Russia

Highlights Chart 1European Policy Uncertainty Down European Policy Uncertainty Down European Policy Uncertainty Down Macron remains on target to win the French election, but Italy looms as a risk ahead; Fade any relief rally after South Korean elections; Russia is not a major source of geopolitical risk at present; Stay underweight Turkey and Indonesia within the EM universe. Feature The supposed pushback against populism is emerging as a theme in the financial industry. The expected defeat of nationalist-populist Marine Le Pen in the second round of the French election on May 7 has reduced Europe's economic policy uncertainty, despite continued elevated levels globally (Chart 1). We are not surprised by this outcome. A year ago, ahead of both the Brexit referendum and the U.S. election, we cautioned investors that it was the Anglo-Saxon world, not continental Europe, which would experience the greatest populist earthquake.1 The middle class in the U.S. and the U.K. lacks the socialist protections of large welfare states (Chart 2), leading to frustrating outcomes in terms of equality and social mobility (Chart 3). In other words, the gains of globalization have not been redistributed in the two laissez-faire economies. Hence the Anglo-Saxon world got Trump and Brexit while the continent got market-positive outcomes like Rajoy, Van der Bellen, Rutte, and (probably) Macron. Chart 2Given The Qualities Of The##br## Anglo-Saxon Economy ... What About Emerging Markets? What About Emerging Markets? Chart 3...Brexit And Trump ##br##Should Not Be A Surprise What About Emerging Markets? What About Emerging Markets? Looking forward, we agree with the consensus that Marine Le Pen will lose, as we have been stressing with high conviction since November.2 Despite a poor start to the campaign, Macron remains 20% ahead of Marine Le Pen with only four days left to the election (Chart 4). Could the polls be wrong? No. And not just because they were right in the first round. Polls are likely to be right because French polls have an exemplary track record (Chart 5) and there is no Electoral College to throw off the math. Chart 4Le Pen Unlikely To Bridge This Gap Le Pen Unlikely To Bridge This Gap Le Pen Unlikely To Bridge This Gap Chart 5French Polls Have Strong Track Record What About Emerging Markets? What About Emerging Markets? As we go to press, the two candidates are set to face off in an important televised debate. Given Le Pen's post-debate polling performance in the first round (Chart 6), we doubt she will perform well enough to make a change. Next week, we will review the second round and its implications for the legislative elections in June and French politics beyond. Overall, we think Europe's policy uncertainty dip is temporary, as the all-important Italian election risk looms just ahead in 2018.3 For now, we are sticking with our bullish European risk asset view, but will look to pare it back later in the year. Chart 6Debates Have Not Helped Le Pen Debates Have Not Helped Le Pen Debates Have Not Helped Le Pen Chart 7Commodity Currencies Suggest Global Trade Is At Risk... Commodity Currencies Suggest Global Trade Is At Risk... Commodity Currencies Suggest Global Trade Is At Risk... What about emerging markets? With investors laser-focused on developed market political risks - Trump's policies and protectionism, European elections, Brexit, etc - have EM political risks fallen by the wayside? Chart 8...And Commodities Are At Risk Too ...And Commodities Are At Risk Too ...And Commodities Are At Risk Too Chart 9China's Growth To Decelerate Again China's Growth To Decelerate Again China's Growth To Decelerate Again We don't think so. According to BCA's Emerging Market Strategy, the recent performance of the commodity currency index (an equally weighted average of AUD, NZD, and CAD) augurs a deceleration of global growth in the second half of this year (Chart 7) and a top in the commodity complex (Chart 8).4 At the heart of the reversal is the slowdown in China's credit and fiscal spending impulse (Chart 9).5 Given China's critical importance as the main source of EM final demand (Chart 10), the slowdown in money and credit growth is a significant risk to EM growth in the latter part of the year (Chart 11).6 Chart 10EM Is Leveraged To China Much More Than DM EM Is Leveraged To China Much More Than DM EM Is Leveraged To China Much More Than DM Chart 11China: Money/Credit Growth Is Slowing China: Money/Credit Growth Is Slowing China: Money/Credit Growth Is Slowing At the heart of China's credit slowdown are efforts by policymakers to cautiously introduce some discipline in the financial sector. Chinese interbank rates have risen noticeably, which should have a material impact on credit growth (Chart 12). Given that the all-important nineteenth National Party Congress is six-to-seven months away, we doubt that the tightening efforts will be severe. But they may foreshadow a much tighter policy in 2018, following the conclusion of the Congress, when President Xi has full reign and the ability to redouble his initial efforts at reform, namely to control the risks of excessive leverage to the state's stability. With both the Fed and PBoC looking to tighten over the next 12-18 months, in part to respond to improvements in global inflation expectations (Chart 13), highly leveraged EM economies may face a triple-whammy of USD appreciation, Chinese growth plateauing, and easing commodity demand. In isolation, none is critical, but as a combination, they could be challenging. Chart 12Chinese Policymakers End The Credit Party? Chinese Policymakers End The Credit Party? Chinese Policymakers End The Credit Party? Chart 13Global Tightening Upon Us? Global Tightening Upon Us? Global Tightening Upon Us? In this weekly report, we take an around-the-world look at several emerging economies that we believe are either defying the odds of political crisis or particularly vulnerable to growth slowdown. South Korea: Here Comes The Sunshine Policy, Part II South Korea's early election will be held on May 9. The victory of a left-wing candidate has been likely since April 2016, when the two main left-wing parties, the Democratic Party and the People's Party, won a majority of the 300-seat National Assembly. It has been inevitable since the impeachment of outgoing President Park Geun-hye in December - whose removal was deemed legal by the Constitutional Court in March - for a corruption scandal that split the main center-right party and decimated its popular support after ten years of ruling the country.7 The only question was whether Moon Jae-in, leader of the Democratic Party and erstwhile chief of staff of former President Roh Moo-hyun, would finally get his turn as president, or whether Ahn Cheol-soo, an entrepreneurial politician who broke from the Democratic Party to form the People's Party, would defeat him. At the moment, Moon has a significant lead in the polls, while Ahn has lost the bump in support he received after other candidates were eliminated through the primary process (Chart 14). Moon's lead has grown throughout the recent spike in saber-rattling between the United States and North Korea, which suggests that Moon is most likely to win the race. The debates have also hurt Ahn. Moon leads in every region, among blue collar and white collar voters, and among centrists as well as progressives. Also, the pollster Gallup Korea has a solid track record for presidential elections going back to 1987, with a margin of error of about 3%, so Moon is highly likely to win if polls do not change in Ahn's or Hong's favor. The key difference between Moon and Ahn boils down to this: Moon is the established left-wing candidate and has mainstream Democratic Party machinery backing him, a clear platform, and experience running the country from 2003-8. Ahn does not have experience in the executive branch (Blue House) and his policy platform is less clear. His party is a progressive offshoot of the Democratic Party, yet he is bidding for disenchanted center-right voters, a contradiction that has at times given him the appearance of flip-flopping on important issues. Thus Ahn's election would bring greater economic policy uncertainty than Moon's, though Ahn is more business-friendly by preference. Regardless, the new president will have to work with the opposing left-wing party in the National Assembly if he intends to get anything accomplished. The combined left-wing vote is 164, yielding only a 13-seat majority if the two parties work together. Differences between them will cause problems in passing legislation. It would be easier for Moon to legislate with his party's 119-seat base than for Ahn with his party's 40-seat base, unless Ahn can steer his party to cooperate with the center right like he is trying to do in the presidential campaign. Markets may celebrate the election regardless of the victor because it sets the country back on the path of stable government. The Kospi bottomed in November when the political crisis reached a fever pitch and has rallied since December 5, when it became clear that the conservatives in the assembly would vote for Park's impeachment. This suggested an early government change to restore political and economic leadership. The market rallied again when the Constitutional Court removed Park, which pulled the presidential elections forward to May and cut short what would otherwise have been another year of uncertainty until the original election date in December 2017 (Chart 15). Chart 14South Korea: Moon In The Lead What About Emerging Markets? What About Emerging Markets? Chart 15Korean Stocks Cheered Impeachment Korean Stocks Cheered Impeachment Korean Stocks Cheered Impeachment Investors can reasonably look forward to an increase in fiscal thrust after the election, particularly if Moon is elected. Table 1 compares the key policy initiatives of the top three candidates - both Moon and Ahn are pledging increases in government spending. Note that South Korean fiscal thrust expanded in the first two years of the last left-leaning government, i.e. the Roh Moo-hyun administration (Chart 16). Table 1South Korean Presidential Candidates And Their Policy Proposals What About Emerging Markets? What About Emerging Markets? Chart 16Left-Wing Leaders Drive Up Fiscal Spending Left-Wing Leaders Drive Up Fiscal Spending Left-Wing Leaders Drive Up Fiscal Spending Beyond any initial relief rally, however, investors may experience some buyer's remorse. South Korea is experiencing a leftward swing of the political pendulum that is not conducive to higher growth in corporate earnings. This is the implication of the April legislative elections and the collapse of President Park's support prior to the corruption scandal; it will also be the takeaway of either Moon's or Ahn's election win over a discredited conservative status quo (both fiscal and corporate). The leftward shift is motivated by structural factors, not mere political optics. Average growth rates have fallen since the Great Recession, yet South Korea lacks the social amenities of a slower-growing developed economy. The social safety net is comparable to Turkey's or Mexico's and wages have been suppressed to maintain competitiveness (Chart 17). Inequality has grown dramatically (Chart 18). Chart 17Keeping Labor Cheap Keeping Labor Cheap Keeping Labor Cheap Chart 18Fueling The Populist Fire What About Emerging Markets? What About Emerging Markets? Therefore the policies to come will emphasize redistribution, job security, and social benefits. Moon's policies, in particular, are aggressive. He has pledged to require the public sector to increase employment by 5% per year and add 810,000 jobs by 2022, and to expand welfare for the elderly regardless of their income level. This will swell the budget deficit and public debt, especially over time, given South Korea's demographic profile, which is rapidly graying (Chart 19). Moon also intends nearly to double the minimum wage, require private companies to hire 3-5% more workers each year, depending on company size, and give substantial subsidies to SMEs that hire more workers. He supports a hike in corporate taxes, though the details of any tax changes have yet to be disclosed. Chart 19Society Turning Gray Society Turning Gray Society Turning Gray Ahn's policy preferences are more focused on productivity improvements than social welfare. While Moon panders to middle-aged workers concerned about job security - among whom he leads Ahn by 30 percentage points - Ahn panders to the youth, who are currently battling an unemployment rate of 11%. He would pay subsidies to young workers while they look for jobs immediately after graduation ($266 per month) and for the first two years of their employment at an SME ($532 per month). He would direct budgetary funds to research and development, high-tech industries, and job training. The SME policies speak to the general dissatisfaction with the cozy relationship between large, export-oriented industrial giants - the chaebol - and the political elite. Both Moon and Ahn will attempt to remove subsidies and privileges from the chaebol, potentially forcing them to sell or spin-off branches that are unrelated to their core business, and will seek to incentivize SMEs. Chaebol reform is a long-running theme in South Korean politics with very little record of success, but the one thing investors can be sure of on this front is greater uncertainty regarding policies toward the country's multinationals. Bottom Line: South Korea is experiencing a swing of the political pendulum to the left regardless of who wins the presidential race on May 9. What About Geopolitics? Internationally, Moon, if he wins, will attempt to improve relations with China and North Korea at the expense of the U.S. and Japan. His voter base came of age during the democracy movement of the 1980s and is friendlier toward China and less hostile toward North Korea than other age groups (Chart 20 A&B). Ahn may attempt a similar foreign policy adjustment, but he is less willing to confront the United States. His attempt to woo the youth will constrain any engagement with Pyongyang, since young South Koreans feel the least connection with their ethnic brethren to the north. Given that a Moon presidency would be paired with that of Trump, it would likely precipitate tensions in the U.S.-Korean relationship. News headlines will announce that South Korea is "pivoting" toward China, much in the way that U.S. ally the Philippines was perceived as shifting toward China after President Rodrigo Duterte's election in 2016. This will be an exaggeration, since Koreans still generally prefer the U.S. to China and view North Korea as an enemy (Chart 21). Nevertheless, there is potential for real, market-relevant disagreements. Chart 20Moon's Middle-Aged Constituency What About Emerging Markets? What About Emerging Markets? Chart 21Constraints On The Sunshine Policy What About Emerging Markets? What About Emerging Markets? In the short term, the risk is to trade, given the South Korean Left's strain of opposition to the U.S.-Korea free trade agreement (KORUS) and Trump's intention to renegotiate it, or even impose tariffs. Trump is bringing a protectionist tilt to U.S. trade policy - at very least - and he is relatively unconstrained on trade so we consider this a high-level risk over his four-year term in office. Trade tensions could become consequential if South Korea breaks with the U.S. over North Korea, angering the Trump administration. At the same time, South Korea's trade with China (Chart 22) is a risk due to China's secular slowdown, protectionism, and intention to move up the value chain and compete with South Korea in global markets. Chart 22South Korea's Twin Trade Risks South Korea's Twin Trade Risks South Korea's Twin Trade Risks In the short and long term, Moon's attempt to revamp Kim Dae-jung's "Sunshine Policy" of economic engagement and denuclearization talks with North Korea could create serious frictions with the U.S. What Moon is proposing is to promote economic integration so that South Korea has more leverage over the North, which is increasingly reliant on China, and also to reduce military tensions via negotiations toward a peace treaty (the 1950-3 war ended with an armistice only). The idea is to launch a five-year plan toward an inter-Korean "economic union." This would begin by re-opening shuttered cooperative projects like the Kaesong Industrial Complex and Mount Kumgang tours and later establish duty-free agreements, free trade zones, and multilateral infrastructure projects that include Russia and China.8 The problem is that any new Sunshine Policy - which is ostensibly a boon for the region's security - will clash with the Trump administration's attempt to rally a new international coalition to tighten sanctions on North Korea to force it to freeze its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. North Korea will want to divide the allies and thus will be receptive to China's and South Korea's offers of negotiations; the U.S. and Japan will not want to allow any additional economic aid to the North without a halt to tests and tokens of eventual denuclearization. How will this tension be resolved? Trump is preparing for negotiations and over the next couple of years the U.S. and Japan are highly likely to give diplomacy at least one last chance, as we have argued in recent reports.9 Eventually, if the U.S. becomes convinced of total collaboration between China and South Korea with the North (i.e. skirting sanctions and granting economic benefits), while the North continues testing capabilities that would enable it to strike the U.S. homeland with a nuclear weapon, some kind of confrontation is inevitable. But first the U.S. will try another round of talks. The "arc of diplomacy" could extend for several years, as it did with Iran (Chart 23), if the North delays its missile progress or appears to do so. Chart 23The 'Arc Of Diplomacy' Can Last For Several Years What About Emerging Markets? What About Emerging Markets? Despite our belief that the North Korean situation will calm down as diplomacy gets under way, South Korea is seeing rising geopolitical headwinds for the following reasons: Sino-American tensions: U.S.-China competition is growing over time, notwithstanding the apparently friendly start between the Trump and Xi administrations.10 Trump's North Korea policy: The Trump administration has signaled that the U.S. does not accept a nuclear-armed North Korea and the need to maintain the credibility of the military option will keep tensions at a higher level than in recent memory.11 Japanese re-armament: Japanese tensions with China and both Koreas are rising as Japan increases military expenditures and maritime defenses and moves to revise its constitution to legitimize military action.12 The costs of peace: If diplomacy prevails, South Korean engagement with the North still poses massive uncertainties about the future of the relationship, the North's internal stability amid liberalization, whether the transition to greater economic integration will be smooth, and whether the South Korean economy (and public finances) can absorb the associated costs. This is not even to mention eventual unification. Bottom Line: The current saber-rattling around the Korean peninsula is not over yet, but tensions are soon to fall as international negotiations get under way. Still, geopolitical risks for South Korea are rising over the long run. Investment Conclusions The currency will be the first to react to the election results and will send a signal about whether the fall in policy uncertainty is deemed more beneficial than the impending rise in pro-labor policies. Beyond that, the won has been strong relative to South Korea's neighbors and competitors (Chart 24). The Korean central bank is considering cutting rates at a time when fiscal policy is set to expand substantially, a negative for the currency. Chart 24Won Strength, Yen Weakness Won Strength, Yen Weakness Won Strength, Yen Weakness Therefore we remain short KRW / long THB. Thailand, another U.S. ally, is running huge current account surpluses, is more insulated from U.S.-China geopolitical conflicts, and has navigated tensions between the two relatively well. We expect a relief rally in stocks due to resolution of the campaign and the likelihood of an easing in trade tensions with China. However, this is the only reason we are not yet ready to join our colleagues in the Emerging Markets Strategy in shorting Korean stocks versus Japanese. We will look to put on this trade in future. We do not have high hopes for Korean stocks over the long run due to the headwinds listed above. As for bonds, both Moon's and Ahn's agendas, particularly Moon's, will be bond bearish because they will increase deficits and debt. At the short end of the curve, yields may have reason to fall; but the long end should reflect looser fiscal policy, the worsening debt and demographic profile, and increasing geopolitical risk, whether from conflicts with the U.S. and North Korea, or from the rising odds of a greater future burden from subsidizing (or even merging with) North Korea. Therefore we recommend going long 2-year government bonds / short 10-year government bonds. Russia: Defying Odds Of A Political Crisis Russia has emerged from the oil-price shocks scathed, but unbowed.13 Its textbook macro policy amid a severe recession over the past two years has been exemplary: The government has maintained constant nominal expenditure growth and substantially cut spending in real terms (Chart 25). The fiscal deficit is still large at 3.7%, but it typically lags oil prices (Chart 26). Hence, the recovery in oil prices over the past year should lead to a notable improvement in the budget balance. For 2017, the budget is conservative, as it assumes $40/bbl Urals crude. Chart 25Russia Has Undergone##br## Through Real Fiscal Squeeze... Russia Has Undergone Through Real Fiscal Squeeze... Russia Has Undergone Through Real Fiscal Squeeze... Chart 26...Which Is##br## Now Over ...Which Is Now Over ...Which Is Now Over Early this year, the Ministry of Finance adopted a new fiscal rule where it will buy foreign currency when the price of oil is above the set target level of 2700 RUB per barrel (the price of oil in rubles at the $40 bbl Urals) and sell foreign exchange when the oil price is below that level (Chart 27). The objective of this policy is to create a counter-cyclical ballast that will limit fluctuations in the ruble caused by swings in oil prices. Chart 27Oil Price Threshold For New Fiscal Rule Oil Price Threshold For New Fiscal Rule Oil Price Threshold For New Fiscal Rule Chart 28Forex Reserves Have Stabilized Forex Reserves Have Stabilized Forex Reserves Have Stabilized The recovery of oil prices and strict macroeconomic policy has allowed Russia to stabilize its foreign exchange reserves (Chart 28), although they remain at a critical level as a percent of broad money supply. However, the GDP growth recovery will be tepid and fall far short of the high growth rates of the early part of the decade (Chart 29). Chart 29Russia: ##br##Recovery Is At Hand Russia: Recovery Is At Hand Russia: Recovery Is At Hand Chart 30Inventories Remain Far ##br##Above Average Levels Inventories Remain Far Above Average Levels Inventories Remain Far Above Average Levels Russian policymakers should be cautiously optimistic. On one hand, they have been able to withstand a massive decline in oil prices. On the other, the situation is still precarious and warrants caution given the delicate situation in oil markets. OECD oil inventories remain elevated and could precipitate an oil-price collapse without OPEC's active oil-production management (Chart 30). From this macroeconomic context, we would conclude that: Russia will abide by the OPEC 2.0 production-cut agreement: While the new budget rule will go a long way in insulating the ruble from swings in oil prices, Russia is still an energy exporter. As such, we expect Russia to play ball with Saudi Arabia and continue to abide by the conditions of the OPEC deal. Thus far, Russia has been less enthusiastic in cutting production than the Saudis, but still going along (Chart 31). Russia will not destabilize the Middle East: While Russia will continue to support President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, its involvement in the civil war will abate. Moscow already began to officially withdraw from the conflict in January. While part of its forces will remain in order to secure Assad's government, Russia has no intention of provoking its newfound OPEC allies with geopolitical tensions. Russia will talk tough, but carry a small stick: Shows of force will continue in the Baltics and the Arctic, but investors should fade any rise in the geopolitical risk premium (Chart 32). It is one thing to fly strategic bombers close to Alaska or conduct military exercises near the Baltic States; it is quite another to act on these threats. In fact, Russia has been doing both since about 2004 and its bluster has amounted to very little with respect to NATO proper. This is because Russia depends on Europe for almost all of its FDI and export demand and it is only in the very early innings of replacing European demand with Chinese (Chart 33). As long as Russia lacks the pipeline infrastructure to export the majority of its energy production to China, it will be reluctant to confront Europe. Chart 31Moscow Will Play ##br##Ball With OPEC Moscow Will Play Ball With OPEC Moscow Will Play Ball With OPEC Chart 32Fade Any Spike ##br##In Geopolitical Risk Fade Any Spike In Geopolitical Risk Fade Any Spike In Geopolitical Risk Chart 33Russia Relies On Europe;##br## China Not A Replacement What About Emerging Markets? What About Emerging Markets? As we have posited in the past, energy exporters are emboldened to be aggressive when oil prices are high.14 When oil prices collapse, energy exporters become far more compliant. Nowhere is this dynamic more true than with Russia, whose military interventions in foreign countries have served as a sure sign that the top of the oil bull market is at hand! Bottom Line: We do not expect any serious geopolitical risk to emanate from Russia, despite the supposed souring of relations between the Trump and Putin administrations due to the U.S. cruise-missile strike against Syria.15 And we also do not expect President Putin to manufacture a geopolitical crisis ahead of Russia's March 2018 presidential elections, given that his popularity remains high and that the opposition is in complete disarray. While Russia may continue to talk tough on a number of fronts, investors should fade the rhetoric as it is purely for domestic consumption. Turkey: Deceitful Stability Turkey held a constitutional referendum that dramatically expands the powers of the presidency on April 16.16 The proposed 18 amendments passed with a 51.41% majority and a high turnout of 85%. As with all recent Turkish referenda and elections, the results reveal a sharply divided country between the Aegean coastal regions and the Anatolian heartland, the latter being a stronghold of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Is Turkey Now A Dictatorship? First, some facts. Turkey has not become a dictatorship, as some Western press allege. Yes, presidential powers have expanded. In particular, we note that: The president is now both head of state and government and has the power to appoint government ministers; The president can issue decrees; however, the parliament has the ability to abrogate them through the legislative process; The president can call for new elections; however, he needs three-fifths of the parliament to agree to the new election; The president has wide powers to appoint judges. What the media is not reporting is that the parliament can remove or modify any state of emergency enacted by the president. In addition, overriding a presidential veto appears to be exceedingly easy, with only an absolute majority (not a super-majority) of votes needed. As such, our review of the constitutional changes is that Turkey is most definitely not a dictatorship. Yes, President Erdogan has bestowed upon the presidency much wider powers than the current ceremonial position possesses. However, the amendments also create a trap for future presidents. If the president should face a parliament ruled by an opposition party, he would lose much of his ability to govern. The changes therefore approximate the current French constitution, which is a semi-presidential system. Under the French system, the president has to cohabitate with the parliament. This appears to be the case with the Turkish constitution as well. Bottom Line: Turkish constitutional referendum has expanded the powers of the presidency, but considerable checks remain. If the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) were ever to lose parliamentary control, President Erdogan would become entrapped by the very constitution he just passed. Is Turkey Now Stable? The market reacted to the results of the referendum with a muted cheer. First, we disagree with the market consensus that President Erdogan will feel empowered and confident following the constitutional referendum that gives him more power. This is for several reasons. For one, the referendum passed with a slim majority. Even if we assume (generously) that it was a clean win for the government, the fact remains that the AKP has struggled to win over 50% of the vote in any election it has contested since coming to power in 2002 (Chart 34). Turkey is a deeply divided country and a narrow win in a constitutional referendum is not going to change this. Chart 34Turkey's Ruling Party Struggles To Get Over 50% Of The Vote What About Emerging Markets? What About Emerging Markets? Second, Erdogan is making a strategic mistake by giving himself more power. It will focus the criticism of the public on the presidency and himself if the economy and geopolitical situation surrounding Turkey gets worse. If the buck now stops with Erdogan, it means that all the blame will go to him in hard times. We therefore do not expect Erdogan to push away from populist economic and monetary policies. In fact, we could see him double down on unorthodox fiscal and monetary policies as protests mount against his rule. While he has expanded control over the army, judiciary, and police, he has not won over the major cities on the Aegean coast, which not only voted against his constitutional referendum but also consistently vote against AKP rule. Events in Turkey since the referendum have already confirmed our view. Despite rumors that the state of emergency would be lifted following the referendum, the parliament in fact moved to expand it by another three months. Furthermore, just a week following the plebiscite, the government suspended over 9,000 police officials and arrested 1,120 suspects of the attempted coup last summer, with another 3,224 at large. This now puts the total number of people arrested at around 47,000. Investors are confusing lack of opposition to stability. Yes, the opposition to AKP remains in disarray. As such, there is no political avenue for opposition to Erdogan. The problem is that such an arrangement raises the probability that the opposition takes the form of a social movement and protest. We would therefore caution investors that a repeat of the Gezi Park protests from 2013 could be likely, especially if the economy stumbles. Bottom Line: The referendum has not changed the facts on the ground. Turkey remains a deeply divided country. Erdogan will continue to feel threatened by the general sentiment on the ground and thus continue to avoid taking any painful structural reforms. We believe that economic populism will remain the name of the game. What To Watch? We would first and foremost watch for any sign of protest over the next several weeks. Any Gezi Park-style unrest would hurt Erdogan's credibility. May Day protests saw police scuffle with protesters in Istanbul, for example. Given his penchant for equating any dissent with terrorism, President Erdogan is very likely to overreact to any sign that a social movement is rising in Turkey to oppose him. It is not our baseline case that the constitutional referendum will motivate protests, but it is a risk investors should be concerned with. Next election is set for November 2019 and the constitutional changes will only become effective at that point (save for provisions on the judiciary). Investors should watch for any sign that Erdogan's or the AKP's popularity is waning in the interim. A failure to secure a majority in parliament could entrap Erdogan in an institutional fight with the legislature that creates a constitutional crisis. Chart 35Turkey Constrained By European Ties Turkey Constrained By European Ties Turkey Constrained By European Ties Relations with the EU remain an issue as well. Erdogan will likely further deepen divisions in the country if he goes ahead and makes a formal break with the EU, either by reinstituting the death penalty or holding a referendum on the EU accession process. Erdogan's hostile position towards the EU should be seen from the perspective of his own insecurity as a leader: he needs an external enemy in order to rally support around his leadership. We would recommend that clients ignore the rhetoric. Turkey depends on Europe far more than any other trade or investment partner (Chart 35). If Turkey were to lash out at the EU by encouraging migration into Europe, for example, the subsequent economic sanctions, which we are certain the EU would impose, would devastate the Turkish economy and collapse its currency. Nonetheless, Ankara's brinkmanship and anti-EU rhetoric will likely continue. It is further evidence of the regime's insecurity at home. Bottom Line: The more that Erdogan captures power within the institutions he controls, the greater his insecurities will become. This is for two reasons. First, he will increase the risk of a return of social movement protests like the Gezi Park event in 2013. Second, he will become solely responsible for everything that happens in Turkey, closing off the possibility to "pass the buck" to the parliament or the opposition when the economy slows down or a geopolitical crisis emerges. As such, we see no opening for genuine structural reform or orthodox policymaking. Turkey will continue to be run along a populist paradigm. Investment Conclusions BCA's Emerging Market Strategy recommends that clients re-instate short positions on Turkish assets, specifically going short TRY versus the U.S. dollar and shorting Turkish bank stocks. The central bank's net liquidity injections into the banking system have recently been expanded again (Chart 36). This is a form of quantitative easing and warrants a weaker currency. To be more specific, even though the overnight liquidity injections have tumbled, the use of the late liquidity money market window has gone vertical. This is largely attributed to the fact that the late liquidity window is the only money market facility that has not been capped by the authorities in their attempt to tighten liquidity when the lira was collapsing in January. The fact remains that Turkish commercial banks are requiring continuous liquidity and the Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) is supplying it. Commercial banks demand liquidity because they continue growing their loan books rapidly. Bank loan and money growth remains very strong at 18-20% (Chart 37). Such extremely strong loan growth means that credit excesses continue to be built. Chart 36Liquidity Injections Reaccelerating Liquidity Injections Reaccelerating Liquidity Injections Reaccelerating Chart 37Money And Credit Growth Strong Money And Credit Growth Strong Money And Credit Growth Strong Besides, wages are growing briskly - wages in manufacturing and service sector are rising at 18-20% from a year ago (Chart 38, top panel). Meanwhile, productivity growth has been very muted. This entails that unit labor costs are mushrooming and inflationary pressures are more entrenched than suggested by headline and core consumer price inflation. It seems Turkey is suffering from outright stagflation: rampant inflationary pressures with a skyrocketing unemployment rate (Chart 38, bottom panel). The upshot of strong credit/money and wage growth as well as higher inflationary pressures is currency depreciation. Excessive credit and income/wage growth are supporting import demand at a time when the current account deficit is already wide. This will maintain downward pressure on the exchange rate. The currency has been mostly flat year-to-date despite the CBT intervening in the market to support the lira by selling U.S. dollars (Chart 39). Without this support from the CBT, the lira would be much weaker than it currently is. That said, the CBT's net foreign exchange rates (excluding commercial banks' foreign currency deposits at the CBT) are very low - they stand at US$ 12 billion and are equal to 1 month of imports. Therefore, the central bank has little capacity to defend the lira by selling its own U.S. dollar. Chart 38Turkish Stagflation Turkish Stagflation Turkish Stagflation Chart 39Turkey Props Up The Lira Turkey Props Up The Lira Turkey Props Up The Lira We also believe there is an opportunity to short Turkish banks outright. The currency depreciation will force interbank rates higher (Chart 40, top panel). Chart 40Weak Lira Will Push Interbank Rates Higher Weak Lira Will Push Interbank Rates Higher Weak Lira Will Push Interbank Rates Higher Historically, currency depreciation has always been negative for banks' stock prices as net interest margins will shrink (Chart 40, bottom panel). Surprisingly, bank share prices in local currency terms have lately rallied despite the headwinds from higher interbank rates and the rollover in net interest rate margin. This creates an attractive opportunity to go short again. Bottom Line: We are already short the lira relative to the Mexican peso. In addition, we are recommending two new trades based on the recommendations of BCA's Emerging Market Strategy: long USD/TRY and short Turkish bank stocks. Dedicated EM equity as well as fixed-income and credit portfolios should continue underweighting Turkish assets within their respective EM universes. Indonesia: A Brief Word On Jakarta Elections President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo saw his ally, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (nicknamed "Ahok"), badly defeated in the second round of a contentious gubernatorial election on April 19. Preliminary results suggest that Ahok received 42% against 58% for his contender, Anies Baswedan, a technocrat and defector from Jokowi's camp whose own party only expected him to receive 52% of the vote. This was a significant setback. Jokowi's loss of the Jakarta government is a rebuke from his own political base, a loss of prestige (since he campaigned to help Ahok), and a boost to the nationalist opposition party Gerindra and other opponents of Jokowi's reform agenda. Ahok is a Christian and ethnic Chinese, which makes him a double-minority in Muslim-majority Indonesia, which has seen anti-Chinese communal violence periodically and has also witnessed a swelling of Islamist politics since the decline of the oppressive secular Suharto regime in 1998. Ahok fell under popular scrutiny and later criminal charges for allegedly insulting the Koran in September 2016 by casting doubt on verses suggesting that Muslims should not be governed by infidels. Mass Islamist protests ensued in November. Gerindra exploited them, as did political forces behind the previous government of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and trade unions opposed to the Jokowi administration's attempt to regularize minimum wage increases.17 Ahok's sound defeat shows that the opposition succeeded in making the race a referendum on him versus Islam. Despite the blow, Jokowi's popularity remains intact (Chart 41). The latest reliable polling is months out of date but puts Jokowi 24% above Prabowo Subianto, leader of Gerindra, whom he has consistently led since defeating him in the 2014 election. Jokowi remains personally popular, maintains a large coalition in the assembly, and is still the likeliest candidate to win the 2019 election. Jokowi's approval ratings in the mid-60 percentile are comparable to those of former President Yudhoyono at this time in 2007, and the latter was re-elected for a second term. Moreover Yudhoyono slumped at this point in his first term down to the mid-40 percentile in 2008 before recovering dramatically in 2009, despite the global recession, to win re-election. In other words, according to recent precedent, Jokowi could fall much farther in the public eye and still recover in time for the election. However, Jokowi will now have to shore up his support among voters with a strong Muslim identity, which is a serious weak spot of his, as indicated in the regional electoral data in Table 2. Jokowi relies on two key Islamist parties in the National Assembly. He cannot afford to let opposition grow among Muslim voters at large (notwithstanding Gerindra's own problems working with Islamist parties). Chart 41Jokowi Still Likely To Be Re-Elected In 2019 What About Emerging Markets? What About Emerging Markets? Table 2Islamist Politics A Real Risk For Jokowi What About Emerging Markets? What About Emerging Markets? He clearly faces a tougher re-election bid now than he did before. Risks to China and EM growth on the two-year horizon are therefore even more threatening than they were. And since a Prabowo victory would mark the rise of a revanchist and nationalist government in Indonesia that would upset markets for fear of unorthodox economic policies, the political dynamic will be all the more important to monitor. These election risks also suggest that traditional interest-group patronage is likely to rise at the expense of structural economic reform over the next two years. Bottom Line: We remain bearish on Indonesian assets. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri, Research Analyst jesse.kuri@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The End Of The Anglo-Saxon Economy?" dated April 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Client Note, "Will Marine Le Pen Win?" dated November 16, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Understated In 2018," dated April 12, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Signs Of An EM/China Growth Reversal," dated April 12, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "EM: The Beginning Of The End," dated April 19, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "Toward A Desynchronized World?" dated April 26, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016; Weekly Report, "How To Play The Proxy Battles In Asia," dated March 1, 2017; and Special Report, "Five Myths About Chinese Politics," dated August 10, 2016, all available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see "Moon Jae-in's initiative for 'Inter-Korean Economic Union," National Committee on North Korea, dated August 17, 2012, available at www.ncnk.org. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire," dated April 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 For our latest feature update on what is one of our major themes, please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and EM Equity Sector Strategy, "The South China Sea: Smooth Sailing?" dated March 28, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see footnote 7 above. 12 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Geopolitics Of Trump," dated December 2, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 13 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Russia: Entering A Lower-Beta Paradigm," dated March 8, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 14 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Forget About The Middle East?" dated January 13, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Client Note, "Trump Re-Establishes America's 'Credible Threat'," dated April 7, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 An original version of this analysis of Turkey appeared in BCA Emerging Market Strategy Weekly Report, "EM: The Beginning Of The End," dated April 19, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 17 Please see "Indonesia: Beware Of Excessive Wage Inflation" in BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Turkey: Military Adventurism And Capital Controls," dated December 7, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Despite Saudi-Iranian tensions, the OPEC 2.0 production-cut deal will survive; Petro-state balance sheets remain under pressure; OPEC 2.0 agreement will backwardate the forward curve, and slow the pace of shale recovery; Aramco IPO will motivate Saudi Arabia to over-deliver on the cuts; In expectation of backwardation, investors should go long Dec/17 Brent vs. short Dec/18 Brent, while also going long Dec/17 $65/bbl Brent calls vs. short Dec/17 $45/bbl Brent puts. Feature Despite cooperating to reduce oil production and drain global oil inventories, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Iran still compete at every level for dominance of the Gulf region's economic and geopolitical order. We have maintained that KSA's aggressive push to privatize (or de-nationalize) its state oil company - ARAMCO - is an extension of this battle. Now that a state-led Chinese consortium has emerged as a potential cornerstone investor in the $100 billion Saudi Armco initial public offering (IPO) expected next year, we believe a key element of KSA's strategy in the Persian Gulf's "security dilemma" is falling into place.1 The Interests At Stake By aggressively courting Chinese investors for its potential record-breaking Aramco IPO next year, KSA doesn't just secure funding to pursue its goal of becoming the largest publicly traded vertically integrated oil company in the world. It tangibly expands the number of powerful interests in the world with a deep economic stake in its execution of Vision 2030, the grand plan to diversify away from its near-total dependence on oil revenues. China, too, benefits from this arrangement: By expanding its financial and economic commitments to KSA, it pursues its global investment and technology strategy, and gradually its standing as a "Great Power" with a vested interest in protecting those investments. These states jointly benefit from Aramco's expansion of its refining business into the Asian refined-product markets, which will remain the most heavily contested space in the oil market. It also does not hurt China, where crude oil production has been falling since June 2015 (Chart 1), to be financially invested in a petro-super-state like KSA, which has been supplying on average 14% of its imports over the same period (Chart 2). China's product demand will breach 12mm b/d this year, with gasoline demand growing some 300k b/d, according to the IEA. Overall product demand will grow close to 345k b/d, keeping China the premier growth market in the world for refined products. Investing in the refining system meeting this consumption - and Asia's other growing markets - therefore is attractive to Chinese companies on numerous fronts. Chart 1Chinese Oil Production Falling ... Chinese Oil Production Falling ... Chinese Oil Production Falling ... Chart 2... And Imports From KSA Steady ... And Imports From KSA Steady ... And Imports From KSA Steady Iran has yet to execute on its apparent strategy to attract FDI to its oil and gas sector, where the resource potential is of the same order of magnitude as KSA's. When combined with the development potential of Iraq, a neighboring petro-state, the potential of OPEC's "Shia Bloc" is enormous. Iran has the largest natural gas reserves in the world, and Iraq's oil endowment is second only to KSA's in terms of the vast low-cost, high-quality resource available for development. Yet Iran's success in lining up the investment and technical expertise required to develop its resource endowment as it approaches critical post-sanctions elections next month has been halting at best.2 Aside, that is, from deepening its relationship with Russia, which also is seeking desperately needed FDI in the wake of the oil-price collapse brought about by OPEC's market-share was during 2015 - 16. The KSA-Iran Security Dilemma In Context Before we get into the intricacies of energy geopolitics, a brief recap is in order.3 Chart 3Saudi Spending Binge Raised Oil Breakevens Saudi Spending Binge Raised Oil Breakevens Saudi Spending Binge Raised Oil Breakevens Prior to the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions against Iran beginning in 2015, KSA and OPEC benefited from an undersupplied oil market that kept oil prices above $100/bbl which allowed these states to increase domestic and military spending massively while experiencing few problems in oil exports or development. This can be seen in the evolution of KSA's fiscal breakeven oil prices, which increased dramatically in the lead-up to the 2014 price collapse (Chart 3), as production grew more slowly than spending. As the Saudi Manifa field came online in early 2014, global production expanded from various quarters, and it became apparent that sanctions against Iran would be lifted, KSA led OPEC into a market-share war. Oil prices fell from $100/bbl before OPEC's November 2014 meeting to below $30/bbl by the beginning of 2016. This strategy turned out to be a complete failure.4 We correctly predicted the failed market-share strategy would force an alliance between OPEC and non-OPEC petro-states - led by KSA and Russia, respectively - to cut production in the face of considerable market skepticism in the lead-up to OPEC's November 2016 Vienna meeting and in consultations with the Russian-led non-OPEC petro-states shortly thereafter.5 We remain convinced that this coalition, which we've dubbed OPEC 2.0, will extend its production cuts to the end of this year.6 As a result, OECD commercial inventories will decline by 10% or so, despite rising in Q1.7 Petro-State Balance Sheets Still Under Pressure The oil-price evolution described above buffeted petro-state budgets, particularly KSA's and Russia's. The pressures generated by this evolution hold the key to understanding where oil prices will go next. Finances: While both Saudi Arabia and Russia have managed to weather the decline in oil prices, the pain has been palpable. BCA's Frontier Market Strategy has detailed Saudi fiscal woes in detail.8 Based on their estimates, Saudi authorities will have enough reserves to defend the country's all-important currency peg for the next 18-24 months (Table 1). Without the peg, prices of imports would skyrocket. Table 1Saudi Arabia: Projected Debt Levels And Foreign Reserves OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets Given that Saudi Arabia imports almost all of its consumer staples, such a price shock could lead to social unrest. Beyond the next two years, the government will have to rely on debt issuance to fund its deficits and focus its remaining foreign exchange resources on maintaining the peg. The problem is that this strategy will leave the country with just $350 billion in reserves by the end of 2018, lower than local currency broad money (Chart 4). At that point, confidence among locals and foreigners in the currency peg could shatter, leading to even greater capital flight than is already underway (Chart 5). Chart 4KSA: Forex Reserves Depleting KSA: Forex Reserves Depleting KSA: Forex Reserves Depleting \ Chart 5KSA: Capital Outflows Persist KSA: Capital Outflows Persist KSA: Capital Outflows Persist While Russia has weathered the storm much better, largely by allowing the ruble to depreciate, its foreign exchange reserves are down to 330 billion, the lowest figure since 2007 (Chart 6). OPEC 2.0's shale-focused strategy: The market strategy behind the OPEC 2.0 agreement is complex. The roughly 1.8 mm b/d of coordinated production cuts is supposed to draw down global storage by ~ 300 mm bbls by the end of 2017. This should lead to forward curves backwardating - a process that is clearly under way (Chart 7). According to BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy, a backwardated forward curve is critical in slowing down the pace of tight oil production in the U.S. given the reliance of shale producers on hedging future production prices to lock in minimum revenue.9 Geopolitics: Countries with an unlimited resource like oil tend to be authoritarian regimes (Chart 8). This phenomenon is referred to as the "resource curse," and is well documented in political science. Chart 6Russia: Forex ##br##Reserves Depleting Russia: Forex Reserves Depleting Russia: Forex Reserves Depleting Chart 7Backwardation ##br##Under Way Backwardation Under Way Backwardation Under Way Chart 8Unlimited Resources ##br##Undermine Democracy OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets What does it have to do with geopolitics? Basically, it suggests that the main national security risk to energy-producing regimes is not each other but their own populations. In countries where the political leadership generates its wealth from the sale of natural resources, the citizenry becomes a de facto "cost center" requiring social benefits and security expenditures to ensure the unemployed remain peaceful. By contrast, manufacturing nations benefit from an industrious citizenry that is a "profit center" for government coffers. In this paradigm, the main national security risk for energy-producing regimes is not external, but rather derives from their own under-utilized or restless populations. Thus, when the "unlimited resource" is re-priced for lower demand or greater global supply, the real risk becomes domestic unrest. At that moment, expensive geopolitical imperatives take a back seat to domestic stability. This explains the current détente between, on one side, Russia and the OPEC "Shia Bloc" (Iran and Iraq), and on the other, Saudi Arabia and its OPEC allies. Even with this détente, Saudi Arabia, its allies, and the "Shia Bloc" are finding it difficult to maintain fiscal spending that funds their still-massive social programs with prices trading in the low- to mid-$50/bbl range (Chart 9). Saudi's fiscal breakeven oil price is estimated to be $77.70/bbl this year by the IMF. Iran and Iraq require $60.70/bbl and $54/bbl, respectively, putting them in slightly better shape than their Gulf rival, but still in need of higher prices to sustain the spending required to quell social unrest.10 Given Russia's relatively superior domestic economic situation and political stability (Chart 10), we suspect that Moscow cares a little less about oil market rebalancing than Saudi Arabia. President Vladimir Putin will face reelection in less than a year, but he is unlikely to face a serious challenger. Chart 9Oil Prices Too Low For National Budgets OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets Chart 10Support For Putin Holding Up Support For Putin Holding Up Support For Putin Holding Up Even so, Russia still feels the pain of lower energy prices. Oil and gas revenues constituted 36% of state revenues last year, down from 50% in 2014, when prices were trading above $100/bbl. This pushed Russia's budget deficit out to more than 3% of GDP in 2016. According to The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, "even with planned spending cuts (the deficit) will still be more than 1% of GDP by 2019 ... Russia's Reserve Fund could be exhausted by the end of 2017, on the government's original forecast of an oil price of $40/barrel in 2017."11 Oil-Market Rebalancing Critical For KSA's Aramco IPO For Saudi Arabia, however, rebalancing is critical, which explains why it has over-delivered on the promised production cuts, while Russia and the "Shia Bloc" have dragged their feet (Chart 11 and Chart 12). Not only is the currency peg non-negotiable, but Riyadh's clear interest is oil-price stability in the lead-up to its Aramco IPO. It is not enough to attract a mega investor from China; the entire oil-investment community has to be convinced they are not pouring money into an enterprise that could lose value close on the heels of the IPO. Chart 11Saudis Cut Production More Than Russians ... Saudis Cut Production More Than Russkies ... Saudis Cut Production More Than Russkies ... Chart 12... Or The 'Shia Bloc' ... Or The 'Shia Bloc' ... Or The 'Shia Bloc' To attract foreign capital at reasonable prices for Aramco's massive privatization, KSA must prove it can exert some control over the oil price "floor." As such, the Kingdom's motivation to stick to the OPEC 2.0 agreement is serious. In a joint report done by BCA's Geopolitical Strategy and Commodity & Energy Strategy last January, we argued that three factors are critical to this IPO:12 Moving downstream: Saudi Arabia intends to become a major global refiner with up to 10 million b/d of refining capacity (an addition of about 5 mm b/d of capacity). If realized, this volume of refining capacity would rival that of ExxonMobil's 6 mm+ b/d, the largest in the world. Because OPEC does not set quotas for refined-product exports, Saudi Arabia's shift downstream would allow it to capture higher revenues from international sales of gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, and other refined products. This could eventually mean that Saudi Arabia would fly above ongoing crude oil market-share wars. Instead, it could rely on its access to short-haul domestic supplies and state-of-the-art technology - Aramco's principal endowments - to command massive crack spreads, or the difference between the price of input, crude oil, and output, refined product. FDI wars: With estimates of its value hovering ~ $100 billion, the Aramco IPO expected next year will be the largest ever executed. It is likely to divert FDI that Iraq and Iran desperately need to revitalize their production, transportation, and refining infrastructure. This is a crucial long-term goal for Saudi Arabia. At the moment, its oil production dwarfs that of its "Shia Bloc" OPEC rivals. However, Iran and Iraq are projected to close the gap and potentially export even more oil than the Kingdom in future (Chart 13). Bringing China into the region: The U.S. deleveraging from the Middle East continues. President Donald Trump may have ordered cruise missile strikes against Syria, but he is not interested in getting bogged down in another land war in the region. Chart 14 speaks for itself. As such, Saudi Arabia is largely on its own when facing off against Iran, its regional rival. Appeals to Chinese state energy companies are therefore designed to give Beijing a stake in Saudi energy infrastructure. This would force China to start caring more about what happens to Saudi Arabia, as with Iraq, where it is heavily invested, and Iran, where it has long flirted with investing more. Chart 13Shia Bloc Gaining On KSA Shia Bloc Gaining On KSA Shia Bloc Gaining On KSA Chart 14U.S. Has Deleveraged From Middle East U.S. Has Deleveraged From Middle East U.S. Has Deleveraged From Middle East When we first penned our report, we were speculating on the China link. Since then, Beijing has created a consortium consisting of state-owned energy giants Sinopec and PetroChina and banks, led by the country's sovereign wealth fund, to compete in the expected $100 billion equity sale.13 Given the financial, economic, and geopolitical importance of the Aramco IPO, we continue to expect that Saudi Arabia will push to extend the OPEC 2.0 production cut when the group meets in Vienna on May 25. Judging by the commitments to the cuts thus far, the deal appears to be an agreement for Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies to continue to cut and for Russia and the "Shia Bloc" (Iran and Iraq) not to increase production.14 (Both of the latter states still have a lot of "skin in the game," so to speak.) As such, an extension of the deal is in the interests of KSA, Russia, and their respective allies. And, importantly, it will continue to provide a floor to oil prices. Meanwhile, downside and upside risks to supply continue. In terms of supply increase, the usual suspects -Libya and Nigeria - are working to increase production. In terms of supply decrease, we continue to worry about the dissolution of Venezuela as a functioning state and the potential that supply disruptions may occur. Bottom Line: Geopolitical drivers still support the continuation of OPEC 2.0's efforts to restrain production and draw down global oil stockpiles. As such, our positioning recommendations for an expected backwardation - i.e., long Dec/17 Brent vs. short Dec/18 Brent - and our fade of the option-market skew favoring put - the long Dec/17 $65/bbl Brent calls vs. short Dec/17 $45/bbl Brent puts - remain intact. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com 1 A "security dilemma" refers to a situation in which a state's pursuit of "security" through military strength and alliances leads its neighbors to respond in kind, triggering a spiral of distrust and tensions. Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: Aramco And The Saudi Security Dilemma," dated January 14, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com and gps.bcaresearch.com. NB: The $100-billion figure often attached to the estimated size of the IPO, which will seek to float 5% of Aramco, is a placeholder for the moment. There is considerable disagreement over the level at which the market will value Aramco, which some estimates significantly below the value assumed by the $100-billion estimate. We will be examining this in future research. 2 The New York Times provided an excellent summary of post-sanctions development recently in "Even Bold Foreign Investors Tiptoe in Iran," March 31, 2017. 3 For a summary of BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy recommendation performance, please contact your relationship manager. 4 Please see "The Game's Afoot, But Which One," for the consequences of OPEC's market-share war. It was published April 6, 2017, in BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy, and is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Raising The Odds Of A KSA-Russia Oil-Production Cut," dated November 3, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC-Russia Oil Deal On Track To Deliver," dated February 9, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC 2.0 Cuts Will Be Extended Into 2017H2; Fade The Skew And Get Long Calls Vs. Short Puts," dated April 20, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Frontier Market Strategy Special Report, "Saudi Arabia: Short-Term Gain, Long-Term Pain," dated February 1, 2017, available at fms.bcaresearch.com. 9 Contango markets - where prices for prompt delivery are less than prices for deferred delivery - favor shale producers when the front of the WTI forward curve is ~ $50/bbl, and - all else equal - incentivizes them to hedge forward so as to lock in future revenues and maximize the number of rigs they deploy. In backwardated markets, however, the number of rigs a shale operator is able to deploy is lower, all else equal, which means the revenue they can lock in by hedging forward is lower. Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "North American Oil Pipeline Buildout Complicates Price And Storage Expectations," dated February 16, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see the IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia, October 2016, Table 5. 11 Please see "Russia Oil Production Outlook to 2020," Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, February 2017. 12 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Commodity & Energy Strategy Special Report, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: Aramco And The Saudi Security Dilemma," dated January 14, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 13 Please see "Exclusive: China gathers state-led consortium for Aramco IPO - sources," Reuters, dated April 19, 2017, available at reuters.com. 14 In "OPEC 2.0 Cuts Will Be Extended Into 2017H2; Fade The Skew And Get Long Calls Vs. Short Puts," dated April 20, 2017, we noted, "Without pulling storage down to more normal levels, inventories remain too close to topping out, which puts markets at higher risk of the sort of price collapse seen in 2015-16. At the beginning of 2016, global oil markets were close to pricing in the approach of a full-storage event. In such an event, as global inventories approach capacity, prices trade below the cash-operating costs of the most expensive producers, until enough supply is forcibly knocked off line to drain excess stocks. This is an extremely high-risk scenario for states like KSA, Russia and their allies, which are heavily dependent on oil-export revenues to fund government budgets and much of the private sector. After the last such event at the beginning of 2016, these states were left reeling, as fiscal spending was slashed, projects were canceled and governments burned through foreign reserves in an effort to make up for lost revenue." This report is available at ces.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Despite cooperating to reduce oil production and drain global oil inventories, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Iran still compete at every level for dominance of the Gulf region's economic and geopolitical order. We have maintained that KSA's aggressive push to privatize (or de-nationalize) its state oil company - ARAMCO - is an extension of this battle. Now that a state-led Chinese consortium has emerged as a potential cornerstone investor in the $100 billion Saudi Armco initial public offering (IPO) expected next year, we believe a key element of KSA's strategy in the Persian Gulf's "security dilemma" is falling into place.1 Energy: Overweight. We are long the Dec/17 Brent $65/bbl calls vs. short the Dec/17 Brent $45/bbl puts at a net premium of -$0.47/bbl. This new recommendation was down 46.8%, which we initiated last week following our assessment of OPEC 2.0's strategy to reduce global oil inventories. We remain long the Dec/17 Brent vs. short Dec/18 Brent, which is up 94.7%. Our long GSCI position is down 4.5%; we have a 10% stop on this position. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper registered a 51k metric ton physical surplus in January, according to estimates from the International Copper Study Group. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold retreated going into French elections over the weekend, indicating investors were not as fearful as some pundits. Our long volatility position is down 43.8%. Ags/Softs: Underweight: Reuters reported the Brazilian government will provide up to 500 million reals (~$159mm) to market this year's corn crop. An expected record harvest and weak export volumes prompted the action.2 Feature By aggressively courting Chinese investors for its potential record-breaking Aramco IPO next year, KSA doesn't just secure funding to pursue its goal of becoming the largest publicly traded vertically integrated oil company in the world. It tangibly expands the number of powerful interests in the world with a deep economic stake in its execution of Vision 2030, the grand plan to diversify away from its near-total dependence on oil revenues. China, too, benefits from this arrangement: By expanding its financial and economic commitments to KSA, it pursues its global investment and technology strategy, and gradually its standing as a "Great Power" with a vested interest in protecting those investments. These states jointly benefit from Aramco's expansion of its refining business into the Asian refined-product markets, which will remain the most heavily contested space in the oil market. It also does not hurt China, where crude oil production has been falling since June 2015 (Chart 1), to be financially invested in a petro-super-state like KSA, which has been supplying on average 14% of its imports over the same period (Chart 2). China's product demand will breach 12mm b/d this year, with gasoline demand growing some 300k b/d, according to the IEA. Overall product demand will grow close to 345k b/d, keeping China the premier growth market in the world for refined products. Investing in the refining system meeting this consumption - and Asia's other growing markets - therefore is attractive to Chinese companies on numerous fronts. Chart 1Chinese Oil Production Falling ... Chinese Oil Production Falling ... Chinese Oil Production Falling ... Chart 2... And Imports From KSA Steady ... And Imports From KSA Steady ... And Imports From KSA Steady Iran has yet to execute on its apparent strategy to attract FDI to its oil and gas sector, where the resource potential is of the same order of magnitude as KSA's. When combined with the development potential of Iraq, a neighboring petro-state, the potential of OPEC's "Shia Bloc" is enormous. Iran has the largest natural gas reserves in the world, and Iraq's oil endowment is second only to KSA's in terms of the vast low-cost, high-quality resource available for development. Yet Iran's success in lining up the investment and technical expertise required to develop its resource endowment as it approaches critical post-sanctions elections next month has been halting at best.3 Aside, that is, from deepening its relationship with Russia, which also is seeking desperately needed FDI in the wake of the oil-price collapse brought about by OPEC's market-share was during 2015 - 16. The KSA-Iran Security Dilemma In Context Chart 3Saudi Profligacy Has Continued In 2017 Saudi Profligacy Has Continued In 2017 Saudi Profligacy Has Continued In 2017 Before we get into the intricacies of energy geopolitics, a brief recap is in order.4 Prior to the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions against Iran beginning in 2015, KSA and OPEC benefited from an undersupplied oil market that kept oil prices above $100/bbl which allowed these states to increase domestic and military spending massively while experiencing few problems in oil exports or development. This can be seen in the evolution of KSA's fiscal breakeven oil prices, which increased dramatically in the lead-up to the 2014 price collapse (Chart 3), as production grew more slowly than spending. As the Saudi Manifa field came online in early 2014, global production expanded from various quarters, and it became apparent that sanctions against Iran would be lifted, KSA led OPEC into a market-share war. Oil prices fell from $100/bbl before OPEC's November 2014 meeting to below $30/bbl by the beginning of 2016. This strategy turned out to be a complete failure.5 We correctly predicted the failed market-share strategy would force an alliance between OPEC and non-OPEC petro-states - led by KSA and Russia, respectively - to cut production in the face of considerable market skepticism in the lead-up to OPEC's November 2016 Vienna meeting and in consultations with the Russian-led non-OPEC petro-states shortly thereafter.6 We remain convinced that this coalition, which we've dubbed OPEC 2.0, will extend its production cuts to the end of this year.7 As a result, OECD commercial inventories will decline by 10% or so, despite rising in Q1.8 Petro-State Balance Sheets Still Under Pressure The oil-price evolution described above buffeted petro-state budgets, particularly KSA's and Russia's. The pressures generated by this evolution hold the key to understanding where oil prices will go next. Finances: While both Saudi Arabia and Russia have managed to weather the decline in oil prices, the pain has been palpable. BCA's Frontier Market Strategy has detailed Saudi fiscal woes in detail.9 Based on their estimates, Saudi authorities will have enough reserves to defend the country's all-important currency peg for the next 18-24 months (Table 1). Without the peg, prices of imports would skyrocket. Table 1Saudi Arabia: Projected Debt Levels And Foreign Reserves OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets Given that Saudi Arabia imports almost all of its consumer staples, such a price shock could lead to social unrest. Beyond the next two years, the government will have to rely on debt issuance to fund its deficits and focus its remaining foreign exchange resources on maintaining the peg. The problem is that this strategy will leave the country with just $350 billion in reserves by the end of 2018, lower than local currency broad money (Chart 4). At that point, confidence among locals and foreigners in the currency peg could shatter, leading to even greater capital flight than is already underway (Chart 5). Chart 4KSA: Forex Reserves Depleting KSA: Forex Reserves Depleting KSA: Forex Reserves Depleting Chart 5KSA: Capital Outflows Persist KSA: Capital Outflows Persist KSA: Capital Outflows Persist While Russia has weathered the storm much better, largely by allowing the ruble to depreciate, its foreign exchange reserves are down to 330 billion, the lowest figure since 2007 (Chart 6). OPEC 2.0's shale-focused strategy: The market strategy behind the OPEC 2.0 agreement is complex. The roughly 1.8 mm b/d of coordinated production cuts is supposed to draw down global storage by ~ 300 mm bbls by the end of 2017. This should lead to forward curves backwardating - a process that is clearly under way (Chart 7). According to BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy, a backwardated forward curve is critical in slowing down the pace of tight oil production in the U.S. given the reliance of shale producers on hedging future production prices to lock in minimum revenue.10 Geopolitics: Countries with an unlimited resource like oil tend to be authoritarian regimes (Chart 8). This phenomenon is referred to as the "resource curse," and is well documented in political science. Chart 6Russia: Forex Reserves Depleting Russia: Forex Reserves Depleting Russia: Forex Reserves Depleting Chart 7Backwardation Under Way Backwardation Under Way Backwardation Under Way What does it have to do with geopolitics? Basically, it suggests that the main national security risk to energy-producing regimes is not each other but their own populations. In countries where the political leadership generates its wealth from the sale of natural resources, the citizenry becomes a de facto "cost center" requiring social benefits and security expenditures to ensure the unemployed remain peaceful. By contrast, manufacturing nations benefit from an industrious citizenry that is a "profit center" for government coffers. In this paradigm, energy-producing states face a primary security risk that is not external, but rather derives from their own under-utilized or restless populations. Thus, when the "unlimited resource" is re-priced for lower demand or greater global supply, the real risk becomes domestic unrest. At that moment, expensive geopolitical imperatives take a back seat to domestic stability. This explains the current détente between, on one side, Russia and the OPEC "Shia Bloc" (Iran and Iraq), and on the other, Saudi Arabia and its OPEC allies. Even with this détente, Saudi Arabia, its allies, and the "Shia Bloc" are finding it difficult to maintain fiscal spending that funds their still-massive social programs with prices trading in the low- to mid-$50/bbl range (Chart 9). Saudi's fiscal breakeven oil price is estimated to be $77.70/bbl this year by the IMF. Iran and Iraq require $60.70/bbl and $54/bbl, respectively, putting them in slightly better shape than their Gulf rival, but still in need of higher prices to sustain the spending required to quell social unrest.11 Chart 8Unlimited Resources Undermine Democracy OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets Chart 9Oil Prices Too Low For National Budgets OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets Chart 10Support For Putin Holding Up Support For Putin Holding Up Support For Putin Holding Up Given Russia's relatively superior domestic economic situation and political stability (Chart 10), we suspect that Moscow cares a little less about oil market rebalancing than Saudi Arabia. President Vladimir Putin will face reelection in less than a year, but he is unlikely to face a serious challenger. Even so, Russia still feels the pain of lower energy prices. Oil and gas revenues constituted 36% of state revenues last year, down from 50% in 2014, when prices were trading above $100/bbl. This pushed Russia's budget deficit out to more than 3% of GDP in 2016. According to The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, "even with planned spending cuts (the deficit) will still be more than 1% of GDP by 2019 ... Russia's Reserve Fund could be exhausted by the end of 2017, on the government's original forecast of an oil price of $40/barrel in 2017."12 Oil-Market Rebalancing Critical For KSA's Aramco IPO For Saudi Arabia, however, rebalancing is critical, which explains why it has over-delivered on the promised production cuts, while Russia and the "Shia Bloc" have dragged their feet (Chart 11 and Chart 12). Not only is the currency peg non-negotiable, but Riyadh's clear interest is oil-price stability in the lead-up to its Aramco IPO. It is not enough to attract a mega investor from China; the entire oil-investment community has to be convinced they are not pouring money into an enterprise that could lose value close on the heels of the IPO. Chart 11Saudis Cut Production More Than Russians ... Saudis Cut Production More Than Russians ... Saudis Cut Production More Than Russians ... Chart 12... Or The "Shia Bloc" ... Or The "Shia Bloc" ... Or The "Shia Bloc" To attract foreign capital at reasonable prices for Aramco's massive privatization, KSA must prove it can exert some control over the oil price "floor." As such, the Kingdom's motivation to stick to the OPEC 2.0 agreement is serious. In a joint report done by BCA's Geopolitical Strategy and Commodity & Energy Strategy last January, we argued that three factors are critical to this IPO:13 Moving downstream: Saudi Arabia intends to become a major global refiner with up to 10 million b/d of refining capacity (an addition of about 5 mm b/d of capacity). If realized, this volume of refining capacity would rival that of ExxonMobil's 6 mm+ b/d, the largest in the world. Because OPEC does not set quotas for refined-product exports, Saudi Arabia's shift downstream would allow it to capture higher revenues from international sales of gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, and other refined products. This could eventually mean that Saudi Arabia would fly above ongoing crude oil market-share wars. Instead, it could rely on its access to short-haul domestic supplies and state-of-the-art technology - Aramco's principal endowments - to command massive crack spreads, or the difference between the price of input, crude oil, and output, refined product. FDI wars: With estimates of its value hovering ~ $100 billion, the Aramco IPO expected next year will be the largest ever executed. It is likely to divert FDI that Iraq and Iran desperately need to revitalize their production, transportation, and refining infrastructure. This is a crucial long-term goal for Saudi Arabia. At the moment, its oil production dwarfs that of its "Shia Bloc" OPEC rivals. However, Iran and Iraq are projected to close the gap and potentially export even more oil than the Kingdom in future (Chart 13). Bringing China into the region: The U.S. deleveraging from the Middle East continues. President Donald Trump may have ordered cruise missile strikes against Syria, but he is not interested in getting bogged down in another land war in the region. Chart 14 speaks for itself. As such, Saudi Arabia is largely on its own when facing off against Iran, its regional rival. Appeals to Chinese state energy companies are therefore designed to give Beijing a stake in Saudi energy infrastructure. This would force China to start caring more about what happens to Saudi Arabia, as with Iraq, where it is heavily invested, and Iran, where it has long flirted with investing more. Chart 13"Shia Bloc" Gaining On KSA "Shia Bloc" Gaining On KSA "Shia Bloc" Gaining On KSA Chart 14U.S. Has Deleveraged From Middle East U.S. Has Deleveraged From Middle East U.S. Has Deleveraged From Middle East When we first penned our report, we were speculating on the China link. Since then, Beijing has created a consortium consisting of state-owned energy giants Sinopec and PetroChina and banks, led by the country's sovereign wealth fund, to compete in the expected $100 billion equity sale.14 Given the financial, economic, and geopolitical importance of the Aramco IPO, we continue to expect that Saudi Arabia will push to extend the OPEC 2.0 production cut when the group meets in Vienna on May 25. Judging by the commitments to the cuts thus far, the deal appears to be an agreement for Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies to continue to cut and for Russia and the "Shia Bloc" (Iran and Iraq) not to increase production.15 (Both of the latter states still have a lot of "skin in the game," so to speak.) As such, an extension of the deal is in the interests of KSA, Russia, and their respective allies. And, importantly, it will continue to provide a floor to oil prices. Meanwhile, downside and upside risks to supply continue. In terms of supply increase, the usual suspects -Libya and Nigeria - are working to increase production. In terms of supply decrease, we continue to worry about the dissolution of Venezuela as a functioning state and the potential that supply disruptions may occur. Bottom Line: Geopolitical drivers still support the continuation of OPEC 2.0's efforts to restrain production and draw down global oil stockpiles. As such, our positioning recommendations for an expected backwardation - i.e., long Dec/17 Brent vs. short Dec/18 Brent - and our fade of the option-market skew favoring put - the long Dec/17 $65/bbl Brent calls vs. short Dec/17 $45/bbl Brent puts - remain intact. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com 1 A "security dilemma" refers to a situation in which a state's pursuit of "security" through military strength and alliances leads its neighbors to respond in kind, triggering a spiral of distrust and tensions. Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: Aramco And The Saudi Security Dilemma," dated January 14, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com and gps.bcaresearch.com. NB: The $100-billion figure often attached to the estimated size of the IPO, which will seek to float 5% of Aramco, is a placeholder for the moment. There is considerable disagreement over the level at which the market will value Aramco, which some estimates significantly below the value assumed by the $100-billion estimate. We will be examining this in future research. 2 Please see "Brazil readies $159 million in corn subsidies amid record crop," Reuters, April 19, 2017, available at Reuters.com. 3 The New York Times provided an excellent summary of post-sanctions development recently in "Even Bold Foreign Investors Tiptoe in Iran," March 31, 2017. 4 For a summary of BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy recommendation performance, please contact your relationship manager. 5 Please see "The Game's Afoot, But Which One," for the consequences of OPEC's market-share war. It was published April 6, 2017, in BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy, and is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "Raising The Odds Of A KSA-Russia Oil-Production Cut," dated November 3, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC-Russia Oil Deal On Track To Deliver," dated February 9, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC 2.0 Cuts Will Be Extended Into 2017H2; Fade The Skew And Get Long Calls Vs. Short Puts," dated April 20, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Frontier Market Strategy Special Report, "Saudi Arabia: Short-Term Gain, Long-Term Pain," dated February 1, 2017, available at fms.bcaresearch.com. 10 Contango markets - where prices for prompt delivery are less than prices for deferred delivery - favor shale producers when the front of the WTI forward curve is ~ $50/bbl, and - all else equal - incentivizes them to hedge forward so as to lock in future revenues and maximize the number of rigs they deploy. In backwardated markets, however, the number of rigs a shale operator is able to deploy is lower, all else equal, which means the revenue they can lock in by hedging forward is lower. Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "North American Oil Pipeline Buildout Complicates Price And Storage Expectations," dated February 16, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see the IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia, October 2016, Table 5. 12 Please see "Russia Oil Production Outlook to 2020," Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, February 2017. 13 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Commodity & Energy Strategy Special Report, "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: Aramco And The Saudi Security Dilemma," dated January 14, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 14 Please see "Exclusive: China gathers state-led consortium for Aramco IPO - sources," Reuters, dated April 19, 2017, availableat reuters.com. 15 In "OPEC 2.0 Cuts Will Be Extended Into 2017H2; Fade The Skew And Get Long Calls Vs. Short Puts," dated April 20, 2017, we noted, "Without pulling storage down to more normal levels, inventories remain too close to topping out, which puts markets at higher risk of the sort of price collapse seen in 2015-16. At the beginning of 2016, global oil markets were close to pricing in the approach of a full-storage event. In such an event, as global inventories approach capacity, prices trade below the cash-operating costs of the most expensive producers, until enough supply is forcibly knocked off line to drain excess stocks. This is an extremely high-risk scenario for states like KSA, Russia and their allies, which are heavily dependent on oil-export revenues to fund government budgets and much of the private sector. After the last such event at the beginning of 2016, these states were left reeling, as fiscal spending was slashed, projects were canceled and governments burned through foreign reserves in an effort to make up for lost revenue." This report is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016 OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets OPEC 2.0: Fear And Loathing In Oil Markets

Highlights Commercial oil inventories finished the first quarter with a minimal draw. This was largely due to a surge in production and sales by Gulf producers and Russia at the end of 2016 and earlier this year, as well as slightly lower demand. Despite reports floating storage and more opaque inventories - e.g., Caribbean storage - drew significantly, OPEC 2.0 remains well short of its goal to get visible oil stocks down to five-year-average levels by year-end. If drawing storage down to more normal levels remains OPEC 2.0's goal, then the production-cutting deal negotiated by Saudi Arabia and Russia will have to be extended when OPEC meets next month. We expect this to happen. Even so, risk-reversals in options markets indicate investors and hedgers are willing to pay more for downside put protection than upside call exposure. We recommend fading this bias, and buying out-of-the-money calls and selling out-of-the-money puts using Dec/17 options. Energy: Overweight. We closed our long Dec/17 WTI vs. short Dec/18 WTI position last Thursday with a 583.3% gain. We remain long Dec/17 Brent vs. short Dec/18 Brent, which is up 242.1%. Our long GSCI position is down 1.3%. We are recommending a long Dec/17 Brent $65/bbl call vs. a short Dec/17 Brent $45/bbl put, which we will put on at tonight's close. This is driven by our analysis of the need to extend OPEC 2.0's production-cutting deal into the end of the year to reduce OECD commercial oil inventories. We continue to expect Brent and WTI prices to trade on either side of $60/bbl by year-end. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper traded lower this week, on the back of news Freeport McMoRan is poised to resume exports from its Indonesian facilities. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold traded higher, but remains range-bound. Our long volatility gold options play is up 2.9%. We will leave this trade on as a hedge, going into the French elections. Ags/Softs: Underweight: Despite heavy rains, grains (excluding rice) and beans were well offered this past week. Feature The surge in oil production and sales by Gulf producers and Russia at the end of last year and earlier this year, along with a reported slowing of demand - down ~ 100k b/d from our March estimates - combined to leave estimated supply and demand roughly balanced for 2017Q1 (Chart of the Week). These dynamics left visible OECD inventories above year-end 2016 levels (Chart 2). Chart of the WeekVisible Inventories Barely Budge In 2017Q1, ##br##As Supply Surge And Lower Demand Collide Visible Inventories Barely Budge In 2017Q1, As Supply Surge And Lower Demand Collide Visible Inventories Barely Budge In 2017Q1, As Supply Surge And Lower Demand Collide Chart 2Visible Inventories Will Reach 5-year Average##br## If OPEC 2.0 Production Cuts Are Extended Visible Inventories Will Reach 5-year Average If OPEC 2.0 Production Cuts Are Extended Visible Inventories Will Reach 5-year Average If OPEC 2.0 Production Cuts Are Extended Less-visible floating storage, along with oil stockpiles in China and Japan, drew more than 70mm barrels (bbls), according to Morgan Stanley, while Caribbean storage fell by some 10 - 20mm bbls during the last quarter.1 In addition, major trading companies are actively looking for buyers to take unwanted physical storage capacity off their hands. Nonetheless, OPEC 2.0 - the states banded together under the leadership of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia to remove some 1.8mm b/d of oil production from the market in 2017H1 - remains well short of its goal to get visible inventories down to five-year-average levels. Failure to reduce inventories almost surely requires producers allied in the production-cutting deal to extend their pact into 2017H2. We think they will, given the oft-stated desire of the Saudi and Russian energy ministers, Khalid Al-Falih and Alexander Novak, to see inventories continue to draw. Their desire was re-stated recently at a hastily called news conference in Houston last month.2 This message has remained constant from other OPEC leaders as well. The Logic Of Extending OPEC 2.0's Deal To 2017H2 Reducing the global storage overhang is imperative for the OPEC 2.0 coalition. It is the driving force behind the unlikely alliance KSA and Russia forged at the end of last year. Without pulling storage down to more normal levels, inventories remain too close to topping out, which puts markets at higher risk of the sort of price collapse seen in 2015 - 16. At the beginning of 2016, global oil markets were close to pricing in the approach of a full-storage event. In such an event, as global inventories approach capacity, prices trade below the cash-operating costs of the most expensive producers, until enough supply is forcibly knocked off line to drain excess stocks. This is an extremely high-risk scenario for states like KSA, Russia and their allies, which are heavily dependent on oil-export revenues to fund government budgets and much of the private sector.3 After the last such event at the beginning of 2016, these states were left reeling, as fiscal spending was slashed, projects were canceled and governments burned through foreign reserves in an effort to make up for lost revenue. Entering the second quarter of this year, KSA and its allies continue to over-deliver on their pledges to cut ~ 1.2mm b/d of production. Markets are expecting Russian cuts to increase to ~ 300k b/d, in line with their pledges under the OPEC 2.0 production-cutting Agreement negotiated last year (Chart 3 and Chart 4). Chart 3KSA Continues To Over-Deliver; ##br##Russian Cuts Expected to Increase KSA Continues To Over-Deliver; Russian Cuts Expected to Increase KSA Continues To Over-Deliver; Russian Cuts Expected to Increase Chart 4KSA Allies Continue to Deliver;##br## Iran And Iraq Continue To Under-Deliver KSA Allies Continue to Deliver; Iran And Iraq Continue To Under-Deliver KSA Allies Continue to Deliver; Iran And Iraq Continue To Under-Deliver However, if the OPEC 2.0 production deal to remove ~ 1.8mm b/d of production is not extended beyond its end-June deadline, storage levels will remain uncomfortably high for the KSA - Russia alliance. By our reckoning, allowing the deal to expire without extending it would only reduce visible OECD inventories by a little over 170mm barrels by year-end. This can be inferred from our assessment of balances (Chart of the Week). Not extending OPEC 2.0's deal leaves OECD commercial oil inventories close to 130mm barrels above the targeted 300mm-barrel drawdown required to return OECD inventories to more normal (i.e., five-year average) levels. With U.S. shale production coming on strong, this could be precarious for OPEC 2.0 next year. Extending the OPEC 2.0 production-cutting deal to the end of 2017H2 will reduce visible commercial inventories in the OECD by slightly more than the 300mm barrels being targeted (Chart 5). This should put storage levels back at more normal, five-year average levels, and give OPEC 2.0 some breathing room to craft a strategy to contain U.S. shale production going forward.4 For this reason, extending the 1.8mm b/d production cuts to end-2017 is almost a foregone conclusion for us, particularly as KSA needs to clean up the market, so to speak, ahead of the IPO of Saudi Aramco next year. Among other potential investors with a keen interest in the potential $100 billion floatation is a state-led consortium of Chinese banks and oil companies.5 We Think Upside Risks Dominate Oil Markets The logic of extending the OPEC 2.0 deal is compelling. But the market does not share this view. Oil speculators have significantly reduced their net long position as a percent of total open interest in the dominant crude-oil futures markets, WTI and Brent (Chart 6). This, after the specs were chastened following their huge increase in upside exposure earlier this year. Chart 5Extending OPEC 2.0'S Production Deal Reduces ##br##OECD Oil Stocks By 300mm+ Barrels By End-2017 Extending OPEC 2.0'S Production Deal Reduces OECD Oil Stocks By 300mm+ Barrels By End-2017 Extending OPEC 2.0'S Production Deal Reduces OECD Oil Stocks By 300mm+ Barrels By End-2017 Chart 6Specs Are Retreating From Oil Specs Are Retreating From Oil Specs Are Retreating From Oil We can also see a lack of conviction in oil options markets. Option markets provide a useful gauge of fear and greed called "skew," which is nothing more than the difference between implied option volatilities (IOV) for puts and calls.6 When the skew favors puts - shown by a negative number in the risk-reversal shown in Chart 7 - markets are signaling they value downside protection more than upside exposure, and vice versa when call IOVs exceed put IOVs. Chart 7Option Skew Favors Downside Puts ##br##Over Upside Call Exposure Option Skew Favors Downside Puts Over Upside Call Exposure Option Skew Favors Downside Puts Over Upside Call Exposure Given the logic we laid out above, we are recommending investors fade the put skew in the options markets. Specifically, we are getting long out-of-the-money Dec/17 $65/bbl Brent calls and selling out-of-the-money Dec/17 $45/bbl Brent puts against them, to express our view. We will be doing so at the close of trading today, and will report our strikes and net premium in next week's publication.7 Bottom Line: We expect the OPEC 2.0 production deal to be extended when OPEC meets on May 25 in Vienna. This will significantly raise the odds OECD commercial oil stocks will be drawn down to more normal levels, giving the OPEC 2.0 petro-states more breathing room to develop a strategy to regain a modicum of control over prices. This is critical for KSA, which still is on track to IPO Saudi Aramco next year. Given our expectation, we are recommending investors buy out-of-the-money Dec/17 $65/bbl Brent calls and sell out-of-the-money Dec/17 $45/bbl Brent puts. This allows investors to fade what appears to be a consensus - given put skews and spec positioning - and capitalize on what we believe is an all-but-certain extension of the OPEC 2.0 production deal. We expect WTI and Brent to trade on either side of $60/bbl by December, and to average $55/bbl to 2020. As has been mentioned often, our level of conviction in that forecast is low beyond 2018, given the large capex cuts for projects that would have been funded between 2015 and 2020 absent the 2014 - 2016 oil-price collapse. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "OPEC's Barkindo Sees Progress in Oil Cuts as Stockpiles Drop," and "Oil Traders Drain Hidden Caribbean Hoards as OPEC Cuts Bite," published by Bloomberg.com on April 2 and 3, 2017, respectively. 2 Please see "Saudi Arabia, Russia Offer United Front on Oil Supply Cuts," published by Bloomberg.com on March 7, 2017, and "Saudi energy minister says oil market fundamentals improving," published by reuters.com on the same day. 3 BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy examined this in our feature article published on September 8, 2016, entitled "Ignore The KSA - Russia Production Pact, Focus Instead On Their Need For Cash." It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 We discuss this at length in "KSA's, Russia's End Game: Contain U.S. Shale Oil," and "The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One," published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report April 6 and March 30, 2017, Both are available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see "Exclusive: China gathers state-led consortium for Aramco IPO - sources," published by Reuters.com on April 19, 2017. We speculated on just such an event in "Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: Aramco And The Saudi Security Dilemma," published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy and its Geopolitical Strategy January 14, 2016. We noted, "While inviting Western investors and energy firms to take a stake in Aramco would make obvious sense for Saudi Arabia, we would speculate that the real target for the IPO will be Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs). China has overtaken the U.S. as the main importer of crude from Saudi Arabia ... but it continues to free-ride on Washington's security guarantees and commitments in the region. By giving China a stake in Saudi Arabia's energy infrastructure, Riyadh would force Beijing to start caring about what happens in the region." 6 "Implied option volatility" is market jargon for the standard deviation of expected returns. It is used as an input for option-pricing models. The "implied," as it's known colloquially in markets, solves an option-pricing model like Fischer Black's, once the option's premium is discovered via trading. Market participants can determine whether puts (i.e., the right, but not the obligation, to sell) are more highly valued than calls (the right to buy) in relative terms by differencing the implied volatilities of puts and calls that are equidistant from at-the-money options. This is referred to as the options' "skew." We use the IOVs for puts and calls that both change by $0.25/bbl for every $1.00/bbl move in oil futures (i.e., 25-delta puts and calls) to calculate skew. Please see Fischer Black's seminal article, "The Pricing of Commodity Contracts," in the Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3, (1976), pp. 167-79. 7 We employed a similar strategy in March 2016 - getting long Dec/16 Brent $50/bbl calls vs. selling $25/bbl puts, which registered a 103.5% gain between March 3 and April 14, following a rally in Brent prices. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016 OPEC 2.0 Cuts Will Be Extended Into 2017H2; Fade The Skew And Get Long Calls Vs. Short Puts OPEC 2.0 Cuts Will Be Extended Into 2017H2; Fade The Skew And Get Long Calls Vs. Short Puts

Feature Game theory teaches us that "credible threats" are an important part of creating stable equilibria. To enforce a credible threat, a geopolitical actor must have the capability and willingness to act on a standing threat. For example, if a country A states that action X will produce a response a, it must follow through decisively with a if X occurs. Otherwise, the lack of action will incite other actors to shirk compliance and conduct action X with little threat of retaliation. The lack of enforcement raises the probability of action X occurring in the future. President Donald Trump has re-established American credibility when it comes to the long-standing opposition to the use of chemical weapons. According to various news reports, approximately 50 BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles were launched from two U.S. Navy destroyers - USS Porter and USS Ross - in the Eastern Mediterranean. The air strike targeted Syrian government-controlled Shayrat Air Base 30km southeast of Homs. The air base was allegedly used by Syrian forces earlier in the week to launch the chemical attack that left at least 86 people, including 28 children, dead. The following are facts that we know surrounding the attack: Russian angle: Russian military has had a presence at the Shayrat air base since December 2015, which has included a contingent of attack helicopters since April 2016.1 This information is public knowledge and therefore was known to American officials ahead of the strike. According to news reports, U.S. officials informed their Russian counterparts of the strike earlier in the day, but President Trump did not speak to President Vladimir Putin ahead of the attack. Limited target: Cruise missiles focused on the parts of the airbase critical to launching further air strikes: runway, aircraft hangars, and fuel depots. However, given the American warning to Russia of the incoming attack, it is highly likely Syrian forces had advance warning as well. Therefore, the attack is likely to have had no discernable military effect. Justification: President Trump justified the attack in broad terms in his statement following the attacks, citing "vital national security interest... to prevent and deter the spread and use of deadly chemical weapons." He also cited Syria's obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention and U.N. Security Council rulings. There is no evidence that the U.S. is preparing a more comprehensive intervention in Syria. While such an action cannot be ruled out, given that Trump has been overseeing a comprehensive policy review, the nature of the strike suggests that it was designed to re-establish America's credible threat against the use of chemical and biological weapons. What does America's commitment to use of military force mean in broader geopolitical sense? We think that the timing and the optics of the attack are relevant in five ways: Re-establishing "red lines": The alleged chemical attack - if indeed perpetrated by the armed forces of the Syrian government and not by rebel forces or the Islamic State to draw the U.S. into conflict - has little or no military utility. As such, it appears to have been conducted precisely to test President Trump's credibility and commitment to enforcing American "red lines," which were put into question in Syria in particular by the previous administration. We speculate, but the attack may have been encouraged by Assad's allies Iran and Russia to create a low-cost crisis - where both could claim plausible deniability - that tests Trump's resolve to retaliate militarily. Objectively speaking, President Trump has passed the test. Signaling: The quick reaction from Washington signals to potential foes like Iran and North Korea that President Trump has a lower threshold for using military force than his predecessor. Most notably, President Trump did not seek authorization of U.S. Congress for the attack, instead justifying the use of force via international law and longstanding U.S. commitment to defending allies.2 Timing: The attack occurred while President Trump and China's President Xi Jinping were dining at the Mar-a-Lago Florida resort. President Trump notably stated ahead of Xi's visit that "if China is not going to solve North Korea, we will." His administration has also said that time was running out on North Korea and all options were on the table. Words like these carry greater weight in light of Trump's actions today. On the other hand, the attack against Syria does allow Trump to scale-down rhetoric on North Korea and South China Sea - having now proven his military mettle - where conducting a military show-of-force would have been much more difficult for the U.S. Capabilities: The attack reminds the world that U.S. military capabilities and its global reach are unrivaled. Much has been made of Russian power-projection capabilities since their successful intervention in Syria. However, the U.S. was able to deliver a payload of 50-60 cruise missiles without tipping its hand and with little fanfare.3 Russian and Chinese capabilities to project power within their spheres of influence have increased dramatically over the past ten years. However, the U.S. remains the only actor capable of acting globally. Doctrine: President Trump's quick decision to use force suggests that he will not follow an extreme isolationist foreign policy. As we wrote in a February note, a truly isolationist America would produce paradigm shifting outcomes, including the eventual loss of U.S. dollar reserve currency status.4 However, Trump's decision to cite international law and American responsibility to allies as justifications for the Syrian air strikes suggest that the Trump White House has abandoned the isolationist rhetoric of the campaign. It also reveals the preferences of the U.S. defense and intelligence establishment, which has re-established its influence in the Trump White House. Incidentally, the air strike coincides with the removal of ultra-isolationist Steve Bannon - campaign chief and White House Chief Strategist - from the National Security Council. Investment Implications We believe that the air strikes are a limited attack whose main purpose is messaging. If the U.S. planned to accomplish broader goals, we would have expected to see multiple strikes against Syrian air force, air defense installations, and command and control capabilities. A risk to this view would be any follow-up rhetoric from the White House on establishing "no-fly zones" above Syrian air space. We suspect that the attack against Shayrat air base will instead be eventually followed by closer coordination with Russia and other regional players to find a diplomatic solution to the Syrian civil war. As such, any negative market reaction, bid-up in oil prices, or safe-haven flows should be temporary (Chart 1). In fact, the attack is bullish for risk assets for three reasons: Political recapitalization: We suspect that President Trump will see a bump in approval rating due to the limited, but resolute, air strikes. Currently, Trump is plumbing unseen lows in overall popularity and even his support among Republican voters appears to be slipping (Chart 2).The strikes will be a shot-in-the-arm, at least among GOP voters. This will further aid President Trump in his ongoing squabbles with the fiscally conservative Freedom Caucus and thus increase the probability of tax legislation being passed by Congress later this year.5 Chart I-1Market Reaction ##br##Should Be Temporary Trump Re-Establishes America's "Credible Threat" Trump Re-Establishes America's "Credible Threat" Chart 2Can A Resolute Strike ##br##Rescue Trump's Popularity? Trump Re-Establishes America's "Credible Threat" Trump Re-Establishes America's "Credible Threat" Establishment strikes back: The air strikes are a highly orthodox reaction to a foreign policy crisis, suggesting that the extreme isolationist rhetoric of the Trump's presidential campaign has been abandoned. It also suggests that the U.S. establishment has wrestled control of foreign policy from unpredictable novices like Steve Bannon. Escalation is limited: We don't see the probability of air strikes against North Korea as having risen. As we will show in a forthcoming military assessment of the risks on the Korean peninsula, North Korea retains considerable retaliatory capacity. It can still inflict massive civilian casualties on Seoul via a conventional artillery barrage. We suspect that the market will quickly realize the objective superiority of a foreign policy that enforces credible threats. As such, the probability of future use of force declines, now that the U.S. has reestablished its commitment to military retaliation when its "red lines" are crossed. The two risks to our view are that: Russia decides it must respond to the U.S. attack for either strategic or domestic political reasons; President Trump is emboldened by the political recapitalization that follows the attack to expand operations in Syria or to attempt a similar strike in North Korea. We doubt that either will happen, but it may take time for the market to be convinced. First, Russia will likely oppose U.S. involvement rhetorically, given the close proximity of its forces to the attack. This is despite the fact that the U.S. informed Russia, showing the courtesy of a geopolitical peer. Indeed, Russian officials are already threatening to scuttle the agreement with the U.S. that keeps the two militaries informed of each other movement in Syria. Second, we doubt that the U.S. defense establishment will advise President Trump to attack North Korea, as it has understood Pyongyang's retaliatory capability for decades. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com 1 The airport was used by the Russian forces as an "advance airfield," which means that it was mainly used for quick refueling and rearming of frontline aviation. There was no permanent presence of Russian troops. 2 In his statement following the attacks, President Trump stated that destabilization of the region and ongoing refugee crisis threatened the U.S. and its allies. 3 As a side note, the number of cruise missiles involved in the strike appears to be complete overkill given the limited nature of the attack. The number appears to have been selected for maximum PR effect, showing again that the attack was meant to serve a signaling purpose. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The Trump Doctrine," dated February 1, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Political Risks Are Overstated In 2017," dated April 5, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights WTI and Brent forward curves remain more or less backwardated beginning in 2018. On its face, this indicates hedgers and speculators are trading and positioning as if the OPEC - non-OPEC production deal negotiated by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia in late 2016 will succeed in drawing inventories, leaving the market in a physical deficit this year. Over the short-term, this induced supply shock benefits producers generally. Longer term, KSA and Russia will have to continue to manage supplies if they are to exert any influence on oil prices. This is a three-level game, which now involves U.S. shale-oil producers as a permanent feature of the market. It will be difficult to manage. But the stakes are sufficiently high for KSA and Russia that we believe it has to be played. Energy: Overweight. We closed the first quarter on an up note, with our trade recommendations still open and closed in 2017Q1 up 420.75% on average. Base Metals: Neutral. Striking miners at Freeport McMoRan's Cerro Verde facility in Peru are back on the job, as are workers at BHP's Escondido mine in Chile. Export licensing difficulties at Freeport's Grasberg facility in Indonesia are close to being resolved.1 Precious Metals: Neutral. Our long volatility play in gold is down -32.8%, which, from a macro perspective, indicates markets are not fearful of a Fed-related surprise over the next couple of months. Ags/Softs: Underweight. U.S. farmers' corn planting intentions came in 1mm acres less than expected at 90mm; beans came in at 89.5mm acres, or 1.4mm over expectations; and wheat was up 100k acres at 46.1mm. Stocks remain high, and we remain bearish. Feature KSA, Russia and their allies - OPEC 2.0 - are trying to regain control of oil fundamentals produced by one of the most unlikely combinations of events ever seen in the history of the oil market. This week, we review how we arrived at the market conditions we now confront, and consider a possible strategy evolving out of the production-cutting Agreement (the "Agreement" for short) that may allow them to do so. Current markets conditions were spawned by a surge in EM oil demand in the early part of the 21st century, which met an almost perfectly inelastic supply curve. This took prices from $55/bbl in 2005 to more than $140/bbl by the end of 2008H1 (Chart of the Week). Along the way, some 5mm b/d of DM oil demand had to be destroyed by higher prices to make room for the EM growth depicted in Chart 2, which is taken from an analysis by Hamilton (2009).2 Chart of the WeekEM Consumption Surge, Flat Production ##br##Drove Prices Past $140/bbl Pre-GFC EM Consumption Surge, Flat Production Drove Prices Past $140/bbl Pre-GFC EM Consumption Surge, Flat Production Drove Prices Past $140/bbl Pre-GFC Chart 2High Prices Were Required##br## To Balance Markets Pre-GFC The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? These high prices combined with the post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) low-interest rate regime into a perfect storm, which allowed the supply side to evolve the shale technology in the U.S. Steadily rising light-tight-oil (LTO) production has profoundly altered the market, forcing OPEC and non-OPEC petro-states to devise a strategy to contain this surge. Whether they can do so is yet to be determined. In this article we consider one strategy that might allow OPEC 2.0 to regain some control over pricing and the rate of growth in shale production, but it is highly dependent on them maintaining production discipline and finding a way to coordinate their production. First, though, a quick review. How Did We Get Here? The GFC dragged all markets lower, leaving oil prices just above $40/bbl by the end of 2008. In the wake of the GFC, central banks led by the Fed pursued massively accommodative monetary policies, which took interest rates to the zero lower bound. OPEC, led by KSA, drastically cut supplies to remove a huge unintended inventory accumulation that developed as demand collapsed (Chart 3). While DM oil demand remained depressed in the wake of the GFC, EM governments, led by China, massively stimulated their economies, which lifted global oil consumption more than 4% by 2010 (Chart 4). Chart 3OPEC Cut Production To Defend Prices, ##br##Make Room For Shale To End-2014H1 OPEC Cut Production To Defend Prices, Make Room For Shale To End-2014H1 OPEC Cut Production To Defend Prices, Make Room For Shale To End-2014H1 Chart 4EM Lifted Global Demand Post-GFC EM Lifted Global Demand Post-GFC EM Lifted Global Demand Post-GFC Growth in global supplies post-GFC, meanwhile, was more measured. OPEC total liquids production from 2009 to 2014 averaged just below 0.05% growth yoy. Part of this meager growth in OPEC production no doubt was explained by lower production from the Cartel resulting from civil war in Libya and nuclear-related sanctions against Iran, which reduced overall output. It also is possible the fall-out from the GFC and the euro-area crisis of 2009 - 2011 kept OPEC producers from committing to higher production as well. Be that as it may, EM demand growth, along with OPEC's lower output, allowed prices to again trade above $100/bbl by 2011 and stay there till mid-2014 (Chart 5). The years-long combination of near-zero interest rates and high oil prices allowed U.S. shale-oil production to advance in leaps and bounds, such that by 2014, yoy light-tight oil (LTO) production from the shales was growing at more than 1mm b/d (Chart 6). Chart 5EM Surge, OPEC Production Moderation##br## Keep Prices Above $100/bbl To 2014H1 EM Surge, OPEC Production Moderation Keep Prices Above $100/bbl To 2014H1 EM Surge, OPEC Production Moderation Keep Prices Above $100/bbl To 2014H1 Chart 6High Prices, Low Interest Rates Propel Shale ##br##Production To 1mm b/d+ Growth By 2014 High Prices, Low Interest Rates Propel Shale Production To 1mm b/d+ Growth By 2014 High Prices, Low Interest Rates Propel Shale Production To 1mm b/d+ Growth By 2014 Now What? OPEC underestimated the magnitude of the shale-oil revolution, as did most observers. However, KSA, the leader of the Cartel, was pre-occupied with geopolitical considerations, chiefly its ongoing proxy wars throughout the Middle East with Iran and its allies. High prices allowed it to build its reserves and fund these proxy wars. This ended when Iran and western powers began negotiating an end to sanctions, which, if successful, would once again allow Iran to access foreign capital and technology to develop its economy.3 As the negotiations to remove sanctions on Iran progressed, KSA led OPEC into a market-share war at the end of 2014, presumably to take back customers lost to shale, particularly in the U.S. We do not believe OPEC's primary aim in declaring a market-share war was to crush U.S. shale output. Indeed, we have consistently maintained the market-share war was more an extension of KSA's and Iran's proxy wars throughout the Middle East, and that KSA was using the pump-at-will strategy to limit revenues that would flow to Iran in the post-sanctions environment. The secondary target of the market-share war was U.S. shale production, but, even then we maintained shale-oil production was needed to keep prices from revisiting $140/bbl-plus levels.4 The market-share war tanked prices, as OPEC increased the quantity of oil it would supply at lower prices. In particular, Saudi Arabia surged production from November 2014, into the collapse of oil prices. Over time, the market-share strategy destroyed high-cost supply worldwide. U.S. shale production fell ~ 15% from a high of ~ 5.3mm b/d in March 2015 in the four largest LTO basins to a low of ~ 4.5mm b/d, by our reckoning, in 2017Q1. At the same time, non-Gulf OPEC production fell dramatically as well, close to 8% in 2016 yoy to an average of 7.7mm b/d. Gulf Arab producers in OPEC and Russia, however, saw production increase 6.5% and 2% yoy, respectively, to close to 25mm b/d and 11.2mm b/d in 2016. In the aftermath of the price collapse, U.S. shale producers retreated to their "core" producing properties - those areas with the lowest-cost, most accessible shale reserves - and dramatically improved their productivity (Chart 7). A collapse in services costs allowed LTO producers to maintain core operations and continue to advance shale-oil technology. At the end of the day, this made the global supply curve more elastic, in that LTO production now allowed higher demand to be met by smaller price increases than had been the case in the lead-up to the GFC. The increased elasticity of supply from U.S. shales, and the increased quantity supply by OPEC is depicted in Chart 8, which picks up from Hamilton's (2009) analysis shown in Chart 2. Chart 7U.S. Shale Productivity Surged ##br##During OPEC's Market-Share War U.S Shale Productivity Surged During OPEC's Market-Share War U.S Shale Productivity Surged During OPEC's Market-Share War Chart 8Global Oil Supply##br## Transformed By 2014H1 The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? OPEC's Market-Share War Failed We contend the KSA - Russia production Agreement negotiated at the end of last year represents an abandonment of OPEC's market-share strategy. If, as recent research suggests, this strategy was an attempt to "squeeze" higher-cost shale production from the market by increasing OPEC crude supplies, it was a failure: The market-share strategy imperiled the finances of OPEC and non-OPEC states heavily dependent on oil revenues to sustain themselves, and left U.S. shale production more resilient than it was prior to the market-share war being declared.5 The surge in shale supplies and in OPEC's quantity supplied to the market during its market-share war, coupled with slower growth following the dramatic increase in EM demand in 2010 - 2012, led to unintended inventory accumulation worldwide, which has kept global storage at record levels. This is the central issue being addressed by the OPEC - non-OPEC production Agreement to remove up to 1.8mm b/d of production from the market. In effect, the KSA - Russia deal is inducing a supply shock to shift the global supply curve back to the left, after it was pushed down and to the right from 2014H2 to 2015H2, as depicted in Chart 9. In and of itself, this should lift and stabilize prices by the end of this year. We expect this induced supply shock will begin to force more visible inventories - e.g., in the U.S. and OECD generally - to draw rapidly. We continue to expect OECD stocks to reach 5-year average levels by year-end 2017, and for prices to reach $60/bbl by year end (Chart 10). We do not believe an extension in OPEC 2.0's production Agreement is needed to achieve this. Chart 9KSA - Russia Deal Is An Induced Supply Shock##br## Intended To Shift The Curve Back To The Left The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? Chart 10Oil Stocks Will Fall To 5-Year ##br##Averages By End-2017 Oil Stocks Will Fall To 5-Year Averages By End-2017 Oil Stocks Will Fall To 5-Year Averages By End-2017 It goes without saying, the parties to OPEC 2.0's production-management deal must maintain production discipline for this strategy to be able to evolve to the next level, where they attempt to restore a measure of price inelasticity to the global supply curve. If they are successful, then they will be able to exercise a degree of control over prices using spare capacity, storage and forward guidance to achieve and defend specific targets. If not, the market will do the hard work of destroying high-cost supply with lower prices. The End Game For KSA - Russia For the KSA - Russia Agreement to affect U.S. shale output over the medium to longer term, they have to coordinate production in a way that keeps WTI prices from rising to the point where shale-oil producers are able to step outside their "core" production areas. We believe over the short term, this price is between $55/bbl and $60/bbl. Our colleague Matt Conlan, of the BCA Energy Sector Strategy, has illustrated that the "true" breakeven for shale producers is much closer to $50/bbl, than the $30/bbl figure oft cited in the media.6 However, above $60/bbl, more costly reserves can be developed and still produce acceptable returns for LTO drillers. Therefore, if prices can be kept below $60/bbl, and the induced supply shock engineered by KSA and Russia causes oil inventories to draw as we expect this year, we believe the resulting backwardation in WTI will limit the rate at which rigs return to the field. In our modeling, we find shale rig counts to be sensitive to the shape of the forward curve for WTI. A backwardated curve translates into fewer rigs returning to the field than a flat or contango curve. In one model we estimated, we found a 10% backwardation from mid-2017 to end-2018 resulted in a rig count that was close to 18% below the rig count that could be expected from a relatively flat forward curve. The only way we see for KSA and Russia to affect the shape of the WTI forward curve over the short term - to end 2018 - is to use their own spare capacity and storage to keep the front of the curve below $60/bbl, and to provide forward guidance that they are able to adjust supply markets over the short- to medium-term in a manner that keeps the forward curve backwardated. This will require short-term production coordination among the states comprising OPEC 2.0, so that refinery demand is met out of current production plus inventories, and that unforeseen outages are remedied quickly. This is a short-term fix. It likely can be implemented this year and carried into next year. However, beyond that, it is difficult to see how KSA and Russia, and their respective allies, will coordinate production, storage operations and forward guidance having never attempted such an effort in the past. However, we are reasonably sure members of OPEC 2.0 are discussing how to implement such coordination. Keeping the front of the curve at a price that dissuades shale producers from expanding beyond their "core" production also will limit the amount of investment that can be made in non-Gulf OPEC production, which already is in decline, and other higher-cost conventional production like deep water.7 This, coupled with the $1-trillion-plus cuts to global capex for projects that would have been producing between 2015 - 2020 resulting from the 2015 - 16 price collapse could produce a supply deficit by 2019 that only can be remedied by significantly higher prices that not only encourage new higher-cost production but destroys demand in the meantime while that production is being developed. Bottom Line: We expect the KSA - Russia Agreement to produce a physical deficit this year that draws OECD oil inventories down by ~ 300mm barrels by year end. We also expect to see deeper coordination among the petro-states that are party to this Agreement - OPEC 2.0 - this year and next, which will keep the WTI forward curve backwardated into 2018. While we expect WTI prices to average $55/bbl to 2020 - and to trade between $45 and $65/bbl most of the time - our level of conviction in that forecast is low beyond 2018. It is not clear OPEC 2.0 can endure beyond the short term (into 2018). We will be watching the response of U.S. shale producers to increasing demand, and increasing decline-curve losses outside the U.S. shales, the Gulf OPEC producers and Russia, where we expect production declines to accelerate. As we have noted often in the past, the loss of more than $1 trillion of capex will place an enormous burden on U.S. shales, Gulf Arab producers in OPEC and Russia. If any one of these cannot deliver higher volumes when called upon, prices could move sharply above $65/bbl after 2018 going forward. Likewise, we will be watching to see if OPEC 2.0 is capable of setting and meeting production and inventory goals. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Assistant hugob@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Workers to end strike at Peru's top copper mine Cerro Verde," published March 30, 2017, by miningweekly.com. 2 Please see "Causes and Consequences of the Oil Shock of 2007-08," by James D. Hamilton, in the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2009, particularly pp. 228 - 234. 3 Please see "P5+1 and Iran agree on nuclear negotiation framework in Vienna," published February 20, 2014, by cnn.com. The sanctions were lifted in early 2016; see "Iran nuclear deal: Five effects of lifting sanctions," published January 18, 2016, by bbc.com. 4 For an in-depth analysis of OPEC's market-share war, please see the Special Report entitled "End Of An Era For Oil And The Middle East," published jointly by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy groups on April 9, 2015, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see "Ignore The KSA - Russia Production Pact, Focus Instead On Their Need For Cash," published September 8, 2016, and our "2017 Commodity Outlook: Energy," published December 8, 2016, in which we discuss the toll lower oil prices were taking on oil-dependent states including KSA and Russia. See also "The Dynamics of the Revenue Maximization - Market Share Trade-Off: Saudi Arabia's Oil Policy in the 2014 - 2015 Price Fall," by Bassam Fattouh, Rahmatallah Poudineh and Anupama Sen, published by The Oxford Institute For Energy Studies in October 2015, and "An analysis of OPEC's strategic actions, US shale growth and the 2014 oil price crash," by Alberto Behar and Robert A. Ritz, published by the IMF July 2016. Both papers consider OPEC's market-share war vis-à-vis U.S. shale-oil production, the strategy of squeezing shale producers from the market by increasing supply and lowering prices, and the likelihood for success. 6 Please see BCA Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Breakeven Analysis: Shale Companies Need ~$50 Oil To Be Self-Sufficient," dated March 15, 2017, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see "The Other Guys In The Oil Market" in this week's Energy Sector Strategy, which takes an in-depth look at the stagnant-to-declining production in conventional oil-producing provinces outside the U.S. onshore, Middle East OPEC and Russia, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? Summary of Trades Closed In 2016

Highlights Dear Client, In this analysis, my colleague Bob Ryan of the BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy argues that there is more upside to oil prices. First, Russia and OPEC will continue to coordinate their production for at least the rest of the year. Second, oil prices are too low to incentivize high cost, non-Gulf OPEC production, such as deep-water production. Third, the world lost roughly $1-trillion-plus of capex due to the oil-price collapse. Bob collaborates frequently with the Geopolitical Strategy team. As we controversially argued in February 2016, Saudi-Iranian tensions have peaked and created the geopolitical conditions for a renewal of OPEC production coordination. With oil prices plumbing decade lows in 2015-2016, both countries have set regional differences aside for the sake of domestic stability. I hope that you will enjoy Bob's note as much as I did. Many clients with whom I have met in person already know the view well, as it forms the core of Geopolitical Strategy's view on the Middle East. For those of you who are not subscribed to BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy, and BCA's Energy Sector Strategy, I would recommend that you reach out to your account manager for a trial of both services. Kindest Regards, Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy Feature KSA, Russia and their allies - OPEC 2.0 - are trying to regain control of oil fundamentals produced by one of the most unlikely combinations of events ever seen in the history of the oil market. This week, we review how we arrived at the market conditions we now confront, and consider a possible strategy evolving out of the production-cutting Agreement (the "Agreement" for short) that may allow them to do so. Current markets conditions were spawned by a surge in EM oil demand in the early part of the 21st century, which met an almost perfectly inelastic supply curve. This took prices from $55/bbl in 2005 to more than $140/bbl by the end of 2008H1 (Chart Of The Week). Along the way, some 5mm b/d of DM oil demand had to be destroyed by higher prices to make room for the EM growth depicted in Chart 2, which is taken from an analysis by Hamilton (2009).1 Chart Of The WeekEM Consumption Surge, Flat Production##br## Drove Prices Past $140/bbl Pre-GFC EM Consumption Surge, Flat Production Drove Prices Past $140/bbl Pre-GFC EM Consumption Surge, Flat Production Drove Prices Past $140/bbl Pre-GFC Chart 2High Prices Were Required ##br##To Balance Markets Pre-GFC The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? These high prices combined with the post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) low-interest rate regime into a perfect storm, which allowed the supply side to evolve the shale technology in the U.S. Steadily rising light-tight-oil (LTO) production has profoundly altered the market, forcing OPEC and non-OPEC petro-states to devise a strategy to contain this surge. Whether they can do so is yet to be determined. In this article we consider one strategy that might allow OPEC 2.0 to regain some control over pricing and the rate of growth in shale production, but it is highly dependent on them maintaining production discipline and finding a way to coordinate their production. First, though, a quick review. How Did We Get Here? The GFC dragged all markets lower, leaving oil prices just above $40/bbl by the end of 2008. In the wake of the GFC, central banks led by the Fed pursued massively accommodative monetary policies, which took interest rates to the zero lower bound. OPEC, led by KSA, drastically cut supplies to remove a huge unintended inventory accumulation that developed as demand collapsed (Chart 3). While DM oil demand remained depressed in the wake of the GFC, EM governments, led by China, massively stimulated their economies, which lifted global oil consumption more than 4% by 2010 (Chart 4). Chart 3OPEC Cut Production To Defend Prices,##br## Make Room For Shale To End-2014H1 OPEC Cut Production To Defend Prices, Make Room For Shale To End-2014H1 OPEC Cut Production To Defend Prices, Make Room For Shale To End-2014H1 Chart 4EM Lifted Global##br## Demand Post-GFC EM Lifted Global Demand Post-GFC EM Lifted Global Demand Post-GFC Growth in global supplies post-GFC, meanwhile, was more measured. OPEC total liquids production from 2009 to 2014 averaged just below 0.05% growth yoy. Part of this meager growth in OPEC production no doubt was explained by lower production from the Cartel resulting from civil war in Libya and nuclear-related sanctions against Iran, which reduced overall output. It also is possible the fall-out from the GFC and the euro-area crisis of 2009 - 2011 kept OPEC producers from committing to higher production as well. Be that as it may, EM demand growth, along with OPEC's lower output, allowed prices to again trade above $100/bbl by 2011 and stay there till mid-2014 (Chart 5). The years-long combination of near-zero interest rates and high oil prices allowed U.S. shale-oil production to advance in leaps and bounds, such that by 2014, yoy light-tight oil (LTO) production from the shales was growing at more than 1mm b/d (Chart 6). Chart 5EM Surge, OPEC Production Moderation##br## Keep Prices Above 0/bbl To 2014H1 EM Surge, OPEC Production Moderation Keep Prices Above $100/bbl To 2014H1 EM Surge, OPEC Production Moderation Keep Prices Above $100/bbl To 2014H1 Chart 6High Prices, Low Interest Rates Propel Shale##br## Production To 1mm b/d+ Growth By 2014 High Prices, Low Interest Rates Propel Shale Production To 1mm b/d+ Growth By 2014 High Prices, Low Interest Rates Propel Shale Production To 1mm b/d+ Growth By 2014 Now What? OPEC underestimated the magnitude of the shale-oil revolution, as did most observers. However, KSA, the leader of the Cartel, was pre-occupied with geopolitical considerations, chiefly its ongoing proxy wars throughout the Middle East with Iran and its allies. High prices allowed it to build its reserves and fund these proxy wars. This ended when Iran and western powers began negotiating an end to sanctions, which, if successful, would once again allow Iran to access foreign capital and technology to develop its economy.2 As the negotiations to remove sanctions on Iran progressed, KSA led OPEC into a market-share war at the end of 2014, presumably to take back customers lost to shale, particularly in the U.S. We do not believe OPEC's primary aim in declaring a market-share war was to crush U.S. shale output. Indeed, we have consistently maintained the market-share war was more an extension of KSA's and Iran's proxy wars throughout the Middle East, and that KSA was using the pump-at-will strategy to limit revenues that would flow to Iran in the post-sanctions environment. The secondary target of the market-share war was U.S. shale production, but, even then we maintained shale-oil production was needed to keep prices from revisiting $140/bbl-plus levels.3 The market-share war tanked prices, as OPEC increased the quantity of oil it would supply at lower prices. In particular, Saudi Arabia surged production from November 2014, into the collapse of oil prices. Over time, the market-share strategy destroyed high-cost supply worldwide. U.S. shale production fell ~ 15% from a high of ~ 5.3mm b/d in March 2015 in the four largest LTO basins to a low of ~ 4.5mm b/d, by our reckoning, in 2017Q1. At the same time, non-Gulf OPEC production fell dramatically as well, close to 8% in 2016 yoy to an average of 7.7mm b/d. Gulf Arab producers in OPEC and Russia, however, saw production increase 6.5% and 2% yoy, respectively, to close to 25mm b/d and 11.2mm b/d in 2016. In the aftermath of the price collapse, U.S. shale producers retreated to their "core" producing properties - those areas with the lowest-cost, most accessible shale reserves - and dramatically improved their productivity (Chart 7). A collapse in services costs allowed LTO producers to maintain core operations and continue to advance shale-oil technology. At the end of the day, this made the global supply curve more elastic, in that LTO production now allowed higher demand to be met by smaller price increases than had been the case in the lead-up to the GFC. The increased elasticity of supply from U.S. shales, and the increased quantity supply by OPEC is depicted in Chart 8, which picks up from Hamilton's (2009) analysis shown in Chart 2. Chart 7U.S. Shale Productivity Surged##br## During OPEC"s Market-Share War U.S. Shale Productivity Surged During OPEC"s Market-Share War U.S. Shale Productivity Surged During OPEC"s Market-Share War Chart 8Global Oil Supply ##br##Transformed By 2014H1 The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? OPEC's Market-Share War Failed We contend the KSA - Russia production Agreement negotiated at the end of last year represents an abandonment of OPEC's market-share strategy. If, as recent research suggests, this strategy was an attempt to "squeeze" higher-cost shale production from the market by increasing OPEC crude supplies, it was a failure: The market-share strategy imperiled the finances of OPEC and non-OPEC states heavily dependent on oil revenues to sustain themselves, and left U.S. shale production more resilient than it was prior to the market-share war being declared.4 The surge in shale supplies and in OPEC's quantity supplied to the market during its market-share war, coupled with slower growth following the dramatic increase in EM demand in 2010 - 2012, led to unintended inventory accumulation worldwide, which has kept global storage at record levels. This is the central issue being addressed by the OPEC - non-OPEC production Agreement to remove up to 1.8mm b/d of production from the market. In effect, the KSA - Russia deal is inducing a supply shock to shift the global supply curve back to the left, after it was pushed down and to the right from 2014H2 to 2015H2, as depicted in Chart 9. In and of itself, this should lift and stabilize prices by the end of this year. We expect this induced supply shock will begin to force more visible inventories - e.g., in the U.S. and OECD generally - to draw rapidly. We continue to expect OECD stocks to reach 5-year average levels by year-end 2017, and for prices to reach $60/bbl by year end (Chart 10). We do not believe an extension in OPEC 2.0's production Agreement is needed to achieve this. Chart 9KSA - Russia Deal Is An Induced Supply Shock ##br##Intended To Shift The Curve Back To The Left The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? Chart 10Oil Stocks Will Fall To 5-Year##br## Averages By End-2017 Oil Stocks Will Fall To 5-Year Averages By End-2017 Oil Stocks Will Fall To 5-Year Averages By End-2017 It goes without saying, the parties to OPEC 2.0's production-management deal must maintain production discipline for this strategy to be able to evolve to the next level, where they attempt to restore a measure of price inelasticity to the global supply curve. If they are successful, then they will be able to exercise a degree of control over prices using spare capacity, storage and forward guidance to achieve and defend specific targets. If not, the market will do the hard work of destroying high-cost supply with lower prices. The End Game For KSA - Russia For the KSA - Russia Agreement to affect U.S. shale output over the medium to longer term, they have to coordinate production in a way that keeps WTI prices from rising to the point where shale-oil producers are able to step outside their "core" production areas. We believe over the short term, this price is between $55/bbl and $60/bbl. Our colleague Matt Conlan, of the BCA Energy Sector Strategy, has illustrated that the "true" breakeven for shale producers is much closer to $50/bbl, than the $30/bbl figure oft cited in the media.5 However, above $60/bbl, more costly reserves can be developed and still produce acceptable returns for LTO drillers. Therefore, if prices can be kept below $60/bbl, and the induced supply shock engineered by KSA and Russia causes oil inventories to draw as we expect this year, we believe the resulting backwardation in WTI will limit the rate at which rigs return to the field. In our modeling, we find shale rig counts to be sensitive to the shape of the forward curve for WTI. A backwardated curve translates into fewer rigs returning to the field than a flat or contango curve. In one model we estimated, we found a 10% backwardation from mid-2017 to end-2018 resulted in a rig count that was close to 18% below the rig count that could be expected from a relatively flat forward curve. The only way we see for KSA and Russia to affect the shape of the WTI forward curve over the short term - to end 2018 - is to use their own spare capacity and storage to keep the front of the curve below $60/bbl, and to provide forward guidance that they are able to adjust supply markets over the short- to medium-term in a manner that keeps the forward curve backwardated. This will require short-term production coordination among the states comprising OPEC 2.0, so that refinery demand is met out of current production plus inventories, and that unforeseen outages are remedied quickly. This is a short-term fix. It likely can be implemented this year and carried into next year. However, beyond that, it is difficult to see how KSA and Russia, and their respective allies, will coordinate production, storage operations and forward guidance having never attempted such an effort in the past. However, we are reasonably sure members of OPEC 2.0 are discussing how to implement such coordination. Keeping the front of the curve at a price that dissuades shale producers from expanding beyond their "core" production also will limit the amount of investment that can be made in non-Gulf OPEC production, which already is in decline, and other higher-cost conventional production like deep water.6 This, coupled with the $1-trillion-plus cuts to global capex for projects that would have been producing between 2015 - 2020 resulting from the 2015 - 16 price collapse could produce a supply deficit by 2019 that only can be remedied by significantly higher prices that not only encourage new higher-cost production but destroys demand in the meantime while that production is being developed. Bottom Line: We expect the KSA - Russia Agreement to produce a physical deficit this year that draws OECD oil inventories down by ~ 300mm barrels by year end. We also expect to see deeper coordination among the petro-states that are party to this Agreement - OPEC 2.0 - this year and next, which will keep the WTI forward curve backwardated into 2018. While we expect WTI prices to average $55/bbl to 2020 - and to trade between $45 and $65/bbl most of the time - our level of conviction in that forecast is low beyond 2018. It is not clear OPEC 2.0 can endure beyond the short term (into 2018). We will be watching the response of U.S. shale producers to increasing demand, and increasing decline-curve losses outside the U.S. shales, the Gulf OPEC producers and Russia, where we expect production declines to accelerate. As we have noted often in the past, the loss of more than $1 trillion of capex will place an enormous burden on U.S. shales, Gulf Arab producers in OPEC and Russia. If any one of these cannot deliver higher volumes when called upon, prices could move sharply above $65/bbl after 2018 going forward. Likewise, we will be watching to see if OPEC 2.0 is capable of setting and meeting production and inventory goals. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Assistant hugob@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Causes and Consequences of the Oil Shock of 2007-08," by James D. Hamilton, in the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2009, particularly pp. 228 - 234. 2 Please see "P5+1 and Iran agree on nuclear negotiation framework in Vienna," published February 20, 2014, by cnn.com. The sanctions were lifted in early 2016; see "Iran nuclear deal: Five effects of lifting sanctions," published January 18, 2016, by bbc.com. 3 For an in-depth analysis of OPEC's market-share war, please see the Special Report entitled "End Of An Era For Oil And The Middle East," published jointly by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy groups on April 9, 2015, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see "Ignore The KSA - Russia Production Pact, Focus Instead On Their Need For Cash," published September 8, 2016, and our "2017 Commodity Outlook: Energy," published December 8, 2016, in which we discuss the toll lower oil prices were taking on oil-dependent states including KSA and Russia. See also "The Dynamics of the Revenue Maximization - Market Share Trade-Off: Saudi Arabia's Oil Policy in the 2014 - 2015 Price Fall," by Bassam Fattouh, Rahmatallah Poudineh and Anupama Sen, published by The Oxford Institute For Energy Studies in October 2015, and "An analysis of OPEC's strategic actions, US shale growth and the 2014 oil price crash," by Alberto Behar and Robert A. Ritz, published by the IMF July 2016. Both papers consider OPEC's market-share war vis-à-vis U.S. shale-oil production, the strategy of squeezing shale producers from the market by increasing supply and lowering prices, and the likelihood for success. 5 Please see BCA Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Breakeven Analysis: Shale Companies Need ~$50 Oil To Be Self-Sufficient," dated March 15, 2017, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see "The Other Guys In The Oil Market" in this week's Energy Sector Strategy, which takes an in-depth look at the stagnant-to-declining production in conventional oil-producing provinces outside the U.S. onshore, Middle East OPEC and Russia, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights The end game for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Russia and their respective allies is fairly obvious: Remove enough production from the market to draw down storage and make the oil-supply curve, once again, more inelastic. This would allow these states to use forward guidance and small adjustments in production to influence prices, the sine qua non of petro-states desperate to maintain revenues and diversify away from near-complete dependence on hydrocarbon exports. We think the effort will succeed over the short run. Just how durable this pact will be remains to be seen, given oil is, once again, super-abundant. If production discipline breaks down, all bets are off. Energy: Overweight. We are now solidly positioned for backwardation in oil - long Dec/17 vs. short Dec/18 WTI and Brent; these positions are up 141.6% and 68.4%, respectively. We also are positioned for a rally on drawdowns in inventories as refiners come back from turnarounds over the next few weeks: We are long $50/bbl WTI calls vs. short $55/bbl calls in Jul-Aug-Sep 2017; these positions are up 7.66% on average. Base Metals: Neutral. Workers at Chile's Escondida mine are back on the job, after a 44-day strike. The strike is estimated to have cost BHP Billiton some $1 billion, according to Reuters.1 Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold has rallied by 4.3% since the FOMC raised overnight rates. Our long volatility position - long a Jun/17 put and call spread for $21/oz - is down 30%. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The long-awaited and much-anticipated USDA planting intentions report is due out tomorrow. We remain bearish, expecting an early indication stocks-to-use ratios for grains and beans will remain elevated. Feature Chart of the WeekStorage Was Well On Its Way to Drawing##br## Before the Year-End Production Surge Storage Was Well On Its Way to Drawing Before the Year-End Production Surge Storage Was Well On Its Way to Drawing Before the Year-End Production Surge KSA and Russia have to make oil supply more inelastic in order to regain some control over where prices go and, consequently, where their revenues go. Their end game is obvious - i.e., remove the excess oil production that pushed inventories to historically high levels - but their execution has been, at best, halting. Prior to KSA and Russia delivering an historic production-management Agreement at the end of last year, oil markets were well on the way to removing the storage overhang by year-end 2017, as any Econ 101 text would have suggested. Low prices following OPEC's market-share war declaration destroyed supply and lifted demand, which was drawing down stocks. This is easily seen in the Chart of the Week showing inventories beginning to head south in mid-2016. Then came the KSA - Russia Agreement between OPEC and non-OPEC producers to cut output by some 1.8mm b/d. The goal of the deal was to accelerate the drawdown in record high storage levels. Even while the deal was being negotiated, it was apparent some producers in the know were getting a jump on shipping those last barrels out the door before they were obliged to cut. This produced the end-of-year production surge, which swelled global inventories. The year-end surge by OPEC and non-OPEC producers could be expected (Chart 2), but it came at a really bad time for the market, since 1Q17 also was when refiners took units down for maintenance. This is fairly routine, but in some key markets like the U.S. Gulf, the current maintenance season was busier than average, according to the EIA (Chart 3). This left a lot of crude in storage, as product inventories were being drawn. Chart 2Year-End Production Surge ##br##Powered The Storage Build Year-End Production Surge Powered The Storage Build Year-End Production Surge Powered The Storage Build Chart 3Maintenance Season In 1Q17 ##br##Exacerbated The Storage Build Maintenance Season In 1Q17 Exacerbated The Storage Build Maintenance Season In 1Q17 Exacerbated The Storage Build Where are we today? Most of the pre-Agreement production and export surge has been absorbed, and inventories in the U.S. are drawing a bit. Floating storage has been drained. But, in an interesting economic twist, OECD storage levels are likely to reach the targeted drawdown of 10% (300mm bbl) by year-end 2017, which is exactly what would have happened absent any action by KSA and Russia at the end of last year. It is difficult to resist reiterating that had nothing been done at the end of last year by KSA and Russia, and the market was left to do its necessary work of removing high-cost production and encouraging increased demand via lower prices, the market would have ended up in the exact same place it now finds itself. Trust But Verify Be that as it may, the really hard work of the KSA - Russia deal now begins. We expect OECD inventories to hit the 10% drawdown target by year end. However, if parties to the deal do not maintain production discipline markets will almost surely take prices lower. This could easily happen if prices start to percolate as we expect in 2Q17, and cash-strapped non-OPEC producers decide to see how far they can push KSA and its Gulf-state allies on their deal. Russia has been slow to deliver on its production commitment, while KSA has over-delivered (Chart 4). The same can be said for their respective allies (Chart 5). We believe markets will remain skittish, until evidence Russia and Iraq also are abiding by the end-2016 Agreement becomes incontrovertible. It is true Russian President Vladimir Putin personally involved himself in this deal, and helped close it on the non-OPEC side, but markets will want proof production actually is falling. Like former U.S. President Ronald Reagan, markets may be willing to trust, but they certainly will want to verify compliance. Chart 4KSA Over-Delivers On Its Cuts, ##br##Russia Is Slow To Deliver KSA Over-Delivers On Its Cuts, Russia Is Slow To Deliver KSA Over-Delivers On Its Cuts, Russia Is Slow To Deliver Chart 5KSA's Allies Are Delivering, ##br##Russia's Not So Much KSA’s Allies Are Delivering, Russia’s Not So Much KSA’s Allies Are Delivering, Russia’s Not So Much While not our base case, it is possible Russia and its fellow travelers could decide to risk keeping their production above agreed volumes under the Agreement, in the belief KSA is more in need of keeping prices above $50/bbl or so over the next 18 months, given the Kingdom wants a successful IPO of state-owned Saudi Aramco. Should this occur, markets would correct violently. At the end of the day, such a gamble likely would be ruinous for both, if it provoked KSA to abandon its commitment to keep production below 10mm b/d. Short-term goals - getting OECD storage levels down to five-year averages - would be sacrificed. Importantly, long-term goals we believe are driving KSA and Russia to cooperate in the first place, namely developing a modus operandi for containing U.S. shale-oil output, will become moot, possibly returning the market to the production free-for-all that motivated the KSA - Russia dialogue. The Quest For Relevance Chart 6Odds Favor Backwardated Markets ##br##As the Production Cuts Lead To Physical Deficits Odds Favor Backwardated Markets As the Production Cuts Lead To Physical Deficits Odds Favor Backwardated Markets As the Production Cuts Lead To Physical Deficits Our base case envisions a successful KSA - Russia Agreement in which production discipline is maintained, and the deal produces its desired result - drawing storage down by ~ 300mm bbls. Forward curves then backwardate (Chart 6). This sets the stage for deeper discussions among KSA, Russia and their respective allies re how they can work together going forward to contain U.S. shale-oil production. In effect, the parties to this deal have a choice to make: Either they figure out a way to make room for shale, which has catapulted the U.S. to major-producer status once again, or they leave this to the market. We are fairly confident these discussions already are ongoing, and will be well advanced by year-end. Next week, we will be publishing a theoretical piece on how the KSA - Russia pact could provide a platform that allows these petro-states - which we are taking the liberty of dubbing OPEC 2.0 - to re-gain a modicum of control over the rate at which U.S. shale-oil resources are developed. In earlier research, we advanced a theory that shale rig counts are highly sensitive not only to the level of prices at the front of the curve, but to the curve shape itself. We were able to demonstrate that contango markets - i.e., prices for promptly delivered crude are less than prices for deferred delivery material - favor shale producers, and, all else equal, incentivize them to hedge forward so as to lock in future revenues that maximize the number of rigs they deploy.2 In backwardated markets, the number of rigs a shale operator is able to deploy is lower, all else equal, which means the revenue they can lock in by hedging forward is lower. This limits the rate at which the resource can be developed. Based on these theoretical results, we believe it is in the interest of the OPEC 2.0 states to keep the WTI forward curve in backwardation, so that, at the margin, the number of rigs deployed to the shales is contained. Our research suggests that the deeper the backwardation, the slower rig counts grow. So, if the ideal price level for KSA is, as has been reported in the media, $60/bbl for Brent, then, in the best of all worlds, the Kingdom, Russia and their respective allies target spot prices at this level and use production, storage and forward guidance to backwardate the WTI curve, which is used by shale producers to hedge.3 Such a strategy has numerous risks, particularly if OPEC 2.0 cannot react quickly enough to keep prices from rising above a level that keeps shale-oil producers restricted to their core production areas. This would allow higher-cost shale reserves to be brought on line, which would raise the likelihood of lower prices, and cost OPEC 2.0 market share.4 Such a strategy also would tempt OPEC 2.0 producers to free ride, raising production at the margin to increase their revenues. This also risks lower prices. Nonetheless, we believe such a strategy could benefit both KSA and Russia and their allies, which is why it likely will at least be considered and attempted.5 KSA would be able to IPO Aramco into a relatively stable higher-price market, which would allow it to invest in additional refinery capacity in Asia and elsewhere, and in alternative-energy resources like solar, to free up oil for export. Russia also is better off keeping prices at a level at which its economy can continue to work on diversifying its exposure away from its heavy dependence on oil and gas exports.6 We will present more of our thinking on this next week. In the meantime, we highly recommend BCA clients read Matt Conlan's article in this week's Energy Sector Strategy entitled "Shale Dynamics: Sensitivities Within Modeling A Shale Recovery."7 This is an excellent analysis of shale-oil economics. Bottom Line: We continue to expect crude and products storage to draw as production cuts become apparent and refiners bring units back up off maintenance. This will backwardate WTI and Brent forward curves. Based on our high level of conviction in this outcome, we added a long Brent Dec/17 vs. short Dec/18 Brent position to our recommended trades, along with a similar WTI position. We also are positioned for a rally on drawdowns in inventories as refiners come back from turnarounds over the next few weeks, by being long $50/bbl WTI calls vs. short $55/bbl calls in Jul-Aug-Sep 2017. We continue to expect the U.S. benchmark WTI crude prices to average $55/bbl to 2020 and for WTI prices to trade most of the time between $45/bbl and $65/bbl. For 2018 and beyond, our conviction is lower: The massive capex cuts seen in the industry will place an enormous burden on shale producers and conventional oil producers - chiefly Gulf Arab producers and Russia - to offset natural decline-curve losses and meet increasing demand. For the international benchmark, Brent crude oil, we expect the spread between Brent and WTI prices to average $1.50/bbl (Brent over). Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Escondida outcome seen as disaster for BHP as workers return," published by Reuters.com on March 24, 2017. 2 We introduced this line of research in our February 16, 2017, issue of Commodity & Energy Strategy, in an article entitled "North American Oil Pipeline Buildout Complicates Price And Storage Expectations," it is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. We continue to delve into this topic, and will be presenting out latest thinking next week. 3 Please see "Exclusive: Saudi Arabia wants oil prices to rise to around $60 in 2017 - sources," published by Reuters February 28, 2017. Russia's budgeting assumption for 2017 to 2019 is $40/bbl, according to a Bloomberg report from March 24, 2017, entitled "OPEC Be Warned: Russia Prepares for Oil at $40." 4 It is not in KSA's, Russia's or their allies' interests to kill off shale production. The more-than-$1 trillion of capex for projects that would have been developed between 2015 and 2020, and would have translated into some 7mm b/d of oil-equivalent production will not be available to the market beginning later this decade. As we have noted, an enormous burden will be placed on shale production, Gulf OPEC producers and Russia to meet growing demand later this decade. 5 We also would note this would be a boon to long-only commodity index investors, whose returns are driven by roll yields that only exist in backwardated markets. More on that in subsequent research as well. 6 Russia's exports are dominated by oil and gas, while KSA's are dominated by crude oil and, increasingly, refined products. In 2015, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace calculated close to 70% of Russia's economy is dependent on revenue from hydrocarbons - production, trade, investments in non-oil industries funded by oil revenues, and consumption made possible via oil and gas production and sales. We discuss this at length in the September 8, 2016, issue of Commodity & Energy Strategy, in an article entitled "Ignore The KSA - Russia Production Pact, Focus Instead On Their Need For Cash." 7 Please see Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report entitled "Shale Dynamics: Sensitivities Within Modeling A Shale Recovery," This article was published March 29, 2017, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016

Highlights EM equity valuations are neutral. Relative to the U.S., EM share prices do offer some value, but this primarily reflects elevated valuations within the S&P 500. According to the cyclically-adjusted P/E ratio, EM stocks are cheap for investors with a long-term time horizon - longer than two to three years. Corporate profits are much more important than equity valuations in driving share prices in the next 12 months. Our outlook for EM EPS is downbeat for the next 12 months. Maintain a defensive posture and an underweight allocation in EM stocks versus DM. A new trade: go long Russian energy stocks / short global energy ones. Feature Chart I-1EM P/E Ratio And EPS EM P/E Ratio And EPS EM P/E Ratio And EPS There is ongoing debate in the investment community concerning whether emerging markets (EM) equities are or are not cheap, in both absolute terms and relative to developed markets (DM). In this week's report we review various equity valuation indicators and reiterate that EM stocks are neither cheap nor expensive in absolute terms. For example, the average of trailing and forward P/E ratios is slightly above its historical mean (Chart I-1, top panel). Relative to the U.S., EM share prices do offer value, but this reflects elevated valuations within the S&P 500. Despite this, we recommend underweighting EM vs U.S./DM because the cyclical growth dynamics is much better in DM than EM. EM stocks are cheap if one assumes a strong earnings recovery (Chart I-1, bottom panel). If earnings per share (EPS) begin contracting anew, as we expect, then the current rally will be reversed sooner than later. Overall, we continue to recommend a defensive posture for absolute-return investors and maintaining an underweight allocation in EM stocks versus DM for asset allocators. Valuation Perspectives Below we consider several valuation ratios: The equal-sector weighted trailing P/E ratio is 17.7 for EM (Chart I-2). Table I-1 displays equal-sector weighted P/E ratio, price-to-book value ratio and dividend yields for major equity markets globally. This is an apples-to-apples comparison, as it assigns equal weights to each of the 10 MSCI sectors - i.e., it removes sector biases. Chart I-2Equal-Sector Weighted Trailing P/E Ratio Equal-Sector Weighted Trailing P/E Ratio Equal-Sector Weighted Trailing P/E Ratio Table I-1Equal-Sector Weighted Valuation Ratios Across EM And DM EM Equity Valuations Revisited EM Equity Valuations Revisited Hence, on a comparable basis, EM equities are only slightly cheaper than DM stocks as is evident in Table I-1. Besides, the composite valuation indicator based on equal-sector weighted trailing and forward P/E, price-to-book value, price-to-cash earnings ratios and dividend yield indicate that EM stocks are fairly valued (Chart I-3). The cyclically-adjusted P/E (CAPE) ratio. The CAPE ratio is a structural valuation measure, i.e. it matters in the long run. Importantly, it assumes that real (inflation-adjusted) EPS will revert to its historical mean or trend. In short, the CAPE ratio tells us what the P/E ratio would be if EPS were to revert to its historical trend. Chart I-4 illustrates the EM CAPE ratio. If EM EPS in inflation-adjusted U.S. dollar terms reaches its historical time trend, one can safely assume that EM stocks are cheap and currently worth buying. In a nutshell, the current CAPE ratio of 15 assumes that EM EPS should rise by about 30% in nominal U.S. dollar terms over an investor's time horizon. Chart I-3EM Equities Valuations Are Neutral bca.ems_wr_2017_03_29_s1_c3 bca.ems_wr_2017_03_29_s1_c3 Chart I-4EM CAPE Ratio EM CAPE Ratio EM CAPE Ratio Given that our time horizon is 12 months, the assumption that EM EPS will surge by about 30% in U.S. dollar terms is in our view ambitious. Therefore, we posit that EM share prices do not offer compelling value at all in the next 12 months. If one's investment horizon were two-to-three years or longer, the assumption that EPS will rise by 30% or more in U.S. dollar terms is much more plausible. In this sense we would concur that EM share prices offer decent value from a longer-term perspective. Our methodology of calculating the CAPE ratio for EM varies from the well-known Robert Shiller's CAPE ratio for the U.S.1 However, even when applying our CAPE methodology to U.S. equities, the resulting ratio is not very different from Shiller's CAPE (Chart I-5). Trimmed-mean equity valuation ratios. Chart 6 illustrates 20% trimmed-mean trailing and forward P/E, price-to-book value, price-to-cash earnings ratios and dividend yields for the EM equity universe. A 20% trimmed-mean ratio excludes the top 10% and bottom 10% of industry groups, and then calculates the average. All calculations are based on 50 EM industry group data available from MSCI. Why look at trimmed-mean valuation ratios? Because by removing the top and bottom 10% of industry groups, this measure excludes outliers and provides a better perspective on valuation. A few observations are in order: First, according to the trimmed-mean valuation ratios, EM equities are not cheap. The trimmed-mean ratios are close to their historical mean (Chart I-6). Second, the trimmed-mean ratios are well above their market cap ones. This indicates that there are a few industry groups with large market caps that pull EM multiples lower. In other words, market-cap weighted multiples are skewed to the downside by a few large industry groups. There are reasons why some sectors and countries have low or high equity multiples. It makes sense to exclude them. Finally, the composite valuation indicator based on trimmed-mean trailing and forward P/Es, PBV and price-to-cash earnings ratios and dividend yield demonstrates that EM equity valuations are neutral (Chart I-7). Chart I-5U.S. CAPE Ratios U.S. CAPE Ratios U.S. CAPE Ratios Chart I-6EM Stocks Are Close to Fair Value EM Stocks Are Close to Fair Value EM Stocks Are Close to Fair Value Chart I-7EM Equities Have Neutral Value bca.ems_wr_2017_03_29_s1_c7 bca.ems_wr_2017_03_29_s1_c7 Bottom Line: EM equities by and large command a neutral valuation. According to the CAPE ratio, EM equities are cheap for investors with a long-term time horizon, say two-to-three years or longer. Profits Hold The Key Valuations are not a good timing tool. For low equity valuations to be realized, i.e., to produce solid price gains, corporate profits should grow. The reverse is also true: for an overvalued market to decline, company earnings should contract, or at least disappoint. When valuations are neutral - as they currently are for the EM equity benchmark - a recovery in EPS should entail higher share prices, while EPS shrinkage should lead to a selloff. EM EPS will continue to recover in the next three to six months, given the rally in commodities prices in 2016, amelioration in China's business cycle and the technology sector boom in Asia. However, this moderate and short-lived EPS recovery is already priced in. For the market to rally further, EPS will need to expand beyond the next three to six months. Remarkably, there has been little improvement in EM ex-China domestic demand. Besides, the risk to bank loan growth remains to the downside both in China and EM ex-China. Slower loan growth and the need to recognize and provision for potentially large NPLs will pressure banks' profits in many EM countries. Finally, we expect oil and industrial metals prices to decline considerably over the course of this year. If and as this view plays out, energy and materials stocks will fall. Energy and materials share prices correlate not with their past or current profits but rather with underlying commodities prices. One area where we remain bullish is the technology sector. Even though tech share prices are overbought and could correct in absolute terms in the months ahead, they will continue to outperform the benchmark. Bottom Line: Corporate profits are much more important in driving share prices in the next 12 months than equity valuations. Our outlook for EM EPS is downbeat for the next 12 months or so, even though EPS will continue to recover in the next three to six months. Timing Reversal: Watch Credit Quality Spreads Chart I-8Credit Quality Spreads: ##br##A Correction Or Reversal? Credit Quality Spreads: A Correction Or Reversal? Credit Quality Spreads: A Correction Or Reversal? Following are some of the indicators we are monitoring to gauge a reversal in EM share prices. EM corporate spreads have widened a notch relative to EM sovereign spreads (Chart I-8, top panel). Similarly, Chinese off-shore corporate spreads have widened versus Chinese sovereign spreads (Chart I-8, middle panel). Credit quality spreads - the gap between B- and BAA-grade corporate bonds - have widened slightly in the U.S. (Chart I-8, bottom panel). These moves are still very small, and do not constitute a definite sign of a major trend reversal. Nevertheless, such widening in credit quality spreads is an important development. If they persist, they will certainly sound the alarm for the reflation trade. Interestingly, this is the first time a simultaneous widening in credit quality spreads has occurred since the risk assets rally began in early 2016. Bottom Line: Major equity market selloffs will occur when lower quality credit begins to persistently underperform better quality credit. There have been budding signs of quality spread widening that are worth being monitored. Identifying Relative Value Within the EM equity universe, valuation ratios differ greatly. For example, banks trade at a trailing P/E of 9.7, while consumer staple stocks trade at 24.8. Table I-2 portrays the trailing P/E ratio and its historical mean as well as 12-month forward EPS growth and the forward P/E ratio for each sector - as well as average of trailing and forward P/E ratios. Table I-3 shows the same valuation measures but for EM countries. Table I-2Stock Valuation Snapshot: EM Sectors EM Equity Valuations Revisited EM Equity Valuations Revisited Table I-3Equity Valuation Snapshot: EM Countries EM Equity Valuations Revisited EM Equity Valuations Revisited It is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions from these tables. On a general level, a simplistic approach to investing based on trailing and forward P/E ratios would not have produced great outcomes in EM in recent years. When analyzing EM stock valuations, we prefer to use the trailing rather than forward P/E ratio because historically, EM forward EPS have had a very poor record forecasting actual EPS. One of our favorite ways to identify relative value is to compare the PBV ratio and return on equity (RoE) across countries/sectors. Chart I-9 plots RoE on the X-axis and the PBV ratio on the Y axis. Countries and sectors located in the bottom right corner (at the low end of the shaded area) have a low PBV ratio compared to their RoE. In contrast, in the north-west side of the distribution (at the upper end of the shaded zone), these have an elevated PBV ratio, taking into account their RoE. Chart I-9Searching For Relative Value EM Equity Valuations Revisited EM Equity Valuations Revisited Among countries, Korea, Russia, Hungary, the Czech Republic and China appear cheap, while Mexico, Brazil, South Africa, Colombia, Malaysia and Poland are on the expensive side. Chart I-10EMS's Recommended ##br##Equity Portfolio Performance EMS's Recommended Equity Portfolio Performance EMS's Recommended Equity Portfolio Performance Concerning equity sectors, utilities and financials/banks are cheap, yet consumer staples and consumer discretionary, health care, telecom and materials appear expensive in relative terms. Our recommended country equity allocation is based on a qualitative assessment of many variables including but not limited to valuation. Chart I-10 displays the performance of our fully invested EM Equity Portfolio Model versus the EM benchmark. Our overweights presently include: Korea, Taiwan, India, China, Thailand, Russia and central Europe. Our underweights are Brazil, Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia and Peru. We are neutral on Mexico, Chile, Colombia, South Africa and the Philippines. The lists of our country allocation and other equity investment recommendations are presented each week at the end of our reports. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Bet On Russia's Non-Compliance With OPEC Odds of Russia's compliance with the OPEC agreement to cut oil output by 300k b/d in the next two months are low. This poses downside risk to oil prices. Russia has so far done only 120k b/d cuts. Hence, in the next two months it should reduce its output by 180k b/d which amounts to 1.6% of the nation's oil output. One way to bet on Russia's non-compliance, regardless the direction of oil prices, is to go long Russian energy stocks / short global energy ones (Chart II-1). There are a number of political, economic and financial motives why Russia might care less about lower oil prices than Saudi Arabia in the next 12-18 months or so. As a result, Russia might not cut as much as it is expected by the OPEC agreement. Russia is able to increase oil production due to a cheaper ruble and technology advances. BCA's Energy Sector Strategy team has been highlighting that there have been concerted efforts by Russia's largest producers to employ horizontal drilling and multi-zone hydraulic fracturing in Western Siberia.2 These have stemmed declines from those aging fields and allowed production to rise (Chart II-2). Chart II-1Long Russia Energy / ##br##Short Global Energy Stocks Long Russia Energy / Short Global Energy Stocks Long Russia Energy / Short Global Energy Stocks Chart II-2Russian Oil ##br##Production Will Increase Russian Oil Production Will Increase Russian Oil Production Will Increase Russia will not shy away from being opportunistic and increase its market share when it can ramp up oil production. A rising global oil market share will allow Russian companies to outperform their global peers regardless the direction of oil prices. There are major cyclical divergences between Russian and Saudi economies. Russia's economy is gradually picking up while there is less certainty about Saudi's growth recovery. The reason is that Russia has allowed the ruble to depreciate and act as a shock absorber. Meanwhile, Sa­­­­udis have stuck to the currency peg. ­­­Oil prices are down by 27% from their top in rubles and 55% in Saudi riyals (Chart II-3). This has reflated Russia's fiscal revenues and the economy, while Saudi Arabia is still struggling with the consequences of low ­oil prices. On the fiscal front, Russia went through a notable fiscal squeeze and its budget deficit is projected to be 3.2% of GDP in 2017 (Chart II-4). In contrast, the Saudi Arabian fiscal deficit in 2016 reached an outstanding 17% of GDP, accounting for the drawdown in reserves by our estimates.3 Chart II-3Ruble's Depreciation ##br##In 2014-15 Made a Difference Ruble's Depreciation In 2014-15 Made a Difference Ruble's Depreciation In 2014-15 Made a Difference Chart II-4Fiscal Deficit: Small In ##br##Russia & Large In Saudi Fiscal Deficit: Small In Russia & Large In Saudi Fiscal Deficit: Small In Russia & Large In Saudi More importantly, Russia's federal budget for 2017 was constructed on the oil price assumption of $40/bbl. The 2017 Saudi budget assumes oil price of $50/bbl.4 Therefore, Russia would not mind if oil prices drop toward or slightly below $40 in the second half of this year. Therefore, Saudis care much more about sustaining oil prices at a higher level than Russians do. Finally, Rosneft has already conducted its IPO while Aramco's IPO has not taken place yet. As such, the need for higher oil prices is much greater in Saudi Arabia - to justify a higher value of their oil giant - than in Russia. Bottom Line: Odds are considerable that Russia will not comply with the OPEC deal and this could cause oil prices to selloff more. Regardless of direction of oil prices, we expect the Russian energy sector to outperform their global peers due to Russia's rising market share in the global oil market. Go long Russian energy stocks / short global ones. Stephan Gabillard, Research Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com 1 For more detailed discussion on our methodology of CAPE, please refer to January 20, 2016 Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled "EM Equity Valuations: A CAPE Model", available at ems. bcaresearch.com 2 Please refer to the Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report titled, "Russian Oil Production: Surpassing Expectation", dated December 14, 2016, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com 3 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report titled, "Saudi Arabia: Short-Term Gain, Long-Term Pain", dated February 1, 2017, available at ems.bcaresearch.com 4 https://mof.gov.sa/en/budget2017/Documents/The_National_Budget.pdf Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations

Highlights Eurostoxx50 versus S&P500 boils down to a simple choice: Banco Santander, BNP Paribas and ING; or Apple, Microsoft and Google? Right now, we would rather own the three tech stocks than the three banks - which necessarily means underweighting the Eurostoxx50 versus the S&P500. Eurostoxx50 performance relative to the FTSE100 boils down to the inverse direction of euro/pound. Right now, we expect euro/pound to strengthen - which necessarily means underweighting the Eurostoxx50 versus the FTSE100. Stay overweight Spanish Bonos versus French OATs as a structural position. Feature Which would you rather own: Banco Santander, BNP Paribas and ING; or Apple, Microsoft and Google?1 Surprising as it may seem, the all-important allocation decision between the Eurostoxx50 and the S&P500 boils down to this simple choice. The Chart of the Week should leave no doubt that everything else is largely irrelevant. Chart of the WeekEurostoxx50 Vs. S&P500 = Santander, BNP & ING Vs. Apple, Microsoft & Google Eurostoxx50 Vs. S&P500 = Santander, BNP & ING Vs. Apple, Microsoft & Google Eurostoxx50 Vs. S&P500 = Santander, BNP & ING Vs. Apple, Microsoft & Google Right now, we would rather own the top three U.S. tech stocks rather than the top three euro area banks - which necessarily means underweighting the Eurostoxx50 versus the S&P500. The Fallacy Of Division For Equities The fallacy of division is a logical fallacy. It occurs when somebody falsely infers that what is true for the whole is also true for the parts that make up the whole. As a simple example, somebody might infer that because their computer screen appears purple, the pixels that make up the screen are also purple. In fact, the pixels are not purple. They are either red or blue. The fallacy of division is that the property of the whole - purpleness - does not translate to the property of the constituent parts - redness or blueness. As investment strategists, we hear a common fallacy of division. Since global equities are a play on the global economy, it might seem that national equity markets - like Ireland's ISEQ or Denmark's OMX - are plays on their national economies. In fact, nothing could be further from the truth. The property of the equity market as a global aggregate does not translate to the property of equity markets as national parts. The equity markets in Ireland and Denmark are each dominated by one stock which accounts for almost a quarter of national market capitalization - in Ireland, Ryanair, the pan-European budget airline, and in Denmark, Novo Nordisk, the global pharmaceutical company. Therefore, the relative performance of Ireland's ISEQ has almost no connection with Ireland's economy; rather, it is a just a play on airlines. And given budget airlines' sensitivity to fuel costs, Ireland's ISEQ is counterintuitively an inverse play on the oil price (Chart I-2). Likewise, the relative performance of Denmark's OMX has no connection with Denmark's economy; it is just a strong play on global pharma (Chart I-3). Chart I-2Ireland = Short Oil Ireland = Short Oil Ireland = Short Oil Chart I-3Denmark = Long Pharma Denmark = Long Pharma Denmark = Long Pharma In a similar vein, the relative performance of Switzerland's SME is also a play on global pharma - via Novartis and Roche (Chart I-4); Norway's OBX is a play on global energy - via Statoil (Chart I-5); and Italy's MIB and Spain's IBEX are plays on banks (Chart I-6 and Chart I-7). We could continue, but you get our drift... Chart I-4Switzerland = Long Pharma / Short Oil Switzerland = Long Pharma / Short Oil Switzerland = Long Pharma / Short Oil Chart I-5Norway = Long Oil Norway = Long Oil Norway = Long Oil Chart I-6Italy = Long Banks Italy = Long Banks Italy = Long Banks Chart I-7Spain = Long Banks Spain = Long Banks Spain = Long Banks But what about a regional index like the Eurostoxx50 or Eurostoxx600: surely, with the broader exposure, there must be a strong connection with the euro area economy? Unfortunately not - at least, not when it comes to relative performance. Consider that for the past few years, the euro area economy has actually outperformed the U.S. economy2 (Chart I-8). Yet the Eurostoxx50 has substantially underperformed the S&P500 (Chart I-9). What's going on? The answer is that the Eurostoxx50 has a major 15% weighting to banks and a minor 7% weighting to tech. The S&P500 is the mirror image; a minor 7% weighting to banks and a major 22% weighting to tech. Chart I-8The Euro Area Economy ##br##Has Outperformed... The Euro Area Economy Has Outperformed... The Euro Area Economy Has Outperformed... Chart I-9...But The Eurostoxx50##br## Has Underperformed ...But The Eurostoxx50 Has Underperformed ...But The Eurostoxx50 Has Underperformed For the Eurostoxx50 the distinguishing property is 'bank'; for the S&P500 it is 'tech'. And as we saw earlier, these distinguishing properties are captured by just three large euro area banks and three large U.S tech stocks. So index relative performance simply boils down to whether the three euro area banks outperform the three U.S. tech stocks, or vice-versa. Everything else is largely irrelevant. Equities' Connection With Economies Is Often Counterintuitive When it comes to the FTSE100, it turns out that it is not more bank or tech than the Eurostoxx50. Major sector weightings across the two indexes are broadly similar. Hence, relative performance is more connected to relative economic performance. But there is a catch - the connection is not as intuitive as you might first think. You see, both major indexes are made up of dollar-earning multinational companies. Yet the index value and earnings are quoted in pounds and euros respectively. If the home currency appreciates, index earnings - translated from dollars into home currency - go down, depressing index relative performance with it. And the opposite happens if the home currency depreciates. So the counterintuitive thing is that a relatively strengthening home economy does not result in index outperformance. Quite the opposite, it normally means a relatively more hawkish central bank, and an appreciating currency (Chart I-10). Thereby it causes index underperformance. Hence, Eurostoxx50 performance relative to the FTSE100 boils down to the inverse direction of euro/pound. Once again, Chart I-11 should leave readers in no doubt. Chart I-10A Relatively More Hawkish Central Bank =##br## A Stronger Currency A Relatively More Hawkish Central Bank = A Stronger Currency A Relatively More Hawkish Central Bank = A Stronger Currency Chart I-11A Stronger Currency = ##br##Equity Index Underperformance A Stronger Currency = Equity Index Underperformance A Stronger Currency = Equity Index Underperformance Which neatly brings us to today's ECB meeting. The ECB is a tunnel-vision 2% inflation-targeting central bank. Any upgrade to its inflation forecast, as seems likely, would imply less need for its extreme and experimental monetary easing. Once digested by the market, this would support the euro. Meanwhile, on the other side of the Channel, the U.K. Government is preparing to trigger Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty and start its formal divorce from the EU within a couple of weeks. Expect the EU's immediate response to cast long shadows across Theresa May's vision of a future in sunlit uplands. Once digested by the market, this would further weigh down the pound. A stronger euro/pound necessarily means underweighting the Eurostoxx50 versus the FTSE100. The Fallacy Of Division For Bonds The fallacy of division also applies to euro area sovereign bonds. The aggregate euro area sovereign yield just equals the average ECB policy rate anticipated over the lifetime of the bond (Chart I-12). This is directly analogous to the relationship between the U.K. gilt yield and the anticipated path of the BoE base rate, and the relationship between the U.S. T-bond yield and the anticipated path of the Fed funds rate (Chart I-13). Chart I-12The Aggregate Euro Area Bond Yield = ##br##The Average ECB Policy Rate Expected The Aggregate Euro Area Bond Yield = The Average ECB Policy Rate Expected The Aggregate Euro Area Bond Yield = The Average ECB Policy Rate Expected Chart I-13The U.S. T-Bond Yield = ##br##The Average Fed Funds Rate Expected The U.S. T-Bond Yield = The Average Fed Funds Rate Expected The U.S. T-Bond Yield = The Average Fed Funds Rate Expected But what is true for the whole is not necessarily true for the parts that make up the whole. Individual euro area sovereign bond yields carry a second component which can override everything else. This second component is a redenomination premium as compensation for the expected loss if the bond redenominates out of euros. For example, the redenomination premium on a Spanish Bono versus a French OAT equals: The annual probability of euro breakup Multiplied by The expected undervaluation of a new peseta versus a new franc. However, the ECB's own analysis shows that Spain is now as competitive as France (Chart I-14), meaning that a new peseta ultimately should not lose value versus a new franc. So irrespective of the probability of euro breakup, the second item of the multiplication should be zero. Meaning that the redenomination premium should also be zero, rather than today's 75 bps (on 10-year Bonos over OATs). Bear in mind that Spain's housing bust and subsequent recapitalisation of its banks has followed Ireland's template - just with a two year lag. And observe that the redenomination premium on Irish 10-year bonds over OATs, which once stood at a remarkable 1100 bps, has now completely vanished. We expect Spain to continue following in the footsteps of Ireland (Chart I-15). As a structural position, stay long Spanish Bonos versus French OATs. Chart I-14Spain Has Dramatically Improved##br## Its Competitiveness Spain Has Dramatically Improved Its Competitiveness Spain Has Dramatically Improved Its Competitiveness Chart I-15Spain Is Following In The##br## Footsteps Of Ireland Spain Is Following In The Footsteps Of Ireland Spain Is Following In The Footsteps Of Ireland Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Listed as Alphabet. 2 On a per capita basis. Fractal Trading Model* Long tin / short copper hit its 5% profit target, while short MSCI AC World hit its 2.5% stop-loss. This week's recommendation is to short ruble / dollar. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-16 Short RUB/USD Short RUB/USD * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations