Sectors

Overweight Not only have investors shunned consumer staples stocks in general, but the S&P packaged foods sub-index has also suffered, even trailing the broad staples sector. We are not willing to throw in the towel in this staples sub-index that offers hidden value. A number of leading industry demand indicators are firming and suggest that a top line growth period is in the cards. Food and beverage exports are rising at a healthy clip, despite the U.S. dollar's year-to-date appreciation, and so are domestic consumer outlays (second panel). Importantly, relative to overall spending, real (volume) food and beverage spending is expanding smartly (third panel). Add on tame raw food commodity costs, especially compared with broad commodity price inflation and relative EPS will overwhelm extremely depressed analysts' expectations (relative grain prices shown inverted, bottom panel). Bottom Line: Stay overweight the S&P packaged foods index; please see Monday's Weekly Report for more details. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5PACK - MDLZ, KHC, GIS, TSN, K, CAG, HSY, MKC, SJM, HRL, CPB. Appetizing Packaged Foods Appetizing Packaged Foods

Highlights Portfolio Strategy A rare buying opportunity has emerged in the S&P consumer staples index, especially for long-term oriented capital. The bearish story is already baked into current valuations, and industry green-shoots are flying under the radar. Similarly, the bearish packaged foods narrative is well ingrained in depressed relative valuations, whereas the budding recovery in industry final demand is severely underappreciated. This offers investors a compelling entry point to this unloved and under-owned consumer products subgroup. Recent Changes There are no changes to our portfolio this week Table 1 Girding For A Breakout? Girding For A Breakout? Feature The S&P 500 digested receding geopolitical risks last week, and continued to consolidate recent gains. Stocks are poking at the upper end of the 10% trading range in place since early-February, and internal equity dynamics suggest that a breakout in a bullish fashion is in store for later in the summer, as we first posited in late April.1 Chart 1 shows our Equity Market Internal Dynamics Indicator (EMIDI) that does an excellent job capturing the shifting internal forces that drive market returns. This coincident-to-leading market Indicator comprising economically sensitive sectors and portfolio biases is signaling that the path of least resistance is higher for the SPX. Similar to the EMIDI, the Value Line Arithmetic Index (an equal weighted broad-based stock market index) broke out to fresh all-time highs and the Value Line Geometric Index (a gauge of median stock prices) is following closely behind (third & fourth panels, Chart 2). Market darling AAPL is making a run at a $1tn valuation, spearheading the tech-laden NASDAQ Composite that remains on a pattern of hitting higher highs (top panel, Chart 2). Equity buying power is also evident in the breakout of Thomson/Reuters' "Most Shorted Stocks Index" (second panel, Chart 2). All of this suggests that before long the SPX will follow the uptrend and vault to all-time highs, a message corroborated by the record highs in the broad market's advance/decline (A/D) line (bottom panel, Chart 2). Chart 1Breakout... Breakout... Breakout... Chart 2...Looming ...Looming ...Looming An enticing macro backdrop continues to underpin equities. The latest ISM manufacturing report confirmed the IHS Markit U.S. manufacturing PMI release that we highlighted in our Report two weeks ago2: the U.S. is firing on all cylinders and has the potential to pull global growth out of its recent lull. In particular, the reacceleration in the ISM new orders-to-inventories ratio suggests that equities will gain steam in the coming months (second panel, Chart 3). Another source of upbeat news was the backlog subcomponent of the May ISM manufacturing survey. Unfilled orders hit a 14-year high, just shy of the all-time record. Historically, backlogs have been an excellent leading indicator of SPX revenue growth and the current message is that S&P 500 top line growth is on a solid footing (bottom panel, Chart 3). The Fed acknowledged this mini economic overheating last week, and the FOMC slightly bumped its median expectation to a total of four hikes in calendar 2018. Moreover, fiscal easing will continue to gain thrust as the year progresses and the cash repatriation will also provide an assist to the stock market. We are modeling between $650bn-to-$800bn in equity retirement for calendar 2018. Chart 4 depicts our estimates and if the historical correlation between share buybacks and equity prices holds, then there is more upside to stocks in the back half of the year. Nevertheless, retail investors are replenishing cash coffers according to the American Association of Individual Investors (AAII), rather than actively participating in the latest market run up. At the margin, this beefing up of retail investor dry powder represents a headwind to additional equity market gains. We heed the message from this traditionally leading Indicator and in order for our cyclical (9-12 month horizon) sanguine equity market view to pan out, individual investors will have to drawdown their cash balances (AAII cash shown inverted, Chart 5). Chart 3Macro Tailwinds Macro Tailwinds Macro Tailwinds Chart 4Corporate Underpinnings... Corporate Underpinnings... Corporate Underpinnings... Chart 5...But Retail Investor Has To Participate ...But Retail Investor Has To Participate ...But Retail Investor Has To Participate This week we are revisiting a broad defensive sector and one of its key subcomponents. What To Do With Staples Investors have deserted consumer staples stocks at a dizzying speed, and valuations have cratered to a multi-decade low, according to our composite Valuation Indicator (Chart 6). Technicals are also as washed out as can be, as staples equities have been sold off indiscriminately. Other sentiment and breadth measures confirm that this safe haven sector has lost its allure: the A/D line is probing multi-year lows, EPS breadth is waning and groups with a positive 52-week rate of change and trading above the 40-week moving average have all but disappeared (Chart 7). Chart 6Buy Into Weakness Buy Into Weakness Buy Into Weakness Chart 7Bombed Out Sentiment Bombed Out Sentiment Bombed Out Sentiment Our sense is that this consumer staples wholesale liquidation provides a great buying opportunity, especially for longer-term oriented capital with a time horizon of at least 2-3 years. Even on a shorter-term outlook, a bounce seems likely from extremely depressed levels, as relative share prices may find support close to the pre-Great Recession trough (top panel, Chart 7). From a cyclical perspective we continue to view this defensive sector as a hedge to our overall portfolio position that sustains a pro-cyclical bent. Importantly, the bearish consumer staples case is well discounted in bombed out valuations. The stock-to-bond ratio is weighing on this fixed income proxy sector that sports a dividend yield on a par with the 10-year Treasury (top & second panels, Chart 8). Moreover, subsiding volatility bodes ill for relative share prices; the opposite is also true (bottom panel, Chart 8). On the demand front, once again the uninspiring non-cyclical spending backdrop is well entrenched in sinking relative share prices. Relative staples retail sales - both compared to discretionary and to total sales - are deflating as is typical in the late stages of the business cycle (top & second panels, Chart 9). Chart 8Bearish Narrative Baked In Bearish Narrative Baked In Bearish Narrative Baked In Chart 9Lack Of Demand... Lack Of Demand... Lack Of Demand... Such waning demand has weighed on industry selling prices at a time when executives are making labor additions, blowing out our wage bill proxy. As a result, profits margins are suffering a squeeze (Chart 10). However, there are some pockets of strength hidden beneath the surface. While non-discretionary demand is losing share versus overall outlays, spending on essentials as a percentage of disposable income is gaining steam. True, this could be a pre-cursor to recession, but our interpretation is that latent staples-related buying power may make a comeback from a still very depressed level and kick-start industry sales growth (bottom panel, Chart 9). Other industry green-shoots are also surfacing. Consumer staples exports are on a slingshot recovery path, expanding by a low double digit growth rate, defying the year-to-date trade-weighted U.S. dollar appreciation (second panel, Chart 11). In fact, given the defensive stature of this index, any additional greenback gains will boost relative profits especially in the first half of 2019 (third panel, Chart 11). Chart 10...Weighing On Margins... ...Weighing On Margins... ...Weighing On Margins... Chart 11...But Green-Shoots Surfacing ...But Green-Shoots Surfacing ...But Green-Shoots Surfacing Finally, CEO confidence of non-durable industries is far outpacing the broad animal spirit recovery according to The Conference Board, and this relative Chief Executive euphoria has historically been positively correlated with share price momentum, underscoring that better times lie ahead for consumer staples stocks (bottom panel, Chart 11). Adding it up, a rare buying opportunity has emerged in the S&P consumer staples index, especially for long-term oriented capital. The bearish story is already baked into current valuations, and industry green-shoots are flying under the radar. Tack on impressive industry return on equity and this index appears extremely undervalued (bottom panel, Chart 6). Bottom Line: Were we not already overweight the S&P consumer staples index, we would not hesitate to lift exposure to above benchmark. Appetizing Packaged Foods Not only have investors shunned consumer staples stocks in general, but the S&P packaged foods sub-index has also suffered, even trailing the broad staples sector. As a reminder, within consumer products we are overweight packaged foods and household products but maintain a below-benchmark allocation to soft drinks. Packaged foods relative share prices have returned to the mid-2000s level offering a compelling entry point for fresh capital, especially longer-term oriented money (top panel, Chart 12). Part of the reason that these stocks are under-owned boils down to their defensive characteristics. These safe-haven equities pay handsome, steadily growing and secure dividends. Thus, when the bond market's selloff gains steam, investors flock to deep cyclical stocks and trim fixed income proxied equities, and vice versa. Moreover, the Warren Buffett induced M&A premia have now fully reversed from this group, with the base effect weighing on relative performance (bottom panel, Chart 12). Nevertheless, we are not willing to throw in the towel in this staples sub-index that offers hidden value. A number of leading industry demand indicators are firming and suggest that a top line growth period is in the cards. Food and beverage exports are rising at a healthy clip, despite the U.S. dollar's year-to-date appreciation, and so are domestic consumer outlays (second panel, Chart 12). The industry's shipments-to-inventories ratio is sending a similar message, jumping to a level last seen four years ago (third panel, Chart 12. Importantly, relative to overall spending, real (volume) food and beverage spending is expanding smartly. Add on tame raw food commodity costs, especially compared with broad commodity price inflation and relative EPS will overwhelm extremely depressed analysts' expectations (relative grain prices shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 13). Chart 12Budding Demand Recovery... Budding Demand Recovery... Budding Demand Recovery... Chart 13...Should Aid Top Line Growth ...Should Aid Top Line Growth ...Should Aid Top Line Growth This encouraging demand backdrop is showing up in industry pricing power. Rising food manufacturing shipments are underpinning food producers' selling prices (second panel, Chart 14), and coupled with the contained crude food input costs suggest that packaged foods margins will continue to expand (middle panel, Chart 14). Even down the supply chain, food manufacturers' appear to be making significant headway, a harbinger at least of a profit margin relief phase. While channel captains food retailers have been dictating pricing terms to food suppliers for the better part of the past five years, industry producer prices are now on an even keel with CPI foods, a good proxy of what super markets are charging the consumer (fourth panel, Chart 14). Any additional pricing power gains will represent a boost to industry margins and, thus, profitability. Finally, firming demand is also showing up on industry operating metrics: factory activity is running red hot with resource utilization rates vaulting to multi-decade highs and industry hours worked picking up momentum (third panel, Chart 15). While CEOs have expanded the labor footprint and wage inflation is a cause for concern (bottom panel, Chart 15), a simple industry productivity proxy (industrial production divided by employment) shows that profits should enjoy a lift in the coming quarters. Chart 14Margins Can Expand Further Margins Can Expand Further Margins Can Expand Further Chart 15Brisk Factory Activity Brisk Factory Activity Brisk Factory Activity Netting it out, the bearish packaged foods narrative is well ingrained in depressed relative valuations (bottom panel, Chart 14), whereas the budding recovery in industry final demand is severely underappreciated, offering investors a compelling entry point to this unloved and under-owned consumer products subgroup. Bottom Line: Stay overweight the S&P packaged foods index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5PACK - MDLZ, KHC, GIS, TSN, K, CAG, HSY, MKC, SJM, HRL, CPB. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Lifting SPX Target," dated April 30, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Unwavering," dated June 4, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps

Underweight (Upgrade Alert) The narrative for the S&P cable & satellite index this year has been an ongoing (and accelerating) loss of share of the consumer's wallet (second panel) as over-the-top providers continue to steal customers. The subscriber losses in the industry are perhaps best evidenced by the divergence of rising prices and falling revenues (third panel). The reaction has been explosive vertical acquisitions between content providers and delivery; this week's failure of the Department of Justice to block AT&T's bid to acquire Time Warner stands as tacit approval of more of the same. Though it may be counterintuitive, we are softening our stance on the S&P cable & satellite index. Merger mania and fears of a balance sheet blowout have decimated the index's relative performance over the past year (top panel), which is now fully reflected in rock bottom valuations (bottom panel). While more shoes may drop in the bidding wars to come, we think we are very close to the worst being priced in. Accordingly, we are adding an upgrade alert to the S&P cable & satellite index to protect the 16% relative gains we have made since our underweight recommendation earlier this year. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the cable & satellite index are BLBG: S5CBST - CMCSA, CHTR, DISH. Acquisitions Go Vertical In Cable Acquisitions Go Vertical In Cable

Highlights The following four investment themes are likely to play out over the next couple of years: The yield shortfall on German long-dated bunds versus the equivalent U.S. T-bonds and U.K. gilts will narrow, one way or the other. The 10% undervaluation of the trade-weighted euro - as assessed by the ECB itself - will eventually correct. As the euro area's structural over-competitiveness gradually adjusts, euro area sectors that are domestically-oriented, like travel and leisure, will structurally outperform those that are export-oriented, like autos. Swedish real estate and Swedish real estate equities, which are both very richly valued, will underperform. Feature What connects last Sunday's dysfunctional G7 Summit with this week's ECB policy meeting? The answer is the euro area's €450 billion export surplus. Specifically, the €300 billion export surplus in Germany which equals 8% of its GDP - an export surplus that is squarely in President Trump's cross-hairs (Chart of the Week). Chart of the WeekECB Policy Has Driven Up Germany's Export Surplus ECB Policy Has Driven Up Germany's Export Surplus ECB Policy Has Driven Up Germany's Export Surplus The interesting thing is that the euro area hasn't always run an export surplus. Before 2012, the euro area's trade with the rest of the world was more or less in balance. Even Germany's export surplus was half of its current size. To put it in Trumpian terms, fewer Mercedes were "rolling down New York's Fifth Avenue." What caused the imbalance to surge in recent years? Was it punitive tariffs or restrictive trade practices in Germany? No, the answer is much simpler than that. ECB Policy Has Driven Up Germany's Export Surplus The export surplus in the euro area and in Germany is just a mirror-image of the euro exchange rate (Chart I-2). As the euro became undervalued, it made euro area exports more competitive and foreign imports into the euro area less competitive. This assessment of euro area over-competitiveness comes straight from the horse's mouth. The ECB's own indicators show that the euro area remains over-competitive by around 10%, meaning the euro is still undervalued by about 10%.1 In turn, the euro's substantial undervaluation is a near perfect function of the yield shortfall on German long-dated bunds versus the equivalent U.S. T-bonds and U.K. gilts (Chart I-3). It follows that the ultimate cause of the euro area's glaring imbalance is ECB policy itself - specifically, the extreme experiment with bond buying and negative interest rates. Chart I-2ECB Policy Has Driven Up The ##br##Euro Area's Export Surplus ECB Policy Has Driven Up The Euro Area's Export Surplus ECB Policy Has Driven Up The Euro Area's Export Surplus Chart I-3The ECB's Expansive Monetary Policy Is ##br##Responsible For The Euro's Undervaluation The ECB's Expansive Monetary Policy Is Responsible For The Euro's Undervaluation The ECB's Expansive Monetary Policy Is Responsible For The Euro's Undervaluation As Germany's former Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, explained: "When ECB chief Mario Draghi embarked on the expansive monetary policy, I told him he would drive up Germany's export surplus... I promised then not to publicly criticise this policy. But then I don't want to be criticised for the consequences of this policy." The ECB counters that it targets neither the euro exchange rate nor the trade balance; it sets policy to achieve its mandate for price stability. It argues that it is further from its mandate for price stability compared with the Federal Reserve because, ostensibly, the euro area is at a different point in the economic cycle compared with the U.S. This requires the ECB to set an ultra-accommodative policy compared with other central banks. The undervalued euro and trade surplus are the unavoidable spill-overs of this relative monetary policy. ECB Spill-Overs Felt Far And Wide However, one important reason that euro area inflation is underperforming U.S. inflation has nothing to do with the economic cycle. Rather, it is because the official measures of inflation in the euro area and the U.S. are defined differently (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). The euro area's Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) omits the consumption costs of owner-occupied housing, whereas the U.S. consumer price basket includes them at a very substantial 25% weight. Homeowners will testify that the cost of maintaining their homes constitutes one of their largest expenses, and that these costs tend to rise faster than other prices. Using the U.S. as a guide, we estimate that a euro area inflation measure that correctly included home maintenance costs would be running higher than HICP inflation by an average of 0.5 percentage points a year (Chart I-6). Chart I-4Euro Area Inflation##br## Is Underperforming... Euro Area Inflation Is Underperforming... Euro Area Inflation Is Underperforming... Chart I-5...Because Euro Area Inflation Omits ##br##Owner-Occupied Housing Costs ...Because Euro Area Inflation Omits Owner-Occupied Housing Costs ...Because Euro Area Inflation Omits Owner-Occupied Housing Costs Chart I-6Including Owner-Occupied Housing ##br##Costs Adds 0.5% To Inflation Including Owner-Occupied Housing Costs Adds 0.5% To Inflation Including Owner-Occupied Housing Costs Adds 0.5% To Inflation Just because the statisticians do not measure owner-occupied housing costs in the euro area HICP, it doesn't mean that homeowners do not feel these costs. In Germany, measured inflation is now running at 2.3%, so the true inflation that households feel is running closer to 3%. Meanwhile, interest rates on savings accounts are stuck near zero, which means that German savers are seeing the real value of their savings erode by 3% every year. As Der Spiegel magazine put it to ECB Chief Economist, Peter Praet: "Can you understand why so many Germans regard the ECB as the greatest threat to their personal wealth?" Spill-overs from the ECB's ultra-accommodative policy have also been felt across the Baltic Sea. The Riksbank and the Norges Bank have had to shadow the ECB to prevent a sharp appreciation of their currencies versus the euro. The trouble is that ultra-low and negative interest rates have been absurdly inappropriate for the booming Scandinavian economies. So ECB policy may have generated spill-over housing bubbles in Sweden and Norway (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-7ECB Spill-Overs Felt In Scandinavia ECB Spill-Overs Felt In Scandinavia ECB Spill-Overs Felt In Scandinavia Chart I-8Scandinavian Real Estate Appears Richly Valued Scandinavian Real Estate Appears Richly Valued Scandinavian Real Estate Appears Richly Valued Hence, a seemingly innocuous 'definitional' difference between the consumer price baskets in the euro area vis-à-vis the U.S. explains: the bulk of the shortfall in euro area inflation; the ECB's justification for ultra-accommodation; the undervalued euro; the euro area's €450 billion trade surplus; deeply negative real interest rates in Germany; and putative housing bubbles in Sweden and Norway. The main argument we hear in the ECB's defence is that the central bank is at the mercy of its treaty. If the treaty demands ultra-accommodation then the ECB must deliver it. But this argument is wrong. The ECB treaty only asks that the central bank delivers "price stability", leaving the ECB with substantial flexibility in how it precisely defines price stability. With this in mind, the ECB - and other central banks - should use this definitional flexibility to minimize differences with other central banks. Because in a world of integrated capital markets, the spill-overs from seemingly innocuous definitional differences are felt far and wide, resulting in political backlashes and economic imbalances. Imbalances Must Correct In The Long Run Ultimately though, economic imbalances must correct, and the corrective mechanism is economic, financial, or political feedback loops, or some combination of these. On this basis, we reiterate four investment themes that are likely to play out over the next couple of years: The yield shortfall on German long-dated bunds versus the equivalent U.S. T-bonds and U.K. gilts will narrow, one way or the other. The 10% undervaluation of the trade-weighted euro - as assessed by the ECB itself - will eventually correct. As the euro area's structural over-competitiveness gradually adjusts, euro area sectors that are domestically-oriented, like travel and leisure, will structurally outperform those that are export-oriented, like autos (Chart I-9). Chart I-9As The Euro's Undervaluation Corrects, It Will Help Euro Area Domestics And Hurt Exporters As The Euro's Undervaluation Corrects, It Will Help Euro Area Domestics And Hurt Exporters As The Euro's Undervaluation Corrects, It Will Help Euro Area Domestics And Hurt Exporters Swedish real estate and Swedish real estate equities, which are both very richly valued, will underperform. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/balance_of_payments_and_external/hci/html/index.en.html The ECB uses three metrics to assess the euro area's competitiveness versus its major trading partners: GDP deflators, CPIs, and unit labour costs. The average of the three metrics suggests that the euro is undervalued by around 10%.The assessment of euro undervaluation assumes that the major euro area economies entered the monetary union at a broadly correct level of competitiveness against each other and against their other major trading partners. This assumption seems valid, given that the net external position of these economies were all in equilibrium at the onset of monetary union. Fractal Trading Model We are pleased to report that our long SEK/GBP currency position hit its profit target of 3% and is now closed. This week we note that the relative performance of two classically cyclical sectors, oil and gas versus financials, is technically stretched and at a 65-day fractal dimension which has accurately predicted the last two major reversals. Hence, our recommended trade is short euro area oil and gas versus euro area financials. Set a profit target of 6% with a symmetric stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-10 Short oil and gas versus financials Short oil and gas versus financials The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations

Overweight Consumer finance stocks have been mostly range-bound over the past two years following their significant underperformance in the two years prior. We think the trading range is only a pause as the sector girds itself for another step higher. Unemployment claims, the single largest driver of underlying earnings growth, have diverged from the index's performance in the last five years (top panel). At the same time as unemployment claims have been falling, revolving consumer credit has been expanding at an exceptional rate. Following a lull at the end of last year, growth appears to be reaccelerating (second panel). Meanwhile, the consumer continues to look eminently capable of growing their household balance sheet (third panel). Typically, periods of expanding consumer credit see tightening of credit card interest rate spreads; the opposite has been happening in the most recent period as spreads have widened by 100 basis points from their most recent low in 2014 (bottom panel). Further, according to the Fed's most recent senior loan officer survey, a majority of lenders are willing extenders of credit. The upshot is that consumer finance companies should be able to grow more profitably than in the past. Stay overweight. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5CFINX - AXP, DFS, SYF, NAVI, COF. Consumer Finance Is Ready For A Breakout Consumer Finance Is Ready For A Breakout

Highlights China's ongoing industrial sector slowdown will not likely lead to a global growth shock, but investors should recognize that China's relative stability is supported by strong global demand. A negative surprise to export growth could materially shift global investor sentiment about the trajectory of China's economy, which would bode poorly for Chinese ex-tech stocks versus their global peers. Stay overweight for now, but with a short leash. The recent inclusion of Chinese A-shares in the MSCI Emerging Markets index may lead to heightened investor attention over the coming months, but we still recommend a neutral allocation. Within the domestic market, a factor approach suggests that financials are a good bet, and that real estate stocks have great potential as a contrarian trade if housing sales begin to durably trend higher. Index inclusion may also be a factor leading to increased global investor attention towards China's bond market over the coming two years. The comparatively high-yield and short duration of China's corporate bond market makes for an attractive investment opportunity, despite recent concerns about defaults. Stay long/overweight over the coming 6-12 months. Feature We have presented the following views about China's economy and its financial markets over the past several months: China's industrial sector is slowing, and is set to slow further based on our proprietary leading indicators for the Li Keqiang index. This will cause a further deceleration in Chinese nominal import growth and suggests that Chinese ex-tech earnings per share growth will soon peak. Residential investment has potential to provide a tailwind to domestic growth if home sales sustainably pick up, but there are no firm signs that this is occurring. Robust export growth will help China's economy from slowing sharply, but there are several risks to the external demand outlook that need to be monitored. Given the poor growth momentum in the industrial sector, fiscal or monetary stimulus will likely be required if China suffers a sudden export shock. China's consumer-oriented tech sector ostensibly stands out as a shelter from an old economy slowdown, but it is extremely expensive, earnings momentum is very stretched, and it may be adversely impacted by the U.S.' section 301 investigation. We have recommended avoiding exposure since mid-February. China's ex-tech equity market is comparatively cheap, high-beta vs the global benchmark, and technically robust. While the risks to the economic outlook are clear, investors should continue to overweight Chinese ex-tech stocks vs their global peers. For global investors who are perennially concerned that a slowdown in China's economy will culminate in a significant shock to the global economy, Chart 1 provides a helpful visual representation of our view. The chart depicts two scenarios: first, the ongoing industrial sector slowdown in China results in an outright subtraction from global growth momentum via a contraction in imports, despite positive growth impulses from the U.S. and euro area. In our view, Chinese import growth is likely to remain positive, but will largely be driven by strong demand in the developed world (scenario 2). Chart 1Two Different Scenarios Concerning China's Contribution To The Global Economy A Shaky Ladder A Shaky Ladder Chart 1 highlights that our view is more positive for the global economy than one might otherwise think, but it is important for investors to understand the nature of China's relative stability in the event that export growth surprises to the downside over the coming months. In fact, Chart 2 highlights that the most salient data development over the past two weeks has been a fairly significant deceleration in smoothed nominal export growth, which is our preferred method of analyzing Chinese trade data. Despite the relative stability of China's PMIs over the past few months, a 3-month moving average of US$ exports decelerated from 17.5% to 7% in May, or from 10% to -1% in RMB-terms. Sequentially, Chinese export growth improved in May (vs April's reading) in both US$ and RMB-terms, and both beat market expectations. As a result, we are sticking with the second scenario depicted in Chart 1 as the more likely of the two for the coming 6-12 months. However, the reliance on strong external demand to prop up China's import growth is somewhat of a "shaky ladder" for global investors to climb, given the clear risks from U.S. protectionist action, the headwinds to Chinese export competitiveness from a strong currency (or, alternatively, the punishing impact of translation effects on exporter revenue), and the potential for robust export growth to embolden Chinese policymakers to push forward with even more aggressive reforms over the coming year. Still, Chart 3 highlights that many investors are perfectly willing to climb this ladder, shaky or otherwise. The chart shows that the relative performance of Chinese ex-tech stocks versus their global peers remains firmly within the ascending trend channel that has been in place since early-2017, despite the ongoing slowdown in the industrial sector. As we noted in our May 30 report,1 this message is consistent with the view that any recent negative relative performance of Chinese ex-tech stocks has been in response to global rather than idiosyncratic, China-specific risk. Chart 2A Nontrivial Slowdown In Chinese Export Growth A Nontrivial Slowdown In Chinese Export Growth A Nontrivial Slowdown In Chinese Export Growth Chart 3Investors Are Fine Climbing A Shaky Ladder Investors Are Fine Climbing A Shaky Ladder Investors Are Fine Climbing A Shaky Ladder We remain nervous bulls concerning Chinese ex-tech stocks, and continue to recommend an overweight stance. But our reading of China's macro dynamics suggests that investors should not be dogmatic about their equity allocation to China, and should be prepared to cut exposure in response to a material shift in sentiment towards the Chinese economy. As a final point, while we have clearly presented our framework over the past several months for thinking about and analyzing China, investors attending BCA's Annual Investment Conference in September will get an opportunity to hear additional perspectives about the cyclical trajectory of its economy. Leland R. Miller, CEO of the China Beige Book, will be presenting his thoughts on the outlook for Chinese growth and risk assets. Based on his firm's unique insights into China's economic and financial market developments, Mr. Miller's panel will certainly be among those not to miss. Bottom Line: China's ongoing industrial sector slowdown will not likely lead to a shock to global demand, but investors should recognize that China's relative stability is supported by strong global demand. A negative surprise to export growth could materially shift global investor sentiment about the trajectory of China's economy, which would bode poorly for Chinese ex-tech stocks versus their global peers. Stay overweight for now, but with a short leash. A-Shares: EM Inclusion, Factor Analysis, And A Contrarian Shadow Trade The beginning of June marked a milestone for Chinese equities, as MSCI added over 226 large-cap A-shares to their Emerging Markets index. Box 1 provides some brief details about the inclusion, and also notes how it affects several of the trades in our trade book. Chart A1A-Share Inclusion Added 10% Market Cap ##br##To The MSCI China Index A-Share Inclusion Added 10% Market Cap To The MSCI China Index A-Share Inclusion Added 10% Market Cap To The MSCI China Index Box 1 The Inclusion Of Chinese A-Shares In The MSCI Emerging Markets Index On May 31 2018, 226 China large-cap RMB-denominated A-shares were included in the MSCI Emerging Markets Index. The change represented a 1.4% increase in the market capitalization of the MSCI Emerging Markets index, and 10% increase in the MSCI China Index (Chart A1). We have often referred to the MSCI China Index as the "investable" index in previous reports and in our trade table, but this index now includes some domestic stocks as a result of the recent inclusion. We plan to continue to use the MSCI China Index (or its ex-tech equivalent) as the main outlet for our investment recommendations, which means that the benchmark for five of our trades will be re-labeled in our trade table (from China investable to MSCI China Index). One exception is our trade favoring the MSCI China ESG Leaders Index, as MSCI has yet to publish an ESG rating index for Chinese domestic stocks. We last wrote about the outlook for A-shares in our March 14 Weekly Report,2 and noted that the significant underperformance of A-shares relative to global stocks over the past few years was due to the legacy effects of an enormous, policy-driven speculative bubble in 2014-2015. We highlighted that while domestic stocks have worked off some of this bubble and multiples are no longer extreme, that a neutral allocation was still warranted due to an uninspiring earnings outlook and, at best, a very modest valuation discount relative to global stocks. Chart 4 illustrates this latter point; based on all four trailing valuation ratios that we track, ex-tech onshore stocks are either on par or considerably more expensive than global ex-tech stocks. By contrast, the MSCI China Index (excluding technology) is cheaper than their global peers by all measures, in some cases considerably so. Nevertheless, while we continue to recommend that investors maintain a neutral stance towards A-shares within a global equity portfolio, the inclusion of A-shares in the EM index may force some investors to increase their exposure to domestic stocks beyond the level that they otherwise would have maintained. In order to provide some perspective of what domestic stocks to favor, we have taken a quantitative approach to analyzing A-shares that is loosely inspired by the Fama-French three-factor model. More precisely, we have examined the historical relative performance of three separate factor strategies for A-shares and global stocks, both relative to their respective broad market. The three factors tested are as follows: Return On Equity (ROE): Replacing market beta in the F&F model, we have built a historical portfolio for both Chinese domestic and global stocks that favors level 1 GICS sectors with above-median ROE. Within high-ROE sectors, the portfolio allocates to the sectors on a value-weighted basis to maximize the investability of the strategy. Sector Weight: Our second approach favors GICS sectors with a below-median sector weight, which conceptually mimics the firm size factor in the F&F model. In reality, this strategy is selecting among sectors made up of large cap firms, meaning that investors should regard the performance of this strategy as reflecting the success or failure of investing in potentially underowned or unloved sectors. Value: Our third factor is exactly in line with the F&F model, with portfolios using this approach favoring sectors with above-median dividend yields. We have chosen a cash flow-based valuation measure instead of the book value yield to assuage potential investor concerns about accrual quality. Chart 5 presents the cumulative returns of these strategies, for both global and Chinese domestic stocks. Several important observations are noteworthy: Chart 4A-Shares Are Not Cheap Vs##br## Global Stocks In Ex-Tech Terms A-Shares Are Not Cheap Vs Global Stocks In Ex-Tech Terms A-Shares Are Not Cheap Vs Global Stocks In Ex-Tech Terms Chart 5ROE, Sector Weight, and Value Are ##br##All Successful Factors In China's Domestic Market ROE, Sector Weight, and Value Are All Successful Factors In China's Domestic Market ROE, Sector Weight, and Value Are All Successful Factors In China's Domestic Market Favoring high-ROE sectors has been a more profitable strategy when allocating among global sectors than those of the domestic Chinese market, but we have seen similar returns from the strategy in both markets since early-2011. This is consistent with an important conclusion that we made in our March report: the perception among some global investors that domestic Chinese stocks are a "casino" market disconnected from fundamentals does not appear to be supported by the data over the past several years. A strategy of favoring sectors with a low market cap weight has fared better for Chinese A-shares than for the global market, albeit with considerable volatility. We suspect that the underperformance of smaller-than-average sectors at the global level has been affected over the past four years by the underperformance of resources, but the outperformance of the strategy in China also makes sense: underowned or unloved sectors should have more abnormal return potential in smaller, less scrutinized markets. Favoring cheap stocks has been an abysmally poor strategy at the global level over the past decade, due to the chronic underperformance of the financial sector. But cheaper sectors have outperformed China's domestic equity market at a modest pace over the past several years, which is good news for value-oriented investors. Chart 6 highlights where each of China's domestic equity sectors currently sits in the ROE/size/value spectrum. There are three sectors exhibiting two of the factors employed in our analysis: health care, financials, and real estate. For now, we would caution investors against buying domestic health care stocks, as Chart 7 shows that the sector has become heavily overbought over the past several months. Domestic financials would appear to be a better bet: despite underperforming financials in the MSCI China Index, domestic financials have outperformed the domestic broad market over the past year and have not broken materially below their trend line despite a recent selloff. Chart 6Health Care, Financials, And Real Estate Are At The Intersection Of Successful Factors A Shaky Ladder A Shaky Ladder Chart 7Financials Are A Better Bet Than Health Care; Watch For A Housing Catalyst To Buy Real Estate Financials Are A Better Bet Than Health Care; Watch For A Housing Catalyst To Buy Real Estate Financials Are A Better Bet Than Health Care; Watch For A Housing Catalyst To Buy Real Estate Finally, real estate stocks have the potential to become a fantastic contrarian trade if Chinese home sales do sustainably pick up. The sector is cheap, profitable, and highly unloved given the view among many investors that the Chinese government's structural reforms will weigh on performance for some time to come. But as we have noted in previous reports, the persistent gap between home sales and housing construction over the past few years may very well be over, implying that the latter may rise in lockstep with the former if sales begin to trend higher. Chart 7 shows that investors are not even remotely pricing in such a scenario, as domestic real estate companies have underperformed the domestic benchmark since early-2016 and remain in a relative downtrend. We would not recommend fighting negative investor sentiment towards the sector for now, but domestic real estate companies should clearly be on an investor's watch list, alongside the trend in residential sales volume. Bottom Line: The recent inclusion of Chinese A-shares in the MSCI Emerging Markets index may lead to heightened investor attention over the coming months, but we still recommend a neutral allocation. Within the domestic market, a factor approach suggests that financials are a good bet, and that real estate stocks have great potential as a contrarian trade if housing sales begin to durably trend higher. An Update On China's Corporate Bond Market China's equity market may not be the only financial market segment to garner more addition from increased index inclusion over the coming year: Bloomberg recently announced that it will add Chinese RMB-denominated government and policy bank bonds to the Bloomberg Barclays Global Aggregate Index over a 20-month period beginning in April 2019, conditional on the implementation of certain "operational enhancements" to the market by the PBOC and Ministry of Finance.3 China's total bond market (government and corporate) is the third-largest in the world, with a record of 79 trillion yuan ($12.7 trillion) outstanding. Yet foreign investors have little exposure to Chinese bonds, due to frictions concerning investability, a lack of transparency on issuers/index components, and concerns about the quality of domestically-issued credit ratings (95% of China's corporate bonds are rated AA- or higher). Chart 8The Recent Uptick In Yields Has Had A Paltry Impact On Total Returns The Recent Uptick In Yields Has Had A Paltry Impact On Total Returns The Recent Uptick In Yields Has Had A Paltry Impact On Total Returns While the proportion of foreign ownership of Chinese bonds may rise slowly over time, our sense is that it will indeed rise. First, there is a clear yield advantage for Chinese relative to global bonds, in a world where high long-term absolute return prospects are scarce. Second, Chinese policymakers continue to (slowly) open China's financial markets to the rest of the world, and global investors can now gain access to China's onshore bond market through four channels without quota: the qualified foreign institutional investors program (QFII), the renminbi qualified foreign institutional investor program (RQFII), the China interbank bond market (CIBM), and the Bond Connect program.4 Third, China's regulators allowed foreign-owned ratings agencies to set up shop in China last year, in an attempt to address the ratings quality issue. BCA's China Investment Strategy service initiated our long China onshore corporate bonds trade on June 22 last year, which has since earned a 3.7% return in spite of widening yield spreads and a spike in default concerns over the past several weeks. Indeed, Chart 8 highlights that the recent rise in corporate yields has had a minimal impact on the index total return profile. There is one critical factor driving this apparent discrepancy that is not well understood by global investors: compared with corporate issues in the developed world, China's corporate bond market has considerably shorter duration. Table 1 highlights that most of the corporate bonds issued in China have a maturity of three years or less, and the duration for the ChinaBond Company Credit Index, the benchmark that we have used for our corporate bond trade, is approximately 2.3 years. By contrast, U.S. investment- and speculative-grade bonds currently have an effective duration of 7.5 and 4 years, respectively. Chart 9 illustrates the 12-month breakeven spread for the Company Credit Index, unadjusted for default. The breakeven spread represents the rise in yields that would be required for investors to lose money over a 12-month horizon (i.e. the yield change that exactly erases the income return from the position), assuming no defaults. The chart shows that Chinese corporate bond yields would have to rise approximately 250 bps over the coming year before investors suffer a negative total return, which would be an enormous rise that is totally inconsistent the PBOC's monetary policy stance. Table 1Maturity Distribution Of China's Bond Market A Shaky Ladder A Shaky Ladder Chart 9A Compelling Cushion Against Potentially Higher Rates A Compelling Cushion Against Potentially Higher Rates A Compelling Cushion Against Potentially Higher Rates Another way to gauge the attractiveness of a corporate bond position is to look at the spread relative to comparable duration government bonds in order to calculate the default loss that would be required to erase the spread (which is also roughly 250 bps today). Using the relatively conservative assumption of a 35% recovery rate, a 2.5% default loss implies a default rate of close to 4%. We noted in our May 23 Special Report that recent corporate defaults in China amounted to only 0.1% of the outstanding corporate bond market,5 implying that the ultimate scope of corporate bond defaults in China would have to be 40 times larger than currently observed to wipe out the spread relative to Chinese government bonds of comparable duration. While we cannot rule such an event from occurring, there is no evidence to suggest that such a dramatic escalation in defaults is about to occur. Bottom Line: Index inclusion may also be a factor leading to increased global investor attention towards China's bond market over the coming two years. The comparatively high-yield and short duration of China's corporate bond market makes for an attractive investment opportunity, despite recent concerns about defaults. Stay long/overweight over the coming 6-12 months. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA, Vice President Special Reports jonathanl@bcaresearch.com Lin Xiang, Research Analyst linx@bcaresearch.com 1 Pease see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "11 Charts To Watch", dated May 30, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Pease see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "A-Shares: Stay Neutral, For Now", dated March 14, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 These enhancements include the implementation of delivery vs. payment settlement, the ability to allocate block trades across portfolios, and clarification on tax collection policies. 4 The first three programs have a clear statement that no quotas apply, whereas the bond connect program has no specific statement concerning quotas. 5 Pease see China Investment Strategy Special Report "Messages From BCA's China Industry Watch", dated May 23, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

Highlights Contagion risk from Italy to its European peers presents a buying opportunity; Italian policymakers are constrained by the bond market and avoiding brinkmanship; In a game of chicken between Berlin and Rome, Chancellor Angela Merkel is behind the wheel of a 2.5-ton SUV; Italy's ultimate constraint is its bifurcated economic system - staying in the EU helps manage this problem; Underweight Italian bonds in a global portfolio and short Italian bonds versus their Spanish equivalents. Feature Chart 1Is Contagion Warranted? Is Contagion Warranted? Is Contagion Warranted? On May 31, Italy formed the second overtly populist government in the Euro Area. The first was the short-lived SYRIZA government in Greece, which lasted from January to September 2015. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras and his colorful finance minister Yanis Varoufakis, Athens took Greece to the brink of Euro Area exit in the summer of 2015. Ultimately, Greek politicians blinked, folded, and re-ran the January election in September, transforming SYRIZA from an overtly euroskeptic party to a europhile party in just eight months. Investors are concerned that "this time will be different." We disagree. To use a poker analogy, Italian policymakers are better positioned to "bluff" their European counterparts as their chip stack is larger. But they are still holding a bad hand, and other players at the table still hold big stacks. The recent turbulence in Italian bond markets has spilled over into other Mediterranean countries (Chart 1). This contagion is unwarranted, as there has been much improvement across the region over the past few years, both politically and economically. As for Italy itself, it is positive that populists have come to power today, for several reasons. First, it will force them to actually run the country, a sobering process that often tempers anti-establishment zeal, as it did in Greece. Second, they will run the country at a time when popular support for the Euro Area and EU remains strong enough to deter an overt attempt to exit those institutions. Third, Italy remains massively constrained by material forces outside of their control, which will force compromises in negotiations with Brussels and fellow EU member states. There Will Be No Contagion From Italy Markets overreacted to the political risks emanating from Italy in recent weeks. Fundamentally, Italy's peripheral peers have emerged stronger from the Euro Area crisis. Since the onset of the Euro Area crisis, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and Spain - the hardest-hit economies in 2010 - have seen their unit labor costs contract by an average of 8.7%. Over the same period, the rest of the Euro Area inflated its labor cost structure by around 10.9% (Chart 2). Italy remains saddled with a rigid, under-educated, and rather unproductive workforce that has seen no adjustment in labor costs.1 Meanwhile, its Mediterranean peers have practically closed their once-enormous unit labor-cost gap with Germany. Furthermore, all southern European countries now run primary surpluses, reducing the need for external funding (Chart 3). It is fair that the market should apply a fiscal premium to Italy, given the new government's plans to blow out the budget deficit. But no such fiscal plan is in the works in the rest of the Mediterranean. The cyclically-adjusted primary balance - for Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece - has gone from a deficit of 4.4% during the height of the debt crisis, to a surplus of 1.4% today. One can argue about whether such fiscal austerity was really necessary. The advantage, however, is that the improvement in structural budget balances has diminished the need for additional austerity measures and could also provide greater fiscal space during the next recession. Finally, household balance sheets have been on the mend for some time. Consumer debt levels as a percentage of disposable income in Spain, Portugal, and Ireland - the epicenter of the original Euro Area debt crisis - have now dipped below U.S. levels. In the case of Italy, importantly, the household sector was never over-indebted to begin with (Chart 4). Chart 2Italy Has Had No Labor-Cost Adjustment Italy Has Had No Labor-Cost Adjustment Italy Has Had No Labor-Cost Adjustment Chart 3Mediterranean Austerity Is Over Mediterranean Austerity Is Over Mediterranean Austerity Is Over Chart 4No Household Credit Bubble In Italy No Household Credit Bubble In Italy No Household Credit Bubble In Italy On the political front, Italians are clearly more euroskeptic than their Euro Area peers (Chart 5). Although only 30% of Italians oppose the common currency, in line with Greece, this is still considerably higher than in Spain and Portugal (Chart 6). Italians also feel less "European" than the Spanish or the Portuguese - i.e., they identify more exclusively with their unique nationality. Again this is in line with Greek sentiment (Chart 7). Italians were not always this way: in the early 1990s, they felt the most European. Chart 5Italy Lags In Support For The Euro... Italy Lags In Support For The Euro... Italy Lags In Support For The Euro... Chart 6...But Only 30% Of Italians Want Out ...But Only 30% Of Italians Want Out ...But Only 30% Of Italians Want Out Chart 7Italians Are Feeling More Italian Italians Are Feeling More Italian Italians Are Feeling More Italian In Portugal and Spain, parties across the political spectrum have responded to improving political and economic fundamentals. In Spain, the mildly euroskeptic Podemos is polling below its June 2016 election result. Its leadership has also abandoned any ambiguity on its support of the common currency, although it still campaigned in 2016 on restructuring Spain's foreign debt. The leading party in the Spanish polls is the centrist Ciudadanos (Chart 8), led by 38-year old Albert Rivera. Much like French President Emmanuel Macron, Rivera has a background in finance - he worked as a legal counsel at La Caixa - and presents a centrist vision for Europe, favoring more integration. The rise of Ciudadanos is important as Spain could have new elections soon. Conservative Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy resigned following a vote of no-confidence engineered by the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) leader Pedro Sánchez. However, PSOE only holds 84 seats of the 350-seat parliament. As such, it is unclear how the Socialist minority government will govern, particularly with the budget vote coming in early fall. But investors should welcome, not fear, early elections in Spain. With Ciudadanos set to join a governing coalition, it is clear that Spain's commitments to the Rajoy structural reforms will remain in place while no discussions of Spanish exit from European institutions is on any investment-relevant horizon. In Portugal, the minority government of Prime Minister António Costa has overseen a brisk economic recovery. Costa's center-left Socialist Party has received support in parliament from the far-left, euroskeptic Left Bloc, plus the Communists and Greens. Despite the involvement of the Left Bloc, the minority government has not initiated any euroskeptic policy. The latest polling suggests that Costa could win a majority in 2019. An election has to be held by October of that year, thus potentially strengthening the pro-European credentials of the Portuguese government (Chart 9). Finally, in Greece, the once overtly euroskeptic SYRIZA is polling well below their 2015 levels of support. Ardently europhile and centrist New Democracy (ND) is set to win the next election - which must be held by October 2019 - if polling remains stable (Chart 10). The fascist and euroskeptic Golden Dawn remains a feature of Greek politics, but has a support rate under 10%, as it has over the past decade. In fact, the rising player in Greek politics is the centrist and europhile Movement for Change, an alliance that includes the vestiges of the center-left PASOK, which polls around 10%. Chart 8There Is No Populism In Spain... There Is No Populism In Spain... There Is No Populism In Spain... Chart 9...Or Portugal... ...Or Portugal... ...Or Portugal... Chart 10...And Surprisingly None In Greece ...And Surprisingly None In Greece ...And Surprisingly None In Greece Bottom Line: Italy stands alone in the Mediterranean as a laggard on both economic and political fundamentals. Contagion risk from Italy to the rest of its European peers should be faded by investors. It represents a buying opportunity every time it manifests itself. What Car Is Italy Driving In This Game Of Chicken? The new ruling coalition in Rome has a democratic mandate for a confrontation with Brussels over fiscal spending. The coalition consists of the Five Star Movement (M5S) and the League (Lega), formerly known as the "Northern League." In his inaugural speech to the Italian Parliament, Prime Minister Guiseppe Conte emphasized that the mandate of the new coalition includes "reducing the public debt ... by increasing our wealth, not with austerity."2 So, the gloves are off! Not really. Almost immediately, Conte pointed out that "we are optimistic about the outcome of these discussions and confident of our negotiating power, because we are facing a situation in which Italy's interests... coincide with the general interests of Europe, with the aim of preventing its possible decline. Europe is our home." PM Conte subsequently focused in his speech on increasing social welfare payments to the poor, conditional on vocational training and job reintegration. Talk of a "flat tax" was replaced with an eponymous concept that is anything but a "flat tax."3 And there was no mention of overturning unpopular pension reforms, but merely "intervening in favor of retirees who do not have sufficient income to live in dignity."4 We may be reading too much into one speech. However, the time for brinkmanship is at the beginning of a government's mandate. And Conte's opening salvo suggests that the M5S-Lega coalition has already punted on three of its most populist promises: wholesale change to retirement reforms, a flat tax of 15%, and universal basic income. The back-of-the-envelope cost of these three proposals is €100bn, which would easily blow out Italy's budget deficit by 5% of GDP, putting the total at 7%. There was also no mention of issuing government IOUs that would create a sort of "parallel currency" in the country. Conte's relatively tame speech represents one of three concessions that Rome has made before it even engaged Brussels in brinkmanship. The two others were to replace the original economy minister designate - euroskeptic Paulo Savona - and to form a government in the first place. The latter is particularly telling. Polls have shown that the two populist parties would have an even stronger hand if they waited until the fall to re-run the election (Chart 11). In particular, Lega has seen its support rise by 9% since the election. It is politically illogical to form a governing coalition with less political capital when a new election would strengthen the hand of both populist parties. So why the concessions? Because Italian policymakers are not interested in brinkmanship. The populist campaign rhetoric and hints of euroskepticism were an act. And perhaps the act would have continued, but the bond market reaction was so quick and jarring (Chart 12) - including the largest day-to-day selloff since 1993 (Chart 13) - that it has disciplined Italy's policymakers almost immediately. Chart 11Lega Gave Up A Lot By Forming A Coalition Lega Gave Up A Lot By Forming A Coalition Lega Gave Up A Lot By Forming A Coalition Chart 12Bond Vigilantes Are... Bond Vigilantes Are... Bond Vigilantes Are... Chart 13...A Massive Constraint On Rome ...A Massive Constraint On Rome ...A Massive Constraint On Rome This is instructive for investors. In 2015, Greece decided to play the game of brinkmanship with Europe and ultimately lost. Our high-conviction view at the time was that Athens would back off from brinkmanship because it was massively constrained.5 Not only would an exit from the Euro Area mean a government default and the redenomination of all household saving into "monopoly money," but the level of euroskepticism in Greece was not high enough to support such a high-risk strategy. At the time, we pointed out that most investors - and practically all pundits - were wrong when they argued that brinkmanship between Greece and Brussels was "unpredictable." This conventional view was supported by an incorrect reading of game theory, particularly the "game of chicken." Game theory teaches us that a game of chicken is the most dangerous game because it can create an equilibrium in which all rational actors have an incentive to stick to their guns - to "keep driving" in the parlance of the game - despite the risks.6 In Diagram 1, we can see that continuing to drive carries the most risks, but it also carries the most reward, provided that your opponent swerves. Since all actors in a game of chicken assume the rationality of their opponents, they also expect them to eventually swerve. When this does not happen, the bottom-right quadrant emerges, one of chaos and deeply negative payouts for everyone involved in the crash. The problem with this analysis is that - as with most game theory - its parsimony belies deep complexity that often varies due to a number of factors. The first such factor is replayability. The decisions of Italian policymakers will be informed by the outcomes of the 2015 Greek episode, which did not go well for Athens. Another factor that obviously varies the payout matrix is the relative strength of each player; or, to stick with the analogy, the type of vehicle driven by each actor. Greece and its Euro Area peers were not driving the same car. The classic game of chicken only produces the payouts from Diagram 1 if all participants are driving the same vehicle. However, if Angela Merkel is behind the wheel of a Mercedes-Benz G-Class SUV, while Greek PM Alexis Tsipras is riding a tricycle, then the payouts are going to be much different in the case of a crash. In that case, the payouts should approximate something closer to Diagram 2. Diagram 1Regular Game Of Chicken Mediterranean Europe: Contagion Risk Or Bear Trap? Mediterranean Europe: Contagion Risk Or Bear Trap? Diagram 2Greece Versus Euro Area In 2015 Mediterranean Europe: Contagion Risk Or Bear Trap? Mediterranean Europe: Contagion Risk Or Bear Trap? So the crucial question for investors is what vehicle are Italian policymakers driving? We do not doubt that it is an actual car, unlike Tsipras's tricycle. But it is more likely to be a finely-crafted Italian sportscar, adept at hugging the twists and turns of Rome's policy, rather than an SUV capable of colliding with Merkel's ominous truck. Why doesn't Rome have more capability than Greece? Because of time horizons. An Italian exit from the Euro Area would undoubtedly shake the foundations of the common currency and the European integrationist project. But Rome actually has to exit in order to shake those foundations. As we have learned with Brexit, such an "exit" scenario could take months, if not years. In the process of trying to exit, the Italian banking system would become insolvent, turning household savings and retirements into linguini. This would occur immediately and would exert economic, financial, and - most importantly - political pressure on Italian policymakers instantaneously. Our colleague Dhaval Joshi, BCA's Chief European Strategist, has argued that a 4% Italian bond yield is the "line in the sand" regarding the survival of Italy's banks.7 As Dhaval points out, investors start to get nervous about a bank's solvency when equity capital no longer covers net non-performing loans (NPLs). Based on this rule, the largest Italian banks now have €165 billion of equity capital against €130 billion of net NPLs, implying excess capital of €35 billion (Chart 14). Although the net NPL figure has improved much from the peak in 2015, it remains large. It follows that there would be fresh doubts about Italian banks' mark-to-market solvency if their bond valuations sustained a drop of just a tenth from the recent peak. Dhaval estimates that this equates to the 10-year BTP yield breaching and remaining above 4% (Chart 15). Chart 14Italian Banks' Equity Capital ##br##Exceeds Net NPLs By Euro 35 Bn Italian Banks' Equity Capital Exceeds Net NPLs By Euro 35 Bn Italian Banks' Equity Capital Exceeds Net NPLs By Euro 35 Bn Chart 15Italian Banks' Solvency Would Be In ##br##Question If The 10-Year BTP Yield Breached 4% Italian Banks' Solvency Would Be In Question If The 10-Year BTP Yield Breached 4% Italian Banks' Solvency Would Be In Question If The 10-Year BTP Yield Breached 4% Additionally, while Italian support for the common currency is relatively low, there is still a majority of around 60% that support the euro. This is similar to the level of support for the euro in Greece in 2015. We would suspect that the support for the currency would rise - and that populist parties would decline in popularity - if Italian policymakers set off a bond market riot that caused the insolvency of Italian banks. Does this mean that the bond market is a permanent constraint on Italian exit from the Euro Area? No. At some point in the future, after a deep recession that raises unemployment levels substantively, popular support for the common currency could tank precipitously. But we are far from that point. In fact, Italy has enjoyed a relatively robust recovery over the past 18 months. As such, any economic crisis today will be blamed on the populist policymakers themselves, yet another reason for them to moderate and seek the path of calm negotiations with the EU. Bottom Line: With regards to any potential "game of chicken" negotiations with the rest of Europe, Italian policymakers are not riding a tricycle like their Greek counterparts were in 2015. Italians are behind the wheel of a finely-crafted, titanium-chassis, Italian roadster. Unfortunately, Chancellor Angela Merkel is still in a Mercedes SUV that weighs 2.5 tons. This is a high-conviction view based on the actions of Italian policymakers over the past month. Despite an improvement in polling, populists have backed off from calling for a new election (which would have been perfectly logical) and that would have been advantageous to them and have abandoned some of the most controversial - and expensive - platforms of their coalition agreement. Unlike their peers in Greece, Italian populists have proven to have little stomach for actual confrontation. The Ultimate Constraint: Risorgimento In a report published back in 2016, we argued that Italy's original sin was its unification in 1861.8 Risorgimento brought together the North and South in a political and economic union that made little sense. The North had developed a market economy during the Middle Ages (and gave the West its Renaissance!), while the South had remained under feudalism well into the early twentieth century. Given the limited resources, governance, and technology of the mid-nineteenth century, the scope, ambition, and yes, folly of uniting Italy were probably several orders of magnitude greater than the effort to forge a common currency union in Europe in the twenty-first century. To this day, Italy remains an economically bifurcated country. Map 1 shows that the four wealthiest and most-productive regions of Europe, outside of capital cities, are the German Rhineland, Bavaria, the Netherlands, and Northern Italy. Meanwhile, the Italian South - or Mezzogiorno - is as undeveloped as Greece and Eastern Europe. Map 1Core Europe Extends Well Into Northern Italy Mediterranean Europe: Contagion Risk Or Bear Trap? Mediterranean Europe: Contagion Risk Or Bear Trap? The units of analysis in Map 1 are the so-called EU "nomenclature of territorial units for statistics" (NUTS).9 These regions matter because Brussels uses them to determine how much "structural funding" - essentially development aid - each country receives from the EU. The EU "regional and cohesion" funding - totaling €351.8 billion for the 2014-2020 budget period - is not distributed based on the aggregate wealth of each country, since that would favor the new entrants into the union. The EU's discerning eye when it comes to distributing development funds is not accidental. It is a product of decades of lobbying by Italy (and Spain) to prevent a shift of structural funding to Eastern European member states. From Rome's perspective, the real European development project is not in Poland or Greece, but in the Mezzogiorno. Chart 16Italy Shares The Burden Of The Mezzogiorno With The EU Mediterranean Europe: Contagion Risk Or Bear Trap? Mediterranean Europe: Contagion Risk Or Bear Trap? To this day, Italy and Spain receive the second and third largest amount of EU development aid (Chart 16). Despite contributing, in gross terms, 13% to the EU's total revenues, Italy's net contribution per person is smaller than those of the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Austria (Chart 17). Given that Italy is a wealthy EU state, its net budget contribution of approximately €3 billion, 0.2% of GDP, essentially means that it gets the benefits of EU membership for free. Chart 17Italy Gets To Join The Club For Free Mediterranean Europe: Contagion Risk Or Bear Trap? Mediterranean Europe: Contagion Risk Or Bear Trap? And EU membership comes with many benefits. Membership in the Euro Area - combined with sharing the same "lender of last resort" with Germany, the European Central Bank - allows Italy to finance its budget deficits at low interest rates and to issue government debt in the world's second largest reserve currency (Chart 18). These financial benefits are even greater than the rebate it gets from Europe. Access to cheap financing allows Italy to carry the costs of Mezzogiorno on its own. Chart 18The Big Difference Between 2011 & Today The Big Difference Between 2011 & Today The Big Difference Between 2011 & Today It is somewhat ironic that Lega is today preaching populism and euroskepticism. In the early 1990s, its main target of angst was not the EU and Brussels, but Italy's South and profligate Rome, which funneled the North's taxes to the South. This early iteration of the party was quite pro-EU, as it saw Italy's North as genuinely European and worthy of membership in EU institutions. Some of its politicians and voters hoped that Northern Italy could meld into the EU, leaving the Mezzogiorno to fend for itself. Hence there is no deep, ideological euroskepticism in Lega's DNA. The party's evolution also illustrates how opportunistic and pragmatic Italian policymakers can be. The reality is that if Italy were to act on its threat of "exit," it would undoubtedly become far worse off economically. Not only would Northern Italy have to support the Mezzogiorno alone, but any structural reforms that could lift productivity and education in the South would become far less likely as anti-establishment forces took hold. Bottom Line: Our high-conviction view is now the same as it was in 2016. Italy is "bluffing." Leaving the EU or the Euro Area makes no sense given its economic bifurcation, which is the result of Risorgimento. Both policymakers and voters understand this. The real intention in the game of chicken between Brussels and Rome is to see an easing of austerity. We expect that Italian policymakers will ultimately succeed in getting leniency from Brussels on allowing deficit-widening fiscal stimulus, but the stimulus will be much smaller than their original plans that spooked the bond market laid out. To European and Italian politicians, Italy's economic bifurcation is well understood. Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission, specifically referred to it when he said, "Italians have to take care of the poor regions of Italy." He was later forced to apologize for his comments, with leaders of M5S and Lega faking outrage. But given that the ideological roots of Lega are precisely in the same intellectual vein as Juncker's comments, investors should understand that politicians in Rome are well aware of their fundamental constraints. Juncker's comments were a dog whistle to Rome. The actual message was: we know you are bluffing. Investment Implications Our analysis suggests that the path of least resistance for the M5S-Lega coalition is to negotiate some austerity relief from the EU Commission, but to definitively pivot away from talk of "exit" from European institutions. PM Conte has reaffirmed that exiting the euro is off the table and that it was never on the table to begin with. The new economy minister, Giovanni Tria, followed this up with a comment that "the position of this government is clear and unanimous... there are no discussions taking place about any proposal to leave the euro." Meanwhile, Lega leader and new Italian interior minister Matteo Salvini has focused his early efforts and commentary on the party's promise to check illegal immigration to Italy. This will be a policy upon which Lega will test its populist credentials, not a fight with Brussels. Is the worst of the crisis therefore "over"? Is it time to buy Italian assets? Not yet. Both Italian bonds and equities rallied throughout 2017. Italian equities, for example, have a higher Shiller P/E ratio than both Spanish and Portuguese stocks (Chart 19). As such, a sell-off was long overdue. Chart 19Why Did Italian Equities Rally So Much? Why Did Italian Equities Rally So Much? Why Did Italian Equities Rally So Much? Chart 20Italy's Binary Future Italy's Binary Future Italy's Binary Future Furthermore, we do not expect Rome's negotiations with Brussels to proceed smoothly. It is very likely that the bond market will have to continue to play the role of disciplinarian. The government debt-to-GDP ratio could quickly become unsustainable if the current primary budget balance is thrown into a deficit (Chart 20). According to the IMF and BCA Research calculations, Italian long-term debt dynamics are stable even with real interest rates rising to 2% - from just 0.5% today - and real GDP growth remaining at a muted 1%. But this stability requires the country to continue to run a primary budget surplus of around 2% of GDP (Chart 21). Conversely, running a persistent primary deficit of 2% would result in an explosive increase in Italy's debt dynamics. Even if that stimulus produces real GDP growth of 3%, the "bond vigilantes" could protest the surge in debt and drive real interest rates to 3.5% or higher. As such, the country's fiscal space will ultimately be determined by the bond market. Rome can afford to lower its primary budget surplus, but only so far as the bond market does not riot. Our colleague Dhaval Joshi believes that the math behind an Italian fiscal stimulus would make sense if it provides enough of a sustainable boost to economic growth without blowing out the budget deficit.10 We suspect that the bond market will eventually agree, but only if Brussels and Berlin bless the ultimate fiscal package as well. While investors wait to see the outcome of Rome-Brussels budget talks, which will likely last well into Q4, we prefer to play Mediterranean politics by shorting Italian government bonds versus their Spanish equivalents. BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy initiated such a trade on December 16, 2016, which has produced a total return of 5.8%. The original logic for the trade was based on an assessment that Italy's medium-term growth potential, sovereign-debt fundamentals, and political stability were all much worse than those of Spain (Chart 22). These differences were not reflected in relative bond prices. Chart 21Three Factors Will Influence Italy's Debt Trajectory Three Factors Will Influence Italy's Debt Trajectory Three Factors Will Influence Italy's Debt Trajectory Chart 22Spain Trumps Italy On All Fronts Spain Trumps Italy On All Fronts Spain Trumps Italy On All Fronts Ongoing political turmoil in Italy has justified sticking with the trade. Looking ahead, there is potential for additional spread widening between Italy and Spain in the coming months. Spain is enjoying better economic growth; the deficit outlook will invariably worsen for Italy with the new coalition government; and Spanish support for the euro and establishment policymakers remains far higher and more buoyant than in Italy. All these factors justify a wider risk premium for Italian debt over Spanish bonds (Chart 23). Chart 23Stay Short 5-Year Italy Vs. 5-Year Spain Stay Short 5-Year Italy Vs. 5-Year Spain Stay Short 5-Year Italy Vs. 5-Year Spain Chart 24Stay Underweight Italian Debt Stay Underweight Italian Debt Stay Underweight Italian Debt One final critical point - the timing of any budget related uncertainty could not be worse for Italy. Economic growth is slowing and leading indicators say that this trend will continue, which suggests that Italian government bonds should continue to underperform global peers (Chart 24). Our Global Fixed Income Strategy team has argued that government debt in the European "periphery" should be treated more like corporate credit rather than sovereign debt.11 Faster economic growth leads to fewer worries about debt sustainability and increased risk-taking behavior by investors, both of which lead to reduced credit risk premiums and eventually, stronger growth. In other words, think of Italian BTPs as a BBB-rated corporate bond rather than a "risk-free" Euro Area government bond. So as long as the Italian economy continues to lose momentum, an underweight stance on Italian government bonds is justified. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis, Senior Vice President Global Fixed Income Strategy rrobis@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Europe's Divine Comedy Part II: Italy In Purgatorio," dated June 21, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Repubblica, "Il discorso di Conte in Senato, la versione integrale," dated June 6, 2018, available at repubblica.it. 3 Conte's exact quote was "the objective is the 'flat tax,' that is a tax reform characterized by the introduction of rates that are fixed, with a system of deductions that can guarantee that the tax code remains progressive." This is our own translation from Italian and therefore we may be missing something. However, a "flat tax" that has a number of different rates and that remains progressive is, by definition, not a flat tax. 4 In fact, the speech could be read with an eye towards some genuine supply-side reforms, particularly in bringing the country's youth into the labor force, improving governance, reforming the judiciary, cracking down on corruption and privileges of the political class, and generally de-bureaucratizing Italy. If successful, these would all be welcome reforms. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Monthly Report, "After Greece," July 8, 2015, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 The game derives its name from a test of manhood by which two drivers drive towards each other on a collision course, preferably behind the wheel of a 1950s American muscle car. Whoever swerves loses. Whoever keeps driving, wins and gets the girl. 7 Please see BCA European Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Italy's 'Line In The Sand,'" dated May 31, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Europe's Divine Comedy: Italian Inferno," dated September 14, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 9 The acronym stands for Nomenclature des Unités Statistiques. 10 Please see BCA European Investment Strategy Special Report, "Italy Vs. Brussel: Who's Right?" dated May 24, 2018, available at eis.bcaresearch.com. 11 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "Is It Partly Sunny Or Mostly Cloudy?" dated May 22, 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com.

Much has been made of preparing for the arrival of the Millennial generation, accompanied by well-worn stereotypes of general 'failure to launch' as they reach adulthood. However, the former is a misnomer as this age cohort is already the largest and the latter is simply untrue. In the report below, authored by guest editor Richard Dias, we explore these themes and conclude with our recommendations for a Millennials basket of stocks to capture the strength of this cohort as consumers. The Echo Boom Heard Round The World According to the U.S. Census Bureau, Millennials are the U.S.'s largest living generation. Millennials, (or Echo Boomers) defined as people aged 18 to 36 (born 1982 to 2000), now number more than +80mn and represent more than one quarter of the U.S.'s population - Baby Boomers (born 1946 to 1964) number about 75mn.1 Stealthily becoming the largest age group in the U.S. over the last few years, Millennials per-year-birth-rate peaked at 4.3mn in 1990. Surprisingly, the pace matched that of the post-war Baby Boom peak-per-year-birth-rate in 1957 - the per-year average over the period was higher for the Baby Boomers (Chart 1). Chart 1Echo Boom Echo Boom Echo Boom This gap is now set to grow rapidly as the death rate of Baby Boomers accelerates. What's more, with the largest one-year age cohort only 25 years old, Millennials will be the dominant generation for many years. How these "kids" will impact the market as they become the most important consumers, borrowers and, to a lesser degree, investors is unclear but make no mistake: this is a seismic shift in economic power and it is here to stay. Also of note is how much better the demographic picture is in the U.S. versus other developed markets (Chart 2) but this last point will not be the focus of this report. Rather, the focus will be on the Echo Boom's domestic implications touching on the labor market (wage growth), inflation, debt and housing, CAPEX and growth. Chart 2Labor Force Growth Millennials Are Not Coming Of Age; They Are Already Here Millennials Are Not Coming Of Age; They Are Already Here The Graduates Chart 3Educational Intensity Is Increasing Unabated Millennials Are Not Coming Of Age; They Are Already Here Millennials Are Not Coming Of Age; They Are Already Here Millennials have invested in "human capital" more than any previous generations. By 2014, more received a postsecondary degree (associates, bachelor's, or graduate degree) than any other generation (Chart 3). More higher education is a rational response to a labor market that pays college graduates much more than adults without a college degree.2 Millennials have also been much more likely to attend graduate school than previous generations - enrollment increased at an even faster rate than undergraduate enrollment, jumping from 2.8% in 1995 to 3.8% in 2010.3 Timing Is Everything Unfortunately Echo Boomers entered the workforce at the worst possible time (Chart 4). During recessions, enrollment increases along with duration of study. This reflects a lower opportunity cost of schooling, as well as a stronger incentive to improve one's skills in a tougher job market. This cyclical pattern was exacerbated by the severity of the Great Recession. A lot has also been made of the historically low youth labor participation rates (Chart 5) but this is partly explained by Millennials focusing on studies instead of combining school and work.4 A rise in educational intensity - more time devoted to schoolwork and other extracurricular activities5 - has also played a role. Difficultly finding employment and poor returns therein (low wages) has also coincided with the massive uptake in student loans - now much more readily available - and acting as a major income substitute (more on this below). Chart 4Recessions Mean More Higher Learning... Recessions Mean More Higher Learning... Recessions Mean More Higher Learning... Chart 5...And Lower Participation Rates ...And Lower Participation Rates ...And Lower Participation Rates Forever Young Another dubious narrative is that Millennials don't want to grow up. In reality, horrible early career economic conditions have meant large and lasting delays to adulthood. Entering the labor market during a recession can result in substantial earnings losses that persist, with negative effects lasting longer for college graduates.6 Poor job prospects and earnings are reflected in reduced labor mobility (not chasing jobs that are no longer available), lower marriage rates (living with parents longer) (Table 1) and home ownership7 rates that are much lower than for previous generations (partly a combination of the two). Table 1Marital Status Of The Adult Population Millennials Are Not Coming Of Age; They Are Already Here Millennials Are Not Coming Of Age; They Are Already Here Millennials continue to delay marriage (and leaving home) for several reasons8 but this does not mean they do not want to marry. Indeed over 80% of Millennials say that they "think that they will marry", more than Generation Xers and Baby Boomers did at similar ages. Similarly, they are more likely to believe that they will have kids. Once you control for some of the demographic trends9 that keep kids at home, 25 to 34 year olds continue to set up independent households at roughly the same rate as they always have and recently this household formation has accelerated. It is also worth remembering that major inflection points in homeownership rates have happened before; following a large increase pre-war, there was a sustained decline in the number of young people living at home in the 1940-50s. Another problem with this narrative is that campus housing is considered "living at home". So as enrollment increased, so did the number of young "living at home". Now, almost half of young people "living with their parents" are in college (campus housing) - even if they pay for the education with student loans or are on scholarship. Assessing the merit of these commonplace assertions is important as an unwind of the negative impulses caused by the recession, along with echo boomers coming of age, will influence the U.S. economy for many years. Back In The Saddle With the youngest of Millennials finally coming of age (the largest one-year age cohort is now 25) and the economic recovery complete, Millennials are finally joining the labor force (Chart 5). Participation rates that were justifiably depressed during Millennials' college-going years have since made a recovery, though, notably, educational intensity remains unchanged for the younger cohort of Millennials (17 to 24) (Chart 5). This significant increase in participation occurred as the size of this cohort expanded at its fastest rate in 20 years (Chart 6). The growing numbers finishing college in a less horrible economic environment are faced with a higher opportunity cost; over the last two years there has been a big jump in the real median income for these older Millennials (Chart 7). Chart 6Participation Is Recovering... Participation Is Recovering... Participation Is Recovering... Chart 7...So Are Earnings ...So Are Earnings ...So Are Earnings Millennials' economic force (population times wages or wage growth) is set to increase in size and as such its relative importance over the next decade. These demographics are positive for home buying, consumption and, ultimately, economic growth. House Prices & Consumption Set To Reaccelerate Americans are moving at the lowest rate on record10 but as we have argued above, this is set to change. Ownership rates for residential real estate have a distinct life cycle pattern; rates start low when households first reach adulthood and rise substantially by the time they reach their late 30s and early 40s. Chart 8Better Household Balance Sheets Supports House Price Gains Better Household Balance Sheets Supports House Price Gains Better Household Balance Sheets Supports House Price Gains With a huge number of Millennials entering this cycle relatively unburdened (see grey box below) and households in aggregate having de-levered (top panel, Chart 8) since the recession, we have a situation where both demand and supply (bottom panel, Chart 8) dynamics point to a highly supportive environment for housing over the short to medium term. But What About All That Student Debt Chart 9Student Loans Are Rising But##br## Other Categories Are Falling Student Loans Are Rising But Other Categories Are Falling Student Loans Are Rising But Other Categories Are Falling A lot has been made about the levels of student debt in the U.S. It is obviously large; the total amount of debt currently stands at 1.4Tn dollars and it has trebled in 10 years (top panel, Chart 9). And it is clear that delinquency rates are high, at about 11% (bottom panel, Chart 9). The reigning theory is that new or recent graduates, heavily burdened by debt, are unable or unwilling to take the next steps into adulthood. This misses the point. Lost in all of this is that while student loan burdens climbed, every other major debt category fell (credit cards, auto loans, mortgages and home equity loans). According to the NY Fed, Millennials now have less per capita debt overall than they did in 2003.11 Granted, the difference (between 2003 & 2015) is modest but when you consider the difference within the context of the wider point, it becomes important to keep in mind: the largest cohort in a generation is entering their (albeit delayed) prime borrowing (and spending) years on better financial footing that in 2003!12 The issue of payments has also been overlooked.13 Although loan balances have ballooned, the average payment has increased only 50%. And, not to belabor the point, a misunderstanding about the debt distribution compounds this false narrative. A small fraction of borrowers have huge payments while 50% of borrowers had payments of $200 or less, and another 25% had payments of $200 to $400. The top panel of Chart 10 highlights the jump in home ownership.14 This is of course due in part to the recovery but Millennials are also now a growing portion of this household formation. As they continue to create millions of new households (delayed by the recession but now accelerating), mortgage debt and house prices (with the help of underwhelming housing supply growth) will be biased higher (bottom panel, Chart 10). This household formation drives consumption (e.g white goods & services). And, as Millennials mature into their peak earning and spending years, this consumption is set to increase (Chart 11). Chart 10Homeownership Is Rising Again Homeownership Is Rising Again Homeownership Is Rising Again Chart 11Millennials Are Consumers Millennials Are Consumers Millennials Are Consumers Phillips Curve Gaining Traction It has been 15 years since we have had employment growth (of young people) of this magnitude (in percentage terms and absolute numbers). The Phillips curve tells us employment and inflation are linked. Hence Chart 12 should not surprise, as it simply suggests that a big jump in the key segment of the population - newly employed, forming households, and able to borrow and consume - help drive up the costs of consumer goods and services. We should expect protracted rises in inflation over the next few years as a function of Millennials flexing their economic might. Bringing It All Together; What Does This All Mean For Growth? The Echo Boom is a big, generational demographic wave. A difficult and painful delay has not tempered its looming importance. Finally here, this wave of echo-boomers is educated, relatively unburdened by debt, and as they inevitably "grow up", will soon begin to form new households (and have kids). They will borrow, spend, earn, but not necessarily save and invest. And this will be an important long-term theme going forward. Near term we might already be seeing signs of their arrival and firms have begun to pivot accordingly. Millennials will support household consumption. Employment growth will underpin much higher inflation. Private residential gross fixed capital formation - which has lagged - will pick up. Add to that a CAPEX cycle (largely independent) that is firing on all cylinders (Chart 13), and improving productivity growth which will follow stronger wage growth and it seems that real GDP growth reaccelerating is the odds-on likely scenario (Chart 14). Chart 12Demand Is Increasing Along With Employment Demand Is Increasing Along With Employment Demand Is Increasing Along With Employment Chart 13Capex Is Surging Capex Is Surging Capex Is Surging Chart 14GDP Growth Is Pointing Higher GDP Growth Is Pointing Higher GDP Growth Is Pointing Higher Admittedly this note paints a rosy picture of future growth (real and nominal) and takes a narrow view by focusing on demographics. And of course this is not without risks; Baby Boomer burdens (debt & health), corporate debt and a tighter monetary policy to name a few. But nominal GDP growth solves many of these and more. Investment Implications The report above does an excellent job underlining why Millennials will boost consumption spending but does not offer many insights on how that consumption will change. For example, healthcare currently makes up 17% of personal consumption expenditure in the U.S., roughly in line with housing and utilities. We would anticipate the natural attrition of the aging Baby Boomer generation to push down health care's share of the consumer's wallet (we currently have an underweight recommendation for the S&P health care index). At the same time, and as discussed in detail above, the positive implications of the relatively unburdened Millennial cohort entering prime home acquisition age factors into our sanguine home-related equities view (we currently have an overweight recommendation for the S&P home improvement retail index and recently upgraded S&P homebuilders to neutral).15 Further, Millennials consume differently from their parents; social media, online shopping and smart phones are not the consumption categories of the Baby Boomers. With this in mind, we have created a basket of ten stocks that we think will be driven over the long term by the demographic rise of the Millennial. We note that these stocks are heavily weighted to the technology and consumer discretionary sectors, which is logical as Millennial consumption habits tend to be discretionary-focused and technology-based. Beginning with consumer discretionary, we are highlighting AMZN, NFLX and SPOT as core holdings in our Millennials basket. AMZN's heft dwarfs consumer discretionary indexes but it could fall in several categories; the acquisition of Whole Foods makes it a Millennials-focused consumer staples retailer and its cloud computing web services segment is a tech leader. NFLX and SPOT represent the means by which Millennials consume media, by streaming movies and music, respectively, over the internet. The idea of owning physical media is rapidly becoming an anachronism. The home ownership themes noted in the report above lead us to add HD and LEN to the basket. Millennials are "doers" and are set to be the dominant DIYers in the next few years, making HD a logical choice. LEN, as the nation's largest home builder, should benefit from the Millennials coming of age into home buyers. We are also adding TSLA to our basket as a lone clean tech-oriented equity. TSLA capitalizes on the increasing shift to clean energy of Millennials (the key reason why no traditional energy companies have a spot in our basket). The technology stocks in our Millennials basket are AAPL, FB and MSFT, together representing more than 9% of the total value of the S&P 500. AAPL's inclusion in the list is predictable as the leading domestic purveyor of devices on which Millennials consume media content. FB too is a predictable holding, with more than half of all Americans being monthly active users, dominated by the Millennial cohort. Our inclusion of MSFT is based on its leadership in cloud computing, a rapidly growing industry we expect the connectivity and mobile computing demands of Millennials will accelerate. Chart 15BCA Millennial Basket BCA Millennial Basket BCA Millennial Basket It is worth noting at this point that at least some of the stocks noted above will be shifting out of both consumer discretionary and tech in September of this year. Stay tuned for our report on the to-be announced communications services sector later this summer. The last stock we are adding to our basket is also the only financial services equity. Though avid consumers, Millennials have shown an aversion to cash, preferring card payment systems, including both debit and credit-based. Accordingly, we are adding the leader in both of these, V, to our Millennials basket. Our basket is shown in Chart 15. To create the basket, we have imagined a $1M portfolio, invested $100,000 in each of our basket stocks at the date of publishing. While the resulting basket has obviously been an outstanding performer in the past year, meaning that it is not as attractive an entry point as it was in recent history, we think a long term view should support continued outperformance. With respect to stocks to avoid, we are believers that Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) criteria will gain in importance as Millennials invest their newfound wealth in the stock market. Accordingly, we would tend to avoid 'sin stocks', including gambling, tobacco and alcohol; demand for their services is unlikely to decline but investment weightings should mean that share prices will underperform. Further, and as noted above, we think demographics and a clean energy shift will mean energy and health care will be long term underperformers. Bottom Line: Investors seeking long term exposure to stocks lifted by the supremacy of the Millennial generation should own our Millennial basket (AAPL, AMZN, FB, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, TSLA, V). We would not hesitate to add other sharing economy stocks, including Airbnb and Uber, to this basket should they become investable. Richard Dias, CFA Guest Editor Chris Bowes Associate Editor chrisb@bcaresearch.com Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Millennials Outnumber Baby Boomers and Are Far More Diverse (June 2015) http://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2015/cb15-113.html 2 The Rising Cost of Not Going to College (Feb 2014) http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/02/11/the-rising-cost-of-not-going-to-college/ 3 15 Economic Facts About Millennials (Oct 2014) https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/millennials_report.pdf 4 NEET (Youth not in employment, education or training) level for youth 19 to 29 increased by only 4% during the Great Recession and has since returned to pre-recession levels about 15%. 5 Labor force participation: what has happened since the peak? (Sep 2016) https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2016/article/labor-force-participation-what-has-happened-since-the-peak.htm 6 The long-term labor market consequences of graduating from college in a bad economy (Apr 2010) http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0927537109001018 7 Homeownership Rates Are Falling, And It's Not Just A Millennial Problem (May 2016) https://www.forbes.com/sites/shreyaagarwal/2016/05/06/homeownership-rates-are-falling-and-its-not-just-a-millennial-problem/#3df54894494a 8 Reasons Millennials (17 to 35) stay at home longer include; this generation is younger (more 17 to 24 that 25 to 35), more culturally diverse, societally more tolerant, more time in post-secondary education, and houses have gotten much bigger 9 Five-year age subgroup, marital status, presence of children, sex, race, ethnicity, nativity (i.e. native- or foreign-born), current school enrollment, and educational attainment (Nov 2015) - http://jedkolko.com/2015/11/23/why-millennials-still-live-with-their-parents/ 10 Americans Moving at Historically Low Rates, Census Bureau Reports https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2016/cb16-189.html 11 This myth about millennials needs debunking (Mar 2016) https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/03/this-myth-about-millennials-need… 12 Also of note from this two charts (Chart 21 & 22) is that it is NOT young people that are increasing their borrowing but old people. A 2016 blog post from the NY Fed "The Greying of American Debt" - expands on this theme. http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2016/02/the-graying-of-ame… 13 Is There a Student Loan Crisis? Not in Payments (May 2016) https://clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-events/publications/forefront/ff-… 14 Demographics: Renting vs. Owning (Feb 2017) http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2017/03/demographics-renting-vs-ownin… 15 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Seeing The Light," dated May 29, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com.

Overweight (High Conviction) The S&P air freight index has been on a tear in recent months, after putting in a bottom earlier this year. It appears the market is valuing rising global trade driving a surge in revenues over a run up in fuel costs that will be a headwind for margins. We would concur. Domestic business conditions are nearly as good as they get, which has historically coincided with rising global air freight volumes (second panel). This rising demand, combined with relatively flat capacity growth, puts pricing power squarely in the hands of the logistics providers (third panel). We think the necessary conditions are in place to improve profit despite rising input costs. While the performance of the S&P air freight index has been solid recently, the growth in forward EPS estimates has been stronger, meaning valuations have barely budged from their steep discount to both normal and the market (bottom panel). We expect this situation is unlikely to persist with the most likely scenario being strong stock price performance, particularly if input costs begin to recede. Accordingly, we reiterate our high conviction overweight recommendation on the air freight index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5AIRF - UPS, FDX, CHRW, EXPD. Global Trade Is LIfting Air Freight Global Trade Is LIfting Air Freight

Highlights One of Europe's major success stories is the structural and broad-based increase in female labour participation rates. The trend is set to continue for the next decade. Stay overweight the Personal Products sector as a long-term position. Italy's decade-long stagnation is not a deep-seated structural malaise. It is a protracted cyclical downturn resulting from a banking system that was never repaired after the 2008 financial crisis combined with wholly inappropriate fiscal austerity. We expect Italy's new government to push back against the EU's misguided fiscal rules and correct this decade-long error. Buy exposure to Italian real estate as a new long-term position either directly or through Italy's small real estate equity sector. Feature Some analysts persist on comparing economic performances on the basis of real GDP per head of total population. But the total population includes children and the elderly who cannot contribute to economic output. Therefore, a correct assessment of economic performance should look at real GDP per head of working-age population. Chart I-1AWomen Are Powering The European Economy... Women Are Powering The European Economy... ...Less So In The U.S. Women Are Powering The European Economy... ...Less So In The U.S. Chart I-1B ...Less So In The U.S. Women Are Powering The European Economy... ...Less So In The U.S. Women Are Powering The European Economy... ...Less So In The U.S. Admittedly, as the retirement age rises, the definition of 'working-age' will gradually change, but the general principle still holds: only count in the denominator those who can contribute to economic output. GDP per head of working-age population can grow in several ways. One way is to get more output or better output from each hour worked through improvements in efficiency and/or quality. As this improvement is theoretically limitless, it is the main source of productivity gains in the long run. A second way is for each worker to work more hours. But given the physical and legal constraints on productive working time, there is only limited scope to increase output in this way. How Women Are Powering The European Economy There is one other way to increase GDP per head of working-age population: increase the percentage of the working age population that is in the labour force.1 In other words, structurally increase the labour participation rate. If this participation rate is already high - as it is for men - then there is little scope to increase it much further. But if the participation rate is low - as it is for European women - then there is considerable scope to increase it. This brings us to one of Europe's major, and largely untold, success stories - the structural and broad-based increase in female participation rates (Chart I-1-Chart I-5). Over the past twenty years, the EU28 female participation rate has risen from 57% to 68%, with an especially large contribution from the socially conservative southern countries. In Spain, female participation has surged from 47% to 70%. In Italy, it has shot up from 42% to 56% and has clear scope to rise much further. Chart I-2Italy: Labour Force Participation Rate Italy: Labour Force Participation Rate Italy: Labour Force Participation Rate Chart I-3Spain: Labour Force Participation Rate Spain: Labour Force Participation Rate Spain: Labour Force Participation Rate Chart I-4Germany: Labour Force Participation Rate Germany: Labour Force Participation Rate Germany: Labour Force Participation Rate Chart I-5France: Labour Force Participation Rate France: Labour Force Participation Rate France: Labour Force Participation Rate What is driving this structural trend? Two things. First, the employment sectors that are growing structurally - healthcare, social care, and education - tend to employ more women than men. Second, European countries have legislated a raft of policies encouraging women to join and remain in the labour force: generous paid maternity leave and subsidised childcare. The trend is for further improvements, with the focus now on improving paternity leave. Sharing parental and family responsibilities between mothers and fathers allows more women to enter and stay in the labour force.2 For the ultimate end-point in the trend, look to the Scandinavian countries which started such policies in the early 1970s. In Sweden, labour force participation for women and men is almost identical: 81% versus 84%. If the EU eventually adopts the Scandinavian model, it would mean another 20 million European women in employment and contributing to economic output (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Another 20 Million European Women ##br##Could Join The Labour Force Another 20 Million European Women Could Join The Labour Force Another 20 Million European Women Could Join The Labour Force Dispelling Two Myths: The Euro Area And Italy Having established that economic performances should be compared on the basis of GDP per head of working age population, we can now dispel two common myths. The first myth is that the U.S. generates superior productivity growth than the euro area. It is true that the U.S. has been better at getting more output from each hour worked, so on this measure, the U.S. does win. Against this, the euro area has been much better at getting more of its working-age population - albeit mostly women - into employment. So on this measure, the euro area wins (Chart of the Week). The net result is that, over the past twenty years, the U.S and the euro area have generated exactly the same growth in real GDP per working-age population (Chart I-7). Of course, the euro area's structural improvement in female participation rates cannot continue forever, but it can certainly continue for another decade or so, and this is generally the longest time horizon that most investors care about. Chart I-7The Euro Area And The U.S.: Identical Growth In Real GDP Per Head Of Working-Age Population The Euro Area And The U.S.: Identical Growth In Real GDP Per Head Of Working-Age Population The Euro Area And The U.S.: Identical Growth In Real GDP Per Head Of Working-Age Population The second myth concerns the subject du jour: Italy. Many people claim that Italy's economic stagnation is due to deep-seated structural problems which differentiate it from other major economies. The problem with this narrative is that from the mid-1990s until 2008 the growth in Italy's real GDP per head of working age population was little different to that in Germany, France or the U.S. (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Italy Performed In Line With Other Major Economies Until 2008 Italy Performed In Line With Other Major Economies Until 2008 Italy Performed In Line With Other Major Economies Until 2008 Italy's economic stagnation only started after the 2008 global financial crisis. After a financial crisis which cripples the banking system, there are two golden rules: unleash fiscal stimulus; and repair the banking system as quickly as possible. The U.S. and U.K. followed the golden rules perfectly and immediately; Ireland followed a couple of years later; Spain waited until 2013. But in each case, the economies rebounded very strongly as the fiscal stimulus kicked in and the banks recuperated. Italy neither unleashed fiscal stimulus, nor repaired its banks - so its economy has stagnated for a decade. Moreover, if output stagnates for a decade, it follows arithmetically that productivity growth will also look poor. In a back-to-front argument, critics have pounced on this as evidence of excessive 'red tape' and 'structural problems'. But this is a misdiagnosis of the malaise. To reiterate, Italy's real GDP per working-age population was growing very respectably before 2008. Italy's misfortune is that its indebtedness has an unusual profile: more public debt than private debt. France and Spain (and other major euro area economies) have the usual profile: less public debt than private debt. So the EU's fiscal rules - which can see only public debt and are blind to private debt - have severely and unfairly constrained Italy's ability to respond to financial crises. While every other major economy followed the golden rules to recover from the 2008 crisis, Italy could neither unleash fiscal stimulus to kick start the economy nor recapitalise its dysfunctional banking system. We expect Italy's new government to push back against the EU's misguided fiscal rules and correct this decade-long error. Two Structural Investment Conclusions This week's two investment conclusions are both long term, and require a buy and hold mentality. The first conclusion reiterates a structural position: overweight the Personal Products sector. This is based on our expectation that, in Europe, female participation rates will continue their structural uptrend; while in the U.S. we expect female participation rates to continue outperforming male participation rates. Therefore the sales and profits of the Personal Products sector, in which female spending dominates, will benefit from a multi-year tailwind, at least relative to other sectors. And the extent of this tailwind is not fully discounted in valuations. The second conclusion is a new long-term recommendation: buy exposure to Italian real estate. This is based on our assessment that Italy's decade-long stagnation is not a deep-seated structural malaise. Instead, it is a protracted cyclical downturn resulting from a banking system that was never repaired after the 2008 financial crisis combined with wholly inappropriate fiscal austerity. Removing these shackles will allow a long-term recovery, just as it did for Spain in 2013. If we are right, the best multi-year buy and hold play is Italian real estate which has been in a decade-long bear market (Chart I-9). For those that cannot directly invest in property, Italy has a small real estate equity sector which faithfully tracks the long term profile of real estate prices (Chart I-10), and whose main component is Beni Stabili. The caveat is that the stock has a market cap of just €2 billion; the appeal is that it offers a juicy dividend yield of 4.5%. Chart I-9Italian Real Estate Has Suffered ##br##A Decade-Long Bear Market Italian Real Estate Has Suffered A Decade-Long Bear Market Italian Real Estate Has Suffered A Decade-Long Bear Market Chart I-10Italian Real Estate Equities##br## Track Real Estate Prices Italian Real Estate Equities Track Real Estate Prices Italian Real Estate Equities Track Real Estate Prices Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 And in employment. 2 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Female Participation: Another Mega-Trend" published on April 6, 2017 and available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* This week, we note that the 130-day fractal dimension for platinum versus nickel is close to its lower bound, a level which has consistently predicted a tradeable countertrend move over the following 130 days. Hence, this week's trade is long platinum/short nickel on a 130 horizon before expiry. The profit target is 14% with a symmetric stop-loss. Our two other open trades, long SEK/GBP and long PLN/USD, are both in profit. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 Long Platinum / Short Nickel Long Platinum / Short Nickel The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations