Russia & EM Europe

Highlights Market-based geopolitical analysis is about identifying upside as well as downside risk. So far this year upside risks include vaccine efficacy, coordinated monetary and fiscal stimulus, China’s avoidance of over-tightening policy, and Europe’s stable political dynamics. Downside risks include vaccine rollout problems, excessive US stimulus, a Chinese policy mistake, and traditional geopolitical risks in the Taiwan Strait and Persian Gulf. Financial markets may see more turmoil in the near-term over rising bond yields and the dollar bounce. But the macro backdrop is still supportive for this year. We are initiating and reinitiating a handful of trades: EM currencies ex-Brazil/Turkey/Philippines, the BCA rare earth basket, DM-ex-US, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership markets, and global value plays. Feature Chart 1Bond Yield Spike Threatens Markets In Near Term Bond Yield Spike Threatens Markets In Near Term Bond Yield Spike Threatens Markets In Near Term Investors hear a lot about geopolitical risk but the implication is always “downside risk.” What about upside risks? Where are politics and geopolitics creating buying opportunities? So far this year, on the positive side, the US fiscal stimulus is overshooting, China is likely to avoid overtightening policy, and Europe’s political dynamics are positive. However, global equity markets are euphoric and much of the good news is priced in. On the negative side, the US stimulus is probably too large. The output gap will be more than closed by the Biden administration’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan yet the Democrats will likely pass a second major bill later this year with a similar amount of net spending, albeit over a longer period of time and including tax hikes. The countertrend bounce in the dollar and rising government bond yields threaten the US and global equity market with a near-term correction. The global stock-to-bond ratio has gone vertical (Chart 1). Meanwhile Biden faces immediate foreign policy tests in the Taiwan Strait and Persian Gulf. These two are traditional geopolitical risks that are once again underrated by investors. The near term is likely to be difficult for investors to navigate. Sentiment is ebullient and likely to suffer some disappointments. In this report we highlight a handful of geopolitical opportunities and offer some new investment recommendations to capitalize on them. Go Long Japan And Stay Long South Korea China’s stimulus and recovery matched by global stimulus and recovery have led to an explosive rise in industrial metals and other China-sensitive assets such as Swedish stocks and the Australian dollar that go into our “China Play Index” (Chart 2). Chart 2China Plays Looking Stretched (For Now) China Plays Looking Stretched (For Now) China Plays Looking Stretched (For Now) While a near-term pullback in these assets looks likely, tight global supplies will keep prices well-bid. Moreover long-term strategic investment plans by China and the EU to accelerate the technology race and renewable energy are now being joined by American investment plans, a cornerstone of Joe Biden’s emerging national policy program. We are long silver and would buy metals on the dips. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s “new era” policies will be further entrenched at the March National People’s Congress with the fourteenth five-year plan for 2021-25 and Xi’s longer vision for 2035. These policies aim to guide the country through its economic transition from export-manufacturing to domestic demand. They fundamentally favor state-owned enterprises, which are an increasingly necessary tool for the state to control aggregate demand as potential GDP growth declines, while punishing large state-run commercial banks, which are required to serve quasi-fiscal functions and swallow the costs of the transition (Chart 3). Xi Jinping’s decision to promote “dual circulation,” which is fundamentally a turn away from Deng Xiaoping’s opening up and liberal reform to a more self-sufficient policy of import substitution and indigenous innovation, will clash with the Biden administration, which has already flagged China as the US’s “most serious competitor” and is simultaneously seeking to move its supply chains out of China for critical technological, defense, and health goods. Chart 3Xi Jinping Leans On The Banks To Save The SOEs Xi Jinping Leans On The Banks To Save The SOEs Xi Jinping Leans On The Banks To Save The SOEs Chinese political and geopolitical risks are almost entirely priced out of the market, according to our GeoRisk Indicator, leaving Chinese equities exposed to further downside (Chart 4). Hong Kong equities have traded in line with GeoRisk Indicator for China, which suggests that they also have downside as the market prices in a rising risk premium due to the US’s attempt to galvanize its allies in a great circumvention of China’s economy in the name of democracy versus autocracy. Chart 4China/HK Political Risk Priced Out Of Market China/HK Political Risk Priced Out Of Market China/HK Political Risk Priced Out Of Market China has hinted that it will curtail rare earth element exports to the US if the US goes forward with a technological blockade. Biden’s approach, however, is more defensive rather than offensive – focusing on building up domestic and allied semiconductor and supply chain capacity rather than de-sourcing China. President Trump’s restrictions can be rolled back for US designed or manufactured tech goods that are outdated or strictly commercial. Biden will draw the line against American parts going into the People’s Liberation Army. Biden has a chance in March to ease the Commerce Department’s rules implementing Trump’s strictures on Chinese software apps in US markets as a gesture of engagement. Supply constraints and shortages cannot be solved quickly in either semiconductors or rare earths. But both China and the US can circumvent export controls by importing through third parties. The problem for China is that it is easier for the US to start pulling rare earths from the ground than it is for China to make a great leap forward in semiconductor production. Given the US’s reawakening to the need for a domestic industrial policy, strategic public investments, and secure supply chains, we are reinitiating our long rare earth trade, using the BCA rare earth basket, which features producers based outside of China (Chart 5). The renminbi is starting to rolling over, having reached near to the ceiling that it touched in 2017 after Trump’s arrival. There are various factors that drive the currency and there are good macro reasons for the currency to have appreciated in 2016-17 and 2020-21 due to strong government fiscal and monetary reflation. Nevertheless the People’s Bank allowed the currency to appreciate extensively at the beginning of both Trump’s and Biden’s terms and the currency’s momentum is slowing as it nears the 2017 ceiling. We are reluctant to believe the renminbi will go higher as China will not want to overtighten domestic policy but will want to build some leverage against Biden for the forthcoming strategic and economic dialogues. For mainland-dedicated investors we recommend holding Chinese bonds but for international investors we would highlight the likelihood that the renminbi has peaked and geopolitical risk will escalate. There is no substantial change on geopolitical risk in the Taiwan Strait since we wrote about it recently. A full-scale war is a low-probability risk. Much more likely is a diplomatic crisis – a showdown between the US and China over Taiwan’s ability to export tech to the mainland and the level of American support for Taiwan – and potentially a testing of Biden’s will on the cybersecurity, economic security, or maritime security of Taiwan. While it would make sense to stay long emerging markets excluding Taiwan, there is not an attractive profile for staying long emerging markets excluding all of Greater China. Therefore investors who are forced to choose should overweight China relative to Taiwan (Chart 6). Chart 5Rare Earth Miners Outside China Can Go Higher Rare Earth Miners Outside China Can Go Higher Rare Earth Miners Outside China Can Go Higher Market forces have only begun to register the fact that Taiwan is the epicenter of geopolitical risk in the twenty-first century. The bottleneck for semiconductors and Taiwan’s role as middleman in the trade war have supported Taiwanese stocks. It will take a long time for China, the US, and Europe to develop alternative suppliers for chips. But geopolitical pressures will occasionally spike and when they do Taiwanese equities will plunge (Chart 7). Chart 6EM Investors Need Either China Or Taiwan ... Taiwan Most At Risk EM Investors Need Either China Or Taiwan ... Taiwan Most At Risk EM Investors Need Either China Or Taiwan ... Taiwan Most At Risk South Korean geopolitical risk is also beneath the radar, though stocks have corrected recently and emerging market investors should generally favor Korea, especially over Taiwan. The first risk to Korea is that the US will apply more pressure on Seoul to join allied supply chains and exclude shipments of sensitive goods to China. The second risk is that North Korea – which Biden is deliberately ignoring in his opening speeches – will demand America’s attention through a new series of provocations that will have to be rebuked with credible threats of military force. Chart 7Markets Starting To Price Taiwan Strait Geopolitical Risk Markets Starting To Price Taiwan Strait Geopolitical Risk Markets Starting To Price Taiwan Strait Geopolitical Risk Chart 8South Korea Favored In EM But Still Faces Risks Over Chips, The North South Korea Favored In EM But Still Faces Risks Over Chips, The North South Korea Favored In EM But Still Faces Risks Over Chips, The North   Chart 9Don't Worry About Japan's Revolving Door Don't Worry About Japan's Revolving Door Don't Worry About Japan's Revolving Door The North Korean risk is usually very fleeting for financial markets. The tech risk is more serious but the Biden administration is not seeking to force South Korea to stop trading with China, at least not yet. The US would need to launch a robust, multi-year diplomatic effort to strong-arm its allies and partners into enforcing a chip and tech ban on China. Such an effort would generate a lot of light and heat – shuttle diplomacy, leaks to the press, and public disagreements and posturing. Until this starts to occur, US export controls will be a concern but not an existential threat to South Korea (Chart 8). Japan is the geopolitical winner in Asia Pacific. Japan is militarily secure, has a mutual defense treaty with the US, and stands to benefit from the recovery in global trade and growth. Japan is a beneficiary of a US-driven tech shift away from excess dependency on China and is heavily invested in Southeast Asia, which stands to pick up manufacturing share. Higher bond yields and inflation expectations will detract from growth stocks more than value stocks, and value stocks have a larger market-cap weight in European and Japanese equity markets. Japanese politics are not a significant risk despite a looming election. While Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga is unpopular and likely to revive the long tradition of a “revolving door” of short-lived prime ministers, and while the Liberal Democratic Party will lose the super-majorities it held under Shinzo Abe, nevertheless the party remains dominant and the national policy consensus is behind Abe’s platform of pro-growth reforms, coordinated dovish monetary and fiscal policy, and greater openness to trade and immigration (Chart 9). Favor EU And UK Over Russia And Eastern Europe Russian geopolitical risk appears to be rolling over according to our indicator but we disagree with the market’s assessment and expect it to escalate again soon (Chart 10). Not only will Russian social unrest continue to escalate but also the Biden administration will put greater pressure on Russia that will keep foreign investors wary. Chart 10Russia Geopolitical Risk Will Not Roll Over Russia Geopolitical Risk Will Not Roll Over Russia Geopolitical Risk Will Not Roll Over While geopolitics thus poses a risk to Russian equities – which are fairly well correlated (inversely) with our GeoRisk indicator – nevertheless they are already cheap and stand to benefit from the rise in global commodity prices and liquidity. Russia is also easing fiscal policy to try to quiet domestic unrest. The pound and the euro today are higher against the ruble than at any time since the invasion of Ukraine. It is possible that Russia will opt for outward aggressiveness amidst domestic discontent, a weak and relapsing approval rating for Vladimir Putin and his government, and the Biden administration’s avowed intention to prioritize democracy promotion, including in Ukraine and Belarus (Chart 11). The ruble will fall on US punitive actions but ultimately there is limited downside, at least as long as the commodity upcycle continues. Chart 11Ruble Can Fall But Probably Not Far Ruble Can Fall But Probably Not Far Ruble Can Fall But Probably Not Far Biden stated in his second major foreign policy speech, “we will not hesitate to raise the cost on Russia.” There are two areas where the Biden administration could surprise financial markets: pipelines and Russian bonds. Biden could suddenly adopt a hard line on the Nordstream 2 pipeline between Russia and Germany, preventing it from completion. This would require Biden to ask the Germans to put their money where their mouths are when it comes to trans-Atlantic solidarity. Biden is keen to restore relations with Germany, and is halting the withdrawal of US troops from there, but pressuring Germany on Russia is possible given that it lies in the US interest and Biden has vowed to push back against Russia’s aggressive regional actions and interference in American affairs. The US imposed sanctions on Russian “Eurobonds” under the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (CBW Act) in the wake of Russia’s poisoning of secret agent Sergei Skripal in the UK in 2018. Non-ruble bank loans and non-ruble-denominated Russian bonds in primary markets were penalized, which at the time accounted for about 23% of Russian sovereign bonds. This left ruble-denominated sovereign bonds to be sold along with non-ruble bonds in secondary markets. The Biden administration views Russia’s poisoning of opposition leader Alexei Navalny as a similar infraction and will likely retaliate. The Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act is not yet law but passed through a Senate committee vote in 2019 and proposed to halt most purchases of Russian sovereign debt and broaden sanctions on energy projects and Kremlin officials. Biden is also eager to retaliate for the large SolarWinds hack that Russia is accused of conducting throughout 2020. Cybersecurity stocks are an obvious geopolitical trade in contemporary times. Authoritarian nations have benefited from the use of cyber attacks, disinformation, and other asymmetric warfare tactics. The US has shown that it does not have the appetite to fight small wars, like over Ukraine or the South China Sea, whereas the US remains untested on the question of major wars. This incentivize incremental aggression and actions with plausible deniability like cyber. Therefore the huge run-up in cyber stocks is well-supported and will continue. The world’s growing dependency on technology during the pandemic lockdowns heightened the need for cybersecurity measures but the COVID winners are giving way to COVID losers as the pandemic subsides and normal economic activity resumes. Traditional defense stocks stand to benefit relative to cyber stocks as the secular trend of struggle among the Great Powers continues (Chart 12). Specifically a new cycle of territorial competition will revive military tensions as commodity prices rise. Chart 12Back To Work' Trade: Long Defense Versus Cyber Back To Work' Trade: Long Defense Versus Cyber Back To Work' Trade: Long Defense Versus Cyber By contrast with Russia, western Europe is a prime beneficiary of the current environment. Like Japan, Europe is an industrial, trade-surplus economy that benefits from global trade and growth. It benefits as the geopolitical middleman between the US and its rivals, China and Russia, especially as long as the Biden administration pursues consultation and multilateralism and hesitates to force the Europeans into confrontational postures against these powers. Chart 13Political Risk Still Subsiding In Continental Europe Political Risk Still Subsiding In Continental Europe Political Risk Still Subsiding In Continental Europe Meanwhile Russia and especially China need to court Europe now that the Biden administration is using diplomacy to try to galvanize a western bloc. China looks to substitute European goods for American goods and open up its market to European investors to reduce European complaints of protectionism. European domestic politics will become more interesting over the coming year, with German and French elections, but the risks are low. The rise of a centrist coalition in Italy under Mario Draghi highlights how overstated European political risk really is. In the Netherlands, Mark Rutte’s center-right party is expected to remain in power in March elections based on opinion polling, despite serious corruption scandals and COVID blowback. In Germany, Angela Merkel’s center-right party is also favored, and yet an upset would energize financial markets because it would result in a more fiscally accommodative and pro-EU policy (Chart 13). The takeaway is that there is limit to how far emerging European countries can outperform developed Europe, given the immediate geopolitical risk emanating from Russia that can spill over into eastern Europe (Chart 14). Developed European stocks are at peak levels, comparable to the period of Ukraine’s election, but Ukraine is about to heat up again as a battleground between Russia and the West, as will other peripheral states. Chart 14Favor DM Europe Over EM Europe Favor DM Europe Over EM Europe Favor DM Europe Over EM Europe Chart 15GBP: Watch For Scottish Risk Revival In May GBP: Watch For Scottish Risk Revival In May GBP: Watch For Scottish Risk Revival In May Finally, in the UK, the pound continues to surge in the wake of the settlement of a post-Brexit trade deal, notwithstanding lingering disagreements over vaccines, financial services, and other technicalities. British equities are a value play that can make up lost ground from the tumultuous Brexit years. There is potentially one more episode of instability, however, arising from the unfinished business in Scotland, where the Scottish National Party wants to convert any victory in parliamentary elections in May into a second push for a referendum on national independence. At the moment public opinion polls suggest that Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s achievement of an EU trade deal has taken the wind out of the sails of the independence movement but only the election will tell whether this political risk will continue to fall in the near term (Chart 15). Hence the pound’s rally could be curtailed in the near term but unless Scottish opinion changes direction the pound and UK domestic-oriented stocks will perform well. Short EM Strongmen Throughout the emerging world the rise of the “Misery Index” – unemployment combined with inflation – poses a persistent danger of social and political instability that will rise, not fall, in the coming years. The aftermath of the COVID crisis will be rocky once stimulus measures wane. South Africa, Turkey, and Brazil look the worst on these measures but India and Russia are also vulnerable (Chart 16). Brazilian geopolitical risk under the turbulent administration of President Jair Bolsonaro has returned to the 2015-16 peaks witnessed during the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff amid the harsh recession of the middle of the last decade. Brazilian equities are nearing a triple bottom, which could present a buying opportunity but not before the current political crisis over fiscal policy exacts a toll on the currency and stock market (Chart 17). Chart 16EM Political Risk Will Bring Bad Surprises EM Political Risk Will Bring Bad Surprises EM Political Risk Will Bring Bad Surprises Chart 17Brazil Risk Hits Impeachment Peaks On Bolso Fiscal Populism Brazil Risk Hits Impeachment Peaks On Bolso Fiscal Populism Brazil Risk Hits Impeachment Peaks On Bolso Fiscal Populism Bolsonaro’s signature pension reform was an unpopular measure whose benefits were devastated by the pandemic. The return to fiscal largesse in the face of the crisis boosted Bolsonaro’s support and convinced him to abandon the pretense of austere reformer in favor of traditional Brazilian fiscal populist as the 2022 election approaches. His attempt to violate the country’s fiscal rule – a constitutional provision passed in December 2016 that imposes a 20-year cap on public spending growth – that limits budget deficits is precipitating a shakeup within the ruling coalition. Our Emerging Market Strategists believe the Central Bank of Brazil will hike interest rates to offset the inflationary impact of breaking the fiscal cap but that the hikes will likely fall short, prompting a bond selloff and renewed fears of a public debt crisis. The country’s political crisis will escalate in the lead up to elections, not unlike what occurred in the US, raising the odds of other negative political surprises. Chart 18Reinitiate Long Mexico / Short Brazil Reinitiate Long Mexico / Short Brazil Reinitiate Long Mexico / Short Brazil While Latin America as a whole is a shambles, the global cyclical upturn and shift in American policy creates investment opportunities – particularly for Mexico, at least within the region. Investors should continue to prefer Mexican equities over Brazilian given Mexico’s fundamentally more stable economic policy backdrop and its proximity to the American economy, which will be supercharged with stimulus and eager to find ways to use its new trade deal with Mexico to diversify its manufacturing suppliers away from China (Chart 18). In addition to Brazil, Turkey and the Philippines are also markets where “strongman leaders” and populism have undercut economic orthodoxy and currency stability. A basket of emerging market currencies that excludes these three witnessed a major bottom in 2014-16, when Turkish and Brazilian political instability erupted and when President Rodrigo Duterte stormed the stage in the Philippines. These three currencies look to continue underperforming given that political dynamics will worsen ahead of elections in 2022 (possibly 2023 for Turkey) (Chart 19). Chart 19Keep Shorting The Strongmen Keep Shorting The Strongmen Keep Shorting The Strongmen Investment Takeaways We closed out some “risk-on” trades at the end of January – admittedly too soon – and since then have hedged our pro-cyclical strategic portfolio with safe-haven assets, while continuing to add risk-on trades where appropriate. The Biden administration still faces one or more major foreign policy tests that can prove disruptive, particularly to Taiwanese, Chinese, Russian, and Saudi stocks. Biden’s foreign policy doctrine will be established in the crucible of experience but his preferences are known to favor diplomacy, democracy over autocracy, and to pursue alliances as a means of diversifying supply chains away from China. We will therefore look favorably upon the members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and recommend investors reinitiate the long CPTPP equities basket. These countries, which include emerging markets with decent governance as well as Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada all stand to benefit from the global upswing and US foreign policy (Chart 20). Chart 20Reinitiate Long Trans-Pacific Partnership Reinitiate Long Trans-Pacific Partnership Reinitiate Long Trans-Pacific Partnership Chart 21Reinitiate Long Global Value Over Growth Reinitiate Long Global Value Over Growth Reinitiate Long Global Value Over Growth The Biden administration will likely try to rejoin the CPTPP but even if it fails to do so it will privilege relations with these countries as it strives to counter China and Russia. The UK, South Korea, Thailand and others could join the CPTPP over time – though an attempt to recruit Taiwan would exacerbate the geopolitical risks highlighted above centered on Taiwan. The dollar is perking up, adding a near-term headwind to global equities, but the cyclical trend for the dollar is still down due to extreme monetary and fiscal dovishness. Tactically, go long Mexican equities over Brazilian equities. From a strategic point of view we still favor value stocks over growth stocks and recommend investors reinitiate this global trade (Chart 21). Strategically, wait to overweight UK stocks in a global portfolio until the result of the May local elections is known and the risk of Scottish independence can be reassessed. Strategically, favor developed Europe over emerging Europe stocks as a result of Russian geopolitical risks that are set to escalate. Strategically go long global defense stocks versus cyber security stocks as a geopolitical “back to work” trade for a time when economic activity resumes and resource-oriented territorial, kinetic, military risks reawaken. Strategically, favor EM currencies other than Brazil, Turkey, and the Philippines to minimize exposure to economic populism, poor macro fundamentals, and election risk. Strategically, go long the BCA Rare Earths Basket to capture persistent US-China tensions under Biden and the search for alternatives to China.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   We Read (And Liked) … Supply-Side Structural Reform Supply-Side Structural Reform, a compilation of Chinese economic and policy research, discusses several aspects of Chinese economic reform as it is practiced under the Xi Jinping administration, spanning the meaning and importance of supply-side structural reform in China as well as five major tasks.1 The book consists of contributions by Chinese scholars, financial analysts, and opinion makers in 2015, so we have learned a lot since it was published, even as it sheds light on Beijing’s interpretation of reform. 2015 was a year of financial turmoil that saw a dramatic setback for China’s 2013 liberal reform blueprint. It also saw the launch of a new round of reforms under the thirteenth Five Year Plan (2016-20), which aimed to push China further down the transition from export-manufacturing to domestic and consumer-led growth. Beijing’s renewed reform push in 2017, which included a now infamous “deleveraging campaign,” ultimately led to a global slowdown in 2018-19 that was fatefully exacerbated by the trade war with the United States – only to be eclipsed by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Built on fundamental economic theory and the social background of China, the book’s authors examine the impact of supply-side reform on the Chinese financial sector, industrial sector, and macroeconomic development. The comprehensive analysis covers short-term, mid-term and long-term effects. From the perspective of economic theory, there is consensus that China's supply-side structural reform framework did not forsake government support for the demand side of the economy, nor was it synonymous with traditional, liberal supply-side economics in the Western world. In contrast to Say’s Law, Reaganomics, and the UK’s Thatcherite privatization reforms, China's supply-side reform was concentrated on five tasks specific to its contemporary situation: cutting excessive industrial capacity, de-stocking, deleveraging, cutting corporate costs, and improving various structural “weaknesses.” The motives behind the new framework were to enhance the mobility and efficiency of productive factors, eliminate excess capacity, and balance effective supply with effective demand. Basically, if China cannot improve efficiencies, capital will be misallocated, corporations will operate at a loss, and the economy’s potential will worsen over the long run. The debt buildup will accelerate and productivity will suffer. Regarding implementation, the book sets forth several related policies, including deepening the reform of land use and the household registration (hukou) system, and accelerating urbanization, which are effective measures to increase the liquidity of productive factors. Others promote the transformation from a factor-driven economy to efficiency and innovation-driven economy, including improving the property rights system, transferring corporate and local government debt to the central government, and encouraging investment in human capital and in technological innovation. The book also analyzes and predicts the potential costs of reform on the economy in the short and long term. In the short run, authors generally anticipated that deleveraging and cutting excessive industrial capacity would put more pressure on the government’s fiscal budget. The rise in the unemployment rate, cases of bankruptcy, and the negative sentiment of investors would slow China’s economic growth. In the medium and long run, this structural reform was seen as necessary for a sustainable medium-speed economic growth, leading to more positive expectations for households and corporates. The improved efficiency in capital allocation would provide investors with more confidence in the Chinese economy and asset market. Authors argued that overall credit risk was still controllable in near-term, as the corresponding policies such as tax reduction and urbanization would boost private investment and consumption in the short run. These policies increased demand in the labor market and created working positions to counteract adverse impacts. Employment in industries where excessive capacity was most severe only accounted for about 3% of total urban employment in 2013. Regarding the rise in credit risk during de-capacity, the asset quality of banks had improved since the 1990s and the level of bad debt was said to be within a controllable range, given government support. Moreover, in the long run, the merger and reorganization of enterprises would increase the efficient supply and have a positive effect on economic innovation-driven transformation. We know from experience that much of the optimism about reform would confront harsh realities in the 2016-21 period. The reforms proceeded in a halting fashion as the US trade war interrupted their implementation, prompting the government to resort to traditional stimulus measures in mid-2018, only to be followed by another massive fiscal-and-credit splurge in 2020 in the face of the pandemic. Yet investors could be surprised to find that the Politburo meeting on April 17, 2020 proclaimed that China would continue to focus on supply-side structural reform even amid efforts to normalize the economy and maintain epidemic prevention and control. Leaders also pledged to maintain the supply-side reform while emphasizing demand-side management during annual Central Economic Work Conference in December 2020. In other words, Xi administration’s policy preferences remain set, and compromises forced by exogenous events will soon give way to renewed reform initiatives. This is a risk to the global reflation trade in 2021-22. There has not been a total abandonment of supply-side reform. The main idea of demand-side reform – shifts in the way China’s government stimulates the economy – is to fully tap the potential of the domestic market and call for an expansion of consumption and effective investment. Combined with the new concept of “dual circulation,” which emphasizes domestic production and supply chains (effectively import substitution), the current demand-side reforms fall in line with the supply-side goal of building a more independent and controllable supply chain and produce higher technology products. These combined efforts will provide “New China” sectors with more policy support, less regulatory constraint, and lead to better economic and financial market performance. Despite the fluctuations in domestic growth and the pressure from external demand, China will maintain the focus on reform in its long-term planning. The fundamental motivation is to enhance efficiency and innovation that is essential for China’s productivity and competitiveness in the future. Thus, investors should not become complacent over the vast wave of fiscal and credit stimulus that is peaking today as we go to press. Instead they should recognize that China’s leaders are committed to restructuring. This means that the economic upside of stimulus has a cap on it– a cap that will eventually be put in place by policymakers, if not by China’s lower capacity for debt itself. It would be a colossal policy mistake for China to overtighten monetary and fiscal policy in 2021 but any government attempts to tighten, the financial market will become vulnerable. A final thought: it is unclear whether there is potential for an improvement in China’s foreign relations contained in this conclusion. What the western world is demanding is for China to rebalance its economy, open up its markets, cut back on the pace of technological acquisition, reduce government subsidies for state-owned companies, and conform better to US and EU trade rules. There is zero chance that China will provide all of these things. But its own reform program calls for greater intellectual property protections, greater competition in non-strategic sectors (which the US and EU should be able to access under recent trade deals), and targeted stimulus for sustainable energy, where the US and EU see trade and investment opportunities. Thus there is a basis for an improvement in cooperation. What remains to be seen is how protectionist dual circulation will be in practice and how aggressively the US will pursue international enforcement of technological restrictions on China under the Biden administration. Jingnan Liu Research Associate JingnanL@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Yifu L, et al. Supply-Side Structural Reform (Beijing: Democracy & Construction Publishing House, 2016). 351 pages. Appendix: GeoRisk Indicator China China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator Russia Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator UK UK: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Germany Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Canada Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Spain Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Korea Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights In the wake of COVID-19, the low-probability, high-impact “Black Swan” event is as relevant as ever. Investors should already expect US terrorist incidents, a fourth Taiwan Strait crisis, and crises involving Turkey – these are no longer black swans. What if Russia had a color revolution, Japan confronted China, or Saudi Arabia collapsed? What if the US and China brokered a North Korean deal? Or a major terrorist attack caused government change in Germany? Ultimately this exercise illustrates what the market is not prepared for – a new rally in the US dollar – though some scenarios would fuel the rise of the euro and renminbi. Feature The COVID-19 pandemic reminded us all of the power of the “Black Swan” – the random, unpredictable event with massive ramifications. As historian Niall Ferguson pointed out at the BCA Conference last fall, COVID-19 was not really a black swan, as epidemiologists had predicted that a pandemic would occur and the world was not ready. Astrophysicist Martin Rees made a bet with psychologist and linguist Steven Pinker that “bioterror or bioerror will lead to one million casualties in a single event within a six month period starting no later than 31 December 2020.”1 Tellingly, countries neighboring China were the best prepared for the outbreak, having dealt with SARS and bird flu. COVID accelerated major trends building up throughout the past decade – notably the shift toward pro-active fiscal policy, which had been gaining traction in policy circles ever since the austerity debates of the early 2010s. In that sense forecasting is still necessary. If solid trends can be identified, then random shocks may simply reinforce them (Chart 1). Chart 1US Fiscal Stimulus About To Get Even Bigger Five Black Swans For 2021 Five Black Swans For 2021 In this year’s “Five Black Swans” report, we focus on geopolitical risks that are highly unlikely, not at all being discussed, and yet would have a major impact on financial markets. Domestic terrorist events in the United States in 2021 would not qualify as a black swan by this definition. A crisis in the Taiwan Strait, which we have warned about for several years, is now widely (and rightly) expected. Black Swan #1: A Color Revolution In Russia Russia is one of the losers of the US election. Not because Trump was a Russian agent – the Trump administration ended up authorizing a fairly hawkish posture toward Russia in eastern Europe – but rather because the Democratic Party threatens Russia with a strengthening of the trans-Atlantic alliance and a recovery of liberal democratic ideology. Geopolitical risk surrounding Russia is therefore elevated, as we argued last year. Both President Vladimir Putin and his government have seen their approval rating drop, a development that has often led Russia to lash out abroad (Chart 2). But our expectation of rising political risk within Russia’s sphere has been reinforced by Russia’s alleged poisoning of opposition politician Alexei Navalny and the eruption of pro-democracy protests in Belarus. Vladimir Putin is increasingly focusing on home affairs due to domestic instability worsened by the pandemic and recession. Fiscal and monetary austerity have weighed on the public. The largest protests since 2011 occurred in mid-2019 in opposition to the fixing of the Moscow municipal elections. This could be a harbinger of larger unrest around the Russian legislative elections on September 19, 2021. Nominal wage growth has collapsed and is scraping its 2015-16 lows (Chart 3). Chart 2Black Swan #1: A Color Revolution In Russia Black Swan #1: A Color Revolution In Russia Black Swan #1: A Color Revolution In Russia Chart 3Russia's Fiscal Austerity Russia's Fiscal Austerity Russia's Fiscal Austerity Meanwhile US policy toward Russia will become more confrontational. New US presidents always start with outreach to Russia, but the Democratic Party blames Russia for betraying the good faith of the Obama administration’s “diplomatic reset” from 2009-11. Russia invaded Ukraine and took Crimea in exchange for cooperating on the 2015 Iran nuclear deal. Adding in the Snowden affair, the 2016 election interference, and now the monumental SolarWinds cyberattack, the Democratic Party will want to strike back and reestablish deterrence against Russia’s asymmetrical warfare. While Biden will seek to negotiate an extension of the New START missile treaty from February 5, 2021 until 2026, he will gear up for confrontation in other areas. The US could seek to go on offense with Russia’s wonted tools: psychological warfare and cyberattacks. The Americans are not willing or able to attempt regime change in Moscow. That would be taken as an act of war among nuclear powers. But if Russia is less stable internally than it appears, then US meddling could hit a weak spot and set off a chain reaction. Even if the US is incapable of anything of the sort, Russia is still ripe for social unrest. Should the authorities mishandle it, it could metastasize. Russia has a long tradition of peasant uprisings – a descent into anarchy is not out of the question. The regime would not be devoting so much attention to suppressing domestic dissent if the conditions for it were not ripe.2 Putin’s constitutional reforms in mid-2020, which could extend his term until 2036, also speak to concerns about regime stability. A successful Russian uprising would threaten to raise serious instability in Europe and the world. When great but decadent empires are destabilized, political struggle can intensify rapidly and spill out to affect the neighbors. Bottom Line: Russian domestic political instability could produce a black swan. The ruble would tank and the US dollar would catch a bid against European currencies. Black Swan #2: A Major Terror Attack In Germany 2020 was a banner year for European solidarity. Brexit went forward but none of the European states have followed – nor would any want to follow given the political turmoil it aroused. Brussels initiated a recovery fund to combat the global pandemic that consisted of a mutual debt scheme – in what has been hailed somewhat excessively as a “Hamiltonian moment,” a move toward federalism. Germany stood at the center of this process. After opening the doors to a flood of migrants from Syria in 2015, Chancellor Angela Merkel suffered a blow to her popularity and was eventually forced to make plans for her exit. But she stuck to her core liberal policies and her fortunes have recovered (Chart 4). She is stepping down in 2021 as the longest-serving chancellor since Helmut Kohl and an influential European stateswoman. The EU member states are more integrated than ever while Germany has taken another step toward improving its international image. The public has rewarded the ruling coalition for its relatively competent handling of the global pandemic (Chart 5). Chart 4Black Swan #2: A Major Terror Attack In Germany Black Swan #2: A Major Terror Attack In Germany Black Swan #2: A Major Terror Attack In Germany Chart 5German People Happy With Their Government Five Black Swans For 2021 Five Black Swans For 2021 Merkel’s approval coincides with a recovery of the liberal democratic consensus in Europe after a series of challenges from anti-establishment and populist parties. Only in Italy did populists take power, and they were forced to back down from their extravagant fiscal policy demands while modifying their policy platform with regard to membership in the monetary union. Even today, as Italy’s ruling coalition comes apart at the seams, the risk of a populist backlash is lower than it was in most of the past decade. One of the main ways the European establishment neutralized the populist challenge was by tightening control over immigration and cracking down on terrorism (Charts 6 and 7). These two forces have played a large role in generating support for right wing parties, and these parties have declined in popularity as these two forces have abated. Chart 6Terrorist Attacks Have Fallen In Europe Terrorist Attacks Have Fallen In Europe Terrorist Attacks Have Fallen In Europe Chart 7Europeans Softening Toward Immigrants? Europeans Softening Toward Immigrants? Europeans Softening Toward Immigrants? Still, the risk posed by terrorist groups has not disappeared – and it is always possible that disaffected individuals could evade detection. French President Emmanuel Macron faced seven terrorist attacks over the past year, which partly stemmed over the commemoration of the Charlie Hebdo massacre but also points to the persistence of underground extremist networks (Chart 8).3 Chart 8French Fear Of Terrorism Has Increased Five Black Swans For 2021 Five Black Swans For 2021 Chart 9European Breakup Risk At Testing Point European Breakup Risk At Testing Point European Breakup Risk At Testing Point What would happen if a major attack occurred in Germany in 2021? Would it upset the country’s liberal consensus and fuel another surge in popular support for far-right parties like the Alternative for Germany? Only a major attack would have a lasting impact. A systemically important attack in the pivotal year of Merkel’s retirement could create more uncertainty in domestic German politics than has been seen since the 1990s and early 2000s. It is possible that an attack could strengthen the ruling coalition and the public’s desire to continue with the leadership of the Christian Democrats after Merkel. More likely, however, it would divide the conservative and right-wing parties among themselves. Merkel’s chosen successor, Defense Minister Annagret Kramp-Karrenbauer, was forced to abandon her bid for the chancellorship last year after members of her Christian Democratic Union in the state of Thuringia voted along with the anti-establishment Alternative for Germany to remove the state’s left-wing leader. The cooperation was minimal but it set off a firestorm by suggesting that Kramp-Karrenbauer was willing to work together with the far right.4 She bowed out and now the party is about to pick a new leader. The point is that if any event strengthens the far right, it would suck away votes from the Christian Democrats. The latter could also see divisions emerge with their Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union, which has differed on immigration in the past. Or the conservatives could alienate the median German voter by tacking too far to the right to preempt the anti-establishment vote (e.g. overreacting to the attack). Either way, German politics would be rocked. Ironically, if the coalition was seen as mishandling the response, a left-wing coalition of the Greens and the Social Democrats could be the beneficiaries. The risk of a government change – in the wake of Merkel and the pandemic – is greatly underrated, entirely aside from black swans. Nevertheless a major shock that strengthens the far right would be a black swan by forcing the question of whether the center-right is willing to cooperate with its fringe. If that occurred, then Europe would be stunned. If it did not, then the conservatives could lose the election and plunge into intra-party turmoil. The takeaway of a rightward shift on the back of any shock would be a renewed risk of fiscal hawkishness – a partial relapse from the past two years’ fiscal expansion to the more traditionally austere German posture. The takeaway of a leftward shift would be the opposite – a doubling down on that fiscal expansion. German hawkishness would increase the European breakup risk premium, while a confirmation of the new German dovishness would further suppress it (Chart 9). Bottom Line: The fiscal dovish turn is the more likely response to such a black swan in today’s climate, but a major terrorist attack could have unpredictable consequences. Black Swan #3: A US-China Deal On North Korea Critics misunderstood President Trump’s policy on North Korea. Trump’s policy – even his belligerent rhetoric – echoed that of Bill Clinton in the 1990s. The intention of the US show of force was to create an overwhelming threat that would force Pyongyang into serious negotiations toward a nuclear deal. That in turn would pave the way to economic cooperation. Trump’s efforts failed – Kim Jong Un stonewalled him in the final year and a half. Kim’s bet paid off since he avoided making major concessions and now Biden must start from scratch. Pyongyang has ramped up its threats and Kim has elevated his sister, Kim Yo Jong, to a higher standing in the party – apparently to lob attacks at South Korea full-time. Biden will put the technocrats and Korea experts in charge. Pyongyang may test nuclear weapons or launch intercontinental ballistic missiles to attract Biden’s attention. But Kim could also go straight to negotiations. Optimistically, a few years of talks could result in a phased reduction of sanctions in exchange for nuclear inspections. Kim has the incentive and the dictatorial powers to open up the economy and engage in market reforms while managing any backlash among the army. He has already prepared the ground by elevating economic policy to the level of military policy in the national program. For years he has allowed some market activity to little effect. The North must have suffered from the pandemic, as Kim publicly confessed to the failure of economic management at the latest party meeting. His country needs a vaccine for COVID. And if he intends to go the way of Vietnam, then he needs to open up the doors while a new global business cycle is beginning (Chart 10). The black swan would emerge if the Biden administration’s attempt to reboot relations with China produced a unified effort to force a resolution onto Kim. It is undeniable that Trump broke diplomatic ice by meeting with Kim directly, giving Biden the option of doing so quickly and with minimal controversy if he should so desire. Most importantly, China has enforced sanctions, if official statistics can be trusted (Chart 11). Beijing made no secret that it saw North Korea as an area of compromise to appease US anger. After all, success on the peninsula would remove the reason for the US to keep troops there. Chart 10Black Swan #3: A US-China Deal On North Korea Five Black Swans For 2021 Five Black Swans For 2021 Chart 11An Area Of US-China Cooperation Under Biden? An Area Of US-China Cooperation Under Biden? An Area Of US-China Cooperation Under Biden? The last point is the material point. If the North sought to open up, it would likely have to do so through talks with the US, China, South Korea, and Japan. Success would mean that US-China engagement is still effective. Bottom Line: A breakthrough on the Korean peninsula would mean that investors could begin imagining a future in which the US and China are not “destined for war” but rather capable of reviving their old cooperative approach. This has far-reaching positive implications, but most concretely the Korean won and Chinese renminbi would rally against the US dollar and Japanese yen on the historic reduction of war risk. Black Swan #4: Saudi Arabia (And Oil Prices) Collapse Saudi Arabia is an even greater loser from the US election than Russia. The Saudis came face to face with their geopolitical nightmare of US abandonment under the Obama administration, as the US gained energy independence while reaching out to Iran. The 2015 nuclear deal gave Iran a strategic boost and enabled it to resume pumping oil (Chart 12). The Saudis, like the Israelis, lobbied hard to stop the deal but failed. They threw their full support behind President Trump, who reciprocated, and now face the restoration of the Obama policy under Joe Biden. Chart 12Black Swan #4: Saudi Arabia (And Oil Prices) Collapse Black Swan #4: Saudi Arabia (And Oil Prices) Collapse Black Swan #4: Saudi Arabia (And Oil Prices) Collapse Chart 13Fiscal Pressure On Saudis Fiscal Pressure On Saudis Fiscal Pressure On Saudis Global investors should expect Biden to return to the nuclear deal with Iran as quickly as possible, notwithstanding Iran’s latest nuclear provocations, since the latter are designed to increase negotiating leverage. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was an executive agreement that Biden could restore with the flick of his wrist, as long as Iranian President Hassan Rouhani returned to compliance. Rouhani can do so before a new president is inaugurated in August – he could secure his legacy at the cost of taking the blame for “dealing with the devil.” This would save the regime from further economic and social instability as it prepares for the all-important succession of the supreme leader in the coming years. A black swan would occur if this diplomatic situation led to a breakdown in support for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS). MBS, whose nickname is “reckless,” in part because his foreign policies have backfired, could attempt to derail or sabotage the US-Iran détente. If he tried and failed, the US could effectively abandon Saudi Arabia – energy self-sufficiency, public war-weariness, and Iranian détente would pave the way for the US to downgrade its commitment. This would create an existential risk for the kingdom, which depends on the US for national security. It could also be the final straw for MBS, who already faces opposition from elites who have been shoved aside and do not wish to see him ascend the throne in a few years’ time. A different trigger for the same black swan would be a collapse of the OPEC 2.0 oil cartel. The Saudis and Russians have fought two market-share wars over the past seven years. They could relapse into conflict in the face of shifting global dynamics, such as the green energy revolution, that disfavor oil. Arthur Budaghyan and Andrija Vesic, of BCA’s Emerging Markets Strategy, have argued that financial markets will start pricing in a higher probability of Saudi currency depreciation versus the US dollar in coming years. Lower-for-longer oil prices (say $40 per barrel average over next few years) would pose a dilemma to the authorities: either (1) cut fiscal spending further and tighten liquidity or (2) resort to local banks financing (money creation “out of thin air”) to sustain economic activity. The first scenario would impose severe fiscal austerity on the population (Chart 13), which is politically difficult to endure in the long run. The second scenario will lead to depleting the country’s FX reserves, robust money growth and some inflation culminating in downward pressure on the currency. The main reason for believing the devaluation will not happen is that it would topple the regime. Currency devaluation would result in unbearable inflation in a country that lacks domestic production and domestically sourced staples. But that is precisely why it is a black swan risk. After all, prolonged fiscal austerity may not be feasible either. Bottom Line: MBS controls the security forces and has consolidated power for years but that may not save him if his foreign policies led to American abandonment or a breakdown of the peg. Black Swan #5: A Sino-Japanese Crisis For the first time since 2016, we are not including US-China tensions over Taiwan in our list of black swans. A crisis in the strait is only a matter of time and the global news media is increasingly aware of it (Chart 14). It would not necessarily have to be a war or even a show of military force, though either are possible. A mere Chinese boycott or embargo of Taiwan would violate the US’s Taiwan Relations Act and trigger a US-China crisis from the get-go of the Biden administration. What is less widely recognized is that peaceful resolution of the China-Taiwan predicament is not just a concern for the United States. It is a concern for Japan and South Korea as well – whose vital supplies must travel around the island one way or another. These two nations would face constriction if mainland China reunified Taiwan by force – and therefore Beijing’s signals of increasing willingness to contemplate armed action are already reverberating among the neighbors. Japan sounded an uncharacteristically stark warning just last month. The hawkish statement from State Minister of Defense Yasuhide Nakayama is worth quoting at length: We are concerned China will expand its aggressive stance into areas other than Hong Kong. I think one of the next targets, or what everyone is worried about, is Taiwan … There’s a red line in Asia – China and Taiwan. How will Joe Biden in the White House react in any case if China crosses this red line? The United States is the leader of the democratic countries. I have a strong feeling to say: America, be strong!5 China and Japan have improved trade relations through the RCEP agreement, as Beijing looks to diversify from the United States. But China’s rise is of enormous strategic concern for Japanese policymakers. COVID-19 and the rollback of Hong Kong’s freedoms have made matters worse. The belt of sea and land around China – the “first island chain” – is the critical area from which Beijing seeks to expel American and foreign military presence. With China already having shown a willingness to clash with India and Australia simultaneously in 2020 – as it carves a sphere of influence in the absence of American pushback – it should be no surprise to see conflicts erupt in the East or South China Sea (Chart 15). Chart 14Differences In The Taiwan Strait Differences In The Taiwan Strait Differences In The Taiwan Strait Chart 15Black Swan #5: A Sino-Japanese Crisis Black Swan #5: A Sino-Japanese Crisis Black Swan #5: A Sino-Japanese Crisis In the aftermath of the last global crisis, in 2010, China and Japan clashed mightily over maritime-territorial disputes in the East China Sea. China imposed a brief embargo on exports of rare earth elements to Japan. The two clashed again the following year and tensions escalated dramatically when China rolled out an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in 2013. Tense periods come and go and are often attended by mass anti-Japanese protests, as in 2005 and 2012. Usually these events are of passing importance, though they have the potential to escalate. What would truly be a black swan would be if Japan took the initiative to challenge China and test the Biden administration’s commitment to Japanese security. With the US internally divided and distracted, and China ascendant, Japan could grow increasingly insecure and seek to take precautions. China could see these as offensive. A new Sino-Japanese crisis could ensue that would catch investors by surprise. It is highly unlikely that Tokyo would provoke China – hence the black swan designation – but the effective absence of the Americans is a strategic liability that Tokyo may wish to resolve sooner rather than later. In this case the market reaction would be predictable – the yen would appreciate while the renminbi and Taiwanese dollar would fall. The risk-off period could be extended if the US failed to reinforce the Japanese alliance for fear of China, with the whole world watching. Bottom Line: Global investors would be blindsided if a sudden explosion of Sino-Japanese tensions prevented any US-China thaw and confirmed their worst fears about China’s economic decoupling from the West. Investment Takeaways This exercise in identifying black swans may be useful in at least one way: it exposes the vulnerability of financial markets to a sudden reversal of the US dollar’s weakening trend (Chart 16). The dollar would surge on broad Russian instability, Sino-Japanese conflict, or another exogenous geopolitical shock. This kind of dollar surprise would be much greater than a temporary counter-trend bounce, which our Foreign Exchange Strategist Chester Ntonifor fully expects. It would upset the financial community’s dollar-bearish consensus, with far-reaching ramifications for the global economy and financial markets. A rising dollar against the backdrop of a recovering global economy represents a de facto tightening of global financial conditions. Equity markets, for example, have only started to rotate away from the US and this trend would be reversed (Chart 17). Whereas further appreciation of the euro and the renminbi is not only expected but would support global reflation. Chart 16The USD Over Trump's Four Years The USD Over Trump's Four Years The USD Over Trump's Four Years Chart 17Global Market Cap Over Trump's Four Years Global Market Cap Over Trump's Four Years Global Market Cap Over Trump's Four Years There is a much plainer and straighter way to an upset of the dollar-bearish consensus. Rather than a black swan it is a “gray rhino,” the term that Michele Wucker uses for risks that are common, expected, and staring you right in the face.6 This would be the peak of China’s stimulus, which holds out the risk of a major reversal to the pro-cyclical global financial market rally in late 2021 (Chart 18). Chart 18China Impulse Will Linger In 2021, But EM Stocks Tactically Stretched China Impulse Will Linger In 2021, But EM Stocks Tactically Stretched China Impulse Will Linger In 2021, But EM Stocks Tactically Stretched It would be a colossal error if Beijing over-tightened monetary and fiscal policy in 2021 in the context of high debt, deflation, and unemployment (Chart 19). Chart 19Three Reasons China Will Avoid Over-Tightening (If It Can) Three Reasons China Will Avoid Over-Tightening (If It Can) Three Reasons China Will Avoid Over-Tightening (If It Can) Nevertheless the government’s renewed efforts to contain asset bubbles and credit excesses clearly increase the risk. Financial policy tightening is always a risky endeavor, as global policymakers routinely discover. Chart 20Book Profits But Stay Cyclically Positive On Reflation Trades Book Profits But Stay Cyclically Positive On Reflation Trades Book Profits But Stay Cyclically Positive On Reflation Trades We maintain that China’s major stimulus will have a lingering positive effects for the economy for most of this year and that the authorities will relax policy and regulation as needed to secure the recovery. The Central Economic Work Conference in December suggested that the Politburo still views downside economic risks as the most important. But this is a clear and present risk that will have to be monitored closely. Clearly the global reflation trend has extended to dangerous technical extremes over the past month on the realization that US fiscal stimulus will surprise to the upside. Therefore we are doing some housekeeping. We will book 31.1% profit on long cyber security, 16.7% on long US infrastructure, and 24.3% on long US materials. We will also book 9.5% gains on our long EM-ex-China equity trade, which has gone vertical (Chart 20).     Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Such epidemiologists include Michael Osterholm and Lawrence Brilliant. For Pinker and Rees, see George Eaton, "Steven Pinker interview: How does a liberal optimist handle a pandemic?" The New Statesman, July 22, 2020, newstatesman.com. 2 Thomas Grove, "New Russian Security Force Will Answer To Vladimir Putin," Wall Street Journal, April 24, 2016, wsj.com. 3 Elaine Ganley, "Grisly beheading of teacher in terror attack rattles France," Associated Press, October 16, 2020, apnews.com. 4 Philip Oltermann, "German politician elected with help from far right to step down," The Guardian, February 6, 2020, theguardian.com. 5 Ju-min Park, "Japan official, calling Taiwan ‘red line,’ urges Biden to ‘be strong,’" Reuters, December 25, 2020, reuters.com. 6 See www.wucker.com.

Highlights The tech sector faces mounting domestic political and geopolitical risks. We fully expected stimulus hiccups but believe they will give way to large new fiscal support, given that COVID-19 is weighing on consumer confidence. Europe’s relative political stability is a good basis for the euro rally but any comeback in opinion polling by President Trump could give dollar bulls new life. DXY is approaching a critical threshold below which it would break down further. The US could take aggressive actions on Russia and Iran, but China and the Taiwan Strait remain the biggest geopolitical risk. Feature Near-term risks continue to mount against the equity rally, even as governments’ combined monetary and fiscal policies continue to support a cyclical economic rebound. Chart 1Tech Bubble Amid Tech War Tech Bubble Amid Tech War Tech Bubble Amid Tech War Testimony by the chief executives of Facebook, Apple, Amazon, and Alphabet to the US House of Representatives highlighted the major political risks facing the market leaders. There are three reasons not to dismiss these risks despite the theatrical nature of the hearings. First, the tech companies’ concentration of wealth would be conspicuous during any economic bust, but this bust has left pandemic-stricken consumers more reliant on their services. Second, acrimony is bipartisan – conservatives are enraged by the tendency of the tech companies to side with the Democratic Party in policing the range of acceptable political discourse, and they increasingly agree with liberals that the companies have excessive corporate power warranting anti-trust probes. Executive action is the immediate risk, but in the coming one-to-two years congressional majorities will also be mustered to tighten regulation. Third, technology is the root of the great power struggle between the US and China – a struggle that will not go away if Biden wins the election. Indeed Biden was part of the administration that launched the US’s “Pivot to Asia” and will have better success in galvanizing US diplomatic allies behind western alternatives to Chinese state-backed and military-linked tech companies. US tech companies struggle to outperform Chinese tech companies except during episodes of US tariffs, given the latter firms’ state-backed turn toward innovation and privileged capture of the Chinese domestic market (Chart 1). The US government cannot afford to break up these companies without weighing the strategic consequences for America’s international competitiveness. The attempt to coordinate a western pressure campaign against Huawei and other leading Chinese firms will continue over the long run as they are accused of stealing technology, circumventing UN sanctions, violating human rights, and compromising the national security of the democracies. China, for its part, will be forced to take counter-measures. US tech companies will be caught in the middle. Like the threat of executive regulation in the domestic sphere, the threat of state action in the international sphere is difficult to time. It could happen immediately, especially given that the US is having some success in galvanizing an alliance even under President Trump (see the UK decision to bar Huawei) and that President Trump’s falling election prospects remove the chief constraint on tough action against China (the administration will likely revoke Huawei’s general license on August 13 or closer to the election). Massive domestic economic stimulus empowers the US to impose a technological cordon and China to retaliate. Combining this headline risk to the tech sector with other indications that the equity rally is extended – the surge in gold prices, the fall in the 30-year/5-year Treasury slope – tells us that investors should be cautious about deploying fresh capital in the near term. Republicans Will Capitulate To New Stimulus Just as President Trump has ignored bad news on the coronavirus, financial markets have ignored bad news on the economy. Dismal Q2 GDP releases were fully expected – Germany shrank by 10.1% while the US shrank by 9.5% on a quarterly basis, 32.9% annualized. But the resurgence of the virus is threatening new government restrictions on economic activity. US initial unemployment claims have edged up over the past three weeks. US consumer confidence regarding future expectations plummeted from 106.1 in June to 91.5 in July, according to the Conference Board’s index. Chart 2Global Instability Will Follow Recession A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) Setbacks in combating the virus will hurt consumers even assuming that governments lack the political will to enforce new lockdowns. The share of countries in recession has surged to levels not seen in 60 years (Chart 2). Financial markets can look past recessions, but the pandemic-driven recession will result in negative surprises and second-order effects that are unforeseen. Yes, fresh fiscal stimulus is coming, but this is more positive for the cyclical outlook than the tactical outlook. Stimulus “hiccups” could precipitate a near-term pullback – such a pullback may be necessary to force politicians to resolve disputes over the size and composition of new stimulus. This risk is immediate in the United States, where House Democrats, Senate Republicans, and the White House have hit an all-too-predictable impasse over the fifth round of stimulus. The bill under negotiation is likely to be President Trump’s last chance to score a legislative victory before the election and the last significant legislative economic relief until early 2021. The Senate Republicans have proposed a $1.1 trillion HEALS Act in response to the House Democrats’ $3.4 trillion HEROES Act, passed in mid-May. As we go to press, the federal unemployment insurance top-up of $600 per week is expiring, with a potential cost of 3% of GDP in fiscal tightening, as well as the moratorium on home evictions. Congress will have to rush through a stop-gap measure to extend these benefits if it cannot resolve the debate on the larger stimulus package. If Democrats and Republicans split the difference then we will get $2.5 trillion in stimulus, likely by August 10. Compromise on the larger package is easy in principle, as Table 1 shows. If the two sides split the difference between their proposals in a commonsense way, as shown in the fourth and fifth columns of Table 1, then the result will be a $2.5 trillion stimulus. This estimate fits with what we have published in the past and likely meets market expectations for the time being. Table 1Outline Of Fifth US COVID Stimulus Package (Estimate) A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) Whether it is enough for the economy depends on how the virus develops and how governments respond once flu season picks up and combines with the coronavirus to pressure the health system this fall. A back-of-the-envelope estimate of the amount of spending necessary to keep the budget deficit from shrinking in the second half of the year comes much closer to the House Democrats’ $3.4 trillion bill (Table 2), which suggests that what appears to be a massive stimulus today could appear insufficient tomorrow. Nevertheless, $2.5 trillion is not exactly small. It would bring the US total to $5 trillion year-to-date, or 24% of GDP! Table 2Reducing The Budget Deficit On A Quarterly Basis Will Slow Economy A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) While a compromise bill should come quickly, the Republican Party is more divided over this round of stimulus than earlier this year. Chart 3US Personal Income Looks Good Compared To 2008-09 US Personal Income Looks Good Compared To 2008-09 US Personal Income Looks Good Compared To 2008-09 First, there is some complacency due to the fact that the economy is recovering, not collapsing as was the case back in March. Our US bond strategist, Ryan Swift, has shown that US personal income is much better off, thus far, than it was in the months following the 2008 financial crisis, even though the initial pre-transfer hit to incomes is larger (Chart 3). Second, the Republican Party is reacting to growing unease within its ranks over the yawning budget deficit, now the largest since World War II (Chart 4). Chart 4If Republicans React To Deficit Concerns They Cook Their Own Goose If Republicans React To Deficit Concerns They Cook Their Own Goose If Republicans React To Deficit Concerns They Cook Their Own Goose Chart 5Consumer Confidence Sends Warning Signal To Republicans A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) If Republicans are guided by complacency and fiscal hawks, they will cook their own goose. A failure to provide government support will cause a financial market selloff, will hurt consumer confidence, and will put the final nail in the coffin of their own chance of re-election as well as President Trump’s. Consumer confidence tracks fairly well with presidential approval rating and election outcomes. A further dip could disqualify Trump, whereas a last-minute boost due to stimulus and an economic surge could line him up for a comeback in the last lap (Chart 5). These constraints are obvious so we maintain our high conviction call that a bill will be passed, likely by August 10. But at these levels on the equity market, we simply have no confidence in the market gyrations leading up to or following the passage of the bill. Our conviction level is on the cyclical, 12-month horizon, in which case we expect US and global stimulus to operate and equities to rise. Bottom Line: Political and economic constraints will force Republicans to join Democrats and pass a new stimulus bill of about $2.5 trillion by around August 10. This is cyclically positive, but hiccups in getting it passed, negative surprises, and other risks tied to US politics discourage us from taking an overtly bullish stance over the next three months. Yes, US-China Tensions Are Still Relevant Chart 6Chinese Politburo"s Bark Worse Than Bite On Stimulus Chinese Politburo"s Bark Worse Than Bite On Stimulus Chinese Politburo"s Bark Worse Than Bite On Stimulus Financial markets have shrugged off US-China tensions this year for understandable reasons. The pandemic, recession, and stimulus have overweighed the ongoing US-China conflict. As we have argued, China is undertaking a sweeping fiscal and quasi-fiscal stimulus – despite lingering hawkish rhetoric – and the size is sufficient to assist in global economic recovery as well as domestic Chinese recovery. What the financial market overlooks is that China’s households and firms are still reluctant to spend (Chart 6). China’s Politburo's late July meetings on the economy are frequently important. Initial reports of this year’s meet-up reinforce the stimulus narrative. Hints of hawkishness here and there serve a political purpose in curbing market exuberance, both at home and in the US election context, but China will ultimately remain accommodative because it has already bumped up against its chief constraint of domestic stability. Note that this assessment also leaves space for market jitters in the near-term. The phase one trade deal remains intact as President Trump is counting on it to make the case for re-election while China is looking to avoid antagonizing a loose cannon president who still has a chance of re-election. As long as broad-based tariff rates do not rise, in keeping with Trump’s deal, financial markets can ignore the small fry. We maintain a 40% risk that Trump levels sweeping punitive measures; our base case is that he goes to the election arguing that he gets results through his deal-making while carrying a big stick. At the same time, our view that domestic stimulus removes the economic constraints on conflict, enabling the two countries to escalate tensions, has been vindicated in recent weeks. Chinese political risk continues on a general uptrend, based on market indicators. The market is also starting to price in the immense geopolitical risks embedded in Taiwan’s situation, which we have highlighted consistently since 2016. While North Korea remains on a diplomatic track, refraining from major military provocations, South Korean political risk is still elevated both for domestic and regional reasons (Chart 7). Chart 7China Political Risk Still Trending Upward China Political Risk Still Trending Upward China Political Risk Still Trending Upward The market is gradually pricing in a higher risk premium in the renminbi, Taiwanese dollar, and Korean won, and this pricing accords with our longstanding political assessment. The closure of the US and Chinese consulates in Houston and Chengdu is only the latest example of this escalating dynamic. While the US’s initial sanctions on China over Hong Kong were limited in economic impact, the longer term negative consequences continue to build. Hong Kong was the symbol of the Chinese Communist Party’s compatibility with western liberalism; the removal of Hong Kong’s autonomy strikes a permanent blow against this compatibility. China’s decision to go forward with the imposition of a national security law in Hong Kong – and now to bar pro-democratic candidates from the September 6 Legislative Council elections, which will probably be postponed anyway – has accelerated coalition-building among the western democracies. The UK is now clashing with China more openly, especially after blocking Huawei from its 5G system and welcoming Hong Kong political refugees. Australia and China have fought a miniature trade war of their own over China’s lack of transparency regarding COVID-19, and Canada is implicated in the Huawei affair. Even the EU has taken a more “realist” approach to China. Across the Taiwan Strait, political leaders are assisting fleeing Hong Kongers, crying out against Beijing’s expansion of control in its periphery, rallying support from informal allies in the US and West, and doubling down on their “Silicon Shield” (prowess in semiconductor production) as a source of protection. Intel Corporation’s decision to increase its dependency on TSMC for advanced microchips only heightens the centrality of this island and this company in the power struggle between the US and China. China cannot fulfill its global ambitions if the US succeeds in creating a technological cordon. Taiwan is the key to China’s breaking through that cordon. Therefore Taiwan is at heightened risk of economic or even military conflict. The base case is that Beijing will impose economic sanctions first, to undermine Taiwanese leadership. The uncertainty over the US’s willingness to defend Taiwan is still elevated, even if the US is gradually signaling a higher level of commitment. This uncertainty makes strategic miscalculations more likely than otherwise. But Taiwan’s extreme economic dependence on the mainland gives Beijing a lever to pursue its interests and at present that is the most important factor in keeping war risk contained. By the same token, Taiwanese economic and political diversification increases that risk. A “fourth Taiwan Strait crisis” that involves trade war and sanctions is our base case, but war cannot be ruled out, and any war would be a major war. Thus investors can safely ignore Tik-Tok, Hong Kong LegCo elections, and accusations of human rights violations in Xinjiang. But they cannot ignore concrete deterioration in the Taiwan Strait. Or, for that matter, the South and East China Seas, which are not about fishing and offshore drilling but about China’s strategic depth and positioning around Taiwan. Taiwan is at heightened risk of economic or military conflict. The latest developments have seen the CNY-USD exchange rate roll over after a period of appreciation associated with bilateral deal-keeping (Chart 8). Depreciation makes it more likely that President Trump will take punitive actions, but these will still be consistent with maintaining the phase one deal unless his re-election bid completely collapses, rendering him a lame duck and removing his constraints on more economically significant confrontation. We are perilously close to such an outcome, which is why Trump’s approval rating and head-to-head polling against Joe Biden must be monitored closely. If his budding rebound is dashed, then all bets are off with regard to China and Asian power politics. Chart 8A Warning Of Further US-China Escalation A Warning Of Further US-China Escalation A Warning Of Further US-China Escalation Bottom Line: China’s stimulus, like the US stimulus, is a reason for cyclical optimism regarding risk assets. The phase one trade deal with President Trump is less certain – there is a 40% chance it collapses as stimulus and/or Trump’s political woes remove constraints on conflict. Hong Kong is a red herring except with regard to coalition-building between the US and Europe; the Taiwan Strait is the real geopolitical risk. Maritime conflicts relate to Taiwan and are also market-relevant. Europe, Russia, And Oil Risks Europe has proved a geopolitical opportunity rather than a risk, as we have contended. The passage of joint debt issuance in keeping with the seven-year budget reinforces the point. The Dutch, facing an election early next year, held up the negotiations, but ultimately relented as expected. Emmanuel Macron, who convinced German Chancellor Angela Merkel to embrace this major compromise for European solidarity, is seeing his support bounce in opinion polls at home. He is being rewarded for taking a leadership position in favor of European integration as well as for overseeing a domestic economic rebound. His setback in local elections is overstated as a political risk given that the parties that benefited do not pose a risk to European integration, and will ally with him in 2022 against any populist or anti-establishment challenger. We still refrain from reinitiating our long EUR-USD trade, however, given the immediate risks from the US election cycle (Chart 9). We will reevaluate if Trump’s odds of victory fall further. A Biden victory is very favorable for the euro in our view. Chart 9EUR-USD Gets Boost From EU Solidarity EUR-USD Gets Boost From EU Solidarity EUR-USD Gets Boost From EU Solidarity We are bullish on pound sterling because even a delay or otherwise sub-optimal outcome to trade talks is mostly priced in at current levels (Charts 10A and 10B). Prime Minister Boris Johnson has the raw ability to walk away without a deal, in the context of strong domestic stimulus, but the long-term economic consequences could condemn him to a single term in office. Compromise is better and in both parties’ interests. Chart 10APound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Pound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Pound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Chart 10BPound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Pound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Pound Sterling A Buy Over Long Run Two other risks are worth a mention in this month’s GeoRisk Update: Chart 11Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russian Bonds May Face Sanctions Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russian Bonds May Face Sanctions Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russian Bonds May Face Sanctions Russia: In recent reports we have maintained that Russian geopolitical risk is understated by markets. Domestic unrest is rising, the Trump administration could impose penalties over Nordstream 2 or other issues to head off criticism on the campaign trail, and a Biden administration would be outright confrontational toward Putin’s regime. Moscow may intervene in the US elections or conduct larger cyber attacks. US sanctions could ultimately target trading of local currency Russian government bonds, which so far have been spared (Chart 11). Iran: The jury is still out on whether the recent series of mysterious explosions affecting critical infrastructure in Iran are evidence of a clandestine campaign of sabotage (Table 3). The nature of the incidents leaves some room for accident and coincidence.1 But the inclusion of military and nuclear sites in the list leads us to believe that some degree of “wag the dog” is going on. The prime suspect would be Israel and/or the United States during the window of opportunity afforded by the Trump administration, which looks to be closing over the next six months. Trump likely has a high tolerance for conflict with Iran ahead of the election. Even though Americans are war-weary, they will rally to the president’s defense if Iran is seen as the instigator, as opinion polls showed they did in September 2019 and January of this year. Iran is avoiding goading Trump so far but if it suffers too great of damage from sabotage then it may be forced to react. The dynamic is unstable and hence an oil price spike cannot be ruled out. Table 3Wag The Dog Scenario Playing Out In Iran A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) A Tech Bubble Amid A Tech War (GeoRisk Update) Chart 12Oil Supply Risks Stem From Iran/Iraq, But COVID Threat To Demand Persists Oil Supply Risks Stem From Iran/Iraq, But COVID Threat To Demand Persists Oil Supply Risks Stem From Iran/Iraq, But COVID Threat To Demand Persists Oil markets have the capacity and the large inventories necessary to absorb supply disruptions caused by a single Iranian incident (Chart 12). Only a chain reaction or major conflict would add to upward pressure. This would also require global demand to stay firm. The threat from COVID-19 suggests that volatility is the only thing one can count on in the near-term. Over the long run we remain bullish crude oil due to the unfettered commitment by world governments to reflation. Bottom Line: The euro rally is fundamentally supported but faces exogenous risks in the short run. We would steer clear of Russian currency and local currency bonds over the US election campaign and aftermath, particularly if Trump’s polling upturn becomes a dead cat bounce. Iran is a “gray swan” geopolitical risk, hiding in plain sight, but its impact on oil markets will be limited unless a major war occurs. Investment Implications The US dollar is at a critical juncture. Our Foreign Exchange Strategist Chester Ntonifor argues that if the DXY index breaks beneath the 93-94 then the greenback has entered a structural bear market. The most recent close was 93.45 and it has hovered below 94 since Monday. Failure to pass US stimulus quickly could result in a dollar bounce along with other safe havens. Over the short run, investors should be prepared for this and other negative surprises relating to the US election and significant geopolitical risks, especially involving China, the tech war, and the Taiwan Strait. Over the long run, investors should position for more fiscal support to combine with ultra-easy monetary policy for as far as the eye can see. The Federal Reserve is not even “thinking about thinking about raising rates.” This combination ultimately entails rising commodity prices, a weakening dollar, and international equity outperformance relative to both US equities and government bonds.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 See Raz Zimmt, "When it comes to Iran, not everything that goes boom in the night is sabotage," Atlantic Council, July 30, 2020. Section II: Appendix : GeoRisk Indicator China China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator Russia Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator UK UK: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Germany Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Canada Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Spain Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Korea Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Dear Clients, This week we offer you a Special Report on Russia and cyber security by our colleague and friend, Elmo Wright. Elmo recently retired from US Army civil service after 43 years working in intelligence, either on active duty, reserves, or as a civilian. From 2018 to 2020, he served as the senior civilian executive at the US Army National Ground Intelligence Center. He has served on five continents and provided analysis of the most pressing global trends in national security and intelligence. In this Special Report with BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy team, Elmo analyzes Russia’s cyber capabilities and argues that structural and cyclical factors, including COVID-19, will ensure the continued salience of Russian and global cyber security challenges in the coming years. His thesis reinforces our recommendation that investors buy cyber security equities. Elmo’s work for this report is in his personal capacity and does not represent any position of the US government. Only publicly available information was used as background research material for Elmo’s contribution to the report. All very best, Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Highlights As the US elections come closer, there will be a return to news about Russia and its potential interference via social media. Russia will continue to use cyber, both state sponsored attacks, and in coordination with criminal groups, to advance Russian national security objectives. In contrast to nuclear doctrine, there is no commonly accepted framework for cyber warfare between Russia and other nations that provides understandable signals for escalation, de-escalation, appropriate targets, or goals. US efforts to conduct military operations against Russia or China would likely be countered by Russian or Chinese cyber operations before any physical military operations could be initiated. Cyber security stocks offer a way for investors to capitalize on our long-term themes of nationalism, multipolarity, and de-globalization. The ISE Cyber Security Index offers value relative to the broad NASDAQ and S&P 500 indexes as well as the S&P tech sector. Feature   As the national elections in the US come closer, there will be a return to news about Russia and its potential interference via social media. Indeed Russia is making headlines even as we go to press. This report aims to provide context for Russian cyber capabilities in general as a contributor to overall geopolitical instability (Chart 1). We forecast Russia will continue to use cyber, both state sponsored attacks, and in coordination with criminal groups, to advance Russian national security objectives. Chart 1Russian Cyber Interference Resurfaces Around US Elections Russian Cyber Interference Resurfaces Around US Elections Russian Cyber Interference Resurfaces Around US Elections As background, the word cyber is commonly accepted to be derived from cybernetics, a phrase attributed to Norbert Wiener, an MIT scientist. The phrase itself is related to the ancient Greek word for steering or helmsman, in other words, control. Chart 2Russian Excellence In Math Makes It Competitive In Cybernetics Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Russia has a long history of excellence in science, especially theoretical work in mathematics and physics (Chart 2). Those fields can explain natural phenomena in formulas and mathematical relationships. The Soviets believed that centralized state planning that manipulated data in formulas could lead to better outcomes in all aspects of the society. Although central state economic planning did not work out for the Soviet economy, Soviet military science built on the concept of data relationships in formulas to develop its theory of troop control, a derivative of reflexive control, that is, the presenting of data to the recipient, either friendly or enemy, in order to get that recipient to act in a way favorable to Soviet military plans. One can see the Soviets embraced the idea of cybernetics as very congruent to their desire for top down control. Russia, as the core part of the Soviet Union, retained significant numbers of scientists and mathematicians who were naturally drawn to the ability of computers to take data and manipulate that data according to formulas. Other Russian scientists and mathematicians emigrated to the West where their expertise was rewarded in the rise in the use of computers to manipulate data. Over time, the term cyber has come to be associated with many aspects of computers, especially the intellectual and physical structures hidden behind the direct interface of a person with a keyboard and screen. Russian expertise in the use of computers to do cyber work was not limited to working for the State. As the Soviet Union broke apart and many people lost their jobs working for the State, there were those persons who took their talents to criminal ventures. And in the symbiotic nature of society in Russia, many of those who went into criminal ventures were former intelligence and security personnel who could maintain their connection to the official organizations that were successors to the KGB, the GRU, and others. Senior Russian military officials, such as General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation armed forces, equivalent to the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have noted the growth of nonmilitary means of achieving strategic goals, and specifically in the information space. Gerasimov, in an article in 2013, has been widely quoted that all elements of national power have to be harnessed, including cyber capabilities. One Soviet and Russian military concept that relates to the information space is maskirovka, the use of camouflage, deception, and disinformation to confuse the enemy. Maskirovka is intimately connected with the Soviet/Russian concept of “active measures”. Active measures include actions taken generally by intelligence services to provide propaganda, false information, and otherwise sow discord and confusion among the enemy ranks at all levels of war as well as in the political, economic, and social spheres. In today’s time period, cyber, especially social media, offers the opportunity for the wide spread of aspects of maskirovka and active measures to all users, as well as targeted groups (Chart 3). Reporting indicates a continued Russian emphasis on cyber as a means for active measures concealed by maskirovka. Chart 3Social Media Offers Russia An Opportunity For The Spread Of Maskirovka Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Wikileaks has provided a platform for the dissemination of information normally hidden from the general public. It is noteworthy how much of the information on the Wikileaks platform relates to the US and the West, and relatively little on Russia. Possible factors that explain that characteristic include the disparity in penalties for disclosing information between the US and the West versus Russia; the greater number of journalists and other persons involved in the media, both for profit and personal reasons, in the West; and the language barriers involved in understanding Russian versus English. A final possible factor in Wikileaks greater dissemination of Western information might be an aspect of active measures undertaken by Russia. Russia is the source of the most sophisticated cyber threats to the US. There are numerous actions attributed to Russian state actors in the cyber field in the recent past (Table 1). They include a distributed denial of service attack on Estonia (2007); hacking the Ministry of Defense in the country of Georgia during a military conflict (2008); attacks on Ukrainian energy infrastructure (2015); and the hacking of the Democratic National Committee (2016). Chancellor Angela Merkel recently publicly named and shamed Russia for a cyber-attack on Germany circa 2015 (Appendix). Table 1Russian State Actors Responsible For Many Of This Year’s Cyber Attacks Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Senior US officials have cited Russia as the source of the most sophisticated cyber threats to the US, both for espionage and state sponsored attacks against US national security capabilities such as energy, transportation, and telecommunications infrastructure; as well as for criminal activity such as ransom ware and identity theft. Russian use of cyber, both state sponsored and sponsoring criminal actors, has been the top threat to the US in each of the US intelligence community’s annual threat assessments for 2017, 2018, and 2019 (Chart 4). Although the 2020 annual threat assessment was not made public in Congressional testimony, there’s little reason to suspect that Russian use of cyber would not continue to be cited as the top threat. Chart 4Russian Use Of Cyber Is A Top Threat To The US Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Other nation states have state sponsored cyber capabilities which are of national security concern to the US, including China, Iran, and North Korea. These nation states are called out in the US intelligence community Annual Threat Assessments. Each of these nation states has been identified as committing intelligence and economic cyber attacks against the US and other Western nations. The recent speech by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation designates China as the top threat. Given the nature of the internet, the pathway of a cyber attack will likely bounce around multiple countries before reaching its intended target. As the Director notes, forensic identification of the source of a cyber attack takes time and expertise. However, there is a clear record of specifically identifying the state sponsored entity that commits attacks on US or Western government information technology and infrastructure. More likely than confusing one state sponsored cyber actor from one country to another would be the potential blending of criminal elements across national boundaries. In this case, cyber criminal elements with Russian backgrounds or connections are clearly the most capable. The stages of cyber conflict include reconnaissance, penetration, mapping, exfiltration, and operations. The US National Security Agency has an extensive technical cyber threat framework which goes into much detail. Cyber security professionals note the ongoing actions in cyber space and the attempts by elements suspected to be linked to Russia to gain and maintain access to US networks for potential military operations, or to exfiltrate data for criminal or other purposes. Part of the frustration of cyber security experts is the lack of transparency and timely reporting of those affected by malign cyber activities. Although some cyber activities may go on for multiple months, the exfiltration of data, or the emplacement of malware may only take a few seconds. Many networks lack the ability to detect penetration and mapping. Companies with large resources devoted to cyber security may have that investment negated if they have affiliations with other companies with lax cyber security which can allow for hostile intrusions into the connected network. Unfortunately, public and open attribution for cyber attacks has lagged. As an example, although the attack on the Democratic National Committee email servers was noted in 2016, it was not until 2018 that specific Russian individuals were charged with the crime. Factors that cause lags in public and open attribution include the difficulty of tracing specific computer code through cyberspace; the disjointed nature of the internet; the lack of an easy and accepted mechanism for involvement of US intelligence agencies in providing assistance to private sector parties; and the reticence of individuals and organizations negatively affected by cyber attacks to publicly disclose their injuries. Chart 5Unlike Nuclear Doctrine, Cyber Lacks A Framework To Control Escalation Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons developed over a period of years in the US and the West and in the Soviet bloc. The Soviets developed a coherent doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons that was understandable to the West. Arms control agreements between nuclear powers established mechanisms for controlling escalation of tensions (Chart 5). The Soviet doctrine was adopted by the Russians after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russia and Western nations continue to have a common understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in military affairs that allows for discussion of escalation and de-escalation. In contrast to nuclear doctrine, there is no commonly accepted framework for cyber warfare between Russia and other nations that provides understandable signals for escalation, de-escalation, appropriate targets, or goals. This is reflected in the Russian information security doctrine of 2016 which notes “The absence of international legal norms regulating inter-State relations in the information space…” The US Director of National Intelligence also noted this lack of agreement in his annual threat assessment testimony of 2017. The rapid growth of the internet, and reliance on it by government and private sectors reflects its founding as an open system, vulnerable to negative actors and actions (Chart 6). The intermingling of hardware and software, the information infrastructure used both by individuals and states, by the private sector and by government, makes separating doctrine and practice for cyberwar from legitimate use very difficult. Since non-cyber military capabilities, both conventional, and nuclear, rely upon the use of commercial information technology infrastructure, the use of offensive cyber is subject to the problem of blowback. As the NotPetya incident of 2018 indicated, damage from malware installed on one computer can rapidly spread across networks, industries, and international boundaries. The code for StuxNet and the code released by the more recent hack of CIA cyber tools have been noted in other cases of cyber attacks. Chart 6Rapid Growth Of Internet Raises Vulnerability To Harmful Actions Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 The view of the international cyber environment by Russia is very similar to views in the US and the West. The Russian national security doctrine of 2015 notes “... An entire spectrum of political, financial-economic, and informational instruments have been set in motion in the struggle for influence in the international arena. Increasingly active use is being made of special services' potential … The intensifying confrontation in the global information arena caused by some countries' aspiration to utilize informational and communication technologies to achieve their geopolitical objectives, including by manipulating public awareness and falsifying history, is exerting an increasing influence on the nature of the international situation.” Although much of the Russian information security doctrine of 2016 is concerned with noting threats to Russia’s information space, what might be called counterintelligence in other documents, there are key comments that note the suitability of using attacks in the information space as an effective means of projecting Russian power, such as “… improving information support activities to implement the State policy of the Russian Federation …” As per usual Soviet and Russian state doctrinal documents, the 2016 doctrine notes all the negative activity of other actors in this field. This practice is consistent with historical Soviet and Russian open press documents which ascribe to other states the activities in which Russia engages or plans to engage. Cyber-crime is rising despite deterrence. Unlike other forms of national security alliances, such as for intelligence, there is little public literature on cyber alliances, especially for offensive action. For example, the US and Israel have never publicly acknowledged a government alliance to emplace the StuxNet virus into the Iranian nuclear development program. Should there be offensive cyber alliances in the West, it is likely they fall along traditional intelligence and defense lines. There is no public reporting on any sort of offensive cyber alliances that involve Russia. There are public efforts at common standards for information technology security, but these efforts are foundering on citizen and government concerns over privacy, as well as commercial proprietary advantage. It is an open question as to whether cyber alliances among friendly nations would deter would-be cyber attackers or hackers. Certainly the growth of complaints to the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center would indicate that statements of deterrence and even prosecutions are failing to reduce cyber attacks (Chart 7). Chart 7Cyber Attacks Are On The Rise Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Both the US national intelligence community and private sector cybersecurity companies agree Russia has a sophisticated state sponsored effort to acquire intelligence via hacking and insert favorable themes into cyberspace via the use of social media. There is also agreement that Russia state elements have a close relationship with criminal elements which can provide a plausibly deniable means of engaging in cyber warfare activities favorable to Russia, as well as engaging in activities for illegal economic advantage. For example, see this quote from the CYBEREASON Intel team: “The crossing of official state sponsored hacking with cybercriminal outfits has created a specter of Russian state hacking that is far larger than their actual program. This hybridization of tools, actors, and missions has created one of the most potent and ill-defined advanced threats that the cybersecurity community faces. It has also created the most technically advanced and bold cybercriminal community in the world. When, as a criminal, your patronage is the internal security service that is charged with tracking and arresting cybercrime, your only concern becomes staying within their defined bounds of acceptable risk and not what global norms, laws, or even domestic Russian law states.” The US Department of Justice in June 2020 noted a Russian national was sentenced to prison for malicious cyber activities. Key points of his illegal activity were the operation of websites open only to Russian speakers, and the vetting or recommendation of other criminals before allowing entry to the websites. One analysis of this situation notes the ties to Russian state security organs and personnel which likely held up the Russian national’s extradition for trial in the US. Government leaders in the US have noted the potential for major cyber attacks in the US affecting physical infrastructure and causing significant economic and social damage, including further attacks on the political election process. However, they have been reticent to state any explicit sort of retaliation. The US Cyber Command notes it is actively combatting hostile cyber actors. Therefore, the question remains open as to what level of cyber attacks would be considered serious enough to be treated as an act of war by the US. There has been public speculation of both Russian and Chinese implants of malware into the US information technology infrastructure that might be activated in the case of open hostilities. US efforts to conduct military operations against Russia or China would likely be countered by Russian or Chinese cyber operations before any physical military operations could be initiated, especially since US based forces would have to transit oceans, taking many days, when cyber operations could happen in seconds. Russian “gray zone” tactics, that is, actions short of large scale conventional war, many of which involve cyber attacks, active measures, and maskirovka, are the subject of much Department of Defense planning and action. To combat such gray zone activity analysis from the RAND Corporation notes the need for a spectrum of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic actions, which would involve commercial partners and allied nations. The difficulty of coordinating such counter action is one reason the Russians continue their gray zone efforts. Russia’s unique characteristics, some of which are weaknesses compared to the US and the West, are indicative of why Russia engages in state sponsored as well as criminal cyber activities (Chart 8). Russian scientific history, the intertwining of state and criminal elements, and continent-spanning location are factors which promote the use of cyber. Russia’s economic position vis-à-vis the US, Russia’s relative lack of military power projection capability beyond the states on its borders (the Near Abroad), except for its nuclear forces, and Russia’s declining demographic situation are negative factors which push Russia to use cyber as a cost effective means of advancing national security and economic policy (Chart 9). Despite US and Western imposed sanctions on Russia for past misdeeds, none of the factors noted above will be changed in the near future. Therefore, those factors, and published Russian doctrine should indicate to Western governments and businesses that Russia will continue to use cyber as a means to advance Russian national security objectives, as well as a means to siphoning off wealth from the West via criminal activities. Chart 8Russia's Relative Weakness Drives Engagement In Cyber Activities Russia's Relative Weakness Drives Engagement In Cyber Activities Russia's Relative Weakness Drives Engagement In Cyber Activities Chart 9Deteriorating Demographics Also Drive Russia’s Cyber Activities Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 US preparedness for Russian cyber activity in the upcoming months should be greater given several factors. First, there is clearly awareness of a Russian cyber threat to US interests across government and in the private sector. Second, the US has established new organizations, shifted resources of money and people, and had practice defending against cyber attacks since the 2016 US election cycle. However, the US information technology infrastructure is vast and porous, making it hard to protect against every threat. Russian cyber actors, both state sponsored and criminal, are smart and persistent. Investment Takeaways Cyber security companies offer a way for investors to capitalize on major themes arising from the COVID-19 crisis and its aftermath. These themes include not only changes in worker behavior, e-commerce, corporate culture, and network security, but also our major geopolitical themes like nationalism and the retreat from globalization. Reports as we go to press that Russian hackers have targeted vaccine developers in the US, UK, and Canada underscore the point. The trend is not limited to Russia or COVID-19 vaccines. It is all too apparent from the actions of Russia and China – as well as the increasing efforts by the US and its allies to patrol their own cyber realms, IT systems, and ideological discourse – that governments view the Internet as a frontier to be conquered and fortified rather than as a free space of human exchange in which globalization can operate unfettered (Map 1). Map 1Governments View The Internet As A Frontier To Be Conquered Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Formal measures of country risk are inadequate but provide some perspective as to which countries and companies are least prepared. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) is the United Nations body charged with monitoring information technology and communications. It ranks countries according to their commitment to cyber security and their exposure to cyber security risks (Chart 10). Chart 10Countries Have An Imperative To Strengthen Cyber Security Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 We take these rankings with a grain of salt knowing that advanced countries like the US and UK rank near the top of the list, and yet are the prime targets of hackers and thus face enormous cyber security risks. What is clear is that no country is safe and every country has an economic and national security imperative to strengthen its cyber security. These indexes also suggest that several European countries are less well prepared than one would think and that emerging markets are grossly underprepared. China, Russia and Iran should not be thought of only as aggressors – they will increasingly become targets as the West seeks to counteract them. As Russia expands operations it becomes a target of cyber counter-strikes as well as economic sanctions. And as China accelerates its drive to become a high tech giant, it encourages economic decoupling from the West and retaliation for its use of cyber-theft and state-based hacking. China, Russia, and Iran will also increasingly become victims of cyber attacks. There are two main cyber security equity indexes – the NASDAQ CTA Cybersecurity Index (NQCYBR) and NASDAQ ISE Cyber Security Index (HXR). These indexes trade in line with each other and have rallied extensively since the COVID-19 crisis (Chart 11). Investors are aware that the surge in working from home and companies conducting operations off-site, as well as geopolitical great power struggle, have created extensive new vulnerabilities and capex requirements. Chart 11Cyber Security Stocks Have Benefited From COVID-19 ... Cyber Security Stocks Have Benefited From COVID-19 ... Cyber Security Stocks Have Benefited From COVID-19 ... On April 24, we recommended that investors go long the ISE index relative to the S&P 500 information technology sector. We are also going long the ISE index relative to the NASDAQ on a strategic horizon. Chart 12... But Not So Much Relative To Broad Tech Sector ... But Not So Much Relative To Broad Tech Sector ... But Not So Much Relative To Broad Tech Sector Tech has been the prime beneficiary of the COVID-19 crisis while the necessary corollary of the tech companies’ continued success is the need for security of their information, property, and customers (Chart 12). We also favor the ISE index because it has a slightly heavier cyclical component due to the fact that 13% of its companies are in the industrial sector, compared to 10% for the CTA index. The industrial side should benefit more as economies reopen and recover. These indexes are tracked by two ETFs. The First Trust NASDAQ Cybersecurity ETF (CIBR) tracks the NASDAQ CTA index with an emphasis on larger companies, while the ETFMG Prime Cyber Security ETF (HACK) tracks the ISE index, companies with market capitalization lower than $250 million, and a slightly lower exposure to the communications sector as opposed to IT and software. The HACK ETF has lagged the CIBR this year so far and offers an opportunity for investors to invest in data protection and up-and-coming firms. Over the past ten years cyber security has proven to be a volatile investment space with rapidly increasing competition for market share. But the secular tailwinds are powerful and a diversified exposure to the sector will be rewarding for investors positioning for the post-COVID-19 world. Elmo Wright Consulting Editor Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Appendix Appendix TableMajor Cyber-Attacks Over The Past Decade Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19 Russia And Cyber Security After COVID-19   Footnotes Coats, Dan. “Statement For The Record Worldwide Threat Assessment Of The Us Intelligence Community,” May 23, 2017. Coats, Dan. “Statement For The Record Worldwide Threat Assessment Of The Us Intelligence Community,” March 6, 2018. Coats, Dan. “Annual Threat Assessment Opening Statement,” January 29, 2019. CyberReason Intel Team, “Russia And Nation-State Hacking Tactics: A Report From Cybereason Intelligence Group,” cybereason.com, June 5, 2017. Department of Justice, “Russian National Sentenced To Prison For Operating Websites Devoted To Fraud And Malicious Cyber Activities”, June 26, 2020. Department of Justice, “U.S. Charges Russian FSB Officers And Their Criminal Conspirators For Hacking Yahoo And Millions Of Email Accounts, Fsb Officers Protected, Directed, Facilitated And Paid Criminal Hackers”, March 15, 2017. Gerasimov, Vasily. “The Value Of Science In Prediction,” Military Industrial Courier, Feb 27, 2013. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Internet Crime Complaint Center Marks 20 Years From Early Frauds to Sophisticated Schemes, IC3 Has Tracked the Evolution of Online Crime,” May 8, 2020. Fedorov, Yuriy Ye. “Arms Control In The Information Age” Symposium “Emerging Challenges In The Information Age,” 23 January 2002, Arlington, Virginia. Galeotti, Mark. “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ And Russian Non-Linear War,” In Moscow’s Shadows, July 6, 2014. Greenberg, Andy. “The Untold Story Of Notpetya, The Most Devastating Cyberattack In History,” Wired Magazine, August 22, 2018. Krebs, Brian. “Why Were the Russians So Set Against This Hacker Being Extradited?,” Krebs on Security, Nov 18, 2019. Lusthaus, Jonathan. “Cybercrime in Southeast Asia Combating a global threat locally,” May 20, 2020. Mattis, James. Department of Defense, “Summary Of The 2018 National Defense Strategy Of The United States Of America”. Meakins, Joss. “Living in (Digital) Denial: Russia’s Approach To Cyber Deterrence,” Russia Matters, July 2018. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. “Doctrine Of Information Security Of The Russian Federation,” Dec 5, 2016. Nakasone, Paul. “Cybercom Commander Briefs Reporters At White House,” Department of Defense video briefing, Aug 2, 2018. National Security Agency, “NSA/CSS Technical Cyber Threat Framework V2”, a report from: Cybersecurity Operations The Cybersecurity Products And Sharing Division, 29 November 2018. Pettijohn and Wasser. “Competing In The Gray Zone,” RAND Corporation, 2019. Putin, Vladimir. “Strategy of National Security of the Russian Federation,” Office of the President of the Russian Federation, Dec 31, 2015. Russian National Security Strategy 31 Dec 2015, Russia Matters. Snegovaya, Maria. “Putin’s Information Warfare In Ukraine: Soviet Origins Of Russia's Hybrid Warfare,” Institute for the Study of War, Sep 22, 2015. Tsygichko, V. N. “About Categories of “Correlation Of Forces” for Potential Military Conflicts in the New Era,” Symposium “Emerging Challenges In The Information Age,” 23 January 2002, Arlington, Virginia. Wiener, Norbert, Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, (1948).

Highlights Theoretically the US could employ a “Reverse Kissinger” strategy – befriend Russia to isolate China or at least prevent the budding Russo-Chinese alliance.  But Trump has made no headway in relations with Russia. Meanwhile Democrats now see engagement with Putin as a failure and will pursue a more aggressive policy. Competition in Europe’s natural gas market underscores the broader Russo-American geopolitical confrontation. Russia will likely succeed in preserving its share in the European natural gas market in the medium term, but not in the long run. We remain overweight Russian equities and bonds relative to EM benchmarks, but will downgrade if Biden’s election becomes a foregone conclusion. Feature Investors do not need to wait for the US election verdict to assess the general trajectory of US-Russia relations. Some points are clear regardless of whether President Trump or former Vice President Joe Biden prevails: US-Russia engagement had mostly but not entirely failed between the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and President Trump’s election in 2016.   President Trump could not break free of the constraints of office and his administration has remained adversarial toward Russia despite his preference for deeper engagement. Whether Democrats or Republicans take the White House in 2021, the result will be confrontation with Russia over the four-year term and likely beyond. The geopolitical risk premium in the Russian ruble will rise relative to its current level. A Trump victory would reduce this risk, but only temporarily.   The Failure Of Engagement Russia’s rise from the ashes of the Soviet Union can be illustrated by our Geopolitical Power Index – it shows Russia’s rise relative to the US in terms of demographic, economic, technological, commercial, and military variables that make a nation strong (Chart 1). Chart 1Russia Rose From Soviet Ashes, But Still Lags US Russia Rose From Soviet Ashes, But Still Lags US Russia Rose From Soviet Ashes, But Still Lags US Russia is a shadow of its Soviet self and lags far behind the US in raw capability. But its recovery from the chaos of the 1998 financial crisis, fueled by a global commodity bull market, has consisted of a systematic removal of domestic political constraints. It is politically unified under the personal rule of Putin, has reformed its economy and modernized its military, and has successfully pushed back against the US and the West in its sphere of influence. Russia punches above its economic weight in the world by means of its military, which it has wielded opportunistically in Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, and Libya (Chart 2). Neither the US nor any other power was willing to fill the power vacuum in these locations. A Trump victory only temporarily reduces the rise in Russian geopolitical risk. The US and Russia have a fundamentally antagonistic relationship over influence in Europe and occasionally the Far East. They have little need to trade with each other. They are both large, independent commodity exporters and advanced weapon-makers separated by vast distances. Russia is threatened by the US’s military and technological superiority, its economic strength and newfound status as an energy exporter (see energy section), and its ability to undermine Russian legitimacy in the former Soviet sphere by promoting democracy.  Russia’s advantage is that the US is internally divided by political factions. Putin’s popular approval has benefited from his restoration of domestic order and Russia’s standing as a great power. Successive American presidents have floundered under domestic partisanship and polarization (Chart 3).   Chart 2Russia’s Military Punches Above Its Economic Weight US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) Chart 3Russia Is Politically Unified, The US is Internally Divided US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet)   Attempts to “reset” relations have failed.1 The Barack Obama administration’s 2009-11 Reset, announced by Biden, saw several concrete compromises, including the New START treaty and Russia’s joining the WTO. But the Bolotnaya Square protests in 2011-12, at the height of the Arab Spring, rekindled Moscow’s fear that the US aimed to foment “color revolutions” not only in Russia’s periphery but even in Russia itself. Faced with losing its control over Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation, Russia invaded parts of Ukraine and seized Crimea, the first military annexation of territory in Europe since World War II. The US and Europe applied extensive sanctions that last to this day and drag on Russian growth.2  True, Moscow cooperated on the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran. Russia does not want Iran to get nuclear weapons. Yet this is not imminent. And Russia gained global oil market share when the US walked away from the deal and restarted sanctions (Chart 4). Either way, Iran survives as a Russian ally capable of exerting influence across the Middle East.   President Trump launched another attempt at engagement with Russia. If there is a strategic basis for this policy – i.e. if it is not just based in Trump’s personal proclivities – then it is the idea of a “Reverse Kissinger” maneuver. During the Cold War, the US befriended Maoist China in order to isolate the Soviet Union. Today, with China posing the clear threat to US hegemony, the US could try to befriend Russia to isolate China or at least prevent the budding Russo-Chinese alliance.  The difference is that in 1972, American and Chinese interests were complementary. China wished to stabilize its borders and the US offered geopolitical relief as well as technology and knowhow. Today American and Russian interests are not complementary other than the political convenience of demonizing each other (Chart 5). The US offers Russia limited investment capital; Russia does not offer cheap labor or a vast consumer market. Chart 4Russia’s Oil Market Share Benefitted From Iran Sanctions US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) Chart 5US-Russo Interests Are Not Complementary US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet)   The Trump administration’s attempt to engage Putin has failed. Putin’s declaration of a global oil market share war this year drove American shale oil companies into bankruptcy during an election year. Barring an “October surprise” engineered by Putin to get Trump reelected, their “alliance” is at best rhetorical and at worst a mirage. Putin might favor Trump because he sharpens US internal divisions, or because he has an isolationist foreign policy preference, but Putin’s actions so far in 2020 suggest a deeper strategic reality: Russia seeks to foment political turmoil in the US, not solidify either of the parties in power, as the latter could backfire against Russia. What Comes After Engagement? Russia lacks the power to create a new world order, but it will continue to leverage its relative power to exercise a veto over affairs in the current global order, in which US influence is weakening. It can hasten the West’s decline by sowing divisions within the West. Chart 6COVID-19 Dented Support For Trump And Putin US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) What happens when US polarization falls and a new political consensus takes shape? This would pose a major threat to Putin’s strategic options. Thus it is relevant if Joe Biden wins the 2020 election with a strong majority and a full Democratic sweep of government. Presidents Trump and Putin, and their political parties, are among the worst performers amid the COVID-19 pandemic and recession (Chart 6). The implication is that Trump will lose the election and Putin will resort to time-tried techniques of confrontation with the West to restore his domestic support. Democrats will pursue a more aggressive policy toward Russia. The Democrats harbor a deep vendetta against Russia over its interference in the 2016 election and will go on the offensive to prevent Russia from trying to undermine their grip on power again. They will also seek to deter Russia from further undermining American strategic interests. Biden will try to revive NATO, expand US troop presence in eastern Europe, and promote democracy and human rights in Russia’s periphery, using the Internet to launch a disinformation campaign against Putin’s regime. Cyber warfare will escalate.  A “Reverse Kissinger” is not achievable until Russia feels threatened by China. The silver lining for Russia is economic: Biden’s policies will help to weaken the dollar and cultivate a global growth recovery. Biden will be less inclined to start disruptive Trump-style trade war with China that could permanently damage China’s potential growth or global growth. Chinese imports are essential to propping up Russia’s sluggish economy. In enabling commodity prices to recover, and reducing global policy uncertainty, Biden would inadvertently aid Russian recovery (Chart 7). Chart 7The Silver Lining Of A Biden Presidency For Russia Is A Weaker Dollar The Silver Lining Of A Biden Presidency For Russia Is A Weaker Dollar The Silver Lining Of A Biden Presidency For Russia Is A Weaker Dollar Ultimately Russia is insecure because the US threatens to undermine its economy and political legitimacy both at home and in its strategic buffers. Putin has re-centralized control while shutting out foreign influence. This approach is not changing anytime soon given the recent constitutional changes to prolong Putin’s rule till 2036. Preliminary reports claim that, with 65% of the public voting, these changes were ratified by 76% of the population.3  What changed is that the US is no longer as optimistic about engaging Russia. If anything, its internal divisions will encourage it to go on the offensive. Sanctions may well be expanded before they are eased, the Ukraine conflict could revive rather than simmer down, and new fronts in the conflict could widen, particularly in cyberspace. This is particularly the case if Biden wins the White House in November. The structural, geopolitical risk premium of US-Russia conflict is priced into Russian assets, but there is room for a cyclical increase if Biden is elected. Our market-based Russian geopolitical risk indicators – which define geopolitical risk as excessive ruble weakness relative to its macro context – show that Russian risk is elevated because of COVID-19, but dropping. The US election should reverse this trend, unless Trump wins (Chart 8). Chart 8Russian Geopolitical Risk Set To Increase Even If Trump Re-Elected Russian Geopolitical Risk Set To Increase Even If Trump Re-Elected Russian Geopolitical Risk Set To Increase Even If Trump Re-Elected Alternative measures of political risk that utilize non-market variables support our qualitative assessment, such as the indicator provided by GeoQuant. The implication is that Russian political risk is higher than the market is pricing (Chart 9). Chart 9Market Is Underpricing Russian Political Risk Market Is Underpricing Russian Political Risk Market Is Underpricing Russian Political Risk Kissinger Reversed? Not Yet. If Trump wins, could he not engineer a major détente with Russia? In 2018 the US shifted its national defense strategy to emphasize that “the central challenge to US prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, strategic competition,” arguing specifically that “it is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model.4”  Yet US geopolitical power has declined such that taking an offensive approach to Russia and China simultaneously is not practicable.  If the US pursues the Reverse Kissinger strategy, then it will have to make major concessions to Putin’s Russia. It would need to provide substantial sanctions relief, accept the Crimean annexation, allow a high degree of Russian influence in Donbass (Ukraine), abandon hopes of retribution for the 2016 election interference, ask for a return to the 2015 nuclear deal on Iran at best, and settle for arms control agreements that do not cover new technologies. It is not clear that President Trump would concede this much in a second term, though in most cases he would have the power to do so. Yet Moscow cannot downgrade its cooperation with Beijing by much, since US-Russia détente never lasts long and China weighs more heavily in its economic calculus than the West’s sanctions. Chart 10US-Russo Struggle Is Subordinate To US-Sino Conflict US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) The Democrats, by contrast, are not prepared to make these concessions, particularly on 2016. They are more willing to pursue a gradualist approach in dealing with China, which they believe is less urgent due to shared economic interests.5  If the US confronts Russia, then Russia will draw closer to China. The informal alliance between these two powers is well advanced. A closer association provides China with a better position in waging its long-term geopolitical competition with the United States.  Ultimately US grand strategy and public opinion will drive American presidents to take a harder line on China because it rivals the US in economic resilience and technology over the long run (Chart 10). The conflict with Moscow will eventually be subordinate to the US-China struggle. But a “Reverse Kissinger” is not achievable until Russia feels threatened by China, either through its own weakness or Chinese strength. A much stronger trans-Atlantic alliance, or much greater Chinese influence over East Asia and/or the Middle East, could trigger a shift in Russian strategy. We are not there yet. Russia’s cooperation with China will deepen, strengthening China’s hand and making it all the more imperative for the United States to solidify the trans-Atlantic alliance with Europe. Otherwise the risk of a precipitous decline in American power will threaten global stability.  Bottom Line: US-Russian antagonism will continue for the foreseeable future. Russian geopolitical risk is underpriced, particularly if Biden wins the election. A Trump victory would offer only a temporary reprieve.  Direct Competition In Energy Russia can offer low cost natural gas alongside an existing and projected (under construction) network of pipelines into Europe. This capability will help it to sustain and marginally increase its market share in Europe relative to the US in the medium term. In turn, this will help Russia secure vital revenues for its macro stability.  Natural gas exports to Europe represent 2.5% of GDP or 9% of total exports. A Biden presidency is negative for Russian assets, but Russia has room to ease policy. In the long run, however, US LNG will challenge Russia’s share in the European natural gas market. On the whole, the US sees Russia as an economic competitor in the European natural gas market and it will continue to disrupt Russian natural gas exports to Europe through sanctions and/or by other means. A resulting market share war between the US and Russia will lead to low natural gas prices benefitting the consumer, Europe. Competition in Europe’s natural gas market underscores the broader geopolitical confrontation between the US and Russia. The following factors will shape heightened competition: Escalating Competition For European Natural Gas Market Europe will remain a major market for natural gas. The combination of falling domestic production, steady consumption growth and the ongoing structural shift to cleaner sources of energy will require greater imports of natural gas (Chart 11). Critically, Europe’s natural gas consumption might rise faster than its GDP making this market attractive to energy producers. According to the IEA, Europe’s consumption of natural gas will continue to grow at a steady rate over the next 5 years. In a nutshell, European policymakers are promoting cleaner energy such as natural gas over coal and nuclear energy. This push will facilitate rising demand for natural gas.  Yet, European natural gas production is expected to drop by 40%, driven by field closures in the Netherlands and the UK.  As such, the diverging gap between falling production and steady consumption opens up a space for both Russian and US natural gas exports into the continent. Russia Natural Gas Strategy: Russia and its largest natural gas producer, Gazprom, are aiming to increase their share in the European market from their current 36% to 40% (Chart 12). Chart 11Europe's Nat Gas Imports Will Continue Growing... Europe's Nat Gas Imports Will Continue Growing... Europe's Nat Gas Imports Will Continue Growing... Chart 12...Allowing Russia To Grab Market Share ...Allowing Russia To Grab Market Share ...Allowing Russia To Grab Market Share   Table 1Russia’s Pipeline Export Capacity US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) More specifically, Russia’s latest 2035 strategy (known as ES-2035) reaffirms its two-pronged strategy: (i) continue to provide low-cost natural gas to Europe and Asia through pipelines and (ii) developing LNG export capacity for exports to the Far East. Pipelines: Russia’s export capacity to Europe is set to increase to 190 Bcm/y by 2022 excluding existing transit routes passing through Ukraine (Table 1). Two new sources of pipeline routes will be the Nord Stream2, coming online by the end of this year, and Turk Stream, expected to come online by 2022. These pipelines will have an export capacity of 55 Bcm/y and 31.5/y Bcm, respectively (Map 1).   Map 1Russia’s Latest Pipelines Bypass Ukraine US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) US-Russia: No Reverse Kissinger (Yet) Chart 13Russian Natural Gas Exports To Non-CIS Countries Russian Natural Gas Exports To Non-CIS Countries Russian Natural Gas Exports To Non-CIS Countries Meanwhile, pipeline capacity through Ukraine will remain 140 Bcm/y. Ultimately, Russia has been determined to diversify its natural gas transit routes despite pressures from the US.6 In addition, Gazprom natural gas production for transport via pipeline is expected to increase by 35% to 983 Bcm in the next 15 years. The European market is essential to Russia’s export revenues, as it currently represents 56% of Russia’s total gas export volumes compared with 83% total export to non-CIS countries (Chart 13). Lastly, regarding natural gas pricing, Gazprom will continue to move away from oil-indexed long-term contracts to shorter-term spot market contracts. This change of tack will cause deflation in Gazprom’s export prices to Europe but will preserve Russia’s market share in its strategic European market.   LNG: Russia will continue to be one the top four LNG producers alongside Qatar, Australia and the US. According to the latest estimates by the IEA, Russian exports of LNG, currently at 39 Bcm, are set to expand by 20% by 2025. The development of the Yamal peninsula into a major natural gas and LNG hub will allow Russia to produce close to 110 Bcm of LNG by 2035, which will constitute 16% of its overall current gas production. This will lead to continued LNG exports to various markets, particularly Europe, which consumes 50% of Russia’s LNG exports. Imported technology from Europe and external financing from China have allowed Novatek, Russia’s second largest natural gas producer, to become the leader in production and exports of LNG. Russia is also investing heavily in liquefaction. It is now fifth globally in liquefaction capacity. There are currently $21 billion in pre-final investment decision (FID) from the LNG Artic 2 in the Yamal that will increase its liquefaction capacity by over 200% by 2026.  Lastly, it is estimated that 70-80% of total commodity exporters’ costs are sourced locally and are in rubles due to the import substitution policy adopted by Moscow in 2015. This will alleviate cost pressures arising from a potentially weaker ruble in exploiting the Yamal reserves. US Needs To Find A Market For Its LNG: US produces 920 bcm/y of natural gas but consumes only 830 bcm/y. The rest is available for export. The need to export rising excess of natural gas output puts the US in direct competition with other natural gas exporters such as Russia. Chart 14US LNG Exports To Europe To Rise US LNG Exports To Europe To Rise US LNG Exports To Europe To Rise In the medium term, an oversupplied market alongside the COVID-19-induced demand shock in Europe will reduce European natural gas demand, hurting both the US and Russia. US LNG might lose market share in the European market to Russia due to falling production arising from capex cuts and bankruptcies in the US natural gas sector.7 Yet, in the long run, Europe’s geopolitical ties with the US and strategic interest in diversifying away from Russia make US LNG an obvious area of cooperation. The Trump-Juncker agreement in July 2018 led to a 300% increase in US LNG exports to Europe before the COVID-19 pandemic (Chart 14). Since coming into effect, the agreement also resulted in a doubling of EU utilization of LNG regasification capacity, from 30% to close to 60% in early 2020 and is expected to continue expanding in the years to come. Bottom Line: Russia will likely succeed in at least preserving its share in the European natural gas market in the medium term, but will be challenged by US LNG in the long run. Macro And Financial Market Implications For Russia Chart 15Russia: Low Public Debt Burden Russia: Low Public Debt Burden Russia: Low Public Debt Burden Heightened confrontation with the US and new sanctions on Russia will materialize if Biden wins the presidency. All else constant, this is unfavourable for Russian asset prices. It should be noted, however, that years of fiscal conservativism, tight monetary policy, a prudent and pro-active bank regulatory stance as well as some success in import substitution have given Russia the capacity to offset negative external shocks by easing macro policy: Russia has one of the lowest public debt-to-GDP ratios among the largest countries in the world. Its total public debt stands at 13.5% of GDP (Chart 15). Its external public debt is at a mere 4% of GDP. As in many other countries, Russia’s fiscal deficit is widening sharply due to the pandemic and low oil prices. However, we expect the primary and overall fiscal deficits will be only 4.25% and 5% of GDP in 2020, respectively. So far, at 3.5% of GDP, the announced fiscal stimulus in response to the pandemic has been small by global standards. Russia has room to boost fiscal expenditure substantially this year and in the coming years to offset negative external shocks. The Central Bank still has room to reduce interest rates further. The real policy rate is 2.5% compared with 1% for EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan (Chart 16, top panel). Russia’s local currency government bond yields offer value: their real yield is 2.5% compared with the EM GBI benchmark real yield of 1.5% (Chart 16, bottom panel). The Central Bank of the Russian Federation will refrain from QE-type policies (i.e., public debt monetization). This is a plus for the ruble relative to other EM currencies where central banks are engaged in QEs. Bank lending rates remain extremely elevated in Russia and local currency credit penetration is reasonably low (Chart 17). Companies and banks’ external indebtedness has declined from $1,200 bn in 2014 to $900 bn currently. Chart 16Russian Real Rates Offer Value Russian Real Rates Offer Value Russian Real Rates Offer Value Chart 17Russia: Real Lending Rates Are Too Elevated! Russia: Real Lending Rates Are Too Elevated! Russia: Real Lending Rates Are Too Elevated!   Authorities have cleaned up the banking system. The number of banks has dropped from 1000 in 2010 to 430. Banks have written down and provisioned for a large amount of loans. All of these reduce Russia’s vulnerability to negative shocks. Finally, pressured by US and EU sanctions, Russia has been moderately successful in import substitution as we discussed in a previous report. The nation has expanded its productive capacity, especially in agriculture and some other industries. As a result, it now has more room to deploy fiscal and monetary stimulus to boost demand that will be satisfied by domestic rather than foreign output. In short, fiscal and monetary stimulus will not cause the currency to plunge. On the negative side, the outlook for productivity growth remains lukewarm. Russia’s long-term economic outlook will be characterized by relative stability but low growth, as has been the case in recent years. Combining our geopolitical and macro analysis, two conclusions stand out. First, we remain overweight Russian equities as well as both local currency and US dollar bonds relative to their EM benchmarks. If Trump stages a comeback over the next four months, which is not impossible, then the geopolitical risk premium will continue to fall. Trump would offer a reprieve in tensions for a year or two.  Second, the US election threatens this view because Joe Biden is currently heavily favoured to beat Trump and if he does, he is likely to impose fresh sanctions on Russia, possibly as early as 2021. Therefore, if Biden’s election becomes a foregone conclusion, we will downgrade Russian assets. Matt Gertken  Vice President Geopolitical Strategist  mattg@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic Associate Editor andrijav@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1  Michael McFaul, From Cold War To Hot Peace: The Inside Story of Russia and America (London: Penguin, 2018). 2  International Monetary Fund, “Russian Federation: 2019 Article IV Consultation,” IMF Country Report 19/260 (August 2019). 3  Ann M. Simmons and Georgi Kantchev, “Russians Vote for Overhaul That Could Keep Putin in Power Until 2036,” Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2020.  4  “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening The American Military’s Competitive Edge,” Department of Defense, 2018. 5  Victoria Nuland, “Pinning Down Putin: How A Confident America Should Deal With Russia,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2020. 6  The US has tried to stop Russia’s expansion of pipelines into Europe in the past. Evidenced from both Kennedy and Reagan administration policies directed towards the building of the Friendship oil pipeline in the 1960s and the Brotherhood gas pipeline in the 1980s, respectively. In response, Russia began developing its own technological capacity through import substitution, hurting western firms in the process. 7  "U.S. natural gas giant Chesapeake Energy goes bankrupt,” CBC, June 29, 2020.

Highlights The collapse in oil prices supercharges the geopolitical risks stemming from the global pandemic and recession. Low oil prices should discourage petro-states from waging war, but Iran may be an important exception. Russian instability is one of the most important secular geopolitical consequences of this year’s crisis. President Trump’s precarious status this election year raises the possibility of provocations or reactions on his part. Europe faces instability on its eastern and southern borders in coming years, but integration rather than breakup is the response. Over a strategic time frame, go long AAA-rated municipal bonds, cyber security stocks, infrastructure stocks, and China reflation plays. Feature Chart 1Someone Took Physical Delivery! Someone Took Physical Delivery! Someone Took Physical Delivery! Oil markets melted this week. Oil volatility measured by the Crude Oil ETF Volatility Index surpassed 300% as WTI futures for May 2020 delivery fell into a black hole, bottoming at -$40.40 per barrel (Chart 1). Our own long Brent trade, initiated on 27 March 2020 at $24.92 per barrel, is down 17.9% as we go to press. Strategically we are putting cash to work acquiring risk assets and we remain long Brent. The forward curve implies that prices will rise to $35 and $31 per barrel for Brent and WTI by April 2021. We initiated this trade because we assessed that: The US and EU would gradually reopen their economies (they are doing so). Oil production would be destroyed (more on this below). Russia and Saudi Arabia would agree to production cuts (they did). Monetary and fiscal stimulus would take effect (the tsunami of stimulus is still growing). Global demand would start the long process of recovery (no turn yet, unknown timing). On a shorter time horizon, we are defensively positioned but things are starting to look up on COVID-19 – New York Governor Andrew Cuomo has released results of a study showing that 15% of New Yorkers have antibodies, implying a death rate of only 0.5%. The US dollar and global policy uncertainty may be peaking as we go to press (Chart 2). However, second-order effects still pose risks that keep us wary. Chart 2Dollar And Policy Uncertainty Roaring Dollar And Policy Uncertainty Roaring Dollar And Policy Uncertainty Roaring Geopolitics is the “next shoe to drop” – and it is already dropping. A host of risks are flying under the radar as the world focuses on the virus. Taken alone, not every risk warrants a risk-off positioning. But combined, these risks reveal extreme global uncertainty which does warrant a risk-off position in the near term. This week’s threats between the US and Iran, in particular, show that the political and geopolitical fallout from COVID-19 begins now, it will not “wait” until the pandemic crisis subsides. In this report we focus on the risks from oil-producing economies, but we first we update our fiscal stimulus tally. Stimulus Tsunami Chart 3Stimulus Tsunami Still Building Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Policymakers responded to COVID-19 by doing “whatever it takes” to prop up demand (Chart 3). Please see the Appendix for our latest update of our global fiscal stimulus table. The latest fiscal and monetary measures show that countries are still adding stimulus – i.e. there is not yet a substantial shift away from providing stimulus: China has increased its measures to a total of 10% of GDP for the year so far, according to BCA Research China Investment Strategy. This includes a general increase in credit growth, a big increase in government spending (2% of GDP), a bank re-lending scheme (1.5% of GDP), an increase in general purpose local government bonds (2% of GDP), plus special purpose bonds (4% of GDP) and other measures. On the political front, the government has rolled out a new slogan, “the Six Stabilities and the Six Guarantees,” and President Xi Jinping said on an inspection tour to Shaanxi that the state will increase investments to ensure that employment is stabilized. This is the maximum reflationary signal from China that we have long expected. The US agreed to a $484 billion “fourth phase” stimulus package, bringing its total to 13% of GDP. President Trump is already pushing for a fifth phase involving bailouts of state and local governments and infrastructure, which we fully expect to take place even if it takes a bit longer than packages that have been passed so far this year. German Chancellor Angela Merkel has opened the way for the EU to issue Eurobonds, in keeping with our expectations. Germany is spending 12% of GDP in total – which can go much higher depending on how many corporate loans are tapped – while Italy is increasing its stimulus to 3% of GDP. As deficits rise to astronomical sums, and economies gradually reopen, will legislatures balk at passing new stimulus? Yes, eventually. Financial markets will have to put more pressure on policymakers to get them to pass more stimulus. This can lead to volatility. In the US the pandemic is coinciding with “peak polarization” over the 2020 election. Lack of coordination between federal and state governments is increasing uncertainty. Currently disputes center on the timing of economic reopening and the provisioning bailout funds for state and local governments. Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell is threatening to deny bailouts for American states with large, unfunded public pension benefits (Chart 4A). He is insisting that the Senate “push the pause button” on coronavirus relief measures; specifically that nothing new be passed until the Senate convenes in Washington on May 4. He may then lead a charge in the Republican Senate to try to require structural reforms from states in exchange for bailouts. Estimates of the total state budget shortfall due to the crisis stand at $500 billion over the next three years, which is almost certainly an understatement (Chart 4B). Chart 4AUS States Have Unfunded Liabilities Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Chart 4BUS States Face Funding Shortfalls Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Could a local government or state declare bankruptcy? Not anytime soon. Technically there is no provision for states to declare bankruptcy. A constitutional challenge to such a declaration would go to the Supreme Court. One commonly cited precedent, Arkansas in 1933, ended up with a federal bailout.1 A unilateral declaration could conceivably become a kind of “Lehman moment” in the public sector, but state governors will ask their legislatures to provide more fiscal flexibility and will seek bailouts from the federal government first. The Federal Reserve is already committed to buying state and local bonds and can expand these purchases to keep interest rates low. Washington would be forced to provide at least short-term funding if state workers started getting fired in the midst of the crisis because of straightened state finances – another $500 billion for the states is entirely feasible in today’s climate. Constraints will prevail on the GOP Senate to provide state bailout funds. This conflict over state finances could have a negative impact on US equities in the near term, but it is largely a bluff – McConnell will lose this battle. The fundamental dynamic in Washington is that of populism combined with a pandemic that neutralizes arguments about moral hazard. Big-spending Democrats in the House of Representatives control the purse strings while big-spending President Trump faces an election. Senate Republicans are cornered on all sides – and their fate is tied to the President’s – so they will eventually capitulate. Bottom Line: The global fiscal and monetary policy tsunami is still building. But there are plenty of chances for near-term debacles. Over the long run the gargantuan stimulus is the signal while the rest is noise. Over the long run we expect the reflationary efforts to prevail and therefore we are long Treasury inflation-protected securities and US investment grade corporate bonds. We recommend going strategically long AAA-rated US municipal bonds relative to 10-year Treasuries. Petro-State Meltdown Since March we have highlighted that the collapse in oil prices will destabilize oil producers above and beyond the pandemic and recession. This leaves Iran in danger, but even threatens the stability of great powers like Russia. Normally there is something of a correlation between the global oil price and the willingness of petro-states to engage in war (Chart 5). Chart 5Petro-States Cease Fire When Oil Drops Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) When prices fall, revenues dry up and governments have to prioritize domestic stability. This tends to defer inter-state conflict. We can loosely corroborate this evidence by showing that global defense stocks tend to be correlated with oil prices (Chart 6). Global growth is the obvious driver of both of these indicators. But states whose budgets are closely tied to the commodity cycle are the most likely to cut defense spending. Chart 6Global Growth Drives Oil And Guns Global Growth Drives Oil And Guns Global Growth Drives Oil And Guns Russia is case in point. Revenues from Rostec, one of Russia’s largest arms firms, rise and fall with the Urals crude oil price (Chart 7). The Russians launch into foreign adventures during oil bull markets, when state coffers are flush with cash. They have an uncanny way of calling the top of the cycle by invading countries (Chart 8). Chart 7Oil Correlates With Russian Arms Sales Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Chart 8Russian Invasions Call Peak In Oil Bull Markets Russian Invasions Call Peak In Oil Bull Markets Russian Invasions Call Peak In Oil Bull Markets Chart 9Turkish Political Risk On The Rise Turkish Political Risk On The Rise Turkish Political Risk On The Rise In the current oil rout, there is already some evidence of hostilities dying down in this way. For instance, after years of dogged fighting in Yemen, Saudi Arabia is finally declaring a ceasefire there. Turkey, which benefits from low oil prices, has temporarily gotten the upper hand in Libya vis-à-vis Khalifa Haftar and the Libyan National Army, which depends on oil revenues and backing from petro-states like Russia and the GCC. Of course, Turkey’s deepening involvement in foreign conflicts is evidence of populism at home so it does not bode well for the lira or Turkish assets (Chart 9). But it does highlight the impact of weak oil on petro-players such as Haftar. However, the tendency of petro-states to cease fire amid low prices is merely a rule of thumb, not a law of physics. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. Already we are seeing that Iran is defying this dynamic by engaging in provocative saber-rattling with the United States. Iran And Iraq The US and Iran are rattling sabers again. One would think that Iran, deep in the throes of recession and COVID-19, would eschew a conflict with the US at a time when a vulnerable and anti-Iranian US president is only seven months away from an election. Chart 10US Maximum Pressure On Iran US Maximum Pressure On Iran US Maximum Pressure On Iran Iran has survived nearly two years of “maximum pressure” from President Trump (Chart 10), and previous US sanction regimes, and has a fair chance of seeing the Democrats retake Washington. The Democrats would restart negotiations to restore the 2015 nuclear deal, which was favorable to Iran. Therefore risking air strikes from President Trump is counterproductive and potentially disastrous. Yet this logic only holds if the Iranian regime is capable of sustaining the pain of a pandemic and global recession on top of its already collapsing economy. Iran’s ability to circumvent sanctions to acquire funds depended on the economy outside of Iran doing fine. Now Iran’s illicit funds are drying up. This could lead to a pullback in funding for militant proxies across the region as Iran cuts costs. But it also removes the constraint on Iran taking bolder actions. If the economy is collapsing anyway then Iran can take bigger risks. Furthermore if Iran is teetering, there may be an incentive to initiate foreign conflicts to refocus domestic angst. This could be done without crossing Trump’s red lines by attacking Iraq or Saudi Arabia. With weak oil demand, Iran’s leverage declines. But a major attack would reduce oil production and accelerate the global supply-demand rebalance. Iran’s attack on the Saudi Abqaiq refinery last September took six million barrels per day offline briefly, but it was clearly not intended to shut down that production permanently. Threats against shipping in the Persian Gulf bring about 14 million barrels per day into jeopardy (Chart 11). Chart 11Closing Hormuz Would Be The Biggest Oil Shock Ever Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Iran-backed militias in Iraq have continued to attack American assets and have provoked American air strikes over the past month, despite the near-war scenario that erupted just before COVID. Iranian ships have harassed US naval ships in recent days. President Trump has ordered the navy to destroy ships that threaten it; Iranian commander has warned that Iran will sink US warships that threaten its ships in the Gulf. There is a 20% chance of armed hostilities between the US and Iran. Why would Iran be willing to confront the United States? First, Iran rightly believes that the US is war-weary and that Trump is committed to withdrawing from the Middle East. But this could prompt a fateful mistake. The equation changes if the US public is incensed and Trump’s election campaign could benefit from conflict. Chart 12Youth Pose Stability Risk To Iran Youth Pose Stability Risk To Iran Youth Pose Stability Risk To Iran Second, the US is never going to engage in a ground invasion of Iran. Airstrikes would not easily dislodge the regime. They could have the opposite effect and convert an entire generation of young, modernizing Iranians into battle-hardened supporters of the Islamic revolution (Chart 12). This is a dire calculation that the Iranian leaders would only make if they believed their regime was about to collapse. But they are quite possibly the closest to collapse that they have been since the 1980s and nobody knows where their pain threshold lies. They are especially vulnerable as the regime approaches the uncharted succession of Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei. Since early 2018 we have argued that there is a 20% chance of armed hostilities between the US and Iran. We upgraded this to 40% in June 2019 and downgraded it back to 20% after the Iranians shied from direct conflict this January. Our position remains the same 20%. This is still a major understated risk at a time when the global focus is entirely elsewhere. It will persist into 2021 if Trump is reelected. If the Democrats win the US election, this war risk will abate. The Iranians will play hard to get but they are politically prohibited from pursuing confrontation with the US when a 2015-type deal is available. This would open up the possibility for greater oil supply to be unlocked in the future, but sanctions are not likely to be lifted till 2022 at earliest. Russia Russia may not be on the verge of invading anyone, but it is internally vulnerable and fully capable of striking out against foreign opponents. Cyberattacks, election interference, or disinformation campaigns would sow confusion or heighten tensions among the great powers. The Russian state is suffering a triple whammy of pandemic, recession, and oil collapse. President Vladimir Putin’s approval rating has fallen this year so far, whereas other leaders in the western world have all seen polling bounces (even President Trump, slightly) (Chart 13). Putin postponed a referendum designed to keep him in office through 2036 due to the COVID crisis. In other words, the pandemic has already disrupted his carefully laid succession plans. While Putin can bypass a referendum, he would have been better off in the long run with the public mandate. Generally it is Putin’s administration, not his personal popularity, that is at risk, but the looming impact on Russian health and livelihoods puts both in jeopardy (Chart 14) and requires larger fiscal outlays to try to stabilize approval (Chart 15). Chart 13Putin Saw No COVID Popularity Bump Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Chart 14Russian Regime Faces Political Discontent Russian Regime Faces Political Discontent Russian Regime Faces Political Discontent Moreover, regardless of popular opinion, Putin is likely to settle scores with the oligarchs. The fateful decision to clash with the Saudis in March, which led to the oil collapse, will fall on Igor Sechin, Chief Executive of Rosneft, and his faction. An extensive political purge may well ensue that would jeopardize domestic stability (Chart 16). Chart 15Russia To Focus On Domestic Stability Russia To Focus On Domestic Stability Russia To Focus On Domestic Stability Chart 16Russian Political Risk Will Rise Russian Political Risk Will Rise Russian Political Risk Will Rise Russian tensions with the US will rise over the US election in November. The Democrats would seek to make Russia pay for interfering in US politics to help President Trump win in 2016. But even President Trump may no longer be a reliable “ally” of Putin given that Putin’s oil tactics have bankrupted the US shale industry during Trump’s reelection campaign. The American and Russian air forces are currently sparring in the air space over Syria and the Mediterranean. The US has also warned against a malign actor threatening to hack the health care system of the Czech Republic, which could be Russia or another actor like North Korea or Iran. These issues have taken place off the radar due to the coronavirus but they are no less real for that. Venezuela We have predicted Venezuela’s regime change for several years but the oil meltdown, pandemic, and insufficient Russian and Chinese support should put the final nail in the regime’s coffin. Hugo Chavez’s rise to power, the last “regime change,” occurred as oil prices bottomed in 1998. Historically the Venezuelan armed forces have frequently overthrown civilian authorities, but in several cases not until oil prices recovered (Chart 17). Chart 17Venezuelan Coups Follow Oil Rebounds Venezuelan Coups Follow Oil Rebounds Venezuelan Coups Follow Oil Rebounds The US decision to designate Nicolas Maduro as a “narco-terrorist,” to deploy greater naval and coast guard assets around Venezuela, to reassert the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt Corollary, and to pull Chevron from the country all suggest that Washington is preparing for regime change. Such a change may or may not involve any American orchestration. Venezuela is an easy punching-bag for President Trump if he seeks to “wag the dog” ahead of the election. Venezuela would be a strategic prize and yet it cannot hurt the US economy or financial markets substantially, giving limited downside to President Trump if he pursues such a strategy. Obviously any conflict with Venezuela this year is far less relevant to global investors than one with Iran, North Korea, China, or Russia. Regime change would be positive for oil supply and negative for prices over the long run. But that is a story for the next cycle of energy development, as it would take years for government and oil industry change in Venezuela to increase production. The US election cycle is a critical aggravating factor for all of these petro-state risks. Shale producers are going bankrupt, putting pressure on the economy and some swing states. The risk of a conflict arises not only from Trump playing “wag the dog” after the crisis abates, but also from other states provoking the president, causing him to react or overreact. The “Other Guys” Oil producers outside the US, Canada, gulf OPEC, and Russia – the “other guys” – are extremely vulnerable to this year’s global crisis and price collapse. Comprising half of global production, they were already seeing production declines and a falling global market share over the past decade when they should have benefited from a global economic expansion. They never recovered from the 2014-15 oil plunge and market share war (Chart 18). Angola (1.4 million barrels per day), Algeria (one million barrels per day), and Nigeria (1.8 million barrels per day) are relatively sizable producers whose domestic stability is in question in the coming years as they cut budgets and deplete limited forex reserves to adjust to the lower oil price. This means fewer fiscal resources to keep political and regional factions cooperating and provide basic services. Algeria is particularly vulnerable. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who ruled as a strongman from 1999, was forced out last year, leaving a power vacuum that persists under Prime Minister Abdelaziz Djerad, in the wake of the low-participation elections in December. An active popular protest movement, Hirak, already exists and is under police suppression. Unemployment is high, especially among the youth. Neighboring Libya is in the midst of a war and extremist militants within Libya and North Africa would like to expand their range of operations in a destabilized Algeria. Instability would send immigrants north to Europe. Oil production will be reduced involuntarily as well as voluntarily this year due to regime failures. Brazil is not facing the risk of state failure like Algeria, but it is facing a deteriorating domestic political outlook (Chart 19). President Jair Bolsonaro’s popularity was already low relative to most previous presidents before COVID. His narrow base in the Chamber of Deputies got narrower when he abandoned his political party. He has defied the pandemic, refused to endorse social distancing or lockdown orders by local governments, and fired his Health Minister Luiz Henrique Mandetta. Chart 18Petro-States: 'Other Guys' Face Instability Petro-States: 'Other Guys' Face Instability Petro-States: 'Other Guys' Face Instability Chart 19Brazilian Political Risk Rising Again Brazilian Political Risk Rising Again Brazilian Political Risk Rising Again Brazil has a high number of coronavirus deaths per million people relative to other emerging markets with similar health capacity and susceptibility to the disease. This, combined with sharply rising unemployment, could prove toxic for Bolsonaro, who has not received a bounce in popular opinion from the crisis like most other world leaders. Thus on balance we expect the October local elections to mark a comeback for the Worker’s Party. The limited fiscal gains of Bolsonaro’s pension reform are already wiped out by the global recession, which will set back the country’s frail recovery from its biggest recession in a century. The country is still on an unsustainable fiscal path. Bolsonaro does not have a strong personal commitment to neoliberal structural reform, which has been put aside anyway due to the need for government fiscal spending amid the crisis. Unless Bolsonaro’s popularity increases in the wake of the crisis – due to backlash against the state-level lockdowns – the economic shock is negative for Brazil’s political stability and economic policy orthodoxy. Bottom Line: Our rule of thumb about petro-states suggests that they will generally act less aggressive amid a historic oil price collapse, but Iran may prove a critical exception. Investors should not underestimate the risk of a US-Iran conflict this year. Beyond that, the US election will have a decisive impact as the Democrats will seek to resume the Iranian nuclear deal and Iran would eventually play ball. Venezuela is less globally relevant this year – although a “wag the dog” scenario is a distinct possibility – but it may well be a major oil supply surprise in the 2020s. More broadly the takeaway is that oil production will be reduced involuntarily as well as voluntarily this year due to regime failures. Investment Takeaways Obviously any conflict with Iran could affect the range of Middle Eastern OPEC supply, not just the portion already shuttered due to sanctions on Iran itself. Any Iran war risk is entirely separate from the risk of supply destruction from more routine state failures in Africa. These shortages have been far less consequential lately and have plenty of room to grow in significance (Chart 20). The extreme lows in oil prices today will create the conditions for higher oil prices later when demand recovers, via supply destruction. Chart 20More Unplanned Outages To Come Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Chart 21European Political Risk No Longer Underrated European Political Risk No Longer Underrated European Political Risk No Longer Underrated An important implication – to be explored in future reports – is that Europe’s neighborhood is about to get a lot more dangerous in the coming years, as the Middle East and Russia will become less stable. Middle East instability will result in new waves of immigration and terrorism after a lull since 2015-16. These waves would fuel right-wing political sentiment in parts of Europe that are the most vulnerable in today’ crisis: Italy, Spain, and France (Chart 21). This should not be equated with the EU breaking apart, however, as the populist parties in these countries are pursuing soft rather than hard Euroskepticism. Unless that changes the risk is to the Euro Area’s policy coherence rather than its existence. Finally Russian domestic instability is one of the major secular consequences of the pandemic and recession and its consequences could be far-reaching, particularly in its great power struggle with the United States. We are reinitiating a strategic long in cyber security stocks, the ISE Cyber Security Index, relative to the S&P500 Info Tech sector. Cyberattacks are a form of asymmetrical warfare that we expect to ramp up with the general increase in global geopolitical tensions. The US’s recent official warning against an unknown actor that apparently intended to attack the health system of the Czech Republic highlights the way in which malign actors could attempt to capitalize on the chaos of the pandemic. We also recommend strategic investors reinitiate our “China Play Index” – commodities and equities sensitive to China’s reflation – and our BCA Infrastructure Basket, which will benefit from Chinese reflation as well as US deficit spending. China’s reflation will help industrial metals more so than oil, but it is positive for the latter as well. Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 John Mauldin, "Don't Be So Sure That States Can't Go Bankrupt," Forbes, July 28, 2016, forbes.com.   Section II: Appendix : GeoRisk Indicator China China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator Russia Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator UK UK: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Germany Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Canada Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Spain Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Korea Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Appendix Table 1 The Global Fiscal Stimulus Response To COVID-19 Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Drowning In Oil (GeoRisk Update) Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights The pandemic has a negative impact on households and has not peaked in the US. But a depression is likely to be averted. Our market-based geopolitical risk indicators point toward a period of rising political turbulence across the world. We are selectively adding risk to our strategic portfolio, but remain tactically defensive. Stay long gold on a strategic time horizon. Feature I'm going where there's no depression, To the lovely land that's free from care. I'll leave this world of toil and trouble My home's in Heaven, I'm going there. - “No Depression In Heaven,” The Carter Family (1936) Chart 1The Pandemic Stimulus Versus The Great Recession Stimulus GeoRisk Update: No Depression GeoRisk Update: No Depression Markets bounced this week on the back of a gargantuan rollout of government spending that is the long-awaited counterpart to the already ultra-dovish monetary policy of global central banks (Chart 1). Just when the investment community began to worry about a full-fledged economic depression and the prospect for bank runs, food shortages, and martial law in the United States, the market rallied. Yet extreme uncertainty persists over how long one third of the world’s population will remain hidden away in their homes for fear of a dangerous virus (Chart 2). Chart 2Crisis Has Not Verifiably Peaked, Uncertainty Over Timing Of Lockdowns GeoRisk Update: No Depression GeoRisk Update: No Depression Chart 3The Pandemic Shock To The Labor Market The Pandemic Shock To The Labor Market The Pandemic Shock To The Labor Market While an important and growing trickle of expert opinion suggests that COVID-19 is not as deadly as once thought, especially for those under the age of 50, consumer activity will not return to normal anytime soon.1 Moreover political and geopolitical risks are skyrocketing and have yet to register in investors’ psyche. Consider: American initial unemployment claims came in at a record-breaking 3.3 million (Chart 3), while China International Capital Corporation estimates that China’s GDP will grow by 2.6% for the year. These are powerful blows against global political as well as economic stability. This should convince investors to exercise caution even as they re-enter the equity market. We are selectively putting some cash to work on a strategic time frame (12 months and beyond) to take advantage of some extraordinary opportunities in equities and commodities. But we maintain the cautious and defensive tactical posture that we initiated on January 24. No Depression In Heaven The US Congress agreed with the White House on an eye-popping $2.2 trillion or 10% of GDP fiscal stimulus. At least 46% of the package consists of direct funds for households and small businesses (Chart 4). This includes $290 billion in direct cash handouts to every middle-class household – essentially “helicopter money,” as it is financed by bonds purchased by the central bank (Table 1). The purpose is to plug the gap left by the near complete halt to daily life and business as isolation measures are taken. A depression is averted, but we still have a recession. Go long consumer staples. Chart 4The US Stimulus Package Breakdown GeoRisk Update: No Depression GeoRisk Update: No Depression Table 1Distribution Of Cash Handouts Under US Coronavirus Response Act GeoRisk Update: No Depression GeoRisk Update: No Depression China, the origin of the virus that triggered the global pandemic and recession, is resorting to its time-tried playbook of infrastructure spending, with 3% of GDP in new spending projected. This number is probably heavily understated. It does not include the increase in new credit that will accompany official fiscal measures, which could easily amount to 3% of GDP or more, putting the total new spending at 6%. Germany and the EU have also launched a total fiscal response. The traditionally tight-fisted Berlin has launched an 11% of GDP stimulus, opening the way for other member states to surge their own spending. The EU Commission has announced it will suspend deficit restrictions for all member states. The ECB’s Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program (PEPP) enables direct lending without having to tap the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) or negotiate the loosening of its requirements. It also enables the ECB to bypass the debate over issuing Eurobonds (though incidentally Germany is softening its stance on the latter idea). The cumulative impact of all this fiscal stimulus is 5% of global GDP – and rising (Table 2). Governments will be forced to provide more cash on a rolling basis to households and businesses as long as the pandemic is raging and isolation measures are in place. Table 2The Global Fiscal Stimulus In Response To COVID-19 GeoRisk Update: No Depression GeoRisk Update: No Depression President Trump has signaled that he wants economic life to begin resuming after Easter Sunday, April 12. But he also said that he will listen to the advice of the White House’s public health advisors. State governors are the ones who implement tough “shelter in place” orders and other restrictions, so the hardest hit states will not resume activity until their governors believe that the impact on their medical systems can be managed. Authorities will likely extend the social distancing measures in April until they have a better handle on the best ways to enable economic activity while preserving the health system. Needless to say, economic activity will have to resume gradually as the government cannot replace activity forever and the working age population can operate even with the threat of contracting the disease (social distancing policies would become more fine-tuned for types of activity, age groups, and health risk profiles). The tipping point from recession to depression would be the point at which the government’s promises of total fiscal and monetary support for households and businesses become incapable of reassuring either the financial markets or citizens. The largest deficit the US government has ever run was 30% of GDP during World War II (Chart 5). Today’s deficit is likely to go well beyond 15% (5% existing plus 10% stimulus package plus falling revenue). If authorities were forced to triple the lockdown period and hence the fiscal response the country would be in uncharted territory. But this is unlikely as the incubation period of the virus is two weeks and China has already shown that a total lockdown can sharply reduce transmission. Chart 5The US's Largest Peacetime Budget Deficit The US's Largest Peacetime Budget Deficit The US's Largest Peacetime Budget Deficit Any tipping point into depression would become evident in behavior: e.g. a return to panic selling, followed by the closure of financial market trading by authorities, bank runs, shortages of staples across regions, and possibly the use of martial law and curfews. While near-term selloffs can occur, the rest seems very unlikely – if only because, again, the much simpler solution is to reduce the restrictions on economic activity gradually for the low-risk, healthy, working age population. Bottom Line: Granting that the healthy working age population can and will eventually return to work due to its lower risk profile, unlimited policy support suggests that a depression or “L-shaped” recovery is unlikely. The Dark Hour Of Midnight Nearing While the US looks to avoid a depression, there will still be a recession with an unprecedented Q2 contraction. The recovery could be a lot slower than bullish investors expect. Global manufacturing was contracting well before households got hit with a sickness that will suppress consumption for the rest of the year. There is another disease to worry about: the dollar disease. The world is heavily indebted and holds $12 trillion in US dollar-denominated debt. Yet the dollar is hitting the highest levels in years and global dollar liquidity is drying up. The greenback has rallied even against major safe haven currencies like the Japanese yen and Swiss franc (Chart 6). Of course, the Fed is intervening to ensure highly indebted US corporates have access to loans and extending emergency dollar swap lines to a total of 14 central banks. But in the near term global growth is collapsing and the dollar is overshooting. This can create a self-reinforcing dynamic. The same goes for any relapse in Chinese growth. Unlike in 2008 – but like 2015 – China is the epicenter of the global slowdown. China has much larger economic and financial imbalances today than it did in 2003 when the SARS outbreak occurred, and it will increase these imbalances going forward as it abandons its attempt to deleverage the corporate sector (Chart 7). Chart 6The Greenback Surge Deprives The World Of Liquidity The Greenback Surge Deprives The World Of Liquidity The Greenback Surge Deprives The World Of Liquidity Chart 7China's Financial Imbalances Are A Worry China's Financial Imbalances Are A Worry China's Financial Imbalances Are A Worry The rest of emerging markets face their own problems, including poor governance and productivity, as well as the dollar disease and the China fallout. They are unlikely to lift themselves out of this crisis, but they could become the source for credit events and market riots that prolong the global risk-off phase. Bottom Line: It is too soon to sound the all-clear. If the dollar continues on its rampage, then the gigantic stimulus will not be enough, markets will relapse, and fears of deflation will grow. World Of Toil And Trouble Political risk is the next shoe to drop. The pandemic and recession are setting in motion a political earthquake that will unfold over the next decade. Almost all of our 12 market-based geopolitical risk indicators have exploded upward since the beginning of the year. Chart 8China's Political Risk Is Rising China's Political Risk Is Rising China's Political Risk Is Rising These indicators show that developed market equities and emerging market currencies are collapsing far more than is justified by underlying fundamentals. This risk premium reflects the uncertainty of the pandemic, but the recession will destabilize regimes and fuel fears about national security. So the risk premium will not immediately decline in several important cases. China’s political risk is shooting up, as one would expect given that the pandemic began in Hubei (Chart 8). The stress within the Communist Party can be measured by the shrill tone of the Chinese propaganda machine, which is firing on all cylinders to convince the world that Chinese President Xi Jinping did a great job handling the virus while the western nations are failing states that cannot handle it. The western nations are indeed mishandling it, but that does not solve China’s domestic economic and social troubles, which will grow from here. Of course, our political risk indicator will fall if Chinese equities rally more enthusiastically than Chinese state banks expand credit as the economy normalizes. But this would suggest that markets have gotten ahead of themselves. By contrast, if China surges credit, yet equity investors are unenthusiastic, then the market will be correctly responding to the fact that a credit surge will increase economic imbalances and intensify the tug-of-war between authorities and the financial system, particularly over the effort to prevent the property sector bubble from ballooning. China needs to stimulate to recover from the downturn. Obviously it does not want instability for the 100th birthday of the Communist Party in 2021. An even more important reason for stimulus is the 2022 leadership reshuffle – the twentieth National Party Congress. This is the date when Xi Jinping would originally have stepped down and the leading member of the rival faction (Hu Chunhua?) would have taken over the party, the presidency, and the military commission. Today Xi is not at risk of losing power, but with a trade war and recession to his name, he will have to work hard to tighten control over the party and secure his ability to stay in power. An ongoing domestic political crackdown will frighten local governments and private businesses, who are already scarred by the past decade and whose animal spirits are important to the overall economic rebound. It is still possible that Beijing will have to depreciate the renminbi against the dollar. This is the linchpin of the trade deal with President Trump – especially since other aspects of the deal will be set back by the recession. As long as Trump’s approval rating continues to benefit from his crisis response and stimulus deals, he is more likely to cut tariffs on China than to reignite the trade war. This approach will be reinforced by the bump in his approval rating upon signing the $2 trillion Families First Coronavirus Response Act into law (Chart 9). He will try to salvage the economy and his displays of strength will be reserved for market-irrelevant players like Venezuela. But if the virus outbreak and the surge in unemployment turn him into a “lame duck” later this year, then he may adopt aggressive trade policy and seek the domestic political upside of confronting China. He may need to look tough on trade on the campaign trail. Diplomacy with North Korea could also break down. This is not our base case, but we note that investors are pricing crisis levels into the South Korean won despite its successful handling of the coronavirus (Chart 10). Pyongyang has an incentive to play nice to assist the government in the South while avoiding antagonizing President Trump. But Kim Jong Un may also feel that he has an opportunity to demonstrate strength. This would be relevant not because of North Korea’s bad behavior but because a lame duck President Trump could respond belligerently. Chart 9Trump’s Approval Gets Bump From Crisis Response And Stimulus GeoRisk Update: No Depression GeoRisk Update: No Depression Chart 10South Korean Political Risk Rising South Korean Political Risk Rising South Korean Political Risk Rising We highlighted Russia as a “black swan” candidate for 2020. This view stemmed from President Vladimir Putin’s domestic machinations to stay in power and tamp down on domestic instability in the wake of domestic economic austerity policies. For the same reason we did not expect Moscow to engage in a market share war with Saudi Arabia that devastated oil prices, the Russian ruble, and economy. At any rate, Russia will remain a source of political surprises going forward (Chart 11). Go long oil. Putin cannot add an oil collapse to a plague and recession and expect a popular referendum to keep him in power till 2036. The coronavirus is hitting Russia, forcing Putin to delay the April 22 nationwide referendum that would allow him to rule until 2036. It is also likely forcing a rethink on a budget-busting oil market share war, since more than the $4 billion anti-crisis fund (0.2% of GDP) will be needed to stimulate the economy and boost the health system. Russia faces a budget shortfall of 3 trillion rubles ($39 billion) this year from the oil price collapse. It is no good compounding the economic shock if one intends to hold a popular referendum – even if one is Putin. For all these reasons we agree with BCA Research Commodity & Energy Strategy that a return to negotiations is likely sooner rather than later. Chart 11Russia: A Lake Of Black Swans Russia: A Lake Of Black Swans Russia: A Lake Of Black Swans However, we would not recommend buying the ruble, as tensions with the US are set to escalate. Instead we recommend going long Brent crude oil. Political risk in the European states is hitting highs unseen since the peak of the European sovereign debt crisis (Chart 12). Some of this risk will subside as the European authorities did not delay this time around in instituting dramatic emergency measures. Chart 12Europe: No Delay In Offering 'Whatever It Takes' Europe: No Delay In Offering 'Whatever It Takes' Europe: No Delay In Offering 'Whatever It Takes' Chart 13Political Risk Understated In Taiwan And Turkey Political Risk Understated In Taiwan And Turkey Political Risk Understated In Taiwan And Turkey However, we do not expect political risk to fall back to the low levels seen at the end of last year because the recession will affect important elections between now and 2022 in Italy, the Netherlands, Germany, and France. Only the UK has the advantage of a single-party parliamentary majority with a five-year term in office – this implies policy coherence, notwithstanding the fact that Prime Minister Boris Johnson has contracted the coronavirus. The revolution in German and EU fiscal policy is an essential step in cementing the peripheral countries’ adherence to the monetary union over the long run. But it may not prevent a clash in the coming years between Italy and Germany and Brussels. Italy is one of the countries most likely to see a change in government as a result of the pandemic. It is hard to see voters rewarding this government, ultimately, for its handling of the crisis, even though at the moment popular opinion is tentatively having that effect. The Italian opposition consists of the most popular party, the right-wing League, and the party with the fastest rising popular support, which is the right-wing Brothers of Italy. So the likely anti-incumbent effect stemming from large unemployment would favor the rise of an anti-establishment government over the next year or two. The result would be a clash with Brussels even in the context of Brussels taking on a more permissive attitude toward budget deficits. This will be all the worse if Brussels tries to climb down from stimulus too abruptly. Our political risk indicators have fallen for two countries over the past month: Taiwan and Turkey (Chart 13). This is not because political risk is falling in reality, but because these two markets have not seen their currencies depreciate as much as one would expect relative to underlying drivers of their economy: In Taiwan’s case the reason is the US dollar’s unusual strength relative to the Japanese yen amidst the crisis. Ultimately the yen is a safe-haven currency and it will eventually strengthen if global growth continues to weaken. Moreover we continue to believe that real world politics will lead to a higher risk premium in the Taiwanese dollar and equities. Taiwan faces conflicts with mainland China that will increase with China’s recession and domestic instability. In Turkey’s case, the Turkish lira has depreciated but not as much as one would expect relative to European equities, which have utterly collapsed. Therefore Turkey’s risk indicator shows its domestic political risk falling rather than rising. Turkey’s populist mismanagement will ensure that the lira continues depreciating after European equities recover, and then our risk indicator will shoot up. Chart 14Brazilian Political Risk Is No Longer Contained Brazilian Political Risk Is No Longer Contained Brazilian Political Risk Is No Longer Contained Prior to the pandemic, Brazilian political risk had remained contained, despite Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s extreme and unorthodox leadership. Since the outbreak, however, this indicator has skyrocketed as the currency has collapsed (Chart 14). To make matters worse, Bolsonaro is taking a page from President Trump and diminishing the danger of the coronavirus in his public comments to try to prevent a sharp economic slowdown. This lackadaisical attitude will backfire since, unlike the US, Brazil does not have anywhere near the capacity to manage a major outbreak, as government ministers have warned. This autumn’s local elections present an opportunity for the opposition to stage a comeback. Brazilian stocks won’t be driven by politics in the near term – the effectiveness of China’s stimulus is critical for Brazil and other emerging markets – but political risk will remain elevated for the foreseeable future. Bottom Line: Geopolitical risk is exploding everywhere. This marks the beginning of a period of political turbulence for most of the major nation-states. Domestic economic stresses can be dealt with in various ways but in the event that China’s instability conflicts with President Trump’s election, the result could be a historic geopolitical incident and more downside in equity markets. In Russia’s case this has already occurred, via the oil shock’s effect on US shale producers, so there is potential for relations to heat up – and that is even more true if Joe Biden wins the presidency and initiates Democratic Party revenge for Russian election meddling. The confluence of volatile political elements informs our cautious tactical positioning. Investment Conclusions If the historic, worldwide monetary and fiscal stimulus taking place today is successful in rebooting global growth, then there will be “no depression.” The world will learn to cope with COVID-19 while the “dollar disease” will subside on the back of massive injections of liquidity from central banks and governments. Gold: The above is ultimately inflationary and therefore our strategic long gold trade will be reinforced. The geopolitical instability we expect to emerge from the pandemic and recession will add to the demand for gold in such a reflationary environment. No depression means stay long gold! US Equities: Equities will ultimately outperform government bonds in this environment as well. Our chief US equity strategist Anastasios Avgeriou has tallied up the reasons to go long US stocks in an excellent recent report, “20 Reasons To Buy Equities.” We agree with this view assuming investors are thinking in terms of 12 months and beyond. Chart 15Oil/Gold Ratio Extreme But Wait To Go Long Oil/Gold Ratio Extreme But Wait To Go Long Oil/Gold Ratio Extreme But Wait To Go Long Tactically, however, we maintain the cautious positioning that we adopted on January 24. We have misgivings about the past week’s equity rally. Investors need a clear sense of when the US and European households will start resuming activity. The COVID-19 outbreak is still capable of bringing negative surprises, extending lockdowns, and frightening consumers. Hence we recommend defensive plays that have suffered from indiscriminate selling, rather than cyclical sectors. Go tactically long S&P consumer staples. US Bonds: Over the long run, the Fed’s decision to backstop investment grade corporate bonds also presents a major opportunity to go long on a strategic basis relative to long-dated Treasuries, following our US bond strategists. Global Equities: We prefer global ex-US equities on the basis of relative valuations and US election uncertainty. Shifting policy winds in the United States favor higher taxes and regulation in the coming years. This is true unless President Trump is reelected, which we assess as a 35% chance. Emerging Markets: We are booking gains on our short TRY-USD trade for a gain of 6%. This is a tactical trade that remains fundamentally supported. Book 6% gain on short TRY-USD.   Oil: For a more contrarian trade, we recommend going long oil. Our tactical long oil / short gold trade was stopped out at 5% last week. While we expect mean reversion in this relationship, the basis for gold to rally is strong. Therefore we are going long Brent crude spot prices on Russia’s and Saudi Arabia’s political constraints and global stimulus (Chart 15). We will reconsider the oil/gold ratio at a later date.     Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 See Joseph T. Wu et al, "Estimating clinical severity of COVID-19 from the transmission dynamics in Wuhan, China," Nature Medicine, March 19, 2020, and Wei-jie Guan et al, "Clinical Characteristics of Coronavirus Disease 2019 in China," The New England Journal Of Medicine, February 28, 2020. Section II: Appendix : GeoRisk Indicator China China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator Russia Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator UK UK: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Germany Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Canada Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Spain Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Korea Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights Geopolitical sparks in the Mediterranean point to the revival of realism or realpolitik in places where it has long been dormant. Europe is wary of Russia but will keep buying more of its natural gas. This will be a source of tension with the United States. Turkey is wary of Russia but will continue choosing pragmatic deals with Moscow that fly in the face of Europe and the United States. Turkey’s intervention in Libya is small but symbolic. Increases in foreign policy aggressiveness are negative signs for Turkey as they stem from domestic economic and political instability. Short Turkish currency, equities, and local government bonds. The recent increase in immigration into Europe will fuel another bout of populism if it goes unchecked. Feature “Multipolarity,” or competition among multiple powerful nations, is our overarching geopolitical theme at BCA Research. The collapse of the Soviet Union did not lead to the United States establishing a global empire, which might in theory have provided a stable and predictable trade and investment regime. The United States lashed out when attacked but otherwise became consumed by internal struggles: financial crisis and political polarization. Under two administrations the American public has demanded a reduced commitment to international affairs. Europe is even less likely to project power abroad – particularly after being thrown on the defensive by the Syrian and Libyan revolutions and ineffectual EU responses. Turkey’s aggressive foreign policy is a symptom of global multipolarity – which makes the world less predictable for investors. Emerging markets have risen in economic and military power relative to their developed counterparts. They demand a redistribution of global political power to set aright historical grievances and address immediate concerns, such as supply line insecurities, which increase alongside a rapidly growing economy. Multipolarity is apparent in Russia’s resurgence: pushing back on its borders with Europe and NATO, seeking a greater role in the Middle East and North Africa, interfering in US politics, and cementing its partnership with China. Multipolarity is equally evident when medium-sized powers – especially those that used to take orders from the US and Europe – seek to establish an independent foreign policy and throw off the shackles of the past. Turkey is just such a middle power. Strongman President Recep Tayyip Erdogan initially sought to lead Turkey into a new era of regional ascendancy. The Great Recession and Arab Spring intervened. Domestic economic vulnerabilities and regional instability have driven him to pursue increasingly populist and unorthodox policies that threaten the credit of the nation and security of the currency. A coup attempt in 2016 and domestic political losses in 2019 drove Erdogan further down this path, which includes aggressive foreign policy as well as domestic economic stimulus. The Anatolian peninsula has always stood at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, as well as Russia and Africa. Turkey’s efforts to change the regional status quo to its favor, increase leverage over its neighbors in Europe and the Middle East, and deal with Russia’s Vladimir Putin from a position of strength, are causing the geopolitics of the Mediterranean to heat up. It has now intervened in the Libyan civil war. In this special report, we focus on this trend and ask what it means for global investors. Unfinished Business In Libya Chart 1Haftar Is Weaponizing Libya’s Oil The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean As the Libyan conflict enters its sixth year this spring, the battle for control of the western bastion of Tripoli rages. Multiple efforts to mediate the conflict between Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar of the Libyan National Army (LNA) and Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj of the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) have failed. Ceasefire talks in Moscow, Rome, and Berlin have fizzled. Instead, fighting has finally hit oil production, with the state-run National Oil Corp (NOC) declaring force majeure on supplies on January 18. Tribal leaders who support Haftar have blockaded eastern ports (Chart 1). Previously the mutual dependence of the rival factions on oil revenues ensured production and exports went mostly undisturbed. LNA forces control nearly all key oil pipelines, fields, ports, and terminals in Libya. The exceptions are the Zawiyya and Mellitah terminals and offshore fields (Map 1). However the National Oil Company (NOC), headquartered in the GNA-controlled Tripoli, is the sole entity controlling operations and the sole marketer of Libyan oil. Map 1Libya’s Oil And Natural Gas Infrastructure: Monopolized By Haftar The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean General Haftar’s blockade – which has ground oil production to a halt – displays his ability to weaponize oil to obtain concessions from the Tripoli-based government. Tribal leaders behind the blockade are calling for a larger share of oil revenues, for which they are at the mercy of the LNA and NOC. With little progress in Haftar’s push to gain control of Tripoli, and Libya more generally, the conflict has reached a stalemate. Not one to back down, Haftar’s decision to cut off oil sales from the Tripoli government, which also cuts off revenues to his own parallel administration, is a brute attempt to force a settlement. Haftar’s gambit follows Turkey’s decision to intervene in Libya on behalf of Sarraj and the GNA. Turkey has deployed roughly 2,000 Syrian fighters, as well as 35 Turkish soldiers in an advisory capacity. Turkey apparently feared that Haftar, who has substantial backing from Egypt and the Gulf Arabs as well as Russia and France, was about to triumph, or at least force a settlement detrimental to Turkish interests. Bottom Line: Turkey’s decision to intervene in the Libyan civil war – while limited in magnitude thus far – raises the stakes of the conflict, which involves the EU, Russia, and the Arab states. It is a clear signal of the geopolitical multipolarity in the region – and a political risk that is flying under the radar amid higher profile risks in other parts of the world. Political Interests: Islamist Democracy Versus Arab Dictatorship The Libyan civil war is a proxy war between foreign nations motivated by conflicting economic and strategic interests in North Africa and the Mediterranean. But there is an ideological and political structure to the conflict that explains the alignment of the nations: Turkey is exporting democracy while the Arab states try to preserve their dictatorships. Haftar’s primary supporters include Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia. These states see monarchy as the way to maintain stability in a region constantly on the edge of chaos. Islamist democracy movements, such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, pose a threat to their long-term authority and security. They try to suppress these movements and contain regimes that promote them or their militant allies. They are willing to achieve one-man rule by force and thus support military strongmen like Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and Libya’s General Haftar. On the other side of the conflict stand the backers of the GNA – Turkey and Qatar – which support political Islam and party politics (Chart 2). Turkey’s Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) are sympathetic to Hamas in the Palestinian territories and Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. They want to ensure a lasting role for Islamic parties in the region, which strengthens their legitimacy. They do not want Libya’s Islamists to suffer the same fate as their affiliates in the Muslim Brotherhood – removal via a military coup. Chart 2Turkey Sees A Place For Political Islam Turkey Sees A Place For Political Islam Turkey Sees A Place For Political Islam Chart 3Turkey Steps In Amid Qatar Embargo The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean The political conflict is mirrored in the Persian Gulf in the form of the air, land, and sea embargo imposed on Qatar in 2017 at the hands of the Saudis, Egyptians, and Emiratis. The Qatar crisis followed a 2014 diplomatic rift and the 2011 Arab Spring, when Qatar supported protesters and democracy movements against neighboring regimes. The embargo strengthened Turkey-Qatar relations, as Turkey stepped in to ensure that Qataris – who are heavily dependent on imports – would continue to receive essentials (Chart 3). Bottom Line: The alliances forged in the Libyan conflict reflect differing responses to powerful forces of change in the region. Established monarchies and dictatorships are struggling to maintain control of large youth populations and rapidly modernizing economies. Their response is to fortify the existing regime, suppress dissent, and launch gradual reforms through the central government. Their fear of Islamist movements makes them suspicious of Tripoli and the various Islamist groups allied with the GNA, and aligns them with Khalifa Haftar’s attempt to impose a new secular dictatorship in Libya. Meanwhile Turkey, with an active Islamist democracy, is seeking to export its political model, and Muslim Brotherhood-esque political participation, to gain influence across the region, including in Libya and North Africa. Economic Interests: The Scramble For Energy Sources Chart 4Europe Addicted To Russian Gas The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean The Libyan proxy war is also about natural resources, for all the powers involved. Turkey’s intervention reflects its supply insecurity and desire to carve a larger role for itself in the east Mediterranean economy. Turkey needs to secure cheap energy supplies, and also wants to make itself central to any emerging east Mediterranean natural gas hub that aims to serve Europe. Europe’s increasing dependency on natural gas imports to meet its energy demand, and Russia’s outsized role – supplying the EU with 40% of its needs – have encouraged a search for alternative suppliers (Chart 4). Israel is attempting to fill that role with resources discovered offshore in the eastern Mediterranean. Given its strategic location, Turkey hopes to become an energy hub. First, it is cooperating with the Russians. Presidents Putin and Erdogan inaugurated the Turkish Stream pipeline (TurkStream) at a ceremony in Istanbul on January 8. The pipeline will transport 15.75 billion cubic meters (Bcm) of Russian natural gas to Europe via Turkey. This is part of Russia’s attempt, along with the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, to bypass Ukraine and increase export capacity, strengthening its dominance over Europe’s natural gas market (Map 2). Map 2Russia’s Latest Pipelines Bypass Ukraine The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean Europe and its allies are wary of Russian influence, but the EU is not really willing to halt business with Russia, which is a low-cost and long-term provider free from the turmoil of the Middle East. Despite the significant growth in US natural gas supplies, the relatively higher cost makes Russian supplies comparatively more attractive (Chart 5). Chart 5Russian Gas Is Competitive In European Markets … The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean Chart 6… As US Attempts To Gain Market Share The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean The result will be tensions with the United States, which expects the Europeans to honor the security relationship by buying American LNG (Chart 6) and will always abhor anything resembling a Russo-European alliance. American legislation signed on December 20 would impose sanctions on firms that lay pipes for Nord Stream 2 and TurkStream. Second, Turkey wants to become central to eastern Mediterranean energy development. A series of offshore discoveries in recent decades has sparked talk of cooperation among potential suppliers (Table 1). There is a huge constraint on developing the fields quickly, as there is no export route currently available for the volumes that will be produced. While the reserves are not significant on a global scale, their location so close to Europe, and growing needs in the Middle East, has generated some interest. Table 1Recent East Mediterranean Discoveries Are Relatively Small, But Geopolitically Attractive The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean However, Europe and Israel – the status quo powers – threaten to marginalize Turkey in this process: A meeting of the energy ministers of Egypt, Cyprus, Greece, Israel, Italy, the Palestinian territories, and Jordan in Cairo last July resulted in the creation of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum to promote regional energy cooperation. Turkey – along with Lebanon and Syria – was excluded. Turkey seeks access to natural resources – and to prevent Israel, Egypt, and Europe from excluding it. The EastMed Pipeline deal – signed by Greece, Cyprus, and Israel on January 2 – envisages a nearly 2,000 km subsea pipeline transporting gas from Israeli and Cypriot offshore fields to Cyprus, Crete and Greece, supplying Europe with 9-12 Bcm per year (Map 3). The project enjoys the support of the European Commission and the US as an attempt to diversify Europe’s gas supplies and boost its energy security.1 But it would also be an alternative to an overland pipeline on Turkish territory. Map 3The Proposed EastMed Pipeline Would Marginalize Turkey The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean Egypt has two underutilized liquefied natural gas plants – in Idku and Damietta – and has benefited from the 2015 discovery of the Zohr gas field. Egypt has recently become a net exporter of natural gas (Chart 7). It signed a deal with Israel to purchase 85.3 Bcm – $19.5 billion – of gas from Leviathan and Tamar fields over 15 years. Egypt sees itself as an energy hub if it can re-export Israeli supplies economically. Note that Russia and Turkey have some overlapping interests here. Russia does not want Europe to diversify, while Turkey does not want to allow alternatives to Russia that exclude Turkey. Thus maintaining the current trajectory of natural gas projects is not only useful for Russia’s economy (Chart 8) but also for Turkey’s strategic ambitions. Chart 7Egypt Also Aims To Become East Mediterranean Gas Hub The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean Of course, while Russian pipes are actually getting built, the EastMed pipeline is not – for economic as well as geopolitical reasons. Europe is currently well supplied and energy prices are low. At an estimated $7 billion, the cost of constructing the EastMed pipeline is exorbitant. Chart 8Maintaining Energy Dominance Advances Russia’s Strategic Ambitions Too The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean Still, Turkey must make its influence known now, as energy development and pipelines are necessarily long-term projects. The chaos in Libya presents an opportunity. Seizing on the Libyan GNA’s weakness, Turkey signed an agreement to provide for offshore maritime boundaries and energy cooperation as well as military aid. The EastMed pipeline, of course, would need to cross through Turkish and Libyan economic zones (see Map 3 above).2 Turkey is incapable of asserting its will militarily in the Mediterranean against powerful western naval forces. But short of war, it is capable of expanding its claims and leverage over regional energy and forcing the Israelis and Europeans to deal with it pragmatically and realistically rather than exclude it from their plans. Part of Turkey’s goal is to cement an alliance with Libya – at least a partitioned western Libyan government in any ceasefire brokered with Haftar and the Russians. Bottom Line: While Turkey and Russia support opposing sides in the Libyan conflict, both benefit from dealing directly with each other – bypassing the western powers, which are frustrated and ineffectual in Libya. Both would gain some direct energy leverage over Europe and both would gain some influence over any future eastern Mediterranean routes to Europe. In Libya, if either side triumphs and unites the country, it will grant its allies oil and gas contracts almost exclusively. But if the different foreign actors can build up leverage on opposing sides, they can hope to secure at least some of their interests in a final settlement. Turkey Needs Foreign Distractions The foregoing would imply that Turkey is playing the game well, except that its foreign adventures are in great part driven by domestic economic and political instability. After all, Turkey’s maritime claims are useless if they cannot be enforced, and offshore development and pipeline-building are at a low level given weak energy prices and slowing global demand. Economically, in true populist fashion, Erdogan has repeatedly employed money creation and fiscal spending to juice nominal GDP growth. The result is a wage-price spiral, currency depreciation, and current account deficits that exacerbate the problem. The poor economy has mobilized political opposition. Over the past year, for the first time since Erdogan rose to power in 2002, his Justice and Development Party is fracturing. Former Turkish deputy prime minister Ali Babacan, a founding member of the AKP, as well as former prime minister Ahmet Davutoglu, have both announced breakaway political parties that threaten to erode support for the AKP. Local elections in 2019 resulted in a popular rebuke in Istanbul. Thus Erdogan is distracting the public with hawkish or nationalist stances abroad that are popular at home. Turkey has taken a strident stance against the US and Europe, symbolized by its threats to loose Syrian refugees into Europe and its purchase of S400 missile defense from Russia despite being a NATO member. Military incursions in Syria aim to relocate refugees back to Syria (Chart 9). Chart 9Erdogan Is Distracting Turks With Popular Foreign Stances The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean Chart 10No Love Lost Toward The West The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean The Geopolitics Of The Mediterranean Turkish public opinion encourages close cooperation with Russia and a more aggressive stance against the West (Chart 10). This is a basis for Russia and Turkey to continue cutting transactional deals despite falling on opposite sides of conflicts in Syria, Libya, Iran, and elsewhere. Erdogan’s pretensions of reviving Ottoman grandeur in the Mediterranean fall in this context. Elections are not until 2023, but we expect Erdogan to continue using foreign policy as a distraction. The opposition is trying to unite behind a single candidate, which could jeopardize Erdogan’s grip on power. The insistence on stimulus at all costs means that Erdogan is not allowing the economic reckoning to occur now, three years before the election. He is trying to delay it indefinitely, which may fail. Libya may not get resolved, however. Allies of Haftar’s LNA – specifically Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE – will be motivated to intensify their support of him for fear that a loss would revive domestic interest in political Islam. Egypt especially fears militant proxies being unleashed from any base of operations there. The LNA currently serves as a buffer between Egypt and the militant actors in Libya. If Haftar is defeated, Egypt’s porous western border would provoke a harsh reaction from Cairo. The threat of a revival of Islamic State in Libya has united the Egyptian people – a critical variable in the administration’s vision of a stable country. That has provided Egypt’s Sisi an excuse to flex his muscles through military exercises. Neither Russia nor NATO will be moved to bring a decisive finish to the conflict, as neither wishes to invest too heavily in it. Bottom Line: Erdogan has doubled down on populism at home and abroad. His assertive foreign policy in Syria and now Libya may end up exacerbating economic and political pressures on the ruling party. What Is The Endgame In Libya? There are three possible scenarios to end the current stalemate between the Haftar’s forces and the internationally recognized GNA: Military: An outright military victory by either Haftar or Sarraj is highly unlikely. While Haftar’s forces enjoy military and financial support from the UAE, he lacks popular support in Tripoli – which has proved to be challenging to takeover. Similarly, Sarraj’s army is not strong enough to confront the eastern forces and reunify the country. The merely limited involvement of foreign actors – including Turkey – makes a military solution all the more elusive. The most likely path to a quick military victory comes if foreign actors disengage. This will only occur if they are punished for their involvement, and thus it requires a major neutral power, perhaps the United States, to change the calculus of countries involved. But the US is eschewing involvement and the Europeans have shown no appetite for a heavy commitment. Diplomatic: A negotiated settlement is eventually likely, given the loss of oil revenues. A ceasefire would assign some autonomy to each side of the country. Given Haftar’s ambitions of conquering the capital and becoming a strongman for the country as a whole, the diplomatic route will be challenging unless his Gulf backers grow tired of subsidizing him. Financial: Haftar could win by breaking the NOC’s monopoly on oil. In the past, the LNA failed at selling the oil extracted from infrastructure under its control. If Haftar manages to market the oil without the aid of the NOC then he will be able to guarantee a stream of revenue for his forces and at the same time starve the Tripoli government of financing. This would pose an existential risk for the GNA. The key challenge in this scenario is to obtain international backing for LNA sales of Libyan crude supplies. Libya’s partition into two de facto states is the likeliest outcome. Bottom Line: Unless one of the constraints on a military, diplomatic, or financial end to the conflict is broken, the current stalemate in the Libyan conflict will endure. A partition of Libya will be the practical consequence. Turkey hopes to boost its regional influence through Tripoli, and thus increase its leverage over Europe, but a heavy investment could result in fiscal losses or spiral into a broader regional confrontation. Investment Implications While it is not clear how long the current blockade on Libyan ports will last – or the associated over 1 million barrels per day loss of production – oil supplies will remain at risk so long as the conflict endures. However, unlike supplies in the Gulf or in Venezuela, Libyan crude is of the light sweet grade. There is enough global spare capacity – from US shales – to make up for the Libyan loss, at least over the short term. The fall in Libyan supplies is occurring against the backdrop of oil markets that have been beaten down by the decline in demand on the back of the coronavirus impact (Chart 11). The OPEC 2.0 technical panel recommended additional output cuts of 600 thousand barrels per day last week, and is waiting on a final decision by Russia. We expect the cartel to tighten supplies to shore up prices. The instability in Libya could also affect Europe through immigration. The conflict re-routes migrants through the western route and thus could result in an increased flow to Spain and Portugal, rather than Italy which was previously their landing pad (Chart 12). A meaningful pick up would have a negative impact on European domestic political stability, especially with Germany in the midst of a succession crisis and incapable of taking a lead role. Chart 11Libyan Blockade Comes Amid Demand Shock Libyan Blockade Comes Amid Demand Shock Libyan Blockade Comes Amid Demand Shock Chart 12Refugees Will Favor Western Route Across The Mediterranean Refugees Will Favor Western Route Across The Mediterranean Refugees Will Favor Western Route Across The Mediterranean Erdogan’s foreign adventurism, and aggression against the West, poses a risk for Turkish markets. We remain underweight Turkish currency and risk assets. Our Emerging Markets strategists expect foreign capital outflows from EM to weigh on Turkey’s currency, local fixed-income and sovereign credit relative to EM benchmarks. Go short the Turkish lira relative to the US dollar. Bottom Line: Historically, the Mediterranean was the world’s most important waterway. It was the “life line” of the British empire. The US succeeded the British as the guarantor of Suez and corralled both Turkey and Greece into a single alliance under the Truman Doctrine. This status quo held until the twenty-first century. Since 2000, Russia has revived, US foreign policy in the Middle East has become erratic, and the Europeans have lost clout. Turkey is seeking to carve a space for itself and challenge the settlements of the past, all the way back to the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Yet in the wake of the Great Recession its economy is unstable and its populist leaders are taking greater risks abroad. The result will be greater friction with Europe, or the Arab states, or both. Given Turkey’s mismanagement at home, and limited gains to be made in Syria or Libya, Turkish assets will be the first to suffer from negative surprises.   Roukaya Ibrahim Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 The Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act of 2019 is an American bi-partisan bill the lends full support for the East Med pipelines and greater security cooperation with Israel, Cyprus, and Greece. The US Senate also passed an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act last June which ended the arms embargo on Cyprus. 2 Turkey has also been engaging in drilling activities in disputed waters near Cyprus – which Ankara argues it is undertaking in order to protect Turkish-Cypriot claims – motivating EU economic sanctions in the form of travel bans and asset freezes on two Turkish nationals.

Highlights Our top five geopolitical “Black Swans” are risks that the market is seriously underpricing. With the “phase one” trade deal signed, Chinese policy could become less accommodative, resulting in a negative economic surprise. The trade deal may fall victim to domestic politics, raising the risk of a US-China military skirmish. A Biden victory at the Democratic National Convention or a Democratic takeover of the White House could trigger social unrest and violence in the US. A pickup in the flow of migrants to Europe would fundamentally undermine political stability there. Russia’s weak economy will add fuel to domestic unrest, risking an escalation beyond the point of containment. Feature Over the past four years, we have started off the year with our top five geopolitical “Black Swans.” These are low-probability events whose market impact would be significant enough to matter for global investors. Unlike the great Byron Wien’s perennial list of market surprises, we do not assign these events a “better than 50% likelihood of happening.” We offer risks that the market is seriously underpricing by assigning them only single-digit probabilities when we think the reality is closer to 10%-15%, a level at which a risk premium ought to be assigned. Some of our risks below are so obscure that it is not clear how exactly to price them. We exclude issues that are fairly probable, such as flare-ups in Indo-Pakistani conflict. The two major risks of the year – discussed in our annual outlook – are that either US President Donald Trump or Chinese President Xi Jinping overreaches in a major way. But what would truly surprise the market would be a policy-induced relapse in Chinese growth or a direct military clash between the two great powers. That is how we begin. Other risks stem from domestic affairs in the US, Europe, and Russia. Black Swan 1: China’s Financial Crisis Begins The risk of Xi Jinping’s concentration of power in his own person is that individuals can easily make mistakes, especially if unchecked by advisors or institutions. Lower officials will fear correcting or admonishing an all-powerful leader. Inconvenient information may not be relayed up the hierarchy. Such behavior was rampant in Chairman Mao Zedong’s time, leading to famine among other ills. Insofar as President Xi’s cult of personality successfully imitates Mao’s, it will be subject to similar errors. If President Xi overreaches and makes a policy mistake this year, it could occur in economic policy or other policies. We begin with economic policy, as we have charted the risks of Xi’s crackdown on the financial system since early 2017 (Chart 1). Chart 1A Crackdown On Financial Risk Could Cause China's Economy To Derail A Crackdown On Financial Risk Could Cause China's Economy To Derail A Crackdown On Financial Risk Could Cause China's Economy To Derail Chart 2Easing Of Trade Tensions May Re-Incentivize Tighter Policy Easing Of Trade Tensions May Re-Incentivize Tighter Policy Easing Of Trade Tensions May Re-Incentivize Tighter Policy This year is supposed to be the third and final year of Xi Jinping’s “three battles” against systemic risk, pollution, and poverty. The first battle actually focuses on financial risk, i.e. China’s money and credit bubble. The regime has compromised on this goal since mid-2018, allowing monetary easing to stabilize the economy amid the trade war. But with a “phase one” trade deal having been signed, there is an underrated risk that economic policy will return to its prior setting, i.e. become less accommodative (Chart 2). When Xi launched the “deleveraging campaign” in 2017, we posited that the authorities would be willing to tolerate an annual GDP growth rate below 6%. This would not only cull excesses in the economy but also demonstrate that the administration means business when it says that China must prioritize quality rather than quantity of growth. While Chinese authorities are most likely targeting “around 6%” in 2020, it is entirely possible that the authorities will allow an undershoot in the 5.5%-5.9% range. They will argue that the GDP target for 2020 has already been met on a compound growth rate basis (Chart 3), as astute clients have pointed out. They may see less need for stimulus than the market expects. Chart 3Chinese Authorities Might Tolerate A Growth Undershoot In 2020 Chinese Authorities Might Tolerate A Growth Undershoot In 2020 Chinese Authorities Might Tolerate A Growth Undershoot In 2020 Similarly, while urban disposable income is ostensibly lagging its target of doubling 2010 levels by 2020, China’s 13th Five Year Plan, which concludes in 2020, conspicuously avoided treating urban and rural income targets separately. Chart 4Lower Impetus For Economic Support Due To Improvements In National Income? Lower Impetus For Economic Support Due To Improvements In National Income? Lower Impetus For Economic Support Due To Improvements In National Income? Chart 5Has China's Stimulus Peaked? Has China's Stimulus Peaked? Has China's Stimulus Peaked? If the authorities focus only on general disposable income, then they are on track to meet their target (Chart 4). This would reduce the impetus for greater economic support. There are already tentative signs that Chinese authorities are “satisfied” with the amount of stimulus they have injected: some indicators of money and credit have already peaked (Chart 5). The crackdown on shadow banking has eased, but informal lending is still contracting. The regime is still pushing reforms that shake up state-owned enterprises. The Xi administration may aim only for stability, not acceleration, in the economy. An added headwind for the Chinese economy stems from the currency. The currency should track interest rate differentials. Beijing’s incremental monetary stimulus, in the form of cuts to bank reserve requirement ratios (RRRs), should also push the renminbi down over time (Chart 6). However, an essential aspect of any trade deal with the Trump administration is the need to demonstrate that China is not competitively devaluing. Hence the CNY-USD could overshoot in the first half of the year. This is positive for global exports to China, but it tightens Chinese financial conditions at home. A stronger than otherwise justified renminbi would add to any negative economic surprises from less accommodative monetary and fiscal policy. Conventional wisdom says China will stimulate the economy ahead of two major political events: the centenary of the Communist Party in 2021 and the twentieth National Party Congress in 2022. The former is a highly symbolic anniversary, as Xi has reasserted the supremacy of the party in all things, while the latter is more significant for policy, as it is a leadership reshuffle that will usher in the sixth generation of China’s political elite. But conventional wisdom may be wrong – the Xi administration may aim only for stability, not acceleration, in the economy. It would make sense to save dry powder for the next US or global recession. The obvious implication is that China’s economic rebound may lose steam as early as H2 – but the black swan risk is that negative surprises could cause a vicious spiral inside of China. This is a country with massive financial and economic imbalances, a declining potential growth profile, and persistent political obstacles to growth both at home and abroad. Corporate defaults have spiked sharply. While the default rate is lower than elsewhere, the market may be sniffing out a bigger problem as it charges a much higher premium for onshore Chinese bonds (Chart 7). Chart 6CNY-USD Overshoot Would Tighten Chinese Financial Conditions CNY-USD Overshoot Would Tighten Chinese Financial Conditions CNY-USD Overshoot Would Tighten Chinese Financial Conditions Chart 7Is China's Bond Market Sniffing Out A Problem? Is China's Bond Market Sniffing Out A Problem? Is China's Bond Market Sniffing Out A Problem? Bottom Line: Our view is that China’s authorities will remain accommodative in 2020 in order to ensure that growth bottoms and the labor market continues to improve. But Beijing has compromised its domestic economic discipline since 2018 in order to fight trade war. The risk now, with a “phase one” deal in hand, is that Xi Jinping returns to his three-year battle plan and underestimates the downward pressures on the economy. The result would be a huge negative surprise for the Chinese and global economy in 2020. Black Swan 2: The US And China Go To War In 2013, we predicted that US-China conflict was “more likely than you think.” This was not just an argument for trade conflict or general enmity that raises the temperature in the Asia-Pacific region – we included military conflict. Chart 8Americans' Attitudes Toward China Plunged … Five Black Swans In 2020 Five Black Swans In 2020 At the time, the notion that a Sino-American armed conflict was the world’s greatest geopolitical threat seemed ludicrous to many of our clients. We published this analysis in October of that year, months after the Islamic State “Soldier’s Harvest” offensive into Iraq. Trying to direct investors to the budding rivalry between American and Chinese naval forces in the South China Sea amidst the Islamic State hysteria was challenging, to say the least. The suggestion that an accidental skirmish between the US and China could descend into a full-blown conflict involved a stretch of the imagination because China was not yet perceived by the American public as a major threat. In 2014, only 19%of the US public saw China as the “greatest threat to the US in the future.” This came between Russia, at 23%, and Iran, at 16%. Today, China and Russia share the top spot with 24%. Furthermore, the share of Americans with an unfavorable view of China has increased from 52% to 60% in the six intervening years (Chart 8). The level of enmity expressed by the US public toward China is still lower than that toward the Soviet Union at the onset of the Cold War in the 1950s (Chart 9). However, the trajectory of distrust is clearly mounting. We expect this trend to continue: anti-China sentiment is one of the few sources of bipartisan agreement remaining in Washington, DC (Chart 10). Chinese sentiment toward the United States has also darkened dramatically. The geopolitical rivalry is deepening for structural reasons: as China advances in size and sophistication, it seeks to alter the regional status quo in its favor, while the US grows fearful and seeks to contain China. Chart 9… But Not Yet To War-Inducing Levels Five Black Swans In 2020 Five Black Swans In 2020 Chart 10Distrust Of China Is Bipartisan Five Black Swans In 2020 Five Black Swans In 2020 Chart 11Newfound American Concern For China’s Repression Five Black Swans In 2020 Five Black Swans In 2020 One example of rising enmity is the US public’s newfound concern for China’s domestic policies and human rights, specifically Beijing’s treatment of its Uyghur minority in Xinjiang. A Google Trends analysis of the term “Uyghur” or “Uyghur camps” shows a dramatic rise in mentions since Q2 of 2018, around the same time the trade war ramped up in a major way (Chart 11). While startling revelations of re-education camps in Xinjiang emerged in recent years, the reality is that Beijing has used heavy-handed tactics against both militant groups and the wider Uyghur minority since at least 2008 – and much earlier than that. As such, the surge of interest by the general American public and legislators – culminating in the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2019 – is a product of the renewed strategic tension between the two countries. The “phase one” trade deal risks falling victim to domestic politics due to greater public engagement in foreign policy. The same can be said for Hong Kong: the US did not pass a Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in 2014, during the first round of mass protests, which prompted Beijing to take heavy-handed legal, legislative, and censorship actions. It passed the bill in 2019, after the climate in Washington had changed. Why does this matter for investors? There are two general risks that come with a greater public engagement in foreign policy. First, the “phase one” trade deal between China and the US could fall victim to domestic politics. This deal envisions a large step up in Sino-American economic cooperation. But if China is to import around $200 billion of additional US goods and services over the next two years – an almost inconceivable figure – the US and China will have to tamp down on public vitriol. This is notably the case if the Democratic Party takes over the White House, given its likely greater focus on liberal concerns such as human rights. And yet the latest bills became law under President Trump and a Republican Senate, and we fully expect a second Trump term to involve a re-escalation of trade tensions to ensure compliance with phase one and to try to gain greater structural concessions in phase two. Second, mounting nationalist sentiment will make it more difficult for US and Chinese policymakers to reduce tensions following a potential future military skirmish, accidental or otherwise. While our scenario of a military conflict in 2013 was cogent, the public backlash in the United States was probably manageable.1 Today we can no longer guarantee that this is the case. China has greater control over the domestic narrative and public discourse, but the rise of the middle class and the government’s efforts to rebuild support for the single-party regime have combined to create an increase in nationalism. Thus it is also more difficult for Chinese policymakers to contain the popular backlash if conflict erupts. In short, the probability of a quick tamping down of public enmity is actively being reduced as American public vilification of China is closing the gap with China’s burgeoning nationalism at an alarming pace. Chart 12Tsai Ing-Wen Enjoys A Greater Mandate On Higher Turnout … Five Black Swans In 2020 Five Black Swans In 2020 Another of our black swan risks – Taiwan island – is inextricably bound up in this dangerous US-China dynamic. To be clear, Washington will tread carefully, as a conflict over Taiwan could become a major war. Nevertheless Taiwan’s election, as we expected, has injected new vitality into this already underrated geopolitical risk. It is not only that a high-turnout election (Chart 12) gave President Tsai Ing-wen a greater mandate (Chart 13), or that her Democratic Progressive Party retained its legislative majority (Chart 14). It is not only that the trigger for this resounding victory was the revolt in Hong Kong and the Taiwanese people’s rejection of the “one country, two systems” formula for Taiwan. It is also that Tsai followed up with a repudiation of the mainland by declaring, “We don’t have a need to declare ourselves an independent state. We are an independent country already and we call ourselves the Republic of China, Taiwan.” Chart 13… Popular Support … Five Black Swans In 2020 Five Black Swans In 2020 Chart 14… And A Legislative Majority Five Black Swans In 2020 Five Black Swans In 2020 This statement is not a minor rhetorical flourish but will be received as a major provocation in Beijing: the crystallization of a long-brewing clash between Beijing and Taipei. Additional punitive economic measures against Taiwan are now guaranteed. Saber-rattling could easily ignite in the coming year and beyond. Taiwan is the epicenter of the US-China strategic conflict. First, Beijing cannot compromise on its security or its political legitimacy and considers the “one China principle” to be inviolable. Second, the US maintains defense relations with Taiwan (and is in the process of delivering on a relatively large new package of arms). Third, the US’s true willingness to fight a war on Taiwan’s behalf is in doubt, which means that deterrence has eroded and there is greater room for miscalculation. Bottom Line: A US-China military skirmish has been our biggest black swan risk since we began writing the BCA Geopolitical Strategy. The difference between then and now, however, is that the American public is actually paying attention. Political ideology – the question of democracy and human rights – is clearly merging with trade, security, and other differences to provoke Americans of all stripes. This makes any skirmish more than just a temporary risk-off event, as it could lead to a string of incidents or even protracted military conflict. Black Swan 3: Social Unrest Erupts In America There are numerous lessons that one can learn from the ongoing unrest in Hong Kong, but perhaps the most cogent one is that Millennials and Generation Z are not as docile and feckless as their elders think. Images of university students and even teenagers throwing flying kicks and Molotov cocktails while clad in black body armor have shocked the world. Perhaps all those violent video games did have a lasting impact on the youth! What is surprising is that so few commentators have made the cognitive leap from the ultra-first world streets of Hong Kong to other developed economies. Perhaps what is clouding analysts’ minds is the idiosyncratic nature of the dispute in Hong Kong, the “one China” angle. However, Hong Kong youth are confronted with similar socio-economic challenges that their peers in other advanced economies face: overpriced real estate and a bifurcated service-sector labor market with few mid-tier jobs that pay a decent wage. In the US, Millennials and Gen Z are also facing challenges unique to the US. First, their debt burden is much more toxic than that of the older cohorts, given that it is made up of student loans and credit card debt (Chart 15). Second, they find themselves at odds – demographically and ideologically – with the older cohorts (Chart 16). Chart 15Younger American Cohorts Plagued By Toxic Debt Five Black Swans In 2020 Five Black Swans In 2020 Chart 16Younger And Older Cohorts At Odds Demographically Five Black Swans In 2020 Five Black Swans In 2020 The adage that the youth are apolitical and do not turn out to vote may have ended thanks to President Trump. The 2018 midterm election, which the Democratic Party successfully turned into a referendum on the president, saw the youth (18-29) turnout nearly double from 20% to 36% (the 30-44 year-old cohort also saw a jump in turnout from 35.6% to 48.8%). The election saw one of the highest turnouts in recent memory, with a 53.4% figure, just two points off the 2016 general election figure (Chart 17). Chart 17Massive Turnout To The 2016 Referendum On Trump Five Black Swans In 2020 Five Black Swans In 2020 Despite the high turnout in 2018, the-most-definitely-not-Millennial Vice President Joe Biden continues to lead the Democratic Party in the polls. Chart 18Biden Unpopular Among Young American Voters Five Black Swans In 2020 Five Black Swans In 2020 Chart 19Bookies Pulled Down "Uncle Joe's" Odds, Capturing Democratic Party Zeitgeist Five Black Swans In 2020 Five Black Swans In 2020 His probability of winning the nomination is not overwhelming, but it is the highest of any contender. In recent polls, Biden comes third place in Millennial/Gen-Z vote preferences (Chart 18). Yet he is hardly out of contention, especially for the 30-44 year-old cohort. The view that “Uncle Joe” does not fit the Democratic Party zeitgeist has become so entrenched in the Democratic Party narrative that it became conventional wisdom last year, pulling oddsmakers and betting markets away from the clear frontrunner (Chart 19). As such, a Biden victory at the Democratic National Convention in Milwaukee, Wisconsin on July 13-16 may come as an affront to the left-wing activists who will surely descend on the convention. This will particularly be the case if Biden wins despite the progressive candidates amassing a majority of overall delegates, which is possible judging by the combined progressive vote share in current polling (Chart 20). He would arrive in Milwaukee without clearing the 1990 delegate count required to win on the first ballot. On the second ballot, his presidency would then receive a boost from “superdelegates” and those progressives who are unwilling to “rock the boat,” i.e. unify against an establishment candidate with the largest share of votes. This is also how Mayor Michael Bloomberg could pull off a surprise win. Chart 20Progressives Come Closest To Victory Five Black Swans In 2020 Five Black Swans In 2020 Such a “brokered” – or contested – convention has not occurred since 1952. However, several Democratic Party conventions came close, including 1968, 1972, and 1984. The 1968 one in Chicago was notable for considerable violence and unrest. Even if the Milwaukee Democratic Party convention does not produce unrest, it could sow the seeds for unrest later in the year. First, a breakout Biden performance in the primaries is unlikely. As such, he will likely need to pledge a shift to the left at the convention, including by accepting a progressive vice-presidential candidate. Second, an actual progressive may win the primary. Chart 21Zealots In Both Parties Perceive Each Other As A National Threat Five Black Swans In 2020 Five Black Swans In 2020 It is likely that either of the two options would be seen as an existential threat to many of Trump’s loyal supporters across the United States. President Trump’s rhetoric often paints the scenario of a Democratic takeover of the White House in apocalyptic terms. And data suggests that the zealots in both parties perceive each other as a “threat to the nation’s wellbeing” (Chart 21). The American Civil War in the nineteenth century began with the election of a president. This is not just because Abraham Lincoln was a particularly reviled figure in the South, but because the states that ultimately formed the Confederacy saw in his election the demographic writing-on-the-wall. The election was an expression of a general will that, from that point onwards, was irreversible. Given demographic trends in the US today, it is possible that many would see in Trump’s loss a similar fait accompli. If one perceives progressive Democrats as an existential threat to the US constitution, rebellion is the obvious and rational response. There is a risk of rebellion from Trump’s most ardent supporters if he loses the White House. Bottom Line: Year 2020 may be a particularly violent one for the US. First, left wing activists may be shocked and angered to learn that Joe Biden (or Bloomberg) is the nominee of the Democratic Party come July. With so much hype behind the progressive candidates throughout the campaign, Biden’s nomination could be seen as an affront to what was supposed to be “the big year” for left-wing candidates. Second, investors have to start thinking about what happens if Biden – or a progressive candidate – goes on to defeat President Trump in the general election. While liberal America took Trump’s election badly, it has demographics – and thus time – on its side. Trump’s most ardent supporters may conclude that his defeat means the end of America as they know it. Black Swan 4: Europe’s Migration Crisis Restarts Chart 22Decline In Illegal Immigration Dampened European Populism Five Black Swans In 2020 Five Black Swans In 2020 It is a testament to Europe’s resilience that we do not have a Black Swan scenario based on an election or a political crisis set on the continent in 2020. Support for the common currency and the EU as a whole has rebounded to its highest since 2013. Even early elections in Germany and Italy are unlikely to produce geopolitical risk. The populists in the former are in no danger of outperforming whereas the populists in the latter barely deserve the designation. But what if one of the reasons for the surge in populism – unchecked illegal immigration – were to return in 2020? The data suggests that the risk of migrant flows has massively subsided. From its peak of over a million arrivals in 2015, the data shows that only 125,472 migrants crossed into Europe via land and sea routes in the Mediterranean last year (Chart 22). Why? There are five reasons that we believe have checked the flow of migrants: Supply: The civil wars in Syria, Iraq, and Libya have largely subsided. Heterogenous regions, cities, and neighborhoods have been ethnically cleansed and internal boundaries have largely ossified. It is unlikely that any future conflict will produce massive outflows of refugees as the displacement has already taken place. These countries are now largely divided into armed, ethnically homogenous, camps. Enforcement: The EU has stepped up border enforcement since 2015, pouring resources into the land border with Turkey and naval patrols across the Mediterranean. Individual member states – particularly Italy and Hungary – have also stepped up border enforcement policy. While most EU member states have publicly chided both for “draconian” policies, there is no impetus to force Rome and Budapest to change policy. Libyan Imbroglio: Conflict in Libya has flared up in 2019 with military warlord Khalifa Haftar looking to wrest control from the UN-backed Government of National Accord led by Fayez al-Serraj. The Islamic State has regrouped in the country as well. Ironically, the conflict is helping stem the flow of migrants as African migrants from sub-Saharan countries dare not cross into Libya as they did in 2015 when there was a brief lull in fighting. Turkish benevolence: Ankara is quick to point out that it is the only thing standing between Europe and a massive deluge of migrants. Turkey is said to host somewhere between two and four million refugees from various conflicts in the Middle East. Fear of the crossing: If crossing the Mediterranean was easy, Europe would have experienced a massive influx of migrants throughout the twentieth century. Not only is it not easy, it is costly and quite deadly, with thousands lost each year. Furthermore, most migrants are not welcomed when they arrive to Europe, many are held in terrible conditions in holding camps in Italy and Greece. Over time, migrants who made it into Europe have reported these dangers and conditions, reducing the overall demand for illegal migration. We do not foresee these five factors changing, at least not all at once. However, there are several reasons to worry about the flow of migrants in 2020. US-Iran tensions have sparked outright military action, while unrest is flaring up across Iran’s sphere of influence. Going forward, Iran could destabilize Iraq or fuel Shia unrest against US-backed regimes. Second, Afghanistan has been the source of most migrants to Europe via sea and land Mediterranean routes – 19.2%. The conflict in the country continues and may flare up with President Trump’s decision to formally withdraw most US troops from the country in 2020. Third, a break in fighting in Libya may encourage sub-Saharan migrants to revisit routes to Europe. Migrants from Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, and the Democratic Republic of Congo make up over 10% of migrants to Europe. Finally, Turkish relationship with the West could break up further in 2020, causing Ankara to ship migrants northward. We highly doubt that President Erdogan will risk such a break, given that 50% of Turkish exports go to Europe. A European embargo on Turkish exports – which would be a highly likely response to such an act – would crush the already decimated Turkish economy. Bottom Line: While we do not see a return to the 2015 level of migration in 2020, we flag this risk because it would fundamentally undermine political stability in Europe. Black Swan 5: Russia Faces A “Peasant Revolt” Our fifth and final black swan risk for the year stems from Russia. This risk may seem obvious, since the US election creates a dynamic that revives the inherent conflict in US-Russian relations. Russia could seek to accomplish foreign policy objectives – interfering in US elections, punishing regional adversaries. The Trump administration may be friendly toward Russia but Trump is unlikely to veto any sanctions passed by the House and Senate in an election year, should an occasion for new sanctions arise. Conversely Russia could anticipate greater US pressure if the Democrats win in November. Yet it is Russia’s domestic affairs that represent the real underrated risk. Putin’s fourth term as president has been characterized by increased focus on domestic political control and stability as opposed to foreign adventurism. The creation of a special National Guard in 2016, reporting directly to Putin and responsible for quelling domestic unrest, symbolizes the shift in focus. So too does Russia’s adherence to the OPEC 2.0 regime of production control to keep oil prices above their budget breakeven level. Meanwhile Putin’s courting of Europe for the Nordstream II pipeline, and his slight peacemaking efforts with Ukraine, has suggested a slightly more restrained international posture. Chart 23Sluggish Wage Growth Threatens Russian Stability Sluggish Wage Growth Threatens Russian Stability Sluggish Wage Growth Threatens Russian Stability Strategically it makes little sense for Russia to court negative attention at a time when the US and Europe are at odds over trade and the Middle East, the US is preoccupied with China and Iran, and Russia itself faces mounting domestic problems. The domestic problems are long in coming. The central bank has maintained a stringent monetary policy for the better part of the decade. Despite cutting interest rates recently, monetary and credit conditions are still tight, hurting domestic demand. Moscow has also imposed fiscal austerity, namely by cutting back on state pensions and hiking the value added tax. Real wage growth is weak (Chart 23), retail sales are falling, and domestic demand looks to weaken further, as Andrija Vesic of BCA Emerging Markets Strategy observes in a recent Special Report. The effect of Russia’s policy austerity has been a drop in public approval of the administration (Chart 24). Protests erupted in 2019 but were largely drowned out by the larger and more globally significant protests in Hong Kong. These were met by police suppression that has not removed their underlying cause. Putin’s first major decision of the new year was to reshuffle the government, entailing Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev’s transfer to a new post and the appointment of a new cabinet. This move reveals the need to show some accountability to reduce popular pressure. While Moscow now has room to cut interest rates and ease fiscal policy, it is behind the curve and the weak economy will add fuel to domestic unrest. Meanwhile Putin’s efforts to alter the Russian constitution so he can stay in power beyond current term limits, effectively becoming emperor for life, like Xi Jinping, should not be dismissed merely because they are expected. They reflect a need to take advantage of Putin’s popular standing to consolidate domestic political power at a time when the ruling United Russia party and the federal government face discontent. They also ensure that strategic conflict with the United States will take on an ideological dimension. Chart 24Austerity Weighed On The Administration's Popularity In Russia Austerity Weighed On The Administration's Popularity In Russia Austerity Weighed On The Administration's Popularity In Russia Chart 25Russian Political Risk Is Unsustainably Low Russian Political Risk Is Unsustainably Low Russian Political Risk Is Unsustainably Low Russia's recent cabinet shakeup is positive from the point of view of economic reform. And the country's monetary and fiscal room provide a basis for remaining overweight equities within EM, as our Emerging Markets Strategy recommends. However, Russian equities have rallied hard and the political risk is understated. Bottom Line: It is never easy predicting Putin’s next international move. Our market-based indicators of Russian political risk have hit multi-year lows, but both the domestic and international context suggest that these lows will not be sustained (Chart 25). A new bout of risk can emanate from Putin, or from changes in Washington, or from the Russian people themselves. What would take the world by surprise would be domestic unrest on a larger scale than Russia can easily suppress through the police force. Housekeeping We are closing our long European Union / short Chinese equities strategic trade with a 1.61% loss since inception on May 10, 2019. Dhaval Joshi of BCA’s European Investment Strategy downgraded the Eurostoxx 50 to underweight versus the S&P 500 and the Nikkei 225 this week. He makes the point that the Euro Area bond yield 6-month impulse hit 100 bps – a critical technical level – and will be a strong headwind to growth. We will look to reopen this trade at a later date when the euphoria over the “phase one” trade deal subsides, as we still favor European equities and DM bourses over EM. We will reinstitute our long Brent crude H2 2020 versus H2 2021 tactical position, which was stopped out on January 9, 2020. We remain bullish on oil fundamentals and expect Middle East instability to add a political risk premium. China's stimulus and the oil view also give reason for us to reinitiate our long Malaysian equities relative to EM as a tactical position. The Malaysian ringgit will benefit as oil prices move higher, helping Malaysian companies make payments on their large pile of dollar-denominated debt and improving household purchasing power. Higher oil prices also correlate with higher equity prices, while China's stimulus and the US trade ceasefire will push the US dollar lower and help trade revive in the region. Marko Papic Consulting Editor marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Observe how little attention the public paid to US-China saber-rattling around China’s announcement of an Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea that year.

Highlights The U.S. and China are moving toward formalizing a trade ceasefire that reduces geopolitical risk in the near term. The risk of a no-deal Brexit is finished – removing a major downside to European assets. Spanish elections reinforce our narrative of general European political stability. Go long 10-year Italian BTPs / short 10-year Spanish bonos for a trade. Geopolitical risks will remain elevated in Turkey, rise in Russia, but remain subdued in Brazil. A post-mortem of Canada’s election suggests upside to fiscal spending but further downside to energy sector investment over the short to medium term. Feature After a brief spike in trade war-related geopolitical risk just prior to the resumption of U.S.-China negotiations, President Trump staged a tactical retreat in the trade war. Chart 1Proxy For Trade War Shows Falling Risk Proxy For Trade War Shows Falling Risk Proxy For Trade War Shows Falling Risk Negotiating in Washington, President Trump personally visited the top Chinese negotiator Liu He and the two sides announced an informal “phase one deal” to reverse the summer’s escalation in tensions: China will buy $40-$50 billion in U.S. agricultural goods while the U.S. will delay the October 15 tariff hike. More difficult issues – forced tech transfer, intellectual property theft, industrial subsidies – were punted to later. The RMB is up 0.7% and our own measures of trade war-related risk have dropped off sharply (Chart 1). We think these indicators will be confirmed and Trump’s retreat will continue – as long as he has a chance to save the 2020 economic outlook and his reelection campaign. Odds are low that Trump will be removed from office by a Republican-controlled senate – the looming election provides the republic with an obvious recourse for Trump’s alleged misdeeds. However, Trump’s approval rating is headed south. While it is around the same level as President Obama’s at this point in his first term, Obama’s started a steep and steady rise around now and ended above 50% for the election, a level that is difficult to foresee for Trump (Chart 2). So Trump desperately needs an economic boost and a policy victory to push up his numbers. Short of passing the USMCA, which is in the hands of the House Democrats, a deal with China is the only way to get a major economic and political win at the same time. Hence the odds of Presidents Trump and Xi actually signing some kind of agreement are the highest they have been since April (when we had them pegged at 50/50). Trump will have to delay the December 15 tariff hike and probably roll back some of the tariffs over next year as continuing talks “make progress,” though we doubt he will remove restrictions on tech companies like Huawei. Still, we strongly believe that what is coming is a détente rather than the conclusion of the Sino-American rivalry crowned with a Bilateral Trade Agreement. Strategic tensions are rising on a secular basis between the two countries. These tensions could still nix Trump’s flagrantly short-term deal-making, and they virtually ensure that some form of trade war will resume in 2021 or 2022, if indeed a ceasefire is maintained in 2020. Both sides are willing to reduce immediate economic pain but neither side wants to lose face politically. Trump will not forge a “grand compromise.” Our highest conviction view all along has been – and remains – that Trump will not forge a “grand compromise” ushering in a new period of U.S.-China economic reengagement in the medium or long term. China’s compliance, its implementation of structural changes, will be slow or lacking and difficult to verify at least until the 2020 verdict is in. This means policy uncertainty will linger and business confidence and capex intentions will only improve on the margin, not skyrocket upward (Chart 3). Chart 2Trump Needs A Policy Win And Economic Boost How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019 How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019 Chart 3Sentiment Will Improve ... Somewhat Sentiment Will Improve ... Somewhat Sentiment Will Improve ... Somewhat The problem for bullish investors is that even if global trade uncertainty falls, and the dollar’s strength eases, fear will shift from geopolitics to politics, and from international equities to American equities (Chart 4). Trump, hit by impeachment and an explosive reaction to his Syria policy, is entering into dangerous territory for the 2020 race. Trump’s domestic weakness threatens imminent equity volatility for two reasons. Chart 4American Outperformance Falls With Trade Tensions bca.gps_wr_2019_10_25_c4 bca.gps_wr_2019_10_25_c4 Chart 5Democratic Win In 2020 Is Market-Negative Democratic Win In 2020 Is Market-Negative Democratic Win In 2020 Is Market-Negative First, if Trump’s approval rating falls below today’s 42%, investors will begin pricing a Democratic victory in 2020, i.e. higher domestic policy uncertainty, higher taxes, and the re-regulation of the American economy (Chart 5). This re-rating may be temporarily delayed or mitigated by the fact that former Vice President Joe Biden is still leading the Democratic Party’s primary election race. Biden is a known quantity whose policies would simply restore the Obama-era status quo, which is only marginally market-negative. Contrary to our expectations Biden's polling has not broken down due to accusations of foul play in Ukraine and China. Nevertheless, Senator Elizabeth Warren will gradually suck votes away from fellow progressive Senator Bernie Sanders and in doing so remain neck-and-neck with Biden (Chart 6). When and if she pulls ahead of Biden, markets face a much greater negative catalyst. (Yes, she is also capable of beating Trump, especially if his polling remains as weak as it is.) Chart 6Warren Will Rise To Front-Runner Status With Biden How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019 How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019 Second, if Trump becomes a “lame duck” he will eventually reverse the trade retreat above and turn into a loose cannon in his final months in office. Right now we see a decline in geopolitical risk, but if the economy fails to rebound or the China ceasefire offers little support, then Trump will at some point conclude that his only chance at reelection is to double down on his confrontation with America’s enemies and run as a “war president.” A cold war crisis with China, or a military confrontation with Iran (or North Korea, Venezuela, or some unexpected target) could occur. But since September we have been confirmed in believing that Trump is trying to be the dealmaker one last time before any shift to the war president. Bottom Line: The “phase one” trade deal is really just a short-term ceasefire. Assuming it is signed by Trump and Xi, it suggests no increase in tariffs and some tariff rollback next year. However, as recessionary fears fade, and if Trump’s reelection chances stabilize, U.S.-China tensions on a range of issues will revive – and there is no getting around the longer-term conflict between the two powers. For this and other reasons, we remain strategically short RMB-USD, as the flimsy ceasefire will only briefly see RMB appreciation. BoJo's Brexit Bluff Is Finished Our U.K. indicator captured a sharp decline in political risk in the past two weeks and our continental European indicators mirrored this move (Chart 7). The risk that the U.K. would fall out of the EU without a withdrawal agreement has collapsed even further than in September, when parliament rejected Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s no-deal gambit and we went long GBP-USD. We have since added a long GBP-JPY trade. Chart 7Collapse In No-Deal Risk Will Echo Across Europe Collapse In No-Deal Risk Will Echo Across Europe Collapse In No-Deal Risk Will Echo Across Europe Chart 8Unlikely To See Another Tory/Brexit Rally Like This Unlikely To See Another Tory/Brexit Rally Like This Unlikely To See Another Tory/Brexit Rally Like This The risk of “no deal” is the only reason to care about Brexit from a macro point of view, as the difference between “soft Brexit” and “no Brexit” is not globally relevant. What matters is the threat of a supply-side shock to Europe when it is already on the verge of recession. With this risk removed, sentiment can begin to recover (and Trump’s trade retreat also confirms our base case that he will not impose tariffs on European cars on November 14). Since Brexit was the only major remaining European political risk, European policy uncertainty will continue to fall. The Halloween deadline was averted because the EU, on the brink of recession, offered a surprising concession to Johnson, enabling him to agree to a deal and put it up for a vote in parliament. The deal consists of keeping Northern Ireland in the European Customs Union but not the whole of the U.K., effectively drawing a new soft border at the Irish Sea. The bill passed the second reading but parliament paused before finalizing it, rejecting Johnson’s rapid three-day time table. The takeaway is that even if an impending election returns Johnson to power, he will seek to pass his deal rather than pull the U.K. out without a deal. This further lowers the odds of a no-deal Brexit as it illuminates Johnson's preferences, which are normally hidden from objective analysis. True, there is a chance that the no-deal option will reemerge if Johnson’s deal totally collapses due to parliamentary amendments, or if the U.K. and EU have failed to agree to a future relationship by the end of the transition period on December 31, 2020 (which can be extended until the end of 2022). However, the chance is well below the 30% which we deemed as the peak risk of no-deal back in August. Johnson created the most credible threat of a no-deal exit that we are likely to see in our lifetimes – a government with authority over foreign policy determined to execute the outcome of a popular referendum – and yet parliament stopped it dead in its tracks. Johnson does not want a no-deal recession and his successors will not want one either. After all, the support for Brexit and for the Tories has generally declined since the referendum, and the Tories are making a comeback on the prospect of an orderly Brexit (Chart 8). All eyes will now turn toward the impending election. Opinion polls still show that Johnson is likely to be returned to power (Chart 9). The Tories have a prospect of engrossing the pro-Brexit vote while the anti-Brexit opposition stands divided. No-deal risk only reemerges if the Conservatives are returned to power with another weak coalition that paralyzes parliament. Chart 9Tory Comeback As BoJo Gets A Deal Tory Comeback As BoJo Gets A Deal Tory Comeback As BoJo Gets A Deal Chart 10Brexit Means Greater Fiscal Policy Brexit Means Greater Fiscal Policy Brexit Means Greater Fiscal Policy Whatever the election result, we maintain our long-held position that Brexit portends greater fiscal largesse (Chart 10). The agitated swath of England that drove the referendum result will not be assuaged by leaving the European Union – the rewards of Brexit are not material but philosophical, so material grievances will return. Voter frustration will rotate from the EU to domestic political elites. Voters will demand more government support for social concerns. Johnson’s own government confirms this point through its budget proposals. A Labour-led government would oversee an even more dramatic fiscal shift. Our GeoRisk indicator will fall on Brexit improvements but the question of the election and next government will ensure it does not fall too far. Our long GBP trades are tactical and we expect volatility to remain elevated. But the greatest risk, of no deal, is finished, so it does make sense for investors with a long time horizon to go strategically long the pound. The greatest risk, of a no deal Brexit, is finished. Bottom Line: Brexit posed a risk to the global economy only insofar as it proved disorderly. A withdrawal agreement by definition smooths the process. Continental Europe will not suffer a further shock to net exports. The Brexit contribution to global policy uncertainty will abate. The pound will rise against the euro and yen and even against the dollar as long as Trump’s trade retreat continues. Spain: Further Evidence Of European Stability We have long argued that the majority of Catalans do not want independence, but rather a renegotiation of the region's relationship with Spain (Chart 11). This month’s protests in Barcelona following the Catalan independence leaders’ sentencing are at the lower historical range in terms of size – protest participation peaked in 2015 along with support for independence (Table 1). Table 1October Catalan Protests Unimpressive How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019 How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019 Our Spanish risk indicator is showing a decline in political risk (Chart 12). However, we believe that this fall is slightly overstated. While the Catalan independence movement is losing its momentum, the ongoing protests are having an impact on seat projections for the upcoming election.  Chart 11Catalonians Not Demanding Independence Catalonians Not Demanding Independence Catalonians Not Demanding Independence Chart 12Right-Wing Win Could Surprise Market, But No Worries Right-Wing Win Could Surprise Market, But No Worries Right-Wing Win Could Surprise Market, But No Worries Since the April election, the right-wing bloc of the People’s Party, Ciudadanos, and Vox has been gaining in the seat projections at the expense of the Socialist Party and Podemos. Over the course of the protests, the left-wing parties’ lead over the right-wing parties has narrowed from seven seats to one (Chart 13). If this momentum continues, a change of government from left-wing to right-wing becomes likely. However, a right-wing government is not a market-negative outcome, and any increase in risk on this sort of election surprise would be short-lived. The People’s Party has moderated its message and focused on the economy. Besides pledging to limit the personal tax rate to 40% and corporate tax rate to 20%, the People’s Party platform supports innovation, R&D spending, and startups. The party is promising tax breaks and easier immigration rules to firms and employees pursuing these objectives. Chart 13Spanish Right-Wing Parties Narrow Gap With Left How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019 How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019 Another outcome of the election would be a governing deal between PSOE and Podemos, along with case-by-case support from Ciudadanos. After a shift to the right lost Ciudadanos 5% in support since the April election, leader Albert Rivera announced in early October that he would be lifting the “veto” on working with the Socialist Party. If the right-wing parties fall short of a majority, then Rivera would be open to talks with Socialist leader Pedro Sanchez. A governing deal between PSOE, Podemos, and Ciudadanos would have 175 seats, as of the latest projections, which is just one seat short of a majority. As we go to press, this is the only outcome that would end Spain’s current political gridlock, and would therefore be the most market-positive outcome. Bottom Line: Despite having a fourth election in as many years, Spanish political risk is contained. This is reinforced by a relatively politically stable backdrop in continental Europe, and marginally positive developments in the U.K. and on the trade front. We remain long European versus U.S. technology, and long EU versus Chinese equities. We will also be looking to go long EUR/USD when and if the global hard data turn. Following our European Investment Strategy, we recommend going long 10-year Italian BTPs / short 10-year Spanish bonos for a trade. Turkey, Brazil, And Russia Chart 14Turkish Risk Will Rise Despite 'Ceasefire' Turkish Risk Will Rise Despite 'Ceasefire' Turkish Risk Will Rise Despite 'Ceasefire' Turkey’s political risk skyrocketed upward after we issued our warning in September (Chart 14). We maintain that the Trump-Erdogan personal relationship is not a basis for optimism regarding Turkey’s evading U.S. sanctions. Both chambers of the U.S. Congress are preparing a more stringent set of sanctions, focusing on the Turkish military, in the wake of Trump’s decision to withdraw U.S. forces from northeast Syria. At a time when Trump needs allies in the senate to defend him against eventual impeachment articles, he is not likely to veto and risk an override. Moreover, Turkey’s military incursion into Syria, which may wax and wane, stems from economic and political weakness at home and will eventually exacerbate that weakness by fueling the growing opposition to Erdogan’s administration and requiring more unorthodox monetary and fiscal accommodation. It reinforces our bearish outlook on Turkish lira and assets. Chart 15Brazilian Risk Will Not Re-Test 2018 Highs Brazilian Risk Will Not Re-Test 2018 Highs Brazilian Risk Will Not Re-Test 2018 Highs Brazil’s political risk has rebounded (Chart 15). The Senate has virtually passed the pension reform bill, as expected, which raises the official retirement age for men and women to 65 and 63 respectively. This will generate upwards of 800 billion Brazilian real in savings to improve the public debt profile. Of course, the country will still run primary deficits and thus the public debt-to-GDP ratio will still rise. Now the question shifts to President Jair Bolsonaro and his governing coalition. Bolsonaro’s approval rating has ticked up as we expected (Chart 16). If this continues then it is bullish for Brazil because it suggests that he will be able to keep his coalition together. But investors should not get ahead of themselves. Bolsonaro is not an inherently pro-market leader, there is no guarantee that he will remain disciplined in pursuing pro-productivity reforms, and there is a substantial risk that his coalition will fray without pension reform as a shared goal (at least until markets riot and push the coalition back together). Therefore we expect political risk to abate only temporarily, if at all, before new trouble emerges. Furthermore, if reform momentum wanes next year, then Brazil’s reform story as a whole will falter, since electoral considerations emerge in 2021-22. Hence it will be important to verify that policymakers make progress on reforms to tax and trade policy early next year. Our Russian geopolitical risk indicator is also lifting off of its bottom (see Appendix). This makes sense given Russia’s expanding strategic role (particularly in the Middle East), its domestic political troubles, and the risks of the U.S. election. The latter is especially significant given the risk (not our base case, however) that a Democratic administration could take a significantly more aggressive posture toward Russia. Political risk in Turkey and Russia will continue to rise. Bottom Line: Political risk in Turkey and Russia will continue to rise. Russia is a candidate for a “black swan” event, given the eerie quiet that has prevailed as Putin devotes his fourth term to reducing domestic political instability. Brazil, on the other hand, has a 12-month window in which reform momentum can be reinforced, reducing whatever spike in risk occurs in the aftermath of the ruling coalition’s completion of pension reform. Canada: Election Post-Mortem Prime Minister Justin Trudeau returned to power at the head of a minority government in Canada’s federal election (Chart 17). The New Democratic Party (NDP) lost 15 seats from the last election, but will have a greater role in parliament as the Liberals will need its support to pass key agenda items (and a formal governing coalition is possible). The NDP’s result would have been even worse if not for its last-minute surge in the polls after the election debates and Trudeau’s “blackface” scandal. Chart 17Liberals Need The New Democrats Now How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019 How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019 The Conservative Party won the popular vote but only 121 seats in parliament, leaving the western provinces of Alberta and Saskatchewan aggrieved. The Bloc Québécois, the Quebec nationalist party, gained 22 seats to become the third-largest party in the House. Energy investment faces headwinds in the near-term. The Liberal Party will face resistance from the Left over the Trans Mountain pipeline. Trudeau will not necessarily have to sacrifice the pipeline to appease the NDP. He may be able to work with Conservatives to advance the pipeline while working with the NDP on the rest of his agenda. But on the whole the election result is the worst-case scenario for the oil sector and political questions will have to be resolved before Canada can take advantage of its position as a heavy crude producer near the U.S. Gulf refineries in an era in which Venezuela is collapsing and Saudi Arabia is exposed to geopolitical risk and attacks. More broadly, the Liberals will continue to endorse a more expansive fiscal policy than expected, given Canada’s low budget deficits and the need to prevent minor parties from eating away at the Liberal Party’s seat count in future. Bottom Line: The Liberal Party failed to maintain its single-party majority. Trudeau’s reliance on left-wing parties in parliament may prove market-negative for the Canadian energy sector, though that is not a forgone conclusion. Over the longer term the sector has a brighter future.   Matt Gertken Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Ekaterina Shtrevensky Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com Appendix GeoRisk Indicator TRADE WAR GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR TRADE WAR GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR U.K.: GeoRisk Indicator U.K.: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR U.K.: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR France: GeoRisk Indicator FRANCE: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR FRANCE: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR Germany: GeoRisk Indicator GERMANY: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR GERMANY: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR Spain: GeoRisk Indicator SPAIN: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR SPAIN: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR Italy: GeoRisk Indicator ITALY: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR ITALY: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR Canada: GeoRisk Indicator CANADA: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR CANADA: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR Russia: GeoRisk Indicator RUSSIA: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR RUSSIA: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator TURKEY: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR TURKEY: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator BRAZIL: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR BRAZIL: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator TAIWAN: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR TAIWAN: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR Korea: GeoRisk Indicator KOREA: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR KOREA: GEOPOLITICAL RISK INDICATOR What's On The Geopolitical Radar? How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019 How Much To Buy An American President? – GeoRisk Update: October 25, 2019 Section III: Geopolitical Calendar