UK

Highlights The U.K. economy has been holding up fairly well, despite the overhang of political uncertainty. However, even before the actual withdrawal of the U.K. from the E.U. has occurred, Brexit has left a lasting mark on the U.K. economy through elevated uncertainty, severe weakness in business investment spending, and anemic productivity. The net result is an economy with lower trend growth, a structurally weaker exchange rate, and relatively high domestic inflation. Brexit will be delayed beyond October 31. No-deal Brexit is an overstated risk unless an early election strengthens Boris Johnson’s hand. That is unlikely. The investment outlook for the British pound and U.K. gilts is highly binary: a “smooth” Brexit is bullish for the pound and bearish for gilts, while no-deal Brexit would push both the pound and gilt yields even lower. Feature Ever since the United Kingdom voted in 2016 to exit the European Union, the outlook for the economy and financial assets has been tied to the binary outcome of whether or not an exit would be orderly. This has been a tremendous source of uncertainty, putting the Bank of England (BoE) in one of the most inconvenient positions ever faced by a central bank. In this week’s report, we look to address a few high-level questions. First, has the slowdown in the U.K. economy been run of the mill, given the global manufacturing recession? Or has it been unduly protracted given heightened political uncertainty? If the latter, what are the prospects of a rebound should anything other than a “no-deal” Brexit prevail? Finally, has there been irreparable damage already done to the economy because of delayed investment, with longer-term ramifications irrespective of the relationship outcome with the E.U.? An Employment Boom The U.K. is currently experiencing the best jobs recovery since the Second World War. 4.2 million new jobs have been created over the past decade, nudging the employment-to-population ratio to the highest level in almost 50 years. What is remarkable is that this recovery looks even more impressive than that of the U.S., where labor market conditions have been very robust. For example, in the U.S., the employment rate stands at 60.9%, just a nudge below the U.K. but still nearly four percentage points below its pre-crisis peak (Chart 1). Compared to the eurozone, the outperformance of the U.K. labor market has been very evident. Despite this recovery, the pickup in wages has been the most tepid since the Boer War. The quality of jobs has also been stellar – full-time job creation has outpaced part-time and female participation rates are soaring. The jobs bonanza has also been broad across regions and industries. Yes, the manufacturing sector has seen some measure of volatility, but aside from the East Midland region, unemployment rates continue to converge downward across the United Kingdom (Chart 2) Chart 1An Employment Boom An Employment Boom An Employment Boom Chart 2Recovery Is Broad-Based Recovery Is Broad-Based Recovery Is Broad-Based     Despite this recovery, the pickup in wages has been the most tepid since the Boer War. In a July speech, the BoE’s chief economist, Andy Haldane, rightly noted that the lost decade of pay has been an equal-opportunity disaster across the major U.K. regions. From the 1950s until the Great Recession, real pay in the U.K. grew by about 2% per annum. Since the Great Recession, real pay has stagnated at a rate of -0.4% per year (Chart 3).1 Chart 3Wages Stagnated Until Recently Wages Stagnated Until Recently Wages Stagnated Until Recently There have been a few reasons for this. First, there has been strong growth in self-employment, zero-hours contracts and agency work. So even though the share of full-time work has been rising during the post-crisis period, it remains well below its pre-crisis highs. This has increased the fluidity of the labor market, lowering the cost of doing business in the process. Compensation of self-employed or zero-hours contract workers lies significantly below their permanent counterparts. The silver lining is that this phenomenon is not specific to the U.K., but is happening worldwide, especially in Europe where structural reform has disentangled rigidities in the labor market. The key question going forward is whether the nascent rise in wages will continue. Over a cyclical horizon, our contention is that should positive employment trends continue, the U.K. could begin to experience significantly stronger wage pressures. There are four fundamental reasons for this: Job offers continue to outpace the number of seekers. Depending on the measure used, there are 20%-40% more jobs than there are applicants (Chart 4). This impasse cannot easily be resolved by a higher employment rate (it is at a secular high) or lower unemployment. The BoE estimates NAIRU in the U.K. is at 4.4%, which means that the unemployment rate is firmly below its structural level. Business surveys continue to suggest that a shortage of skilled labor is among the top problems firms are facing. The Phillips curve in the U.K. has flattened in the last few years, but wage growth has started to inflect higher of late. Like many other countries, the Phillips curve in the U.K. is kinked, whereby the convexity of wage growth increases as the unemployment gap closes.  The velocity of circulation in the jobs market, also known as the job-to-job flow, has picked up. This has historically been positive for wage growth (Chart 5). This is also mirrored by the quits rate, which has been accelerating since 2012. Chart 4Wage Pressures Should Mount Wage Pressures Should Mount Wage Pressures Should Mount Chart 5Velocity Of U.K. Employment Rising Velocity Of U.K. Employment Rising Velocity Of U.K. Employment Rising At the moment, the transmission mechanism from a tight labor market to higher wages is being impeded by political uncertainty, which will continue to cast a near-term shadow on longer-term hiring plans. For example, for all the talk of the U.K. being a financial center, attrition in banking and insurance employment remains entrenched (Chart 6). The U.K. continues to attract a significant amount of financial business, especially in the foreign exchange market, but there was a clear hit to volumes in 2016, the year the Brexit referendum was held (Chart 7). Meanwhile, for the manufacturing sector, it will take a while to rekindle animal spirits and re-attract foreign direct investment. Chart 6Attrition In Manufacturing And Finance Employment Attrition In Manufacturing And Finance Employment Attrition In Manufacturing And Finance Employment Chart 7The U.K. Is An Important Financial Center United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? That said, the U.K. economy remains mostly driven by services, meaning wages will still face some measure of upward pressure. Service sector wage growth has been robust and unless the manufacturing recession grows deeper and starts to infect other sectors of the U.K. economy, the path of least resistance for wages remains up. Bottom Line: The U.K. economy has been holding up fairly well, despite the overhang of political uncertainty. Virtuous Circle Of Spending While the U.K. income pie could grow, a lack of confidence is nonetheless constraining spending. Chart 8 shows that U.K. consumer confidence has negatively diverged from trends in both the U.S. and the euro area. There have been a few offsetting factors at play suggesting that once the clouds of Brexit uncertainty lift, spending could re-accelerate higher. The transmission mechanism from a tight labor market to higher wages is being impeded by political uncertainty, which will continue to cast a near-term shadow. A big driver for retail sales in the U.K. is tourist arrivals and the weaker pound is likely to keep attracting an influx of visitors (Chart 9). Chart 8Confidence Will Be Key For ##br##Any Recovery Confidence Will Be Key For Any Recovery Confidence Will Be Key For Any Recovery Chart 9The Cheap Pound Will Encourage ##br##Foreign Shoppers The Cheap Pound Will Encourage Foreign Shoppers The Cheap Pound Will Encourage Foreign Shoppers The U.K. commands many of the world’s leading brands that will benefit from a cheap currency. The household deleveraging process is well advanced, and the tentative recovery in borrowing and mortgage applications is helping to cushion the fall in U.K. house prices. This is underpinned by the fact that mortgage-borrowing costs in the U.K. have collapsed along with yields (Chart 10). That said, any rise is borrowing will be mitigated by the fact that household debt-to-GDP in the U.K. remains higher than in many other developed economies. Chart 10Low Rates Should Help Housing Low Rates Should Help Housing Low Rates Should Help Housing Chart 11Cost-Push Inflation Cost-Push Inflation Cost-Push Inflation Inflation expectations are blasting upward, partly in response to the weaker currency. What is remarkable is that the pound has plummeted by a lot more than is warranted on a fundamental PPP basis. This will bring about imported inflation (Chart 11). Bottom Line: The big risk to the U.K. economy is that it enters into stagflation. A BoE survey pins the loss to output in the event of a no-deal Brexit at around 3% of GDP, but these are estimates since the bulk of the economic adjustment might occur through the exchange rate. The range of estimates for the economic impact of a no-deal (Table 1), perhaps not coincidentally, mirrors the range of Britain’s recessions in the 20th century (Chart 12). This puts the BoE in a particularly uncomfortable “wait and see” mode. For example, if a hard exit leads to a fall in the pound and a rise in inflation expectations, it is not clear the BoE’s Monetary Policy Committee would cut rates if it were to meet its inflation mandate. Table 1Wide Range Of Estimates For Impact ##br##Of No-Deal Brexit United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? Chart 12Past British Recessions Offer Guidelines ##br##For No-Deal Impact United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? Brexit Uncertainty Has Already Caused Lasting Damage To U.K. Growth A major drag on U.K. economic growth over the past three years has been the collapse in business confidence and associated contraction in capital spending (Chart 13). Since the 2016 Brexit vote, business investment has been substantially weaker than at similar points in previous U.K. business cycles – by a cumulative 26%, according to the BoE (Chart 14). While some of the softness seen in 2019 can also be attributable to slowing global economic growth and uncertainty related to the U.S.-China trade war, U.K. capital spending has been far weaker than that of other advanced economies (Chart 15). Since the 2016 Brexit vote, business investment has been substantially weaker than at similar points in previous U.K. business cycles – by a cumulative 26%. This is a critical point to consider when judging the long-run damage that has already been inflicted on the U.K. economy just from the uncertainty of Brexit. The best way to evaluate this damage is through the lens of capital spending, the growth of which is highly correlated to changes in productivity and potential economic growth (Chart 16). Chart 13Gloomy U.K. Businesses Have Stopped Investing Gloomy U.K. Businesses Have Stopped Investing Gloomy U.K. Businesses Have Stopped Investing Chart 14Massive Underperformance Of U.K. Capex Compared To History ... United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? Chart 15...And Compared To ##br##Global Peers ...And Compared To Global Peers ...And Compared To Global Peers Chart 16A Lasting Hit To The U.K. Economy From Brexit Uncertainty A Lasting Hit To The U.K. Economy From Brexit Uncertainty A Lasting Hit To The U.K. Economy From Brexit Uncertainty     An important research paper published by the BoE last month – co-authored by two current members of the BoE Monetary Policy Committee, Ben Broadbent and Silvana Tenreyro – discusses the linkages between Brexit uncertainty, capital spending and U.K. productivity.2 The authors concluded that the economic effects of the Brexit referendum result can be categorized as a response to an anticipated, persistent decline in productivity growth for the tradeable sectors of the U.K. economy. In that framework, the following chain of events would occur after the “news” of weaker expected productivity (i.e. the Brexit referendum result) is announced: Chart 17A Misallocation of Resources A Misallocation of Resources A Misallocation of Resources An immediate and permanent fall in the relative price of non-tradeable output relative to tradeable output, i.e. the real exchange rate. Resources shift to the tradeable sector to take advantage of the higher relative price, leading to an increase in output and a rise in exports. Productivity growth in the tradeable sector then falls, as heralded by the “news” of the Brexit vote, leading to a shift in economic resources back towards the higher productivity non-tradeable sectors. U.K. interest rates fall relative to the world, as financial markets discount the expected relatively slower path of U.K. productivity. Aggregate business investment growth slows, but overall employment growth remains resilient. This is exactly how the U.K. economy has evolved since the 2016 Brexit vote: The BoE’s trade-weighted index for the pound has fallen in both nominal and real terms. The export share of U.K. real GDP rose from 27% to 30%, while the investment share of real GDP declined from 10% to 9% (Chart 17, top panel). Annual employment growth in U.K. services (non-tradeable) fell from 2.1% to zero by the end of 2018, but has since begun to recover; manufacturing (tradeable) employment growth initially increased from 0.5% to 2.7% within a year of the Brexit vote, before slowing back to 0% in 2018, and is also starting to move higher (Chart 17, third panel). Productivity growth has declined from 1.9% to nil, even as wage growth has accelerated due to the steady pace of labor demand at a time of low unemployment (Chart 17, bottom panel). On a sectoral level, the worst growth rates of realized productivity growth are occurring in tradeable industries like metal products and financial services, while the highest productivity growth is seen in non-tradeable industries like professional services and retail (Chart 18).3 Chart 18Latest U.K. Productivity Growth Rates, By Industry United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? Summing it all up, according to the analytic framework of the BoE research paper, the Brexit referendum result essentially created a signal, manifested by the plunge in the British pound, for the misallocation of U.K. resources away from higher-productivity non-tradeable industries to lower productivity tradeable sectors. If true, we would also expect to see the following: Chart 19Inflationary Consequences of Brexit Uncertainty Inflationary Consequences of Brexit Uncertainty Inflationary Consequences of Brexit Uncertainty Much higher inflation rates in more domestically-focused measures like services and wages. Faster growth in unit labor cost as a result of the gap between accelerating wages and stagnant productivity. Structurally higher inflation expectations. Lower real interest rates in the U.K. than in other advanced economies. Prolonged weakness in the exchange rate. Again, all of this has come to fruition in the U.K. (Chart 19): Services CPI inflation is now at 2.2%, compared to only 1.7% for overall CPI inflation. Unit labor costs growth has accelerated from below zero before the Brexit referendum to a 2%-3% range since the end of 2016. The real 10-year gilt yield (deflated by the 10-year CPI swap rate) is now -3.1%, compared to a 0% real yield on 10-year U.S. Treasurys. The trade-weighted British pound remains close to its post-Brexit referendum lows. It is clear that the Brexit uncertainty has resulted in a structurally weaker, and more inflationary, U.K. economy – an outcome that may not be quickly reversed in the event a no-deal Brexit is avoided. This has important implications for the future monetary policy decisions of the BoE and the investment outlook for the pound and U.K. gilts. Bottom Line: Even before the actual withdrawal of the U.K. from the E.U. has occurred, Brexit has left a lasting mark on the U.K. economy through elevated uncertainty, severe weakness in business investment spending and anemic productivity. The net result is an economy with lower trend growth, a structurally weak exchange rate, and relatively high domestic inflation. Political Uncertainty Prevails Chart 20Public Opposes No-Deal Brexit United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? Even after considering the cyclical and structural state of the U.K. economy, as we have done in this report, the near-term outlook is still entirely dependent on the Brexit outcome. The state of Brexit is more uncertain than ever due to the Supreme Court case against the government’s suspension of Parliament and Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s refusal to obey an order by Parliament to seek an extension to the October 31 exit deadline. What is not in doubt is that parliament opposes a disorderly, no-deal Brexit. And the best polling suggests that public opinion opposes a no-deal Brexit as well (Chart 20). Members soundly rejected Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s negotiation strategy in September – they prohibited both a no-deal Brexit and voted against holding an early election on two separate occasions (Chart 21). Johnson lost his coalition majority and yet cannot go to new elections, leaving him hamstrung until Parliament returns. What is likely regardless of the outcome is a substantial increase in fiscal spending, The United Kingdom is not a seventeenth-century Stuart monarchy – Parliament is the supreme political body in the constitution and its decrees cannot be permanently ignored or disobeyed. Whenever Parliament reconvenes, likely October 14, it will have the ability to ensure that the Brexit deadline is extended. The E.U. is likely to grant an extension because it is in the E.U.’s interest to delay or cancel Brexit and demonstrate to all members that leaving the bloc is neither desirable nor practical. The result will then be an election. Chart 21Boris Johnson’s Negotiation Strategy Failed United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? Chart 22A Hung Parliament Is The Likely Outcome A Hung Parliament Is The Likely Outcome A Hung Parliament Is The Likely Outcome Election polls show the Conservative Party breaking out, the Liberal Democrats overtaking Labour, and the Brexit Party maintaining an edge (Chart 22). Translating these polls to parliamentary seats is not straightforward because the first-past-the-post electoral system means that a smaller party can steal crucial votes from the most popular party leaving the second- or third-most popular party to win the seat. The key point is that the Brexit Party is a single-issue party and the Tories under Johnson are now monopolizing that same issue. If this dynamic persists, the Lib Dems pose a greater threat of splitting Labour’s votes than the Brexit Party does of splitting Conservative votes. The result is that it is still possible for the Conservatives to gain a majority, even though it seems unlikely given that they need 325-plus seats and have fallen to 288 seats after purging unruly members and losing leadership in Scotland. A hung Parliament is a more likely outcome. A hung Parliament will prolong the indecision and uncertainty – but will also be likely to remain united against a no-deal Brexit. An opposition coalition government will prevent a no-deal Brexit. Even a single-party Tory majority is not a disastrous outcome, as it would increase Johnson’s leverage with the E.U. and increase the likelihood that the E.U. would offer some concessions to get a withdrawal agreement passed, resulting in a Brexit deal and an orderly exit (Specifically, a Northern Irish limitation to the backstop, or a sunset clause or withdrawal mechanism for the same). Such a deal is in Johnson’s best interests so that he does not preside over a recession from the moment he returns to office. All of these outcomes point toward either an exit deal or a new chapter in which parliament seeks a new referendum. Chart 23Expect An Increase In Fiscal Spending Expect An Increase In Fiscal Spending Expect An Increase In Fiscal Spending The worst outcome for the markets would be a weak Tory coalition majority that cannot agree on Ireland or pass an exit deal, as this could lead to paralysis, as it did with Theresa May, at a time when the prime minister is committed to delivering an exit come hell or high water. This is the scenario in which no-deal once again becomes a genuine risk. Subjectively we have estimated that the risk of no-deal is around 30%, but this is currently falling, not rising, as a result of parliament’s strong majorities against that outcome in September – and only an election can change that. It is fruitless trying to predict the U.K.’s future political landscape without knowing the conclusion of the Brexit saga. What is likely regardless of the outcome is a substantial increase in fiscal spending, reversing the “austerity” of the aftermath of the Great Recession. This trend is already apparent from Johnson’s current attempt to present a generous social spending package at the Tory party conference this fall – which would, if vindicated by a new election, represent a turnaround in Conservative fiscal policy (Chart 23). More fiscal spending will be needed to counteract the negative impact of a disorderly Brexit, or to placate the middle class once it becomes clear that leaving the E.U. is not a panacea for the UK’s problems, or to fulfill the agenda of an opposition government when it comes to power. In the event that a no-deal Brexit occurs, the U.K. will not only face a tumultuous economic aftermath, but the constitutional struggles among the three kingdoms will reignite due to the negative impact in Northern Ireland and the likely revival of Scottish independence efforts. Bottom Line: The U.K. is not a dictatorship and the prime minister cannot refuse to obey Parliament’s will. Parliament has voted clearly to delay a no-deal Brexit and will continue to do so. A disorderly exit remains a risk because an eventual election could return the Tories to power. But in this case, the E.U. will be more likely to offer a concession that enables Parliament to pass a withdrawal bill. The odds of no deal are no higher than 30%. The structural takeaway, regardless of the outcome, is that fiscal spending will rise. Investment Conclusions The episodes surrounding the collapse of the pound in 1992 carry important lessons for today.4  Crucially, most of the adjustment in the pound happened quickly, but a key difference from today is that an exit from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism was unanticipated, unlike Brexit. Foreign exchange markets are extremely fluid and adjust to expectations quite quickly. Peak to trough, cable has already fallen by circa 30% suggesting the bulk of the downward adjustment is done. Chart 24A Binary Brexit Outcome for Gilts A Binary Brexit Outcome for Gilts A Binary Brexit Outcome for Gilts The British currency is free floating, meaning there are less “hidden sins” compared to the fixed exchange rate period. That said, the fair value of the pound has structurally weakened. Our bias is that if there is a hard Brexit, the pound could easily drop to the 1.10-1.15 zone. Part of this move will be an undershoot. In the case of a soft Brexit (or no Brexit), the pound should converge toward the mid-point of its historical real effective exchange rate range, which would pin it 15%-20% higher, or at around 1.50. From a risk-reward perspective, this looks attractive. For U.K. gilts, the direction of yields is also dependent on the Brexit outcome, as there is essentially no change in policy rates discounted in the U.K. Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve (Chart 24).  A “smooth” Brexit would allow the BoE to return its focus to fighting elevated U.K. inflation expectations. That would likely result in both higher gilt yields and a flattening of the gilt yield curve, as the market prices in future BoE rate hikes, and lower longer-term inflation expectations. A rising cable will also temper inflation expectations. Neither gilts nor U.K. inflation-linked bonds would perform well in this scenario.. A “no deal” Brexit, on the other hand, would prompt the BoE to cut interest rates in order to offset the potential hit to business and consumer confidence. This could occur even if inflation expectations remain high or rise further on pound weakness. That would mean lower gilt yields and a steepening of the gilt curve. Going overweight gilts but also long inflation-linked bonds would be the best way to position for this outcome. The scenarios for fiscal easing outlined earlier would also influence the shape of the gilt curve, resulting in some degree of bearish steepening as the gilt curve prices in both larger deficits and higher future inflation, all else equal. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Chester Ntonifor, Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, CFA, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Andrew G Haldane, “Climbing the Jobs Ladder,” Bank of England, July 23, 2019 2 Bank of England External MPC Unit Discussion Paper No. 51, “The Brexit vote, productivity growth and macroeconomic adjustments in the United Kingdom”, August 2019 3  London’s role as a major global financial center makes the U.K. financial services industry a “tradeable” sector, in that a significant share of its output is “traded” to non-U.K. users. 4 Mathias Zurlinden, “The Vulnerability of Pegged Exchange Rates: The British Pound in the ERM,” Economic Research, Vol. 75, No. 5 (September/October 1993).

Highlights The U.K. economy has been holding up fairly well, despite the overhang of political uncertainty. However, even before the actual withdrawal of the U.K. from the E.U. has occurred, Brexit has left a lasting mark on the U.K. economy through elevated uncertainty, severe weakness in business investment spending, and anemic productivity. The net result is an economy with lower trend growth, a structurally weaker exchange rate, and relatively high domestic inflation. Brexit will be delayed beyond October 31. No-deal Brexit is an overstated risk unless an early election strengthens Boris Johnson’s hand. That is unlikely. The investment outlook for the British pound and U.K. gilts is highly binary: a “smooth” Brexit is bullish for the pound and bearish for gilts, while no-deal Brexit would push both the pound and gilt yields even lower. Feature Ever since the United Kingdom voted in 2016 to exit the European Union, the outlook for the economy and financial assets has been tied to the binary outcome of whether or not an exit would be orderly. This has been a tremendous source of uncertainty, putting the Bank of England (BoE) in one of the most inconvenient positions ever faced by a central bank. In this week’s report, we look to address a few high-level questions. First, has the slowdown in the U.K. economy been run of the mill, given the global manufacturing recession? Or has it been unduly protracted given heightened political uncertainty? If the latter, what are the prospects of a rebound should anything other than a “no-deal” Brexit prevail? Finally, has there been irreparable damage already done to the economy because of delayed investment, with longer-term ramifications irrespective of the relationship outcome with the E.U.? An Employment Boom The U.K. is currently experiencing the best jobs recovery since the Second World War. 4.2 million new jobs have been created over the past decade, nudging the employment-to-population ratio to the highest level in almost 50 years. What is remarkable is that this recovery looks even more impressive than that of the U.S., where labor market conditions have been very robust. For example, in the U.S., the employment rate stands at 60.9%, just a nudge below the U.K. but still nearly four percentage points below its pre-crisis peak (Chart 1). Compared to the eurozone, the outperformance of the U.K. labor market has been very evident. Despite this recovery, the pickup in wages has been the most tepid since the Boer War. The quality of jobs has also been stellar – full-time job creation has outpaced part-time and female participation rates are soaring. The jobs bonanza has also been broad across regions and industries. Yes, the manufacturing sector has seen some measure of volatility, but aside from the East Midland region, unemployment rates continue to converge downward across the United Kingdom (Chart 2) Chart 1An Employment Boom An Employment Boom An Employment Boom Chart 2Recovery Is Broad-Based Recovery Is Broad-Based Recovery Is Broad-Based     Despite this recovery, the pickup in wages has been the most tepid since the Boer War. In a July speech, the BoE’s chief economist, Andy Haldane, rightly noted that the lost decade of pay has been an equal-opportunity disaster across the major U.K. regions. From the 1950s until the Great Recession, real pay in the U.K. grew by about 2% per annum. Since the Great Recession, real pay has stagnated at a rate of -0.4% per year (Chart 3).1 Chart 3Wages Stagnated Until Recently Wages Stagnated Until Recently Wages Stagnated Until Recently There have been a few reasons for this. First, there has been strong growth in self-employment, zero-hours contracts and agency work. So even though the share of full-time work has been rising during the post-crisis period, it remains well below its pre-crisis highs. This has increased the fluidity of the labor market, lowering the cost of doing business in the process. Compensation of self-employed or zero-hours contract workers lies significantly below their permanent counterparts. The silver lining is that this phenomenon is not specific to the U.K., but is happening worldwide, especially in Europe where structural reform has disentangled rigidities in the labor market. The key question going forward is whether the nascent rise in wages will continue. Over a cyclical horizon, our contention is that should positive employment trends continue, the U.K. could begin to experience significantly stronger wage pressures. There are four fundamental reasons for this: Job offers continue to outpace the number of seekers. Depending on the measure used, there are 20%-40% more jobs than there are applicants (Chart 4). This impasse cannot easily be resolved by a higher employment rate (it is at a secular high) or lower unemployment. The BoE estimates NAIRU in the U.K. is at 4.4%, which means that the unemployment rate is firmly below its structural level. Business surveys continue to suggest that a shortage of skilled labor is among the top problems firms are facing. The Phillips curve in the U.K. has flattened in the last few years, but wage growth has started to inflect higher of late. Like many other countries, the Phillips curve in the U.K. is kinked, whereby the convexity of wage growth increases as the unemployment gap closes.  The velocity of circulation in the jobs market, also known as the job-to-job flow, has picked up. This has historically been positive for wage growth (Chart 5). This is also mirrored by the quits rate, which has been accelerating since 2012. Chart 4Wage Pressures Should Mount Wage Pressures Should Mount Wage Pressures Should Mount Chart 5Velocity Of U.K. Employment Rising Velocity Of U.K. Employment Rising Velocity Of U.K. Employment Rising At the moment, the transmission mechanism from a tight labor market to higher wages is being impeded by political uncertainty, which will continue to cast a near-term shadow on longer-term hiring plans. For example, for all the talk of the U.K. being a financial center, attrition in banking and insurance employment remains entrenched (Chart 6). The U.K. continues to attract a significant amount of financial business, especially in the foreign exchange market, but there was a clear hit to volumes in 2016, the year the Brexit referendum was held (Chart 7). Meanwhile, for the manufacturing sector, it will take a while to rekindle animal spirits and re-attract foreign direct investment. Chart 6Attrition In Manufacturing And Finance Employment Attrition In Manufacturing And Finance Employment Attrition In Manufacturing And Finance Employment Chart 7The U.K. Is An Important Financial Center United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? That said, the U.K. economy remains mostly driven by services, meaning wages will still face some measure of upward pressure. Service sector wage growth has been robust and unless the manufacturing recession grows deeper and starts to infect other sectors of the U.K. economy, the path of least resistance for wages remains up. Bottom Line: The U.K. economy has been holding up fairly well, despite the overhang of political uncertainty. Virtuous Circle Of Spending While the U.K. income pie could grow, a lack of confidence is nonetheless constraining spending. Chart 8 shows that U.K. consumer confidence has negatively diverged from trends in both the U.S. and the euro area. There have been a few offsetting factors at play suggesting that once the clouds of Brexit uncertainty lift, spending could re-accelerate higher. The transmission mechanism from a tight labor market to higher wages is being impeded by political uncertainty, which will continue to cast a near-term shadow. A big driver for retail sales in the U.K. is tourist arrivals and the weaker pound is likely to keep attracting an influx of visitors (Chart 9). Chart 8Confidence Will Be Key For ##br##Any Recovery Confidence Will Be Key For Any Recovery Confidence Will Be Key For Any Recovery Chart 9The Cheap Pound Will Encourage ##br##Foreign Shoppers The Cheap Pound Will Encourage Foreign Shoppers The Cheap Pound Will Encourage Foreign Shoppers The U.K. commands many of the world’s leading brands that will benefit from a cheap currency. The household deleveraging process is well advanced, and the tentative recovery in borrowing and mortgage applications is helping to cushion the fall in U.K. house prices. This is underpinned by the fact that mortgage-borrowing costs in the U.K. have collapsed along with yields (Chart 10). That said, any rise is borrowing will be mitigated by the fact that household debt-to-GDP in the U.K. remains higher than in many other developed economies. Chart 10Low Rates Should Help Housing Low Rates Should Help Housing Low Rates Should Help Housing Chart 11Cost-Push Inflation Cost-Push Inflation Cost-Push Inflation Inflation expectations are blasting upward, partly in response to the weaker currency. What is remarkable is that the pound has plummeted by a lot more than is warranted on a fundamental PPP basis. This will bring about imported inflation (Chart 11). Bottom Line: The big risk to the U.K. economy is that it enters into stagflation. A BoE survey pins the loss to output in the event of a no-deal Brexit at around 3% of GDP, but these are estimates since the bulk of the economic adjustment might occur through the exchange rate. The range of estimates for the economic impact of a no-deal (Table 1), perhaps not coincidentally, mirrors the range of Britain’s recessions in the 20th century (Chart 12). This puts the BoE in a particularly uncomfortable “wait and see” mode. For example, if a hard exit leads to a fall in the pound and a rise in inflation expectations, it is not clear the BoE’s Monetary Policy Committee would cut rates if it were to meet its inflation mandate. Table 1Wide Range Of Estimates For Impact ##br##Of No-Deal Brexit United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? Chart 12Past British Recessions Offer Guidelines ##br##For No-Deal Impact United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? Brexit Uncertainty Has Already Caused Lasting Damage To U.K. Growth A major drag on U.K. economic growth over the past three years has been the collapse in business confidence and associated contraction in capital spending (Chart 13). Since the 2016 Brexit vote, business investment has been substantially weaker than at similar points in previous U.K. business cycles – by a cumulative 26%, according to the BoE (Chart 14). While some of the softness seen in 2019 can also be attributable to slowing global economic growth and uncertainty related to the U.S.-China trade war, U.K. capital spending has been far weaker than that of other advanced economies (Chart 15). Since the 2016 Brexit vote, business investment has been substantially weaker than at similar points in previous U.K. business cycles – by a cumulative 26%. This is a critical point to consider when judging the long-run damage that has already been inflicted on the U.K. economy just from the uncertainty of Brexit. The best way to evaluate this damage is through the lens of capital spending, the growth of which is highly correlated to changes in productivity and potential economic growth (Chart 16). Chart 13Gloomy U.K. Businesses Have Stopped Investing Gloomy U.K. Businesses Have Stopped Investing Gloomy U.K. Businesses Have Stopped Investing Chart 14Massive Underperformance Of U.K. Capex Compared To History ... United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? Chart 15...And Compared To ##br##Global Peers ...And Compared To Global Peers ...And Compared To Global Peers Chart 16A Lasting Hit To The U.K. Economy From Brexit Uncertainty A Lasting Hit To The U.K. Economy From Brexit Uncertainty A Lasting Hit To The U.K. Economy From Brexit Uncertainty     An important research paper published by the BoE last month – co-authored by two current members of the BoE Monetary Policy Committee, Ben Broadbent and Silvana Tenreyro – discusses the linkages between Brexit uncertainty, capital spending and U.K. productivity.2 The authors concluded that the economic effects of the Brexit referendum result can be categorized as a response to an anticipated, persistent decline in productivity growth for the tradeable sectors of the U.K. economy. In that framework, the following chain of events would occur after the “news” of weaker expected productivity (i.e. the Brexit referendum result) is announced: Chart 17A Misallocation of Resources A Misallocation of Resources A Misallocation of Resources An immediate and permanent fall in the relative price of non-tradeable output relative to tradeable output, i.e. the real exchange rate. Resources shift to the tradeable sector to take advantage of the higher relative price, leading to an increase in output and a rise in exports. Productivity growth in the tradeable sector then falls, as heralded by the “news” of the Brexit vote, leading to a shift in economic resources back towards the higher productivity non-tradeable sectors. U.K. interest rates fall relative to the world, as financial markets discount the expected relatively slower path of U.K. productivity. Aggregate business investment growth slows, but overall employment growth remains resilient. This is exactly how the U.K. economy has evolved since the 2016 Brexit vote: The BoE’s trade-weighted index for the pound has fallen in both nominal and real terms. The export share of U.K. real GDP rose from 27% to 30%, while the investment share of real GDP declined from 10% to 9% (Chart 17, top panel). Annual employment growth in U.K. services (non-tradeable) fell from 2.1% to zero by the end of 2018, but has since begun to recover; manufacturing (tradeable) employment growth initially increased from 0.5% to 2.7% within a year of the Brexit vote, before slowing back to 0% in 2018, and is also starting to move higher (Chart 17, third panel). Productivity growth has declined from 1.9% to nil, even as wage growth has accelerated due to the steady pace of labor demand at a time of low unemployment (Chart 17, bottom panel). On a sectoral level, the worst growth rates of realized productivity growth are occurring in tradeable industries like metal products and financial services, while the highest productivity growth is seen in non-tradeable industries like professional services and retail (Chart 18).3 Chart 18Latest U.K. Productivity Growth Rates, By Industry United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? Summing it all up, according to the analytic framework of the BoE research paper, the Brexit referendum result essentially created a signal, manifested by the plunge in the British pound, for the misallocation of U.K. resources away from higher-productivity non-tradeable industries to lower productivity tradeable sectors. If true, we would also expect to see the following: Chart 19Inflationary Consequences of Brexit Uncertainty Inflationary Consequences of Brexit Uncertainty Inflationary Consequences of Brexit Uncertainty Much higher inflation rates in more domestically-focused measures like services and wages. Faster growth in unit labor cost as a result of the gap between accelerating wages and stagnant productivity. Structurally higher inflation expectations. Lower real interest rates in the U.K. than in other advanced economies. Prolonged weakness in the exchange rate. Again, all of this has come to fruition in the U.K. (Chart 19): Services CPI inflation is now at 2.2%, compared to only 1.7% for overall CPI inflation. Unit labor costs growth has accelerated from below zero before the Brexit referendum to a 2%-3% range since the end of 2016. The real 10-year gilt yield (deflated by the 10-year CPI swap rate) is now -3.1%, compared to a 0% real yield on 10-year U.S. Treasurys. The trade-weighted British pound remains close to its post-Brexit referendum lows. It is clear that the Brexit uncertainty has resulted in a structurally weaker, and more inflationary, U.K. economy – an outcome that may not be quickly reversed in the event a no-deal Brexit is avoided. This has important implications for the future monetary policy decisions of the BoE and the investment outlook for the pound and U.K. gilts. Bottom Line: Even before the actual withdrawal of the U.K. from the E.U. has occurred, Brexit has left a lasting mark on the U.K. economy through elevated uncertainty, severe weakness in business investment spending and anemic productivity. The net result is an economy with lower trend growth, a structurally weak exchange rate, and relatively high domestic inflation. Political Uncertainty Prevails Chart 20Public Opposes No-Deal Brexit United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? Even after considering the cyclical and structural state of the U.K. economy, as we have done in this report, the near-term outlook is still entirely dependent on the Brexit outcome. The state of Brexit is more uncertain than ever due to the Supreme Court case against the government’s suspension of Parliament and Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s refusal to obey an order by Parliament to seek an extension to the October 31 exit deadline. What is not in doubt is that parliament opposes a disorderly, no-deal Brexit. And the best polling suggests that public opinion opposes a no-deal Brexit as well (Chart 20). Members soundly rejected Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s negotiation strategy in September – they prohibited both a no-deal Brexit and voted against holding an early election on two separate occasions (Chart 21). Johnson lost his coalition majority and yet cannot go to new elections, leaving him hamstrung until Parliament returns. What is likely regardless of the outcome is a substantial increase in fiscal spending, The United Kingdom is not a seventeenth-century Stuart monarchy – Parliament is the supreme political body in the constitution and its decrees cannot be permanently ignored or disobeyed. Whenever Parliament reconvenes, likely October 14, it will have the ability to ensure that the Brexit deadline is extended. The E.U. is likely to grant an extension because it is in the E.U.’s interest to delay or cancel Brexit and demonstrate to all members that leaving the bloc is neither desirable nor practical. The result will then be an election. Chart 21Boris Johnson’s Negotiation Strategy Failed United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? United Kingdom: Cyclical Slowdown Or Structural Malaise? Chart 22A Hung Parliament Is The Likely Outcome A Hung Parliament Is The Likely Outcome A Hung Parliament Is The Likely Outcome Election polls show the Conservative Party breaking out, the Liberal Democrats overtaking Labour, and the Brexit Party maintaining an edge (Chart 22). Translating these polls to parliamentary seats is not straightforward because the first-past-the-post electoral system means that a smaller party can steal crucial votes from the most popular party leaving the second- or third-most popular party to win the seat. The key point is that the Brexit Party is a single-issue party and the Tories under Johnson are now monopolizing that same issue. If this dynamic persists, the Lib Dems pose a greater threat of splitting Labour’s votes than the Brexit Party does of splitting Conservative votes. The result is that it is still possible for the Conservatives to gain a majority, even though it seems unlikely given that they need 325-plus seats and have fallen to 288 seats after purging unruly members and losing leadership in Scotland. A hung Parliament is a more likely outcome. A hung Parliament will prolong the indecision and uncertainty – but will also be likely to remain united against a no-deal Brexit. An opposition coalition government will prevent a no-deal Brexit. Even a single-party Tory majority is not a disastrous outcome, as it would increase Johnson’s leverage with the E.U. and increase the likelihood that the E.U. would offer some concessions to get a withdrawal agreement passed, resulting in a Brexit deal and an orderly exit (Specifically, a Northern Irish limitation to the backstop, or a sunset clause or withdrawal mechanism for the same). Such a deal is in Johnson’s best interests so that he does not preside over a recession from the moment he returns to office. All of these outcomes point toward either an exit deal or a new chapter in which parliament seeks a new referendum. Chart 23Expect An Increase In Fiscal Spending Expect An Increase In Fiscal Spending Expect An Increase In Fiscal Spending The worst outcome for the markets would be a weak Tory coalition majority that cannot agree on Ireland or pass an exit deal, as this could lead to paralysis, as it did with Theresa May, at a time when the prime minister is committed to delivering an exit come hell or high water. This is the scenario in which no-deal once again becomes a genuine risk. Subjectively we have estimated that the risk of no-deal is around 30%, but this is currently falling, not rising, as a result of parliament’s strong majorities against that outcome in September – and only an election can change that. It is fruitless trying to predict the U.K.’s future political landscape without knowing the conclusion of the Brexit saga. What is likely regardless of the outcome is a substantial increase in fiscal spending, reversing the “austerity” of the aftermath of the Great Recession. This trend is already apparent from Johnson’s current attempt to present a generous social spending package at the Tory party conference this fall – which would, if vindicated by a new election, represent a turnaround in Conservative fiscal policy (Chart 23). More fiscal spending will be needed to counteract the negative impact of a disorderly Brexit, or to placate the middle class once it becomes clear that leaving the E.U. is not a panacea for the UK’s problems, or to fulfill the agenda of an opposition government when it comes to power. In the event that a no-deal Brexit occurs, the U.K. will not only face a tumultuous economic aftermath, but the constitutional struggles among the three kingdoms will reignite due to the negative impact in Northern Ireland and the likely revival of Scottish independence efforts. Bottom Line: The U.K. is not a dictatorship and the prime minister cannot refuse to obey Parliament’s will. Parliament has voted clearly to delay a no-deal Brexit and will continue to do so. A disorderly exit remains a risk because an eventual election could return the Tories to power. But in this case, the E.U. will be more likely to offer a concession that enables Parliament to pass a withdrawal bill. The odds of no deal are no higher than 30%. The structural takeaway, regardless of the outcome, is that fiscal spending will rise. Investment Conclusions The episodes surrounding the collapse of the pound in 1992 carry important lessons for today.4  Crucially, most of the adjustment in the pound happened quickly, but a key difference from today is that an exit from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism was unanticipated, unlike Brexit. Foreign exchange markets are extremely fluid and adjust to expectations quite quickly. Peak to trough, cable has already fallen by circa 30% suggesting the bulk of the downward adjustment is done. Chart 24A Binary Brexit Outcome for Gilts A Binary Brexit Outcome for Gilts A Binary Brexit Outcome for Gilts The British currency is free floating, meaning there are less “hidden sins” compared to the fixed exchange rate period. That said, the fair value of the pound has structurally weakened. Our bias is that if there is a hard Brexit, the pound could easily drop to the 1.10-1.15 zone. Part of this move will be an undershoot. In the case of a soft Brexit (or no Brexit), the pound should converge toward the mid-point of its historical real effective exchange rate range, which would pin it 15%-20% higher, or at around 1.50. From a risk-reward perspective, this looks attractive. For U.K. gilts, the direction of yields is also dependent on the Brexit outcome, as there is essentially no change in policy rates discounted in the U.K. Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve (Chart 24).  A “smooth” Brexit would allow the BoE to return its focus to fighting elevated U.K. inflation expectations. That would likely result in both higher gilt yields and a flattening of the gilt yield curve, as the market prices in future BoE rate hikes, and lower longer-term inflation expectations. A rising cable will also temper inflation expectations. Neither gilts nor U.K. inflation-linked bonds would perform well in this scenario.. A “no deal” Brexit, on the other hand, would prompt the BoE to cut interest rates in order to offset the potential hit to business and consumer confidence. This could occur even if inflation expectations remain high or rise further on pound weakness. That would mean lower gilt yields and a steepening of the gilt curve. Going overweight gilts but also long inflation-linked bonds would be the best way to position for this outcome. The scenarios for fiscal easing outlined earlier would also influence the shape of the gilt curve, resulting in some degree of bearish steepening as the gilt curve prices in both larger deficits and higher future inflation, all else equal. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Chester Ntonifor, Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Ray Park, CFA, Research Analyst ray@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Andrew G Haldane, “Climbing the Jobs Ladder,” Bank of England, July 23, 2019 2 Bank of England External MPC Unit Discussion Paper No. 51, “The Brexit vote, productivity growth and macroeconomic adjustments in the United Kingdom”, August 2019 3  London’s role as a major global financial center makes the U.K. financial services industry a “tradeable” sector, in that a significant share of its output is “traded” to non-U.K. users. 4 Mathias Zurlinden, “The Vulnerability of Pegged Exchange Rates: The British Pound in the ERM,” Economic Research, Vol. 75, No. 5 (September/October 1993). Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades

Highlights Global bond yields have closely tracked the trajectory of global growth. While the global economy remains fragile, some positive signs are emerging: Our global leading economic indicator has moved off its lows; global financial conditions have eased significantly; U.S. household spending remains resilient; and China is set to further increase stimulus. Neither a severe escalation of the trade war nor a hard Brexit is likely. A simple comparison between current dividend yields and bond yields implies that global equities would need to fall by an outsized amount over the next decade for bonds to outperform stocks. As global growth stabilizes and then begins to recover over the coming months, bond yields will rebound from depressed levels. Investors should overweight stocks versus bonds for now, and look to upgrade EM and European equities later this year. Feature Global Growth Driving Bond Yields Chart 1Global Bond Yields: How Low Will They Go? Global Bond Yields: How Low Will They Go? Global Bond Yields: How Low Will They Go? Global bond yields rose sharply yesterday on word that U.S. and Chinese trade negotiators will meet in October. The announcement by China’s State Council of additional stimulus measures and better-than-expected data on the health of the U.S. service sector also drove the bond sell-off. The jump in yields follows a period of almost unrelenting declines. After hitting a high of 3.25% last October, the U.S. 10-year yield fell to 1.43% this Tuesday, just shy of its all-time low of 1.34% reached on July 5, 2016. The 30-year Treasury yield broke below 2% for the first time in history on August 15, falling to as low as 1.91% this week. It now stands at 2.07%. In Japan and across much of Europe, bond yields remain firmly in negative territory (Chart 1). The large movements in bond yields can be attributed to both the state of the global economy as well as to changes in how central banks are reacting to economic uncertainty. Just as stronger global growth pushed yields higher between mid-2016 and early-2018, the deceleration in growth since then has pulled yields lower. Chart 2 shows that there has been a close correlation between changes in the U.S. 10-year yield and the ISM manufacturing index. The release on Tuesday of a weaker-than-expected ISM manufacturing print for August was enough to push the 10-year yield down by seven basis points within a matter of minutes. Chart 2The Deceleration In Growth Has Pulled Yields Down The Deceleration In Growth Has Pulled Yields Down The Deceleration In Growth Has Pulled Yields Down The forward-looking new orders component of the ISM manufacturing index sunk to a seven-year low. The export orders component fell to the lowest level since 2009. Export volumes track ISM export orders quite closely (Chart 3). Not surprisingly, the ISM press release noted that trade remains “the most significant issue” for U.S. manufacturers. Chart 3Export Volumes Track The ISM Export Component Export Volumes Track The ISM Export Component Export Volumes Track The ISM Export Component The only redeeming feature in the report was that the customers’ inventories index dropped a notch from 45.7 in July to 44.9 in August. A reading below 50 for this subindex indicates that manufacturers believe that their customers are holding too few inventories, which is positive for future production. Global Manufacturing PMI Not Looking Much Brighter The Markit global manufacturing PMI remained below 50 for the fourth month in a row in August. While the global PMI did edge up slightly from July’s reading, this was largely due to a modest rebound in the Chinese PMI, which rose from 49.9 to 50.4. The improvement in the China Markit-Caixin PMI stands in contrast to the further deterioration observed in the “official” National Bureau of Statistics PMI. The former is more heavily geared towards private-sector exporting companies, and hence may have been influenced by the front-loading of exports ahead of the planned tariff increase on Chinese exports to the United States. Some Positive Signs Chart 4Global LEI Has Moved Off Its Lows Global LEI Has Moved Off Its Lows Global LEI Has Moved Off Its Lows In light of the disappointing manufacturing data, it is too early to call a bottom in the global industrial cycle. Nevertheless, there are some hopeful signs. Our Global Leading Economic Indicator (LEI) has moved off its lows (Chart 4). It usually leads the PMIs by a few months. Sterling will probably be the best performing currency in the G7 over the next five years. Despite ongoing weakness in the manufacturing sector, household spending has held up in most economies. In the U.S., the nonmanufacturing ISM index jumped to 56.4 in August from 53.7 in July. Real personal consumption is still on track to grow by 2.8% in Q3 according to the Atlanta Fed (Chart 5). The euro area services PMIs have also been resilient (Chart 6). In Germany, where the manufacturing PMI stood at 43.5 in August, the services PMI rose to 54.8.  Chart 5Inventories And Net Exports Have Subtracted From U.S. Growth In Q2 And Q3 Bond Yields Have Hit Bottom Bond Yields Have Hit Bottom Chart 6AThe Service Sector Has Softened Much Less Than Manufacturing (I) The Service Sector Has Softened Much Less Than Manufacturing (I) The Service Sector Has Softened Much Less Than Manufacturing (I) Chart 6BThe Service Sector Has Softened Much Less Than Manufacturing (II) The Service Sector Has Softened Much Less Than Manufacturing (II) The Service Sector Has Softened Much Less Than Manufacturing (II) Global financial conditions have eased significantly, mainly thanks to the steep decline in bond yields. The current level of financial conditions implies that global growth could rebound swiftly (Chart 7). The Chinese government is also likely to step up fiscal/credit stimulus over the coming months in an effort to shore up growth. In a boldly worded statement released on Wednesday, the Chinese State Council promised to further increase bond issuance to finance infrastructure projects, while cutting interest rates and reserve requirements. A stronger Chinese economy should benefit global growth (Chart 8). Chart 7Easier Financial Conditions Will Benefit Global Growth Easier Financial Conditions Will Benefit Global Growth Easier Financial Conditions Will Benefit Global Growth Chart 8Stronger Chinese Growth Should Benefit The Global Economy Stronger Chinese Growth Should Benefit The Global Economy Stronger Chinese Growth Should Benefit The Global Economy   The Trade War: Moving Towards A Détente? The announcement that the U.S. and China will resume trade negotiations on October 5th is a step in the right direction. As we noted last week, both parties have an incentive to de-escalate the trade conflict. President Trump wants to prop up the stock market and the economy in order to improve his re-election prospects. China also wants to bolster growth.1 Chart 9Would China Really Be Better Off Negotiating With A Democrat As President? Would China Really Be Better Off Negotiating With A Democrat As President? Would China Really Be Better Off Negotiating With A Democrat As President? As difficult as it has been for China to deal with Donald Trump, trying to secure a trade deal with him after he has been re-elected would be even more challenging. This would be especially the case if Trump thought that the Chinese had tried to sabotage his re-election bid. Even if Trump were to lose the election, it is not clear that China would end up with someone more palatable to deal with on trade matters. Does the Chinese government really want to negotiate over labor standards and human rights with President Warren, who betting markets now think has a better chance of becoming the Democratic nominee than Joe Biden (Chart 9)? While Republicans in Congress would be able to restrain a Democratic president on domestic issues, the president would still enjoy free rein over trade policy.   Brexit Uncertainty Adding To Investor Angst Two weeks before the Brexit vote on June 23, 2016, I wrote that “Just like my gut told me last August that Trump would do much better at the polls than almost anyone thought possible, I increasingly feel that come June 24th, the EU may find itself with one less member.”2 Chart 10Brexit Opposition Has Been Growing Brexit Opposition Has Been Growing Brexit Opposition Has Been Growing Soon after the shocking verdict, we argued that a hard Brexit would prove to be politically infeasible, meaning that the U.K. would either end up holding another referendum or be forced to negotiate some sort of customs union with the EU. Our view that a hard Brexit will not happen has not changed. Chart 10 shows that opposition to Brexit has only grown since that fateful day. Boris Johnson does not have enough votes in Westminster to force a hard Brexit. Another election would not change this outcome, given that it would almost certainly produce a hung parliament. In any case, it is not clear that Johnson actually wants a hard Brexit. The Times of London recently reported that the government’s own contingency plans for a hard Brexit, weirdly code-named “Operation Yellowhammer,” predicted a crippling logjam at British ports leading to shortages of fuel, food and medicine.3  Boris Johnson is all hat and no cattle. He will be forced to make a deal with the EU. Buy the pound on any dips. Sterling will probably be the best performing currency in the G7 over the next five years. Central Banks: Cut First, Ask Questions Later Chart 11Inflation Expectations Are Low Across The Globe Inflation Expectations Are Low Across The Globe Inflation Expectations Are Low Across The Globe Despite a few glimmers of good news, central banks are in no mood to take any chances. St. Louis Fed President James Bullard said it bluntly last week: “Our job is to get the yield curve uninverted.”4 If history is any guide, global growth will stabilize and begin to recover over the coming months. Inflation expectations are below target in most economies (Chart 11). Central banks know full well that if the current slowdown morphs into a full-blown recession, they will be out of monetary ammunition very quickly. In such a setting, it does not make sense to hold your punches. Much better to generate as much inflation as possible, and as soon as possible, so that real rates can be brought deeper into negative territory if economic circumstances later warrant it. What If The Medicine Works? The risk of easing monetary policy too much is that economies will eventually overheat, producing more inflation than is desirable. It is easy to forget that the aggregate unemployment rate in the G7 is now below its 2007 lows (Chart 12). True, inflation has yet to take off, but this may simply be because inflation is a lagging indicator (Chart 13). Chart 12Unemployment Rates Keep Trending Lower Unemployment Rates Keep Trending Lower Unemployment Rates Keep Trending Lower Chart 13Inflation Is A Lagging Indicator Bond Yields Have Hit Bottom Bond Yields Have Hit Bottom For all the talk about how the Phillips curve is dead, the empirical evidence suggests it is very much alive and well (Chart 14). Ironically, this means that lower interest rates today could set the stage for much higher rates in the future if hyperstimulative monetary policies ultimately generate a bout of inflation.  Chart 14The Phillips Curve Is Alive And Well The Phillips Curve Is Alive And Well The Phillips Curve Is Alive And Well Chart 15The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency The Dollar Is A Countercyclical Currency   Investment Conclusions Like most economic forecasters, central banks tend to extrapolate recent trends too far into the future. Global growth has been weakening since early 2018 so it seems reasonable to assume that this trend will persist into next year. However, as we have documented, global industrial cycles tend to last about three years – 18 months of rising growth followed by 18 months of falling growth.5 If history is any guide, global growth will stabilize and begin to recover over the coming months. Should that occur, we will enter an environment where the lagged effects of easier monetary policy are hitting the economy just when the manufacturing cycle is taking a turn for the better. Stocks are likely to fare well in such a setting, while long-term bond yields will move higher. As a countercyclical currency, the dollar will also start to weaken anew (Chart 15). Granted, an intensification of the trade war or some other major adverse shock would upset this rosy forecast. Nevertheless, current market pricing offers a fairly large cushion against downside risks. Thanks to the drop in bond yields, the equity risk premium is quite high globally (Chart 16). Even if one were to assume that nominal dividend payments remain unchanged for the next ten years, the S&P 500 would still need to fall by more than 20% in real terms over the next decade for bonds to outperform stocks (Chart 17). Euro area stocks would need to drop by more than 42%. U.K. stocks would need to plummet by at least 60%! Chart 16AEquity Risk Premia Remain Quite High (I) Equity Risk Premia Remain Quite High (I) Equity Risk Premia Remain Quite High (I) Chart 16BEquity Risk Premia Remain Quite High (II) Equity Risk Premia Remain Quite High (II) Equity Risk Premia Remain Quite High (II) Chart 17AStocks Need To Fall By A Considerable Amount For Bonds To Outperform Over A 10-Year Horizon (I) Stocks Need To Fall By A Considerable Amount For Bonds To Outperform Over A 10-Year Horizon (I) Stocks Need To Fall By A Considerable Amount For Bonds To Outperform Over A 10-Year Horizon (I) Chart 17BStocks Need To Fall By A Considerable Amount For Bonds To Outperform Over A 10-Year Horizon (II) Stocks Need To Fall By A Considerable Amount For Bonds To Outperform Over A 10-Year Horizon (II) Stocks Need To Fall By A Considerable Amount For Bonds To Outperform Over A 10-Year Horizon (II) Investors should remain overweight stocks versus bonds over the next 12 months. We intend to upgrade EM and European equities once we see a bit more evidence that global growth has troughed.   Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “A Psychological Recession?” dated August 30, 2019. 2Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Worry About Brexit, Not Payrolls,” dated June 10, 2016. 3Rosamund Urwin and Caroline Wheeler, “Operation Chaos: Whitehall’s Secret No-Deal Brexit Preparations Leaked,” The Times, August 18, 2019. 4“Fed’s Bullard Sees ‘Robust Debate’ Over Half-Point Cut,” Bloomberg, August 23, 2019. 5Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Three Cycles,” dated July 26, 2019. Strategy & Market Trends MacroQuant Model And Current Subjective Scores Bond Yields Have Hit Bottom Bond Yields Have Hit Bottom Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades

Highlights An inevitable and imminent U.K. general election will be one of the most unpredictable and ‘non-linear’ elections ever. This non-linearity makes it difficult to take a high-conviction view on sterling’s direction because a tiny vote swing in one direction or another could be the difference between a no-deal Brexit – and the pound below parity against the euro – or a solid coalition for remain – and the pound at €1.30. Instead, a good strategy is to buy sterling volatility on the announcement of the election. The easiest way to implement this is simultaneously to buy at-the-money call and put options (versus either the euro or dollar). In a soft Brexit or remain, the U.K. equity sectors most likely to outperform the overall market are real estate and general retailers. In a hard Brexit, a U.K. sector likely to outperform the overall market is clothing and accessories. Feature Chart of the WeekSterling Volatility Could Go Up A Lot Sterling Volatility Could Go Up A Lot Sterling Volatility Could Go Up A Lot Lyndon B Johnson famously said that that the first rule of politics is to learn to count. A government is a lame duck if it does not have a majority of legislators to drive and set its policy. Fifty years on, LBJ’s namesake is learning this first rule of politics. Boris Johnson is running a minority U.K. government. The irony is that this makes it impossible for a pro-Brexit Johnson to pass legislation for the Brexit process itself! Ending the free movement of EU citizens was supposedly one of the biggest ambitions of the Brexit vote. But astonishingly, even after a no-deal Brexit, free movement would not end – because EU law continues to apply until its legal foundation is repealed. The U.K. government wanted to end free movement through a new law, the immigration bill, but the proposed legislation, along with several other key new laws, cannot make it through parliament. The Most Non-Linear Election Looms The only way out of the impasse is to change the parliamentary arithmetic via a snap general election. The trouble is that the outcome of such an election is near impossible to predict. This is because the U.K.’s first past the post electoral system is designed for a head-to-head between two dominant parties. But right now, there are four parties in play – from left to right: Labour, Liberal Democrat, Conservative, and Brexit. While in Scotland, the SNP is resurgent. Making the next U.K. general election one of the most unpredictable and ‘non-linear’ elections ever. The outcome of a snap general election is near impossible to predict. For example, in the recent Brecon and Radnorshire by-election, the 10 percent of votes that went to the Brexit party syphoned just enough ‘leave’ votes from the Conservatives to hand the seat to the Lib Dems. Repeated nationwide, such a swing could inflict mortal damage to the Conservatives. On the other hand, the staunchly pro-remain Lib Dems could also syphon crucial votes from a Labour party that is prevaricating on its Brexit policy. Understanding this, Johnson isn’t using the next election to resolve Brexit; quite the opposite, he is using Brexit to resolve the next election – in his favour – with the ancient strategy of ‘divide and rule’. Unite ‘leave’ by tacking to the hard right, and divide ‘remain’ between Labour, Lib Dem, Green, SNP, and Plaid Cymru. However, it is a very risky strategy. A small but critical rump of Brexit party voters are diehard anti-establishment rather than pure leave votes; furthermore, remainers almost certainly will vote tactically as they did in 2017 when they obliterated the Conservatives’ overall majority. For U.K. investments, the inevitable imminent election dominates all other considerations, as its outcome will determine the U.K.’s ultimate trading relationship with the EU and rest of the world, as well as establish the U.K’s overarching economic policy and strategy. But to reiterate, the outcome is highly non-linear. A tiny vote swing in one direction or another could be the difference between a no-deal Brexit – and the pound below parity against the euro – or a solid coalition for remain – and the pound at €1.30, as sterling’s ‘Brexit discount’ is unwound (Chart I-2 and Chart I-3). Chart I-2Sterling's Brexit Discount Is 15 Percent, Based On Real Interest Rate Differentials... Sterling's Brexit Discount Is 15 Percent, Based On Real Interest Rate Differentials... Sterling's Brexit Discount Is 15 Percent, Based On Real Interest Rate Differentials... Chart I-3...And Expected Interest Rate ##br##Differentials ...And Expected Interest Rate Differentials ...And Expected Interest Rate Differentials The non-linearity makes it difficult to take a high-conviction view on sterling’s direction. Instead, as soon as an election is announced, a good strategy is to buy sterling volatility. Although it has risen recently, sterling volatility is only in the foothills relative to the heights of 2016, meaning plenty of upside (Chart I-1). The easiest way to implement this is simultaneously to buy at-the-money call and put options (versus either the euro or dollar). Brexit Investments  A common question we get is what are the most Brexit-impacted investments, in both directions? As mentioned, the most obvious is sterling. Relative to the established relationship with interest rate differentials prior to the Brexit vote in 2016, the pound now carries a Brexit discount of around 15 percent. For U.K. investments, the inevitable imminent election dominates all other considerations. Related to this, the FTSE100 has outperformed the Eurostoxx600. This is exactly as theory would suggest. The FTSE100 and Eurostoxx600 are just a collection of global multi-currency earning companies quoted in pounds and euros respectively. So when sterling weakens, the multi-currency earnings increase more in FTSE100 index terms than in Eurostoxx600 index terms, resulting in FTSE100 outperformance (Chart I-4). Chart I-4The FTSE100 Outperforms When Sterling Weakens The FTSE100 Outperforms When Sterling Weakens The FTSE100 Outperforms When Sterling Weakens Turning to U.K. equity sectors, those most likely to outperform the overall market in a soft Brexit are real estate and general retailers (Chart I-5 and Chart I-6). Chart I-5U.K. Real Estate Outperforms In A Soft Brexit U.K. Real Estate Outperforms In A Soft Brexit U.K. Real Estate Outperforms In A Soft Brexit Chart I-6U.K. General Retailers Outperform In A Soft Brexit U.K. General Retailers Outperform In A Soft Brexit U.K. General Retailers Outperform In A Soft Brexit While a sector likely to outperform the overall market in a hard Brexit is clothing and accessories (Chart I-7). Chart I-7U.K. Clothing And Accessories Could Outperform In A Hard Brexit U.K. Clothing And Accessories Could Outperform In A Hard Brexit U.K. Clothing And Accessories Could Outperform In A Hard Brexit Four Disruptors Revisited The final section this week revisits the wider context for Brexit and other recent examples of populism. Specifically, they are backlashes to four structural disruptors to economies and financial markets. Disruptor 1: Protectionism. Since the Great Recession, an extremely polarised distribution of economic growth has left many people’s standard of living stagnant – despite seemingly decent headline economic growth and job creation (Chart I-8). Chart I-8Disruptor 1: Income Inequality Leads To Protectionism Disruptor 1: Income Inequality Leads To Protectionism Disruptor 1: Income Inequality Leads To Protectionism Looking to find a scapegoat, economic nationalism and protectionism have resonated very strongly with voters in several major economies: the U.S., U.K., Italy, and Brazil. Other voters could follow in the same vein. But history teaches us that protectionism ends up hurting many more people than it helps. Disruptor 2: Technology. The bigger danger is that the malaise is being misdiagnosed. Many middle-income job losses are not due to globalization, but due to technology. A polarised distribution of economic growth has left many people’s standard of living stagnant. Specifically, Artificial Intelligence (AI) is replacing secure middle-income jobs and displacing workers into insecure low-income manual jobs – like bartending and waitressing – which AI cannot (yet) replace (Table I-1). And AI’s impact on middle-income jobs is only in its infancy.1 The worry is that by misdiagnosing the illness as globalization and wrongly responding with protectionism, the illness will get worse, rather than improve. Table I-1Disruptor 2: Technology Brexit: Rock Meets Hard Place Brexit: Rock Meets Hard Place Disruptor 3: Debt super-cycles have reached exhaustion. Protectionism carries a further danger. Just like developed economies did a decade ago, major emerging market economies are now coming to the end of structural credit booms and need to wean themselves off their credit addictions (Chart I-9). At this point of vulnerability, aggressive protectionism risks tipping these emerging economies into a sharp slowdown.  Chart I-9Disruptor 3: Debt Super-Cycles Have Reached Exhaustion Disruptor 3: Debt Super-Cycles Have Reached Exhaustion Disruptor 3: Debt Super-Cycles Have Reached Exhaustion Disruptor 4: Financial markets are richly valued. Disruptors one, two and three come at a time when equities are valued to generate feeble total nominal returns over the next decade (Chart I-10). Extremely compressed risk premiums are justified so long as bond yields remain ultra-low. Otherwise, the rich valuations will come under pressure.  Chart I-10Disruptor 4: Financial Markets Are Richly Valued Disruptor 4: Financial Markets Are Richly Valued Disruptor 4: Financial Markets Are Richly Valued The long-term investment message is crystal clear. With the four disruptors in play, we strongly advise long-term investors not to follow passive (equity) index-tracking strategies. Instead, we advise long-term investors to follow bespoke structural investment themes as shown in our structural recommendations section. Please note that owing to my travelling there is no fractal trading system this week. Normal service will resume next week.   Dhaval Joshi, Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report ‘The Superstar Economy: Part 2’ January 19, 2017 available at eis.bcaresearch.com Cyclical Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields   Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

Highlights Four ghosts of 2016 are knocking at the door: Brexit, Trump, Brazil, Italy. President Trump and U.S. trade policy are keeping uncertainty high. Upgrade the odds of a no-deal Brexit to about 33%. Expect limited stimulus from Italy and Germany – for now. Brazil’s pension reform is entering its final stretch – buy the rumor, sell the news. Feature Four major political events of 2016 are returning to affect the global investment landscape this fall – though only two of these ghosts are truly frightening. In order of market relevance: Trump: The election of Donald J. Trump as U.S. president, November 8, 2016 Brexit: The U.K. referendum to leave the European Union, June 23, 2016 Italy: The Italian constitutional referendum, December 4, 2016 Brazil: The removal of Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, August 31, 2016 Italy and Brazil are producing market-positive political results in the short run. Brexit and Trump pose substantial and immediate risks to the global bull market. A pivot by Trump is the headline risk to our view that no trade agreement will be concluded by November 2020, as we outlined in a Special Report last week. At the moment tensions are still escalating. President Trump has ordered an increase in tariffs (Chart 1) and threatened to invoke the International Economic Emergency Powers Act of 1977, which would give him the ability to halt transactions, freeze funds, and appropriate assets. China is retaliating proportionately and virtually incapable of softening its tone prior to its National Day celebration on October 1. The next round of negotiations, slated for Washington in September, could be a flop like the talks in July, or it could be canceled. Investors should stay defensive. The equity market will have to fall to force Trump to stage a tactical retreat. Meanwhile China could intervene violently in Hong Kong SAR. That possibility, the nationalist military parade on October 1, and U.S. actions toward the South China Sea and Taiwan, show that sabers are rattling, causing additional market jitters. Chart 1Trump's Latest Tariff Salvo Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 U.S.-China tensions underpin our tactical safe-haven trade recommendations. But we are not shifting to a cyclically bearish stance until we get clarity on Trump’s and Xi’s handling of their immediate predicament. Brexit is the other acute short-term risk. This was true even before Prime Minister Boris Johnson opted to prorogue parliament from September 10 to October 14, shortening the time that parliament has to either pass a law forbidding a no-deal exit or bring down Johnson’s government in a vote of no confidence. We are upgrading the odds of “no deal” to no higher than 33%, using a conservative decision-making process (Diagram 1). No-deal is not our base case because parliament, the public, and even Johnson himself want to avoid a recession, which is the likely outcome, even granting that the Bank of England will not stand idly by. We are upgrading the odds of “no deal” Brexit to about 33%. Diagram 1Brexit Decision Tree (Revised August 29, 2019) Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 From a bird’s eye point of view, the pound is very attractive (Chart 2). But in the near-term the twists and turns of Britain’s political struggle imply that we will see wild volatility. Our foreign exchange strategists expect that a no-deal Brexit would cause GBP/USD to collapse to 1 after October 31. Assuming our one-in-three odds of such an outcome, the probability-weighted average of cable is about 1.2. Hence investors should not short sterling from here, unless they strongly believe we are underrating the odds of no-deal exit. In the worst-case scenario, a no-deal Brexit will cause an economic shock at a time when Europe is on the brink of recession – Italy and Germany are virtually there. This means there is a substantial risk of additional deflationary pressure piling onto German bunds and sustaining the global bond rally. This pressure will be sharply reduced if Johnson loses an early no confidence vote, but that is a 50/50 call so we would not call time on this rally yet. Stay cautious. Chart 2Pound Can Only Go So Low Pound Can Only Go So Low Pound Can Only Go So Low   Italy: Stimulus … Without A Bruising Brussels Battle Italy has avoided a new election by producing an unusual tie-up between the establishment Democratic Party and the anti-establishment Five Star Movement (M5S). The coalition still needs to clear some internal hurdles and an online vote by Five Star members, but an agreement is to be presented to President Sergio Mattarella as we go to press. This is the most market-friendly outcome that could have been expected, as is clear through the sharp drop in Italian government bond yields (Chart 3). Our GeoRisk indicator for Italy is also collapsing. Chart 3Markets Cheer New Italian Coalition Markets Cheer New Italian Coalition Markets Cheer New Italian Coalition This development marks the climax of a story line that we outlined in 2016, when Prime Minister Matteo Renzi lost a constitutional referendum that aimed to strengthen Italian governments to enable deeper structural reforms (he subsequently resigned). At that time we argued that Italy would emerge as a market-relevant political risk due to rampant anti-establishment sentiment, but that this risk would subside when Italy’s populists were shown to be pragmatic at heart, i.e. unwilling to push their conflicts with Brussels to a point that truly reignited European break-up risk. This view is now vindicated – and not only for the short-term. The new coalition comes at the nick of time, with Europe teetering on recession and the risk of a no-deal Brexit rising. The new government will have to deliver the 2020 budget to the European Commission by October 15. The budget will aim to provide fiscal support, including a delay of the legislatively mandated hike in the Value Added Tax from 22% to 24.2%, already rolled over from 2019. The Five Star Movement will demand as a price for its participation in the coalition that social spending go up; the Democratic Party will have learned a lesson while out of power and will be more fiscally permissive and strike a tougher tone with Brussels. The Italian budget talks will be a non-issue: the coalition will cooperate with Brussels. The episode demonstrates that the Italian risk to financial markets is overrated. This point goes beyond the fact that the Democrats and Five Star were able to cooperate. Italy’s leading populist parties have already shown that they are pragmatic and will play the game with Brussels to avoid a financial breakdown. In May 2018, the newly formed populist coalition proposed a gigantic “wish list” budget that would have increased the budget deficit to roughly 7.3% of GDP in 2019. They also appointed a euroskeptic economy minister who almost prevented government formation. The ensuing conflict with Brussels triggered considerable turmoil (Chart 4). Ultimately, however, the populists did precisely what we expected: they bowed to the severe financial constraint on Italy’s banking system. They agreed to a 2019 and 2020 deficit of 2.04% and 2.1%, respectively (Chart 5). Chart 4Italian Populists Prove Pragmatic Italian Populists Prove Pragmatic Italian Populists Prove Pragmatic Chart 5Even Salvini Compromised On Budget Clash Even Salvini Compromised On Budget Clash Even Salvini Compromised On Budget Clash At present, the market is relieved that an election was avoided that might have seen Salvini and the League form a government with a much smaller right-wing party (Fratelli D’Italia) (Chart 6) – but the truth is that Salvini had already capitulated to the EU, both on budget matters and the euro currency. He was hardly likely to push for a budget more aggressive than that of the initial proposal in 2018. The clash with Brussels would have been a flash in the pan; the result would have been greater fiscal thrust, which would have been market-positive in the current environment. Chart 6Election Would Have Meant More Stimulus ... And More Political Risk Election Would Have Meant More Stimulus ... And More Political Risk Election Would Have Meant More Stimulus ... And More Political Risk M5S will also push for more spending and has also moderated their stance on the euro. A coalition with the Democrats will not work if the purpose is to push a euroskeptic agenda. There will be a focus on counter-cyclical fiscal policy, pragmatic reforms that the two can agree on, and fighting corruption. The budget talks will be a non-issue: the Democratic Party is an establishment party and the coalition will cooperate with Brussels. Furthermore, the context has changed since 2018 in a way that will reduce budget frictions. There is a need for countercyclical fiscal policy in light of the global slowdown, so the European Commission will have to be more flexible on the budget. This is particularly true if Germany itself loosens its belt on a cyclical basis. The risk to the above is that the coalition shaping up between the Democrats and Five Star is an alliance of convenience that will break down over time. Five Star will remain hard-line on immigration, which is driving anti-establishment sentiment. Italian elections are a frequent affair. Salvini and the League will be waiting in the wings, especially if Brussels proves too tight-fisted or if the Democrats do not toughen their stance on immigration. But as outlined above, Salvini’s own evolution on the euro, on northern Italy, and on the budget and financial stability shows that the economy will have to get a lot worse before Italian euroskepticism presents a renewed systemic risk. Bottom Line: The tentative coalition taking shape in Italy will produce a modest increase in fiscal thrust with minimal frictions with Brussels. As such it is the most market-friendly outcome that could have occurred from Salvini’s push to seize power. Beneath this episode of government change is the political arrangement taking shape in Italy, and across Europe, which calls for a commitment to the European project and currency. The price of this commitment is a tougher line on immigration from European leaders. Germany: Fiscal Loosening, But Not For The States (Yet) Our GeoRisk indicator for Germany is pointing to an increase in risk in recent weeks. Germany is threatened by a potential technical recession and while fiscal stimulus is in preparation, there will not be a fiscal game-changer until Merkel steps down in 2021 – barring a total collapse in the economy that forces her hand in the meantime. The outlook is not improving (Chart 7, top panel). The economy shrank by 0.1% in Q2 2019, exports are falling, and passenger car production is at the lowest level ever recorded (Chart 7, bottom panels). Chart 7German Economy Gets Pummeled German Economy Gets Pummeled German Economy Gets Pummeled Chart 8Germany: Expect Orthodox Stimulus For Now Germany: Expect Orthodox Stimulus For Now Germany: Expect Orthodox Stimulus For Now Finance Minister Olaf Scholz has announced that Germany could increase government spending by $55 billion within the context of European and German budget constraints. Split proportionally between 2019 and 2020, this additional spending would not put Germany in violation of the “black zero” rule – a commitment to a balanced budget that limits the federal structural deficit to 0.35% of GDP – even without any additional revenue (Chart 8).   There will not be a fiscal game-changer in Germany until Merkel steps down – barring a crisis. The German Chancellery reports that it does not see the need for stimulus in the short term – as long as trade tensions do not escalate and there is no hard Brexit. At present, however, trade tensions are escalating and the odds of a no-deal Brexit are increasing. Moreover China’s economy and stimulus efforts continue to disappoint. In this context Germany’s ruling coalition is putting together a climate change package that would entail additional spending (while stealing some thunder from the increasingly popular Green Party). Given the European Commission’s forecast of Germany’s 2020 budget surplus, 0.8% of GDP, the government could ultimately go further than Scholz’s ~$50bn. This is because the black zero rule provides for exceptions in case of recession (or natural disasters or other crises out of governmental control) with a majority vote in the Bundestag. Hence we are not so much concerned about the magnitude of the stimulus as its timing. First, Merkel and her coalition typically move slower than the market would like in the face of financial and economic challenges. Second, according to the black zero rule, which is transcribed in the German constitution (the Basic Law), the Länder cannot run budget deficits from 2020. Amending the constitution to delay this deadline requires a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat – a much taller order than the simple majority needed to boost federal deficits. The governing coalition currently holds 56% of the seats in the Bundestag. If the Greens were brought on board, which they would be inclined to do, this number falls just short of two-thirds at 65.6%. In order to obtain a two-thirds majority in the Bundesrat, the Social Democrats, Christian Democrats, and the Greens would need the support of another party, either the Left or the Free Democrats. This could be done but it would require political will, which is only likely to be sufficient if the German and global economy get worse from here. Meanwhile financial markets will have to settle for the gradual implementation of a stimulus package on the order of 1% of GDP – the one the government is planning. Bottom Line: While Germany will likely roll out a stimulus package by Q4, if third quarter GDP data confirm that the country is in a technical recession, Merkel’s hesitation and budget limits mean that this stimulus will likely be moderate. A marginal upside surprise is possible but it will not represent a true “game changer” on fiscal policy in Germany. The game changer is more likely after Merkel steps down in 2021. The Green Party is surging in Germany and could possibly lead the next government. Even if it doesn’t, its success and Europe-wide developments are pushing German leaders to become more accommodative. Brazil: Reform Or Bust Political turmoil in Brazil over the past five years has ultimately resulted in a right-wing populist government under President Jair Bolsonaro. Bolsonaro is pursuing a pension reform that is universally acknowledged as necessary to straighten out Brazil’s fiscal books, but that the previous government tried and failed to pass. On this front the news is market-positive: having cleared the lower Chamber of Deputies, the pension reforms are now likely to pass the senate. This will lift investor confidence and give Bolsonaro an initial success that he may then be able to translate into additional economic reforms. The Brazilian economy and financial markets are moving in opposite directions. The currency and equities staged a mid-year rally despite negative data releases – shrinking retail sales and industrial production amid high unemployment (Chart 9). More recently these assets relapsed despite tentative signs of improvement on the economic front (Chart 10). All the while, chaos and controversies surrounding Bolsonaro’s government have weighed on his approval rating, ending the honeymoon period after election (Chart 11). Chart 9Brazil: Signs Of Improvement Brazil: Signs Of Improvement Brazil: Signs Of Improvement   Chart 10Brazil: Markets Sold Despite Pension Progress Brazil: Markets Sold Despite Pension Progress Brazil: Markets Sold Despite Pension Progress Chart 11Bolsonaro’s Honeymoon Is Long Gone Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 The mid-year equity re-rating was driven by an improvement in sentiment on the back of the government’s pension reform. The relapse occurred despite the passage of the pension reform bill in the lower house, indicating that global economic pessimism has dominated. The bill’s next step goes to the senate where it faces two rounds of voting before enactment (Diagram 2). It should clear this hurdle by a large margin, though we expect delays. Diagram 2Brazil: Pension Reform Timeline Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 In the second round vote in the lower house on August 6 – which had a smaller margin of victory than the first round – deputies voted largely in line with party alliances (Charts 12A & 12B). Assuming legislators in the senate behave in the same way, the reform should gain the support of 64 of the 81 senators – easily surpassing the 49 votes needed. Even in a more pessimistic scenario where all opposition parties and all independent parties vote against the bill – along with two defecting senators from government-allied parties – the reform would pass by 56-25. Chart 12APension Bill Sailed Through Lower House ... Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Chart 12B... And Should Pass Senate In Time Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 This favorable outlook is also supported by popular opinion, which indicates that the majority of those polled agree that pension reforms are necessary (Chart 13). This leaves two questions: How soon will the bill clear the senate? According to senate party leaders’ proposed timetable, the bill will undergo its first upper house vote on September 18 with the second round slated for October 2. This is ambitious. The strategy of Senator Tasso Jereissati – who has been appointed senate pension reform rapporteur – is to approve the text in its current form and create a parallel proposed amendment to the constitution (PEC) which will bring together the amendments that senators make to the original text. Dozens of amendments have been filed with the Commission on Constitution and Justice. These will prolong the enactment of the final bill and dilute its impact. We doubt the senate will let Jereissati have his way entirely and hence expect delays and dilution. Chart 13Brazil: Public Now Favors Pension Reform Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Chart 14Brazil: Pension Reform Not Enough Brazil: Pension Reform Not Enough Brazil: Pension Reform Not Enough How much savings will the bill generate? Will the reforms be sufficient to improve public debt dynamics in Brazil? The Independent Fiscal Institute of the senate estimates that the reform will generate BRL 744 billion of savings. This is significantly less than the BRL 1.2 trillion initially proposed, and lower than the BRL 860 billion that Economy Minister Paulo Guedes has indicated as the minimum fiscal savings required. Our Emerging Markets strategists argue that the bill falls short of what is needed. While the plan will reduce the fiscal deficit and slow debt accumulation, it will be insufficient to generate primary surpluses over the coming years (Chart 14).1 Moreover, estimated savings in the final bill will likely be further revised down as the bill undergoes more amendments in the senate. What comes after pension reform? The market has focused almost exclusively on this issue to the neglect of Bolsonaro’s wider economic reform agenda. The agenda includes privatization, trade liberalization, tax reforms, and deregulation. Here we are more skeptical. First, Bolsonaro will have spent a lot of political capital on pensions. Second, while the economy and unemployment are always important, they are not the foremost concern for Brazilians (Chart 15). Chart 15Bolsonaro Will Lose Political Capital After Pension Bill Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Third, the economic agenda is often at odds with Bolsonaro’s social, foreign, and environmental policies: The new Mercosur-European Union trade agreement and ongoing trade negotiations between Mercosur and Canada are positive developments. However the G7 summit in France highlighted that the deal with the EU is at risk due to dissatisfaction with Bolsonaro’s response to the Amazon fires. France and Ireland have threatened to withhold support of the ratification. With world leaders concerned about the political risks of trade liberalization, and with Trump having issued a license to foreign leaders for trade weaponization, an escalation of tensions between the Europeans and Bolsonaro could lead to punitive measures even beyond the delay to the Mercosur-EU deal. Brazil’s China problem: Bolsonaro has been cozying up to President Donald Trump while striking a more aggressive tone with China. This is a risky strategy as it may undermine Brazil’s economic interests. The country’s exports are much more leveraged to China than to the U.S. and have been benefitting on the back of the trade war as China substitutes away from the U.S. (Chart 16). The president’s planned trip to China in October reveals an attempt to mend ties after having accused China of dominating key Brazilian sectors during his election campaign. But it is not clear yet that Bolsonaro will stage a retreat. And if President Trump backtracks on his trade war in order to clinch a deal, Bolsonaro may have lost some goodwill with China without receiving the benefit of China’s substitution effects. Hence Bolsonaro will have to soften his approach to China to make progress on the trade aspect of the reform agenda. Chart 16Brazil: Time To Mend Ties With China Brazil: Time To Mend Ties With China Brazil: Time To Mend Ties With China Bottom Line: We expect the passage of a diluted pension reform bill that will slow the growth of public debt to some extent. However global headwinds are persisting. And any success on pensions should not be extrapolated to other items on the economic reform agenda. Bolsonaro’s trade liberalization faces difficulties on the surface. Other domestic reforms are even more difficult to achieve in the wake of painful pension cuts. Reforms that enjoy public support and do not require a complicated legislative process are the most likely to be implemented, but even then, legislation and implementation are likely to be long-in-coming in Brazil’s highly fractured congress. As a result we share the view with our Emerging Markets Strategy that the pension reform is a “buy the rumor, sell the news” phenomenon. Housekeeping We are booking gains on our long BCA global defense basket for a 17% gain since inception in October 2018. The underlying thesis for this trade remains strong and we will reinstitute it at an appropriate time, though likely on a relative basis to minimize headwinds to cyclical sectors. We are also finally throwing in the towel on our long rare earth / strategic metals equity trade. The logic behind the trade is intact but it was very poorly timed and the basket has depreciated 24% since inception.   Matt Gertken, Vice President Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Roukaya Ibrahim, Editor/Strategist Geopolitical Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com Ekaterina Shtrevensky, Research Analyst ekaterinas@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1      Please see BCA Research’s Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report “On Chinese Banks And Brazil,” dated July 18, 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. France: GeoRisk Indicator Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 U.K.: GeoRisk Indicator Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Germany: GeoRisk Indicator Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019   Italy: GeoRisk Indicator Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Spain: GeoRisk Indicator Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Russia: GeoRisk Indicator Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019   Korea: GeoRisk Indicator Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Taiwan: GeoRisk Indicator Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Turkey: GeoRisk Indicator Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Brazil: GeoRisk Indicator Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 What's On The Geopolitical Radar? Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Four Ghosts Of 2016 - GeoRisk Update: August 30, 2019 Geopolitical Calendar

Dear Client, Please note that there will be no regular Weekly Report next week, as we take a summer break. Our regular publication will resume September 6th. Best regards, Chester Ntonifor, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy Highlights Our PPP models show the DXY index to be overvalued by 10-15%. Within the G10 universe, the cheapest currencies are the Swedish krona, the British pound, the Japanese yen and the Norwegian krone. Look to go short CHF/GBP on valuation grounds. Feature Regular readers of our publication will notice that we tend to adhere to very simple and time-tested ideas. One such is the concept of purchasing power parity (PPP). The beauty comes from its simplicity. If the price of a good in Sweden is rising faster than in South Africa, then the krona should depreciate versus the rand to equalize prices across both borders. Otherwise, the krona becomes incrementally expensive, relative to the rand. In practice, various models have shown PPP to be a very poor tool for managing currencies. One roadblock comes from measurement issues, since consumer price baskets tend to differ in composition from one country to the next. Second, there is less price discovery for services, than there is for tradable goods. For example, it is rather difficult to import a haircut from Mumbai into the U.S., and so arbitraging those prices away tends to be impractical. Tariffs, trade restrictions and transport costs also tend to dampen the explanatory power of PPP models, though those have had diminishing importance over time. In order to get closer to an apples-to-apples comparison across countries, we make two adjustments. First, we divide the consumer price index (CPI) baskets into five major groups. In most cases, this breakdown captures 90% of the national CPI basket: Food, restaurants and hotels Shelter Health, culture and recreation Energy and transportation Household goods The second adjustment is to run two regressions with the exchange rate as the dependent variable. The first regression (call it REG1) uses the relative price ratios of the five groups as independent variables. This allows us to observe the most influential price ratios that help explain variations in the exchange rate. The second regression (call it REG2) uses a weighted average combination of the five groups to form a synthetic relative price ratio. If for example, shelter is 33% in the U.S. CPI basket, but 19% in the Swedish CPI basket, relative shelter prices will represent 26% of the combined price ratio. This allows for a uniform cross-sectional comparison, compared to using the national CPI weights. The results were largely consistent: Both regressions were statistically significant, but more so for REG1. This makes intuitive sense, as the number of variables were higher in the first regression. The sign for household goods was negative for some countries. This could be due to some specter of multicollinearity, if the tradable goods price effect is captured in other categories. There is also the low value-to-weight ratio for many household goods such as refrigerators or air conditioners, which could make currency deviations from PPP persistent. The shelter sign was also negative for some countries, meaning rising shelter prices tended to be associated with an incrementally cheaper currency. This could be due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Rising incomes (one key determinant of rising house prices) usually reflect rising productivity levels, which tend to lift the fair value of the exchange rate. The results showed the U.S. dollar as overvalued, especially versus the Swedish krona, British pound and Norwegian krone. Commodity currencies were closer to fair value, and within the safe haven complex, the Japanese yen was more attractive than the Swiss franc. The euro was less undervalued than implied by the overvaluation in the DXY index. As a final note, PPP models are just an additional kit to our currency toolbox, and so should never be used in isolation, but in conjunction with other currency signals. This is just a first iteration in our PPP modelling work, which we intend to improve in the months to come. U.S. Dollar We reverse-engineered the fair value for the DXY index by aggregating the model results from its six constituents. This includes the euro, the Japanese yen, the British pound, the Canadian dollar, the Swedish krona, and the Swiss franc, using the corresponding DXY weights. The message from the synthetic model is clear: the U.S dollar is above its fair value, in line with our fundamental view (Chart 1). Chart 1The Dollar is Slightly Expensive The Dollar is Slightly Expensive The Dollar is Slightly Expensive Americans spent 35% of their income in 2018 on goods and 65% on services. Shelter remains the single largest consumption item for American households, which makes up 33% of the consumption basket. However, the relative importance of shelter is dwarfed by much more rampant rent and house price increases in other developed countries. Medical care accounts for 8.7% of the CPI basket, and is the highest in the developed world on a per capita basis. Total spending on health care accounts for almost 20% of nominal GDP. Since the 1980s, the CPI for medical care has risen fivefold, far outpacing many developed countries. This makes the dollar incrementally expensive.  Core CPI edged higher to 2.2% in July, driven by medical care and shelter. While above the Federal Reserve’s 2% target, the risks to inflation remain asymmetric to the downside. That will keep the Fed on a dovish path near-term, which should help close overvaluation in the dollar. Euro We had limited data for the euro area, and so our regression results were less robust. REG1 shows the euro as cheap, while REG2 is more ambiguous (Chart 2). In short, a PPP model for the euro had one of lowest explanatory powers within the G10 universe. Food, restaurants and hotels are the largest consumption item in the euro CPI basket. Looking at the details, food and non-alcoholic beverages account for 14%, alcohol and tobacco make up 4%, and restaurant and hotels account for about 10% (Table). Relative price trends have moved to undermine the fair value of the euro. Chart 2The Euro Is Slightly Cheap The Euro Is Slightly Cheap The Euro Is Slightly Cheap Euro Area CPI Weights A Fresh Look At Purchasing Power Parity A Fresh Look At Purchasing Power Parity Shelter’s weight in the euro area CPI basket currently stands at 16.7%, the smallest among G10 countries. Since 2012, relative house and rent prices in the euro area have been decreasing compared with that in the U.S. Rampant rent controls, especially in places like Germany have subdued housing CPI, and tempered the fair value of the euro. This makes sense to the extent that it represents a concomitant rise in the welfare state. It is well-known that the euro area is relatively open and so tradable goods prices are important for the fair value of the euro. Given that the epicenter of trade tensions is between the U.S. and China, this will act to boost the relative attractiveness of European goods, which will be a bullish underpinning for the euro. Inflation expectations have collapsed in the euro area. However, compared to the Federal Reserve, there is little the European Central Bank can do to boost inflation. This is relatively euro bullish. Once global growth eventually picks up, improved competitiveness in the periphery will allow for non-inflationary growth. Japanese Yen The yen benefits from being cheap, as well as being a safe-haven currency (Chart 3). The overarching theme for Japan is a falling (and rapidly aging) population, which means that deficient demand and falling prices are the norm. This makes the yen relatively attractive on a recurring basis. Most of the Heisei era in Japan has been characterized by deflation. Importantly, all categories in Japan have been in a relative price downtrend during this period (Table). Domestically, an aging population (that tends to be a large voting base), prefer falling prices. Meanwhile, the bursting of the asset bubble in the late 80s/early 90s led to a powerful deleveraging wave that undermined prices. Chart 3The Yen Is Quite Cheap The Yen Is Quite Cheap The Yen Is Quite Cheap Japan CPI Weights A Fresh Look At Purchasing Power Parity A Fresh Look At Purchasing Power Parity The relative prices for most items have been decreasing, but culture and recreation inflation have experienced a meaningful rebound since 2013, largely due to a booming tourism industry in Japan.1 According to tourism statistics, the number of international visitors to Japan reached 31 million in 2018, almost five times the number ten years ago. But as long as the younger generation in Japan continues to save more and consume less, prices will remain under pressure. BoJ Governor Haruhiko Kuroda remains committed to achieving a 2% inflation target, but inflation expectations are falling to historical lows at a time when the BoJ is running out of policy bullets.2  That means inflation will likely lag that of other developed countries, lifting the fair value of the yen. British Pound Both regressions show the pound as undervalued. This supports our view that over the long term, the pound is a categorical buy (Chart 4). The consumption baskets in both the U.K. and the U.S. are roughly similar, which means traditional PPP models do a good job at capturing the true underlying picture of price differentials (Table). For example, OECD PPP models, based on national expenditure, show the pound as 15% undervalued. Chart 4The Pound Is Cheap The Pound Is Cheap The Pound Is Cheap U.K. CPI Weights A Fresh Look At Purchasing Power Parity A Fresh Look At Purchasing Power Parity Housing is the largest item in the consumption basket, with a total weight close to 30% (including housing electricity and water supply). The shelter consumer price index in the U.K. started to fall relative to the U.S. in 2016, which has lowered the fair-value of the pound (in the Balassa-Samuelson framework). That said, the fall in the pound has been much more deep and violent than suggested by domestic price fundamentals. For example, food restaurants and hotels are 10% cheaper in the U.K. compared to the U.S. over the last half decade. However, rather than appreciating 10%, the pound has plummeted by about 30%. Brexit will continue to dictate the ebb and flow of sterling gyrations, but the reality is that the pound should be higher on a fundamental basis. Meanwhile, a pick up in the global economy will benefit the pound. Going short CHF/GBP on valuation grounds is an attractive bet today. Australian Dollar As a commodity currency, PPP models are less useful for the Australian dollar than terms of trade, or even interest rate differentials. That said, the Aussie dollar is still relatively cheap versus the USD on a PPP basis (Chart 5). The key driver for value in the AUD has been a drop in the currency, relative to what price differentials will dictate. Food, restaurants and hotels comprise 23% of the Australian CPI basket, with the alcohol and tobacco category alone making up 7.4% (Table). Given food price differentials have been stable versus the U.S. in over a decade, Aussie citizens have not been particularly worse off. Chart 5The Aussie Is Slightly Cheap The Aussie Is Slightly Cheap The Aussie Is Slightly Cheap Australia CPI Weights A Fresh Look At Purchasing Power Parity A Fresh Look At Purchasing Power Parity Shelter accounts for almost a quarter percent of the basket. Relative shelter prices in Australia have been rising since the late 1990s, but started to soften in the past few years, on the back of macro prudential measures. Meanwhile, holiday travel and accommodation have a total weight of 6%, of which domestic travel makes up 2.9%, and international travel 3.1%. The overall cost of tourism in Australia has been falling relative to the U.S., boosting the fair value of the Aussie. In the 1980s, inflation in Australia averaged around 8.3% year-on-year. This made the Aussie incrementally expensive, creating grounds for a subsequent 50% devaluation from 1980 to 1986. Inflation targeting was finally introduced and has realigned Aussie prices with the rest of the world. Our bias is that the Aussie will be less driven by price differentials going forward, but more by RBA policy and terms of trade. New Zealand Dollar The New Zealand dollar is at fair value according to both models (Chart 6).  Like the aussie, the kiwi is less driven by price differentials and more by terms of trade. Food and shelter account for the largest share of the consumption basket, and relative prices have not been moving in favor of the kiwi (Table). So, while the kiwi was overvalued earlier this decade, the overvaluation gap has been mostly closed via a higher dollar. Chart 6The Kiwi Is At Fair Value The Kiwi Is At Fair Value The Kiwi Is At Fair Value New Zealand CPI Weights A Fresh Look At Purchasing Power Parity A Fresh Look At Purchasing Power Parity Relative shelter prices in New Zealand have been soaring in recent decades compared to the U.S. Higher immigration, foreign purchases and a commodity boom helped. However, in August 2018, the ban on foreign property purchases came into effect, which helped cool down the housing market. Like in Australia, the inflation rate in New Zealand reached 18% year-on-year in the early 1980s, and was subsequently addressed via inflation targeting. This has realigned New Zealand prices somewhat with the rest of the world. Our bias is that going forward, the kiwi will underperform the aussie, mainly because of a negative terms of trade shock. Canadian Dollar The loonie is currently trading below its fair value, according to both of our models (Chart 7).  Shelter remains the largest budget item for Canadian households (Table). The average Canadian household spent C$18,637 on shelter per year, around 29.2% of the total consumption in 2017.3 Interestingly, the shelter consumer price index does not fully capture skyrocketing house prices in Canada over the last decade. Since 2005, Canadian house prices relative to U.S. have doubled, according to OECD. On the contrary, the relative shelter CPI has trended downwards. These crosscurrents have dampened the explanatory power of the exchange rate. Chart 7The Loonie Is Slightly Cheap The Loonie Is Slightly Cheap The Loonie Is Slightly Cheap Canada CPI Weights A Fresh Look At Purchasing Power Parity A Fresh Look At Purchasing Power Parity Canadians are avid users of private transportation. The average spending on transportation accounted for 20% of total consumption, the second-largest expenditure item. Relative prices in this category have been rising, which has lowered the fair value of the exchange rate. Canada stands as the sixth largest energy producer in the world, but due to heavy taxation, Canadian consumers are paying more for gas prices than their U.S. neighbors. That said, terms of trade have been more important than PPP concerns for the loonie. In the near term, we believe energy prices (and the Western Canadian Select price spread) will continue to be important for the loonie. Swiss Franc USD/CHF is trading slightly below fair value, despite structural appreciation in the franc in recent years (Chart 8). The largest consumption item in Switzerland is the food, restaurants and hotels category (Table). The second item is shelter. Social services have a higher weight in the CPI basket, compared to other developed nations. This has been a huge driver of relative prices between Switzerland and the rest of the world, with falling relative prices boosting the fair value of the franc. Chart 8The Swiss Franc Is At Fair Value The Swiss Franc Is At Fair Value The Swiss Franc Is At Fair Value Switzerland CPI Weights A Fresh Look At Purchasing Power Parity A Fresh Look At Purchasing Power Parity Healthcare notably accounts for 15.5% in the total CPI basket, of which patient services makes up 11.5%. The Swiss healthcare system is a combination of public, subsidized private, and entirely private systems. It is mandatory for a Swiss resident to purchase basic health insurance, which covers a range of treatments. The insured person then pays the insurance premium plus part of the treatment costs. Finally, as a small open economy, tradable goods prices are important for Switzerland. Given high levels of specialization, terms-of-trade in Switzerland are soaring to record highs. This makes the franc a core holding in a currency portfolio. Norwegian Krone The Norwegian krone is undervalued according to both models (Chart 9). Food and shelter account for the largest share of the Norwegian CPI basket (Table). While the share of shelter is lower than in the U.S., other categories share similar weights, allowing traditional PPP models to be adequate for USD/NOK. One difference is that in terms of social services, only 0.2% of the expenditures are allocated to education, since all schools are free in Norway, including universities. Chart 9The Norwegian Krone Is Cheap The Norwegian Krone Is Cheap The Norwegian Krone Is Cheap Norway CPI Weights A Fresh Look At Purchasing Power Parity A Fresh Look At Purchasing Power Parity As a large energy producer, Norwegians pay less for electricity, gas, and other fuels. Norway is also a heavy producer of renewable energy, notably hydropower. This makes the domestic energy basket less susceptible to the ebbs and flows of energy prices. Going forward, the path of energy prices will continue to dictate ebbs and flows in the krone. Meanwhile, long NOK positions also benefit from an attractive valuation starting point.  Swedish Krona The krona is the cheapest currency in our universe by a wide margin (Chart 10). This stems less from fluctuations in relative prices and more from negative rates that have hammered the exchange rate. Like many countries, food and shelter is the largest component of the consumption basket (Table). Transportation is also important. However, an important driver for undervaluation in the currency has been a drop in the relative price of social services. Chart 10The Swedish Krona Is Very Cheap The Swedish Krona Is Very Cheap The Swedish Krona Is Very Cheap Sweden CPI Weights A Fresh Look At Purchasing Power Parity A Fresh Look At Purchasing Power Parity Sweden experienced very high inflation rates in the 1980s, and since then, has been in a disinflationary regime. More recently, the inflation rate has edged down below the Riksbank’s target, mostly dragged down by recreation, culture, and healthcare. This makes Swedish real rates relatively attractive. We remain positive on the Swedish krona and believe that it will be one of the first to benefit, should global growth pick up.   Chester Ntonifor, Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com   Kelly Zhong, Research Analyst kellyz@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 We removed the shelter component in regression 1, since it was distorting results. 2 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, titled “Short USD/JPY: Heads I Win, Tails I Don’t Lose Too Much”, dated May 31, 2019, available at fes.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see “Survey of Household Spending, 2017,” Statistic Canada, December 12, 2018. Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades