Sorry, you need to enable JavaScript to visit this website.
Skip to main content
Skip to main content

Technology

An analysis on Ukraine is available below.   Highlights A number of liquidity and technical reasons have led us to give benefit of the doubt to the bullish market action and chase this EM rally. We still doubt that the US-China trade truce alone is sufficient to propel a cyclical recovery in global trade and manufacturing. However, it seems the market is operating on a “buy now, ask questions later” principle. Therefore, we are initiating a long position in the EM equity index as of today. Despite the potential for higher EM share prices in absolute terms, we are still reluctant to upgrade EM versus DM stocks. The basis is that EM corporate profits will continue lagging those in DM. Feature We could be in for a replay of the 2012-2014 DM equity rally, where EM stocks rebounded in absolute terms but massively underperformed DM on a relative basis. Chart I-1EM Share Prices: In Absolute Terms And Relative To DM EM Share Prices: In Absolute Terms And Relative To DM EM Share Prices: In Absolute Terms And Relative To DM EM share prices have spiked on the announcement of a trade truce between the US and China. As a result, our buy stop at 1075 on the EM MSCI Equity Index has been triggered, and we are initiating a long position in EM stocks as of today (Chart I-1, top panel). That said, we are still reluctant to upgrade EM versus DM stocks. Regardless of the direction of the market (bull, bear or sideways), EM share prices will likely underperform the global equity benchmark. As we discussed in our report, the primary risk to our view has been that EM share prices get pulled higher as a result of rallying DM markets. Nevertheless, our fundamental assessment remains that EM corporate profits will lag those in DM, heralding EM relative equity underperformance. In fact, we could be in a replay of the 2012-2014 DM equity rally where EM stocks massively underperformed (Chart I-1, bottom panel), as we elaborated in our November 28 report. In this report, we review the indicators that support a bullish stance, the ones that are inconclusive and those that are not confirming the current rally in China-plays in general and EM risk assets in particular. Bullish Liquidity And Technical Settings The following points have led us to give benefit of the doubt to recent market action and to chase this rally: The global liquidity backdrop appears to be conducive for higher share prices. Global narrow and broad money growth have accelerated (Chart I-2). That said, a caveat is in order: These money measures do not always strongly correlate with both global share prices and the global business cycle. There are numerous times when they gave a false signal or were too early or late at turning points. Chart I-2Global Narrow And Broad Money: A Useful But Not Always Reliable Indicator Global Narrow And Broad Money: A Useful But Not Always Reliable Indicator Global Narrow And Broad Money: A Useful But Not Always Reliable Indicator   The technical profile of EM equities is rather bullish. As shown on the top panel of Chart I-1 on page 1, EM share prices have found a support at their six-year moving average. When a market fails to break down below its long-term technical support line, odds are that a major bottom has been reached, and the path of the least resistance is up. The reason we look at these long-term (multi-year) moving averages is because they have historically worked very well for key markets like the S&P 500 and 10-year US Treasury bond yields (Chart I-3A & I-3B). Chart I-3AThe Reason Why We Use Multi-Year Moving Averages The Reason Why We Use Multi-Year Moving Averages The Reason Why We Use Multi-Year Moving Averages Chart I-3BThe Reason Why We Use Multi-Year Moving Averages The Reason Why We Use Multi-Year Moving Averages The Reason Why We Use Multi-Year Moving Averages   As another positive development, both EM share prices in local currency terms and the EM equity total return index in US dollar terms have bounced from their three-year moving averages (Chart I-4). Chart I-4A Bullish Chart Formation For EM Equities A Bullish Chart Formation For EM Equities A Bullish Chart Formation For EM Equities In addition, when a market does not drop below its previous top, this creates a bullish chart configuration (Chart I-4). This seems to be the case with EM share prices currently. Bottom Line: A number of liquidity and technical reasons have led us to give benefit of the doubt to the bullish market action and to chase this rally. Inconclusive Indicators It is rare that all types of indicators – directional market, business cycle, valuation and technical – all line up together to convey the same investment recommendation. Below we present the market indicators and signals that we have been watching to get confirmation of sustainability in the bull market in EM risk assets, commodities and global cyclical equity sectors. They are still inconclusive: The US broad trade-weighted dollar has recently sold off, but it has not broken down technically (Chart I-5). A decisive relapse below its 200-day moving average will signify that the greenback has entered a major bear market. The latter would be consistent with a sustainable and extended bull market in EM risk assets, commodities and global cyclical equity sectors.  Chart I-5The US Dollar Has Fallen But Not Broken Down The US Dollar Has Fallen But Not Broken Down The US Dollar Has Fallen But Not Broken Down Chart I-6Indecisive Signals From Commodities And Commodity Currencies bca.ems_wr_2019_12_19_s1_c6 bca.ems_wr_2019_12_19_s1_c6   Even though copper prices have recently rebounded, they have not yet broken above their three-year moving average (Chart I-6, top panel). The latter can be viewed as the neckline of the head-and-shoulders pattern that has formed in recent years. The same holds true for the overall London Metals Exchange Industrial Metals Price Index, as well as our Risk-On/Safe-Haven currency ratio1 (Chart I-6, middle and bottom panels). Barring a decisive break above their three-year moving averages, the jury is still out on the durability of the rally in commodities prices and EM/China plays.   Finally, global industrial share prices and US high-beta stocks have advanced to their 2018 highs, but have not yet broken out (Chart I-7). The same is true for the euro area aggregate stock index in local currency terms (Chart I-8). A decisive breakout above these levels will confirm that global equities in general and cyclical segments in particular are in an enduring bull market. Chart I-7Decisive Breakouts Here Are Needed To Confirm The EM Rally Decisive Breakouts Here Are Needed To Confirm The EM Rally Decisive Breakouts Here Are Needed To Confirm The EM Rally Chart I-8European Share Prices Are At A Critical Juncture European Share Prices Are At A Critical Juncture European Share Prices Are At A Critical Juncture   Bottom Line: Several cyclical and high-beta segments of global financial markets are at a critical juncture. A decisive breakout from these key technical levels is required for us to uphold that EM risk assets and global cyclical plays are in a medium-term bull market. The Eye Of The Storm? There are a number of leading indicators and market signals that do not corroborate the common narrative of a sustainable improvement in global manufacturing/trade in general and China’s industrial cycle in particular: First, China’s narrow and broad money growth appear to be rolling over (Chart I-9). Notably, the money impulses lead the credit impulse, as illustrated in Chart I-10. Consequently, we expect the credit impulse – which is the main indicator currently portraying a revival in the Chinese economy as well as in the global business cycle – to roll over in early 2020. Chart I-9China: Narrow And Broad Money Growth Are Rolling Over bca.ems_wr_2019_12_19_s1_c9 bca.ems_wr_2019_12_19_s1_c9 Chart I-10China: Money Impulses Are Coincident Or Lead Credit Impulse bca.ems_wr_2019_12_19_s1_c10 bca.ems_wr_2019_12_19_s1_c10   This entails that the recent tentative improvements in China’s manufacturing, its imports and global trade will not be sustained going forward. Crucially, China’s narrow money (M1) growth point to the lack of a cyclical upturn in EM corporate profits in H1 2020 (Chart I-11). In short, EM listed companies’ profit growth rate stabilizing at around -10% is not a recovery. Second, government bond yields in both China and Korea are not corroborating a revival in their respective business cycles (Chart I-12). Chart I-11EM Corporate Profit Growth To Remain Negative In H1 2020 bca.ems_wr_2019_12_19_s1_c11 bca.ems_wr_2019_12_19_s1_c11 Chart I-12Asian Rates Are Not Confirming A Recovery Asian Rates Are Not Confirming A Recovery Asian Rates Are Not Confirming A Recovery   Chinese onshore interest rates have been a reliable compass for both its business cycle as well as EM share prices and currencies as we illustrated in Chart 15 of the November 28 report. For now, the mainland fixed-income market is not predicting an upturn in China’s industrial economy (Chart I-12, top panel). In Korea, exports account for 40% of GDP. Hence, without a considerable export recovery, there cannot be a business cycle revival in Korea. In brief, the latest relapse in local bond yields could be sending a downbeat signal for global trade (Chart I-12, bottom panel). Third, the four-month rise in the Chinese Caixin manufacturing PMI can be partially explained by front-running production and shipments of smartphones, laptops, computers and other electronics ahead of the December 15 round of US tariffs on imports from China. Right after President Trump announced these tariffs in the summer, businesses likely did not take a chance to wait and see. In fact, whether or not these tariffs would have come into effect was unknown till December 13. Manufacturers and US importers of these electronic goods initiated orders, produced and shipped these goods to the US ahead of December 15. Chart I-13Caixin And Taiwanese PMIs Benefited From Front Running Caixin And Taiwanese PMIs Benefited From Front Running Caixin And Taiwanese PMIs Benefited From Front Running Given the focus on that particular round of tariffs was electronics, producers of these goods got a temporary but notable boost from such front-running. Smartphone and electronics manufacturers and their suppliers are predominantly located in Shenzhen and Taiwan. The Caixin manufacturing PMI is a survey of 500 companies, many of which are private enterprises located in Shenzhen. Not surprisingly, the Caixin manufacturing PMI index often fluctuates with Taiwan’s electronics and optical PMI (Chart I-13). In brief, there has been meaningful improvement in China’s and Taiwan’s tech manufacturing. Yet it can be attributed to front-running of production and shipments of electronic products to the US ahead of the December 15 tariff deadline as well as stockpiling of semiconductors by China. The odds are that these measures of manufacturing will slump in early 2020 as the front-running ends. Chart I-14Commodities Prices In China Commodities Prices In China Commodities Prices In China Finally, several commodities prices in China, that troughed in late 2015 ahead of the bottom in global and EM/Chinese equities in early 2016, continue to drift lower or exhibit only a mild uptick. Specifically, these include prices of nickel, steel, iron ore, thermal coal, coke, polyethylene and rubber (Chart I-14). They corroborate that there has been no broad-based amelioration in the mainland’s industrial sector. Bottom Line: In China, narrow and broad money growth has rolled over, onshore interest rates are subsiding and many commodities prices are weak. All of these signify the lack of sustainable growth revival in China in the coming months.  Putting It All Together EM risk assets have rallied on the consensus market narrative that the temporary truce between the US and China will lift global growth. We have written at length that China’s domestic demand – not its exports – has been the epicenter of and basis for the global slowdown over the past two years. Without Chinese domestic demand and imports, not exports, staging a material amelioration, global trade and manufacturing are unlikely to experience a cyclical upturn.   In short, we doubt that the US-China trade truce is alone sufficient to propel a cyclical recovery in global trade and manufacturing. Yet, when the majority of investors perceive things the same way and act on these perceptions, asset prices can move a lot. We continue to believe that China’s industrial sector, global trade, EM ex-China domestic demand and consequently EM corporate profits will continue to disappoint in the first half of 2020. Nevertheless, we presently concede that we need to give benefit of the doubt to markets. We still doubt that the US-China trade truce alone is sufficient to propel a cyclical recovery in global trade and manufacturing. It could be that the EM equity and currency market rallies are not driven by their fundamentals – i.e., corporate profits/exports do not matter. However, it is rather possible that this rally is only stoked by the worst-kept secret in the investment industry: the search for yield. If that is the case, then there is no dichotomy between our fundamental thesis – that EM/China profits/growth will disappoint in H1 2020 – and the rally in EM markets. It seems the market is operating on a “buy now, ask questions later” principle. We had thought that the ongoing and enduring contraction in EM corporate profits (please refer to Chart I-11 on page 8) amid various structural malaises would overwhelm the impact of the global search for yield. However, it seems the market is operating on a “buy now, ask questions later” principle. Overall, we are initiating a long position in the EM equity index as of today. Provided the high uncertainty over the outlook, we are also instituting a stop point at 1050 for the MSCI EM equity index, 5% below its current level. For global equity investors, we continue recommending favoring DM over EM stocks. Finally, our country equity overweights are Korea, Thailand, Russia, central Europe, Pakistan, Vietnam and Mexico. A basket of these bourses is likely to outperform the EM equity benchmark in any market scenario in terms of EM absolute share price performance. We have been and remain neutral on Chinese, Indian, Taiwanese and Brazilian equities. As always, our list of overweight, underweight and market weight recommendations for EM equities, local and US dollar government bonds and currencies are available at the end of our report on pages 17-18 and on our website.   Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com     Ukraine: Buy Local Currency Bonds EM fixed-income investors should buy Ukraine local currency government bonds as well as overweight Ukraine sovereign credit within an EM credit portfolio. The exchange rate is the key for EM fixed-income investors. The Ukrainian hryvnia will be supported by high real interest rates, improving public debt and balance of payment dynamics, as well as abating geopolitical risks. In turn, a stable currency will keep inflation at bay. In such an environment, investors should favor local currency government bonds, as local interest rates will continue falling.  Chart II-1Inflation Will Fall Further Inflation Will Fall Further Inflation Will Fall Further In turn, a stable currency will keep inflation at bay (Chart II-1). In such an environment, investors should favor local currency government bonds, as local interest rates will continue falling. The primary risk of owning Ukrainian domestic bonds is a major depreciation in the hryvnia stemming from a risk-off phase in EM. However, as a periphery country, Ukraine’s financial markets might not correlate with their EM peers. Besides, these bonds offer high carry, which protects them against moderate currency depreciation. Overall, the case for buying Ukraine local currency government bonds is based on the following: First, Ukraine satisfies the two prerequisites for public debt sustainability, namely (1) it runs a robust primary fiscal surplus and/or (2) the government’s borrowing costs are below nominal GDP growth. The public debt-to-GDP ratio stands at 56% and will continue to fall so long as the above two conditions are satisfied. The primary consolidated fiscal surplus currently amounts to 1.8% of GDP (Chart II-2). The recently approved 2020 budget projects the primary surplus to be above 1% of GDP and the overall fiscal deficit to be close to 2% of GDP.  Local currency interest rates are below nominal GDP growth (Chart II-3). In addition, public debt servicing is at 3.2% and 9% as a share of GDP and total government expenditures, respectively. According to the new budget, the government plans to use close to 12% of total spending for debt repayments in 2020. This will further help reduce the public debt load. Chart II-2A Healthy Fiscal Position A Healthy Fiscal Position A Healthy Fiscal Position Chart II-3Interest Rates Are Below Nominal GDP Growth And Are Falling Interest Rates Are Below Nominal GDP Growth And Are Falling Interest Rates Are Below Nominal GDP Growth And Are Falling Second, the central bank has more scope to cut interest rates because various measures of inflation will continue falling. Real (adjusted for inflation) interest rates are still very elevated. In particular, the prime lending rate is at 17% for companies and 35% for households, both in nominal terms. Provided core inflation is running at 6%, lending rates are extremely high in real terms. Not surprisingly, narrow and broad money growth are sluggish (Chart II-4). Commercial banks are undergoing major balance sheet deleveraging: their asset growth is in the low single digits in nominal terms, while their value is dropping relative to nominal GDP (Chart II-5). Chart II-4Money Growth Is Sluggish Money Growth Is Sluggish Money Growth Is Sluggish Chart II-5Deleveraging In The Banking Sector Deleveraging In The Banking Sector Deleveraging In The Banking Sector Meanwhile, tighter regulations are forcing banks to recognize bad assets and boost their capital. This has led to a sharp drop in the number of registered banks. Such a structural overhaul of the banking system is cyclically deflationary and warrants lower interest rates. Critically, these reforms are a positive for the exchange rate in the long run. Third, receding foreign funding pressures are helping the balance of payments dynamics and are supportive for the currency. Ukrainian exports have been outperforming global exports since 2017 (Chart II-6). Agricultural exports – which represent 40% of total exports – are an important source of foreign currency revenue for the country. Chart II-6Ukraine Exports Are Outperforming Global Trade Ukraine Exports Are Outperforming Global Trade Ukraine Exports Are Outperforming Global Trade Chart II-7Tight Fiscal And Monetary Policies Are Good For The Current Account Balance Tight Fiscal And Monetary Policies Are Good For The Current Account Balance Tight Fiscal And Monetary Policies Are Good For The Current Account Balance The current account deficit has been narrowing due to slowing domestic demand, arising from tight fiscal and monetary policies (Chart II-7). Foreign ownership of local currency government bonds is $4.6 billion and it makes only 12% of total outstanding amount. Consequently, risk of major foreign portfolio capital outflows due to a risk-off phase in global markets is low. Lastly, Ukraine’s foreign debt obligations – the sum of short-term claims, interest payment and amortization – have been declining and are presently well covered by exports. They comprise 34% of total exports. Finally, geopolitical risks will continue to subside over the coming months. Peace talks between Ukraine and Russia will continue. Importantly, two sets of constraints could force Ukraine and Russia towards resolving the conflict. Specifically: Russia is constrained by its commitment to be a reliable gas supplier to the EU. Half of its gas export capacity passes through Ukraine. European demand for Russian gas is falling and Gazprom gas revenues are decelerating. Cutting transit of gas through Ukraine could now severely jeopardize Russia’s relations with Europe. Therefore, as much as Europe is dependent on Russian gas, Russia is as dependent on European demand for its natural gas.   The EU’s support for Ukraine is contingent on reliable transits of Russian gas into EU countries. As such, President Zelensky is under pressure from Europe to assure transmission of Russian gas to Europe. This has led Zelensky into opening a dialogue with Russia and motivated him to seek a new gas transit deal with Gazprom. Given President Zelensky’s high popularity at home, he has political capital to pursue a rapprochement with Russia and attempt to find a resolution to end the conflict in the Donbass. All of these developments have been, and will continue to be, positively perceived by international investors, sustaining the recent stampede into Ukraine’s fixed-income markets. Investment Recommendation We recommend investors purchase 5-year local currency government bonds currently yielding 12%. EM fixed-income investors should also consider overweighting US dollar sovereign bonds in an EM credit portfolio on the back of improving public debt and balance of payments dynamics.   Andrija Vesic Research Analyst andrijav@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1    The Risk-On/Safe-Haven currency ratio is the average of high-beta commodity currencies such as the CAD, AUD, NZD, BRL, CLP and ZAR total return (including carry) indices relative to the average of JPY and CHF total returns (including carry). This ratio is dollar-agnostic. Equities Recommendations Currencies, Credit And Fixed-Income Recommendations
Feature The purpose of this Special Report is to identify and provoke a healthy debate on the prevailing investment themes for the 2020s and to speculate on what the key US sector beneficiaries and likely losers may be. Every decade a dominant theme captures investors’ imaginations and morphs into a bubble. Massive speculation typically propels the relevant asset class into the stratosphere as investors extrapolate the good times far into the future and go on a buying frenzy. Chart 1 shows previous manic markets starting with the Nifty Fifty, gold bullion, the Nikkei 225, the NASDAQ 100, crude oil and most recently the FAANGs. Chart 1Manias: An Historical Roadmap Manias: An Historical Roadmap Manias: An Historical Roadmap What will be the dominant themes of the next decade? How should investors capitalize on some of these big trends? The purpose of this Special Report is to identify and provoke a healthy debate on the prevailing investment themes for the 2020s and to speculate on what the key US sector beneficiaries and likely losers may be. Theme #1: De-Globalization Picks Up Steam The first investment theme for the upcoming decade is the “apex of globalization” or “de-globalization”. We have written about this theme extensively at BCA Research and it is the mega-theme of our sister Geopolitical Strategy (GPS) service. Odds are high that countries will continue looking inward as the US adopts a more aggressive trade policy, China’s trend growth slows, and US-China strategic tensions intensify. The three pillars of globalization are the free movement of goods, capital, and people across national borders. We expect to see marginally less of each in the future. Chart 2 shows that we are at the conclusion of a period of tranquility. Pax Americana underpinned globalization as much as Pax Britannica before it. The US is in a relative decline after decades of geopolitical stability allowed countries like China to rise to “great power” status and rivals like Russia to recover from the chaos of the 1990s. Chart 2De-globalization Has Commenced De-globalization Has Commenced De-globalization Has Commenced De-globalization has become the consensus since the election of Donald Trump. But Trump is not the prophet of de-globalization; he is its acolyte. Globalization is ending because of structural factors, not cyclical ones. And its decline was pre-written into its “source code.” Three factors stand at the center of this assessment, outlined in our 2014 Special Report, “The Apex Of Globalization – All Downhill From Here”: multipolarity, populism and protectionism. Events have since confirmed this view. The three pillars of globalization are the free movement of goods, capital, and people across national borders. We expect to see marginally less of each in the future. Investment Implication #1: Profit Margin Peak The most profound and provocative investment implication from de-globalization is that SPX profit margins have peaked and will likely come under intense pressure, especially for US conglomerates that – on a relative basis to international peers – most enthusiastically embraced globalization. Reconstructed S&P 500 profits and sales data date back to the late-1920s. Historically, corporate profit margins and globalization (depicted as global trade as a percentage of GDP) have been positively correlated (Chart 3). Chart 3Profit Margin Trouble Profit Margin Trouble Profit Margin Trouble As countries are more outward looking, trade flourishes and openness to trade allows the free flow of capital to take advantage of profit-maximizing projects. Following the Great Recession and similar to the Great Depression, trade has suffered and trade barriers have risen. The Sino-American trade war has accelerated the inward movement of countries, including Korea and Japan, and has had negative knock-on effects on trade as evidenced by the now two-year old global growth deceleration. China’s response to President Trump’s election was to redouble its pursuit of economic self-sufficiency, which meant a crackdown on corporate debt and a fiscal boost to household consumption. Trump’s tariffs then damaged sentiment and trade between the two countries. Any deal reached prior to the 2020 US election will remain in doubt among global investors. The longer the trade war remains unresolved, the deeper the cracks will be in the foundations of the global trading system. Such a backdrop is negative for profit margins, as inward looking countries prevent capital from being allocated most efficiently. Moreover, the uprooting of supply chains due to the trade war hurts margins and the redeployment of equipment in different jurisdictions will do the same at a time when final demand is suffering a setback. In addition, rising profit margins are synonymous with wealth accruing to the top 1% of US families and vice versa. This relationship dates back to the late-1920s, as far back as our dataset goes. Using Piketty and Saez data, which exclude capital gains, it is clear that profit margin expansion exacerbates income inequality (top panel, Chart 4). Chart 4Heightened Risk Of Wealth Re-distribution Heightened Risk Of Wealth Re-distribution Heightened Risk Of Wealth Re-distribution Expanding margins lead to higher profits. Because families at the top of the income distribution are more often than not business owners, income disparities are the widest when margins are in overshoot territory. Eventually this income chasm comes to a head and generates political discontent. Populism has emerged on both the right and left wings of the US political spectrum – and since the rise of Trump, even Republicans complain about inequality and the excesses of “corporate welfare” and laissez-faire capitalism. Because inequality is extreme – relative to America’s developed peers – and political forces are mobilizing against it, the probability of wealth re-distribution is rising in the coming decades (middle panel, Chart 4). Labor’s share of national income has nowhere to go but higher in coming years and that is negative for profit margins, ceteris paribus (bottom panel, Chart 4). Drilling beneath the surface, the three secular US equity sector/factor implications of the apex of globalization paradigm shift are: prefer small caps over large caps prefer value over growth overweight the pure-play BCA Defense Index Investment Implication #2: Small Is Beautiful While a small cap bias is contrary to the cyclical US Equity Strategy view of preferring large caps to small caps, the issue is timing: the small cap preference is a secular view with a time horizon that spans the next decade. The small versus large cap share price ratio’s ebbs and flows persist over long cycles. Small caps outshined large caps uninterruptedly from 1999 to 2010. Since then large caps have had the upper hand (Chart 5). Were the apex of globalization theme to gain traction in the 2020s, small caps should reclaim the lead from large caps, especially in the wake of the next US recession. Similar to the death of the global banking model, companies with global footprints will suffer the most, especially compared with domestically focused outfits. One way to explore this theme is via domestic versus global sector preference. But a more investable way to position for this sea change, is to buy small caps (or microcaps) at the expense of large caps (or mega caps). Small caps are traditionally domestically geared compared with large caps that have significantly more foreign sales exposure. Chart 5It’s A Small World After All It’s A Small World After All It’s A Small World After All The closest ETF ticker symbols resembling this trade is long IWM:US/short SPY:US. Investment Implication #3: Buy Value At The Expense Of Growth Similar to the size bias, the style bias also moves in secular ways. Value outperformed growth from the dot com bust until the GFC. Since then growth has crushed value, even temporarily breaking below the year 2000 relative trough. This breakneck pace of appreciation for growth stocks is clearly unsustainable and offers long-term oriented investors a compelling entry point near two standard deviations below the historical mean (Chart 6). Chart 6Value Has The Upper Hand Versus Growth Value Has The Upper Hand Versus Growth Value Has The Upper Hand Versus Growth Financials populate value indexes, a similarity with small cap outfits. Traditionally, financials are a domestically focused sector with export exposure registering at half of the S&P’s average 40% level of internationally sourced revenues. On the flip side, tech stocks sit atop the growth table and they garner 60% of their revenue from abroad. This value over growth style preference will pay handsome dividends if the de-globalization theme becomes more main stream as countries become more hawkish on trade and the Sino-American war continues to erect barriers to trade that took decades to lift. The caveat? If President Trump strikes a short-term deal with China ahead of the 2020 election, the de-globalization theme will suffer a setback. But our geopolitical strategists expect a ceasefire at best, not a durable deal, and also expect the trade war to resume in some way, shape or form in 2021-22, regardless of the outcome of the US election. The closest ETF ticker symbols resembling this trade is long IVE:US/short IVW:US.  Investment Implication #4: Defense Fortress One final long-term playable investment idea from the apex of globalization is a structural bull market in defense stocks (Chart 7). Our October 2016 “Brothers In Arms” Special Report drew parallels with the late nineteenth century period of European rearmament, and the American and Soviet arms race of the 1960s. These movements were greatly beneficial to the aerospace and defense industry. Currently, the move by several countries to adopt more independent foreign policies, i.e. to move away from collaboration and cooperation toward isolationism and self-sufficiency, entails an accompanying arms race. Chart 7Stick With Pure-play Defense Stocks Stick With Pure-play Defense Stocks Stick With Pure-play Defense Stocks Table 1 Top US Sector Investment Ideas For The Next Decade Top US Sector Investment Ideas For The Next Decade China’s challenge to the regional political status quo motivates a boost to defense spending globally. In fact SIPRI data on global military spending by 2030 (Table 1) increases our conviction that this trade will succeed on a five-to-ten year horizon. Beyond the global arms race, two additional forces are at work underpinning pure-play defense contractors. A global space race with China, India and the US wanting to have manned missions to the moon, and the rise of global cybersecurity breaches. Defense companies are levered to both of these secular forces and should be prime sales and profit beneficiaries to rising space budgets and increasing cybersecurity combat budgets. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the pure-play BCA defense index are: LMT, RTN, NOC, GD, HII, AJRD, BWXT, CW, MRCY. Theme #2: Tech Sector Regulation, US Enacts Privacy Laws The second long-term geopolitical theme that we are exploring is the regulatory or “stroke of pen” risk that is rising on FAANG stocks – Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix, and Google. These companies were this decade’s undisputed stock market winners. The US anti-trust regulatory framework was designed to curb broad anti-competitive actions of trusts. As Lina Khan discusses in her seminal article, these actions “include not only cost but also product quality, variety, and innovation.” However, through subsequent regulatory evolution, the Chicago School has focused the US anti-trust process on consumer welfare and prices. If President Reagan and the courts could change how anti-trust laws were administered in the 1980s, so too can future administrations and courts. Today the US Congress, on both sides of the aisle, is looking into regulatory tightening, while the judicial system will take longer to change its approach. Moreover, the impetus for tougher anti-trust policy is here. It comes from a long period of slow growth, income inequality, and economic volatility – such as in the 1870s-80s. This was certainly the case for Standard Oil in 1911, which became a nation-wide boogeyman despite most of its transgressions occurring in the farm belt states. Today, income inequality is a prominent political theme and source of consumer discontent. A narrative is emerging – which will be super-charged during the next recession – that growth has been unequally distributed between the old economy and the twenty-first century technology leaders. With regard to privacy, the news is equally grim for large tech outfits. The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which came into force on May 2018, imposes compliance burdens on any company handling user data. In the US, California has signed its own version of the law – the Consumer Privacy Act – which will go into effect in January 2020. These laws give consumers the right to know what information companies are collecting about them and what companies that data is being shared with. They also allow consumers to ask technology companies to delete their data or not to sell it. While tech companies are likely to fight the new California law, and the US court system is a source of uncertainty, we believe the writing is on the wall. The EU is by some measures the largest consumer market on the planet. California is certainly the largest US market of the states. It is unlikely that the momentum behind consumer protection will change, especially with the EU and California taking the lead. The odds of a federal privacy law, following in the footsteps of the Consumer Privacy Act, are also rising. Investment Implication #5: Shun Interactive Media & Services Stocks These risks introduce a severe overhang for FAANG stocks. We are especially worried for the S&P interactive media & services index that includes GOOGL and FB. Tack on the threat of federal regulation and this represents another major headwind for profits and net profit margins that are extremely elevated for these near monopolies. Given that advertising revenue is crucial to the business model of social media companies (GOOGL and FB included), a significant uptick in privacy regulation will likely hurt their bottom line. With regard to profit margins, tech stocks in general command a profit margin twice as high as the SPX. Specifically, FB and GOOGL enjoy margins that are 500 basis points higher than the broad tech sector (Chart 8)! This is unsustainable and will likely serve as easy prey for policymakers. Our view does not necessarily call for breaking up these monopolies. The US will have to weigh the economic consequences of anti-trust policy in a context of multipolarity in which China’s national tech champions are emerging to compete with American companies for global market share. Nevertheless increased regulation is inevitable and some forced sales of crown jewel assets may take place. Moreover, the threat of a breakup will lurk in the background, creating uncertainty until key legislative and judicial battles have already been fought. That will take years. Finally, we doubt the tech sector will be left alone to “self-regulate” its incumbents and negotiate a price on consumers’ privacy. More likely, a new privacy law will loom overhead, serving as a negative catalyst for profit growth. Uncertainty will weigh on the S&P interactive media & services relative performance. Chart 8Regulation Will Squeeze Tech Margins Regulation Will Squeeze Tech Margins Regulation Will Squeeze Tech Margins The ticker symbols to short/underweight the S&P interactive media & services index are an equally weighted basket of GOOGL and FB (they command a 98% market cap weight in the index). Theme #3: SaaS, Artificial Intelligence, Augmented Reality And Autonomous Driving Are Not Fads The third big theme that will even outlive the upcoming decade is the proliferation of software as a service (SaaS). The move to cloud computing and SaaS, the wider adoption of artificial intelligence, machine learning, autonomous driving and augmented reality are not fads, but enjoy a secular growth profile. In the grander scheme of things today’s world is surrounded by software. Millions of lines of code go even into gasoline powered automobiles, let alone electric vehicles. Autonomous driving is synonymous with software, the Internet of Things (IoT) needs software, the space race depends on software, modern manufacturing and software are closely intertwined, phone calls for quite some time have been a software solution, and the list goes on and on. This tidal effect is hard to reverse and is already embedded in workflows across industries. Opportunities to penetrate health care and financial services more deeply remain unexplored and it is difficult to envision another competing industry unseating “king software”. These secular trends are not only productivity enhancing, but will also most likely prove recession-proof. When growth is scarce investors flock to any source of growth they can come by and we are foreseeing that when the next recession arrives, investors will likely seek shelter in pure play SaaS firms. Investment Implication #6: Software Is Eating The World Buying software stocks for the long haul seems like a bulletproof investment idea. But the recent stellar performance of software stocks that has moved valuations to overshoot territory. Our recommended strategy is to buy or add software stock exposure on any weakness with a 10-year investment time horizon. All of these secular trends have pushed capital outlays on software into a structural uptrend. Software related capex is not only garnering a larger slice of the tech spending budgets but also of the overall capex pie. If it were not for software capex, the contraction in non-residential investment in recent quarters would have been more severe (Chart 9). Private sector software capex is near all-time highs as a share of total outlays. Government investment in software is also reaccelerating at the fastest pace since the tech bubble. When productivity gains are anemic, both the business and government sectors resort to software upgrades in order to boost productivity. Cyber security is another more recent source of software related demand as governments around the globe are taking such risks extremely seriously (bottom panel, Chart 9). Given this upbeat demand backdrop and ongoing equity retirement, software stocks are primed to grow into their pricey valuations. Chart 9Software Is Eating The World Software Is Eating The World Software Is Eating The World Finally, this long-term trade will also serve as a hedge to the short/underweight position we recommend in the S&P interactive media & services index. The closest ETF ticker symbol resembling the S&P software index is IGV:US. Theme #4: Millennials Already Are The Largest Cohort And Will Dominate Spending The fourth long-term theme we anticipate will gain traction in the 2020s is the demographic rise of the Millennial generation. Much has been made of preparing for the arrival of the Millennial generation, accompanied by well-worn stereotypes of general "failure to launch" as they reach adulthood. However, "arrival" is a misnomer as this age cohort is already the largest and "failure" is simply untrue. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, Millennials are the US’s largest living generation. Millennials (or Echo Boomers) defined as people aged 18 to 37 (born 1982 to 2000), now number more than 80mn and represent more than one quarter of the US’s population. Baby Boomers (born 1946 to 1964) number about 75mn. Stealthily becoming the largest age group in the US over the last few years, Millennials per-year-birth-rate peaked at 4.3mn in 1990. Surprisingly, the pace matched that of the post-war Baby Boom peak-per-year-birth-rate in 1957 - the per-year average over the period was higher for the Baby Boomers (Chart 10). Chart 10Millennials Are The Largest Cohort Millennials Are The Largest Cohort Millennials Are The Largest Cohort This gap is now set to grow rapidly as the death rate of Baby Boomers accelerates. What is more, the largest one-year age cohort is only 25 years old, thus, Millennials will be the dominant generation for many years. It is unclear how these “kids” will impact the market as they become the most important consumers, borrowers and investors, but make no mistake: this is a seismic shift in economic power and it is here to stay. The Echo Boom is a big, generational demographic wave. A difficult and painful delay has not tempered its looming importance. Finally, this wave of echo-boomers is educated, relatively unburdened by debt (please see BOX in the June 11, 2018 Special Report on demystifying the student debt load as it pertains to Millennials), and as they inevitably “grow up”, form new households and have kids. They will borrow, spend, earn, but not necessarily save and invest to the same extent as the Boomers. And this will be an important long-term theme going forward. Near term we might already be seeing signs of their arrival and firms have begun to pivot accordingly. Investment Implication #7: Buy The BCA Millennials Equity Basket Millennials will boost consumption spending in a number of different ways. The relatively unburdened Millennial cohort will be entering prime home acquisition age soon and this should underpin the long-term prospects of the US housing market and derivative industries. Further, Millennials consume differently from their parents; social media, online shopping and smart phones are not the consumption categories of the Baby Boomers. With this in mind, we have created a basket of ten stocks that we think will be driven over the long term by the demographic rise of the Millennial. We note that these stocks are heavily weighted to the technology and consumer discretionary sectors, which is logical as Millennial consumption habits tend to be discretionary focused and technology-based. Beginning with consumer discretionary, we are highlighting AMZN, NFLX and SPOT as core holdings in our Millennials basket. AMZN’s heft dwarfs consumer discretionary indexes but it could fall in several categories; the acquisition of Whole Foods makes it a Millennials-focused consumer staples retailer and its cloud computing web services segment is a tech leader. NFLX and SPOT represent the means by which Millennials consume media, by streaming movies and music over the internet. The idea of owning physical media is rapidly becoming an anachronism. The home ownership themes noted in the report above lead us to add HD and LEN to the basket. Millennials are “doers” and are set to be the dominant DIYers in the next few years, making HD a logical choice. LEN, as the nation’s largest home builder, should benefit from the Millennials coming of age into home buyers. We are also adding TSLA to our basket as a lone clean tech-oriented equity. TSLA capitalizes on the increasing shift to clean energy of Millennials (the key reason why no traditional energy companies have a spot in our basket). The technology stocks in our Millennials basket are AAPL, UBER (which replaces FB as of today) and MSFT, together representing more than 9% of the total value of the S&P 500. AAPL’s inclusion in the list is predictable as the leading domestic purveyor of devices on which Millennials consume media content. FB is a predictable holding, with more than half of all Americans being monthly active users, dominated by the Millennial cohort. It has served our basket well since inception, but today we are compelled to remove it and replace it with UBER. UBER is a Millennial favorite and the epitome of the sharing economy. In reality UBER is a logistics company and while it is losing money it is eerily reminiscent of AMZN in its early days. Maybe UBER will dominate all means of transportation and its ease of use will propel it to a mega cap in the coming decade. Our inclusion of MSFT is based on its leadership in cloud computing, a rapidly growing industry. We expect the connectivity and mobile computing demands of Millennials will accelerate. The last stock we are adding to our basket is also the only financial services equity. Though avid consumers, Millennials have shown an aversion to cash, preferring card payment systems, including both debit and credit-based. Accordingly, we are adding the leader in both of these, V, to our Millennials basket (Chart 11). Chart 11Buy BCA’s Millennial Equity Basket Buy BCA’s Millennial Equity Basket Buy BCA’s Millennial Equity Basket Investors seeking long term exposure to stocks lifted by the supremacy of the Millennial generation should own our Millennial basket (AAPL, AMZN, UBER, HD, LEN, MSFT, NFLX, SPOT, TSLA, V). We would not hesitate to add other sharing economy stocks, including Airbnb, to this basket should they become investable in the near future. Theme #5: ESG Becomes Mainstream Investors are increasingly looking at allocating assets based on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) considerations, and this mini-theme has the potential to become a big trend in the 2020s. There are a number of factors that underpin ESG investing. First, Millennials are climate conscious and given that they already are the largest cohort in the US they will not only dominate spending, but also influence election results. Moreover, via social media Millennials can sway public opinion and participate in the ESG conversation. Second, ECB President Christine Lagarde recent speech to the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament is a must read.1 If the ECB were to explicitly focus on climate change policy as part of its monetary policy operations then this is a game changer. Green investment financing including “green bonds” could become mainstream. Keep in mind the as reported in the FT “the European Parliament has declared a climate emergency; the new European Commission (EC) has taken office on a promise of an imminent “green new deal”, and Commission president Ursula von der Leyen has vowed to accelerate emissions cuts.” Last Wednesday, the EC released “The European Green Deal” with a pretty aggressive time table. The EC president said “The green deal is Europe’s man on the moon moment” and presented 50 policies slated to get rolled by 2022 to meet revamped climate goals. The implication is that once ESG takes center stage at a number of these institutions it will be easier to become mainstream and propagate the world over. Third, large institutional investors are starting to adopt an ESG mindset, especially pension plans. These investors with trillions of dollars at their disposal can not only disfavor fossil fuel investment, but also undertake investments in “green projects” via private and public equity markets. Banks are also moving in the “greening of finance” direction and given that they are the pipelines of the global plumbing system, swift adoption will go a long way in taking ESG mainstream. Finally, the electric vehicle (EV) proliferation is another key driver on how the ESG theme will play out in the 2020s. As a reminder, in the US 50% of all energy consumption is gasoline related linked to automobiles. While battery technology still has limitations, EV is no longer a fad as the German and Japanese automakers are starting to make inroads on TSLA. These car manufacturers do not want to be left out, especially if this shift toward EV becomes mainstream in the 2020s. The Chinese are not far behind on the EV manufacturing front, however government policy can really become a game changer. If a number of countries and/or California mandate a large share of all new vehicles sold be EV, then the investment implications will be massive. Investment Implication #8: Avoid Fossil Fuels, Gambling, Alcohol And Tobacco… While there are a few ESG related ETFs, we would rather explore this theme’s investment implications of sectors to avoid in the coming decade. We are believers that ESG criteria will continue to gain in importance in institutional investment management decisions. Accordingly, we would tend to avoid ‘sin stocks’, including gambling, tobacco and alcohol; demand for their services is unlikely to decline but investment weightings should mean that share prices will underperform. Further, we think a clean energy shift will mean energy stocks will likely continue to be long-term underperformers (Chart 12). Chart 12Areas To Avoid As ESG Becomes Mainstream Areas To Avoid As ESG Becomes Mainstream Areas To Avoid As ESG Becomes Mainstream Final Thoughts On The US Dollar In this report, we tried to focus on the upcoming decade’s big themes that we deem will play out, and centered recommendations on US equities/sectors. We do not want to neglect some macroeconomic variables that tend to mean revert over time. Specifically, the US dollar, interest rates and most importantly US indebtedness, will also be key drivers of investment theses in the 2020s. Currently, debt is rising faster than nominal GDP growth with the government and non-financial business debt-to-GDP profiles on an unsustainable path (second panel, Chart 13). Granted, the saving grace has been generationally low interest rates as the debt service ratios have fallen (top panel, Chart 13). However, if the four decade bull market in Treasury bonds is over, or may end definitively with the next US recession sometime in the early 2020s, then rising interest rates are the only mechanism to concentrate CEOs’ and politicians’ minds. On the dollar front, Chart 14 highlights the ebbs and flows of the trade-weighted US dollar since it floated in the early-1970s. The DXY index has moved in six-to-ten year bull and bear markets. The most recent trough was during the depths of the Great Recession, while the (tentative?) peak was in late-2016. If history repeats, eventually the dollar will mean revert lower in the 2020s, especially given the fiscal profligacy of the current administration that may continue into 2024, assuming President Trump gets re-elected next November. Chart 13Unsustainable Debt Profiles Unsustainable Debt Profiles Unsustainable Debt Profiles Chart 14Greenback’s Historical Ebbs And Flows Greenback’s Historical Ebbs And Flows Greenback’s Historical Ebbs And Flows The US dollar remains the reserve currency of the world today, but that exorbitant privilege is clearly fraying on the edges as the balance-of-payments dynamics are heading in the wrong direction. Over the next five years, the US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the US budget deficit will swell to 4.8% of GDP. Assuming the current account deficit widens a bit then stabilizes (usually happens when global growth improves), this will pin the twin deficits at 8% of GDP. This assumes no recession, which would have the potential to swell the deficit even further. The US saw its twin deficits swell to almost 13% of GDP following the financial crisis, but the difference then was that in the wake of the commodity boom the dollar was cheap (and commodity currencies overvalued). The subsequent shale revolution also greatly cushioned the US trade deficit. Shale productivity remains robust and US output will continue to rise, but the low-hanging fruit has already been plucked.   Another dollar-negative force is its expensiveness. By rising 35% since its trough, the USD has sapped the competitiveness of the US manufacturing sector, which is accentuating the American trade deficit outside of the commodity sector. If the ESG trend ends up hurting oil prices, the US current account will follow the widening deficit in manufactured products. Moreover, the US is lagging Europe on the green revolution. Either the US will have to import green technologies, or the US government will have to provide more subsidies to the private sector. Either way, both of these dynamics will hurt the US current account deficit further. Historically, the currency market is the main vehicle to correct such imbalances. Chart 15Twin Deficits Will Weigh On The US Dollar Twin Deficits Will Weigh On The US Dollar Twin Deficits Will Weigh On The US Dollar The apex of globalization will also hurt the greenback. In a world where all the markets are integrated, borrowers in EM nations often use the reserve currency to issue liabilities at a lower cost. This boosts the demand by EM central banks for US dollar reserves to protect domestic banking systems funded in USD. Moreover, some countries like China implement pegs (both official and unofficial) to the US dollar in order to maintain their competitiveness and export their production surpluses to the US. To do so they buy US assets. If the global economy becomes more fragmented and the Sino-US relationship continues to deteriorate structurally as we expect, then these sources of demand for the dollar will recede. Overlay the widening US current account deficit, and you have the perfect recipe for a depreciating trade-weighted US dollar. Finally, the US is likely to experience more inflation than the rest of the world following the next recession. The US economy has a smaller capital stock as a share of GDP than Europe or Japan, and American demographics are much more robust. This means that the neutral rate of interest is higher in the US than in other advanced economies. As a result, the Fed will have an easier time generating inflation by cutting real rates than both the ECB and the BoJ. Higher inflation will ultimately erode the purchasing power of the dollar and prove to be a structurally negative force for the USD.   Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Marko Papic Chief Strategist, Clocktower Group marko@clocktowergroup.com Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Mathieu Savary The Bank Credit Analyst mathieu@bcaresearch.com   References Please click on the links below to view reports: Peak Margins - October 7, 2019 The Polybius Solution - July 5, 2019 War! What Is It Good For? Global Defense Stocks! - October 31, 2018 The Dollar: Will The U.S. Invoke A "Nuclear" Option? - August 30, 2018 Is The Stock Rally Long In The FAANG? - August 1, 2018 Millennials Are Not Coming Of Age; They Are Already Here - June 11, 2018 Brothers In Arms - October 31, 2016 The End Of The Anglo-Saxon Economy?  - April 13, 2016 Apex of Globalization  - November 12, 2014 Footnotes 1           https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/09/04/sp090419-Opening-Statement-by-Christine-Lagarde-to-ECON-Committee-of-European-Parliament
SPX Return In Perspective SPX Return In Perspective Overweight The handsome year-over-year SPX return will hit a zenith later this month of roughly 35%. However, putting this impressive recovery from last year’s doldrums in perspective is instructive. Tech stocks (including GOOGL and FB) have massively outperformed the SPX (top panel). Within the tech universe, software stocks have in turn trounced the tech sector (top panel). In fact, the SPX return profile excluding tech stocks is eerily similar to the emerging markets that have been global laggards and failed to break out to fresh cycle highs (bottom panel). In other words, returns have been extremely concentrated, and if portfolio managers have missed the software rally, then they have left sizable returns on the table. As a reminder, while we recommend a benchmark allocation on the S&P tech sector, we have been secularly overweight the S&P software index since November 27, 2017, and we are currently up 35 percentage points above and beyond the SPX’s return, since inception. Bottom Line: Stay overweight the S&P software index, but maintain the trailing stop at the 27% return mark since inception. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5SOFT: MSFT, ADBE, CRM, ORCL, INTU, NOW, ADSK, ANSS, SNPS, CDNS, NLOK, FTNT, CTXS.  
2020 High-Conviction Calls: S&P Semi Equipment 2020 High-Conviction Calls: S&P Semi Equipment Underweight While year-to-date chip equipment stocks are the best performing index in the SPX, we deem them a mania, and include them in our high-conviction underweight basket for 2020. The top panel shows this irrational exuberance that has permeated the semi equipment universe is similar to the dotcom era excesses. Back in the late-1990s relative profit growth was sky high, but today it is flirting with the zero line, warning that gravity will pull these stocks back down to earth. The contracting ISM manufacturing survey signals that relative share price momentum running at a breakneck pace is unwarranted. The same holds true for relative forward profit and revenue growth expectations, especially given the ongoing contraction in global semi sales. This deficient demand for semis and therefore semi equipment manufacturers is also apparent in deflating DRAM prices, our industry pricing power proxy. Historically, relative profit expectations and pricing power have moved in lockstep and the current message is to fade sell-side analysts’ buoyancy. Net earnings revisions have slingshot from extreme pessimism to extreme optimism during the past quarter and are vulnerable to disappointment. In sum, lack of profit growth, deficient industry demand, perky valuations and extremely overbought conditions all suggest that the mania in the S&P chip equipment index will likely turn into a panic next year. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5SEEQ – AMAT, LRCX, KLAC.​​​​​​​
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Interest rates are one of the most important macro drivers of overall equity returns via valuations. BCA’s view of a selloff in the bond market is a key factor underpinning most of our 2020 high-conviction calls. A 50bps to 75bps rise in the 10-year Treasury yield in 2020, as BCA predicts, will have significant knock on effects on sector selection. Recent Changes There are no changes to our portfolio this week. Table 1 2020 Key Views: High-Conviction Calls 2020 Key Views: High-Conviction Calls Feature As 2019 draws to a close, this week we reveal our high-conviction calls for the coming year. But before proceeding, a brief market comment is in order. As 2019 draws to a close, this week we reveal our high-conviction calls for the coming year. But before proceeding, a brief market comment is in order. We remain perplexed by the market’s euphoric rise and near total neglect of weak profit growth fundamentals. This “hope rally”, as we have characterized it in the recent past, may have some more legs with the traditional Santa Rally around the corner, but the set up for stocks could not be more treacherous for 2020. Importantly, we deem the risk of not getting a Sino-American trade deal to be significantly greater than a relief rally in case of a successful deal. Most of the positive trade-related news is already reflected into equities. This complacent backdrop is reminiscent of the early 2018 SPX catapult to 2,870 as back then the fresh fiscal easing package was all priced into stocks in the first 20 trading days of that year. Chart 1 vividly depicts this euphoric melt-up in stocks with the longest dated VIX future trouncing the squashed front month VIX future. While this ratio is not at the stratospheric level hit in late-December 2017, it hit a wall recently forewarning that equities are skating on thin ice. Chart 1VOL... VOL... VOL... Similarly, speculators are net short vol, but a snap can occur at any time. This is eerily reminiscent of February 2018. Since 2017, this vol positioning measure has consistently troughed prior to the SPX peak on three occasions and a “four-peat” likely looms (vol net spec positions shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 2).   On the profit front, sector earnings breadth is sinking like a stone confirming the negatively anchored S&P 500 net EPS revisions ratio (Chart 3). We doubt that 10% EPS growth for calendar 2020 is even plausible, especially given the looming steep deceleration in equity retirement that we highlighted recently.1 Tack on the mighty US dollar, and profit headwinds abound. Chart 2...A Coiled Spring ...A Coiled Spring ...A Coiled Spring Chart 3No Earnings Pulse No Earnings Pulse No Earnings Pulse Market internals are also screaming that something is off in the equity markets. Small caps are trailing large caps, transports are at stall speed, weak balance sheet stocks are underperforming strong balance sheet stocks, the median stock as per the Value Line Geometric Index is far from all-time highs and high yield bonds (especially CCC rated) are also not confirming the SPX breakout (Chart 4). Importantly, the CBOE’s S&P 500 implied correlation index, which gauges “the expected average correlation of price returns of S&P 500 Index components, implied through SPX option prices and prices of single-stock options on the 50 largest components of the SPX”,2 is rising again over the 40% mark, underscoring that stocks are more and more beginning to move in tandem. Historically this has been a negative omen (implied correlation index shown inverted, top panel, Chart 5). Chart 4Watch Market Internals Watch Market Internals Watch Market Internals Chart 5Reflation No More? Reflation No More? Reflation No More? Downtrodden M&A activity is also firing a warning shot. A steep divergence of M&A deals from stock prices is atypical at this late stage of the business cycle (middle panel, Chart 5). In fact, out Reflation Gauge comprising the greenback, oil prices and the 10-year Treasury yield has taken a turn for the worse, signaling that economic surprises will likely suffer the same fate (bottom panel, Chart 5). All of this, warns that the risks of a significant pullback in the SPX are rising. What follows is four high-conviction overweight and four underweight calls. Similar to last year, we are using BCA’s view of a selloff in the bond market is a key factor underpinning most of our 2020 high-conviction calls.3 While last year this was offside, the collapse in the 10-year US Treasury yield from 3% last December to 1.75% currently offers a better backdrop for this view to pan out. A 50bps to 75bps rise in the 10-year Treasury yield in 2020, as our BCA house view predicts, will have significant knock on effects on sector selection.4 As a reminder, interest rates are one of the most important macro drivers of overall equity returns via valuations (10-year Treasury yield shown inverted, Chart 6). Moreover on a sector basis, the ebbs and flows of the risk free asset directly influence utilities, real estate, financials, consumer discretionary and tech growth stocks or more than half of the S&P 500’s market capitalization. Chart 6Priced To Perfection Priced To Perfection Priced To Perfection What follows is four high-conviction overweight and four underweight calls.     Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com   S&P Managed Health Care (Overweight) We upgraded the S&P managed health care group to overweight in April shortly after Bernie Sanders re-introduced his revamped “Medicare For All” bill. Despite the recent explosive run up in relative share prices – partly owing to the drop in Elizabeth Warren’s odds of winning the Democratic candidacy and partly given her watering down of her “Medicare For All” take up plan – we are adding this health care sub-group to our high-conviction overweight call list. HMOs are finally raising prices at the steepest rate of the past fifteen years and while such breakneck pace is unsustainable, profit margins are set to expand smartly (Chart 7). The profit margin backdrop is enticing for health insurers for another reason: labor cost containment. CEOs have been extremely prudent refraining from adding to headcount. One final profit margin booster is the rising 10-year Treasury yield, as roughly 10% of the industry’s operating income is tied to “investment income”. In other words, as insurers receive the premia they typically invest it in Treasurys and that explains the high EPS and margin sensitivity on interest rate moves. Thus, if BCA’s bond view materializes, it will prove a tonic to both margins and profits. With regard to technicals, relative share prices are not as oversold as they were mid-year, but remain below the neutral zone still offering investors a compelling entry point to this position (bottom panel, Chart 7). The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5MANH – UNH, ANTM, HUM, CNC, WCG.  Chart 7S&P Managed Health Care S&P Managed Health Care S&P Managed Health Care S&P Machinery (Overweight) A tentative up-tick in EM data in general and China in particular along with improving operating metrics signal that the US/China trade war wounded machinery stocks deserve a high-conviction overweight status for 2020. In more detail, the budding recoveries in the EM and Chinese manufacturing PMIs herald a brighter outlook for relative share prices. China’s fiscal and credit impulse also signals that a bottom in relative share prices is likely already in place. If this leading indicator proves accurate in the coming months, then relative share prices can reclaim the early-2018 highs. On the operating front, the new orders-to-inventories momentum has traced a bottom. Assuming that the Chinese manufacturing PMI reading stays on an upward trajectory, machinery demand will make a durable comeback. None of these green shoots are reflected in sell-side analysts’ bombed out relative profit and sales growth expectations (bottom panel, Chart 8). The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5MACH – CAT, DE, ITW, IR, CMI, PCAR, PH, SWK, FTV, DOV, XYL, IEX, WAB, SNA, PNR, FLS.  Chart 8S&P Machinery S&P Machinery S&P Machinery S&P Banks (Overweight) The expected price of credit, still pristine credit quality, and a looming reacceleration in credit growth all argue for including the S&P banks index in our high-conviction overweight list. Banks stocks troughed in mid-August, sniffing out a sell-off in the bond market. As the bond sell-off gained steam, the bank outperformance phase also caught on fire. BCA’s view for next year calls for a 50-75bps selloff in the 10-year Treasury yield, further boosting the allure of bank equities (top panel, Chart 9). Beyond the rising price of credit, credit growth is another key industry profit driver. Importantly, the latest Fed Senior Loan Officer Survey painted a bright picture on both the demand and supply of credit. In more detail, bankers reported that a rising number of credit categories reversed course and demand for loans slingshot higher. The upshot is that bank credit growth will likely reaccelerate in the first half of 2020 (third panel, Chart 9). Finally, credit quality, the third key bank profit driver, is also emitting a positive signal. While a few loan categories have deteriorated recently in absolute terms, as percentage of loans outstanding, credit quality remains pristine. Despite all this enticing news, bank valuations remain anchored near rock bottom levels and a resurgent ROE is signaling that there is a long runway ahead for relative bank valuations (bottom panel, Chart 9). The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5BANKX – WFC, JPM, BAC, C, USB, PNC, BBT, STI, MTB, FITB, CFG, RF, KEY, HBAN, CMA, ZION, PBCT, SIVB, FRC.  Chart 9S&P Banks S&P Banks S&P Banks Long Large Caps/Short Small Caps (Overweight) The large cap size bias is our sole hold out from last year’s high-conviction list despite getting stopped out and booking a handsome 9% profit. Today we recommend reinstating a large cap size bias. This call actually represents a slight hedge on BCA’s overall higher interest rates view for next year. Financials comprise 13% of the SPX, but the weight jumps to 18% in small cap indexes. Thus, if the rising interest view is off the mark, the large cap bias will provide an offset. Relative forward profit growth favors mega caps and by a wide margin. One key factor underpinning this increasing profit gap is the massive profit margin divergence (Chart 10). Tack on the fact that index providers omit negative forward profits from their index EPS calculations and the narrative that small caps have cheapened versus large caps falls flat on an adjusted basis. Why? Because a large number of small caps have negative forward EPS. Moreover, we recently created a relative employment proxy that is firing on all cylinders. Not only is the small business labor market crumbling according to the latest NFIB survey, but hard data also suggest that nonfarm private small business payroll employment has ground to a halt. Finally, small caps are debt saddled compared with large caps and small cap b/s have actually been degrading of late (Chart 10). Chart 10Long Large Caps/Short Small Caps Long Large Caps/Short Small Caps Long Large Caps/Short Small Caps S&P Homebuilding (Underweight) We downgraded homebuilders to underweight in late-October, and today we are adding it to our high-conviction underweight call list. Most, if not all, positive profit drivers are already reflected in relative share prices. Specifically, the drubbing in interest rates has been more than accounted for by the year-to-date outperformance in homebuilders. Now that interest rates are moving in reverse, more pain lies ahead for the S&P homebuilding index (Chart 11). Worrisomely, consumers’ expectations to purchase a new home plunged anew last month according to The Conference Board’s survey, and that demand softness will weigh on housing starts and ultimately homebuilding revenues (Chart 11). Adding insult to injury, new house selling prices are losing ground to existing home prices, but such discounting is no longer boosting volumes as new home sales market share gains have stalled. Already, S&P homebuilding sales are contracting and the risk is that deflation gets entrenched in this construction industry (Chart 11). Simultaneously, lumber prices are gaining steam and coupled with contracting new home prices signal that homebuilding profits will suffer a setback. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5HOME – DHI, LEN, PHM, NVR.  Chart 11S&P Homebuilding S&P Homebuilding S&P Homebuilding S&P Semi Equipment (Underweight) While year-to-date chip equipment stocks are the best performing index in the SPX, we deem them a mania, and include them in our high-conviction underweight basket for 2020. The top panel of Chart 12 shows this irrational exuberance that has permeated the semi equipment universe is similar to the dotcom era excesses. Back in the late-1990s relative profit growth was sky high, but today it is flirting with the zero line, warning that gravity will pull these stocks back down to earth (second panel, Chart 12). The contracting ISM manufacturing survey signals that relative share price momentum running at a breakneck pace is unwarranted. The same holds true for relative forward profit and revenue growth expectations, especially given the ongoing contraction in global semi sales (middle panel, Chart 12). This deficient demand for semis and therefore semi equipment manufacturers is also apparent in deflating DRAM prices, our industry pricing power proxy. Historically, relative profit expectations and pricing power have moved in lockstep and the current message is to fade sell-side analysts’ buoyancy. Net earnings revisions have slingshot from extreme pessimism to extreme optimism during the past quarter and are vulnerable to disappointment (bottom panel, Chart 12). In sum, lack of profit growth, deficient industry demand, perky valuations and extremely overbought conditions all suggest that the mania in the S&P chip equipment index will likely turn into a panic next year. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5SEEQ – AMAT, LRCX, KLAC. Chart 12S&P Semi Equipment S&P Semi Equipment S&P Semi Equipment S&P Utilities (Underweight) Heavily indebted utilities are a high-conviction underweight call for next year. · Relative share prices and the 10-year Treasury yield are closely inversely correlated. Now that the risk free asset is having a more competitive yield, investors will likely start to abandon this niche defensive sector. The jury is still out on the final outcome of the Sino-American trade war. However, there has been a decisive change of heart in US exporters and the ISM manufacturing survey’s new export orders subcomponent reflects an, at the margin, improvement in the US/China trade relationship. This bodes ill for safe haven utilities stocks (Chart 13). Utilities command a 19.4 forward P/E multiple representing roughly a 10% premium to the broad market, but their forecast EPS growth rate at 5% trails the SPX by 400bps. Our composite relative Valuation Indicator has surged to one standard deviation above the historical mean, a level typically associated with recession (Chart 13). On the operating front, natural gas prices are contracting at the steepest pace of the past four years, and electricity capacity utilization is in a multi-decade downtrend, warning that the relative profitability will remain under pressure in 2020. The implication is that this crowded trade is at risk of deflating, especially if the breakout in bond yields gains steam as BCA expects. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5UTIL– PPL, PNW, ATO, PEG, FE, EIX, AEE, SO, SRE, AEP, XEL, DTE, EVRG, WEC, AES, CMS, LNT, ED, NRG, D, AWK, DUK, ETR, EXC, NEE, CNP, NI, ES.  Chart 13S&P Utilities S&P Utilities S&P Utilities S&P Real Estate (Underweight) We would refrain from chasing high yielding real estate stocks higher, and instead we are including them in our high-conviction underweight call list for 2020. The commercial real estate (CRE) sector is a bubble candidate that exemplifies this cycle’s excesses. CRE prices sit at roughly two standard deviations above both the historical time trend and the previous cycle’s peak (not shown). Worryingly, CRE demand is waning. Not only our proprietary real estate demand indicator has sunk recently, but also the latest Fed Senior Loan Officer survey revealed that demand for CRE loans remains feeble. Simultaneously, fewer bankers are willing to extend CRE credit according to the same quarterly Fed survey (Chart 14). Occupancy rates have crested and there are increasing anecdotes of credit quality deterioration. As a result, CRE rents are also failing to keep up with inflation which eats into relative cash flow growth prospects. The supply side build up tilts this delicate balance further into deficit. Non-residential construction shows no signs of abating, with multi-family housing starts still running at an historically high rate of roughly 400K/annum (Chart 14). Finally, interest rate related headwinds will also weigh on this high-yielding sector in coming quarters, especially if the selloff in the bond market gains steam as BCA expects. (Chart 14). The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5RLST – AMT, PLD, CCI, SPG, EQIX, WELL, PSA, EQR, AVB, SBAC, O, DLR, WY, VTR, ESS, BXP, CBRE, ARE, PEAK, MAA, UDR, EXR, DRE, HST, REG, VNO, IRM, FRT, KIM, AIV, SLG, MAC. Chart 14S&P Real Estate S&P Real Estate S&P Real Estate Footnotes 1     Please see BCA US Equity Strategy Weekly Report, “Gasping For Air” dated November 18, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2    https://www.cboe.com/micro/impliedcorrelation/impliedcorrelationindicator.pdf 3    Please see BCA The Bank Credit Analyst Monthly Report, “OUTLOOK 2020: Heading Into The End Game” dated November 22, 2019, available at bca.bcaresearch.com. 4    Ibid. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Stay neutral cyclicals over defensives (downgrade alert) Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps (Stop 10%)
Highlights Building on a previous special report focused on the investable market, in this report we construct and present models designed to predict the odds of Chinese domestic equity sector outperformance. BCA Research's China Investment Strategy service will aim to use our newly developed sector outperformance probability models to better understand the drivers of performance at any given moment, and to make more active equity sector recommendations in the future. Episodes of domestic equity sector outperformance over the past decade appear to be more idiosyncratic (or sector specific) than has been the case for the investable market, suggesting that periods of “abnormal” relative sector performance may occur more frequently than in the investable universe. Among the predictors included in our model, our Li Keqiang leading indicator (based on monetary conditions, money, and credit growth) has been the most important. Our base case view argues in favor of domestic cyclicals over defensives over the coming year, but recent sector performance suggests that domestic consumer discretionary and tech should be favored within a cyclical equity portfolio over energy, materials, and industrials barring a surge in oil prices or a capitulation by Chinese policymakers in favor of “flood irrigation-style” stimulus. Over the long-term, we argue that investors have a good reason to favor domestic defensives over cyclicals until the latter demonstrates meaningfully better earnings performance. Feature We examined China’s investable equity sector performance in detail in our October 30 Special Report,1 with a particular emphasis on understanding the specific macroeconomic or equity market factors that have historically predicted relative sector performance. In today’s report, we extend our approach to China’s A-share market. Our research focused on constructing and presenting models that quantify a checklist-based approach to determining the odds of equity sector performance. The aim is to use these models to better understand the drivers of performance at any given moment, and to make more active equity sector recommendations in the future. These recommendations will not mechanically follow the models; rather, we plan to use them as a stand in for what typically would be expected given the macro and financial market environment, and as a basis to investigate “abnormal” relative performance. We find that episodes of domestic equity sector outperformance over the past decade appear to be more idiosyncratic (or sector specific) that has been the case for the investable market, suggesting that periods of “abnormal” relative sector performance may occur more frequently than in the investable universe. Among the macroeconomic and equity market factors that we found to be important predictors, our Li Keqiang leading indicator was the most significant. This confirms that China’s domestic market is more sensitive to monetary conditions, money, and credit growth than its investable peer. We also note the sharp difference in the relative performance of cyclicals versus defensives in the domestic market compared with the investable market, and what this means for investors over the coming 6-12 months. Finally, we argue that investors should maintain a structural bias towards defensive stocks in the domestic market until cyclicals demonstrate meaningfully better earnings performance, and point to an existing position in our trade book for investors interested in strategically allocating to the A-share market. Detailing Our Approach In our effort to better understand historical periods of domestic sector performance, we have chosen to model the probability of outperformance of each level 1 GICS sector (plus banks) based on a set of macro and equity market variables. Specifically, we use an analytical tool called a logistic regression, which forecasts the probability of a discrete event rather than forecasting the value of a dependent variable. We utilized this approach when building our earnings recession model for China (first presented in our January 16 Special Report).2 The “events” that we modeled are historical periods of individual Chinese investable sector outperformance from 2010 to 2018, relative to the MSCI China index (the “broad market”). We find that episodes of domestic equity sector outperformance over the past decade appear to be more idiosyncratic (or sector specific) than has been the case for the investable market. Chart I-1A and Chart I-1B illustrate these periods with shading in each panel. We then attempt to explain these episodes of outperformance with the following macro predictors: Chart I-1AThis Report Builds Models ##br##Aimed At... Chart 1A This Report Builds Models Aimed At… This Report Builds Models Aimed At… Chart I-1B...Predicting The Shaded Regions Of These Charts Chart IB …Predicting The Shaded Regions Of These Charts …Predicting The Shaded Regions Of These Charts Periods of accelerating economic activity, represented by our BCA's China Activity Index Periods of rising leading indicators of economic activity, represented by our BCA Li Keqiang (LKI) Leading Indicator Episodes of tight monetary policy, defined as periods where China’s 3-month interbank repo rate is rising Periods of accelerating inflation, measured both by headline and core inflation We also include several equity market variables: uptrends in relative sector earnings, periods of rising broad market stock prices, uptrends in broad market earnings, and episodes of extreme technical conditions and relative over/undervaluation for the sector in question. In the case of energy stocks, we also include oil prices as a predictor. Chart I-2A and Chart I-2B illustrate these periods as well as the macro & market variables that we have included as predictors. Chart I-2AWe Use These Macroeconomic And Equity Market Factors... Chart 2A We Use These Macroeconomic And Equity Market Factors… We Use These Macroeconomic And Equity Market Factors… Chart I-2B...To Predict Periods Of Equity Sector Outperformance Chart 2B …To Predict Periods Of Equity Sector Outperformance …To Predict Periods Of Equity Sector Outperformance Our approach also accounts for the existence of any leading or lagging relationships between the macro and market variables we have used as predictors and sector relative performance. In most cases the predictors lead relative sector performance, but in some cases it is the opposite. In the case of the latter, we have limited the lead of any variable in our models to three months in order to reduce the need to forecast. Finally, our approach also limits the extent to which we consider a leading relationship between our predictors and relative sector performance, in order to avoid picking up overlapping economic cycles. This issue, and the evidence supporting the existence of a 3½-year credit cycle in China, is detailed in Box I-1 of our October 30 Special Report (please see footnote 1). Key Drivers Of Sector Performance: Domestic Versus Investable Pages 11-22 present the results of each sector’s outperformance probability model, along with a list of factors that were found to be useful predictors and a summary of the results. The importance of the factors included in the models is shown in each of the tables at the top right of pages 11-22 by a score of 1-3 stars, (loosely representing key levels of statistical significance) as well as each factor’s optimal lead or lag. A minus sign shows that the predictor leads sector relative performance, whereas a plus sign shows that it lags. Following a review of our domestic equity sector outperformance models, differences in the results from those presented in our previous report can be organized into three distinct elements: 1) the breadth of macro & equity market factors in predicting sector performance, 2) the relative importance of our LKI leading indicator, and 3) the difference between domestic/investable cyclical versus defensive performance. The Breath Of Predictive Factors Chart I-3In The Domestic Market, The Breadth Of Predictive Factors Is Narrower Chart 3 In The Domestic Market, The Breadth Of Predictive Factors Is Narrower In The Domestic Market, The Breadth Of Predictive Factors Is Narrower Compared with the models for investible sector performance that we detailed in our previous report, our work modeling domestic equity sector performance highlights that the breadth of predictive factors is narrower, particularly among cyclical sectors (Chart I-3). Our model for domestic materials (shown on page 12) is one exception to this rule, but we found that our models for energy, industrial, and consumer discretionary relative performance were all focused on fewer predictors than is the case for the investable market. In addition, our domestic utilities model has considerably worse predictive power than our model for investable utilities. The case of industrials is particularly notable: our model for investable industrials highlighted the importance of tight monetary policy, rising core inflation, rising broad market stock prices & earnings, and overbought and oversold technical conditions in explaining past periods of industrial sector outperformance. By contrast, our domestic industrials model is quite simple: the sector has been more likely to outperform, with a lag, when our BCA China Activity Index and LKI leading indicator have been rising, and underperform following periods of extreme overvaluation. One of the core conclusions of our previous report was that investors should view the relative performance of investable industrials versus consumer staples as a reflationary barometer, given the strong sensitivity of both sectors to tight monetary policy. We explained this sensitivity by pointing to the substantial difference in corporate health between the two sectors: industrial firms are heavily debt-laden and thus experience deteriorating operating performance and an environment of rising interest rates. In comparison, food and beverage firms appear to have the strongest balance sheets among the sub-sectors that we have examined, suggesting that they would benefit less from easier monetary conditions than firms in other industries. Our leading indicator for Chinese economic activity has been considerably more important in predicting domestic equity sector outperformance than in the investable market. However, these dynamics appear to be completely absent in influencing performance in China’s domestic equity market. Not only has domestic industrial sector relative performance not been negatively linked to periods of tight monetary policy, but our model for consumer staples (shown on page 15) highlights that periods of staples performance have been driven by two simple factors: the relative trend in staples EPS  (positive sign), and the trend in broad market EPS (negative sign). The Relative Importance Of Monetary Conditions, Money, And Credit Growth Chart I-4 summarizes the significance of the factors in predicting sector performance in general, by summing up each predictor’s number of stars across all of the models. The chart shows that our LKI leading indicator is the most important signal of sector performance that emerged from our analysis, followed by rising core inflation, rising broad market stock prices, rising economic activity, and oversold technical conditions. The ranking of results shown in Chart I-4 is fairly similar to those that we listed for the investable market, with two exceptions. First, for the domestic market, periods of tight monetary policy were considerably less important than in the investable market as an important predictor of relative sector performance. Instead, our LKI leading indicator was by far the most important predictor, which underscores a point that we have made in previous reports: domestic stocks appear to be much more sensitive to the trend in monetary conditions, money, and credit growth than for the investable market. This increased sensitivity has helped explain the difference in performance this year between the investable and domestic market, underscoring that the former has more catch-up potential than the latter in a trade truce scenario. Chart I-4Monetary Conditions, Money, & Credit Growth Drive A-Share Performance Chart 4 Monetary Conditions, Money, & Credit Growth Drive A-Share Performance Monetary Conditions, Money, & Credit Growth Drive A-Share Performance Second, in the investable market, episodes of significant overvaluation had essentially no power to predict future episodes of equity market underperformance. But this factor was an important or very important contributor to our domestic industrials, health care, and tech models. This finding is consistent with our May 23 Special Report, which noted that value stocks have outperformed in China’s domestic equity market over the past five years and underperformed in the investable market (Chart I-5). Chart I-5Value Has Been A More Successful ##br##Factor In The Domestic Market Chart 5 Value Has Been A More Successful Factor In The Domestic Market Value Has Been A More Successful Factor In The Domestic Market   Major Differences In The Performance Of Cyclicals Versus Defensives The results of our models for domestic equity sector performance did not change the cyclical & defensive labels that we applied in our previous report. The signs of the predictors shown in the tables on pages 11-22 clearly highlight that the domestic energy, materials, industrials consumer discretionary, and information technology sectors are cyclical sectors, and that consumer staples, health care, financials, telecom services, utilities, and real estate are defensive. What is striking, however, is that there is a major difference in the relative performance of equally-weighted domestic cyclicals versus defensives compared with what has occurred in the investable market over the past decade. Chart I-6A and Chart I-6B illustrate the different relative performance trends, along with their corresponding trends in relative P/E and relative EPS. Whereas the relative performance of investable cyclicals versus defensives has had somewhat of a stable mean over the past decade, domestic cyclicals have badly underperformed since early-2011. The charts also make it clear that this underperformance has been driven by a downtrend in relative EPS, not due to trend differences in relative valuation. Chart I-6ACyclicals/Defensives Somewhat Mean-Reverting In The Investable Market... Chart 6A Cyclicals/Defensives Somewhat Mean-Reverting In The Investable Market… Cyclicals/Defensives Somewhat Mean-Reverting In The Investable Market… Chart I-6B...But Not So In The Domestic##br## Market Chart 6B …But Not So In The Domestic Market …But Not So In The Domestic Market Digging further, it appears that this discrepancy can be largely explained by the significant difference in performance between investable and domestic tech over the past decade (Chart I-7). Whereas the former has outperformed the overall investable index by roughly 4-5 times since 2010, the relative performance of the latter has only very modestly risen. In effect, Charts I-6 and I-7 highlight that Chinese cyclical sectors have been structurally impaired over the past decade and have only been “saved” in the investable market by massive outsized outperformance of the tech sector. The fact that investable tech sector performance itself has been largely driven by 2 extremely successful firms underscores how narrowly based the investible cyclical versus defensives performance trend has been. Chart I-7A Huge Gap In Tech Explains Domestic Cyclical Underperformance Chart 7 A Huge Gap In Tech Explains Domestic Cyclical Underperformance A Huge Gap In Tech Explains Domestic Cyclical Underperformance Investment Conclusions There are three conclusions that investors can draw from our analysis. First, our research shows that episodes of domestic equity sector outperformance over the past decade appear to be more idiosyncratic (or sector specific) that has been the case for the investable market. This does not mean that domestic sector performance is not significantly impacted by macro and top down equity market factors, but it suggests that periods of “abnormal” relative sector performance may occur more frequently than in the investable universe. As such, investors should be prepared to include episode-specific investigation of abnormal performance as a regular part of their domestic equity sector allocation decisions. Investors should favor domestic cyclicals over the coming year, with exposure focused on consumer discretionary and tech. Second, the fact that our LKI leading indicator is in an uptrend suggests that investors should favor domestic cyclicals over defensives over the coming year, with a caveat. We have noted in several previous reports that our indicator is in a shallow uptrend, and the slower pace of money and credit growth than during previous economic upswings suggests that the bar may be higher for some cyclical sectors to outperform. We would advise investors to watch closely over the coming 3-6 months for signs of a technical breakout in all cyclical sectors. But sector performance in Q1 of this year, when the overall A-share market rose sharply versus global stocks, suggests that domestic consumer discretionary and tech should be favored within a cyclical equity portfolio over energy, materials, and industrials barring a surge in oil prices or a capitulation by Chinese policymakers in favor of “flood irrigation-style” stimulus (Chart I-8). Within resources, we prefer the investable energy sector to its domestic peer, due to a sizeable valuation advantage. Chart I-8Favor Select Domestic Cyclical Sectors Over The Coming Year Chart 8 Favor Select Domestic Cyclical Sectors Over The Coming Year Favor Select Domestic Cyclical Sectors Over The Coming Year As a third and final point, abstracting from our bullish outlook for select cyclical sectors over the coming year, Charts 6 and 7 clearly argue for investors to maintain a structural bias towards defensive stocks in the domestic market until cyclicals demonstrate meaningfully better earnings performance. In the May 23 Special Report that we referred to above, we noted that an A-share portfolio formed of industry groups with above-median return on equity and below-median ex-post beta has significantly outperformed over the past decade. Table I-1 presents the current industry group weights of this portfolio, and shows that overweight exposure is concentrated in the health care, consumer staples, and real estate sectors (all of which are defensive), and a heavy underweight towards industrials. Table I-1Current High ROE / Low Beta Factor Industry Group Portfolio Weights* Table 1 Current High ROE / Low Beta Factor Industry Group Portfolio Weights* Current High ROE / Low Beta Factor Industry Group Portfolio Weights* For clients who are interested in strategically allocating to the A-share market, we maintain a long position in this portfolio relative to the MSCI China A Onshore index in our trade book, and plan to continue to update the performance of the trade on a weekly basis. Energy Chart II-1 Chart II-1 Energy Energy Table II-1 A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance Similar to the investable energy sector, periods of domestic energy sector outperformance are strongly positively related to rising oil prices and rising headline inflation in China. We noted in our previous report that this is a behavioral relationship, rather than a fundamental one. Domestic energy stocks are negatively associated with rising broad market stock prices, unlike their investable peers. This largely reflects the fact that the relative performance of domestic energy stocks has been in a structural downtrend over the past decade. From 2010 to mid-2016, this decline was caused by a persistent underperformance in earnings. Since mid-2016, domestic energy sector EPS have been rising in relative terms, meaning that more recent underperformance has been due to multiple contractions. While not as relatively cheap as their investable peers, domestic energy stocks are heavily discounted versus the broad domestic market based on both the price/earnings ratio and the dividend yield. Consequently, it is possible that domestic energy stocks may at some point begin to outperform in a rising broad equity market environment. For now, our model argues for an underweight stance towards domestic energy due to the lack of a clear uptrend in oil prices. As a pure value play, investable energy stocks maintain a dividend yield of nearly 6.5%, and are thus more attractive than their domestic peers. Materials Chart II-2 Chart II-2 Materials Materials Table II-2 A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance Our model for the domestic materials highlights that the sector’s performance has been related to strengthening economic activity and strongly related to a rising Li Keqiang leading indicator. Among the equity market variables that we tested, materials outperformance has been positively associated with rising relative EPS, rising broad market EPS, and prior oversold technical conditions. Similarly, the investable materials sector, these results show that domestic materials are a strong play on accelerating Chinese economic activity. The factors included in our domestic materials sector model are similar to those included in our investable material, except that relative material earnings have also been a significant predictor of sector relative performance. In addition, the macro & equity market predictors included in our domestic materials model have done a better job of leading material sector performance. The odds of domestic materials outperformance rose twice above the 50% mark this year according to our model, without any corresponding improvement in relative stock prices. The spikes in the model occurred largely because domestic materials became significantly oversold; technical conditions for the sector have only twice been weaker over the past decade. This underscores that investors should be watching domestic materials closely in Q1 of next year for signs of a relative rebound. Industrials Chart II-3 Chart II-3 Industrials Industrials Table II-3 A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance The results of our model for domestic industrial sector outperformance are interesting, as they imply that the drivers of performance are different between the domestic and investable markets. In the investable index, we found that industrials were heavily sensitive to monetary policy, rising core inflation, relative sector earnings, and periods of rising broad market stock prices. Our domestic model is considerably simpler: industrials outperform, with a lag, when our activity index and Li Keqiang leading indicator are rising. Periods of strong overvaluation have also been significant in predicting future episodes of domestic industrial sector underperformance. It is not clear to us why the drivers of relative performance for domestic industrials have been different than in the investable equity index, But the good news is that the relative simplicity of the model makes the investment decision making process for domestic industrials considerably easier. Today, domestic industrials are significantly undervalued, and our Li Keqiang leading indicator is in a shallow uptrend. This suggests that domestic industrials are likely to begin outperforming at some point in early-2020 following a bottoming in Chinese economic activity, unless policymakers are quick to tighten once activity begins to improve (which would be contrary to our expectations). Consumer Discretionary Chart II-4 Chart II-4 Consumer Discretionary Consumer Discretionary Table II-4 A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance Our domestic consumer discretionary model highlights that the sector’s relative performance is positively associated with a rising Li Keqiang leading indicator, rising core inflation, and rising broad market stock prices. Similar to its investable peers, domestic consumer discretionary stocks are cyclical, and positive relationship with core inflation may reflect improved pricing power for the sector. Unlike investable consumer discretionary, the domestic consumer discretionary has not been meaningfully impacted by the December 2018 changes to the global industry classification standard. Hence, our model does not exclude the internet & direct marketing retail sector as we did in our previous report on investable sectors. For now, our model suggests that the domestic consumer discretionary sector is likely to continue to underperform, given decelerating core inflation and the lack of a clear uptrend in the broad domestic equity index. However, as a cyclical sector, we will be watching closely for an upside breakout in domestic consumer discretionary performance in the first quarter as a signal to increase exposure to the sector. Consumer Staples Chart II-5 Chart II-5 Consumer Staples Consumer Staples Table II-5 A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance Our domestic consumer staples model is significantly different than that shown in our previous report for investable staples. This reflects sizeable differences in investable/domestic staples relative performance over the past decade, particularly from mid-2015 to late-2017 (where domestic staples outperformed significantly and investable staples languished). Of the two predictors found to be significant in explaining historical periods of domestic staples performance, a negative relationship with the trend in broad market EPS has been the most important. This underscores that staples are defensive sector. The trend in staples relative earnings has closely followed in importance, showing that the tremendous outperformance in domestic consumer staples over the past several years has, at least in part, been driven by fundamentals. Still, domestic consumer staples are currently priced at 34x earnings per share, compared with 15x for the overall domestic market. While our model currently argues for continued staples outperformance, the risk of a valuation mean reversion next year, against the backdrop of an improving economy, is above average. Over the coming 6-12 months, investors should be closely monitoring domestic staples for signs of waning earnings momentum and/or a major technical breakdown as potential signals to reduce domestic staples exposure. Health Care Chart II-6 Chart II-6 Health Care Health Care Table II-6 A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance Over the past decade, periods of domestic health care outperformance have been negatively associated with rising economic activity, rising core inflation, and rising broad market stock prices. Oversold technical conditions and periods of overvaluation have also helped predict future episodes of health care relative performance. These factors clearly point to the defensive nature of domestic health care, similar to health care stocks in the investable index. However, one clear difference between investable and domestic health care is that the former appears to have leading properties and the latter does not. We noted in our previous report that periods of investable health care underperformance appeared to lead, on average, our BCA Activity Index, periods of rising core inflation, and uptrends in the broad investable index. By contrast, domestic health care lags the Activity Index and core inflation by just over a year, and also lags the trend in broad market EPS. Our model points to further health care outperformance, but we would expect domestic health care stocks to underperform at some point next year following an improvement in economic activity and a resumed uptrend in broad domestic EPS. Financials Chart II-7 Chart II-7 Financials Financials Table II-7 A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance Our outperformance probability model for domestic financials highlights that the sector is countercyclical: periods of outperformance have been negatively related to our LKI leading indicator, rising core inflation, and rising broad market stock prices. Similar to the case of the investable index and unlike the case globally, financials are clearly defensive. Investable financials have exhibited atypical performance this year according to the model presented in our previous report. By contrast, domestic financials have performed in line with what our model has suggested: our LKI leading indicator is in a shallow uptrend, and the relative performance of domestic financials has trended flat-to-down since late-2018. Barring a major shift by the PBoC towards a hawkish stance in the coming year (which we do not expect), our base case view for the Chinese economy implies that domestic financials are likely to continue to underperform. Banks Chart II-8 Chart II-8 Banks Banks Table II-8 A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance Our model for domestic banks is similar to that of financials, with some important differences. In addition to being sensitive to our LKI leading indicator, domestic bank performance is negatively related to our Activity Index. Oversold technical conditions have also been quite important in predicting future episodes of domestic bank outperformance. The model is currently forecasting domestic bank underperformance, although it was late in predicting the selloff in bank stocks that began late last year. Similar to the case for domestic financials, our baseline view for the Chinese economy implies that domestic bank are likely to continue to underperform over the coming year. Information Technology Chart II-9 Information Technology Information Technology Table II-9 A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance Our model for the domestic technology sector is different than that of investable tech, which reflects the vast difference in performance between the two sectors. While the relative performance of domestic tech has trended sideways over the past decade, investable tech stock prices have risen fourfold relative to the broad investable index. This difference is largely accounted for by the absence of the BAT stocks (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent) from the domestic market. Similar to investable tech, domestic technology stocks are negatively related to tight monetary policy, and positively linked with a pro-cyclical economic variable (a rising LKI leading indicator). However, strangely, domestic tech has been strongly and negatively related to rising headline inflation, a finding with no clear fundamental basis. The model has been less successful in predicting domestic tech performance over the past year than in the past, which appears to be linked to the inclusion of headline inflation in the model. Rising headline inflation has been clearly associated with three major episodes of domestic tech underperformance since 2010, but over the past year domestic tech has outperformed as headline inflation accelerated. For now we would advise investors to focus on the other factors in the model: the lack of overvaluation, and our view that policy will remain easy on a measured basis, supports an overweight stance towards domestic tech over the coming year. Telecom Services Chart II-10 Telecom Services Telecom Services Table II-10 A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance Our domestic telecom services relative performance model highlights that the sector is defensive like its investable peer, but the factors driving performance are somewhat different. The only similarity between the two models is that periods of outperformance are negatively related to rising broad market stocks prices for both investable and domestic telecom services, with domestic telecom stocks responding with a lag. Among the macro factors included in the model, periods of domestic telecom services outperformance are negatively and coincidently related to our LKI leading indicator, and positively related to tight monetary policy (with a slight lead). Oversold technical conditions have also proven to help predict future episodes of outperformance. The model failed to predict a brief period of outperformance in mid-2018, but has generally accurately predicted underperformance of domestic telecom stocks since early-2017. Barring a collapse in the US/China trade talks or considerably weaker near-term economic conditions than we expect, domestic telecom services will likely continue to underperform until the specter of tighter monetary policy emerges. This is unlikely to occur until the middle of 2020, at the earliest. Utilities Chart II-11 Utilities Utilities Table II-11 A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance Overall, our domestic utilities model has considerably worse predictive power than our model for investable utilities. The model shows that the performance of domestic utilities is negatively related to rising core inflation (with a lag) and rising broad market EPS, but these relationships are not particularly strong. We noted in our June 19 Special Report that domestic utilities ranked highly on the impact that relative EPS had on predicting relative stock prices , yet relative sector earnings did not register as a significant predictor in our model. This apparent discrepancy is resolved by differences in the time horizon between these two approaches. The analysis that we presented in our June 19 Special Report examined the relationship between earnings and stock prices over the entire sample period (2011-2018), meaning that it examined the predictive power of earnings over the long-term. The models built in this report have focused strongly on explaining periods of outperformance over a 6-12 month time horizon, there have been enough deviations in the trend between the relative performance of utilities and relative utilities earnings that the relationship between the two was not sufficiently strong to show up in the model. In other words, the long-term link between utilities relative earnings and stock prices is strong, but the short-term link is fairly weak. Real Estate Chart II-12 Real Estate Real Estate Table II-12 A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance A Guide To Chinese Domestic Equity Sector Performance Similar to investable real estate, our model shows that domestic real estate is a counter-cyclical sector in that it is negatively related to periods of rising economic activity, a rising LKI leading indicator, tight monetary policy, and rising core inflation. Overbought technical conditions have also aided in predicting future episodes of domestic real estate underperformance. Our model for domestic real estate stocks has performed quite well on average, but its predictive success since late-2017 has been mixed. This period of atypical underperformance has coincided with a considerably weaker rebound in residential floor space sold than has occurred in previous recoveries in the real estate market. This suggests that domestic real estate stocks are more susceptible to trends in housing sales than their investable peers (which appear to be mostly sensitive to rising house prices). We noted in our November 6 Weekly Report that floor space sold is picking up , but it still remains weak when compared with history. This, in combination with our view that the Chinese economy will improve over the coming year, suggests that investors should avoid domestic real estate exposure relative to the overall domestic equity market. Footnotes 1  Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report "A Guide To Chinese Investable Equity Sector Performance," dated October 30, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 2  Please see China Investment Strategy "Six Questions About Chinese Stocks," dated January 16, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 3  Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report "Chinese Equity Sector Earnings: Predictability, Cyclicality, And Relevance," dated June 19, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com 4  Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report "China Macro And Market Review," dated November 6, 2019, available at uses.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Underweight We reiterate our recent downgrade in the S&P semi equipment index to underweight. Our previous mid-year attempt to fight this rally in chip equipment stocks fell short, but thankfully our prudent risk management metric limited our losses. While still early, there is tentative evidence that our underweight stance is starting to bear fruit as the position has moved in our favor. We expect to harvest more gains down the road as a potential trade tension flare up and sustained capex blues leave no room for error in the perfectly priced S&P semi equipment index. Please refer to this Weekly Report for additional details. Bottom Line: We remain underweight the S&P semi equipment index, and maintain the stop loss at the -10% relative return mark. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the index are: BLBG – S5SEEQ – AMAT, LRCX, KLAC. Defying Gravity, No Longer Defying Gravity, No Longer
Neutral (Downgrade Alert) Tech stocks have been on a tear with the sector besting the SPX by over 40% since 2015. While such a breakneck pace is unsustainable, what is missing from this outperformance is relative forward earnings participation. Specifically, on a sub sector level, our newly created S&P semiconductors earnings model is flashing a red light as it forecasts the steepest contraction in semi earnings since the GFC. Meanwhile, relative share prices have rallied ~15% since the mid-2019 lows highlighting the prevalent euphoria in semi equities. Bottom Line: We remain on the sidelines in the S&P semiconductors index, but we have entered into a tactical S&P semi equipment underweight position. Please see the recent Weekly Report for more details. Semi Earnings Model Semi Earnings Model
Disconnected Disconnected Underweight Bellwether CSCO’s latest guidance was weak and confirmed that the capex-laden S&P communications equipment tech sub-index is in for a rough ride. Worryingly, CSCO’s key enterprise segment has no pulse. Historically, this data series has been positively correlated with telecom carrier capital outlays and the current message is grim (second panel). Tack on the ongoing manufacturing recession with CEOs canceling/postponing capital spending plans and the outlook dims further for the revenue prospects of communications equipment vendors (third & bottom panels). Adding insult to injury, the US/China trade war is further complicating the picture as the ongoing tariffs have exacerbated the global growth slowdown, and global capex plans have come under intense scrutiny. Bottom Line: Continue to avoid the S&P communications equipment index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5COMM – CSCO, JNPR, MSI, ANET, FFIV. Please refer to this Monday’s Weekly Report for more details.
The communications equipment rally stalled early in the summer and has since morphed into a bear market. The darkening profit outlook for this niche tech sub-group warrants remaining underweight. Bellwether CSCO’s latest guidance was weak and confirmed…