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Highlights Uncertainty & Yields: Global bond yields, driven to all-time lows as investors seek safety amid rioting markets, now discount a multi-year period of very weak global growth and inflation. Bond Portfolio Strategy: Maintain overall neutral portfolio duration exposure with so much bad news already priced into yields. Downgrade overall global spread product exposure to underweight versus governments on a tactical (0-3 months) basis given intense uncertainties on COVID-19 and oil markets. Model Bond Portfolio Changes – Governments: Upgrade countries that are more responsive to changes in the level of overall global bond yields and with room to cut interest rates (the US & Canada) to overweight, while downgrading sovereign debt with a lower “global yield beta” and less policy flexibility (Germany, France, Japan) to underweight. Model Bond Portfolio Changes – Credit: Downgrade US high-yield, euro area corporates and emerging market USD sovereigns & corporates to underweight. Feature Chart of the WeekOn The Verge Of Global ZIRP On The Verge Of Global ZIRP On The Verge Of Global ZIRP The title of this report is a quote from a worried BCA client this morning, discussing his daily commute into Manhattan from the New York suburbs. We can think of no better analogy for the mood of investors in the current market panic. After having enjoyed a decade of riding the gravy train of recession-free growth and robust returns on risk assets, all underwritten by accommodative monetary policies, worries about a deflationary bust following the boom have intensified. The global spread of COVID-19, the ebbs and flows of the US presidential election and, now, a stunning collapse in oil prices – markets have simply been unable to process the investment implications of these unpredictable events all at once. At times of such stress, the obvious thing to do is to stand aside and hedge portfolios while awaiting better visibility on the uncertainties. At times of such stress, the obvious thing to do is to stand aside and hedge portfolios while awaiting better visibility on the uncertainties. It is clear that global government bonds have been a preferred hedge, with yields collapsing to record lows worldwide. While most of the market attention has been on the breathtaking fall in US yields that has pushed the entire Treasury curve below 1% as the market has moved to discount a swift move to a 0% fed funds rate. New lows were also hit yesterday in countries that had been lagging the Treasury rally: the 10-year German bund reached -0.85% yesterday, while the 10-year UK Gilt fell to an intraday all-time low of 0.08% with some shorter-maturity Gilt yields actually dipping into negative territory (Chart of the Week). The common driver of yesterday’s yield declines was the 25% plunge in global oil prices after the weekend collapse of the OPEC 2.0 alliance between Russia and Saudi Arabia. The inflation expectations component of global bond yields fell accordingly, continuing the correlation with energy prices seen over the past decade. Yet the real component of global bond yields has also been falling, with markets increasingly pricing in an extended period of weak growth and negative real interest rates – especially in the US. Collapsing US Treasury Yields Discount A Recession, Not A Financial Crisis Chart 2Re-opening Old Wounds Re-opening Old Wounds Re-opening Old Wounds While this latest plunge in US equity markets has been both rapid and powerful, the damage only takes us back to levels on the S&P 500 last seen as recently as January 2019 (Chart 2). The turmoil, however, has reopened old wounds in markets that had suffered their own crises over the past decade, with European bank stocks hitting new all-time lows and credit spreads on US high-yield Energy bonds and Italian sovereign debt (versus Germany) sharply blowing out. The backdrop remains treacherous and global equity markets will likely remain under pressure until the number of new COVID-19 cases peaks outside of China (especially in the US). If there is one silver lining amidst the market carnage, it is that there appears to be few signs of 2008-style systemic financial stress. If there is one silver lining amidst the market carnage, it is that there appears to be few signs of 2008-style systemic financial stress. Bank funding indicators like Libor-OIS spreads and bank debt spreads have widened a bit over the past week but remain at very subdued levels (Chart 3). This is in sharp contrast to classic risk aversion indicators like the price of gold and the value of the Japanese yen versus the Australian dollar, which are closing in on the highs seen during the 2008 global financial crisis and 2012 European debt crisis. Chart 3A Growth Downturn, Not A Systemic Crisis A Growth Downturn, Not A Systemic Crisis A Growth Downturn, Not A Systemic Crisis We interpret this as investors being far more worried about a deep global recession than another major financial crisis. That is also confirmed in the pricing of US Treasury yields, especially when looking at the real yield. Chart 4Does The UST Market Think R* Is Negative? Does The UST Market Think R* Is Negative? Does The UST Market Think R* Is Negative? Chart 5Another Convexity-Fueled Bond Rally Another Convexity-Fueled Bond Rally Another Convexity-Fueled Bond Rally The entire TIPS yield curve is now negative for the first time, even with the real fed funds rate below the Fed’s estimate of the “r*” neutral real rate (Chart 4). The combination of low and falling inflation expectations, and plunging real yields, indicates that the Treasury market now believes that the neutral real funds rate is not 0.8%, as suggested by the Fed’s estimate of r*, but is somewhere well below 0%. With the fed funds rate now down to 0.75% after last week’s intermeeting 50bps cut, the Treasury market is not only pricing the Fed quickly returning to the zero lower bound on the funds rate, but staying trapped at zero for a very long time. The Treasury market is not only pricing the Fed quickly returning to the zero lower bound on the funds rate, but staying trapped at zero for a very long time. Yet that may be too literal an interpretation of the incredible collapse of US Treasury yields. The power of negative convexity is also at work, driving intense demand for long-duration bonds that puts additional downward pressure on yields. Large owners of US mortgage backed securities (MBS) like the big commercial banks have seen the duration of their MBS holdings collapse as yields have fallen. The result is that banks are forced to buy huge amounts of Treasuries (or receive US dollar interest rate swaps) to hedge their duration exposure of negative convexity MBS, hyper-charging the fall in Treasury yields – perhaps over $1 trillion worth of buying, by some estimates.1 This is a similar dynamic to what occurred last summer in Europe, when sharply falling bond yields triggered convexity-related demand for duration from large asset-liability managers like pension funds, further fueling the decline in bond yields (Chart 5). Yet even allowing that some of the Treasury yield decline has been driven by a mechanical demand for duration, a 10-year US Treasury yield of 0.56% clearly discounts expectations of a US recession, as well – which appears justified by the recent performance of some critical US economic data. In Charts 6 & 7, we show a “cycle-on-cycle” analysis of some key US financial and indicators and how they behave before and after the start of the past five US recessions. The charts are set up so the vertical line represents the start of the recession, and we line up the data for the current business cycle as if the latest data point represents the start of a recession. Done this way, we can see if the current data is evolving in a similar fashion to past US economic downturns. Chart 6The US Business Cycle Looks Toppy The US Business Cycle Looks Toppy The US Business Cycle Looks Toppy Chart 7COVID-19 Will Likely Trigger A Confidence-Driven US Recession COVID-19 Will Likely Trigger A Confidence-Driven US Recession COVID-19 Will Likely Trigger A Confidence-Driven US Recession The charts show that the current flat 10-year/3-month US Treasury curve and steady decline in corporate profit growth are both accurately following the path entering past US recessions. Other indicators like the NFIB Small Business confidence survey, the Conference Board’s leading economic indicator and consumer confidence series typically peak between 12-18 months prior to the start of a recession, but appear to be only be peaking now. The same argument goes for initial jobless claims, which are usually rising for several months heading into a recession but remain surprisingly steady of late – a condition that seems unlikely to continue as more companies suffer virus-related hits to their sales and profits and begin to shed labor. Net-net, these reliable cyclical US data suggest that the Treasury market is right to be pricing in elevated recession risk – especially with US cases of COVID-19 starting to increase more rapidly and US financial conditions having tightened sharply in the latest market rout. Bottom Line: Global bond yields, driven to all-time lows as investors seek safety amid rioting markets, now discount a multi-year period of very weak global growth and inflation – most notably in the US. Allocation Changes To Our Model Bond Portfolio The stunning fall in global bond yields has already gone a long way. Yet it is very difficult to forecast a bottom in yields, even with central banks easing monetary policy to try and boost confidence, before there is evidence that the global COVID-19 outbreak is being contained (i.e. a decreasing total number of confirmed cases). By the same token, corporate bonds (and equities) will continue to be under selling pressure until the worst of the viral outbreak has passed. We raised our recommended overall global duration stance to neutral last week – a move that was more tactical in nature as a near-term hedge to our strategic overweight corporate bond allocations in our Model Bond Portfolio amid growing market volatility. Yet with the new stresses coming from the collapse in oil prices and increasing spread of COVID-19 in the US and Europe, we are moving to a much more cautious near-term stance on global credit. Yet with the new stresses coming from the collapse in oil prices and increasing spread of COVID-19 in the US and Europe, we are moving to a much more cautious near-term stance on global credit. This week, we are making the following additional changes to our model bond portfolio to reflect the growing odds of a global recession: Downgrade global corporates to underweight versus global governments Maintain a neutral overall portfolio duration, but favor countries within the government bond allocation that are more highly correlated to changes in to the overall level of global bond yields. Chart 8Favor Higher-Beta Bond Markets With Room To Cut Rates Favor Higher-Beta Bond Markets With Room To Cut Rates Favor Higher-Beta Bond Markets With Room To Cut Rates Given how far yields have declined already, we think raising allocations to “high yield beta” countries that can still cut interest rates, at the expense of reduced weightings toward low beta countries that have limited scope to ease policy, offers a better risk/reward profile than simply raising duration exposure across the board. Such a nuanced argument is less applicable to global corporates, where elevated market volatility, poor investor risk appetite and deteriorating global growth momentum all argue for continued near-term underperformance of corporates versus government bonds. Specifically, we are making the following changes to our recommended allocations, presented with a brief rationale for each move: Upgrade US Treasuries and Canadian government bonds to overweight: Both Treasuries and Canadian bonds are higher beta markets, as we define by a regression of monthly yield changes to changes in the yield of the overall Bloomberg Barclays Global Treasury index (Chart 8). The Fed cut 50bps last week as an emergency measure and has 75bps to go before reaching the zero bound, which the market now expects by mid-year. Additional bond bullish moves after reaching the zero bound, like aggressive forward guidance, restarting quantitative easing and even anchoring Treasury yields in a BoJ-like form of yield curve control, are all possible if the US enters a recession. Meanwhile, the Bank of Canada (BoC) followed the Fed’s cut with a 50bp easing the next day and signaled that additional rate cuts are likely to prevent a plunge in Canadian consumer confidence. The collapsing oil price likely seals the deal for additional rate cuts by the BoC in the next few months. Downgrade Japanese government bonds to maximum underweight: Japanese government bonds (JGBs) are the most defensive low-beta market in model bond portfolio universe, thanks to the Bank of Japan’s Yield Curve Control policy that anchors the 10yr JGB yield around 0%. This makes JGBs the best candidate for a maximum underweight stance when global bond yields are not expected to rise in the near term, as we expect. Downgrade Germany and France to Underweight: The ECB meets this week and will be under pressure to ease policy given recent moves by other major central banks. A -10bps rate cut is expected, which may happen to counteract the recent increase in the euro versus the US dollar, but there is also possibility that ECB will increase and/or extend the size and scope of its current Asset Purchase Program. Given the ECB’s lack of overall monetary policy flexibility, and low level of inflation expectations, we see limited scope for the lower-beta German and French government bonds to outperform their global peers. Remain overweight UK and Australia: While both Australian government bonds and UK Gilts have a “median” yield beta in our model bond portfolio universe, both deserve moderate overweights as there is still the potential for rate cuts in both countries. The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) cut the Cash Rate by -25bps last week and they are still open to cut further to boost a sluggish economy hurt by wildfires and weak export demand from China. The RBA will stay more dovish for longer until we will see clear signs of a rebound of the Chinese economy from the COVID-19 outbreak. The Bank of England (BoE) will likely cut its policy rate later this month, or even before the next scheduled policy meeting, as COVID-19 is starting to spread through the UK. Downgrade US High-Yield To Underweight: US junk bonds had already taken a hit during the global market selloff in recent weeks, but the collapse in oil prices pummeled the market given the high weighting of US shale producers in the index (Chart 9). With additional weakness in oil prices likely as Russia and Saudi Arabia are now in a full-fledged price war, US high-yield will come under additional spread widening pressure focused on the weaker Caa-rated segment that contains most of the energy names. We recommend a zero weight in the Caa-rated US junk bonds, within an overall underweight allocation to the entire asset class. Downgrade euro area investment grade and high-yield corporates to underweight: COVID-19 is now spreading faster in Germany and France, after leaving Italy in a full-blown national crisis. The export-oriented economies of the euro area were already vulnerable to a global growth slowdown, but now domestic growth weakness raises the odds of a full-blown recession – not a good environment to own corporate bonds, especially with the euro now appreciating. Downgrade emerging market (EM) USD-denominated sovereigns and corporates to underweight: EM debt remains a levered play on global growth, so the increased odds of a global recession are a problem for the asset class – even with sharply lower interest rates and early signs of a softening in the US dollar (Chart 10). Chart 9Downgrade US Junk Bonds To Underweight Downgrade US Junk Bonds To Underweight Downgrade US Junk Bonds To Underweight Chart 10Still Not Much Broad-Based Weakness In The USD Still Not Much Broad-Based Weakness In The USD Still Not Much Broad-Based Weakness In The USD We will present the new specific model bond portfolio weightings, along with a discussion of the risk management implications of these changes, in next week’s report. Bottom Line: Maintain overall neutral portfolio duration exposure with so much bad news already priced into yields. Downgrade overall global spread product exposure to underweight versus governments on a tactical (0-3 months) basis given intense uncertainties on COVID-19 and oil markets. Upgrade high-beta countries with room to cut interest rates (the US & Canada) to overweight, while downgrading lower-beta countries with less policy flexibility (Germany, France, Japan) to underweight. Downgrade US high-yield, euro area corporates and emerging market USD sovereigns & corporates to underweight.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Ray Park, CFA Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1https://www.wsj.com/articles/fear-isnt-the-only-driver-of-the-treasury-rally-banks-need-to-hedge-their-mortgages-1158347080 Recommendations Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights The elevated uncertainty about global growth stemming from the COVID-19 virus in China has not only made investors more anxious, but central bankers as well. This means that, only six weeks into the year, policymakers may already be having to rethink their expected strategies for 2020 - which were, for the most part, sitting on hold after the monetary easing in 2019. This has important implications for the direction of global bond yields, which were starting to see a cyclical increase before the viral outbreak. In this report, we present what we see as the most important data for investors to focus on in the major developed markets to get the central bank call correct. This is based on our interpretation of recent speeches, press conferences and published research. We also provide our own suggested data series to watch for each country – which do not always line up with what central bankers are saying they are most worried about. We conclude that it is still not clear that the global growth backdrop has turned sustainably more bond bullish, but there is no pressure on any of the major central banks to move away from extremely accommodative policy settings. Feature Over the past four weeks, all of the major central banks have had the opportunity to formally communicate their current views to financial markets. Whether it was through post-policy- meeting press conferences or published monetary policy reports, central bankers have tried to signal their intentions about future changes in the direction of interest rates, given the heightened uncertainties about the momentum of global growth. At the moment, our global leading economic indicator (LEI) is still signaling that 2020 should see some rebound in global growth – and bond yields – after the sharp 2019 manufacturing-led slowdown (Chart 1). Unfortunately, the latest read on the global LEI uses data as of December, so it does not include what is almost certainly to be a very severe slowdown in the Chinese (and global) economy in the first quarter of 2020 due to the COVID-19 virus outbreak. Underlying stories within each developed market economy – on growth, inflation and potential financial imbalances – suggest that the additional interest rate cuts now discounted globally may not come to fruition if the China shock is contained to the first quarter of the year.  Central bankers are in the same spot as investors, trying to ascertain the extent of the hit to global growth from the virus, both in terms of size and, more importantly, duration. This comes at a time when many central banks were already formally rethinking how to meet their own individual inflation-targeting mandates given the persistence of low global inflation alongside tight labor markets (Chart 2). Chart 1Global Bond Yields: Think Globally, Act Locally Global Bond Yields: Think Globally, Act Locally Global Bond Yields: Think Globally, Act Locally Chart 2Common Worries For All CBs: China & Global Inflation Common Worries For All CBs: China & Global Inflation Common Worries For All CBs: China & Global Inflation That all sounds potentially very bond-bullish, but a lot of bad economic news is already discounted in the current low level of global bond yields. More importantly, the underlying stories within each developed market economy – on growth, inflation and potential financial imbalances – suggest that the additional interest rate cuts now discounted globally may not come to fruition if the China shock is contained to the first quarter of the year. In this Weekly Report, we provide a brief synopsis of what we believe are the biggest concerns for each of the major developed economy central banks. This is based on our read of recent policy decisions and central banker statements, as well as our own understanding of the current reaction function of policymakers. Our intention is to provide a short list of indicators to watch for each central bank, to help cut through the noise of data and news during this current period of unusual uncertainty, as well as our own assessment of what policymakers should be focusing on more. We conclude that it is still too soon to expect a new wave of bond-bullish global monetary policy easings in 2020. It will take evidence pointing to an extended shock to global growth from the COVID-19 virus to reverse the bond-bearish signal from other indicators like our global LEI. Federal Reserve Chart 3Federal Reserve: Focus On Financial Conditions & Inflation Expectations Federal Reserve: Focus On Financial Conditions & Inflation Expectations Federal Reserve: Focus On Financial Conditions & Inflation Expectations Currently, the Fed’s commentary suggests a policy bias that can be described as “neutral-to-dovish”, but it is giving no indication that additional rate cuts are likely in 2020 after the 75bps of cuts last year. Markets remain skeptical, however, with -42bps of cuts over the next twelve months now priced into the USD overnight index swap (OIS) curve according to our Fed Discounter (Chart 3). What the Fed seems most focused on: Fed officials seem focused on measures of market-based inflation expectations, like TIPS breakevens, as the best indication that current policy settings are appropriate (or not) relative to the growth outlook of investors. While FOMC members have expressed concern about TIPS breakevens being persistently below the 2% inflation target, they would not necessarily respond to a further decline in breakevens with more rate cuts without first seeing the US Treasury curve becoming inverted for a prolonged period, just like in 2019 (middle panel). Right now, with the 10-year TIPS breakeven at 1.67% and the 10-year/3-month US Treasury curve now at only -1bp, another decline in longer-term inflation expectations will likely invert the Treasury curve. What the Fed should be more focused on: US financial conditions are highly stimulative, with equity indices back near all-time highs and corporate credit spreads remaining well-contained at tight levels. Given the usual lead times of financial conditions indices to US cyclical growth indicators like the ISM manufacturing index (bottom panel), a continuation of the most recent bounce in the ISM is still the most likely result – even allowing for a near-term hit to global growth from China. While FOMC members have expressed concern about TIPS breakevens being persistently below the 2% inflation target, they would not necessarily respond to a further decline in breakevens with more rate cuts without first seeing the US Treasury curve becoming inverted for a prolonged period, just like in 2019. Bottom Line: The incoming US growth data is critical to determine the Fed’s next move. If there is no follow through from easy financial conditions into faster growth momentum, the odds increase that the Treasury curve will become more deeply inverted for a longer period of time – an outcome that would likely prompt more rate cuts, especially if equity and credit markets also begin to sell off as growth disappoints. European Central Bank Chart 4ECB: Focus On Manufacturing & Inflation Expectations ECB: Focus On Manufacturing & Inflation Expectations ECB: Focus On Manufacturing & Inflation Expectations The ECB has been clearly signaling that it still has a dovish bias, although central bank officials have acknowledged that the options available to them to ease further are limited with policy rates already in negative territory. The market agrees, as there are only -7bps of cuts over the next twelve months now priced into the EUR OIS curve according to our ECB Discounter (Chart 4). What the ECB seems most focused on: The ECB has been paying the most attention to the contractions in euro area manufacturing data (like PMIs) and exports seen in 2019. Rightly so, as nearly all of the two percentage point decline in year-over-year euro area real GDP growth since the late-2017 peak has come from weaker net exports. The central bank has also been concerned about the depressed level of inflation expectations, with the 5-year EUR CPI swap rate, 5-years forward, now at only 1.23% - far below the ECB’s inflation target of “at or just below” 2%. What the ECB should be more focused on: We agree that the focus for the ECB should be most concerned about the weakness in manufacturing/exports and low inflation expectations – the latter having not yet responded to extremely stimulative euro area financial conditions (most notably, the weak euro). The euro area economy is highly leveraged to Chinese demand, with exports to China representing 11% of total euro area exports. This makes leading indicators of Chinese economic activity, like the OECD China LEI and the China credit impulse, critically important indicators in determining the future path of European export demand. The COVID-19 outbreak in China could not have come at a worse time for the ECB, as there have been tentative signs of stabilization in cyclical euro area indicators like manufacturing PMIs in recent months. Bottom Line: The COVID-19 outbreak in China could not have come at a worse time for the ECB, as there have been tentative signs of stabilization in cyclical euro area indicators like manufacturing PMIs in recent months. If the China demand shock to euro area exports is large enough, the ECB will likely be forced to deliver a modest interest rate cut – or an expansion of the size of its monthly asset purchases – to try and boost growth. Bank Of England Chart 5Bank Of England: Focus On Business Sentiment & Labor Costs Bank Of England: Focus On Business Sentiment & Labor Costs Bank Of England: Focus On Business Sentiment & Labor Costs The Bank of England (BoE) has a well-deserved reputation as having an unpredictable policy bias under outgoing Governor Mark Carney, but the central bank does appear to be currently leaning on the moderately dovish side of neutral. Short-term interest rate markets also feel the same way, with -19ps of easing over the next twelve months priced into the GBP OIS curve according to our BoE Discounter (Chart 5). What the BoE seems most focused on: The BoE has been paying a lot of attention to indicators of UK business sentiment, which had been negatively impacted by both Brexit uncertainty and global trade tensions in 2019. The BoE has focused on the link from depressed business sentiment to weak investment spending and anemic productivity growth as an important reason why UK potential GDP growth has been so low and why UK inflation expectations have been relatively high. What the BoE should be more focused on: We agree that business sentiment should be the BoE’s greatest area of focus. Sentiment has shown a solid improvement of late, after the signing of the “phase one” US-China trade deal in December and the formal exit of the UK from the EU on January 31. The CBI Business Optimism survey (measuring the net balance of optimists versus pessimists) soared from -44 in October to +23 in January – the biggest quarterly jump ever recorded in the series. It remains to be seen if this improvement in confidence can be sustained and begin to arrest the steady decline in UK capital spending and productivity growth, and the associated surge in unit labor costs and inflation expectations, that has taken place since the 2016 Brexit vote. Bottom Line: The BoE’s next move, under the new leadership of incoming Governor Andrew Bailey, is not clear. Inflation expectations remain elevated but the recovery in business sentiment is still fragile. One potential risk to watch: UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson may choose to take a bolder stand on trade negotiations with the EU after his resounding election victory in December, risking an outcome closer to the “no-deal Brexit” scenario that was most feared by UK businesses. Bank Of Japan Chart 6Bank of Japan: Focus On Exports & The Yen Bank of Japan: Focus On Exports & The Yen Bank of Japan: Focus On Exports & The Yen The Bank of Japan (BoJ) seems to have had a perpetually dovish bias since the 1990s. Yet the current group of policymakers under Governor Haruhiko Kuroda, realizing that they have run out of realistic policy options after years of extreme stimulus, has not been signaling that fresh easing measures are on the horizon, even with economic growth and inflation remaining very weak in Japan. Markets have taken the hint, with only -6bps of rate cuts over the next twelve months priced into the JPY OIS curve according to our BoJ Discounter (Chart 6). What the BoJ seems most focused on: The BoJ has been vocally concerned about the recent slump in Japanese consumer spending, which declined -2.9% (in real terms) in Q4 after the sales tax hike last October. That blow to consumption was expected, but could not have come at a worse time for a central bank that was already worried about plunging Japanese manufacturing activity and exports – the latter declining by -8% in nominal terms as of December 2019. There is little hope for a near-term rebound given the certain hit to global growth and export demand from virus-stricken China. What the BoJ should be more focused on: Given that Japan is still an economy with a large manufacturing sector that is levered to global growth, the BoJ should remain focused on the path for Japanese exports. A bigger risk, however, comes from the Japanese yen, which has remained very stable over the past year. It has proven very difficult to generate any rise in Japanese inflation without some yen weakness, and with headline CPI inflation now only at +0.2%, a burst of yen strength would likely tip Japan back into outright deflation. Bottom Line: The BoJ is now stuck in a very bad spot, with no real ability to provide a major monetary policy stimulus for the stagnant Japanese economy. At best, all the central bank could do is deliver a small interest rate cut and hope for a quick rebound in global manufacturing activity and/or some yen weakness to boost flagging inflation. Bank Of Canada Chart 7Bank of Canada: Focus On Housing & Capital Spending Bank of Canada: Focus On Housing & Capital Spending Bank of Canada: Focus On Housing & Capital Spending The Bank of Canada (BoC) surprised many observers by keeping policy on hold last year, even as central banks worldwide engaged in various forms of monetary easing to offset the effects of the global manufacturing downturn. The BoC’s recent messaging has been relatively neutral, in our view, although Governor Stephen Poloz has not completely dismissed the possibility of rate cuts in his speeches. The markets are strongly convinced that the BoC will need to belatedly join the global easing party, with -32bps of rate cuts now priced into the CAD OIS curve according to our BoC Discounter (Chart 7) What the BoC seems most focused on: The BoC remains highly concerned over the high level of Canadian household debt, especially given how Canadian consumer spending has been highly geared towards trends in house price inflation over the past few years. This is likely why the BoC has been reluctant to cut policy rates as “insurance” against the effects of a prolonged global growth slump, to avoid stoking a new Canadian housing bubble. Interestingly, the commentary from BoC officials has taken on a bit more dovish tone whenever USD/CAD has threatened to break down below 1.30, suggesting some fears of unwanted currency appreciation. What the BoC should be more focused: The BoC should continue to monitor developments in the Canadian housing market, given the implications for consumer spending and, potentially, financial stability if there is another boom in house prices. The central bank should also pay even greater attention than usual to the subdued level of oil prices, which has triggered a deep slump in the oil-rich Alberta province that has weighed on the overall level of Canadian business investment spending. Persistently soft oil prices would also force the BoC to continue resisting strength in the Canadian dollar. It would likely take a breakdown in oil prices, or an outright decline in house prices, for the rate cut expectations currently discounted in the CAD OIS curve to come to fruition. Bottom Line: The BoC appears under no pressure to make any near-term interest rate adjustments, especially with realized inflation now sitting at the midpoint of the BoC’s 1-3% target band. It would likely take a breakdown in oil prices, or an outright decline in house prices, for the rate cut expectations currently discounted in the CAD OIS curve to come to fruition. Reserve Bank Of Australia Chart 8Reserve Bank Of Australia: Focus On Underemployment & Housing Reserve Bank Of Australia: Focus On Underemployment & Housing Reserve Bank Of Australia: Focus On Underemployment & Housing The Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) has been very transparent over the past year, loudly signaling a dovish bias and following through with 75bps of rate cuts that took the Cash Rate to a record low of 0.75%. The latest messaging has been a bit more balanced, while still leaving the door to additional rate cuts if the economy worsens. Markets are expecting at least one more easing, with -24bps of rate cuts over the next twelve months priced into the AUD OIS curve, according to our RBA Discounter (Chart 8). What the RBA seems most focused on: The RBA’s main concerns have centered around the persistent undershoot of Australian inflation, with core inflation remaining below the central bank’s 2-3% target band since the beginning of 2016. The central bank has attributed this to persistent excess capacity in the Australian labor market, as evidenced by the elevated underemployment rate. The RBA is also paying close attention to the Australian housing market and its links to consumer spending, with house prices already responding positively to last year’s RBA rate cuts. The outlook for exports is also on the RBA radar, particularly after the recent surge that lifted the Australia trade balance into surplus but is now at risk from a plunge in Chinese demand. What the RBA should be more focused on: We agree that the labor market should be the main focus for the RBA, particularly the underemployment rate which is still high at 8.3%, signaling that core CPI inflation should remain subdued (bottom panel). We also see the RBA as potentially being more sanguine about the risks of a renewed upturn in the housing market than many observers expect, since that would provide a potential offset to a likely pullback in exports which are now a record 25% of GDP (middle panel). Bottom Line: The RBA still has a clear dovish bias, even though they are currently on hold to assess the impact of last year’s easing. RBA Governor Philip Lowe noted in a recent speech that more cuts may be necessary “if the unemployment rate deteriorates”, suggesting that the labor market is the main area of focus for the central bank. Reserve Bank Of New Zealand Chart 9Reserve Bank Of New Zealand: Focus On The Terms Of Trade & Non-Tradeables Inflation Reserve Bank Of New Zealand: Focus On The Terms Of Trade & Non-Tradeables Inflation Reserve Bank Of New Zealand: Focus On The Terms Of Trade & Non-Tradeables Inflation The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) was one of the more dovish central banks in 2019, cutting the Cash Rate by 75bps to a record low of 1%. The overall tone of the central bank’s recent commentary remains cautious, but has taken on a more balanced tone. Markets are priced appropriately, with only -13bps of rate cuts over the next twelve months discounted in the NZD OIS curve according to our RBNZ Discounter (Chart 9). What the RBNZ seems most focused on: The latest messaging from the RBNZ has highlighted the downside risks to New Zealand from weak global growth, but those are now more manageable since the central bank estimates the economy is operating at full employment. In its latest Monetary Policy Statement (MPS), the RBNZ noted that the economy has been able to weather the weakness in global growth thanks to the positive terms of trade effect from elevated New Zealand export prices – a trend that the central bank expects will persist in 2020 even if external demand remains sluggish (middle panel). The central bank has also expressed some concern over the recent pickup in domestically-driven inflation measures, with core CPI inflation back above 2% (bottom panel). What the RBNZ should be more focused on: The RBNZ is right to focus on global growth, particularly given the coming demand shock from virus-stricken China. While the New Zealand dollar has always been a critical variable for the RBNZ in its policy decisions, the currency now takes on added importance given the central bank’s expectation that export prices and the terms of trade will remain elevated. If the latter turns out to be wrong, the RBNZ will be far more likely to take actions to ensure that the Kiwi dollar stays undervalued. Bottom Line: The RBNZ still has a dovish policy bias, but the hurdle to deliver additional rate cuts after last year’s easing seems a bit higher now. It would likely take a major downturn in global growth, combined with a decline in New Zealand export prices and some cooling of domestic inflation, to get the RBNZ to cut again in 2020. Investment Conclusions Based on our “whirlwind tour” of the major developed market central banks in this report, we can make the following conclusions regarding the expected path of interest rates, and bond yields, in these countries: There are no central banks with anything resembling a hawkish bias – not surprising in the current slow global growth environment with heightened uncertainty. The least dovish central banks are the BoC and the RBNZ, which are not signaling any urgency to cut rates. The most dovish central bank is the RBA, which is indicating a clear willingness to cut again if domestic growth deteriorates. The Fed and the BoE are somewhere in the middle of the “dovishness” spectrum, with both likely willing to ease policy but only under a specific set of circumstances. The ECB and BoJ are clearly boxed in having policy rates already below the zero bound, limiting their ability to ease further if needed. In our view, the rate cut probabilities in the US and Canada seem a bit too aggressive, as we are not anticipating major growth slowdowns in either country over the next 6-12 months.  Looking back at our Central Bank Discounters, the largest amount of rate cuts over the next year are now discounted in the US (-42bps), Canada (-32bps), Australia (-24bps) and the UK (-19bps). At the same time, the fewest cuts are priced in Japan (-6bps), the euro area (-7bps) and New Zealand (-13bps). In our view, the rate cut probabilities in the US and Canada seem a bit too aggressive, as we are not anticipating major growth slowdowns in either country over the next 6-12 months. The odds seem more “fair” in the other countries, in terms of the size of rate cut expectations versus the probability of those cuts actually being delivered because of domestic economic considerations. What does this all mean for global bond investing this year? For that we can turn to our Global Golden Rule framework, which links expected returns of government bonds versus cash to the difference between actual and expected rate cuts.1 US Treasuries and Canadian government bond yields are most at risk of underperforming their global peers in 2020 as the Fed and BoC disappoint the current dovish rate cut expectations discounted in interest rate markets.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing", dated September 25th 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index What Central Banks Are (Or Should Be) Watching What Central Banks Are (Or Should Be) Watching Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Highlights China’s economic rebound in Q1 will be delayed due to the coronavirus, which will have a larger negative hit than SARS. New stimulus measures will assist a rebound in demand later this year. Europe remains a geopolitical opportunity rather than a risk. As long as global growth rebounds this year, European equities can outperform their richly valued American counterparts. Emerging markets face a new headwind from the coronavirus. Emerging market performance relative to developed markets will be a key test of whether endogenous growth trends are taking shape. Tactically – over a 12-month horizon – we remain long industrial commodities; long Korean equities versus Taiwanese; and long Malaysian equities relative to emerging markets. Feature Global equities will ultimately push through the coronavirus and the Democratic Party primary election, but risks are elevated and Q1 looks to bring significant volatility. Last week we shifted to a tactically neutral stance on risk assets but we remain cyclically bullish. In this report we update our market-based GeoRisk indicators, which are almost all set to rise from low levels in the coming months as developed market equities and emerging market currencies face higher risk premiums. China: The Year Of The Rat Chart 1Markets Will Rebound Once Toll Of Virus Peaks Markets Will Rebound Once Toll Of Virus Peaks Markets Will Rebound Once Toll Of Virus Peaks The ink had hardly dried on our “Black Swan” report for 2020 when Chinese scientists confirmed human-to-human transmission of the Wuhan coronavirus (2019-nCoV), sending a wave of fear over China and the world. The number of new cases and new deaths is rising and economic activity will suffer as the Chinese New Year is extended, shoppers stay home, and international travel is canceled. The virus is likely to prove more troublesome than stock investors want to admit, at least in the short term. Too little is known to make confident assertions about promptly containing the virus or its impact on global economy and markets. The analogy with the SARS outbreak of 2003 is limited: it is not certain that this virus has a lower death rate, but it is certain that the Chinese economy is more vulnerable to disruption today than at that time – and much more influential on the global economy. The SARS episode is useful, however, in suggesting that the market will not rebound until the number of new cases and deaths turn down (Chart 1). Assuming the virus is ultimately contained – both in China and in neighboring Asian countries whose governments may not be as effective at quarantining the problem – regional consumption and production will bounce back. New stimulus measures will also take effect with a lag. Domestic political risk is structurally understated in China. Stimulus will indeed be the answer. First, the negative shock to consumer demand comes at a time when global trade is still relatively weak, thus presenting a two-pronged threat to China’s economy, which was only just stabilizing after the truce in the trade war. Second, China’s hundredth anniversary of the Communist Party, in 2021, will require the government to stabilize the economy now. The important political leadership reshuffle at the twentieth National Party Congress in 2022 is another imperative to avoid a deepening slump today (Chart 2). Chart 2China Will Stimulate To Avoid A Deepening Slump China Will Stimulate To Avoid A Deepening Slump China Will Stimulate To Avoid A Deepening Slump Beyond 2020, the Wuhan virus highlights our theme that domestic political risk is structurally understated in China. At the centennial celebration, China’s leaders aim to show that the country is a “moderately prosperous society in all respects,” emphasis added. For decades China’s leaders have emphasized industrial production to the detriment of other social and economic goals, such as food safety and a clean and safe environment for households to live in. The emergence of the middle class, writ broadly, as a majority of the population is a persistent source of pressure on leaders, as the limited opinion polling available from China demonstrates (Chart 3). In other emerging markets, a large middle class has led to social and political change when the government failed to meet growing middle class demands (Chart 4). Chart 3Chinese Social And Economic Conditions Are Source Of Pressure GeoRisk Update: The Year Of The Rat GeoRisk Update: The Year Of The Rat Chart 4Consumerism Encourages Democracy Consumerism Encourages Democracy Consumerism Encourages Democracy Chart 5China’s Government Is Behind The Curve GeoRisk Update: The Year Of The Rat GeoRisk Update: The Year Of The Rat Under General Secretary Xi Jinping, the government has cracked down on corruption and pollution as well as poverty, and has attempted to improve consumer safety and the health care system. The party officially aims to shift its policy focus from meeting the basic material needs of the population to improving quality of life. The problem is that China’s government is behind the curve (Chart 5). While it is making rapid progress – for instance, the communicable disease burden has dropped dramatically – and has unique authoritarian tools, acute problems of health, food safety, pollution, and public services will nevertheless persist. The government’s responses will inevitably fall short from time to time and heads will roll. Crisis events create the potential for the market to be surprised by the level of domestic political change or pushback, which will prove disruptive at times. Bottom Line: China’s economic rebound in Q1 will be delayed due to the coronavirus, which will have a larger negative hit than SARS. The SARS episode suggests that Chinese equities will be a tactical buy when the number of new cases and deaths begin falling. New stimulus measures will assist a rebound in demand later this year – underscoring our constructive cyclical view on Chinese and global growth. The episode highlights the challenges China faces in modernizing and improving regulations, health, and safety for the emerging middle class. Domestic political risk is understated. Europe: Political Risks Still Contained China’s near-term hit, and rebound later this year, will echo in Europe, where the economy and equity market are highly reliant on China’s credit cycle and import demand. Politically, however, Europe remains a geopolitical opportunity rather than a risk (Chart 6). Chart 6China's Hit Will Echo In Europe, But Political Risks Are Contained There GeoRisk Update: The Year Of The Rat GeoRisk Update: The Year Of The Rat The final months of last year saw the biggest and most immediate political risk – a disorderly UK exit from the EU – removed. The Trump administration is not likely to slap large-scale tariffs – such as auto tariffs on a national security pretext – because Trump is constrained by the weak manufacturing sector in advance of his election. Meanwhile immigration and terrorism have declined since 2016, draining the fuel of Europe’s anti-establishment parties. Pound weakness during the Brexit transition period is an opportunity for investors to buy. Chart 7Immigration Is Ticking Up, But From Low Levels Immigration Is Ticking Up, But From Low Levels Immigration Is Ticking Up, But From Low Levels Chart 8Refugees Will Favor Western Route Across The Mediterranean Refugees Will Favor Western Route Across The Mediterranean Refugees Will Favor Western Route Across The Mediterranean Chart 9Government Gridlock, Catalonia, And Poor Reform Momentum Will Pull Up Spanish Risk Government Gridlock, Catalonia, And Poor Reform Momentum Will Pull Up Spanish Risk Government Gridlock, Catalonia, And Poor Reform Momentum Will Pull Up Spanish Risk There are some signs of immigration numbers ticking up, but from very low levels (Chart 7). This uptick must be monitored for Spain (and France), as the renewed civil war in Libya is forcing refugees to shift to the western route across the Mediterranean (Chart 8). (Note that even peace in Libya opens the possibility of greater migrant flows as the country then becomes a viable transit route again). Our Spanish risk indicator is already ticking up due to government gridlock, the Catalonian conflict, and a declining commitment to structural economic reform (Chart 9). But this is not a major concern for global investors. The United Kingdom The UK will formally exit the European Union on January 31. The transition period – in which the UK remains fully integrated into the EU single market – expires on December 31, 2020. This is the official deadline for the two sides to negotiate a trade agreement – though it can, and likely will, be delayed. Chart 10British Political Risk Will Revive, But Not Dramatically British Political Risk Will Revive, But Not Dramatically British Political Risk Will Revive, But Not Dramatically The trade agreement is intended to minimize the negative economic impact of Brexit while ensuring that the UK reclaims its sovereignty and the EU retains the integrity of the single market. As negotiations get under way, the pound will face a new round of volatility and British political risk will revive somewhat, but we do not expect a dramatic increase (Chart 10). Ultimately we see pound weakness as an opportunity for investors to buy. The twin risks of no-deal Brexit or a socialist Jeremy Corbyn government have been decisively cast off. The end-of-year deadline can be extended and the two sides can find technical ways to compromise over regulations, tariffs, and border checks. Challenges to global growth only make an amicable solution more obtainable. Italy Our Italian GeoRisk indicator is collapsing as political risks proved yet again to be overstated (Chart 11). Chart 11Italian GeoRisk Indicator Is Collapsing Italian GeoRisk Indicator Is Collapsing Italian GeoRisk Indicator Is Collapsing The local election in Emilia-Romagna was hyped as a major populist risk, in which the chief anti-establishment players, Matteo Salvini and the League, would take power in a region viewed as the symbolic home of the Italian left wing. Instead, the League lost, the ruling Democratic Party won, and the current government coalition will survive. While the populists prevailed at another election in Calabria, this outcome was fully expected. The trend of recent provincial elections does not suggest a swell of Italian populism (Chart 12). Chart 12Recent Local Elections Do Not Suggest A Swell Of Italian Populism GeoRisk Update: The Year Of The Rat GeoRisk Update: The Year Of The Rat Chart 13The Italian Coalition Will Not Rush To Elections The Italian Coalition Will Not Rush To Elections The Italian Coalition Will Not Rush To Elections This local election is not the end of the coalition’s troubles. The left-wing, anti-establishment Five Star Movement is suffering in the polls as a result of its uninspiring, politically expedient pairing with the establishment Democrats. The Democrats may receive a boost from Emilia-Romagna but the Five Star’s leadership change – the resignation of party leader Luigi di Maio – will not be enough to revive its fortunes alone. A new Five Star leader will have to decide whether to collaborate more deeply with the Democrats or try to reclaim the party’s anti-establishment credentials. The latter would push the coalition toward an election before too long. But the Five Star’s weak polling – and the League’s persistent 10 percentage point lead over the Democratic Party in nationwide polling – suggests that the coalition will not rush to elections but will try to prepare by passing a new electoral law (Chart 13). What is clear is that the Five Star Movement will not court elections until they improve their polling. France In France, Emmanuel Macron and his ruling En Marche party have seen their popularity drop to new lows amid the historic labor strikes in opposition to Macron’s pension reforms (Chart 14). Macron’s current trajectory is dangerously close to that of his predecessor, Francois Hollande, and threatens to turn him into a lame duck. We doubt this is the case. Chart 14Macron’s Popularity Is On A Dangerous Trajectory GeoRisk Update: The Year Of The Rat GeoRisk Update: The Year Of The Rat Diagram 1The ‘J-Curve’ Of Structural Reform GeoRisk Update: The Year Of The Rat GeoRisk Update: The Year Of The Rat We view Macron’s decline as another example of the “J-Curve of Structural Reform,” in which a leader’s political capital drops amid controversial reforms (Diagram 1). If the leader avoids an election during the trough of the curve, the danger zone, then his or her political capital may well revive after the benefits of the structural reform are recognized. In this case, the reform is neutral for France’s budget deficit – a cyclical positive – but it encourages an improvement in pension sustainability by incentivizing workers to work longer and postpone retirement – a structural positive. Chart 15France's Economy Is Holding Up France's Economy Is Holding Up France's Economy Is Holding Up Chart 16A Relatively Strong Economy Will Buffer Against Political Risk In France A Relatively Strong Economy Will Buffer Against Political Risk In France A Relatively Strong Economy Will Buffer Against Political Risk In France Municipal elections in March will not go Macron’s way, but the presidential and legislative elections are not until 2022. France’s GDP growth is holding up better than that of its neighbors, wages are rising, and confidence did not collapse amid the Christmas labor strike (Chart 15). Hence we expect the increase in political risk to be manageable (Chart 16), a boon for French equities. Germany German political risk is set to rise from today’s depths (Chart 17). The country faces a major shift: globalization is structurally declining and Chancellor Angela Merkel is stepping down. Merkel’s heir-apparent, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (AKK), is floundering in the opinion polls (Chart 18). Chart 17German Political Risk Will Rise German Political Risk Will Rise German Political Risk Will Rise Chart 18Merkel's Heir-Apparent Is Floundering In The Opinion Polls Merkel's Heir-Apparent Is Floundering In The Opinion Polls Merkel's Heir-Apparent Is Floundering In The Opinion Polls Thus intra-party struggle, and conceivably even a rare early election, could emerge. But the US-China trade ceasefire offers a temporary reprieve. Next year will be different, with elections looming in the fall and the potential for a Trump reelection to trigger a second round of the US-China trade war or to shift to trade war with the EU and tariffs on German cars. The overall political trend in Germany is centrist and pro-Europe, and most of the parties are becoming more willing to upgrade fiscal policy over time. South Korea’s economic problems are priced in, while the market is dismissing Taiwan’s immense political risk. Bottom Line: The US election cycle is the chief source of policy risk and geopolitical risk in 2020, a stark contrast with the EU. European political risk will spike with a full-fledged recession, but for now it is contained. In fact the risks are largely to the upside in the short term as the countries turn slightly more fiscally accommodative. As long as global growth rebounds this year, European equities can outperform their richly valued American counterparts. Emerging Markets: Can They Outperform? With volatility likely in the near-term, Arthur Budaghyan of BCA Research’s Emerging Markets Strategy argues that the key test for emerging markets equities is whether they outperform their developed market counterparts. If they do not, then it suggests that investors still do not see endogenous growth, capital spending and profitability in emerging markets and therefore that they will lag their DM counterparts in the eventual equity upswing. Our long Korea / short Taiwan trade exploded out of the gate but has since fallen back in the face of the new headwind from the coronavirus. We have a high conviction in this trade because the difference in equity valuations faces a looming catalyst in the market’s mispricing of relative geopolitical risk: South Korea’s risk indicator is in a broad upswing while Taiwan’s has collapsed, despite the persistence of the diplomatic track with North Korea and Taiwan’s resounding reelection of both a pro-independence president and legislature (Chart 19). Mainland China will send both risk indicators upward in the near term, but South Korea’s economic problems are priced in and Trump’s diplomacy with North Korea is grounded in well-established constraints on Washington, Beijing, Pyongyang, and Seoul. By contrast the market is entirely dismissing Taiwan’s immense political risk, which does not depend on the outcome of the US election. In the coming 1-3 years, Beijing, Taipei, and Washington are all more likely to take self-interested actions that test the constraints in the Taiwan Strait, upsetting the market, before those constraints are reconfirmed (assuming they are). Beijing is likely to impose economic sanctions as Taipei’s demand for greater freedom and alliance with the US will agitate Chinese leaders who will seek to get the Kuomintang back into power. Brazilian political risk has failed to reach new highs, as anticipated, suggesting that President Jair Bolsonaro’s many problems are not driving investors to sell the real amid underlying indications of rebounding global growth and at least attempts at pro-market reform (Chart 20). Chart 19Markets Are Mispricing Geopolitical Risks In South Korea And Taiwan Markets Are Mispricing Geopolitical Risks In South Korea And Taiwan Markets Are Mispricing Geopolitical Risks In South Korea And Taiwan Chart 20Political Risks Remain Contained In Brazil Political Risks Remain Contained In Brazil Political Risks Remain Contained In Brazil Turkey’s military intervention into Libya’s civil war is another example of the foreign adventurism that we see as an outgrowth of populism and the need to distract the public’s attention from domestic mismanagement. We expect the risk indicator to rise or be flat and would remain short Turkish currency and risk assets. Bottom Line: Emerging markets face a new headwind from the coronavirus. Not only will China’s growth rebound sputter but Asian EMs will be exposed to the virus and may be less capable than China of dealing with it rapidly and effectively. With volatility looming, emerging market performance relative to developed markets will be a key test of whether endogenous growth trends are taking shape. Investment Conclusions Tactically we are closing our long GBP/JPY trade and UK curve steepener for negligible gains. We are also closing our long Egyptian sovereign bond trade for a gain of 5.59%. We remain long industrial commodities; long Korean equities versus Taiwanese; and long Malaysian equities relative to emerging markets. We expect these trades to perform well over a 12-month horizon. Strategically several of our recommendations will benefit from heightened volatility in the near term but face challenges later in the year as growth rebounds and risk sentiment revives. Nevertheless our time horizon is three-to-five years. In that span we remain long gold, long euro, long defense, short US tech, and short CNY-USD.   Matt Gertken Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Appendix Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Germany: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator France: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Spain: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator UK: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator Canada: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator China: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Section III: Geopolitical Calendar

Highlights The coronavirus scare is the catalyst for the recent correction, not the cause. The true cause is that the stock market had reached a point of groupthink-triggered instability and therefore needed the slightest catalyst to correct. Bond yields will stay depressed for (at least) the first half of 2020. Long-term investors should use corrections to overweight equities versus bonds, provided bond yields stay near or below current levels. The pound and UK-exposed investments will come under near-term pressure as UK/EU trade deal tensions ratchet up. But ultimately, UK-exposed investments will enjoy a major leg up later this year if both the UK and EU blink. Feature Chart of the WeekThe Next Up-Leg In The Pound And UK-Exposed Investments Will Occur Later In 2020 The Next Up-Leg In The Pound And UK-Exposed Investments Will Occur Later in 2020 The Next Up-Leg In The Pound And UK-Exposed Investments Will Occur Later in 2020 Corrections, Catalysts, And Coronavirus Markets have suffered a correction, begging the question: what caused it? The question is a good one, because identifying the cause can help to inform our response. Yet the danger is that the knee-jerk narrative pinpoints the catalyst rather than the true cause. In which case our response will be wrong too. For example, consider the following two narratives: Tree foliage collapses because of 40 mph winds. Tree foliage collapses because it is autumn. The first narrative is exciting, satisfying, and headline grabbing, but it only pinpoints the catalyst for the foliage collapse: the puff of wind. The second explanation is dull and less newsworthy, but it pinpoints the true cause: in autumn, tree foliage is unstable. Likewise, the coronavirus scare is the catalyst for the recent correction. The true cause is that the stock market had reached a point of groupthink-triggered instability and therefore needed the slightest catalyst to correct. The catalyst could have come from anywhere at any time. If it hadn’t been the coronavirus scare, it would have been the next worry… or the one after that. On January 9 in Markets Are Fractally Fragile we warned that usually cautious value investors had become momentum traders – undermining market liquidity and stability. When this happens, there is a two in three chance of a tactical reversal (Chart I-2). Chart I-2When Markets Are Fractally Fragile, There Is A 2 In 3 Chance Of A Tactical Reversal When Markets Are Fractally Fragile, There Is A 2 In 3 Chance Of A Tactical Reversal When Markets Are Fractally Fragile, There Is A 2 In 3 Chance Of A Tactical Reversal We also warned that the bond yield 6-month impulse – the change in the change – had recently become a severe 100 bps headwind to growth. At this severity of headwind, there is a nine in ten chance that bond yields have reached a near-term peak (Chart I-3). Chart I-3When The Bond Yield 6-Month Impulse Becomes A Severe Headwind, There Is A 9 In 10 Chance Of A Near-Term Peak In Yields When The Bond Yield 6-Month Impulse Becomes A Severe Headwind, There Is A 9 In 10 Chance Of A Near-Term Peak In Yields When The Bond Yield 6-Month Impulse Becomes A Severe Headwind, There Is A 9 In 10 Chance Of A Near-Term Peak In Yields In combination, we warned that equities would underperform bonds by about 4 percent on a tactical horizon. Now that this anticipated correction has happened, what next? Long-term investors should use corrections to overweight equities versus bonds.  First, irrespective of coronavirus – or any other catalyst – the recent severe headwind to growth from the bond yield impulse suggests that bond yields will stay depressed for (at least) the first half of 2020. Second, the good news is that the ultra-low bond yields justify and underpin the valuation of equities. Hence, at the current level of bond yields, long-term investors should use corrections to overweight equities versus bonds. Brexit Is “Done”. Or Is It? Rumour has it that Boris Johnson will banish the word Brexit from the UK government lexicon after January 31, because Brexit is now “done”. Good luck with that. When Britain wakes up bleary-eyed on Saturday February 1, what will have changed? Not a lot. The UK will have lost its voice and votes in the EU decision making institutions. Yet in practical terms nothing will have changed, because the UK and EU will enter an 11-month ‘standstill’ transition period in which existing arrangements will continue: the free movement of people, financial contributions, and full access to the single market without tariffs or customs checks. The Conservative government made a manifesto pledge not to extend the 11-month transition, so the more important question is: what will change when the standstill period ends on December 31? The answer depends on what sort of trade deal the UK and EU can negotiate in the limited space of 11 months. Or indeed whether they can negotiate a trade deal at all. Therein lies the problem. A free trade deal with the EU will require a mutual commitment to a ‘level playing field’. If the UK wants to diverge on food standards, environmental protection, labour rights, and state aid – as the Brexit purists yearn – then there is zero chance that the EU will agree to a free trade deal.  This leaves two options, neither of which is appealing. The first is for the UK to end the 11-month standstill period without a trade deal. Technically, this would not be ‘no deal’ because the withdrawal agreement would still bind both sides on citizens’ rights, financial contributions, and arrangements for Northern Ireland. A free trade deal with the EU will require a mutual commitment to a ‘level playing field’.  However, for UK companies, the option of ending the standstill period without a trade deal would constitute a painful dislocation from the single market involving tariffs and customs checks. It would also hurt the EU economies most exposed to the UK, notably Ireland and the Netherlands. Moreover, a full customs and tariff border in the Irish Sea would endanger the very existence of a ‘United’ Kingdom which included Northern Ireland.   The second option is for the UK to accept a trade deal on EU terms, recognising that the EU is the larger and more economically powerful party in the negotiation. The EU will offer the UK a tariff-free and quota-free trade deal conditional on strict level playing field conditions where the UK chooses to diverge from EU standards, combined with a mechanism to adjudicate on any level playing field disputes. Though economically better than no trade deal at all, the Brexit purists would claim it isn’t Brexit. Meanwhile, even without tariffs and quotas, UK companies whose just-in-time supply chains depended on the EU would still suffer disruption, as the level playing field was policed at every border crossing. So this option would satisfy nobody in the UK. The bigger practical problem is a lack of time to leave the EU regulatory orbit smoothly. Nobody believes that eleven months is enough time to implement a system in Northern Ireland that prevent a hard border in the Irish Sea; or indeed to implement a new UK immigration system if free movement were to end at the end of 2020. So what’s the resolution? The answer is the same as it has always been for Brexit – a gradual ratcheting up of tension ahead of a hard deadline to focus minds and force progress. Followed by a ‘fudged resolution’ at the eleventh hour in which both sides blink – because neither side is prepared to go over the cliff-edge. Recall that to get the withdrawal agreement over the line, the UK blinked by allowing Northern Ireland to be treated differently; but the EU also blinked by allowing the withdrawal agreement to be reopened. And once this happened, the pound and UK-exposed investments enjoyed a major leg up (Chart I-1 and Chart I-4-Chart I-7). Chart I-4The FTSE 250 Is A UK-Exposed ##br##Investment The FTSE 250 Is A UK-Exposed Investment The FTSE 250 Is A UK-Exposed Investment Chart I-5The FTSE 100 Is Not A UK-Exposed Investment The FTSE 100 Is Not A UK-Exposed Investment The FTSE 100 Is Not A UK-Exposed Investment Chart I-6UK General Retail Is A UK-Exposed Investment UK General Retail Is A UK-Exposed Investment UK General Retail Is A UK-Exposed Investment Chart I-7UK Clothing And Accessories Is Not A ##br##UK-Exposed Investment UK Clothing And Accessories Is Not A UK-Exposed Investment UK Clothing And Accessories Is Not A UK-Exposed Investment In the next fudged resolution, the UK could blink by retaining full regulatory alignment with the EU in most areas for a little while longer, and where it doesn’t the EU could blink by becoming flexible in its interpretation of ‘level playing field’. Obviously, nobody would call this an extension to the transition, but the UK would, in most practical terms, still be in the single market on January 1 2021. UK-exposed investments will enjoy their next major leg up later this year In this playbook, the pound and UK-exposed investments will come under near-term pressure, as UK/EU trade deal tensions ratchet up. But ultimately, UK-exposed investments will enjoy their next major leg up later this year if both the UK and the EU blink (Chart I-8). Chart I-8The Pound Still Has A Brexit Discount The Pound Still Has A Brexit Discount The Pound Still Has A Brexit Discount Fractal Trading System* There are no new trades this week. The rolling 1-year win ratio now stands at 62 percent. Chart I-9EUR/GBP EUR/GBP EUR/GBP When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report “Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model,” dated   December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com.   Dhaval Joshi Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Don't Mention The C-Word Or The B-Word Don't Mention The C-Word Or The B-Word Don't Mention The C-Word Or The B-Word Don't Mention The C-Word Or The B-Word   Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Don't Mention The C-Word Or The B-Word Don't Mention The C-Word Or The B-Word Don't Mention The C-Word Or The B-Word Don't Mention The C-Word Or The B-Word Don't Mention The C-Word Or The B-Word Don't Mention The C-Word Or The B-Word Don't Mention The C-Word Or The B-Word Don't Mention The C-Word Or The B-Word Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Highlights Most central banks still consider economic risks asymmetrical to the downside. This means that even if global growth rebounds in earnest, policy is likely to stay pat over the next three to six months. The conclusion is that relative growth fundamentals rather than central bank policy will likely drive FX price action in the next few months. Our bias remains that the growth impulse will be strongest outside the US during the first half of this year. Stay short the DXY index. The BoJ’s inaction this week makes long yen bets cheap insurance against a rise in FX volatility.  Remain short USD/JPY and go short CHF/JPY. The pound remains a buy on dips but will likely underperform the euro over the next few months. EUR/GBP should touch 0.88. The BoC kept rates on hold, but erred on the dovish side, in line with our expectations. Stay short CAD/NOK and long AUD/CAD. We were stopped out of our long NOK/SEK trade for a profit of 1.8%. We will look to rebuy the cross at lower levels. Feature Chart I-1Currency Markets Have Priced In A Benign Recovery Currency Markets Have Priced In A Benign Recovery Currency Markets Have Priced In A Benign Recovery The powerful bounce in global equity markets since the August lows has pushed many stock indices into overbought territory. Chart I-1 shows that the rise in global stocks has already discounted an improvement in global manufacturing in order of magnitude similar to the 2012 and 2016 episodes. However, currency markets have been discounting a much more benign outcome (bottom panel). The divergence between currency and equity performance is a marked change from what has prevailed during past cycles. For example, trough to peak, AUD/JPY, a key barometer of greed versus fear in currency markets, appreciated 40% during the 2012 episode, and 25% in 2016-2017, along with rising equity prices. The performance of even more high-octane currency pairs such as the RUB/JPY, the ZAR/JPY, or even the BRL/JPY, was explosive. More muted currency action this time around therefore calls into question the durability of this recovery. Perhaps given that equities are long-duration assets, it is quite plausible that the drop in interest rates in 2019 has increased their relative appeal, boosting nominal values. While that makes sense, most bond markets have also seen higher yields over the past few months, making this explanation questionable. Alternatively, the easing in trade tensions and/or the Federal Reserve’s liquidity injections may have rekindled animal spirits among domestic investors. Or perhaps, a synchronized recovery has narrowed G10 growth differentials, muting currency performance in the process but boosting share prices. The rise in global stocks has already discounted an improvement in global manufacturing. However, currency markets have been discounting a much more benign outcome. Either way, the resolution to this dissonance will be either through marked improvement in global economic data in the coming months (which will support pro-cyclical currencies), or a period of indigestion for stock markets (which will lift volatility) – or a combination of both. At a minimum, this suggests tweaking currency portfolios in anticipation of these dynamics.   On Volatility And The Dollar Everyone understands that currency markets are about relative trends. Therefore, the implicit assumption that the dollar will weaken as global growth picks up is that the epicenter of this recovery will be outside the US. Chart I-2 shows that economic data is not yet surprising to the upside outside the US, even though there has been marked improvement on a rate-of-change basis. Beneath the surface, the strongest data surprises have been in the euro area, Switzerland, New Zealand and Australia, while disappointments have been in Canada and the UK. In hindsight, the chart also highlights why the Canadian dollar was the best performing G10 currency in 2019, while the Swedish krona was the weakest. Chart I-2Growth Dispersion Has Fallen Growth Dispersion Has Fallen Growth Dispersion Has Fallen The drop in economic dispersion has pushed currency volatility near record lows (Chart I-3). Every seasoned investor does and should pay attention to low volatility. This is because what destroys portfolios is not exuberance, but complacency. This might sound like a tautology, but during the last three episodes of volatility dropping to these levels, the dollar soared and pro-cyclical currencies suffered severe losses. Everyone remembers 1997-1998, 2007-2008 and 2014-2015. Will this time be the same? While a rise in volatility is usually associated with a higher dollar, there are three key differences this time around. First, real rates turned positive in the US relative to its G10 counterparts in 2014 (Chart I-4). This meant the US dollar, which has typically been a funding currency (not least because it is a reserve currency), became the object of carry trades. It is a fair contention that any capital that wanted to find its way into US Treasurys has had more than five years of positive real carry to do so. With real relative yields in the US now rolling over, which way will capital gravitate? Chart I-3Volatility Near Record Lows Volatility Near Record Lows Volatility Near Record Lows Chart I-4Real Rates Lower In The US Real Rates Lower In The US Real Rates Lower In The US The dollar has been in a bull market since 2011, which has shifted valuations towards expensive quartiles. This is a key difference from previous low-volatility episodes when the dollar was much earlier into bull-market territory (Chart I-5). The dollar tends to run in long cycles, and a spike in volatility can either mark the beginning or the end of a cycle. As we have emphasized numerous times in previous reports, being long the US dollar is a consensus trade. Our primary basis for this is CFTC positioning data. However, a timelier leading indicator to watch is the gold-to-bond ratio. Currencies are about confidence, and a key measure of confidence in the US dollar is the total return in the US 10-year Treasury compared to gold bullion, which has collapsed (Chart I-6). The budget deficit in the US is about to explode, while it was low and falling during prior dollar riot points.   Chart I-5The Dollar Is Expensive The Dollar Is Expensive The Dollar Is Expensive Chart I-6Tug Of War Between US Bonds And Gold Tug Of War Between US Bonds And Gold Tug Of War Between US Bonds And Gold More importantly, currency markets are likely to gyrate with relative fundamentals. The slowdown in the global economy was driven by the manufacturing sector, so it is fair to assume that this is the part of the economy that is ripe for mean reversion. Historically, cyclical swings in most economies tend to be driven by manufacturing and exports rather than services (and consumption). More specifically, the currencies that have borne the brunt of the manufacturing slowdown should logically be the ones to experience the quickest reversals. This is already being manifested in a very steep rise in their bond yields vis-à-vis those in the US. For example, yields in Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and Japan have risen significantly versus those in the US since the bottom. A synchronized recovery in global growth will go a long way in further eroding the US’ yield advantage. Currencies are about confidence, and a key measure of confidence in the US dollar is the total return in the US 10-year Treasury compared to gold bullion. Bottom Line: Remain short the DXY index with an initial target of 90 and a stop loss at 100.  The Yen As Portfolio Insurance Should our thesis that the dollar is in a downtrend for 2020 be correct, it is unlikely to occur in a straight line. This argues for having some portfolio insurance. The Bank of Japan’s inaction this week may have been a red herring, since one of the most potent moves in asset markets in recent months has been the +130-basis-point move in favor of Japanese yields (Chart I-7). The gap between the USD/JPY and real rates has opened up a rare arbitrage opportunity. Should a selloff in global risk assets materialize, the yen will strengthen. On the other hand, if global growth does eventually accelerate, the yen could weaken on its crosses but strengthen vis-à-vis the dollar. This keeps short USD/JPY bets in an enviable “heads I win, tails I do not lose too much” position. The rise in Japanese yields has been driven by three key pivotal developments: For most of the past five years, the BoJ was one of the most aggressive central banks in terms of asset purchases. This was a huge catalyst for a downturn in the trade-weighted yen (Chart I-8). With a renewed expansion in the Fed’s balance sheet, monetary policy is tightening on a relative basis in Japan. Total annual asset purchases by the BoJ are currently running at about ¥20 trillion, while JGB purchases are running at ¥15 trillion. This is a far cry from the central bank’s soft target of ¥80 trillion, and unlikely to change anytime soon. Chart I-7Japanese Bond Yields Have Surged Japanese Bond Yields Have Surged Japanese Bond Yields Have Surged Chart I-8The Yen And QE The Yen And QE The Yen And QE Movements in the yen are as influenced by external conditions as what is happening domestically, given Japan’s huge export sector. Credit default swap spreads of cyclical sectors are collapsing to new lows, symptomatic of an improving profit outlook (Chart I-9). This suggests it is the growth component driving Japanese yields higher (Japanese CPI swaps have indeed been flat). This also mirrors the recent outperformance of Asian cyclical sectors relative to defensive ones. The Abe government announced a huge fiscal package last year, in part driven by the disastrous typhoons as well as the upcoming Olympics. This allowed the BoJ to upgrade its growth forecasts in its latest policy minutes. The relative performance of construction and engineering stocks are an important barometer for when the funds are flowing into the economy (Chart I-10). Chart I-9Default Risk Easing In Japan Default Risk Easing In Japan Default Risk Easing In Japan Chart I-10Fiscal Stimulus And Construction Stocks Fiscal Stimulus And Construction Stocks Fiscal Stimulus And Construction Stocks As a defensive currency, the yen tends to weaken as global growth improves, given it is usually used to fund carry trades. That said, our contention is that the yen will surely weaken at the crosses, but could still strengthen versus the dollar. As mentioned above, one catalyst is the divergence from the traditional relationship with real rates. More importantly, the USD/JPY and the DXY tend to have a positive correlation, because the dollar drives the yen most of the time. Meanwhile, net short positioning in the yen versus the dollar makes it attractive from a contrarian standpoint (Chart I-11). Given extremely low volatility, this places short USD/JPY bets as an attractive vehicle to play a rise in volatility. Chart I-11Investors Are Short The Yen Investors Are Short The Yen Investors Are Short The Yen More conservative investors could go short CHF/JPY. The recent rise in the Swiss franc threatens the nascent recovery in inflation (Chart I-12), while weakness in the Japanese yen will help lift domestic tradeable goods prices. This puts more pressure on the Swiss National Bank rather than the BoJ. Meanwhile, as a safe haven, the yen is cheaper than the franc. This is confirmed by many of our in-house models. In simple terms, relative inflation with the US has been lower in Japan over the last several decades, but the franc has been stronger. In simple terms, relative inflation with the US has been lower in Japan over the last several decades, but the franc has been stronger (Chart I-13). Meanwhile, over the last two years, a rise in volatility has benefited the yen more than the franc. Chart I-12Strong Franc Is A Headwind For Swiss Inflation Strong Franc Is A Headwind For Swiss Inflation Strong Franc Is A Headwind For Swiss Inflation Chart I-13The Yen Is Cheaper ##br##Insurance The Yen Is Cheaper Insurance The Yen Is Cheaper Insurance Bottom Line: The yen is the most attractive safe-haven currency at the moment. Remain short USD/JPY and sell CHF/JPY. Housekeeping We were stopped out of our long NOK/SEK trade for a profit of 1.8%. We will look to rebuy this cross at lower levels. The trade is mostly about carry, and we are both positive on the NOK and SEK. This makes market timing important. NOK/SEK at 1.04 will be attractive. There were no new insights from the Norges bank this week, in the context of all the central bank meetings. We will also be looking to opportunistically buy the pound, but buying EUR or GBP volatility might be a better bet. For now, despite the robust labor report, economic surprises in the UK remain negative (Chart I-14). Stay tuned. Chart I-14GBP Is Vulnerable GBP Is Vulnerable GBP Is Vulnerable Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the US have been mixed: Industrial production fell by 1% year-on-year in December. The preliminary Michigan consumer sentiment index fell slightly to 99.1 in January. MBA mortgage applications fell by 1.2% for the week ended January 17th. However, existing home sales surprised to the upside, rising 3.6% month-on-month in December. Chicago Fed national activity index fell to -0.35 from 0.41 in December. Initial jobless claims increased to 211K for the week ended January 17th, better than expectations. The DXY index increased by 0.4% this week. There are growing concerns over whether China's coronavirus would significantly drag down global growth. While this is a hiccup in the short term, we remain positive and believe that global growth will accelerate this year on easy financial conditions and faded trade war risks. Report Links: On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have been mostly positive: The current account balance came in at €33.9 billion in November. Headline and core inflation were both unchanged at 1.3% year-on-year respectively in December. The ZEW economic sentiment survey soared to 25.6 from 11.2 in January. The euro fell by 0.8% against the US dollar this week. On Thursday, the ECB maintained interest rates at -0.5%. The key takeaway from the ECB is that they are grappling with a review of their monetary policy objective in a manner that might increase accommodation. A switch to an explicit 2% inflation target and/or including a climate change objective into quantitative easing decisions heralds a much more dovish ECB. We are tightening our stop on long EUR/CAD to 1.42. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 On Money Velocity, EUR/USD And Silver - October 11, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been negative: Industrial production fell by 8.2% year-on-year in November. The trade deficit widened to ¥152.5 billion in December. Imports and exports both fell by 4.9% and 6.3% year-on-year, respectively. All industry activity index increased by 0.9% month-on-month in November. Both the coincident index and the leading economic index fell to 94.7 and 90.8, respectively in November. The Japanese yen appreciated by 0.3% against the US dollar this week. The BoJ kept interest rates unchanged, in line with expectations. More importantly, the outlook report revised the growth forecast upward to 0.9% from 0.7% for the fiscal year 2020. Moreover, the BoJ revised down the inflation forecast by 10 bps due to lower crude oil prices. Please refer to our front section this week for a more in-depth analysis on the Japanese yen. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Signposts For A Reversal In The Dollar Bull Market - November 1, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the UK have been positive: Retail sales grew by 0.9% year-on-year in December. The Rightmove house price index increased by 2.7% year-on-year in January. The ILO unemployment rate was unchanged at 3.8% in November. Average earnings grew by 3.2% year-on-year in November. This followed a 3-month improvement in employment of 208K, after what had been a dismal employment report for most of 2019. The British pound appreciated by 0.7% against the US dollar this week. The biggest volatility in European currencies in the next few weeks is likely to emerge in the EUR/GBP cross. European economic data has had the best positive surprises in the last few weeks, in part due to base effects.  However, the ECB’s transcript this week suggests leaning against any currency strength. In the UK, the pound will still trade partly on politics for now. Buying GBP and EUR volatility looks like a good bet. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Few Trade Ideas - Sept. 27, 2019 United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? - Sept. 20, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been positive: The Westpac consumer confidence index fell by 1.8% in January. Consumer inflation expectations increased to 4.7% from 4% in January. 28.9K new jobs were created in December, above consensus. This was a combination of 29.2K part-time jobs but a loss of 0.3K full-time jobs. The participation rate was unchanged at 66% in December, while the unemployment rate fell further to 5.1%. The Australian dollar fell by 0.6% against the US dollar this week. The positive jobs report placed a bid under AUD, but that quickly dissipated as the coronavirus scare started to dominate headlines. We discussed AUD in depth last week and are buyers at 68 cents. Our primary rationale is that this is a potent contrarian bet. Report Links: On AUD And CNY - January 17, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been negative: Visitor arrivals fell by 3.5% year-on-year in November. Net migration fell to 2610 from 3400 in November. The performance services index fell to 51.9 from 52.9 in December. The New Zealand dollar fell by 0.5% against the US dollar this week. While we believe that the kiwi dollar will outperform the US dollar this year amid improving global growth, domestic constraints including decreasing net migration might limit upside potential. Stay long AUD/NZD and SEK/NZD. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Place A Limit Sell On DXY At 100 - November 15, 2019 USD/CNY And Market Turbulence - August 9, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been soft: Manufacturing sales fell by 0.6% month-on-month in November. Headline inflation was unchanged at 2.2% year-on-year in December. Core inflation however, fell to 1.7% from 1.9% in December. New house prices grew by 0.1% year-on-year in December. The Canadian dollar fell by 0.8% against the US dollar this week. On Wednesday, the BoC decided to put interest rates on hold, while opening the door for possible rate cuts later this year if the Canadian data disappointed. In short, like most other central banks, the BoC is data dependent. Our story for CAD is simple – if the epicenter of a growth rebound is outside the US, CAD will underperform its antipodean counterparts. Stay long AUD/CAD. Report Links: The Loonie: Upside Versus The Dollar, But Downside At The Crosses Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 CHF Technicals 2 There have been scant data from Switzerland this week: Producer prices fell by 1.7% year-on-year in December, compared with a decrease of 2.5% the previous month. Money supply (M3) grew by 0.7% year-on-year in December. The Swiss franc has been more or less flat against the US dollar this week. We continue to favor the Swiss franc as global risks persist, including concerns about the coronavirus. However, as discussed in the front section of this report, the yen is a better hedge than the franc at the current juncture. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Notes On The SNB - October 4, 2019 What To Do About The Swiss Franc? - May 17, 2019 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 NOK Technicals 2 There was scant data out of Norway this week: The Labor Force Survey recorded an increase in the unemployment rate to 4% in November.  The Norwegian krone fell by 1.3% against the US dollar this week amid lower energy prices. On Thursday, the Norges Bank kept interest rates on hold at 1.5%, as widely expected. Moreover, the Bank Governor Øystein Olsen said that "The Committee’s current assessment of the outlook and the balance of risks suggests that the policy rate will most likely remain at the present level in the coming period," implying no change in the policy rate in the near-term. This suggests that going forward, relative fundamentals rather than policy decisions will dictate NOK’s path. Our bias is that a valuation cushion offers a margin of safety for long NOK positions. Remain short USD/NOK and CAD/NOK. Report Links: On Oil, Growth And The Dollar - January 10, 2020 Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Making Money With Petrocurrencies - November 8, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 SEK Technicals 2 There was scant data out of Sweden this week: After rising from 6% to 6.8% in November, the unemployment rate fell back to 6% in December. The Swedish krona fell by 0.2% against the US dollar this week. Going forward, improving global growth, diminished trade tensions, and fewer concerns about a near-term recession all underpin the Swedish economy and the krona. SEK is the most potent G10 cross to play a global manufacturing rebound. Report Links: Updating Our Balance Of Payments Monitor - November 29, 2019 Where To Next For The US Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights Global Corporates: The cyclical backdrop – accommodative monetary policies, improving global growth momentum, moderate inflation and subdued volatility – is supportive for the continued outperformance of global corporate bonds over sovereign debt in 2020. Corporate Bond Valuation: Extending a valuation framework we’ve introduced for US corporates to non-US credit – looking at volatility-adjusted spreads relative to both their own history and the “phase” of the monetary policy cycle - we calculate spread targets for non-US corporates in the euro area, UK and Canada. 2020 Opportunities: Current corporate spread levels are furthest above our targets (i.e. cheap) for US high-yield (most notably for Ba- and Caa-rated credit), UK high-yield and UK investment grade. Spreads are furthest below our targets (i.e. expensive) for euro area high-yield (mostly Ba-rated), US investment grade (all credit tiers) and Canadian investment grade. Feature Chart 1Deviations From Corporate Spread Targets How To Find Value In Global Corporate Bonds How To Find Value In Global Corporate Bonds One of our main investment themes for 2020 is that accommodative monetary policies and faster economic growth will delay the peak in the aging global credit cycle, giving investors another year of corporate bond outperformance versus sovereign debt in the developed economies. Returns this year will be nowhere near as robust as in 2019, however, given rich valuation starting points for much of the global corporate universe. Against this backdrop, fixed income investors will have to be more selective in allocations by country, sector and credit quality in order to outperform. To that end, in this Special Report we extend a valuation framework for corporate bond spreads first introduced for US corporates by our sister service, US Bond Strategy, to non-US credit. This methodology looks at spreads on a volatility-adjusted basis, allowing comparison of valuations versus their own history and relative to similar stages of past monetary policy cycles. Chart 1 shows the deviations of current benchmark index option-adjusted spreads (OAS) from spread targets derived from our methodology for different countries (the US, euro area, the UK and Canada) and credit quality tiers (investment grade vs. high-yield). Positive deviations imply current spreads are above the targets derived from our framework – in other words, relatively undervalued - and vice-versa. Returns this year will be nowhere near as robust as in 2019, however, given rich valuation starting points for much of the global corporate universe. Against this backdrop, fixed income investors will have to be more selective in allocations by country, sector and credit quality in order to outperform. The conclusions are that there are still opportunities for additional spread tightening from current levels for lower-rated US high-yield and both UK investment grade and high-yield corporates. At the same time, valuations are looking most stretched for euro area high-yield, US investment grade (all credit tiers) and Canadian investment grade. A Brief Word On The Outlook For Global Corporate Credit In 2020 Chart 2Positive Backdrop For Corporate Bonds Positive Backdrop For Corporate Bonds Positive Backdrop For Corporate Bonds The backdrop for global corporate bond markets will remain positive in 2020 for three main reasons: Global monetary policies will remain accommodative. Central bankers are now focusing more on boosting soft growth and low inflation expectations. Real policy interest rates in the US, euro area, UK and Canada are already below estimates of neutral like r-star (Chart 2, top panel), and will likely remain so throughout 2020. In the past, periods of credit market underperformance have occurred when monetary policy was restrictive, with real rates above neutral or government bond yield curves that were very flat or inverted (more on that later). Global growth momentum will improve. Recent data releases (global manufacturing PMIs, sentiment surveys like the global ZEW and German IFO) have shown that the 2019 global industrial downturn was in the process of bottoming out during the 4th quarter of the year. Additional improvement is likely in the coming months, based on the steady gains of the BCA Global Leading Economic Indicator (LEI). The elevated level of our global LEI diffusion index – measuring the share of individual country LEIs that are rising and which is itself a leading indicator of both the global LEI and corporate bond returns - suggests that additional outperformance of global corporates versus sovereign bonds is likely within the next 12 months (Chart 2, middle panel). Financial conditions are stimulative. Global equities and credit are off to a strong start in 2020, while market volatility is subdued across a variety of asset classes. For example, the US VIX index is now just above its 2019 low, which is consistent with narrow global corporate bond spreads (Chart 2, bottom panel). That low volatility backdrop – supported by market-friendly central bank policies - is helping keep financial conditions easy enough to lift economic growth, while also boosting investor risk appetite for corporate credit. The overall outlook for global corporate credit is still positive and investors should expect another year of corporate bond outperformance versus sovereign debt in the developed economies. Nonetheless, returns will be lower in 2020 than in 2019 due to expensive valuation starting points. As can be seen from Chart 3, global corporate bond spreads are already fairly tight relative to their long-term historical range. Also, outright index yields in many asset classes, like US high-yield, are now at new all-time lows. We interpret this as a sign that the “easy money” has already been made in being generally long corporate credit versus government bonds. Having the right tools to assess the relative values among differing credit markets will be critical to finding the best investment opportunities in this environment. Chart 3Rich Valuation Starting Points In Corporate Credit How To Find Value In Global Corporate Bonds How To Find Value In Global Corporate Bonds We can use the breakeven spread as a valuation tool by looking at the percentile rank relative to its own history, effectively showing the percentage of time that the breakeven spread has been lower in the past. Bottom Line: The cyclical backdrop – accommodative monetary policies, improving global growth momentum, moderate inflation and subdued volatility – is supportive for the continued outperformance of global corporate bonds over sovereign debt in 2020. Valuations are likely to be more of a headwind for corporate bond returns, though. Using Breakeven Spreads As A Credit Valuation Tool As a reminder to existing readers (and to new clients), one of our main valuation tools for credit instruments is the 12-month breakeven spread. That is, the amount of spread widening required for corporate bond returns to break even with a duration-matched position in government bond securities over a 12-month horizon. It can be approximated by dividing the OAS of a bond (or a benchmark bond index) by its duration. More specifically, we can use the breakeven spread as a valuation tool by looking at the percentile rank relative to its own history, effectively showing the percentage of time that the breakeven spread has been lower in the past. We find this valuation tool to be superior to others for two main reasons: (i) using the breakeven spread rather than the average index OAS allows us to control for the changing average duration of the benchmark bond indices; and (ii) the percentile rank is often a better representation of credit spreads than the spread itself.1 BCA Research US Bond Strategy and Global Fixed Income Strategy have both regularly shown the percentile rankings of US investment grade and high-yield breakeven spreads as part of our discussion of US corporate bond markets. We have never produced such rankings for non-US credit, until now. InCharts 4- 7, we show those percentile ranks relative to history for credit in the US and, for the first time, the euro area, UK, Canada, Japan, Australia and Emerging Markets US dollar denominated corporates. We also provide the breakeven spread historical percentile ranks for each individual credit tier in the Appendix charts on pages 13-16. Chart 4US: Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads US: Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads US: Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads Chart 5Euro Area: Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads Euro Area: Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads Euro Area: Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads Chart 6UK: Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads UK: Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads UK: Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads Using these charts, we can gauge which markets offer the best (or worst) level of spread, adjusted by its own volatility and compared to its own history. The most attractive corporate credit spreads on a volatility-adjusted basis are: US high-yield (mostly Caa-rated and B-rated) Japan investment grade (mostly Baa-rated and A-rated) Canada Aaa-rated UK high-yield (excluding financials) Chart 7Other Countries: Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads More Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads More Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads The least attractive corporate credit spreads on a volatility-adjusted basis are: US investment grade (all credit tiers) UK Aaa-rated Canada Baa-rated Euro Area high-yield Using this metric, US Caa-rated junk bonds look most “undervalued”, with a volatility-adjusted spread in the upper 20% of all observations. Chart 8 displays the current breakeven spread historical percentile ranks across countries and credit quality, with high-yield markets shown in red. Using this metric, US Caa-rated junk bonds look most “undervalued”, with a volatility-adjusted spread in the upper 20% of all observations. While this chart provides a quick overview of which corporate bond markets are cheap/expensive with respect to their own history, it does not allow for comparisons of the relative cheapness between markets. To do this, we need to find a way to convert the percentile rankings into some measure of a “fair value” credit spread. Chart 8Global Corporate Bond 12-Month Breakeven Spreads By Percentile Rank (%) How To Find Value In Global Corporate Bonds How To Find Value In Global Corporate Bonds Using Monetary Policy Cycles To Determine Corporate Spread Targets Our colleagues at BCA Research US Bond Strategy have come up with a novel approach for determining spread targets for US corporate credit, based on the breakeven spread percentile rankings.2 Essentially, the stance of US monetary policy, as measured by the slope of the US Treasury curve, is used to predict changes in the US credit cycle, helping to determine “cyclical” spread targets relative to the stance of monetary policy. The first step of this process is to group corporate bond excess returns (vs government debt) into buckets defined by the following “phases” of the US monetary policy cycle, measured by the yield differential between 10-year and 3-year Treasuries: Phase 1: from the end of the previous recession until the slope goes below 50 bps. Phase 2: from the time that the slope crosses below 50 bps until it inverts. Phase 3: from the time that the yield curve first inverts to the start of the next recession. Recessionary periods are not included in these phases, as all corporate credit exhibits the worst returns during those episodes. That is because economic growth and downgrade/default risks, and not the state of monetary policy, are the driving factor behind credit spread moves during recessions. Chart 9 shows the history of the US corporate bond markets broken down into “curve-defined” cycles.3 Dating back to 1974, the earliest date for investment grade bond index data, there have been five such cycles. Chart 9US Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve US Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve US Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve In Charts 10-12, we show the same phases for the euro area, the UK and Canada, using their own government bond yield curves to determine the phase of the monetary policy cycle in the same fashion as was done for the US.4 Once the phases of the monetary policy cycle are defined, we can then calculate corporate bond excess returns during each phase. Chart 10Euro Area: Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve Euro Area Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve Euro Area Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve Chart 11UK: Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve UK: Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve UK: Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve Chart 12Canada: Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve Canada: Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve Canada: Corporate Bond Performance And The Yield Curve Table 1 shows the average corporate bond annualized excess returns under each phase across every cycle that can be defined with available data. Excess returns tend to be highest in Phase 1, quite low but still positive in Phase 2, and usually turn negative during Phase 3, once the yield curve has inverted. Table 1Corporate Bond Annualized Excess Returns* (%) Under Each Phase Of The Cycle How To Find Value In Global Corporate Bonds How To Find Value In Global Corporate Bonds Currently, we are in Phase 2 in the US, euro area and UK, with yield curves that are relatively flat but still positively sloped. Historically, such periods have generated positive excess returns for corporate debt versus duration-matched government bonds, although of far smaller magnitudes compared to Phase 1 periods. Given our expectation that the Fed, ECB and Bank of England will maintain a dovish bias throughout 2020, we expect the no shift from Phase 2 for the US, euro area and the UK that would hurt corporate bond excess returns in those countries. With the Canadian yield curve now slightly inverted, however, Canada is now in Phase 3. This raises the risk that the recent strong outperformance of Canadian investment grade corporate bonds could end if the Bank of Canada does not deliver the monetary easing currently discounted in the Canadian yield curve. How We Determine Corporate Spread Targets Having defined the three phases of the monetary policy cycle, we then re-calculate our corporate bond breakeven spread percentile ranks within each phase. We then back-out a spread target for each credit tier by taking the median 12-month breakeven spread seen in similar monetary policy environments, as determined by the slope of the yield curve.5 Finally, we convert those “median” breakeven spreads into OAS targets using the current benchmark index duration and credit rating distribution. We are assuming that a reasonable spread target for any corporate bond market is determined by adjusting for both spread volatility AND the monetary policy cycle. So, essentially, we are assuming that a reasonable spread target for any corporate bond market is determined by adjusting for both spread volatility AND the monetary policy cycle. Charts 13-16 show the index OAS and their respective targets for the US (both investment grade and high-yield), euro area (both investment grade and high-yield), the UK (both investment grade and high-yield excluding financials), and Canada (only investment grade). Further, the spread targets for each individual credit tier are provided in the Appendix on pages 17-19. Chart 13US: Corporate Bond Spread Targets US Corporate Bond Spread Targets US Corporate Bond Spread Targets Chart 14Euro Area: Corporate Bond Spread Targets Euro Area: Corporate Bond Spread Targets Euro Area: Corporate Bond Spread Targets Chart 15UK: Corporate Bond Spread Targets UK: Corporate Bond Spread Targets UK: Corporate Bond Spread Targets Chart 16Canada: Corporate Bond Spread Targets Canada: Corporate Bond Spread Target Canada: Corporate Bond Spread Target For example, our spread target for US B-rated high-yield is 227bps, which is 80bps below the current index OAS. From the charts, we can make the following conclusions about the relative attractiveness of current spread levels: The largest deviations from our spread target (i.e. potentially most undervalued) are: US high-yield (mostly Caa-rated and B-rated) UK high-yield (excluding financials) The lowest deviations from our spread target (i.e. potentially most overvalued) are: Euro Area high-yield (mostly Ba-rated) Canada investment grade US investment grade (all credit tiers) This framework is an interesting way to derive corporate bond value, by adjusting for both the volatility and monetary policy backdrop. Of course, there are other factors that are more difficult to quantify that can keep spreads too tight or too wide versus these fair value levels, like investor risk tolerance or risk premia for political uncertainty. In terms of factors that are quantifiable, however, this spread target methodology is a useful way to get a sense of the richness or cheapness of global corporate debt. In terms of factors that are quantifiable, however, this spread target methodology is a useful way to get a sense of the richness or cheapness of global corporate debt. We will regularly update these targets in future BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy reports. Bottom Line: Current corporate spread levels are furthest above our targets (i.e. cheap) for US high-yield (most notably for Ba- and Caa-rated credit), UK high-yield and UK investment grade. Spreads are furthest below our targets (i.e. expensive) for euro area high-yield (mostly Ba-rated), US investment grade (all credit tiers) and Canadian investment grade.   Jeremie Peloso Research Analyst jeremiep@bcaresearch.com Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 This is because credit spreads often tighten to very low levels and then remain tight for an extended period. Thus, by showing the percentage of time that a given spread has been tighter than its current level, the percentile rank gives a better sense of this pattern than the actual spread. 2 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For US Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 3 Note that the Treasury curve used for this analysis is the spread between the 10-year Treasury and the 3-year Treasury yield. The more widely-followed 2-year Treasury was not used as there was more historical data available for the 3-year maturity. 4 Note that there are fewer cycles to analyze for these countries due to the shorter available history of corporate bond market data outside the US. 5 For more details on the spread targets please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Paid To Wait”, dated February 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Appendix Chart 1AUS: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads US: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads US: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads Chart 1BUS: High-Yield Breakeven Spreads US: High-Yield Breakeven Spreads US: High-Yield Breakeven Spreads Chart 1CEuro Area: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads By Credit Tiers Euro Area: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads Euro Area: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads Chart 1DEuro Area: High-Yield Breakeven Spreads By Credit Tiers Euro Area: High-Yield Breakeven Spreads Euro Area: High-Yield Breakeven Spreads Chart 1EUK: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads UK: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads UK: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads Chart 1FCanada: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads Canada: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads Canada: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads Chart 1GJapan: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads Japan: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads Japan: Investment Grade Breakeven Spreads Chart 2AUS: Investment Grade Spread Targets US: Investment Grade Spread Targets US: Investment Grade Spread Targets Chart 2BUS: High-Yield Spread Targets US: High-Yield Spread Targets US: High-Yield Spread Targets Chart 2CEuro Area: Investment Grade Spread Targets By Credit Tiers Euro Area: Investment Grade Spread Targets Euro Area: Investment Grade Spread Targets Chart 2DEuro Area: High-Yield Spread Targets By Credit Tiers How To Find Value In Global Corporate Bonds How To Find Value In Global Corporate Bonds Chart 2EUK: Investment Grade Spread Targets By Credit Tiers UK: Investment Grade Spread Targets UK: Investment Grade Spread Targets Chart 2FCanada: Investment Grade Spread Targets By Credit Tiers Canada: Investment Grade Spread Targets Canada: Investment Grade Spread Targets

Highlights 2020 Model Bond Portfolio Positioning: Translating our 2020 global fixed income Key Views into recommended positioning within our model bond portfolio comes up with the following conclusions: target a moderately aggressive level of overall portfolio risk, with below-benchmark duration exposure alongside meaningful overweight allocations to global corporate credit. Country Allocations: The cyclical improvement in global growth heralded by leading indicators should put upward pressure on overall global bond yields in 2020. With central banks likely to maintain accommodative policy settings to try and boost depressed inflation expectations, government bond allocations should reflect each country’s “beta” to global yield changes. That means favoring lower-beta countries (Japan, Germany, Spain, Australia, the UK) over higher-beta countries (the US, Canada, Italy). Spread Product: Better global growth, combined with stimulative monetary conditions, will provide an ideal backdrop for growth-sensitive spread product like corporate bonds to outperform government debt this year. We are maintaining an overweight stance on US high-yield credit, while increasing overweights to euro area corporates (both investment grade and high-yield). With the US dollar likely to soften as 2020 evolves, emerging market hard currency debt, both sovereign and corporate, is poised to outperform – we are upgrading both to overweight. Feature Welcome to our first report of the New Year. Just before our holiday break last month, we published our 2020 “Key Views” report, outlining the thematic implications of the BCA 2020 Outlook for global bond markets.1 In this follow-up report, we turn those themes into specific investment recommendations for the next twelve months. We will also make any necessary changes to the allocations in the Global Fixed Income Strategy (GFIS) model bond portfolio to reflect our themes. The main takeaway is that 2020 will be a much different year than 2019, when virtually all global fixed income classes delivered solid absolute returns. The unusual combination of rapidly falling government bond yields and stable-to-narrowing spreads on the majority of credit products – especially in developed market corporate debt – will not be repeated in 2020. Absolute returns from fixed income will be far lower than in 2019, forcing bond investors to focus on relative returns across maturities, countries and credit sectors to generate outperformance. With global monetary policy to remain stimulative, alongside improved global growth, market volatility should remain subdued over the next 6-12 months. Being more aggressive on overall levels of portfolio risk, particularly through higher allocations to markets like high-yield corporates and emerging market (EM) credit, is a solid strategy in a world of low risk-free interest rates and tame volatility. Top-Down Bond Market Implications Of Our Key Views As a reminder, the main fixed income investment themes from our 2020 Key Views report were the following: Global growth will rebound in 2020, led by the US and China, putting upward pressure on global bond yields. Central banks will stay dovish until policy reflation has clearly turned into inflation, limiting how high bond yields can climb in 2020 but sowing the seeds for a far more bond-bearish backdrop in 2021. Accommodative monetary policy and faster growth will delay the peak in the aging global credit cycle. Returns on global fixed income will be far lower in 2020 than in 2019, given rich valuation starting points. Country and sector selection will be more important in driving fixed income outperformance. We now present the specific fixed income investment recommendations that derive from those themes, described along the following lines: overall portfolio risk, overall duration exposure, country allocations within government bonds, yield curve allocations within countries, and corporate credit allocations by country and credit rating. Overall Portfolio Risk: MODERATELY AGGRESSIVE Global growth is in the process of bottoming out after the sharp manufacturing-driven slowdown in 2019. The cumulative lagged impact of monetary easing by central banks last year, led by the US Federal Reserve cutting rates and the European Central Bank (ECB) restarting its Asset Purchase Program, is a main reason why growth is set to rebound. Reduced trade uncertainty between the US and China should augment the impact of easier monetary policy through improved business confidence. Our global leading economic indicator (LEI), which has increased for nine consecutive months, is already heralding this improvement in the global economy. Our global LEI diffusion index – which measures the number of countries with a rising LEI and is itself a leading indicator of the LEI – suggests more gains ahead as 2020 progresses. The LEI diffusion index is also a reliable leading indicator of bond market volatility, with the former signaling that the latter will remain quiescent in 2020 (Chart 1). At the same time, cross-asset correlations across fixed income sectors should drift a bit higher alongside a more broad-based upturn in global economic growth and expanding monetary liquidity via central bank asset purchases (Chart 2). This pickup in correlations suggests that there is scope for markets that lagged the 2019 global credit rally, like EM USD-denominated sovereign debt, to make up for that underperformance in 2020. Chart 1Improving Global Growth Will Keep Volatility Subdued Improving Global Growth Will Keep Volatility Subdued Improving Global Growth Will Keep Volatility Subdued Chart 2Cross-Asset Correlations Should Increase In 2020 Cross-Asset Correlations Should Increase In 2020 Cross-Asset Correlations Should Increase In 2020 The combination of better growth, stable volatility – but with only a mild rise in correlations – is a good backdrop to take a somewhat more aggressive investment stance in fixed income portfolios in 2020.  The combination of better growth, stable volatility – but with only a mild rise in correlations – is a good backdrop to take a somewhat more aggressive investment stance in fixed income portfolios in 2020. We prefer to take that additional risk by adding to our recommended overweight to global credit, rather than further reducing our below-benchmark overall duration exposure. Overall Portfolio Duration Exposure: BELOW BENCHMARK Chart 3Global Bond Yields Poised To Move Higher Global Bond Yields Poised To Move Higher Global Bond Yields Poised To Move Higher The improvement in global growth that we are anticipating in 2020 would normally be expected to put upward pressure on the real component of global government bond yields (Chart 3, top panel). This would initially manifest itself through asset allocation shifts out of bonds into equities and, later, through expectations of rate hikes and tighter monetary policy. However, with all major developed market central banks now expressing a desire to keep policy as easy as possible to try and boost inflation expectations, the cyclical move higher in real yields is likely to be more muted in 2020. However, given our expectation that the US dollar is likely to see a moderate decline, as global capital flows move into more growth-sensitive markets in EM and Europe, there is scope for global bond yields to rise via higher inflation expectations – especially with global oil prices likely to move a bit higher, as our commodity strategists expect (bottom two panels). We recommend only a moderate below-benchmark overall duration exposure in global fixed income portfolios in 2020, given that real yields will likely stay relatively muted. Investors should maintain core allocations to inflation-linked bonds, however, to benefit from the pickup in inflation expectations that is likely to occur this year. We recommend only a moderate below-benchmark overall duration exposure in global fixed income portfolios in 2020, given that real yields will likely stay relatively muted. Investors should maintain core allocations to inflation-linked bonds, however, to benefit from the pickup in inflation expectations that is likely to occur this year. Government Bond Country Allocation: UNDERWEIGHT HIGHER-BETA MARKETS, OVERWEIGHT LOWER-BETA MARKETS At the country level, we would typically let our expectations of monetary policy changes guide our recommended allocations. Yet in 2020, we see very little potential for any change in monetary policy outside of Australia (where rate cuts can happen early in the year) and Canada (where a rate hike may be possible later in the year). Thus, we think that a more useful framework for making fixed income country allocation decisions in 2020 is to rely on the “yield betas” of each country to changes in the overall level of global bond yields. Chart 4 shows the three-year trailing yield betas for 10-year government bonds of the major developed markets. Changes in the 10-year yields are compared to the yield of the 7-10 year maturity bucket of the Bloomberg Barclays Global Treasury Index (as a proxy for the unobservable “global bond yield”). On that basis, the higher-beta markets are the US, Canada and Italy, while the lower-beta markets are Japan, Germany, France, Spain, Australia and the UK. Thus, we want to maintain underweight positions in the former group and overweight positions in the latter group. At the moment, we already have most of those tilts within our model bond portfolio, with two exceptions: we are currently neutral (benchmark index weight) in the UK and Canada. For the UK, Brexit uncertainty has made it difficult to take a strong view on the direction of Gilt yields - a problem now compounded further with Andrew Bailey set to take over from Mark Carney as the new Governor of the Bank of England. Staying neutral, for now, still seems like the best strategy until all the policy uncertainties are fully resolved. Canadian bond yields are more likely to maintain their “higher-beta” status as global yields rise, as we discussed in a recent report.2 Thus, this week, we move our recommended allocation for Canadian government bonds to underweight from neutral. For Canada, the growth and inflation data continue to print strong enough to keep the Bank of Canada on a relatively more hawkish path than the other developed market central banks. This suggests that Canadian bond yields are more likely to maintain their “higher-beta” status as global yields rise, as we discussed in a recent report.2 Thus, this week, we move our recommended allocation for Canadian government bonds to underweight from neutral. Applying Our Global Golden Rule To Government Bond Allocations In September 2018, we published a Special Report introducing a government bond return forecasting methodology called the “Global Golden Rule.”3 This is an extension of a framework introduced by our sister service, US Bond Strategy, that links US Treasury returns (versus cash) to changes in the fed funds rate not already discounted in the US Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve. That relationship also holds in other developed market countries, where there is a clear correlation between the level of bond yields and our 12-month discounters, which measure the change in policy rates over the next year priced into OIS curves (Chart 5). Chart 4Favor Lower-Beta Government Bond Markets In 2020 Favor Lower-Beta Government Bond Markets In 2020 Favor Lower-Beta Government Bond Markets In 2020 In Table 1, we show the expected returns generated by the Global Golden Rule (shown hedged into US dollars) for the countries in our model bond portfolio universe, based on monetary policy scenarios that we deem to be most plausible for 2020. Chart 5Monetary Policy Expectations Will Remain Critical For Bond Yields Monetary Policy Expectations Will Remain Critical For Bond Yields Monetary Policy Expectations Will Remain Critical For Bond Yields In Table 2, we show the returns on a duration-adjusted basis (expected total return divided by duration). We then rank the return scenarios for overall country indices, aggregating the returns of the individual yield curve maturity buckets shown in those two tables, in Table 3. Table 1Global Golden Rule Forecasts For 2020 Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2020: Selectively Aggressive Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2020: Selectively Aggressive The results in Table 1 show that expected returns are still expected to be positive across most countries, although this is largely due to the gains from hedging into higher-yielding US dollars. The duration-adjusted returns shown in Table 2 look most attractive at the front-end of yield curves across all the countries. This is somewhat consistent with our view, discussed in the 2020 Key Views report, that investors should expect some “bear-steepening” of global yield curves over the course of this year as inflation expectations drift higher (Chart 6). Table 2Global Golden Rule Duration-Adjusted Forecasts For 2020 Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2020: Selectively Aggressive Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2020: Selectively Aggressive   Chart 6Expect A Mild Reflationary Bear Steepening Of Global Yield Curves Expect A Mild Reflationary Bear Steepening Of Global Yield Curves Expect A Mild Reflationary Bear Steepening Of Global Yield Curves Table 3Ranking The 2020 Return Scenarios Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2020: Selectively Aggressive Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2020: Selectively Aggressive The results in Table 3 show that the best expected returns would come in rate cutting scenarios – an unsurprising outcome given that there is very little change in policy rates currently discounted in OIS curves in all countries in our model bond portfolio universe. We see rates more likely to remain stable across all countries, however, making the “rates flat” scenarios in the middle of Table 3 more likely in 2020. After our downgrade of Canada this week, our recommended country allocations now reflect both yield betas and the results of our Global Golden Rule. Spread Product Allocation: OVERWEIGHT GLOBAL CORPORATES VERSUS GOVERNMENT BONDS, IN THE US, EURO AREA AND EM Chart 7Stay Overweight US High-Yield Stay Overweight US High-Yield Stay Overweight US High-Yield Turning to credit markets, the shift of global central banks to a more accommodative stance – with global growth improving – has opened a window for another year of outperformance versus sovereign bonds in 2020. With market volatility likely to remain low, as discussed earlier, there is a strong case to increase credit allocations relative to government debt as 2020 begins. Turning to credit markets, the shift of global central banks to a more accommodative stance – with global growth improving – has opened a window for another year of outperformance versus sovereign bonds in 2020. We already have a recommended overweight allocation to US high-yield corporate debt within our model bond portfolio. As we discussed in a recent report, the conditions that would lead us to become more cautious on US junk bonds – deteriorating corporate health, restrictive Fed policy and tightening bank lending standards – are currently not in place (Chart 7).4 If US economic growth starts to rebound in the first half of 2020, as we expect, then the case for US junk bond outperformance is even stronger. We are maintaining only a neutral allocation to US investment grade corporates, however, but this is part of a relative value view versus US Agency mortgage backed securities, which look more attractive on a volatility-adjusted basis.5 We are comfortable with our US credit views, but we are making the following changes this week to raise the credit allocation in our model bond portfolio: Upgrade EM USD-denominated sovereign and corporate debt to overweight. The two conditions that typically must be in place before EM hard currency debt can outperform – a softer US dollar and improving global growth – are now both in place. The two conditions that typically must be in place before EM hard currency debt can outperform – a softer US dollar and improving global growth – are now both in place (Chart 8). The momentum in the US dollar has clearly rolled over and even in level terms, the trade-weighted dollar is peaking. Add in the improvement in both our global LEI and the global manufacturing PMI (and the China PMI, most importantly) and the case for upgrading EM hard currency debt for 2020 is a strong one. Increase the size of overweights to euro area investment grade and high-yield corporate debt. We already have a modest overweight stance on euro area corporate bonds in our model bond portfolio, based on our expectations that the ECB will maintain a highly-accommodative stance – which could include buying more corporate debt in its Asset Purchase Program. Yet with an increasing body of evidence highlighting that the sharp downturn in European growth seen in 2019 is bottoming out, the argument for raising euro area corporate bond allocations for this year is compelling. This is especially true for euro area high-yield, where the backdrop looks even more constructive (Chart 9) compared to US junk bonds using the same metrics described above – corporate health (not deteriorating), monetary policy (not restrictive) and lending standards (not tightening). Chart 8Upgrade EM Credit To Overweight Upgrade EM Credit To Overweight Upgrade EM Credit To Overweight Chart 9Increase Overweights To European Credit Increase Overweights To European Credit Increase Overweights To European Credit Summing It All Up: Our Model Bond Portfolio Adjustments To Begin 2019 The outlook described in our 2020 Key Views report, and in this week’s report, lead us to make several adjustments to our model bond portfolio weightings seen in the table on Pages 15 and 16. The results of those changes are the following: Duration: We are maintaining an overall portfolio duration of 6.5 years, which is 0.5 years below that of our custom benchmark portfolio index (Chart 10). Credit Allocation: We are increasing the allocation to EM USD-denominated debt, funded by reducing exposure to US Treasuries. We are also increasing the size of the overweight positions in euro area investment grade and high-yield corporate debt, funded by cutting allocations to German and French government bonds. The net effect of these changes is to increase our total spread product weighting to 57% of the portfolio (Chart 11), which represents an overweight tilt versus the benchmark of +15% (versus a +8% overweight prior to this week’s changes). Chart 10Stay Below-Benchmark On Duration Exposure Stay Below-Benchmark On Duration Exposure Stay Below-Benchmark On Duration Exposure Chart 11A Larger Recommended Allocation To Spread Product For 2020 Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2020: Selectively Aggressive Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2020: Selectively Aggressive Country Allocation: We are cutting the Canadian government bond allocation to underweight, while making additional modest adjustments to yield curve positioning in the US, Japan, and the UK to reflect the output from our Global Golden Rule. The net result of these changes, combined with the increased allocation to corporate bonds, is to boost the overall portfolio yield to 3%, which represents a positive carry of +43bps versus our benchmark index (Chart 12). Chart 12Greater Portfolio Yield To Begin 2020 Greater Portfolio Yield To Begin 2020 Greater Portfolio Yield To Begin 2020 Chart 13Move To A Moderately Aggressive Level Of Portfolio Risk Move To A Moderately Aggressive Level Of Portfolio Risk Move To A Moderately Aggressive Level Of Portfolio Risk Overall Portfolio Risk: All of the above changes represent an increase in the usage of the “risk budget” of our model bond portfolio, which is now running a tracking error (or excess volatility versus that of the benchmark) of 73bps (Chart 13). This is higher than the 58bps prior to this week’s changes, but is still below the maximum allowable tracking error of 100bps that we have imposed on the model portfolio since its inception. This is consistent with our view that investors should maintain a “moderately aggressive” level of risk in fixed income portfolios in 2020.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “2020 Key Views: Delay Of Reckoning”, dated December 12th 2019, available at gfis.bcarsearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “How Sweet It Is”, dated November 6, 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated September 25th 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “The Lowdown On Low-Rated High-Yield”, dated November 27, 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “Big Mo(mentum) Is Turning Positive”, dated October 29, 2019, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2020: Selectively Aggressive Our Model Bond Portfolio Strategy For 2020: Selectively Aggressive Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns