Social Unrest

Highlights In this week’s report we update our Chart Pack, updating familiar charts that underscore our strategic themes and cyclical/tactical views. Social unrest in Kazakhstan points to two of our strategic themes: great power struggle and populism/nationalism. A sneak preview of our Black Swan risks for the year: Iran crisis, Russian aggression, and a massive cyber attack. Recent market moves reinforce the BCA House View that investors will rotate out of US growth stocks and into global cyclicals and value plays.  We are sticking with our current tactical and cyclical views and trades. Feature Since releasing our key views for 2022, bond yields have surged, tech shares have sold off, and social unrest has erupted in Central Asia. These developments have both structural and cyclical drivers and are broadly supportive of our investment strategy. First, a brief word about Kazakhstan. The surge in unrest this week is a new and urgent example of one of our strategic themes: populism and nationalism. Long-accumulating Kazakh nationalism is blowing up and forcing the autocratic regime to complete an unfinished political leadership transition that began three years ago. Russia is now forced to intervene militarily to maintain stability in this important satellite state. If instability is prolonged, Russia will be weakened in its high-stakes standoff against the United States and the West over Ukraine. China’s interest in Kazakhstan is also threatened by the change in political orientation there. We will provide a full report on this topic soon but for now the investment implication is to stay short Russian equities. In the rest of this report we offer our newly revised chart book for investors to consider as they gird for a year that promises to be anything but dull. The purpose of the chart book is to update a succinct series of charts that underpin our key themes and views. Many of these charts will be familiar to regular readers but here they are updated with some notable points highlighted in the text. A Waning Pandemic And Global Growth Falling To Trend The Omicron variant of COVID-19 is causing a surge of new cases and hospitalizations around the world, which will weigh on economic activity in the first quarter. However, this variant does not appear to be a game changer. While it is highly contagious, not as many people who go to the hospital end up in the intensive care unit (Chart 1). Chart 1 China is in a difficult predicament that will continue to constrict the global supply side of the economy. Chinese authorities maintain a “zero COVID” policy that emphasizes draconian social restrictions to suppress COVID cases and deaths to minimal levels (Chart 2A). Chart 2 ​​​​​ Chart 2 But Chinese-made vaccines are not as effective as western alternatives, particularly against Omicron, as discussed in our flagship Bank Credit Analyst. Hence China cannot open its economy without risking a disastrous wave of infections. When China shuts down activity, as at the Yantian port last spring, the rest of the world suffers higher costs for goods (Chart 2B). Chart 3Global Growth Will Fall Back To Trend Global Growth Will Fall Back To Trend Global Growth Will Fall Back To Trend Global economic growth is decelerating from the peaks of the extreme rebound (Chart 3). The historic fiscal stimulus of 2020 (Chart 4A) is giving way to negative fiscal thrust, or a decline in budget deficits, that will take away from growth (Chart 4B). Chart 4 Chart 4 Chart 5Inflation Will Moderate But Remain A Long-Term Risk Inflation Will Moderate But Remain A Long-Term Risk Inflation Will Moderate But Remain A Long-Term Risk Yet a recession is not the likeliest scenario since growth is expected to stabilize given the resumption of activity across the world due to an improved ability to live with the virus. The Federal Reserve is considering hiking interest rates faster than the market had expected given that the unemployment rate is collapsing and core inflation is surging. The persistence of the pandemic’s supply disruptions adds to concerns. At the same time, a wage-price spiral is not yet taking shape, as our bond strategist Ryan Swift shows. Productivity is growing faster than real wages and long-term inflation expectations remain within reasonable ranges, at least for now (Chart 5). Three Strategic Themes In our annual outlook (“2022 Key Views: The Gathering Storm”)  we revised our long-term mega themes: 1. Great Power Struggle The US’s relative decline as a share of global geopolitical power, despite a brief respite last year, is indicated in Charts 6-8. Chart 6 Chart 7 ​​​​​ Chart 7 ​​​​​ Chart 8America's Global Role Persists (If Lessened) America's Global Role Persists (If Lessened) America's Global Role Persists (If Lessened) 2. Hypo-Globalization An ongoing globalization process, yet one that falls short of potential, is shown in Charts 9-10. A tentative improvement in our multi-century globalization chart is misleading – it is due to lack of data reporting by several countries, which artificially suppresses the denominator.  Chart 9Hypo-Globalization And Hegemonic Instability Hypo-Globalization And Hegemonic Instability Hypo-Globalization And Hegemonic Instability Chart 10AFrom 'Hyper-Globalization' To Hypo-Globalization From 'Hyper-Globalization' To Hypo-Globalization From 'Hyper-Globalization' To Hypo-Globalization While trade sharply rebounded from the pandemic, the global policy setting is now averse to ever-deeper dependency on international trade. Chart 10BFrom 'Hyper-Globalization' To Hypo-Globalization From 'Hyper-Globalization' To Hypo-Globalization From 'Hyper-Globalization' To Hypo-Globalization ​​​​​ 3. Populism and Nationalism The post-pandemic cycle will see these structural trends reaffirmed. Charts 11-12 shows a rising Misery Index, or sum of unemployment and inflation, a source of political turmoil that will both reflect and feed these trends. Chart 11Misery Indexes Signal More Unrest, Populism, And Nationalism Misery Indexes Signal More Unrest, Populism, And Nationalism Misery Indexes Signal More Unrest, Populism, And Nationalism ​​​​​​ Chart 12EM Populism/Nationalism Threatens Negative Surprises In 2022 EM Populism/Nationalism Threatens Negative Surprises In 2022 EM Populism/Nationalism Threatens Negative Surprises In 2022 ​​​​​ Chart 12 highlights major markets that have local or nationwide elections in 2022-23, where policy fluctuations are already occurring with various investment implications. We are tactically bullish on South Korea and Brazil, strategically but not tactically bullish on India, and bearish on Turkey. Russia’s domestic sociopolitical problems are not all that different from Kazakhstan’s and its response may be outwardly aggressive, so we are bearish. Three Key Views For 2022 Our annual outlook also outlined three key views for this year: 1. China’s Reversion To Autocracy The government will ease policy to secure the economic recovery so that President Xi Jinping can clinch his personal rule for at a critical Communist Party personnel reshuffle this fall (Chart 13). Chart 13China Will Easy Policy Ahead Of Political Reversion To Autocracy China Will Easy Policy Ahead Of Political Reversion To Autocracy China Will Easy Policy Ahead Of Political Reversion To Autocracy A stabilization of Chinese demand in 2022 will be positive for commodities, cyclical equity sectors, and emerging markets. Chart 14 ​​​​​​ Chart 14 Policy easing will not lead to a sustainable rally in Chinese equities, as internal and external political risks remain high (Charts 14A & 14B). A “fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis”  is likely in the short run while a military conflict is not unlikely over the long run. ​​​​​​​​​​​​​​2. America’s Policy Insularity The Biden administration is focused on domestic legislation and the midterm elections, due November 8, 2022. Biden’s approval rating has deteriorated further, putting the Democrats in line for a loss of around 40 seats in the House and four seats in the Senate, judging by historic patterns (Chart 15). But our sense is that the Senate is still in play – Democrats probably will not lose four Senate seats – but they are likely to lose control of both chambers as things stand. Chart 15 However, the Democrats still have a subjective 65% chance of passing a partisan budget reconciliation bill, which would be a badly needed victory. The “Build Back Better” plan would include a minimum corporate tax and various social programs. Another round of fiscal reflation would reinforce the Federal Reserve’s less dovish pivot. Chart 16US Still At Peak Polarization US Still At Peak Polarization US Still At Peak Polarization Polarization will remain at historic peaks leading up to the election, as the Democrats will need “wedge issues” to drive enthusiasm among their popular base in the face of Republican enthusiasm. For decades polarization has correlated with falling Treasury yields and US tech sector equity outperformance (Chart 16). Midterm election years tend to see flat equity performance and falling yields, albeit with yields higher when a single party controls government, as is the case this year. 3. Petro-State Leverage Globally, commodity markets continue to tighten on the supply side. Our Commodity & Energy Strategist Bob Ryan outlines the situation admirably: The supply side is tightening in oil markets, where OPEC 2.0 producers have been unable to restore output under their agreement to return 400,000 barrels per day each month since August 2021. It is true in base metals, where the energy crisis in Europe and Asia are constricting supplies, particularly in copper. And it is true in agricultural commodities, where high natural gas prices are driving fertilizer prices higher, which will push food prices up this year. Demand for these commodities will increase as Omicron becomes the dominant COVID-19 strain, keeping consumption above production, particularly in oil. These are long-term trends. Oil and natural gas markets will probably remain tight throughout the decade, as will base metal markets. This is going to put enormous stress on the global energy transition to renewable energy over the next 10 years. The ascendance of left-of-center political parties in critical base-metal exporting states, and rising ESG initiatives, will increase costs for energy and metals producers; and global climate activism in boardrooms and courtrooms will push costs higher as well. Higher prices will be necessary to recover these cost increases. In this context, energy producers gain geopolitical leverage. Their treasuries become flush with cash and they see an opportunity to pursue foreign policy objectives. Conflicts involving oil producers are more likely when oil prices are swinging up (Chart 17). Chart 17 This trend is on display in Russia’s dispute with the West, where Europe is struggling with a surge in natural gas prices due to Russian supply constraints that weaken its resolve in the showdown over Ukraine (Chart 18, top panel). Chart 18Energy Prices: Biden's And Europe's Problem Energy Prices: Biden's And Europe's Problem Energy Prices: Biden's And Europe's Problem ​​​​​ Yet even in the energy-independent US, the Biden administration is wary of pursuing policies against Russia or Iran that would ignite a bigger spike in prices at the pump during an election year (Chart 18, bottom panel). Biden will have to attend to foreign policy this year but will be defensive. Petro-states are not immune to domestic problems, including social unrest. Many of them are poor, unequal, misgoverned, and suffering from inflation. Iran is a prime example. Yet Iran has not collapsed under sanctions so far, the world is recovering, and Tehran has the advantage in its negotiations with the US because it can stage attacks across the Middle East, including the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. Military incidents could drive oil prices into politically punitive territory. Three Black Swans For 2022 This brings us to three “Black Swans” or low-probability, high-impact events for 2022. We will publish our regular annual report on this year’s black swans soon. For now we offer a sneak preview: 1. Iran Crisis In Middle East The fear of being abandoned by the US has kept Israel from acting unilaterally so far (Chart 19A). Chart 19 ​​​​​​ Chart 19 ​​​​ But an attack is not impossible if Iran reaches “breakout” levels of highly enriched uranium – and the global impact of an attack could be catastrophic (Chart 19B). The news media have been conspicuously quiet about Iran. Taken together, this scenario is pretty much the definition of a black swan. 2. Russian Aggression Abroad There is a 50% chance that Russia will stage a limited re-invasion of Ukraine to secure its control of territory in the east or along the Black Sea coast. Chart 20Black Swan #2: Russian Aggression Abroad Black Swan #2: Russian Aggression Abroad Black Swan #2: Russian Aggression Abroad Within this risk, there is a small chance (less than 5%) that Russia would invade all of Ukraine. We do not expect this and neither do other analysts. The total conquest of Ukraine is unlikely when Russia’s domestic conditions are weak and it faces so much unrest in other parts of its sphere of influence (including Belarus and Kazakhstan). As we go to press, Russia is staging a military intervention in Kazakhstan, which could expand. Kazakhstan could create a way for Russia to avoid its self-induced pressure to take military action against Ukraine. But most likely Russia and Kazakhstan will quell the unrest, enabling Russia to sustain the threat of a partial re-invasion of Ukraine. Putin’s low approval rating often triggers new foreign adventures and financial markets are pricing higher risks (Chart 20). 3. Massive Cyber Attack Amid the pandemic and inflation surge, investors have forgotten about the huge risks facing businesses and individuals from their extreme dependency on remote work and digital services. A cyber war is also raging behind the scenes. So far it has not spilled into the physical realm. Yet Russia-based ransomware attacks in 2021 showed that vital US infrastructure is vulnerable. Cyber stocks have topped out amid the recent tech selloff (Chart 21A). But the global average cost of data breaches is skyrocketing. Governments are devoting more resources to network security and cyber-security (Chart 21B), which should be positive for earnings. Chart 21ABlack Swan #3: Massive Cyber Attack Black Swan #3: Massive Cyber Attack Black Swan #3: Massive Cyber Attack ​​​​​ Chart 21BBlack Swan #3: Massive Cyber Attack Black Swan #3: Massive Cyber Attack Black Swan #3: Massive Cyber Attack ​​​​​ Investment Takeaways The revised Geopolitical Risk Index does not show as pronounced of an uptrend as the version published last year but it is still higher than in the late 1990s (Chart 22). Our reading of all available evidence points to rising geopolitical risk – at least until the current challenge to US global supremacy leads to a new equilibrium. Chart 22 Global policy uncertainty is also rising on a secular basis and maintaining its correlation with the trade-weighted dollar, which has rebounded despite the global growth recovery and rise in inflation (Chart 23). We remain neutral on the dollar. Chart 23A Secular Rise In Global Uncertainty A Secular Rise In Global Uncertainty A Secular Rise In Global Uncertainty Gold has fallen from its peaks during the onset of the pandemic and real rates suggest it will fall further. But we hold it as a hedge against geopolitical risk as well as inflation (Chart 24). Chart 24Stay Long Gold As Hedge Against Geopolitical Crisis As Well As Inflation Stay Long Gold As Hedge Against Geopolitical Crisis As Well As Inflation Stay Long Gold As Hedge Against Geopolitical Crisis As Well As Inflation The evidence is inconclusive about whether global investors will rotate away from US assets this year. The US share of global equity capitalization is stretched. Long-dated Treasuries will eventually reflect higher inflation expectations (Chart 25). Chart 25No Substitute For The USA Yet No Substitute For The USA Yet No Substitute For The USA Yet ​​​​​ Chart 26Waiting For Rotation Waiting For Rotation Waiting For Rotation ​​​​​ US equity outperformance continues unabated and emerging market equities are still underperforming their developed peers (Chart 26). Cyclically investors should take the opposite side of these trends but not tactically. The renminbi is tentatively peaking against both the dollar and euro. As expected, China’s policymakers are shifting toward preserving economic stability (Chart 27). Stabilization may require a weaker renminbi, though producer price inflation is also a factor for the People’s Bank to consider. Chart 27Strategically Short Renminbi And Taiwanese Dollar Strategically Short Renminbi And Taiwanese Dollar Strategically Short Renminbi And Taiwanese Dollar Taiwanese stocks continue to outperform Korean stocks (to our chagrin) but they have not broken above previous peaks relative to global equities. Nor has the Taiwanese dollar broken above previous peaks versus the greenback (Chart 28). So far Taiwan has avoided the fate of semiconductor stocks, which have sold off. This situation presents a buying opportunity for semi stocks but we remain short Taiwan as a bourse because it is central to US-China strategic conflict. Chart 28Strategically Short Taiwan Strategically Short Taiwan Strategically Short Taiwan ​​​​​​ Chart 29Strategically Short Russia And EM Europe Strategically Short Russia And EM Europe Strategically Short Russia And EM Europe ​​​​​​ Chart 30Safe Havens Look Attractive Safe Havens Look Attractive Safe Havens Look Attractive Russia and eastern European assets continue to underperform developed market peers as geopolitical risks mount across the former Soviet Union (Chart 29). Russia’s negotiations with the US, NATO, and the EU in January will help us to gauge whether tensions will break out to new highs. Assuming Russia succeeds in quashing Kazakh unrest, it will be necessary for the US to offer concessions to Russia to prevent the Ukraine showdown from worsening Europe’s energy crisis. Safe havens caught a bid in early 2021 and have not yet broken down. Our geopolitical views support building up safe-haven positions (Chart 30). Presumably one should favor global cyclical equities as the pandemic wanes and global growth stabilizes. But cyclicals are struggling to outperform defensives (Chart 31A). Chart 31AFavor Cyclicals On China's Stabilization Favor Cyclicals On China's Stabilization Favor Cyclicals On China's Stabilization ​​​​​ Chart 31BFavor Cyclicals On China's Stabilization Favor Cyclicals On China's Stabilization Favor Cyclicals On China's Stabilization ​​​​​ ​​​​​​​China’s policy easing is positive in this regard, although the new wave of fiscal-and-credit support is only just beginning and financial markets will remain skeptical until the dovish policy pivot is borne out in hard data (Chart 31B). Global value stocks have ticked up again versus growth stocks, suggesting that the choppy process of bottom formation continues (Charts 32A & 32B). Chart 32AValue’s Choppy Bottom Versus Growth Stocks Value's Choppy Bottom Versus Growth Stocks Value's Choppy Bottom Versus Growth Stocks ​​​​​​ Chart 32BValue’s Choppy Bottom Versus Growth Stocks Value's Choppy Bottom Versus Growth Stocks Value's Choppy Bottom Versus Growth Stocks ​​​​​     Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

Highlights Our three strategic themes over the long run: (1) great power rivalry (2) hypo-globalization (3) populism and nationalism. The implications are inflationary over the long run. Nations that gear up for potential conflict and expand the social safety net to appease popular discontent will consume a lot of resources. Our three key views for 2022: (1) China’s reversion to autocracy (2) America’s policy insularity (3) petro-state leverage. The implications are mostly but not entirely inflationary: China will ease policy, the US will pass more stimulus, and energy supply may suffer major disruptions. Stay long gold, neutral US dollar, short renminbi, and short Taiwanese dollar. Stay tactically long global large caps and defensives. Buy aerospace/defense and cyber-security stocks. Go long Japanese and Mexican equities – both are tied to the US in an era of great power rivalry. Feature Chart 1US Resilience US Resilience US Resilience Global investors have not yet found a substitute for the United States. Despite a bout of exuberance around cyclical non-US assets at the beginning of 2021, the year draws to a close with King Dollar rallying, US equities rising to 61% of global equity capitalization, and the US 30-year Treasury yield unfazed by inflation fears (Chart 1). American outperformance is only partly explained by its handling of the lingering Covid-19 pandemic. The US population was clearly less restricted by the virus (Chart 2). But more to the point, the US stimulated its economy by 25% of GDP over the course of the crisis, while the average across major countries was 13% of GDP. Americans are still more eager to go outdoors and the government has been less stringent in preventing them (Chart 3). Chart 2 ​​​​​ Chart 3Social Restrictions Short Of Lockdown Social Restrictions Short Of Lockdown Social Restrictions Short Of Lockdown ​​​​​​ Going forward, the pandemic should decline in relevance, though it is still possible that a vaccine-resistant mutation will arise that is deadlier for younger people, causing a new round of the crisis. The rotation into assets outside the US will be cautious. Across the world, monetary and credit growth peaked and rolled over this year, after the extraordinary effusion of stimulus to offset the social lockdowns of 2020 (Chart 4). Government budget deficits started to normalize while central banks began winding down emergency lending and bond-buying. More widespread and significant policy normalization will get under way in 2022 in the face of high core inflation. Tightening will favor the US dollar, especially if global growth disappoints expectations. Chart 4Waning Monetary And Credit Stimulus Waning Monetary And Credit Stimulus Waning Monetary And Credit Stimulus Chart 5Global Growth Stabilization Global Growth Stabilization Global Growth Stabilization Global manufacturing activity fell off its peak, especially in China, where authorities tightened monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policy aggressively to prevent asset bubbles from blowing up (Chart 5). Now China is easing policy on the margin, which should shore up activity ahead of an important Communist Party reshuffle in fall 2022. The rest of the world’s manufacturing activity is expected to continue expanding in 2022, albeit less rapidly. This trend cuts against US outperformance but still faces a range of hurdles, beginning with China. In this context, we outline three geopolitical themes for the long run as well as three key views for the coming 12 months. Our title, “The Gathering Storm,” refers to the strategic challenge that China and Russia pose to the United States, which is attempting to form a balance-of-power coalition to contain these autocratic rivals. This is the central global geopolitical dynamic in 2022 and it is ultimately inflationary. Three Strategic Themes For The Long Run The international system will remain unstable in the coming years. Global multipolarity – or the existence of multiple, competing poles of political power – is the chief destabilizing factor. This is the first of our three strategic themes that will persist next year and beyond (Table 1). Our key views for 2022, discussed below, flow from these three strategic themes. Table 1Strategic Themes For 2022 And Beyond 2022 Key Views: The Gathering Storm 2022 Key Views: The Gathering Storm 1. Great Power Rivalry Multipolarity – or great power rivalry – can be illustrated by the falling share of US economic clout relative to the rest of the world, including but not limited to strategic rivals like China. The US’s decline is often exaggerated but the picture is clear if one looks at the combined geopolitical influence of the US and its closest allies to that of the EU, China, and Russia (Chart 6). Chart 6 China’s rise is the most destabilizing factor because it comes with economic, military, and technological prowess that could someday rival the US for global supremacy. China’s GDP has surpassed that of the US in purchasing power terms and will do so in nominal terms in around five years (Chart 7). Chart 7 True, China’s potential growth is slowing and Chinese financial instability will be a recurring theme. But that very fact is driving Beijing to try to convert the past 40 years of economic success into broader strategic security. Chart 8America's Global Role Persists (If Lessened) America's Global Role Persists (If Lessened) America's Global Role Persists (If Lessened) ​​​​​ Since China is capable of creating an alternative political order in Asia Pacific, and ultimately globally, the United States is reacting. It is penalizing China’s economy and seeking to refurbish alliances in pursuit of a containment policy. The American reaction to the loss of influence has been unpredictable, contradictory, and occasionally belligerent. New isolationist impulses have emerged among an angry populace in reaction to gratuitous wars abroad and de-industrialization. These impulses appeared in both the Obama and Trump administrations. The Biden administration is attempting to manage these impulses while also reinforcing America’s global role. The pandemic-era stimulus has enabled the US to maintain its massive trade deficit and aggressive defense spending. But US defense spending is declining relative to the US and global economy over time, encouraging rival nations to carve out spheres of influence in their own neighborhoods (Chart 8). Russia’s overall geopolitical power has declined but it punches above its weight in military affairs and energy markets, a fact which is vividly on display in Ukraine as we go to press. The result is to exacerbate differences in the trans-Atlantic alliance between the US and the European Union, particularly Germany. The EU’s attempt to act as an independent great power is another sign of multipolarity, as well as the UK’s decision to distance itself from the continent and strengthen the Anglo-American alliance. If the US and EU do not manage their differences over how to handle Russia, China, and Iran then the trans-Atlantic relationship will weaken and great power rivalry will become even more dangerous. 2. Hypo-Globalization The second strategic theme is hypo-globalization, in which the ancient process of globalization continues but falls short of its twenty-first century potential, given advances in technology and governance that should erode geographic and national boundaries. Hypo-globalization is the opposite of the “hyper-globalization” of the 1990s-2000s, when historic barriers to the free movement of people, goods, and capital seemed to collapse overnight. Chart 9From 'Hyper-Globalization' To Hypo-Globalization From 'Hyper-Globalization' To Hypo-Globalization From 'Hyper-Globalization' To Hypo-Globalization The volume of global trade relative to industrial production  peaked with the Great Recession in 2008-10 and has declined slowly but surely ever since (Chart 9). Many developed markets suffered the unwinding of private debt bubbles, while emerging economies suffered the unwinding of trade manufacturing. Periods of declining trade intensity – trade relative to global growth – suggest that nations are turning inward, distrustful of interdependency, and that the frictions and costs of trade are rising due to protectionism and mercantilism. Over the past two hundred years globalization intensified when a broad international peace was agreed (such as in 1815) and a leading imperial nation was capable of enforcing law and order on the seas (such as the British empire). Globalization fell back during times of “hegemonic instability,” when the peace settlement decayed while strategic and naval competition eroded the global trading system. Today a similar process is unfolding, with the 1945 peace decaying and the US facing the revival of Russia and China as regional empires capable of denying others access to their coastlines and strategic approaches (Chart 10).1 Chart 10Hypo-Globalization And Hegemonic Instability Hypo-Globalization And Hegemonic Instability Hypo-Globalization And Hegemonic Instability Chart 11Hypo-Globalization: Temporary Trade Rebound Hypo-Globalization: Temporary Trade Rebound Hypo-Globalization: Temporary Trade Rebound No doubt global trade is rebounding amid the stimulus-fueled recovery from Covid-19. But the upside for globalization will be limited by the negative geopolitical environment (Chart 11). Today governments are not behaving as if they will embark on a new era of ever-freer movement and ever-deepening international linkages. They are increasingly fearful of each other’s strategic intentions and using fiscal resources to increase economic self-sufficiency. The result is regionalization rather than globalization. Chinese and Russian attempts to revise the world order, and the US’s attempt to contain them, encourages regionalization. For example, the trade war between the US and China is morphing into a broader competition that limits cooperation to a few select areas, despite a change of administration in the United States. The further consolidation of President Xi Jinping’s strongman rule will exacerbate this dynamic of distrust and economic divorce. Emerging Asia and emerging Europe live on the fault lines of this shift from globalization to regionalism, with various risks and opportunities. Generally we are bullish EM Asia and bearish EM Europe. 3. Populism And Nationalism A third strategic theme consists of populism and nationalism, or anti-establishment political sentiment in general. These forces will flare up in various forms across the world in 2022 and beyond. Even as unemployment declines, the rise in food and fuel inflation will make it difficult for low wage earners to make ends meet. The “misery index,” which combines unemployment and inflation, spiked during the pandemic and today stands at 10.8% in the US and 11.4% in the EMU, up from 5.2% and 8.1% before the pandemic, respectively (Chart 12). Large budget deficits and trade deficits, especially in the US and UK, feed into this inflationary environment. Most of the major developed markets have elected new governments since the pandemic, with the notable exception of France and Spain. Thus they have recapitalized their political systems and allowed voters to vent some frustration. These governments now have some time to try to mitigate inflation before the next election. Hence policy continuity is not immediately in jeopardy, which reduces uncertainty for investors. By contrast, many of the emerging economies face higher inflation, weak growth, and are either coming upon elections or have undemocratic political systems. Either way the result will be a failure to address household grievances promptly. The misery index is trending upward and governments are continually forced to provide larger budget deficits to shore up growth, fanning inflation (Chart 13). Chart 12DM: Political Risk High But New Governments In Place DM: Political Risk High But New Governments In Place DM: Political Risk High But New Governments In Place ​​​​​ Chart 13EM: Political Risk High But Governments Not Recapitalized EM: Political Risk High But Governments Not Recapitalized EM: Political Risk High But Governments Not Recapitalized ​​​​​​ Chart 14EM Populism/Nationalism Threatens Negative Surprises In 2022 EM Populism/Nationalism Threatens Negative Surprises In 2022 EM Populism/Nationalism Threatens Negative Surprises In 2022 Just as social and political unrest erupted after the Great Recession, notably in the so-called “Arab Spring,” so will new movements destabilize various emerging markets in the wake of Covid-19. Regime instability and failure can lead to big changes in policies, large waves of emigration, wars, and other risks that impact markets. The risks are especially high unless and until Chinese imports revive. Investors should be on the lookout for buying opportunities in emerging markets once the bad news is fully priced. National and local elections in Brazil, India, South Korea, the Philippines, and Turkey will serve as market catalysts, with bad news likely to precede good news (Chart 14). Bottom Line: These three themes – great power rivalry, hypo-globalization, and populism/nationalism – are inflationary in theory, though their impact will vary based on specific events. Multipolarity means that governments will boost industrial and defense spending to gear up for international competition. Hypo-globalization means countries will attempt to put growth on a more reliable domestic foundation rather than accept dependency on an unreliable international scene, thus constraining supplies from abroad. Populism and nationalism will lead to a range of unorthodox policies, such as belligerence abroad or extravagant social spending at home. Of course, the inflationary bias of these themes can be upset if they manifest in ways that harm growth and/or inflation expectations, which is possible. But the general drift will be an inflationary policy setting. Inflation may subside in 2022 only to reemerge as a risk later. Three Key Views For 2022 Within this broader context, our three key views for 2022 are as follows: 1. China’s Reversion To Autocracy As President Xi Jinping leads China further down the road of strongman rule and centralization, the country faces a historic confluence of internal and external risks. This was our top view in 2021 and the same dynamic continues in 2022. The difference is that in 2021 the risk was excessive policy tightening whereas this coming year the risk is insufficient policy easing. Chart 15China Eases Fiscal Policy To Secure Recovery In 2022 China Eases Fiscal Policy To Secure Recovery In 2022 China Eases Fiscal Policy To Secure Recovery In 2022 China’s economy is witnessing a secular slowdown, a deterioration in governance, property market turmoil, and a rise in protectionism abroad. The long decline in corporate debt growth points to the structural slowdown. Animal spirits will not improve in 2022 so government spending will be necessary to try to shore up overall growth. The Politburo signaled that it will ease fiscal policy at the Central Economic Work Conference in early December, a vindication of our 2021 view. Neither the combined fiscal-and-credit impulse nor overall activity, indicated by the Li Keqiang Index, have shown the slightest uptick yet (Chart 15). Typically it takes six-to-nine months for policy easing to translate to an improvement in real economic activity. The first half of the year may still bring economic disappointments. But policymakers are adjusting to avoid a crash. Policy will grow increasingly accommodative as necessary in the first half of 2022. The key political constraint is the Communist Party’s all-important political reshuffle, the twentieth national party congress, to be held in fall 2022 (usually October). While Xi may not want the economy to surge in 2022, he cannot afford to let it go bust. The experience of previous party congresses shows that there is often a policy-driven increase in bank loans and fixed investment. Current conditions are so negative as to ensure that the government will provide at least some support, for instance by taking a “moderately proactive approach” to infrastructure investment (Chart 16). Otherwise a collapse of confidence would weaken Xi’s faction and give the opposition faction a chance to shore up its position within the Communist Party. Chart 16China Aims For Stability, Not Rapid Growth, Ahead Of 20th National Party Congress China Aims For Stability, Not Rapid Growth, Ahead Of 20th National Party Congress China Aims For Stability, Not Rapid Growth, Ahead Of 20th National Party Congress Party congresses happen every five years but the ten-year congresses, such as in 2022, are the most important for the country’s overall political leadership. The party congresses in 1992, 2002, and 2012 were instrumental in transferring power from one leader to the next, even though the transfer of power was never formalized. Back in 2017 Xi arranged to stay in power indefinitely but now he needs to clinch the deal, lest any unforeseen threat emerge from at home or abroad. Xi’s success in converting the Communist Party from “consensus rule” to his own “personal rule” will be measurable by his success in stacking the Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee with factional allies. He will also promote his faction across the Central Committee so as to shape the next generations of party leaders and leave his imprint on policy long after his departure. The government will be extremely sensitive to any hint of dissent or resistance and will move aggressively to quash it. Investors should not be surprised to see high-level sackings of public officials or private magnates and a steady stream of scandals and revelations that gain prominence in western media. The environment is also ripe for strange and unexpected incidents that reveal political differences beneath the veneer of unity in China: defections, protests, riots, terrorist acts, or foreign interference. Most incidents will be snuffed out quickly but investors should be wary of “black swans” from China in 2022. Chinese government policies will not be business friendly in 2022 aside from piecemeal fiscal easing. Everything Beijing does will be bent around securing Xi’s supremacy at all levels. Domestic politics will take precedence over economic concerns, especially over the interests of private businesses and foreign investors, as is clear when it comes to managing financial distress in the property sector. Negative regulatory surprises and arbitrary crackdowns on various industrial sectors will continue, though Beijing will do everything in its power to prevent the property bust from triggering contagion across the economic system. This will probably work, though the dam may burst after the party congress. Relations with the US and the West will remain poor, as the democracies cannot afford to endorse what they see as Xi’s power grab, the resurrection of a Maoist cult of personality, and the betrayal of past promises of cooperation and engagement. America’s midterm election politics will not be conducive to any broad thaw in US-China relations. While China will focus on domestic politics, its foreign policy actions will still prove relatively hawkish. Clashes with neighbors may be instigated by China to warn away any interference or by neighbors to try to embarrass Xi Jinping. The South and East China Seas are still ripe for territorial disputes to flare. Border conflicts with India are also possible. Taiwan remains the epicenter of global geopolitical risk. A fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis looms as China increases its military warnings to Taiwan not to attempt anything resembling independence (Chart 17A). China may use saber-rattling, economic sanctions, cyber war, disinformation, and other “gray zone” tactics to undermine the ruling party ahead of Taiwan’s midterm elections in November 2022 and presidential elections in January 2024. A full-scale invasion cannot be ruled out but is unlikely in the short run, as China still has non-military options to try to arrange a change of policy in Taiwan. Chart 17 ​​​​​​ Chart 17BMarket-Based Risk Indicators Say China/Taiwan Risk Has Not Peaked Market-Based Risk Indicators Say China/Taiwan Risk Has Not Peaked Market-Based Risk Indicators Say China/Taiwan Risk Has Not Peaked China has not yet responded to the US’s deployment of a small number of troops in Taiwan or to recent diplomatic overtures or arms sales. It could stage a major show of force against Taiwan to help consolidate power at home. China also has an interest in demonstrating to US allies and partners that their populations and economies will suffer if they side with Washington in any contingency. Given China’s historic confluence of risks, it is too soon for global investors to load up on cheap Chinese equities. Volatility will remain high. Weak animal spirits, limited policy easing, high levels of policy uncertainty, regulatory risk, ongoing trade tensions, and geopolitical risks suggest that investors should remain on the sidelines, and that a large risk premium can persist throughout 2022. Our market-based geopolitical risk indicators for both China and Taiwan are still trending upwards (Chart 17B). Global investors should capitalize on China’s policy easing indirectly by investing in commodities, cyclical equity sectors, and select emerging markets. 2. America’s Policy Insularity Our second view for 2022 centers on the United States, which will focus on domestic politics and will thus react or overreact to the many global challenges it faces. The US faces the first midterm election after the chaotic and contested 2020 presidential election. Political polarization remains at historically high levels, meaning that social unrest could flare up again and major domestic terrorist incidents cannot be ruled out. So far the Biden administration has focused on the domestic scene: mitigating the pandemic and rebooting the economy. Biden’s signature “Build Back Better” bill, $1.75 trillion investment in social programs, has passed the House of Representatives but not the Senate. The spike in inflation has shaken moderate Democratic senators who are now delaying the bill. We expect it to pass, since tax hikes were dropped, but our conviction is low (65% subjective odds), as a single defection would derail the bill. The implication would be inflationary since it would mark a sizable increase in government spending at a time when the output gap is already virtually closed. Spending would likely be much larger than the Congressional Budget Office estimate, shown in Chart 18, because the bill contains various gimmicks and hard-to-implement expiration clauses. Equity markets may not sell if the bill fails, since more fiscal stimulus would put pressure on the Federal Reserve to hike rates faster. Chart 18 Chart 19 Whether the bill passes or fails, Biden’s legislative agenda will be frozen thereafter. He will have to resort to executive powers and foreign policy to lift his approval rating and court the median voter ahead of the midterm elections. Currently Democrats are lined up to lose the House and probably also the Senate, where a single seat would cost them their majority (Chart 19). The Senate is still in play so Biden will be averse to taking big risks. For the same reason, Biden’s foreign policy goal will be to stave off various bubbling crises. Restoring the Iranian nuclear deal was his priority but Russia has now forced its way to the top of the agenda by threatening a partial reinvasion of Ukraine. In this context Biden will not have room for maneuver with China. Congress will be hawkish on China ahead of the midterms, and Xi Jinping will be reviving autocracy, so Biden will not be able to improve relations much. Biden’s domestic policy could fuel inflation, while his domestic-focused foreign policy will embolden strategic rivals, which increases geopolitical risks. 3. Petro-State Leverage A surge in gasoline prices at the pump ahead of the election would be disastrous for a Democratic Party that is already in disarray over inflation (Chart 20). Biden has already demonstrated that he can coordinate an international release of strategic oil reserves this year. Oil and natural gas producers gain leverage when the global economy rebounds, commodity prices rise, and supply/demand balances tighten. The frequency of global conflicts, especially those involving petro-states, tend to rise and fall in line with oil prices (Chart 21). Chart 20Inflation Constrains Biden Ahead Of Midterms Inflation Constrains Biden Ahead Of Midterms Inflation Constrains Biden Ahead Of Midterms Chart 21 Both Russia and Iran are vulnerable to social unrest at home and foreign strategic pressure abroad. Both have long-running conflicts with the US and West that are heating up for fundamental reasons, such as Russia’s fear of western influence in the former Soviet Union and Iran’s nuclear program. Both countries are demanding that the US make strategic concessions to atone for the Trump administration’s aggressive policies: selling lethal weapons to Ukraine and imposing “maximum pressure” sanctions on Iran. Biden is not capable of making credible long-term agreements since he could lose office as soon as 2025 and the next president could reverse whatever he agrees. But he must try to de-escalate these conflicts or else he faces energy shortages or price shocks, which would raise the odds of stagflation ahead of the election. The path of least resistance for Biden is to lift the sanctions on Iran to prevent an escalation of the secret war in the Middle East. If this unilateral concession should convince Iran to pause its nuclear activities before achieving breakout uranium enrichment capability, then Biden would reduce the odds of a military showdown erupting across the region. Opposition Republicans would accuse him of weakness but public opinion polls show that few Americans consider Iran a major threat. The problem is that this logic held throughout 2021 and yet Biden did not ease the sanctions. Given Iran’s nuclear progress and the US’s reliance on sanctions, we see a 40% chance of a military confrontation with Iran over the coming years. With regard to Ukraine, an American failure to give concessions to Russia will probably result in a partial reinvasion of Ukraine (50% subjective odds). This in turn will force the US and EU to impose sanctions on Russia, leading to a squeeze of natural gas prices in Europe and eventually price pressures in global energy markets. If Biden grants Russia’s main demands, he will avoid a larger war or energy shock but will make the US vulnerable to future blackmail. He will also demoralize Taiwan and other US partners who lack mutual defense treaties. But he may gain Russian cooperation on Iran. If Biden gives concessions to both Russia and Iran, his party will face criticism in the midterms but it will be far less vulnerable than if an energy shock occurs. This is the path of least resistance for Biden in 2022. It means that the petro-states may lose their leverage after using it, given that risk premiums would fall on Biden’s concessions. Of course, if energy shocks happen, Europe and China will suffer more than the US, which is relatively energy independent. For this reason Brussels and Beijing will try to keep diplomacy alive as long as possible. Enforcement of US sanctions on Iran may weaken, reducing Iran’s urgency to come into compliance. Germany may prevent a hardline threat of sanctions against Russia, reducing Russia’s fear of consequences. Again, petro-states have the leverage. Therefore investors should guard against geopolitically induced energy price spikes or shocks in 2022. What if other commodity producers, such as Saudi Arabia, crank up production and sink oil prices? This could happen. Yet the Saudis prefer elevated oil prices due to the host of national challenges they face in reforming their economy. If the US eases sanctions on Iran then the Saudis may make this decision. Thus downside energy price shocks are possible too. The takeaway is energy price volatility but for the most part we see the risk as lying to the upside. Investment Takeaways Traditional geopolitical risk, which focuses on war and conflict, is measurable and has slipped since 2015, although it has not broken down from the general uptrend since 2000. We expect the secular trend to be reaffirmed and for geopolitical risk to resume its rise due to the strategic themes and key views outlined above. The correlation of geopolitical risk with financial assets is debatable – namely because some geopolitical risks push up oil and commodity prices at the expense of the dollar, while others cause a safe-haven rally into the dollar (Chart 22).  Global economic policy uncertainty is also measurable. It is in a secular uptrend since the 2008 financial crisis. Here the correlation with the US dollar and relative equity performance is stronger, which makes sense. This trend should also pick up going forward, which is at least not negative for the dollar and relative US equity performance (Chart 23). Chart 22Geopolitical Risk Will Rise, Market Impacts Variable Geopolitical Risk Will Rise, Market Impacts Variable Geopolitical Risk Will Rise, Market Impacts Variable ​​​​​​ Chart 23Economic Policy Uncertainty Will Rise, Not Bad For US Assets Economic Policy Uncertainty Will Rise, Not Bad For US Assets Economic Policy Uncertainty Will Rise, Not Bad For US Assets ​​​​​​ We are neutral on the US dollar versus the euro and recommend holding either versus the Chinese renminbi. We are short the currencies of emerging markets that suffer from great power rivalry, namely the Taiwanese dollar versus the US dollar, the Korean won versus the Japanese yen, the Russian ruble versus the Canadian dollar, and the Czech koruna versus the British pound.     We remain long gold as a hedge against both geopolitical risk and inflation. We recommend staying long global equities. Tactically we prefer large caps and defensives. Within developed markets, we favor the UK and Japan. Japan in particular will benefit from Chinese policy easing yet remains more secure from China-centered geopolitical risks than emerging Asian economies. Within emerging markets, Mexico stands to benefit from US economic strength and divorce from China. We would buy Indian equities on weakness and sell Chinese and Russian equities on strength. We remain long aerospace and defense stocks and cyber-security stocks.   -The GPS Team We Read (And Liked) … Conspiracy U: A Case Study “Crazy, worthless, stupid, made-up tales bring out the demons in susceptible, unthinking people.” Thus the author’s father, a Holocaust survivor translated from Yiddish, on conspiracy theories and the real danger they present in the world. Scott A. Shay, author and chairman of Signature Bank, whose first book was a finalist for the National Jewish Book Award, has written an intriguing new book on the topic and graciously sent it our way.2 Shay is a regular reader of BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy and an astute observer of international affairs. He is also a controversialist who has written essays for several of America’s most prominent newspapers. Shay’s latest, Conspiracy U, is a bracing read that we think investors will benefit from. We say this not because of its topical focus, which is too confined, but because of its broader commentary on history, epistemology, the US higher education system – and the very timely and relevant problem of conspiracy theories, which have become a prevalent concern in twenty-first century politics and society. The author and the particular angle of the book will be controversial to some readers but this very quality makes the book well-suited to the problem of the conspiracy theory, since it is not the controversial nature of conspiracy theories but their non-falsifiability that makes them specious. As the title suggests, the book is a polemical broadside. The polemic arises from Shay’s unique set of moral, intellectual, and sociopolitical commitments. This is true of all political books but this one wears its topicality on its sleeve. The term “conspiracy” in the title refers to antisemitic, anti-Israel, and anti-Zionist conspiracy theories, particularly the denial of the Holocaust, coming from tenured academics on both the right and the left wings of American politics. The “U” in the title refers to universities, namely American universities, with a particular focus on the author’s beloved alma mater, Northwestern University in Chicago, Illinois. Clearly the book is a “case study” – one could even say the prosecution of a direct and extended public criticism of Northwestern University – and the polemical perspective is grounded in Shay’s Jewish identity and personal beliefs. Equally clearly Shay makes a series of verifiable observations and arguments about conspiracy theories as a contemporary phenomenon and their presence, as well as the presence of other weak and lazy modes of thought, in “academia writ large.” This generalization of the problem is where most readers will find the value of the book. The book does not expect one to share Shay’s identity, to be a Zionist or support Zionism, or to agree with Israel’s national policies on any issue, least of all Israeli relations with Arabs and Palestinians. Shay’s approach is rigorous and clinical. He is a genuine intellectual in that he considers the gravest matters of concern from various viewpoints, including viewpoints radically different from his own, and relies on close readings of the evidence. In other words, Shay did not write the book merely to convince people that two tenured professors at Northwestern are promoting conspiracy theories. That kind of aberration is sadly to be expected and at least partially the result of the tenure system, which has advantages as well, not within the scope of the book. Rather Shay wrote it to provide a case study for how it is that conspiracy theories can manage to be adopted by those who do not realize what they are and to proliferate even in areas that should be the least hospitable – namely, public universities, which are supposed to be beacons of knowledge, science, openness, and critical thinking, but also other public institutions, including the fourth estate. Shay is meticulous with his sources and terminology. He draws on existing academic literature to set the parameters of his subject, defining conspiracy theories as “improbable hypotheses [or] intentional lies … about powerful and sinister groups conspiring to harm good people, often via a secret cabal.” The definition excludes “unwarranted criticism” and “unfair/prejudiced perspectives,” which are harmful but unavoidable. Many prejudices and false beliefs are “still falsifiable in the minds of their adherents,” which is not the case with conspiracy theories, although deep prejudices can obviously be helpful in spreading such theories. Conspiracy theories often depend on “a stunning amount of uniformity of belief and coordination of action without contingencies.” They also rely excessively on pathos, or emotion, in making their arguments, as opposed to logos (reason) and ethos (credibility, authority). Unfortunately there is no absolute, infallible distinction between conspiracy theories and other improbable theories – say, yet-to-be-confirmed theories about conspiracies that actually occurred. Conspiracy theories differ from other theories “in their relationship to facts, evidence, and logic,” which may sound obvious but is very much to the point. Again, “the key difference is the evidence and how it is evaluated.” There is no ready way to refute the fabrications, myths, and political propaganda that people believe without taking the time to assess the claims and their foundations. This requires an open mind and a grim determination to get to the bottom of rival claims about events even when they are extremely morally or politically sensitive, as is often the case with wars, political conflicts, atrocities, and genocides: Reliable historians, journalists, lawyers, and citizens must first approach the question of the cause or the identity of perpetrators and victims of an event or process with an open mind, not prejudiced to either party, and then evaluate the evidence. The diagnosis may be easy but the treatment is not – it takes time, study, and debate, and one’s interlocutors must be willing to be convinced. This problem of convincing others is critical because it is the part that is so often left out of modern political discourse. Conspiracy theories are often hateful and militant, so there is a powerful urge to censor or repress them. Openly debating with conspiracy theorists runs the risk of legitimizing or appearing to legitimize their views, providing them with a public forum, which seems to grant ethos or authority to arguments that are otherwise conspicuously lacking in it. In some countries censorship is legal, almost everywhere when violence is incited. The problem is that the act of suppression can feed the same conspiracy theories, so there is a need, in the appropriate context, to engage with and refute lies and specious arguments. Clients frequently email us to ask our view of the rise of conspiracy theories and what they entail for the global policy backdrop. We associate them with the broader breakdown in authority and decline of public trust in institutions. Shay’s book is an intervention into this topic that clients will find informative and thought-provoking, even if they disagree with the author’s staunchly pro-Israel viewpoint. It is precisely Shay’s ability to discuss and debate extremely contentious matters in a lucid and empirical manner – antisemitism, the history of Zionism, Holocaust denialism, Arab-Israeli relations, the Rwandan genocide, QAnon, the George Floyd protests, various other controversies – that enables him to defend a controversial position he holds passionately, while also demonstrating that passion alone can produce the most false and malicious arguments. As is often the case, the best parts of the book are the most personal – when Shay tells about his father’s sufferings during the Holocaust, and journey from the German concentration camps to New York City, and about Shay’s own experiences scraping enough money together to go to college at Northwestern. These sequences explain why the author felt moved to stage a public intervention against fringe ideological currents, which he shows to have gained more prominence in the university system than one might think. The book is timely, as American voters are increasingly concerned about the handling of identity, inter-group relations, history, education, and ideology in the classroom, resulting in what looks likely to become a new and ugly episode of the culture and education wars. Let us hope that Shay’s standards of intellectual freedom and moral decency prevail.   Matt Gertken, PhD Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      The downshift in globalization today is even worse than it appears in Chart 10 because several countries have not yet produced the necessary post-pandemic data, artificially reducing the denominator and making the post-pandemic trade rebound appear more prominent than it is in reality. 2     Scott A. Shay, Conspiracy U: A Case Study (New York: Post Hill Press, 2021), 279 pages. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Appendix: GeoRisk Indicator China China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator Russia Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator United Kingdom UK: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Germany Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Canada Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Spain Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan Taiwan Territory: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan Territory: GeoRisk Indicator Korea Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Australia Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Australia: GeoRisk Indicator South Africa South Africa: GeoRisk Indicator South Africa: GeoRisk Indicator Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights A partial reinvasion of Ukraine cannot be ruled out. The constraints on Russia are not prohibitive, especially amid global energy shortages. On this issue, it is better to be alarmist than complacent. We would put the risk of a partial re-invasion of Ukraine as high as 50/50, albeit with an uncertain time frame over 12-36 months. The negative impact of conflict may not stay contained within Russian and eastern European markets. The US and EU are now threatening major retaliatory sanctions if Russia invades. In response Russia could reduce energy exports, exacerbating global shortages and damaging Europe’s overall economy. Investors should stay short Russian assets and overweight developed European equities over emerging European peers. Stay long gold and GBP-CZK. The dollar will be flat-to-up. Feature Chart 1Ruble Faces More Downside From Geopolitics Ruble Faces More Downside From Geopolitics Ruble Faces More Downside From Geopolitics Geopolitical tensions surrounding Russia remain unresolved and investors should continue to reduce holdings of assets exposed to any renewed conflict in Ukraine and the former Soviet Union. The ruble has dropped off its peaks since early November when strategic tensions revived (Chart 1). Presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin held their second bilateral summit on a secure video link on December 7 to discuss the situation in Ukraine, where Russia has amassed 95,000-120,000 troops on the border in a major show of force. Russia also mustered troops in April and only partially drew them down after the Biden-Putin summit in Geneva where the two sides agreed to hold talks to address differences. The two presidents agreed to hold consultations regarding Ukraine. Putin accused NATO of building up Ukraine’s military and demanded “reliable, legally fixed guarantees excluding the expansion of NATO in the eastern direction and the deployment of offensive strike weapons systems in the states adjacent to Russia.”1 President Putin’s red line against Ukraine joining NATO is well known. Recently he said his red line includes the placement of western military infrastructure or missile systems in Ukraine. Biden refused to accept any limits on NATO membership in keeping with past policy. After the summit National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan said, “I will tell you clearly and directly [Biden] made no such commitments or concessions. He stands by the proposition that countries should be able to freely choose who they associate with.” 2 Biden, who had conferred with the UK, France, Germany, and Italy prior to the call, outlined the coordinated economic sanctions that would be leveled against Russia if it resorted to military force, as well as defense aid that would go to Ukraine and other eastern European countries.  Thus Putin gave an ultimatum and Biden rebuffed it – and yet the two agreed to keep talking. The Russians have since said that they will present proposals to the Americans in less than a week. Talks are better than nothing. But neither side has given concrete indication of a change in position that would de-escalate strategic tensions – instead they have both raised the stakes. Therefore investors should proceed with the strong presumption that tensions will remain elevated or escalate in the coming months. Clearing Away Misconceptions Before going further we should clear away a few misconceptions about the current situation: Ukraine has unique strategic value to Russia. Like Belarus, but unlike Central Asia, Ukraine serves as critical buffer territory protecting Moscow and the Russian core from any would-be invaders. Russia lacks firm geological borders so it protects itself by means of distance and winter. This grand strategy succeeded against King Charles XII of Sweden, Napoleon, and Hitler. The collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia shorn of much of its buffer territory. Ukraine also offers access to the Black Sea. Russia has long striven to gain access to warm-water ports. The loss of control over Ukraine resulted in a loss of access. Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 only partially rectified the situation. Ukraine’s southern coastline around Crimea is the territory at risk today (Map 1). Chart It is Ukraine’s physical existence and unique strategic value – not its democratic leanings or ideological orientation – that ensures perpetual tensions with post-Soviet Russia. Russia has a strategic imperative to reassert control or at least prevent control by foreign powers. Ideological opposition may make things worse but an anti-Russian Ukrainian dictator would also face Russian coercion or aggression, perhaps even more than the current weak democracy. In fact Russia is trying to force Ukraine to revise its constitution and adopt a federal structure so as to grant greater autonomy to separatist regions Donetsk and Luhansk that Russia helped break away in 2014. But Ukraine has not relented to Moscow’s demands of political reform. It is not authoritarianism but a permanent foreclosure of Ukrainian membership in the EU and NATO that Moscow is after. Yet it is highly unlikely that Russia would try to invade and conquer all of Ukraine. Ukraine is the largest country by territory in Europe and has 255,000 active soldiers and 900,000 reserves (contra Russia’s 1 million active and 2 million reserves) who would defend their freedom and sovereignty against an invader.3 Russia would not be able to stage a full-scale invasion with the 175,000 maximum troop buildup that US intelligence is warning about. It would have to mobilize fully, dangerously neglecting other vast dimensions of its national security, and would inevitably get bogged down fighting a vicious insurgency backed by the NATO powers. It would save blood and treasure by paralyzing Ukraine’s politics and preventing it from allying with western militaries, which is what Putin is attempting to do today. Putin uses foreign adventures to strengthen his grip at home but an adventure of this nature would impose such burdens as to threaten his grip at home. A limited re-invasion of Ukraine could yield historic strategic advantages to Russia. Moscow could focus on a partial military incursion that would annex or shore up Donbass, or extend its control from Donbass to the Black Sea, conceivably all the way to the Dnieper river. This pathway would yield Russia maritime access and a buffer space to fortify Crimea. Naval warfare could also yield control of deep-water ports (Yuzhne, Odessa, Mykolaiv, Chornomorsk), control of the mouth of the Dnieper, control of the canal that supplies water to Crimea, and a means of bottling up the Ukrainian navy and preventing foreign maritime assistance. Ukraine would be further weakened and Russia would have a larger beachhead in Ukraine for future pressure tactics. Russia is not bluffing – its military buildup poses a credible threat. If there is anywhere Russia’s threats are credible, it is in taking military action against former Soviet republics like Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014) that have pro-western leanings yet lack the collective security of the NATO alliance. At very least, given that Russian forces did deploy in Ukraine in 2014, Russian action in Ukraine cannot be ruled out. The military balance has not changed so significantly in that time and strongly favors Russia (Chart 2). The US has provided around $2.5 billion in military aid to Ukraine since 2014, and has sent lethal weapons including Javelin anti-tank missiles and launchers since 2017-18, including $450 million worth of military aid under the Biden administration (and $300 million just authorized by Congress on December 7). NATO allies have also provided defense aid. This is part of Putin’s complaint but these new arms are not game changers that would prevent Russia from taking military action. Chart 2 Thus if the West rejects Moscow’s core demands, war is likely. This is true even if Russia would prefer to achieve its aims through political and economic rather than military means. Russia does not deem the West’s threat of sanctions as prohibitive of invasion. The West’s sanctions since 2014 have failed to change Russia’s government, strategy, or posture in Ukraine. Yes, European nations joined the US in imposing sanctions. But Germany also pursued the Nord Stream II pipeline as a means of bypassing Ukraine and working directly with Russia to preserve economic engagement and energy security. Former Chancellor Merkel forced the pipeline through despite the objections of eastern Europeans and the United States. The allies also formed the “Normandy Quartet,” excluding the US, to force Ukraine to accept the Minsk agreements on resolving the conflict. Thus the lesson of 2014-21 is not that NATO allies stood shoulder-to-shoulder in defense of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity but rather that Germany and the EU, and the EU and the US, have major differences in interests and risk-tolerance in dealing with Russia. Russia does not face, or may think it does not face, a united front among the western powers. A partial reinvasion of Ukraine would bring the western allies together initially but probably not for long. Russia determines the timing of any new military incursion in Ukraine. Winter is not the ideal time to invade Ukraine, though it is possible. Russia could act in spring 2022, as the US has warned, but it could also act in the summer of 2023, the spring of 2024, or other times. From a strategic point of view, Russia has enjoyed a historic window of opportunity since 2001 when the US got bogged down in Afghanistan and Iraq and then the US and the EU got bogged down in economic and financial crisis. Given that the American political establishment is withdrawing from foreign quagmires, reactivating fiscal policy, bulking up the military-industrial complex, and making a dedicated effort to revitalize its global alliances, Russia may believe that its historic window is closing. Russia’s domestic fundamentals are deteriorating over time. Putin could decide it is necessary to seize strategic ground in Ukraine sooner rather than later. Bottom Line: Ukraine offers unique and irreplaceable buffer space and maritime access to Russia. Russia’s military actions in 2014 led to stalemate, such that Russia remains insecure, Ukraine remains defiant, and the West is still entertaining defense cooperation or even NATO membership with Ukraine. Yet the Crimea conflict also revealed a lack of concert among western powers exemplified by Germany’s Nord Stream II pipeline. Today Russia has the military capability to seize another slice of Ukrainian territory. Western retaliatory actions would be painful but may not be deemed prohibitive. Investors cannot rule out a partial re-invasion of Ukraine. Nord Stream Pipeline Is Not The Sole Factor Is Russia not making a show of military force merely to ensure that Nord Stream II pipeline goes into operation? Will Russia not back down if the pipeline is guaranteed? A common view in Washington and the financial industry is that Russia’s military buildup is just a bluff, i.e. Moscow’s aggressive way of demanding that Germany’s new government and the European Union approve Nord Stream. The pipeline finished construction in September but now awaits formal regulatory certification. Approval was originally expected by May 2022 but has now been delayed. The pipeline would carry 55 billion cubic meters of natural gas into Europe, about half of Russia’s current export capacity outside of Ukraine. Ukraine’s total capacity is around 150 billion cubic meters. The pipeline enables Russia and Germany to bypass Ukraine, whose conflicts with Moscow since 2004 have threatened Germany’s energy security. About 18% of EU’s total energy imports come from Russia, whilst this figure is 16% for Germany. That is about 0.5% and 0.2% of EU and German GDP, respectively. Meanwhile Russian energy exports to Germany and the EU make up 0.8% and 5.6% of GDP, respectively (Chart 3). Chart 3 The problem with this reasoning is that the US conceded Nord Stream to Russia over the summer. The US initially raised the threat of sanctions because the pipeline  strengthened Russo-German ties, diminished Ukraine’s leverage, and deprived the US of a chance to sell liquefied natural gas to Europe. But the Biden administration proved unwilling to take this aggressive approach. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has a long history of arguing that the US should prioritize strong relations with its European allies rather than punitive measures to try to block Russian gas sales. Biden met with outgoing Chancellor Angela Merkel in July and agreed to let Nord Stream go forward. The only proviso was that Russia not “weaponize natural gas,” i.e. withhold supplies for geopolitical purposes, as it has done in the past.4 Before Russia’s military threats, Germany and the EU were expected to certify the pipeline by no later than May 2022 and an earlier certification looked possible because of Europe’s low natural gas supplies. Yet Russia, fresh off parliamentary elections, did precisely what Germany said it was not supposed to do. The pipeline was completed in September and reports of Russian limitations on natural gas supply surfaced in October. Moscow not only weaponized the gas but also mustered its army on the Ukrainian border again. Putin may have feared that the new German government, which officially took office on December 8, would change policy and refuse to certify the pipeline. He also could have feared that the US Congress would pass a Republican-backed provision that would require Biden to impose sanctions that would halt the pipeline. But these explanations are not satisfactory. First, the German government was not likely to halt Nord Stream. Quite the opposite, Berlin has pushed against all opposition to speed the pipeline into action. It only delayed the regulatory approval when Russia did the one thing that Germany had expressly prohibited, which was weaponize natural gas. Second, the US Congress was never likely to pass mandatory sanctions on Nord Stream operators. The Democrats opposed it, as it would have tied Biden’s hands, whereas presidents always retain discretion over foreign policy and national security. Even moderate Republicans opposed the measure, for the same reason. If either of these were the reason for Putin’s latest buildup, then the buildup will probably dissipate in the coming months. Putin also wants to force Ukraine to implement the Minsk agreements. But the Biden administration adopted the Minsk framework in June for the first time, which was a concession to Russia. So the latest military threats are not solely about coercing Europe to approve the pipeline or Ukraine to implement Minsk. Putin is driving at something else. Putin’s Focus On Ukraine And NATO Putin used military pressure on Ukraine’s border to force the US to accept the pipeline and the Minsk agreements. He is now using the same tactic to raise the stakes and demand that the US and its allies permanently rule out NATO membership and defense cooperation with Ukraine. Biden rejected the first demand during the summit, as mentioned. There is no way that the US or NATO will forswear any and all eastward expansion. Even on Ukraine specifically, Biden cannot give Russia a legal guarantee because it would require a 60-seat majority in the Senate (not likely). Any future president would retain prerogative over the matter anyway and Putin knows this. Moreover Ukraine is never going to join NATO. Russia would attack. And NATO members would not be unanimous (as is required for new members) because the collective defense treaty would require them to defend Ukraine. They would be signing up for a war with Russia. Still Biden is unlikely to disavow Ukrainian NATO membership because to do so would be to deny the self-determination of nations, capitulate to Russian coercion, and demoralize the Ukrainians, whom the US hopes will maintain a plucky resistance against Russian domination. It would also demoralize US allies and partners – namely Taiwan, which also lacks a formal defense treaty and would be forced to sue for peace with China in the face of American abandonment. Biden’s refusal to ban Ukraine from NATO is encapsulated in Diagram 1, an exercise in game theory that exemplifies why the risk of war should not be dismissed. Diagram 1Game Theory Suggests Russia Will Keep Applying Military Pressure Russia/Ukraine: Don’t Be Complacent Russia/Ukraine: Don’t Be Complacent Biden may give private or executive assurances on Ukraine and NATO but Putin will know that these mean nothing since Biden may be out of office as early as January 2025 and then Putin would have to renegotiate. America is not a credible negotiator because partisanship has resulted in extreme foreign policy vacillations – the next president could revoke the deal. Even after Putin is gone Russia would have to negotiate with the US to prevent the US from arming Ukraine. Hence Moscow may decide to reduce Ukraine and improve Russia’s strategic position by force of arms. This is true even if Biden forswears the NATO option, as Diagram 1 illustrates. Putin’s second demand – that the US not provide offensive weapon systems in countries adjacent to Russia – is more material. This is what the new round of talks will focus on. This new Ukraine line of talks is separate, more urgent and important, than the other bilateral dialogues on the arms race, and cyber-war. US-Russia talks on Iran are also urgent, however, and Russia’s cooperation there may be contingent on US concessions regarding Ukraine. The US may be willing to stop its defense cooperation with Ukraine but not with other allies and partners, however. It is also not clear what Putin will accept. These negotiations will have to be watched. Biden cannot make major concessions with a gun to his head. It is unclear how far the US is willing to concede on defense cooperation with countries around Russia. The US may quietly abandon Ukraine but then it would need to reinforce its other defense relationships. If Putin draws down the troops, and Biden calls a stop to defense aid to Ukraine, then a crisis may be averted. What Could Go Wrong? Economic sanctions under consideration in Washington are significant: the US could freeze bank transactions, expand restrictions on trading Russian sovereign and corporate debt, and lobby Belgium to kick Russia off the SWIFT financial messaging system. However, these sanctions may not be effective in preventing Russia from using military force. Russia has weathered US sanctions since 2014, and the smaller and weaker Iranian economy has weathered maximum pressure sanctions since 2019. Energy producers like Russia and Iran have maximum geopolitical leverage when global energy inventories draw down, as is the case today. Even in the face of Russian military aggression, the Biden administration is vacillating on sanctions targeting Russia’s energy sector that would contribute to global shortages and ultimately raise prices at the pump for voters in a midterm election year.5 Germany’s new government also hesitates to declare unambiguously that it will discontinue the Nord Stream II pipeline if Russia invades Ukraine. True, Germany signaled that the pipeline would be halted. Its energy regulator declared that the pipeline’s ownership must be unbundled, which pushes back the certification date to sometime after May 2022 – this was a geopolitical not a legalistic decision. But construction is completed, the pipeline physically exists, which will vitiate Germany’s commitment to sanctions whenever natural gas shortages occur, as is the case this winter (Chart 4). Shortages will continue to occur and Russia controls a large share of supply. Chart 4 ​​​​​​ Chart 5 It would take a catastrophe to drive Germany to restart coal and nuclear plants, so natural gas will continue to be in demand. Germany does not have liquefied natural gas import capability yet. If Europe imposes crippling sanctions on Russia, Russia could reduce energy supplies and harm Europe’s economy (Chart 5). The Russian economy and society would suffer which is one reason any military action in Ukraine would be limited in scope. Still, Moscow may believe that Germany would restrain the EU, and the EU would restrain the US, thereby preventing sanctions from being fully, uniformly, and durably implemented. Prior to Russia’s aggression, public opinion polls showed that the German public strongly supported Nord Stream. Even a majority of Green Party members supported it despite the fact that the Greens were the most critical of increasing Germany’s dependency on fossil fuels and an authoritarian petro-state. While public approval of the pipeline has surely suffered in the face of Russian aggression, a majority probably still favors the pipeline. Germany has a national consensus in support of engagement with Russia and avoiding a new cold war, given that the original Cold War cut Germany in half. For that reason invasion may only temporarily unite the western powers – it could ultimately drive a wedge between Germany and other EU members, namely in the former Soviet bloc. It would also divide the more risk-averse EU from the US in terms of how to deal with Russia. And it would weaken the Biden administration at a time when it is extremely vulnerable, exacerbating America’s internal divisions. Russian domestic patriotism would rally, at least initially. Note that Russia could miscalculate on this issue and that is one reason for high level of risk. Perhaps the West would prove far more unified and aggressive in its sanctions enforcement than it was after 2014. A falling ruble and rising inflation could cause Russian social unrest. But Russia could misread the situation. Unless the US and Europe escalate the sanctions threat massively to better deter Russia, their lack of concert is another reason for investors not to be complacent about renewed conflict. Bottom Line: The threat of sanctions may prove insufficient to deter renewed Russian aggression against Ukraine. Germany favors engagement with Russia and Europe’s energy dependency on Russia makes it vulnerable to supply disruptions. Russia has leverage given tight global energy markets, Europe’s low natural gas inventories, and US domestic political considerations ahead of the 2022 midterms. Investment Takeaways The point of this report argues that a partial re-invasion of Ukraine cannot be ruled out. Russia has the capability to reinforce de facto control of Donbas, or expand its footprint in southern Ukraine, though not to invade the whole country. The threat of economic sanctions is not yet so overwhelming as to warrant overconfident predictions of de-escalation. In this case it is better to be alarmist than complacent. Russia would want to maintain an element of surprise so the timing of any belligerence is hard to predict. For de-escalation, investors should watch for Russia to withdraw troops from the Ukrainian border, US-Russia consultations to begin promptly and proceed regularly, and for the US and allies to delay or halt defense cooperation and arms transfers to Ukraine. While global investors would quickly become de-sensitized to conflict that is entirely contained in Ukraine, the trans-Atlantic threat of major sanctions now raises the stakes and suggests that global energy shocks could negatively affect the European or global economy in the event of conflict. Any conflict could also spill outside of Ukraine’s borders, as with Malaysian Airlines flight MH17, which was shot down by Russian-backed Ukrainian separatists in July 2014. The Black Sea has seen a dangerous uptick in naval saber-rattling and that strategic situation would become permanently more dangerous if Russia seized more of coastal Ukraine. Russian military integration with Belarus is also a source of insecurity for EU and NATO members. Global financial markets have only started to price the geopolitical risk emanating from Russia. Our Russian GeoRisk Indicator has ticked up (Chart 6). But Russian equity performance relative to broad emerging markets is only arguably underperforming what is implied by Brent crude oil prices. Chart 6Market Slow To React To Ukraine Crisis - Risk To Downside For Russian Assets Market Slow To React To Ukraine Crisis - Risk To Downside For Russian Assets Market Slow To React To Ukraine Crisis - Risk To Downside For Russian Assets This relatively muted reaction suggests more downside lies ahead if we are right that strategic tensions will be flat-to-up over the coming months. Sell the RUB-USD on any strength. Stay long GBP-CZK. Tactically short Russian equities versus EM-ex-Asia (Chart 7). They are exposed to further correction as a result of escalating geopolitical risk. Chart 7Russia Falling Off Peaks Of Performance Versus EM-Ex-Asia Russia Falling Off Peaks Of Performance Versus EM-Ex-Asia Russia Falling Off Peaks Of Performance Versus EM-Ex-Asia ​​​​​​ Chart 8Developed Europe A Safer Bet Than Emerging Europe Amid Tensions Developed Europe A Safer Bet Than Emerging Europe Amid Tensions Developed Europe A Safer Bet Than Emerging Europe Amid Tensions ​​​​​​ Stick to long DM Europe versus EM Europe – our main trade this year to capture rising geopolitical risk between Russia and the West (Chart 8).     Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      President of Russia, "Meeting with US President Joseph Biden," December 7, 2021, kremlin.ru.  2     White House, "Press Briefing by Press Secretary Jen Psaki and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, December 7, 2021," whitehouse.gov. 3     Dan Peleschuk, "Ukraine’s military poses a tougher challenge for Russia than in 2014," Politico, April 14, 2021, politico.eu.; see also Gav Don, "LONG READ: Russia looks poised to invade Ukraine, but what would an invasion actually look like?" Intellinews, November 24, 2021, intellinews.com. 4     US Department of State, "Joint Statement of the United States and Germany on Support for Ukraine, European Energy Security, and our Climate Goals," July 21, 2021, state.gov. 5     Kylie Atwood and Natasha Bertrand, "US likely to hold off for now on energy sanctions for Russia, fearing impact on global prices," CNN, December 9, 2021, cnn.com. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)

Highlights Geopolitical conflicts point to energy price spikes and could add to inflation surprises in the near term. However, US fiscal drag and China’s economic slowdown are both disinflationary risks to be aware of.  Specifically, energy-producers like Russia and Iran gain greater leverage amid energy shortages. Europe’s natural gas prices could spike again. Conflict in the Middle East could disrupt oil flows.    President Biden’s $1.75 trillion social spending bill is a litmus test for fiscal fatigue in developed markets. It could fail, and even assuming it passes it will not prevent overall fiscal drag in 2022-23. However, it is inflationary over the long run. China’s slowdown poses the chief disinflationary risk. But we still think policy will ease to avoid an economic crash ahead of the fall 2022 national party congress.  We are closing this year’s long value / short growth trade for a loss of 3.75%. Cyclical sectors ended up being a better way to play the reopening trade. Feature Equity markets rallied in recent weeks despite sharp upward moves in core inflation across the world (Chart 1). Inflation is fast becoming a popular concern and we see geopolitical risks that could drive headline inflation still higher in the short run. We also see underrated disinflationary factors, namely China’s property sector distress and economic slowdown.     Several major developments have occurred in recent weeks that we will cover in this report. Our conclusions: Biden’s domestic agenda will pass but risks are high and macro impact is limited. Congress passed Biden’s infrastructure deal and will probably still pass his signature social spending bill, although inflation is creating pushback. Together these bills have little impact on the budget deficit outlook but they will add to inflationary pressures.  Energy shortages embolden Russia and Iran. Winter weather is unpredictable, the energy crisis may not be over. But investors are underrating Russia’s aggressive posture toward the West. Any conflict with Iran could also cause oil disruptions in the near future. US-China relations may improve but not for long. A bilateral summit between Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping will not reduce tensions for very long, if at all. Climate change cooperation is an insufficient basis to reverse the cold war-style confrontation over the long run. Chart 1Inflation Rattles Policymakers Inflation Rattles Policymakers Inflation Rattles Policymakers The investment takeaway is that geopolitical tensions could push energy prices still higher in the short term. Iran and Russia need to be monitored. However, China’s economic slowdown will weigh on growth. China poses an underrated disinflationary risk to our views. US Congress: Bellwether For Fiscal Fatigue While inflation is starting to trouble households and voters, investors should bear in mind that the current set of politicians have long aimed to generate an inflation overshoot. They spent the previous decade in fear of deflation, since it generated anti-establishment or populist parties that threatened to disrupt the political system. They quietly built up an institutional consensus around more robust fiscal policy and monetary-fiscal coordination. Now they are seeing that agenda succeed but are facing the first major hurdle in the form of higher prices. They will not simply cut and run. Inflation is accompanied by rising wages, which today’s leaders want to see – almost all of them have promised households a greater share of the fruits of their labor, in keeping with the new, pro-worker, populist zeitgeist. Real wages are growing at 1.1% in the US and 0.9% across the G7 (Chart 2). Even more than central bankers, political leaders are focused on jobs and employment, i.e. voters. Yet the labor market still has considerable slack (Chart 3). Almost all of the major western governments have been politically recapitalized since the pandemic, either through elections or new coalitions. Almost all of them were elected on promises of robust public investment programs to “build back better,” i.e. create jobs, build infrastructure, revitalize industry, and decarbonize the energy economy. Thus while they are concerned about inflation, they will leave that to central banks, as they will be loathe to abandon their grand investment plans.  Chart 2Higher Wages: Real Or Nominal? Higher Wages: Real Or Nominal? Higher Wages: Real Or Nominal? Still, there will be a breaking point at which inflation forces governments to put their spending plans on hold. The US Congress is the immediate test of whether today’s inflation will trigger fiscal fatigue and force a course correction.      Chart 3Policymakers Fear Populism, Focus On Employment Policymakers Fear Populism, Focus On Employment Policymakers Fear Populism, Focus On Employment President Biden’s $550 billion infrastructure bill passed Congress last week and will be signed into law around November 15. Now he is worried that his signature $1.75 trillion social spending bill will falter due to inflation fears. He cannot spare a single vote in the Senate (and only three votes in the House of Representatives). Odds that the bill fails are about 35%. Democratic Party leaders will not abandon the cause due to recent inflation prints. They see a once-in-a-generation opportunity to expand the role of government, the social safety net, and the interests of their constituents. If they miss this chance due to inflation that ends up being transitory then they will lose the enthusiastic left wing of the party and suffer a devastating loss in next year’s midterm elections, in which they are already at a disadvantage.   Biden’s social bill is also likely to pass because the budget reconciliation process necessary to pass the bill is the same process needed to raise the national debt limit by December 3. A linkage of the two by party leaders would ensure that both pass … and otherwise Democrats risk self-inflicting a national debt default. The reconciliation bill is more about long-term than short-term inflation risk. The bill does not look to have a substantial impact on the budget outlook: the new spending is partially offset by new taxes and spread out over ten years. The various legislative scenarios look virtually the same in our back-of-the-envelope budget projections (Chart 4). Chart 4 However, given that the output gap is virtually closed, this bill combined with the infrastructure bill will add to inflationary pressures. The fiscal drag will diminish by 2024, not coincidentally the presidential election year 2024, not coincidentally the presidential election year. The deficit is not expected to increase or decrease substantially between 2023 and 2024. From then onward the budget deficit will expand. The increased government demand for goods and services and the increased disposable income for low-earning families will add to inflationary pressures. Other developed markets face a similar situation: inflation is picking up, but big spending has been promised and normalizing budgets will marginally weigh on growth in the next few years (Chart 5). True, growth should hold up since the private economy is rebounding in the wake of the pandemic. But politicians will not be inclined to renege on campaign promises of liberal spending in the face of fiscal drag. The current crop of leaders is primed to make major public investments. This is true of Germany, Japan, Canada, and Italy as well as the United States. It is partly true in France, where fiscal retrenchment has been put on hold given the presidential election in the spring. The effect will be inflationary, especially for the US where populist spending is more extravagant than elsewhere. Chart 5 The long run will depend on structural factors and how much the new investments improve productivity. Bottom Line: A single vote in the US Senate could derail the president’s social spending bill, so the US is now the bellwether for fiscal fatigue in the developed world. Biden is likely to pass the bill, as global fiscal drag is disinflationary over the next 12 months. Yet inflation could stay elevated for other reasons. And this fiscal drag will dissipate later in the business cycle. Russia And Iran Gain Leverage Amid Energy Crunch The global energy price spike arose from a combination of structural factors – namely the pandemic and stimulus. It has abated in recent weeks but will remain a latent problem through the winter season, especially if La Niña makes temperatures unusually cold as expected. Rising energy prices feed into general producer prices, which are being passed onto consumers (Chart 6). They look to be moderating but the weather is unpredictable.   There is another reason that near-term energy prices could spike or stay elevated: geopolitics. Tight global energy supply-demand balances mean that there is little margin of safety if unexpected supply disruptions occur. This gives greater leverage to energy producers, two of which are especially relevant at the moment: Russia and Iran.      Russia’s long-running conflict with the West is heating up on several fronts, as expected. Russia may not have caused the European energy crisis but it is exacerbating shortages by restricting flows of natural gas for political reasons, as it is wont to do (Chart 7). Moscow always maintains plausible deniability but it is currently flexing its energy muscles in several areas: Chart 6Energy Price Depends On Winter ... And Russia/Iran! Energy Price Depends On Winter ... And Russia/Iran! Energy Price Depends On Winter ... And Russia/Iran! Ukraine: Russia has avoided filling up and fully utilizing pipelines and storage facilities in Ukraine, where the US is now warning that Russia could stage a large military action in retaliation for Ukrainian drone strikes in the still-simmering Russia-Ukraine war.    Belarus: Russia says it will not increase the gas flow through the major Yamal-Europe natural gas pipeline in 2022 even as Belarus threatens to halt the pipeline’s operation entirely. Belarus, backed by Russia, is locked in a conflict with Poland and the EU over Belarus’s funneling of migrants into their territory (Chart 8). The conflict could lead not only to energy supply disruptions but also to a broader closure of trade and a military standoff.1 Russia has flown two Tu-160 nuclear-armed bombers over Belarus and the border area in a sign of support. Moldova: Russia is withholding natural gas to pressure the new, pro-EU Moldovan government. Chart 7 Chart 8 Russia’s main motive is obvious: it wants Germany and the EU to approve and certify the new Nord Stream II pipeline. Nord Stream II enables Germany and Russia to bypass Ukraine, where pipeline politics raise the risk of shortages and wars. Lame duck German Chancellor Angela Merkel worked with Russia to complete this pipeline before the end of her term, convincing the Biden administration to issue a waiver on congressional sanctions that could have halted its construction. However, two of the parties in the incoming German government, the Greens and the Free Democrats, oppose the pipeline. While these parties may not have been able to stop the pipeline from operating, Russia does not want to take any chances and is trying to force Germany’s and the EU’s hand. The energy crisis makes it more likely that the pipeline will be approved, since the European Commission will have to make its decision during a period when cold weather and shortages will make it politically acceptable to certify the pipeline.2 The decision will further drive a wedge between Germany and eastern EU members, which is what Russia wants. EU natural gas prices will likely subside sometime next year and will probably not derail the economic recovery, according to both our commodity and Europe strategists. A bigger and longer-lasting Russian energy squeeze would emerge if the Nord Stream II pipeline is not certified. This is a low risk at this point but the next six months could bring surprises. More broadly, the West’s conflict with Russia can easily escalate from here. First, President Vladimir Putin faces economic challenges and weak political support. He frequently diverts popular attention by staging aggressive moves abroad. There is no reason to believe his post-2004 strategy of restoring Russia’s sphere of influence in the former Soviet space has changed. High energy prices give him greater leverage even aside from pipeline coercion – so it is not surprising that Russia is moving troops to the Ukraine border again. Growing military support for Belarus, or an expanded conflict in Ukraine, are likely to create a crisis now or later.   Second, the US-Germany agreement to allow Nord Stream II explicitly states that Russia must not weaponize natural gas supply. This statement has had zero effect so far. But when the energy shortage subsides, the EU could pursue retaliatory measures along with the United States. Of course, Russia has been able to weather sanctions. But tensions are already escalating significantly.  After Russia, Iran also gains leverage during times of tight energy supplies. With global oil inventories drawing down, Iran is in the position to inflict “maximum pressure” on the US and its allies, a role reversal from the 2017-20 period in which large inventories enabled the US to impose crippling sanctions on Iran after pulling out of the 2015 nuclear deal (Chart 9). Iran is rapidly advancing on its nuclear program and a new round of diplomatic negotiations may only serve to buy time before it crosses the “breakout” threshold of uranium enrichment capability as early as this month or next. In a recent special report we argued that there is a 40% chance of a crisis over Iran in the Middle East. Such a crisis could ultimately lead to an oil shock in the Persian Gulf or Strait of Hormuz.  Chart 9Now Iran Can Use 'Maximum Pressure' Now Iran Can Use 'Maximum Pressure' Now Iran Can Use 'Maximum Pressure' Bottom Line: Russia’s natural gas coercion of Europe could keep European energy prices high through March or May. More broadly Russia’s renewed tensions with the West confirm our view that oil producers gain geopolitical leverage amid the current supply shortages. Iran also gains leverage and its conflict with the US could lead to global oil supply disruptions anytime over the next 12 months. Until Nord Stream II is certified and a new Iranian nuclear agreement is signed, there are two clear sources of potential energy shocks. Moreover in today’s inflationary context there is limited margin of safety for unexpected supply disruptions regardless of source. Xi’s Historical Rewrite China continues to be a major source of risk for the global economy and financial markets in the lead-up to the twentieth national party congress in fall 2022. While Chinese assets have sold off this year, global risk assets are still vulnerable to negative surprises from China.  The five-year political reshuffle in 2022 is more important than usual since President Xi Jinping was originally supposed to step down but will instead stick around as leader for life, like China’s previous strongmen Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.3 Xi’s rejection of term limits became clear in 2017 and is not really news. But Xi will fortify himself and his faction in 2022 against any opposition whatsoever. He is extremely vigilant about any threats that could disrupt this process, whether at home or abroad.  The Communist Party’s sixth plenary session this week highlights both Xi’s success within the Communist Party and the sensitivity of the period. Xi produced a new “historical resolution,” or interpretation of the party’s history, which is only the third such resolution. A few remarks on this historical resolution are pertinent: Mao’s resolution: Chairman Mao wrote the first such resolution in 1945 to lay down his version of the party’s history and solidify his personal control. It is naturally a revolutionary leftist document. Deng’s revision of Mao: General Deng Xiaoping then produced a major revision in 1981, shortly after initiating China’s economic opening and reform. Deng’s interpretation aimed to hold Mao accountable for “gross mistakes” during the Cultural Revolution and yet to recognize the Communist Party’s positive achievements in founding the People’s Republic. His version gave credit to the party and collective leadership rather than Mao’s personal rule. Two 30-year periods: The implication was that the party’s history should be divided into two thirty-year periods: the period of foundations and conflict with Mao as the party’s core and the period of improvement and prosperity with Deng as the core. Jiang’s support of Deng: Deng’s telling came under scrutiny from new leftists in the wake of Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. But General Secretary Jiang Zemin largely held to Deng’s version of the story that the days of reform and opening were a far better example of the party’s leadership because they were so much more stable and prosperous.4 Xi’s reaction to Jiang and Deng: Since coming to power in 2012, Xi Jinping has shown an interest in revising the party’s official interpretation of its own history. The central claim of the revisionists is that China could never have achieved its economic success if not for Mao’s strongman rule. Mao’s rule and the Communist Party’s central control thus regain their centrality to modern China’s story. China’s prosperity owes its existence to these primary political conditions. The two periods cannot be separated.  Xi’s synthesis of Deng and Mao: Now Xi has written himself into that history above all other figures – indeed the communique from the Sixth Plenum mentions Xi more often than Marx, Mao, or Deng (Chart 10). The implication is that Xi is the synthesis of Mao and Deng, as we argued back in 2017 at the end of the nineteenth national party congress. The synthesis consists of a strongman who nevertheless maintains a vibrant economy for strategic ends. Chart 10 What are the practical policy implications of this history lesson? Higher Country Risk: China’s revival of personal rule, as opposed to consensus rule, marks a permanent increase in “country risk” and political risk for investors. Autocratic governments lack institutional guardrails (checks and balances) that prevent drastic policy mistakes. When Xi tries to step down there will probably be a succession crisis. Higher Macroeconomic Risk: China is more likely to get stuck in the “middle-income trap.” Liberal or pro-market economic reform is de-emphasized both in the new historical resolution and in the Xi administration’s broader program. Centralization is already suppressing animal spirits, entrepreneurship, and the private sector.  Higher Geopolitical Risk: The return to autocracy and the withdrawal from economic liberalism also entail a conflict with the United States, which is still the world’s largest economy and most powerful military. The US is not what it once was but it will put pressure on China’s economy and build alliances aimed at strategic containment. Bottom Line: China is trying to escape the middle-income trap, like Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, but it is trying to do so by means of autocracy, import substitution, and conflict with the United States. These other Asian economies improved productivity by democratizing, embracing globalization, and maintaining a special relationship with the United States. China’s odds of succeeding are low. China will focus on power consolidation through fall 2022 and this will lead to negative surprises for financial markets.    China Slowdown: The Disinflationary Risk While it is very unlikely that Xi will face serious challenges to his rule, strange things can happen at critical junctures. Therefore the regime will be extremely alert for any threats, foreign or domestic, and will ultimately prioritize politics above all other things, which means investors will suffer negative surprises. The lingering pandemic still poses an inflationary risk for the rest of the world while the other main risk is disinflationary:    Inflationary Risk – Zero COVID: The “Covid Zero” policy of attempting to stamp out any trace of the virus will still be relevant at least over the next 12 months (Chart 11). Clampdowns serve a dual purpose since the Xi administration wants to minimize foreign interference and domestic dissent before the party congress. Hence the global economy can suffer more negative supply shocks if ports or factories are closed.  Inflationary Risk – Energy Closures: The government is rationing electricity amid energy shortages to prioritize household heating and essential services. This could hurt factory output over the winter if the weather is bad. Disinflationary Risk – Property Bust: The country is still flirting with overtightening monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policies. Throughout the year we have argued that authorities would avoid overtightening. But China is still very much in a danger zone in which policy mistakes could be made. Recent rumors suggest the government is trying to “correct the overcorrection” of regulatory policy. The government is reportedly mulling measures to relax the curbs on the property sector. We are inclined to agree but there is no sign yet that markets are responding, judging by corporate defaults and the crunch in financial conditions (Chart 12). Chart 11 Chart 12China Has Not Contained Property Turmoil China Has Not Contained Property Turmoil China Has Not Contained Property Turmoil Evergrande, the world’s most indebted property developer, is still hobbling along, but its troubles are not over. There are signs of contagion among other developers, including state-owned enterprises, that cannot meet the government’s “three red lines.” 5 Credit growth has now broken beneath the government’s target range of 12%, though money growth has bounced off the lower 8% limit set for this year (Chart 13). China is dangerously close to overtightening.   China’s economic slowdown has not yet been fully felt in the global economy based on China’s import volumes, which are tightly linked to the combined credit-and-fiscal-spending impulse (Chart 14). The implication is that recent pullbacks in industrial metal prices and commodity indexes will continue. Chart 13China Tries To Avoid Over-Tightening China Tries To Avoid Over-Tightening China Tries To Avoid Over-Tightening Chart 14China Slowdown Not Yet Fully Felt China Slowdown Not Yet Fully Felt China Slowdown Not Yet Fully Felt ​​​​​​​Until China eases policy more substantially, it poses a disinflationary risk and a strong point in favor of the transitory view of global inflation.    It is difficult for China to ease policy – let alone stimulate – when producer prices are so high (see Chart 6 above). The result is a dangerous quandary in which the government’s regulatory crackdowns are triggering a property bust yet the government is prevented from providing the usual policy support as the going gets tough. Asset prices and broader risk sentiment could go into free fall. However, the party has a powerful incentive to prevent a generalized crisis ahead of the party congress. So we are inclined to accept signs that property curbs and other policies will be eased. Bottom Line: The full disinflationary impact of China’s financial turmoil and economic slowdown has yet to be felt globally.     Biden-Xi Summit Not A Game Changer As long as inflation prevents robust monetary and fiscal easing, Beijing is incentivized to improve sentiment in other ways. One way is to back away from the regulatory crackdown in other sectors, such as Big Tech. The other is to improve relations with the United States. A stabilization of US ties would be useful before the party congress since President Xi would prefer not to have the US interfering in China’s internal affairs during such a critical hour. No surprise that China is showing signs of trying to stabilize the relationship.   The US is apparently reciprocating. Presidents Biden and Xi also agreed to hold a virtual bilateral summit next week, which could lead to a new series of talks. The US Trade Representative also plans to restart trade negotiations. The plan is to enforce the Phase One trade deal, issue waivers for tariffs that hurt US companies, and pursue new talks over outstanding structural disputes. The Phase One trade deal has fallen far short of its goals in general but on the energy front it is doing well. China will continue importing US commodities amid global shortages (Chart 15). Chart 15 Chart 15 The summit alone will have a limited impact. Biden had a summit with Putin earlier this year but relations could deteriorate tomorrow over cyber-attacks, Ukraine, or Belarus. However, there is some basis for the US and China to cooperate next year: Iran. Xi is consolidating power at home in 2022 and probably wants to use negotiations to keep the Americans at bay. Biden is pivoting to foreign policy in 2022, since Congress will not get anything done, and will primarily focus on halting Iran’s nuclear program. If China assists the US with Iran, then there is a basis for a reduction in tensions. The problem is not only Iran itself but also that China will not jump to enforce sanctions on Iran amid energy shortages. And China is not about to make sweeping structural economic concessions to the US as the Xi administration doubles down on state-guided industrial policy. Meanwhile the US is pursuing a long-term policy of strategic containment and Biden will not want to be seen as appeasing China ahead of midterm elections, especially given Xi’s reversion to autocracy. What about cooperation on climate change? The US and China also delivered a surprise joint statement at the United Nations climate change conference in Scotland (COP26), confirming the widely held expectation that climate policy is an area of engagement. These powers and Europe have a strategic interest in reducing dependency on Middle Eastern oil (Chart 16). Climate talks will begin in the first half of next year. However, climate cooperation is not significant enough alone to outweigh the deeper conflicts between the US and China. Moreover climate policy itself is somewhat antagonistic, as the EU and US are looking at applying “carbon adjustment fees” to carbon-intensive imports, e.g. iron and steel exports from China and other high-polluting producers (Chart 17). While the EU and US are not on the same page yet, and these carbon tariffs are far from implementation, the emergence of green protectionism does not bode well for US-China relations even aside from their fundamental political and military disputes. Chart 16 Bottom Line: Some short-term stabilization of US-China relations is possible but not guaranteed. Markets will cheer if it happens but the effect will be fleeting. Chinese assets are still extremely vulnerable to political and geopolitical risks.   Chart 17 Investment Takeaways Gold can still go higher. Financial markets are pricing higher inflation and weak real rates. Gold has been our chief trade to prepare both for higher inflation and geopolitical risk. We are closing our long value / growth equity trade for a loss of 3.75%. We are maintaining our long DM Europe / short EM Europe trade. This trade has performed poorly due to the rally in energy prices and hence Russian equities. But while energy prices may overshoot in the near term, investors will flee Russian equities as geopolitical risks materialize. We are maintaining our long Korea / short Taiwan trade despite its being deeply in the red. This trade is valid over a strategic or long-term time horizon, in which a major geopolitical crisis and/or war is likely. Our expectation that China will ease policy to stabilize the economy ahead of fall 2022 should support Korean equities.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com       Footnotes 1     Over the past year President Alexander Lukashenko’s repression of domestic unrest prompted the EU to impose sanctions. Lukashenko responded by organizing an immigration scheme in which Middle Eastern migrants are flown into Belarus and funneled into the EU via Poland. The EU is threatening to expand sanctions while Belarus is threatening to cut off the Yamal-Europe pipeline amid Europe’s energy crisis. See Pavel Felgenhauer, “Belarus as Latest Front in Acute East-West Standoff,” Jamestown Foundation, November 11, 2021, Jamestown.org. 2     Both Germany and the EU must approve of Nord Stream II for it to enter into operation. The German Federal Network Agency has until January 8, 2022 to certify the project. The Economy Ministry has already given the green light. Then the European Commission has two-to-four months to respond. The EU is supposed to consider whether the pipeline meets the EU’s requirement that gas transport be “unbundled” or separated from gas production and sales. This is a higher hurdle but Germany’s clout will be felt. Hence final approval could come by March 8 or May 8, 2022. The energy crisis will put pressure for an early certification but the EU Commission may take the full time to pretend that it is not being blackmailed. See Joseph Nasr and Christoph Steitz, “Certifying Nord Stream 2 poses no threat to gas supply to EU – Germany,” Reuters, October 26, 2021, reuters.com. 3    Xi is not serving for an “unprecedented third term,” as the mainstream media keeps reporting. China’s top office is not constant nor were term limits ever firmly established. Each leader’s reign should be measured by their effective control rather than technical terms in office. Mao reigned for 27 years (1949-76), Deng for 14 years or more (1978-92), Jiang Zemin for 10 years (1992-2002), and Hu Jintao for 10 years (2002-2012).  4    See Joseph Fewsmith, “Mao’s Shadow” Hoover Institution, China Leadership Monitor 43 (2014), and “The 19th Party Congress: Ringing In Xi Jinping’s New Age,” Hoover Institution, China Leadership Monitor 55 (2018), hoover.org.  5    Liability-to-asset ratios less than 70%, debt-to-equity less than 100%, and cash-to-short-term-debt ratios of more than 1.0x.   Strategic View Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Open Trades & Positions  Image

Highlights Short-term inflation risk will escalate further if politics causes new supply disruptions. Long-term inflation risk is significant as well. There is a distinct risk of a geopolitical crisis in the Middle East that would push up energy prices: the US’s unfinished business with Iran. The primary disinflationary risk is China’s property sector distress. However, Beijing will strive to maintain stability prior to the twentieth national party congress in fall 2022. South Asian geopolitical risks are rising. The Indo-Pakistani ceasefire is likely to break down, while Afghani terrorism will rebound. Book gains on our emerging market currency short targeting “strongman” regimes. Feature Chart 1 Investors are underrating the risk of a global oil shock. This was our geopolitical takeaway from the BCA Conference this year. Investors are focused on the risk of inflation and stagflation, always with reference to the 1970s. The sharp increase in energy prices due to the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973 and the Iranian Revolution of 1979 are universally cited as aggravating factors of stagflation at that time. But these events are also given as critical differences between the situation in the 1970s and today. Unfortunately, there could be similarities. From a strictly geopolitical perspective, the risk of a conflict in the Middle East is significant both in the near term and over the coming year or so. The risk stems from the US’s unfinished business with Iran. More broadly, any supply disruption would have an outsized impact as global energy inventories decline. OPEC’s spare capacity at present can cover a 5 million barrel shock (Chart 1). In this week’s report we also provide tactical updates on China, Russia, and India. Geopolitics And The 1970s Inflation Chart 2Wage-Price Spiral, Stagflation In 1970s Wage-Price Spiral, Stagflation In 1970s Wage-Price Spiral, Stagflation In 1970s Fundamentally the stagflation of the 1970s occurred because global policymakers engendered a spiral of higher wages and higher prices. The wage-price spiral was exacerbated by a falling dollar, after President Nixon abandoned the gold standard, and a commodity price surge (Chart 2). Monetary policy clearly played a role. It was too easy for too long, with broad money supply consistently rising relative to nominal GDP (Chart 3). Central banks including the Federal Reserve were focused exclusively on employment. Policymakers saw the primary risk to the institution’s credibility as recession and unemployment, not inflation. Fear of the Great Depression lurked under the surface. Fiscal policy also played a role. The size of the US budget deficit at this time is often exaggerated but there is no question that they were growing and contributed to the bout of inflation and spike in bond yields (Chart 4). The reason was not only President Johnson’s large social spending program, known as the “Great Society.” It was also Johnson’s war – the Vietnam war. Chart 3Central Banks Focused On Employment, Not Prices, In 1970s Central Banks Focused On Employment, Not Prices, In 1970s Central Banks Focused On Employment, Not Prices, In 1970s On top of this heady mix of inflationary variables came geopolitics. The Yom Kippur war in 1973 prompted Arab states to impose an embargo on Israel’s supporters in the West. The Arab embargo cut off 8% of global oil demand at the time. Oil prices skyrocketed, precipitating a deep recession (Chart 5). Chart 4Johnson's 'Great Society' And Vietnam War Spending Johnson's 'Great Society' And Vietnam War Spending Johnson's 'Great Society' And Vietnam War Spending The embargo came to a halt in spring of 1974 after Israeli forces withdrew to the east of the Suez Canal. The oil shock exacerbated the underlying inflationary wave that continued throughout the decade. The Iranian revolution triggered another oil shock in 1979, bringing the rise in general prices to their peak in the early 1980s, at which point policymakers intervened decisively. Chart 5Arab Oil Embargo And Iranian Revolution Arab Oil Embargo And Iranian Revolution Arab Oil Embargo And Iranian Revolution There is an analogy with today’s global policy mix. Fear of the Great Recession and deflation rules within policymaking circles, albeit less so among the general public. The Fed and the European Central Bank have adjusted their strategies to pursue an average inflation target and “maximum employment.” Chart 6Wage-Price Spiral Today? Wage-Price Spiral Today? Wage-Price Spiral Today? ​​​​​​ The Biden administration is reviving big government with a framework agreement of around $1.2 trillion in new deficit spending on infrastructure, green energy, and social programs likely to pass Congress before year’s end. In short, the macro and policy backdrop are changing in a way that is reminiscent of the 1970s despite various structural differences between the two periods. It is too early to declare that a wage-price spiral has developed but core inflation is rising and investors are right to be concerned about the direction and potential for inflation surprises down the road (Chart 6). These trends would not be nearly as concerning if they were not occurring in the context of a shift in public opinion in favor of government versus markets, labor versus capital, onshoring versus offshoring, and protectionism versus free trade. Investors should note that the last policy sea change (in the opposite direction) lasted roughly 30-40 years. The global savings glut – shown here as the combined current account balances of the world’s major economies – has begun to decline, implying that a major deflationary force might be subsiding. Asian exporters apparently have substantial pricing power, as witnessed by rising export prices, although they have yet to break above the secular downtrend of the post-2008 period (Chart 7). Chart 7Hypo-Globalization Is Inflationary Hypo-Globalization Is Inflationary Hypo-Globalization Is Inflationary A commodity price surge is also underway, of course, though it is so far manageable. The US and EU economies are less energy-intensive than in the 1970s and there is considerable buffer between today’s high prices and an economic recession (Chart 8). Chart 8Wage-Price Spiral Today? Wage-Price Spiral Today? Wage-Price Spiral Today? The problem is that there is a diminishing margin of safety. Furthermore, a crisis in the Middle East is not far-fetched, as there is a concrete and distinct reason for worrying about one: the US’s unresolved collision course with Iran. A crisis in the Persian Gulf would greatly exacerbate today’s energy shortages. Iran: The Risk Of An Oil Shock Iran now says it will rejoin diplomatic talks over its nuclear program in late November. This development was expected, and is important, but it masks the urgent and dangerous trajectory of events that could blow up any day now. It is emphatically not an “all clear” sign for geopolitical risk in the Persian Gulf. The US is hinting, merely hinting, that it is willing to use military force to prevent Iran from going nuclear. The Iranians doubt US appetite for war and have every reason to think that nuclear status will guarantee them regime survival. Thus the Iranians are incentivized to use diplomacy as a screen while pursuing nuclear weaponization – unless the US and Israel make a convincing display of military strength to force Iran back to genuine diplomacy. A convincing display is hard to do. A secret war is taking place, of sabotage and cyber-attacks. On October 26 a cyber-attack disrupted Iranian gas stations. But even attacks on nuclear scientists and facilities have not dissuaded the Iranians from making progress on their nuclear program yet. Iran does not want to be attacked but it knows that a ground invasion is virtually impossible and air strikes alone have a poor record of winning wars. The Iranians have achieved 60% highly enriched uranium and are expected to achieve nuclear breakout capacity – the ability to make a nuclear device – sometime between now and December (Table 1). The IAEA no longer has any visibility in Iran. The regime’s verified production of uranium metal can only be used for the construction of a warhead. Recent technical progress may be irreversible, according to the Institute for Science and International Security.1 If that is true then the upcoming round of diplomatic negotiations is already doomed. Table 1Iran’s Compliance With Nuclear Deal And Time Until Breakout (Oct 2021) Bad Time For An Oil Shock! (GeoRisk Update) Bad Time For An Oil Shock! (GeoRisk Update) American policymakers seem overconfident in the face of this clear nuclear proliferation risk. This is strange given that North Korea successfully manipulated them over the past three decades and now has an arsenal of 40-50 nuclear weapons. The consensus goes as follows: Regime instability: Americans emphasize that the Iranian regime is unstable, lacks genuine support, and faces a large and restive youth population. This is all true. Indeed Iran is one of the most likely candidates for major regime instability in the wake of the COVID-19 shock. Chart 9AIran's Economy Sees Inflation Spike ... Iran's Economy Sees Inflation Spike ... Iran's Economy Sees Inflation Spike ... ​​​​​​ Chart 9B... Yet Some Green Shoots Are Rising ... Yet Some Green Shoots Are Rising ... Yet Some Green Shoots Are Rising However, popular protest has not had any effect on the regime over the past 12 years. Today the economy is improving and illicit oil revenues are rising (Chart 9). A new nationalist government is in charge that has far greater support than the discredited reformist faction that failed on both the economic and foreign policy fronts (Chart 10). The sophisticated idea that achieving nuclear breakout will somehow weaken the regime is wishful thinking.  If it provokes US and/or Israeli air strikes, it will most likely see the people rally around the flag and convince the next generation to adopt the revolutionary cause.2 If it does not provoke a war, then the regime’s strategic wisdom will be confirmed. American military and economic superiority: Americans tend to think that Iran will back down in the face of the US’s and Israel’s overwhelming military and economic superiority. It is true that a massive show of force – combined with the sale of specialized weaponry to Israel to enable a successful strike against extremely hardened nuclear facilities – could force Iran to pause its nuclear quest and go back to negotiations. Yet the US’s awesome display of military power in both Iraq and Afghanistan ended in ignominy and have not deterred Iran, just next door, after 20 years. Nor have American economic sanctions, including “maximum pressure” sanctions since 2019. The US is starkly divided, very few people view Iran as a major threat, and there is an aversion to wars in the Middle East (Chart 11). The Iranians could be forgiven for doubting that the US has the appetite to enforce its demands. Chart 10 ​​​​​​ Chart 11 ​​​​​​ In short the US is attempting to turn its strategic focus to China and Asia Pacific, which creates a power vacuum in the Middle East that Iran may attempt to fill. Meanwhile global supply and demand balances for energy are tight, with shortages popping up around the world, giving Iran greater leverage. From an investment point of view, a crisis is likely in the near term regardless of what happens afterwards. A crisis is necessary to force the US and Iran to return to a durable nuclear deal like in 2015. Otherwise Iran will reach nuclear breakout and an even bigger crisis will erupt, potentially forcing the US and Israel (or Israel alone) to take military action. Diplomatic efforts will need to have some quick and substantial victories in the coming months to convince us that the countries have moved off their collision course. A conflict with Iran will not necessarily go to the extreme of Iran shutting down the Strait of Hormuz and cutting off 21% of the world’s oil and 26% of liquefied natural gas (Chart 12). If that happens a global recession is unavoidable. It would more likely involve lesser conflicts, at least initially, such as “Tanker War 2.0” in the Persian Gulf.3 Or it could involve a flare-up of the ongoing proxy war by missile and drone strikes, such as with the Abqaiq attack in 2019 that knocked 5.7 million barrels per day offline overnight. The impact on oil markets will depend on the nature and magnitude of the event. Chart 12 What are the odds of a military conflict? In past reports we have demonstrated that there is a 40% chance of conflict with Iran. The country’s nuclear program is at a critical juncture. The longer the world goes without a diplomatic track to defuse tensions, the more investors should brace for negative surprises. Bottom Line: There is a clear and present danger of a geopolitical oil shock. The implication is that oil and LNG prices could spike in the coming zero-to-12 months. The implication would be a dramatic “up then down” movement in global energy prices. Inflation expectations should benefit from simmering tensions but a full-blown war would cause an extreme price spike and global recession. China: The Return Of The Authoritative Person Another reason that today’s inflation risk could last longer than expected is that China’s government is likely to backpedal from overtightening monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policy. If this is true then China will secure its economic recovery, the global recovery will continue, commodity prices will stay elevated, and the inflation expectations and bond yields will recover. If it is not true then investors will start talking about disinflation and deflation again soon. We are not bullish on Chinese assets – far from it. We see China entering a property-induced debt-deflation crisis over the long run. But over the 2021-22 period we have argued that China would pull back from the brink of overtightening. Our GeoRisk Indicator for China highlights how policy risk remains elevated (see Appendix). So far our assessment appears largely accurate. The government has quietly intervened to prevent the troubled developer Evergrande from suffering a Lehman-style collapse. The long-delayed imposition of a nationwide property tax is once again being diluted into a few regional trial balloons. Alibaba founder Jack Ma, whom the government disappeared last year, has reappeared in public view, which implies that Beijing recognizes that its crackdown on Big Tech could cause long-term damage to innovation. At this critical juncture, a mysterious “authoritative” commentator has returned to the scene after five years of silence. Widely believed to be Vice Premier Liu He, a Politburo member and Xi Jinping confidante on economic affairs, the authoritative person argues in a recent editorial that China will stick with its current economic policies.4 However, the message was not entirely hawkish. Table 2 highlights the key arguments – China is not oblivious to the risk of a policy mistake. Table 2Messages From China’s ‘Authoritative Person’ On Economic Policy (2021) Bad Time For An Oil Shock! (GeoRisk Update) Bad Time For An Oil Shock! (GeoRisk Update) Readers will recall that a similar “authoritative Person” first appeared in the People’s Daily in May 2016. At that time, the Chinese government had just relented in the face of economic instability and stimulated the economy. It saw a 3.5% of GDP increase in fiscal spending and a 10.0% of GDP increase in the credit impulse from the trough in 2015 to the peak in 2016. The authoritative person was explaining that the intention to reform would persist despite the relapse into debt-fueled growth. So one must wonder today whether the authoritative person is emerging because Beijing is sticking to its guns (consensus view) or rather because it is gradually being forced to relax policy by the manifest risk of financial instability. To be fair, a recent announcement on government special purpose bonds does not indicate major fiscal easing. If local governments accelerate their issuance of new special purpose bonds to meet their quota for the year then they are still not dramatically increasing the fiscal support for the economy. But this announcement could protect against downside growth risks. The first quarter of 2022 will be the true test of whether China will remain hawkish. Going forward there are two significant dangers as we see it. The first is that policymakers prove ideological rather than pragmatic. An autocratic government could get so wrapped up in its populist campaign to restrain high housing costs that it refuses to slacken policies enough and causes a crash. The second danger is that inflation stays higher for longer, preventing authorities from easing policy even when they know they need to do so to stabilize growth. The second danger is the bigger of the two risks. As for the first risk, ideology will take a backseat to necessity. Xi Jinping needs to secure key promotions for his faction in the top positions of the Communist Party at the twentieth national party congress in 2022. He cannot be sure to succeed if the economy is in free fall. A self-induced crash would be a very peculiar way of trying to solidify one’s stature as leader for life at the critical hour. Similarly China cannot maintain a long-term great power competition with the United States if it deliberately triggers property deflation and financial turmoil. It can and will continue modernizing and upgrading its military, e.g. developing hypersonic missiles, even if it faces financial turmoil. But it will have a much greater chance of neutralizing US regional allies and creating a regional buffer space if its economic growth is stable. Ultimately China cannot prevent financial instability, economic distress, and political risk from rising in the coming years. There will be a reckoning for its vast imbalances, as with all countries. It could be that this reckoning will upset the Xi administration’s best-laid plans for 2022. But before that happens we expect policy to ease. A policy mistake today would mean that very negative economic outcomes will arrive precisely in time to affect sociopolitical stability ahead of the party congress next fall. We will keep betting against that. Bottom Line: China’s “authoritative” media commentator shows that policymakers are not as hawkish as the consensus holds. The main takeaway is that policymakers will adjust the intensity of their reform efforts to maintain stability. This is standard Chinese policymaking and it is more important than usual ahead of the political rotation in 2022. Otherwise global inflation risk will quickly give way to deflation risk as defaults among China’s property developers spread and morph into broader financial and economic instability. Indo-Pakistani Ceasefire: A Breakdown Is Nigh India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire along the line of control in February 2021. While the agreement has held up so far, a breakdown is probably around the corner. It was never likely to last for long. Over the short run, the ceasefire made sense for both countries: COVID-19 Risks: The first wave of the pandemic had abated but COVID-19-related risks loomed large. India had administered less than 15 million vaccine doses back then and Pakistan only 100,000. Dangerous Transitions Were Underway: With America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in the works, Pakistan was fully focused on its western border. India was pre-occupied with its eastern front, where skirmishes with Chinese troops forced it to redirect some of its military focus. As we now head towards the end of 2021, these constraints are no longer binding. COVID-19 Risks Under Control: The vaccination campaign in India and Pakistan has gathered pace. More than 50% of India’s population and 30% of Pakistan’s have been given at least one dose. Pakistan’s Ducks Are Lined-up In Afghanistan: America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan has been completed. Afghanistan is under Taliban’s control and Pakistan has a better hold over the affairs of its western neighbor. One constraint remains: India and China remain embroiled in border disputes. Conciliatory talks between their military commanders broke down a fortnight ago. Winter makes it nearly impossible to undertake significant operations in the Himalayas but a failure of coordination today could set up a conflict either immediately or in the spring. While India may see greater value in maintaining the ceasefire than Pakistan, India has elections due in key northern states in 2022. India’s northern states harbor even less favorable views of Pakistan than the rest of India. Hence any small event could trigger a disproportionate response from India. Bottom Line: While it is impossible to predict the timing, a breakdown in the Indo-Pakistani ceasefire may materialize in 2022 or sooner. Depending on the exact nature of any conflict, a geopolitically induced selloff in Indian equities could create a much-needed consolidation of this year’s rally and ultimately a buying opportunity. Russia, Global Terrorism, And Great Power Relations Part of Putin’s strategy of rebuilding the Russian empire involves ensuring that Russia has a seat at the table for every major negotiation in Eurasia. Now that the US has withdrawn forces from Afghanistan, Russia is pursuing a greater role there. Most recently Russia hosted delegations from China, Pakistan, India, and the Taliban. India too is planning to host a national security advisor-level conference next month to discuss the Afghanistan situation. Do these conferences matter for global investors? Not directly. But regional developments can give insight into the strategies of the great powers in a world that is witnessing a secular rise in geopolitical risk. Chart 13 China, Russia, and India have skin in the game when it comes to Afghanistan’s future. This is because all three powers have much to lose if Afghanistan becomes a large-scale incubator for terrorists who can infiltrate Russia through Central Asia, China through Xinjiang, or India through Pakistan. Hence all three regional powers will be constrained to stay involved in the affairs of Afghanistan. Terrorism-related risks in South Asia have been capped over the last decade due to the American war (Chart 13). The US withdrawal will lead to the activation of latent terrorist activity. This poses risks specifically for India, which has a history of being targeted by Afghani terrorist groups. And yet, while China and Russia saw the Afghan vacuum coming and have been engaging with Taliban from the get-go, India only recently began engaging with Taliban. The evolution of Afghanistan under the Taliban will also influence the risk of terrorism for the rest of the world. In the wake of the global pandemic and recession, social misery and regime failures in areas with large youth populations will continue to combine with modern communications technology to create a revival of terrorist threats (Chart 14). Chart 14 American officials recently warned of the potential for transnational attacks based in Afghanistan to strike the homeland within six months. That risk may be exaggerated today but it is real over the long run, especially as US intelligence turns its strategic focus toward states and away from non-state actors. India, Europe, and other targets are probably even more vulnerable than the United States. If Russia and China succeed in shaping the new Afghanistan’s leadership then the focus of militant proxies will be directed elsewhere. Beyond terrorism, if Russia and China coordinate closely over Afghanistan then India may be left in the cold. This would reinforce recent trends in which a tightening Russo-Chinese partnership hastens India’s shift away from neutrality and toward favoring the US and the West in strategic matters. If these trends continue to the point of alliance formation, then they increase the risk that any conflicts between two powers will implicate others. Bottom Line: Afghanistan is now a regional barometer of multilateral cooperation on counterterrorism, the exclusivity of Russo-Chinese cooperation, and India’s strategic isolation or alignment with the West. Investment Takeaways It is too soon to play down inflation risks. We share the BCA House View that they will subside next year as pandemic effects wane. But we also see clear near-term risks to this view. In the short run (zero to 12 months), a distinct risk of a Middle Eastern geopolitical crisis looms. A gradual escalation of tensions is inflationary whereas a sharp spike in conflict would push energy prices into punitive territory and kill global demand. Over the next 12 months, China’s economic and financial instability will also elicit policy easing or fiscal stimulus as necessary to preserve stability, as highlighted by the regime’s mouthpiece. Obviously stimulus will not be utilized if the economic recovery is stable, given elevated producer prices. In a future report we will show that Russia is willing and able to manipulate natural gas prices to increase its bargaining leverage over Europe. This dynamic, combined with the risk of cold winter weather exacerbating shortages, suggests that the worst is not yet over. Geopolitical conflict with Russia will resume over the long run. Stay long gold as a hedge against both inflation and geopolitical crises involving Iran, Taiwan/China, and Russia. Maintain “value” plays as a cheap hedge against inflation. Book a profit of 2.5% on our short trade for currencies of emerging market “strongmen,” Turkey, Brazil, and the Philippines. Our view is still negative on these economies. Stay long cyber-security stocks. Over the long run, inflation risk must be monitored. We expect significant inflation risk to persist as a result of a generational change in global policy in favor of government and labor over business and capital. But the US is maintaining easy immigration policy and boosting productivity-enhancing investments. Meanwhile China’s secular slowdown is disinflationary. The dollar may remain resilient in the face of persistently high geopolitical risk. The jury is still out.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Ritika Mankar, CFA Editor/Strategist ritika.mankar@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1      David Albright and Sarah Burkhard, "Iran’s Recent, Irreversible Nuclear Advances," Institute for Science and International Security, September 22, 2021, isis-online.org. 2     Ray Takeyh, "The Bomb Will Backfire On Iran," Foreign Affairs, October 18, 2021, foreignaffairs.com. 3     See Aaron Stein and Afshon Ostovar, "Tanker War 2.0: Iranian Strategy In The Gulf," Foreign Policy Research Institute, August 10, 2021, fpri.org. 4     "Ten Questions About China’s Economy," Xinhua, October 24, 2021, news.cn.     Section II: Appendix: GeoRisk Indicator China China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator Russia Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator United Kingdom UK: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Germany Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Canada Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Spain Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan Taiwan-Province of China: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan-Province of China: GeoRisk Indicator Korea Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Australia Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Australia: GeoRisk Indicator South Africa South Africa: GeoRisk Indicator South Africa: GeoRisk Indicator Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights The ruling African National Congress will be difficult to displace in upcoming elections given the large economic role it plays in the public sector and in low-income households. Low growth outcomes will continue as the government navigates allocating state funds more efficiently, amid rising public debt, weak macroeconomic fundamentals and a fresh undertaking of fiscal austerity. The African National Congress is primed to claw back some lost voter support with President Ramaphosa at the helm. But Ramaphosa will also put a stop to fiscal austerity ahead of the 2024 general election. Our new South Africa Geopolitical Risk Indicator captures moments of significant political risk in the past and currently signals that the country is facing a geopolitical and political risk level last seen in 2016. The political status quo will remain for now, which is positive for investors. But China’s economic troubles and South Africa’s eventual need to inflate away its debt pose long-term risks for investors. Feature In the wake of COVID-19, South Africa has witnessed an increase of civil unrest. Severe looting in July 2021 only lasted a couple of days and was mostly contained to the central and eastern parts of the country but it nearly brought the country to a stand-still. The imprisonment of former President Jacob Zuma and a harsh lockdown amid resurging COVID-19 cases at the time fanned flames already lit by long-standing structural economic issues. The country has been stuck in a low growth trap for several years and government is facing constraints from rising debt levels. Yet the ruling party (the African National Congress, or ANC) will be difficult to displace in upcoming municipal elections and future general elections. It plays a large role in the public sector and low-income households depend heavily on government grants. Moreover, the ruling party also enjoys a “liberator” status, with voters pledging support to the ANC based on the party’s historical achievement of playing a major role in ending the apartheid regime. Unless the party implodes from within – possible but unlikely – the ANC will continue to rule, which is also the best outcome for investors at the current juncture. Low Growth Continues Amid High Debt The South African economy was straining before the pandemic and will continue to underperform going forward. Plagued by rampant corruption, misused state funds, and a lack of political leadership, the public sector has dragged on growth for several years now. Coupled with poor productivity in the primary and secondary sectors, South Africa’s economy faces headwinds which will affect future growth outcomes for years to come (Chart 1A). Chart 1   In the mining sector, the country’s top foreign exchange earner, output has been in a structural decline since 1980 even as the country has benefited from several commodity price booms (Chart 1B). More recently, Ramaphosa’s 2018 investment drive to rebuild South African industries has failed to galvanize a turnaround.1 Manufacturing is much of the same story as mining. Output has been in decline from 1990 and has reached its lowest level since mid-1960 (Chart 1C). The National Union of Metal Workers have recently undertaken a protracted strike that has lasted three weeks already – with many industry bodies citing the dangers of irreparable harm to production and severe job losses should the strike continue for much longer. Other factors such as intermittent electricity outages across the country will subtract from productivity going forward. Chart 1BPrimary Sector Productivity In Structural Downfall... Primary Sector Productivity In Structural Downfall... Primary Sector Productivity In Structural Downfall... Chart 1C...Followed By The Secondary Sector ...Followed By The Secondary Sector ...Followed By The Secondary Sector Chart 2Public Debt Is Ballooning Fast Public Debt Is Ballooning Fast Public Debt Is Ballooning Fast From longstanding misuse of public funds comes the ballooning public government debt (Chart 2). Our colleagues over at the BCA Emerging Markets Strategy team have assessed the state of fiscal policy and debt in South Africa and the outlook is bleak. The government is currently pursuing fiscal austerity measures to rein in debt. However, these measures are unlikely to be enough and will become politically untenable over time. Otherwise, to stabilize debt, policy makers will have to inflate their way out of debt servicing costs or increase fiscal spending to boost nominal GDP growth. According to the 2021 budget speech, real spending is projected to contract each year over the next three years. This marks the first cut to nominal noninterest government expenditure in at least 20 years. Other items such as health care will see spending cuts over the next three years and remain lower than 2013 levels. Social protection and job creation initiatives will also see spending cuts. Another large budgetary item that will see spending cuts is the public sector wage bill. The government has reiterated its commitment to curb this growing expense. Recent negotiations with civil servants saw only a 1.5% wage increase over the next year compared to an average growth rate of 7% over the last five years. Chart 3Government Spending Important To Demand Government Spending Important To Demand Government Spending Important To Demand Austerity measures will lower public sector demand and ultimately growth. However, if successful, they will bolster both potential economic growth and the ruling party’s support. The problem is the timing of the general election in 2024. The economic backdrop in the country remains weak. Assuming more civil unrest takes place, government finances will be burdened with picking up the cost again and appeasing the masses through higher social spending. Austerity measures will presumably be relaxed ahead of the 2024 vote. Government debt needs to be curtailed considering that debt servicing costs are the second largest expenditure item of the country’s national economic budget. But given how large the public sector contributes to local demand (Chart 3), the ANC will see pushback by trade unions and those that have been in its growing employ. However, pushback will not necessarily translate into an irreversible breakdown of political support. Trade unions have been part and parcel of the ANC since the party’s inception. The party will have to strike a balance to keep the unions on its side. Bottom Line: Under Ramaphosa’s leadership, government austerity measures will continue at least over the short to medium term but will most likely be balanced to ensure the ANC maintains control through the 2024 elections. Ramaphosa Strengthens The ANC Civil unrest is nothing new in South Africa. There have been various displays of civil unrest and riots in recent years. The most recent civil unrest led to over 300 civilian casualties, the deadliest since the apartheid era. However, casualties were mostly a result of public stampeding civilian-on-civilian violence. The government did not play a major role in these deaths compared to the Marikana massacre of 2012.2 Even then, despite the ANC facing backlash from the immediate community, the party suffered no major fallout nationally. Recent unrest was more widely spread this time around and serves as an early warning signal to the ANC that social risks are high and not abating. But as things stand, these events will not displace the ANC from power. Such events would need to occur more regularly across the entire country, for them to pose a real threat to ANC rule. Since taking the helm of the ruling party in late 2017, Ramaphosa is viewed a lot more favorably than his predecessor, Zuma, by most South Africans. Ramaphosa is more business friendly, transparent, and is at least trying to weed out corruption in government. The public view of Ramaphosa’s handing of COVID-19 has been improving. Even supporters of the Democratic Alliance, the official opposition, and the Economic Freedom Fighters, a radical far-left party, have shown a large improvement in their approval of Ramaphosa’s handling of the pandemic (Chart 4). The Economic Freedom Fighter’s growth has largely been driven by disgruntled ANC supporters in recent years. Seeing supporters of the Economic Freedom Fighters improve their approval of Ramaphosa is positive for the ANC in upcoming elections. Chart 4 The ANC has two significant backstops to any deep erosion of their voter base: feudalism and social grants. Feudalism is defined as a socioeconomic structure in which people work for a leader of a community or tribe who in return, give them protection and use of land. It still runs deep in South Africa and across its cultures and tribes. It gives life to the ANC, a strong base that the Economic Freedom Fighters will always have a tough time chipping away at. Rural voters matter most to the ANC and mostly live under feudal rule. Tribal leaders and village chiefs play a major part in everyday life for rural people. There is overwhelming support among these leaders for the ANC because the ruling party provides them with access to land, among other things. By contrast, the Democratic Alliance and the Economic Freedom Fighters have had little success in penetrating these barriers. Support for both of these parties is driven by urban dwellers. The overarching royal Zulu family is the biggest factor contributing to feudalism. The Zulu family will always support the ANC and ensure their people do too. The Zulus are the largest tribe of black South Africans and have significant interests in the ANC maintaining power, such as access to land and financial resources. Obviously they have historic ties to the founding of the ANC and past leaders of the ANC, including Zuma (but not Ramaphosa). Additionally, the tripartite alliance of trade unions, the South African Communist Party, and the ANC has always ensured that workers represented in labor unions across the country voted for the ANC. The candidate elected president of the ANC, and ultimately the country, has always had the backing of trade unions, represented by the largest, the Congress of South African Trade Unions.3 The Congress of South African Trade Unions has never waived their support of the ANC in any elections and have shown no interest in supporting any other parties. The social grants system is the second backstop. The ANC provides social payments to 22% of the population, of which approximately 76% of recipients vote for the ANC (Chart 5, top panel). That’s a significant amount of the population that will forego a large part of their economic livelihoods if they vote for the Economic Freedom Fighters or another party to rule the country. In the current climate of COVID-19, foregoing government grants in order to vote for another party will not happen. Voters are increasingly worried about losing their social grants if another party comes into power (Chart 5, bottom panel). While other parties like the Economic Freedom Fighters have promised to more than double the going social grant rate if they come to power, social grant recipients and ANC voters at large have not budged on this “promise.” A sure thing today is better than a gamble tomorrow. But, if the fiscal standing of the country teeters into a position whereby the ANC fails to meet its growing social grant liabilities, then the Economic Freedom Fighters will gain the most, even if its promises will be extremely difficult to back up. Upcoming municipal elections in November 2021 will put to the test whether the ANC will shed support like it did in the 2016 election (Chart 6, top panel). Under Zuma, the ANC’s losses were the Economic Freedom Fighter’s gains. In the 2019 general election this transfer of votes lost some momentum because of Ramaphosa’s ability to galvanize support for the ANC (Chart 6, bottom panel). The Economic Freedom Fighter’s rise has been driven by the party’s ability to berate the ANC on its systemic corruption, embodied in Zuma. With Zuma in jail and Ramaphosa cleaning up the party and government, the Economic Freedom Fighters will lose momentum in forthcoming elections.4 Chart 5 Chart 6 To the ANC’s benefit, opposition parties that won some significant metros in the 2016 municipal elections subsequently formed coalitions that have largely failed to govern well. Specifically, in the economic capital of Johannesburg, the ANC reclaimed a majority to govern the city through coalitions with smaller parties, after the Democratic Alliance and Economic Freedom Fighters governed the city following the 2016 election. While the ANC has only reclaimed one of three metros lost in the 2016 municipal elections, they have benefited from lackluster service delivery by opposition parties which has shown that there is no realistic alternative to the ANC right now.5 Bottom Line: As Ramaphosa cleans up the ANC and government, the ANC will shed less support to the EFF and look to claw back lost voters in forthcoming elections. Introducing Our South Africa GeoRisk Indicator Recent civil unrest in South Africa presents an ideal backdrop to introduce a new GeoRisk Indicator to our existing suite of thirteen indicators. Our newly devised South Africa GeoRisk Indicator captures moments of significant political risk in the past, including this year’s civil unrest, and currently signals that the country is facing a geopolitical and political risk level last seen in 2016, when President Zuma was on his way out of office (Chart 7). Chart 7South Africa Geopolitical Risk Indicator South Africa Geopolitical Risk Indicator South Africa Geopolitical Risk Indicator The South Africa indicator is based on the rand and US dollar exchange rate (ZAR/USD) and its deviation from four underlying macro variables that should otherwise explain its economic trend. These variables are: gold prices, emerging market equities, industrial production, and retail sales. The four variables cover South Africa’s commodity dependency, financial sector, and the supply and demand side of the domestic economy. All four variables exhibit sufficient correlation with the ZAR/USD for use in this indicator. If the ZAR/USD weakens relative to these variables, then a South Africa-specific risk premium is apparent. As with previous indicators, we ascribe that premium to politics and geopolitics, although this is a generalization, and a qualitative assessment must always be made. The indicator is effective in tracking the country’s recent history too. Events such as ex-President Zuma’s general election win in 2009, and his controversial firing of several finance ministers in late 2015, signal an increase in risk. Meanwhile, lower risk was implied when current president, Ramaphosa, was elected president of the ANC in late 2017, and later, in 2019, as president of the country. Some additional events worth highlighting include: (1) In late 2001 to mid-2002, the local currency lost significant value relative to the US dollar for several reasons. First, the 1998 Asia financial crisis continued to send aftershocks throughout the emerging markets. The ZAR was put through the ringer in forward markets by speculators on a frequent basis, buying cheaper in the spot and driving speculation in the forward market, making easy returns. This speculation was only compounded by the South African Reserve Bank’s intervention in the local currency market to curtail speculation through regulatory action. Second, money supply grew substantially from mid-2001 to early 2002, which is associated with exchange rate undershooting.6 Thirdly, adding to these factors, contagion risk from neighboring Zimbabwe, which was dealing with land seizures and food shortages at the time, played into risk aversion toward regional and South African assets. (2) Eskom, South Africa’s state-owned power utility company, implements more regular power outages amid struggles to supply rising demand. (3) Despite allegations of corruption, former President Zuma wins the ANC presidential nomination. Zuma becomes party president. (4) Former President Zuma wins the general election (5) Former President Zuma fires well-respected then finance minister Nhlanhla Nene (6) Former President Zuma fires well-respected then finance minister Pravin Gordhan (7) President Ramaphosa wins the ANC presidential nomination. Ramaphosa becomes party president. (8) Former President Zuma resigns from the presidency (9) Former US President Donald Trump tweets on white farm murders in South Africa7 (10) President Ramaphosa wins the general election (11) First COVID-19 case is reported (12) Civil unrest and looting In terms of South African assets, when geopolitical and political risk rises, investors favor alternative emerging market assets (Chart 8). In 2021, South African equities have climbed to levels last seen in 2018 on the back of an improving global growth outlook and swelling commodity prices. But recent civil unrest has seen local equities pull back a notch. If risks escalate further, local assets will continue to retreat. Chart 8Geopolitical Risk Signals Move To Alternative Bourses Geopolitical Risk Signals Move To Alternative Bourses Geopolitical Risk Signals Move To Alternative Bourses Investment Takeaways Table 1 provides a snapshot of equity performance, volatility, and relative valuations and momentum in South Africa compared to frontier markets, including African frontier markets, and emerging markets. Table 1South Africa And African Frontier Markets: Valuations, Momentum, Volatility South Africa: Ruling Party Will Stay South Africa: Ruling Party Will Stay Chart 9Wait And See On Frontier Markets Wait And See On Frontier Markets Wait And See On Frontier Markets Equity returns in South Africa have notched good gains as global growth picks up alongside rising commodity prices. On a risk-adjusted basis, however, Nigeria and Kenya are more attractive. The general aggregates of Frontier and African frontier markets are more attractive on the same basis. Price and timing wise, Table 1 shows valuations and momentum relative to other markets. South Africa is cheap but Nigeria is cheaper. On a cyclical basis, South Africa has more to offer than Nigeria. African countries such as Nigeria and Ghana are all prepped to move higher in the wake of cheaper currencies. But a widening financial crisis in China is a risk to these countries given how they have trended closely with Chinese total social financing (Chart 9). Meanwhile, Kenyan equities have outperformed. South African equities in US dollar terms have retreated somewhat following recent civil unrest and some contagion linked to China’s Evergrande crisis (Chart 9, second panel). If China secures its economic recovery, then higher commodity prices will boost miners and industrial stocks going forward. But this is not guaranteed. Upcoming municipal elections will aid investors in determining what to expect from the policy backdrop. We expect that the ANC will stabilize, i.e. not lose control of more cities, and this should throw some impetus back into local equities. Conclusion This year’s civil unrest was stark and disruptive but does not spell fundamental political destabilization or the end of ANC rule in upcoming elections. The South African economy is structurally weak and, aside from a bounceback on the post-pandemic recovery, will continue to lag its peers until the ANC and Ramaphosa get a solid grip on allocating state funds more efficiently, promoting a more friendly and stable business environment, and fighting corruption. Undertaking fiscal austerity now is not a bad thing for the ANC, but it will become an increasing political liability leading up to the next general election. Ramaphosa will have to pull the plug on fiscal cost cutting as soon as 2023, so as to allow demand to recover before voters head to the polls again in 2024. But this has longer term economic implications. Public debt will continue to rise in this case and add to debt default risk and debt servicing costs. If austerity is reinstated after elections, the South African economy will remain in a low growth trap. For now, tightening the fiscal belt is doable because of the dynamic created by the downfall of Zuma, giving support to austerity as a means of cutting back corruption, and the pandemic, which reinforces the ANC as the institutional ruling party during a time of national crisis.   Guy Russell Research Analyst GuyR@bcaresearch.com Appendix The market is the greatest machine ever created for gauging the wisdom of the crowd and as such our Geopolitical Risk Indicators were not designed to predict political risk but to answer the question of whether and to what extent markets have priced that risk. Our South African GeoRisk Indicator (see Chart 8 above) makes use of the same methodology used for all thirteen of our other indicators. The methodology avoids the pitfall of regression-based models. We begin with a financial asset that has a daily frequency in price, in this case the ZAR/USD, and compare its movement against several fundamental factors. These factors are the price of gold in US dollars, emerging market equities in US dollar terms, South African industrial production, and South African retail sales. Like our recently added Australia GeoRisk Indicator, South Africa is a commodity exporting country. South Africa is the largest producer of platinum in the world, and was the seventh largest gold producer by volume in 2019. Gold is South Africa’s largest export and the ZAR has a strong historic correlation to gold prices.8 Hence we use gold prices instead of platinum, which is less well correlated. South Africa also has a deep financial market, with lose capital controls and easy flow of funds. When sentiment toward EM equities is high, the ZAR benefits, and hence our inclusion of emerging market equities. On the supply and demand side of the economy, both industrial production and retail sales show a strong relationship with the ZAR. We include these as the last two variables measured in our indicator. All four variables exhibit strong correlation with the local currency. If the currency sharply underperforms them, then it must be weighed down by some risk premium, which we ascribe to domestic political and policy developments or the general geopolitical environment. Footnotes 1 In 2018, President Cyril Ramaphosa laid out a target of $100 billion in new investments over the next five years, primarily targeting primary and secondary industries. According to The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, foreign direct investment flows into South Africa in 2020 almost halved to $2.5 billion from $4.6 billion in 2019, which was a 15% decline from around $5.4 billion in 2018. 2 The Marikana massacre was the killing of 34 miners by the South African Police Service. It took place on 16 August 2012 and was the most lethal use of force by South African security forces against civilians since 1976. 3 According to the International Labour Organization, South Africa’s union density rate was 28.1% in 2016. Strikingly, the public sector union density rate was approximately 70.1% compared to 29.1% in the private sector. 4 In June 2021, ex-President Jacob Zuma was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment for contempt of court, by failing to legally attend a tribunal on corruption in South Africa. Zuma has recently been released on medical parole. 5 In the 2016 municipal elections, the ANC lost control of three major metros. Pretoria (political capital), Johannesburg (economic capital) and (Port Elizabeth, or Nelson Mandela Bay). The official opposition (the Democratic Alliance) and the Economic Freedom Fighters formed governing coalitions in all three of the lost ANC metros. Opposition coalitions have struggled to govern more effectively than what the ANC did, given how far apart they are ideologically. In Pretoria and Nelson Mandela Bay, service delivery has been poor since, in line with ANC rule prior to 2016. In Johannesburg, the ANC won back the metro by forming a coalition with several smaller parties. Opposition coalitions are still in force in Pretoria and Nelson Mandela Bay. 6 Bhundia, A.J. and Ricci, L.A., 2005. The Rand Crises of 1998 and 2001: What have we learned. Post-apartheid South Africa: The first ten years, pp.156-173. 7 Donald Trump tweets "I have asked Secretary of State @SecPompeo to closely study the South Africa land and farm seizures and expropriations and the large scale killing of farmers." The South African government have not seized any farms nor have there been any recordings of large-scale farm killings. The tweet caused a minor sell-off in local assets at the time. 8 Arezki, Rabah & Dumitrescu, Elena-Ivona & Freytag, Andreas & Quintyn, Marc. (2012). Commodity Prices and Exchange Rate Volatility: Lessons from South Africa’s Capital Account Liberalization. Emerging Markets Review. 19. Jordaan, F. Y., & Van Rooyen, J. H. (2011). An empirical investigation into the correlation between rand currency indices and changing gold prices. Corporate Ownership & Control, 9(1-1), 172-183.

Highlights Taiwan remains the epicenter of global geopolitical risk, as highlighted by the past week’s significant increase in saber-rattling around Taiwan and across East Asia and the Pacific. Tensions may subside in the short run, as the US and China resume high-level negotiations. But then again they may not. And they will most likely escalate over the long run. Investors should judge the Taiwan scenario based on China’s capabilities rather than intentions. China’s intentions may never be known but it is increasingly capable of prevailing in a war over Taiwan. Before then, economic sanctions and cyber attacks are highly likely. The US has a history of defending Taiwan from Chinese military threats. Washington is trying to revive its strategic commitment to Asia Pacific. But US attempts to increase deterrence could provoke conflict. The simplest solution to Taiwan tensions is for a change of party in Taiwan. This would require an upset in the 2022 and especially 2024 elections. China may try to arrange that. Otherwise the risk of conflict will increase. A sharp economic slowdown in China is the biggest risk for investors, as it would not only be negative for the global economy but also would threaten domestic political stability, discredit the gradual and non-military approach to incorporating Taiwan, and boost nationalist and jingoistic pressures directed against Taiwan. Feature Chart 1China's Confluence Of Internal And External Risks China's Confluence Of Internal And External Risks China's Confluence Of Internal And External Risks China faces a historic confluence of internal and external political risks. This was our key view for 2021 and it continues to be priced by financial markets (Chart 1). The latest example of these risks is the major bout of saber-rattling over Taiwan. The US sent two aircraft carriers, and the UK one carrier, to the waters southwest of Okinawa for naval drills with Japan, Canada, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. Related drills are occurring across Southeast Asia, including Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, and others. Meanwhile the Chinese air force let loose its largest yet intrusion into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (Chart 2). The US assured Japan that it would defend the disputed Senkaku islands, while Japan said that it would seek concrete options – beyond diplomacy – for dealing with Chinese pressure. Chart 2China’s Warning To Taiwan Biden, Xi, And Taiwan Biden, Xi, And Taiwan Chart 3Market Response To Saber-Rattling Over Taiwan Strait Market Response To Saber-Rattling Over Taiwan Strait Market Response To Saber-Rattling Over Taiwan Strait Yet, at the same time, a diplomatic opening emerged between the US and China. A virtual summit is expected to be scheduled between Presidents Joe Biden and Xi Jinping. The Biden administration unveiled its review of US trade policy toward China, with mixed results (i.e. imply a defensive rather than offensive trade policy). China offered to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal (the CPTPP). All sides exchanged prisoners, with Huawei’s Meng Wanzhou back in China. In the short run global investors will cheer attempts by the US and China to stabilize relations. But over the long run tensions over Taiwan suggest the underlying US-China strategic confrontation will persist. We do not doubt that global risk appetite will improve marginally on the news, including toward Chinese and Taiwanese assets (Chart 3). But investors should not mistake summitry for diplomacy, or diplomacy for concrete and material strategic de-escalation. The geopolitical outlook is gloomy for China and Taiwan. Grand Strategies Collide US grand strategy forbids countries from creating regional empires lest they challenge the US for global empire. China has the long-term potential to dominate the eastern hemisphere. The US now quite explicitly seeks to counter China’s growing economic, technological, military, and political influence. China’s grand strategy forbids countries from interfering in its domestic affairs and undermining its economic and political stability. This could include eroding its territorial integrity, jeopardizing its supply security, or denying its maritime access. The US still has considerable capabilities on this front, particularly due to its control of the oceans and special relationship with Taiwan, the democratic island that China claims as a province but that the US supplies with arms. Historically, the Kingdom of Tungning (1661-83) exemplifies that a rival political and naval power rooted in Taiwan can jeopardize the security of southern China and hence all of China (Map 1). Taiwan’s predicament is geopolitically unsustainable and the difference between the past 72 years and today is that Beijing increasingly has the military means of doing something about it. Map 1Why Taiwan’s Status Quo Is Geopolitically Unsustainable Biden, Xi, And Taiwan Biden, Xi, And Taiwan China seeks to establish maritime access, expand its navy, and improve supply security. This process points toward turf battles with the US and its allies and could easily lead to conflict over Taiwan, the East and South China Seas, and other strategic approaches to China. It could also lead to conflict over technological access. The latter is an economic and supply vulnerability that relates directly to Taiwan, which produces the world’s most advanced computer chips. The Chinese strategy since the Great Recession, under two presidents of two different factions, has been to take a more assertive stance on domestic and foreign policy, economic policy, territorial disputes, and supply security. This hawkish turn occurred in response to falling potential GDP growth, which ultimately threatens social stability and the survival of the political regime. Hong Kong was long the symbol that the western liberal democracies could coexist with the Chinese Communist Party. China’s reduction of Hong Kong’s political autonomy over the past decade violated this understanding. Taiwan is now increasingly concerned about its autonomy while the West is looking to deter China from attacking Taiwan. China is willing to wage war if the West attempts to make Taiwan’s autonomous status permanent through increased military support. The US strategy since the Great Recession, under three presidents of two different parties, has been to raise the costs on China for its increasingly assertive policies, particularly in acquiring technology and using economic and military coercion against neighbors. The US is increasing its use of sanctions, secondary sanctions, tariffs, export controls, cyber warfare, and regional strategic deterrence. Hence the policy consensus in both the US and China is more confrontational than cooperative. The Biden administration is largely maintaining President Trump’s punitive measures toward China while trying to build an international coalition to constrain China more effectively. Meanwhile the Xi administration is refusing to hand over power to a successor in 2022, so there will not be a change in Chinese strategy. The US is politically divided, a major factor in Beijing’s favor. China is politically unified, particularly on the question of Taiwan. But one area of national consensus in the US is the need to become “tougher” with respect to China. President Trump’s policies and the COVID-19 pandemic reinforced this consensus. The number of Americans who would support sending US troops to Taiwan if China invaded has risen from 19% in 1982 to 52% today – meaning that the country is divided but fear of China is driving a shift in opinion.1 Chart 4Taiwan Strait Risk Shoots Up To 1950s Levels And Beyond Biden, Xi, And Taiwan Biden, Xi, And Taiwan The China Cross-Strait Academy, a new think tank with pro-mainland sympathies, has produced a Cross Strait Relations Risk Index that goes back to 1950 and utilizes 59 factors ranging from politics and diplomacy to military and economics. It suggests that tensions have reached historically high levels, comparable to the 1950s, when the first and second Taiwan Strait crises occurred (Chart 4). Beware Chinese Economic Crisis – Or Concerted US Action Tensions across the Taiwan Strait began to rise in 2012 when the Communist Party adopted a more hawkish national policy in response to potential threats to its long-term rule arising from the Great Recession. The 2014 “Sunflower Protests” in Taiwan and “Umbrella Protests” in Hong Kong symbolized the rise in tension as Beijing sought to centralize control across Greater China. Support for the political status quo in Taiwan peaked around this time, although most Taiwanese still prefer the status quo to any final decision on the island’s status, which could trigger conflict (Chart 5). China’s militarization of rocks and reefs in the South China Sea throughout the 2010s gave it greater control over the strategic approaches to Taiwan. Since 2016, we have argued that geopolitical risk in the Taiwan Strait would rise on a structural, long-term basis for the following reasons: (1) China’s economic downshift triggered power consolidation and outward nationalism (2) Taiwanese opinion was shifting away from integration with the mainland (3) the US was attempting a strategic shift of focus back to Asia and countering China. Underlying this assessment was the long-running trend of rising support for independence and falling support for unification with China (Chart 6). Chart 5Taiwanese Favor Status Quo Indefinitely Biden, Xi, And Taiwan Biden, Xi, And Taiwan Chart 6Very Few Taiwanese Favor Reunification, Now Or Later Biden, Xi, And Taiwan Biden, Xi, And Taiwan China’s crackdown on Hong Kong from 2016-19 escalated matters further as it removed the “one country, two systems” model for Taiwan (Chart 7). China continues to insist on this solution. In 2013 and again in 2019, Xi Jinping declared that the Taiwan problem cannot be passed down from one generation to another, implying that he intended to resolve the matter during his tenure, which is expected to extend through 2035. Whether Xi has formally altered China’s cross-strait policy is debatable.2 But his use of military intimidation is not. The US policy of “strategic ambiguity” is debatable but the historical record is clear. In the three major crises in the Taiwan Strait (1954-55, 1958, and 1995-96), the US has sent naval forces to the area and clearly signaled that it would defend Taiwan against aggression.3 However, in diplomatic matters, the US has constantly downgraded Taiwan: for instance, transferring its United Nations seat to China in 1971, revoking its mutual defense treaty in 1980, and prioritizing economic cooperation with China in recent decades. The implication is that the US will not stand in the way of unification unless Beijing attempts to achieve it through force of arms. China’s conclusion from US behavior must be that it can definitely overtake Taiwan by means of economic attraction and diplomacy over time. For example, Beijing’s assertion of direct control over Hong Kong took 20 years and ultimately occurred without any resistance from the West. By contrast, a full-scale attack poses major logistical and military risks and potentially devastating costs if the US upholds its historic norm of defending Taiwan. China’s economy and political system could ultimately be destabilized, despite any initial nationalistic euphoria. Taiwan’s wealth (and semiconductor fabs) would be piles of ash. Of course, Taiwan is different from Hong Kong. The Taiwanese people can believe realistically that they have an alternative to direct rule from Beijing. If mainland China’s economic trajectory falters then the option of absorbing Taiwan gradually will fall away. Today about 30%-40% of Taiwanese people believe cross-strait economic exchange should deepen (Chart 8). Only one period of Taiwanese policy since 1949, the eight years under President Ma Ying-jeou (2008-16), focused exclusively on cross-strait economic integration and deemphasized the tendency toward greater autonomy. If China’s economic prospects dim, then Beijing will become more inclined toward the military option, both to distract from domestic instability and to prevent Taiwan from entertaining independence. Chart 7Taiwanese Oppose "One Country, Two Systems" Biden, Xi, And Taiwan Biden, Xi, And Taiwan Chart 8Taiwanese Not Enthusiastic About Cross-Strait Economic Integration Biden, Xi, And Taiwan Biden, Xi, And Taiwan Chart 9Taiwanese Identify Exclusively As Taiwanese, Not Chinese Biden, Xi, And Taiwan Biden, Xi, And Taiwan Most likely China already has the capability to fight and win a war within the “first island chain,” including over Taiwan, especially if US intervention is hesitant or limited. But any doubts will likely be dispelled in the coming years. As long as China’s military advantage continues to grow, Beijing will increasingly view Taiwan as an object that it can take at will, regardless of whether economic gradualism would eventually work. The Taiwanese increasingly view themselves as distinctly Taiwanese – not Chinese or a mix of Taiwanese and Chinese (Chart 9). The implication is that it may be too late for China to win over hearts and minds. However, Beijing will presumably want to see whether Taiwan’s pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) can be dislodged from power in the 2024 elections before making a drastic leap to war. Taiwan, like the US and other democracies, is internally divided. President Tsai Ing-wen’s narrative of Taiwan’s democratic triumph over authoritarianism is not only applied to the mainland but also directed against Taiwan’s own Kuomintang (KMT).4 The country is unified on its right to expand economic and diplomatic cooperation with the West but it is starkly divided on whether the US should formally ally with Taiwan, sell it arms, and defend it from invasion (Chart 10A). Kuomintang supporters say they are not willing to fight and die for Taiwan in the face of any invasion (Chart 10B). American policymakers complain that Taiwan’s military structure and policies – long managed by the KMT – are not seriously aimed at preparing for asymmetric warfare against Chinese invasion. Chart 10ATaiwan Divided On Whether US Should Increase Military And Strategic Support Biden, Xi, And Taiwan Biden, Xi, And Taiwan Chart 10BTaiwan Divided On War Sacrifice Biden, Xi, And Taiwan Biden, Xi, And Taiwan The international sphere also matters for Beijing’s calculus. If the US remains divided and distracted – and allies curry favor with China – then China will presumably continue the gradualist approach. But if the US unifies at home and forges closer ties with allies, aiming to curb China’s economy and defend Taiwan’s democracy, then China may be motivated to take military action sooner. If the US and allies want to deter an attack on Taiwan, they need to signal that war will exact profound costs on China, such as crippling economic sanctions, a full economic blockade, or allied military intervention. But the West’s attempts to increase deterrence could spur China to take action before the West is fully prepared. Unlike the US in the Cuban Missile Crisis, China cannot accept a defeat in any showdown over arms sales to Taiwan. Its own political legitimacy is tied up with Taiwan, contrary to that of the US with Cuba. Given the lack of American willingness to fight a nuclear war over a non-treaty ally, the probability of China launching air strikes would be much higher (Diagram 1). Diagram 1Game Theory Of A Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis Biden, Xi, And Taiwan Biden, Xi, And Taiwan The US is not trying to give Taiwan nuclear arms, or other game-changing offensive systems, although the US has sent marines and special operations forces to help train Taiwanese troops. It is up to Beijing when to make an ultimatum regarding US military support.5 Ultimately the US still controls the seas and China depends on the Persian Gulf for nearly half of its oil imports. This is a good reason for China not to invade Taiwan. But if the US imposes an oil blockade, then the US and China will go to war – this is how the US and Japan came to blows in World War II. The danger is that China assesses that the US will not go that far. Will Biden-Xi Summit Reduce Tensions? Not Over The Long Run True, strategic tensions could be calmed in the short run. The US is restarting talks with China and setting up a bilateral summit between Presidents Biden and Xi. The two sides have exchanged prisoners (e.g. Meng Wanzhou), held climate talks, and Beijing has offered to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The US Trade Representative is suggesting it could ease some of President Trump’s tariffs under pressure from corporate lobbyists. The Biden administration is also likely to seek Beijing’s cooperation in other areas, such as North Korea and Iran. Biden has an urgent problem with Iran and may need China’s help constraining Iran’s nuclear program. However, none of the current initiatives change the underlying clash of grand strategies outlined above. A fundamental US-China reengagement is not in the cards. China is adopting nationalism and mercantilism to deal with its slowing potential growth, while China-bashing is one of the few areas of US national consensus. Specifically: Democracy over autocracy: The Biden administration cannot afford to be seen as smoothing the way for Xi Jinping to restore autocracy in the twentieth National Party Congress 12 months from now. China doubles down on manufacturing: China is not making liberal reforms to its economy to lower trade tensions but rather doubling down on state-led manufacturing and technological acquisition, according to the US Trade Representative.6 The US trade deficit is surging due to US fiscal stimulus. Biden will maintain or even expand high-tech export controls. Climate cooperation is limited: The US public does not agree that it should exchange its homegrown fossil fuels for Beijing’s renewable energy equipment, and the US and EU are flirting with “carbon adjustment fees,” which would be tariffs on carbon-intensive goods imports from places like China. Meanwhile China just told its state-owned enterprises to do everything in their power to secure coal for electricity and ordered banks to lend more to coal companies. North Korea is already a nuclear-armed state, which China condoned, despite multiple rounds of negotiations with the West. No agreement on Iran: If China helps force Iran to accept restrictions on its nuclear program, then that could mark a substantial improvement. But China has made long term commitments to Iran recently and probably will not backtrack on them unless the US makes major concessions that would undermine its attempts to counter China. The Taiwan conundrum undermines trust. If China can be brought to help the US with historic deals on North Korea or Iran, it will expect the US to stand back from Taiwan. The US may not see it that way. A failure to do so will appear a betrayal of trust. Consider China’s bid to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership. China’s state-driven economic model is fundamentally at odds with the TPP. It only takes one member to veto China’s membership, and Australia and Japan would defer to the US on this issue. The US is only likely to rejoin the TPP, which requires Republican support in Congress, on the basis that it is a vehicle for countering China. Even if the TPP members could be convinced to accept China, they would also want to accept Taiwan, which Beijing would refuse. Ultimately if China’s membership is vetoed, then it will conclude that the West is not serious about economic integration. China will be excluded and will be more inclined to pursue its own solutions to problems. China possesses or is close to possessing the capability of taking Taiwan by force today. We cannot rule it out. Taiwanese Defense Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng just claimed it could be attempted as early as 2025. Other estimates point to important Chinese calendar dates as deadlines for Taiwan’s absorption: 2027 (centenary of the People’s Liberation Army), 2035 (Xi Jinping’s long-term policy program), and 2049 (centenary of the People’s Republic of China). The truth is that any attack on Taiwan would not be based on symbolic anniversaries but on maximizing the element of surprise, China’s military capabilities, and foreign lack of readiness and coordination. Given that China’s capabilities are in place, or nearly in place, and nobody can predict such things precisely, investors should be prepared for conflict at any time. Investment Takeaways Chart 11Taiwanese Dollar Strengthened Since Trump Taiwanese Dollar Strengthened Since Trump Taiwanese Dollar Strengthened Since Trump The Taiwanese dollar has rallied since the escalation of US-China strategic tensions in 2016. The real effective exchange rate is now in line with its historic average after a long period of weakness (Chart 11). The trade war and COVID-19 have reinforced Taiwan’s advantage as a chokepoint for semiconductors and tech exports. If we thought there was no real risk of a war, we would not stand in the way of this rally. But based on geopolitical assessment above, the rally could be cut short at any time. Taiwanese equities have also rallied sharply for the same reasons – earnings have exploded throughout the pandemic and semiconductor shortage (Chart 12). Equities are not overly expensive on a cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings basis. But they are meeting resistance at a level that is slightly above fair value. Again, the macro and market fundamentals are positive but geopolitics is deeply negative. We remain underweight Taiwan. China’s willingness to try to stabilize relations with the US is an important positive sign that global investors will cheer in the short run. However, with the US economy fired up, and China’s export machine firing on all cylinders, Chinese authorities apparently believe they can maintain relatively tight monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policy, according to our Emerging Markets Strategy and China Investment Strategy. This will lead to negative outcomes in China’s economy and financial markets. The domestic economy is weak and animal spirits in the private sector are depressed. Retail sales, for example, have dropped far beneath their long-term trend (Chart 13). Chart 12Taiwanese Stocks Not Exactly Cheap Taiwanese Stocks Not Exactly Cheap Taiwanese Stocks Not Exactly Cheap Chart 13China: Consumer Sentiment Weak China: Consumer Sentiment Weak China: Consumer Sentiment Weak The regulatory crackdown on the property sector could trigger an economic and financial crisis (Chart 14). Chinese onshore equity markets were ultimately not able to sustain the collapse in sentiment this year that hit offshore equities even harder. China’s technology sector will continue to struggle under the burden of hawkish regulation, while Chinese stocks ex-tech have long underperformed the broad market (Chart 15). Chart 14China's Huge Property Sector Looking Wobbly China's Huge Property Sector Looking Wobbly China's Huge Property Sector Looking Wobbly Chart 15Beware Financial Turmoil In Mainland China Beware Financial Turmoil In Mainland China Beware Financial Turmoil In Mainland China We maintain the view that Chinese authorities will ease policy when necessary to try to prevent deleveraging in the property sector from triggering a crisis ahead of the twentieth national party congress. A look at past five-year political rotations suggests that bank loans will be flat-to-up over the coming 12 months and that fixed asset investment will tick up (Chart 16). But as long as policymakers are reluctant, risks lie to the downside for Chinese assets and related plays. Chart 16National Party Congress 2022 Requires Overall Stability National Party Congress 2022 Requires Overall Stability National Party Congress 2022 Requires Overall Stability Chart 17GeoRisk Indicators Flash Warnings GeoRisk Indicators Flash Warnings GeoRisk Indicators Flash Warnings China’s shift from “consensus rule” to “personal rule,” i.e. reversion to strongman rule or autocracy, permanently increases the risk of policy mistakes. This could apply to fiscal and regulatory policy as much as to cross-strait policy or foreign policy. It is appropriate that our geopolitical risk indicators for China and Taiwan are rising, signaling that equities are not yet out of the woods (Chart 17). Over the long run China is capable of staging a surprise attack and defeating Taiwan. We have argued that the odds are small this year but that some crisis is imminent – and that the risk of war will rise in the coming years. This is especially true if China cannot engineer a recession to get the Kuomintang back into power in 2024. However, from a fundamentally geopolitical point of view, any attack is bound to be a surprise and hence investors should be prepared. The three main conditions for a conflict over Taiwan are: (1) Chinese domestic instability (2) an American transfer of game-changing offensive weapon systems to Taiwan (3) a formal Taiwanese movement toward independence. The likeliest of these, by far, is Chinese instability.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 See Dina Smeltz and Craig Kafura, "For First Time, Half Of Americans Favor Defending Taiwan If China Invades," Chicago Council on Global Affairs, August 26, 2021, thechicagocouncil.org. 2 See Lu Hui, "Xi says ‘China must be, will be reunified’ as key anniversary marked," Xinhua, January 2, 2019, Xinhuanet.com. For a less alarmist reading of Xi’s recent speeches, see David Sacks, "What Xi Jinping’s Major Speech Means For Taiwan," Council on Foreign Relations, July 6, 2021, cfr.org. 3 See Ian Easton, "Will America Defend Taiwan? Here’s What History Says," Strategika, Hoover Institution, June 30, 2021, hoover.org. 4 See Tsai Ing-wen, "Taiwan and the Fight for Democracy," Foreign Affairs, November/December 2021, foreignaffairs.com. 5 See Gordon Lubold, "U.S. Troops Have Been Deployed In Taiwan For At Least A Year," Wall Street Journal, October 7, 2021, wsj.com. 6 Office of the US Trade Representative, "Fact Sheet: The Biden-Harris Administration’s New Approach To The U.S.-China Trade Relationship," October 4, 2021, ustr.gov.

Highlights The fourth quarter will be volatile as China still poses a risk of overtightening policy and undermining the global recovery. US political risks are also elevated. A debt default is likely to be averted in the end. Fiscal stimulus could be excessive. There is a 65% chance that taxes will rise in the New Year. A crisis over Iran’s nuclear program is imminent. Oil supply disruptions are likely. A return to diplomacy is still possible but red lines need to be underscored. European political risks are comparatively low, although they cannot go much lower, Russia still poses threats to its neighbors, and China’s economic wobbles will weigh on European assets. Our views still support Mexican equities and EU industrials over the long run but we are booking some gains in the face of higher volatility. Feature Our annual theme for 2021 was “No Return To Normalcy” and events have borne this out. The pandemic has continued to disrupt life while geopolitics has not reverted to pre-Trump norms. Going forward, the pandemic may subside but the geopolitical backdrop will be disruptive. This is primarily due to Chinese policy, unfinished business with Iran, and the struggle among various nations to remain stable in the aftermath of the pandemic. Chart 1Delta Recedes With Vaccinations Delta Recedes With Vaccinations Delta Recedes With Vaccinations Chart 2Global Recovery Marches On Global Recovery Marches On Global Recovery Marches On Chart 3Global Labor Markets On The Mend Global Labor Markets On The Mend Global Labor Markets On The Mend The underlying driver of markets in the fourth quarter will be the fact that the COVID-19 pandemic is waning as vaccination campaigns make progress (Chart 1). New cases of the Delta variant have rolled over in numerous countries and in US states that are skeptical toward vaccines. Global growth will still face crosswinds. US growth rates are unlikely to be downgraded further while Europe’s growth has been upgraded. However, forecasters are likely to downgrade Chinese growth expectations in the face of the government’s regulatory onslaught against various sectors and property sector instability (Chart 2). Barring a Chinese policy mistake, the global composite PMI is likely to stabilize. Labor markets will continue healing (Chart 3). The tug of war between unemployment and inflation will continue to give way in favor of inflation, given that wage pressures will emerge, stimulus-fueled household demand will be strong, and supply shortages will persist. Central banks will try to normalize policy but will not move aggressively in the face of any new setbacks to the recovery. Will China Spoil The Recovery? Maybe. Chinese policy and structural imbalances pose the greatest threat to the global economic recovery both in the short and the long run. The immediate risk to the recovery is clear from our market-based Chinese growth indicator, which has not yet bottomed (Chart 4). The historic confluence of domestic political and geopolitical risks in China is our key view for the year. China is attempting to make the economic transition that other East Asian states have made – away from the “miracle” manufacturing phase of growth toward something more sustainable. But there are two important differences: China is making its political and economic system less open and free (the opposite of Taiwan and South Korea) and it is confronting rather than befriending the United States. The Xi administration is focused on consolidating power ahead of the twentieth national party congress in fall 2022. Xi is attempting to stay in power beyond the ten-year limit that was in place when he took office. On one hand he is presenting a slate of socioeconomic reforms – dubbed “common prosperity” – to curry popular favor. This agenda represents a tilt from capitalism toward socialism within the context of the Communist Party’s overarching idea of socialism with Chinese characteristics. On the other hand, Xi is cracking down on the private sector – Big Tech, property developers – which theoretically provides the base of power for any political opposition. The crackdowns have caused Chinese equities to collapse relative to global and have reaffirmed the long trend of underperformance of cyclical sectors relative to defensives within Chinese investable shares (Chart 5, top panel). Chart 4China Threatens To Spoil The Party China Threatens To Spoil The Party China Threatens To Spoil The Party In terms of financial distress, so far only high-yield corporate bonds have seen spreads explode, not investment grade. But current policies force property developers to liquidate their holdings, pay off debts, and raise cash while forcing banks to cut bank on loans to property developers and homebuyers. (Not to mention curbs on carbon emissions and other policies squeezing industrial and other sectors.) Chart 5Beijing Could Easily Trigger Global Market Riot Beijing Could Easily Trigger Global Market Riot Beijing Could Easily Trigger Global Market Riot If these policies are not relaxed then property developers will continue to struggle, property prices will fall, credit tightening will intensify, and local governments will be starved of revenue and forced to cut back on their own spending. Yet the government’s signals of policy easing are so far gradual and behind the curve. If policy is not relaxed, then onshore equities will sell off (as well as offshore) and credit spreads will widen more generally (Chart 5, bottom panel). Broad financial turmoil cannot be ruled out in the fourth quarter. Ultimately, however, China will be forced to do whatever it takes to try to secure the post-pandemic recovery. Otherwise it will instigate a socioeconomic crisis ahead of the all-important political reshuffle in fall 2022. That would be the opposite of what Xi Jinping needs as he tries to consolidate power. Chinese households have stored their wealth, built up over decades of economic success, in the housing sector (Chart 6). Economic instability could translate to political instability. Chart 6Beijing Will Provide Bailouts And Stimulus … Or Face Political Instability Fourth Quarter Outlook: So Much For Normalcy! Fourth Quarter Outlook: So Much For Normalcy! Investors often ask how the government can ease policy if doing so will further inflate housing prices, which hurts the middle class and is the opposite of the common prosperity agenda. High housing prices are the biggest of the three “mountains” that are said to be crushing the common folks and weighing on Chinese birthrates and fertility (the other two are high education and medical costs). The answer is that while policymakers want to cap housing prices and encourage fertility, they must prevent a general collapse in prices and economic and financial crisis. There is no evidence that suppressing housing prices will increase fertility or birthrates – if anything, falling fertility is hard to reverse and goes hand in hand with falling prices. Rather, evidence from the US, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, and other countries shows that a bursting property bubble certainly does not increase fertility or birthrates (Charts 7A and 7B). Chart 7AEconomic Crash Not A Recipe For Higher Fertility Economic Crash Not A Recipe For Higher Fertility Economic Crash Not A Recipe For Higher Fertility Chart 7BEconomic Crash Not A Recipe For Higher Fertility Economic Crash Not A Recipe For Higher Fertility Economic Crash Not A Recipe For Higher Fertility Bringing it all together, investors should not play down negative news and financial instability emerging from China. There are no checks and balances on autocrats. Our China Investment Strategy has a high conviction view that policy stimulus is not forthcoming and regulatory curbs will not be eased. The implication is that China’s government could make major policy mistakes and trigger financial instability in the near term before changing its mind to try to preserve overall stability. At that point it could be too late. Will Countries Add More Stimulus? Yes. Chart 8Global Monetary Policy Challenges Global Monetary Policy Challenges Global Monetary Policy Challenges With China’s stability in question, investors face a range of crosswinds. Central banks are struggling with a surge in inflation driven by stimulus-fueled demand and supply bottlenecks. The global output gap is still large but rapid economic normalization will push inflation up further if kinks are not removed (Chart 8). A moderating factor in this regard is that budget deficits are contracting in 2022 and coming years – fiscal policy will shift from thrust to drag (Chart 9). However, the fiscal drag is probably overstated as governments are also likely to increase deficit spending on the margin. The US is certainly likely to do so. But before considering US fiscal policy we must address the immediate question: whether the US will default on national debt. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has designated October 18 as the “X-date” at which the Treasury will run out of extraordinary measures to make debt payments if Congress does not raise the statutory debt ceiling. There is presumably a few weeks of leeway after this date but markets will grow very jittery and credit rating agencies will start to downgrade the United States, as Standard & Poor’s did in 2011. Chart 9Global Fiscal Drag Rears Its Head Fourth Quarter Outlook: So Much For Normalcy! Fourth Quarter Outlook: So Much For Normalcy! Democrats have full control of Congress and can therefore suspend the debt ceiling through a party-line vote. They can do this through regular legislation, if Republicans avoid raising a filibuster, though that requires Democrats to make concessions in a back-room deal with Republicans. Or they can compromise the filibuster, though that requires convincing moderate Democrats who support the filibuster that they need to make an exception to preserve the faith and credit of the US. Or they can raise the debt ceiling via budget reconciliation, though this would run up against the time limit and so far Senate Leader Chuck Schumer claims to refuse this option. While the odds of a debt default are not zero, the Democrats have the power to avoid it and will also suffer the most in public opinion if it occurs. Therefore the debt limit will likely be suspended at the last minute in late October or early November. Investors should expect volatility but should view it as short-term noise and buy on dips – i.e. the opposite of any volatility that stems from Chinese financial turmoil. Congress is likely to pass Biden’s $550 billion bipartisan infrastructure bill (80% subjective odds). It is also likely to pass a partisan social welfare reconciliation bill over the coming months (65% subjective odds). The full impact on the deficit of both bills should range from $1.1-$1.6 trillion over ten years. This will not be enough to prevent the fiscal drag in 2022 but it will provide for a gradually expanding budget deficit over the course of the decade (Chart 10). Chart 10New Fiscal Stimulus Will Reduce Fiscal Drag On Margin Fourth Quarter Outlook: So Much For Normalcy! Fourth Quarter Outlook: So Much For Normalcy! The reconciliation package will be watered down and late in coming. Investors will likely buy the rumor and sell the news. If reconciliation fails, markets may cheer, as it will also include tax hikes and pose the risk of pushing up inflation and hastening Fed rate hikes. Elsewhere governments are also providing “soft budgets.” The German election results confirmed our forecast that the government will change to left-wing leadership that will be able to boost domestic investment but not raise taxes. This is due to the inclusion of at least one right-leaning party, most likely the Free Democrats. Fiscal deficits will go up. Germany has a national policy consensus on most matters of importance and thus can pass some legislation. But the new coalition will be ideologically split and barely have a majority in the Bundestag, so controversial or sweeping legislation will be unlikely. This outcome is positive for German markets and the euro. Looking at popular opinion toward western leaders and their ruling coalitions since the outbreak of COVID-19, the takeaway is that the Europeans have the strongest political capital (Chart 11). Governments are either supported by leadership changes (Italy, Germany) or likely to be supported in upcoming elections (France). The UK does not face an election until 2024, unless an early election is called. This seems doubtful to us given the government’s strong majority. Chart 11DM Shifts In Popular Opinion Since COVID-19 Fourth Quarter Outlook: So Much For Normalcy! Fourth Quarter Outlook: So Much For Normalcy! Chart 12EM Shifts In Popular Opinion Since COVID-19 Fourth Quarter Outlook: So Much For Normalcy! Fourth Quarter Outlook: So Much For Normalcy! After all, Canada called an early election and it became a much riskier affair than the government intended and did not increase the prime minister’s political capital. Spain is far more likely to see tumult and an early election. Japan’s election in November will not bring any surprises: as we have written, Kishidanomics will be Abenomics by a different name. The implication is that after November, most developed markets will be politically recapitalized and fiscal policy will continue to be accommodative across the board. In emerging markets, popular opinion has been much more damning for leaders, calling attention to our expectation that the aftershocks of the global pandemic will come in the form of social and political instability (Chart 12). Russia has a record of pursuing more aggressive foreign policy to distract from its domestic ills. The next conflict could already be emerging, with allegations that it is deliberately pushing up natural gas prices in Europe to try to force the new German government to certify and operate the NordStream II pipeline. The Americans are already brandishing new sanctions. Chart 13Stary Neutral Dollar For Now Stary Neutral Dollar For Now Stary Neutral Dollar For Now Brazil and Turkey both face extreme social instability in the lead-up to elections in 2022 and 2023. India has been the chief beneficiary of today’s climate but it also faces an increase in political and geopolitical risk due to looming state elections and its increasing alliance with the West against China. Putting it all together, the US is likely to stimulate further and pump up inflation expectations. Europe is politically stable but Russia disrupt it. Other emerging markets, including China, will struggle with economic, political, and social instability. This is an environment in which the US dollar will remain relatively firm and the renminbi will depreciate – with negative effects on EM currencies more broadly (Chart 13). Annual Views On Track Our three key views for 2021 are so far on track but face major tests in the fourth quarter: 1. China’s internal and external headwinds: If China overtightens policy and short-circuits the global economic recovery, then its domestic political risks will have exceeded even our own pessimistic expectations. We expect China to ease fiscal policy and do at least the minimum to secure the recovery. Investors should be neutral on risky assets until China provides clearer signals that it will not overtighten policy (Chart 14). 2. Iran is the crux of the US pivot to Asia: A crisis over Iran is imminent since Biden did not restore the 2015 nuclear deal promptly upon taking office. Any disruption of Middle Eastern energy flows will add to global supply bottlenecks and price pressures. Brent crude oil prices will see upside risks relative both to BCA forecasts and the forward curve (Chart 15). Chart 14Wait For China To Relax Policy Wait For China To Relax Policy Wait For China To Relax Policy Chart 15Expect A Near-Term Crisis Over Iran Expect A Near-Term Crisis Over Iran Expect A Near-Term Crisis Over Iran The reason is that Iran is expected to reach nuclear “breakout” capability by November or December (i.e. obtain enough highly enriched uranium to make a nuclear device). The Biden administration is focused on diplomacy and so far hesitant to impose a credible threat of war to halt Iranian advances. Israel’s new government has belatedly admitted that it would be a good thing for the US and Iran to rejoin the 2015 nuclear deal – if not, it supports a global coalition to impose sanctions, and finally a military option as a last resort. Biden will struggle to put together a global coalition as effective as Obama did, given worse relations with China and Russia. The US and Israel are highly likely to continue using sabotage and cyberattacks to slow Iran’s nuclear and missile progress. Chart 16Pivot To Asia Runs Through Iran Pivot To Asia Runs Through Iran Pivot To Asia Runs Through Iran Chart 17Europe: A Post-Trump Winner? Depends On China Europe: A Post-Trump Winner? Depends On China Europe: A Post-Trump Winner? Depends On China Thus the Iranians are likely to reach breakout capability at which point a crisis could erupt. The market is not priced for the next Middle East crisis (Chart 16). Incidentally, any additional foreign policy humiliation on top of Afghanistan could undermine the Biden administration more broadly, in both domestic and foreign policy. 3. Europe benefits most from a post-pandemic, post-Trump world: Europe is a cyclical economy and is also relatively politically stable in a world of structurally rising policy uncertainty and geopolitical risk. We thought it stood to benefit most from the global recovery and the passing of the Trump administration. However, China’s policy tightening has undermined European assets and will continue to do so. Therefore this view is largely contingent on the first view (Chart 17). Investment Takeaways Strategically we maintain a diversified portfolio of trades based on critical geopolitical themes: long gold, short China/Taiwan, long developed markets, long aerospace/defense, long rare earths, and long value over growth stocks. Taiwanese equities have continued to outperform despite bubbling geopolitical tensions. We maintain our view that Taiwan is overpriced and vulnerable to long-term semiconductor diversification as well as US-China conflict. Our rare earths basket, which focuses on miners outside China, has been volatile and stands to suffer if China’s growth decelerates. But global industrial, energy, and defense policy will continue to support rare earths and metals prices. Russian tensions with the West have been manageable over the course of the year and emerging European stocks have outperformed developed European peers, contrary to our recommendation. However, fundamental conflicts remain unresolved and the dispute over the recently completed Nord Stream II pipeline to Germany could still deal negative surprises. We will reassess this recommendation in a future report. We are booking gains on the following trades: long Mexico (8%), long aerospace and defense in absolute terms (4%), long EU industrials relative to global (4%), and long Italian BTPs relative to bunds (0.2%).   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Appendix: GeoRisk Indicator China China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator Russia Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator United Kingdom UK: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Germany Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Canada Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Spain Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Korea Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Australia Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Australia: GeoRisk Indicator Appendix: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights We cannot predict how China will manage Evergrande precisely but we have a high conviction that it will do whatever it takes to prevent contagion across the property sector. However, China’s stimulus tools are losing their effectiveness over time. The country is due for a prolonged struggle with financial and economic instability regardless of whether Evergrande defaults. A messy default would obviously exacerbate the problem. China’s regulatory crackdowns target private companies and will continue to weigh on animal spirits in the private sector. The government will be forced to use fiscal policy to compensate. The US’s and China’s switch from engagement to confrontation poses a persistent headwind for investor sentiment toward China. The new consensus that investors should buy into China’s “strategic sectors” to avoid arbitrary regulatory crackdowns is vulnerable to its own logic and to sanctions by the US and its allies. Feature China poses a unique confluence of domestic and foreign political risks and global markets are now pricing them. Property giant Evergrande could default on $120 million in onshore and offshore interest payments as early as September 23, or next month, prompting investors to run for cover. Is this crisis fleeting or part of a larger systemic failure? It is a larger systemic failure. We expect a slow-motion, Japanese-style crisis over the coming decade, marked with periodic bailouts and stimulus packages. We recommend investors stay the course: steer clear of China and stay short the renminbi and Taiwanese dollar. Tactically, stick with large caps, defensive sectors, and developed markets within the global equity universe. Strategically, prefer emerging markets that benefit from forthcoming Chinese (and American) stimulus. 1. A “Minsky Moment” Cannot Be Ruled Out The chief fear is whether the approaching default of Evergrande marks China’s “Minsky Moment.” Hyman Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis held that long periods of stable revenues lead to risky financial deals and large accumulations of systemic risk that are underpriced. When revenues cannot cover interest payments, a crash ensues followed by deleveraging. Minsky’s hypothesis speaks to debt crises in an entire economy, yet nobody knows for sure whether China’s economy has reached such a breaking point. China’s national savings rate stands at 45.7% of GDP and nominal growth exceeds the long-term government bond yield. However, a sharp drop in asset prices, especially in the property sector, could change everything, as it could lead to balance sheet recession among corporates and a fall in national income. Evergrande is supposed to make an $84 million interest payment on offshore debt and a $36 million payment on onshore debt this week, and after 30 days it would default. It owes $37 billion in debt payments over the next 12 months but only has $13 billion cash on hand (as of June 30, 2021). Authorities can opt for a full bailout or a partial bailout, in which the company defaults on offshore bonds but not onshore. They could even let the company fail categorically, though that would produce exactly the kind of precipitous drop in property asset prices that would lead to wider financial contagion. State intervention to smooth the crisis is more likely – and the government can easily pressure other companies into acquiring Evergrande’s assets and business divisions. Chart 1Yes, This Could Be China's Minsky Moment Yes, This Could Be China's Minsky Moment Yes, This Could Be China's Minsky Moment Chart 1 shows that China’s corporate debt-to-GDP ratio stands head and shoulders above other countries that experienced financial crises in recent decades, courtesy of our Emerging Markets Strategy. While China can undoubtedly bear large debts due to its savings, the implication is that China has large enough financial imbalances to suffer a full-fledged financial crisis, even if the timing is hard to predict. Household credit is also elevated at 61.7% of GDP, and the household debt-to-disposable-income ratio is now higher than in the United States. About two-thirds of China’s corporate debt is held by state-owned or state-controlled entities, prompting some investors to dismiss the gravity of the risk. However, financial crises often involve the transfer of debt from the state to private sector or vice versa. 59% of bond defaults in H1 2021 have involved state companies. Total debt is the main concern. Don’t take our word for it: China’s Communist Party has warned for the past decade about the danger of “implicit guarantees” and “moral hazard” that encourage financial excesses in the corporate sector. The Xi Jinping administration has tried to induce a deleveraging process since it came to power in 2012-13. Xi’s “three red lines” for the property sector precipitated the current turmoil. Even if Evergrande’s troubles are managed, China’s systemic risks will continue to boil over as its potential growth rate slows and the government continues trying to wring out financial excesses. Chart 2Policy Uncertainty, Financial Stress Can Rise Higher Policy Uncertainty, Financial Stress Can Rise Higher Policy Uncertainty, Financial Stress Can Rise Higher More broadly China is experiencing an unprecedented overlap of economic and political crises: The population is aging and labor force is shrinking; The economic model since 2009 has been changing from export-manufacturing to domestic-oriented, investment-driven growth; Indebtedness is spreading from corporates to households and ultimately the government; The governance model is shifting from “single-party rule” to “single-person rule” or autocracy; The population is reaching middle class status and demanding better quality of life; The international trade environment is turning from hyper-globalization to hypo-globalization; The geopolitical backdrop is darkening with the US and its allies attempting to contain China’s ambitions of regional supremacy. Almost all of these changes bring more risks than opportunities to China over the long haul. The need for rapid policy shifts provides the ostensible reasoning for President Xi Jinping’s decision not to step down but to remain president for the foreseeable future. He will clinch this position at the twentieth national party congress in fall 2022. The implication is that policy uncertainty will continue climbing up to at least 2019 peaks while offshore equity markets will continue to trend lower, as they have done since the onset of the US trade war (Chart 2). Credit default swap rates have so far been subdued but they are showing signs of life. A sharp rise in policy uncertainty and property sector stress would pull them up. Domestic equities (A-shares) have rallied since 2019 but we would expect them to fall back given China’s historic confluence of structural and cyclical challenges, which will create further negative surprises (Chart 2, bottom panel). 2. Beijing Will Provide Bailouts And Stimulus Ad Nauseum Evergrande’s future may be in doubt but Beijing will throw all its power at stopping nationwide financial contagion. True, a policy miscalculation is possible. A tardy or failed intervention cannot be ruled out. However, investors should remember that a clear pattern of bailouts and stimulus has emerged over the course of the Xi Jinping administration whenever a “hard landing” or financial collapse loomed. The government tightens controls on bloated sectors until the financial fallout threatens to undermine general economic and social stability, at which point the government eases policy. It is often forced to stimulate the economy aggressively. Chart 3 shows these cycles in two ways: China’s control of credit through the state-controlled banks, and the frequency of news stories mentioning important terms associated with financial and economic distress: defaults, layoffs, and bankruptcies. These three terms used to be unheard of among China watchers. Under the Xi administration, a higher tolerance of creative destruction has served as the way to push forward reform. The current rise in distress is not extended, suggesting that more bad news is coming, but it also shows that the government has repeatedly been forced to provide stimulus even under the Xi administration. Chart 3Xi Jinping Has Bailed Out System Three Times Already Xi Jinping Has Bailed Out System Three Times Already Xi Jinping Has Bailed Out System Three Times Already Could this time be different? Not likely. The American experience and the pandemic will also force China’s government to ease policy: China learns from US mistakes. The US lurched from Lehman’s failure into a financial crisis, an impaired credit channel, a sluggish economic recovery, a spike in polarization, policy paralysis, a near-default on the national debt, a surge in right- and left-wing populism, the tumultuous Trump presidency, widespread social unrest, a contested leadership succession, and a mob storming the nation’s capitol (Chart 4). This is obviously the nightmare of any Chinese leader and a trajectory that the Xi administration will avoid at any cost. Chart 4Lehman Brothers A Powerful Disincentive For China To Let Evergrande Fail Lehman Brothers A Powerful Disincentive For China To Let Evergrande Fail Lehman Brothers A Powerful Disincentive For China To Let Evergrande Fail Chinese households store their wealth in the property sector, so any attempt at policy restraint or austerity faces a massive constraint. Only a few countries are comparable to China with respect to the share of non-financial household wealth (property and land) within total household wealth. All of them are hosts of property sector bubbles, including the bubbles in Spain and Ireland back in 2007 (Chart 5). A property collapse would destroy the savings of the Chinese people over four decades of prosperity. Chart 5Property Is The Bedrock Of Chinese Households Five Points On China’s Crisis Five Points On China’s Crisis Social instability is already flaring up. Almost all China experts agree that “social stability” is the Communist Party’s bottom line. But note that the Evergrande saga has already led to protests, not only at the company’s headquarters in Shenzhen but also in other cities such as Shenyang, Guangzhou, Chongqing. Protests were filmed and shown on social media (posts have been censored). Protesters demanded repayment for wealth management products gone sour and properties they are owed that have not been built. This is only a taste of the cross-regional protests that would emerge if the broader property sector suffered. The lingering COVID-19 pandemic is still relevant. Investors should not underrate the potential threat that the pandemic poses to the regime. Severe epidemics have occurred about 11% of the time over the course of China’s history and they often have major ramifications. Disease has played a role in the downfall of six out of ten dynasties – and in four cases it played a major role. It would be suicidal for any regime to add self-inflicted economic collapse to a lingering pandemic (Table 1). Table 1Disease Threatens Chinese Dynasties – Not A Time To Self-Inflict A Recession Five Points On China’s Crisis Five Points On China’s Crisis Easing policy does not necessarily mean bringing out the “bazooka” and splurging on money and credit growth, though that is increasingly likely as the crisis intensifies. Notably the July Politburo statement specifically removed language that said China would “avoid sharp turns in policy.” In other words, sharp turns might be necessary. That can only mean sharp reflationary turns, as there is very little chance of doubling down on policy tightening. A counterargument holds that the Chinese government is now exclusively focused on power consolidation to the neglect of financial and economic stability. Perhaps the leadership is misinformed, overconfident, or thinks a financial collapse will better purge its enemies – along the lines of the various political purges under Chairman Mao Zedong. Wealthy tech magnates and property owners could conceivably challenge the return of autocracy. After all, the US political establishment almost “fell” to a rich property baron – why couldn’t China’s Communist Party? Political purges should certainly be expected ahead of next year’s party congress. But not to the point of killing the economy. The government would not be trying to balance policy tightening and loosening so carefully if it sought to induce chaos. It must be admitted, however, that the change to autocracy means that the odds of irrational or idiosyncratic policy have gone up substantially and permanently. Of course, the high likelihood that Beijing will provide bailouts and stimulus should not be read as a bullish investment thesis, even though it would create a pop in oversold assets. The Chinese system is saturated with money and credit, which have been losing their effectiveness in driving growth. Financial imbalances get worse, not better, with each wave of credit stimulus. Beijing is caught between a rock and a hard place. Hence stimulus comes only reluctantly and reactively. But it does come in the end because a financial crash would threaten the life of the regime and preclude all other policy priorities, domestic and foreign. 3. Yes, China’s Regulatory Crackdown Targets The Private Sector Global growth and other emerging economies will get most of the benefit once China stimulates, since China’s own firms will still face a negative domestic political backdrop. Bullish investors argue that the government’s regulatory tightening is misunderstood and overblown. The claim is that China is not targeting the private sector generally but only isolated sectors causing social problems. Costs need to be reduced in property, education, and health to improve quality of life. China shares the US’s and EU’s desire to rein in tech giants that monopolize their markets, abuse consumer data and privacy, and benefit from distorted tax systems. Most of these arguments are misleading. China does not have a strong record on data privacy, equality, social safety nets, rule of law, or “sustainable” growth (as opposed to “unsustainable,” high-debt, high-polluting growth). China actively encourages state champions that monopolize key sectors. Many developed markets have better records in these areas, notably in Europe, yet China is eschewing these regulatory models in preference for an approach that is arbitrary and absolutist, i.e. negative for governance. As for the private sector, animal spirits have been in a long decline throughout the past decade. This is true whether judging by money velocity – i.e. the pace of economic activity relative to the increase in money supply – or by households’ and businesses’ marginal propensity to save (Chart 6). The 2015-16 period shows that even periodic bouts of government stimulus have not reversed the general trend. Regulatory whack-a-mole and financial turmoil will not improve the situation. Chart 6Private Sector Animal Spirits Depressed Throughout Xi Era Private Sector Animal Spirits Depressed Throughout Xi Era Private Sector Animal Spirits Depressed Throughout Xi Era Chart 7Even Official Data Shows Consumer Confidence Flagging Even Official Data Shows Consumer Confidence Flagging Even Official Data Shows Consumer Confidence Flagging Surveys of sentiment confirm that the latest developments will have a negative effect (Chart 7). Cumulatively, the changes in China’s domestic and international policy context are being interpreted as negative for business, entrepreneurship, and economic freedom – notwithstanding the government’s claims to expand opportunity in its “common prosperity” plan. 4. The Withdrawal Of US Friendship Is A Headwind For China Chart 8Other Asians Sought US Friendship, Not Conflict, When Export Models Expired Other Asians Sought US Friendship, Not Conflict, When Export Models Expired Other Asians Sought US Friendship, Not Conflict, When Export Models Expired All of the successful Asian economies – including China for most of the past forty years of prosperity – have tried to stay on the good side of the United States. By contrast, China and the US today are shifting from engagement to confrontation and breaking up their economic ties (Chart 8). This is a problem for China because the US and to some extent its allies will seek to undermine China’s economy and its autocratic model as part of this great power competition. The rise in geopolitical risk is underscored by the Australia-UK-US (AUKUS) agreement, by which the US will provide Australia with nuclear submarines over the next decade. This was a clear demonstration of the US’s “pivot to Asia” and the fact that the US and China are preparing for war – if only to deter it. China’s return to autocracy and clash with the US and Asian neighbors is also leading to a deterioration of its global image, particularly over issues of transparency and information sharing. The dispute over the origins of COVID-19 is a major source of division with the US and other countries. Transparency is important for investors. The World Bank has discontinued its “Ease of Doing Business” rankings after a scandal was revealed in which China’s ranking was artificially bumped up. The last-published trend is still downward (Chart 9). Most recently China has stepped up censorship of its financial news media amid the current market turmoil, which makes it harder for investors to assess the full extent of property and financial risks.1 The US political factions agree on China-bashing if nothing else. The Biden administration has little political impetus to eschew tariffs and export controls. One important penalty will come from the Securities and Exchange Commission, which is likely to ban Chinese firms from US stock exchanges unless they conform to common accounting standards. Hence the dramatic fall in the share prices of Chinese companies listed via American Depository Receipts (ADRs), in both absolute and relative terms (Chart 10, top panel). This threat prompted China’s recent crackdown on its own firms that were attempting to hold initial public offerings on US exchanges. Chart 9US Conflict Exposes China’s Global Influence Campaign Five Points On China’s Crisis Five Points On China’s Crisis The Quadrilateral Forum – the US, Japan, Australia, and India – has agreed to link the semiconductor supply chain to human rights standards, foreclosing China’s participation in that supply chain. US semiconductor firms are among the most exposed to China but they have not suffered over the course of the US-China tech war, suggesting that US vulnerabilities are limited (Chart 10, bottom panel). Chart 10US Regulators Will Kick Chinese Firms While They Are Down US Regulators Will Kick Chinese Firms While They Are Down US Regulators Will Kick Chinese Firms While They Are Down The point is not to exaggerate the strength of the US and its allies but rather the costs to China of actively opposing them. The US has a difficult enough time cobbling together a coalition of states to impose sanctions on Iran over its nuclear program, not to mention forming any coalition that would totally exclude and isolate China. China is far more important to US allies than Iran – it is irreplaceable in the global economy (Chart 11). The EU and China’s Asian neighbors will typically restrain the US’s more aggressive impulses so as not to upset the global recovery or end up on the front lines of a war.2 Chart 11No Substitute For China In Global Economy Five Points On China’s Crisis Five Points On China’s Crisis This diplomatic constraint on the US is probably positive for global growth but not for China per se. American allies are still able to increase the costs on China for pursuing its own state-backed development path and geopolitical sphere of influence. Japan, Australia, and others are likely to veto China’s application to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), while the UK and eventually the US are likely to join it. Investors should view US-China ties as a headwind at least until the two powers manage to negotiate a diplomatic thaw, i.e. substantial de-escalation of tensions. A thaw is unlikely in the lead-up to Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power and the US midterm elections in fall 2022. Presidents Biden and Xi are still working on a bilateral summit, not to mention a more substantial improvement in ties. We doubt a diplomatic thaw would be durable anyway but the important point is that until it happens China will face periodic bouts of negative sentiment from the emerging cold war. Other Asian economies thrived under US auspices – China is sailing in uncharted waters. 5. Global Investors Cannot Separate Civilian From State And Military Investments The word on Wall Street is that investors should align their strategies with those of China’s leaders so as not to run afoul of arbitrary and draconian regulators. For example, instead of “soft tech” or consumer-oriented companies – like those that give people rides, deliver food, or make creative video games – investors should invest in “hard tech” or strategic companies like those that make computer chips, renewable energy, biotechnologies, pharmaceuticals, and capital equipment. There is no question that the trend in China – and elsewhere – is for governments to become more active in picking winners and losers. Industrial policy is back. Investors have no choice but to include policy analysis in their toolbox. However, for global investors, an investment strategy of buying whatever the government says is far from convincing. The most basic investment strategy in keeping with the Xi administration’s goals would be to invest in state-owned enterprises in domestic equity markets. So SOEs should have outperformed the market, right? Wrong. They were in a downtrend prior to the 2015 bubble, the burst of which caused a further downtrend (Chart 12, top panel). Similarly, the preference for “hard tech” over “soft tech” is promising in theory but complicated in practice: hard tech is flat-to-down over the decade and down since COVID-19 (Chart 12, middle panel). It has underperformed its global peers (Chart 12, bottom panel). China’s policy disposition should be beneficial for industrials, health care, and renewable energy. First, China is doubling down on its manufacturing economy. Second, the population is aging and health care is a critical part of the common prosperity plan. Third, green energy is a way of diversifying from dependency on imported oil and natural gas. However, the profile of these sectors relative to their global counterparts is only unambiguously attractive in the case of industrials, which began to outperform even during the trade war (Chart 13). Chart 12State Approved' Trades Still Bring Risks State Approved' Trades Still Bring Risks State Approved' Trades Still Bring Risks Chart 13Beware 'State Approved' Trades Beware 'State Approved' Trades Beware 'State Approved' Trades In Table 2 we outline the valuations and political risks of onshore equity sectors. Valuations are not cheap. Domestic and foreign risks are not fully priced. Table 2China Onshore Equities, Valuations, And (Geo)Political Risks Five Points On China’s Crisis Five Points On China’s Crisis There is a bigger problem for global investors, especially Americans: investing in China’s strategic sectors directly implicates investors in the Communist Party’s domestic human rights practices, state-owned enterprises, and national security goals. “Civil-military fusion” is a well-established doctrine that calls for the People’s Liberation Army to have access to the cutting-edge technology developed by civilians and vice versa. These investments will eventually be subject to punitive measures since the US policy establishment believes it can no longer afford to let US wealth buttress China’s military and technological rise. Investment Takeaways China may or may not work out a partial bailout for Evergrande but it will definitely provide state assistance and fiscal stimulus to try to prevent contagion across the property sector and financial system. Bad news in the coming weeks and months will be replaced by good news in this sense. However, the fact that China will eventually be forced to undertake traditional stimulus yet again will increase its systemic financial risks, in a well-established pattern. The best equity opportunities will lie outside of China, where companies will benefit from global recovery yet avoid suffering from China’s unique confluence of domestic and foreign political risks. We prefer developed markets and select emerging markets in Latin America and Asia-ex-China. Chinese households and businesses are downbeat. This behavior cannot be separated from the historic changes in the economy, domestic politics, and foreign policy. It is hard to see an improvement until the government boosts growth and the 2022 political reshuffle is over. American opposition is a bigger problem for China than global investors realize. Not only are the two economies divorcing but other democracies will distance themselves from China as well – not because of US demands but because their own manufacturing, national security, and ideological space is threatened by China’s reversion to autocracy and assertive foreign policy. Investing in China’s “hard tech” and strategic sectors with government approval is not a simple solution. This approach will directly funnel capital into China’s state-owned enterprises, domestic security forces, and military. As such the US and West will eventually impose controls. Investments may not be liquid since China would suffer if capital ever fled these kinds of projects. Both American and Chinese stimulus is looming this winter but the short run will see more volatility. We are closing our long JPY-KRW tactical trade for a gain of 4.4%   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 We have often noted in these pages over the past decade that multilateral organizations overrated improvements in China’s governance based on policy pronouncements rather than structural changes. 2 Still, tensions among the allies should not be overrated since they share a fundamental concern over China’s increasing challenge to the current global order. The EU is pursuing trade talks with Taiwan, and there are ways that the US can compensate France over the nullification of its submarine sales to Australia (most of which are detrimental to China’s security).

Highlights The US dollar’s reserve status will remain intact for the foreseeable future. While this privilege is fraying at the edges, there are no viable alternatives just yet. There is an overarching incentive for any country to hold onto its currency’s power. For the US, it is still well within their ability to keep this “exorbitant privilege.” That said, there will be rolling doubts about the ability of the US to maintain its large currency sphere. This will create tidal waves in the currency’s path, providing plenty of trading opportunities for investors. China is on track to surpass the US in economic size, but it is far from dethroning the US in the military realm. However, it is gradually gaining the ability to deny the US access to its immediate offshore areas and may already be capable of winning a war over nearby islands like Taiwan. Watch the RMB over the next few decades. From a macro and cyclical perspective, the dollar is likely to decline as global growth picks up and the Fed lags market expectations in raising rates. From a geopolitical perspective, however, the backdrop is neutral-to-bullish for the dollar over the next three to five years. Feature Having the world’s reserve currency comes with a few advantages, which any governments would be loath to give up. The most important advantage is the ability to settle one’s balance of payments in one’s own currency. This not only facilitates trade for the reserve nation, it also reinforces the turnover of the reserve currency internationally. The value of this privilege is as much symbolic as economic. This “first mover advantage” or adoption of one’s currency internationally automatically ordains the resident central bank as the world’s bank. The primary advantage here is being able to dictate global financial conditions, expanding and contracting money supply to address domestic and global funding pressures. As compensation for this task, the world provides one with non-negligible seigniorage revenue. Being the world’s central bank also comes with another crucial advantage: being able to choose which international projects will be funded, while using cheaply issued local debt to finance these investments. Of course, any sensible society will earn more on its investments than it pays on the debt issued. There is a geopolitical angle to having the world’s reserve currency. A nation’s currency is widely held because of strategic depth—its ability to secure the people who trade in that currency and the property denominated in it. Deposits and transactions can be monitored, secured, or even halted at the behest of the sovereign. Holding the currency means one can maintain one’s purchasing power, given that it is backed by the most powerful country in the world. As the reserve currency becomes the de facto international medium of exchange, having stood the test of time through various crises, this allows the resident country to alter its purchasing power to achieve both national and international goals. Throughout history, having the world’s reserve currency has been the pursuit of many governments and kingdoms. In the current paradigm, the US enjoys this privilege. But could that change? And if so, how and when? Our goal in this report is threefold. First, why would any country want to maintain reserve status? Second, does the US still possess the apparatus to keep the dollar as a reserve asset over the next decade? And finally, are there any identifiable threats to the US dollar reserve status beyond a ten-year horizon? The Imperative To Maintain Status Quo Global trade is still largely conducted in US dollars. According to the BIS triennial central bank survey, 88.3% of transactions globally were in dollars just before the pandemic, a percentage that has been rather resilient over the last two decades (Chart I-1). It is true that currencies such as the Chinese renminbi have been gaining international acceptance, but displacing a currency that dominates almost 90% of global transactions is a herculean task. Surprisingly, the world has been transacting less often in euros and Japanese yen, currencies that also commanded international appeal in recent history. Chart I-1The US Dollar Still Dominates Global Transactions Is The Dollar’s Reserve Status Under Threat? Is The Dollar’s Reserve Status Under Threat? The big benefit for the US comes from being able to settle its balance of payments in dollars. This not only lowers transaction costs (by lowering exchange rate risk), but it also provides the ability to cheaply borrow in your own currency to pay for imports. Having global trade largely denominated in US dollars also establishes a network of systems that make it much easier to settle trade in that currency. It is remarkable that, despite running a persistent current account deficit, the US dollar has tended to appreciate during crises, a privilege other deficit countries do not enjoy (Chart I-2). Strong network effects make the US dollar the currency of choice during crises. Chart I-2Despite Running A Current Account Deficit, The Dollar Tends To Rise During Crises Is The Dollar’s Reserve Status Under Threat? Is The Dollar’s Reserve Status Under Threat? Chart I-3The US Generates Non-Negligible Seignorage Revenue The US Generates Non-Negligible Seignorage Revenue The US Generates Non-Negligible Seignorage Revenue Being at the center of the global financial architecture comes with an important benefit beyond trade: the ability to dictate financial conditions both domestically and globally. Consider a scenario in which the US and the global economy are facing a downturn. In this scenario, the Federal Reserve can be instrumental in turning the tide: To stimulate the US economy, the Fed lowers interest rates and/or runs a wider fiscal deficit. The central bank helps finance this fiscal deficit by expanding the monetary base (benefitting from seigniorage revenue). As the Fed drops interest rates, the yield curve steepens. Banks use the positive term structure to borrow at the short end of the curve and lend at the longer end. This boosts the US money supply. As firms borrow to invest, this increases demand for imports (machinery, commodities, consumer goods), widening the US current account deficit. US trade is settled in dollars, increasing the international supply of the greenback. To maintain competitiveness, other central banks purchase these dollars from the private sector, in exchange for their local currency. As global USD reserves rise, they can be reinvested back into Treasuries and held in custody at the Fed. In essence, the US can finance its budget deficit through a strong capital account surplus. The seigniorage revenue that the US enjoys by easing both domestic and international financing conditions is about $100 billion a year or roughly 0.5% of GDP (Chart I-3). But the goodwill from being able to dictate both domestic and international financial conditions is far greater. At BCA, one of our favorite measures of global dollar liquidity is the sum of the Fed’s custody holdings together with the US monetary base. Every time this measure has severely contracted in the past, the shortage of dollars has triggered a financial crisis somewhere, typically among other countries running deficits (Chart I-4), a highlight of the importance of the US as a global financier. Chart I-4US Money Supply And Global Liquidity US Money Supply And Global Liquidity US Money Supply And Global Liquidity Chart I-5Despite A Liability Shortfall, US Assets Generate A Net Profit Despite A Liability Shortfall, US Assets Generate A Net Profit Despite A Liability Shortfall, US Assets Generate A Net Profit Beyond seigniorage revenue, the US enjoys another advantage—being able to earn much more on its international investments than it pays on its liabilities. The US generates an excess return of 1% of GDP from its external assets, despite having a net liability shortfall of 67% of GDP (Chart I-5). The ability to issue debt that will be gobbled up by foreigners, and in part use these proceeds to generate a higher overall return on investments made abroad, does indeed constitute an “exorbitant privilege.” In a nutshell, there is a very strong incentive for the US to keep the dollar as the world’s reserve currency. One short-term implication is that the Fed might only taper asset purchases and/or raise interest rates in an environment in which both global and US growth are strong, or it could otherwise trigger a global liquidity crisis. This will be particularly the case given the Delta variant of COVID-19 is still hemorrhaging global economic activity. An Overreach In The Dollar’s Influence There is a political advantage to the US dollar’s reserve status that is often overlooked: transactions conducted in US dollars anywhere in the world fall under US law. In simple terms, if a company in any country buys energy from Iran and the transaction is done in US dollars, the Treasury has powers to sanction the parties involved. Since most companies across the world cannot afford to be locked out of the US financial system, they will tend to comply with US sanctions. Even companies that operate under the umbrella of great powers, such as China and Russia, still tend to adhere to US sanctions, because they do not want to jeopardize their trade with US allies, such as the European Union. Of course, China, Russia, and Iran are actively seeking alternative transaction systems to bypass the dollar and US sanctions. But they do not yet trust each other’s currencies. Chart I-6A Deep And Liquid Pool Of Treasurys A Deep And Liquid Pool Of Treasurys A Deep And Liquid Pool Of Treasurys The euro is the only viable alternative; however, the euro’s share of global transactions has fallen, despite the EU’s solidification as a monetary union over the past decade and despite the unprecedented deterioration of US relations with China and Russia. The EU could do great damage to the USD’s standing if it joined Russia’s and China’s efforts wholeheartedly, but the EU is still a major trading partner of the US and shares many of the same foreign policy aims. It is also chronically short of aggregate demand and runs trade and current account surpluses, depriving trade partners of euro savings or a debt market to recycle those savings (Chart I-6). Historically, having the world’s reserve currency allows the US to conduct international accords that serve both domestic and foreign interests. The Plaza Accord, signed in the 1980s to depreciate the US dollar, served both US interests in rebalancing the deficit and international interests in financing global trade. The 1980s were golden years for Japan and the Asian tigers on the back of a weak USD, allowing entities to borrow in greenbacks and profitably invest in Asian growth. Once the US dollar had depreciated by a fair amount, threatening its store of value, the US engineered the Louvre Accord to stabilize exchange rates. Ultimately, when various Asian bubbles popped, investors thought of nowhere better to flee than to the safety of the US dollar. The same thing happened after the emerging market boom of the 2000s and the eventual bust of the 2010s. Today, the US may not be able to organize an international intervention, if one should be necessary in the coming years. Past experience shows that countries act unilaterally and coordinated interventions lack staying power. Neither Europe nor Japan is in the position today to allow currency appreciation, as they were in the past. And the US has shown itself unable to combat its trading partners’ depreciation, as in the case of China, whose renminbi remains below 2014 levels. The bottom line is that there is nothing to stop the US from attempting to stretch its overreach too far, which would create a backlash that diminishes the dollar’s status. This is especially the case given trust in the US government is quite low by historical standards, which for now points to a lower dollar cyclically (Chart I-7). Chart I-7Trust In The US Government And The Dollar Is The Dollar’s Reserve Status Under Threat? Is The Dollar’s Reserve Status Under Threat? This is not to say that other countries with reserve aspirations can tolerate sustained appreciation. China has recommitted to manufacturing supremacy in its latest five-year plan, as it fears the political consequences of rapid deindustrialization. As such, the renminbi will be periodically capped to maintain competitiveness. Can The US Maintain Status Quo? Chart I-8A Lifespan Of Reserve Currencies Is The Dollar’s Reserve Status Under Threat? Is The Dollar’s Reserve Status Under Threat? Over the last few centuries, reserve currencies have tended to have a lifespan of about 100 years (Chart I-8). The reason is that global wars tend to knock the leading power off its geopolitical pedestal, devaluing its currency and giving rise to a new peace settlement with a new ascendant country whose currency then becomes the basis for international trade. Such was the case for Spain, France, the UK, and the United States in a pattern of war and peace since the sixteenth century. Granting that the US dollar took the baton from sterling in the 1920s and that the post-World War II peace settlement is eroding in the face of escalating geopolitical competition, it is reasonable to ask whether or not the US might lose its grip on this power. To assess this possibility, it is instructive to revisit the anatomy of a reserve currency: Typically, a reserve currency tends to be that of the “greatest” nation. For the same reason, the reserve nation tends to be the wealthiest, which ensures that its currency is a store of value and that it can act as a buyer of last resort during crisis (Chart I-9). This reasoning is straightforward when a global empire is recognizable and unopposed. But in the current context of multipolarity, or great power competition, the paradigm could start to shift. Global trade is slowing globally, but it is accelerating in Asia (Chart I-10). China is a larger trading partner than the US for many emerging markets and is slated to surpass the US economy over the next decade. The renminbi has a long way to go to rival the dollar, but it is gradually rising and its place within the global reserve currency basket is much smaller than its share of global trade or output, implying room for growth (Chart I-11). Chart I-9Wealth And Reserve Currency Status Go Hand-In-Hand Is The Dollar’s Reserve Status Under Threat? Is The Dollar’s Reserve Status Under Threat? Chart I-10Trade In Asia Is Booming Is The Dollar’s Reserve Status Under Threat? Is The Dollar’s Reserve Status Under Threat? Chart I-11Adoption Of The RMB Has Room To Grow Adoption Of The RMB Has Room To Grow Adoption Of The RMB Has Room To Grow To maintain hegemonic power (especially controlling the vital supply routes of prosperity), the reserve nation needs military might above and beyond everyone else. It helps that US military spending remains the biggest in the world, in part financed by US liabilities (Chart I-12). China is far from dethroning the US in the military realm. But it is gradually gaining the ability to deny the US access to its immediate offshore areas and may already be capable of winning a war over nearby islands like Taiwan. Moreover, its naval power is set to grow substantially between now and 2030 (Table I-1). Already, over the past decade, the US stood helplessly by when Russia and China annexed Crimea and the reefs of the South China Sea. It is possible to imagine a series of events that erode US security guarantees in the region, even as the US loses economic primacy. Chart I-12The US Still Maintains Military Might Is The Dollar’s Reserve Status Under Threat? Is The Dollar’s Reserve Status Under Threat? Table I-1China’s Economic And Naval Growth Slated To Reduce American Primacy In Asia Pacific Is The Dollar’s Reserve Status Under Threat? Is The Dollar’s Reserve Status Under Threat? The reserve currency nation needs to run deficits to finance activity in the rest of the world. That requires having deep and liquid capital markets to absorb global savings. There is considerable trust or “goodwill” that makes the US Treasury market the most liquid debt exchange pool in the world. This remains the case today (previously mentioned Chart I-6). Even so, this trend is shifting. The growth in euro- and yen-denominated debt is exploding. This mirrors the gradual shift in the allocation of FX reserves away from dollars into other currencies. If the US began to use the dollar as a geopolitical weapon recklessly, foreign entities may have no other choice but to rally into other currency blocks, including the euro (and perhaps eventually the yuan). This will take years, but it is worth noting that global allocation to FX reserves have fallen from around 80% toward USDs in the 70s to around 60% today (Chart I-13). Chart I-13The Dollar Reserve Status Has Been Ebbing The Dollar Reserve Status Has Been Ebbing The Dollar Reserve Status Has Been Ebbing On the political front, there is some evidence that public opinion on the dollar is fading, although it is far from damning. A Pew survey on the trust in the US government is near decade lows and has tracked the ebb and flow of changes in the dollar (previously shown Chart I-7). Trust in government will probably not get much worse in the coming years, as the pandemic will wane and stimulus will secure the economic recovery, but too much stimulus could conceivably ignite an inflation problem that weighs on trust. True, populism has driven the US government under two administrations into extreme deficit spending. With the pandemic as a catalyst, US deficits have reached WWII levels despite the absence of a war. However, the Biden administration’s $3.5 trillion spending bill will be watered down heavily – and the 2022 midterms will likely restore gridlock in Congress, freezing fiscal policy through at least 2025. In other words, fiscal policy is negative for the dollar in the very near term, but the fiscal outlook is not yet so extravagant as to suggest a loss of reserve currency status. After all, there is some positive news for the US. The US demonstrated its leadership in innovation with the COVID-19 vaccines; it survived its constitutional stress test in the 2020 election; it is now shifting from failed “nation building” abroad to nation building at home; and its companies remain the most innovative and efficient, judging by global equity market capitalization (Chart I-14). China, meanwhile, is facing the most severe test of its political and economic system since it marketized its economy in 1979. Investors should not lose sight of the fact that, since the rise of President Xi Jinping and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, global policy uncertainty has tended to outpace US policy uncertainty, attracting flows into the dollar (Chart I-15). Given that China and Russia are both pursuing autocratic governments at the expense of the private economy, it would not be surprising to see global policy uncertainty take the lead once again, confirming the decade trend of global flows favoring the US when uncertainty rises. Chart I-14American Primacy Still Clear In Equity Market American Primacy Still Clear In Equity Market American Primacy Still Clear In Equity Market Chart I-15Higher Policy Uncertainty Good For Dollar Higher Policy Uncertainty Good For Dollar Higher Policy Uncertainty Good For Dollar The bottom line is that the US dollar is gradually declining as a share of the global currency reserve basket, just as the US economy and military are gradually declining as a share of global output and defense spending. Yet the US will remain the first or second largest economy and premier military power for a long time, and the dollar still lacks a viable single replacement. A major war or geopolitical crisis is probably necessary to precipitate a major breakdown. The Iranian Revolution and September 11 attacks both had this kind of effect (see 1979 and 2001 in Chart I-13 above). But COVID-19 is less clear. If China and Europe emerge as more stable than the US, then the post-pandemic aftermath will bring more bad news for the dollar. Investment Implications From a geopolitical perspective, the backdrop is neutral for the dollar beyond the next twelve to eighteen months. An escalating conflict with Iran—which is possible in the near term—would echo the early 2000s and weigh on the currency. But a deal with Iran and a strategic pivot to Asia would compound China’s domestic political problems and likely boost the greenback. Chart I-16US Twin Deficits And The Dollar US Twin Deficits And The Dollar US Twin Deficits And The Dollar From a macro and cyclical perspective, however, the view is clearly negative for the dollar. Over the next five years, the U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the U.S. budget deficit will shrink and then begin expanding again to -5% of GDP. If one assumes that the current account deficit will widen somewhat, then stabilize, the twin deficits will be pinned at around -10% of GDP. Markets have typically punished the dollar on rising twin deficits (Chart I-16). This suggests near-term pressure on the dollar’s reserve status is to the downside. EM currencies may hold a key to the performance of the dollar. While most EM economies remain hostage to the virus, a coiled-spring rebound cannot be ruled out as populations become vaccinated. China’s Politburo signaled in July that it will no longer tighten monetary and fiscal policy. We would expect policy easing over the next twelve months to ensure the economy is stable in advance of the fall 2022 party congress. If the virus wanes and China’s economy is stimulated, global growth will improve and the dollar will fall.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com