Sectors

Feature June’s economic data and second-quarter GDP indicate that China’s economic recovery may have peaked. Slight improvements in some sectors, including manufacturing investment, exports and consumption, were offset by slowing in China’s old economy, such as infrastructure and real estate. A softening economy will weigh on Chinese corporate profits in 2H21. Inflation in Producer Price Index (PPI) has likely peaked, but it remains far above its historic average. Downstream industries may benefit from low interest rates and slightly less inflationary pressures on input prices, however, their profit growth has rolled over given weakening domestic demand and base effect. Industrial profits will shift downward in 2H21, meanwhile China’s macro policy will probably disappoint investors. Last week’s GDP’s numbers show that small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs) and private-sector businesses bore the brunt of rising global commodity prices and a slow recovery in domestic household consumption and services. The data, coupled with recent policy moves, support our view that China’s leadership is focused on helping vulnerable segments of the economy rather than boosting domestic demand by broadly easing policies (Chart 1). Nonetheless, the authorities may resort to easing policy later in 2021 if export growth weakens significantly in the second half of the year. A series of Reserve Requirement Ratio (RRR) and/or interest rate cuts, increased infrastructure project approvals, and/or looser real estate regulations, will signal that China’s ongoing policy tightening cycle has ended. In recent weeks both Chinese onshore and offshore stocks slipped further in absolute terms and relative to global benchmarks (Chart 2). We continue to recommend that investors remain cautious on Chinese stocks, at least through Q3. Chart 1No Broad Easing Yet No Broad Easing Yet No Broad Easing Yet Chart 2Investors Still Cautious On China's Economy And Policy Investors Still Cautious On China's Economy And Policy Investors Still Cautious On China's Economy And Policy   Qingyun Xu, CFA Associate Editor qingyunx@bcaresearch.com Jing Sima China Strategist jings@bcaresearch.com   Q2 GDP: Recovering At A Slower Pace China’s official GDP growth, on a year-over-year basis, slowed to 7.9% in Q2 from 18.3% in Q1 (Chart 3, top panel). While Q2’s weaker reading reflects the base effect in the data, it was slightly below the market’s expectation of 8.0-8.5%. Moreover, on a sequential basis (quarter-over-quarter), Q2’s seasonally adjusted GDP growth was one of the slowest in the past decade (Chart 3, bottom panel). These figures and the underlying data highlight that China’s economic growth momentum, which historically lags the credit impulse by six to nine months, has peaked (Chart 4). However, in 1H21, China aggregate output still grew by a 5.5% average annual rate during the same period over the past two years, well within Chinese policymakers’ target of above 5% growth needed to maintain a stable economy.  Meanwhile, the bifurcation in China’s economic recovery continues.  While robust external demand for Chinese goods helped to underpin manufacturing output, the sector’s profit growth has lagged upstream industries. Moreover, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are experiencing soaring profit growth whereas SMEs have struggled with rising global commodity prices and sluggish domestic consumption as discussed below. We expect that the pace in credit growth deceleration will moderate in 2H21 and interest rates will stay at historically low levels. However, the authorities are unlikely to loosen macro policies until more signs of economic weaknesses emerge. Chart 3Q2 GDP: Slowing From An Elevated Level Q2 GDP: Slowing From An Elevated Level Q2 GDP: Slowing From An Elevated Level Chart 4Chinese Economic Growth Should Soften Further In 2H21 Chinese Economic Growth Should Soften Further In 2H21 Chinese Economic Growth Should Soften Further In 2H21   Robust Exports, Sluggish Manufacturing Investment Chart 5Subdued Manufacturing Investment Recovery Despite Robust Exports Subdued Manufacturing Investment Recovery Despite Robust Exports Subdued Manufacturing Investment Recovery Despite Robust Exports China’s export growth in June beat market expectations, despite shipping disruptions at major ports in Guangdong province due to a resurgence in COVID-19 cases. However, the recovery in manufacturing investment was muted through most of 1H21 even though export growth was resilient (Chart 5). There are several reasons for the sluggish recovery: the RMB’s rapid appreciation in the first five months of 2021, rising inflation and the limited pricing power that Chinese exporters gained in the first half of the year likely impeded their profits and curbed their propensity to invest (Chart 6). Total export values in USD significantly outpaced those in RMB terms, suggesting that the profit gains by Chinese exporters were offset by the strengthening local currency (Chart 7). Chart 6Rapid RMB Appreciation Will Weigh On Industrial Profits Rapid RMB Appreciation Will Weigh On Industrial Profits Rapid RMB Appreciation Will Weigh On Industrial Profits Chart 7Divergence Between Exports In USD versus RMB Divergence Between Exports In USD versus RMB Divergence Between Exports In USD versus RMB Furthermore, manufacturers in mid-to-downstream industries have been unable to fully pass on rising input costs to domestic consumers, which is evidenced in the faster growth of manufacturing output volume compared with price increases. It contrasts with the previous inflationary cycles, where surging prices for manufactured goods surpassed output volume (Chart 8A & 8B). Chart 8AChina's Manufacturing Recovery: Stronger Volume Than Prices China's Manufacturing Recovery: Stronger Volume Than Prices China's Manufacturing Recovery: Stronger Volume Than Prices Chart 8BMuted Profit Margin Recovery In Manufacturing Compared With Mining Muted Profit Margin Recovery In Manufacturing Compared With Mining Muted Profit Margin Recovery In Manufacturing Compared With Mining June’s improvement in manufacturing investment may not advance into 2H21 without added policy support. The nearly 2% depreciation in the RMB against the dollar in recent weeks will alleviate some pressure on exporters’ profit margins. However, export prices in USD also started to weaken (Chart 9). In addition, June’s manufacturing PMI and a Chinese business school survey,1 reported a deterioration in business conditions among smaller businesses. The weaker sentiment will depress manufacturing investments since China’s manufacturing sector is dominated by private and smaller businesses (Chart 10). Chart 9Chinese Export Prices In USD Are Rolling Over Chinese Export Prices In USD Are Rolling Over Chinese Export Prices In USD Are Rolling Over Chart 10Deteriorating Business Sentiment Will Depress Manufacturing Investments Deteriorating Business Sentiment Will Depress Manufacturing Investments Deteriorating Business Sentiment Will Depress Manufacturing Investments Recent policy measures to keep a low interest-rate environment will help the export and manufacturing sectors by reducing operating costs. The measures are also in keeping with China’s shift from boosting its service sector to maintaining a steady share of manufacturing output in its domestic economy (Chart 11). Chart 11Maintaining A Steady Share Of Manufacturing Output In China's Economy Maintaining A Steady Share Of Manufacturing Output In China's Economy Maintaining A Steady Share Of Manufacturing Output In China's Economy   Policy Tightening In The Old Economy Continues Chart 12Investments In Real Estate Have Lost Steam Investments In Real Estate Have Lost Steam Investments In Real Estate Have Lost Steam Infrastructure investment growth slowed further in June. Investments in real estate, which drove China’s economic recovery in the second half of 2020, are also losing momentum (Chart 12). The slowdown, engineered by policymakers, will likely endure for the rest of the year. Bank loans to real estate developers tumbled to a cyclical low (Chart 13). In addition, deposit and advance payments, the main source of funds for real estate projects, nose-dived along with home sales (Chart 14).  Chart 13No Signs Of Looser Financing Regulations In Property Sector No Signs Of Looser Financing Regulations In Property Sector No Signs Of Looser Financing Regulations In Property Sector Chart 14Falling Home Sales Will Further Depress Real Estate Investments Falling Home Sales Will Further Depress Real Estate Investments Falling Home Sales Will Further Depress Real Estate Investments Chart 15Sharp Pullback In New Infrastructure Project Approvals This Year Sharp Pullback In New Infrastructure Project Approvals This Year Sharp Pullback In New Infrastructure Project Approvals This Year Infrastructure project approvals by the Ministry of Finance remain on a downward trend (Chart 15). Last week, China’s Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) announced a new rule to stop financial institutions from lending to local government financing vehicles (LGFV) that hold off-balance sheet government debt. LGFVs are largely used by provincial governments to borrow from banks to help fund infrastructure projects. Regulations targeting the real estate sector will further dampen real estate investments in the second half of this year. Land purchases and housing starts, both leading indicators for real estate investment, have declined since February. Excavator sales and investment in construction equipment also deteriorated sharply (Chart 16). Given that housing prices remain elevated, we do not expect real estate regulations to shift to an easier tone.  The deceleration in China’s old economy is reflected in imports. While the value of imports remains strong, the volume has slowed, which suggests that the surge was due to soaring commodity prices (Chart 17, top panel). In particular, the growth in China’s imports of copper and steel, on a year-over-year basis and in volume terms, contracted in June (Chart 17, bottom panel). Chart 16Construction Activities Set To Slow Further Construction Activities Set To Slow Further Construction Activities Set To Slow Further Chart 17Falling Import Volume Falling Import Volume Falling Import Volume   The Key To A Consumption Recovery Retail sales picked up slightly in June following two consecutive months of decline.  However, retail sales remain below their pre-pandemic level (Chart 18). Labor market dynamics and household income growth, which stayed sluggish through 1H21, hold the key to the speed and magnitude of a recovery in consumption this year (Chart 19). Chart 18Sluggish Recovery In Household Consumption Sluggish Recovery In Household Consumption Sluggish Recovery In Household Consumption Chart 19A Lackluster Consumption Recovery Due To Slow Recovery in Household Income A Lackluster Consumption Recovery Due To Slow Recovery in Household Income A Lackluster Consumption Recovery Due To Slow Recovery in Household Income Household precautionary savings, which remain elevated compared with their historical norms, have depressed the propensity to spend (Chart 20). While the overall unemployment rate in China’s urban centers has steadily declined this year, the rate of jobless young graduates (ages 16-24) picked up and is nearly three percentage points higher than its historical mean (Chart 21). However, the high unemployment among graduates will not encourage policymakers to stimulate the economy. The number of new graduates in both 2020 and 2021 is larger than the historical average, while the growth in new job creation has nearly recovered to that of the pre-pandemic years (Chart 22). Chart 20Households' Propensity For Precautionary Savings Remains Elevated Households' Propensity For Precautionary Savings Remains Elevated Households' Propensity For Precautionary Savings Remains Elevated Chart 21Rising Unemployment Rate Among Younger Workers Rising Unemployment Rate Among Younger Workers Rising Unemployment Rate Among Younger Workers Moreover, labor market slack among young graduates seems to be concentrated in the services sector, and this sector’s improvement is dependent on China’s domestic pandemic situation and inoculation rates rather than on stimulus (Chart 23). Chart 22Urban Job Creation Growth Still On The Mend Urban Job Creation Growth Still On The Mend Urban Job Creation Growth Still On The Mend Chart 23Interruptions In Service Sector Recovery Due To Lingering COVID Cases Interruptions In Service Sector Recovery Due To Lingering COVID Cases Interruptions In Service Sector Recovery Due To Lingering COVID Cases   Elevated Inflation, Downshifting Industrial Profits Chart 24China's PPI May Have Reached A Cyclical Peak... China's PPI May Have Reached A Cyclical Peak... China's PPI May Have Reached A Cyclical Peak... China’s domestic inflationary pressures eased slightly in June with a small decline in both consumer and producer prices. The input price component of the manufacturing PMI, which normally leads the PPI by about three months, dropped sharply last month, which indicates that the PPI may have reached its cyclical peak (Chart 24). However, producer price inflation will likely remain elevated in the second half of the year. Although global industrial metal prices have rolled over since May, they remain at their highest level since 2011 (Chart 25). A rapid deceleration in Chinese credit growth and weakening demand in 2H21 will remove some pressure in the sizzling hot commodity market, but global supply-side constraints will limit the downside in raw material prices, at least through the next six months. Therefore, diminishing inflationary pressures on the PPI will only slightly reduce input costs for China’s mid-to- downstream manufacturers, which have been unable to pass on rising commodity prices to domestic consumers (Chart 26). As discussed earlier, Chinese export prices in both USD and RMB terms have also rolled over. Chart 25...But Global Commodity Prices Are Still Elevated ...But Global Commodity Prices Are Still Elevated ...But Global Commodity Prices Are Still Elevated Chart 26Absence Of Inflation Pass-Through Absence Of Inflation Pass-Through Absence Of Inflation Pass-Through Given that price changes are more important to corporate profits than volume changes, Chinese mid-to-downstream industries will continue to face downward pressure on their profit margins. Profit growth in mid-to-downstream industries consistently lagged their upstream counterparts in the past 12 months (Chart 27). Moreover, state-holding enterprises, which dominate upstream industries, have seen a 150% jump in profit growth from a year ago, while the rate of profit gains among privately owned industrial companies tumbled this year (Chart 28). Chart 27A Faster Mean Reversal In Profit Growth Among Private Companies Taking The Pulse Of China’s Slowing Economy Taking The Pulse Of China’s Slowing Economy Chart 28A Faster Mean Reversal In Profit Growth Among Private Companies A Faster Mean Reversal In Profit Growth Among Private Companies A Faster Mean Reversal In Profit Growth Among Private Companies Chinese policymakers will probably focus on addressing imbalances in China’s industrial sector and economy by supporting SMEs and the private sector. Meanwhile, industrial profit growth will decline in 2H21 from its V-shaped recovery last year, given weakening domestic demand and the waning base effect. Table 1China Macro Data Summary Taking The Pulse Of China’s Slowing Economy Taking The Pulse Of China’s Slowing Economy Table 2China Financial Market Performance Summary Taking The Pulse Of China’s Slowing Economy Taking The Pulse Of China’s Slowing Economy Footnotes 1The CKGSB (Cheung Kong Graduate School Of Business) Business Conditions Index (BCI) comprises four sub-indices: corporate sales, corporate profits, corporate financing environment and inventory levels. Equity Sector Recommendations Cyclical Investment Stance

Highlights Metals prices are likely to suffer in the short term on the back of weakening Chinese demand and fading inflationary pressures. Accordingly, in our most recent Global Asset Allocation (GAA) Quarterly Outlook, we downgraded the AUD to underweight against the greenback. Bond yields, globally, are bound to rise moderately over the course of the coming 12 months. Australian yields, however, are likely to rise slower than those in the US. The RBA has been explicit in communicating what it would take to adjust its policy stance and is likely to lag behind other central banks in DM. We therefore recommend investors favor Australian government bonds in a global bond portfolio. Australian equities, now dominated by Financials rather than the Materials sector, would benefit from a rise in bond yields. However, a weaker AUD and declining metal prices warrant no more than a benchmark exposure to Australian equities within a global equity portfolio. Introduction Recently, clients have often been asking about Australia. The reasons seem clear. With a potential commodities “super-cycle” driven by a shift to renewable energy and electric vehicles (EVs), both the Australian economy and equities should be in a position to benefit. The reality, however, has been much less positive. Particularly the divergence between the core driver of the Australian market, industrial metals, and the performance of both equities and the currency over the past few years has been a concern (Chart 1). Over the past year and a half, Australian equities have underperformed the MSCI ACWI by 12.4% (Chart 2, panel 1). This underperformance was mainly due to the outperformance of the US. However, even against global markets excluding the US, Australian equities did not match the rise in commodity prices – particularly industrial metals (Chart 2, panel 2). Chart 1Despite The Rise In Metals Prices... Despite The Rise In Metals Prices... Despite The Rise In Metals Prices... Chart 2...Australian Equities Have Not Outperformed ...Australian Equities Have Not Outperformed ...Australian Equities Have Not Outperformed   Chart 3Financials Dominate Australian Equities Financials Dominate Australian Equities Financials Dominate Australian Equities The structure of the Australian market has changed over the past few years. The commodities boom and subsequent global liquidity boom over the past two decades have fueled a housing bubble in Australia and an unsustainable rise in household debt. As a result, Australian equities are no longer dominated by metals and mining stocks, but rather by banks (Chart 3). We structured this Special Report in a Q&A format, answering questions we think are most relevant for investors to assess both the short- and long-term outlook for Australia. We aim to provide an overview of the economy and draw some conclusions on how investors should be positioned. Our conclusions are as follows: Over the past year and a half, the Australian economy has shown how complementary actions between fiscal and monetary policy, as well as social restriction measures, can mitigate both economic and human damage. The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) will be in no rush to adjust its policy stance until wage growth is back to its 3% target. However, RBA officials risk running the economy hot in the meantime given that measures of employment are back to their pre-pandemic levels. The RBA is not likely to change its policy stance before reaching its wage growth and inflation targets and will probably lag behind other global central banks in tightening. In that case, investors should favor Australian government bonds in a global bond portfolio. Australian banks remain well-funded and in good health. But their excessive exposure to the housing sector puts them at grave risk if home prices collapse. Despite this, there seems to be a feedback loop where a decline in mortgage rates fuels further demand for loans, pushing up home prices. A slowdown in Chinese credit growth and economic activity will hamper commodity demand, weighing down on Australian equities. The longer-term outlook remains compelling for Australian equities and metals as we enter into a new commodities “supercycle” fueled by a transition to renewable and alternative energy. The Australian economy stands to benefit given that the country has high levels of both production and reserves of the minerals needed for this transition.   Q: How Does The Economy Look In The Short-Term? A: Australia can be regarded as one of the few countries that successfully navigated the pandemic with a minimal amount of damage, both to its population and economy. With swift measures to limit travel and implement social restrictions, the spread of the outbreak was curtailed to slightly over 30,000 total cases, representing only 0.12% of its population (Chart 4). On the other hand, its vaccination campaign has been much slower (at 38 doses administered per 100 people) than in other DM economies such as the US, UK, France, or Germany with 100, 120, 90, and 102 doses per 100 people, respectively. In the short term, this might not seem particularly damaging to the economy. However, if vaccination rates do not pick up rapidly, Australia’s international travel restrictions (which cannot sustainably be kept in place) will hamper economic growth and become a major drag on the tourism and education sectors (Chart 5, panels 1 & 2). Chart 4Government Policies Contained The Pandemic Outbreak... Government Policies Contained The Pandemic Outbreak... Government Policies Contained The Pandemic Outbreak... Chart 5...At The Expense Of Tourism ...At The Expense Of Tourism ...At The Expense Of Tourism Ample fiscal support – in the form of wage subsidies and business support through the JobKeeper program – mitigated the shortfall in household incomes (Chart 6). This provided a boost to both consumers and businesses with Q1 GDP growth coming in at 1.8% quarter-on-quarter (7.4% annualized). GDP expectations for the remainder of this year and next show a resilient strong momentum for Australian growth and domestic demand (Chart 7). Chart 6Fiscal Stimulus Supported Employment... A Deeper Dive Into The Land Down Under A Deeper Dive Into The Land Down Under Chart 7...And Overall Growth ...And Overall Growth ...And Overall Growth Chart 8Labor Market Back To Pre-Pandemic Levels... Labor Market Back To Pre-Pandemic Levels... Labor Market Back To Pre-Pandemic Levels...   The labor market recovery has been an excellent example of how fiscal support and lockdown measures complement each other. Most employment indicators have almost recovered or surpassed their pre-pandemic levels: The unemployment rate stands at 4.90%, compared to 5.13%, the underemployment rate is at 7.44%, compared to 8.60%. The total number of those employed is now above its pre-pandemic level, albeit still below the 2018-2019 growth trend (Chart 8).   Q: When Will The RBA Shift Its Policy Stance? A: The RBA has been explicit in communicating that changes in its policy stance hinge on Australian wage growth rising sustainably towards 3% – a level last reached in Q1 2013. Even with economic activity mostly restored, wage growth remains low at 1.49% (Chart 9). Our belief is that until that occurs, the RBA will probably maintain its accommodative stance. Our global fixed-income strategists, in a recent report, highlighted their belief that the RBA is likely to be less hawkish than markets currently expect – on both tapering and hiking rates. We agree with that assessment. Comments by RBA Governor Lowe earlier last month back our dovish belief: He stated that “The Board is committed to maintaining highly supportive monetary conditions to support a return to full employment in Australia and inflation consistent with the target…This is unlikely to be until 2024 at the earliest”. Market expectations nevertheless remain much more hawkish – pointing to a first rate hike by mid 2022 and almost 70 basis points of hikes by 2024 (Chart 10). Chart 9...However Wage Growth Remains Muted ...However Wage Growth Remains Muted ...However Wage Growth Remains Muted Chart 10Market Expects A Hawkish RBA... Market Expects A Hawkish RBA Market Expects A Hawkish RBA   Chart 11...And Is Already Pricing That Down The Curve ...And Is Already Pricing That Down The Curve ...And Is Already Pricing That Down The Curve Chart 12Inflation Remains Well-Below The RBA's Target Inflation Remains Well-Below The RBA's Target Inflation Remains Well-Below The RBA's Target This means that the RBA will probably risk running the economy hot for a while. With total employment back to its pre-pandemic level and other employment indicators closely behind, inflationary pressures, sooner or later, will begin to mount. Higher growth prospects and inflation risks are being discounted further down the curve (Chart 11). The June CPI print is likely to reflect a transitory short-term base effect and the RBA is mostly going to see through that. In the meantime, we would watch other broad inflation indicators to gauge for price pressures. Broader measures such as the trimmed-mean inflation index or median inflation remain subdued at 1.1% and 1.3%, respectively. The 10-year breakeven rate currently stands at 2.1%, within the RBA’s range of 2%-3%, highlighting the market’s belief that long-term inflation remains well under control (Chart 12). Bottom Line: The RBA is likely to maintain its dovish stance for longer than the market expects. A return to sustainable levels of wage growth and inflation will remain the top objectives and it is unlikely that policy will be reversed before they are achieved. Our global fixed-income strategists laid out a checklist of what would make the RBA turn less dovish. So far, only 1 out of 5 items on their list (the recovery in private-sector demand) signals the need for a more hawkish stance. The remaining items signal no imminent pressure on the RBA to adjust policy (Table 1). The RBA is also wary of the currency appreciating if it took a more hawkish stance ahead of other central banks (e.g., the Fed) and is therefore likely to switch policy only after other central banks do so (Chart 13). Accordingly, investors should favor Australian government bonds within a global bond portfolio. Table 1RBA Checklist A Deeper Dive Into The Land Down Under A Deeper Dive Into The Land Down Under Chart 13The RBA Will Be Wary Of A Rising AUD The RBA Will Be Wary Of A Rising AUD The RBA Will Be Wary Of A Rising AUD   Q: Are There Signs Of Improvement In The Banking Sector? A: Headline indicators of the health of the Australian banking sector paint a picture of a well-capitalized, highly funded, and profitable industry. Return on equity (ROE) has averaged 12.1% over the past decade. Capital adequacy and Tier 1 capital ratios stand at 14.5% and 18.2%, respectively – much higher than at the start of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). The ratio of non-performing loans remains low and Australian banks’ reliance on leverage has also decreased (Chart 14). Chart 14Banks Look Healthy... Banks Look Healthy... Banks Look Healthy... Chart 15...But Remain Exposed To The Housing Sector... ...But Remain Exposed To The Housing Sector ...But Remain Exposed To The Housing Sector However, these indicators mask a major underlying risk. Banks remain heavily exposed to the housing market, with housing loans as high as 62% of banks’ gross outstanding loans and 40% of total assets (Chart 15, panel 1). Over the past decade and a half, banks have lent an average of A$56 of housing-related loans for every A$100 in total loans (Chart 15, panel 2).   Chart 16...Which Is Showing No Signs Of Slowing Down ...Which Is Showing No Signs Of Slowing Down ...Which Is Showing No Signs Of Slowing Down Chart 17Households Remain Heavily Indebted Households Remain Heavily Indebted Households Remain Heavily Indebted With interest rates falling over the past few decades, construction activity has boomed. Consequently, the demand for loans for new homes has been rising, leading home prices higher (Chart 16). This also meant that household debt levels have climbed and currently standing at a staggering 130% of GDP and 180% of disposable income (Chart 17).   So what does this mean for banks’ stock prices? The short answer is that absent a bursting of the bubble in house prices, banks should continue to fare well. Interestingly, the long-standing relationship between bond yields and banks’ relative stock price returns – one that works in other financial-heavy markets such as the euro area – did not hold in Australia, at least until recently. In fact, we find that, historically, Australian banks outperformed the broad market when bond yields were falling. This relationship changed post-GFC, most likely when inflation expectations became unanchored and trended lower – reflecting lower commodity prices (Chart 18). Bottom Line: Rising rates, reflecting better growth prospects and higher long-term inflation, should be a tailwind for bank stocks in the short term. Accommodative monetary policy will spur activity in the property market, propping up bank profits. This, however, puts banks at even greater risk when profitability starts to decline, NPLs rise and regulations tighten further. The latter risk is one we would highlight following RBA deputy governor Guy Debelle’s statement that monetary policy will not be used as a tool to curtail housing prices and that there are other tools to address that issue. Chart 18Rising Yields Will Be A Tailwind For Australian Equities Rising Yields Will Be A Tailwind For Australian Equities Rising Yields Will Be A Tailwind For Australian Equities   Q: How Does Chinese Policy Impact Australian Growth? A: China's role in global supply chains, as both a producer and consumer, has increased dramatically since the early 2000s. China’s demand for commodities generally and industrial metals in particular has grown over the past two decades from an average of 10% of total global demand to 50% for most metals (Chart 19). Australia stood to benefit, redirecting more and more of its metals’ production away from the rest of the world and towards China. For example, during the same period, the share of Australian iron ore exports to China increased fourfold (Chart 20). Chart 19China Is A Major Consumer Of Metals... China Is A Major Consumer Of Metals... China Is A Major Consumer Of Metals... Chart 20...And This Has Benefited Australia Over The Past Two Decades ...And This Has Benefited Australia Over The Past Two Decades ...And This Has Benefited Australia Over The Past Two Decades     However, this dynamic leaves the Australian economy very exposed to the Chinese business cycle – one that is heavily reliant on policymakers’ decisions on how much liquidity to inject into the economy. After strong credit and fiscal support throughout 2020, the Chinese authorities – wary of excessive leverage in the economy – have begun paring back stimulus which is likely to lead to weaker growth in the second half of the year and put downward pressure on metal demand (Chart 21). Chart 21Weakening Chinese Demand Will Hurt Metals In The Short-Term Weakening Chinese Demand Will Hurt Metals In The Short-Term Weakening Chinese Demand Will Hurt Metals In The Short-Term Heightened political tensions between Australia and China have also played a role. China recently imposed restrictions, including additional tariffs and bans, on Australian imports such as beef, wine, coal, and other goods. Consequently, Australian exports to China slowed. However, the goods not imported by China were absorbed by other economies – Australian export growth did not fall that much. It is unlikely that a new commodity-heavy marginal buyer will emerge in the short-term to replace Chinese demand. The recent rise in commodity prices reflected a return to economic activity, as well as inflationary fears, and supply, shipping, and logistical backlogs. These will ease in the short term, weighing on both the AUD and Australian equities.   Q: Can The Shift To Renewable Energy Spur Future Australian Growth? A: The shift to renewable energy and electrification – particularly in the transport sector – will occur sooner rather than later. Some commodity-exporting countries stand to benefit, and Australia is likely to be one. We previously highlighted that modeling longer-term demand is tricky since it relies on assumptions for the emergence of new technologies, metals’ efficiency and recycling rates, and the rate of conversion to renewables. Chart 22The Shift To Renewables Will Require More Resources... A Deeper Dive Into The Land Down Under A Deeper Dive Into The Land Down Under The mechanics of the future demand/supply relationship hinge on the following: Demand will rise during this energy transition period – simply due to the fact that the new clean energy systems require more minerals (such as copper and zinc) than the current traditional hydrocarbon-fueled energy system (Chart 22, panel 1). Electric vehicles (EVs) require about four and a half times more of certain commodities – particularly copper, nickel, and graphite – than conventional vehicles do (Chart 22, panel 2). Supply limitations, on the other hand, are what might propel metal prices even higher and lead the world economy into a new commodities “supercycle”. A study by the Institute for Sustainable Futures has shown that, in the most positive energy transition scenarios, demand for some metals will exceed supply, in terms of both available resources and reserves (Table 2). Table 2...Which Are Likely To Be In Short Supply A Deeper Dive Into The Land Down Under A Deeper Dive Into The Land Down Under For some of those metals, Australia is either among the top producers, or has the largest reserves. For example, Australia produces almost 45% and 12% of the world’s lithium and zinc, and has 22% and 27% of the world’s reserves. Looking at other metals, supply disruptions – particularly in economies where political, social, and environmental influences are an issue – might be the driver of further price rises. For example, Chile has the largest shares of global lithium reserves (~44%), and copper reserves (~23%), while South Africa has the largest share of global manganese reserves (~40%). Bottom Line: The transition to renewable energy is already underway and is likely to intensify. Forecast demand should outstrip supply and Australia stands to benefit given its large share of current production and/or reserves. How much will depend on the pace of renewable energy integration but miners are likely to be long-term winners.   Q: What Is The Outlook For The AUD? A: The Global Asset Allocation (GAA) service, in its latest Quarterly Outlook, turned negative on the AUD. The currency has historically had a high positive correlation with commodity prices and industrial metals prices, which in turn are very sensitive to Chinese demand (Chart 23). Given our outlook for metals in the short term (falling demand driven by slowing Chinese activity), we expect some weakening in the AUD over the coming 9-to-12 months (Chart 24). Chart 23The AUD Is Highly Correlated To Metal Prices... The AUD Is Highly Correlated To Metal Prices... The AUD Is Highly Correlated To Metal Prices... Chart 24...Which In Turn Are Highly Correlated To Chinese Activity ...Which In Turn Are Highly Correlated To Chinese Activity ...Which In Turn Are Highly Correlated To Chinese Activity Additionally, short-term weakness in the economy, caused by further lockdowns as Delta-variant COVID cases rise, is a risk since it might reduce domestic demand. From a valuation perspective, the AUD is slightly below its fair value (Chart 25). However, this on its own does not compel us to remain positive on the currency. We also consider other indicators such as investor positioning – which has reached a decade high, according to Citibank’s FX Positioning Alert Indicator (PAIN) (Chart 26). This indicator suggests that active FX traders hold substantial long positions in the AUD against the USD. Historically, this indicator has provided contrarian signals, with extreme optimism (pessimism) providing useful short (long) signals. Chart 25The AUD Is Close To Fair Value The AUD Is Close To Fair Value The AUD Is Close To Fair Value Chart 26Investors Are Long The AUD Investors Are Long The AUD Investors Are Long The AUD Bottom Line: Short-term weakness in the economy and a reversal in metal prices warrant caution on the currency. While valuations do not signal overbought conditions, investor positioning (a contrarian indicator) does.   Q: How Should Equity Investors Be Positioned? A: Our recent Special Report on whether country or sector effects drive equity performance showed that sector composition was relatively important in Australia, given the large difference in sector weightings relative to the global benchmark. Our analysis showed that cumulative Australian sector performance over the past two decades detracted from overall returns (Chart 27). Given that framework, and the relationship between the Australian economy and industrial metals, we find that Australian equity performance relative to the US mirrors the performance of global metal and mining relative to global tech stocks (Chart 28). This underperformance makes sense: Commodity prices have been in a structural downtrend throughout the past decade. Chart 27Country Vs Sector Effect Country Vs Sector Effect Country Vs Sector Effect Chart 28Australia / US = Metals / Tech Australia / US = Metals / Tech Australia / US = Metals / Tech Therefore, given our view of the outlook for metals, we would not want to shun Australian equities. The Global Asset Allocation (GAA) service is currently neutral the Australian market within a global equity portfolio, and underweight the Materials sector over the next 12 months. We believe this positioning makes sense given the slowdown in the Chinese economy and the improbability that another country will emerge as the alternative marginal buyer of commodities. The longer-term outlook is more compelling however, as the shift to decarbonization, renewables, and alternative energy gets underway. Conclusions In the short term metals prices are likely to suffer on the back of weakening Chinese demand (with no immediate substitute as a marginal buyer) as well as fading inflationary fears and an easing of supply/logistical issues. Our analysis shows that sector composition is a larger driver of Australian equity relative performance than country composition. While Australian equities – dominated by Financials – would benefit from a moderate rise in global bond yields, yields will rise more slowly in Australia than in the US and the AUD is likely to weaken. Over the next 12 months, investors should remain neutral on Australian equities within a global equity portfolio. The RBA is likely to lag other central banks in tightening policy. Investors should therefore favor Australian government bonds over other developed economies such as the US and Canada.   Amr Hanafy, Senior Analyst Global Asset Allocation amrh@bcaresearch.com        

Highlights The ECB has changed its inflation target, but its credibility remains weak. Inflation will not allow the ECB to tighten policy anytime soon. Instead, the ECB will have to add to its asset purchase program next year and may even consider dual interest rates. EUR/USD should continue to appreciate because of the weakness in the USD, but EUR/GBP, EUR/NOK, and EUR/SEK will soften. The SNB will follow the ECB; buy Swiss stocks / sell Eurozone defensives as an uncorrelated trade. China matters more than COVID-19 for the cyclical/defensive ratio. Despite our pro-cyclical medium- to long-term portfolio bias, the reflation trade is pausing. Remain tactically long telecom / short consumer discretionary as a hedge. European momentum stocks are near critical levels relative to growth equities. Feature The European Central Bank has found a new way to shed its Bundesbank heritage further and to justify the continuation of its QE program well after other central banks around the world will have ended their asset purchases. The early results of the Strategy Review and the subsequent comments by President Christine Lagarde will make it near impossible for the ECB to taper its asset purchases anytime soon. Practically, this means that the European yield curve will steepen relative to that of the US. Additionally, this policy should not hurt EUR/USD, but it will hurt EUR/GBP, EUR/NOK, and EUR/SEK. In the equity space, Swiss stocks will outperform European defensive equities, creating an opportunity for an uncorrelated trade. A New Tougher Target The ECB has abandoned its long-standing target of “close but below” 2% inflation. Even more importantly, the ECB followed the Bank of Japan and the Fed in adopting an approach whereby both downside and upside deviations from the 2% inflation target are to be fought. The ECB’s credibility was already hurt by its inability to achieve its more modest previous inflation target. Since 2009, the Euro Area HICP only averaged 1.2% (Chart 1). To prevent losing further credibility under its new mandate, the ECB will have to increase its stockpile of assets. Moreover, the ECB is far from achieving its new mandate, which will add to the ECB’s need to expand stimulus to the system even once the impact of owner-equivalent rent is included in CPI. Chart 1Mission Impossible Mission Impossible Mission Impossible Chart 2Narrow Inflationary Pressures Narrow Inflationary Pressures Narrow Inflationary Pressures Today, the ECB’s measure of core inflation stands at 1%, while headline inflation is 1.9%. As the economy re-opens, a surge in inflation is likely, but this spike will be transitory, even more so than in the US. As we recently showed, our estimate of the Eurozone trimmed-mean CPI has plunged close to 0%, which highlights that inflation pressures remain narrow (Chart 2). The labor market is another hurdle that will prevent Eurozone inflation from durably reaching 2% anytime soon. Currently, the total hours worked in the Euro Area remains well below the equilibrium level implied by the working-age population (Chart 3), which historically constrains wages. Moreover, it generally takes many quarters after labor shortages become prevalent before inflation begins to inch higher (Chart 4). Chart 3No Wage Pressure Yet No Wage Pressure Yet No Wage Pressure Yet Chart 4No Inflation Labor Shortages For A While No Inflation Labor Shortages For A While No Inflation Labor Shortages For A While The euro is the last force that caps European inflation. Despite the recent depreciation in EUR/USD, the trade-weighted euro remains near all-time highs, which historically imparts strong deflationary pressures to the economy (Chart 5). Beyond the time it will take for realized inflation to reach the ECB’s new target, inflation expectations are still inconsistent with 2% inflation. As the top panel of Chart 6illustrates, market-based inflation expectations in the Eurozone remain well below both 2% and the levels that prevailed before the Great Financial Crisis, even though rising commodity prices are lifting global inflation expectations. Market participants are not alone in doubting the ECB; professional forecasters do not see inflation at 2% in the near-term or the long-term (Chart 6, bottom panel). Chart 5The Euro Is Deflationary The Euro Is Deflationary The Euro Is Deflationary Chart 6The ECB Lacks Credibility The ECB Lacks Credibility The ECB Lacks Credibility   In addition to the continued inability of the ECB to achieve its previous inflation target, let alone its present one, sovereign risk still hamstrings the central bank. The Italian economy remains fragile, because little structural reform has taken place. The Spanish economy cannot stand on its own two feet while the tourism industry continues to suffer due to COVID-19 related fears. And the exploding debt load of the French economy as well as its structural current account deficit raise the possibility that OATs will become unmoored. The ECB will ensure that spreads in those nations do not widen, or Eurozone inflation will never reach the new 2% target. Bottom Line: When it was time to achieve near—but below—2% inflation, the credibility of the ECB was already limited. The new target will be even harder to reach, but the symmetry around it gives the ECB more leeway to provide additional support to the Eurozone economy. Market Implications The ECB is now bound to maintain policy accommodation beyond the scheduled end of the PEPP program in March 2022, or the new policy target will be even less credible than the previous one. BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy team expects the ECB to maintain its asset purchase program beyond the stated end of the PEPP. Practically, this means that the ECB will fold the program into the pre-pandemic APP. The ECB cannot tighten policy while it remains so far from its target, especially now that missing the goalpost to the downside is as problematic as missing it to the upside. We expect the ECB to hint at this on Thursday. Chart 7The EONIA Curve Anticipated The Strategy Review The EONIA Curve Anticipated The Strategy Review The EONIA Curve Anticipated The Strategy Review The ECB will also not increase interest rates for the foreseeable future, which the EONIA curve already anticipates (Chart 7). Money markets only expect a first hike in late 2024, which is appropriate. Compared to a month ago, overnight rates 10-year forward fell by more than 10bps, from 0.75% to 0.61%. We are inclined to fade this move. More stimulus raises the outlook for long-term policy rates. Amid the correction in global bond yields, betting against the decline in the long-term EONIA rate is akin to catching a falling knife; however, because the ECB is easing relative to the Fed, a box trade of buying European steepeners at the same time as US flatteners remains appropriate. The ECB could also lower the rate on TLTRO operations, resulting in a dual interest rate regime in the Eurozone. As Megan Greene and Eric Lonergan have argued, this policy would provide a further lift to the Euro Area economy by boosting the attractiveness of borrowing; at the same time, it would limit the deleterious impact of ever-more negative deposit rates on the profitability of the banking sector, because banks would borrow at extremely negative rates to finance lending activities.  Chart 8JPY And YCC JPY And YCC JPY And YCC The effect of the policy on the euro is more complex. When Japan announced its Yield Curve Control strategy in September 2016, it defined price stability as achieving a 2% inflation rate over the span of the business cycle. In other words, the BoJ implemented a backdoor average inflation mandate. Following this announcement, USD/JPY strengthened (Chart 8), but this move reflected the dollar rally and the global bond selloff around the US election, not yen-specific factors. This suggests that the euro will continue to track the USD inversely. BCA’s FX Strategy team remains bearish on the greenback, as a result of the growing US current account deficit and the fact that the Fed continues to target an overshoot in inflation, which suggests that, even if US nominal interest rates rise, real rates will lag behind. The EUR is nonetheless set to underperform compared to other European currencies. In the UK, house price gains are accelerating, the jobless count is declining rapidly as the economy re-opens, and the cheapness of the pound is accentuating positive inflation surprises. This combination suggests that the BoE is likely to follow the path of the Bank of Canada or the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, by beginning to tighten policy by early next year. Norway also faces a similar set of circumstances and has already announced it will lift interest rates this year. As we argued two months ago, the Riksbank is likely to follow its western neighbor, because the Swedish housing market is roaring, and the economy will remain well supported by the upcoming global capex boom. Hence, EUR/GBP, EUR/NOK, and EUR/SEK will depreciate.  The Swiss National Bank should be the outlier that will follow the ECB. Swiss headline and core inflation linger at 0.6% and 0.4%, respectively. Wage growth is a meager 0.5%, because the Swiss output gap remains a massive 5.5% of GDP (Chart 9, top panel). Meanwhile, consumer confidence and retail sales are much weaker than those of Sweden, Norway, or the UK. Finally, Swiss private debt stands at 270% of GDP, which means that this economy still risks falling into a Fisherian debt-deflation trap. As a result, the SNB will continue to try to cap the upside in the CHF vis-à-vis the EUR, because the currency remains the main determinant of Swiss monetary conditions. Moreover, according to the central bank, the Swiss franc is still 10% overvalued relative to the euro, which is weighing on the country’s competitiveness (Chart 9, bottom panel). To fight the recent depreciation of EUR/CHF, the SNB will not raise rates for a long time and will intervene further in the FX market. The liquidity injections should prompt additional increases in the SNB’s domestic sight deposits, which since 2015 have resulted in a rise of Swiss bond yields relative to those of Germany (Chart 10). While counterintuitive, this relationship reflects the reflationary impact of the SNB’s asset purchases. It also means that the Swiss real estate market is set to become ever bubblier. Chart 9The SNB Will Follow The ECB The SNB Will Follow The ECB The SNB Will Follow The ECB Chart 10Swiss/German Spreads To Widen Swiss/German Spreads To Widen Swiss/German Spreads To Widen For Swiss shares, the picture is more complex. Swiss equities are extremely defensive, but, while they underperform Euro Area stocks when global yields rise, widening Swiss / German spreads often provide a lift to the SMI. A simple model, assuming US 10-year Treasury yields rise to 2.25% by the end of 2022 (BCA’s US Bond Strategy forecast) and that Swiss/German spreads widen to 20bps as the SNB domestic sight deposits swell, suggests that Swiss stocks will underperform that of the Euro Area over the coming 18 months (Chart 11). However, if we compare Swiss equities to European defensive sectors, then the widening in Swiss/German spreads should prompt an outperformance of Swiss equities, because their multiples benefit from ample liquidity conditions in Switzerland (Chart 12). Chart 11Swiss Stocks Are Too Defensive To Outperform Durably... Swiss Stocks Are Too Defensive To Outperform Durably... Swiss Stocks Are Too Defensive To Outperform Durably... Chart 12...But They Will Beat Euro Area Defensives ...But They Will Beat Euro Area Defensives ...But They Will Beat Euro Area Defensives Bottom Line: The results of the ECB Strategy Review will force this central bank to remain a laggard and continue to expand its balance sheet well after the expected end of the PEPP program. Eurozone interest rates will also fall behind that of other major economies. The ECB may even consider cutting the interest rate on TLTROs to boost lending. These policies will have a minimal impact on EUR/USD, which will continue to be dominated by the dollar’s fluctuations. However, EUR/GBP, EUR/SEK, and EUR/NOK will suffer. Finally, the SNB will follow the ECB and expand its balance sheet further, which will paradoxically lift Swiss/German spreads. As a result of their defensive nature, Swiss stocks will underperform Euro Area ones over the next 18 months, but they will outperform European defensive equities. Go long Swiss equities relative to European defensives, as a trade uncorrelated to the broad market. Follow China, Not Delta Chart 13 The ECB’s New Groove The ECB’s New Groove In recent days, doubts have grown about the European re-opening trade because of the resurgence of COVID-19 cases. The Delta variant (or any subsequent mutation for that matter) will cause hiccups along the way, but, ultimately, the re-opening will continue to proceed. As a result of the growing rate of vaccination, hospitalizations and deaths remain stable even if new cases are climbing rapidly in many countries (Chart 13). As long as the burden on the healthcare system remains limited, governments will find it difficult to justify further large-scale lockdowns. Instead, measures such as Macron’s Pass Sanitaire will provide increasing, widespread incentives for greater vaccination. Despite this sanguine take on the Delta variant, we remain concerned for the near-term outlook for cyclical equities because of the Chinese economy, even after the recent 50bps cut in the Reserve Requirement Ratio. BCA’s China Investment Strategy service believes that the RRR cut does not signal the beginning of a policy easing cycle.  More evidence would be needed, such as additional RRR cuts, rising excess reserves, or supportive policies for the infrastructure and real estate sectors. For now, we heed the message from PBoC official Sun Guofeng that “the RRR cut is a standard liquidity operation.” Chart 14Fade The RRR Cut Fade The RRR Cut Fade The RRR Cut The dominant force for the Chinese economy remains the previous deterioration in the credit impulse, which suggests that Q3 and Q4 growth will decelerate materially (Chart 14, top panel). Moreover, the softening impulse is consistent with weaker global economic activity, as approximated by our Global Nowcast (Chart 14, middle panel), especially since the lingering effect of the past RRR increases is still consistent with a global deceleration (Chart 14, bottom panel). In this context, we continue to hedge our long-term preference for cyclical stocks because of the near-term risks created by China and the excessively rapid move in the cyclical-to-defensives ratio (Chart 15). In response to this pause in the reflation trade, we continue to favor a long telecom/short consumer discretionary tactical position, which is supported by valuations and RoE differentials, as well as the still extended relative momentum (Chart 16). The period of risk to the global reflation trade should also allow the dollar to remain firm in the near-term, which means that for the coming months, the euro will not go beyond its trading range in place since the beginning of the year. Chart 15Cyclicals Remain Tactically Vulnerable Cyclicals Remain Tactically Vulnerable Cyclicals Remain Tactically Vulnerable Chart 16Stay Long Telecom / Short Consumer Discretionary Stay Long Telecom / Short Consumer Discretionary Stay Long Telecom / Short Consumer Discretionary Bottom Line: China’s RRR cut is not yet enough to bet against the temporary pause in the global reflation trade. Thus, investors should continue to hedge pro-cyclical long-term bets in their portfolios via a long telecom / short consumer discretionary position. An Exciting Chart A chart caught our eye this week: The underperformance of Eurozone momentum stocks relative to growth stocks is massively overdone (Chart 17). For now, we only want to highlight the phenomenon, but, in the coming weeks, we will delve deeper into the topic to gauge if these oversold conditions constitute an attractive opportunity. Chart 17Washed Out Moment Washed Out Moment Washed Out Moment   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Investment Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com   Currency Performance The ECB’s New Groove The ECB’s New Groove Fixed Income Performance Government Bonds The ECB’s New Groove The ECB’s New Groove Corporate Bonds The ECB’s New Groove The ECB’s New Groove Equity Performance Major Stock Indices The ECB’s New Groove The ECB’s New Groove Geographic Performance The ECB’s New Groove The ECB’s New Groove Sector Performance The ECB’s New Groove The ECB’s New Groove

Highlights With geopolitical risks increasing around China, India is attracting greater attention from global investors. India’s youthful demographics also mark a stark contrast with China. While this demographic dividend is real, its benefits should not be overstated. India is young but socially complex, which will create unique social conflicts and policy risks. In particular, the country faces structurally large budget deficits. Regional political differences could slow down reforms. Lastly, competition with China will increase India’s own geopolitical risks. Macroeconomic and (geo)political factors, not youth alone, will determine India’s equity market returns. The bullish long-term view faces near-term challenges. Feature Map 1 PreviewIndia’s Demographic Dividend Can Be Overstated India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details “Independence had come to India like a kind of revolution; now there were many revolutions within that revolution … All over India scores of particularities that had been frozen by foreign rule, or by poverty or lack of opportunity or abjectness, had begun to flow again.” – Sir VS Naipaul, India: A Million Mutinies Now (Vintage, 1990) What is well known is that India is populous, young, and boasts a high GDP growth rate. India is also largely free of internal conflicts. Its democratic framework is seen as a pressure valve that can release social tensions. India’s hefty 58% cross-cycle premium to Emerging Markets (EM) is often attributed to the fact that India is younger than its peers, especially China. In this report we highlight that India’s demographic advantage is real but should not be overstated. For instance, India’s northern region can be likened to a demographic tinderbox. It accounts for about 45% of India’s population and is also younger than the national average. However, per capita incomes in this region are lower than the national average and to complicate matters, this region is crisscrossed by several social fault lines. This heterogeneity and economic backwardness in India’s population is the reason why the trend-line of India’s demographic dividend will not be linear. Its diverse population’s attempt to break out of its poverty will spawn unique policy risks. The North Is A Demographic Tinderbox, The South Is Prosperous But Ageing India will soon be the most populous country in the world (Chart 1). India’s median age is a decade lower than that of China to boot (Chart 2). Some emerging market investors fret about India’s low per capita income but India holds the promise of lifting individual incomes over time. This is because its GDP growth rate has been higher than that of its peers (Chart 3). Chart 1India Will Soon Be The Most Populous Country India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details Chart 2India Is A Decade Younger Than China India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details Chart 3India’s Per Capita Income Is Low, But GDP Growth Rate Is High India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details However, the “demographic dividend” narrative oversimplifies India’s investment case. India is young but also socially heterogenous and its median voter is poor. This complicates India’s development process and makes its demographic dividend trend-line non-linear. India’s social complexity is best understood if India is characterized as an amalgamation of three major regions: the North, the South (which we define to include the western region), and the East. Each of these parts are unique and have distinctive socio-demographic identities. India hence is more comparable to a continent like Europe than a country like the US. Like the European Union, India is a union of multiple social, religious, and ethnic groups. It straddles a vast geography and represents a very wide spectrum of interests. India’s South is more like a middle-income Asian country such as Sri Lanka or Vietnam whilst India’s East is more like a poor Latin American economy with latent social unrest. Understanding the heterogeneity of India’s vast populace is key to get a better sense of why an investment strategy for India must be nuanced and tactical in its approach, even if the overarching strategic view is constructive. The key features of each of these three regions can be summarized as follows: Region #1: The North This region comprises the triangular area between Jammu & Kashmir, Rajasthan and Jharkhand. This is the largest landmass in India stretching from the Himalayas to the fertile Gangetic plains of central India. Ethnically most of the population here is of Indo-Aryan descent. A lion’s share of this region’s population remains engaged in agriculture and allied activities. The North accounts for about 45% of the nation’s total population and is a demographic tinderbox. Per capita incomes are low and one in five persons falls in the age group of 15-24 years. To complicate matters, wage inflation in the farm sector, which employs a large majority of the populace in this region, has been slowing. If job creation in the non-farm sector stays insufficient then it will fan fires of social instability. The North includes states like Uttar Pradesh and Punjab which have seen a steady increase in small but notable socio-political conflicts in the recent past. Issues that triggered social conflict ranged from inter-religious marriages to resistance to amending farmer-friendly laws. Region #2: The South India’s South constitutes the large inverted-triangular region on the map and spans the area between Gujarat, Kerala, and West Bengal. We include India’s western region in this category because of its socio-economic similarities with the southern peninsula. Together the South and West account for the entirety of India’s peninsular coastline and for about 40% of total population. Historically, the South has seen far fewer external invasions and its social fabric is more homogenous than that of the North. This region is characterized by high per capita incomes, balanced gender ratios (Chart 4), and higher literacy ratios (Chart 5). Socio-political conflicts in this region are less common as compared to the North. Chart 4India’s South Has Healthy Gender Ratios Compared To North India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details Chart 5India’s South Is More Educated Than The Rest Of India India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details The state of Kerala is an exception in this region. The social fabric in this state is unusual, with Hindus accounting for only 55% of its population (versus the national average of 80%). The high degree of religious heterogeneity in this southern Indian state could perhaps be the reason why the state has lately seen a rise of small but significant incidences of social conflict. Unlike India’s young North, the median age of the population in India’s South is likely to be higher than the national average. Whilst India’s South is clearly young by global standards, this region will have to deal with problems of an ageing population before India’s North or East. The Southern region in India even today relies on migrant workers from India’s North. Region #3: The East This region is the youngest and the smallest of the three, as it accounts for the remaining 15% of India’s population. The region is young but must contend with low per capita incomes and very high degrees of religious diversity. Muslims, Christians, and other religions account for 20% of India’s population nationally but +50% of the population in India’s East. By virtue of sharing borders with countries like Bangladesh, Nepal, and Myanmar, this region is often the entry point for migration into India. It is historically the least stable of the three regions owing to its heterogeneity and the steady influx of migrants. To conclude, India is young but is also socially complex. Whilst a youthful population yields economic advantages, if this young population lacks economic opportunity then social dissatisfaction and associated risks can be a problem. Furthermore, history suggests that if a region’s populace is young but poor and diverse, then it often spawns the rise of identity politics, which takes policymakers’ attention away from matters of economic development. Social Complexity Index To better represent India’s demographic granularities, we created a Social Complexity Index (SCI), as shown in Map 1. Map 1India’s North Is A Demographic Tinderbox; South Is Prosperous But Ageing India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details The SCI for Indian states is created by adding a layer of socio-economic data over the demographic data. It uses three sets of variables: Economic well-being of a state as proxied by state-level per capita incomes. The lower the incomes, the greater the risk of social instability. This is because India’s per capita income is low to start with and if pockets have incomes that are substantially lower than the national average then the associated economic duress can be significant. Religious diversity in a state as measured by creating a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of religious diversity in the state. The greater the religious diversity the greater the social complexity is expected to be. Youthfulness of a state as measured by population in the age group of 15-24 years relative to the total population. The greater the youth population ratio, the more complex are the social realities likely to be. If a state is exposed unfavorably to all three of the above stated parameters then such a state is deemed to have a high degree of social complexity and hence could be exposed to a higher risk of social conflicts and/or policy risks. Our Social Complexity Index (SCI) (Map 1) shows how parts of India are young but also socially complex. Why does this matter? This matters because a diverse, young and vast population’s attempt to develop will create policy risks. Policy Impact: Left-Leaning Economics, Right-Leaning Politics To be sure, governments in India will stay focused on creating large-scale jobs, a big concern for India’s median voter (Chart 6). However, given the time involved in building consensus for any major reform, progress on economic reforms (and hence job creation) will remain slow. India’s large population and democratic framework render the reform process more acceptable, but also less nimble. This contrasts with the speed of reforms executed by East Asian countries in the 1970s-90s, which turned them into export powerhouses. Two recent examples illustrate the problem of slow reform in India: Implementation of GST: Goods and services tax (GST) was a major reform that India embraced in 2017. However, the creation of a nation-wide GST was first mooted in 2000 and it took seventeen years for this reform to pass into law. Even in its current form India’s GST does not cover all products. It excludes large categories like petroleum products and electricity owing to resistance from state governments. Industrial sector growth: Despite India’s consistent efforts to grow its industrial sector as a source of large-scale, low-skill jobs, the share of this sector in India’s GDP has remained static for three decades (Chart 7). The services sector has grown rapidly in India over this period but its ability to absorb low-skill workers on a large scale is fundamentally restricted since (1) the sector needs mid-to-high skill workers and (2) the sector generates fewer jobs per unit of GDP owing to high degrees of productivity in the sector. Chart 6India’s Median Voter Worries Greatly About Job Creation India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details Chart 7India’s Industrial Sector Stuck In A Rut, India’s Workforce Is Connected And Aware India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details India’s inability to reform rapidly and create jobs on a large-scale will trigger policy risks. This factor is more relevant now than ever. In the 1990s, India was a small, closed economy that was just opening up. Hence slow reforms were acceptable as they yielded high growth off a low base. By contrast India’s masses today are at the forefront of connectivity (Chart 7). Slow job growth in a young country with high degrees of connectivity will have to be managed in the short term by responding to other needs of India’s median voter. This process might delay painful structural reforms necessary to improve productivity and hence create policy risks in the interim. What policy-risks is India exposed to? We highlight three policy risks that investors must brace for: Policy Risk #1: Structurally Large Budget Deficits Despite being young, India’s fiscal deficit has been large and as such comparable to that of countries that have an older demographic profile (Chart 8). Chart 8Despite India’s Youth, Its Fiscal Deficit Has Been Comparable To That Of Older Countries India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details Chart 9Unlike China, The Majority Of India’s Citizenry Lives On Less Than US$10 A Day India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details Whilst India’s fiscal deficit will rise and fall cyclically, it will remain elevated on a structural basis as India’s median voter is young but poor (Chart 9). This median voter will keep needing government support to tide over her economic duress. These fiscal transfers are likely to assume the form of transfer payments, food subsidies and a large interest burden on the exchequer who will need to borrow funds in the absence of adequate tax revenue growth. Two manifestations of this fiscal quagmire that India must contend with include: Revenue expenditure for India’s central government accounts for 85% of its total expenditure, with only 15% being set aside for more productive capital expenditure. Within central government revenue expenditure, 40% is foreclosed by food-subsidies, transfer payments, and interest payments. Can India’s fiscal deficit be expected to structurally trend lower? Only if India embraces big-ticket tax reforms. This appears unlikely given that India’s central tax revenue to GDP ratio has remained static at 10% of GDP for two decades owing to its inability to widen its tax base. Policy Risk #2: Foreign Policy Will Turn Rightwards India’s northern states are known to harbor unfavorable views of Pakistan. These are more unfavorable than the rest of India (Map 2). Geopolitical tension will persist due to a confluence of factors. Map 2Northern India Views Pakistan Even More Unfavorably Than Rest Of India India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details India may be forced to adopt a far more aggressive foreign policy response and shed its historical stance of neutrality. This will be done to respond to tectonic shifts in geopolitics as well as the preferences of India’s north that accounts for about 45% of India’s population. China’s active involvement in South Asia will accentuate this phenomenon whereby India tilts towards abandoning its historical foreign policy stance of non-alignment. An aggressive foreign policy stance will engender fiscal costs as well as diverting attention away from internal reform. The adoption of a more aggressive foreign policy stance will necessitate the maintenance of high defense spending when these scarce resources could be used for boosting productivity through spends on soft as well as hard infrastructure. Despite having low per capita incomes, India already is the third largest military spender globally. In 2022, India’s central government plans to allocate ~15% of its budget for defense, which is the same allocation that productivity-enhancing capital expenditure as a whole will attract. Since it will be politically untenable to cut social spending, defense spending will simply add to the budget deficit. Policy Risk #3: Regional Differences Could Get Amplified Over Time India’s northern states typically lag on human development indicators (Charts 4 and 5). Owing to their large population, these states have also lagged smaller states in the east more recently on vaccination rates, which could be a symptom of deeper problems of managing public services in highly populous states (Chart 10). Chart 10India’s Northern States Lagging On Vaccinations, Smaller Eastern States Are Leading India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details Whilst such differences between India’s more populous and less populous states are commonplace, these tensions could grow over the next few years. In specific, it is worth noting that a delimitation exercise in India is due in 2026. Delimitation refers to the process of redrawing boundaries for Lok Sabha seats to reflect changes in population. India’s Northern states are likely to receive an increased allocation of seats in India’s lower house (i.e. the Lok Sabha) beginning in 2026, despite poor performance on human development indicators. This is because India’s North accounted for 40% of seats in India’s lower house and accounted for 41% of its population in 1991. Owing rapid population growth, this region’s population share rose to 44% by 2011 and the ratio could rise further. Given that a review of the allocation of Lok Sabha seats is due in 2026, it is highly likely that India’s northern states get allocated more seats at this review. A change in political influence of different regions will have two sets of implications. Firstly, reforms that require a buy-in from all Indian states (such as GST implementation in 2017) could become trickier to implement if states that have delivered improvements in human development have to contend with a decline in political influence. Secondly, the rising political influence of India’s more populous states in the North could reinforce the trend of a less neutral and more aggressive foreign policy stance that we expect India to assume. Investment Conclusions Indian equity markets have historically traded at a hefty premium to Emerging Markets (EMs). This premium is often attributed to India’s youthful demographic structure. However academic literature has shown that realizing benefits associated with a youthful demographic structure is dependent on a country’s institutions and requires the productive employment of potential workers. It has also been shown, both theoretically and empirically, that there is nothing automatic about the link from demographic change to economic growth.1 Country-specific studies have also shown that it is difficult to find a robust relationship between asset returns on stocks, bonds, or bills, and a country’s age structure.2 An analysis of equity market returns generated by young EMs confirms that a youthful demographic structure can aid high equity returns but the geopolitical setting and macroeconomic factors matter too. Moreover, history confirms that each young country spawns a new generation of winners and losers. Fixed patterns in terms of top performing or worst performing sectors are not seen across young and populous EMs. The rest of this section highlights details pertaining to these two findings. Investment Implication#1: Youth Does Not Assure High Equity Market Returns China in the nineties, Indonesia & Brazil in the early noughties and India over the last decade had similar demographic features (see Row 1, 2 and 3 in Table 1). Table 1Leader And Laggard Sectors Can Vary Across Young, Populous Countries India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details However, it is worth noting that these four EMs delivered widely varying returns even when their demographic features were similar (see Row 5, 6 and 7 in Table 1). In real dollarized terms equity returns ranged from a CAGR of -22% to 8% for these four countries. The variation in returns can be attributed to differences in macroeconomic and geopolitical factors. Brazil’s period of political stability in the early 2000s along with its relatively high per capita incomes were potentially responsible for Brazil’s youthful demography translating into high equity market returns. At the other end of the spectrum, equity returns in China were the lowest despite a young demography owing to low per capita incomes and economic restructuring prevalent in the nineties. Investment Implication#2: Each Young Country Spawns A New Generation Of Winners And Losers Given that a young populace is expected to display a higher propensity to consume, sectors like consumer staples, consumer discretionary, and financials are expected to outperform in young countries. However, a cross-country analysis suggests that a young country does not necessarily throw up any consistent patterns of sector performance. Sectoral performance patterns too appear to be affected by demographics along with macroeconomic and geopolitical factors. Similarities in the profile of top performing sectors in India, China, Brazil and Indonesia when these countries were young are few and far between (see Row 9, 10 and 11 in Table 1). No patterns or similarities are evident even in the profile of worst performing sectors in India, China, Brazil and Indonesia when they had similar demographic features (see Row 12, 13 and 14 in Table 1). Even India’s own experience confirms that: There exists no correlation between India’s equity market returns and its demographic structure. India was at its youngest in the nineties and yet its peak equity market returns were achieved in the subsequent decade (see Row 4, 5 & 6 in Table 2). High domestic growth combined with the emergence of political stability potentially allowed India’s youth to translate into high equity market returns over 2000-2010. Table 2Youth Is Not A Sufficient Condition For A Market To Deliver High Returns India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details India’s Demographics: The Devil Is In The Details There exists no pattern in terms of top or worst performing sectors in India as it has aged over the last three decades (see Row 8 to 13 in Table 2). Healthcare for instance was the top performing sector in India in the 1990s when India’s median age was only 21 years. Industrials as a sector have featured as one of the worst performing sectors in India in the 1990s as well as the late noughties despite India’s youthful age structure. This could be attributed to the fact that India’s growth model pivoted off service sector growth while industrial sector development has lagged. Bottom Line: History suggests that a youthful demographic structure is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for an emerging market like India to deliver high equity market returns. Besides demographics, domestic macroeconomic and regional geopolitical factors create a deep imprint on equity returns’ patterns too. India faces a geopolitical tailwind as its economy develops and China’s risks increase. Nevertheless, owing to India’s heterogeneity and poverty, its road to realizing its demographic dividend will be paved with policy risks. Even as India’s lead on the demographic front is expected to continue, tactical underweights on this EM too are warranted from time to time.   Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist ritika.mankar@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 David Bloom et al, "Global demographic change: dimensions and economic significance", NBER Working Paper No. 10817, September 2004, nber.org. 2 James M Poterba, "Demographic Structure and Asset Returns" The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 83, No. 4, November 2001, The MIT Press.

In yesterday’s Sector Insight report we stripped out the base effect from SPX earnings growth. Today, we repeat this exercise and look at a two-year annualised growth rate for US headline CPI as well as some of its categories. Using 2019 as a benchmark year reveals that the headline number is at 3%, sitting on par with the 2011 level – a sharp contrast to the regular 12-month YoY CPI rate (6%) that is close to pre-GFC highs. In fact, the key food & energy categories also appear contained despite the former perking up during the pandemic (Chart 1). 2021/2020 comparison of food and energy prices yields 2.4% and 7.5% YoY inflation respectively. There are also exceptions: The used cars category is clearly accelerating (19%) even compared to 2019, albeit it is just a small component of the headline CPI number. For completion purposes, Chart 2 on the next page also shows data for some of the pandemic-scared industries including airlines and shelter, for which prices are still below pre-pandemic highs. Bottom Line: While optically the 2021 US inflation is surging, our analysis suggests that numbers are exaggerated by the base effect from the pandemic. Chart 1 Chart 1 Chart 1 Chart 2 Chart 2 Chart 2    

Earnings season is upon us again. Time just flies! This quarter, according to Refinitiv, Net Income is expected to increase by 64.9% YoY on Revenue growth of 18.5%. EPS growth is expected to be 68.1% - it is higher than income growth by 3.2% thanks to the projected share repurchases. BCA Model expects a 3.6% buyback yield. These numbers are truly spectacular, and yet a little suspicious. So what do we make of them? Similar to the inflation story, Q2-21 earnings season growth numbers look so high because they are dominated by the base effect: growth is computed against the worst quarter of the pandemic, Q2-20. To strip out the base effect, we calculated quarterly earnings growth with respect to Q2 of 2019 for the S&P 500 as well as its GICS1 sectors. Looking at the cleaner numbers reveals that SPX quarterly EPS growth sits at a respectable 12.2%. This number appears manageable, in sharp contrast to eyewatering growth calculated based on Q2-20 comparables.  Bottom Line: The implication is that once we take out the once in a lifetime pandemic effect, we observe that earnings growth is normalizing, and expectations are rather reasonable. Earnings Season Is On Earnings Season Is On  

Feature Since the end of the first quarter, the decline in Treasury yields has been the most important trend in global financial markets. It has contributed to the return of the outperformance of growth stocks relative to value stocks, the underperformance of Eurozone equities relative to the S&P 500, and the tepid results of cyclicals relative to defensive equities. This decline in yields is a temporary phenomenon, because the global economy continues to re-open and inventory levels remain so low that further restocking is in the cards. The cyclical picture is not without blemish; COVID-19 variants remain a concern. However, if these risks were to materialize into another delayed re-opening, then further reflationary efforts by both monetary and fiscal authorities would buoy financial markets. The greatest near-term worry for the global economy and markets comes from China. The Chinese credit impulse is slowing markedly and fiscal support has yet to come to the rescue. This phenomenon is the main reason why this publication maintains a cautious tactical stance on Eurozone cyclical stocks, even if we believe these sectors have ample scope to outperform over the remainder of the business cycle. As a corollary, we believe that yields will likely remain within range this summer and Eurozone benchmarks will lag behind the US. This week, we review key charts, organized by theme, highlighting some of these key concepts. As an aside, none covers inflation. Even if the balance of evidence suggests that any sharp increase in Eurozone inflation will be temporary, the proof will only become more visible by early 2022. The Opening Is On Track… The pace of vaccination across the major Eurozone economies has picked up meaningfully since the spring. Consequently, the number of doses distributed per capita is rapidly approaching that of the US, even as it still lags behind that of the UK (Chart 1). As a result of this improvement, the stringency of lockdown measures is declining, which is allowing European mobility to recover (Chart 2). While this phenomenon is evident around the world, EM still lag in terms of vaccination rates. However, the Global Health Innovation Center at Duke University expects 10 billion vaccine doses to be produced by the year’s end, which will be enough to inoculate most (if not all) the vulnerable people in the world by early 2022. Consequently, the re-opening of the economy will remain a potent tailwind behind global growth for three or four more quarters. Chart 1Vaccination Progress... Vaccination Progress... Vaccination Progress... Chart 2...Leads To Greater Activity ...Leads To Greater Activity ...Leads To Greater Activity   … But Near-Term Headwinds Remain The re-opening of the global economy will allow growth to stay well above trend for the upcoming 12 months, at least. Global industrial activity could nonetheless decelerate this summer. Input costs have risen. The two most important ones, oil and interest rates, are already consistent with a peak in the US ISM manufacturing and the global PMI (Chart 3). In this context, the decelerating Chinese credit impulse is concerning (Chart 4) because it portends a hit to global trade and industrial activity. The effect of this slowdown should be most evident in the third and fourth quarters of 2021. However, it will be temporary because Beijing only wants credit to grow in line with GDP, rather than an outright deleveraging. Thus, the credit impulse will stabilize before the year’s end, which will allow the positive effect of the global re-opening to be fully experienced once again. Chart 3Rising Input Costs... Rising Input Costs... Rising Input Costs... Chart 4...And China's Credit Slowdown Matter ...And China's Credit Slowdown Matter ...And China's Credit Slowdown Matter   Domestic Tailwind In Europe Despite the extreme sensitivity of the European economy to the global business cycle, Europe should continue to produce positive surprises. The supports to the domestic economy are strong. The NGEU funds means that Europe will suffer one of the smallest fiscal drag among G-10 nations next year. Moreover, the re-opening will support household income and allow the positive effect of the increase in the money supply to buoy consumption (Chart 5). Finally, rising consumer confidence, and the ebbing propensity to save will reinforce the tailwinds behind consumption (Chart 6). Chart 5Europe's Domestic Activity Europe's Domestic Activity Europe's Domestic Activity Chart 6...Will Improve Further ...Will Improve Further ...Will Improve Further   Higher Bond Yields Are Coming… The environment continues to support higher yields. Our BCA Pipeline Inflation Indicator is surging, which historically translates into higher global borrowing costs (Chart 7). Most importantly, our Nominal Cyclical Spending Proxy remains very robust, which normally leads to rising yields (Chart 8). While US inflation expectations at the short end of the curve already fully reflect current inflationary pressures, the 5-year/5-year forward inflation breakeven rates will have additional upside. Moreover, the term premium and real rates remain depressed, and policy normalization will cause these variables to climb higher over time. Chart 7Higher Yields Will Come... Higher Yields Will Come... Higher Yields Will Come... Chart 8...Later This Year ...Later This Year ...Later This Year   … But Not This Summer It could take some time before the bearish backdrop for bonds results in higher bond yields. First, bonds have yet to purge fully their oversold status created by the 125 basis-point surge that took place between August 2020 and March 2021 (Chart 9). This vulnerability is even more salient in an environment in which the Chinese credit impulse is decelerating. As Chart 10 illustrates, a slowing total social financing number reliably leads to bond rallies. While the chart looks dire for bond bears, it must be placed in context, in which global fiscal policy remains accommodative considering the decline in the private sector savings rate and in which Advanced Economies’ capex will stay strong. Thus, instead of betting on a large swoon in yields in the coming quarters, we expect US yields to remain stuck between 1.20% and 1.70% for a few more months before they resume their upward path once the Chinese economy stabilizes. Chart 9But Bonds Are Still Oversold... But Bonds Are Still Oversold... But Bonds Are Still Oversold... Chart 10...And Fundamentals Cap Yields For Now ...And Fundamentals Cap Yields For Now ...And Fundamentals Cap Yields For Now   A Positive Cyclical Backdrop For The Euro The near-term forces suggest that the euro will remain range bound over the summer, between 1.16 and 1.23. EUR/USD is a pro-cyclical pair, and so the near-term lack of upside to global growth will act as a temporary ceiling on this currency. Nonetheless, the 18-month outlook continues to favor the common currency. Investors have shed Eurozone exposure for more than 10 years and are structurally underweight this region (Chart 11). Hence, EUR/USD should benefit from any positive reassessment of the growth path in the Euro Area compared to that of the US. Additionally, the euro benefits from a structural current account surplus compared to the USD, which translates into a positive basic balance of payments (Chart 12). In an environment in which US real interest rates are low in relation to foreign ones and in which the Fed wants to maintain accommodative monetary conditions to achieve maximum employment, the capital account balance is unlikely to come to the rescue of the dollar. In this context, EUR/USD still possesses significant cyclical upside and is likely to move back above 1.30 by the year’s end of 2022. Chart 11Investors Underweight Eurozone Assets... Investors Underweight Eurozone Assets... Investors Underweight Eurozone Assets... Chart 12...And The BoP Favors The Euro ...And The BoP Favors The Euro ...And The BoP Favors The Euro   The Bull Market In Global Stocks Is Not Over The cyclical outlook for equities remains supportive. To begin with, in most years, equities eke out positive returns, as long as a recession is not around the corner; we do not expect a recession anytime soon. Moreover, while the balance of valuation risk and monetary accommodation is not as supportive of stocks as it was last year, it is not pointing to an imminent deep pullback either (Chart 13). The equity risk premium echoes this message. Our ERP measure adjusts for the expected growth rate of earnings as well as the lack of stationarity of the ERP. According to this indicator, equities are not an urgent buy, but they are not at risk of a bear market either (Chart 14). This combination does not prevent corrections, but it suggests that pullbacks of 10% are to be bought. Chart 13Equities Are Not A Screaming Buy... Equities Are Not A Screaming Buy... Equities Are Not A Screaming Buy... Chart 14...Nor A Screaming Sell ...Nor A Screaming Sell ...Nor A Screaming Sell   Europe’s Structural Underperformance Is Intact… Eurozone stocks have been underperforming their US counterparts since the GFC. As Chart 15 highlights, this subpar performance reflects the decline in European EPS relative to US ones. There is very little case to be made for this underperformance to end on a structural basis. Europe remains saddled with an excessive capital stock and ageing assets. This combination is weighing on European profit margins and RoE (Chart 16). To put an end to this structural underperformance, either European firms will have to consolidate within each industry (allowing cuts to the excess capital stock, to increase concentration, and to boost profit margins) or the regulatory burden must rise in the US to curtail rates of returns in relation to European levels. Chart 15Europe's Underperformance... Europe's Underperformance... Europe's Underperformance... Chart 16...Reflects Profitability Problems ...Reflects Profitability Problems ...Reflects Profitability Problems   …But The Window For A Cyclical Outperformance Remains Open Despite a challenging structural backdrop, European equities have a window to outperform US stocks, similar to the outperformance of Japan from 1999 to 2006, which only marked a pause within a prolonged relative bear market. European stocks beat their US counterparts when global yields rise (Chart 17). This is because European benchmarks underweight growth stocks relative to US markets. The effect of higher yields on the relative performance of the Euro Area is not limited to the impact of higher discount rates. Yields rise when global economic activity is above trend. As Chart 18 highlights, robust readings of our Global Growth Indicator correlate with an outperformance of the EPS of value stocks compared to growth equities. Thus, when rates rise, Europe should enjoy both a period of re-rating relative to the US and stronger profits. Chart 17Yields Drive European Stocks... Yields Drive European Stocks... Yields Drive European Stocks... Chart 18...And So Does Global Growth ...And So Does Global Growth ...And So Does Global Growth   Positives For Euro Area Financials Like the broad European market, the financials’ fluctuations are linked to interest rates. Moreover, Euro Area banks also move in line with EUR/USD (Chart 19). As a result, our positive view on both yields and the euro for the next 18 months or so should translate into an outperformance of financials in Europe. Additionally, European banks are inexpensive, embedding not just depressed long-term growth expectations, but also a wide risk premium. Europe’s structural problems mean that investors are correct to expect poor earnings growth from the region’s banks. However, the risk premium is overdone. Eurozone banks are much safer than they were 10 years ago. Banks now sport significantly higher Tier 1 capital adequacy ratios and NPLs have shrunk considerably (Chart 20). Moreover, governmental supports and credit guarantees implemented during the pandemic should limit the upside to NPL in the coming quarters. Finally, the so-called doom-loop that used to bind government and bank solvency together is not as problematic as it once was, because the ECB is a willing buyer of government paper and the NGEU programs create the embryo of fiscal risk sharing that limit these dynamics. As a result, investors should overweight this sector for the next 18 months. Chart 19Financials Have A Window To Shine... Financials Have A Window To Shine... Financials Have A Window To Shine... Chart 20...And Are Less Risky ...And Are Less Risky ...And Are Less Risky   A Tactical Hedge Our worries about the impact on the global economy of the Chinese credit slowdown are likely to prompt some downside in European cyclical equities relative to defensive ones. Moreover, cyclicals are still significantly overbought relative to defensives, while our relative Combined Mechanical Valuation Indicator confirms the near-term threat (Chart 21). A high-octane vehicle to play this tactical underperformance of cyclicals relative to defensives is to buy Euro Area telecom stocks relative to consumer discretionary equities. Not only are the discretionary stocks massively overbought and expensive relative to telecoms (Chart 22), they also offer a lower RoE. This backdrop makes the short discretionary / long telecoms bet a great hedge for portfolios with a pro-cyclical bias over one- to two-year horizons.  Chart 21Cyclicals Are Tactically Vulnerable... Cyclicals Are Tactically Vulnerable... Cyclicals Are Tactically Vulnerable... Chart 22...But This Risk Can Be Hedged Away ...But This Risk Can Be Hedged Away ...But This Risk Can Be Hedged Away   Currency Performance Currency Performance Summer Charts Summer Charts Fixed Income Performance Government Bonds Summer Charts Summer Charts Corporate Bonds Summer Charts Summer Charts Equity Performance Major Stock Indices Summer Charts Summer Charts Geographic Performance Summer Charts Summer Charts Sector Performance Summer Charts Summer Charts  

Highlights Over the short term – 1-2 years – the pick-up in re-infection rates in Asia and LatAm states with large-scale deployments of Sinopharm and Sinovac COVID-19 vaccines will re-focus attention on demand-side risks to the global recovery (Chart of the Week). The UAE-Saudi impasse re extending the return of additional volumes of OPEC 2.0 spare capacity to the oil market over 2H21 will be short-lived.  The UAE's official baseline production will be increased to 3.8mm b/d from 3.2mm b/d presently, and its output in 2H21 will be adjusted accordingly.  Over the medium term – 3-5 years out – the risk to the expansion of metal supplies needed for renewables and electric vehicles (EVs) will rise, as left-of-center governments increase taxes and royalties, and carbon prices move higher. Rising metals costs will redound to the benefit of oil and gas producers, and accelerate R+D in carbon- and GHG-reduction technologies. Longer-term – 5-10 years out – the active discouragement of investment in hydrocarbons will contribute to energy shortages. In anticipation of continued upside volatility in commodity prices and share values of oil, gas and metals producers, we remain long the S&P GSCI and COMT ETF, and long equities of producers and traders via the PICK ETF. Feature Our conversations with clients almost invariably leads us to considering the risks to our long-standing bullish views for energy and metals. This week, we reprise some of the highlights of these conversations. In the short term, our bullish call on oil is underpinned by the assumption of continued expansion in vaccinations, which we believe will lead to global economic re-opening and increased mobility, as the world emerges from the devastation of COVID-19. This expectation is once again under scrutiny. On the supply side, the very public negotiations undertaken by the UAE and the leaders of OPEC 2.0 – the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia – over re-basing the UAE's production reminds investors there is substantial spare capacity from the coalition available for the market over the short term. The slow news cycle going into the US Independence Day holiday certainly was a fortuitous time to make such a point. Chart of the WeekWorrisome Uptick Of COVID-19 Cases Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views KSA-UAE Supply-Side Worries The abrupt end to this week's OPEC 2.0 meeting was unsettling to markets. Shortly after the meeting ended – without being concluded – officials from the Biden administration in the US spoke with officials from KSA and the UAE, presumably to encourage resolution of outstanding issues and to get more oil into the market to keep crude oil prices below $80/bbl (Chart 2). We're confident the KSA-UAE impasse re extending the return of additional volumes of spare capacity to the oil market over 2H21 will be short-lived. The UAE's official baseline production number (i.e., its October 2018 output level) will be increased to 3.8mm b/d from 3.2mm b/d presently, and its output in 2H21 will be adjusted accordingly. Coupled with a likely return of Iranian export volumes in 4Q21, this will bring prices down into the mid- to high-$60/bbl range we are forecasting. Chart 2US Pushing For Resolution of KSA-UAE Spat US Pushing For Resolution of KSA-UAE Spat US Pushing For Resolution of KSA-UAE Spat Longer term, markets are worried this incident is a harbinger of a breakdown in OPEC 2.0's so-far-successful production-management strategy, which has lifted oil prices 200% since their March 2020 nadir. At present, the producer coalition has ~ 6-7mm b/d of spare capacity, which resulted from its strategy to keep the level of supply below demand. A breakdown in this discipline – in extremis, another price war of the sort seen in March 2020 or from 2014-2016 – could plunge oil markets into a price collapse that re-visits sub-$40/bbl levels. In our view, economics – specifically the cold economic reality of the price elasticity of supply – continues to work for the OPEC 2.0 coalition: Higher revenues are realized by members of the group as long as relatively small production cuts produce larger revenue gains – e.g., a 5% (or less) cut in production that produces a 20% (or more) increase in price trumps a 20% increase in production that reduces prices by 50%. Besides, none of the members of the coalition possess the wherewithal to endure another shock-and-awe display from KSA similar to the one following the breakdown of the March 2020 OPEC 2.0 meeting. We also continue to expect US shale-oil producers to be disciplined by capital markets, and to retain a focus on providing competitive returns to their shareholders, which will limit supply growth to that which maintains profitability. Until we see actual evidence of a breakdown in the coalition's willingness to maintain its production-management strategy, we will continue to assume it remains operative. Worrisome COVID-19 Re-Infection Trends Reports of increased re-infection rates in Latin American and Asia-Pacific states providing Chinese Sinopharm and Sinovac COVID-19 vaccines will re-focus attention on demand-side risks to the global recovery. Conclusive data on the efficacy of these vaccines is not available at present, based on reporting from Health Policy Watch (HPW).1 The vast majority of these vaccines were purchased in Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region, where ~ 80% of the 759mm doses of the two Chinese vaccines were sold, according to HPW's reporting. This will draw the attention of markets to this risk (Chart 3). Of particular concern are the increases in re-infection rates in the Seychelles and Chile, where the majority of populations in both countries were inoculated with one of the Chinese vaccines. Re-infections in Indonesia also are drawing attention, where more than 350 healthcare workers were re-infected after receiving the Sinovac vaccination.2 The risk of renewed global lockdowns remains small, but if these experiences are repeated globally with adverse health consequences, this assessment could be challenged. Chart 3COVID-19 Returning In High-Vaccination States Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views Transition Risks To A Low-Carbon Economy Over the medium- to long-terms, our metals views are premised on the expectation the build-out of the global EV fleet and renewable electricity generation – including its supporting grids – will require massive increases in the supply of copper, aluminum, nickel, and tin, not to mention iron ore and steel. This surge in demand will be occurring as governments rush headlong into unplanned and unsynchronized wind-downs of investment in the hydrocarbon fuels that power modern economies.3 The big risk here is new metal supplies will not be delivered fast enough to build all of the renewable generation, EVs and their supporting grids and infrastructures to cover the loss of hydrocarbons phased out by policy, legal and boardroom challenges. Such a turn of events would re-invigorate oil and gas production. Renewable energy and electric vehicles are the sine qua non of the drive to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. However, the rising price of base metals will add to already high costs of rebuilding power grids to make them suitable for green energy. Given miners’ reluctance to invest in new mines, we do not expect metals prices to drop anytime soon. According to Wood Mackenzie, in 2019 the cost of shifting just the US power grid to renewable energy over the next 10 years will amount to $4.5 trillion.4 Given these cost and supply barriers, fossil fuels will need to be used for longer than the IEA outlined in its recent and controversial report on transitioning to a net-zero economy.5 To ensure that fossil fuels can be used while countries work to achieve their net zero goals, carbon capture utilization and storage (CCUS) technology will need to be developed and made cheaper. The main barrier to entry for CCUS technology is its high cost (Chart 4). However, like renewable energy, the more it is deployed and invested in, the cheaper it will become, following the trend seen in the development of renewable energy and EVs, which were aided by large-scale subsidies from governments to encourage the development of the technology. These cost reductions are already visible: In its 2019 report, the Global CCS Institute noted the cost of implementing CCS technology initially used in 2014 had fallen by 35% three years later. Chart 4CCUS Can Be Expensive Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views Metals Mines' Long Lead Times In 2020 the total amount of discovered copper reserves in the world stood at ~ 870mm MT (Chart 5), according to the US Geological Service (USGS). As of 2017, the total identified and undiscovered amount of reserves was ~ 5.6 billion MT.6 The World Bank recently estimated additional demand for copper would amount to ~ 20mm MT p.a. by 2050 (Chart 6).7 Glencore’s recently retired CEO Ivan Glasenberg last month said that by 2050, miners will need to produce around 60mm MT p.a. of copper to keep up with demand for countries’ net zero initiatives.8 Even with this higher estimate, if miners focus on exploration and can tap into undiscovered reserves, supply will cover demand for the renewable energy buildout. Chart 5Copper Reserves Are Abundant Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views Chart 6Call On Base Metals Supply Will Be Massive Out To 2050 Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views While recent legislative developments in Chile and Peru, which together constitute ~ 34% of total discovered copper reserves, could lead to significantly higher costs as left-of-center governments re-write these states' constitutions, geological factors would not be the main constraint to copper supply for the renewables energy buildout: Even if copper mining companies were to move out of these two countries, there still is about 570 million MT in discovered copper reserves, and nearly ten times that amount in undiscovered reserves. As we have written in the past, capital expenditure restraint is the principal reason the supply side of copper markets – and base metals generally – is challenged (Chart 7). Unlike in the previous commodity boom, this time mining companies are focusing on providing returns to shareholders, instead of funding the development of new mines (Chart 8). Chart 7Copper Prices Remains Parsimonious Copper Prices Remains Parsimonious Copper Prices Remains Parsimonious Chart 8Shareholder Interests Predominate Metals Agendas Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views Of course, it is likely metals miners, like oil producers, are waiting to see actual demand for copper and other base metals pick up before ramping capex. Sharp increases in forecasted demand is not compelling for miners, at this point. This means metals prices could stay elevated for an extended period, given the 10-15-year lead times for copper mines (Chart 9). For example, the Kamoa-Kakula mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) now being brought on line took roughly 24 years of exploration and development work, before it started producing copper. Technological breakthroughs that increase brownfield projects’ productivity, or significant increases in the amount of recycled copper as a percent of total copper supply would address some of the price pressures arising from the long lead times associated with the development of new copper supply. Another scenario with a non-trivial probability that threatens the viability of metals investing is a breakthrough – or breakthroughs – in CCUS technology, which allows oil and gas producers to remove enough carbon from their fuels to allow firms using these fuels to achieve their net-zero carbon goals. Chart 9Long Lead Times For Mine Development Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views Assessing Risks To Our Commodity Views Investment Implications Short-term supply-demand issues affecting the oil market at present are transitory, and do not signal a shift in the fundamentals supporting our bullish call on oil. Our thesis based on continued production discipline remains intact. That said, we will continue to subject it to rigorous scrutiny on a continual basis. Our average Brent forecast for 2021 remains $66.50/bbl, with 2H21 prices averaging $70/bbl. For 2022 and 2023 we continue to expect prices to average $74 and $81/bbl, respectively (Chart 10). WTI will trade $2-$3/bbl lower. Our metals view has become slightly more nuanced, thanks to our client conversations. One of the unintended consequences of the unplanned and uncoordinated rush to a net-zero carbon future will be an improvement in the competitive position of oil and gas as transportation fuels and electric-generation fuels going forward. This will be driven by rising costs of developing and delivering the metals supplies needed to effect the net-zero transition. We expect markets will provide incentives to CCUS technologies and efforts to decarbonize oil and gas fuels, which will contribute to the global effort to arrest rising temperatures. This suggests the rush to sell these assets – which is underway at present – could be premature.9 In the extreme, this could be a true counterbalance to the metals story, if it plays out. Chart 10Our Oil Price View Remains Intact Our Oil Price View Remains Intact Our Oil Price View Remains Intact     Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish The monthly OPEC 2.0 meeting ended without any action to increase monthly supplies, following the UAE's bid to increase its baseline reference production – determined based on October 2018 production levels – to 3.8mm b/d, up from 3.2mm b/d. S&P Global Platts reported the UAE's Energy Minister, Suhail al-Mazrouei, advanced a proposal to raise its monthly production level under the coalition's overall output deal, while KSA's energy minister, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, insisted the UAE follow OPEC 2.0 procedures in seeking an output increase. We do not expect this issue to become a protracted standoff between these states. The disagreement between the ministers is procedural to substantive. Remarks by bin Salman last month – to wit, KSA has a role in containing inflation globally – and his earlier assertions that production policy of OPEC 2.0 would be driven by actual oil demand, as opposed to forecasted oil demand, suggest the Kingdom is not aiming for higher oil prices per se. Base Metals: Bullish Spot benchmark iron ore (62 Fe) prices traded above $222/MT this week in China on the back of stronger steel demand, according to mining.com (Chart 11). Market participants are anticipating further steel-production restrictions and appear to be trying to get out in front of them. Precious Metals: Bullish The USD rally eased this week, allowing gold prices to stabilize following the June Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting. In the two weeks since the FOMC, our gold composite indicator shows that gold started entering oversold territory (Chart 12). We believe gold prices will start correcting upwards, expecting investor bargain-hunting to pick up after the price drop. The mixed US jobs report, which showed the unemployment rate ticked up more than expected, implies that interest rates are not going to be raised soon. Our colleagues at BCA Research's US Bond Strategy (USBS) expect rates to increase only by end-2022.10 This, along with slightly higher odds of a potential COVID-19 resurgence, will support gold prices in the near-term. Ags/Softs: Neutral The USDA's Crop Progress report for the week ended 4 July 2021 showed 64% of the US corn crop was in good to excellent condition, down from the 71% reported for the comparable 2020 date. The Department reported 59% of the bean crop was in good to excellent shape vs 71% the year earlier. Chart 11 BENCHMARK IRON ORE 62% FE, CFR CHINA (TSI) GOING DOWN BENCHMARK IRON ORE 62% FE, CFR CHINA (TSI) GOING DOWN Chart 12 Sentiment Supports Oil Prices Sentiment Supports Oil Prices     Footnotes 1     Please see Are Chinese COVID Vaccines Underperforming? A Dearth of Real-Life Studies Leaves Unanswered Questions, published by Health Policy Watch, June 18, 2021. 2     According to HPW, the World Health Organization's Emergency Use Listing for these two vaccines "were unique in that unlike the Pfizer, AstraZeneca, Moderna, and Jonhson & Johonson vaccines that it had also approved, neither had undergone review and approval by a strict national or regional regulatory authority such as the US Food and Drug Administration or the European Medicines Agency. Nor have Phase 3 results of the Sinopharm and Sinovac trials been published in a peer-reviewed medical journal.  More to the point, post-approval, any large-scale tracking of the efficacy of the Sinovac and Sinopharm vaccine rollouts by WHO or national authorities seems to be missing." 3    Please see A Perfect Energy Storm On The Way, which we published on June 3, 2021 for additional discussion.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 4    Please refer to The Price of a Fully Renewable US Grid: $4.5 Trillion, published by greentechmedia 28 June 2019. 5    Please refer to the IEA's Net Zero By 2050, published in May 2021. 6    Please refer to USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries, 2021. 7     Please refer to Minerals for Climate Action: The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition, published by the World Bank. 8    Please refer to Copper supply needs to double by 2050, Glencore CEO says, published by reuters.com on June 22, 2021. 9    Please see the FT's excellent coverage of this trend in A $140bn asset sale: the investors cashing in on Big Oil’s push to net zero published on July 6, 2021. 10   Please refer to Watch Employment, Not Inflation, published by the USBS on June 15, 2021.   Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades Image

Underweight (Upgrade Alert) We are currently underweight US banks, but the macro environment is changing and today we put this sub-sector on an upgrade alert looking to push it to a neutral allocation. The news on the buyback and dividend fronts is encouraging as banks will be allowed to resume their shareholder friendly activities that were halted last year due to the Fed’s Stress Test. Already, financials stocks are at the front of the pack with a roughly 3% total yield that is likely to increase further. Tack on the current search for yield environment, and the allure of financials equities becomes even more tempting.  Bottom Line: We are putting banks on our upgrade alert watchlist. Please see an upcoming Strategy Report where we delve deeper into the buyback and dividend topics. Buyback Revival? Buyback Revival?

Highlights Inflation is set to decelerate, job creation has a speed limit, and super-spreaders of new-variant Covid-19 infections will create speed bumps in the economy.  This means that in the second half of the year: Bonds will rally. The US dollar will rally. Growth stocks will outperform value stocks. US stocks will outperform non-US stocks. Fractal trade shortlist: Brazilian real, Saudi Tadawul All Share, and Marine Transportation.  Feature Chart of the WeekThe 60 Percent Correction In Lumber Shows What Happens When Supply Bottlenecks Ease. Are Used Cars Next? The 60 Percent Correction In Lumber Shows What Happens When Supply Bottlenecks Ease. Are Used Cars Next? The 60 Percent Correction In Lumber Shows What Happens When Supply Bottlenecks Ease. Are Used Cars Next? As Supply Bottlenecks Ease, Inflation Will Cool Since mid-March, US inflation has surged to 5 percent. Yet bond yields have drifted lower, by almost 50 bps in the case of the 30-year T-bond yield, equating to a handsome return of 12 percent. The seeming contradiction between rising inflation and declining bond yields has puzzled some people, but it shouldn’t. In 2009, the same pattern occurred in reverse. Inflation collapsed, culminating in a modern era low of -2 percent in July 2009. Yet while inflation was collapsing, bond yields rose sharply (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Chart I-2In 2009, Bond Yields Rose When Year-On-Year Inflation Fell In 2009, Bond Yields Rose When Year-On-Year Inflation Fell In 2009, Bond Yields Rose When Year-On-Year Inflation Fell Chart I-3In 2021, Bond Yields Fell When Year-On-Year Inflation Rose In 2021, Bond Yields Fell When Year-On-Year Inflation Rose In 2021, Bond Yields Fell When Year-On-Year Inflation Rose We can explain this seeming contradiction with an analogy from driving. The inflation rate is like your average speed over the past mile. But the bond market cares much more about your average speed over the next mile, or even over the next 5-10 miles. If you are driving at a constant speed, then your speed over the past mile is a good guide to your future speed. But if you have been driving unusually fast or unusually slowly, there is a more important predictor of your future speed. That important predictor is your acceleration – meaning, what is happening to your speed over successive hundred yards stretches. In the same way, during episodes of unusually low or unusually high inflation, the bond market focusses on the monthly rate of inflation, and specifically the moment that it stops decreasing, as in early-2009, or stops increasing, as in mid-2021. In 2008, after a long sequence of declining monthly rates of inflation that went deep into negative territory, the December 2008 print marked the first substantial increase. Hence, the bond yield also bottomed in December 2008 (Chart I-4), even though annual inflation did not bottom until July 2009. Chart I-4In 2009, Bond Yields Bottomed When Month-On-Month Inflation Bottomed In 2009, Bond Yields Bottomed When Month-On-Month Inflation Bottomed In 2009, Bond Yields Bottomed When Month-On-Month Inflation Bottomed Similarly, in 2020-21, after a six month sequence of increasing monthly rates of inflation, the May 2021 print marked the end of the rising trend. To the extent that this was anticipated, most of the decline in the bond yield has happened since mid-May (Chart I-5). Chart I-5In 2021, Bond Yields Topped When Month-On-Month Inflation Topped In 2021, Bond Yields Topped When Month-On-Month Inflation Topped In 2021, Bond Yields Topped When Month-On-Month Inflation Topped Since mid-May, the 60 percent crash in the lumber price shows what happens when supply bottlenecks ease. Other prices that are being supported by temporary supply constraints – such as used car prices – are likely to suffer the same fate (Chart of the Week). Hence, so long as the coming monthly prints confirm an ongoing deceleration in inflation, the current rally in bonds will stay intact. Jobs: The Hard Work Starts Now Staying on the theme of speed, there is a well-defined speed limit to every post-recession jobs recovery. In A Fed Rate Hike By Early 2023 Is Pie In the Sky, we pointed out the remarkable consistency in the pace of post-recession US jobs recoveries. The last five recessions had different causes, severities, durations and peak unemployment rates. Yet in the recoveries that followed each recession, the unemployment rate declined at a remarkably consistent pace of 0.4-0.5 percent per year (Table I-1). Table I-1After Every Recession, The Pace Of Recovery In The Jobs Market Is Near-Identical H2 2021: Speed Limits, Speed Bumps, And Super-Spreaders H2 2021: Speed Limits, Speed Bumps, And Super-Spreaders Reassuringly at the last FOMC press conference, Jay Powell supported this thesis: Most of the act of sort of going back to one's old job – that's kind of already happened. So, this is a question of people finding a new job. And that's just a process that takes longer. There may be something of a speed limit on it. You've got to find a job where your skills match, you know, what the employer wants. It's got to be in the right area. There's just a lot that goes into the function of finding a job. Powell’s comments lead to two further points: The act of going back to one’s old job for those on ‘temporary layoff’ is relatively straightforward. For job creation, this is the low hanging fruit, most of which has already been picked. Now comes the much harder part – finding jobs for those ‘not on temporary layoff’ whose numbers have barely declined from the peak (Chart I-6). Chart I-6For Job Creation, The Low Hanging Fruit Has Already Been Picked For Job Creation, The Low Hanging Fruit Has Already Been Picked For Job Creation, The Low Hanging Fruit Has Already Been Picked One way of encapsulating this is to observe that the unemployment rate – including those on temporary layoff – has already made 80 percent of the journey from its recession peak to the February 2020 trough, which makes it seem that the jobs recovery is largely done. However, the unemployment rate for those not on temporary layoff has made only 25 percent of the journey (Chart I-7). Moreover, this process is not a straight line, it is a curve. The first quarter of the journey is the easiest, then it gets harder. Chart I-7The Hard Part Is Finding Jobs For Those Unemployed 'Not On Temporary Layoff' The Hard Part Is Finding Jobs For Those Unemployed 'Not On Temporary Layoff' The Hard Part Is Finding Jobs For Those Unemployed 'Not On Temporary Layoff' As we, and Jay Powell, have pointed out, the process to reduce this unemployment rate has a remarkably consistent speed limit of 0.4-0.5 percent per year. Starting at the current rate of 2.5 percent and a target of 1.5 percent, this means full employment will not be reached before the second half of 2023. And even this assumes clear blue skies for the world economy through the next two years, which is a tall order. We conclude that the market pricing of a Fed funds rate lift-off in December 2022 is much too optimistic, making the December 2022 Eurodollar contract a good buy. The End Of Pandemic Restrictions Will Unleash Super-Spreaders On July 19, the UK will remove all its domestic pandemic restrictions – meaning no more facemasks, social distancing, and limits on the size of gatherings. This doesn’t mean that the pandemic is over in the UK. Far from it. The delta variant of the virus is rampant. Rather, with a large portion of the population vaccinated, the government is replacing state-imposed laws and regulations with a libertarian onus on personal responsibility. Given that Covid-19 is not going away, the UK strategy raises a fundamental question. Other than implementing a vaccination program, what role should a government take in containing the virus? In Who’s Right On The Pandemic – Sweden Or Denmark? we revealed two important findings: First, it is a misunderstanding that state-imposed restrictions cause the collapse in social consumption. This is a classic confusion between correlation and causation. The true cause of the recession is that a virulent disease focuses millions of people on self-preservation, shunning crowds and public places. But to the extent that the pandemic also leads to state-imposed restrictions, many people blame the slowdown on these correlated restrictions rather than on the underlying cause – the voluntary change in behaviour. Second, without state-imposed restrictions, the majority will voluntarily change their behaviour to avoid catching and spreading the virus, but a minority will not. When a virus is spreading, this is critical because a tiny minority of so-called ‘super-spreaders’ is responsible for most infections. Put simply, economic growth depends on the behaviour of the majority and in a pandemic the majority will voluntarily reduce their social consumption. This explains why libertarian Sweden and lockdown Denmark suffered similar contractions in their economies (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Libertarian Sweden Has Not Significantly Outperformed Lockdown Denmark... Libertarian Sweden Has Not Significantly Outperformed Lockdown Denmark... Libertarian Sweden Has Not Significantly Outperformed Lockdown Denmark... In contrast, containing the virus depends on restricting the minority of super-spreaders. Which explains why libertarian Sweden suffered a much worse outbreak of the disease than lockdown Denmark (Chart I-9). Chart I-9...But Libertarian Sweden Has Suffered Many More Covid-19 Casualties ...But Libertarian Sweden Has Suffered Many More Covid-19 Casualties ...But Libertarian Sweden Has Suffered Many More Covid-19 Casualties The worry now is that the end of state-imposed restrictions will unleash super-spreaders and super-spreading events. This will allow the virus to replicate, mutate, and create new variants which are potentially more transmissible and resistant to existing vaccines. Pulling together our three themes for the second half of the year, inflation is set to decelerate, job creation has a natural speed-limit, and super-spreaders of new-variant Covid-19 infections will create speed bumps in the economy. This means that:  Bonds will rally. The US dollar will rally. Growth stocks will outperform value stocks. US stocks will outperform non-US stocks Candidates For Countertrend Reversal This week, we present three candidates for countertrend reversal. First, the Brazilian real’s recent surge has hit expected resistance at 65-day fractal fragility. A good way to play a continued reversal is to short BRL/COP (Chart I-10). Chart I-10The Brazilian Real Is Correcting The Brazilian Real Is Correcting The Brazilian Real Is Correcting Second, within emerging markets, the strong rally in the Saudi equity market is vulnerable to a setback, especially versus other markets. A good way to play this is to short the Saudi Tadawul All Share index versus the FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI, given that the 260-day fractal structure is at the point of fragility that marked the major top in 2014 (Chart I-11). Chart I-11The Saudi Stock Market Is Vulnerable To A Setback The Saudi Stock Market Is Vulnerable To A Setback The Saudi Stock Market Is Vulnerable To A Setback Finally, coming full circle to short-term supply bottlenecks, one major beneficiary has been the Marine Transportation sector which, since February, has outperformed the world market by 70 percent. As the supply bottlenecks ease, this is vulnerable to correction, especially as the 260-day fractal structure is at the point of fragility that marked the major top in 2007 (Chart I-12). Chart I-12Underweight Marine Transportation Underweight Marine Transportation Underweight Marine Transportation Hence, this week’s recommended trade is to underweight Marine Transportation versus the market, setting the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 16.5 percent.   Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Equity Market Performance   Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area   Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations   Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations