Saudi Arabia

Highlights Dear Client, In this analysis, my colleague Bob Ryan of the BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy argues that there is more upside to oil prices. First, Russia and OPEC will continue to coordinate their production for at least the rest of the year. Second, oil prices are too low to incentivize high cost, non-Gulf OPEC production, such as deep-water production. Third, the world lost roughly $1-trillion-plus of capex due to the oil-price collapse. Bob collaborates frequently with the Geopolitical Strategy team. As we controversially argued in February 2016, Saudi-Iranian tensions have peaked and created the geopolitical conditions for a renewal of OPEC production coordination. With oil prices plumbing decade lows in 2015-2016, both countries have set regional differences aside for the sake of domestic stability. I hope that you will enjoy Bob's note as much as I did. Many clients with whom I have met in person already know the view well, as it forms the core of Geopolitical Strategy's view on the Middle East. For those of you who are not subscribed to BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy, and BCA's Energy Sector Strategy, I would recommend that you reach out to your account manager for a trial of both services. Kindest Regards, Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy Feature KSA, Russia and their allies - OPEC 2.0 - are trying to regain control of oil fundamentals produced by one of the most unlikely combinations of events ever seen in the history of the oil market. This week, we review how we arrived at the market conditions we now confront, and consider a possible strategy evolving out of the production-cutting Agreement (the "Agreement" for short) that may allow them to do so. Current markets conditions were spawned by a surge in EM oil demand in the early part of the 21st century, which met an almost perfectly inelastic supply curve. This took prices from $55/bbl in 2005 to more than $140/bbl by the end of 2008H1 (Chart Of The Week). Along the way, some 5mm b/d of DM oil demand had to be destroyed by higher prices to make room for the EM growth depicted in Chart 2, which is taken from an analysis by Hamilton (2009).1 Chart Of The WeekEM Consumption Surge, Flat Production##br## Drove Prices Past $140/bbl Pre-GFC EM Consumption Surge, Flat Production Drove Prices Past $140/bbl Pre-GFC EM Consumption Surge, Flat Production Drove Prices Past $140/bbl Pre-GFC Chart 2High Prices Were Required ##br##To Balance Markets Pre-GFC The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? These high prices combined with the post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) low-interest rate regime into a perfect storm, which allowed the supply side to evolve the shale technology in the U.S. Steadily rising light-tight-oil (LTO) production has profoundly altered the market, forcing OPEC and non-OPEC petro-states to devise a strategy to contain this surge. Whether they can do so is yet to be determined. In this article we consider one strategy that might allow OPEC 2.0 to regain some control over pricing and the rate of growth in shale production, but it is highly dependent on them maintaining production discipline and finding a way to coordinate their production. First, though, a quick review. How Did We Get Here? The GFC dragged all markets lower, leaving oil prices just above $40/bbl by the end of 2008. In the wake of the GFC, central banks led by the Fed pursued massively accommodative monetary policies, which took interest rates to the zero lower bound. OPEC, led by KSA, drastically cut supplies to remove a huge unintended inventory accumulation that developed as demand collapsed (Chart 3). While DM oil demand remained depressed in the wake of the GFC, EM governments, led by China, massively stimulated their economies, which lifted global oil consumption more than 4% by 2010 (Chart 4). Chart 3OPEC Cut Production To Defend Prices,##br## Make Room For Shale To End-2014H1 OPEC Cut Production To Defend Prices, Make Room For Shale To End-2014H1 OPEC Cut Production To Defend Prices, Make Room For Shale To End-2014H1 Chart 4EM Lifted Global##br## Demand Post-GFC EM Lifted Global Demand Post-GFC EM Lifted Global Demand Post-GFC Growth in global supplies post-GFC, meanwhile, was more measured. OPEC total liquids production from 2009 to 2014 averaged just below 0.05% growth yoy. Part of this meager growth in OPEC production no doubt was explained by lower production from the Cartel resulting from civil war in Libya and nuclear-related sanctions against Iran, which reduced overall output. It also is possible the fall-out from the GFC and the euro-area crisis of 2009 - 2011 kept OPEC producers from committing to higher production as well. Be that as it may, EM demand growth, along with OPEC's lower output, allowed prices to again trade above $100/bbl by 2011 and stay there till mid-2014 (Chart 5). The years-long combination of near-zero interest rates and high oil prices allowed U.S. shale-oil production to advance in leaps and bounds, such that by 2014, yoy light-tight oil (LTO) production from the shales was growing at more than 1mm b/d (Chart 6). Chart 5EM Surge, OPEC Production Moderation##br## Keep Prices Above 0/bbl To 2014H1 EM Surge, OPEC Production Moderation Keep Prices Above $100/bbl To 2014H1 EM Surge, OPEC Production Moderation Keep Prices Above $100/bbl To 2014H1 Chart 6High Prices, Low Interest Rates Propel Shale##br## Production To 1mm b/d+ Growth By 2014 High Prices, Low Interest Rates Propel Shale Production To 1mm b/d+ Growth By 2014 High Prices, Low Interest Rates Propel Shale Production To 1mm b/d+ Growth By 2014 Now What? OPEC underestimated the magnitude of the shale-oil revolution, as did most observers. However, KSA, the leader of the Cartel, was pre-occupied with geopolitical considerations, chiefly its ongoing proxy wars throughout the Middle East with Iran and its allies. High prices allowed it to build its reserves and fund these proxy wars. This ended when Iran and western powers began negotiating an end to sanctions, which, if successful, would once again allow Iran to access foreign capital and technology to develop its economy.2 As the negotiations to remove sanctions on Iran progressed, KSA led OPEC into a market-share war at the end of 2014, presumably to take back customers lost to shale, particularly in the U.S. We do not believe OPEC's primary aim in declaring a market-share war was to crush U.S. shale output. Indeed, we have consistently maintained the market-share war was more an extension of KSA's and Iran's proxy wars throughout the Middle East, and that KSA was using the pump-at-will strategy to limit revenues that would flow to Iran in the post-sanctions environment. The secondary target of the market-share war was U.S. shale production, but, even then we maintained shale-oil production was needed to keep prices from revisiting $140/bbl-plus levels.3 The market-share war tanked prices, as OPEC increased the quantity of oil it would supply at lower prices. In particular, Saudi Arabia surged production from November 2014, into the collapse of oil prices. Over time, the market-share strategy destroyed high-cost supply worldwide. U.S. shale production fell ~ 15% from a high of ~ 5.3mm b/d in March 2015 in the four largest LTO basins to a low of ~ 4.5mm b/d, by our reckoning, in 2017Q1. At the same time, non-Gulf OPEC production fell dramatically as well, close to 8% in 2016 yoy to an average of 7.7mm b/d. Gulf Arab producers in OPEC and Russia, however, saw production increase 6.5% and 2% yoy, respectively, to close to 25mm b/d and 11.2mm b/d in 2016. In the aftermath of the price collapse, U.S. shale producers retreated to their "core" producing properties - those areas with the lowest-cost, most accessible shale reserves - and dramatically improved their productivity (Chart 7). A collapse in services costs allowed LTO producers to maintain core operations and continue to advance shale-oil technology. At the end of the day, this made the global supply curve more elastic, in that LTO production now allowed higher demand to be met by smaller price increases than had been the case in the lead-up to the GFC. The increased elasticity of supply from U.S. shales, and the increased quantity supply by OPEC is depicted in Chart 8, which picks up from Hamilton's (2009) analysis shown in Chart 2. Chart 7U.S. Shale Productivity Surged##br## During OPEC"s Market-Share War U.S. Shale Productivity Surged During OPEC"s Market-Share War U.S. Shale Productivity Surged During OPEC"s Market-Share War Chart 8Global Oil Supply ##br##Transformed By 2014H1 The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? OPEC's Market-Share War Failed We contend the KSA - Russia production Agreement negotiated at the end of last year represents an abandonment of OPEC's market-share strategy. If, as recent research suggests, this strategy was an attempt to "squeeze" higher-cost shale production from the market by increasing OPEC crude supplies, it was a failure: The market-share strategy imperiled the finances of OPEC and non-OPEC states heavily dependent on oil revenues to sustain themselves, and left U.S. shale production more resilient than it was prior to the market-share war being declared.4 The surge in shale supplies and in OPEC's quantity supplied to the market during its market-share war, coupled with slower growth following the dramatic increase in EM demand in 2010 - 2012, led to unintended inventory accumulation worldwide, which has kept global storage at record levels. This is the central issue being addressed by the OPEC - non-OPEC production Agreement to remove up to 1.8mm b/d of production from the market. In effect, the KSA - Russia deal is inducing a supply shock to shift the global supply curve back to the left, after it was pushed down and to the right from 2014H2 to 2015H2, as depicted in Chart 9. In and of itself, this should lift and stabilize prices by the end of this year. We expect this induced supply shock will begin to force more visible inventories - e.g., in the U.S. and OECD generally - to draw rapidly. We continue to expect OECD stocks to reach 5-year average levels by year-end 2017, and for prices to reach $60/bbl by year end (Chart 10). We do not believe an extension in OPEC 2.0's production Agreement is needed to achieve this. Chart 9KSA - Russia Deal Is An Induced Supply Shock ##br##Intended To Shift The Curve Back To The Left The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? The Game's Afoot In Oil, But Which One? Chart 10Oil Stocks Will Fall To 5-Year##br## Averages By End-2017 Oil Stocks Will Fall To 5-Year Averages By End-2017 Oil Stocks Will Fall To 5-Year Averages By End-2017 It goes without saying, the parties to OPEC 2.0's production-management deal must maintain production discipline for this strategy to be able to evolve to the next level, where they attempt to restore a measure of price inelasticity to the global supply curve. If they are successful, then they will be able to exercise a degree of control over prices using spare capacity, storage and forward guidance to achieve and defend specific targets. If not, the market will do the hard work of destroying high-cost supply with lower prices. The End Game For KSA - Russia For the KSA - Russia Agreement to affect U.S. shale output over the medium to longer term, they have to coordinate production in a way that keeps WTI prices from rising to the point where shale-oil producers are able to step outside their "core" production areas. We believe over the short term, this price is between $55/bbl and $60/bbl. Our colleague Matt Conlan, of the BCA Energy Sector Strategy, has illustrated that the "true" breakeven for shale producers is much closer to $50/bbl, than the $30/bbl figure oft cited in the media.5 However, above $60/bbl, more costly reserves can be developed and still produce acceptable returns for LTO drillers. Therefore, if prices can be kept below $60/bbl, and the induced supply shock engineered by KSA and Russia causes oil inventories to draw as we expect this year, we believe the resulting backwardation in WTI will limit the rate at which rigs return to the field. In our modeling, we find shale rig counts to be sensitive to the shape of the forward curve for WTI. A backwardated curve translates into fewer rigs returning to the field than a flat or contango curve. In one model we estimated, we found a 10% backwardation from mid-2017 to end-2018 resulted in a rig count that was close to 18% below the rig count that could be expected from a relatively flat forward curve. The only way we see for KSA and Russia to affect the shape of the WTI forward curve over the short term - to end 2018 - is to use their own spare capacity and storage to keep the front of the curve below $60/bbl, and to provide forward guidance that they are able to adjust supply markets over the short- to medium-term in a manner that keeps the forward curve backwardated. This will require short-term production coordination among the states comprising OPEC 2.0, so that refinery demand is met out of current production plus inventories, and that unforeseen outages are remedied quickly. This is a short-term fix. It likely can be implemented this year and carried into next year. However, beyond that, it is difficult to see how KSA and Russia, and their respective allies, will coordinate production, storage operations and forward guidance having never attempted such an effort in the past. However, we are reasonably sure members of OPEC 2.0 are discussing how to implement such coordination. Keeping the front of the curve at a price that dissuades shale producers from expanding beyond their "core" production also will limit the amount of investment that can be made in non-Gulf OPEC production, which already is in decline, and other higher-cost conventional production like deep water.6 This, coupled with the $1-trillion-plus cuts to global capex for projects that would have been producing between 2015 - 2020 resulting from the 2015 - 16 price collapse could produce a supply deficit by 2019 that only can be remedied by significantly higher prices that not only encourage new higher-cost production but destroys demand in the meantime while that production is being developed. Bottom Line: We expect the KSA - Russia Agreement to produce a physical deficit this year that draws OECD oil inventories down by ~ 300mm barrels by year end. We also expect to see deeper coordination among the petro-states that are party to this Agreement - OPEC 2.0 - this year and next, which will keep the WTI forward curve backwardated into 2018. While we expect WTI prices to average $55/bbl to 2020 - and to trade between $45 and $65/bbl most of the time - our level of conviction in that forecast is low beyond 2018. It is not clear OPEC 2.0 can endure beyond the short term (into 2018). We will be watching the response of U.S. shale producers to increasing demand, and increasing decline-curve losses outside the U.S. shales, the Gulf OPEC producers and Russia, where we expect production declines to accelerate. As we have noted often in the past, the loss of more than $1 trillion of capex will place an enormous burden on U.S. shales, Gulf Arab producers in OPEC and Russia. If any one of these cannot deliver higher volumes when called upon, prices could move sharply above $65/bbl after 2018 going forward. Likewise, we will be watching to see if OPEC 2.0 is capable of setting and meeting production and inventory goals. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Assistant hugob@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Causes and Consequences of the Oil Shock of 2007-08," by James D. Hamilton, in the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2009, particularly pp. 228 - 234. 2 Please see "P5+1 and Iran agree on nuclear negotiation framework in Vienna," published February 20, 2014, by cnn.com. The sanctions were lifted in early 2016; see "Iran nuclear deal: Five effects of lifting sanctions," published January 18, 2016, by bbc.com. 3 For an in-depth analysis of OPEC's market-share war, please see the Special Report entitled "End Of An Era For Oil And The Middle East," published jointly by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy groups on April 9, 2015, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see "Ignore The KSA - Russia Production Pact, Focus Instead On Their Need For Cash," published September 8, 2016, and our "2017 Commodity Outlook: Energy," published December 8, 2016, in which we discuss the toll lower oil prices were taking on oil-dependent states including KSA and Russia. See also "The Dynamics of the Revenue Maximization - Market Share Trade-Off: Saudi Arabia's Oil Policy in the 2014 - 2015 Price Fall," by Bassam Fattouh, Rahmatallah Poudineh and Anupama Sen, published by The Oxford Institute For Energy Studies in October 2015, and "An analysis of OPEC's strategic actions, US shale growth and the 2014 oil price crash," by Alberto Behar and Robert A. Ritz, published by the IMF July 2016. Both papers consider OPEC's market-share war vis-à-vis U.S. shale-oil production, the strategy of squeezing shale producers from the market by increasing supply and lowering prices, and the likelihood for success. 5 Please see BCA Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report, "Breakeven Analysis: Shale Companies Need ~$50 Oil To Be Self-Sufficient," dated March 15, 2017, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see "The Other Guys In The Oil Market" in this week's Energy Sector Strategy, which takes an in-depth look at the stagnant-to-declining production in conventional oil-producing provinces outside the U.S. onshore, Middle East OPEC and Russia, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights The end game for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), Russia and their respective allies is fairly obvious: Remove enough production from the market to draw down storage and make the oil-supply curve, once again, more inelastic. This would allow these states to use forward guidance and small adjustments in production to influence prices, the sine qua non of petro-states desperate to maintain revenues and diversify away from near-complete dependence on hydrocarbon exports. We think the effort will succeed over the short run. Just how durable this pact will be remains to be seen, given oil is, once again, super-abundant. If production discipline breaks down, all bets are off. Energy: Overweight. We are now solidly positioned for backwardation in oil - long Dec/17 vs. short Dec/18 WTI and Brent; these positions are up 141.6% and 68.4%, respectively. We also are positioned for a rally on drawdowns in inventories as refiners come back from turnarounds over the next few weeks: We are long $50/bbl WTI calls vs. short $55/bbl calls in Jul-Aug-Sep 2017; these positions are up 7.66% on average. Base Metals: Neutral. Workers at Chile's Escondida mine are back on the job, after a 44-day strike. The strike is estimated to have cost BHP Billiton some $1 billion, according to Reuters.1 Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold has rallied by 4.3% since the FOMC raised overnight rates. Our long volatility position - long a Jun/17 put and call spread for $21/oz - is down 30%. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The long-awaited and much-anticipated USDA planting intentions report is due out tomorrow. We remain bearish, expecting an early indication stocks-to-use ratios for grains and beans will remain elevated. Feature Chart of the WeekStorage Was Well On Its Way to Drawing##br## Before the Year-End Production Surge Storage Was Well On Its Way to Drawing Before the Year-End Production Surge Storage Was Well On Its Way to Drawing Before the Year-End Production Surge KSA and Russia have to make oil supply more inelastic in order to regain some control over where prices go and, consequently, where their revenues go. Their end game is obvious - i.e., remove the excess oil production that pushed inventories to historically high levels - but their execution has been, at best, halting. Prior to KSA and Russia delivering an historic production-management Agreement at the end of last year, oil markets were well on the way to removing the storage overhang by year-end 2017, as any Econ 101 text would have suggested. Low prices following OPEC's market-share war declaration destroyed supply and lifted demand, which was drawing down stocks. This is easily seen in the Chart of the Week showing inventories beginning to head south in mid-2016. Then came the KSA - Russia Agreement between OPEC and non-OPEC producers to cut output by some 1.8mm b/d. The goal of the deal was to accelerate the drawdown in record high storage levels. Even while the deal was being negotiated, it was apparent some producers in the know were getting a jump on shipping those last barrels out the door before they were obliged to cut. This produced the end-of-year production surge, which swelled global inventories. The year-end surge by OPEC and non-OPEC producers could be expected (Chart 2), but it came at a really bad time for the market, since 1Q17 also was when refiners took units down for maintenance. This is fairly routine, but in some key markets like the U.S. Gulf, the current maintenance season was busier than average, according to the EIA (Chart 3). This left a lot of crude in storage, as product inventories were being drawn. Chart 2Year-End Production Surge ##br##Powered The Storage Build Year-End Production Surge Powered The Storage Build Year-End Production Surge Powered The Storage Build Chart 3Maintenance Season In 1Q17 ##br##Exacerbated The Storage Build Maintenance Season In 1Q17 Exacerbated The Storage Build Maintenance Season In 1Q17 Exacerbated The Storage Build Where are we today? Most of the pre-Agreement production and export surge has been absorbed, and inventories in the U.S. are drawing a bit. Floating storage has been drained. But, in an interesting economic twist, OECD storage levels are likely to reach the targeted drawdown of 10% (300mm bbl) by year-end 2017, which is exactly what would have happened absent any action by KSA and Russia at the end of last year. It is difficult to resist reiterating that had nothing been done at the end of last year by KSA and Russia, and the market was left to do its necessary work of removing high-cost production and encouraging increased demand via lower prices, the market would have ended up in the exact same place it now finds itself. Trust But Verify Be that as it may, the really hard work of the KSA - Russia deal now begins. We expect OECD inventories to hit the 10% drawdown target by year end. However, if parties to the deal do not maintain production discipline markets will almost surely take prices lower. This could easily happen if prices start to percolate as we expect in 2Q17, and cash-strapped non-OPEC producers decide to see how far they can push KSA and its Gulf-state allies on their deal. Russia has been slow to deliver on its production commitment, while KSA has over-delivered (Chart 4). The same can be said for their respective allies (Chart 5). We believe markets will remain skittish, until evidence Russia and Iraq also are abiding by the end-2016 Agreement becomes incontrovertible. It is true Russian President Vladimir Putin personally involved himself in this deal, and helped close it on the non-OPEC side, but markets will want proof production actually is falling. Like former U.S. President Ronald Reagan, markets may be willing to trust, but they certainly will want to verify compliance. Chart 4KSA Over-Delivers On Its Cuts, ##br##Russia Is Slow To Deliver KSA Over-Delivers On Its Cuts, Russia Is Slow To Deliver KSA Over-Delivers On Its Cuts, Russia Is Slow To Deliver Chart 5KSA's Allies Are Delivering, ##br##Russia's Not So Much KSA’s Allies Are Delivering, Russia’s Not So Much KSA’s Allies Are Delivering, Russia’s Not So Much While not our base case, it is possible Russia and its fellow travelers could decide to risk keeping their production above agreed volumes under the Agreement, in the belief KSA is more in need of keeping prices above $50/bbl or so over the next 18 months, given the Kingdom wants a successful IPO of state-owned Saudi Aramco. Should this occur, markets would correct violently. At the end of the day, such a gamble likely would be ruinous for both, if it provoked KSA to abandon its commitment to keep production below 10mm b/d. Short-term goals - getting OECD storage levels down to five-year averages - would be sacrificed. Importantly, long-term goals we believe are driving KSA and Russia to cooperate in the first place, namely developing a modus operandi for containing U.S. shale-oil output, will become moot, possibly returning the market to the production free-for-all that motivated the KSA - Russia dialogue. The Quest For Relevance Chart 6Odds Favor Backwardated Markets ##br##As the Production Cuts Lead To Physical Deficits Odds Favor Backwardated Markets As the Production Cuts Lead To Physical Deficits Odds Favor Backwardated Markets As the Production Cuts Lead To Physical Deficits Our base case envisions a successful KSA - Russia Agreement in which production discipline is maintained, and the deal produces its desired result - drawing storage down by ~ 300mm bbls. Forward curves then backwardate (Chart 6). This sets the stage for deeper discussions among KSA, Russia and their respective allies re how they can work together going forward to contain U.S. shale-oil production. In effect, the parties to this deal have a choice to make: Either they figure out a way to make room for shale, which has catapulted the U.S. to major-producer status once again, or they leave this to the market. We are fairly confident these discussions already are ongoing, and will be well advanced by year-end. Next week, we will be publishing a theoretical piece on how the KSA - Russia pact could provide a platform that allows these petro-states - which we are taking the liberty of dubbing OPEC 2.0 - to re-gain a modicum of control over the rate at which U.S. shale-oil resources are developed. In earlier research, we advanced a theory that shale rig counts are highly sensitive not only to the level of prices at the front of the curve, but to the curve shape itself. We were able to demonstrate that contango markets - i.e., prices for promptly delivered crude are less than prices for deferred delivery material - favor shale producers, and, all else equal, incentivize them to hedge forward so as to lock in future revenues that maximize the number of rigs they deploy.2 In backwardated markets, the number of rigs a shale operator is able to deploy is lower, all else equal, which means the revenue they can lock in by hedging forward is lower. This limits the rate at which the resource can be developed. Based on these theoretical results, we believe it is in the interest of the OPEC 2.0 states to keep the WTI forward curve in backwardation, so that, at the margin, the number of rigs deployed to the shales is contained. Our research suggests that the deeper the backwardation, the slower rig counts grow. So, if the ideal price level for KSA is, as has been reported in the media, $60/bbl for Brent, then, in the best of all worlds, the Kingdom, Russia and their respective allies target spot prices at this level and use production, storage and forward guidance to backwardate the WTI curve, which is used by shale producers to hedge.3 Such a strategy has numerous risks, particularly if OPEC 2.0 cannot react quickly enough to keep prices from rising above a level that keeps shale-oil producers restricted to their core production areas. This would allow higher-cost shale reserves to be brought on line, which would raise the likelihood of lower prices, and cost OPEC 2.0 market share.4 Such a strategy also would tempt OPEC 2.0 producers to free ride, raising production at the margin to increase their revenues. This also risks lower prices. Nonetheless, we believe such a strategy could benefit both KSA and Russia and their allies, which is why it likely will at least be considered and attempted.5 KSA would be able to IPO Aramco into a relatively stable higher-price market, which would allow it to invest in additional refinery capacity in Asia and elsewhere, and in alternative-energy resources like solar, to free up oil for export. Russia also is better off keeping prices at a level at which its economy can continue to work on diversifying its exposure away from its heavy dependence on oil and gas exports.6 We will present more of our thinking on this next week. In the meantime, we highly recommend BCA clients read Matt Conlan's article in this week's Energy Sector Strategy entitled "Shale Dynamics: Sensitivities Within Modeling A Shale Recovery."7 This is an excellent analysis of shale-oil economics. Bottom Line: We continue to expect crude and products storage to draw as production cuts become apparent and refiners bring units back up off maintenance. This will backwardate WTI and Brent forward curves. Based on our high level of conviction in this outcome, we added a long Brent Dec/17 vs. short Dec/18 Brent position to our recommended trades, along with a similar WTI position. We also are positioned for a rally on drawdowns in inventories as refiners come back from turnarounds over the next few weeks, by being long $50/bbl WTI calls vs. short $55/bbl calls in Jul-Aug-Sep 2017. We continue to expect the U.S. benchmark WTI crude prices to average $55/bbl to 2020 and for WTI prices to trade most of the time between $45/bbl and $65/bbl. For 2018 and beyond, our conviction is lower: The massive capex cuts seen in the industry will place an enormous burden on shale producers and conventional oil producers - chiefly Gulf Arab producers and Russia - to offset natural decline-curve losses and meet increasing demand. For the international benchmark, Brent crude oil, we expect the spread between Brent and WTI prices to average $1.50/bbl (Brent over). Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Escondida outcome seen as disaster for BHP as workers return," published by Reuters.com on March 24, 2017. 2 We introduced this line of research in our February 16, 2017, issue of Commodity & Energy Strategy, in an article entitled "North American Oil Pipeline Buildout Complicates Price And Storage Expectations," it is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. We continue to delve into this topic, and will be presenting out latest thinking next week. 3 Please see "Exclusive: Saudi Arabia wants oil prices to rise to around $60 in 2017 - sources," published by Reuters February 28, 2017. Russia's budgeting assumption for 2017 to 2019 is $40/bbl, according to a Bloomberg report from March 24, 2017, entitled "OPEC Be Warned: Russia Prepares for Oil at $40." 4 It is not in KSA's, Russia's or their allies' interests to kill off shale production. The more-than-$1 trillion of capex for projects that would have been developed between 2015 and 2020, and would have translated into some 7mm b/d of oil-equivalent production will not be available to the market beginning later this decade. As we have noted, an enormous burden will be placed on shale production, Gulf OPEC producers and Russia to meet growing demand later this decade. 5 We also would note this would be a boon to long-only commodity index investors, whose returns are driven by roll yields that only exist in backwardated markets. More on that in subsequent research as well. 6 Russia's exports are dominated by oil and gas, while KSA's are dominated by crude oil and, increasingly, refined products. In 2015, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace calculated close to 70% of Russia's economy is dependent on revenue from hydrocarbons - production, trade, investments in non-oil industries funded by oil revenues, and consumption made possible via oil and gas production and sales. We discuss this at length in the September 8, 2016, issue of Commodity & Energy Strategy, in an article entitled "Ignore The KSA - Russia Production Pact, Focus Instead On Their Need For Cash." 7 Please see Energy Sector Strategy Weekly Report entitled "Shale Dynamics: Sensitivities Within Modeling A Shale Recovery," This article was published March 29, 2017, available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016

Highlights Crude-oil fundamentals stand out among commodities because of the active efforts by critical producers to rein in supply since the end of last year. This can be seen in even-higher compliance with the production accord - a supply shock in many ways - negotiated by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia: Last month, Reuters estimated 94% compliance on the 1.2mm b/d in cuts pledged by OPEC states. We expect compliance to remain high, which will strengthen the divergence between oil prices and the USD, as markets look toward the upcoming summer driving season in the Northern Hemisphere. Active supply management and robust demand growth wrought by lower prices could continue to overwhelm a strong USD's influence on oil prices, if this Agreement becomes a durable modus operandi for KSA and Russia going forward. We give a high probability to this outcome, even as the Fed leans into its interest-rate normalization. Energy: Overweight. This past Thursday, we closed our long WTI Dec/17 vs. short Dec/18 backwardation spread at +$0.96/bbl (Dec/17 over); it was initiated February 9 at -$0.11/bbl (Dec/17 under), resulting in a 972.7% gain. We also closed our Dec/19 short WTI vs. long Brent spread, elected February 6 at +$0.07/bbl (WTI over) at -$1.17/bbl (WTI under), for a gain of 1,771.4%. Base Metals: Neutral. Any demand uptick for base metals' coming from U.S. fiscal stimulus will not hit markets until 2H18 at the earliest. We remain neutral. Precious Metals: Neutral. Based on last week's analysis, we are tactically long a Jun/17 gold put spread (long the $1200/oz put vs. short the $1150/oz puts) and call spread (long the $1275/oz call vs. short the $1325/oz calls) at a net debit of $21/oz. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA expects continued demand from China to keep soybeans relatively well bid versus corn and wheat in the 2017/18 crop year. Total planted area for these crops is expected to be the lowest since 2011, keeping ending stocks flat to lower. Feature Prior to the end of the 1990s, crude-oil prices were, to use one of the most popular catch-phrases in finance, mean-reverting: The price of crude oil imported to the U.S. averaged just over $19/bbl from Mar/83, when WTI futures began trading, to 1999 (Chart of the Week). This meant WTI traded at ~ $20/bbl on average over that period. Prices were volatile, but pretty much returned to $20ish/bbl, which allowed traders to take a view on how soon prices would revert to their mean. Whenever prices were too far removed from that level, markets expected producers - OPEC mostly - to adjust output to meet current and expected demand conditions. Since roughly 2000 - maybe a little earlier - oil prices have followed a random walk.1 During this time, oil prices have been negatively correlated with the broad trade-weighted index (TWI) for the USD. One striking characteristic of oil prices and the USD TWI during this time is both followed random walks, which "like the walk of a drunken sailor, wanders indefinitely far, listing with the wind," to borrow Paul Samuelson's well-turned metaphor (Chart 2).2 Chart of the WeekOil's Past As Prelude: ##br##A Return To Mean Reversion? Oil's Past As Prelude: A Return To Mean Reversion? Oil's Past As Prelude: A Return To Mean Reversion? Chart 2Oil Prices And The USD Followed ##br##A Common Long-term Trend Until 1Q16 Oil Prices And The USD Followed A Common Long-term Trend Until 1Q16 Oil Prices And The USD Followed A Common Long-term Trend Until 1Q16 We believe this was caused by OPEC's decision to become a price-taker at the end of the 1990s - shortly after Dec/98 or thereabouts - after years of unsuccessfully trying to manage oil prices via production adjustments. After the price of oil imports in the U.S. dropped below $10/bbl (nominal), it appears the Cartel took the decision to respond to prices set by market forces (supply, demand, inventories and exchange rates), and to abandon its price-management efforts. The long-term correlation between oil and the USD was due to the fact that while oil prices and the USD followed random walks, they followed a common long-term trend as they wandered indefinitely about. This held up to the end of 1Q16, when a massive sell-off in risky-asset markets globally took oil prices below $30/bbl (Chart 3).3 This came on the heels of a price collapse brought about by OPEC's Nov/14 decision to launch a market-share war. By no means did this high correlation mean oil and the USD were always moving in lock step. The collapse in oil prices at the end of the last century led to a production-cutting agreement among OPEC states, Norway and Mexico, which lifted U.S. import prices from less than $10/bbl at the end of 1998 to $30/bbl by Nov/00. Likewise, export disruptions in Venezuela in 2002 - 2003 and, to a lesser extent, hurricane losses in the U.S. Gulf in 2005 sharply curtailed supply and lifted oil prices above what could have been expected given the USD's level at the time, as the Chart of the Week shows.4 End Of Oil's Random Walk? The price collapse of 1Q16 marked the bottom of the price move begun a few months prior to the Nov/14 market-share war declaration. The subsequent divergence between oil prices and the USD since then has been remarkable (Chart 4). The market-share strategy, which essentially allowed Cartel members to produce full-out and grab as much market share as possible, was engineered by KSA, and, we believe, initially was directed at undermining Iran's efforts to restore oil production lost to nuclear-related sanctions. From time to time, it also appeared OPEC was trying to retard the continued growth of shale-oil production in the U.S., which, by 2014, was increasing at an annual rate of more than 1mm b/d, enough to replace the entire output of Libya. Chart 3Close-up Of USD vs. ##br##Brent Divergence Close-Up Of USD Vs. Brent Divergence Close-Up Of USD Vs. Brent Divergence Chart 4The Divergence Between ##br##Oil Prices And The USD Is Remarkable The Divergence Between Oil Prices And The USD Is Remarkable The Divergence Between Oil Prices And The USD Is Remarkable This strategy was a complete failure. The price collapse that ensued brought KSA and Russia - both highly dependent on oil revenues - to the brink of financial ruin, compelling them to find a way to work together.5 After several false starts in 2016, they succeeded late in the year with a negotiated production cut. OPEC pledged to reduce output by as much as 1.2mm b/d, and non-OPEC producers agreed to cut output by close to 600k b/d, half of which is expected to come from Russia. Recent tallies by Reuters indicate 94% of the cuts from OPEC states that signed on to the deal have actually been realized.6 Should KSA and Russia find a way to coordinate their and their allies' production in a way that maintains the backwardation we expect later this year - the result of production cuts (Chart 5), and robust demand growth (Chart 6) - we could see oil prices become mean-reverting once again. Chart 5If KSA And Russia Can ##br##Coordinate Production ... If KSA And Russia Can Coordinate Production ... If KSA And Russia Can Coordinate Production ... Chart 6... And Demand Continues To Grow, ##br##The Oil-Price Backwardation Could Persist ... And Demand Continues To Grow, The Oil-Price Backwardation Could Persist ... And Demand Continues To Grow, The Oil-Price Backwardation Could Persist This likely requires the forward curves for WTI and Brent to remain backwardated, so as to moderate the growth in shale production, and for prices to remain between $55/bbl and $65/bbl, so as not to set off another shale boom. Gulf sources have indicated KSA prefers prices this year of ~ $60/bbl, which, we believe would allow it to keep some control over the rate at which shale production revives.7 Chart 7Supply Destruction And Robust Growth ##br##Rallied Oil Despite A Strong USD Supply Destruction And Robust Growth Rallied Oil Despite A Strong USD Supply Destruction And Robust Growth Rallied Oil Despite A Strong USD Investment Implications We are not calling for a return to mean-reversion in oil prices just yet. We are, however, highlighting the possibility for such a sea-change in the market if all the supply-side pieces fall into place - i.e., KSA, Russia and their respective allies find a way to work together to moderate U.S. shale-oil production. That said, we will be watching closely to see whether the KSA - Russia Agreement becomes a durable modus operandi in the oil market, particularly as regards the management of inventories and production in the market generally. If these states are able to keep prices ~ $60/bbl, and gain some control over the forward curve's slope - i.e., literally manage their production for backwardation - then there is a chance oil prices could once again become mean-reverting. In a mean-reverting world with backwardated oil prices, commodity-index exposure is favored, since investors would, once again, earn positive roll yields as the indices are rebalanced monthly in the underlying futures markets. Bottom Line: The persistent negative correlation between oil prices and the USD broke down following the global asset sell-off in 1Q16. Since then, the combination of supply destruction and robust demand growth has allowed oil prices to rally despite a strong USD (Chart 7). If KSA and Russia can continue to cooperate in their production-management deal - i.e., find a way to manage production so that prices remain closer to $60/bbl than not - and Brent and WTI forward curves backwardate, markets could once again become mean-reverting. In such a world, commodity-index exposures are favored - particularly those heavy on crude-oil and refined-products price exposure - for their positive roll yield. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Technically, oil prices have been I(1) variables (integrated of order 1) since about 2000, meaning they are mean-reverting in first differences (e.g., today's price minus yesterday's price). Please see Geman, Helyette (2007), "Mean Reversion Versus Random Walk in Oil and Natural Gas Prices," pp. 219 - 228, in Advances in Mathematical Finance. Haidar, Imad and Rodney C. Wolff (2011) obtained similar results, reporting crude prices were mean-reverting from Jan/86 - Jan/98, then random-walking since then; please see pp. 3 - 4 of "Forecasting Crude Oil Price (revisited)," presented at the 30th USAEE/IAEE North American Conference in Washington, D.C., during October 2011. Our own research corroborates these results - we find WTI and Brent were mean-reverting from Mar/83, when WTI futures started trading, to Mar/98; and were random-walking I(1) variables after that. 2 Please see Samuelson, Paul A. (1965), "Proof That Properly Anticipated Prices Fluctuate Randomly," in Industrial Management Review, 6:2. 3 This is to say, these variables were cointegrated, and could be expressed in a linear combination using an error-correction model. 4 Our colleague, Mathieu Savary, who runs BCA Research's Foreign Exchange Strategy, addressed these oil-USD divergences in "Party Like It's 1999," published November 25, 2016. It is available at fes.bcareseach.com. 5 We discuss this at length in the feature article of Commodity & Energy Strategy published September 8, 2016, entitled "Ignore The KSA - Russia Production Pact, Focus Instead On Their Need For Cash." Both states were burning through cash reserves, and were trying tap foreign markets for additional funds by selling interests in their most valuable holdings - via the IPO of, and via the sale of just under 20% of Rosneft held by the Russian government. Russia placed its Rosneft shares late last year with Glencore and Qatar's sovereign wealth fund, while KSA is expected to IPO Aramco in late 2018. 6 Please see "OPEC compliance with oil curbs rises to 94 percent in February: Reuters survey," published by the news service online February 28, 2017. 7 Please see "Exclusive: Saudi Arabia wants oil prices to rise to around $60 in 2017 - sources," published by Reuters online February 28, 2016. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016

Highlights Weekly swings in U.S. inventories notwithstanding, we believe global storage is on track to draw ~ 10% by early- to mid-3Q17, which will have achieved the goal of the OPEC - Russia production Agreement negotiated late last year. This will not require an extension of the pact beyond June, based on our modeling. Unexpectedly high compliance by OPEC producers to agreed cuts is being offset somewhat by increased production in those states exempted from the deal. Strong oil consumption on the back of a synchronized global uptick in GDP growth, which started to emerge late last year, provides the impetus for sustained storage draws. Markets are overestimating offshore production's resilience, particularly in the U.S. Gulf, where we see material declines beginning to set in next year. Backwardation likely persists in 2018, absent a U.S. policy-induced USD rally that crimps EM demand and spurs production ex U.S. Energy: Overweight. The return of contango in the WTI forward curve gives us the opportunity to reset our strategic front-to-back position (long Dec/17 vs. short Dec/18) at tonight's close. Our balances assessment supports our view backwardation will return in the deferred part of the curve. Our Dec/19 short WTI vs. long Brent spread buy stop was elected at $0.07/bbl. Base Metals: Neutral. We remain neutral base metals, but are keeping a close watch on copper. Unions working at BHP's Escondida mine, the world's largest, are set to strike today. Negotiations resumed this week, following BHP's request for government mediation. Precious Metals: Neutral. We continue to look to get long gold at $1,180/oz. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Grain fundamentals remain unsupportive for a rally. We remain underweight. Feature Chart of the WeekGlobal Oil Storage On Track For 10% Drop Global Oil Storage On Track For 10% Drop Global Oil Storage On Track For 10% Drop Global oil storage levels remain on track to hit the ~ 10% draw targeted in last year's OPEC - Russia production Agreement by early- to mid-3Q17, weekly gyrations in U.S. inventories notwithstanding. This means an extension of the agreement beyond its June expiry will not be required. Early reports suggest compliance with the deal is unexpectedly high by OPEC states that agreed to cut production by up to 1.2mm b/d - exceeding 80% by various accounts. However, OPEC states not required to cut - Libya, Nigeria, and Iran - have increased production and partially offset those declines, which took total reductions in OPEC output to ~ 840k b/d, based on a Bloomberg tally last week.1 This brought total Cartel compliance to ~ 60% of the agreed cuts, which, as we noted in our 2017 Commodity Outlook in December, would be sufficient to achieve the Agreement's goal of pulling inventories in the OECD down by ~ 10% by 3Q17.2 Non-OPEC producers also appear to be complying with the Agreement. Notable among them is Russia, which is ahead of its commitment with cuts of close to 120k b/d in January, due partly to extreme cold in Siberian fields. We expect cuts in Russia to average 200k b/d in 1Q17, going to 300k b/d in 2Q17. These cuts will allow demand to outstrip supply in 1H17 and into year-end. By early- to mid-3Q17, draws to OECD storage of 300mm bbl can be expected, without extending the OPEC - Russia production agreement (Chart of the Week). We expect to see these cuts show up in OECD inventory data this month and next and continue into the end of 2017. For non-OECD states, the draws will show up in JODI data beginning in March.3 The physical deficits - i.e., supply less than demand - will force storage to draw, backwardating the WTI forward curve later this year (Chart 2).4 If markets are not surprised by a policy-induced rally in the USD on the back of a U.S. border-adjustment tax (BAT), or a too-aggressive tightening by the Fed as it seeks to normalize monetary policy, we expect the drawdown in inventories to continue keeping markets backwardated. Even with production returning to pre-Agreement levels in 2H17 in states with the capacity to expand and reliably sustain production - Gulf Arab producers, Russia and U.S. shales - we expect storage to continue to draw through the year and into 2018 (Chart 3). Chart 2We Continue To Expect Backwardation We Continue To Expect Backwardation We Continue To Expect Backwardation Chart 3Storage Drawdown On Track Storage Drawdown On Track Storage Drawdown On Track In 4Q16 the impact of the higher Kuwaiti and UAE output is apparent, along with higher Russian production. This put more crude on the market, which found its way into storage late in 4Q16 and early 1Q17, reversing the trend in draws seen earlier in 2H16. This put the market back in a temporary surplus condition, with the result being more storage will have to be worked off in 1H17 than our earlier estimates indicated. But these draws will occur, following the implementation of the production accord. Extending The KSA - Russia Deal Beyond June Is Unnecessary In our estimates, OPEC crude production increases by ~ 850k b/d in 2H17 versus 1H17 levels. Despite this recovery, the storage drawdown continues. Our modeling assumes Gulf OPEC will account for slightly more than +1mm b/d growth, and non-Gulf OPEC will see production continue to fall by 170k b/d. Russia's total liquids production goes from 10.95mm b/d in 1H17 to 11.34mm b/d in 2H17. We estimate U.S. shale production grows at an average rate of ~ 300k b/d in 2H17, while total U.S. liquids production increases 720k b/d over the same interval. Setting aside the possibility of a policy-induced rally in the USD on the back of too-aggressive Fed tightening or a border-adjusted tax becoming the law of the land, both of which would depress demand and raise production ex U.S., we expect the crude-oil market to remain backwardated next year. The globally synchronized upturn in GDP will keep demand robust, with growth coming in close to even with this year's rate of ~ 1.50mm b/d. We have global liquids production and OPEC crude output growing less than 1.0% next year. We believe the market is overestimating the resilience of offshore production next year, particularly in the U.S. Gulf, based on the stout performance put in last year and expected for this year. Our colleague Matt Conlan notes in BCA's Energy Sector Strategy, U.S. production growth since October has almost exclusively been from the Gulf of Mexico's new projects. Output in the Gulf continues to increase due to the lagged effect of final investment decisions made during 2012 - 2014, when WTI prices were consistently trading above $100/bbl. GOM production will peak in 2017 then decline in 2018 due to lack of new investments made since 2014. Indeed, as "increasing decline rates overwhelm a shrinking inventory of new projects, GOM production should peak sometime in 2017 and then start decreasing. The EIA's estimate for another 200,000 b/d increase in GOM production in 2017 seems overly-optimistic."5 Once this becomes apparent to the market, we believe backwardation will reassert itself and persist into 2018. The backwardation of the forward curve structure will affect U.S. shale production economics in 2018. However, our base case is for U.S. shale-oil production in the "Big Four" basins - Permian, Eagle Ford, Bakken and Niobrara - to grow 700k b/d next year, given the current structure of the WTI forwards, which were taken higher along with the WTI price rally at the front of the curve. This triggered the revival of rig counts; however, we want to point out that different curve shapes at different price levels produce different expected rig-count responses.6 Chart 4Barring a Policy Shock Demand Will Remain Robust bca.ces_wr_2017_02_09_c4 bca.ces_wr_2017_02_09_c4 Global Demand Firing On All Cylinders Robust demand growth - ~ +1.50mm b/d in 2017 and 2018 in our modeling - provides the impetus for the continued draws in storage this year and next (Chart 4). We revised our demand estimates for 2015 - 16 in line with the IEA's just-revised assessment of global consumption published in its January 2017 Oil Market Report.7 The IEA brought 2016 oil demand growth up to 1.50mm b/d, in line with our earlier estimates, but significantly revised 2015 demand growth upward to 2.0mm b/d. The Agency expects higher prices to crimp demand this year, taking it to 1.30mm b/d; our estimate, however, is higher, largely on the back of the first global synchronized growth we've seen since the Global Financial Crisis, which will be supported by accommodative monetary conditions worldwide, all else equal.8 Investment Implications Our analysis suggests there will be no need to extend the OPEC - Russia production accord into 2H17. In addition, it reinforces our view markets will backwardate later this year and stay backwardated in 2018, provided we do not see a BAT-induced rally in the USD, or an overly aggressive Fed normalization trajectory. As we noted in previous research, a BAT would lift the value of the USD, which would lower demand ex U.S. and raise supply at the margin.9 We make the odds of a BAT becoming the law of the land in the U.S. this year 50:50, so this is a non-trivial risk. This would be unambiguously bearish for oil prices. While we do not expect oil to be included among the imported commodities subject to a BAT, we do, nonetheless, expect the imposition of a BAT to lift the USD by 10%. This, coupled with the 5% increase in the greenback we'd already penciled in due to the Fed's monetary-policy normalization, will lift the USD 15% if it goes through. Should this occur, we would be preparing for prices to again fall below $50/bbl and push back to the $40/bbl area, which would cause supply and capex to once again contract significantly. That said, we are reinstating our long front-to-back WTI recommendation (long Dec/17 WTI vs. short Dec/18 WTI), given our updated balances assessment. Our expectation for inventories to continue to draw after the OPEC - Russia production-cutting agreement expires in June supports this recommendation. In addition, if we do see a BAT in the U.S., we believe markets will take the deferred WTI curve significantly lower in expectation of reduced demand and higher marginal supplies that almost surely will ensue in 2018. While the Dec/17 contract also will trade lower, more damage to prices will occur in 2018 contracts. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "OPEC Cuts Oil Output, But More Work Needed to Fulfill Deal," published by Bloomberg February 2, 2017. Iraq stands out among OPEC producers agreeing to cut, but apparently not following through as diligently as the rest of the Gulf Arab states; we are assuming production of 4.5mm b/d for 1H17, going to 4.6mm b/d in 2H17 for Iraq. 2 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy "2017 Commodity Outlook: Energy," dated December 8, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 JODI refers to the Joint Organisations Data Initiative, a supranational producer-consumer oil-market data provider headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. 4 "Backwardation" describes a forward price curve in which the price for a commodity for prompt delivery (e.g., tomorrow) exceeds the price of a commodity delivered in the future (e.g., next year). It is the opposite of a contango curve structure. 5 Please see issue of BCA Research's Energy Sector Strategy "Gulf Of Mexico Oil Production Likely To Peak In 2017," dated January 11, 2017, available nrg.bcaresearch.com. 6 In next week's report, we will present scenario analysis of shale-oil production as a function of WTI forward curve shape - i.e., the implications of backwardation for shale rig counts. This will update our assessments of price sensitivities to interest rates and USD movements. 7 Please see the IEA's Oil Market Report of 19 January 2017. 8 We discuss this in last week's Commodity & Energy Strategy feature article entitled "Gold Will Perform...," dated February 2, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy "Taking A BAT To Commodities," dated January 26, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016

Dear Client, I am visiting clients in Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and India this week, and as such there will be no regular Weekly Report. Instead, we are sending you a Special Report written by my colleague Marko Papic, Senior Vice President, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service. Marko argues that the Middle East has reached a stable equilibrium, as much as is possible, and will not drive the news or markets in 2017. I hope you will find this report both interesting and informative. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Senior Vice President Global Investment Strategy Highlights The Middle East is not a major geopolitical risk in 2017. Saudi-Iranian and Russo-Turkish tensions will de-escalate, for now. The OPEC production cut will go through; oil prices will average $55/bbl in 2017. Geopolitical risk continues to rotate to the Asia Pacific region. Trump, Iranian elections, and Iraqi instability pose risks to the view. Feature The Middle East has dominated the news flow for the past five years, for good reason. The carnage in Syria and Iraq is tragic and reprehensible. However, the investment relevance of the various regional conflicts is dubious. For all the attention paid to the rise of the Islamic State, we would remind clients that the group's conquest of Iraq's second-largest city Mosul in June 2014 did not cause a spike in oil prices but rather marked the end of the bull market (Chart 1)! From an investment perspective, the only dynamic worth watching in the Middle East is the "Great Game" between regional actors, which have been looking to fill the vacuum left by America's dramatic geopolitical deleveraging (Chart 2). The U.S. strategy is permanent and driven by global interests, namely the rise of China and the need to shift resources towards East Asia. Given the incoming Trump administration's laser focus on China, we expect that the U.S. will remain aloof from the Middle East. Chart 1Ironically, Worry About The Fall Of ISIS Ironically, Worry About The Fall Of ISIS Ironically, Worry About The Fall Of ISIS Chart 2While The U.S. Military Deleverages... While The U.S. Military Deleverages... While The U.S. Military Deleverages... Does the recent détente between Russia and Turkey in Syria, and between Iran and Saudi Arabia over OPEC production cuts, signal that the Middle East has finally found geopolitical equilibrium? We tentatively think the answer is yes. This will reduce the importance of the region as the primary source of geopolitical risk premia, which BCA's geopolitical strategists have expected to shift to Asia for some time.1 Saudi-Iranian Tensions Are On Ice Chart 3...The Saudi Arabian Military Leverages Up ...The Saudi Arabian Military Leverages Up ...The Saudi Arabian Military Leverages Up Since the U.S. decision to deleverage from the region in 2011, Saudi Arabia has leveraged up, becoming one of the world's largest arms purchasers and involving itself overtly and covertly in several regional conflicts in the process (Chart 3). Saudi insecurity deepened following President Barack Obama's decision to leave no troops in Iraq. The last U.S. soldier of the main occupation force left Iraq on December 18, 2011. The very next day, on December 19, Iraq's Shia Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, a close ally of Iran, issued an order for the arrest of the Sunni Vice-President Tariq al-Hashimi. The move by al-Maliki set off what essentially became a civil war in the country, with the Sunni minority eventually turning to ever-more radicalized militant groups for protection. From the Saudi perspective, Iraq is a vital piece of real estate as it is a natural buffer between itself and its Shia rival Iran. While the Fifth Fleet of the U.S. Navy, based in Bahrain, continues to guard against any Iranian incursion via the Persian Gulf, there is very little space between the Saudi oil fields and Iran if Iraq falls into Iran's orbit. The subsequent five years saw Iran and Saudi Arabia fight several proxy wars in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. These included direct military action by Iran in Iraq and Syria against Saudi-backed militants and by Saudi Arabia in Yemen against Iranian-backed militants. It also included oil politics, with Saudi Arabia announcing in November 2014 that it was ending years of its price-setting strategy. These strategies ultimately proved to be unsustainable and BCA's Geopolitical Strategy called the peak in Saudi-Iranian tensions in February 2016.2 Why? First, because oil prices collapsed! Geopolitical adventurism is a luxury afforded to those with the means to pursue adventures. The combination of low oil prices, domestic social outlays, and an expensive war in Yemen forced Saudi Arabia to burn through $220 billion of its foreign reserves between July 2014 and December 2016, equivalent to 30% of its central-bank holdings!3 There is a relationship between high oil prices and aggressive foreign policy in oil-producing states (Chart 4). Political science research shows that the relationship is not spurious. As Chart 5 illustrates, petrol states led by revolutionary leaders are much more likely to engage in militarized international disputes.4 This relationship is particularly pronounced when oil sells at above $70 per barrel. At that price, oil producing states become more prone to disputes than non-oil states, regardless of leadership qualities. Chart 4 Chart 5 Second, Saudi Arabia's military campaign in Yemen proved to be a disaster. The kingdom intervened in March 2015 to reinstate the democratically elected President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, who had been removed from power by Iranian-linked Houthi rebels. The real reason for the intervention was for the Saudis to gauge their war-making capabilities, test their recently purchased military equipment, and put a check on Iranian influence in the region. A quick, successful war in Yemen would have been a template for future interventions in Iraq and Syria on behalf of Sunni allies, and would have cemented Saudi Arabia's position as a regional power in the wake of the U.S. withdrawal. As BCA's Geopolitical Strategy warned, however, defeating the experienced Houthis would not be easy and Saudi Arabia would ultimately hesitate to commit to a land war.5 The intervention has resulted in disaster for Saudi Arabia on several levels: Houthis remain in control of the capital Sana'a and largely the same territory that encompassed the former Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen); The Saudis, desperate for a ground-force presence, have turned a blind eye to Al Qaeda's and ISIS's control of almost a third of the country in the south and coastal regions; Saudi forces have taken considerable losses, including some high-tech and high-priced items; The conflict has exposed severe military deficiencies, from the low level of strategic and tactical planning of senior staff, to the poor communication of units at the middle level, to the pervasive low morale and training of the rank-and-file. The biggest loss for Saudi Arabia has been that of leadership. What began as a pan-Sunni intervention led by Riyadh, with considerable involvement by the UAE and Egypt, has seen the Saudis lose almost all their allies. The UAE removed its troops in mid-2016 (in somewhat of a diplomatic spat with Riyadh) and Egypt has subsequently held military exercises with Russia, a Saudi rival in the region, and decided in December to provide military advisors to the Syrian Arab Army. All the talk about a "Sunni NATO" is over. Saudi Arabia's experience in Yemen, combined with the decline in its currency reserves, forced it to come to terms with reality, and eventually agree to an oil production cut with Russia and Iran. Thus it took Saudi Arabia exactly five years, from the U.S. withdrawal in Iraq in 2011, to realize the limits of its regional power. Bob Ryan, Senior Vice President of BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy, correctly forecast the OPEC cut and expects the deal to be successfully implemented in 2017.6 One reason Bob is confident is that both Saudi Arabia and Russia are looking to privatize their energy sector significantly by 2018. Russia has sold 19.5% of Rosneft and the Saudis want to conduct an IPO of 5% of their state-owned oil company Aramco. It makes no sense to do this IPO in an environment of low oil prices. Furthermore, sovereign debt issuance to cover budget deficits will become cheaper when oil prices are higher. Geopolitics are aligning with Bob's view as well. Saudi Arabia's attempt to counter Iranian influence in the region has failed both militarily and via oil politics. Riyadh is focusing inwards, on its "Vision 2030" reforms, which will entail considerable domestic upheaval as a result of its comprehensive effort to remove the ultra-conservative religious establishment from power.7 This is now coming to light, with Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman recently announcing harsh punitive measures for any cleric who incites or resorts to violence against the reform agenda. Bottom Line: Saudi Arabia's bid for regional hegemony is over, at least for now. The country is focusing inwards, on long-term political and social reforms and economic diversification. Its efforts to bring Iran to heel with low oil prices and with direct military confrontation in Yemen have failed. The oil production-cut deal between Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Russia should hold as a result of the de-escalation of Saudi-Iranian tensions and the socio-economic priorities of all three states. BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy service is overweight energy relative to other commodities as a result.8 Is The Russia-Turkey Détente Sustainable? Turkey and Russia have concluded a political and military détente in Syria with surprising speed. This has made one of our major geopolitical risks for 2017 - a Turkish-Russian confrontation over Syria - already obsolete. Much as with Saudi Arabia, Turkey has had a bite of regional hegemony, did not like the bitter taste, and has decided to make a deal with its rivals instead. For Turkey, the real concern over the past five years has been American inaction in Syria. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has spent a lot of political capital opposing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. He had hoped that a successful revolution would create a new client state for Turkey, yielding Turkey overland access to Persian Gulf energy sources. Erdogan was therefore beyond dismayed when President Barack Obama failed to intervene in Syria in 2013 following Assad's use of chemical weapons. The chronology of what happened next is important: Russia intervened two years later, in September 2015, to stem the progress of anti-Assad rebels and save the regime from collapse. Two months later, a Russian Sukhoi Su-24 was shot down by Turkish F-16s in the Turkey-Syria border area. Turkey and Russia broke relations for a while, but tensions did not escalate. Ankara faced a coup attempt in mid-July 2016, which the ruling party linked to the U.S.-based Islamist preacher Fethullah Gülen. The Obama administration refused to extradite Gülen without concrete evidence of his involvement. By late July, Turkish officials were calling Russia a "friendly neighbor" and a "strategic partner." In early August, Erdogan met Russian President Vladimir Putin in St. Petersburg, after issuing a letter with an apology to the family of the shot-down pilot. Then, on August 24, Turkey invaded Syria. The military intervention, dubbed "Operation Euphrates Shield," was officially launched to fight the Islamic State, a common pretext these past three years. Erdogan officially stated that he also aimed to fight Assad's regime, but this appeared to put Ankara and Moscow back on collision course, and statements from the Turkish side have since been "corrected." The real reason for the intervention was not to fight ISIS or Assad, but rather to curb the gains made by the various Kurdish militias on the ground in Iraq and Syria. In particular, Ankara intervened to prevent the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) - the armed wing of the Syrian Democratic Union Party, which is affiliated with the Turkey-based Kurdistan Workers' Party - from linking up with its now vast territory held in the north of Syria (Map 1). Chart The territory, which our map shows has expanded considerably as the YPG has claimed mostly Islamic State-held areas, is split between Rojava, the main territory east of the Euphrates river, and the Afrin enclave near the Mediterranean Sea. For Turkey, the proximity of such a vast Kurdish-held territory so close to its own Kurdish southeastern region presents a national-security nightmare. The operation's strategic goal was to capture Al-Bab, the stronghold of the Islamic State in northern Syria and a strategic point between the two YPG-held swaths of territory. However, it has taught the Turks that they have no experience fighting a prolonged battle, especially against local insurgents and militants who know the region. Since the first attack on Al-Bab's western part, the Turkish army has suffered three defeats and retreated to initial positions. With Turkey stuck in Al-Bab, the Russian air force has now begun to bomb Islamic State positions to help their tentative new ally. This level of operational coordination is notable and important. It suggests that Turkey, a NATO member state, is now reliant on Russian air strikes for ground support rather than on American sorties flying out of NATO's air base in Incirlik, Turkey. Turkey even claims that U.S. presence in Incirlik is obsolete if it receives no help from the U.S. Air Force around Al-Bab. How sustainable is the Turkey-Russia détente? We suspect it will be quite sustainable, at least in the short term. Ankara has moved away from demands for Assad to step down, with the Deputy Prime Minister, Numan Kurtulmus, recently stating that Turkey would not "impose any decision" on the Syrian people regarding future leadership. The assassination of the Russian ambassador in Turkey also failed to derail Russo-Turkish cooperation. Beyond the short term, however, the question remains what Turkey intends to do about Kurdish gains, which are considerable in both Syria and Iraq. The town of Manbij, for instance, is strategically located west of the Euphrates and was supposed to be ceded to Turkey by the Kurds. The situation could grow even more complicated for Turkey as the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq may proclaim independence after the Islamic State stronghold of Mosul is liberated in early 2017.9 The YPG in Syria could then ask to join their fellow Kurds in Iraq in forming a unitary state. Although unlikely, this scenario is probably on Turkey's mind, as it would mean that the Kurds inside Turkey may intensify their anti-government insurgency. Note, however, that this scenario does not bother Russia. As far as Moscow is concerned, it has succeeded in keeping Assad in power, its Syrian naval base in Tartus is secure, and it has proven its ability to project power outside of its immediate sphere of influence (Ukraine, Crimea, Georgia, and the Caucasus), thus advertising its "Great Power" status. Bottom Line: For the time being, the Russian-Turkish détente will hold. The real risk is not a Turkish-Russian confrontation, but rather a wider Turkish engagement in both Syria and Iraq against the Kurds sometime in the future. We suspect that the Turkish military experience in Syria may make the Turks think twice about engaging in a large-scale war against the Kurds across three states. But given the erratic policymaking out of Ankara in recent years, it is difficult to say this with any confidence. The geopolitical risk of Turkish imperial overreach will continue to weigh on Turkish assets in 2017. Risks To The Sanguine View There are many reasons why investors should stay up at night in 2017, but the Middle East is not one of them. The process of U.S. deleveraging from the region has been painful and costly (from a human perspective especially), but it has ultimately forced regional powers to figure out how to carve out the leftover space between them. There are a few questions left to answer, starting with the Kurdish question. But, for the most part, we do not expect to see the major players - Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, Egypt, or Israel - come to blows with each other. There are three major risks to this sanguine view. The U.S. Is Back! The current semi-stable equilibrium will definitely be thrown off track if the Trump administration decides to sink its teeth fully into the Middle East. We expect President-elect Donald Trump to authorize greater military action against the Islamic State, including more intense air strikes. However, this is not a qualitative reversal of Obama's deleveraging policy. A real reversal would be if Trump decided to follow the advice of Iran hawks in his government - of whom there are several - and increase tensions with Tehran. This is unlikely, given Trump's focus on China and his willingness to improve ties with Russia, a nominal ally of Iran. In fact, there has been almost no talk of Iran from either President-elect Trump or any of his advisors since the election. Furthermore, while U.S. oil imports from OPEC are no longer declining, they are still massively down since their peak in the mid-2000s (Chart 6). It is unlikely that Trump will commit resources to a region of diminishing importance to U.S. interests. Change Of Guard In Tehran. While the risk of Washington saber-rattling with Iran is overstated, what happens if the moderate President Hassan Rouhani is defeated in the upcoming May election? Hardliners are arguing that the nuclear deal with the West has done nothing for the economy, the main pillar of Rouhani's 2013 platform. This is not true. Headline inflation ticked up in late 2016, but remains well off the 40% levels in 2013, while GDP growth has been in the black throughout Rouhani's term, and net exports have bottomed (Chart 7). However, the flow of FDI into the country has been tepid, probably due to ongoing uncertainty with the government transition in the U.S. Both European and Asian businesses are waiting to see if the incoming Trump administration wants to revive sanctions. Meanwhile, skirmishes between U.S. and Iranian vessels - purportedly controlled by the hardline Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - have increased in the Persian Gulf. Perhaps the hardliners in Tehran are hoping that they can bait the hardliners in D.C. into a pre-election confrontation that sinks Rouhani. Iraqi Instability. Although the Iraqi government is set to take over Mosul from the Islamic State some time in Q1 2017, the fact remains that the country is bitterly divided between Sunnis and Shia amidst sluggish oil revenues. While the production cut deal will raise revenues marginally, revenues will still be well below their highs (Chart 8). Defeating the Islamic State militarily is one thing, but the real challenge is for Baghdad to reintegrate the Sunni population, which largely lives in territory devoid of oil production. A renewal of civil strife and terrorism targeting Iraqi civilians, which could happen as the Islamic State militants blend back into the wider population, may be a risk in 2017. Chart 6U.S. Imports From OPEC Remain Low U.S. Imports From OPEC Remain Low U.S. Imports From OPEC Remain Low Chart 7Iranian Economy Improves Under Reformist Rule Iranian Economy Improves Under Reformist Rule Iranian Economy Improves Under Reformist Rule Chart 8Iraqi Oil Revenues Still Down From Highs Iraqi Oil Revenues Still Down From Highs Iraqi Oil Revenues Still Down From Highs A word on Israel may also be in order. Israel has not played a major geopolitical role in the region for the past five years and we suspect it will not in the next five. It is secure from its neighbours, who cannot match it in terms of military capability, and remains preoccupied with domestic politics and internal security. Meanwhile, the days when the region unified against Israel are over. Sectarian and ethnic conflicts have gutted Israel's traditional enemies. And former foes, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are now close allies. The one geopolitical threat that remains is Iran. However, that threat remains dormant as long as Israel maintains nuclear supremacy over Iran and as long as the U.S. remains a security guarantor for Israel. We do not see either changing any time soon. Investment Implications The main investment implication of our thesis that the Middle East has found a new equilibrium is that the region will not dominate the news flow in 2017. Short of a major Turkish blunder in Syria and Iraq, we see the current status quo largely frozen in place. Saudi Arabia appears to have conceded, for now at least, its inferior place in the geopolitical pecking order. Investors have plenty of things to worry about in 2017, such as general de-globalization, a potential Sino-American trade war, geopolitical tensions in East Asia, and elections in four of the five largest euro-area economies. Our geopolitical team's long-standing thesis that geopolitical risk is rotating out of the Middle East and into East Asia is therefore fully playing out.10 Chart 9KSA-Russia Production ##br##Pact Aims at Lowering Inventories KSA-Russia Production Pact Aims at Lowering Inventories KSA-Russia Production Pact Aims at Lowering Inventories In the near term, the geopolitical equilibrium should allow Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Russia to maintain their six-month agreement to cut production by up to 1.8 million b/d. The stated volumes to be cut are comprised of 1.2 million b/d from OPEC, 300,000 b/d from Russia, and another 300,000 b/d from other non-OPEC producers. The goal of this agreement is to reduce global oil inventories to more normal levels, which our commodity strategists believe will happen by the end of 2017 (Chart 9). Bob Ryan, of the Commodity & Energy Strategy, forecasts U.S. benchmark WTI crude prices to average $55/bbl in 2017. The incoming Trump administration will focus its Middle East policy on cooperating with regional actors against the Islamic State. Investors should expect to see more American "muscle" dedicated to the fight, perhaps at the risk of causing civilian casualties (which the Obama White House was careful to avoid). The downside of this strategy is that as the Islamic State loses its territory and ceases to be a caliphate, it will revert to being a more conventional terrorist organization. Its foreign fighters may return home to Europe, Russia, and elsewhere, while home-grown militants will seek to sow further Sunni-Shia discord, especially in Iraq. Unfortunately, this trend will keep our thesis of "A Bull Market For Terror" intact, which lends support to U.S. defense stocks.11 Marko Papic, Senior Vice President marko@bcaresearch.com Oleg Babanov, Editor/Strategist obabanov@bcaresearch.co.uk 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now," dated December 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see "Middle East: Saudi-Iran Tensions Have Peaked," in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Mercantilism Is Back," dated February 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 According to the estimates of BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy, "Tactical Focus Again Required In 2017," dated January 5, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Cullen S. Hendrix, "Oil Prices and Interstate Conflict Behavior," Peterson Institute for International Economics, dated July 2014, available at iie.com. According to Hendrix, revolutionary leaders are "leaders who come to power by force and attempt to transform preexisting political and economic relationships, both domestically and abroad." The definition is broad and includes leaders who used force in order to gain prominence. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Client Note, "Does Yemen Matter?" dated March 26, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "2017 Commodity Outlook: Energy," December 8, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Saudi Arabia's Choice: Modernity Or Bust," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. See also Emerging Market Equity Sector Strategy, "MENA: Rise Early, Work Hard, Strike Oil," dated October 4, 2016, available at emes.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy, "Tactical Focus Again Required In 2017," dated January 5, 2017, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see P. Ronzheimer, C. Weinmann, and K. Mössbauer, "Kurden Brauchen Mehr Deutsche Abwehrraketen," Bild, dated October 28, 2016, available at http://www.bild.de/politik/ausland/mossul/kurden-brauchen-dringend-milan-systeme-48495330.bild.html. 10 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "The Great Risk Rotation," dated December 11, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "A Bull Market For Terror," dated August 5, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights Multipolarity will peak in 2017 - geopolitical risks are spiking; Globalization is giving way to zero-sum mercantilism; U.S.-China relations are the chief risk to global stability; Turkey is the most likely state to get in a shooting war; Position for an inflation comeback; Go long defense, USD/EUR, and U.S. small caps vs. large caps. Feature Before the world grew mad, the Somme was a placid stream of Picardy, flowing gently through a broad and winding valley northwards to the English Channel. It watered a country of simple beauty. A. D. Gristwood, British soldier, later novelist. The twentieth century did not begin on January 1, 1900. Not as far as geopolitics is concerned. It began 100 years ago, on July 1, 1916. That day, 35,000 soldiers of the British Empire, Germany, and France died fighting over a couple of miles of territory in a single day. The 1916 Anglo-French offensive, also known as the Battle of the Somme, ultimately cost the three great European powers over a million and a half men in total casualties, of which 310,862 were killed in action over the four months of fighting. British historian A. J. P. Taylor put it aptly: idealism perished on the Somme. How did that happen? Nineteenth-century geopolitical, economic, and social institutions - carefully nurtured by a century of British hegemony - broke on the banks of the Somme in waves of human slaughter. What does this have to do with asset allocation? Calendars are human constructs devised to keep track of time. But an epoch is a period with a distinctive set of norms, institutions, and rules that order human activity. This "order of things" matters to investors because we take it for granted. It is a set of "Newtonian Laws" we assume will not change, allowing us to extrapolate the historical record into future returns.1 Since inception, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has argued that the standard assumptions about our epoch no longer apply.2 Social orders are not linear, they are complex systems. And we are at the end of an epoch, one that defined the twentieth century by globalization, the spread of democracy, and American hegemony. Because the system is not linear, its break will cause non-linear outcomes. Since joining BCA's Editorial Team in 2011, we have argued that twentieth-century institutions are undergoing regime shifts. Our most critical themes have been: The rise of global multipolarity;3 The end of Sino-American symbiosis;4 The apex of globalization;5 The breakdown of laissez-faire economics;6 The passing of the emerging markets' "Goldilocks" era.7 Our view is that the world now stands at the dawn of the twenty-first century. The transition is not going to be pretty. Investors must stop talking themselves out of left-tail events by referring to twentieth-century institutions. Yes, the U.S. and China really could go to war in the next five years. No, their trade relationship will not prevent it. Was the slaughter at the Somme prevented by the U.K.-German economic relationship? In fact, our own strategy service may no longer make sense in the new epoch. "Geopolitics" is not some add-on to investor's asset-allocation process. It is as much a part of that process as are valuations, momentum, bottom-up analysis, and macroeconomics. To modify the infamous Milton Friedman quip, "We are all geopolitical strategists now." Five Decade Themes: We begin this Strategic Outlook by updating our old decade themes and introducing a few new ones. These will inform our strategic views over the next half-decade. Below, we also explain how they will impact investors in 2017. From Multipolarity To ... Making America Great Again Our central theme of global multipolarity will reach its dangerous apex in 2017. Multipolarity is the idea that the world has two or more "poles" of power - great nations - that pursue their interests independently. It heightens the risk of conflict. Since we identified this trend in 2012, the number of global conflicts has risen from 10 to 21, confirming our expectations (Chart 1). Political science theory is clear: a world without geopolitical leadership produces hegemonic instability. America's "hard power," declining in relative terms, created a vacuum that was filled by regional powers looking to pursue their own spheres of influence. Chart 1Frequency Of Geopolitical Conflicts Increases Under Multipolarity Frequency Of Geopolitical Conflicts Increases Under Multipolarity Frequency Of Geopolitical Conflicts Increases Under Multipolarity The investment implications of a multipolar world? The higher frequency of geopolitical crises has provided a tailwind to safe-haven assets such as U.S. Treasurys.8 Ironically, the relative decline of U.S. power is positive for U.S. assets.9 Although its geopolitical power has been in relative decline since 1990, the U.S. bond market has become more, not less, appealing over the same timeframe (Chart 2) Counterintuitively, it was American hegemony - i.e. global unipolarity after the Soviet collapse - that made the rise of China and other emerging markets possible. This created the conditions for globalization to flourish and for investors to leave the shores of developed markets in search of yield. It is the stated objective of President-elect Donald Trump, and a trend initiated under President Barack Obama, to reduce the United States' hegemonic responsibilities. As the U.S. withdraws, it leaves regional instability and geopolitical disequilibria in its wake, enhancing the value-proposition of holding on to low-beta American assets. We are now coming to the critical moment in this process, with neo-isolationist Trump doubling down on President Obama's aloof foreign policy. In 2017, therefore, multipolarity will reach its apex, leading several regional powers - from China to Turkey - to overextend themselves as they challenge the status quo. Chaos will ensue. (See below for more!) The inward shift in American policy will sow the seeds for the eventual reversal of multipolarity. America has always profited from geopolitical chaos. It benefits from being surrounded by two massive oceans, Canada, and the Sonora-Chihuahuan deserts. Following both the First and Second World Wars, the U.S.'s relative geopolitical power skyrocketed (Chart 3). Chart 2America Is A Safe-Haven,##br## Despite (Because Of?) Relative Decline America Is A Safe-Haven, Despite (Because Of?) Relative Decline America Is A Safe-Haven, Despite (Because Of?) Relative Decline Chart 3America Is Chaos-Proof bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c3 bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c3 Over the next 12-24 months, we expect the chief investment implications of multipolarity - volatility, tailwind to safe-haven assets, emerging-market underperformance, and de-globalization - to continue to bear fruit. However, as the U.S. comes to terms with multipolarity and withdraws support for critical twentieth-century institutions, it will create conditions that will ultimately reverse its relative decline and lead to a more unipolar tendency (or possibly bipolar, with China). Therefore, Donald Trump's curious mix of isolationism, anti-trade rhetoric, and domestic populism may, in the end, Make America Great Again. But not for the reasons he has promised-- not because the U.S. will outperform the rest of the world in an absolute sense. Rather, America will become great again in a relative sense, as the rest of the world drifts towards a much scarier, darker place without American hegemony. Bottom Line: For long-term investors, the apex of multipolarity means that investing in China and broader EM is generally a mistake. Europe and Japan make sense in the interim due to overstated political risks, relatively easy monetary policy, and valuations, but even there risks will mount due to their high-beta qualities. The U.S. will own the twenty-first century. From Globalization To ... Mercantilism "The industrial glory of England is departing, and England does not know it. There are spasmodic outcries against foreign competition, but the impression they leave is fleeting and vague ... German manufacturers ... are undeniably superiour to those produced by British houses. It is very dangerous for men to ignore facts that they may the better vaunt their theories ... This is poor patriotism." Ernest Edwin Williams, Made in Germany (1896) The seventy years of British hegemony that followed the 1815 Treaty of Paris ending the Napoleonic Wars were marked by an unprecedented level of global stability. Britain's cajoled enemies and budding rivals swallowed their wounded pride and geopolitical appetites and took advantage of the peace to focus inwards, industrialize, and eventually catch up to the U.K.'s economy. Britain, by providing expensive global public goods - security of sea lanes, off-shore balancing,10 a reserve currency, and financial capital - resolved the global collective-action dilemma and ushered in an era of dramatic economic globalization. Sound familiar? It should. As Chart 4 shows, we are at the conclusion of a similar period of tranquility. Pax Americana underpinned globalization as much as Pax Britannica before it. There are other forces at work, such as pernicious wage deflation that has soured the West's middle class on free trade and immigration. But the main threat to globalization is at heart geopolitical. The breakdown of twentieth-century institutions, norms, and rules will encourage regional powers to set up their own spheres of influence and to see the global economy as a zero-sum game instead of a cooperative one.11 Chart 4Multipolarity And De-Globalization Go Hand-In-Hand bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c4 bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c4 At the heart of this geopolitical process is the end of Sino-American symbiosis. We posited in February that Charts 5 and 6 are geopolitically unsustainable.12 China cannot keep capturing an ever-increasing global market share for exports while exporting deflation; particularly now that its exports are rising in complexity and encroaching on the markets of developed economies (Chart 7). China's economic policy might have been acceptable in an era of robust global growth and American geopolitical confidence, but we live in a world that is, for the time being, devoid of both. Chart 5China's Share Of Global##br## Exports Has Skyrocketed... bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c5 bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c5 Chart 6And Now China ##br##Is Exporting Deflation bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c6 bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c6 China and the U.S. are no longer in a symbiotic relationship. The close embrace between U.S. household leverage and Chinese export-led growth is over (Chart 8). Today the Chinese economy is domestically driven, with government stimulus and skyrocketing leverage playing a much more important role than external demand. Exports make up only 19% of China's GDP and 12% of U.S. GDP. The two leading economies are far less leveraged to globalization than the conventional wisdom would have it. Chart 7China's Steady Climb Up ##br##The Value Ladder Continues Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Chart 8Sino-American ##br##Symbiosis Is Over bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c8 bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c8 Chinese policymakers have a choice. They can double down on globalization and use competition and creative destruction to drive up productivity growth, moving the economy up the value chain. Or they can use protectionism - particularly non-tariff barriers, as they have been doing - to defend their domestic market from competition.13 We expect that they will do the latter, especially in an environment where anti-globalization rhetoric is rising in the West and protectionism is already on the march (Chart 9). Chart 9Protectionism On The March Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now The problem with this likely choice, however, is that it breaks up the post-1979 quid-pro-quo between Washington and Beijing. The "quid" was the Chinese entry into the international economic order (including the WTO in 2001), which the U.S. supported; the "quo" was that Beijing would open its economy as it became wealthy. Today, 45% of China's population is middle-class, which makes China potentially the world's second-largest market after the EU. If China decides not to share its middle class with the rest of the world, then the world will quickly move towards mercantilism - particularly with regard to Chinese imports. Mercantilism was a long-dominant economic theory, in Europe and elsewhere, that perceived global trade to be a zero-sum game and economic policy to be an extension of the geopolitical "Great Game" between major powers. As such, net export growth was the only way to prosperity and spheres of influence were jealously guarded via trade barriers and gunboat diplomacy. What should investors do if mercantilism is back? In a recent joint report with the BCA's Global Alpha Sector Strategy, we argued that investors should pursue three broad strategies: Buy small caps (or microcaps) at the expense of large caps (or mega caps) across equity markets as the former are almost universally domestically focused; Favor closed economies levered on domestic consumption, both within DM and EM universes; Stay long global defense stocks; mercantilism will lead to more geopolitical risk (Chart 10). Chart 10Defense Stocks Are A No-Brainer Defense Stocks Are A No-Brainer Defense Stocks Are A No-Brainer Investors should also expect a more inflationary environment over the next decade. De-globalization will mean marginally less trade, less migration, and less free movement of capital across borders. These are all inflationary. Bottom Line: Mercantilism is back. Sino-American tensions and peak multipolarity will impair coordination. It will harden the zero-sum game that erodes globalization and deepens geopolitical tensions between the world's two largest economies.14 One way to play this theme is to go long domestic sectors and domestically-oriented economies relative to export sectors and globally-exposed economies. The real risk of mercantilism is that it is bedfellows with nationalism and jingoism. We began this section with a quote from an 1896 pamphlet titled "Made in Germany." In it, British writer E.E. Williams argued that the U.K. should abandon free trade policies due to industrial competition from Germany. Twenty years later, 350,000 men died in the inferno of the Somme. From Legal To ... Charismatic Authority Legal authority, the bedrock of modern democracy, is a critical pillar of civilization that investors take for granted. The concept was defined in 1922 by German sociologist Max Weber. Weber's seminal essay, "The Three Types of Legitimate Rule," argues that legal-rational authority flows from the institutions and laws that define it, not the individuals holding the office.15 This form of authority is investor-friendly because it reduces uncertainty. Investors can predict the behavior of policymakers and business leaders by learning the laws that govern their behavior. Developed markets are almost universally made up of countries with such norms of "good governance." Investors can largely ignore day-to-day politics in these systems, other than the occasional policy shift or regulatory push that affects sector performance. Weber's original essay outlined three forms of authority, however. The other two were "traditional" and "charismatic."16 Today we are witnessing the revival of charismatic authority, which is derived from the extraordinary characteristics of an individual. From Russia and the U.S. to Turkey, Hungary, the Philippines, and soon perhaps Italy, politicians are winning elections on the back of their messianic qualities. The reason for the decline of legal-rational authority is threefold: Elites that manage governing institutions have been discredited by the 2008 Great Recession and subsequent low-growth recovery. Discontent with governing institutions is widespread in the developed world (Chart 11). Elite corruption is on the rise. Francis Fukuyama, perhaps America's greatest political theorist, argues that American political institutions have devolved into a "system of legalized gift exchange, in which politicians respond to organized interest groups that are collectively unrepresentative of the public as a whole."17 Political gridlock across developed and emerging markets has forced legal-rational policymakers to perform like charismatic ones. European policymakers have broken laws throughout the euro-area crisis, with the intention of keeping the currency union alive. President Obama has issued numerous executive orders due to congressional gridlock. While the numbers of executive orders have declined under Obama, their economic significance has increased (Chart 12). Each time these policymakers reached around established rules and institutions in the name of contingencies and crises, they opened the door wider for future charismatic leaders to eschew the institutions entirely. Chart 11As Institutional Trust Declines, ##br##Voters Turn To Charismatic Leaders As Institutional Trust Declines, Voters Turn To Charismatic Leaders As Institutional Trust Declines, Voters Turn To Charismatic Leaders Chart 12Obama ##br##The Regulator Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Furthermore, a generational shift is underway. Millennials do not understand the value of legal-rational institutions and are beginning to doubt the benefits of democracy itself (Chart 13). The trend appears to be the most pronounced in the U.S. and U.K., perhaps because neither experienced the disastrous effects of populism and extremism of the 1930s. In fact, millennials in China appear to view democracy as more essential to the "good life" than their Anglo-Saxon peers. Chart 13Who Needs Democracy When You Have Tinder? Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Charismatic leaders can certainly outperform expectations. Donald Trump may end up being FDR. The problem for investors is that it is much more difficult to predict the behavior of a charismatic authority than a legal-rational one.18 For example, President-elect Trump has said that he will intervene in the U.S. economy throughout his four-year term, as he did with Carrier in Indiana. Whether these deals are good or bad, in a normative sense, is irrelevant. The point is that bottom-up investment analysis becomes useless when analysts must consider Trump's tweets, as well as company fundamentals, in their earnings projections! We suspect that the revival of charismatic leadership - and the danger that it might succeed in upcoming European elections - at least partly explains the record high levels of global policy uncertainty (Chart 14). Markets do not seem to have priced in the danger fully yet. Global bond spreads are particularely muted despite the high levels of uncertainty. This is unsustainable. Chart 14Are Assets Fully Pricing In Global Uncertainty? Are Assets Fully Pricing In Global Uncertainty? Are Assets Fully Pricing In Global Uncertainty? Bottom Line: The twenty-first century is witnessing the return of charismatic authority and erosion of legal-rational authority. This should be synonymous with uncertainty and market volatility over the next decade. In 2017, expect a rise in EuroStoxx volatility. From Laissez-Faire To ... Dirigisme The two economic pillars of the late twentieth century have been globalization and laissez-faire capitalism, or neo-liberalism. The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the communist challenge, anointing the U.S.-led "Washington Consensus" as the global "law of the land." The tenets of this epoch are free trade, fiscal discipline, low tax burden, and withdrawal of the state from the free market. Not all countries approached the new "order of things" with equal zeal, but most of them at least rhetorically committed themselves to asymptotically approaching the American ideal. Chart 15Debt Replaced Wages##br## In Laissez-Faire Economies Debt Replaced Wages In Laissez-Faire Economies Debt Replaced Wages In Laissez-Faire Economies The 2008 Great Recession put an end to the bull market in neo-liberal ideology. The main culprit has been the low-growth recovery, but that is not the full story. Tepid growth would have been digested without a political crisis had it not followed decades of stagnating wages. With no wage growth, households in the most laissez-faire economies of the West gorged themselves on debt (Chart 15) to keep up with rising cost of housing, education, healthcare, and childcare -- all staples of a middle-class lifestyle. As such, the low-growth context after 2008 has combined with a deflationary environment to produce the most pernicious of economic conditions: debt-deflation, which Irving Fisher warned of in 1933.19 It is unsurprising that globalization became the target of middle-class angst in this context. Globalization was one of the greatest supply-side shocks in recent history: it exerted a strong deflationary force on wages (Chart 16). While it certainly lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty in developing nations, globalization undermined those low-income and middle-class workers in the developed world whose jobs were most easily exported. World Bank economist Branko Milanovic's infamous "elephant trunk" shows the stagnation of real incomes since 1988 for the 75-95 percentile of the global income distribution - essentially the West's middle class (Chart 17).20 It is this section of the elephant trunk that increasingly supports populism and anti-globalization policies, while eschewing laissez faire liberalism. In our April report, "The End Of The Anglo-Saxon Economy," we posited that the pivot away from laissez-faire capitalism would be most pronounced in the economies of its greatest adherents, the U.S. and U.K. We warned that Brexit and the candidacy of Donald Trump should be taken seriously, while the populist movements in Europe would surprise to the downside. Why the gap between Europe and the U.S. and U.K.? Because Europe's cumbersome, expensive, inefficient, and onerous social-welfare state finally came through when it mattered: it mitigated the pernicious effects of globalization and redistributed enough of the gains to temper populist angst. Chart 16Globalization: A Deflationary Shock Globalization: A Deflationary Shock Globalization: A Deflationary Shock Chart 17Globalization: No Friend To DM Middle Class Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now This view was prescient in 2016. The U.K. voted to leave the EU, Trump triumphed, while European populists stumbled in both the Spanish and Austrian elections. The Anglo-Saxon median voter has essentially moved to the left of the economic spectrum (Diagram 1).21 The Median Voter Theorem holds that policymakers will follow the shift to the left in order to capture as many voters as possible under the proverbial curve. In other words, Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders are not political price-makers but price-takers. Diagram 1The Median Voter Is Moving To The Left In The U.S. And U.K. Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now How does laissez-faire capitalism end? In socialism or communism? No, the institutions that underpin capitalism in the West - private property, rule of law, representative government, and enforcement of contracts - remain strong. Instead, we expect to see more dirigisme, a form of capitalism where the state adopts a "directing" rather than merely regulatory role. In the U.S., Donald Trump unabashedly campaigned on dirigisme. We do not expand on the investment implications of American dirigisme in this report (we encourage clients to read our post-election treatment of Trump's domestic politics).22 But investors can clearly see the writing on the wall: a late-cycle fiscal stimulus will be positive for economic growth in the short term, but most likely more positive for inflation in the long term. Donald Trump's policies therefore are a risk to bonds, positive for equities (in the near term), and potentially negative for both in the long term if stagflation results from late-cycle stimulus. What about Europe? Is it not already quite dirigiste? It is! But in Europe, we see a marginal change towards the right, not the left. In Spain, the supply-side reforms of Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy will remain in place, as he won a second term this year. In France, right-wing reformer - and self-professed "Thatcherite" - François Fillon is likely to emerge victorious in the April-May presidential election. And in Germany, the status-quo Grand Coalition will likely prevail. Only in Italy are there risks, but even there we expect financial markets to force the country - kicking and screaming - down the path of reforms. Bottom Line: In 2017, the market will be shocked to find itself face-to-face with a marginally more laissez-faire Europe and a marginally more dirigiste America and Britain. Investors should overweight European assets in a global portfolio given valuations, relative monetary policy (which will remain accommodative in Europe), a weak euro, and economic fundamentals (Chart 18), and upcoming political surprises. For clients with low tolerance of risk and volatility, a better entry point may exist following the French presidential elections in the spring. From Bias To ... Conspiracies As with the printing press, the radio, film, and television before it, the Internet has created a super-cyclical boom in the supply and dissemination of information. The result of the sudden surge is that quality and accountability are declining. The mainstream media has dubbed this the "fake news" phenomenon, no doubt to differentiate the conspiracy theories coursing through Facebook and Twitter from the "real news" of CNN and MSNBC. The reality is that mainstream media has fallen far short of its own vaunted journalistic standards (Chart 19). Chart 18Europe's Economy Is Holding Up Europe's Economy Is Holding Up Europe's Economy Is Holding Up Chart 19 "Mainstream Media" Is A Dirty Word For Many "Mainstream Media" Is A Dirty Word For Many We are not interested in this debate, nor are we buying the media narrative that "fake news" delivered Trump the presidency. Instead, we are focused on how geopolitical and political information is disseminated to voters, investors, and ultimately priced by the market. We fear that markets will struggle to price information correctly due to three factors: Low barriers to entry: The Internet makes publishing easy. Information entrepreneurs - i.e. hack writers - and non-traditional publications ("rags") are proliferating. The result is greater output but a decrease in quality control. For example, Facebook is now the second most trusted source of news for Americans (Chart 20). Cost-cutting: The boom in supply has squeezed the media industry's finances. Newspapers have died in droves; news websites and social-media giants have mushroomed (Chart 21). News companies are pulling back on things like investigative reporting, editorial oversight, and foreign correspondent desks. Foreign meddling: In this context, governments have gained a new advantage because they can bring superior financial resources and command-and-control to an industry that is chaotic and cash-strapped. Russian news outlets like RT and Sputnik have mastered this game - attracting "clicks" around the world from users who are not aware they are reading Russian propaganda. China has also raised its media profile through Western-accessible propaganda like the Global Times, but more importantly it has grown more aggressive at monitoring, censoring, and manipulating foreign and domestic media. Chart 20Facebook Is The New Cronkite? Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Chart 21The Internet Has Killed Journalism Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now The above points would be disruptive enough alone. But we know that technology is not the root cause of today's disruptions. Income inequality, the plight of the middle class, elite corruption, unchecked migration, and misguided foreign policy have combined to create a toxic mix of distrust and angst. In the West, the decline of the middle class has produced a lack of socio-political consensus that is fueling demand for media of a kind that traditional outlets can no longer satisfy. Media producers are scrambling to meet this demand while struggling with intense competition from all the new entrants and new platforms. What is missing is investment in downstream refining and processing to convert the oversupply of crude information into valuable product for voters and investors.23 Otherwise, the public loses access to "transparent" or baseline information. Obviously the baseline was never perfect. Both the Vietnam and Iraq wars began as gross impositions on the public's credulity: the Gulf of Tonkin Incident and Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. But there was a shared reference point across society. The difference today, as we see it, is that mass opinion will swing even more wildly during a crisis as a result of the poor quality of information that spreads online and mobilizes social networks more rapidly than ever before. We could have "flash mobs" in the voting booth - or on the steps of the Supreme Court - just like "flash crashes" in financial markets, i.e. mass movements borne of passing misconceptions rather than persistent misrule. Election results are more likely to strain the limits of the margin of error, while anti-establishment candidates are more likely to remain viable despite dubious platforms. What does this mean for investors? Fundamental analysis of a country's political and geopolitical risk is now an essential tool in the investor toolkit. If investors rely on the media, and the market prices what the media reports, then the same investors will continue to get blindsided by misleading probabilities, as with Brexit and Trump (Chart 22). While we did not predict these final outcomes, we consistently advised clients, for months in advance, that the market probabilities were too low and serious hedging was necessary. Those who heeded our advice cheered their returns, even as some lamented the electoral returns. Chart 22Get Used To Tail-Risk Events Get Used To Tail-Risk Events Get Used To Tail-Risk Events Bottom Line: Keep reading BCA's Geopolitical Strategy! Final Thoughts On The Next Decade The nineteenth century ended in the human carnage that was the Battle of the Somme. The First World War ushered in social, economic, political, geopolitical, demographic, and technological changes that drove the evolution of twentieth-century institutions, rules, and norms. It created the "order of things" that we all take for granted today. The coming decade will be the dawn of the new geopolitical century. We can begin to discern the ordering of this new epoch. It will see peak multipolarity lead to global conflict and disequilibrium, with globalization and laissez-faire economic consensus giving way to mercantilism and dirigisme. Investors will see the benevolent deflationary impulse of globalization evolve into state intervention in the domestic economy and the return of inflation. Globally oriented economies and sectors will underperform domestic ones. Developed markets will continue to outperform emerging markets, particularly as populism spreads to developing economies that fail to meet expectations of their rising middle classes. Over the next ten years, these changes will leave the U.S. as the most powerful country in the world. China and wider EM will struggle to adapt to a less globalized world, while Europe and Japan will focus inward. The U.S. is essentially a low-beta Great Power: its economy, markets, demographics, natural resources, and security are the least exposed to the vagaries of the rest of the world. As such, when the rest of the world descends into chaos, the U.S. will hide behind its Oceans, and Canada, and the deserts of Mexico, and flourish. Five Themes For 2017: Our decade themes inform our view of cyclical geopolitical events and crises, such as elections and geopolitical tensions. As such, they form our "net assessment" of the world and provide a prism through which we refract geopolitical events. Below we address five geopolitical themes that we expect to drive the news flow, and thus the markets, in 2017. Some themes are Red Herrings (overstated risks) and thus present investment opportunities, others are Black Swans (understated risks) and are therefore genuine risks. Europe In 2017: A Trophy Red Herring? Europe's electoral calendar is ominously packed (Table 1). Four of the euro area's five largest economies are likely to have elections in 2017. Another election could occur if Spain's shaky minority government collapses. Table 1 Europe In 2017 Will Be A Headline Risk Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now We expect market volatility to be elevated throughout the year due to the busy calendar. In this context, we advise readers to follow our colleague Dhaval Joshi at BCA's European Investment Strategy. Dhaval recommends that BCA clients combine every €1 of equity exposure with 40 cents of exposure to VIX term-structure, which means going long the nearest-month VIX futures and equally short the subsequent month's contract. The logic is that the term structure will invert sharply if risks spike.24 While we expect elevated uncertainty and lots of headline risk, we do not believe the elections in 2017 will transform Europe's future. As we have posited since 2011, global multipolarity increases the logic for European integration.25 Crises driven by Russian assertiveness, Islamic terrorism, and the migration wave are not dealt with more effectively or easily by nation states acting on their own. Thus far, it appears that Europeans agree with this assessment: polling suggests that few are genuinely antagonistic towards the euro (Chart 23) or the EU (Chart 24). In our July report called "After BREXIT, N-EXIT?" we posited that the euro area will likely persevere over at least the next five years.26 Chart 23Support For The Euro Remains Stable Support For The Euro Remains Stable Support For The Euro Remains Stable Chart 24Few Europeans Want Out Of The EU Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Take the Spanish and Austrian elections in 2016. In Spain, Mariano Rajoy's right-wing People's Party managed to hold onto power despite four years of painful internal devaluations and supply-side reforms. In Austria, the establishment candidate for president, Alexander Van der Bellen, won the election despite Austria's elevated level of Euroskepticism (Chart 24), its central role in the migration crisis, and the almost comically unenthusiastic campaign of the out-of-touch Van der Bellen. In both cases, the centrist candidates survived because voters hesitated when confronted with an anti-establishment choice. Next year, we expect more of the same in three crucial elections: The Netherlands: The anti-establishment and Euroskeptic Party for Freedom (PVV) will likely perform better than it did in the last election, perhaps even doubling its 15% result in 2012. However, it has no chance of forming a government, given that all the other parties contesting the election are centrist and opposed to its Euroskeptic agenda (Chart 25). Furthermore, support for the euro remains at a very high level in the country (Chart 26). This is a reality that the PVV will have to confront if it wants to rule the Netherlands. Chart 25No Government For Dutch Euroskeptics Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Chart 26The Netherlands & Euro: Love Affair The Netherlands & Euro: Love Affair The Netherlands & Euro: Love Affair France: Our high conviction view is that Marine Le Pen, leader of the Euroskeptic National Front (FN), will be defeated in the second round of the presidential election.27 Despite three major terrorist attacks in the country, unchecked migration crisis, and tepid economic growth, Le Pen's popularity peaked in 2013 (Chart 27). She continues to poll poorly against her most likely opponents in the second round, François Fillon and Emmanuel Macron (Chart 28). Investors who doubt the polls should consider the FN's poor performance in the December 2015 regional elections, a critical case study for Le Pen's viability in 2017.28 Chart 27Le Pen's Polling: ##br##Head And Shoulder Formation? Le Pen's Polling: Head And Shoulder Formation? Le Pen's Polling: Head And Shoulder Formation? Chart 28Le Pen Will Not Be##br## Next French President Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Germany: Chancellor Angela Merkel's popularity is holding up (Chart 29), the migration crisis has abated (Chart 30), and there remains a lot of daylight between the German establishment and populist parties (Chart 31). The anti-establishment Alternative für Deutschland will enter parliament, but remain isolated. Chart 29Merkel's Approval Rating Has Stabilized Merkel's Approval Rating Has Stabilized Merkel's Approval Rating Has Stabilized Chart 30Migration Crisis Is Abating bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c30 bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c30 Chart 31There Is A Lot Of Daylight... bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c31 bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c31 The real risk in 2017 remains Italy. The country has failed to enact any structural reforms, being a laggard behind the reform poster-child Spain (Chart 32). Meanwhile, support for the euro remains in the high 50s, which is low compared to the euro-area average (Chart 33). Polls show that if elections were held today, the ruling Democratic Party would gain a narrow victory (Chart 34). However, it is not clear what electoral laws would apply to the contest. The reformed electoral system for the Chamber of Deputies remains under review by the Constitutional Court until at least February. This will make all the difference between further gridlock and a viable government. Chart 32Italy Is Europe's bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c32 bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c32 Chart 33Italy Lags Peers On Euro Support bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c33 bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c33 Chart 34Italy's Next Election Is Too Close To Call bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c34 bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c34 Investors should consider three factors when thinking about Italy in 2017: The December constitutional referendum was not a vote on the euro and thus cannot serve as a proxy for a future referendum.29 The market will punish Italy the moment it sniffs out even a whiff of a potential Itexit referendum. This will bring forward the future pain of redenomination, influencing voter choices. Benefits of the EU membership for Italy are considerable, especially as they allow the country to integrate its unproductive, poor, and expensive southern regions.30 Sans Europe, the Mezzogiorno (Southern Italy) is Rome's problem, and it is a big one. The larger question is whether the rest of Italy's euro-area peers will allow the country to remain mired in its unsustainable status quo. We think the answer is yes. First, Italy is too big to fail given the size of its economy and sovereign debt market. Second, how unsustainable is the Italian status quo? OECD projections for Italy's debt-to-GDP ratio are not ominous. Chart 35 shows four scenarios, the most likely one charting Italy's debt-to-GDP rise from 133% today to about 150% by 2060. Italy's GDP growth would essentially approximate 0%, but its impressive budget discipline would ensure that its debt load would only rise marginally (Chart 36). Chart 35So What If Italy's Debt-To-GDP Ends Up At 170%? bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c35 bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c35 Chart 36Italy Has Learned To Live With Its Debt Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now This may seem like a dire prospect for Italy, but it ensures that the ECB has to maintain its accommodative stance in Europe even as the Fed continues its tightening cycle, a boon for euro-area equities as a whole. In other words, Italy's predicament would be unsustainable if the country were on its own. Its "sick man" status would be terminal if left to its own devices. But as a patient in the euro-area hospital, it can survive. And what happens to the euro area beyond our five-year forecasting horizon? We are not sure. Defeat of anti-establishment forces in 2017 will give centrist policymakers another electoral cycle to resolve the currency union's built-in flaws. If the Germans do not budge on greater fiscal integration over the next half-decade, then the future of the currency union will become murkier. Bottom Line: Remain long the nearest-month VIX futures and equally short the subsequent month's contract. We have held this position since September 14 and it has returned -0.84%. The advantage of this strategy is that it is a near-perfect hedge when risk assets sell off, but pays a low price for insurance. Investors with high risk tolerance who can stomach some volatility should take the plunge and overweight euro-area equities in a global equity portfolio. Solid global growth prospects, accommodative monetary policy, euro weakness, and valuations augur a solid year for euro-area equities. Politics will be a red herring as euro-area stocks climb the proverbial wall of worry in 2017. U.S.-Russia Détente: A Genuine Investment Opportunity Trump's election is good news for Russia. Over the past 16 years, Russia has methodically attempted to collect the pieces from the Soviet collapse. Putin sought to defend the Russian sphere of influence from outside powers (Ukraine and Belarus, the Caucasus, Central Asia). Putin also needed to rally popular support at various times by distracting the public. We view Ukraine and Syria through this prism. Lastly, Russia acted aggressively because it needed to reassure its allies that it would stand up for them.31 And yet the U.S. can live with a "strong" Russia. It can make a deal if the Trump administration recognizes some core interests (e.g. Crimea) and calls off the promotion of democracy in Russia's sphere, which Putin considers an attempt to undermine his rule. As we argued during the Ukraine invasion, it is the U.S., not Russia, which poses the greatest risk of destabilization.32 The U.S. lacks constraints in this theater. It can be aggressive towards Russia and face zero consequences: it has no economic relationship with Russia and does not stand directly in the way of any Russian reprisals, unlike Europe. That is why we think Trump and Putin will reset relations. Trump's team may be comfortable with Russia having a sphere of influence, unlike the Obama administration, which explicitly rejected this idea. The U.S. could even pledge not to expand NATO further, given that it has already expanded as far as it can feasibly and credibly go. Note, however, that a Russo-American truce may not last long. George W. Bush famously "looked into Putin's eyes and ... saw his soul," but relations soured nonetheless. Obama went further with his "Russian reset," removing European missile defense plans from Poland and the Czech Republic. These are avowed NATO allies, and this occurred merely one year after Russian troops marched on Georgia. And yet Moscow and Washington ended up rattling sabers and meddling in each other's internal affairs anyway. Chart 37Thaw In Russian-West##br## Cold War Is Bullish Europe bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c37 bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c37 Ultimately, U.S. resets fail because Russia is in structural decline and attempting to hold onto a very large sphere of influence whose citizens are not entirely willing participants.33 Because Moscow must often use blunt force to prevent the revolt of its vassal states (e.g. Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014), it periodically revives tensions with the West. Unless Russia strengthens significantly in the next few years, which we do not expect, then the cycle of tensions will continue. On the horizon may be Ukraine-like incidents in neighboring Belarus and Kazakhstan, both key components of the Russian sphere of influence. Bottom Line: Russia will get a reprieve from U.S. pressure. While we expect Europe to extend sanctions through 2017, a rapprochement with Washington will ultimately thaw relations between Europe and Russia by the end of that year. Europe will benefit from resuming business as usual. It will face less of a risk of Russian provocations via the Middle East and cybersecurity. The ebbing of the Russian geopolitical risk premium will have a positive effect on Europe, given its close correlation with European risk assets since the crisis in Ukraine (Chart 37). Investors who want exposure to Russia may consider overweighing Russian equities to Malaysian. BCA's Emerging Market Strategy has initiated this position for a 55.6% gain since March 2016 and our EM strategists believe there is more room to run for this trade. We recommend that investors simply go long Russia relative to the broad basket of EM equities. The rally in oil prices, easing of the geopolitical risk premium, and hints of pro-market reforms from the Kremlin will buoy Russian equities further in 2017. Middle East: ISIS Defeat Is A Black Swan In February 2016, we made two bold predictions about the Middle East: Iran-Saudi tensions had peaked;34 The defeat of ISIS would entice Turkey to intervene militarily in both Iraq and Syria.35 The first prediction was based on a simple maxim: sustained geopolitical conflict requires resources and thus Saudi military expenditures are unsustainable when a barrel of oil costs less than $100. Saudi Arabia overtook Russia in 2015 as the globe's third-largest defense spender (Chart 38)! Chart 38Saudi Arabia: Lock And Load Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now The mini-détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia concluded in 2016 with the announced OPEC production cut and freeze. While we continue to see the OPEC deal as more of a recognition of the status quo than an actual cut (because OPEC production has most likely reached its limits), nevertheless it is significant as it will slightly hasten the pace of oil-market rebalancing. On the margin, the OPEC deal is therefore bullish for oil prices. Our second prediction, that ISIS is more of a risk to the region in defeat than in glory, was highly controversial. However, it has since become consensus, with several Western intelligence agencies essentially making the same claim. But while our peers in the intelligence community have focused on the risk posed by returning militants to Europe and elsewhere, our focus remains on the Middle East. In particular, we fear that Turkey will become embroiled in conflicts in Syria and Iraq, potentially in a proxy war with Iran and Russia. The reason for this concern is that the defeat of the Islamic State will create a vacuum in the Middle East that the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds are most likely to fill. This is unacceptable to Turkey, which has intervened militarily to counter Kurdish gains and may do so in the future. We are particularly concerned about three potential dynamics: Direct intervention in Syria and Iraq: The Turkish military entered Syria in August, launching operation "Euphrates Shield." Turkey also reinforced a small military base in Bashiqa, Iraq, only 15 kilometers north of Mosul. Both operations were ostensibly undertaken against the Islamic State, but the real intention is to limit the Syrian and Iraqi Kurds. As Map 1 illustrates, Kurds have expanded their territorial control in both countries. Map 1Kurdish Gains In Syria & Iraq Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Conflict with Russia and Iran: President Recep Erdogan has stated that Turkey's objective in Syria is to remove President Bashar al-Assad from power.36 Yet Russia and Iran are both involved militarily in the country - the latter with regular ground troops - to keep Assad in power. Russia and Turkey did manage to cool tensions recently. Yet the Turkish ground incursion into Syria increases the probability that tensions will re-emerge. Meanwhile, in Iraq, Erdogan has cast himself as a defender of Sunni Arabs and has suggested that Turkey still has a territorial claim to northern Iraq. This stance would put Ankara in direct confrontation with the Shia-dominated Iraqi government, allied with Iran. Turkey-NATO/EU tensions: Tensions have increased between Turkey and the EU over the migration deal they signed in March 2016. Turkey claims that the deal has stemmed the flow of migrants to Europe, which is dubious given that the flow abated well before the deal was struck. Since then, Turkey has threatened to open the spigot and let millions of Syrian refugees into Europe. This is likely a bluff as Turkey depends on European tourists, import demand, and FDI for hard currency (Chart 39). If Erdogan acted on his threat and unleashed Syrian refugees into Europe, the EU could abrogate the 1995 EU-Turkey customs union agreement and impose economic sanctions. The Turkish foray into the Middle East poses the chief risk of a "shooting war" that could impact global investors in 2017. While there are much greater geopolitical games afoot - such as increasing Sino-American tensions - this one is the most likely to produce military conflict between serious powers. It would be disastrous for Turkey. The broader point is that the redrawing of the Middle East map is not yet complete. As the Islamic State is defeated, the Sunni population of Iraq and Syria will remain at risk of Shia domination. As such, countries like Turkey and Saudi Arabia could be drawn into renewed proxy conflicts to prevent complete marginalization of the Sunni population. While tensions between Turkey, Russia, and Iran will not spill over into oil-producing regions of the Middle East, they may cloud Iraq's future. Since 2010, Iraq has increased oil production by 1.6 million barrels per day. This is about half of the U.S. shale production increase over the same time frame. As such, Iraq's production "surprise" has been a major contributor to the 2014-2015 oil-supply glut. However, Iraq needs a steady inflow of FDI in order to boost production further (Chart 40). Proxy warfare between Turkey, Russia, and Iran - all major conventional military powers - on its territory will go a long way to sour potential investors interested in Iraqi production. Chart 39Turkey Is Heavily Dependent On The EU Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Chart 40Iraq Is The Big, And Cheap, Hope bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c40 bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c40 This is a real problem for global oil supply. The International Energy Agency sees Iraq as a critical source of future global oil production. Chart 41 shows that Iraq is expected to contribute the second-largest increase in oil production by 2020. And given Iraq's low breakeven production cost, it may be the last piece of real estate - along with Iran - where the world can get a brand-new barrel of oil for under $13. In addition to the risk of expanding Turkish involvement in the region, investors will also have to deal with the headline risk of a hawkish U.S. administration pursuing diplomatic brinkmanship against Iran. We do not expect the Trump administration to abrogate the Iran nuclear deal due to several constraints. First, American allies will not go along with new sanctions. Second, Trump's focus is squarely on China. Third, the U.S. does not have alternatives to diplomacy, since bombing Iran would be an exceedingly complex operation that would bog down American forces in the Middle East. When we put all the risks together, a geopolitical risk premium will likely seep into oil markets in 2017. BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy argues that the physical oil market is already balanced (Chart 42) and that the OPEC deal will help draw down bloated inventories in 2017. This means that global oil spare capacity will be very low next year, with essentially no margin of safety in case of a major supply loss. Given the political risks of major oil producers like Nigeria and Venezuela, this is a precarious situation for the oil markets. Chart 41Iraq Really Matters For Global Oil Production Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Chart 42Oil Supply Glut Is Gone In 2017 bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c42 bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c42 Bottom Line: Given our geopolitical view of risks in the Middle East, balanced oil markets, lack of global spare capacity, the OPEC production cut, and ongoing capex reductions, we recommend clients to follow BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy view of expecting widening backwardation in the new year.37 U.S.-China: From Rivalry To Proxy Wars President-elect Trump has called into question the U.S.'s adherence to the "One China policy," which holds that "there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China" and that the U.S. recognizes only the People's Republic of China as the legitimate Chinese government. There is widespread alarm about Trump's willingness to use this policy, the very premise of U.S.-China relations since 1978, as a negotiating tool. And indeed, Sino-U.S. relations are very alarming, as we have warned our readers since 2012.38 Trump is a dramatic new agent reinforcing this trend. Trump's suggestion that the policy could be discarded - and his break with convention in speaking to the Taiwanese president - are very deliberate. Observe that in the same diplomatic document that establishes the One China policy, the United States and China also agreed that "neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region." Trump is initiating a change in U.S. policy by which the U.S. accuses China of seeking hegemony in Asia, a violation of the foundation of their relationship. The U.S. is not seeking unilaterally to cancel the One China policy, but asking China to give new and durable assurances that it does not seek hegemony and will play by international rules. Otherwise, the U.S. is saying, the entire relationship will have to be revisited and nothing (not even Taiwan) will be off limits. The assurances that China is expected to give relate not only to trade, but also, as Trump signaled, to the South China Sea and North Korea. Therefore we are entering a new era in U.S-China relations. China Is Toast Asia Pacific is a region of frozen conflicts. Russia and Japan never signed a peace treaty. Nor did China and Taiwan. Nor did the Koreas. Why have these conflicts lain dormant over the past seventy years? Need we ask? Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong have seen their GDP per capita rise 14 times since 1950. China has seen its own rise 21 times (Chart 43). Since the wars in Vietnam over forty years ago, no manner of conflict, terrorism, or geopolitical crisis has fundamentally disrupted this manifestly beneficial status quo. As a result, Asia has been a region synonymous with economics - not geopolitics. It developed this reputation because its various large economies all followed Japan's path of dirigisme: export-oriented, state-backed, investment-led capitalism. This era of stability is over. The region has become the chief source of geopolitical risk and potential "Black Swan" events.39 The reason is deteriorating U.S.-China relations and the decline in China's integration with other economies. The Asian state-led economic model was underpinned by the Pax Americana. Two factors were foundational: America's commitment to free trade and its military supremacy. China was not technically an ally, like Japan and Korea, but after 1979 it sure looked like one in terms of trade surpluses and military spending (Chart 44).40 For the sake of containing the Soviet Union, the U.S. wrapped East Asia under its aegis. Chart 43The Twentieth Century Was Kind To East Asia Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Chart 44Asia Sells, America Rules bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c44 bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c44 It is well known, however, that Japan's economic model led it smack into a confrontation with the U.S. in the 1980s over its suppressed currency and giant trade surpluses. President Ronald Reagan's economic team forced Japan to reform, but the result was ultimately financial crisis as the artificial supports of its economic model fell away (Chart 45). Astute investors have always suspected that a similar fate awaited China. It is unsustainable for China to seize ever greater market share and drive down manufacturing prices without reforming its economy to match G7 standards, especially if it denies the U.S. access to its vast consumer market. Today there are signs that the time for confrontation is upon us: Since the Great Recession, U.S. household debt and Chinese exports have declined as a share of GDP, falling harder in the latter than the former, in a sign of shattered symbiosis (see Chart 8 above). Chinese holdings of U.S. Treasurys have begun to decline (Chart 46). China's exports to the U.S., both as a share of total exports and of GDP, have rolled over, and are at levels comparable to Japan's 1980s peaks (Chart 47). China is wading into high-tech and advanced industries, threatening the core advantages of the developed markets. The U.S. just elected a populist president whose platform included aggressive trade protectionism against China. Protectionist "Rust Belt" voters were pivotal to Trump's win and will remain so in future elections. China is apparently reneging on every major economic promise it has made in recent years: the RMB is depreciating, not appreciating, whatever the reason; China is closing, not opening, its capital account; it is reinforcing, not reforming, its state-owned companies; and it is shutting, not widening, access to its domestic market (Chart 48). Chart 45Japan's Crisis Followed Currency Spike bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c45 bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c45 Chart 46China Backing Away From U.S. Treasuries bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c46 bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c46 There is a critical difference between the "Japan bashing" of the 1980s-90s and the increasingly potent "China bashing" of today. Japan and the U.S. had established a strategic hierarchy in World War II. That is not the case for the U.S. and China in 2017. Unlike Japan, Korea, or any of the other Asian tigers, China cannot trust the United States to preserve its security. Far from it - China has no greater security threat than the United States. The American navy threatens Chinese access to critical commodities and export markets via the South China Sea. In a world that is evolving into a zero-sum game, these things suddenly matter. Chart 47The U.S. Will Get Tougher On China Trade bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c47 bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c47 Chart 48China Is De-Globalizing bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c48 bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c48 That means that when the Trump administration tries to "get tough" on longstanding American demands, these demands will not be taken as well-intentioned or trustworthy. We see Sino-American rivalry as the chief geopolitical risk to investors in 2017: Trump will initiate a more assertive U.S. policy toward China;41 It will begin with symbolic or minor punitive actions - a "shot across the bow" like charging China with currency manipulation or imposing duties on specific goods.42 It will be critical to see whether Trump acts arbitrarily through executive power, or systematically through procedures laid out by Congress. The two countries will proceed to a series of high-level, bilateral negotiations through which the Trump administration will aim to get a "better deal" from the Xi administration on trade, investment, and other issues. The key to the negotiations will be whether the Trump team settles for technical concessions or instead demands progress on long-delayed structural issues that are more difficult and risky for China to undertake. Too much pressure on the latter could trigger a confrontation and broader economic instability. Chart 49China's Demographic Dividend Is Gone bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c49 bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c49 The coming year may see U.S.-China relations start with a bang and end with a whimper, as Trump's initial combativeness gives way to talks. But make no mistake: Sino-U.S. rivalry and distrust will worsen over the long run. That is because China faces a confluence of negative trends: The U.S. is turning against it. Geopolitical problems with its periphery are worsening. It is at high risk of a financial crisis due to excessive leverage. The middle class is a growing political constraint on the regime. Demographics are now a long-term headwind (Chart 49). The Chinese regime will be especially sensitive to these trends because the Xi administration will want stability in the lead up to the CCP's National Party Congress in the fall, which promises to see at least some factional trouble.43 It no longer appears as if the rotation of party leaders will leave Xi in the minority on the Politburo Standing Committee for 2017-22, as it did in 2012.44 More likely, he will solidify power within the highest decision-making body. This removes an impediment to his policy agenda in 2017-22, though any reforms will still take a back seat to stability, since leadership changes and policy debates will absorb a great deal of policymakers' attention at all levels for most of the year.45 Xi will also put in place his successors for 2022, putting a cap on rumors that he intends to eschew informal term limits. Failing this, market uncertainty over China's future will explode upward. The midterm party congress will thus reaffirm the fact that China's ruling party and regime are relatively unified and centralized, and hence that China has relatively strong political capabilities for dealing with crises. Evidence does not support the popular belief that China massively stimulates the economy prior to five-year party congresses (Chart 50), but we would expect all means to be employed to prevent a major downturn. Chart 50Not Much Evidence Of Aggressive Stimulus Ahead Of Five-Year Party Congresses bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c50 bca.gps_so_2016_12_14_c50 What this means is that the real risks of the U.S.-China relationship in 2017 will emanate from China's periphery. Asia's Frozen Conflicts Are Thawing Today the Trump administration seems willing to allow China to carve a sphere of influence - but it is entirely unclear whether and where existing boundaries would be redrawn. Here are the key regional dynamics:46 The Koreas: The U.S. and Japan are increasingly concerned about North Korea's missile advances but will find their attempts to deal with the problem blocked by China and likely by the new government in South Korea.47 U.S. threats of sanctioning China over North Korea will increase market uncertainty, as will South Korea's political turmoil and (likely) souring relations with the U.S. Taiwan: Taiwan's ruling party has very few domestic political constraints and therefore could make a mistake, especially when emboldened by an audacious U.S. leadership.48 The same combination could convince China that it has to abandon the post-2000 policy of playing "nice" with Taiwan.49 China will employ discrete sanctions against Taiwan. Hong Kong: Mainland forces will bring down the hammer on the pro-independence movement. The election of a new chief executive will appear to reinforce the status quo but in reality Beijing will tighten its legal, political, and security grip. Large protests are likely; political uncertainty will remain high.50 Japan: Japan will effectively receive a waiver from Trump's protectionism and will benefit from U.S. stimulus efforts; it will continue reflating at home in order to generate enough popular support to pass constitutional revisions in 2018; and it will not shy away from regional confrontations, since these will enhance the need for the hawkish defense component of the same revisions. Vietnam: The above issues may provide Vietnam with a chance to improve its strategic position at China's expense, whether by courting U.S. market access or improving its position in the South China Sea. But the absence of an alliance with the U.S. leaves it highly exposed to Chinese reprisals if it pushes too far. Russia: Russia will become more important to the region because its relations with the U.S. are improving and it may forge a peace deal with Japan, giving it more leverage in energy negotiations with China.51 This may also reinforce the view in Beijing that the U.S. is circling the wagons around China. What these dynamics have in common is the emergence of U.S.-China proxy conflicts. China has long suspected that the Obama administration's "Pivot to Asia" was a Cold War "containment" strategy. The fear is well-grounded but the reality takes time to materialize, which is what we will see playing out in the coming years. The reason we say "proxy wars" is because several American allies are conspicuously warming up to China: Thailand, the Philippines, and soon South Korea. They are not abandoning the U.S. but keeping their options open. The other ASEAN states also stand to benefit as the U.S. seeks economic substitutes for China while the latter courts their allegiance.52 The problem is that as U.S.-China tensions rise, these small states run greater risks in playing both sides. Bottom Line: The overarching investment implications of U.S.-China proxy wars all derive from de-globalization. China was by far the biggest winner of globalization and will suffer accordingly (Chart 51). But it will not be the biggest loser, since it is politically unified, its economy is domestically driven, and it has room to maneuver on policy. Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore are all chiefly at risk from de-globalization over the long run. Chart 51Globalization's Winners Will Be De-Globalization's Losers Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Strategic Outlook 2017: We Are All Geopolitical Strategists Now Japan is best situated to prosper in 2017. We have argued since well before the Bank of Japan's September monetary policy shift that unconventional reflation will continue, with geopolitics as the primary motivation for the country's "pedal to the metal" strategy.53 We will look to re-initiate our long Japanese equities position in early 2017. ASEAN countries offer an opportunity, though country-by-country fundamentals are essential. Brexit: The Three Kingdoms The striking thing about the Brexit vote's aftermath is that no recession followed the spike in uncertainty, no infighting debilitated the Tory party, and no reversal occurred in popular opinion. The authorities stimulated the economy, the people rallied around the flag (and ruling party), and the media's "Bregret" narrative flopped. That said, Brexit also hasn't happened yet.54 Formal negotiations with Europe begin in March, which means uncertainty will persist for much of the year as the U.K. and EU posture around their demands for a post-exit deal. However, improving growth prospects for Britain, Europe, and the U.S. all suggest that the negotiations are less likely to take place in an atmosphere of crisis. That does not mean that EU negotiators will be soft. With each successive electoral victory for the political establishment in 2017, the European negotiating position will harden. This will create a collision of Triumphant Tories and Triumphant Brussels. Still, the tide is not turning much further against the U.K. than was already the case, given how badly the U.K. needs a decent deal. Tightercontrol over the movement of people will be the core demand of Westminster, but it is not necessarily mutually exclusive with access to the common market. The major EU states have an incentive to compromise on immigration with the U.K. because they would benefit from tighter immigration controls that send highly qualified EU nationals away from the U.K. labor market and into their own. But the EU will exact a steep price for granting the U.K. the gist of what it wants on immigration and market access. This could be a hefty fee or - more troublingly for Britain - curbs on British financial-service access to euro markets. Though other EU states are not likely to exit, the European Council will not want to leave any doubt about the pain of doing so. The Tories may have to accept this outcome. Tory strength is now the Brexit voter base. That base is uncompromising on cutting immigration, and it is indifferent, or even hostile, to the City. So it stands to reason that Prime Minister Theresa May will sacrifice the U.K.'s financial sector in the coming negotiations. The bigger question is what happens to the U.K. economy in the medium and long term. First, it is unclear how the U.K. will revive productivity as lower labor-force growth and FDI, and higher inflation, take shape. Government "guidance" of the economy - dirigisme again - is clearly the Tory answer. But it remains to be seen how effectively it will be done. Second, what happens to the United Kingdom as a nation? Another Scottish independence referendum is likely after the contours of the exit deal take shape, especially as oil prices gin up Scottish courage to revisit the issue. The entire question of Scotland and Northern Ireland (both of which voted to stay in the EU) puts deeper constitutional and governmental restructuring on the horizon. Westminster is facing a situation where it drastically loses influence on the global stage as it not only exits the European "superstate" but also struggles to maintain a semblance of order among the "three kingdoms." Bottom Line: The two-year timeframe for exit negotiations ensures that posturing will ratchet up tensions and uncertainty throughout the year - invoking the abyss of a no-deal exit - but our optimistic outlook on the end-game (eventual "soft Brexit") suggests that investors should fade the various crisis points. That said, the pound is no longer a buy as it rises to around 1.30. Investment Views De-globalization, dirigisme, and the ascendancy of charismatic authority will all prove to be inflationary. On the margin, we expect less trade, less free movement of people, and more direct intervention in the economy. Given that these are all marginally more inflationary, it makes sense to expect the "End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market," as our colleague Peter Berezin argued in July.55 That said, Peter does not expect the bond bull market to end in a crash - and neither do we. There are many macroeconomic factors that will continue to suppress global yields: the savings glut, search for yield, and economic secular stagnation. In addition, we expect peak multipolarity in 2017 and thus a rise in geopolitical conflict. This geopolitical context will keep the U.S. Treasury market well bid. However, clients may want to begin switching their safe-haven exposure to gold. In a recent research report on safe havens, we showed that gold and Treasurys have changed places as safe havens in the past.56 Only after 2000 did Treasurys start providing a good hedge to equity corrections due to geopolitical and financial risks. The contrary is true for gold - it acted as one of the most secure investments during corrections until that time, but has since become correlated with S&P 500 total returns. As deflationary risks abate in the future, we suspect that gold will return to its safe-haven status. In addition to safe havens, U.S. and global defense stocks will be well bid due to global multipolarity. We recommend that clients go long S&P 500 aerospace and defense relative to global equities on a strategic basis. We are also sticking with our tactical trade of long U.S. defense / short U.S. aerospace. On the equity front, we have closed our post-election bullish trade of long S&P 500 / short gold position for an 11.53% gain in just 22 days of trading. We are also closing our long S&P 600 / short S&P 100 position - a play on de-globalization - for an 8.4% gain. Instead, we are initiating a strategic long U.S. small caps / short U.S. large caps, recommended jointly with our colleague Anastasios Avgeriou of the BCA Global Alpha Sector Strategy. We are keeping our EuroStoxx VIX term-structure hedge due to mounting political risk in Europe. However, we are looking for an opening into European stocks in early 2017. For now, we are maintaining our long USD/EUR - return 4.2% since July - and long USD/SEK - return 2.25% since November. The first is a strategic play on our view that the ECB has to remain accommodative due to political risks in the European periphery. The latter is a way to articulate de-globalization via currencies, given that Sweden is one of the most open economies in the world. We are converting it from a tactical to a strategic recommendation. Finally, we are keeping our RMB short in place - via 12-month NDF. We do not think that Beijing will "blink" and defend its currency more aggressively just because Donald Trump is in charge of America. China is a much more powerful country than in the past, and cannot allow RMB appreciation at America's bidding. Our trade has returned 7.14% since December 2015. With the dollar bull market expected to continue and RMB depreciating, the biggest loser will be emerging markets. We are therefore keeping our strategic long DM / short EM recommendation, which has returned 56.5% since November 2012. We are particularly fond of shorting Brazilian and Turkish equities and are keeping both trades in place. However, we are initiating a long Russian equities / short EM equities. As an oil producer, Russia will benefit from the OPEC deal and the ongoing risks to Iraqi stability. In addition, we expect that removing sanctions against Russia will be on table for 2017. Europe will likely extend the sanctions for another six months, but beyond that the unity of the European position will be in question. And the United States is looking at a different approach. We wish our clients all the best in health, family, and investing in 2017. Thank you for your confidence in BCA's Geopolitical Strategy. Marko Papic Senior Vice President Matt Gertken Associate Editor Jesse Anak Kurri Research Analyst 1 In Michel Foucault's famous The Order of Things (1966), he argues that each period of human history has its own "episteme," or set of ordering conditions that define that epoch's "truth" and discourse. The premise is comparable to Thomas Kuhn's notion of "paradigms," which we have referenced in previous Strategic Outlooks. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2012," dated January 27, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2013," dated January 16, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think," dated October 4, 2013, available at gps.bcaresearch.com and Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Underestimating Sino-American Tensions," dated November 6, 2015, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Apex Of Globalization - All Downhill From Here," dated November 12, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The End Of The Anglo-Saxon Economy?" dated April 13, 2016, and "Introducing: The Median Voter Theory," dated June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Strategic Outlook, "Strategic Outlook 2014 - Stay The Course: EM Risk - DM Reward," dated January 23, 2014, and Special Report, "The Coming Bloodbath In Emerging Markets," dated August 12, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA The Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "Stairway To (Safe) Haven: Investing In Times Of Crisis," dated August 25, 2016, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Multipolarity And Investing," dated April 9, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 A military-security strategy necessary for British self-defense that also preserved peace on the European continent by undermining potential aggressors. 11 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Trump And Trade," dated December 8, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 12 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Mercantilism Is Back," dated February 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 13 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Taking Stock Of China's Reforms," dated May 13, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 14 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "De-Globalization," dated November 9, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 15 Please see Max Weber, "The Three Types Of Legitimate Rule," Berkeley Publications in Society and Institutions 4 (1): 1-11 (1958). Translated by Hans Gerth. Originally published in German in the journal Preussische Jahrbücher 182, 1-2 (1922). 16 We do not concern ourselves with traditional authority here, but the obvious examples are Persian Gulf monarchies. 17 Please see Francis Fukuyama, Political Order And Political Decay (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014). See also our review of this book, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 18 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Transformative Vs. Transactional Leadership," dated September 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 19 Please see Irving Fisher, "The Debt-deflation Theory of Great Depressions," Econometrica 1(4) (1933): 337-357, available at fraser.stlouisfed.org. 20 Please see Milanovic, Branko, "Global Income Inequality by the Numbers: in History and Now," dated November 2012, Policy Research Working Paper 6250, World Bank, available at worldbank.org. 21 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Introducing: The Median Voter Theory," June 8, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 22 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Constraints And Preferences Of The Trump Presidency," dated November 30, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 23 In some way, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy was designed precisely to fill this role. It is difficult to see what would be the point of this service if our clients could get unbiased, investment-relevant, prescient, high-quality geopolitical news and analysis from the press. 24 Please see BCA European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Roller Coaster," dated March 31, 2016, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 25 Please see The Bank Credit Analyst, "Europe's Geopolitical Gambit: Relevance Through Integration," dated November 2011, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 26 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "After BREXIT, N-EXIT?" dated July 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 27 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Client Note, "Will Marine Le Pen Win?" dated November 16, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 28 Despite winning an extraordinary six of the 13 continental regions in France in the first round, FN ended up winning zero in the second round. This even though the election occurred after the November 13 terrorist attack that ought to have buoyed the anti-migration, law and order, anti-establishment FN. The regional election is an instructive case of how the French two-round electoral system enables the establishment to remain in power. 29 Please see BCA European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Italy: Asking The Wrong Question," dated December 1, 2016, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 30 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Europe's Divine Comedy: Italian Inferno," dated September 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 31 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Cold War Redux?" dated March 12, 2014, and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Russia: To Buy Or Not To Buy?" dated March 20, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 32 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Russia-West Showdown: The West, Not Putin, Is The 'Wild Card,'" dated July 31, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 33 Please see BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Russia's Trilemma And The Coming Power Paralysis," dated February 21, 2012, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 34 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy, "Middle East: Saudi-Iranian Tensions Have Peaked," in Monthly Report, "Mercantilism Is Back," dated February 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 35 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Scared Yet? Five Black Swans For 2016," dated February 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 36 President Erdogan, speaking at the first Inter-Parliamentary Jerusalem Platform Symposium in Istanbul in November 2016, said that Turkey "entered [Syria] to end the rule of the tyrant al-Assad who terrorizes with state terror... We do not have an eye on Syrian soil. The issue is to provide lands to their real owners. That is to say we are there for the establishment of justice." 37 Please see BCA Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "2017 Commodity Outlook: Energy," dated December 8, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 38 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Power And Politics In East Asia: Cold War 2.0?" dated September 25, 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 39 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think," dated October 4, 2013, and "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think, Part II," dated November 6, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 40 In recent years, however, China's "official" defense budget statistics have understated its real spending, possibly by as much as half. 41 Please see "U.S. Election Update: Trump, Presidential Powers, And Investment Implications" in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "The Socialism Put," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 42 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Constraints & Preferences Of The Trump Presidency," dated November 30, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 43 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Five Myths About Chinese Politics," dated August 10, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 44 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "China: Two Factions, One Party - Part II," dated September 2012, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 45 The National Financial Work Conference will be one key event to watch for an updated reform agenda. 46 Please see "East Asia: Tensions Simmer ... Will They Boil?" in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Partem Mirabilis," dated April 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 47 Please see "North Korea: A Red Herring No More?" in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Partem Mirabilis," dated April 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 48 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Scared Yet? Five Black Swans For 2016," dated February 10, 2016, and "Taiwan's Election: How Dire Will The Straits Get?" dated January 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 49 The Trump administration has signaled a policy shift through Trump's phone conversation with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen. The "One China policy" is the foundation of China-Taiwan relations, and U.S.-China relations depend on Washington's acceptance of it. The risk, then, is not so much an overt change to One China, a sure path to conflict, but the dynamic described above. 50 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Hong Kong: From Politics To Political Economy," dated September 8, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 51 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Can Russia Import Productivity From China?" dated June 29, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 52 Please see "Thailand: Upgrade Stocks To Overweight And Go Long THB Versus KRW" in BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, "The EM Rally: Running Out Of Steam?" dated October 19, 2016, and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Philippine Elections: Taking The Shine Off Reform," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 53 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Japan: The Emperor's Act Of Grace," dated June 8, 2016, and "Unleash The Kraken: Debt Monetization And Politics," dated September 26, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 54 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "BREXIT Update: Brexit Means Brexit, Until Brexit," dated September 16, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 55 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market," dated July 5, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 56 Please see Bank Credit Analyst Special Report, "Stairway To (Safe) Haven: Investing In Times Of Crisis," dated August 15, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights Dear Client, This week's BCA's Commodity & Energy Strategy contains our 2017 Outlook for Energy markets. After surprising the markets with a production cut last week, OPEC and Russia likely will do so again with a successful implementation of their agreement next year. Even if they only get buy-in on 60% to 70% of the 1.8 mm b/d in cuts they believe they've secured, production cuts and natural declines in production that are not reversed via enhanced oil recovery (EOR) will accelerate the drawdown in global crude oil and refined products inventories, which is the stated goal of the agreement. We expect the U.S. benchmark WTI crude prices to average $55/bbl next year, up $5 from our previous forecast, on the back of last week's announced cut. We are moving the bottom of the range in which we expect WTI prices to trade most of the time next year to $45/bbl and keeping the upside at $65/bbl. For 2018 and beyond, our conviction is lower: The massive capex cuts seen in the industry will place an enormous burden on shale producers and conventional oil producers - chiefly Gulf Arab producers and Russia - to offset natural decline-curve losses and meet increasing demand. Any sign either or both will not be able to move quickly enough to meet growing demand and replace natural declines could spike prices further out the curve. For the international benchmark, Brent crude oil, things get a bit complicated next year: As the spread between Brent and WTI prices widens - the Feb17 spread was pricing at ~ $2.10/bbl earlier this week (Brent over) - we expect U.S. WTI exports to increase from current levels averaging ~ 500k b/d, which should keep the price differential in check next year. For the near term, we are using a +$1.50/bbl differential (Brent over) for our 2017 central tendency, although this could narrow and invert as U.S. exports grow. We closed out our long Feb/17 Brent $50/$55 call spread last week - recommended November 3, 2016, expecting OPEC and Russia to agree a production cut - with a 156% indicated profit. We are taking profits of 80.6% on our long Aug/17 WTI vs. short Nov/17 WTI, basis Tuesday's close, and replacing it with a long Dec/17 vs. short Dec/18 WTI spread at today's closing levels, expecting backwardation to widen next year. We remain bullish U.S. natural gas near term, given reduced year-on-year production growth going into year-end. A normal-to-colder winter will be especially bullish. We remain long 2017Q1 natural gas, which is up 21.1% since we recommended the position on November 2, 2016. Longer term, we are neutral natgas, expecting production growth to resume in 2017. Kindest regards, Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Feature KSA, Russia Deal Drives Oil Prices In 2017 The evolution of oil prices next year will be dominated by the agreement between OPEC, led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and non-OPEC, with Russia in the lead, to cut production by up to 1.8 mm b/d. The stated volumes to be cut are comprised of 1.2 mm from OPEC, 300k b/d from Russia, and another 300 from other non-OPEC producers. Later this week, other non-OPEC producers are scheduled to arrive in Vienna to discuss cuts they will pledge to make starting in January. Non-OPEC production is down ~ 900k b/d this year, according to the IEA's November Oil Market Report, so it is difficult to see where these cuts will come from. Outside Russia, Kazakhstan and Oman, anything coming out of the meetings with non-OPEC producers in Vienna this week will be decline-curve losses disguised as production cuts. Still, it means they're not funding EOR programs to replace lost production (e.g., China's 10% yoy losses). Even if actual cuts only amount to 60 - 70% of the volumes agreed at OPEC's November 30 meeting in Vienna, we expect OECD storage levels - combined commercial inventories of both crude oil and refined products - to fall some 10%, or 300 million bbls, to ~ 2.75 billion bbls by the end of 2017Q3. This would put stocks roughly at their five-year average levels, the stated goal of OPEC, and its reason for negotiating the production cut (Chart of the Week). In addition, this will flatten the forward Brent and WTI curves, and deepen an already-developing backwardation in WTI beginning with contracts delivering in December 2017 (Chart 2). This will reverse the contango structure in place since mid-2014, which allowed commercial OECD oil inventories to swell by 400 mm bbls, and non-OECD inventories to increase by 240 mm bbls, according to OPEC estimates. Chart of the WeekOPEC's, Russia's Goal: Normalize Storage##br## To Five-year Average Level bca.ces_wr_2016_12_08_c1 bca.ces_wr_2016_12_08_c1 Chart 2Backwardation Expected ##br##In WTI And Brent bca.ces_wr_2016_12_08_c2 bca.ces_wr_2016_12_08_c2 Analysts Expect Cheating On The Deal Most analysts expect cheating on this deal: OPEC's production is expected to fall to 33mm b/d following production cuts, from a record high in November of 34.2mm b/d, according to a Reuters poll.1 At 33mm b/d, OPEC's output would be 500k b/d above the targeted production level of 32.5mm b/d agreed at OPEC's November 30 meeting in Vienna with Russia (Table 1). In other words, most analysts think OPEC will only deliver 700k b/d of the 1.2 mm b/d it pledged to cut under this deal. We disagree. Table 1Allocation of OPEC Cuts 2017 Commodity Outlook: Energy 2017 Commodity Outlook: Energy This Deal's Going To Work: KSA And Russia Want And Need It OPEC's goal is to get inventories back to 5-year average levels. The Cartel's latest Monthly Oil Market Report puts the global stock overhang at 304mm over the 5-year average, just slightly over our calculated value to end October (Chart of the Week).2 To get stocks to the 5-year average level by the end of June 2017 - when the Vienna agreement runs out - would require an average weekly draw of ~ 11.7mm bbl in OECD oil and products stocks, or roughly 1.7mm b/d. Between normal decline-curve losses and the production cuts, if KSA and Russia got full compliance on this deal, it stands a good chance of meeting OPEC's goal by the end of June. Even if they don't and get, say, a total of 1.1 to 1.2mm b/d in cuts from OPEC and non-OPEC producers, the Agreement's storage goal will be achieved by the end of 2017Q3 or the beginning of Q4. Chart 3KSA And Russia Need To Back Off ##br##After Near-Vertical Output Increases bca.ces_wr_2016_12_08_c3 bca.ces_wr_2016_12_08_c3 Unlike past production-cut deals, we think there is a good chance KSA and Russia will get fairly high compliance on this agreement. Given the results of the Reuters survey on expected compliance, our out-of-consensus call is predicated on our belief this round of cuts is fundamentally different from what we've seen before. KSA and Russia - and their allies - want and need this deal. KSA and Russia have made their point by massively increasing production in a down market, but both now need to - and want to - back off of flogging their fields and driving prices lower (Chart 3). Given the extremely high dependence both have on oil revenues, they need higher prices.3 For starters, Russia was an active participant in this deal: its energy minister, Alexander Novak, told KSA's oil minister, Khalid Al-Falih, Russia would cut - not freeze - production in the lead-up to the November 30 meeting, and would contribute half the cut OPEC wanted from producers outside the Cartel. In addition, Vladimir Putin, Russia's president, was "directly involved" in the deal, mediating between KSA and its arch rival Iran, according to various press reports.4 Politically, after having invested so much capital, we do not think Russia will backslide on this agreement. There may be some fudging on what actually constitutes a "cut" - e.g., 2017Q1 maintenance that removes 200k b/d or so from production may be called a "cut" - but by Q2 we expect to see the full 300k b/d cut taken. By the same token, we do not think KSA will backslide on its commitment. Saudi's new oil minister Al-Falih invested considerable political capital in getting a deal done, as well, over the course of meetings in Algiers, Istanbul and finally around the November 30 Vienna meeting. Practically, both KSA and Russia have burned through considerable foreign reserves to fund government expenditures following the price collapse (Chart 4). By our estimates, KSA will have burned through $220 billion in reserves between July 2014, just prior to its decision to launch OPEC's market-share war, and December 2016, equivalent to 30% of foreign reserves. Russia will have drawn down its official reserves by $77 billion over the same period, or 16% of its total holdings. Chart 4Lower Oil Prices Forced KSA And Russia ##br##To Burn Through Reserves bca.ces_wr_2016_12_08_c4 bca.ces_wr_2016_12_08_c4 In addition, both want to tap foreign direct investment (FDI) for cash, investments and technology, and will find it difficult to do so if oil markets remain chronically oversupplied and subject to large downdrafts as producers relentlessly increase production, as we noted in recent research.5 Both KSA and Russia are working on larger agendas next year and 2018. And both require higher prices. They cannot afford to run down reserves any further. Russia is looking to sell 19.5% of Rosneft, after the state pushed through a $5.2 billion merger with Bashneft in October. KSA is looking to issue additional debt, having raised $17.5 billion in October, and will look to IPO 5% of state-owned Aramco next year or in 2018. Both must convince FDI that money invested in their economies will not be wasted because oil production cannot be reined in. And, they both must attend to increasingly restive populations. As a result of the production cuts, KSA's and Russia's export revenues will increase: KSA's 2017 oil export revenues will increase by close to $17.5 billion, and Russia's will increase by ~ $9 billion, following the ~ $10/bbl lift in oil prices the agreement has provided. Both will be able to lever their production to support more debt issuance. KSA will need that leverage to pull off the diversification it is attempting under its Vision 2030 initiative. Russia needs higher prices for its secondary offering of Rosneft, and to get some much-needed breathing room for its budget after years of sanctions, recession and lower government revenues. We would not be surprised if Russia sees additional production cuts next year, which will goose prices a little and put a firmer support under the ~ $50/bbl floor (basis Brent crude oil prices). Given the dire straits in which Russia finds itself, the government likely will increase taxes in 2017, which will result in lower production at the margin. We expect, however, that this will be spun in such a way as to show that when Putin gets involved, positive results occur.6 KSA's Allies Will Cut; Iran And Iraq Are Maxed Out For Now We believe this is a deal that will hold up, which, net, will generate something along the lines of 1.1 to 1.2mm b/d in production cuts in 2017H1. UAE and Kuwait can be counted on to support KSA, as they always have, and cut. And Oman - now at 1mm b/d - will step up for a small slug of the cuts too, and have said they'll match OPEC up to a 10% cut. Iran and Iraq have taken production as far as it can go over the next six months to a year, and do not represent a threat to the KSA-Russia deal (Chart 5). Iran's maxed out - they're not capable of adding all that much to their current 3.7mm b/d output. Iraq could cheat, but we don't think they can go much above 4.5mm b/d, despite their assertion they're at 4.7 mm b/d. Besides, producing at 4.4mm b/d, per the agreement, will produce more revenue for them at higher prices than producing 4.7 mm b/d at lower prices (if they actually could get to that level), and they realize that. According to press reports, Iraq only signed on to the deal in Vienna after they saw the rally in prices following leaks a deal had been reached. Maybe at this time next year, they will have mobilized some FDI to get production ramping, but even that's doubtful. With the exception of Libya and Nigeria - both of which are exempt under this deal - everyone in OPEC outside Iraq, KSA and the GCC OPEC members is producing at max (Chart 6). Libya and Nigeria are equally likely to raise output as prices increase as they are to lose output. The higher prices go the more likely these states are to see increased violence, as warring factions within their borders vie for control of rising oil revenues. Internal conflicts have not been resolved: Any increase in prices accompanied by increased production gives the warring factions more to fight over. The expected value of their increased production next year is therefore zero. Chart 5KSA's Allies Will Support It;##br## Iran, Iraq Maxed Out bca.ces_wr_2016_12_08_c5 bca.ces_wr_2016_12_08_c5 Chart 6Most Of OPEC Ex Gulf States ##br##Also Are Producing At Max Levels bca.ces_wr_2016_12_08_c6 bca.ces_wr_2016_12_08_c6 U.S. Shale Production Will Rise We expect to see evidence of the cuts contained in the KSA-Russia deal to begin showing up in the February - March period, in the form of falling commercial inventory levels. The only thing that can destabilize the six-month KSA-Russia deal is U.S. shale-oil production coming back faster and stronger than expected (Chart 7). Pre-cut, we (and the U.S. EIA) estimated U.S. shale production would bottom in late 2017Q1, and then start re-expansion as rig counts rose to sufficient levels. However, overall 2017 production would be 200 - 300 kb/d lower than 2016 production. Chart 7If U.S. Shale Ramps Too Quickly ##br##KSA-Russia Deal Could Unravel bca.ces_wr_2016_12_08_c7 bca.ces_wr_2016_12_08_c7 If, as we expect, the higher oil price caused by the KSA-Russia deal results in an increase of only ~ 200 kb/d above this estimate, with the production response substantially occurring in the second half of 2017, there's a good chance this deal can hold together and get global commercial oil stocks down to average levels by September 2017. As we've argued, KSA and Russia already have to have factored that in. The apparent average breakeven for the U.S. producers (including a return on capital) appears to be ~ $55/bbl, which could pop above $60 from time to time next year as the long process of restoring U.S. production plays out.7 Having the international oil market pricing at the marginal cost of U.S. shale producers is a lot better for KSA, Russia and the rest of the distressed, low-cost sovereign producers than the low-$40s that cleared the market a few weeks ago. As long as the global market is pricing to shale economics at the margin, these states earn economic rent. Too fast a move to or through the $65 - $75/bbl range would no doubt produce a short-term revenue jump for cash-strapped producers - particularly those OPEC members outside the GCC. But it also would make most of the U.S. shales economic to develop, and incentivize the development of other "lumpy," expensive production that does not turn off quickly once it is brought on line (e.g., oil sands and deepwater). This ultimately would crash prices over the longer term, making it difficult for the industry to attract capital. This is not an ideal outcome for KSA's planned IPO of Aramco, or Russia's sale of 19.5% of Rosneft, or their investors. Even so, reinvestment has to be stimulated with higher oil prices in the not-too-distant future, most likely in 2018. Oil production so far has barely started to show the negative production ramifications of the $1+ trillion cuts to capex that will occur between 2015 and 2020, resulting in some 7mm b/d of oil-equivalent production not being available to the market. We expect the effects of this foregone production to show up over the next four years, and believe there is not much producers, particularly International Oil Companies (IOCs), can do to stop it, since their mega-project investments generally require 3-5 years from the time spending decisions are made until first oil is produced. Chart 8Accelerating Decline Rates And##br## Steady Demand Will Stress Shale Producers bca.ces_wr_2016_12_08_c8 bca.ces_wr_2016_12_08_c8 With such huge cuts to future expenditures, and enormous amounts of debt incurred by the IOCs to pay for the completion of legacy mega-projects that will need to be repaid ($130B in debt added in the past two years), OPEC could see a looming shortage of oil developing later this decade if IOC-sponsored offshore production falls into steep declines, as we think is likely. With U.S. shales accounting for a larger share of global production, the global decline curve will accelerate from our estimated current level of 8 - 10% p.a. This will be happening as oil demand continues to grow 1.2 - 1.5mm b/d over the 2017 - 2020 interval (Chart 8). These massive capex cuts seen in the industry since OPEC's market-share war was launched in November 2014 will place an enormous burden on shale producers and conventional oil producers - chiefly Gulf Arab producers and Russia - to offset natural decline-curve losses and meet increasing demand. Any sign either or both will not be able to move quickly enough to meet growing demand could spike prices further out the curve, as we've noted in previously. Investment Implications Of BCA's Oil View The KSA-Russia deal is short term - it expires in June, but is "extendable for another six months to take into account prevailing market conditions and prospects," according to terms of the Agreement contained in the OPEC press release of November 30. This forces investors to take relatively tactical positions in the oil markets, with some optionality for longer-dated exposure. We closed out our long Feb/16 Brent $50/$55 call spread last week - recommended November 3, 2016, expecting OPEC and Russia to agree a production cut - with a 156% indicated profit (using closing prices). We are taking profits of 80.6% on our long Aug/17 WTI vs. short Nov/17 WTI, basis Tuesday's close, and replacing it with a long Dec/17 vs. short Dec/18 WTI spread at today's closing levels, expecting backwardation to widen next year. This is a strategic recommendation, which also will give us exposure to higher prices by the end of 2017. We will look for overshoots on the downside to get long options exposures again, and longer dated exposures as well. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President rryan@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "OPEC expected to deliver only half of target production cut: Kemp," published online by reuters.com on December 6, 2016. OPEC has invited Russia, Colombia, Congo, Egypt, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Oman, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Bolivia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain and Brunei to meet in Vienna Dec. 10, according to Reuters. 2 Please see the feature article in last month's OPEC Monthly Oil Market Report published November 11, 2016, "Developments in global oil inventories," beginning on p. 3. 3 Please see "Ignore The KSA - Russia Production Pact, Focus Instead On Their Need For Cash," in the September 8, 2016, issue of BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see "Exclusive: How Putin, Khamenei and Saudi prince got OPEC Deal Done," published by reuters.com on December 1, 2016, and "OPEC Deal Hinged on 2 a.m. Phone Call and It Nearly Failed," published on line by bloomberg.com on December 1, 2016. See also Russia Today's online article "Putin 'directly involved' in OPEC reaching production cut deal," published December 2, 2016, on rt.com, which also details Putin's meetings months prior with KSA Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at the G20 meeting in China. 5 Please see issue of BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "The OPEC Debate", dated November 24, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6 Lukoil officials are talking up production cuts and possible tax hikes in Iranian and Arab media: Here is an Iranian outlet (https://financialtribune.com/articles/energy/54595/lukoil-sees-60-oil-in-2017), and an Arab outlet with a longer version of the same TASS story (http://www.tradearabia.com/news/OGN_317517.html). Concerns re possible tax increases next year, which will force production lower, appear in the second-to-last paragraph. 7 Please see pp. 22 - 23 of "From Boom to Gloom: Energy States After the Oil Bust," presented by Mine Yucel, Senior Vice President and Director of Research at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, July 12, 2016, for a discussion of shale breakevens. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Closed Trades

Highlights Trump's foreign policy proposals will exacerbate geopolitical risks. Sino-American relations are the chief risk - they will determine global stability. A Russian reset will benefit Europe, especially outside the Russian periphery. Trump will retain the gist of the Iran nuclear deal. Turkey and North Korea are wildcards. Feature Chart 1Market Rally Redoubled After Trump's Win Market Rally Redoubled After Trump's Win Market Rally Redoubled After Trump's Win Financial markets rallied sharply after the election of Donald Trump and the resulting prospect of lower taxes, fewer regulations, and greater fiscal thrust (Chart 1). But is the euphoria justified in light of Trump's unorthodox views on U.S. foreign policy and trade? Is Trump's "normalization" amid the transition to the White House a reliable indicator that the geopolitical status quo will largely be preserved? We believe Trump's election marks a substantial increase in geopolitical risk that is being understated by markets.1 This is not because of his personality, though that is not particularly reassuring, but rather because of his policy proposals. If acted on, Trump's geopolitical agenda would exacerbate global trends that are already underway: Waning U.S. Dominance: American power, relative to other nations, has been declining in recent years as a result of the emergence of new economic and military powers like China and India (Chart 2). If Trump allows himself to be sucked into another conflict despite his campaign promises - say, by overturning the nuclear deal with Iran - he could embroil the U.S. at a time when it is relatively weak. Multipolarity: America's relative decline has emboldened various other nations to pursue their interests independently, increasing global friction and creating a world with multiple "poles" of influence.2 If Trump keeps his word on reducing foreign commitments he will speed along this historically dangerous process. Lesser powers like Russia and Turkey will try to fill vacuums created by the U.S. with their own ambitions, with competition for spheres of influence potentially sparking conflict. Multipolarity has already increased the incidence of global conflicts (Chart 3). De-Globalization: The greatest risk of the incoming administration is protectionism. Trump ran on an overtly protectionist platform. Democratic-leaning economic patriots in the American "Rust Belt" handed him the victory (Chart 4), and he will enact policies to maintain these pivotal supporters in 2018 and 2020 elections. This will hasten the decline of trade globalization, which we signaled was peaking back in 2014.3 It does not help that multipolarity and collapse of globalization have tended to go hand in hand in the past. And historically speaking, big reversals in global trade do not end well (Chart 5). Chart 2U.S. Power Eroding In A Relative Sense U.S. Power Eroding In A Relative Sense U.S. Power Eroding In A Relative Sense Chart 3Multipolarity Increases Conflict Frequency bca.gis_sr_2016_12_02_c3 bca.gis_sr_2016_12_02_c3 Chart 4 Chart 5Declines In Global Trade Preceded World Wars Declines In Global Trade Preceded World Wars Declines In Global Trade Preceded World Wars In what follows we assess what we think are likely to be the most important geopolitical effects of Trump's "America First" policies. We see Russia and Europe as the chief beneficiaries, and China and Iran as the chief risks. A tougher stance on China, in particular, will feed broader strategic distrust; the combination of internal and external pressures on China will ensure that the latter will not be as flexible as in the past. For the past five years, BCA's Geopolitical Strategy has stressed that the deterioration in Sino-American cooperation is the greatest geopolitical risk for investors - and the world. Trump's election will accelerate this process. Trump And Eurasia Chart 6 Trump's election is clearly a boon for Russia. Over the past 16 years, Russia has methodically attempted to collect the pieces from the Soviet collapse. The purpose of Putin's assertiveness has been to defend the Russian sphere of influence (namely Ukraine and Belarus in Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia) from outside powers: the U.S. and NATO seemed eager to "move in for the kill" after Russia emerged from the ashes. Putin also needed to rally popular support at various times by distracting the public with "rally around the flag" operations. We view Ukraine and Syria through this analytical prism. Lastly, Russia acted aggressively because it needed to reassure its allies that it would stand up for them.4 And yet the U.S. can live with a "strong" Russia. It can make a deal with Russia if the Trump administration recognizes some core interests (e.g. Crimea) and calls off the "democracy promotion" activities that Putin considers to be directly aimed at the Kremlin. As we argued during the Ukraine invasion, it is the U.S., not Russia, which poses the greatest risk of destabilization.5 That is because the U.S. lacks constraints. It can be aggressive towards Russia and face zero consequences: it has no economic relationship with Russia (Chart 6) and does not stand directly in the way of any retaliation, as Europe does. That is why we think Trump and Putin will manage to reset relations. The U.S. can step back and allow Russia to control its sphere of influence. Trump's team may be comfortable with the concept, unlike the Obama administration, whose Vice-President Joe Biden famously pronounced that America "will not recognize any nation having a sphere of influence." We could even see the U.S. pledging not to expand NATO from this point onwards, given that it has already expanded as far as it can feasibly and credibly go. Note, however, that a Russo-American truce may not last long. George W. Bush famously "looked into Putin's eyes and ... saw his soul," but relations soured nonetheless. Obama went further with his "Russian reset," removing European missile defense plans from avowed NATO allies Poland and Czech Republic merely one year after Russian troops invaded Georgia. And yet Moscow and Washington ended up rattling sabers and meddling in each other's internal affairs. Ultimately, U.S. resets fail because Russia is in a structural decline as a great power and is attempting to hold on to a very large sphere of influence whose denizens are not entirely willing participants.6 Because Moscow often must use blunt force to prevent the revolt of its vassal states (e.g. Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014), it renews tensions with the West. Unless Russia strengthens significantly in the next few years, we would expect the cycle to continue. On the horizon may be Ukraine-like incidents in neighboring Belarus and Kazakhstan, both key components of the Russian sphere of influence. Bottom Line: Russia will get a reprieve from U.S. pressure under Trump. While we expect Europe to extend sanctions through the end of 2017, a rapprochement with Washington could ultimately thaw relations by the end of next year. Europe stands to benefit, being able to resume business as usual with Russia and face less of a risk of Russian provocations via the Middle East, like in Syria. The recent decline in refugee flows will be made permanent with Russia's cooperation. The losers will be states in the Russian periphery that will feel less secure about American, EU and NATO backing, particularly Ukraine, but also Turkey. Countries like Belarus, which enjoyed playing Moscow against the West in the past, will lose the ability to do so. Once the U.S. abandons plans to prop up pro-West regimes in the Russian sphere of influence, Europeans will drop their designs to do the same as well. Trump And The Middle East Trump's "America First" foreign policy promises to be Obama's "geopolitical deleveraging" on steroids. He is opposed to American adventurism and laser-focused on counter-terrorism and U.S. domestic security. He also wants to deregulate the U.S. energy sector aggressively to encourage even greater energy independence (Chart 7). The chief difference from Obama - and a major risk to global stability - is Iran, where Trump could overturn the Obama administration's 2015 nuclear deal, potentially setting the two countries back onto the path of confrontation. Nevertheless, this deal never depended on Obama's preferences but was rooted in a strategic logic that still holds:7 Iraqi stability: The U.S. needed to withdraw troops from Iraq without creating a power vacuum that would open up a regional war or vast terrorist safe haven. With the advent of the Islamic State, this plan clearly failed. However, Iran did provide a Shia-led central government that has maintained security for investments and oil outflows (Chart 8). Iranian defenses: Bombing Iran is extremely difficult logistically, and the U.S. did not want to force the country into a corner where asymmetric warfare, like cutting off shipping in the Straits of Hormuz, seemed necessary. Despite growing American oil production, the U.S. will always care about the transit of oil through the Straits of Hormuz, as this impacts global oil prices.8 China's emergence: Strategic threats grew rapidly in Asia while the U.S. was preoccupied in Iraq and Afghanistan. China has emerged as a more technologically advanced and assertive global power that threatens to establish hegemony in the region. The deal with Iran was therefore a crucial piece of President Obama's "Pivot to Asia" strategy. Chart 7U.S. Becoming More Energy Independent U.S. Becoming More Energy Independent U.S. Becoming More Energy Independent Chart 8U.S. Policy Boosts Iraqi And Iranian Oil bca.gis_sr_2016_12_02_c8 bca.gis_sr_2016_12_02_c8 None of the above will change with Obama's moving on. Nor will the other powers that participated in sanctioning Iran (Germany, France, the U.K., Russia, and China) be convinced to re-impose sanctions now, just as they gain access to Iranian resources and markets. It is also not clear why Trump would seek confrontation with Iran in light of his desire to improve relations with Russia and concentrate U.S. firepower on ISIS - both objectives make Iran the ideal and obvious partner. Trump will therefore begrudgingly agree to the détente with Iran, perhaps after tweaking some aspects of the deal to save face. Meanwhile, it will serve the hawks in both countries if they can go back to calling each other "Satan." Iran itself is comfortable with the current situation, so it does not have an incentive to reverse the deal. It controls almost half of Iraq (and specifically the portion of Iraq that produces oil), its ally Hezbollah is safe in Lebanon, its ally Bashar Assad will win in Syria (more so with Trump in charge!), and its allies in Yemen (Houthi rebels) are a status quo power secure in a mountain fortress in the north of the country. It is hard to see where Trump would dislodge Iranian influence if he sought to do so. The U.S. is a powerful country that could put a lot of resources into rolling back Iranian influence, but the logic for such a move simply does not exist. Trump will also maintain Obama's aloof policy toward Saudi Arabia, which keeps it constrained (Chart 9).9 The country is in some ways the stereotype of the "ungrateful ally" that Trump wants to downgrade. For instance, Trump supported the law allowing victims of the September 11 attacks to sue the kingdom (a law that Obama tried unsuccessfully to veto). He has blamed the Saudis for the rise of ISIS and the failure to take care of Syrian refugees. His primary focus is on preventing terrorists from striking the U.S., and to that end he wants to cooperate with Russia and stabilize the region's regimes. This entails the relative neglect of Sunni groups under Shia rule in Syria and Iraq. Indeed, the few issues where the Saudis will welcome Trump - opposition to the Iran nuclear deal, support for Egypt's military ruler Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, and opposition to aggressive democracy promotion - are so far rhetorical, not concrete, commitments. Chart 9Saudi Arabia Sees The U.S. Stepping Back Saudi Arabia Sees The U.S. Stepping Back Saudi Arabia Sees The U.S. Stepping Back Will Trump get sucked into the region to intervene against ISIS? We do not think so. A bigger risk is Turkey.10 President Recep Erdogan may think that Trump will either be too complacent about Turkish interests in Syria, or that Trump is in fact a "kindred nationalist spirit" who will not prevent Turkey from pursuing its own sphere of influence in Syria and northern Iraq. Trump's foreign policy of "offshore balancing" would call for the U.S. to prevent Turkey from resurrecting any kind of regional empire, especially if it risks a war with Russia and Iran or comes at the cost of regional influence for American allies like the Kurds.11 Turkey will also be starkly at odds on Syria and ISIS. This means Turkey and the U.S. could see already tense relations get substantially worse in 2017. We would not be surprised to see President Trump threaten Erdogan with expulsion from NATO within his first term. Bottom Line: The biggest risk to our view is that Trump rejects the consensus of the intelligence and defense establishment and pushes Iran too far, leading to conflict. We do not think this will happen, but his rhetoric on the nuclear deal has been consistently negative and he seems likely to favor "Middle East hands" for top cabinet positions. He could involve the country in new Middle East entanglements if he does not show discipline in adhering to his non-interventionist preferences - particularly if he overreacts to an attack. Nonetheless, we believe that America's policy of geopolitical deleveraging from the Middle East will continue. Trump may have a mandate to be tough on terrorism from his voters, but he definitely does not have a free hand to commit military resources to the region. Trump And Asia Trump criticized China furiously during the campaign, declaring that he would name China a currency manipulator on his first day in office and threatening to impose a 45% tariff on Chinese imports. However, there is a familiar pattern of China bashing in U.S. presidential elections that leads to no sharp changes in policy.12 Will Trump be different? Some would argue that relations may actually improve, given how bad they already are. First, Trump's chief concern is to fire up the U.S. economy's animal spirits, and that would support China's ailing economy as long as he does not couple his tax cuts and fiscal stimulus with aggressive protectionist measures (Chart 10). Proponents of this view would point out that Trump's tougher measures may be called off when he realizes that the Chinese current account surplus has fallen sharply in recent years (Chart 11), and that the PBoC is propping up the RMB, not suppressing it. Similarly, Trump's China-bashing trade advisor, the former steel executive Dan DiMicco, may not get much traction given that the U.S. has largely shifted to Brazilian steel imports (Chart 12). In short, the U.S. could take a somewhat tougher stance on specific trade spats without provoking a vicious spiral of discriminatory actions. The fact that the U.S. is more exposed than ever to trade with emerging markets only reinforces the idea that it does not want to spark a real trade war (Chart 13). Chart 10A Trump Boom, Sans Protectionism, Would Lift Chinese Growth A Trump Boom, Sans Protectionism, Would Lift Chinese Growth A Trump Boom, Sans Protectionism, Would Lift Chinese Growth Chart 11China's Economy Rebalancing China's Economy Rebalancing China's Economy Rebalancing Chart 12China Already Lost The China Already Lost The "Steel Wars" China Already Lost The "Steel Wars" Chart 13A Reason To Eschew Protectionism A Reason To Eschew Protectionism A Reason To Eschew Protectionism Second, the Obama administration's "Pivot to Asia" and attempts to undermine China's economic influence in the region through the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) have aggravated China with little substantive gain. By contrast, Trump may emphasize American business access to China over Chinese citizens' freedoms - which could reduce the risk of conflict. He may not go beyond symbolic protectionist moves, like the currency manipulation charge, and meanwhile canceling the never-ratified TPP would be a net gain for China.13 In essence, Trump, despite his populist rhetoric, could prove both pragmatic and willing to inherit the traditional Republican stance of business-oriented positive engagement with China. Chart 14 This is a compelling argument and we take it seriously. But it is not our baseline case. Rather, we think Trump will eventually take concrete populist steps that will mark a departure from U.S. policy in recent memory. As mentioned, it was protectionist blue-collar voters in the Midwest who gave Trump the White House, and he will need to retain their loyalty in coming elections. Moreover, the secular flatlining of American wages and the growth of income inequality have moved the median U.S. voter to the left of the economic spectrum, as we have argued.14 Neo-liberal economic policy has fewer powerful proponents than in the recent past. Thus, in the long run, we expect the grand renegotiation with China to fall short of market hopes, and Sino-American tensions to resume their upward trajectory.15 Why are we so pessimistic? Three main reasons: The "Thucydides Trap": Sino-U.S. tensions are fundamentally driven not by trade disputes but by the U.S.'s fear of China's growing capability and ambition.16 Great conflicts in history have often occurred when a new economic and military power emerged and tried to alter the regional political arrangements set up by the dominant power. This was as true in late nineteenth-century Europe, with the rise of Germany vis-à-vis the U.K. and France (Chart 14), as it was in ancient Greece. The rise of Japan in the first half of the twentieth century had a similar effect in Asia (Chart 15). Trump could, of course, endorse Xi's idea of a "new type of great power relations," which is supposed to avoid this problem. But nobody knows what that would look like, and greater trade openness is the only conceivable foundation for it. Chart 15AThe Disruptive Rise Of Germany The Disruptive Rise Of Germany The Disruptive Rise Of Germany Chart 15BThe Disruptive Rise Of Japan The Disruptive Rise Of Japan The Disruptive Rise Of Japan China's economic imbalances: A caustic dose of trade remedies from the Trump administration will compound internal economic pressures in China resulting from rampant credit expansion, misallocation of capital, excessive money printing, and capital outflows (Chart 16).17 The combination of internal and external pressures is potentially fatal and China's leaders will fight it. Otherwise, they risk either the fate of the Soviets or of the Asian strongman regimes that succumbed to democracy after embracing capitalism fully. Instead, China will avoid rushing its structural reforms (it is, after all, currently closing its capital account), and protect its consumer market, which it hopes to be the growth engine going forward. This is not a strong basis for the "better deal" that Trump will demand. President Trump will want China to open up further to U.S. manufacturing, tech, and service exports. Economics and the security dilemma: China and the U.S. will not be able to prevent economic tensions from spilling over into broader strategic tensions. Compare the spike in trade tensions with Japan in the 1980s, when Japanese exports to the U.S. peaked and the U.S. strong-armed Japan into appreciating its currency (Chart 17). The U.S. had nurtured Japan and South Korea out of their post-war devastation by running large trade deficits and enabling them to focus on manufacturing exports while minimizing spending on defense. China joined this system in the 1980s and has largely resembled the formal U.S. allies (Chart 18). Given that China has largely followed Japan's path, it was inevitable that the U.S. would eventually lose patience and become more competitive with China. China has seized a greater share of the U.S. market than Japan had done at that time, and its exports are even more important to the U.S. as a share of GDP (Chart 19). Comparing the exchange rates then and now, the Trump administration will be able to argue that China's currency is overdue for appreciation (Chart 20). However, in the 1980s, the U.S. and Japan faced no risk of military conflict - their strategic hierarchy was entirely settled in 1945. The U.S. and China have no such understanding. There is no way of assuring China that U.S. economic pressure is not about strategic dominance. In fact, it is about that. So while China may be cajoled into promising faster reforms - given that its trade surplus with the U.S. is the only thing that stands between it and current account deficits (Chart 21) - nevertheless it will tend to dilute and postpone these reforms for the sake of its own security, putting Trump's resolve to the test. Chart 16Flashing Red Light On China's Economy Flashing Red Light On China's Economy Flashing Red Light On China's Economy Chart 17The U.S. Forced Structural Changes On Japan The U.S. Forced Structural Changes On Japan The U.S. Forced Structural Changes On Japan Chart 18Asia Sells, America Rules Asia Sells, America Rules Asia Sells, America Rules Chart 19The U.S. Will Get Tougher On China Trade The U.S. Will Get Tougher On China Trade The U.S. Will Get Tougher On China Trade Chart 20China Drags Its Feet On RMB Appreciation China Drags Its Feet On RMB Appreciation China Drags Its Feet On RMB Appreciation Chart 21A Reason For China To Kowtow A Reason For China To Kowtow A Reason For China To Kowtow Trump's victory may also heighten Beijing's fears that it is being surrounded by the U.S. and its partners. That is because Trump will make the following developments more likely: Better Russian relations: From a bird's eye view, Trump's thaw with Putin could mark an inversion of Nixon's thaw with Mao. China is the only power today that can stand a comparison with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The U.S. at least needs to make sure the Sino-Russian relationship does not become too warm (Chart 22).18 Russo-Japanese peace treaty: The two sides are already working on a treaty, never signed after World War II. Aside from their historic territorial dispute, the U.S. has been the main impediment by demanding Japan help penalize Russia after the invasion of Ukraine. Yet negotiations have advanced regardless, and Japanese air force scrambles against Russia have fallen while those against China have continued to spike (Chart 23). The best chance for a deal since the 1950s is now, with Abe and Putin both solidly in power until 2018. This would reduce Russian dependency on China for energy markets and capital investment, and free up Japan's security establishment to focus on China and North Korea. American allies are not defecting: The United States armed forces are deeply embedded in the Asia Pacific region and setbacks to the "pivot" policy should not be mistaken for setbacks to U.S. power in the absolute.19 U.S. allies like Thailand, the Philippines, and (soon) South Korea are in the headlines for seeking to warm up ties with China, but there is no hard evidence that they will turn away from the U.S. security umbrella. Rather, the pivot reassured them of U.S. commitment, giving them the flexibility to focus on boosting their economies, which means sending emissaries to Beijing. The problem is that Beijing knows this and will therefore still suspect that a "containment" strategy is underfoot over time. Better Indian relations: The Bush administration made considerable progress in improving ties with India. Trump also seems India-friendly, which would be supported by better ties with Russia and Iran. India could therefore become a greater obstacle to China's influence in South and Southeast Asia. Chart 22Energy A Solid Foundation For Sino-Russian Ties Energy A Solid Foundation For Sino-Russian Ties Energy A Solid Foundation For Sino-Russian Ties Chart 23Japan's Strategic Predicament Japan's Strategic Predicament Japan's Strategic Predicament From the above, we can draw three main conclusions: The U.S. role in the Pacific will determine global geopolitical stability under the Trump administration. The primary question is whether China is willing and able to accede to enough of Trump's demands to ensure that the U.S. and China have at least "one more fling," a further extension to the post-1979 trade relationship. It is possible that China is simply unable to do so and in the face of any concrete sanctions by Trump, will batten down the hatches, rally people around the flag, and shore up the state-led economy. There may be a tactical U.S.-China "improvement" over the next year - relative to the worst fears of trade war under Trump - but it will not be durable. The year 2017 will be the year of Trump's "honeymoon," while Xi Jinping will be focused on internal politics ahead of the Communist Party's crucial National Party Congress in the fall.20 Thus, after Trump gives China a "shot across the bow," like charging it with currency manipulation, the two sides will likely settle down at the negotiating table and send positive signals to the world about their time-tried ability to manage tensions. Financial markets will see through Trump's initially symbolic actions and begin to behave as if nothing has changed in U.S.-China relations. However, this calm will be deceiving, since economic and security tensions will eventually rise to the surface again, likely in a more disruptive way than ever before. China's periphery will be decisive, especially the Korean peninsula. The Koreas could become the locus of East Asia tensions for two reasons. First, North Korea's nuclear weaponization has reached a level that is truly alarming to the U.S. and Japan.21 New sanctions, if enforced, have real teeth because they target commodity exports (Chart 24). The problem is that China is unlikely to enforce them and South Korean politics are likely to turn more China-friendly and more pacific toward the North with the impending change of ruling parties. This will leave the U.S. and Japan with legitimate security grievances but less of an ability to change the outcome through non-military means. That is an arrangement ripe for confrontation. Separately, China's worsening relations with Taiwan, Vietnam's resistance to China's power-grab in the South China Sea, and conflicts between India and Pakistan will be key barometers of regional stability vis-à-vis China. Chart 24Will China Cut Imports From Here? Will China Cut Imports From Here? Will China Cut Imports From Here? The risk to this view, again, is that a Middle East crisis could distract the Trump administration. This would mark an excellent opportunity for China to build on its growing regional sway, and it would delay our baseline view that the Asia Pacific is now the chief source of geopolitical risk in the world. Investment Conclusions There is no geopolitical risk premium associated with Sino-American tensions. Our clients, colleagues, and friends in the industry are at a loss when we ask how one should hedge tensions in the region. This is a major risk for investors as the market will have to price emerging tensions quickly. Broadly speaking, Sino-American tensions will reinforce the ongoing de-globalization. If the top two global economies are at geopolitical loggerheads, they are more likely to see their geopolitical tensions spill over to the economic sphere. Unwinding globalization implies that inflation will make a comeback, as the reduction in flows of goods, services, capital, and people gradually increases supply constraints. This is primarily bad for bonds, which have enjoyed a bull market for the past three decades that we see reversing.22 At the same time, these trends suggest that investors should favor consumer-oriented sectors and countries relative to their export-reliant counterparts, and small-to-medium sized businesses over externally-exposed multinationals. BCA Geopolitical Strategy's long S&P 600 / short S&P 100 trade is up 7.4% since inceptionon November 9. Finally, these trends, combined with the associated geopolitical risks of various powers struggling for elbow room, warrant a continuation of the Geopolitical Strategy theme of favoring Developed Markets over Emerging Markets, which has made a 45.5% return since inception in November 2012. The centrality of China risk only reinforces this view. Matt Gertken, Associate Editor mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Geopolitical Strategy marko@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see our initial discussion of Trump's foreign policy, "U.S. Election Update: Trump, Presidential Powers, And Investment Implications," in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "The Socialism Put," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Multipolarity And Investing," dated April 9, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The Apex Of Globalization: All Downhill From Here," dated November 12, 2014, and, more recently, "Constraints & Preferences Of The Trump Presidency," dated November 30, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see "In Focus - Cold War Redux?" in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "It's A Long Way Down From The 'Wall Of Worry,'" dated March 2014, and Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Russia: To Buy Or Not To Buy?" dated March 20, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Russia-West Showdown: The West, Not Putin, Is The 'Wild Card,'" dated July 31, 2014, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Russia's Trilemma And The Coming Power Paralysis," dated February 21, 2012, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 7 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Out Of The Vault: Explaining The U.S.-Iran Détente," dated July 15, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "End Of An Era For Oil And The Middle East," dated April 8, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Saudi Arabia's Choice: Modernity Or Bust," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Turkey: Strategy After The Attempted Coup," dated July 18, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see John J. Meirsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "The Case For Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy," Foreign Affairs, July/August 2016, available at www.foreignaffairs.com. 12 Please see BCA China Investment Strategy, "China As A Currency Manipulator?" dated November 24, 2016, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 13 One of his foreign policy advisors, former CIA head James Woolsey, has floated the idea that the U.S. could turn positive about Chinese initiatives like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the One Belt One Road program to link Eurasian economies. Please see Woolsey, "Under Donald Trump, the US will accept China's rise - as long as it doesn't challenge the status quo," South China Morning Post, dated November 10, 2016, available at www.scmp.com. 14 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "The End Of The Anglo-Saxon Economy?" dated April 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 15 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Global Investment Strategy Joint Special Report, "Sino-American Conflict: More Likely Than You Think, Part II," dated November 6, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 16 Please see Graham Allison, "The Thucydides Trap: Are The U.S. And China Headed For War?" The Atlantic, September 24, 2015, available at www.theatlantic.com. 17 Please see BCA Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "China's Money Creation Redux And The RMB," dated November 23, 2016, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 18 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Can Russia Import Productivity From China?" dated June 29, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 19 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy and Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report, "Philippine Elections: Taking The Shine Off Reform," dated May 11, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 20 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "De-Globalization," dated November 9, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 21 Please see "North Korea: A Red Herring No More?" in BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "Partem Mirabilis," dated April 13, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 22 Please see BCA Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "End Of The 35-Year Bond Bull Market," dated July 5, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights Tighter global oil markets resulting from the production cut we expect to be announced November 30 at OPEC's Vienna meeting, along with fiscal stimulus from the incoming Trump administration in the U.S., will continue to stoke inflation expectations. We believe gold is well suited for hedging investors' medium-term inflation exposure, given its sensitivity to 5-year/5-year CPI swaps in the U.S. and eurozone. If the Fed decides to get out ahead of this expected pick-up in inflation and inflation expectations by raising rates aggressively next year, we would expect any increase in gold prices - and oil prices, for that matter - to be challenged. For OPEC and non-OPEC producers, a larger production cut may be required to offset a stronger USD next year. Near term, we still like upside oil exposure, given our expectation that production will be cut. Energy: Overweight. We remain long Brent call spreads expiring at year-end, and long WTI front-to-back spreads in 2017H2, in anticipation of an oil-production cut. Base Metals: Neutral. We expect nickel to outperform zinc in 2017. Precious Metals: Neutral. We are long gold at $1,227/oz after our buy-stop was elected on November 11. We are including a 5% stop-loss for this position. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Our long Mar/17 wheat vs. beans order was filled on November 14. We still look to go long corn vs. sugar. Feature Chart of the WeekBrent, WTI Curves Will Flatten, ##br##Then Backwardate Following Oil-Production Cut bca.ces_wr_2016_11_17_c1 bca.ces_wr_2016_11_17_c1 Continuing production increases from sundry sources outside OPEC, which the International Energy Agency estimates will lift output almost 500k b/d in 2017, are turning the heat up on the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia to agree a production cut at the Cartel's meeting in Vienna later this month. It's either that or risk another downdraft that takes prices closer to the bottom of our long-standing $40-to-$65/bbl price range that defines U.S. shale-oil economics. The unexpected strength in production growth outside OPEC likely will require KSA and Russia to come up with a production cut that exceeds the 1mm b/d we projected earlier this month would be required to lift prices into the mid-$50s/bbl range. On the back of the expected cuts, we recommended getting long a February 2017 Brent call spread - long the $50/bbl strike vs. short the $55/bbl strike at $1.21/bbl. As of Tuesday's close, when we mark our positions to market every week, the position was up 9.09%. Reduced output from KSA and Russia - and, most likely, Gulf allies of KSA - will force refiners globally to draw down crude in storage, and for refined product inventories to draw as well. This will lift the forward curves for Brent and WTI futures (Chart of the Week). We expect oil prices will increase by approximately $10/bbl, following the joint cuts of 500k b/d each we expect KSA and Russia, which will be announced November 30. This also will lift 3-year forward WTI futures prices, which, as we showed in previous research, share a common trend with 5y5y CPI swaps. As stocks continue to draw next year, we expect the forward Brent and WTI curves to flatten, and, in 2017H2, to backwardate - that is to say, prompt-delivery prices will trade above the price of oil delivered in the future. For this reason, we are long August 2017 WTI futures vs. short November 2017 WTI futures, expecting the price difference between the two, which favors the deferred contract at present (i.e., a contango curve), to flip in favor of the Aug/17 contract. Chart 2Longer-dated WTI Futures, ##br##Inflation Expectations Rising bca.ces_wr_2016_11_17_c2 bca.ces_wr_2016_11_17_c2 Fiscal Stimulus Expected in the U.S. The election of Donald J. Trump as the 45th president of the U.S. likely will usher in significant fiscal stimulus beginning next year, particularly as Republicans now control the Presidency and Congress for the first time since 2005 - 06, when George W. Bush was president. Trump campaigned on a promise of significant fiscal stimulus, which likely will, among other things, stoke inflation expectations as money starts to flow to infrastructure projects and tax cuts toward the end of next year. Even before Trump's election 5-year/5-year (5y5y) CPI swaps were ticking higher, as oil markets rebalanced and started to discount the drawdown in global inventories this year and next (Chart 2). As the outlines of the Trump administration's fiscal policy take shape and money starts to flow to infrastructure projects, we expect inflation expectations to continue to rise. In previous research, we showed 5y5y CPI swaps and 3-year forward WTI futures are cointegrated, meaning they follow the same long-term trend. Indeed, we can specify 5y5y CPI swaps in the U.S. and eurozone directly as a function of 3-year forward WTI futures.1 Gold Will Lift With Rising Inflation Expectations... In the post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC) markets, gold prices have shared a common trend with U.S. CPI 5y5y swaps and real interest rates, which we show in a new model (Chart 3A, top panel).2 Using this specification, we find a 1% increase in the U.S. 5y5y CPI swaps increases gold prices by slightly more than 9%. Similarly, we find a 1% increase in EMU 5y5y CPI swaps increases gold prices by slightly more than 10% (Chart 3B, top panel).3 Of course, investors always can go straight to Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) for inflation protection, given the evolution of the respective CPIs in the U.S. and eurozone drives returns for these securities (Chart 4). However, we believe gold gives investors higher leverage to actual inflation and expected inflation. Chart 3AGold Prices Ticking Higher With ##br##U.S. CPI Inflation Expectations Gold Prices Ticking Higher With U.S. CPI Inflation Expectations Gold Prices Ticking Higher With U.S. CPI Inflation Expectations Chart 3BEMU Inflation Expectations ##br##Vs. 3-year Forward WTI bca.ces_wr_2016_11_17_c3b bca.ces_wr_2016_11_17_c3b Chart 4Inflation Expectations And TIPS ##br##Are Highly Correlated, As Well Inflation Expectations And TIPS Are Highly Correlated, As Well Inflation Expectations And TIPS Are Highly Correlated, As Well ...But The USD's Evolution Matters, Too The combination of tighter oil markets and fiscal stimulus in the U.S. will continue to push inflation and inflation expectations higher. The Fed will not sit idly by and just watch inflation expectations move higher next year. Indeed, prior to the election, we expected two rate hikes next year, following a likely rate increase at the FOMC's meeting next month. With expectations of a tightening oil market, and a fresh round of fiscal stimulus from the incoming Trump administration, the odds of an even stronger USD increase. We had been expecting the USD will appreciate 10% over the next year or so, as a result of the upcoming December rate hike and two additional hikes next year. This could change, since, as, our Foreign Exchange Strategy service noted, "Trump's electoral victory only re-enforces our bullish stance on the dollar."4 A stronger USD, all else equal, is bearish for commodities generally, since it raises the cost of dollar-denominated commodities ex-U.S., and lowers the costs of commodity producers in local-currency terms. The former effect depresses demand at the margin, while the latter raises supply at the margin. Both effects would combine to reduce oil prices at the margin (Chart 5). This would, in turn, lower inflation expectations, which would feed into lower gold prices (Chart 6). Chart 5A Stronger USD Would Be Bearish For Oil bca.ces_wr_2016_11_17_c5 bca.ces_wr_2016_11_17_c5 Chart 6And Gold Prices As It Would Lower Inflation Expectations bca.ces_wr_2016_11_17_c6 bca.ces_wr_2016_11_17_c6 Our FX view, is complicated by the possibility the Fed might want to run a "high-pressure economy" next year, and the potential for additional Chinese fiscal stimulus going into the 19th Communist Party Congress next fall. If both the U.S. and China deploy significant fiscal stimulus next year, the growth in these economies could overwhelm the negative effects of a stronger USD, and industrial commodities - chiefly base metals, iron ore and steel - could rally as demand picks up. Oil demand also would be expected to pick up as a result of the combined fiscal stimulus coming out of the U.S. and China, both from infrastructure build-outs and income growth. KSA - Russia Oil-Production Cut Gets Complicated These considerations will complicate the calculus of KSA and Russia and their respective oil-producing allies as the November 30 OPEC meeting in Vienna draws near. If the Fed moves to get out ahead of increasing inflation expectations by adding another rate hike or two next year, oil prices will encounter a significant headwind. OPEC and non-OPEC producers could very well find themselves back at the bargaining table negotiating additional cuts, as prices come under pressure next year from higher U.S. interest rates. It is too early to act on any speculation regarding fiscal policy in the U.S. or China next year. However, given our expectation for an oil-production cut announcement later this month at OPEC's Vienna meeting, we are confident staying long the Brent $50/$55 call spread, and the long Jul/17 vs. short Nov/17 WTI spread position we recommended earlier this month. As greater clarity emerges on U.S. and Chinese fiscal policy going into next year, we will update our assessments. Bottom Line: We expect global oil markets to tighten as KSA and Russia engineer a production cut, which will be announced at OPEC's Vienna meeting later this month. Fiscal stimulus from the incoming Trump administration in the U.S., and possible fiscal stimulus in China next year could put a bid under commodities. However, if the Fed gets out ahead of the expected pick-up in inflation and inflation expectations by raising rates aggressively next year, any increase in commodity prices - oil and gold, in particular - will be challenged. KSA and Russia could find themselves back at the bargaining table, negotiating yet another production cut to offset a stronger USD. That said, we are retaining our upside oil exposure via a Brent $50/$55 call spread expiring at the end of this year, and our long Jul/17 WTI vs. short Nov/17 WTI futures, which will go into the money as the forward curve flattens and then goes into a backwardation. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com BASE METALS China Commodity Focus: Base Metals Nickel: A Good Buy, Especially Versus Zinc Chart 7Nickel: More Upside Ahead Nickel: More Upside Ahead Nickel: More Upside Ahead We are bullish on nickel prices, both tactically and strategically. Its supply deficit is likely to widen on rising stainless steel demand and falling nickel ore supply in 2017. China will continue to increase its refined nickel imports to meet strong domestic stainless steel production growth. We remain strategically bearish zinc even though our short Dec/17 LME zinc position got stopped out at $2500/MT with a 4% loss. We expect nickel to outperform zinc considerably in 2017. We recommend buying Dec/17 LME nickel contract versus Dec/17 LME zinc contract at 4.3 (current level: 4.38). If the order gets filled, we suggest putting a stop-loss level for the ratio at 4.15. Nickel prices have gone up over 50% since bottoming in February (Chart 7, panel 1). The global nickel supply deficit reached a record high of 75 thousand metric tons (kt) for the first eight months of this year, based on the World Bureau of Metal Statistics (WBMS) data (Chart 7, panel 2). More upside for nickel in 2017 On the supply side, the outlook is not promising in 2017. Global nickel ore and refined nickel production fell 5.2% and 1.1% yoy for the first eight months of this year, respectively, according to the WBMS data (Chart 7, panel 3). The newly elected Philippine government is clearly aiming for "responsible mining," and has been highly restrictive on domestic nickel mining activities, actions that likely will reduce the country's nickel ore production in 2017. The Philippines became the world's biggest nickel ore producer and exporter after Indonesia banned nickel ore exports in January 2014. The Philippines has implemented a national audit on domestic mines from July to September and has halted 10 mines for their environmental violations since July. Eight of them are nickel producers, which account for about 10% of the country's total nickel output. In late September, the government further declared that 12 more mines (mostly nickel) were recommended for suspension, and 18 firms are also subject to a further review. Stringent policy oversight will be the on-going theme for Philippine mines. We expect more suspensions in the country next year. There is no sign the export ban will be removed by the Indonesian government. Since Indonesia banned nickel ore exports in January 2014, the country's nickel ore output has declined 84% from 2013 to 2015. This occurred even though smelters were built locally, which will allow more nickel ore output in Indonesia. However, the incremental Indonesian output is unlikely to make up for the global nickel ore shortage next year. Global nickel demand is on the rise again (Chart 7, panel 4). According to the International Stainless Steel Forum (ISSF), global stainless steel production grew by 11.5% in 2016Q2 from only 3.7% yoy in 2016Q1. Comparatively, in 2015, the growth was a negative 0.3%. Due to fiscal and monetary stimulus in China this year, we expect continued growth in global stainless steel production in 2017. Why China Is Important To Global Nickel Markets China is the world's biggest nickel producer, consumer and importer. Its primary effect on nickel prices is through refined nickel imports. It also influences global stainless steel prices through stainless steel exports. In comparison to the global supply deficit of 75 kt, the deficit in China widened to 346 kt for the first eight months of this year - the highest physical shortage ever (Chart 8, panel 1). China has driven the global growth of both refined nickel production and nickel consumption since 2010 (Chart 8, panels 2 and 3). During the first eight months of this year, Chinese nickel production dropped sharply to 40.5 kt, nearly three times the global nickel output loss of 13.6 kt. For the same period, China's nickel demand growth accounted for 67% of global growth. In addition, the country produces about 53% of global stainless steel and exports about 10% of domestic-made stainless steel products to the rest of world (Chart 8, panel 4). Clearly, China is extremely important to both the global stainless steel and nickel markets. China Needs To Import More Nickel in 2017 Looking forward, China is likely to continue increasing its nickel imports to meet a growing domestic supply deficit (Chart 9, panel 1). The country's ore imports have been declining because of Indonesia's ban since 2014, and further dropped this year on the Philippine's suspensions (Chart 9, panel 2). Scarcer ore supply drove down Chinese refined nickel and nickel pig iron (NPI) output every year for the past three consecutive years (including this year). Chart 8China: A Key Factor For Nickel Market China: A Key Factor For Nickel Market China: A Key Factor For Nickel Market Chart 9Chinese Nickel Imports Are Set To Rise bca.ces_wr_2016_11_17_c9 bca.ces_wr_2016_11_17_c9 Prior to 2014, China imported nickel ores from Indonesia to produce NPI, which is used in its domestic stainless steel production. In 2013, only 20% of domestic nickel demand was met by unwrought nickel imports. After 2014, China's higher nickel ore imports from the Philippines were not able to make up the import losses from Indonesia (Chart 9, panel 3). As a result, in 2015, the percentage of domestic nickel demand met by unwrought nickel imports jumped to 47%. Furthermore, for the first eight months of this year, imports accounted for 57% of Chinese demand. Before the Indonesian ban in 2014, Chinese stainless steel producers and NPI producers built up mammoth nickel ore inventories for their stainless steel ore NPI production (Chart 9, panel 4). Now, Chinese laterite ore inventories are much lower than three years ago. Plus, most of the inventories likely are low nickel-content Philippines ore. Besides the tight ore inventory, China's stainless-steel output is accelerating. According to Beijing Antaike Information Development Co., a state-backed research firm, for the first nine months of 2016, Chinese nickel-based stainless steel output grew 11.3% yoy, a much stronger growth rate than the 4% seen during the same period last year. Given falling domestic nickel output and increasing nickel demand from the stainless steel sector, China seems to have no other choice but to import more refined nickel or NPI from overseas. Downside Risks Nickel prices could fall sharply in the near term if massive LME inventories are released to the global market. After all, global nickel inventories currently are at a high level of more than 350 kt, which is more than enough to meet the supply deficit of 75 kt (Chart 10, panel 1). However, as prices are still at the very low end of the range over the past 13 years, we believe that the odds of a massive, sudden inventory release is small. Inventory holders will be hesitant to sell their precious inventory too quickly, therefore the inventory release will likely be gradual, especially given the continuing export ban in Indonesia and a likely increase in the suspension of mines in the Philippines. In the longer term, if Indonesian refined nickel output continues growing at the pace registered in the past two years, the global nickel supply deficit may be much less than the market expects (Chart 10, panel 2). In that scenario, nickel prices will also fall. Due to power supply shortages, poor infrastructure and funding problems, many of the smelters and stainless steel plants' development have got delayed, so we believe these problems will continue to be headwinds for Indonesian nickel output growth. A five-million capacity stainless steel project, funded by three Chinese companies, potentially making Indonesia the world's second biggest stainless steel producer, will only be in production by 2018. Therefore, we believe next year is still a good window for a further rally in nickel prices. In addition, global stainless steel output may weaken again after this year's stimulus from China runs out of steam, which will also weigh on nickel prices (Chart 10, panel 3). We will monitor these risks closely. Investment strategy We expect nickel to outperform zinc considerably in 2017. Nickel has underperformed zinc massively since 2010 with the nickel/zinc price ratio tumbling to a 17-year low (Chart 11, panel 1). Chart 10Downside Risks To Watch bca.ces_wr_2016_11_17_c10 bca.ces_wr_2016_11_17_c10 Chart 11Nickel Likely To Outperform Zinc In 2017 bca.ces_wr_2016_11_17_c11 bca.ces_wr_2016_11_17_c11 Even though our short Dec/17 LME zinc position was stopped out at $2500/MT with a 4% loss due to the short-term turbulence, we remain strategically bearish zinc, as we expect supply to rise in 2017 (Chart 11, panel 2).5 Given our assessments of the nickel and zinc markets, we recommend buying Dec/17 LME nickel contract versus Dec/17 LME zinc contract at 4.3 (current level: 4.38) (Chart 11, panel 3). If the order gets filled, we suggest putting a stop-loss level for the ratio at 4.15. Ellen JingYuan He, Editor/Strategist ellenj@bcaresearch.com 1 Our updated estimates of the cointegrating regressions for U.S. and eurozone 5y5y CPI swaps indicate 3-year forward WTI futures explain close to 87% of the U.S. swap levels and 82% of the eurozone swaps, in the post-GFC period (January 2010 to present). Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Inflation Expectations Will Lift As Oil Rebalances," dated March 31, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 We also found that, over a longer period encompassing pre-GFC markets, gold prices shared a common trend with U.S. 5y5y CPI swaps, as well. Indeed, the evolution of 5y5y CPI swaps explained 84% of gold's price from 2004, when the 5y5y CPI swap time series begins, to present. 3 Previously, we estimated a gold model using the Fed's core PCE and the St. Louis Fed's 5y5y U.S. TIPS inflation index and found a 1% increase in the core PCE translates to a 4% increase in gold prices. Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "A 'High-Pressure Economy' Would Be Bullish For Gold," dated October 20, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report "Reaganomics 2.0?," dated November 11, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report for zinc section "The Lithium Battery Supply Chain: Efficient Exposure To Electric-Vehicle Market," dated October 27, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Closed Trades

Highlights The inexorable shift of refining eastward would be accelerated if the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia fail to curb crude oil production as we expect. Prolonging the crude oil market-share war - particularly between opposing camps led by KSA and Iran within OPEC, and Russia's campaign outside the Cartel - will advantage Asian refiners in the short term. Over the longer term, the expansion of oil refining in Asia and the Middle East likely will accelerate, as these warring camps invest directly in refining capacity in Asia and expand their domestic and regional refining and trading capacity. The risk Asian product markets will become super-saturated over the next 3 - 5 years remains elevated, as local refining capacity outgrows local demand and export markets are used to dispose of product surpluses. Like their upstream counterparts, refiners can be expected to fight for market share, leading to a compression in margins. Energy: Overweight. We continue to expect a production cut by KSA and Russia to be announced at the OPEC meeting this month. Base Metals: Neutral. LME aluminum prices still have upside as the market will likely remain supply deficit in the short term. We look to buy aluminum on weakness. Precious Metals: Neutral. We remain on the sidelines ahead of the Fed's December meeting. Ags/Softs: Underweight. We still look to go long wheat versus soybeans. We also look to go long corn versus sugar. Feature We continue to expect an announcement from KSA and Russia of a net 1mm b/d production cut at this month's OPEC meeting in Vienna, after accounting for the 400k b/d or so of seasonal production declines in KSA. A failure to follow through on a cut will prolong the global market-share war among OPEC and Russian oil producers seeking long-term customers in Asian refining markets, particularly in China. China's so-called teapots, which refine 60k to 70k b/d, only started importing crude oil for their own accounts late last year. These refiners represent about one-third of China's 14.3 mm b/d refining capacity as of 2015. It's been a slow ramp - some of these teapots only got started on importing their own crude this year - but they're definitely on a growth trajectory and should catch up with KSA and India in the near future. Some of them already are using hedge markets and setting up their own trading operations, according to media reports. Also, we're expecting to see increased investment in refining in China by KSA and others in the very near future, which will bring state of the art technology to the sector. In and of itself, a failure of KSA and Russia to agree a production cut would be bullish for the growth potential of Asian refiners, as Middle Eastern and Russian crude oil supplies continue to be aggressively marketed to them, allowing them to build capacity and grow their share of global exports (Chart of the Week). Chart of the Week (A)Asia/Middle East Refining Inputs Continue to ##br##Grow As OPEC Market-Share War Drags On bca.ces_wr_2016_11_10_c1a bca.ces_wr_2016_11_10_c1a Chart of the Week (B)Asia/Middle East Refiners' Market Share Of ##br##Gasoline Exports Is Growing bca.ces_wr_2016_11_10_c1b bca.ces_wr_2016_11_10_c1b Chart of the Week (C)...As Are ##br##Diesel/Gasoil Exports bca.ces_wr_2016_11_10_c1c bca.ces_wr_2016_11_10_c1c Our expectation for crude production cuts by KSA and Russia, perhaps with sundry cuts from their allies in the market-share war, would accelerate the draws in crude and product inventories globally. Absent a cut, inventories will continue to draw slowly, based on an assessment of data provided by the Joint Oil Data Initiative (JODI), a transnational oil-data service (Chart 2). The current cycle of supply destruction is being prolonged by high global inventory levels. High inventories keep prices under pressure, which, as we have often noted, raise the odds of civil unrest in cash-strapped states. The odds of unplanned production outages and loss of exports thus remains elevated. A price spike in such a scenario cannot be ruled out. Chart 2Inventories Will Continue To Fall Slowly ##br##If KSA-Russia Don't Cut Crude Output bca.ces_wr_2016_11_10_c2 bca.ces_wr_2016_11_10_c2 Chart 3Asia/Middle East Diesel Output##br## Growth Will Continue bca.ces_wr_2016_11_10_c3 bca.ces_wr_2016_11_10_c3 Global Refining and Storage Markets Continue Transformation Longer term, we see an inexorable shift in refining eastward, as local refiners expand their capacity in China and India, and financially stronger crude and product exporters expand their refining and trading operations by investing in existing or new Asian refining capacity - e.g., KSA in China and South Korea, and Russia's Rosneft in India alongside a major trading company. This will keep high-valued-added exports growing in Asia (Chart 3 and Chart 4), and will take market share from traditional processing centers - e.g., northwest Europe, and Singapore's processing refineries (Chart 5). Chart 4Along With ##br##Gasoline Output bca.ces_wr_2016_11_10_c4 bca.ces_wr_2016_11_10_c4 Chart 5Asia/Middle East Refiners ##br##Displace Traditional Processors bca.ces_wr_2016_11_10_c5 bca.ces_wr_2016_11_10_c5 With or without a production cut by KSA and Russia, the incidence of crude-oil supply destruction will continue to fall on the poorer OPEC producers outside the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which lack the wherewithal to invest in higher crude-oil output domestically, or in refining and trading capacity domestically or abroad. These cash-strapped states also will be unable to make direct investments in refining assets in end-use markets, depriving them of assured outlets for crude production enjoyed by exporters like KSA with substantial refining investments domestically and worldwide.1 This means that, unlike KSA, where refined-product sales and trading will constitute a greater share of revenues over the medium term (out to 10 years), these cash-strapped producers will continue to depend on crude oil sales alone. Chart 6U.S. Product Exports Hold Up Well bca.ces_wr_2016_11_10_c6 bca.ces_wr_2016_11_10_c6 Given its technological edge and nearby crude supplies - Canadian heavy shipped south via pipeline, conventional and light-tight oil (LTO) from shale fields, and increasing volumes of Mexican crude following the sale of deep-water acreage next month - we do not expect U.S. refiners to lose export-market share in the high-value-added light-product markets (diesel and gasoline/aviation fuels) (Chart 6). Indeed, on a 5-year seasonal basis, U.S. refined-product exports actually are increasing, as nearby refiners - e.g., Mexico - continue to find it difficult to maintain operations. Even as Asia and the Middle East refining and trading markets develop, we continue to expect a deepening of crude and product flows among North and South American producers and refiners.2 China Policy Put Could Spur Refining Output In our earlier research, we noted the implicit put provided to Chinese refiners, after the National Development and Reform Commission mandated products be sold at a minimum crude oil reference price of $40/bbl. This was done to encourage conservation and to support domestic refiners and producers.3 So, if crude oil prices go below $40/bbl for Chinese refiners, this regulation incentivizes them to refine as much as possible, then store or export output surplus to domestic needs. Unless the government steps in to tax away the refining windfall resulting from this put whenever the reference crude price falls below $40/bbl, this policy will, at the margin, pressure global refined-product prices, and keep refining margin growth potential limited as Chinese capacity increases. This pattern was seen in Chinese agricultural markets, where crop price supports resulted in a massive accumulation of corn in storage, as farmers bought cheap corn on the international market and sold it into the government storage market. The crop price supports are being unwound, but it does illustrate the Ironclad Law of Regulation - markets always find a way to game regulations to their advantage. Refining Margins Will Remain Under Pressure Chart 7Refining Margins Will Remain Under Pressure bca.ces_wr_2016_11_10_c7 bca.ces_wr_2016_11_10_c7 The rapid expansion of refining capacity in Asia and the Middle East - driven by increased domestic and foreign investment in refining and trading capacity - suggests to us refined-product markets could be in for an extended period of oversupply, which will limit refiner margins going forward. OPEC's market-share war, and the massive supplies produced by U.S. shale-oil producers made it abundantly clear that crude oil is a super-abundant resource, particularly with shale-oil production ready to come on line as soon as prices move above $50/bbl. The buildout in refining capacity by KSA and other OPEC members, along with plans to expand Asian and Middle East refining capacity and, critically, to supply that capacity with aggressively priced crude charging stock, will keep refining margins under pressure going into 2017 (Chart 7). The risk of super-saturating Asian markets in the near future with unsold refined products as crude supplies and production are ramped up in the near future, therefore, poses a risk for refiners generally, since, at the right prices, crude and product can be moved anywhere on the globe. This poses a particular risk for KSA as it readies the IPO of is state-owned oil company Aramco. KSA is simultaneously attempting to grow its own refining capacity worldwide - from a current level of ~ 6mm b/d to as much as 10mm b/d - and retain and secure long-term customers for its crude. In effect, as a refiner it will be competing with the very customers to which it provides crude oil. This doubly compounds the difficulty of IPOing Aramco, as well, since investors will want to be assured the refining side of the enterprise is not being disadvantaged by the crude-oil supply side of the enterprise. However, for KSA as a sovereign state, this expansion of revenues earned from a massive refining presence worldwide is clearly a boon. KSA could, at the end of the day, refine, export and trade product volumes that equal or surpass its current crude export volumes, as it continues to invest and build out its global refining presence. This will further distance it from its OPEC brethren and other crude oil producers worldwide, making it less a crude exporter and more a global vertically integrated portfolio manager. Bottom Line: We see an inexorable shift of refining eastward, with or without a production cut by KSA and Russia. Failure to agree and implement a production cut would prolong the crude oil market-share and provide a tailwind to Asian refiners in the short term. With or without a production cut, we see the expansion of oil refining in Asia and the Middle East continuing apace, as direct investment flows to refining and trading. The risk that Asian product markets will become super-saturated over the next 3 - 5 years remains elevated, as local refining capacity outgrows local demand and exports from Asian and Middle East refineries grow. Like their upstream counterparts, refiners can be expected to fight for market share, leading to a compression in margins. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com BASE METALS China Commodity Focus: Base Metals Aluminum: Buy On Weakness Tactically, we are bullish on LME aluminum prices and neutral on SHFE aluminum prices.4 Supply shortages will likely persist in the ex-China world over next three to six months. Strategically, we are neutral on LME aluminum prices and bearish on SHFE aluminum prices. Profitable Chinese smelters will continue boosting their aluminum production, which will eventually spill over into the global market. We recommend buying Mar/17 LME aluminum contract if it falls to $1,580/MT (current: $1,727/MT). We expect the contract price to rise to $1,900/MT over next three to five months. If the order gets filled, we suggest putting a stop-loss at $1,500/MT. Aluminum prices have gone up considerably this year (Chart 8, panel 1). Global aluminum producers cut their production sharply while global consumption only contracted slightly, reversing a deep supply-surplus market in 2015 to a significant supply-deficit market in 2016 (Chart 8, panel 2). Moreover, aluminum inventories in both LME and SHFE markets also have fallen to multi-year lows (Chart 8, panel 3). However, aluminum prices went nearly vertical in China with a 48% rally since late last November, while LME prices have been only up 21% during the same period of time (Chart 8, panel 1). Why have prices in China gone up much more than the global LME prices? Will the rallies in aluminum prices in both LME and SHFE markets continue? The answer is mainly in China. China: The Most Important Factor In The Global Aluminum Market As the world's largest aluminum producer and consumer, China accounts more than 50% of global aluminum production and consumption (Chart 9, panel 1). The country has also been the major contributor to the growth of both global supply and demand for at least the past 10 years (Chart 9, panels 2 and 3). Chart 8Aluminum: Still More ##br##Upside Ahead? bca.ces_wr_2016_11_10_c8 bca.ces_wr_2016_11_10_c8 Chart 9China: The Most Important Factor ##br##In Aluminum Market China: The Most Important Factor In Aluminum Market China: The Most Important Factor In Aluminum Market China And The Price Collapse In 2015 In November 2015, while LME aluminum prices plunged to their lowest levels since February 2009, aluminum prices in China (SHEF) collapsed to their lowest levels since at least 1994. There were four main factors driving for the price drop. Chinese aluminum output increased more than 3 million metric tons (Mn MT), which accounted 87% of global supply growth, and resulted in excessive global supply. At the same time, global aluminum demand growth experienced a sharp slowdown -- yoy growth was 6% in 2015, versus 16.1% in 2014. This was mainly led by China, where, last year, aluminum demand growth slowed from 27.5% in 2014 to 10.9% in 2015. Inventories at SHFE were boosted by about 68% in 2015, while inventories at LME remained elevated. With China producing much more than it consumed, the country started to encourage exports of semi-manufactured aluminum products last year to reduce the domestic supply surplus (Chart 9, panel 4). In April 2015, the country removed the export tariff on several major aluminum semi-manufactured products. In November 2015, the country implemented a policy of giving a 13-15% value-added tax rebate to exporters of semi-manufactured products. As a result, last year net Chinese unwrought aluminum exports increased 16.7% yoy, which have weighed on global LME aluminum prices. China And The Price Rally In 2016 Chart 10Positive Factors To Aluminum Prices Positive Factors To Aluminum Prices Positive Factors To Aluminum Prices Similarly, China was the major driving factor behind this year's rally as well. Global supply was cut massively for the last two months of 2015 and the first eight months of 2016, as extremely low aluminum prices resulted in huge losses for most global aluminum producers. According to the World Bureau of Metal Statistics (WBMS), for the first eight months of this year, China accounted for 55% of the global aluminum supply cuts, as the country suspended its high-cost producing capacity and started industry-wide coordinated production cutbacks in last December (Chart 10, panel 1). Extremely low inventory levels also spurred the price rally. Inventories at SHFE warehouses fell 76.5% from mid-March to late-September (Chart 10, panel 2). In addition, the social inventory at major cities (Wuxi, Shanghai, Hangzhou, Gongyi and Foshan) also fell to record lows. Surging coal prices and rising alumina prices have also pushed up domestic aluminum production costs (Chart 10, panel 3). In addition, China implemented its newly promulgated Road Traffic Management Regulations regarding overloaded and oversized trucks, and unsafe vehicles on September 21. It was common before these regulations were implemented for drivers to overload shipments of commodities in order to increase profits. This raised road transportation costs for commodities like steel, coal, aluminum, aluminum products and other metals. It also created a bottleneck for timely transporting of coal to aluminum smelters, which own self-generated power plants, and transporting primary aluminum from major producing provinces Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Ningxia to some inner-land provinces like Henan for further manufacturing. As China cut its aluminum production this year, the country's exports of semi-manufactured aluminum products also fell 1.9% yoy for the first nine months of this year. As for Chinese aluminum demand, the data are confusing: The WBMS data showed a contraction for the first eight months of 2016, but the domestic industry association reported a decent increase in Chinese aluminum demand so far this year. Based on domestic auto output and construction activity data, we are inclined to believe Chinese aluminum demand rose moderately on the back of this year's fiscal stimulus. Other Factors For The Price Rally In 2016 There are two factors besides China for this year's aluminum rally. U.S. aluminum output fell nearly 50% yoy this year as Alcoa and Century Aluminum massively cut capacity late last year in response to lower prices (Chart 10, panel 4). For the ex-China world, while its supply fell 1.2%, consumption actually grew 0.4% for the first eight months of this year. This increased the supply deficit for the world excluding China, which is positive for LME aluminum prices (Chart 10, panel 5). So, What's Next? Tactically, we are bullish on LME aluminum prices and neutral on SHFE aluminum prices. Chart 11Aluminum: Buy On Weakness bca.ces_wr_2016_11_10_c11 bca.ces_wr_2016_11_10_c11 Most of the aforementioned positive factors are still in place. Even though China has enough capacity to oversupply both its domestic market and global markets again, the key factor will be how fast China boosts its aluminum output. With new added capacity and idled capacity returned to service, China's operating capacity for aluminum has been rising every month so far this year. According to the data provided by Sublime China Information Group, as of the end of October, China's aluminum operating capacity was 35.1 MMt/y (million metric tons per year), a rise of 0.575 MMt/y from the previous month, and an increase of 2.034 mtpy from the end of 2015. Based on our calculations, so far, total aluminum output from January to September is still much lower than the same period last year. In addition, considering the possible output loss due to the Spring Festival in late January, we believe it will take another three to six months for China to meet its own domestic demand and inventory restocking. Therefore, as domestic supply becomes more ample, China's domestic prices - including SHFE aluminum prices - should have limited upside. At the same time, the downside also should be limited by low inventory and rebounding demand. We expect more upside for LME aluminum prices as the supply shortage will likely persist in the ex-China world over next three to six months. Currently, Chinese aluminum prices are about 20% higher than the LME prices (both are in USD terms), which will likely limit the supply coming from China's exports to the rest of the world. Strategically, we are neutral on LME aluminum prices and bearish on SHFE aluminum prices. Currently, about 85% of the China's aluminum operating capacity is profitable. With new low-cost capacity and more idled capacity coming back line, profitable Chinese smelters will continue boosting their aluminum production to maximize profits. This, over a longer term such as nine months to one year, should eventually spill over into the global market. Risks China has imposed stricter environmental regulations on the domestic metal smelting and refining process since 2014 to control domestic pollution. The government currently is sending environmental inspection teams to major aluminum producing provinces to check how well the smelters and refiners comply with state environment rules. Some unqualified factories may be ordered to close. If this occurs, domestic SHFE aluminum prices may go up further in the near term. On the other side, if unprofitable aluminum producers in China also increase their output quickly, in order to creating jobs and revenue for local governments, prices at both SHFE and LME may face a big drop. We will monitor these risks closely. Investment Strategy We probably will see increasing Chinese aluminum production in 2016Q4, which may induce price corrections in both LME and SHFE prices. We prefer to buy LME aluminum on weakness. We recommend buying the Mar/17 LME aluminum contract if it falls to $1,580/MT (current: $1,727/MT) (Chart 11). We expect the contract price to rise to $1,900/MT over next three to five months. If the order gets filled, we suggest putting a stop-loss level at $1,500/MT. Ellen JingYuan He, Editor/Strategist ellenj@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report for an extended discussion of increasing Asian and Middle Eastern refining capacity "KSA, China, India Ramping Oil Product Exports," dated July 28, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 We will be exploring inter-American crude and product flows - and the potential for expanding this trade - in future research. 3 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report p. 6 of the earlier-referenced "KSA, China, India Ramping Oil Product Exports," dated July 28, 2016, available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4 LME denotes London Metals Exchange and SHFE denotes Shanghai Futures Exchange. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Closed Trades