Sectors

Up In The Air Up In The Air Overweight The recent carnage in oil markets has breathed a huge sigh of relief into the S&P airlines index (most of which do not hedge fuels costs) as the collapse in WTI crude oil prices has also taken down kerosene prices. As we noted in our early-summer report when we added an upgrade alert to this sector, a letup in jet fuel prices would be the catalyst for a change in view1; we executed this upgrade in Monday's Weekly Report. The second panel of our chart shows that input cost relief will be a key driver of a rebound in relative airline profits in the coming months. However, not only will airlines get a boost from falling jet fuel prices, but also demand for travel remains upbeat. Consumer confidence is sky high and consumer spending is running at a healthy clip, at a time when job certainty is high and wage inflation is making a comeback (third and bottom panels). Adding it up, it no longer pays to be bearish airlines. Firming pricing power on the back of recovering demand coupled with input cost deflation suggest that an earnings led recovery in the S&P airlines index is in order. Bottom Line: We crystallized gains of 18% since inception and lifted exposure to an above benchmark allocation on Monday, please see our Weekly Report for more details. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5AIRL - DAL, LUV, UAL, AAL and ALK. ​​​​ 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Insight Report, "Could Jet Fuel Be The Tailwind Airlines Need?" dated June 6, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.

Highlights U.S. housing's immediate past will not repeat, ... : It is understandable that investors who lived through the financial crisis are acutely sensitive to any sign of trouble in housing, but none of the factors that helped precipitate the crisis are in place now. ... and its older history will only rhyme: Home construction slowdowns have a good record of signaling recessions, but residential investment's steadily waning share of GDP has chipped away at its influence. The current housing soft patch is not over, but it's unlikely to get much worse, ... : The rapid rise in mortgage rates sharply reduced affordability, but it still remains at a very comfortable level relative to history. Inventories of new and existing homes are very low, and the pace of new construction continues to run slightly behind household formation. Most importantly for the expansion, there were no construction excesses in this cycle that need to be worked off. ... so we don't think it's sending any broader signal about the economy: A tiny contraction in residential investment is not a harbinger of recession, nor is it an indication that monetary policy is already tight. Feature Desynchronization has been the name of the game in 2018. The U.S. economy, already ahead of its peers in putting the crisis in its rear-view mirror, has gotten an additional fillip from the fiscal stimulus package. Global growth, on the other hand, has been slipping. As Fed chair Jay Powell put it last week, the rest of the world is "gradual[ly] chipping away" at the U.S., but there "is not a terrible slowdown" in the global ex-U.S. economy. Global conditions have not slowed enough to get the Fed to interrupt its tightening campaign, but signs of softness outside of the U.S.'s borders have been popping up like mushrooms after the rain. With disappointments having been few and far between in the U.S., any pockets of weakness that do appear attract immediate attention. Against this backdrop, the slowing in housing - residential investment has now contracted for three consecutive quarters - is making some investors a little uneasy. We have spent a good deal of time within BCA debating housing's recent softness, its outlook, and its implications for financial assets and the economy, and clients are increasingly inquiring about our views. Housing's Recent Past Housing is top of mind for many investors because it was at the center of the financial crisis. Residential mortgages were ground zero of the credit bubble that systemically threatened the banking system. Wobbles in housing bring back unpleasant memories of the searing trauma that unfolded just ten years ago. With the dot-com mania and the financial crisis having occurred just a decade apart, the financial media, and many strategists, analysts and investors are on high alert for the next crash. The concerns are understandable, but conditions today are nearly the polar opposite of conditions in 2005 and 2006. There is nothing even remotely bubble-like about the current housing market. The critical weakness back then was the shunning of time-tested underwriting standards, as revealed by the homeownership rate. An average of just over 64% of households owned their own homes for the first three decades of the ownership series in a remarkably steady pattern,1 but a steady debauching of standards pushed the rate to above 69% at its peak (Chart 1, top panel). Chart 1Too-Easy Lending Standards ... Too-Easy Lending Standards ... Too-Easy Lending Standards ... The homeownership rate was built on a foundation of increasingly unserviceable mortgages (Chart 1, bottom panel). Prices surged (Chart 2, top panel), flippers flooded the market, and homebuilders ramped up production to meet the ensuing demand (Chart 2, second panel). When the music stopped, the housing market was left with unprecedentedly large inventories of unsold homes (Chart 2, third panel); the banking system's primary source of collateral was poised to suffer a body blow; and a hiring surge that played out over a decade and a half was unwound in just two years (Chart 2, bottom panel). Chart 2... Made Housing Unstable ... Made Housing Unstable ... Made Housing Unstable Housing In The Current Cycle Current conditions are much more stable. The homeownership rate is back to its time-tested levels. New housing supply has generally undershot the smoothed trend in household formations ever since the crisis ended (Chart 3, top panel). Inventories are strikingly low when adjusted for the overall size of the housing stock (Chart 3, middle panel). The vacancy rate is low (Chart 3, bottom panel), and there is no construction employment cliff. Most importantly from a stability perspective, the Basel III/Dodd-Frank regulatory framework makes it very difficult to replicate the reckless credit conditions that enabled the housing bubble. This cycle has been devoid of housing excesses. Chart 3Plenty Of Room For More Homes Plenty Of Room For More Homes Plenty Of Room For More Homes A broader historical context reveals that housing has been exerting steadily less influence on the economy across the entire postwar era. We have a good deal of sympathy for the argument that the postwar business cycle has been a consumption cycle, largely led by housing,2 but it's possible that the crisis marked housing's last hurrah as a driver of recessions. Residential investment's share of GDP exploded when pent-up demand was released upon the return of servicemen and women needing homes for their burgeoning families (Chart 4). The construction of the interstate system, and the network of subsidiary roads that sprang up to connect to it, facilitated the creation of the suburbs, and Levittown-style tract housing communities had to be built from scratch to meet the demand. Chart 4The Incredible Shrinking Impact Of Housing Activity The Incredible Shrinking Impact Of Housing Activity The Incredible Shrinking Impact Of Housing Activity The baby boom kept demand for more, and larger, houses going strong. Once grown themselves, the baby boomers helped keep household formation growth flush. The baby boomers are now net sellers, however, and will be at an increasing rate across the next couple of decades. The time trend of residential investment's share of GDP is stark, and demographics are poised to keep it going as long as the baby boomers are divesting their holdings. The bottom line is that we do not think housing is the business cycle this time around. It is a highly cyclical part of the economy, and its fluctuations will still be felt, but its influence on the overall economy has been steadily waning for 70 years, and it is not currently in a position to exert a powerful drag. It would be overstating matters to say that housing booms cause recessions, but they've been observed at the scene of the crime in every recession of the last 60 years except for the dot-com bust. In this cycle, the barely visible white area above the trend line in Chart 4 is nowhere near large enough to give rise to a big swing below the trend line, and inspire a patch of gray shading on its own. The ratio of housing starts to the existing stock of homes (Chart 5) reinforces the message of residential investment's declining contribution to overall output. The United States has been augmenting and/or replacing the existing stock of homes at a steadily diminishing rate for 60 years. Assuming that the rate of obsolescence has remained roughly constant, it seems that there has simply been less to build once the suburban frontier was settled. Even against the declining time trend, however, residential construction activity in this cycle has not revived enough to require a correction. Chart 5Tinkering Around The Edges Tinkering Around The Edges Tinkering Around The Edges We attribute the current softness to the backup in mortgage rates over the last twelve months. 100 basis points may not seem like the end of the world, but the rise in interest rates has been sudden, and it is entirely plausible to think that it has sent some marginal first-time buyers to the sidelines. The Housing Affordability Index is way below its 2013 peak, but remains quite high relative to its pre-ZIRP history (Chart 6, top panel). The sudden drop in the index has been a function of mortgage payments (Chart 6, second panel) as sudden moves almost always are - the median home price (Chart 6, third panel) and the median income series (Chart 6, bottom panel) are much less variable. Chart 6Mortgage Rates Drive Affordability Mortgage Rates Drive Affordability Mortgage Rates Drive Affordability We expect that rates will go still higher, but our bond strategists don't think it will happen any time soon. They see rates consolidating for a while as the economy digests the sharp move higher, and favorable year-over-year comparisons cool off inflation's upward momentum over the coming months. Our above-consensus view on the terminal fed funds rate is not housing friendly. Housing will have to contend with ongoing bond-market headwinds, but we don't expect another move of this magnitude will recur in such a concentrated time frame. Bottom Line: Housing may face a headwind from higher rates for at least another year, but a big drop-off in activity is not in the cards. There are no current cycle excesses that need to be unwound, and housing has become too small a part of the economy to induce a recession on its own. Housing Demand And The Fed Funds Rate Cycle The notion that mortgage rates are to blame for the housing soft patch raises some questions about our assessment of the monetary policy backdrop. Is it possible that a funds rate that's proximally related to a slowdown in housing demand is not impacting consumer demand for other goods or services, or corporate demand? Could there be multiple equilibrium fed funds rates? If not, is the housing soft patch a sign that the economy is actually in Phase II of the cycle, and not Phase I? We are unperturbed by the three-quarter contraction in residential investment, which one has to squint to see (Chart 7). We do not believe that housing demand has reached an inflection point; we simply think that prospective monthly mortgage payments have moved so fast that some buyers have temporarily stepped aside. Given that buying a home still looks quite inviting by the historical standards of the affordability index, conditions are not yet restrictive. Ex-the ZIRP era, the index had not exceeded 140 for more than three decades (Chart 6, top panel). If homes are still affordable relative to history, then housing would seem to support our equilibrium fed funds rate model's assessment that monetary policy remains accommodative. Chart 7Not Much Of A Downturn Yet Not Much Of A Downturn Yet Not Much Of A Downturn Yet We view the state of policy as binary for the economy as a whole, even if some activity is necessarily more rate-sensitive. While some marginal investment projects cease to generate positive prospective net present value any time interest rates rise, encouraging or discouraging activity is a universal condition. The broader investment-relevant question is whether or not our assessment that the fed funds rate cycle has not yet transited from Phase I to Phase II is correct (Chart 8). If the economy is still in Phase I, and will remain there for a year, our constructive take on the economy and financial markets still applies. If it's shifted to Phase II, however, the empirical record says investors should be paring back risk. Chart 8The Fed Funds Rate Cycle Housing: Past, Present And (Near) Future Housing: Past, Present And (Near) Future The preponderance of evidence supports the idea that we remain in Phase I. Real-time measures of activity remain robust. Credit performance remains very good, so banks are still eager lenders. Employment is surging, and a follow-up dose of fiscal stimulus in 2019 should keep all the plates spinning for another year. As macro investors, and students of cycles, we are as eager as anyone to recognize the inflection point as swiftly as possible, but the data series we follow do not indicate that it is approaching. We continue to abide by our equilibrium fed funds rate model's benign conclusion. Investment Implications Although housing's direct impact on GDP has steadily waned, it remains an important part of the economy, given how it feeds into several other elements of consumer demand. Three consecutive quarters of contraction in residential investment are worthy of notice, but such a run has occurred before without provoking a recession, and the contraction to date has been awfully modest in any event. We do not view the slowdown as the beginning of the end for the expansion. We also do not view it as a sign that monetary policy is tighter than we originally judged. We expect that the ongoing surprise over the rest of this cycle will be that the neutral fed funds rate is considerably higher than the market consensus expects. We therefore think that investors should continue to maintain benchmark exposure to risk assets while remaining underweight Treasuries and holding all bond exposure below benchmark duration. Since we think the expansion remains in place, supported by accommodative monetary policy, we view the recurring mini-scares provoked by data points like housing's soft patch as potential opportunities to put our cash overweight to work. Doug Peta, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy dougp@bcaresearch.com 1 Over the 120 quarters through the end of 1994, a mean 64.3% of households owned a home, with a standard deviation of 0.6%. Only 22% of the quarterly observations were more than a standard deviation away from the mean, as opposed to the 32% predicted by the normal distribution. 2 Leamer, Edward E., "Housing IS the Business Cycle," NBER Working Paper No. 13428, September 2007. http://www.nber.org/papers/w13428

Dear Client, Next week on November 26th instead of our regular weekly publication you will receive our flagship publication “The Bank Credit Analyst” with our annual investment outlook. Our regular publication service will resume on December 3rd with our high-conviction trades for 2019. Kind regards, Anastasios Avgeriou Highlights Portfolio Strategy We maintain our sanguine U.S. equity market view for the coming 9-12 months and reiterate our conviction that it is a good time to deploy longer-term oriented capital. The signal from our Economic Impulse Indicator represents a yellow flag and we will continue to monitor the economy for additional soft-patch signals, especially as the Fed remains committed to tighten monetary policy three more times by mid-2019. Firming pricing power on the back of recovering demand coupled with input cost deflation suggest that an earnings led recovery in the S&P airlines index is in order. Take profits and boost to an overweight stance today. Burgeoning domestic demand for freight services, healthy industry operating metrics, the recent margin boost owing to the crude oil price collapse along with compelling valuations and technicals, suggest that the path of least resistance is higher for the S&P air freight & logistics group. Recent Changes Book gains in the S&P Airlines index of 18% since inception and lift from below benchmark to overweight today. Table 1 Manic Market Manic Market FEATURE The SPX was rudderless last week, as the tug-of-war between bears and bulls has yet to be decided. Equities have been experiencing mini-aftershocks following October's seismic move because the Fed has injected some volatility back into the markets via raising interest rates and allowing bonds to roll off its balance sheet at an accelerating pace. While the Fed stayed pat in November, it will most definitely tighten monetary policy next month for the ninth time this cycle. Fed policy is at the epicenter of recent S&P 500 oscillations, which raises the question: is the Fed tightening monetary policy too far too fast to cause equity market consternation? To put the latest monetary tightening cycle in perspective, we examined trough-to-peak moves in the fed funds rate since the 1950s. Chart 1 shows the results of our analysis. During the past ten Fed tightening cycles, the median trough-to-peak delta in the fed funds rate heading into recession has been 495bps. The latest cycle that commenced in December 2015 is already 25bps above the median, if one uses the Wu-Xia shadow fed funds rate to capture the full quantitative easing effect (Chart 2). Were the Fed to hike three more times by the first half of 2019, as our fixed income strategists expect, this will push the current cycle 100bps above the historical median. Chart 1Too Far Too Fast? Too Far Too Fast? Too Far Too Fast? Chart 2Trough-To-Peak Tightening Cycle Already Above Historical Median Manic Market Manic Market While almost everyone raves about the stellar U.S. economic performance squarely focused on levels of different economic indicators (Chart 3), drilling beneath the surface reveals that small cracks are forming, as we first highlighted in the October 22nd Weekly Report when we introduced our Economic Impulse Indicator (EII).1 The EII is a second derivate equally-weighted composite of six indicators of the U.S. economy, highlighting that peak economy was likely hit this year in Q2, when nominal GDP grew 7.6% on a quarter-over-quarter annualized growth rate basis. Chart 3Do Not Focus On Levels Alone... Do Not Focus On Levels Alone… Do Not Focus On Levels Alone… Chart 4 shows that 5 out of the 6 indicators included in the EII are losing steam, 4 out of 6 are in outright contraction, and only capex is showing modest signs of life. While this backdrop in isolation does not portend recession, were the Fed to go ahead with three additional hikes by mid-year 2019 that would push the fed funds rate to a range of 2.75%-3% and a possible negative Q2/2019 GDP print could then easily invert the yield curve, ticking the box in one of our three recession indicators we track.2 Chart 4...Impulses Tell A Different Story …Impulses Tell A Different Story …Impulses Tell A Different Story The latest Fed Senior Loan Officer survey released last week also struck a nerve. While bankers are willing extenders of credit throughout most loan categories, demand for loans is declining across the board (Chart 5A); only other consumer (likely student) loans are in high demand, and subprime residential loans are also threatening to break above the zero line.3 Nevertheless, before getting too bearish, a bond valuation examination is in order. BCA's 10-year bond valuation index has been an excellent predictor of cycle ends dating back to the 1960s. It has accurately forecast 6 out of the last 7 recessions missing only the 1974 iteration. When this valuation metric swings to extremely undervalued territory - defined as at least one standard deviation above the historical mean - it signals that a recession is approaching. Why? Typically a selloff in the bond market is associated with a fed tightening cycle and such steep monetary tightening slams the breaks on the economy via the slowing housing market and the dent in consumer spending power. True, we are closing in on this level, but we are not there yet (Chart 5B). Chart 5ALoan Demand In Freefall Loan Demand In Freefall Loan Demand In Freefall Chart 5BWatch Bond Valuations Watch Bond Valuations Watch Bond Valuations Finally, we bought the proverbial dip on October 26th as we did not (and still do not) foresee recession in the coming 9-12 months, underscoring that likely the trough is in place.4 On that front the Minneapolis Fed's implied probability of a 20%+ correction remains tame near the 10% probability mark, corroborating our sense that the worst is behind the equity market, at least for now (Chart 6). Chart 6Risk Of A Bear Market Is Low Risk Of A Bear Market Is Low Risk Of A Bear Market Is Low Netting it all out, we maintain our sanguine equity market view for the coming 9-12 months and reiterate our conviction that it is a good time to deploy longer-term oriented capital. The signal from our EII represents a yellow flag and we will continue to monitor the economy for additional soft-patch signals especially as the Fed remains committed to tighten monetary policy three more times by mid-2019. This week we crystalize gains in the smallest transportation sub-index we cover and boost exposure to overweight, and reiterate our high-conviction overweight stance on a large transportation sub-index. Airlines: Up In The Air Within transports we have been advocating a barbell portfolio preferring air freight & logistics (see below for an update) to airlines (as a reminder we recently downgraded rails to neutral5). The recent carnage in oil markets has breathed a huge sigh of relief into the S&P airlines index (most of which do not hedge fuels costs) as the collapse in WTI crude oil prices has also taken down kerosene prices. Chart 7 shows that input cost relief will be a key driver of a rebound in relative airline profits in the coming months. Thus, we are compelled to trigger our upgrade alert and cement gains of 18% in our underweight and lift exposure to overweight in the niche S&P airlines index. Chart 7Energy Price Plunge Is Bullish For Airline EPS Energy Price Plunge Is Bullish For Airline EPS Energy Price Plunge Is Bullish For Airline EPS Not only will airlines get a boost from falling jet fuel prices, but also demand for travel remains upbeat. Consumer confidence is sky high and consumer spending is running at a healthy clip, at a time when job certainty is high and wage inflation is making a comeback (Chart 8). Chart 8Air Travel Demand... Air Travel Demand… Air Travel Demand… In fact, a larger proportion of the consumer's wallet is used for air travel, a trend that has been recently gaining steam according to national accounts. Airline load factors are pushing cyclical highs and passenger revenue per available seat mile is also gaining momentum, corroborating the U.S. government consumption expenditure data (Chart 9). Chart 9...Is Upbeat... …Is Upbeat… …Is Upbeat… As a result, airlines have been successful at raising selling prices and will soon exit the deflationary zone. International airfares are also in positive territory. Taken together, robust demand and higher selling prices along with declining fuel costs are a harbinger of rising margins and profits (Chart 10). Chart 10Firming Ticket Prices Is A Boon To Margins Firming Ticket Prices Is A Boon To Margins Firming Ticket Prices Is A Boon To Margins This is not yet reflected in depressed relative forward sales and profit growth estimates. Net earnings revisions have also recovered to the zero line and there is scope for additional positive EPS revisions, especially if jet fuel prices stay tamed and travel demand remains healthy. The implication is that relative share price momentum can lift off further (Chart 11). Chart 11Low Hurdle Low Hurdle Low Hurdle Finally, valuations are perched deeply in the undervalued zone while technicals have only recently returned to a neutral setting (Chart 12). Chart 12Unloved and Under-owned Unloved and Under-owned Unloved and Under-owned Adding it up, it no longer pays to be bearish airlines. Firming pricing power on the back of recovering demand coupled with input cost deflation suggest that an earnings led recovery in the S&P airlines index is in order. Bottom Line: Take profits in the S&P airlines index of 18% since inception and lift exposure to an above benchmark allocation. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5AIRL - DAL, LUV, UAL, AAL and ALK. Air Freight & Logistics: We Have Liftoff Air freight & logistics stocks have been bouncing along the bottom for the better part of the past year and have formed a base that should serve as a launch board higher in the coming months. Firming industry operating metrics tell a positive story and suggest that relative share prices will soon take off. Air freight pricing power has been healthy, in expansionary territory and above overall inflation measures, at a time when industry executives have been showing labor restraint, with employment growth decelerating steadily over the past two years (Chart 13). This is a conducive backdrop for air freight profit margins and sell-side analysts have taken notice, penciling in higher margins in the coming 12 months. Chart 13Enticing Margin Prospects Enticing Margin Prospects Enticing Margin Prospects Importantly, energy costs comprise a large chunk of freight services input costs and the recent drubbing in oil markets will boost margins especially on the eve of the busiest season for courier delivery services (top panel, Chart 14). Chart 14Holiday Selling Season Beneficiary Holiday Selling Season Beneficiary Holiday Selling Season Beneficiary On that front, there are high odds that this holiday sales season will be another record setting one, especially given that corporations have paid out bonuses and shared part of the lowering in corporate taxes and also wage inflation is underpinning discretionary incomes. Keep in mind that the accelerating domestic manufacturing shipments-to-inventories ratio confirms that demand for hauling services is upbeat. The implication is that rising demand for freight services will buoy industry profits and lift valuations out of their recent funk (middle & bottom panels, Chart 14). With regard to the global macro and trade backdrop, while global revenue ton miles and G3 capital goods orders remain near cyclical highs (Chart 15), were Trump's trade rhetoric to re-escalate then global exports would give way. Already international and U.S. export expectations are on the verge of contracting - according to the IFO World Economic Survey and ISM manufacturing survey, respectively. Tack on the appreciating U.S. currency and the clouds darken further (bottom panel, Chart 15). The U.S./China trade tussle and the greenback are clear risks to our sanguine S&P air freight & logistics transportation subindex. Chart 15Greenback And Decelerating Global Growth Are Key Risks... Greenback And Decelerating Global Growth Are Key Risks… Greenback And Decelerating Global Growth Are Key Risks… Nevertheless, most of the grim news is already reflected in depressed relative forward profit estimates, bombed out valuations and washed out technicals. In sum, firming domestic demand for freight services, healthy industry operating metrics, the recent margin boost owing to the crude oil price collapse along with compelling valuations and technicals suggest that the path of least resistance is higher for the S&P air freight & logistics group (Chart 16). Chart 16...But Already Reflected In Depressed Valuations And Washed Out Technicals …But Already Reflected In Depressed Valuations And Washed Out Technicals …But Already Reflected In Depressed Valuations And Washed Out Technicals Bottom Line: We reiterate our high-conviction overweight status in the S&P air freight & logistics index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5AIRF - FDX, UPS, EXPD and CHRW. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Report, "Icarus Moment?" dated October 22, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Ibid. 3 https://www.federalreserve.gov/data/documents/sloos-201810-charts.pdf 4 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Insight Report, “Time To Bargain Hunt” dated October 26, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Report, "Critical Reset" dated October 29, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps

Underweight In early-2018, some green shoots appeared for telecom services that an end was in sight for the nearly two years of pricing deflation hitting industry profits as some year-on-year pricing gains were eked out. However, as shown in the second panel of the chart, those year-on-year gains have petered out and, in fact, pricing is in deflation again on a three-month rate of change basis. At the same time, industry wages have fully reversed their declines and have accelerated for the past year (third panel). The combination implies increasing margin pressure, which is reflected in sell-side earnings growth estimates continuing to underperform the broad market (bottom panel). Tack on the tight inverse correlation between the high dividend yielding telecom services stocks and the 10-year yield, paired with BCA's expectation for rising yields, and the ingredients are all in place to remain bearish; stay underweight the S&P telecom services index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5TELSX - T, VZ, CTL. Pricing Power Weighs On Telcos Pricing Power Weighs On Telcos

Overweight General Electric, the former heavyweight of the S&P industrial conglomerates index, found some reprieve Tuesday on the news that they had agreed to divest part of their investment in Baker Hughes as part of an overall asset sale effort to shore up the company's weak balance sheet. Credit crunch fears had been weighing heavily on the stock in the week prior, taking the industrial conglomerates index down, despite strength from the other constituent members (top panel). We have previously focused heavily on GE with respect to our positioning on the S&P industrial conglomerates index. However, as shown in the second and third panels of the chart, such focus is no longer warranted as the stock represents a very much diminished share of both the S&P industrial conglomerates index and the greater S&P industrials index. We recently upgraded the S&P industrial conglomerates index to overweight on the basis that valuations had become enticing as most of the GE negativity had been priced in (bottom panel). Tack on GE's vastly lower share of the S&P industrial conglomerates index and the discounted valuation is even more compelling; we reiterate our overweight recommendation. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5INDCX - GE, MMM, HON, ROP. Breaking Up Is Hard To Do Breaking Up Is Hard To Do

Highlights Bond yields have trapped equities, and equities have trapped bond yields. The double-digit investment opportunities are within asset-classes. From a tactical perspective: Banks will outperform the broad market. EM will outperform DM. The Eurostoxx50 will briefly outperform the S&P500. Raw industrial commodities will outperform crude oil. Feature What has been the biggest driver of financial markets this year? Trade wars and the emerging market slowdown? The budget spat between Italy and the EU Commission? The U.S. mid-term elections? Or perhaps, central bank policy normalization? These are all sensible answers, and each one has generated endless output of commentary and analysis. But none of these tells the biggest story of 2018. Chart of the WeekIn 2018, Bond Yields Have Trapped Equities, And Equities Have Trapped Bond Yields In 2018, Bond Yields Have Trapped Equities, And Equities Have Trapped Bond Yields In 2018, Bond Yields Have Trapped Equities, And Equities Have Trapped Bond Yields The Biggest Story Is Not Economics Or Politics... It Is Mathematics This year, the two largest five-day plunges in the global stock market - 6 percent in February and 7 percent in mid-October - resulted directly from the two largest five-day spikes in the global bond yield (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). This simple observation reveals the biggest story in the financial markets this year: the hypersensitivity of the stock market to rising bond yields, and especially when the global 10-year yield approaches 2 percent - or equivalently 'the rule of 4': when the sum of the 10-year U.S. T-bond, German bund and Japanese government bond approaches 4 percent (Chart of the Week).1 Chart I-2Equities Plunged In February After A Spike In Bond Yields Equities Plunged In February After A Spike In Bond Yields Equities Plunged In February After A Spike In Bond Yields Chart I-3Equities Plunged In October After A Spike In Bond Yields Equities Plunged In October After A Spike In Bond Yields Equities Plunged In October After A Spike In Bond Yields With the global stock market now flat year-to-date, it follows that excluding these two five-day plunges, global equities would be comfortably higher even with the emerging market slowdown, trade war quarrels, and political spats. Meaning that this year's market action is not explained by economics or by politics. It is explained by mathematics, and specifically the great misunderstanding of investment risk. Previous reports have focused on this great misunderstanding, most recently Risk: The Great Misunderstanding Of Finance, to which we refer our readers. Here, we will just summarize:2 An investment's risk depends on the negative asymmetry of its short-term returns. At very low bond yields, bond returns develop the same negative asymmetry as equity returns. This means that equities lose their excess riskiness versus bonds, requiring equity valuations to experience a phase transition sharply higher. But when bond yields normalize, equities regain their excess riskiness versus bonds - and their valuations must suffer a phase transition sharply lower. This phase transition to sharply lower equity valuations is most pronounced when the global 10-year bond yield rises to 2 percent. This dynamic has proved to be the biggest driver of financial markets in 2018, and is likely to be the biggest driver in 2019 too. Essentially, higher bond yields can suddenly and viciously undermine the valuation support of equities, limiting the upside in the stock market (Chart I-4). In turn, a plunge in the stock market and other risk-assets threatens a disinflationary impulse, limiting the sustainable upside in bond yields. Chart I-4Equities Remain Richly Valued Equities Remain Richly Valued Equities Remain Richly Valued In effect, bond yields have trapped equities, and equities have trapped bond yields (Chart I-5). The result is that in 2018 the global asset-classes: equities, bonds, commodities, and cash have all ended up going nowhere. Indeed, the global 30-year bond yield has been trapped since early 2017!3 Chart I-5The Global 30-Year Bond Yield Has Been Trapped For Two Years The Global 30-Year Bond Yield Has Been Trapped For Two Years The Global 30-Year Bond Yield Has Been Trapped For Two Years The Double-Digit Investment Opportunities Are Within Asset-Classes Although the global asset-classes have ended up going nowhere this year (Chart I-6), 2018 has still provided double-digit investment opportunities. But to find these double-digit opportunities, you have to look below the main asset allocation decision to within the asset-classes, in sector, region and country allocation. Chart I-6In 2018, Global Asset-Classes Have Ended Up Going Nowhere In 2018, Global Asset-Classes Have Ended Up Going Nowhere In 2018, Global Asset-Classes Have Ended Up Going Nowhere For example, until very recently: banks had underperformed the broad equity market by 10 percent globally and 25 percent in Europe; emerging market equities had underperformed developed market equities by 15 percent; the Eurostoxx50 had underperformed the S&P500 by 13 percent; and raw industrial commodities had underperformed crude oil by 30 percent. But in the last month or so, these strong trends have exhausted and even started to reverse: banks have started to outperform the market; the Eurostoxx50 has eked ahead of the S&P500; emerging market equities have retraced versus developed market equities; and raw industrial commodities have made up much lost ground on crude oil (Charts I-7 - Chart I-10). One important reason is that the sharp down-oscillation in global credit growth which was responsible for many of this year's intra asset-class trends has now clearly rebounded into an up-oscillation. Chart I-7Banks Have Started To Outperform Banks Have Started To Outperform Banks Have Started To Outperform Chart I-8The Eurostoxx50 Is Starting To Outperform The S&P500 The Eurostoxx50 Is Starting To Outperform The S&P500 The Eurostoxx50 Is Starting To Outperform The S&P500 Chart I-9EM Has Started To Outperform DM EM Has Started To Outperform DM EM Has Started To Outperform DM Chart I-10Industrial Commodities Are Starting To Outperform Crude Oil Industrial Commodities Are Starting To Outperform Crude Oil Industrial Commodities Are Starting To Outperform Crude Oil Hence, we expect these trend reversals to continue in the coming months. From a tactical perspective only, this means: 1. Banks will outperform the broad market. 2. EM will outperform DM. 3. The Eurostoxx50 will briefly outperform the S&P500. 4. Raw industrial commodities will outperform crude oil. Such an inflection point can leave investors scratching their heads in confusion, because sector performances seem to conflict with the economic data releases. But the conflict is easily resolved. Though we are now in mid-November, the economic data releases - for example, German exports - are a lagging indicator, referring to a time in the past, September, when global credit growth might still have been in a down-oscillation. Whereas the financial markets - for example, bank equities' relative performance - are a contemporaneous indicator, sensing credit growth's switch to an up-oscillation in real-time. Always remember that market prices move on the marginal change in information and expectations. To be absolutely clear, we are not referring to the business cycle. We are referring to predictable oscillations in credit growth that occur within the business cycle, but which nevertheless create double-digit investment opportunities - such as bank equities' relative performance. The Importance Of 6-Month Credit Growth Still, several clients have asked about our choice of 6-month credit growth, as it appears to be an arbitrary period plucked out of thin air or, more cynically, 'data-mined'. In fact, our choice of 6-month growth has a rock-solid foundation in economic theory.4 For any item, if supply lags demand by a period t, then economic theory proves that both the quantity of the item and its price will experience oscillations with half-cycle length t. Clearly, bank credit is such an item whose supply does lag demand. For example, a mortgage is only allocated and released after a time-consuming process of checking collateral and creditworthiness. For bank credit in aggregate, the lag between demand and supply, and specifically final spending of the funds, averages six to eight months. Once you accept this fundamental truth, it follows that credit growth must also experience oscillations whose half-cycles last six to eight months. So we end with a very important investment lesson. If you only look at the conventionally examined year-on-year credit growth data, you will not see the predictable oscillations in 6-month credit growth. And if you do not look at 6-month credit growth, you will miss the double-digit investment opportunities that are always on offer (Chart I-11). Chart I-11A Sharp Down-Oscillation In Global Credit Growth Has Rebounded Into An Up-Oscillation A Sharp Down-Oscillation In Global Credit Growth Has Rebounded Into An Up-Oscillation A Sharp Down-Oscillation In Global Credit Growth Has Rebounded Into An Up-Oscillation The choice is yours. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 We use the MSCI All Country World Index in local currency terms to capture the global stock market. 2 Negative asymmetry of returns means the possibility of larger short-term losses than short-term gains. Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Risk: The Great Misunderstanding Of Finance", October 25, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Trapped: Have Equities Trapped Bonds?", September 13, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report, "The Cobweb Theory And Market Cycles", January 11, 2018 available at eis.bcaresearch.com. Fractal Trading Model* Palladium has outperformed nickel by 50% in the past three months, but this strong trend is nearing exhaustion according to its 65-day fractal dimension. Hence, this week's trade recommendation is long nickel/short palladium setting a profit target of 14% with a symmetrical stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-12 Long Platinum / Short Nickel Long Platinum / Short Nickel The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Asset Allocation Equity Regional and Country Allocation Equity Sector Allocation Bond and Interest Rate Allocation Currency and Other Allocation Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Highlights Chinese pro-consumption policy stimulus will likely stabilize Chinese household consumption growth at 8-10% over the next 12-15 months, with service consumption continuing to be the key driver. Our research shows that Chinese nominal retail sales of consumer goods are currently growing at only 3-4%, significantly lower than the 9-10% pace that the Chinese government has reported, and that the market has commonly quoted. We expect it to rebound moderately to 4-6% in 2019 on the government's pro-consumption stimulus. The services sector including healthcare, education, travel, entertainment, sports, high-tech, daycare for kids, nursing homes for the elderly, and so on will likely experience strong growth. In the consumer discretionary space, car sales will also likely rebound as the country may soon release stimulus measures supporting the auto industry. For now, we advise overweighting consumer discretionary stocks versus the benchmark. We also recommend going long consumer discretionary versus consumer staples. Feature The Chinese economy is in transition from investment- and export-led growth to consumer-led growth. With faltering investment growth and escalating China-U.S. trade tensions, the strength and durability of Chinese household consumption has become all the more important to the country's economic growth. To address increasing challenges facing the economy, the government over the past several months has released a slew of policies aimed at stimulating domestic consumption. Our focus in this week's report is to outline these policies and in turn gauge what the strength of Chinese household consumption will be over the next 12-15 months. In order to do this, some key questions need to be addressed, including: What is the current growth rate of household consumption? What pro-consumption policies have already been implemented, and what additional policies are likely on the way? How effective will stimulus be on Chinese household consumption this time around? One of our key findings is that Chinese nominal retail sales of consumer goods - a common proxy for Chinese household spending - is currently growing at only 3-4%, significantly lower than the 9-10% pace the Chinese government has reported, and that the market has commonly quoted (Chart 1). Chart Retail Sales Growth Measure: Which One Is Accurate? Retail Sales Growth Measure: Which One Is Accurate? Retail Sales Growth Measure: Which One Is Accurate? Another important finding is that recent pro-consumption policy stimulus will likely increase household income levels by 400-500 billion RMB. In addition, we expect more pro-consumption policies from the Chinese government later this year or early 2019 - i.e., cutting car sales taxes or giving out subsidies to encourage households' purchases of automobiles, especially in rural areas, and/or lowering the policy rate to spur spending by reducing households' borrowing costs. This will stabilize Chinese household consumption growth at 8-10% over the next 12-15 months, with service consumption continuing to be the key driver. Making Sense Of The Data According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) data, Chinese nominal household consumption accounted for about 40% of GDP last year, and grew 8.2% year-on-year (about 9-10% in 2015 and 2016). We estimate that currently about 65-70% of Chinese household consumption is consumer goods, with the remainder going to services. Goods consumption Chinese retail sales figures are probably the most-often-used among market participants as a proxy for Chinese household consumption, despite the fact that the data only provide a partial picture of Chinese household spending: spending on consumer goods. Based on the NBS's definition, Chinese total retail sales of consumer goods refer to the sum of retail sales of commodities sold to urban and rural households for household consumption, and to social institutions for public consumption for non-production purposes. Chinese total retail sales also include online goods sales but do not include online service sales. They also do not include many service sectors including education, medical care, travel, entertainment, eldercare and childcare. In short, while Chinese retail sales cannot represent the full picture of Chinese household consumption, they can indeed reveal the strength of Chinese household consumption on consumer goods. The most quoted retail sales growth data by the majority of market participants is from the NBS - a straight growth number that the bureau reported every month - which recently decelerated to 9% (the dotted line in Chart 1). The bureau does not give out information about how to calculate this growth data. The NBS also reports the level data of retail sales every month, from which the year-on-year growth actually plunged to 3.8% (the solid line in Chart 1). Which one is more accurate? All of the findings below suggest the validity of the growth estimates we calculated from the level of NBS retail sales. For major consuming discretionary goods like cars, washing machines, air conditioners, refrigerators and TVs, all products excluding TVs exhibited a sharp drop in sales volume growth this year (Chart 2). Chart 2Falling Sales Volume Nearly Across The Board From Discretionary Goods... Falling Sales Volume Nearly Across The Board From Discretionary Goods... Falling Sales Volume Nearly Across The Board From Discretionary Goods... Some major consumer staples such as dairy products, soft drinks and liquor - also experienced a sharp decline in sales-volume terms (Chart 3). Chart 3...To Major Consumer Staples ...To Major Consumer Staples ...To Major Consumer Staples The sub-categories of total nominal retail sales in value terms also showed a significant slowdown in terms of urban and rural, and in terms of commodity goods and catering (Chart 4). Chart 4Weakness In Retail Sales From Urban To Rural Weakness In Retail Sales From Urban To Rural Weakness In Retail Sales From Urban To Rural Meanwhile, 26 out of 31 provinces experienced retail sales growth slower than 6% for the first six months, with three provinces - Shandong, Jilin and Guizhou - in contraction. Why did Chinese retail sales experience such a significant drop this year? We believe it is because households' sentiment and willingness to consume has diminished considerably (Chart 5). Chart 5Falling Marginal Propensity To Consume Falling Marginal Propensity To Consume Falling Marginal Propensity To Consume The cracking down of peer-to-peer lending, falling stock prices and high mortgage payments this year have all reduced household wealth. Mortgage interest payments currently account for nearly 50% of the nation's household disposable income, higher than 45% a year ago.1 In addition, rising China-U.S. trade tensions have also increased uncertainty on future income growth and affected confidence. Service consumption If our estimate of Chinese retail sales growth can correctly capture the strength of consumer goods consumption, what data can be used to measure services consumption. Chart 6 can at least provide some sense in gauging the strength of household service consumption, as tourism, medical services and entertainment services (i.e., movie box office receipts) are all major household service consumption components. In the meantime, online services sales can also somewhat reflect the overall strength of Chinese household services consumption. Chart 6Services Consumption Still Growing At A Double Digit Pace Services Consumption Still Growing At A Double Digit Pace Services Consumption Still Growing At A Double Digit Pace Chart 6 clearly shows that despite the growth deceleration, nominal services consumption growth is currently still quite strong - in the range of 10-15% - considerably higher than the 3-4% growth in nominal consumer goods consumption. To gauge how Chinese nominal household consumption growth will be going forward, we need to assess the pro-consumption policies that have already been implemented. Consumption Stimulus A flurry of pro-consumption policies has been announced over the past several months, aiming at spurring consumer spending to support the country's underlying economic growth. Personal tax cuts and tax exemptions will increase households' ability to spend, while improvements in the quality of goods and services supplied and more availability of high-quality products will also encourage consumption. On October 21, China unveiled a new income tax law to boost consumption. The law increases the tax-free threshold from 3,000 RMB per month to 5,000 RMB per month and expands the lower tax brackets, effective October 1, 2018. It also adds new itemized tax deductions related to education, housing, eldercare, childcare and medical care, which will come into effect on January 1, 2019. Additional details of the new itemized deductions have so far not been released. The Ministry of Finance estimates that the tax changes will collectively lift household incomes by approximately 320 billion RMB. This is equivalent to about 1% of household consumption expenditures, or about 0.4% of GDP. Given that the total amount of personal income tax was 1.2 trillion RMB last year, the total tax deduction from the new income law and new itemized tax deductions should be much smaller than the amount of total personal income tax. Assuming 40-50% of the 1.2 trillion RMB personal tax will be deducted in 2019, this will be equal to about 500-600 billion RMB in household incomes (1.6-1.9% of household consumption expenditures, and about 0.6-0.7% of GDP). On September 20, the government released a policy guideline: "New measures to spur residential consumption." Two weeks later, on October 11, the government announced a "three-year (2018-2020) action plan to stimulate domestic consumption." The government's plan is geared to facilitating a virtuous cycle in which boosting consumption leads to supply innovation, and subsequently improvement in new consumption growth. According to the plan, the authority will widen the openness of seven key service sectors for private and / or overseas companies to enter in sectors such as tourism, culture, sports, healthcare, eldercare, home services and education/training. The country aims to develop rental markets, promote new-energy automobiles, support high-tech products (VR, robots, etc.), encourage green consumption and upgrade the quality of existing goods and services. Insufficient high-quality supply in these service sectors have in the past curbed consumption growth to some extent. By boosting the supply of high-quality services, the government expects to increase consumption in these sectors. Starting on July 1, China reduced import tariffs on 1449 imported items, resulting in a decline in average import tariffs from 15.7% to 6.9%. Starting on November 1, the government further lowered tariffs with most-favored nations on an additional 1585 items with the average tax rate falling from 10.5% to 7.8%. Clearly, there are two trends from these policies. First, the services sector including healthcare, education, travel, entertainment, sports, high-tech, childcare, eldercare, and so on will benefit most, as households in general have high demand for these services and are willing to spend more on these sectors (Chart 7). Chart 7Service Consumption Vs. Consumer Staples Consumption: Higher Growth Chinese Household Consumption: Full Steam Ahead? Chinese Household Consumption: Full Steam Ahead? For example, while China's aging population will have increasing demands for medical and eldercare service, the termination of the one-child policy will continue to boost demand for childcare and education services. Food and clothing accounts for about 35% of total Chinese household consumption expenditures (Chart 8), significantly higher than the 21% proportion in South Korea. Meanwhile, Chinese consumers spend 11% of their disposable income on education, culture and recreation, lower than the 17% figure in South Korea. Chart 8Chinese Household Consumption Structure Chinese Household Consumption: Full Steam Ahead? Chinese Household Consumption: Full Steam Ahead? Second, the supply of high-quality consumer goods and high-quality services will strongly increase in response to rising demand of wealthier Chinese consumers. This increase in supply will be met by both domestic production of goods and services and overseas imports. What additional policies could be implemented in the remainder of 2018 and 2019? The government may release more supportive policies to promote car sales - i.e., reducing the sales tax on cars with a capacity of 1.6L or lower, or providing subsidies on car purchases. They have implemented similar stimulus measures since 2008. If recent pro-consumption policies and supportive policies for the auto industry still cannot revive household consumption strongly enough, the authorities may cut the policy rate to spur additional spending. After knowing the probable scale of the pro-consumption stimulus, we can now put everything together to see what Chinese household consumption growth could be in 2019. How Strong Will Household Consumption Be? Structurally, we believe growth in Chinese household consumption is facing strong headwinds, including lower household income growth in real terms (inflation-adjusted) because of slowing productivity growth and rising household debt levels (Chart 9). Chart 9Structural Headwinds For Chinese Household Consumption Growth Structural Headwinds For Chinese Household Consumption Growth Structural Headwinds For Chinese Household Consumption Growth However, over the next 12-15 months, we still expect the government's pro-consumption policies to be able to stabilize domestic household consumption growth at 8-10%. We estimated in the first section that the new income law and itemized tax deduction policy will likely release about 500-600 billion RMB of income available for spending. The ratio of marginal propensity to consume gauges the proportion of one additional unit of disposable income spent on consumption. We estimated that the marginal propensity to consume for Chinese households is currently at about 50%. This will result in 250-300 billion RMB spending on household consumption, equaling about 0.7-0.8% of 2017 Chinese retail sales of consumer goods (36.6 trillion RMB), or 0.8-0.9% of household consumption expenditures. Autos will be another major potential driver of overall household consumption growth. China has stimulated the car industry by slashing the auto sales tax from 10% to 5% in 2009-2010 and again in 2015-2016. As a result, the volume of passenger car sales jumped 50% in 2009 and 15% in 2016, respectively (Chart 10). While car sales have dropped each time the stimulus measures have expired, a temporary growth rebound in auto sales in 2019 is still possible. Chart 10The Government May Stimulate The Auto Market Again The Government May Stimulate The Auto Market Again The Government May Stimulate The Auto Market Again As car sales volumes are currently in double-digit contraction, the Chinese government is likely to implement similar stimulus measures in late 2018 or early 2019. If so, Chinese car sales in volume terms may rebound by 5-10% in 2019. By the end of last year, the measure of urban households with cars was about 37.5 out of 100. There is still plenty of upside, with the rural areas having much bigger potential for car sales than urban areas. The value of Chinese auto sales was 4.2 trillion RMB last year. It increased 280 billion RMB in 2016 and 220 billion in 2017, but decreased 220 billion for the first nine months of this year. Assuming a 5% growth in the auto sales value next year because of the stimulus, it will be about 200 billion RMB increase, equivalent to 0.2% of 2017 GDP or 0.6% of household consumption expenditures. Although households have already taken out much more in the way of consumer loans for purchases of homes and other day-to-day expenses, with plenty of consumption-related stimulus policy in place, consumer loan growth will likely continue to grow in the double digits in 2019 (Chart 11). In September, household loans for short-term consumption (non-mortgage) grew at 28% year-on-year. Chart 11Consumer Loan Growth May Remain Strong In 2019 Consumer Loan Growth May Remain Strong In 2019 Consumer Loan Growth May Remain Strong In 2019 Chart 12 shows that the breakdown of household borrowing - medium- and long-term consumption loans (mostly mortgage loans) accounted for 60% of total household borrowing. Chart 12Most Of Consumption Loans Are Mortgage Chinese Household Consumption: Full Steam Ahead? Chinese Household Consumption: Full Steam Ahead? With the property market now slowing down and a gradual decline in the Chinese central bank's PSL lending,2 property sold has been decelerating (Chart 13). This may lead to less mortgage borrowing, leaving more loans available for short-term spending. Chart 13Household Borrowing In 2019: Less For Mortgage And More For Consumption? Household Borrowing In 2019: Less For Mortgage And More For Consumption? Household Borrowing In 2019: Less For Mortgage And More For Consumption? How different is this round of stimulus versus the previous two episodes? First, the strength of household consumption growth due to recent policy stimuli will be much weaker than the 2009-2010 and 2015-2016 episodes (Chart 14). Chart 14Stimulus Impact On Household Consumption Growth In 2019: Less Than Previous Episodes Stimulus Impact On Household Consumption Growth In 2019: Less Than Previous Episodes Stimulus Impact On Household Consumption Growth In 2019: Less Than Previous Episodes Home appliance markets like TVs, air conditioners, washing machines and refrigerators have already entered a mature phase. On average, as of the end of 2017 there were already 133 TVs, 100.3 air conditioners, 97.1 washing machines and 97.2 refrigerators for every 100 urban households (Chart 15, top panel). Even in rural areas, as of the end of last year there were 120 TVs, 52.6 air conditioners, 86.3 washing machines and 91.7 refrigerators for every 100 households, significantly higher than 2008 levels (Chart 15, bottom panel). Chart 15Home Appliance Markets: More Mature Than The Auto Market Chinese Household Consumption: Full Steam Ahead? Chinese Household Consumption: Full Steam Ahead? Second, this time the stimulus is focusing more on the services sector, while the previous two episodes were more on consumer goods. As result, this time the stimulus will have much less impact on commodities than the previous two episodes, in which major commodity goods sales and production experienced significant growth. Overall, China's pro-consumption policies will likely stabilize Chinese household consumption growth at 8-10% over the next 12-15 months, with services consumption remaining the key driver. We expect household service consumption to continue to grow at 10-15%, and retail sales growth to rebound to 4-6% from 3-4%. Investment Implications Chinese pro-consumption policy will likely benefit services and the automobile industry more than consumer staples. Meanwhile, commodity sectors may not benefit much. For now, we recommend overweighting the domestic consumer discretionary sector versus the Chinese CSI300 benchmark, a trade that we are initiating as of today (Chart 16, top panel). The sector's relative P/E and P/B valuations versus the benchmark also suggest its relative attractiveness (Chart 16, middle and bottom panels). Chart 16Overweight Consumer Discretionary Versus Benchmark Overweight Consumer Discretionary Versus Benchmark Overweight Consumer Discretionary Versus Benchmark China's pro-consumption stimulus also warrants the opposite position of what was one of our most successful trades over the past year (long investable staples / short investable discretionary), which we closed at the end of September for a profit of 48%.3 Within the domestic market, investors should go long consumer discretionary versus consumer staples, a trade that we are also initiating as of today (Chart 17). In addition to the cyclical tailwind from policy, relative valuation ratios suggest that the former is likely to outperform the later. Chart 17Go Long Consumer Discretionary Versus Consumer Staples Go Long Consumer Discretionary Versus Consumer Staples Go Long Consumer Discretionary Versus Consumer Staples Finally, our conclusion that policymakers are likely to succeed at stabilizing household consumption growth has implications beyond the relative performance of consumer stocks. Our outlook for a stable consumer over the coming year supports the argument that China will not push for a significant reacceleration in credit growth as a response to ongoing economic weakness, and argues in favor of our view that the "strike price" of the China put option has fallen. As we have noted in previous reports, we have no doubt that Chinese policymakers will eventually move to a maximum reflationary stance if they feel that the existing slowdown will lead to deep, threatening economic instability. But it will be impossible for investors and policymakers to make a judgement about the true odds of such an outcome without hard evidence of the magnitude of the tariff-induced export shock, which for now remains obscured by trade front-running (which may persist until the new year). This means that it is too soon to bottom fish deeply oversold Chinese financial assets (such as A-shares), and China-related plays more generally. Ellen JingYuan He, Associate Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy EllenJ@bcaresearch.com 1 Pease refer to Table 1 in the China Investment Strategy Special Reports "China's Property Market: Where Will It Go From Here? ", dated September 13, and Table 1 in the Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "China Real Estate: A Never-Bursting Bubble?", dated April 6, 2018, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 2 Pease see China Investment Strategy Special Report "China's Property Market: Where Will It Go From Here?", dated September 13, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Pease see China Investment Strategy Special Reports "GICS Sector Changes: The Implications For China", dated September 26, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Neutral When we downgraded the S&P home improvement retail index (HIR) to neutral in September, the core of our thesis was that fixed residential investment as a percentage of GDP appeared to have peaked, up 50% from trough to the recent highs, whereas relative HIR performance is up 170% in the same time frame (top and second panels).1 Such euphoria, both among investors and the sell side community (bottom panel), leaves the index prone to fall, should a disappointment occur. Yesterday's results from index giant Home Depot reinforce this point. The company exceeded earnings expectations and raised their guidance (albeit for only one quarter) and the stock still underperformed the market. Considering the cautious guidance from management on the housing market, cost pressures from tariffs and a much-reduced price of lumber, it is of little wonder the company failed to live up to expectations. Net, while we remain constructive on the overall housing market, we continue to think the positivity is fully baked in to the S&P HIR index; stay neutral. Clients seeking housing exposure should consider the compellingly valued S&P homebuilding index that we are overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOMI - HD, LOW. 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Indurated," dated September 24, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Expectations Still Too High For Home Improvement Retail Expectations Still Too High For Home Improvement Retail

Highlights Duration: The waning impact from fiscal stimulus and the drag from weak foreign economic activity will cause U.S. growth to slow as we enter 2019. But with market-implied rate hike expectations still depressed, we are inclined to maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration. Yield Curve: Over the course of the year the sweet spot on the Treasury curve has shifted from the 5-year/7-year maturity point to the 2-year. The 2-year note offers the best combination of risk and reward of any point on the Treasury curve. This is true in both absolute and duration-neutral terms. Spread Product: Investors looking for attractive alternatives to Treasury debt at the short-end of the curve should consider Agency CMBS and Local Authority debt. Those sectors offer attractive spread pick-up and low risk of capital loss. Feature So far this year the Bloomberg Barclays Treasury index has returned -2.2% in absolute terms and -3.7% versus cash (Chart 1). If the year ended today, it would go into the books as the worst year for excess Treasury returns since 2009. Chart 1A Year To Forget A Year To Forget A Year To Forget Taking stock of this poor bond market performance makes us wonder what might prompt a reversal of fortunes. Our golden rule of bond investing tells us that if the economic outlook worsens enough for the market to discount a slower pace of Fed rate hikes, then bond market performance will improve.1 But with the market priced for only 63 bps of rate hikes during the next 12 months, we are reluctant to make that bet today. That being said, it also seems likely that U.S. GDP growth will slow as we head into the New Year. At the very least, the intensity of the bond market sell-off should diminish as well. Peak Growth There are two reasons why we think U.S. growth will soften during the next few quarters. The first is that global economic growth (excluding the U.S.) has already slowed. In past reports we demonstrated that weak foreign economic growth tends to pull down the U.S., rather than strong U.S. growth pulling up the rest of the world.2 While recent U.S. data show only tentative signs of contagion from the rest of the world, we also see no evidence of moderation in the global growth slowdown.3 The Global Manufacturing PMI fell to 52.1 in October, a far cry from its early-2018 peak above 54 (Chart 2). The percentage of countries with PMIs above the 50 boom/bust line also fell to 74% in October, down from its 2018 high of 95%. Chart 2The Global Growth Slowdown Continues... The Global Growth Slowdown Continues... The Global Growth Slowdown Continues... Considering the major economic blocs, the global growth slowdown continues to be driven by Europe and China (Chart 3). The Eurozone aggregate PMI remains above 50, but is falling rapidly. Meanwhile, the Chinese PMI is threatening to break below 50, and will probably do so during the next few months. The full slate of U.S. import tariffs have still not been implemented, and in the background, leading indicators of Chinese economic activity remain soft (Chart 4). Chart 3...Driven By Europe And China ...Driven By Europe And China ...Driven By Europe And China Chart 4Chinese Economy Keeps Slowing Chinese Economy Keeps Slowing Chinese Economy Keeps Slowing The second reason why U.S. growth is likely to slow during the next few quarters is the waning impact from fiscal stimulus. With the Democrats taking control of the House following last week's midterm elections, any hopes for another round of tax cuts should be quickly dashed. There is probably room for compromise between the two parties on infrastructure spending, but it will take some time (possibly the better part of two years) for them to reach an agreement. Meanwhile, the IMF estimates that fiscal policy will shift from adding 1% to GDP growth in 2018 to only 0.4% next year (Chart 5). Chart 5Less Boost From Fiscal In 2019 Less Boost From Fiscal In 2019 Less Boost From Fiscal In 2019 Bottom Line: The waning impact from fiscal stimulus and the drag from weak foreign economic activity will cause U.S. growth to slow as we enter 2019, but at this point it is not clear whether growth will slow sufficiently for the Fed to deviate from its +25 bps per quarter rate hike pace. With the market only priced for 63 bps of rate hikes during the next year, below-benchmark portfolio duration remains warranted. We prefer to position for slowing U.S. growth by taking less credit risk, maintaining only a neutral allocation to spread product with an up-in-quality bias. The Increasing Attractiveness Of Shorter Maturities Chart 1 shows a fairly consistent bearish trend in the bond market: at no point in 2018 were Treasury index returns in the black. But this doesn't mean that nothing has changed in the Treasury market this year, far from it. In fact, this year's bear-flattening of the yield curve has shifted the sweet spot for Treasury investors from the 5-year/7-year maturity point to the 2-year maturity point (Chart 6). This is true both in absolute and duration-neutral terms. Chart 6Par Coupon Treasury Curve The Sweet Spot On The Yield Curve The Sweet Spot On The Yield Curve Absolute Returns As can be seen in Chart 6, at the beginning of the year the steepest part of the Treasury curve ended at around the 5-year/7-year maturity point. Today, the curve flattens off considerably after the 2-year maturity point. This change in shape has important implications for the amount of return investors can earn from rolling down the yield curve. Table 1 shows expected 12-month returns for 2-year, 5-year and 10-year Treasury notes in three different scenarios. A scenario where the yield curve is unchanged during the next year, one where all yields rise by the average of historical 12-month yield increases, and one where all yields decrease by the average of historical 12-month yield declines. Table 1Bullish And Bearish Scenarios At Different Points Of The Curve The Sweet Spot On The Yield Curve The Sweet Spot On The Yield Curve In the unchanged yield curve scenario, expected returns are equal to "carry" which is simply the sum of the coupon income from the note (yield pick-up) and the capital gains earned from rolling down the curve (roll-down). It is in the roll-down component where the changing shape of the yield curve is most apparent. At the beginning of the year, an investor in the 5-year Treasury note could expect to earn 40 basis points of roll-down on a 12-month investment horizon, whereas an investor in the 2-year note would only earn 13 bps. But today, there is 21 bps of roll-down embedded in the 2-year note and only 6 bps in the 5-year. The end result is that we would actually expect the 2-year note to outperform the 5-year note in an unchanged yield curve environment, and only deliver 15 bps less return than the 10-year note. Charts 7A and 7B show that this sort of attractiveness in the 2-year note is quite rare. The 2-year does not usually offer more carry than the 5-year or 10-year, and periods when it does tend to coincide with an inverted yield curve. Since an inverted yield curve is a reliable predictor of recession, it usually makes sense to extend duration and favor long maturity Treasuries in those environments. This is because yields are likely to fall as the Fed cuts rates to fight the recession. But in the current environment, if recession is avoided during the next 12 months - as is our expectation - and Treasury yields continue to drift higher, a strategy of favoring the 2-year note will pay off handsomely. Chart 7AMore Carry In The 2-Year Note I More Carry In The 2-Year Note I More Carry In The 2-Year Note I Chart 7BMore Carry In The 2-Year Note II More Carry In The 2-Year Note II More Carry In The 2-Year Note II This is further elucidated by the bull and bear cases shown in Table 1. In the bearish scenario where each point on the yield curve rises by its historical 12-month average (the average is calculated only for periods when yields actually increased), the 2-year note still has a positive expected return. More importantly, the 2-year note offers an expected return that is 215 bps greater than the expected return from the 5-year note. At the beginning of the year, the 2-year note only offered 161 bps more expected return than the 5-year note in the bearish bond scenario. Similarly, in the bullish bond scenario, the 2-year note is only expected to lag the 5-year note by 228 bps. At the beginning of the year, the 2-year would have been expected to lag the 5-year by 297 bps in the bullish bond scenario. In other words, from an absolute return perspective the 2-year Treasury note is the most attractive part of the yield curve. The 2-year will outperform other maturities by more than usual in a rising yield scenario and underperform by less than usual in a falling yield scenario. This alluring combination of risk and reward looks even more enticing when coupled with our preference for keeping portfolio duration low. In Duration-Neutral Terms We do not typically look at expected total returns for specific maturity points. Rather, we prefer to separate the portfolio duration call from the yield curve positioning call. In other words, we communicate our view on the level of rates through our portfolio duration recommendation and then consider which parts of the yield curve look most attractive in duration-neutral terms. To do this, we look at butterfly spreads. Chart 8 shows that the 2/5/10 butterfly spread - the spread between the 5-year bullet and a duration-matched 2/10 barbell - has turned negative. This is unusual outside of environments where the 2/10 slope is inverted. In fact, our fair value model for the 2/5/10 butterfly spread is based on the slope of the 2/10 Treasury curve and it currently flags the 5-year bullet as expensive (Chart 8, bottom panel).4 Chart 8The 5-Year Bullet Is Expensive... The 5-Year Bullet Is Expensive... The 5-Year Bullet Is Expensive... In contrast, the 2-year bullet is the cheapest it has been since 2005 relative to the 1/5 barbell (Chart 9). This means that the 1/5 slope would have to flatten dramatically for returns in the 1/5 barbell to overcome the carry advantage in the 2-year note. For this reason we closed our prior yield curve position - long the 7-year bullet and short the 1/20 barbell - in last week's report, and entered a position long the 2-year bullet and short the 1/5 barbell. Chart 9...But The 2-Year Bullet Is Cheap ...But The 2-Year Bullet Is Cheap ...But The 2-Year Bullet Is Cheap Bottom Line: Over the course of the year the sweet spot on the Treasury curve has shifted from the 5-year/7-year maturity point to the 2-year. The 2-year note offers the best combination of risk and reward of any point on the Treasury curve. This is true in both absolute and duration-neutral terms. Short Maturity Spread Product Given that the sweet spot on the yield curve has shifted from the 5-year/7-year maturity point to the 2-year maturity point, we thought we should also examine which spread products offer attractive opportunities to earn extra compensation at the short-end of the curve, as an alternative to simply buying the 2-year Treasury note. Table 2 shows the spread per unit of duration offered by different high-quality (Aaa/Aa rated), low maturity (1-3 year) spread products. We exclude non-Agency CMBS and Agency MBS because the spread volatility in those sectors makes them riskier than their credit ratings imply. Table 21-3 Year Maturity Aaa/Aa-Rated Spread Products The Sweet Spot On The Yield Curve The Sweet Spot On The Yield Curve Auto loan ABS and Aa-rated corporate bonds offer the most spread pick-up per unit of duration, but we see some potential for spread widening in both sectors. Corporate spreads could widen as profit growth falls below the rate of debt growth during the next few quarters and consumer ABS spreads might also have upside. The consumer credit delinquency rate is rising, and banks are tightening standards lending standards (Chart 10). Chart 10Some Upside In Consumer ABS Spreads The Sweet Spot On The Yield Curve The Sweet Spot On The Yield Curve Agency CMBS and Foreign Agencies both offer 17 bps of spread per unit of duration. Of those two sectors we prefer Agency CMBS, which look very attractive on our Bond Map.5 Foreign Agencies also look attractive on our Map, but could struggle as the U.S. dollar appreciates making dollar debt more difficult for foreign borrowers to service. Of all the sectors listed in Table 2, the 15 bps spread per unit of duration offered by Local Authority debt looks most alluring. Largely composed of taxable municipal issues, Local Authority debt is insulated from weakness abroad and still offers a reasonably attractive spread pick-up. Bottom Line: Investors looking for attractive alternatives to Treasury debt at the short-end of the curve should consider Agency CMBS and Local Authority debt. Those sectors offer attractive spread pick-up and low risk of capital loss. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing", dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "An Oasis Of Prosperity?", dated August 21, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 While U.S. data remain very strong, the low contribution of nonresidential investment spending to overall GDP growth in Q3 could be a sign of contagion from the rest of the world. For further details please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "What Kind Of Correction Is This?", dated October 30, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 For further details on our butterfly spread models, please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies", dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "Toxic Combination", dated November 6, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification

Overweight (downgrade alert) In an August Insight Report, we noted the stratospheric rise of Apple was the key driver of the S&P 500's exceptional run and the S&P tech hardware, storage & peripherals (THSP) index's stellar outperformance.1 In that report, we suggested that clients institute a stop in this high-conviction call at the 10% relative return mark; Apple's fall since the weak outlook provided in their recent earnings report triggered that stop on Friday. Accordingly, we have booked the 10% gain since the April 9, 2018 addition of the S&P THSP index to our high-conviction list. The core rationale for our initial high-conviction overweight recommendation was our capex upcycle theme. However, capex intentions have rolled over, albeit from extended levels, and that should reveal itself in lower real capital deployment growth in general (second panel). More specific to the S&P THSP index, the decelerating investment growth has been pronounced in computers and peripheral equipment (bottom panel), which is corroborated by Apple's slowing sales expansion. Our thesis is thus somewhat dented and we are also compelled to add it to our downgrade watch list. Bottom Line: The recent pullback in the S&P THSP index triggered our stop last Friday and we locked in gains of 10% since inception. The S&P THSP index is now off our high conviction overweight list and we also put it on downgrade alert. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5CMPE - HPQ, WDC, STX, XRX, AAPL, HPE, NTAP. 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Insight Report, "Tech Hardware Is On Fire," dated August 31, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. The Falling Apple And The Law Of Gravity The Falling Apple And The Law Of Gravity