and communication technologies to achieve their geopolitical objectives, including by manipulating public awareness and falsifying history, is exerting an increasing influence on the nature of the international situation.” Although much of the Russian information security doctrine of 2016 is concerned with noting threats to Russia’s information space, what might be called counterintelligence in other documents, there are key comments that note the suitability of using attacks in the information space as an effective means of projecting Russian power, such as “… improving information support activities to implement the State policy of the Russian Federation …” As per usual Soviet and Russian state doctrinal documents, the 2016 doctrine notes all the negative activity of other actors in this field. This practice is consistent with historical Soviet and Russian open press documents which ascribe to other states the activities in which Russia engages or plans to engage. Cyber-crime is rising despite deterrence. Unlike other forms of national security alliances, such as for intelligence, there is little public literature on cyber alliances, especially for offensive action. For example, the US and Israel have never publicly acknowledged a government alliance to emplace the StuxNet virus into the Iranian nuclear development program. Should there be offensive cyber alliances in the West, it is likely they fall along traditional intelligence and defense lines. There is no public reporting on any sort of offensive cyber alliances that involve Russia. There are public efforts at common standards for information technology security, but these efforts are foundering on citizen and government concerns over privacy, as well as commercial proprietary advantage. It is an open question as to whether cyber alliances among friendly nations would deter would-be cyber attackers or hackers. Certainly the growth of complaints to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center would indicate that statements of deterrence and even prosecutions are failing to reduce cyber attacks (Chart 7). Chart 7Cyber Attacks Are On The Rise Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Both the US national intelligence community and private sector cybersecurity companies agree Russia has a sophisticated state sponsored effort to acquire intelligence via hacking and insert favorable themes into cyberspace via the use of social media. There is also agreement that Russia state elements have a close relationship with criminal elements which can provide a plausibly deniable means of engaging in cyber warfare activities favorable to Russia, as well as engaging in activities for illegal economic advantage. For example, see this quote from the CYBEREASON Intel team: “The crossing of official state sponsored hacking with cybercriminal outfits has created a specter of Russian state hacking that is far larger than their actual program. This hybridization of tools, actors, and missions has created one of the most potent and ill-defined advanced threats that the cybersecurity community faces. It has also created the most technically advanced and bold cybercriminal community in the world. When, as a criminal, your patronage is the internal security service that is charged with tracking and arresting cybercrime, your only concern becomes staying within their defined bounds of acceptable risk and not what global norms, laws, or even domestic Russian law states.” The US Department of Justice in June 2020 noted a Russian national was sentenced to prison for malicious cyber activities. Key points of his illegal activity were the operation of websites open only to Russian speakers, and the vetting or recommendation of other criminals before allowing entry to the websites. One analysis of this situation notes the ties to Russian state security organs and personnel which likely held up the Russian national’s extradition for trial in the US. Government leaders in the US have noted the potential for major cyber attacks in the US affecting physical infrastructure and causing significant economic and social damage, including further attacks on the political election process. However, they have been reticent to state any explicit sort of retaliation. The US Cyber Command notes it is actively combatting hostile cyber actors. Therefore, the question remains open as to what level of cyber attacks would be considered serious enough to be treated as an act of war by the US. There has been public speculation of both Russian and Chinese implants of malware into the US information technology infrastructure that might be activated in the case of open hostilities. US efforts to conduct military operations against Russia or China would likely be countered by Russian or Chinese cyber operations before any physical military operations could be initiated, especially since US based forces would have to transit oceans, taking many days, when cyber operations could happen in seconds. Russian “gray zone” tactics, that is, actions short of large scale conventional war, many of which involve cyber attacks, active measures, and maskirovka, are the subject of much Department of Defense planning and action. To combat such gray zone activity analysis from the RAND Corporation notes the need for a spectrum of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic actions, which would involve commercial partners and allied nations. The difficulty of coordinating such counter action is one reason the Russians continue their gray zone efforts. Russia’s unique characteristics, some of which are weaknesses compared to the US and the West, are indicative of why Russia engages in state sponsored as well as criminal cyber activities (Chart 8). Russian scientific history, the intertwining of state and criminal elements, and continent-spanning location are factors which promote the use of cyber. Russia’s economic position vis-à-vis the US, Russia’s relative lack of military power projection capability beyond the states on its borders (the Near Abroad), except for its nuclear forces, and Russia’s declining demographic situation are negative factors which push Russia to use cyber as a cost effective means of advancing national security and economic policy (Chart 9). Despite US and Western imposed sanctions on Russia for past misdeeds, none of the factors noted above will be changed in the near future. Therefore, those factors, and published Russian doctrine should indicate to Western governments and businesses that Russia will continue to use cyber as a means to advance Russian national security objectives, as well as a means to siphoning off wealth from the West via criminal activities. Chart 8Russia's Relative Weakness Drives Engagement In Cyber Activities Russia's Relative Weakness Drives Engagement In Cyber Activities Russia's Relative Weakness Drives Engagement In Cyber Activities Chart 9Deteriorating Demographics Also Drive Russia’s Cyber Activities Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 US preparedness for Russian cyber activity in the upcoming months should be greater given several factors. First, there is clearly awareness of a Russian cyber threat to US interests across government and in the private sector. Second, the US has established new organizations, shifted resources of money and people, and had practice defending against cyber attacks since the 2016 US election cycle. However, the US information technology infrastructure is vast and porous, making it hard to protect against every threat. Russian cyber actors, both state sponsored and criminal, are smart and persistent. Investment Takeaways Cyber security companies offer a way for investors to capitalize on major themes arising from the COVID-19 crisis and its aftermath. These themes include not only changes in worker behavior, e-commerce, corporate culture, and network security, but also our major geopolitical themes like nationalism and the retreat from globalization. Reports as we go to press that Russian hackers have targeted vaccine developers in the US, UK, and Canada underscore the point. The trend is not limited to Russia or COVID-19 vaccines. It is all too apparent from the actions of Russia and China – as well as the increasing efforts by the US and its allies to patrol their own cyber realms, IT systems, and ideological discourse – that governments view the Internet as a frontier to be conquered and fortified rather than as a free space of human exchange in which globalization can operate unfettered (Map 1). Map 1Governments View The Internet As A Frontier To Be Conquered Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Formal measures of country risk are inadequate but provide some perspective as to which countries and companies are least prepared. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations body charged with monitoring information technology and communications. It ranks countries according to their commitment to cyber security and their exposure to cyber security risks (Chart 10). Chart 10Countries Have An Imperative To Strengthen Cyber Security Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 We take these rankings with a grain of salt knowing that advanced countries like the US and UK rank near the top of the list, and yet are the prime targets of hackers and thus face enormous cyber security risks. What is clear is that no country is safe and every country has an economic and national security imperative to strengthen its cyber security. These indexes also suggest that several European countries are less well prepared than one would think and that emerging markets are grossly underprepared. China, Russia and Iran should not be thought of only as aggressors – they will increasingly become targets as the West seeks to counteract them. As Russia expands operations it becomes a target of cyber counter-strikes as well as economic sanctions. And as China accelerates its drive to become a high tech giant, it encourages economic decoupling from the West and retaliation for its use of cyber-theft and state-based hacking. China, Russia, and Iran will also increasingly become victims of cyber attacks. There are two main cyber security equity indexes – the NASDAQ CTA Cybersecurity Index (NQCYBR) and NASDAQ ISE Cyber Security Index (HXR). These indexes trade in line with each other and have rallied extensively since the COVID-19 crisis (Chart 11). Investors are aware that the surge in working from home and companies conducting operations off-site, as well as geopolitical great power struggle, have created extensive new vulnerabilities and capex requirements. Chart 11Cyber Security Stocks Have Benefited From COVID-19 ... Cyber Security Stocks Have Benefited From COVID-19 ... Cyber Security Stocks Have Benefited From COVID-19 ... On April 24, we recommended that investors go long the ISE index relative to the S&P 500 information technology sector. We are also going long the ISE index relative to the NASDAQ on a strategic horizon. Chart 12... But Not So Much Relative To Broad Tech Sector ... But Not So Much Relative To Broad Tech Sector ... But Not So Much Relative To Broad Tech Sector Tech has been the prime beneficiary of the COVID-19 crisis while the necessary corollary of the tech companies’ continued success is the need for security of their information, property, and customers (Chart 12). We also favor the ISE index because it has a slightly heavier cyclical component due to the fact that 13% of its companies are in the industrial sector, compared to 10% for the CTA index. The industrial side should benefit more as economies reopen and recover. These indexes are tracked by two ETFs. The First Trust NASDAQ Cybersecurity ETF (CIBR) tracks the NASDAQ CTA index with an emphasis on larger companies, while the ETFMG Prime Cyber Security ETF (HACK) tracks the ISE index, companies with market capitalization lower than $250 million, and a slightly lower exposure to the communications sector as opposed to IT and software. The HACK ETF has lagged the CIBR this year so far and offers an opportunity for investors to invest in data protection and up-and-coming firms. Over the past ten years cyber security has proven to be a volatile investment space with rapidly increasing competition for market share. But the secular tailwinds are powerful and a diversified exposure to the sector will be rewarding for investors positioning for the post-COVID-19 world. Elmo Wright Consulting Editor Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Appendix Appendix TableMajor Cyber-Attacks Over The Past Decade Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19   Footnotes Coats, Dan. “Statement For The Record Worldwide Threat Assessment Of The Us Intelligence Community,” May 23, 2017. Coats, Dan. “Statement For The Record Worldwide Threat Assessment Of The Us Intelligence Community,” March 6, 2018. Coats, Dan. “Annual Threat Assessment Opening Statement,” January 29, 2019. CyberReason Intel Team, “Russia And Nation-State Hacking Tactics: A Report From Cybereason Intelligence Group,” cybereason.com, June 5, 2017. Department of Justice, “Russian National Sentenced To Prison For Operating Websites Devoted To Fraud And Malicious Cyber Activities”, June 26, 2020. Department of Justice, “U.S. Charges Russian FSB Officers And Their Criminal Conspirators For Hacking Yahoo And Millions Of Email Accounts, Fsb Officers Protected, Directed, Facilitated And Paid Criminal Hackers”, March 15, 2017. Gerasimov, Vasily. “The Value Of Science In Prediction,” Military Industrial Courier, Feb 27, 2013. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Internet Crime Complaint Center Marks 20 Years From Early Frauds to Sophisticated Schemes, IC3 Has Tracked the Evolution of Online Crime,” May 8, 2020. Fedorov, Yuriy Ye. “Arms Control In The Information Age” Symposium “Emerging Challenges In The Information Age,” 23 January 2002, Arlington, Virginia. Galeotti, Mark. “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ And Russian Non-Linear War,” In Moscow’s Shadows, July 6, 2014. Greenberg, Andy. “The Untold Story Of Notpetya, The Most Devastating Cyberattack In History,” Wired Magazine, August 22, 2018. Krebs, Brian. “Why Were the Russians So Set Against This Hacker Being Extradited?,” Krebs on Security, Nov 18, 2019. Lusthaus, Jonathan. “Cybercrime in Southeast Asia Combating a global threat locally,” May 20, 2020. Mattis, James. Department of Defense, “Summary Of The 2018 National Defense Strategy Of The United States Of America”. Meakins, Joss. “Living in (Digital) Denial: Russia’s Approach To Cyber Deterrence,” Russia Matters, July 2018. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. “Doctrine Of Information Security Of The Russian Federation,” Dec 5, 2016. Nakasone, Paul. “Cybercom Commander Briefs Reporters At White House,” Department of Defense video briefing, Aug 2, 2018. National Security Agency, “NSA/CSS Technical Cyber Threat Framework V2”, a report from: Cybersecurity Operations The Cybersecurity Products And Sharing Division, 29 November 2018. Pettijohn and Wasser. “Competing In The Gray Zone,” RAND Corporation, 2019. Putin, Vladimir. “Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation,” Office of the President of the Russian Federation, Dec 31, 2015. Russian National Security Strategy 31 Dec 2015, Russia Matters. Snegovaya, Maria. “Putin’s Information Warfare In Ukraine: Soviet Origins Of Russia's Hybrid Warfare,” Institute for the Study of War, Sep 22, 2015. Tsygichko, V. N. “About Categories of “Correlation Of Forces” for Potential Military Conflicts in the New Era,” Symposium “Emerging Challenges In The Information Age,” 23 January 2002, Arlington, Virginia. Wiener, Norbert, Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, (1948).

Highlights Theoretically the US could employ a “Reverse Kissinger” strategy – befriend Russia to isolate China or at least prevent the budding Russo-Chinese alliance.  But Trump has made no headway in relations with Russia. Meanwhile Democrats now see engagement with Putin as a failure and will pursue a more aggressive policy. Competition in Europe’s natural gas market underscores the broader Russo-American geopolitical confrontation. Russia will likely succeed in preserving its share in the European natural gas market in the medium term, but not in the long run. We remain overweight Russian equities and bonds relative to EM benchmarks, but will downgrade if Biden’s election becomes a foregone conclusion. Feature Investors do not need to wait for the US election verdict to assess the general trajectory of US-Russia relations. Some points are clear regardless of whether President Trump or former Vice President Joe Biden prevails: US-Russia engagement had mostly but not entirely failed between the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and President Trump’s election in 2016.   President Trump could not break free of the constraints of office and his administration has remained adversarial toward Russia despite his preference for deeper engagement. Whether Democrats or Republicans take the White House in 2021, the result will be confrontation with Russia over the four-year term and likely beyond. The geopolitical risk premium in the Russian ruble will rise relative to its current level. A Trump victory would reduce this risk, but only temporarily.   The Failure Of Engagement Russia’s rise from the ashes of the Soviet Union can be illustrated by our Geopolitical Power Index – it shows Russia’s rise relative to the US in terms of demographic, economic, technological, commercial, and military variables that make a nation strong (Chart 1). Chart 1Russia Rose From Soviet Ashes, But Still Lags US Russia Rose From Soviet Ashes, But Still Lags US Russia Rose From Soviet Ashes, But Still Lags US Russia is a shadow of its Soviet self and lags far behind the US in raw capability. But its recovery from the chaos of the 1998 financial crisis, fueled by a global commodity bull market, has consisted of a systematic removal of domestic political constraints. It is politically unified under the personal rule of Putin, has reformed its economy and modernized its military, and has successfully pushed back against the US and the West in its sphere of influence. Russia punches above its economic weight in the world by means of its military, which it has wielded opportunistically in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, and Libya (Chart 2). Neither the US nor any other power was willing to fill the power vacuum in these locations. A Trump victory only temporarily reduces the rise in Russian geopolitical risk. The US and Russia have a fundamentally antagonistic relationship over influence in Europe and occasionally the Far East. They have little need to trade with each other. They are both large, independent commodity exporters and advanced weapon-makers separated by vast distances. Russia is threatened by the US’s military and technological superiority, its economic strength and newfound status as an energy exporter (see energy section), and its ability to undermine Russian legitimacy in the former Soviet sphere by promoting democracy.  Russia’s advantage is that the US is internally divided by political factions. Putin’s popular approval has benefited from his restoration of domestic order and Russia’s standing as a great power. Successive American presidents have floundered under domestic partisanship and polarization (Chart 3).   Chart 2Russia’s Military Punches Above Its Economic Weight US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) Chart 3Russia Is Politically Unified, The US is Internally Divided US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet)   Attempts to “reset” relations have failed.1 The Barack Obama administration’s 2009-11 Reset, announced by Biden, saw several concrete compromises, including the New START treaty and Russia’s joining the WTO. But the Bolotnaya Square protests in 2011-12, at the height of the Arab Spring, rekindled Moscow’s fear that the US aimed to foment “color revolutions” not only in Russia’s periphery but even in Russia itself. Faced with losing its control over Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation, Russia invaded parts of Ukraine and seized Crimea, the first military annexation of territory in Europe since World War II. The US and Europe applied extensive sanctions that last to this day and drag on Russian growth.2  True, Moscow cooperated on the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran. Russia does not want Iran to get nuclear weapons. Yet this is not imminent. And Russia gained global oil market share when the US walked away from the deal and restarted sanctions (Chart 4). Either way, Iran survives as a Russian ally capable of exerting influence across the Middle East.   President Trump launched another attempt at engagement with Russia. If there is a strategic basis for this policy – i.e. if it is not just based in Trump’s personal proclivities – then it is the idea of a “Reverse Kissinger” maneuver. During the Cold War, the US befriended Maoist China in order to isolate the Soviet Union. Today, with China posing the clear threat to US hegemony, the US could try to befriend Russia to isolate China or at least prevent the budding Russo-Chinese alliance.  The difference is that in 1972, American and Chinese interests were complementary. China wished to stabilize its borders and the US offered geopolitical relief as well as technology and knowhow. Today American and Russian interests are not complementary other than the political convenience of demonizing each other (Chart 5). The US offers Russia limited investment capital; Russia does not offer cheap labor or a vast consumer market. Chart 4Russia’s Oil Market Share Benefitted From Iran Sanctions US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) Chart 5US-Russo Interests Are Not Complementary US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet)   The Trump administration’s attempt to engage Putin has failed. Putin’s declaration of a global oil market share war this year drove American shale oil companies into bankruptcy during an election year. Barring an “October surprise” engineered by Putin to get Trump reelected, their “alliance” is at best rhetorical and at worst a mirage. Putin might favor Trump because he sharpens US internal divisions, or because he has an isolationist foreign policy preference, but Putin’s actions so far in 2020 suggest a deeper strategic reality: Russia seeks to foment political turmoil in the US, not solidify either of the parties in power, as the latter could backfire against Russia. What Comes After Engagement? Russia lacks the power to create a new world order, but it will continue to leverage its relative power to exercise a veto over affairs in the current global order, in which US influence is weakening. It can hasten the West’s decline by sowing divisions within the West. Chart 6COVID-19 Dented Support For Trump And Putin US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) What happens when US polarization falls and a new political consensus takes shape? This would pose a major threat to Putin’s strategic options. Thus it is relevant if Joe Biden wins the 2020 election with a strong majority and a full Democratic sweep of government. Presidents Trump and Putin, and their political parties, are among the worst performers amid the COVID-19 pandemic and recession (Chart 6). The implication is that Trump will lose the election and Putin will resort to time-tried techniques of confrontation with the West to restore his domestic support. Democrats will pursue a more aggressive policy toward Russia. The Democrats harbor a deep vendetta against Russia over its interference in the 2016 election and will go on the offensive to prevent Russia from trying to undermine their grip on power again. They will also seek to deter Russia from further undermining American strategic interests. Biden will try to revive NATO, expand US troop presence in eastern Europe, and promote democracy and human rights in Russia’s periphery, using the Internet to launch a disinformation campaign against Putin’s regime. Cyber warfare will escalate.  A “Reverse Kissinger” is not achievable until Russia feels threatened by China. The silver lining for Russia is economic: Biden’s policies will help to weaken the dollar and cultivate a global growth recovery. Biden will be less inclined to start disruptive Trump-style trade war with China that could permanently damage China’s potential growth or global growth. Chinese imports are essential to propping up Russia’s sluggish economy. In enabling commodity prices to recover, and reducing global policy uncertainty, Biden would inadvertently aid Russian recovery (Chart 7). Chart 7The Silver Lining Of A Biden Presidency For Russia Is A Weaker Dollar The Silver Lining Of A Biden Presidency For Russia Is A Weaker Dollar The Silver Lining Of A Biden Presidency For Russia Is A Weaker Dollar Ultimately Russia is insecure because the US threatens to undermine its economy and political legitimacy both at home and in its strategic buffers. Putin has re-centralized control while shutting out foreign influence. This approach is not changing anytime soon given the recent constitutional changes to prolong Putin’s rule till 2036. Preliminary reports claim that, with 65% of the public voting, these changes were ratified by 76% of the population.3  What changed is that the US is no longer as optimistic about engaging Russia. If anything, its internal divisions will encourage it to go on the offensive. Sanctions may well be expanded before they are eased, the Ukraine conflict could revive rather than simmer down, and new fronts in the conflict could widen, particularly in cyberspace. This is particularly the case if Biden wins the White House in November. The structural, geopolitical risk premium of US-Russia conflict is priced into Russian assets, but there is room for a cyclical increase if Biden is elected. Our market-based Russian geopolitical risk indicators – which define geopolitical risk as excessive ruble weakness relative to its macro context – show that Russian risk is elevated because of COVID-19, but dropping. The US election should reverse this trend, unless Trump wins (Chart 8). Chart 8Russian Geopolitical Risk Set To Increase Even If Trump Re-Elected Russian Geopolitical Risk Set To Increase Even If Trump Re-Elected Russian Geopolitical Risk Set To Increase Even If Trump Re-Elected Alternative measures of political risk that utilize non-market variables support our qualitative assessment, such as the indicator provided by GeoQuant. The implication is that Russian political risk is higher than the market is pricing (Chart 9). Chart 9Market Is Underpricing Russian Political Risk Market Is Underpricing Russian Political Risk Market Is Underpricing Russian Political Risk Kissinger Reversed? Not Yet. If Trump wins, could he not engineer a major détente with Russia? In 2018 the US shifted its national defense strategy to emphasize that “the central challenge to US prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition,” arguing specifically that “it is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model.4”  Yet US geopolitical power has declined such that taking an offensive approach to Russia and China simultaneously is not practicable.  If the US pursues the Reverse Kissinger strategy, then it will have to make major concessions to Putin’s Russia. It would need to provide substantial sanctions relief, accept the Crimean annexation, allow a high degree of Russian influence in Donbass (Ukraine), abandon hopes of retribution for the 2016 election interference, ask for a return to the 2015 nuclear deal on Iran at best, and settle for arms control agreements that do not cover new technologies. It is not clear that President Trump would concede this much in a second term, though in most cases he would have the power to do so. Yet Moscow cannot downgrade its cooperation with Beijing by much, since US-Russia détente never lasts long and China weighs more heavily in its economic calculus than the West’s sanctions. Chart 10US-Russo Struggle Is Subordinate To US-Sino Conflict US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) The Democrats, by contrast, are not prepared to make these concessions, particularly on 2016. They are more willing to pursue a gradualist approach in dealing with China, which they believe is less urgent due to shared economic interests.5  If the US confronts Russia, then Russia will draw closer to China. The informal alliance between these two powers is well advanced. A closer association provides China with a better position in waging its long-term geopolitical competition with the United States.  Ultimately US grand strategy and public opinion will drive American presidents to take a harder line on China because it rivals the US in economic resilience and technology over the long run (Chart 10). The conflict with Moscow will eventually be subordinate to the US-China struggle. But a “Reverse Kissinger” is not achievable until Russia feels threatened by China, either through its own weakness or Chinese strength. A much stronger trans-Atlantic alliance, or much greater Chinese influence over East Asia and/or the Middle East, could trigger a shift in Russian strategy. We are not there yet. Russia’s cooperation with China will deepen, strengthening China’s hand and making it all the more imperative for the United States to solidify the trans-Atlantic alliance with Europe. Otherwise the risk of a precipitous decline in American power will threaten global stability.  Bottom Line: US-Russian antagonism will continue for the foreseeable future. Russian geopolitical risk is underpriced, particularly if Biden wins the election. A Trump victory would offer only a temporary reprieve.  Direct Competition In Energy Russia can offer low cost natural gas alongside an existing and projected (under construction) network of pipelines into Europe. This capability will help it to sustain and marginally increase its market share in Europe relative to the US in the medium term. In turn, this will help Russia secure vital revenues for its macro stability.  Natural gas exports to Europe represent 2.5% of GDP or 9% of total exports. A Biden presidency is negative for Russian assets, but Russia has room to ease policy. In the long run, however, US LNG will challenge Russia’s share in the European natural gas market. On the whole, the US sees Russia as an economic competitor in the European natural gas market and it will continue to disrupt Russian natural gas exports to Europe through sanctions and/or by other means. A resulting market share war between the US and Russia will lead to low natural gas prices benefitting the consumer, Europe. Competition in Europe’s natural gas market underscores the broader geopolitical confrontation between the US and Russia. The following factors will shape heightened competition: Escalating Competition For European Natural Gas Market Europe will remain a major market for natural gas. The combination of falling domestic production, steady consumption growth and the ongoing structural shift to cleaner sources of energy will require greater imports of natural gas (Chart 11). Critically, Europe’s natural gas consumption might rise faster than its GDP making this market attractive to energy producers. According to the IEA, Europe’s consumption of natural gas will continue to grow at a steady rate over the next 5 years. In a nutshell, European policymakers are promoting cleaner energy such as natural gas over coal and nuclear energy. This push will facilitate rising demand for natural gas.  Yet, European natural gas production is expected to drop by 40%, driven by field closures in the Netherlands and the UK.  As such, the diverging gap between falling production and steady consumption opens up a space for both Russian and US natural gas exports into the continent. Russia Natural Gas Strategy: Russia and its largest natural gas producer, Gazprom, are aiming to increase their share in the European market from their current 36% to 40% (Chart 12). Chart 11Europe's Nat Gas Imports Will Continue Growing... Europe's Nat Gas Imports Will Continue Growing... Europe's Nat Gas Imports Will Continue Growing... Chart 12...Allowing Russia To Grab Market Share ...Allowing Russia To Grab Market Share ...Allowing Russia To Grab Market Share   Table 1Russia’s Pipeline Export Capacity US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) More specifically, Russia’s latest 2035 strategy (known as ES-2035) reaffirms its two-pronged strategy: (i) continue to provide low-cost natural gas to Europe and Asia through pipelines and (ii) developing LNG export capacity for exports to the Far East. Pipelines: Russia’s export capacity to Europe is set to increase to 190 Bcm/y by 2022 excluding existing transit routes passing through Ukraine (Table 1). Two new sources of pipeline routes will be the Nord Stream2, coming online by the end of this year, and Turk Stream, expected to come online by 2022. These pipelines will have an export capacity of 55 Bcm/y and 31.5/y Bcm, respectively (Map 1).   Map 1Russia’s Latest Pipelines Bypass Ukraine US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) Chart 13Russian Natural Gas Exports To Non-CIS Countries Russian Natural Gas Exports To Non-CIS Countries Russian Natural Gas Exports To Non-CIS Countries Meanwhile, pipeline capacity through Ukraine will remain 140 Bcm/y. Ultimately, Russia has been determined to diversify its natural gas transit routes despite pressures from the US.6 In addition, Gazprom natural gas production for transport via pipeline is expected to increase by 35% to 983 Bcm in the next 15 years. The European market is essential to Russia’s export revenues, as it currently represents 56% of Russia’s total gas export volumes compared with 83% total export to non-CIS countries (Chart 13). Lastly, regarding natural gas pricing, Gazprom will continue to move away from oil-indexed long-term contracts to shorter-term spot market contracts. This change of tack will cause deflation in Gazprom’s export prices to Europe but will preserve Russia’s market share in its strategic European market.   LNG: Russia will continue to be one the top four LNG producers alongside Qatar, Australia and the US. According to the latest estimates by the IEA, Russian exports of LNG, currently at 39 Bcm, are set to expand by 20% by 2025. The development of the Yamal peninsula into a major natural gas and LNG hub will allow Russia to produce close to 110 Bcm of LNG by 2035, which will constitute 16% of its overall current gas production. This will lead to continued LNG exports to various markets, particularly Europe, which consumes 50% of Russia’s LNG exports. Imported technology from Europe and external financing from China have allowed Novatek, Russia’s second largest natural gas producer, to become the leader in production and exports of LNG. Russia is also investing heavily in liquefaction. It is now fifth globally in liquefaction capacity. There are currently $21 billion in pre-final investment decision (FID) from the LNG Artic 2 in the Yamal that will increase its liquefaction capacity by over 200% by 2026.  Lastly, it is estimated that 70-80% of total commodity exporters’ costs are sourced locally and are in rubles due to the import substitution policy adopted by Moscow in 2015. This will alleviate cost pressures arising from a potentially weaker ruble in exploiting the Yamal reserves. US Needs To Find A Market For Its LNG: US produces 920 bcm/y of natural gas but consumes only 830 bcm/y. The rest is available for export. The need to export rising excess of natural gas output puts the US in direct competition with other natural gas exporters such as Russia. Chart 14US LNG Exports To Europe To Rise US LNG Exports To Europe To Rise US LNG Exports To Europe To Rise In the medium term, an oversupplied market alongside the COVID-19-induced demand shock in Europe will reduce European natural gas demand, hurting both the US and Russia. US LNG might lose market share in the European market to Russia due to falling production arising from capex cuts and bankruptcies in the US natural gas sector.7 Yet, in the long run, Europe’s geopolitical ties with the US and strategic interest in diversifying away from Russia make US LNG an obvious area of cooperation. The Trump-Juncker agreement in July 2018 led to a 300% increase in US LNG exports to Europe before the COVID-19 pandemic (Chart 14). Since coming into effect, the agreement also resulted in a doubling of EU utilization of LNG regasification capacity, from 30% to close to 60% in early 2020 and is expected to continue expanding in the years to come. Bottom Line: Russia will likely succeed in at least preserving its share in the European natural gas market in the medium term, but will be challenged by US LNG in the long run. Macro And Financial Market Implications For Russia Chart 15Russia: Low Public Debt Burden Russia: Low Public Debt Burden Russia: Low Public Debt Burden Heightened confrontation with the US and new sanctions on Russia will materialize if Biden wins the presidency. All else constant, this is unfavourable for Russian asset prices. It should be noted, however, that years of fiscal conservativism, tight monetary policy, a prudent and pro-active bank regulatory stance as well as some success in import substitution have given Russia the capacity to offset negative external shocks by easing macro policy: Russia has one of the lowest public debt-to-GDP ratios among the largest countries in the world. Its total public debt stands at 13.5% of GDP (Chart 15). Its external public debt is at a mere 4% of GDP. As in many other countries, Russia’s fiscal deficit is widening sharply due to the pandemic and low oil prices. However, we expect the primary and overall fiscal deficits will be only 4.25% and 5% of GDP in 2020, respectively. So far, at 3.5% of GDP, the announced fiscal stimulus in response to the pandemic has been small by global standards. Russia has room to boost fiscal expenditure substantially this year and in the coming years to offset negative external shocks. The Central Bank still has room to reduce interest rates further. The real policy rate is 2.5% compared with 1% for EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan (Chart 16, top panel). Russia’s local currency government bond yields offer value: their real yield is 2.5% compared with the EM GBI benchmark real yield of 1.5% (Chart 16, bottom panel). The Central Bank of the Russian Federation will refrain from QE-type policies (i.e., public debt monetization). This is a plus for the ruble relative to other EM currencies where central banks are engaged in QEs. Bank lending rates remain extremely elevated in Russia and local currency credit penetration is reasonably low (Chart 17). Companies and banks’ external indebtedness has declined from $1,200 bn in 2014 to $900 bn currently. Chart 16Russian Real Rates Offer Value Russian Real Rates Offer Value Russian Real Rates Offer Value Chart 17Russia: Real Lending Rates Are Too Elevated! Russia: Real Lending Rates Are Too Elevated! Russia: Real Lending Rates Are Too Elevated!   Authorities have cleaned up the banking system. The number of banks has dropped from 1000 in 2010 to 430. Banks have written down and provisioned for a large amount of loans. All of these reduce Russia’s vulnerability to negative shocks. Finally, pressured by US and EU sanctions, Russia has been moderately successful in import substitution as we discussed in a previous report. The nation has expanded its productive capacity, especially in agriculture and some other industries. As a result, it now has more room to deploy fiscal and monetary stimulus to boost demand that will be satisfied by domestic rather than foreign output. In short, fiscal and monetary stimulus will not cause the currency to plunge. On the negative side, the outlook for productivity growth remains lukewarm. Russia’s long-term economic outlook will be characterized by relative stability but low growth, as has been the case in recent years. Combining our geopolitical and macro analysis, two conclusions stand out. First, we remain overweight Russian equities as well as both local currency and US dollar bonds relative to their EM benchmarks. If Trump stages a comeback over the next four months, which is not impossible, then the geopolitical risk premium will continue to fall. Trump would offer a reprieve in tensions for a year or two.  Second, the US election threatens this view because Joe Biden is currently heavily favoured to beat Trump and if he does, he is likely to impose fresh sanctions on Russia, possibly as early as 2021. Therefore, if Biden’s election becomes a foregone conclusion, we will downgrade Russian assets. Matt Gertken  Vice President Geopolitical Strategist  mattg@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic Associate Editor andrijav@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Michael McFaul, From Cold War To Hot Peace: The Inside Story of Russia and America (London: Penguin, 2018). 2  International Monetary Fund, “Russian Federation: 2019 Article IV Consultation,” IMF Country Report 19/260 (August 2019). 3  Ann M. Simmons and Georgi Kantchev, “Russians Vote for Overhaul That Could Keep Putin in Power Until 2036,” Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2020.  4  “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening The American Military’s Competitive Edge,” Department of Defense, 2018. 5  Victoria Nuland, “Pinning Down Putin: How A Confident America Should Deal With Russia,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2020. 6  The US has tried to stop Russia’s expansion of pipelines into Europe in the past. Evidenced from both Kennedy and Reagan administration policies directed towards the building of the Friendship oil pipeline in the 1960s and the Brotherhood gas pipeline in the 1980s, respectively. In response, Russia began developing its own technological capacity through import substitution, hurting western firms in the process. 7  "U.S. natural gas giant Chesapeake Energy goes bankrupt,” CBC, June 29, 2020.

Highlights Theoretically the US could employ a “Reverse Kissinger” strategy – befriend Russia to isolate China or at least prevent the budding Russo-Chinese alliance.  But Trump has made no headway in relations with Russia. Meanwhile Democrats now see engagement with Putin as a failure and will pursue a more aggressive policy. Competition in Europe’s natural gas market underscores the broader Russo-American geopolitical confrontation. Russia will likely succeed in preserving its share in the European natural gas market in the medium term, but not in the long run. We remain overweight Russian equities and bonds relative to EM benchmarks, but will downgrade if Biden’s election becomes a foregone conclusion. Feature Investors do not need to wait for the US election verdict to assess the general trajectory of US-Russia relations. Some points are clear regardless of whether President Trump or former Vice President Joe Biden prevails: US-Russia engagement had mostly but not entirely failed between the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and President Trump’s election in 2016.   President Trump could not break free of the constraints of office and his administration has remained adversarial toward Russia despite his preference for deeper engagement. Whether Democrats or Republicans take the White House in 2021, the result will be confrontation with Russia over the four-year term and likely beyond. The geopolitical risk premium in the Russian ruble will rise relative to its current level. A Trump victory would reduce this risk, but only temporarily.   The Failure Of Engagement Russia’s rise from the ashes of the Soviet Union can be illustrated by our Geopolitical Power Index – it shows Russia’s rise relative to the US in terms of demographic, economic, technological, commercial, and military variables that make a nation strong (Chart 1). Chart 1Russia Rose From Soviet Ashes, But Still Lags US Russia Rose From Soviet Ashes, But Still Lags US Russia Rose From Soviet Ashes, But Still Lags US Russia is a shadow of its Soviet self and lags far behind the US in raw capability. But its recovery from the chaos of the 1998 financial crisis, fueled by a global commodity bull market, has consisted of a systematic removal of domestic political constraints. It is politically unified under the personal rule of Putin, has reformed its economy and modernized its military, and has successfully pushed back against the US and the West in its sphere of influence. Russia punches above its economic weight in the world by means of its military, which it has wielded opportunistically in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, and Libya (Chart 2). Neither the US nor any other power was willing to fill the power vacuum in these locations. A Trump victory only temporarily reduces the rise in Russian geopolitical risk. The US and Russia have a fundamentally antagonistic relationship over influence in Europe and occasionally the Far East. They have little need to trade with each other. They are both large, independent commodity exporters and advanced weapon-makers separated by vast distances. Russia is threatened by the US’s military and technological superiority, its economic strength and newfound status as an energy exporter (see energy section), and its ability to undermine Russian legitimacy in the former Soviet sphere by promoting democracy.  Russia’s advantage is that the US is internally divided by political factions. Putin’s popular approval has benefited from his restoration of domestic order and Russia’s standing as a great power. Successive American presidents have floundered under domestic partisanship and polarization (Chart 3).   Chart 2Russia’s Military Punches Above Its Economic Weight US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) Chart 3Russia Is Politically Unified, The US is Internally Divided US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet)   Attempts to “reset” relations have failed.1 The Barack Obama administration’s 2009-11 Reset, announced by Biden, saw several concrete compromises, including the New START treaty and Russia’s joining the WTO. But the Bolotnaya Square protests in 2011-12, at the height of the Arab Spring, rekindled Moscow’s fear that the US aimed to foment “color revolutions” not only in Russia’s periphery but even in Russia itself. Faced with losing its control over Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation, Russia invaded parts of Ukraine and seized Crimea, the first military annexation of territory in Europe since World War II. The US and Europe applied extensive sanctions that last to this day and drag on Russian growth.2  True, Moscow cooperated on the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran. Russia does not want Iran to get nuclear weapons. Yet this is not imminent. And Russia gained global oil market share when the US walked away from the deal and restarted sanctions (Chart 4). Either way, Iran survives as a Russian ally capable of exerting influence across the Middle East.   President Trump launched another attempt at engagement with Russia. If there is a strategic basis for this policy – i.e. if it is not just based in Trump’s personal proclivities – then it is the idea of a “Reverse Kissinger” maneuver. During the Cold War, the US befriended Maoist China in order to isolate the Soviet Union. Today, with China posing the clear threat to US hegemony, the US could try to befriend Russia to isolate China or at least prevent the budding Russo-Chinese alliance.  The difference is that in 1972, American and Chinese interests were complementary. China wished to stabilize its borders and the US offered geopolitical relief as well as technology and knowhow. Today American and Russian interests are not complementary other than the political convenience of demonizing each other (Chart 5). The US offers Russia limited investment capital; Russia does not offer cheap labor or a vast consumer market. Chart 4Russia’s Oil Market Share Benefitted From Iran Sanctions US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) Chart 5US-Russo Interests Are Not Complementary US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet)   The Trump administration’s attempt to engage Putin has failed. Putin’s declaration of a global oil market share war this year drove American shale oil companies into bankruptcy during an election year. Barring an “October surprise” engineered by Putin to get Trump reelected, their “alliance” is at best rhetorical and at worst a mirage. Putin might favor Trump because he sharpens US internal divisions, or because he has an isolationist foreign policy preference, but Putin’s actions so far in 2020 suggest a deeper strategic reality: Russia seeks to foment political turmoil in the US, not solidify either of the parties in power, as the latter could backfire against Russia. What Comes After Engagement? Russia lacks the power to create a new world order, but it will continue to leverage its relative power to exercise a veto over affairs in the current global order, in which US influence is weakening. It can hasten the West’s decline by sowing divisions within the West. Chart 6COVID-19 Dented Support For Trump And Putin US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) What happens when US polarization falls and a new political consensus takes shape? This would pose a major threat to Putin’s strategic options. Thus it is relevant if Joe Biden wins the 2020 election with a strong majority and a full Democratic sweep of government. Presidents Trump and Putin, and their political parties, are among the worst performers amid the COVID-19 pandemic and recession (Chart 6). The implication is that Trump will lose the election and Putin will resort to time-tried techniques of confrontation with the West to restore his domestic support. Democrats will pursue a more aggressive policy toward Russia. The Democrats harbor a deep vendetta against Russia over its interference in the 2016 election and will go on the offensive to prevent Russia from trying to undermine their grip on power again. They will also seek to deter Russia from further undermining American strategic interests. Biden will try to revive NATO, expand US troop presence in eastern Europe, and promote democracy and human rights in Russia’s periphery, using the Internet to launch a disinformation campaign against Putin’s regime. Cyber warfare will escalate.  A “Reverse Kissinger” is not achievable until Russia feels threatened by China. The silver lining for Russia is economic: Biden’s policies will help to weaken the dollar and cultivate a global growth recovery. Biden will be less inclined to start disruptive Trump-style trade war with China that could permanently damage China’s potential growth or global growth. Chinese imports are essential to propping up Russia’s sluggish economy. In enabling commodity prices to recover, and reducing global policy uncertainty, Biden would inadvertently aid Russian recovery (Chart 7). Chart 7The Silver Lining Of A Biden Presidency For Russia Is A Weaker Dollar The Silver Lining Of A Biden Presidency For Russia Is A Weaker Dollar The Silver Lining Of A Biden Presidency For Russia Is A Weaker Dollar Ultimately Russia is insecure because the US threatens to undermine its economy and political legitimacy both at home and in its strategic buffers. Putin has re-centralized control while shutting out foreign influence. This approach is not changing anytime soon given the recent constitutional changes to prolong Putin’s rule till 2036. Preliminary reports claim that, with 65% of the public voting, these changes were ratified by 76% of the population.3  What changed is that the US is no longer as optimistic about engaging Russia. If anything, its internal divisions will encourage it to go on the offensive. Sanctions may well be expanded before they are eased, the Ukraine conflict could revive rather than simmer down, and new fronts in the conflict could widen, particularly in cyberspace. This is particularly the case if Biden wins the White House in November. The structural, geopolitical risk premium of US-Russia conflict is priced into Russian assets, but there is room for a cyclical increase if Biden is elected. Our market-based Russian geopolitical risk indicators – which define geopolitical risk as excessive ruble weakness relative to its macro context – show that Russian risk is elevated because of COVID-19, but dropping. The US election should reverse this trend, unless Trump wins (Chart 8). Chart 8Russian Geopolitical Risk Set To Increase Even If Trump Re-Elected Russian Geopolitical Risk Set To Increase Even If Trump Re-Elected Russian Geopolitical Risk Set To Increase Even If Trump Re-Elected Alternative measures of political risk that utilize non-market variables support our qualitative assessment, such as the indicator provided by GeoQuant. The implication is that Russian political risk is higher than the market is pricing (Chart 9). Chart 9Market Is Underpricing Russian Political Risk Market Is Underpricing Russian Political Risk Market Is Underpricing Russian Political Risk Kissinger Reversed? Not Yet. If Trump wins, could he not engineer a major détente with Russia? In 2018 the US shifted its national defense strategy to emphasize that “the central challenge to US prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition,” arguing specifically that “it is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model.4”  Yet US geopolitical power has declined such that taking an offensive approach to Russia and China simultaneously is not practicable.  If the US pursues the Reverse Kissinger strategy, then it will have to make major concessions to Putin’s Russia. It would need to provide substantial sanctions relief, accept the Crimean annexation, allow a high degree of Russian influence in Donbass (Ukraine), abandon hopes of retribution for the 2016 election interference, ask for a return to the 2015 nuclear deal on Iran at best, and settle for arms control agreements that do not cover new technologies. It is not clear that President Trump would concede this much in a second term, though in most cases he would have the power to do so. Yet Moscow cannot downgrade its cooperation with Beijing by much, since US-Russia détente never lasts long and China weighs more heavily in its economic calculus than the West’s sanctions. Chart 10US-Russo Struggle Is Subordinate To US-Sino Conflict US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) The Democrats, by contrast, are not prepared to make these concessions, particularly on 2016. They are more willing to pursue a gradualist approach in dealing with China, which they believe is less urgent due to shared economic interests.5  If the US confronts Russia, then Russia will draw closer to China. The informal alliance between these two powers is well advanced. A closer association provides China with a better position in waging its long-term geopolitical competition with the United States.  Ultimately US grand strategy and public opinion will drive American presidents to take a harder line on China because it rivals the US in economic resilience and technology over the long run (Chart 10). The conflict with Moscow will eventually be subordinate to the US-China struggle. But a “Reverse Kissinger” is not achievable until Russia feels threatened by China, either through its own weakness or Chinese strength. A much stronger trans-Atlantic alliance, or much greater Chinese influence over East Asia and/or the Middle East, could trigger a shift in Russian strategy. We are not there yet. Russia’s cooperation with China will deepen, strengthening China’s hand and making it all the more imperative for the United States to solidify the trans-Atlantic alliance with Europe. Otherwise the risk of a precipitous decline in American power will threaten global stability.  Bottom Line: US-Russian antagonism will continue for the foreseeable future. Russian geopolitical risk is underpriced, particularly if Biden wins the election. A Trump victory would offer only a temporary reprieve.  Direct Competition In Energy Russia can offer low cost natural gas alongside an existing and projected (under construction) network of pipelines into Europe. This capability will help it to sustain and marginally increase its market share in Europe relative to the US in the medium term. In turn, this will help Russia secure vital revenues for its macro stability.  Natural gas exports to Europe represent 2.5% of GDP or 9% of total exports. A Biden presidency is negative for Russian assets, but Russia has room to ease policy. In the long run, however, US LNG will challenge Russia’s share in the European natural gas market. On the whole, the US sees Russia as an economic competitor in the European natural gas market and it will continue to disrupt Russian natural gas exports to Europe through sanctions and/or by other means. A resulting market share war between the US and Russia will lead to low natural gas prices benefitting the consumer, Europe. Competition in Europe’s natural gas market underscores the broader geopolitical confrontation between the US and Russia. The following factors will shape heightened competition: Escalating Competition For European Natural Gas Market Europe will remain a major market for natural gas. The combination of falling domestic production, steady consumption growth and the ongoing structural shift to cleaner sources of energy will require greater imports of natural gas (Chart 11). Critically, Europe’s natural gas consumption might rise faster than its GDP making this market attractive to energy producers. According to the IEA, Europe’s consumption of natural gas will continue to grow at a steady rate over the next 5 years. In a nutshell, European policymakers are promoting cleaner energy such as natural gas over coal and nuclear energy. This push will facilitate rising demand for natural gas.  Yet, European natural gas production is expected to drop by 40%, driven by field closures in the Netherlands and the UK.  As such, the diverging gap between falling production and steady consumption opens up a space for both Russian and US natural gas exports into the continent. Russia Natural Gas Strategy: Russia and its largest natural gas producer, Gazprom, are aiming to increase their share in the European market from their current 36% to 40% (Chart 12). Chart 11Europe's Nat Gas Imports Will Continue Growing... Europe's Nat Gas Imports Will Continue Growing... Europe's Nat Gas Imports Will Continue Growing... Chart 12...Allowing Russia To Grab Market Share ...Allowing Russia To Grab Market Share ...Allowing Russia To Grab Market Share   Table 1Russia’s Pipeline Export Capacity US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) More specifically, Russia’s latest 2035 strategy (known as ES-2035) reaffirms its two-pronged strategy: (i) continue to provide low-cost natural gas to Europe and Asia through pipelines and (ii) developing LNG export capacity for exports to the Far East. Pipelines: Russia’s export capacity to Europe is set to increase to 190 Bcm/y by 2022 excluding existing transit routes passing through Ukraine (Table 1). Two new sources of pipeline routes will be the Nord Stream2, coming online by the end of this year, and Turk Stream, expected to come online by 2022. These pipelines will have an export capacity of 55 Bcm/y and 31.5/y Bcm, respectively (Map 1).   Map 1Russia’s Latest Pipelines Bypass Ukraine US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) Chart 13Russian Natural Gas Exports To Non-CIS Countries Russian Natural Gas Exports To Non-CIS Countries Russian Natural Gas Exports To Non-CIS Countries Meanwhile, pipeline capacity through Ukraine will remain 140 Bcm/y. Ultimately, Russia has been determined to diversify its natural gas transit routes despite pressures from the US.6 In addition, Gazprom natural gas production for transport via pipeline is expected to increase by 35% to 983 Bcm in the next 15 years. The European market is essential to Russia’s export revenues, as it currently represents 56% of Russia’s total gas export volumes compared with 83% total export to non-CIS countries (Chart 13). Lastly, regarding natural gas pricing, Gazprom will continue to move away from oil-indexed long-term contracts to shorter-term spot market contracts. This change of tack will cause deflation in Gazprom’s export prices to Europe but will preserve Russia’s market share in its strategic European market.   LNG: Russia will continue to be one the top four LNG producers alongside Qatar, Australia and the US. According to the latest estimates by the IEA, Russian exports of LNG, currently at 39 Bcm, are set to expand by 20% by 2025. The development of the Yamal peninsula into a major natural gas and LNG hub will allow Russia to produce close to 110 Bcm of LNG by 2035, which will constitute 16% of its overall current gas production. This will lead to continued LNG exports to various markets, particularly Europe, which consumes 50% of Russia’s LNG exports. Imported technology from Europe and external financing from China have allowed Novatek, Russia’s second largest natural gas producer, to become the leader in production and exports of LNG. Russia is also investing heavily in liquefaction. It is now fifth globally in liquefaction capacity. There are currently $21 billion in pre-final investment decision (FID) from the LNG Artic 2 in the Yamal that will increase its liquefaction capacity by over 200% by 2026.  Lastly, it is estimated that 70-80% of total commodity exporters’ costs are sourced locally and are in rubles due to the import substitution policy adopted by Moscow in 2015. This will alleviate cost pressures arising from a potentially weaker ruble in exploiting the Yamal reserves. US Needs To Find A Market For Its LNG: US produces 920 bcm/y of natural gas but consumes only 830 bcm/y. The rest is available for export. The need to export rising excess of natural gas output puts the US in direct competition with other natural gas exporters such as Russia. Chart 14US LNG Exports To Europe To Rise US LNG Exports To Europe To Rise US LNG Exports To Europe To Rise In the medium term, an oversupplied market alongside the COVID-19-induced demand shock in Europe will reduce European natural gas demand, hurting both the US and Russia. US LNG might lose market share in the European market to Russia due to falling production arising from capex cuts and bankruptcies in the US natural gas sector.7 Yet, in the long run, Europe’s geopolitical ties with the US and strategic interest in diversifying away from Russia make US LNG an obvious area of cooperation. The Trump-Juncker agreement in July 2018 led to a 300% increase in US LNG exports to Europe before the COVID-19 pandemic (Chart 14). Since coming into effect, the agreement also resulted in a doubling of EU utilization of LNG regasification capacity, from 30% to close to 60% in early 2020 and is expected to continue expanding in the years to come. Bottom Line: Russia will likely succeed in at least preserving its share in the European natural gas market in the medium term, but will be challenged by US LNG in the long run. Macro And Financial Market Implications For Russia Chart 15Russia: Low Public Debt Burden Russia: Low Public Debt Burden Russia: Low Public Debt Burden Heightened confrontation with the US and new sanctions on Russia will materialize if Biden wins the presidency. All else constant, this is unfavourable for Russian asset prices. It should be noted, however, that years of fiscal conservativism, tight monetary policy, a prudent and pro-active bank regulatory stance as well as some success in import substitution have given Russia the capacity to offset negative external shocks by easing macro policy: Russia has one of the lowest public debt-to-GDP ratios among the largest countries in the world. Its total public debt stands at 13.5% of GDP (Chart 15). Its external public debt is at a mere 4% of GDP. As in many other countries, Russia’s fiscal deficit is widening sharply due to the pandemic and low oil prices. However, we expect the primary and overall fiscal deficits will be only 4.25% and 5% of GDP in 2020, respectively. So far, at 3.5% of GDP, the announced fiscal stimulus in response to the pandemic has been small by global standards. Russia has room to boost fiscal expenditure substantially this year and in the coming years to offset negative external shocks. The Central Bank still has room to reduce interest rates further. The real policy rate is 2.5% compared with 1% for EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan (Chart 16, top panel). Russia’s local currency government bond yields offer value: their real yield is 2.5% compared with the EM GBI benchmark real yield of 1.5% (Chart 16, bottom panel). The Central Bank of the Russian Federation will refrain from QE-type policies (i.e., public debt monetization). This is a plus for the ruble relative to other EM currencies where central banks are engaged in QEs. Bank lending rates remain extremely elevated in Russia and local currency credit penetration is reasonably low (Chart 17). Companies and banks’ external indebtedness has declined from $1,200 bn in 2014 to $900 bn currently. Chart 16Russian Real Rates Offer Value Russian Real Rates Offer Value Russian Real Rates Offer Value Chart 17Russia: Real Lending Rates Are Too Elevated! Russia: Real Lending Rates Are Too Elevated! Russia: Real Lending Rates Are Too Elevated!   Authorities have cleaned up the banking system. The number of banks has dropped from 1000 in 2010 to 430. Banks have written down and provisioned for a large amount of loans. All of these reduce Russia’s vulnerability to negative shocks. Finally, pressured by US and EU sanctions, Russia has been moderately successful in import substitution as we discussed in a previous report. The nation has expanded its productive capacity, especially in agriculture and some other industries. As a result, it now has more room to deploy fiscal and monetary stimulus to boost demand that will be satisfied by domestic rather than foreign output. In short, fiscal and monetary stimulus will not cause the currency to plunge. On the negative side, the outlook for productivity growth remains lukewarm. Russia’s long-term economic outlook will be characterized by relative stability but low growth, as has been the case in recent years. Combining our geopolitical and macro analysis, two conclusions stand out. First, we remain overweight Russian equities as well as both local currency and US dollar bonds relative to their EM benchmarks. If Trump stages a comeback over the next four months, which is not impossible, then the geopolitical risk premium will continue to fall. Trump would offer a reprieve in tensions for a year or two.  Second, the US election threatens this view because Joe Biden is currently heavily favoured to beat Trump and if he does, he is likely to impose fresh sanctions on Russia, possibly as early as 2021. Therefore, if Biden’s election becomes a foregone conclusion, we will downgrade Russian assets. Matt Gertken  Vice President Geopolitical Strategist  mattg@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic Associate Editor andrijav@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Michael McFaul, From Cold War To Hot Peace: The Inside Story of Russia and America (London: Penguin, 2018). 2  International Monetary Fund, “Russian Federation: 2019 Article IV Consultation,” IMF Country Report 19/260 (August 2019). 3  Ann M. Simmons and Georgi Kantchev, “Russians Vote for Overhaul That Could Keep Putin in Power Until 2036,” Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2020.  4  “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening The American Military’s Competitive Edge,” Department of Defense, 2018. 5  Victoria Nuland, “Pinning Down Putin: How A Confident America Should Deal With Russia,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2020. 6  The US has tried to stop Russia’s expansion of pipelines into Europe in the past. Evidenced from both Kennedy and Reagan administration policies directed towards the building of the Friendship oil pipeline in the 1960s and the Brotherhood gas pipeline in the 1980s, respectively. In response, Russia began developing its own technological capacity through import substitution, hurting western firms in the process. 7  "U.S. natural gas giant Chesapeake Energy goes bankrupt,” CBC, June 29, 2020.

Highlights The collapse in oil prices supercharges the geopolitical risks stemming from the global pandemic and recession. Low oil prices should discourage petro-states from waging war, but Iran may be an important exception. Russian instability is one of the most important secular geopolitical consequences of this year’s crisis. President Trump’s precarious status this election year raises the possibility of provocations or reactions on his part. Europe faces instability on its eastern and southern borders in coming years, but integration rather than breakup is the response. Over a strategic time frame, go long AAA-rated municipal bonds, cyber security stocks, infrastructure stocks, and China reflation plays. Feature Chart 1Someone Took Physical Delivery! Someone Took Physical Delivery! Someone Took Physical Delivery! Oil markets melted this week. Oil volatility measured by the Crude Oil ETF Volatility Index surpassed 300% as WTI futures for May 2020 delivery fell into a black hole, bottoming at -$40.40 per barrel (Chart 1). Our own long Brent trade, initiated on 27 March 2020 at $24.92 per barrel, is down 17.9% as we go to press. Strategically we are putting cash to work acquiring risk assets and we remain long Brent. The forward curve implies that prices will rise to $35 and $31 per barrel for Brent and WTI by April 2021. We initiated this trade because we assessed that: The US and EU would gradually reopen their economies (they are doing so). Oil production would be destroyed (more on this below). Russia and Saudi Arabia would agree to production cuts (they did). Monetary and fiscal stimulus would take effect (the tsunami of stimulus is still growing). Global demand would start the long process of recovery (no turn yet, unknown timing). On a shorter time horizon, we are defensively positioned but things are starting to look up on COVID-19 – New York Governor Andrew Cuomo has released results of a study showing that 15% of New Yorkers have antibodies, implying a death rate of only 0.5%. The US dollar and global policy uncertainty may be peaking as we go to press (Chart 2). However, second-order effects still pose risks that keep us wary. Chart 2Dollar And Policy Uncertainty Roaring Dollar And Policy Uncertainty Roaring Dollar And Policy Uncertainty Roaring Geopolitics is the “next shoe to drop” – and it is already dropping. A host of risks are flying under the radar as the world focuses on the virus. Taken alone, not every risk warrants a risk-off positioning. But combined, these risks reveal extreme global uncertainty which does warrant a risk-off position in the near term. This week’s threats between the US and Iran, in particular, show that the political and geopolitical fallout from COVID-19 begins now, it will not “wait” until the pandemic crisis subsides. In this report we focus on the risks from oil-producing economies, but we first we update our fiscal stimulus tally. Stimulus Tsunami Chart 3Stimulus Tsunami Still Building Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Policymakers responded to COVID-19 by doing “whatever it takes” to prop up demand (Chart 3). Please see the Appendix for our latest update of our global fiscal stimulus table. The latest fiscal and monetary measures show that countries are still adding stimulus – i.e. there is not yet a substantial shift away from providing stimulus: China has increased its measures to a total of 10% of GDP for the year so far, according to BCA Research China Investment Strategy. This includes a general increase in credit growth, a big increase in government spending (2% of GDP), a bank re-lending scheme (1.5% of GDP), an increase in general purpose local government bonds (2% of GDP), plus special purpose bonds (4% of GDP) and other measures. On the political front, the government has rolled out a new slogan, “the Six Stabilities and the Six Guarantees,” and President Xi Jinping said on an inspection tour to Shaanxi that the state will increase investments to ensure that employment is stabilized. This is the maximum reflationary signal from China that we have long expected. The US agreed to a $484 billion “fourth phase” stimulus package, bringing its total to 13% of GDP. President Trump is already pushing for a fifth phase involving bailouts of state and local governments and infrastructure, which we fully expect to take place even if it takes a bit longer than packages that have been passed so far this year. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has opened the way for the EU to issue Eurobonds, in keeping with our expectations. Germany is spending 12% of GDP in total – which can go much higher depending on how many corporate loans are tapped – while Italy is increasing its stimulus to 3% of GDP. As deficits rise to astronomical sums, and economies gradually reopen, will legislatures balk at passing new stimulus? Yes, eventually. Financial markets will have to put more pressure on policymakers to get them to pass more stimulus. This can lead to volatility. In the US the pandemic is coinciding with “peak polarization” over the 2020 election. Lack of coordination between federal and state governments is increasing uncertainty. Currently disputes center on the timing of economic reopening and the provisioning bailout funds for state and local governments. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell is threatening to deny bailouts for American states with large, unfunded public pension benefits (Chart 4A). He is insisting that the Senate “push the pause button” on coronavirus relief measures; specifically that nothing new be passed until the Senate convenes in Washington on May 4. He may then lead a charge in the Republican Senate to try to require structural reforms from states in exchange for bailouts. Estimates of the total state budget shortfall due to the crisis stand at $500 billion over the next three years, which is almost certainly an understatement (Chart 4B). Chart 4AUS States Have Unfunded Liabilities Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Chart 4BUS States Face Funding Shortfalls Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Could a local government or state declare bankruptcy? Not anytime soon. Technically there is no provision for states to declare bankruptcy. A constitutional challenge to such a declaration would go to the Supreme Court. One commonly cited precedent, Arkansas in 1933, ended up with a federal bailout.1 A unilateral declaration could conceivably become a kind of “Lehman moment” in the public sector, but state governors will ask their legislatures to provide more fiscal flexibility and will seek bailouts from the federal government first. The Federal Reserve is already committed to buying state and local bonds and can expand these purchases to keep interest rates low. Washington would be forced to provide at least short-term funding if state workers started getting fired in the midst of the crisis because of straightened state finances – another $500 billion for the states is entirely feasible in today’s climate. Constraints will prevail on the GOP Senate to provide state bailout funds. This conflict over state finances could have a negative impact on US equities in the near term, but it is largely a bluff – McConnell will lose this battle. The fundamental dynamic in Washington is that of populism combined with a pandemic that neutralizes arguments about moral hazard. Big-spending Democrats in the House of Representatives control the purse strings while big-spending President Trump faces an election. Senate Republicans are cornered on all sides – and their fate is tied to the President’s – so they will eventually capitulate. Bottom Line: The global fiscal and monetary policy tsunami is still building. But there are plenty of chances for near-term debacles. Over the long run the gargantuan stimulus is the signal while the rest is noise. Over the long run we expect the reflationary efforts to prevail and therefore we are long Treasury inflation-protected securities and US investment grade corporate bonds. We recommend going strategically long AAA-rated US municipal bonds relative to 10-year Treasuries. Petro-State Meltdown Since March we have highlighted that the collapse in oil prices will destabilize oil producers above and beyond the pandemic and recession. This leaves Iran in danger, but even threatens the stability of great powers like Russia. Normally there is something of a correlation between the global oil price and the willingness of petro-states to engage in war (Chart 5). Chart 5Petro-States Cease Fire When Oil Drops Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) When prices fall, revenues dry up and governments have to prioritize domestic stability. This tends to defer inter-state conflict. We can loosely corroborate this evidence by showing that global defense stocks tend to be correlated with oil prices (Chart 6). Global growth is the obvious driver of both of these indicators. But states whose budgets are closely tied to the commodity cycle are the most likely to cut defense spending. Chart 6Global Growth Drives Oil And Guns Global Growth Drives Oil And Guns Global Growth Drives Oil And Guns Russia is case in point. Revenues from Rostec, one of Russia’s largest arms firms, rise and fall with the Urals crude oil price (Chart 7). The Russians launch into foreign adventures during oil bull markets, when state coffers are flush with cash. They have an uncanny way of calling the top of the cycle by invading countries (Chart 8). Chart 7Oil Correlates With Russian Arms Sales Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Chart 8Russian Invasions Call Peak In Oil Bull Markets Russian Invasions Call Peak In Oil Bull Markets Russian Invasions Call Peak In Oil Bull Markets Chart 9Turkish Political Risk On The Rise Turkish Political Risk On The Rise Turkish Political Risk On The Rise In the current oil rout, there is already some evidence of hostilities dying down in this way. For instance, after years of dogged fighting in Yemen, Saudi Arabia is finally declaring a ceasefire there. Turkey, which benefits from low oil prices, has temporarily gotten the upper hand in Libya vis-à-vis Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army, which depends on oil revenues and backing from petro-states like Russia and the GCC. Of course, Turkey’s deepening involvement in foreign conflicts is evidence of populism at home so it does not bode well for the lira or Turkish assets (Chart 9). But it does highlight the impact of weak oil on petro-players such as Haftar. However, the tendency of petro-states to cease fire amid low prices is merely a rule of thumb, not a law of physics. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Already we are seeing that Iran is defying this dynamic by engaging in provocative saber-rattling with the United States. Iran And Iraq The US and Iran are rattling sabers again. One would think that Iran, deep in the throes of recession and COVID-19, would eschew a conflict with the US at a time when a vulnerable and anti-Iranian US president is only seven months away from an election. Chart 10US Maximum Pressure On Iran US Maximum Pressure On Iran US Maximum Pressure On Iran Iran has survived nearly two years of “maximum pressure” from President Trump (Chart 10), and previous US sanction regimes, and has a fair chance of seeing the Democrats retake Washington. The Democrats would restart negotiations to restore the 2015 nuclear deal, which was favorable to Iran. Therefore risking air strikes from President Trump is counterproductive and potentially disastrous. Yet this logic only holds if the Iranian regime is capable of sustaining the pain of a pandemic and global recession on top of its already collapsing economy. Iran’s ability to circumvent sanctions to acquire funds depended on the economy outside of Iran doing fine. Now Iran’s illicit funds are drying up. This could lead to a pullback in funding for militant proxies across the region as Iran cuts costs. But it also removes the constraint on Iran taking bolder actions. If the economy is collapsing anyway then Iran can take bigger risks. Furthermore if Iran is teetering, there may be an incentive to initiate foreign conflicts to refocus domestic angst. This could be done without crossing Trump’s red lines by attacking Iraq or Saudi Arabia. With weak oil demand, Iran’s leverage declines. But a major attack would reduce oil production and accelerate the global supply-demand rebalance. Iran’s attack on the Saudi Abqaiq refinery last September took six million barrels per day offline briefly, but it was clearly not intended to shut down that production permanently. Threats against shipping in the Persian Gulf bring about 14 million barrels per day into jeopardy (Chart 11). Chart 11Closing Hormuz Would Be The Biggest Oil Shock Ever Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Iran-backed militias in Iraq have continued to attack American assets and have provoked American air strikes over the past month, despite the near-war scenario that erupted just before COVID. Iranian ships have harassed US naval ships in recent days. President Trump has ordered the navy to destroy ships that threaten it; Iranian commander has warned that Iran will sink US warships that threaten its ships in the Gulf. There is a 20% chance of armed hostilities between the US and Iran. Why would Iran be willing to confront the United States? First, Iran rightly believes that the US is war-weary and that Trump is committed to withdrawing from the Middle East. But this could prompt a fateful mistake. The equation changes if the US public is incensed and Trump’s election campaign could benefit from conflict. Chart 12Youth Pose Stability Risk To Iran Youth Pose Stability Risk To Iran Youth Pose Stability Risk To Iran Second, the US is never going to engage in a ground invasion of Iran. Airstrikes would not easily dislodge the regime. They could have the opposite effect and convert an entire generation of young, modernizing Iranians into battle-hardened supporters of the Islamic revolution (Chart 12). This is a dire calculation that the Iranian leaders would only make if they believed their regime was about to collapse. But they are quite possibly the closest to collapse that they have been since the 1980s and nobody knows where their pain threshold lies. They are especially vulnerable as the regime approaches the uncharted succession of Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei. Since early 2018 we have argued that there is a 20% chance of armed hostilities between the US and Iran. We upgraded this to 40% in June 2019 and downgraded it back to 20% after the Iranians shied from direct conflict this January. Our position remains the same 20%. This is still a major understated risk at a time when the global focus is entirely elsewhere. It will persist into 2021 if Trump is reelected. If the Democrats win the US election, this war risk will abate. The Iranians will play hard to get but they are politically prohibited from pursuing confrontation with the US when a 2015-type deal is available. This would open up the possibility for greater oil supply to be unlocked in the future, but sanctions are not likely to be lifted till 2022 at earliest. Russia Russia may not be on the verge of invading anyone, but it is internally vulnerable and fully capable of striking out against foreign opponents. Cyberattacks, election interference, or disinformation campaigns would sow confusion or heighten tensions among the great powers. The Russian state is suffering a triple whammy of pandemic, recession, and oil collapse. President Vladimir Putin’s approval rating has fallen this year so far, whereas other leaders in the western world have all seen polling bounces (even President Trump, slightly) (Chart 13). Putin postponed a referendum designed to keep him in office through 2036 due to the COVID crisis. In other words, the pandemic has already disrupted his carefully laid succession plans. While Putin can bypass a referendum, he would have been better off in the long run with the public mandate. Generally it is Putin’s administration, not his personal popularity, that is at risk, but the looming impact on Russian health and livelihoods puts both in jeopardy (Chart 14) and requires larger fiscal outlays to try to stabilize approval (Chart 15). Chart 13Putin Saw No COVID Popularity Bump Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Chart 14Russian Regime Faces Political Discontent Russian Regime Faces Political Discontent Russian Regime Faces Political Discontent Moreover, regardless of popular opinion, Putin is likely to settle scores with the oligarchs. The fateful decision to clash with the Saudis in March, which led to the oil collapse, will fall on Igor Sechin, Chief Executive of Rosneft, and his faction. An extensive political purge may well ensue that would jeopardize domestic stability (Chart 16). Chart 15Russia To Focus On Domestic Stability Russia To Focus On Domestic Stability Russia To Focus On Domestic Stability Chart 16Russian Political Risk Will Rise Russian Political Risk Will Rise Russian Political Risk Will Rise Russian tensions with the US will rise over the US election in November. The Democrats would seek to make Russia pay for interfering in US politics to help President Trump win in 2016. But even President Trump may no longer be a reliable “ally” of Putin given that Putin’s oil tactics have bankrupted the US shale industry during Trump’s reelection campaign. The American and Russian air forces are currently sparring in the air space over Syria and the Mediterranean. The US has also warned against a malign actor threatening to hack the health care system of the Czech Republic, which could be Russia or another actor like North Korea or Iran. These issues have taken place off the radar due to the coronavirus but they are no less real for that. Venezuela We have predicted Venezuela’s regime change for several years but the oil meltdown, pandemic, and insufficient Russian and Chinese support should put the final nail in the regime’s coffin. Hugo Chavez’s rise to power, the last “regime change,” occurred as oil prices bottomed in 1998. Historically the Venezuelan armed forces have frequently overthrown civilian authorities, but in several cases not until oil prices recovered (Chart 17). Chart 17Venezuelan Coups Follow Oil Rebounds Venezuelan Coups Follow Oil Rebounds Venezuelan Coups Follow Oil Rebounds The US decision to designate Nicolas Maduro as a “narco-terrorist,” to deploy greater naval and coast guard assets around Venezuela, to reassert the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary, and to pull Chevron from the country all suggest that Washington is preparing for regime change. Such a change may or may not involve any American orchestration. Venezuela is an easy punching-bag for President Trump if he seeks to “wag the dog” ahead of the election. Venezuela would be a strategic prize and yet it cannot hurt the US economy or financial markets substantially, giving limited downside to President Trump if he pursues such a strategy. Obviously any conflict with Venezuela this year is far less relevant to global investors than one with Iran, North Korea, China, or Russia. Regime change would be positive for oil supply and negative for prices over the long run. But that is a story for the next cycle of energy development, as it would take years for government and oil industry change in Venezuela to increase production. The US election cycle is a critical aggravating factor for all of these petro-state risks. Shale producers are going bankrupt, putting pressure on the economy and some swing states. The risk of a conflict arises not only from Trump playing “wag the dog” after the crisis abates, but also from other states provoking the president, causing him to react or overreact. The “Other Guys” Oil producers outside the US, Canada, gulf OPEC, and Russia – the “other guys” – are extremely vulnerable to this year’s global crisis and price collapse. Comprising half of global production, they were already seeing production declines and a falling global market share over the past decade when they should have benefited from a global economic expansion. They never recovered from the 2014-15 oil plunge and market share war (Chart 18). Angola (1.4 million barrels per day), Algeria (one million barrels per day), and Nigeria (1.8 million barrels per day) are relatively sizable producers whose domestic stability is in question in the coming years as they cut budgets and deplete limited forex reserves to adjust to the lower oil price. This means fewer fiscal resources to keep political and regional factions cooperating and provide basic services. Algeria is particularly vulnerable. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who ruled as a strongman from 1999, was forced out last year, leaving a power vacuum that persists under Prime Minister Abdelaziz Djerad, in the wake of the low-participation elections in December. An active popular protest movement, Hirak, already exists and is under police suppression. Unemployment is high, especially among the youth. Neighboring Libya is in the midst of a war and extremist militants within Libya and North Africa would like to expand their range of operations in a destabilized Algeria. Instability would send immigrants north to Europe. Oil production will be reduced involuntarily as well as voluntarily this year due to regime failures. Brazil is not facing the risk of state failure like Algeria, but it is facing a deteriorating domestic political outlook (Chart 19). President Jair Bolsonaro’s popularity was already low relative to most previous presidents before COVID. His narrow base in the Chamber of Deputies got narrower when he abandoned his political party. He has defied the pandemic, refused to endorse social distancing or lockdown orders by local governments, and fired his Health Minister Luiz Henrique Mandetta. Chart 18Petro-States: 'Other Guys' Face Instability Petro-States: 'Other Guys' Face Instability Petro-States: 'Other Guys' Face Instability Chart 19Brazilian Political Risk Rising Again Brazilian Political Risk Rising Again Brazilian Political Risk Rising Again Brazil has a high number of coronavirus deaths per million people relative to other emerging markets with similar health capacity and susceptibility to the disease. This, combined with sharply rising unemployment, could prove toxic for Bolsonaro, who has not received a bounce in popular opinion from the crisis like most other world leaders. Thus on balance we expect the October local elections to mark a comeback for the Worker’s Party. The limited fiscal gains of Bolsonaro’s pension reform are already wiped out by the global recession, which will set back the country’s frail recovery from its biggest recession in a century. The country is still on an unsustainable fiscal path. Bolsonaro does not have a strong personal commitment to neoliberal structural reform, which has been put aside anyway due to the need for government fiscal spending amid the crisis. Unless Bolsonaro’s popularity increases in the wake of the crisis – due to backlash against the state-level lockdowns – the economic shock is negative for Brazil’s political stability and economic policy orthodoxy. Bottom Line: Our rule of thumb about petro-states suggests that they will generally act less aggressive amid a historic oil price collapse, but Iran may prove a critical exception. Investors should not underestimate the risk of a US-Iran conflict this year. Beyond that, the US election will have a decisive impact as the Democrats will seek to resume the Iranian nuclear deal and Iran would eventually play ball. Venezuela is less globally relevant this year – although a “wag the dog” scenario is a distinct possibility – but it may well be a major oil supply surprise in the 2020s. More broadly the takeaway is that oil production will be reduced involuntarily as well as voluntarily this year due to regime failures. Investment Takeaways Obviously any conflict with Iran could affect the range of Middle Eastern OPEC supply, not just the portion already shuttered due to sanctions on Iran itself. Any Iran war risk is entirely separate from the risk of supply destruction from more routine state failures in Africa. These shortages have been far less consequential lately and have plenty of room to grow in significance (Chart 20). The extreme lows in oil prices today will create the conditions for higher oil prices later when demand recovers, via supply destruction. Chart 20More Unplanned Outages To Come Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Chart 21European Political Risk No Longer Underrated European Political Risk No Longer Underrated European Political Risk No Longer Underrated An important implication – to be explored in future reports – is that Europe’s neighborhood is about to get a lot more dangerous in the coming years, as the Middle East and Russia will become less stable. Middle East instability will result in new waves of immigration and terrorism after a lull since 2015-16. These waves would fuel right-wing political sentiment in parts of Europe that are the most vulnerable in today’ crisis: Italy, Spain, and France (Chart 21). This should not be equated with the EU breaking apart, however, as the populist parties in these countries are pursuing soft rather than hard Euroskepticism. Unless that changes the risk is to the Euro Area’s policy coherence rather than its existence. Finally Russian domestic instability is one of the major secular consequences of the pandemic and recession and its consequences could be far-reaching, particularly in its great power struggle with the United States. We are reinitiating a strategic long in cyber security stocks, the ISE Cyber Security Index, relative to the S&P500 Info Tech sector. Cyberattacks are a form of asymmetrical warfare that we expect to ramp up with the general increase in global geopolitical tensions. The US’s recent official warning against an unknown actor that apparently intended to attack the health system of the Czech Republic highlights the way in which malign actors could attempt to capitalize on the chaos of the pandemic. We also recommend strategic investors reinitiate our “China Play Index” – commodities and equities sensitive to China’s reflation – and our BCA Infrastructure Basket, which will benefit from Chinese reflation as well as US deficit spending. China’s reflation will help industrial metals more so than oil, but it is positive for the latter as well. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 John Mauldin, "Don't Be So Sure That States Can't Go Bankrupt," Forbes, July 28, 2016, forbes.com.   Section II: Appendix : GeoRisk Indicator China China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator Russia Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator UK UK: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Germany Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Canada Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Spain Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Korea Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Appendix Table 1 The Global Fiscal Stimulus Response To COVID-19 Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Section III: Geopolitical Calendar