UK

Feature Over the past months, we have seen a potent bout of volatility in developed government bond markets, as investors have tried to assess the “lift-off” dates for central bank hiking cycles and the speed and cumulative degree of eventual monetary tightening. Record inflation prints have also created a communication challenge for central banks, with investors demanding more certainty in relation to the preconditions that need to be met in the data for central banks to raise rates. Adding to the uncertainty are the new frameworks adopted by the US Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank (ECB) that allow for overshoots of the 2% inflation target to make up for historical undershoots. However, it remains to be seen how committed policymakers will be to these new frameworks. Even the historically dovish European Central Bank has been forced to talk down market pricing, with overnight swap markets eyeing a rate hike as early as next year. Across the English Channel, the Bank Of England, which initially baffled investors by failing to deliver a rate hike during its November meeting, now appears to have embarked on a new path, with Governor Andrew Bailey calling into question the very efficacy of forward guidance itself and possibly returning to making decisions on a meeting-by-meeting basis. Chief Economist Huw Pill has recently talked about “training” people to “think the right way about monetary policy,” but it remains to be seen if market participants will be receptive students. In any case, it is clear that the uniformly dovish period of extraordinary monetary accommodation induced by the pandemic is at an end. To navigate the uncertainty as central banks shift gears toward tighter policy on the margin, we are introducing revised versions of our BCA European Central Bank monitors this week. These indicators use economic and financial market data to gauge whether the current stance of monetary policy lines up with current conditions. Our revisions focus on making the monitors more dynamic and responsive to shifts in central bank reaction functions. Overall, the message from our new monitors is clear—rebounding growth and inflation data mean that all our indicators are moving in a direction more consistent with tighter policy even after Friday's market action (Chart 1). In the following sections of this report, we cover in greater detail the methodological changes to our indicators, followed by region-level assessments of the five new monitors introduced in this report for the Euro Area, UK, Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland. Chart 1The New BCA European Central Bank Monitors The New BCA European Central Bank Monitors The New BCA European Central Bank Monitors What’s New? We have made three major improvements to our central bank monitors: First, the sub-components—economic growth, inflation, and financial conditions—are no longer calculated as a simple average of their constituent data series. Instead, each data series is now weighted according to the degree that it moves in conjunction with other data series over a 60-month rolling window. In other words, data series that are highly correlated with other series receive a greater weight. There are two benefits to this approach: (i) it makes the monitors more dynamic and (ii) it adjusts for changes in correlations over time. Second, the weights of each of the three sub-components in the overall monitor are now determined so as to minimize the sum of squared residuals (SSR) of a regression of the 12-month change in policy rate (the dependent variable) with the readings from our monitors (the independent variable). We have imposed two constraints: each sub-component must have a minimum weight of 15% and may not weigh more than 70%. More importantly, the weights are now re-calculated every 60 months. In doing so, there is no assumption that central bankers’ reaction function is constant over time, and it avoids look-ahead bias. There is also the natural question of how to optimize the weights of our sub-components when policy rates remain flat for extended periods at, or near, the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB). While we did consider calculating a different set of weights targeting the annual change in assets held by the Central Bank during ZLB periods, we eschewed this approach for two reasons: these periods are neither frequent nor sufficiently prolonged to provide an appropriate sample. As a result, the weights currently applied to the monitors are based on the 60 months preceding policy rates reaching the Zero Lower Bound. Table 1 shows the weights currently being used for each monitor. Table 1European Central Bank Monitors' Weights A Tour Of The New BCA European Central Bank Monitors A Tour Of The New BCA European Central Bank Monitors Third, all of the data series included in our monitors are now standardized over 60-month rolling time horizons. Like the changes made to the weight calculation above, it ensures the monitor does not rely too heavily on either past or future data. Although central banks’ mandates do not change often—if at all—their reaction functions do. Take inflation, for instance. Our monitors should not factor in the level of price changes experienced in the 1970s as a benchmark to determine whether a central bank should be more or less accommodative based on what inflation is today. We also took this opportunity to make changes to the data series included in the monitors, with a focus on including higher-frequency series to improve the timeliness of the indicator. All in all, clients should note that these improvements do not change the interpretation of the monitors. A rising trend is still consistent with fundamentals that would have caused central banks to tighten in the past and vice versa. ECB Monitor: Stay Put Chart 2Euro Area: ECB Monitor Euro Area: ECB Monitor Euro Area: ECB Monitor Our European Central Bank (ECB) Monitor is currently in positive territory, suggesting that the ECB should be removing accommodation (Chart 2). However, the ECB did not sound any more hawkish at the close of its last meeting held at the beginning of the month. The latest surge of COVID-19 cases in Europe and subsequent governments’ responses will weigh on economic growth and give reason to the ECB not to rush into a new tightening cycle. It will also be interesting to see how the renewed energy crisis affects President Christine Lagarde's stance on the transitory aspects of inflation. The components of our ECB Monitor are consistent with these two forces (Chart 2, panel 2). Strong economic data prints have been losing steam this year, which weighed on the economic growth component. Nonetheless, this indicator now tries to move back up. Meanwhile, the inflation component is surging, driven by both the rapid acceleration in European realized inflation and CPI swaps. We have argued that energy, taxes, and base effects account for the bulk of the price increases in the Euro Area, and that, as such, the ECB was correct in looking past them. Market participants do not agree with the ECB. The Euro Overnight Index Average (EONIA) curve is now pricing 15bps of tightening by the end of 2022 (Chart 2, bottom panel), which is unlikely to happen considering the ECB’s dovish communication and its adoption of AIT. In this context, we lean against the EONIA pricing and expect the ECB to increase rates in 2024, at the earliest. We also continue to recommend an overweight stance on European government bonds within global fixed income portfolios. BoE Monitor: Tightening On The Way Chart 3UK: BoE Monitor UK: BoE Monitor UK: BoE Monitor Our Bank of England (BoE) monitor has continued its sharp rebound into positive territory since its trough in 2020 (Chart 3). While the BoE’s communication has been questionable, the Bank has done nothing to reverse its recent hawkish turn. This makes sense given economic data that is showing signs of an overheating economy. Consumer price inflation came in at 4.2% year-over-year in October, a ten-year high. And as we discussed in a recent BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy report, there are signs that rising inflation is having a dampening effect on consumer confidence, imperiling growth in 2022. Turning to the individual components of our BoE monitor, we see broad-based pressure to tighten policy, with all three components in solidly positive territory and rising quickly (Chart 3, middle panel). Inflationary pressures are being driven not only by strong CPI prints, but also by rising input prices and inflation expectations that are becoming unmoored from the BoE’s target. Meanwhile, capacity utilization scores from the BoE’s Agents’ Summary are at the highest level since 2007, creating scope for further inflation down the road. Growth is ebullient as well, with both manufacturing and services PMIs significantly above the 50 advance/decline line. Rising house prices and consumer lending are creating stability risks captured in the financial subcomponent of the monitor. Market anticipations for tightening over the next year have continued to increase, notwithstanding the muddled messaging from the BoE, with 111bps of tightening expected over the coming year (Chart 3, bottom panel). With the BoE set to be one of the more hawkish developed market central banks in 2022, we are comfortable maintaining an underweight stance on Gilts within global government bond portfolios. Riksbank Monitor: On Hold, But Not For Long Chart 4Sweden: Riksbank Monitor Sweden: Riksbank Monitor Sweden: Riksbank Monitor Our Riksbank Monitor is now close to neutral, after reaching all-time highs earlier this year (Chart 4). For now, the Riksbank seems content to continue to hold the repo rate at 0%, while expanding the size of its balance sheet. Taking a closer look at the breakdown in the Riksbank Monitor, we can see that the earlier surge was mostly driven by the financial conditions component, which is still solidly in positive territory (Chart 4, panel 2). The inflation component confirms that inflation is still not a concern for the Riksbank. In fact, core CPI stands at 1.82% annually, below the 2% target and far from what other developed economies are currently experiencing. We expect the ongoing robust economic recovery to continue lifting the economic growth component, which, at some point in the future, should place more pressure on the Riksbank to remove accommodation. Market participants have only started pricing in some rate hikes from the Riksbank recently (Chart 4, bottom panel). Still, we view this 35bps of expected tightening as too modest relative to the actual pressure on the Riksbank to tighten policy. The positive outlook for the Swedish economy,1 as well as rising house prices and household indebtedness, will force the Riksbank to tighten policy before the ECB—all of which may happen sooner if inflation starts to accelerate. Consequently, Swedish sovereign debt does not appear as an attractive underweight candidate in global government bond portfolios. Norges Bank Monitor: More Hikes To Come Chart 5Norway: Norges Bank Monitor Norway: Norges Bank Monitor Norway: Norges Bank Monitor Our Norges Bank Monitor is well into positive territory and continues to increase, signaling pressure for tighter policy (Chart 5). In September, the Norges Bank became the first of the G10 central banks to deliver a rate hike, which it paired with forward guidance suggesting hikes at its coming December, January, and March meetings. We believe such an outcome is supported by the data, which show pressure to tighten on a growth and inflation basis (Chart 5, middle panel). The growth subcomponent of our indicator has been driven by rebounding business and consumer sentiment. Meanwhile, inflationary pressures have been driven by rising capacity utilization and producer prices, which grew at an unbelievable 60.8% year-over-year in October, the highest annual growth rate that has ever been recorded for the series. The reading from the financial subcomponent is more neutral, hovering above the zero level. This slight decline this year may largely be explained by slowing house price growth and falling debt service ratios. However, the NOK remains undervalued on a PPP-basis, which, at the margin, creates pressure on the Norges Bank to tighten. Overnight index swap curves are currently discounting 136bps of tightening in Norway over the coming year. We believe this is a realistic outcome, given the Norges Bank’s uniquely hawkish reaction function and pressures to tighten, which are not likely to dissipate any time soon. We remain bearish on Norwegian government debt. SNB Monitor: Still About The Swiss Franc Chart 6Switzerland: SNB Monitor Switzerland: SNB Monitor Switzerland: SNB Monitor Our Swiss National Bank (SNB) Monitor has decreased somewhat after peaking earlier this year, but remains solidly in positive territory, which suggests that the SNB should remove accommodation (Chart 6). This is unlikely to happen anytime soon. At the Central Bank leadership’s annual meeting with the Swiss government last month, the SNB emphasized the need to maintain accommodative monetary policy. In so doing, it kept policy rate and interest on sight deposits at the SNB at −0.75%, while remaining willing to intervene in the foreign exchange market as necessary, in order to counter upward pressure on the Swiss franc. After all, the currency remains the main determinant of Swiss monetary conditions. Therefore, the SNB will continue to try to cap the upside in the CHF vis-à-vis the EUR, because it considers the Swiss franc "highly valued". Meanwhile, inflation does not seem to be an imminent concern for the SNB. Headline inflation and core inflation stand at 1.25% and 0.58%, respectively. All three components of our SNB Monitor appear to send the same message at the moment (Chart 6, panel 2). Markets largely seem to believe the SNB’s unwillingness to tighten monetary policy (Chart 6, bottom panel). Only 16 bps of tightening are priced over the next 12 months, and 54bps over the next 24 months. We maintain our neutral stance on Swiss bonds within global portfolios, given low liquidity. Jeremie Peloso, Associate Editor JeremieP@bcaresearch.com Shakti Sharma Senior Analyst ShaktiS@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see BCA Research European Income Strategy Report, "Take A Chance On Sweden", dated May 3, 2021, available at eis.bcareseach.com.

Dear Client, The next two BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy reports will be jointly published with other BCA services, which will impact the publishing dates. Our next report will be a joint Special Report on Australia, published with our colleagues at Foreign Exchange Strategy, which you will receive this Friday, November 19. The following report will be a joint Special Report published with European Investment Strategy, which you will receive on November 29. -Rob Robis   Highlights High realized inflation rates are pushing up longer-term inflation expectations toward all-time highs, while also weighing on consumer confidence, in the US and the UK. The inflation overshoot has not been as severe in the euro area, but consumer confidence appears to be rolling over there too. Over the next year, central banks will have to manage around the communications challenges posed by a rise in inflation that is perceived to be more supply-driven than demand-driven and, hence, beyond the full control of monetary policy. Public opinion surveys are showing eroding satisfaction with the Fed and Bank of England, while similar surveys in the euro area show public trust in the ECB remains strong despite higher euro area inflation.  We continue to favor overweights in euro area government bonds (both core and periphery) versus US Treasuries and UK Gilts, given the far greater likelihood of multiple rate hikes in the UK and US in 2022/23, compared to the euro area, in order to restore central bank credibility.  Feature Rapidly accelerating inflation has become front-page news around the world. It is also increasingly becoming a political issue and not just an economic one. After the release of the October US consumer price index (CPI) report, where headline inflation came in at a 30-year high of 6.2%, US President Joe Biden had to issue a formal White House statement acknowledging that inflation “hurts Americans’ pocketbooks, and reversing this trend is a top priority for me.” Biden also pulled off the neat trick of both committing to, and subtly challenging, the Fed’s independence when he noted that “I want to reemphasize my commitment to the independence of the Federal Reserve to monitor inflation, and take necessary steps to combat it.” The Great Inflation Of 2021 (and 2022?) has raised a new risk for both politicians and investors. As long as the high inflation persists, and for as long as central banks seem unwilling or unable to respond to try and bring down inflation with tighter monetary policy, consumer confidence will be negatively impacted – even if job growth remains reasonably healthy. Confidence & Inflation: A Matter Of Trust Chart of the WeekHigh Inflation Weighing On Consumer Confidence High Inflation Weighing On Consumer Confidence High Inflation Weighing On Consumer Confidence The preliminary read on US consumer confidence for November from the University of Michigan survey showed sentiment hitting a ten-year low, largely on worries about the impact of rising inflation on household spending power. This effect of high inflation eroding consumer confidence is not just a US phenomenon (Chart of the Week). UK consumer sentiment is also falling due to what has been described as “a potential cost of living crisis” by consumer research firm GfK. In the euro area, however, consumer sentiment is still relatively elevated, but is starting to roll over as headline inflation reaches a 13-year high of 4.1% in October. From the point of view of financial markets,  surging inflation is still expected to be a short-lived phenomenon, although conviction on that view is starting to wane. Market-based inflation expectations curves for the US, UK and euro area are all currently inverted, with shorter-maturity expectations above longer-maturity ones (Chart 2). Yet the upward momentum of those measures across all maturity points is showing little sign of ebbing, especially in the US. The 2-year TIPS breakeven rate now sits at a 16-year high of 3.51%, the 5-year breakeven is at an all-time high of 3.22%, while the 10-year breakeven of 2.77% is now just a single basis point below its all-time high reached in 2005. The story is similar in the UK, where RPI swap rates for the 2-year, 5-year and 10-year maturities are 5.3%, 4.8% and 4.3%, respectively – all hovering near all-time highs (as are breakevens on index-linked Gilts). Euro area inflation expectations are not so historically elevated, and the inflation curve is not as inverted, but the 2-year euro CPI swap rate is still at a 15-year high of 2.4% compared to a 9-year high of 2.0% - right at the ECB’s inflation target - for the 10-year CPI swap rate. In the US, the survey-based measures of inflation expectations are telling a similar story. The New York Fed’s Consumer Survey shows that median 3-year expectations are now at 4.2% with 1-year expectations even higher at 5.7% (Chart 3). Meanwhile, the early November read on inflation expectations from the University of Michigan survey showed that 1-year-ahead expectations climbed to a 13-year high of 4.9%, while the longer-term 5-10 year inflation expectations were unchanged from the October reading of 2.9%. Chart 2Rising Inflation Expectations, Both Short- & Long-Term Rising Inflation Expectations, Both Short- & Long-Term Rising Inflation Expectations, Both Short- & Long-Term Chart 3A Broad-Based Surge In US Inflation A Broad-Based Surge In US Inflation A Broad-Based Surge In US Inflation The latter figure may provide some comfort to the Fed, with surging shorter-term expectations not fully leaking through into longer-term expectations. However, the longer the inflation upturn persists, the more likely it will be that US consumers begin to factor in a higher rate of longer-term inflation, just as TIPS traders are doing. After all, the Michigan 5-10 year measure has still climbed by 0.7 percentage points from the pre-COVID low. Even more worrying from the Fed’s perspective is that inflation expectations are rising for essentially all Americans. The New York Fed Consumer Survey shows that 3-year-ahead inflation expectations are rising across all levels of education (Chart 4) and income cohorts (Chart 5). Chart 4US Inflation Expectations Are Rising For All Education Levels... US Inflation Expectations Are Rising For All Education Levels... US Inflation Expectations Are Rising For All Education Levels... Chart 5...And Income Levels ...And Income Levels ...And Income Levels The New York Fed also compiles a measure of consumer inflation uncertainty (bottom panels of both charts on page 5). Survey participants are asked to provide probabilities of inflation falling within certain ranges, with the gap between the top and bottom quartiles of those expected inflation outcomes representing the “uncertainty” over future US inflation. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the dispersion of inflation forecasts is typically much wider for those earning lower incomes and with less education. Yet even highly educated, high earning Americans are reporting wider gaps in possible inflation outcomes, in sharp contrast to the pre-COVID years where their expectations were low and stable. Americans Are Having Second Thoughts About The Fed Any way you cut it – TIPS breakevens or survey-based measures - US inflation uncertainty and volatility have increased. This appears to be starting to erode public confidence with the Fed. Along with its consumer confidence surveys, the University of Michigan also publishes a periodic survey of Confidence In Financial Institutions like commercial banks, asset managers and, most importantly, the Fed. The last survey was just conducted for the September/October 2021 period and showed that 43% of respondents reported a loss of confidence in the Fed compared to five years ago (Chart 6). That is up from 36% reporting a loss of confidence in the last such survey conducted in 2019, and is approaching the +50% levels seen in 2008 (the Financial Crisis) and in 2011 (the Taper Tantrum) – episodes where the Fed had difficulty maintaining economic and financial stability. Chart 6 The University of Michigan also noted that reported consumer confidence was much lower for those claiming to have less confidence in the Fed, and vice versa (Chart 7). Chart 7 Taken at face value, this survey shows that the Great Inflation of 2021 has shaken the public’s faith in the Fed’s ability to maintain economic stability. Combined with the message from the New York Fed Consumer Survey on the growing instability of American inflation expectations, this shows that the Fed may be facing an uphill climb to restore some of the credibility it has lost this year. Much like all aspects of American life these days, political partisanship must be factored in the analysis of US confidence data. The regular monthly University of Michigan sentiment survey for November noted that various measures of US confidence were consistently higher for respondents who reported to be Democrats compared to Republicans since President Biden took office (Chart 8). This is a mirror image of the years under President Trump (pre-pandemic), where Republicans consistently reported greater optimism than Democrats. Chart 8 Chart 9Americans Can Agree On One Thing - High Inflation Is Bad Americans Can Agree On One Thing - High Inflation Is Bad Americans Can Agree On One Thing - High Inflation Is Bad The University of Michigan Confidence in Financial Institutions survey also noted that less trust in the Fed was reported more frequently by Republicans (67%) than Democrats (27%) in 2021, the first year under Biden. This compares to 2017, the first year of the Trump Administration, where more Democrats (41%) reported less trust with the Fed compared to Republicans (30%). The Michigan survey described this “partisan identification” as being a “significant correlate of consumer assessments of the Federal Reserve, treating the Fed as part of the administration rather than an independent body.” Consumer confidence among reported Democrats has been falling since April of this year, although there is still room to catch up to the complete collapse of sentiment seen among Republican consumers (Chart 9, top panel). High US inflation is hitting everyone hard. The surge in inflation expectations is overwhelming income expectations for the next year, according to the New York Fed Consumer Survey (middle panel). High realized inflation has also eroded real spending power, with real average hourly earnings having contracted in year-over-year terms since April of this year (bottom panel). Even with that fall in real income growth perceptions, the plunge in the University of Michigan US consumer confidence has not been matched by other measures like the Conference Board US consumer confidence index, which remains well above pandemic era lows. Even more importantly, US consumer spending has held up well, with nominal retail sales expanding by +1.7% in October following a +0.8% gain in September. Some of those increases were due to rising prices, but were still significantly above inflation in both months, suggesting a solid pace of real consumer spending (the headline US CPI index rose +0.9% and +0.4% in October and September, respectively). For the Fed, the case is building to begin preparing Americans for higher interest rates in 2022. This is true both from an economic perspective – the US economy is likely to continue growing above trend next year, further tightening the US labor market – and in response to the high inflation that has caused some damage to the Fed’s credibility. What About The UK And Euro Area? Looking across the Atlantic, survey-based measures of inflation expectations have also climbed steadily higher (Chart 10). The YouGov/Citigroup survey of UK consumer inflation expectations is now at 4.4% for the 1-year-ahead measure and 3.7% for the longer-run 5-10 year ahead measure, both well above the BoE’s 2% inflation target. The European Commission surveys show a rapidly rising share of European Union businesses and consumers expect higher prices in the coming months. Yet while inflation expectations are rising in both the UK and Europe, only the UK shows the sort of deterioration in central bank confidence that is evident in the US. 48% of Europeans expressed confidence in the ECB, according to the Eurobarometer public opinion surveys – the highest share since 2007 and well above the 36% level seen after the Global Financial Crisis and European Debt Crisis (Chart 11). Some of that improvement in perceptions of the ECB mirrors better sentiment over the euro currency itself, as evidenced by that fact that both Germans and Italians now express similar levels of ECB confidence. Chart 10High Inflation Is Also A Problem Outside The US High Inflation Is Also A Problem Outside The US High Inflation Is Also A Problem Outside The US Chart 11Europeans Have Not Lost Confidence In The ECB Europeans Have Not Lost Confidence In The ECB Europeans Have Not Lost Confidence In The ECB High levels of public trust in the ECB play an important role in anchoring European inflation expectations. The ECB introduced its own Consumer Expectations Survey as a pilot project last year, and the latest reading from October 2021 shows that 1-year-ahead inflation expectations are now at 3% and 3-year-ahead expectations are at 2%. Both measures were at 2% a year earlier, and have generally stayed close to ECB’s 2% inflation target since the survey began. Chart 12High Inflation Is Worsening Public Satisfaction With The BoE High Inflation Is Worsening Public Satisfaction With The BoE High Inflation Is Worsening Public Satisfaction With The BoE A recent research report from the Bank of Finland concluded that European consumers who have high trust in the ECB adjust their medium-term inflation expectations more slowly than those with low trust. The high public confidence in the ECB seen in the Eurobarometer surveys, combined with the stability of medium-term inflation expectations (both survey-based and market-based) around the ECB’s 2% target – even with realized euro area inflation now at 3.4% - fits with the conclusions of that report. We read this as a sign that the ECB is not under the same growing pressure to tighten policy in the face of rising inflation as the Fed, which is facing an erosion of public confidence that is showing up in steadily rising inflation expectations. In the UK, the Bank of England (BoE) is facing a situation more akin to that of the Fed. The BoE’s Inflation Attitudes Survey has been showing a steady erosion of UK consumers reporting satisfaction with how the BoE has been setting policy to fight inflation (Chart 12). The “net satisfied” index fell to +18% in the last survey published in September – similarly low levels of BoE satisfaction coincided with major spikes in longer-term UK inflation expectations in 2008 and 2011 (bottom panel). Our conclusion from the UK consumer surveys, along with measures of inflation expectations that are well above the BoE medium-term target, is similar to that in the US. The UK public is losing faith in the BoE’s ability, or willingness, to tackle the high inflation “problem” – even if much of the inflation is caused by high energy prices and global supply chain disruptions that are beyond the immediate control of monetary policy. The BoE will likely need to follow through on the rate hikes markets expect in 2022 to help restore public trust and credibility, even if realized inflation slows from current elevated levels. This is especially true after the debacle of the November 4 BoE meeting where a widely-signaled rate hike did not occur. If the BoE continues to delay the start of tightening while inflation expectations are accelerating, this will only put more pressure on the central bank to tighten faster, and by more than expected, in a bid to stabilize inflation expectations. Investment Conclusions Chart 13Favor European Government Bonds Over US & UK Equivalents Favor European Government Bonds Over US & UK Equivalents Favor European Government Bonds Over US & UK Equivalents Our read of the various surveys shows that public trust in central banks has deteriorated in the US and UK, but not in Europe, because of surging inflation in 2021. This compounds the existing trends of tightening labor markets and accelerating wage growth in the US and UK that are more traditional reasons to tighten monetary policy. We continue to favor strategic overweights in euro area government bonds (both core and periphery) versus US Treasuries and UK Gilts, given the far greater likelihood of multiple rate hikes in the UK and US in 2022/23 in order to restore public trust in the Fed and BoE (Chart 13). The ECB can continue to be patient on responding to higher euro area inflation, given more stable euro area inflation expectations and with limited evidence that higher realized inflation is boosting European wage growth. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark Image The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index

Highlights Fed/BoE: Both the Fed and the Bank of England found ways to talk down 2022 rate hike expectations discounted in US and UK bond markets. This is only a temporary reprieve, however, as the near-term uncertainties over the persistence of cost-push inflation will eventually be overwhelmed by medium-term certainties of demand-pull inflation confirmed by tightening labor markets. Stay underweight US Treasuries and UK Gilts in global bond portfolios. US Treasury Curve: Longer-term US Treasury yields are priced too low relative to the likely peak in the fed funds rate in the next cycle. Position for a steeper US Treasury curve until Fed rate hikes are imminent, which will likely not be until Q4/2022. Feature Chart of the WeekShifting Rate Expectations Driving Bond Yields As QE Fades Shifting Rate Expectations Driving Bond Yields As QE Fades Shifting Rate Expectations Driving Bond Yields As QE Fades Bond market uncertainty about future monetary policy moves is on the rise. Bond volatility has picked up, most notably at the front end of yield curves that are most sensitive to rate hike expectations which have been intensifying. Yet last week, the Federal Reserve and Bank of England (BoE) were able to talk bond investors off the ledge – at least, temporarily - by pushing back against expectations of multiple rate hikes in the US and UK in 2022. Central bankers in those countries are stuck in a difficult spot. Inflation is high enough to warrant some tightening of monetary policy. Yet there are lingering concerns over how long the current upturn in global inflation will last. Meanwhile, there are just enough questions on the underlying pace of economic momentum to require policymakers to see more data, especially in labor markets, before feeling comfortable enough to pull the trigger on actual rate hikes. We now see that happening first in the UK early next year, and in the US in late 2022. One thing that is certain is that the ups and downs of interest rate expectations – and the central bank forward guidance that influences them – will increasingly become the more dominant driver of bond yields and yield curve shape as global pandemic bond-buying programs get wound down (Chart of the Week). On that front, we see more potential for bond-bearish steepening in the UK and US over the next several months. The BoE: Another Bad Date With The Unreliable Boyfriend The UK financial press infamously dubbed the BoE “the unreliable boyfriend”, under the leadership of former Governor Mark Carney, for hinting at interest rate increases that never materialized. At last week’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) meeting, rates were kept unchanged in a 7-2 vote despite some intense signaling in recent weeks that a rate hike was imminent. Under current BoE Governor Andrew Bailey, this edition of the MPC is more like an indecisive spouse than unreliable boyfriend. On the one hand, there is a clear overshoot of UK inflation (and inflation expectations) that would justify a rate hike as soon as possible (Chart 2). The BoE’s new economic forecasts presented in the November Monetary Policy Report (MPR) called for headline CPI inflation to reach a peak of 5% in April 2022 – significantly higher than the 4% late-2021 forecast from the August MPR. On the other hand, high current inflation is already having a dampening effect on economic sentiment. The GfK index of UK consumer confidence is down -10% from the peak seen in July, despite diminishing concerns over COVID seen in public opinion polls (Chart 3, middle panel). A similar divergence is evident in the BoE’s Decision Maker Panel survey of UK Chief Financial Officers, which showed that uncertainty over future sales was somewhat elevated compared to diminished concerns about COVID and Brexit (bottom panel). Chart 2Fed/BoE Cannot Stay Dovish For Much Longer Fed/BoE Cannot Stay Dovish For Much Longer Fed/BoE Cannot Stay Dovish For Much Longer Chart 3High UK Inflation Raises Growth Uncertainty High UK Inflation Raises Growth Uncertainty High UK Inflation Raises Growth Uncertainty The BoE highlighted these divergences in economic sentiment series in the November MPR as examples of how high inflation, fueled by global supply chain disruptions and soaring energy prices, introduced uncertainty into the central bank’s forecasts. Even more uncertainty exists in the BoE’s ability to assess the amount of spare capacity, and underlying inflationary pressure, in the UK economy. The BoE dedicated a 9-page section of the November MPR to a discussion about estimating the growth of the supply-side of the UK economy, evidence of how difficult that process has become during the COVID era. The BoE concluded that the pandemic would end up reducing the level of UK potential supply by -2% from pre-COVID levels, even though the growth rate would return to a pre-pandemic pace of around 1.5% by 2023-24. This is a combination that makes setting monetary policy tricky. Reduced supply indicates that the UK economy has a smaller output gap with more inflationary pressure that would require higher interest rates. Yet sluggish growth in potential supply implies that the UK equilibrium interest rate is likely still very low, thus the BoE would not have to raise rates much to get policy back to neutral. This uncertainty over the size of the output gap in the UK economy will force to BoE to focus more on the labor market as the best “real-time” measure of spare capacity. On that front, the evidence is also difficult to interpret. The UK unemployment rate fell to 4.5% over the three months to August, the last available data before the UK government’s COVID furlough schemes, which protected worker incomes hit by COVID job losses, ended on September 30. The UK Office of National Statistics estimates that there were between 900,000 and 1.4 million UK workers furloughed in late September, representing a significant source of labor supply to be absorbed when the government income assistance ends. Thus, the BoE would need to see at least a month or two of post-furlough employment reports – not just job growth, but labor force participation - to assess how quickly those workers were being reabsorbed into the UK labor market. By the BoE’s own estimates, the impact of the furlough schemes, combined with the compositional issues arising from pandemic job losses being borne more by lower-wage workers, boosted UK wage growth by 2.2% (Chart 4, bottom panel). “Underlying” wage growth, net of those effects, is 0.6%, above the pre-COVID peak, suggesting a tightening labor market before the return of furloughed workers to the labor force. In the end, we see the BoE’s November non-hike as nothing more than a delay of the inevitable. While a December hike is possible, this would represent a “double tightening” of monetary policy with the current BoE quantitative easing program set to expire at year-end. The more likely date for a rate hike is now February. This would give the MPC a few months of post-furlough labor data to assess the amount of spare capacity in UK labor markets. We expect the data to show enough underlying health in labor demand relative to supply for the BoE to conclude that accelerating wage growth represents a more sustainable form of UK inflation in 2022 than energy prices or supply-chain disruptions were in 2021, justifying a move to begin hiking rates. We continue to recommend positioning for a steeper UK Gilt curve, focused on longer-maturities where yields were too low relative to even a moderate future BoE rate hike cycle (Chart 5). We entered a new tactical butterfly spread trade last week, going long the 10-year Gilt bullet versus a duration-neutral 7-year/30-year barbell – we continue to like that trade as a way to play for eventual BoE rate hikes in the first half of 2022. Chart 4BoE Needs More Employment Data To Confirm Wage Uptrend BoE Needs More Employment Data To Confirm Wage Uptrend BoE Needs More Employment Data To Confirm Wage Uptrend Chart 5Stay In UK Long-End Gilt Curve Steepeners Stay In UK Long-End Gilt Curve Steepeners Stay In UK Long-End Gilt Curve Steepeners Bottom Line: The Bank of England is still on a path to begin rate hikes, either in December or, more likely, February of next year. Stay underweight UK Gilts. Position For A Steeper US Treasury Curve The Fed announced last week that tapering would begin right away in November, in a move that has been hinted at since the summer. The monthly pace of purchases of Treasuries and Agency MBS will decline by $10 billion and $5 billion, respectively in November and also December. The Fed declined to commit to any specific tapering amounts beyond that, although it seems likely that the same monthly pace of reduction will continue in 2022. This would take the buying of Treasuries and MBS, net of maturing debt, to zero by June of next year, clearing the first necessary hurdle before the FOMC could contemplate a hike in the funds rate. A completion of the taper by June has been hinted at in the speeches of several Fed officials in recent weeks. This is a bit faster than the expected pace of tapering seen in the most recent New York Fed Primary Dealer and Market Participant Surveys from September (Chart 6), but should not be categorized as a hawkish surprise. There were also few bond-bearish signals on future policy moves hinted at by Fed Chair Jay Powell in post post-FOMC meeting press conference. Chart 6 Chart 7Upside Risk To UST Yields From A Tightening Labor Market Upside Risk To UST Yields From A Tightening Labor Market Upside Risk To UST Yields From A Tightening Labor Market Powell did note that it was still not clear how long the current supply chain/commodity price driven surge in inflation would persist into next year. The expectation, however, was that these forces would eventually subside and allow US inflation to return back to levels much closer to the Fed’s 2% target. Given the uncertainties in the timing of that peak and decline in US inflation, the Fed has limited ability to calibrate any post-taper rate hikes by focusing solely on inflation - especially with longer-term inflation expectations still at levels consistent with the Fed’s target. The Fed will continue to look at US labor market developments to determine the timing and pace of future rate hikes. The last set of FOMC economic projections compiled for the September meeting have the US unemployment rate falling to 3.8% next year, below the median FOMC estimate of full employment at 4%, with one 25bp rate hike penciled in for 2022. We can use that as a baseline assumption on what the Fed considers to be the level of “maximum employment” that would need to be reached before rate hikes could begin. The US unemployment rate fell to 4.6% in October, thus there is still some more to go before hitting that 3.8% rate hike threshold. Yet among the FOMC members, the estimates of full employment range from 3.5%-4.5%, so the October print did knock on the door of that range (Chart 7, middle panel). With US wage growth already showing signs of breaking out – the Atlanta Fed Wage Tracker hit a 14-year high of 14% in September (bottom panel), while the Employment Cost Index rose by a record quarterly pace of 1.3% in Q3 – the Fed will likely be under a lot of pressure to begin hiking rates soon after the taper is expected to end next June. Chart 8UST Curve Forwards Too Flat Vs. Likely Fed Rate Hikes UST Curve Forwards Too Flat Vs. Likely Fed Rate Hikes UST Curve Forwards Too Flat Vs. Likely Fed Rate Hikes We still see December 2022 as the most likely liftoff date, although a faster decline in unemployment could move that timetable forward. The bigger issue for the US Treasury market, however, is not the timing of liftoff but how fast the pace of hikes will be afterward. On that note, future rate expectations are still far too low. For example, according to the New York Fed’s Primary Dealer Survey, the fed funds rate is expected to average only 1.7% over the next ten years (top panel), a level that has proved to be a ceiling for the 10-year Treasury yield so far in 2021. Our colleagues at BCA Research US Bond Strategy recently made the case for expecting the US Treasury curve to bearishly steepen in the coming months. In their view, longer-maturity Treasury yield forward rates were too low compared to a fair value determined by the likely path for the funds rate that assumes rate hikes start in December of next year and rise by 100bps per year to a terminal rate of 2.08% (Chart 8). Interestingly, 2-year Treasury forward rates were in line with the projections of our US Bond Strategy team’s fair value framework. We fully agree with our US Bond colleagues on the likelihood of future Treasury curve steepening. This fits with our views on many developed market countries, not just the US, where longer-maturity bond yields were pricing in too few future rate hikes relative to what was likely to occur over the next few years. Even when taking a much longer perspective, the US Treasury curve looks too flat right now. Going back to the mid-1980s, the current 2-year/10-year US Treasury curve slope of just over 100bps has never been reached (in a flattening move) in the absence of actual Fed rate hikes (Chart 9). Chart 9UST Curve Has Never Been This Flat Without Some Actual Fed Rate Hikes UST Curve Has Never Been This Flat Without Some Actual Fed Rate Hikes UST Curve Has Never Been This Flat Without Some Actual Fed Rate Hikes This week, we are adding a new trade to our Tactical Overlay table to benefit from this expected move in the US yield curve, a US Treasury 2-year/10-year curve steepener (combined with a position in cash, or US 3-month treasury bills, to make the entire trade duration-neutral). We are also taking profits on our previous Tactical US curve flattening trade, which has returned 0.84% since initiation back in June. The exact securities and weightings for our new trade can be found in the Tactical Overlay Trades table below. Bottom Line: Longer-term US Treasury yields are priced too low relative to the likely peak in the fed funds rate in the next cycle. Position for a steeper US Treasury curve until Fed rate hikes are imminent, which will likely not be until Q4/2022.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Overlay Trades GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark Image The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index

Highlights Duration & Country Allocation: Global bond yields have been driven by growth and inflation expectations over the past year, but shifting policy expectations are now the more important driver. Tighter monetary policies will pressure global bond yields higher over the next 6-12 months, but not equally. Stay underweight countries where tapering and rate hikes are more likely (the US, the UK, Canada, New Zealand) relative to countries where policymakers will move much more slowly (euro area, Australia, Japan). Inflation-Linked Bonds: An update of our Comprehensive Breakeven Indicators shows limited scope for a further widening of breakeven inflation rates between nominal and index-linked government bonds in most developed economies, most notably in Europe. Downgrade strategic (6-18 months) exposure to inflation-linked bonds (vs nominals) to underweight in Germany, France and Italy. Feature Chart of the WeekGlobal Bond Yield Drivers: Inflation Now, Labor Later Global Bond Yield Drivers: Inflation Now, Labor Later Global Bond Yield Drivers: Inflation Now, Labor Later “Actually, we talked about inflation, inflation, inflation. That has been a topic that has occupied a lot of our time and a lot of our debates.” – ECB President Christine Lagarde Are you tired of talking about inflation? Central bankers likely are. The only problem is that is the job of monetary policymakers to worry about inflation – and the appropriate policy response – when it is rising as fast as been the case in 2021. The current global inflation surge, on the back of supply squeezes for both durable goods and commodity prices, will ease to some degree in 2022. This does not mean, however, that global bond yields have seen their cyclical peak. The driver of higher yields is already starting to transition from high inflation to tightening labor markets and rising wage costs – more enduring sources of potential inflation that will require monetary tightening in many, but not all, countries (Chart of the Week). This week, we discuss the implications of this shift to more policy-driven yields for the country allocation decisions in a government bond portfolio, for both nominal and inflation-linked debt. Shorter-Term Bond Yields Awaken, Longer-Term Yields Take Notice October represented a shift in the relative performance of developed economy government bond markets compared to the previous three months, most notably at the extremes (Chart 2). UK Gilts were the largest underperformer in Q3, down 1.8% versus the Bloomberg Global Treasury index (in USD-hedged terms, duration-matched to the benchmark), while Spain (+0.7%), Australia (+0.4%) and Italy (+0.3%) were the outperformers. In October, that script was flipped with Gilts being the best performer (+2.3%), Australia being the worst performer (-4.2%) and Spain (-0.6%) and Italy (-1.5%) reversing the Q3 gains. Chart 2 Those particular swings in relative performance were a result of shifting market views on policy changes in those countries. The UK Gilt rally was largely contained to a single day, and focused at the long-end of the Gilt curve after the Conservative government announced a smaller-than-expected budget deficit on October 26 - with much less issuance of longer-maturity bonds – which triggered a huge -22bps decline in 30-year Gilt yields. The Australian bond selloff was a triggered by a rapid market reassessment of the next move in monetary policy for the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) after an upside surprise on Q3 inflation data. Italian and Spanish debt also sold off on the back of growing fears that even the European Central Bank (ECB) would be forced to tighten policy in response to higher inflation. The backup in Australian and European yields ran counter to the latest policy guidance of from the RBA and ECB, indicating speculation of a bond-bearish hawkish policy shift. In countries where policymakers have been more explicit about the need for monetary tightening, like Canada and New Zealand, government bonds performed poorly in both Q3 and October. While US Treasury returns were “flattish” in both Q3 (0.1%) and October (0.1%), the 2-year Treasury yield doubled from 0.27% to 0.52% during October as the market pulled forward the timing and pace of Fed rate hikes starting next year (Chart 3). Shifting views on monetary policy have not only impacted the relative performance of bond markets, but also the shapes of yield curves. The bigger increases seen in shorter-maturity bond yields have resulted in a fairly synchronized global move towards curve flattening (Chart 4). This would not be unusual during an actual monetary policy tightening cycle involving rate hikes. However, within the developed economies, only Norway and New Zealand have seen an actual rate hike. In other words, yield curves have been flattening on the anticipation of a rate hiking cycle – but one that is expected to be relative mild. Chart 3A Bond-Bearish Repricing Of Global Rate Expectations A Bond-Bearish Repricing Of Global Rate Expectations A Bond-Bearish Repricing Of Global Rate Expectations ​​​​​​ Chart 4Some Violent Repricing Of Policy Expectations Some Violent Repricing Of Policy Expectations Some Violent Repricing Of Policy Expectations ​​​​​​ Forward interest rates in Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curves are discounting higher rates in 2022 and 2023 across most countries, but with stable rates in 2024 (Chart 5). Yet the cumulative amounts of tightening are very modest, especially when compared to inflation (both realized and expected). Only in New Zealand are policy rates expected to go above 2% by 2023, with the US OIS curve discounting the Fed lifting policy rates to just 1.4%. In the UK, markets are discounting 123bps of hikes by the end of 2022 and a rate cut in 2024 – market pricing that strongly suggests that the Bank of England will make a “policy error” by tightening too much, too quickly, over the next year. Chart 5Markets Still Think Central Banks Will Not Have To Hike Much Markets Still Think Central Banks Will Not Have To Hike Much Markets Still Think Central Banks Will Not Have To Hike Much After the October repricing of rate expectations, and reshaping of yield curves, we see a few conclusions – and investment opportunities – that stand out: US Treasuries With the Fed set to begin tapering asset purchases, the market discussion has moved on to the timing and pace of the post-taper rate hike cycle. The US OIS curve is discounting two Fed hikes in the second half of 2022, starting shortly after the likely end of the Fed taper in June. That timing and pace for 2022 is a bit more aggressive than we are expecting, but a rapidly tightening US labor market and rising wage growth could force the Fed to at least match the market pricing for hikes next year. On that note – the US Employment Cost Index in Q3 rose +1.3%, the fastest quarterly pace since 2001, and +3.7% on a year-over-year basis, the highest since 2004. The greater medium-term risk for the Treasury market is that the Fed starts to signal a need to go higher and faster than the market expects in 2023 and even into 2024. US Treasury yields remain well below levels implied by growth indicators like the ISM index. Thus, there is upside potential as the Fed tightens because of persistent above-trend growth and falling unemployment over the next couple of years (Chart 6). Chart 6Stay Below-Benchmark On US Duration Exposure Stay Below-Benchmark On US Duration Exposure Stay Below-Benchmark On US Duration Exposure We continue to recommend a below-benchmark duration strategic stance for dedicated US bond investors, based on our expectation that US bond yields will climb higher over the next 12-18 months. However, our more preferred way to play this for global investors is as a spread trade versus euro area bond yields – specifically, selling 10-year US Treasury versus 10-year German bunds (Chart 7). Chart 7Position For UST Underperformance Vs. Europe Position For UST Underperformance Vs. Europe Position For UST Underperformance Vs. Europe ​​​​​​ While headline inflation in the euro area has rapidly converged to the pace of US inflation over the past few months, this is overwhelmingly due to surging European energy costs. The pace of underlying inflation, as proxied by measures like the Cleveland Fed trimmed mean CPI and the euro area trimmed mean CPI constructed by our colleagues at BCA Research European Investment Strategy, has diverged sharply with the latter barely above 0%. The ECB will not follow the Fed into a rate hiking cycle next year, which will push US government yields higher versus European equivalents. Australia Government Bonds Chart 8Fade The RBA 'Rate Shock' In Australia Fade The RBA 'Rate Shock' In Australia Fade The RBA 'Rate Shock' In Australia The RBA fought back against the sharp repricing of Australian interest rate expectations earlier this week by signaling that no rate hikes are expected until 2023. This is a modest change from the previous forward guidance of 2024 liftoff, but a surprisingly dovish message for markets that had rapidly moved to price in rate hikes next year after the big upside surprise on Q3/2021 Australian inflation With underlying trimmed mean inflation now having crept back into the RBA’s 2-3% target range, although just barely at 2.1%, the RBA would be justified in removing some degree of monetary accommodation. The central bank has already been doing so, on the margin, with some earlier tapering of the pace of asset purchases and last week’s decision to formally abandon its yield control target on shorter-dated government bond yields. Per the RBA’s current forward guidance, however, a move to actual rate hikes would require more evidence of tighter labor markets and faster wage growth – and thus, a more sustainable move to the 2-3% inflation target - that is not yet evident in measures like the Wage Cost Index (Chart 8). We plan on doing a deeper dive into Australia for next week’s report, where we’ll more formally evaluate our strategic view on Australian bond markets. For now, we remain comfortable with our overweight stance on Australian government bonds, as the RBA is still projected to be one of the less hawkish central banks in 2022. UK Gilts Chart 9 The sharp rally in longer-dated UK Gilts seen at the end of October was due to a downside surprise in the expected size of the UK budget deficit next year, and the amount of Gilt issuance that will be needed to finance it. The UK Debt Management Office (DMO) said it planned to issue 194.8 billion pounds ($267.5 billion) of bonds in the current 2021/22 financial year, 57.8 billion pounds less than its previous remit back in March. The pre-budget market expectation was for a far smaller reduction of 33.8 billion pounds. The cut in issuance was most pronounced for longer-dated Gilts, -35% lower than the March budget issuance projection (Chart 9). With longer-maturity Gilts always in high demand from longer-term UK institutional investors, a major “supply shock” of reduced issuance can temporarily boost bond prices and lower yields. This is especially true in the UK where more aggressive rate hike expectations, and more defensive bond market positioning after the August/September selloff, left Gilts vulnerable to a short squeeze. The most important medium-term drivers of Gilt yields are still expectations of growth, inflation and future policy rates. There was very little change in shorter-dated Gilt yields or UK OIS forward rates after last week’s budget announcement – all the price action was the long end of the Gilt yield curve, resulting in an overall bull flattening. As we discussed in last week’s report, we expect the next move in the shape of the Gilt curve will be towards a steeper curve, likely bond-bearishly as long-term yields are still priced too low relative to how high UK policy rates will eventually have to climb in the upcoming BoE hiking cycle. The post-budget flattening has made the valuation of longer-maturity Gilt curve steepeners far more attractive, according to our UK butterfly spread valuation model (Table 1). Table 1UK Butterfly Spread Valuations From Our Curve Models Transitioning From Inflation To Policy As The Driver Of Bond Yields Transitioning From Inflation To Policy As The Driver Of Bond Yields Chart 10A New UK Tactical Trade: Long 10yr Bullet Vs. 7/30 Barbell A New UK Tactical Trade: Long 10yr Bullet Vs. 7/30 Barbell A New UK Tactical Trade: Long 10yr Bullet Vs. 7/30 Barbell The trade that stands out as most attractive is to go long the 10-year Gilt bullet versus selling a 7-year/30-year Gilt curve barbell – a butterfly spread that was last priced this attractively in 2013 (Chart 10). We are adding this as a new recommended trade in our Tactical Overlay portfolio, the details of which (specific bonds and weightings for each leg of the trade) can be found on page 17. Bottom Line: Tighter monetary policies will pressure global bond yields higher over the next 6-12 months, but not equally. Stay underweight countries where tapering and rate hikes are more likely (the US, the UK, Canada, New Zealand) relative to countries where policymakers will move much more slowly (euro area, Australia, Japan). Global Breakevens: How Much More Upside? The surge in global inflation this year has helped boost the performance of inflation-linked government bonds versus nominal equivalents. Yet current breakeven inflation rates have reached levels not seen in some time. Last week, the 10-year US TIPS breakeven hit a 15-year high of 2.7%, the 10-year German breakeven reached a 9-year high of 2.1%, while the 10-year UK breakeven climbed to 4.2% - the highest level since 1996 (!). With market-based inflation expectations reaching such historically high levels, how much more can breakevens widen – especially with central banks incrementally moving towards tighter monetary policies? To answer that question, we turn to our Comprehensive Breakeven Indicators (CBIs). The CBIs measure the upside/downside potential for breakevens for the US, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the UK, Canada and Australia. The CBIs incorporate the following three measures: The residuals from our 10-year breakeven inflation spread fair value models, as a measure of valuation. The spread between 10-year breakevens and survey-based measures of inflation expectations, as a measure of the inflation risk premium embedded in breakevens The gap between headline inflation and the central bank inflation target, as an indication of the existing inflation backdrop and of future monetary policy moves in response to an inflation trend that can help to reverse that trend. Each of the three measures is standardized and added together to produce a single CBI. A higher reading on CBI suggests less potential for additional increases in breakevens, and vice versa. The latest readings from our CBIs are shown in Chart 11. The red diamonds for each country are the actual CBI, while the stacked bars show the individual CBI components. The highest CBI readings are in Germany and the US, while the lowest are in Canada and France. Importantly, no country has a CBI significantly below zero, indicative of the more limited upside potential for breakevens after the big run-up since mid-2020. Chart 11 As a way to assess the usefulness of the CBIs as an indicator of the future breakeven moves, we constructed a simple backtest. We looked at how 10-year breakevens performed in the twelve months after the CBI hit certain thresholds (Chart 12). The backtest results show that the CBIs work as intended, signaling reversals of existing trends once the CBIs climb above +0.5 or below -0.5. The average (mean) size of the breakeven reversal gets larger as the CBI moves further to extremes. Chart 12 Based on the latest reading from the CBIs, we are making significant changes to the recommended allocations (Chart 13) to inflation-linked bonds (ILBs) in our model bond portfolio on pages 14-15: Chart 13No Overweights In Our Revised Allocations To Global Linkers No Overweights In Our Revised Allocations To Global Linkers No Overweights In Our Revised Allocations To Global Linkers Downgrading ILBs to underweight (versus nominal government bonds) in Germany, France, Italy & Spain from the current overweight allocation. The backtested CBI history for those countries suggests breakevens are more likely to fall over the next twelve months. Furthermore, realized euro area inflation is more likely to fall in 2022, given the lack of underlying euro area inflation described earlier in this report. Downgrade Japan ILBs to neutral from overweight. While the CBI is not at a stretched level, realized Japanese core inflation has struggled to stay in positive territory – even in the current environment of soaring commodity and durable goods prices. Upgrade ILBs in Canada and Australia to neutral from underweight. The former has a CBI that is still below zero, while the latter benefits from the lack of RBA hawkishness compared to other central banks. We are maintaining our other ILB allocations in the UK (underweight vs. nominals) and the US (neutral vs. nominals). In the UK, stretched breakevens are at risk from the hawkish turn by the BoE, which is a clear response to the higher UK inflation expectations. While the US CBI is at a high level, we see better value in playing for narrowing TIPS breakevens at shorter maturity points that are even more exposed to a likely slowing of commodity fueled inflation in 2022 than longer maturity TIPS breakevens. In other words, we see a steeper US breakeven curve, but a flatter real yield curve as the Fed tightens. Bottom Line: An update of our Comprehensive Breakeven Indicators shows limited scope for a further widening of breakeven inflation rates between nominal and index-linked government bonds in most developed economies, most notably in Europe.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.co Recommendations Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning     Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark Image The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index

Highlights The 26th Conference of the Parties (COP26) will open this weekend in Glasgow, Scotland, amid a global crisis induced in no small measure by policies and regulations that led to energy-market failures. Price-distorting regulations and ad hoc fixes – e.g., retail price caps, "windfall profits" taxes – will compound the current crisis. Mad rushes to cover energy and space-heating demand in spot coal and gas markets when renewable-energy output falters will be repeated, given utility-scale battery storage will continue to be insufficient to replace hydrocarbons in the transition to a low-carbon economy.  On the back of higher coal, gas and oil demand, CO2 emissions will return to trend growth or higher this year (Chart of the Week). Base metals capex will have to increase at the mining and refining levels to meet renewables and EV demand.  This includes the need to diversify metals' production and refining concentration risks more broadly.1 We remain strategically long the COMT ETF and the S&P GSCI index, as these fundamental imbalances are addressed.  We also are initiating a resting buy order on the XME ETF if this basic materials ETF trades down to $40/share. Feature Going into the COP26 meetings starting this weekend, delegates no doubt will be preoccupied with the global energy crisis engulfing markets as the Northern Hemisphere winter approaches. In no small measure, the crisis is a product of poor policy design and regulatory measures meant to accelerate the transition to low-carbon economies globally. This is most apparent in China, the UK and the EU. China and the UK use retail price-caps to control the cost of energy to households. In China, the price caps recently brought state-owned electricity providers to the brink of bankruptcy, because suppliers were not able to pass through higher wholesale prices for coal and natural gas to retail consumers. In the UK, retail price caps actually did result in bankruptcies of smaller electricity providers. In the EU, price caps and "windfall profits" taxes are being imposed on retail energy providers in different states in the wake of the energy crisis.2 Chart 1 China's Impressive Renewables Push China has been making significant progress in introducing renewable energy to their energy supply mix, particularly wind and solar (Chart 2), accounting for 81.5% of Asia-Pacific's wind generation last year, and 55.5% of the region's solar generation. Chart 2 China generates just 11% of its energy from renewables. This has been insufficient to meet demand over the past year, owing to a combination of reduced coal supplies; colder-than-normal temperatures last winter, and hotter-than-normal temps during the summer brought on by a La Niña event. While energy demand was expanding over the course of the year due to strong economic growth in 1H21 and weather-related demand over the course of the year (for heating and cooling), provincial officials were vigorously enforcing the state-mandated "dual-control policy," which in some instances led to overly aggressive shutdowns of coal mines that left local markets short of the fuel needed to supply ~ 63% of the country's electricity.3 Chinese authorities have said that they would “go all out” to boost coal production in a bid to tackle widespread power cuts. Some 20 provinces in China have experienced electricity rationing and blackouts over the past month due to power-production shortfalls driven by a lack of coal. The power rationing was imposed due to a shortage of coal supply, which led to the surge in coal prices. The high coal prices, in turn, forced coal-power companies to cut back their production to avoid losses that threatened to bankrupt them.4 To be able to ensure coal and electricity supplies this winter, state authorities released new rules to enforce a policy scheme that includes increasing coal production capacity and revising the electricity pricing mechanism. China's state-owned Global Times news service reported more than 150 coal mines have been approved to re-open.5 The regional governments can prioritize their energy intensity targets over energy consumption. Coal-fired power prices, which are largely state-controlled, will be allowed to fluctuate by up to 20% from baseline levels. However, raising household tariffs is seen as a difficult task politically, given that China's per-capita income remains low.6 UK, EU Market-Distortions The UK electricity production and supply market consists of three segments – producing, distributing, and selling electricity. Entities can operate in any or all of these areas. As in many things, the UK punches way above its weight in renewables, accounting for 15% of wind generation and 7.5% of solar produced in Europe, as seen in Chart 2. Wind can supply ~ 25% of UK power, depending on weather conditions. For all renewables, the UK accounts for 14% of Europe's total generation capacity. Twice a year, the national energy regulator, The Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) sets a cap on the price at which electricity sellers or retailers can supply power to the final consumer. While the maximum price retailers can sell electricity to consumers is capped, the price they can buy it from the electricity producer is not. This price depends on market factors, including fuel costs. When wind power dropped sharply this past summer, electric suppliers were forced to scramble for natgas as a generation fuel, and, at the margin, coal. In the UK, natural gas powers more than 35% of the electricity mix, and accounts for 15% of Europe's natgas-fired generation. Coal generation in the UK accounts for 1% of Europe's coal fueled electricity generation. China's push to secure additional coal and natgas places it in direct competition for limited supplies with European buyers. High demand, stiff competition, reduced supply, and low inventories all contribute to higher gas prices globally (Chart 3). Easing pandemic related restrictions globally has released pent-up energy demand, which is expected to move higher over the next few months, as the Northern Hemisphere possibly sees another colder-than-normal winter, and economic growth boosts manufacturing demand. Chart 3 Capping selling prices during periods of very high fuel costs squeezes retailers’ profit margins. In the last six weeks, seven UK retailers have gone under, affecting ~ 1.5 million consumers. Such a system favors the incumbents: retailers that can produce their own electricity and hedge their exposure to price volatility have access to lower costs of capital and higher economies of scale. When retailers are no longer able to operate due to bankruptcy, their customers are distributed to the remaining suppliers. The British government would prefer to offer financial support to persuade larger companies to take on stranded consumers than save retailers who are being forced to go out of business.7 However, as wholesale gas prices rise, industry operators – even the more established ones – may not be keen to borrow from the government to take on additional consumers. The EU also finds itself facing stiff competition from Asia for natgas imports. According to Qatar’s energy minister, suppliers prefer Asian buyers since they purchase natgas on fixed long-term contracts to ensure energy security, unlike European buyers which purchase much of their  fuel on the spot market.8 The EU's natgas imports are projected to remain uncertain as Russian exports have fallen below pre-pandemic levels and supply via the NordStream2 pipeline is delayed. With one of the lowest working inventories within the EU (Chart 4), the UK, which imports ~ 65% of its natural gas, is unable to protect itself from supply volatility. These high prices coincided with low wind speeds earlier this year, curtailing wind power, which as of 2020, is the UK’s second highest electricity source. Chart 4 Unfocused Policy Hinders Energy Transition It is impossible to gainsay the merit of the decarbonization of the global economy. Disrupting weather patterns, spewing particulates and chemicals into the atmosphere, dumping plastics into the oceans and waterways, and ravaging forests worldwide do not contribute to any species fitness for survival. However, policymakers appear to be completely ignoring existing constraints any serious decarbonization effort would require. Encouraging the winddown of fossil fuels decades before sufficient renewable-energy and carbon-capture technologies are developed and deployed to replace the lost energy indirectly forces a harsh calculation: Do sovereign governments want to restrict income growth and quality-of-life improvements to the energy available from renewables (including EVs) at any point in time? Who actually makes that choice and enforces the rules and regulations that go with it? We have written about the enormous increase in base metals supply that will be required over the coming decades to develop and deploy renewables, most recently in La Niña And The Energy Transition last month. Base metals – like oil and gas markets – are extremely tight, and are operating in years-long physical deficit conditions, as can be seen in the bellwether copper and Brent markets (Charts 5 and 6). Chart 5Base Metals Markets Are Tight … Base Metals Markets Are Tight... Base Metals Markets Are Tight... Chart 6As Is Oil... As Is Oil... As Is Oil... Any policy contemplating a global buildout of renewable-energy generation and its supporting grids, along with EVs and their supporting infrastructure, should start with the recognition laws, regulations and rules need to encourage responsible, safe and sound incentives for developing the supply side of base metals markets. An argument also could be made for fossil-fuels, which arguably should receive technology subsidies and favorable tax treatment – not unlike those granted to renewables and EVs – to invest in carbon-capture tech development. Rules and regulations favoring long-term contracts so that producers are able to address stranded-asset concerns and secure funding for these projects also should be developed. Investment Implications Absent a more thought-out and focused effort to write laws, develop rules and regulations on at least the level of trading blocs, the evolution to a low-carbon energy future will be halting and volatile. This in an of itself is detrimental to funding such an enormous undertaking. Until something like it comes along, we remain long commodity-index exposure – the S&P GSCI index and the COMT ETF – and long the PICK ETF. At tonight's close we are opening a resting order to buy the XME ETF if if trades to or below $40/share.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Paula Struk Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy paula.struk@bcaresearch.com Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish Crude oil markets unexpectedly moved lower mid-week on the back of yet another drop in Cushing, OK, inventory levels reported by the US EIA. Cushing crude-oil stocks stood at 27.3mm barrels vs. 31.2mm barrels for the week ended 22 October 2021. Two years ago, Cushing inventories were at 46mm barrels. Markets had been rallying on falling Cushing storage levels over the past couple of weeks. The EIA's estimate of refined-product demand – known as "Product Supplied" – remains below comparable 2019 levels at this time of year, although not by much (19.8mm b/d vs. 21.6mm b/d). We expect global oil and liquids demand to rebound above 100mm b/d in the current quarter. Stronger demand in 2022 and 2023 prompted us to raise our Brent forecasts to $80/bbl and $81/bbl, respectively (Chart 7). Base Metals: Bullish Copper continues to trade lower as markets price in a higher likelihood of softer demand for the bellwether metal as the global power-supply crunch weighs on manufacturing activity, particularly in China. Copper inventories are still at precariously low levels, with the red metal in global inventories hitting lows not seen since 2008 (Chart 8). This will keep copper's forward curve backwardated over time, as inventories are drawn to fill the gap between supply and demand globally. Low inventory levels are expected to persist as power rationing in China, which was responsible for more than 41% of global refined copper output in 2020, persists. Precious Metals: Bullish Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell's remarks stating supply disruptions are expected to keep US inflation elevated next year are supportive to base metals. Higher inflation will increase demand for the yellow metal, as investors look for a hedge against USD debasement. However, the Fed's asset-purchase taper, which we expect to be announced in November, and the interest rate hikes we expect as a result of it beginning in end-2022, will push bond yields higher and raise the opportunity cost of holding non-yielding gold. That said, we believe the Fed will remain behind the inflation curve and will work to keep real rates weak, which will tend to support gold prices. Chart 7 Brent Forecast Lifted Slightly Brent Forecast Lifted Slightly Chart 8 Global Copper Inventories Rebuilding But Still Down Y/Y Global Copper Inventories Rebuilding But Still Down Y/Y       Footnotes 1     Please see our report entitled La Niña And The Energy Transition, published on September 30, 2021, for discussion. 2     Please see Spain to Cap Windfall Energy Profits as Rally Hits Inflation published by bloomberglaw.com on September 14, 2021. 3    Please see carbonbrief.org's China Briefing for 23 and 30 September and 14 October 2021 for additional discussion, and fn 1 above. 4    Please see ‘All out’ to beat power shortages; 2050 ‘net-zero’ for airlines; ‘Critical decade” for global warming, published by China Brief on 7 October, 2021. 5    Please see Chinese officials move to increase coal output amid shortage published by globaltimes.cn 13 October 2021. 6    Data from the World Bank showed China's GDP per capita reached $10,500 in 2020, below the global average of $10,926. Some experts expect any reform to be gradual. 7     Please see Kwarteng insists UK will avoid power shortages as gas crisis worsens, published by the Financial Times on September 20, 2021. 8    Please see Qatar calls for embrace of gas producers for energy transition, published by the Financial Times on October 24, 2021.   Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations