United States

In the decade following the global financial crisis, investor concerns that the Fed’s monetary policies have artificially boosted equity market valuation have been mostly overblown. But today, it is now true that US equities are increasingly dependent on persistently low bond yields, as stocks can only avoid near bubble-like relative pricing if yields remain below trend rates of economic growth. Macroeconomic theory and the historical record both support the notion that nominal interest rates are normally in equilibrium when they are roughly equal to the trend rate of nominal income growth. A gap between interest rates and trend rates of growth was indeed justified for a few years following the global financial crisis, but in the few years prior to the pandemic, it is altogether possible that the neutral rate of interest (or “r-star”) was in fact meaningfully higher than academic estimates suggested. In a scenario where the US output gap closes quickly, inflation rises above target, and where permanent damage to the labor market from the pandemic is relatively limited, we expect the narrative of secular stagnation to be challenged and for investor expectations for the neutral rate to move closer to trend rates of economic growth. That would imply that the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield could hypothetically rise above 3%, and possibly as high as 4% or more. Such a shift would push the US equity risk premium back to 2002 levels based on current stock market pricing. This is not necessarily negative for equities, but it is also not clear what equity risk premium investors will require to contend with the myriad risks to the economic outlook that did not exist in the early 2000s. A low ERP that is technically not as low as that of the tech bubble era could thus still threaten stock prices, as T.I.N.A., “There Is No Alternative,” may not prevail. Many investors have questioned what asset allocation strategy should be pursued in a scenario where stock prices and bond yields are no longer positively correlated. While they are not likely to be without cost, options exist for investors to potentially earn positive absolute returns in a scenario where a significant shift in the interest rate outlook threatens both stock and bond prices. Chart II-1Equity Valuation Concerns Have Persisted For The Past Decade... Equity Valuation Concerns Have Persisted For The Past Decade... Equity Valuation Concerns Have Persisted For The Past Decade... For the better part of the last decade, many investors have argued that the Fed’s monetary policies have artificially boosted equity market valuation. Based on the cyclically-adjusted P/E ratio metric originated by Robert Shiller, stocks reached pre-global financial crisis (GFC) multiples in late 2014 and early 2015 (Chart II-1). Based on metrics such as the price-to-sales ratio, stocks rose to pre-GFC valuation in late 2013, and are now even more richly valued than they were at the height of the dotcom bubble. These concerns have mostly occurred in response to absolute changes in stock multiples, but equity valuation cannot be divorced from the prevailing level of interest rates. Relative to bond yields, stocks were extraordinarily cheap for many years following the GFC. Measured by one simple approach to calculating the equity risk premium, the spread between the 12-month forward earnings yield (the inverse of the forward P/E ratio) and the real 10-year Treasury yield, stocks were the cheapest following the GFC that they had been since the mid 1980s, and remain reasonably priced today (Chart II-2). Chart II-2...But Stocks Have Actually Been Cheap Versus Bonds ...But Stocks Have Actually Been Cheap Versus Bonds ...But Stocks Have Actually Been Cheap Versus Bonds The fact that stocks have appeared to be expensive for several years but quite cheap (or reasonably priced) relative to bonds underscores the fact that longer-term bond yields have been extraordinarily low following the global financial crisis. Still, equities were not dependent on low bond yields prior to the pandemic, as illustrated in Chart II-3. The chart highlights the range of 10-year Treasury yields that would be consistent with the pre-GFC equity risk premium range (measured from 2002-2007), alongside the actual 10-year yield and trend nominal GDP growth. The chart shows that for years following the financial crisis, bond yields could have risen to levels well above trend rates of economic growth and stocks would still have been priced in line with pre-crisis norms. This “normal pricing” range for the 10-year declined as the expansion continued, but remained consistent with trend growth rates and above the actual 10-year yield up until the beginning of the pandemic. Chart II-3 also highlights, however, that the circumstances changed last year. The equity risk premium briefly rose at the onset of the pandemic as stocks initially sold off sharply, but then quickly fell as stock prices recovered in response to aggressive fiscal and monetary easing. Today, it is true that US equities are increasingly dependent on persistently low bond yields, as stocks can only avoid bubble-like relative pricing if yields remain below trend rates of economic growth. Chart II-3Now, Stocks Are Increasingly Dependent On Low Bond Yields Now, Stocks Are Increasingly Dependent On Low Bond Yields Now, Stocks Are Increasingly Dependent On Low Bond Yields Prior to the pandemic, most fixed-income investors would have viewed the risk of bond yields rising to trend nominal GDP growth, let alone above it, as minimal. Global investors have come to accept the secular stagnation narrative as described by Larry Summers in November 2013, and have gravitated to academic estimates of the neutral rate of interest (“R-star”) that show a substantial gap between the natural rate and trend real growth (Chart II-4). This view has manifested itself in a decline in surveyed estimates of the long-run Fed funds rate, but at present the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield has pushed well above this survey-derived fair value range (Chart II-5). It is possible that the fiscal response to the pandemic will cause investor views about r-star to evolve even further over the coming 12-24 months, and in this report we explore the potential headwind that such an evolution could present to stock prices at some point – potentially as early as next year. Chart II-4Investors Have Accepted Secular Stagnation, And The View That R-star Is Well Below Trend Rates Of Growth Investors Have Accepted Secular Stagnation, And The View That R-star Is Well Below Trend Rates Of Growth Investors Have Accepted Secular Stagnation, And The View That R-star Is Well Below Trend Rates Of Growth Chart II-5The Market's Views About R-star May Be Shifting The Market's Views About R-star May Be Shifting The Market's Views About R-star May Be Shifting   R-star: A Brief Primer Macroeconomic theory and the historical record both support the notion that nominal interest rates are normally in equilibrium when they are roughly equal to the trend rate of nominal income growth. From the perspective of macro theory, the neutral rate of interest is determined by the supply of and demand for savings. But in practical terms, this implies that the neutral rate should normally be closely linked to the trend rate of economic growth. For example, if interest rates – and thus the cost of capital – were persistently below aggregate income growth, then demand for capital (and thus credit and likely labor demand) should increase as firms seek to profit from the gap between the interest rate and the expected rate of return from real investment. As such, the trend rate of growth acts as a good proxy for the interest rate that will balance the supply and demand for credit during normal economic circumstances. Empirically, academic estimates of r-star closely followed estimates of trend real GDP growth prior to the global financial crisis, as shown in Chart II-4 above. In addition, we noted in our January report that the stance of monetary policy, as defined by the difference between nominal GDP growth and the 10-year Treasury yield, has generally done a good job of explaining the US output gap prior to 2000. This supports the notion that monetary policy is stimulative (restrictive) when bond yields are below (above) trend growth rates. However, in the years following the GFC, investors’ estimates of r-star collapsed, as evidenced by the sharp decline in 5-year / 5-year forward Treasury yields (Chart II-6). This was followed by a decline in primary dealer and FOMC expectations for the long-term Fed funds rate, which investors took as validating their view that the neutral rate of interest has permanently declined. Chart II-6Investors Led The Fed And Others In Expecting A Lower Nominal Neutral Rate Investors Led The Fed And Others In Expecting A Lower Nominal Neutral Rate Investors Led The Fed And Others In Expecting A Lower Nominal Neutral Rate R-star And Trend Growth: Is A Gap Between The Two Really Justified? Chart II-7R-star Likely Did Decline Following The GFC (For A Time) R-star Likely Did Decline Following The GFC (For A Time) R-star Likely Did Decline Following The GFC (For A Time) It seems clear that r-star did indeed decline for a time after the GFC. The US and select European economies suffered a balance sheet recession in 2008/2009 that impacted credit demand for an extended period of time (Chart II-7), and extraordinarily low interest rates for several years did not fuel major credit excesses (at least in the household sector). But as we detailed in a Special Report last year,1 we doubt that the decline in r-star was permanent, for several reasons. The first, and most important, is that there have been at least four deeply impactful non-monetary shocks to both the US and global economies since 2008 that magnified the impact of prolonged household deleveraging and help explain the disconnect between growth and interest rates during the last economic cycle: The euro area sovereign debt crisis Premature fiscal austerity in the US, the UK, and euro area from 2010 – 2012/2014 The US dollar / oil price shock of 2014 The Trump administration’s aggressive use of tariffs beginning in 2018, impacting China but also other developed market economies. Chart II-8Recent Trends In US Private Sector Leverage Do Not Suggest R-star Is Very Low Recent Trends In US Private Sector Leverage Do Not Suggest R-star Is Very Low Recent Trends In US Private Sector Leverage Do Not Suggest R-star Is Very Low Except for the oil price shock of 2014 (which was driven by technological developments and a price war among producers), all of these non-monetary shocks were caused or exacerbated by policymakers – often for political reasons or due to regulatory failures. Second, the trend in US private sector credit growth last cycle does not suggest that r-star fell permanently. Chart II-8 underscores two points: the first is that while US household sector credit contracted for several years following the global financial crisis, it started growing again in 2013 and had largely closed the gap with income growth prior to the pandemic. The second point is that the nonfinancial corporate sector clearly leveraged itself over the course of the last expansion, arguing that interest rates have not in any way been restrictive for businesses. Third, we disagree with a common view in the marketplace that the 2018-2019 period supported the validity of low academic estimates of the neutral rate. Chart II-9 highlights that monetary policy ceased to be stimulative in 2019 according to the Laubach & Williams r-star estimate, which some investors have argued explains the late 2018 equity market selloff, the 2019 slowdown in the US housing market, the inversion of the yield curve, and the global manufacturing recession. Chart II-9Monetary Policy Ceased To Be Stimulative In 2019, According To The LW R-star Estimate Monetary Policy Ceased To Be Stimulative In 2019, According To The LW R-star Estimate Monetary Policy Ceased To Be Stimulative In 2019, According To The LW R-star Estimate But this narrative ignores other important factors that contributed to the slowdown. For example, Chart II-10 highlights that this period of economic weakness exactly coincided with the most intense phase of the Sino-US trade war, as well as a significant slowdown in Chinese credit growth. The chart highlights that the selloff in the US equity market began almost immediately after a surge in the effective tariff rates levied by the two countries against each other, and after the Chinese credit impulse fell three percentage points (from 30% to 27% of GDP). Chart II-10The 2018 Stock Market Selloff Occurred Once Sino-US Tariffs Exploded The 2018 Stock Market Selloff Occurred Once Sino-US Tariffs Exploded The 2018 Stock Market Selloff Occurred Once Sino-US Tariffs Exploded Chart II-11 highlights that interest rates did likely impact the housing market, but that it was the speed at which rates rose that was damaging rather than their level. The chart shows that the rise in mortgage rates from late 2016 to late 2018 was among the largest 2-year increases that has occurred since the early 1980s, so it is unsurprising that the growth in home sales and real residential investment slowed for a time. Additionally, Chart II-12 highlights that the rise in mortgage rates during this period did not cause a downtrend in mortgage credit growth, which only occurred in Q4 2018 in response to the impact of the sharp selloff in the equity market on household net worth. Chart II-11Mortgage Rates Rose Very Significantly From Late 2016 To Late 2018 Mortgage Rates Rose Very Significantly From Late 2016 To Late 2018 Mortgage Rates Rose Very Significantly From Late 2016 To Late 2018 Chart II-12A Record Rise In Mortgage Rates Did Not Crack The Housing Market A Record Rise In Mortgage Rates Did Not Crack The Housing Market A Record Rise In Mortgage Rates Did Not Crack The Housing Market   In short, the late 2018 / 2019 period saw a major global aggregate demand shock occur following an already-established slowdown in Chinese credit growth and a rapid rise in interest rates in the DM world. It is these factors that were likely responsible for the 2019 slowdown in economic growth, not the fact that interest rates reached levels that restricted economic activity on their own. R-star In A Post-Pandemic World Charts II-7 – II-12 above suggest that a gap between interest rates and trend rates of growth was indeed justified for a few years following the global financial crisis, but that a decline in r-star only appeared to be permanent due to persistent, non-monetary policy shocks to aggregate demand. In the few years prior to the pandemic, it is altogether possible that r-star was in fact meaningfully higher than academic estimates suggested. But that is now a counterfactual assertion, as the pandemic has transformed the outlook for interest rates and bond yields in conflicting ways. A 10% decline in the level of real output was the most intensely negative non-monetary shock to aggregate demand since the 1930s (Chart II-13), and we agree that another depression would have occurred without extraordinary government assistance. The economic damage caused by the pandemic certainly does not work in favor of a higher neutral rate, and we highlighted in Section 1 of our report that the Fed expects there to be some lingering and persistent slack in the labor market even once the pandemic is over. Chart II-13Without Major Monetary And Fiscal Policy Support, The Pandemic Would Probably Have Caused A Depression Without Major Monetary And Fiscal Policy Support, The Pandemic Would Probably Have Caused A Depression Without Major Monetary And Fiscal Policy Support, The Pandemic Would Probably Have Caused A Depression Chart II-14A Huge Increase In Government Transfers And Spending Is Underway April 2021 April 2021 On the other hand, Larry Summers, the chief proponent of the theory of secular stagnation, has argued for several years that increased fiscal spending was warranted in order to address an imbalance between private sector savings and investment. Summers himself now characterizes US fiscal policy as the “least responsible” that he has seen over the past 40 years, because of too-large government spending that risks overheating the economy (Chart II-14). Summers’ critique rests in large part on the fact that new government spending has not occurred in the form of investment (to balance out the existence of excess savings), but is instead providing transfers to households that in many cases have already accumulated significant excess savings. But the key point for investors is that the pandemic has completely shifted the narrative about fiscal spending, from “arguably insufficient for several years following the global financial crisis” to now “risking a dramatic overheating of the economy.” Some elements of Summers’ criticism of the Biden administration’s fiscal policy are justified, particularly the policy of large direct transfer payments to workers who have suffered no loss in employment or income as a result of the pandemic. Despite this, as detailed in Section 1 of our report, we are more sanguine about the risks of aggressive overheating for three reasons: it does seem likely that some portion of the spending on services that has been “missing” over the past year will never return or will be slow to return, some of the excess savings that have accumulated will not be immediately (or ever) spent, and the rise in consumer inflation expectations that has occurred over the past year has happened from an extremely low starting point and has yet to even rise above its post-GFC range. The low odds that we assign to dangerously above-target inflation over the coming 12-24 months does not, however, mean that investors’ expectations for r-star will stay low. For right or for wrong, the US government has aggressively dis-saved over the past year, in an environment where low expectations for the neutral rate were anchored by a view of excessive private sector savings and insufficient demand from governments. In a scenario where the US output gap closes quickly, inflation rises modestly above target, and where permanent damage to the labor market from the pandemic is relatively limited, it seems reasonable to conclude that the narrative of secular stagnation will be challenged and that investor expectations for the neutral rate will converge towards trend rates of economic growth. That would imply that the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield could hypothetically rise above 3%, possibly as high as 4% or more. This is not our base case view, but it will be an important possibility to monitor as the decisive end to social distancing and other pandemic control measures draws nearer. Investment Conclusions A rise in the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield does not, in and of itself, suggest that 10-year Treasury yields will rise to levels that would threaten a significant decline in stock prices. The Fed does not control the long-end of the Treasury curve, but it does exert a very strong influence on the short-end. For example, were the Fed to follow the median current projection of FOMC participants and refrain from raising interest rates until sometime after 2023, it would limit how high current 10-year Treasury yields could rise. But it is not difficult to envision plausible scenarios where the 10-year Treasury yield rises above the range consistent with the pre-GFC US equity risk premium. Chart II-15 presents three hypothetical fair value paths for the 10-year yield assuming a mid-2022 liftoff date and a 4% terminal Fed funds rate for the following three scenarios: Chart II-1510-Year Yields Could Rise Meaningfully Further If Investors Shift Their Expectations For R-star 10-Year Yields Could Rise Meaningfully Further If Investors Shift Their Expectations For R-star 10-Year Yields Could Rise Meaningfully Further If Investors Shift Their Expectations For R-star The Fed raises rates at a pace of 1% (4 hikes) per year, with a term premium of 10 basis points The Fed raises rates at a pace of 1% (4 hikes) per year, with a term premium of 50 basis points The Fed raises rates at a pace of 1.5% (6 hikes) per year, with a term premium of 50 basis points In the first scenario, based on the current US 12-month forward P/E ratio, the fair value of the 10-year Treasury yield would rise above the range consistent with a reasonable ERP in the middle of 2022, the liftoff point assumed in all three scenarios. In the second and third scenarios, the US equity ERP would already be quite low. When using the late 1999 / early 2000 bubble period as a reference point, even the scenarios shown in Chart II-15 are not very threatening to stock prices. Given current equity market pricing, the third scenario would take the US equity risk premium back to mid 2002 levels, which were still meaningfully higher than during the peak of the bubble. And that is assuming an earlier liftoff than the market currently expects, a faster pace of rate hikes than experienced during the last economic cycle, and a very meaningful increase in the market’s expectations for the neutral rate. But it is not clear what equity risk premium investors will require to contend with the myriad risks to the economic outlook that did not exist in the early 2000s. For example, equity investors are today faced with a riskier policy environment than existed 20 years ago in the US and in other developed economies that is at least partially driven by populist sentiment, potentially impacting earnings via lower operating margins or higher taxes. These or other risks existed at several points over the past decade and T.I.N.A. (“There Is No Alternative”) prevailed, but that occurred precisely because the equity risk premium was very elevated. A low ERP that is technically not as low as what prevailed during the tech bubble era could thus still threaten stock prices, raising the specter of negative absolute returns from stocks and nominal government bonds for a period of time, beginning potentially at or in the lead-up to the first Fed rate hike. Chart II-16There Are Alternatives To A Traditional 60/40 Portfolio In A Rising Rate Environment There Are Alternatives To A Traditional 60/40 Portfolio In A Rising Rate Environment There Are Alternatives To A Traditional 60/40 Portfolio In A Rising Rate Environment Many investors have questioned what asset allocation strategy should be pursued in a scenario where stock prices and bond yields are no longer positively correlated. Chart II-16 provides some perspective on the question, by comparing the total return of a 60/40 stock/bond portfolio to a strategy involving the opportunistic redeployment of cash into stocks. The strategy rule maintains a 50/50 stock/cash allocation during normal market conditions, but it then shifts the entire cash allocation into equities following a 15% selloff in the stock market. The portfolio is shifted back to a 50/50 allocation once stocks rise to a new rolling 1-year high. The chart highlights that 60/40 balanced portfolio-style returns may be achievable with cash as the diversifier without a significant reduction in the Sharpe ratio. In fact, the strategy has the effect of lowering average volatility due to prolonged periods of comparatively lower equity exposure, although this occurs at the cost of higher volatility during periods of high market stress (precisely when investors most want protection from volatility). But the bottom line for investors is that while they are not likely to be without cost, options exist for investors to potentially earn positive absolute returns in a scenario where a significant shift in the interest rate outlook threatens both stock and bond prices. As noted above, this remains a risk to our view rather than our expectation, but we will continue to monitor the potential threat posed to stock prices as the pandemic draws to a decisive close later this year. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1  2020-03-20 GIS SR “Revisiting The Neutral Rate Of Interest: A Contrarian View In A Time Of Crisis.”

Highlights Extremely accommodative fiscal policy and a rapid pace of vaccination puts the US on track to close its output gap by the end of the year. The situation is different in Europe, and the euro area economy will likely continue to underperform the US until at least the summer. Investors are now unusually more hawkish than the Fed, whose caution is driven by the expectation of some lingering and persistent slack in the labor market even once the pandemic is over. The Fed’s rate projections, coupled with the extraordinary size of the American Rescue Plan, have stoked investor concerns about a significant rise in inflation. For inflation to rise dangerously above the Fed’s target, the US would likely need to see a persistently strong and positive output gap, and/or a major upward shift in expectations among consumers and firms. We expect a meaningful recovery in inflation this year, perhaps to above-target levels even without factoring in transitory supply-chain effects, but probably not to levels that investors deem to be “out of control.” Over the coming 6 to 12 months, a comparatively sanguine perspective on inflation supports a bullish view on stocks and an overweight stance towards equities within a multi-asset portfolio. We recommend that investors maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration, and overweight US speculative over investment-grade corporate bonds. The fact that Europe may lag growth-wise for a few months could continue to impact regional equity performance as well as the trend in the dollar over the coming 0-3 months. But over a 6-12 month time horizon, we continue to favor global ex-US vs. US stocks, and expect the dollar to be lower than it is today. A Brighter Light At The End Of The Tunnel Chart I-1Even Better Than Some Optimists Would Have Predicted Even Better Than Some Optimists Would Have Predicted Even Better Than Some Optimists Would Have Predicted Over the past 4-6 weeks, the US has continued to make incredible progress in vaccinating its population against COVID-19. Chart I-1 highlights that the pace of vaccination is now well within the range required for herd immunity to be in place by the end of the third quarter. If this pace continues at an average of 2.5 million doses per day, the US will have vaccinated 90% of its population by the end of September (if it is determined that the vaccine is safe to give to children). And these calculations assume the continuation of a two-dose regime, meaning that the eventual rollout of Johnson & Johnson's Janssen vaccine – which requires only one dose and has shown to be extremely effective at preventing severe illness and death – could shorten the time to herd immunity rates of vaccination among adults even further. The situation is clearly different in Europe. The vaccination progress in several European countries is woefully behind that of the US and the UK (Chart I-2), and per capita cases in the euro area have again risen significantly above that of the US (Chart I-3). This reality motivated last week’s news that the European Union is reportedly planning on banning exports of the AstraZeneca vaccine for a period of time, as European policymakers grow increasingly concerned about the potential economic consequences of lengthened or additional pandemic control measures over the coming few months. Chart I-2Europe Is Badly Lagging The Vaccine Race… April 2021 April 2021 There was at least some positive economic news from Europe this month, as reflected by the flash manufacturing and services PMIs (Chart I-4). The euro area manufacturing PMI surpassed that of the US this month, reflecting that the prospects for goods-producing companies in Europe remain solidly linked to the strong global manufacturing cycle. Services, on the other hand, have been the weak spot in Europe, having remained below the boom/bust line since last summer (in contrast to the US). The March services PMI highlighted that this gap is now starting to narrow, although the euro area economy will likely continue to underperform the US until at least the summer. Chart I-3...And It Is Starting To Show ...And It Is Starting To Show ...And It Is Starting To Show Chart I-4Some Closure Of The Services Gap, But Still A Ways To Go Some Closure Of The Services Gap, But Still A Ways To Go Some Closure Of The Services Gap, But Still A Ways To Go   The underperformance of the European services sector over the past nine months has been due in part to more severe pandemic control measures, but also a comparatively timid fiscal policy. The IMF’s October Fiscal Monitor highlighted that the US had provided roughly eight percentage points more of GDP in above-the-line fiscal measures versus the European Union as a whole, and that was before the US December 2020 relief bill and this month’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan (ARP) act were passed. The CBO estimates that the ARP will result in about US$1 trillion in outlays in 2021, which is roughly 5% of nominal GDP. Consequently, Chart I-5 highlights that consensus expectations now suggest that the output gap will be marginally positive by the end of the year, with the Fed’s most recent forecast implying that real GDP will be more than 1% above the CBO’s estimate of potential output. Chart I-5The US Output Gap Will Likely Be Closed By The End Of This Year The US Output Gap Will Likely Be Closed By The End Of This Year The US Output Gap Will Likely Be Closed By The End Of This Year The Fed Versus The Market Despite this, the Fed held pat during this month’s FOMC meeting and did not validate market expectations of rate hikes beginning in early 2023. Chart I-6 highlights the Fed funds rate path over the coming years as implied by the OIS curve, alongside the Fed’s median projection of the Fed funds rate. This means that investors are now more hawkish than the Fed, which is the opposite of what has typically prevailed since the global financial crisis. Chart I-6The Market Is Now, Unusually, More Hawkish Than The Fed The Market Is Now, Unusually, More Hawkish Than The Fed The Market Is Now, Unusually, More Hawkish Than The Fed Fed Chair Jerome Powell implied during the March 17 press conference that some FOMC participants were unwilling to change their projections for the path of interest rates based purely on a forecast, which argues that the median dot in the Fed’s “dot plot” will shift higher in the second half of the year if participants’ growth and inflation forecasts come to fruition. But Charts I-7A and I-7B suggest that the Fed’s caution is also driven by the expectation of some lingering and persistent slack in the labor market even once the pandemic is over. Chart I-7AA Positive Output Gap Implies… April 2021 April 2021 Chart I-7B…An Unemployment Rate Below NAIRU April 2021 April 2021   The charts highlight the historical relationship between the output gap and the deviation of NAIRU from the unemployment rate, from 2000 and 2010. In both cases, the charts show that the unemployment rate would be below the CBO’s estimate of NAIRU at the end of this year (roughly 4.5%) given the CBO’s estimate for potential (i.e. full employment) GDP and the Fed's forecast for growth. However, the Fed is forecasting that the unemployment rate will essentially be at NAIRU, which is itself above the Fed’s longer-run unemployment rate projection of 4%. As such, the Fed does not see the unemployment rate falling to “full employment” levels this year, a precondition for the onset of rate normalization. Investors should note that the relationships shown in Charts I-7A and I-7B suggest that the unemployment rate will be closer to 3-3.5% at the end of this year if the Fed’s growth forecast is correct, which would constitute full employment based on the Fed’s 4% unemployment rate target. The difference between a 3-3.5% unemployment rate and the Fed’s estimate of 4.5% translates to a gap of roughly 1.5-2.5 million jobs at the end of this year, which underscores that the Fed expects either a significant shift in temporary to permanent unemployment or an influx of unemployed workers back into the labor force who don’t quickly find jobs once social distancing ends and pandemic restrictions are no longer required. Chart I-8The Full Employment Level Of GDP Has Not Been Significantly Revised The Full Employment Level Of GDP Has Not Been Significantly Revised The Full Employment Level Of GDP Has Not Been Significantly Revised There are three possible circumstances that would resolve this seeming contradiction. The first is that the Fed’s estimate for growth this year is simply too high, and that the output gap will be close to zero at the end of the year (i.e., more in line with consensus market expectations). The second is that the CBO is understating the level of GDP that is consistent with full employment, namely that potential GDP is higher than what they currently project. But Chart I-8 shows that the CBO’s current estimate for potential output at the end of this year is only 0.4% below what it had estimated prior to the pandemic, which is smaller than the positive gap implied by the Fed’s growth estimate for this year (roughly 1.2%). The third possibility is that the Fed is overestimating the extent to which the pandemic will cause permanent damage to the labor market. As we noted in our February report, even once social distancing is no longer required, it does seem likely that some portion of the spending on services that has been “missing” over the past year will never return. While it seems reasonable to expect that the gap in spending on hospitality and travel will close quickly once the health situation allows, it also seems reasonable to expect that some service areas, particularly retail, will experience a permanent loss in demand owing to durable shifts in consumer behavior that occurred during the pandemic (greater familiarity and use of online shopping, a permanent reduction of some magnitude in commuting, etc). A gap of 1.5-2.5 million jobs accounts for roughly 10-15% of pre-pandemic employment in retail trade, or 4-7% of the sum of retail trade, leisure & hospitality, and other services. It is possible that permanent job losses or significantly deferred job recovery of this size will occur, but it is far from clear that it will. Were job losses / deferred jobs recovery of this magnitude to not materialize, it would suggest that the US will reach full employment earlier than the Fed is currently projecting, and would significantly increase the odds that the Fed will begin to taper its asset purchases and/or raise interest rates at some point next year – which is earlier than investors currently expect. For Now, Dangerously Above-Target Inflation Is Unlikely Fed projections of a 0% Fed funds rate for the next 2 1/2 years, coupled with the extraordinary size of the American Rescue Plan, have understandably stoked investor concerns about a significant rise in inflation. Larry Summers’ recent interview with Bloomberg was emblematic of the concern, during which he criticized the Biden administration’s fiscal policy as the “least responsible” that the US has experienced in four decades and warned of the potential inflationary consequences of overheating the economy.1 It is true that the Federal Reserve is explicitly aiming to generate a temporary overshoot of inflation relative to its target, the Biden administration’s fiscal plan is legitimately large, and there is a tremendous pool of excess savings that could be deployed later this year once the pandemic is essentially over. Clearly, the risks of overheating must be higher than they have been in the past. But from our perspective, out-of-control inflation over the coming 12-24 months would very likely necessitate one of two things to occur, and possibly both: US consumers decide to spend an overwhelmingly large amount of the excess savings that have been accumulated. Main street expectations for consumer prices rise sharply, prompted by a public discussion about the likelihood of a shifting inflation regime. Our view is rooted in the examination of the modern-day Phillips Curve that we presented in our January report, which considers both the impact of economic/labor market slack and inflation expectations as a driver of actual inflation. The modern-day Phillips Curve posits that expectations act as the trend for inflation, and slack in the economy determines whether actual inflation is above or below that baseline. Chart I-9 highlights that the output gap worked well prior to the global financial crisis at explaining the difference between actual and exponentially-smoothed inflation, the latter acting as a long-history proxy for expectations. Pre-GFC, the chart highlights that there have been only two exceptions to the relationship that concerned the magnitude rather than the direction of inflation. Post-GFC, the relationship deviated substantially, but in a way that implied that actual inflation was too strong during the last expansion, not too weak – particularly during the early phase of the economic recovery. This likely occurred because expectations initially stayed very well anchored due to the Fed’s strong record of maintaining low and stable inflation, but ultimately declined due to a persistently negative output gap as well as in response to the 2014 collapse in oil prices (Chart I-10). Chart I-9Pre-GFC, The Output Gap Generally Explained Inflation Surprises Pre-GFC, The Output Gap Generally Explained Inflation Surprises Pre-GFC, The Output Gap Generally Explained Inflation Surprises Chart I-10Inflation Expectations Eventually Succumbed Post-GFC To Collapsing Energy Prices Inflation Expectations Eventually Succumbed Post-GFC To Collapsing Energy Prices Inflation Expectations Eventually Succumbed Post-GFC To Collapsing Energy Prices Thus, for inflation to rise dangerously above the Fed’s target, the US would likely need to see a persistently strong and positive output gap, and/or a major upward shift in expectations among consumers and firms. Chart I-11 highlights that the amount of excess savings that have accumulated as a percentage of GDP does indeed significantly exceed the magnitude of the output gap, but some of those savings have been and will be invested in financial markets (boosting valuation), some will be used to pay down debt, some will eventually be spent on international travel (boosting services imports), and some will likely be permanently held as deposits in anticipation of future tax increases. And while long-term household expectations for prices have risen since the passing of the CARES act last year, the rise has merely unwound the decline that took place following the 2014 oil price collapse (Chart I-12). Chart I-11A Huge Pool Of Savings Exists, But Not All Of It Will Be Spent A Huge Pool Of Savings Exists, But Not All Of It Will Be Spent A Huge Pool Of Savings Exists, But Not All Of It Will Be Spent Chart I-12Long-Term Consumer Inflation Expectations Have Risen From A Very Low Base Long-Term Consumer Inflation Expectations Have Risen From A Very Low Base Long-Term Consumer Inflation Expectations Have Risen From A Very Low Base   For now, this framework points to a meaningful recovery in inflation this year, perhaps to above-target levels even without factoring in transitory supply-chain effects, but probably not to levels that investors deem to be “out of control.” Investment Conclusions Over the coming 6 to 12 months, a comparatively sanguine perspective on inflation supports a bullish view on stocks and an overweight stance towards equities within a multi-asset portfolio. While the Fed is likely to shift in a hawkish direction compared with its current projections, it is highly unlikely to become meaningfully more hawkish than current market expectations unless economic growth and the recovery in the labor market is much stronger than the Fed or the market is projecting. In fact, even if the market’s expectations for the first Fed rate hike shift to mid-2022 over the coming several months, Chart I-13 highlights that the impact on the equity market is likely to be minimal unless investors shift up their expectations for the terminal Fed funds rate. The chart presents a fair value estimate for the 10-year Treasury yield based on the OIS-implied path of the Fed funds rate out to December 2024, and assumes that short rates ultimately rise to the Fed’s long-term Fed funds rate projection of 2.5%. The second fair value series assumes that the shape of the OIS curve stays the same, but shifts closer by 6 months. Chart I-13The Market’s Assumed Rate Hike Path And Terminal Rate Are Not Threatening For Stocks April 2021 April 2021 The chart underscores that the 10-year yield will rise to at most between 2-2.2% by the end of the year based on these scenarios. A shift forward in the timing of Fed rate hikes will impact the short end of the curve, but the long end will remain relatively unchanged if terminal rate expectations stay constant and the term premium on long-term bonds remains near zero. These levels would in no way be economically damaging nor threatening to stock market valuation. It is possible, however, that investor expectations for the neutral rate of interest (“r-star”) will shift higher once the pandemic is over, and we explore this risk to stocks in Section 2 of our report. For now, this remains a risk to our view rather than our expectation, but it is likely to remain an important possibility to monitor as the decisive end to social distancing and other pandemic control measures draws nearer. Within fixed income, we recommend that investors maintain below-benchmark portfolio duration even though investors are already pricing in a more hawkish path for the Fed funds rate. First, Chart I-13 highlighted that yields at the long end of the curve are likely to continue to move modestly higher this year even if the projected path for the Fed funds rate remains relatively unchanged. But more importantly, barring a substantially negative development on the health or vaccine front that prolongs the pandemic, the risk appears to be clearly to the upside in terms of the timing of the first Fed rate hike and the terminal Fed funds rate. As such, from a risk-reward perspective, a long duration stance remains unattractive. We would also recommend overweighting US speculative over investment-grade corporate bonds, as spreads are not as historically depressed for the former than the latter (Chart I-14). Finally, in terms of the dimensions of equity market performance and the dollar, we recommend that investors overweight global ex-US equities vs. the US, overweight value vs. growth, overweight cyclicals vs. defensives, and overweight small vs. large caps. We are also bearish on the dollar on a 12-month time horizon. However, there are two caveats that investors should bear in mind. First, global cyclicals versus defensives (especially in equally-weighted terms) as well as small versus large caps have already mostly normalized not just the impact of the pandemic but as well that of the 2018-2019 Trump trade war (Chart I-15). We would expect, at best, modest further gains from both positions this year. Chart I-14Speculative-Grade Corporate Bonds Are Less Expensive Than Investment-Grade Speculative-Grade Corporate Bonds Are Less Expensive Than Investment-Grade Speculative-Grade Corporate Bonds Are Less Expensive Than Investment-Grade Chart I-15Going Forward, Expect More Modest Gains From Cyclicals And Small Caps Going Forward, Expect More Modest Gains From Cyclicals And Small Caps Going Forward, Expect More Modest Gains From Cyclicals And Small Caps   Second, the fact that Europe may lag growth-wise for a few months could continue to impact regional equity performance as well as the trend in the dollar on a 0-3 month time horizon. The US dollar is typically a counter-cyclical currency, but there have been exceptions to that rule. And historically, exceptions have tended to revolve around periods when US growth has been quite strong, as is currently the case (Chart I-16). A continued counter-trend rally in the dollar is thus possible over the course of the next few months, but we would expect USD-EUR to be lower than current levels 12 months from now. Chart I-16A Short-Term Counter-Trend Dollar Move Is Possible A Short-Term Counter-Trend Dollar Move Is Possible A Short-Term Counter-Trend Dollar Move Is Possible A counter-trend dollar move could also correspond with a period of US outperformance versus global ex-US, or at a minimum, a period of flat performance when global ex-US stocks would normally outperform. Our China strategists expect that the Chinese credit impulse will decelerate later this year (Chart I-17), which would weigh on EM stocks and heighten the importance of European equities in driving global ex-US outperformance. European equity outperformance, in turn, will likely necessitate the outperformance of euro area financials. Chart I-18 highlights that euro area equity underperformance versus the US last year was mostly a tech story, but today there is little difference between the relative performance of euro area stocks overall versus indexes that exclude the broadly-defined technology sector. In both cases, the euro area index is roughly 10% below its US counterpart relative to pre-pandemic levels, which exactly matches the extent to which euro area financials have underperformed. Chart I-17A Slowing Chinese Credit Impulse Means EM Equities Will Struggle To Outperform A Slowing Chinese Credit Impulse Means EM Equities Will Struggle To Outperform A Slowing Chinese Credit Impulse Means EM Equities Will Struggle To Outperform Chart I-18Euro Area Financials Need To Outperform For Europe To Outperform Euro Area Financials Need To Outperform For Europe To Outperform Euro Area Financials Need To Outperform For Europe To Outperform   Euro area financials have demonstrated very poor fundamental performance over the past decade, but they are likely to outperform for some period once the European vaccination campaign gains enough traction to alter the disease’s transmission and hospitalization dynamics. Chart I-19 highlights that euro area bank 12-month forward earnings have further room to recover to pre-pandemic levels than for banks in the US, and Chart I-20 highlights that euro area banks trade at their deepest price-to-book discount versus their US peers since the euro area financial crisis. Chart I-19Euro Area Bank Earnings Have Catch-Up Potential Euro Area Bank Earnings Have Catch-Up Potential Euro Area Bank Earnings Have Catch-Up Potential Chart I-20Euro Area Banks Are Extremely Cheap Versus The US Euro Area Banks Are Extremely Cheap Versus The US Euro Area Banks Are Extremely Cheap Versus The US   Thus, while euro area and global ex-US equities may not outperform on the back of rising global stock prices over the coming few months, investors focused on a 6-12 month time horizon should respond by increasing their allocation to European stocks and to further reduce dollar exposure. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst March 31, 2021 Next Report: April 29, 2021 II. R-star, And The Structural Risk To Stocks In the decade following the global financial crisis, investor concerns that the Fed’s monetary policies have artificially boosted equity market valuation have been mostly overblown. But today, it is now true that US equities are increasingly dependent on persistently low bond yields, as stocks can only avoid near bubble-like relative pricing if yields remain below trend rates of economic growth. Macroeconomic theory and the historical record both support the notion that nominal interest rates are normally in equilibrium when they are roughly equal to the trend rate of nominal income growth. A gap between interest rates and trend rates of growth was indeed justified for a few years following the global financial crisis, but in the few years prior to the pandemic, it is altogether possible that the neutral rate of interest (or “r-star”) was in fact meaningfully higher than academic estimates suggested. In a scenario where the US output gap closes quickly, inflation rises above target, and where permanent damage to the labor market from the pandemic is relatively limited, we expect the narrative of secular stagnation to be challenged and for investor expectations for the neutral rate to move closer to trend rates of economic growth. That would imply that the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield could hypothetically rise above 3%, and possibly as high as 4% or more. Such a shift would push the US equity risk premium back to 2002 levels based on current stock market pricing. This is not necessarily negative for equities, but it is also not clear what equity risk premium investors will require to contend with the myriad risks to the economic outlook that did not exist in the early 2000s. A low ERP that is technically not as low as that of the tech bubble era could thus still threaten stock prices, as T.I.N.A., “There Is No Alternative,” may not prevail. Many investors have questioned what asset allocation strategy should be pursued in a scenario where stock prices and bond yields are no longer positively correlated. While they are not likely to be without cost, options exist for investors to potentially earn positive absolute returns in a scenario where a significant shift in the interest rate outlook threatens both stock and bond prices. Chart II-1Equity Valuation Concerns Have Persisted For The Past Decade... Equity Valuation Concerns Have Persisted For The Past Decade... Equity Valuation Concerns Have Persisted For The Past Decade... For the better part of the last decade, many investors have argued that the Fed’s monetary policies have artificially boosted equity market valuation. Based on the cyclically-adjusted P/E ratio metric originated by Robert Shiller, stocks reached pre-global financial crisis (GFC) multiples in late 2014 and early 2015 (Chart II-1). Based on metrics such as the price-to-sales ratio, stocks rose to pre-GFC valuation in late 2013, and are now even more richly valued than they were at the height of the dotcom bubble. These concerns have mostly occurred in response to absolute changes in stock multiples, but equity valuation cannot be divorced from the prevailing level of interest rates. Relative to bond yields, stocks were extraordinarily cheap for many years following the GFC. Measured by one simple approach to calculating the equity risk premium, the spread between the 12-month forward earnings yield (the inverse of the forward P/E ratio) and the real 10-year Treasury yield, stocks were the cheapest following the GFC that they had been since the mid 1980s, and remain reasonably priced today (Chart II-2). Chart II-2...But Stocks Have Actually Been Cheap Versus Bonds ...But Stocks Have Actually Been Cheap Versus Bonds ...But Stocks Have Actually Been Cheap Versus Bonds The fact that stocks have appeared to be expensive for several years but quite cheap (or reasonably priced) relative to bonds underscores the fact that longer-term bond yields have been extraordinarily low following the global financial crisis. Still, equities were not dependent on low bond yields prior to the pandemic, as illustrated in Chart II-3. The chart highlights the range of 10-year Treasury yields that would be consistent with the pre-GFC equity risk premium range (measured from 2002-2007), alongside the actual 10-year yield and trend nominal GDP growth. The chart shows that for years following the financial crisis, bond yields could have risen to levels well above trend rates of economic growth and stocks would still have been priced in line with pre-crisis norms. This “normal pricing” range for the 10-year declined as the expansion continued, but remained consistent with trend growth rates and above the actual 10-year yield up until the beginning of the pandemic. Chart II-3 also highlights, however, that the circumstances changed last year. The equity risk premium briefly rose at the onset of the pandemic as stocks initially sold off sharply, but then quickly fell as stock prices recovered in response to aggressive fiscal and monetary easing. Today, it is true that US equities are increasingly dependent on persistently low bond yields, as stocks can only avoid bubble-like relative pricing if yields remain below trend rates of economic growth. Chart II-3Now, Stocks Are Increasingly Dependent On Low Bond Yields Now, Stocks Are Increasingly Dependent On Low Bond Yields Now, Stocks Are Increasingly Dependent On Low Bond Yields Prior to the pandemic, most fixed-income investors would have viewed the risk of bond yields rising to trend nominal GDP growth, let alone above it, as minimal. Global investors have come to accept the secular stagnation narrative as described by Larry Summers in November 2013, and have gravitated to academic estimates of the neutral rate of interest (“R-star”) that show a substantial gap between the natural rate and trend real growth (Chart II-4). This view has manifested itself in a decline in surveyed estimates of the long-run Fed funds rate, but at present the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield has pushed well above this survey-derived fair value range (Chart II-5). It is possible that the fiscal response to the pandemic will cause investor views about r-star to evolve even further over the coming 12-24 months, and in this report we explore the potential headwind that such an evolution could present to stock prices at some point – potentially as early as next year. Chart II-4Investors Have Accepted Secular Stagnation, And The View That R-star Is Well Below Trend Rates Of Growth Investors Have Accepted Secular Stagnation, And The View That R-star Is Well Below Trend Rates Of Growth Investors Have Accepted Secular Stagnation, And The View That R-star Is Well Below Trend Rates Of Growth Chart II-5The Market's Views About R-star May Be Shifting The Market's Views About R-star May Be Shifting The Market's Views About R-star May Be Shifting   R-star: A Brief Primer Macroeconomic theory and the historical record both support the notion that nominal interest rates are normally in equilibrium when they are roughly equal to the trend rate of nominal income growth. From the perspective of macro theory, the neutral rate of interest is determined by the supply of and demand for savings. But in practical terms, this implies that the neutral rate should normally be closely linked to the trend rate of economic growth. For example, if interest rates – and thus the cost of capital – were persistently below aggregate income growth, then demand for capital (and thus credit and likely labor demand) should increase as firms seek to profit from the gap between the interest rate and the expected rate of return from real investment. As such, the trend rate of growth acts as a good proxy for the interest rate that will balance the supply and demand for credit during normal economic circumstances. Empirically, academic estimates of r-star closely followed estimates of trend real GDP growth prior to the global financial crisis, as shown in Chart II-4 above. In addition, we noted in our January report that the stance of monetary policy, as defined by the difference between nominal GDP growth and the 10-year Treasury yield, has generally done a good job of explaining the US output gap prior to 2000. This supports the notion that monetary policy is stimulative (restrictive) when bond yields are below (above) trend growth rates. However, in the years following the GFC, investors’ estimates of r-star collapsed, as evidenced by the sharp decline in 5-year / 5-year forward Treasury yields (Chart II-6). This was followed by a decline in primary dealer and FOMC expectations for the long-term Fed funds rate, which investors took as validating their view that the neutral rate of interest has permanently declined. Chart II-6Investors Led The Fed And Others In Expecting A Lower Nominal Neutral Rate Investors Led The Fed And Others In Expecting A Lower Nominal Neutral Rate Investors Led The Fed And Others In Expecting A Lower Nominal Neutral Rate R-star And Trend Growth: Is A Gap Between The Two Really Justified? Chart II-7R-star Likely Did Decline Following The GFC (For A Time) R-star Likely Did Decline Following The GFC (For A Time) R-star Likely Did Decline Following The GFC (For A Time) It seems clear that r-star did indeed decline for a time after the GFC. The US and select European economies suffered a balance sheet recession in 2008/2009 that impacted credit demand for an extended period of time (Chart II-7), and extraordinarily low interest rates for several years did not fuel major credit excesses (at least in the household sector). But as we detailed in a Special Report last year,2 we doubt that the decline in r-star was permanent, for several reasons. The first, and most important, is that there have been at least four deeply impactful non-monetary shocks to both the US and global economies since 2008 that magnified the impact of prolonged household deleveraging and help explain the disconnect between growth and interest rates during the last economic cycle: The euro area sovereign debt crisis Premature fiscal austerity in the US, the UK, and euro area from 2010 – 2012/2014 The US dollar / oil price shock of 2014 The Trump administration’s aggressive use of tariffs beginning in 2018, impacting China but also other developed market economies. Chart II-8Recent Trends In US Private Sector Leverage Do Not Suggest R-star Is Very Low Recent Trends In US Private Sector Leverage Do Not Suggest R-star Is Very Low Recent Trends In US Private Sector Leverage Do Not Suggest R-star Is Very Low Except for the oil price shock of 2014 (which was driven by technological developments and a price war among producers), all of these non-monetary shocks were caused or exacerbated by policymakers – often for political reasons or due to regulatory failures. Second, the trend in US private sector credit growth last cycle does not suggest that r-star fell permanently. Chart II-8 underscores two points: the first is that while US household sector credit contracted for several years following the global financial crisis, it started growing again in 2013 and had largely closed the gap with income growth prior to the pandemic. The second point is that the nonfinancial corporate sector clearly leveraged itself over the course of the last expansion, arguing that interest rates have not in any way been restrictive for businesses. Third, we disagree with a common view in the marketplace that the 2018-2019 period supported the validity of low academic estimates of the neutral rate. Chart II-9 highlights that monetary policy ceased to be stimulative in 2019 according to the Laubach & Williams r-star estimate, which some investors have argued explains the late 2018 equity market selloff, the 2019 slowdown in the US housing market, the inversion of the yield curve, and the global manufacturing recession. Chart II-9Monetary Policy Ceased To Be Stimulative In 2019, According To The LW R-star Estimate Monetary Policy Ceased To Be Stimulative In 2019, According To The LW R-star Estimate Monetary Policy Ceased To Be Stimulative In 2019, According To The LW R-star Estimate But this narrative ignores other important factors that contributed to the slowdown. For example, Chart II-10 highlights that this period of economic weakness exactly coincided with the most intense phase of the Sino-US trade war, as well as a significant slowdown in Chinese credit growth. The chart highlights that the selloff in the US equity market began almost immediately after a surge in the effective tariff rates levied by the two countries against each other, and after the Chinese credit impulse fell three percentage points (from 30% to 27% of GDP). Chart II-10The 2018 Stock Market Selloff Occurred Once Sino-US Tariffs Exploded The 2018 Stock Market Selloff Occurred Once Sino-US Tariffs Exploded The 2018 Stock Market Selloff Occurred Once Sino-US Tariffs Exploded Chart II-11 highlights that interest rates did likely impact the housing market, but that it was the speed at which rates rose that was damaging rather than their level. The chart shows that the rise in mortgage rates from late 2016 to late 2018 was among the largest 2-year increases that has occurred since the early 1980s, so it is unsurprising that the growth in home sales and real residential investment slowed for a time. Additionally, Chart II-12 highlights that the rise in mortgage rates during this period did not cause a downtrend in mortgage credit growth, which only occurred in Q4 2018 in response to the impact of the sharp selloff in the equity market on household net worth. Chart II-11Mortgage Rates Rose Very Significantly From Late 2016 To Late 2018 Mortgage Rates Rose Very Significantly From Late 2016 To Late 2018 Mortgage Rates Rose Very Significantly From Late 2016 To Late 2018 Chart II-12A Record Rise In Mortgage Rates Did Not Crack The Housing Market A Record Rise In Mortgage Rates Did Not Crack The Housing Market A Record Rise In Mortgage Rates Did Not Crack The Housing Market   In short, the late 2018 / 2019 period saw a major global aggregate demand shock occur following an already-established slowdown in Chinese credit growth and a rapid rise in interest rates in the DM world. It is these factors that were likely responsible for the 2019 slowdown in economic growth, not the fact that interest rates reached levels that restricted economic activity on their own. R-star In A Post-Pandemic World Charts II-7 – II-12 above suggest that a gap between interest rates and trend rates of growth was indeed justified for a few years following the global financial crisis, but that a decline in r-star only appeared to be permanent due to persistent, non-monetary policy shocks to aggregate demand. In the few years prior to the pandemic, it is altogether possible that r-star was in fact meaningfully higher than academic estimates suggested. But that is now a counterfactual assertion, as the pandemic has transformed the outlook for interest rates and bond yields in conflicting ways. A 10% decline in the level of real output was the most intensely negative non-monetary shock to aggregate demand since the 1930s (Chart II-13), and we agree that another depression would have occurred without extraordinary government assistance. The economic damage caused by the pandemic certainly does not work in favor of a higher neutral rate, and we highlighted in Section 1 of our report that the Fed expects there to be some lingering and persistent slack in the labor market even once the pandemic is over. Chart II-13Without Major Monetary And Fiscal Policy Support, The Pandemic Would Probably Have Caused A Depression Without Major Monetary And Fiscal Policy Support, The Pandemic Would Probably Have Caused A Depression Without Major Monetary And Fiscal Policy Support, The Pandemic Would Probably Have Caused A Depression Chart II-14A Huge Increase In Government Transfers And Spending Is Underway April 2021 April 2021 On the other hand, Larry Summers, the chief proponent of the theory of secular stagnation, has argued for several years that increased fiscal spending was warranted in order to address an imbalance between private sector savings and investment. Summers himself now characterizes US fiscal policy as the “least responsible” that he has seen over the past 40 years, because of too-large government spending that risks overheating the economy (Chart II-14). Summers’ critique rests in large part on the fact that new government spending has not occurred in the form of investment (to balance out the existence of excess savings), but is instead providing transfers to households that in many cases have already accumulated significant excess savings. But the key point for investors is that the pandemic has completely shifted the narrative about fiscal spending, from “arguably insufficient for several years following the global financial crisis” to now “risking a dramatic overheating of the economy.” Some elements of Summers’ criticism of the Biden administration’s fiscal policy are justified, particularly the policy of large direct transfer payments to workers who have suffered no loss in employment or income as a result of the pandemic. Despite this, as detailed in Section 1 of our report, we are more sanguine about the risks of aggressive overheating for three reasons: it does seem likely that some portion of the spending on services that has been “missing” over the past year will never return or will be slow to return, some of the excess savings that have accumulated will not be immediately (or ever) spent, and the rise in consumer inflation expectations that has occurred over the past year has happened from an extremely low starting point and has yet to even rise above its post-GFC range. The low odds that we assign to dangerously above-target inflation over the coming 12-24 months does not, however, mean that investors’ expectations for r-star will stay low. For right or for wrong, the US government has aggressively dis-saved over the past year, in an environment where low expectations for the neutral rate were anchored by a view of excessive private sector savings and insufficient demand from governments. In a scenario where the US output gap closes quickly, inflation rises modestly above target, and where permanent damage to the labor market from the pandemic is relatively limited, it seems reasonable to conclude that the narrative of secular stagnation will be challenged and that investor expectations for the neutral rate will converge towards trend rates of economic growth. That would imply that the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield could hypothetically rise above 3%, possibly as high as 4% or more. This is not our base case view, but it will be an important possibility to monitor as the decisive end to social distancing and other pandemic control measures draws nearer. Investment Conclusions A rise in the 5-year/5-year forward Treasury yield does not, in and of itself, suggest that 10-year Treasury yields will rise to levels that would threaten a significant decline in stock prices. The Fed does not control the long-end of the Treasury curve, but it does exert a very strong influence on the short-end. For example, were the Fed to follow the median current projection of FOMC participants and refrain from raising interest rates until sometime after 2023, it would limit how high current 10-year Treasury yields could rise. But it is not difficult to envision plausible scenarios where the 10-year Treasury yield rises above the range consistent with the pre-GFC US equity risk premium. Chart II-15 presents three hypothetical fair value paths for the 10-year yield assuming a mid-2022 liftoff date and a 4% terminal Fed funds rate for the following three scenarios: Chart II-1510-Year Yields Could Rise Meaningfully Further If Investors Shift Their Expectations For R-star 10-Year Yields Could Rise Meaningfully Further If Investors Shift Their Expectations For R-star 10-Year Yields Could Rise Meaningfully Further If Investors Shift Their Expectations For R-star The Fed raises rates at a pace of 1% (4 hikes) per year, with a term premium of 10 basis points The Fed raises rates at a pace of 1% (4 hikes) per year, with a term premium of 50 basis points The Fed raises rates at a pace of 1.5% (6 hikes) per year, with a term premium of 50 basis points In the first scenario, based on the current US 12-month forward P/E ratio, the fair value of the 10-year Treasury yield would rise above the range consistent with a reasonable ERP in the middle of 2022, the liftoff point assumed in all three scenarios. In the second and third scenarios, the US equity ERP would already be quite low. When using the late 1999 / early 2000 bubble period as a reference point, even the scenarios shown in Chart II-15 are not very threatening to stock prices. Given current equity market pricing, the third scenario would take the US equity risk premium back to mid 2002 levels, which were still meaningfully higher than during the peak of the bubble. And that is assuming an earlier liftoff than the market currently expects, a faster pace of rate hikes than experienced during the last economic cycle, and a very meaningful increase in the market’s expectations for the neutral rate. But it is not clear what equity risk premium investors will require to contend with the myriad risks to the economic outlook that did not exist in the early 2000s. For example, equity investors are today faced with a riskier policy environment than existed 20 years ago in the US and in other developed economies that is at least partially driven by populist sentiment, potentially impacting earnings via lower operating margins or higher taxes. These or other risks existed at several points over the past decade and T.I.N.A. (“There Is No Alternative”) prevailed, but that occurred precisely because the equity risk premium was very elevated. A low ERP that is technically not as low as what prevailed during the tech bubble era could thus still threaten stock prices, raising the specter of negative absolute returns from stocks and nominal government bonds for a period of time, beginning potentially at or in the lead-up to the first Fed rate hike. Chart II-16There Are Alternatives To A Traditional 60/40 Portfolio In A Rising Rate Environment There Are Alternatives To A Traditional 60/40 Portfolio In A Rising Rate Environment There Are Alternatives To A Traditional 60/40 Portfolio In A Rising Rate Environment Many investors have questioned what asset allocation strategy should be pursued in a scenario where stock prices and bond yields are no longer positively correlated. Chart II-16 provides some perspective on the question, by comparing the total return of a 60/40 stock/bond portfolio to a strategy involving the opportunistic redeployment of cash into stocks. The strategy rule maintains a 50/50 stock/cash allocation during normal market conditions, but it then shifts the entire cash allocation into equities following a 15% selloff in the stock market. The portfolio is shifted back to a 50/50 allocation once stocks rise to a new rolling 1-year high. The chart highlights that 60/40 balanced portfolio-style returns may be achievable with cash as the diversifier without a significant reduction in the Sharpe ratio. In fact, the strategy has the effect of lowering average volatility due to prolonged periods of comparatively lower equity exposure, although this occurs at the cost of higher volatility during periods of high market stress (precisely when investors most want protection from volatility). But the bottom line for investors is that while they are not likely to be without cost, options exist for investors to potentially earn positive absolute returns in a scenario where a significant shift in the interest rate outlook threatens both stock and bond prices. As noted above, this remains a risk to our view rather than our expectation, but we will continue to monitor the potential threat posed to stock prices as the pandemic draws to a decisive close later this year. Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst III. Indicators And Reference Charts BCA’s equity indicators highlight that the “easy” money from expectations of an eventual end to the pandemic have already been made. Our technical, valuation, and sentiment indicators are very extended, highlighting that investors should expect positive but more modest returns from stocks over the coming 6-12 months. Our monetary indicator has aggressively retreated from its high last year, reflecting a meaningful recovery in government bond yields. The indicator remains above the boom/bust line, however, highlighting that monetary policy remains supportive for risky asset prices. Forward equity earnings already price in a complete earnings recovery, but for now there is no meaningful sign of waning forward earnings momentum. Net revisions remain very strong, and positive earnings surprises have ticked slightly lower from their strongest levels on record. Within a global equity portfolio, US stocks have recently risen versus global ex-US, reflecting a countertrend rise in the US dollar and a lagging vaccination campaign in Europe. We expect a deceleration in the Chinese credit impulse later this year, which will weigh on EM stocks and heighten the importance of European equities in driving global ex-US outperformance. European equity outperformance, in turn, will likely necessitate the outperformance of euro area financials. The US 10-Year Treasury yield has risen well above its 200-day moving average. Long-dated yields are technically stretched to the upside, but our valuation index highlights that bonds are still extremely expensive and that yields could move higher over the cyclical investment horizon. The recent bounce in the US dollar has reflected improved relative US growth expectations, but also previously oversold levels. The dollar may continue to strengthen on a 0-3 month time horizon, but we expect it to be lower in 12 months’ time than it is today. Commodity prices have recovered not just back to pre-pandemic levels, but also back to 2014 levels. This underscores that many commodity prices are extended, and may be due for a breather once the Chinese credit impulse begins to decline. US and global LEIs remain in a solid uptrend, and global manufacturing PMIs are strong. This underscores that the global demand for goods is robust, and that output is below pre-pandemic levels in most economies because of very weak services spending. The latter will recover significantly later this year, as social distancing and other pandemic control measures disappear. EQUITIES: Chart III-1US Equity Indicators US Equity Indicators US Equity Indicators Chart III-2Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Willingness To Pay For Risk Chart III-3US Equity Sentiment Indicators US Equity Sentiment Indicators US Equity Sentiment Indicators   Chart III-4Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Revealed Preference Indicator Chart III-5US Stock Market Valuation US Stock Market Valuation US Stock Market Valuation Chart III-6US Earnings US Earnings US Earnings Chart III-7Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Chart III-8Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance Global Stock Market And Earnings: Relative Performance   FIXED INCOME: Chart III-9US Treasurys And Valuations US Treasurys And Valuations US Treasurys And Valuations Chart III-10Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Yield Curve Slopes Chart III-11Selected US Bond Yields Selected US Bond Yields Selected US Bond Yields Chart III-1210-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components 10-Year Treasury Yield Components Chart III-13US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor US Corporate Bonds And Health Monitor Chart III-14Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Global Bonds: Developed Markets Chart III-15Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets Global Bonds: Emerging Markets   CURRENCIES: Chart III-16US Dollar And PPP US Dollar And PPP US Dollar And PPP Chart III-17US Dollar And Indicator US Dollar And Indicator US Dollar And Indicator Chart III-18US Dollar Fundamentals US Dollar Fundamentals US Dollar Fundamentals Chart III-19Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Japanese Yen Technicals Chart III-20Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Euro Technicals Chart III-21Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Euro/Yen Technicals Chart III-22Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals Euro/Pound Technicals   COMMODITIES: Chart III-23Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Broad Commodity Indicators Chart III-24Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-25Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Commodity Prices Chart III-26Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Commodity Sentiment Chart III-27Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning Speculative Positioning   ECONOMY: Chart III-28US And Global Macro Backdrop US And Global Macro Backdrop US And Global Macro Backdrop Chart III-29US Macro Snapshot US Macro Snapshot US Macro Snapshot Chart III-30US Growth Outlook US Growth Outlook US Growth Outlook Chart III-31US Cyclical Spending US Cyclical Spending US Cyclical Spending Chart III-32US Labor Market US Labor Market US Labor Market Chart III-33US Consumption US Consumption US Consumption Chart III-34US Housing US Housing US Housing Chart III-35US Debt And Deleveraging US Debt And Deleveraging US Debt And Deleveraging   Chart III-36US Financial Conditions US Financial Conditions US Financial Conditions Chart III-37Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Global Economic Snapshot: Europe Chart III-38Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China Global Economic Snapshot: China   Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst Footnotes 1  “Summers Sees ‘Least Responsible’ Fiscal Policy in 40 Years,” Bloomberg News, March 20, 2021. 2  2020-03-20 GIS SR “Revisiting The Neutral Rate Of Interest: A Contrarian View In A Time Of Crisis.”

Highlights Central Bank Expectations: Market expectations of short-term interest rate moves over the next few years are inching higher. The potential for markets to offer a greater bond-bearish challenge to the current highly dovish forward guidance of the major central banks should not be dismissed given the growth-positive mix of expanding global vaccinations and US fiscal stimulus. Global Golden Rule: The gap between market expectations of global central bank policy rates and realized interest rate outcomes is a reliable predictor of government bond returns – a dynamic we have dubbed the “Global Golden Rule of Bond Investing”. Given our expectation that no major developed market central bank will hike rates within the next twelve months, the Global Golden Rule is calling for the recent government bond market laggards to outperform over the next year. Tapering & The Golden Rule: Government bonds in countries where central banks are most likely to begin tapering in 2022 well before considering rate hikes – most notably, the US and Canada – are likely to suffer returns worse than implied by the Global Golden Rule. It is too soon to raise allocations to those higher-beta bond markets. Feature As the first quarter of 2021 draws to a close, fixed income investors are licking their wounds from a rough start to the year. Government bonds across the developed world have absorbed heavy losses as yields have climbed higher, led by US Treasuries which are down -4.0% year-to-date in total return terms. Other markets have also been hit hard, like Canada (-3.9%), Australia (-3.5%) and the UK (-6.3%). The trend in rising yields has been concentrated at longer maturities, with shorter ends of yield curves seeing much smaller moves (Chart 1). Two-year government bond yields are still being pinned down by the dovish forward guidance of the major central banks. The Fed is signaling no rate hikes through at least the end of 2023, while other central banks are sending similar messages on the timing of any potential future rate moves. However, global growth expectations continue to gain upward momentum, fueled by the optimistic combination of expanding COVID-19 vaccinations and aggressive US fiscal stimulus. Real GDP growth is expected to soar to a mid-single digit pace in the US, UK, Canada and even the euro zone - moves heralded by the steady climb of the OECD leading economic indicators and composite purchasing manager indices (Chart 2). Chart 1Rising Yields Reflect Reflation Rising Yields Reflect Reflation Rising Yields Reflect Reflation Chart 2A Bond-Bearish Surge In Global Growth Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Markets will continue to pull forward the timing and pace of the next monetary tightening cycle if those faster above-trend growth forecasts are realized. This will represent a change of “leadership” in the global bond bear market from faster inflation breakevens to increased policy rate expectations helping drive real yields higher. That shift may already be underway according to the ZEW survey of global investor expectations which now shows that the net number of respondents expecting higher short-term interest rates in the US and UK has turned positive (Chart 3). Already, our Central Bank Monitors for the US, Canada and Australia (Chart 4) have climbed back to neutral levels suggesting that easier monetary policy is no longer required. Similar trends can be seen to a lesser extent in the UK, euro area and even Japan (Chart 5). These moves are already coinciding with increased cyclical upward pressure on global bond yields, even without any change in dovish central bank guidance alongside ongoing buying of government bonds via quantitative easing programs. Chart 3Shifting Expectations For Policy Rates? Shifting Expectations For Policy Rates? Shifting Expectations For Policy Rates? Chart 4Diminishing Need For Easy Monetary Policy Here Diminishing Need For Easy Monetary Policy Here Diminishing Need For Easy Monetary Policy Here   Chart 5Easy Policy Still Required Here Easy Policy Still Required Here Easy Policy Still Required Here How will a trend of rising short-term interest rate expectations translate into future expected returns on government bonds? For that, we revisit a framework temporarily set aside during the pandemic era of crisis monetary policies – the Global Golden Rule (GGR) of bond investing. An Update Of The Global Golden Rule, By Country In September 2018, we published a Special Report introducing a government bond return forecasting methodology called the “Global Golden Rule.” This was an extension of a framework introduced by our sister service, US Bond Strategy, that links US Treasury returns (versus cash) to changes in the fed funds rate that were not already discounted in the US Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curve.1 The historical results convincingly showed that investors who "get the Fed right" by making correct bets on changes in the funds rate versus expectations were very likely to make the right call on the direction of Treasury yields. We discovered that relationship also held in other developed market countries. Thus, we now had a framework to help project expected bond returns simply based on a view for future central bank interest rate moves versus market expectations.2 Specific details on the calculation of the Global Golden Rule can be found in those original 2018 papers. In the following pages, we present the latest results of the Global Golden Rule for the US, Canada, Australia, the UK, the euro area and Japan. The set-up for the chart shown for each country is the same. We show the 12-month policy rate “surprise”, defined as the actual change in the central bank policy rate over the preceding 12-months versus the expected 12-month change in the policy rate from a year earlier extracted from OIS curves (aka our 12-month discounters). We then compare the 12-month policy rate surprise to the annual excess return over cash (treasury bills) of the Bloomberg Barclays government bond index for each country. We also show the 12-month policy rate surprise versus the 12-month change in the government bond index yield. The very strong historical correlation between those latter two series is the backbone of the Global Golden Rule framework. After that, we present tables showing expected yield changes and excess returns for various maturity points, as well as the overall government bond index, derived from the Global Golden Rule regressions. The expected change in yield is derived from regressions on the policy rate surprises, with different estimations done for each maturity point. In the tables, we show the results for different scenarios for changes in policy rates. For example, the row in the return tables called “1 rate hike” would show the expected yield changes and excess returns if the central bank for that particular country lifts the policy interest rate by +25bps over the next 12 months. This allows us to pick the scenario(s) that most closely correlate to our own expectation for central bank actions, translating that into government bond return expectations. Global Golden Rule: US Chart 6UST Selloff Akin To A Hawkish Surprise UST Selloff Akin To A Hawkish Surprise UST Selloff Akin To A Hawkish Surprise The Golden Rule would have underestimated the losses realized by US Treasuries over the past year (-4.5%), as negative excess returns over cash typically occur when the Fed is more hawkish than expectations – an outcome that did not occur (Chart 6). The trailing 12-month policy rate surprise for the US is currently zero, as last year’s massively dovish rate cuts have rolled off. The US OIS curve now discounts only 5bps of interest rate increases over the next 12 months, a period that runs to the end of first quarter of 2022. This is in line with the Fed’s guidance that no rate hikes will take place before the end of 2023. Our base case is the “Flat” scenario shown in Table 1 and Table 2, with the Fed keeping the funds rate unchanged near 0% for the next twelve months – a very modest “dovish” surprise. This produces a Golden Rule forecast of the overall US Treasury index yield falling -2bps that generates a total return of +1.1%. This is essentially a coupon-clipping return equivalent to the current index yield. Table 1US: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Table 2US: Expected Changes In Treasury Yields Over The Next 12 Months Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Global Golden Rule: Canada Chart 7Canadian Bond Selloff Worse Than Implied By Golden Rule Canadian Bond Selloff Worse Than Implied By Golden Rule Canadian Bond Selloff Worse Than Implied By Golden Rule Canadian government bonds have sold off smartly over the past 12 months, delivering an excess return over cash of -2.8%. That is a smaller loss, however, compared to other developed economy government bond markets. The Canadian OIS curve did not move as aggressively to price in rate cuts last year, so the rapid pace of Bank of Canada (BoC) easing that was actually delivered constituted a modest “dovish surprise” that helped mute Canadian bond losses to some degree (Chart 7). The trailing 12-month policy rate surprise for Canada is +37bps (a dovish surprise), but rate expectations are more aggressive on forward basis. The Canadian OIS curve now discounts +28bps of interest rate increases over the next 12-months, a period that runs to the end of first quarter of 2022. This stands out as the highest such figure among the countries discussed in this report. This is likely due to the relatively less dovish messaging from BoC officials who have hinted that QE could be tapered sooner than expected if the economy outperforms the BoC’s forecasts for 2021. Our base case is the “Flat” scenario shown in Table 3 and Table 4, with the BoC keeping the policy interest rate at 0.25% for the next twelve months. This produces a Golden Rule forecast of a decline in the overall Canadian government bond index yield of -12bps, delivering a projected total return of +1.69%. That return may turn out to be overly optimistic if the BoC does indeed begin tapering QE later this year. Table 3Canada: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Table 4Canada: Expected Changes In Government Bond Yields Over The Next 12 Months Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Global Golden Rule: Australia Chart 8Australian Bonds Acting Like The RBA Was Hawkish Australian Bonds Acting Like The RBA Was Hawkish Australian Bonds Acting Like The RBA Was Hawkish Australian government bonds have delivered a negative excess return over cash of -3.6% over the past year (Chart 8). This underperformed the projection from the Golden Rule, as the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) was not more hawkish than market expectations. The central bank actually delivered a dovish surprise in 2020, not only cutting policy rates dramatically but starting up a bond-buying QE program and instituting yield curve control to cap 3-year bond yields. The trailing 12-month policy rate surprise for Australia is zero, as last year’s massively dovish surprise rate cuts have rolled off. The Australia OIS curve now discounts only 7bps of interest rate increases over the next 12-months, a period that runs to the end of first quarter of 2022. This is in line with the RBA’s highly dovish guidance suggesting that there will be no change to current policy settings until Australian wage growth picks up to the 3% level consistent with the RBA’s 2-3% CPI inflation target. The central bank does not expect that to occur before 2023. We agree with dovish guidance from the RBA, thus our base case is the “Flat” scenario shown in Table 5 and Table 6, with the RBA keeping the Cash Rate unchanged at 0.1% for the next twelve months. This generates a Golden Rule forecast of an -5bps decline in the overall Australian government bond index yield, producing a total return projection of +1.4%. Table 5Australia: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Table 6Australia: Expected Changes In Government Bond Yields Over The Next 12 Months Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Global Golden Rule: UK Chart 9A UK Gilt Selloff Without A Hawkish BoE A UK Gilt Selloff Without A Hawkish BoE A UK Gilt Selloff Without A Hawkish BoE UK Gilts underperformed the Golden Rule forecast over the past 12 months, delivering a negative excess return over cash of –5.1% even with the Bank of England (BoE) not delivering any hawkish surprise versus market expectations (Chart 9). The trailing 12-month policy rate surprise for the UK is currently zero. The UK OIS curve now discounts only 5bps of interest rate increases over the next 12-months, a period that runs to the end of first quarter of 2022. This is in line with the BoE’s guidance that no monetary tightening will take place until there is clear evidence that the excess capacity created by the pandemic shock is clearly being absorbed. Yet while the BoE has still left the door open to moving to a negative policy rate if needed, markets are not discounting any such move. Our base case is the “Flat” scenario shown in Table 7 and Table 8, with the BoE keeping the Bank Rate unchanged at 0.1% for the next twelve months. This produces a Golden Rule forecast of the overall UK Gilt index yield falling -2bps that generates a total return of +1.0%. This is a return only slightly above the current index yield. Table 7UK: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Table 8UK: Expected Changes In Gilt Yields Over The Next 12 Months Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Global Golden Rule: Germany Chart 10Even Bunds Acting Like ECB Is "Hawkish" Even Bunds Acting Like ECB Is "Hawkish" Even Bunds Acting Like ECB Is "Hawkish" German government bonds have produced an excess return over cash of -1.6% over the past year. There was no surprise from the European Central Bank (ECB) during that time relative to market expectations (Chart 10), so that negative return reflected the modest rise in German bond yields on the back of improving global growth. The trailing 12-month policy rate surprise for Germany (and the overall euro area) remains stuck near zero, as has been the case since the ECB cut its deposit rate below zero and instituted QE back in 2016. The euro area OIS curve now discounts only -4bps of interest rate cuts over the next 12 months, a period that runs to the end of first quarter of 2022. This is in line with the ECB’s guidance that rates will be kept unchanged until at least 2023, as the central bank’s projections call for euro area inflation to not climb above 1.5% - below the ECB’s 2% target – through 2023. The OIS curve is discounting a small probability that the ECB could be forced to deliver a small rate cut given the degree of the euro area inflation undershoot. Our base case, however, is that the ECB will keep rates steady over the next 12 months (and likely for a few more years after that). Thus, the “Flat” scenarios shown in Table 9 and Table 10 are most relevant, with the German government bond index yield rising +2bps according to the Golden Rule. This produces a total return projection of -0.6%. Table 9Germany: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Table 10Germany: Expected Changes In Bund Yields Over The Next 12 Months Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Global Golden Rule: Japan Chart 11JGBs Bucking The Global "Hawkish" Selloff JGBs Bucking The Global "Hawkish" Selloff JGBs Bucking The Global "Hawkish" Selloff Japanese government bonds (JGBs) have delivered an excess return versus cash of -0.8% over the past twelve months (Chart 11). Although it may sound unusual for Japan, there was actually a tiny “hawkish” surprise as the Bank of Japan (BoJ) kept policy rates steady over the past year even as markets had priced in a possibility of a small rate cut in response to the COVID-19 growth shock. Admittedly, the Golden Rule framework is poorly suited to project Japanese bond returns. The Bank of Japan (BoJ) has been unable to lift policy rates for many years, while they have instituted yield curve control on 10-year JGBs since 2016, anchoring yields near zero. With no variability on policy rates or bond yields, a methodology that links bond returns to unexpected policy interest rate changes will have poor predictive power. The Japan OIS curve now discounts -5bps of interest rate cuts over the next 12 months, a period that runs to the end of first quarter of 2022. The BoJ has not ruled out the possibility of a small rate cut sometime in the next few months, as Japanese inflation remains far below the 2% BoJ target. Our base case is the “Flat” scenarios shown in Table 11 and Table 12, with the BoJ keeping policy rates unchanged near 0% for the next twelve months. That generates a Golden Rule forecast of a +5bp increase in the Japanese government bond index yield, with a total return projection of -0.4%. This would be consistent with the BoJ producing a small hawkish “surprise” by not cutting rates deeper into negative territory. Table 11Japan: Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Table 12Japan: Expected Changes In JGB Yields Over The Next 12 Months Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Investment Implications Of The Global Golden Rule Projections Among all the scenarios laid out above, our base case has been that no change in policy rates should be expected over the next 12 months in any of the countries. This fits with our view that central banks will be reluctant to consider any changes to the current dovish forward guidance on future rate hikes until there is clear evidence that the global economy has moved beyond the pandemic. That means taking some near-term inflation risks given the very robust pace of growth expected over the rest of 2021. In Table 13, we rank all the return projections generated by the Global Golden Rule for the “Flat” scenarios on policy rates over the next year. Returns are shown both in local currency terms and in USD-hedged terms. Table 13Government Bond Index Total Return Forecasts Over The Next 12 Months Assuming Policy Rates Remain Unchanged Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing The return rankings are a mirror image of the performance seen year-to-date, with the “higher beta” bond markets (Canada, Australia and the US) outperforming the more defensive low-yielding markets (the UK, Germany and Japan). Returns are projected to be moderate, however, with Canada leading the way both unhedged (+1.69%) and currency hedged (+1.73%). The return rankings excluding the +10-year maturity buckets of the government bond indices are shown in Table 14. We present these to allow a more “apples to apples” comparison of the six regions shown, as the UK index has a huge weighting in the +10-year bucket while there is no +10-year benchmark for Australia. On this basis, Australia stands out as having the best Global Golden Rule generated return projections, both unhedged (+1.44%) and USD-hedged (+1.66%).3 Table 14 Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing These return rankings run counter to our current recommended country allocation: underweight the US, overweight Germany and Japan and neutral the UK, Canada and Australia. We still believe there is more near-term upside for global bond yields, led by US Treasuries, thus it is too soon to begin to position for the results projected by the Global Golden Rule. There is one other factor that leads us to interpret the results cautiously – the likelihood that some central banks will begin tapering their bond purchases within the next 12 months. Our expectation is that the Fed will begin to signal a need to slow the pace of its QE bond buying in the fourth quarter of this year, with actual tapering beginning in Q1 of 2022. The BoC is likely to follow suit shortly thereafter. Thus, the Fed and BoC will begin tapering within the 12-month forecasting window of the Global Golden Rule. The RBA and BoE will debate a need to taper later in 2022 – beyond that 12-month window – while the ECB and BoJ will maintain their current pace of bond buying until at least the end of 2022. From the point of view of bond markets, tapering by the Fed and BoC will likely feel as if those central banks were actually delivering rate hikes. Bond yields will likely rise by more than projected by the Global Golden Rule in the “Flat” scenarios highlighted earlier. Quantitative models that attempt to translate QE into interest rate changes, so-called “shadow rates”, show that the Fed’s QE bond buying over the past year has been equivalent to nearly 250bp of additional Fed rate cuts after the funds rate was slashed to 0% (Chart 12). Thus, when the Fed begins to taper QE, it will conceptually be as if the Fed started a rate hike cycle with the starting point of a fed funds rate at minus -2.5%. When looking at the historical correlation of changes in the US shadow rate and US Treasury yields, the +40bps rise in the Treasury index yield over the past 12 months is equivalent to roughly a 100bp increase in the shadow fed funds rate (Chart 13, top panel). That would line up with a fairly aggressive pace of Fed tapering when looking at the correlation of changes in the shadow rate to changes in the size of the Fed balance sheet (middle panel). Chart 12"Shadow Policy Rates" Are Below 0% "Shadow Policy Rates" Are Below 0% "Shadow Policy Rates" Are Below 0% Chart 13UST Yields Discount A Lot Of Fed Tapering UST Yields Discount A Lot Of Fed Tapering UST Yields Discount A Lot Of Fed Tapering US Treasury yields have been rising for more fundamental reasons like improving growth expectations alongside rising inflation expectations. If the Fed is forced to signal a tapering of QE later this year because that robust growth outlook comes to fruition, it is a stretch to think that Treasury yields will not see additional upward pressure. Thus, we are sticking with our current country allocations, despite the message from our Global Golden Rule. US Treasury returns may look more like the “1 rate hike” or “2 rate hikes” scenarios shown in Table 1 when the Fed begins tapering early in 2022. The same goes for Canadian bond yields once the BoC moves to taper soon after the Fed, as we expect, which is why we are keeping Canada on “downgrade watch.” Bottom Line: The Global Golden Rule is calling for the recent government bond market laggards to outperform over the next year if central banks keep rates on hold. Government bonds in countries where central banks are most likely to begin tapering in 2022 well before considering rate hikes – most notably, the US and Canada – are likely to suffer returns worse than implied by the Global Golden Rule. It is too soon to raise allocations to those higher-beta bond markets.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Research US Bond Strategy Special Report, "The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing", dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcarearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, "The Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing", dated September 25, 2018, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Note that in Table 14, we rescale the other maturity buckets after removing the +10-year bucket. The index returns are presented as a market-capitalization weighted combination of the expected returns of the remaining maturity buckets. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Revisiting Our Global Golden Rule Of Bond Investing Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Losing Traction Losing Traction Neutral In light of the likely slowdown in Chinese data, last week we downgraded the S&P machinery index from overweight to neutral. This sub-surface industrials sector move also comes on the heels of our previous upgrade in the more domestically focused S&P railroads index, and does not affect the broad sector’s overweight stance. As China goes, so do machinery stocks. The latest Chinese manufacturing PMIs hooked down and any sustained weakness will weigh heavily on demand for US machinery new orders (not shown). Adding that to the waning impulse of Chinese total social financing aggregates including BCA’s downbeat forecast, and the risk/reward of being overweight machinery stocks loses traction (see chart). Bottom Line: We reiterate our recent downgrade on the S&P construction machinery & heavy trucks index to neutral. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5CSTF – CAT, CMI, PCAR & WAB. ​​​​​​​

Highlights Duration: The Treasury market has moved quickly to price-in expectations of a strong economic recovery, while the Fed has been more cautious about moving its own rate forecasts. We think that the market’s expectations are well founded and that the Fed will eventually move its dots higher. Stick with below-benchmark portfolio duration. Corporate Bonds: Junk spreads already embed a significant decline in the default rate during the next 12 months, but reasonable assumptions for corporate debt growth and profit growth suggest that this outcome will be achieved. Investors should continue to favor spread product over Treasuries and continue to hold a down-in-quality bias within corporate credit. Economy: Disposable personal income fell in February compared to January, but it has risen massively since last year’s passage of the CARES act. The large pool of accumulated household savings will help drive economic growth as the pandemic recedes. Feature There is widespread anticipation that the economic recovery is about to kick into high gear. To us, this anticipation seems rather well founded. The United States’ vaccination roll-out is proceeding quickly and the federal government is pitching in with a tsunami of fiscal support. But it’s important to acknowledge that this positive outlook is still a forecast, one that has not yet been validated by hard economic data. The risk for investors is obvious. Market prices have already moved to price-in a significant amount of economic optimism and they are vulnerable in a situation where that optimism doesn’t pan out. In this week’s report we look at how much economic optimism is already discounted in both the Treasury and corporate bond markets. We conclude that the most likely scenario is one where the economic data are strong enough to validate current pricing in both markets. Investors should keep portfolio duration below-benchmark and continue to favor spread product over Treasuries, with a down-in-quality bias. Optimism In The Treasury Market The most obvious way to illustrate the economic optimism currently embedded in Treasury securities is to look at the rate hike expectations priced into the yield curve relative to the Fed’s own projections (Chart 1). The market is currently looking for four 25 basis point rate hikes by the end of 2023 while only seven out of 18 FOMC participants expect any hikes at all by then. Chart 1Market More Hawkish Than Fed Market More Hawkish Than Fed Market More Hawkish Than Fed We addressed the wide divergence between market and FOMC expectations in last week’s report.1 We noted that the main reason for the divergence is that while the market is focused on expectations for rapid economic growth the Fed is making a concerted effort to rely only on hard economic data. This sentiment was echoed by Fed Governor Lael Brainard in a speech last week:2 The focus on achieved outcomes rather than the anticipated outlook is central to the Committee’s guidance regarding both asset purchases and the policy rate. The emphasis on outcomes rather than the outlook corresponds to the shift in our monetary policy approach that suggests policy should be patient rather than preemptive at this stage in the recovery. The upshot of the Fed’s excessively cautious approach is that its interest rate projections will move toward the market’s as the hard economic data strengthen during the next 6-12 months, keeping the bond bear market intact. As evidence for this view, consider that the US Economic Surprise Index remains at an extremely high level, consistent with a rising 10-year Treasury yield (Chart 2). Further, 12-month core inflation rates are poised to jump significantly during the next two months as the weak monthly prints from March and April 2020 fall out of the 12-month sample (Chart 3). Then, pipeline pressures in both the goods and service sectors will ensure that inflation remains relatively high for the balance of the year (Chart 3, bottom panel).3   Chart 2Data Surprises Remain Positive Data Surprises Remain Positive Data Surprises Remain Positive Chart 3Inflation About To Jump Inflation About To Jump Inflation About To Jump Finally, the hard economic data still do not reflect the truly massive amount of fiscal stimulus that is about to hit the US economy. Chart 4 illustrates how large last year’s fiscal stimulus was compared to what was seen during recent recessions, and this chart does not yet incorporate the recently passed $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan (~8.7% of GDP) or the second infrastructure focused reconciliation bill that is likely to pass this fall. Our political strategists expect 2021’s second budget bill to be similar in size to the American Rescue Plan though tax hikes will also be included and, due to the infrastructure-focused nature of the bill, the spending will be more spread out over a number of years.4  Chart 4The Era Of Big Government Is Back That Uneasy Feeling That Uneasy Feeling Bottom Line: The Treasury market has moved quickly to price-in expectations of a strong economic recovery, while the Fed has been more cautious about moving its own rate forecasts. We think that the market’s expectations are well founded and that the Fed will eventually move its dots higher. Stick with below-benchmark portfolio duration.  Optimism In The Corporate Bond Market Chart 5What's Priced In Junk Spreads? What's Priced In Junk Spreads? What's Priced In Junk Spreads? The way we assess the amount of economic optimism baked into the corporate bond market is to calculate the 12-month default rate that is implied by the current High-Yield Index spread (Chart 5). We need to make a few assumptions to do this. First, we assume that investors require an excess spread of at least 100 bps from the index after subtracting 12-month default losses. In past research, we’ve noted that High-Yield has a strong track record of outperforming duration-matched Treasuries when the realized excess spread is above 100 bps. High-Yield underperforms Treasuries more often than it outperforms when the realized excess spread is below 100 bps.5 Second, we must assume a recovery rate for defaulted bonds. The 12-month recovery rate tends to fluctuate between 20% and 60%, with higher levels seen when the default rate is low and lower levels when the default rate is high (Chart 5, bottom panel). For this week’s analysis, we assume a range of recovery rates, from 20% to 50%, though we expect the recovery rate to be closer to the top-end of that range during the next 12 months, given our expectations for a rapid economic recovery. With these assumptions in mind, we calculate that the High-Yield Index is fairly priced for a default rate between 2.8% and 4.5% for the next 12 months (Chart 5, panel 2). If the default rate falls into that range, or below, then we would expect High-Yield bonds (and corporate credit more generally) to outperform a duration-matched position in Treasuries. If the default rate comes in above 4.5%, then we would expect Treasuries to beat High-Yield. To figure out whether the default rate will meet the market’s expectations, we turn to a simple model of the 12-month speculative grade default rate that is based on nonfinancial corporate sector gross leverage (aka total debt over pre-tax profits) and C&I lending standards (Chart 6). If we make forecasts for nonfinancial corporate 12-month debt growth and pre-tax profit growth, we can let the model tell us what default rate to anticipate. Chart 6Default Rate Model Default Rate Model Default Rate Model Debt Growth Expectations We expect corporate debt growth to be quite weak during the next 12 months (Chart 7). This is mainly because firms raised a huge amount of debt last spring when the Fed and federal government made it very attractive to do so. Now, we are emerging from a recession and the nonfinancial corporate sector already holds an elevated cash balance (Chart 7, bottom panel). Debt growth was also essentially zero during the past six months, and very low (or even negative) debt growth is a common occurrence right after a peak in the default rate (Chart 7, top 2 panels). It is true that the nonfinancial corporate sector’s Financing Gap – the difference between capital expenditures and retained earnings – is no longer negative (Chart 7, panel 3). But it is also not high enough to suggest that firms need to significantly add debt. Chart 7Debt Growth Will Be Slow Debt Growth Will Be Slow Debt Growth Will Be Slow For our default rate calculations, we assume that corporate debt growth will be between 0% and 8% during the next 12 months. However, our sense is that it will be closer to 0% than to 8%. Profit Growth Expectations Chart 8Profit Growth Will Surge Profit Growth Will Surge Profit Growth Will Surge Our expectation is that profit growth will surge during the next 12 months, as is the typical pattern when the economy emerges from recession. Year-over-year profit growth peaked at 62% in 2002 following the 2001 recession, and it peaked at 51% in 2010 coming out of the Global Financial Crisis (Chart 8). More specifically, if we model nonfinancial corporate sector pre-tax profit growth on real GDP and then assume 6.5% real GDP growth in 2021, in line with the Fed’s median forecast, then we get a forecast for 31% profit growth in 2021. If we use a higher real GDP growth forecast of 10%, in line with our US Political Strategy service's "maximum impact" scenario, then our model forecasts pre-tax profit growth of 40% for 2021.6 Default Rate Expectations Table 1 puts together different estimates for profit growth and debt growth and maps them to a range of 12-month default rate outcomes, as implied by our Default Rate Model. For example, profit growth of 30% and debt growth between 0% and 8% in 2021 maps to a 12-month default rate of between 3.2% and 3.8%. This falls comfortably within the range of 2.8% to 4.5% that is consistent with current market pricing. Table 1Default Rate Scenarios That Uneasy Feeling That Uneasy Feeling In fact, for our model to output a default rate range that is higher than what is priced into junk spreads, we need to assume 2021 profit growth of 20% or less. This is quite far below the estimates we made above based on reasonable forecasts for real GDP. Bottom Line: Junk spreads already embed a significant decline in the default rate during the next 12 months, but reasonable assumptions for corporate debt growth and profit growth suggest that this outcome will be achieved. Investors should continue to favor spread product over Treasuries and continue to hold a down-in-quality bias within corporate credit. Economy: Household Income Update Last week’s personal income and spending report showed that disposable household income was lower in February than in January, a decline that is entirely attributable to the fact that the $600 checks to individuals that were part of the December stimulus bill were mostly delivered in January. These “Economic Impact Payments” totaled $138 billion in January and only $8 billion in February. This drop-off of $130 billion almost exactly matches the $128 billion monthly decline seen in disposable personal income. Consumer spending also fell in February compared to January, a result that likely owes a lot to February’s bad weather conditions, particularly the winter storm that caused much of Texas to lose power. Though spending has recovered a lot from last year’s lows, it remains significantly below its pre-COVID trend (Chart 9). In contrast to spending, disposable income has skyrocketed since the pandemic started last March. Chart 10 shows that disposable personal income has increased 8% in the 12 months since COVID struck compared to the 12 months prior. Moreover, it shows that the increase is entirely attributable to fiscal relief. Chart 9Households Have Excess ##br##Savings Households Have Excess Savings Households Have Excess Savings Chart 10Disposable Personal Income Growth And Its Drivers That Uneasy Feeling That Uneasy Feeling The result of below-trend spending and a surge in income is a big jump in the savings rate. The personal savings rate was 13.6% in February, well above its average pre-COVID level (Chart 9, panel 3), as it has been since the pandemic began. This consistently elevated savings rate has led to US households building up a $1.9 trillion buffer of excess savings compared to a pre-pandemic baseline (Chart 9, bottom panel). Perhaps the biggest question for economic growth is whether households will deploy this large pool of savings as the economy re-opens or whether they will continue to hoard it. In this regard, the individual checks that were part of last year’s CARES act are the most likely to be hoarded, as these checks were distributed to all Americans making less than $99,000. The income support provisions in this month’s American Rescue Plan are much more targeted. Only individuals making below $75,000 will receive a $1,400 check and the bill also includes expanded unemployment benefits and a large amount of aid for state & local governments. All in all, we anticipate that a substantial amount of household excess savings will be spent once the vaccination effort has made enough progress that people feel safe venturing out. This will lead to strong economic growth and higher inflation in the second half of 2021.   Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Fed Looks Backward While Markets Look Forward”, dated March 23, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20210323b.htm 3 For more details on our outlook for core inflation in 2021 please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Limit Rate Risk, Load Up On Credit”, dated March 16, 2021, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see US Political Strategy Second Quarter Outlook 2021, “From Stimulus To Structural Reform”, dated March 24, 2021, available at usps.bcaresearch.com 5 For more details on this excess spread analysis please see US Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “Trading The US Corporate Bond Market In A Time Of Crisis”, dated March 31, 2020, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 The "maximum impact" scenario assumes that the full amount of authorized outlays from the American Rescue Plan will be spent, with 60% of the outlays spent in FY2021. For more details see US Political Strategy Second Quarter Outlook 2021, “From Stimulus To Structural Reform”, dated March 24, 2021, available at usps.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification