United States

Overweight Our S&P home improvement retail overweight continues posting healthy gains: the position is up 23%, in relative terms, since the mid-April inception. Such handsome returns compel us to move our trailing stop from 10% to the 15% relative return mark in order to protect gains. Nevertheless, we still expect to harvest more gains – a view that HD’s earnings release reiterated yesterday. Remote working has created an opportunity for homeowners to undertake remodeling projects that drove extra traffic to home improvement retail stores. Specifically, HD comparable-store sales grew by 25% year-over-year, which translated into a sizable EPS beat. The bottom panel of the chart corroborates that HIR sales are on fire. Bottom Line: We remain overweight the S&P home improvement retail index, but today we move our trailing stop from 10% to 15%. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOMI – HD, LOW.  

Underweight Our S&P communications equipment index underweight stance is paying dividends, and ongoing capex-related woes signal that a breakdown is looming (top panel). US CEOs are still reluctant to spend on big ticket items, as highlighted by the most recent CEO Confidence Survey (bottom panel). Lackluster capex spending will remain a headwind for CSCO, which commands a 77% market cap weight in the index. True, the recent drubbing in the greenback should aid telecom equipment exports (second panel). However, the industry’s 40% foreign sales exposure is on par with the SPX, underscoring that a weaker dollar will fail to provide relative profit relief. In fact, our margin proxy has rolled over recently signaling that the sell side’s profit margin optimism is unwarranted (middle panel). All of this suggests that the industry’s 30% forward P/E discount to the broad market represents a value trap rather than an opportunity (fourth panel). As a reminder, our technology sector (currently neutral) strategy is to prefer “defensive” software and services stocks at the expense of hardware and equipment manufacturers. Bottom Line: We remain underweight the S&P communications equipment index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG – S5COMM – CSCO, JNPR, MSI, ANET, FFIV.  

Highlights Global Credit Spreads: The relentless rally in global credit markets since the rout in February and March has driven corporate spreads to near pre-pandemic lows in the US, Europe and even emerging markets. Central bank liquidity is dominating uncertainties over the coronavirus and US politics. Credit Strategy: Valuations now look far less compelling in US investment grade corporates, even with the Fed backstop. EM USD-denominated corporates offer better value versus US equivalents. High-yield spreads offer mixed signals in both the US and Europe: historically attractive breakeven spreads that offer no compensation for likely default losses over the next 6-12 months. Remain neutral US junk and underweight euro area junk, favoring Ba-rated names in both. Feature Chart of the WeekA Pandemic? Credit Markets Are Not Concerned Global credit markets have enjoyed a spectacular recovery from the carnage seen just five months ago when investors realized the magnitude of the COVID-19 shock. The option-adjusted spread (OAS) on the Bloomberg Barclays Global Investment Grade Corporate index has tightened from the 2020 high of 326bps to 130bps, while the OAS on the Global High-Yield index has narrowed from the 2020 high of 1192bps to 556bps. Unsurprisingly, those spread peaks both occurred on the same day: March 23, the day the US Federal Reserve announced their corporate bond buying programs. We have described the Fed’s actions as effectively removing the “left tail risk” of investing in credit, and not just in the US, by introducing a central bank liquidity backstop to the US corporate bond market. The backdrop for global credit markets, on the surface, seems typical for sustained spread compression (Chart of the Week). Economic optimism is buoyant, with the global ZEW expectations index now at the highest level since 2014. Monetary conditions are highly supportive, with near-0% policy rates across all developed economies and the balance sheets of the Fed, ECB, Bank of Japan and Bank of England growing at a combined year-over-year pace of 46%. Credit markets seem to be signaling boom times ahead, ignoring the pesky details of an ongoing global pandemic and election-year political uncertainty in the US. Credit markets seem to be signaling boom times ahead, ignoring the pesky details of an ongoing global pandemic and election-year political uncertainty in the US.  The next moves in credit will be more challenging and less rewarding than the past five months. Investment grade corporate credit spreads no longer offer compelling value in most developed economies, while high-yield spreads are tightening in the face of rising default rates in the US and Europe. While additional spread tightening is not out of the question in these markets, investors should consider rotating into credit sectors that still offer some relative value – like emerging market (EM) hard currency corporates. A World Tour Of Our Spread Valuation Indicators The sharp fall in global bond yields over the past several months has not just been confined to government debt. Yields have fallen toward, and even below, pre-virus lows for a variety of sectors ranging from US mortgage-backed securities (MBS) to EM USD-denominated sovereign debt (Chart 2). Investors are clearly reaching for yield in the current environment of tiny risk-free government bond yields, with no greater sign of this than the recent new issue by a US sub-investment grade borrower of a 10-year bond with a coupon below 3%.1 The drop in credit yields has also occurred alongside tightening credit risk premiums, although spreads remain above the pre-virus lows for most sectors in the US, Europe and EM (Chart 3). The degree of correlation across global credit markets has been intense, with very little differentiation between countries. Investment grade corporate spreads in the US, UK and euro area are all closing in on 100bps; high-yield spreads in those same regions are all around 500bps. Chart 2Global Credit Yields Are Low Chart 3Global Credit Spreads Are Getting Tight Last week, we introduced the concept of “yield chasing” to describe how the ranking of returns in developed market government bonds was becoming increasingly correlated to the ranking of outright yield levels.2 We have seen a similar dynamic unfold in global credit markets, especially since that peak in spreads in late March. In Chart 4 and Chart 5, we present the relationship between starting benchmark index yields, and the subsequent excess returns over risk-free government bonds, for a variety of developed market and EM credit products. The first chart covers the time from start of 2020 to the March 23 peak in spreads, while the second chart shows the relationship since then. The two charts are mirror images of each other. Chart 4Starting Yields & Subsequent Global Credit Excess Returns In 2020 (January 1 To March 20) Chart 5Starting Yields & Subsequent Global Credit Excess Returns In 2020 (Since March 23) The worst performing markets in the first three months of the year were those with the highest yield to begin 2020: high-yield corporates in the US and Europe along with EM credit, which have been the best performing markets since late March. The opposite is true for lower yielders like investment grade credit in Japan, the euro area and Australia, which were among the top performers before March 23 and have lagged sharply since then. While there appears to be “yield chasing” going on in credit markets, much of the spread tightening over the past five months has been a reflection of reduced market volatility that justify lower risk premiums. Chart 6Lower Vol = Lower Credit Risk Premia While there appears to be “yield chasing” going on in credit markets, much of the spread tightening over the past five months has been a reflection of reduced market volatility that justify lower risk premiums. Measures of bond volatility like the MOVE index of US Treasury options prices have declined to pre-pandemic lows, while the VIX index of US equity volatility is now down to 22 from the 2020 peak around 80 (Chart 6). The excess return volatility of US corporate bond markets has followed suit, thus allowing for lower US credit spreads. Even allowing for the lower levels of overall market volatility, corporate credit spreads do look relatively tight in the US and Europe. The ratio of the US investment grade index OAS to the VIX is now one standard deviation below the median since 2000 (Chart 7). A similar reading exists for the ratio of the US high-yield index OAS to the VIX, which is also one standard deviation below the long-run average (bottom panel). In the euro area, the ratios of investment grade and high-yield OAS to European equity volatility, the VStoxx index, are not as stretched as in the US, but remain below long-run median levels (Chart 8). Chart 7Very Tight US Corporate Credit Spreads Relative To Equity Vol Chart 8Tight Euro Area Corporate Credit Spreads Relative To Equity Vol While these simple comparisons of spread to market volatility suggest that corporate credit spreads are tight in most major markets, other indicators paint a more nuanced picture of cross-market valuations. Our preferred measure of the attractiveness of credit spreads is the 12-month breakeven spread. That measures the amount of spread widening that must occur over a one-year horizon for a credit product to have the same return as government bonds. In other words, how much must spreads increase to eliminate the carry advantage of a credit product over a risk-free bond, after accounting for the volatility of that product. We compare those 12-month breakeven spreads with their own history in a percentile ranking, which determines the attractiveness of spreads. While the valuations for US investment grade credit look the least compelling among those three main regions, the power of the Fed liquidity backstop will continue to put downward pressure on spreads. A look at breakeven spread percentile rankings for the major credit groupings in the US (Chart 9), euro area (Chart 10) and EM (Chart 11) shows more diverging spread valuations. Chart 9US Corporate Bond Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings Chart 10Euro Area Corporate Bond Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings Chart 11EM USD Credit Breakeven Spread Percentile Rankings The US investment grade breakeven spread is just below the 25th percentile of their long-run history, although the high-yield breakeven spread remains in the top quartile of its history. Euro area breakeven spreads are “fairly” valued, both sitting around the 50th percentile. The EM USD-denominated sovereign breakeven spread is in the third quartile below the 50th percentile, while the EM USD-denominated corporate breakeven spread looks better, sitting just at the 75th percentile. While the valuations for US investment grade credit look the least compelling among those three main regions, the power of the Fed liquidity backstop will continue to put downward pressure on spreads. We would not be surprised to see US investment grade spreads tighten back to the previous cyclical low at some point in the next 6-12 months. There are more compelling opportunities in other global credit markets, however, especially on a risk-adjusted basis. The only investment grade sectors that have attractive breakeven spreads are in Japan, Canada and, most interestingly, EM. Bottom Line: The relentless rally in global credit markets since the out in February and March has driven credit spreads to near pre-pandemic lows in the US, Europe and even emerging markets. Central bank liquidity is dominating uncertainties over the virus and US politics. Spread valuations are looking more stretched, but “yield chasing” and “spread chasing” behavior will remain dominant with central banks encouraging risk-seeking behavior with easy money policies. Putting It All Together: Recommended Allocations One way to look at the relative attractiveness of global spread product sectors is to compare them all by 12-month breakeven spread percentile rankings. We show that in Chart 12, not just for the overall credit indices by country but also among credit tiers within each country. Sectors rated below investment grade are in red to differentiate from higher-quality markets. Chart 12Global Corporate Bond Breakeven Spreads, Ordered By Percentile Ranks The main conclusion form the chart is that there is a lot of red on the left side and none on the right side. That means junk bonds in the US and Europe have relatively high breakeven spreads, while investment grade credit in most countries have relatively lower breakeven spreads. The only investment grade sectors that have attractive breakeven spreads are in Japan, Canada and, most interestingly, EM. To further refine the cross-country comparisons, we must look at those breakeven spreads relative to the riskiness of each sector. In Chart 13, we present a scatter graph plotting the 12-month breakeven spreads versus our preferred measure of credit risk, duration-times-spread (DTS), for all developed market corporate credit tiers, as well as EM USD-denominated sovereign and corporate debt. The shaded region represents all values within +/- one standard error of the fitted regression line. Thus, sectors below that shaded region have breakeven spreads that are low relative to its DTS, suggesting a poor valuation/risk tradeoff. The opposite is true for sectors above the shaded region. Chart 13Comparing Value (Breakeven Spreads) With Risk (Duration Times Spread) The sectors that stand out as most attractive in this framework are B-rated and Caa-rated US high-yield, and EM USD-denominated investment grade corporates. The least attractive sectors are US investment grade corporates, for both the overall index and the Baa-rated credit tier. While those US high-yield valuations suggest overweighting allocations to the lower credit tiers, we remain reluctant to make such a recommendation. Looking beyond the spread and volatility measures presented in this report, we must consider the default risk of high-yield bonds. Our preferred measure of valuation that incorporates default risk is the default-adjusted spread, which measures the current high-yield index spread net of default losses. While those US high-yield valuations suggest overweighting allocations to the lower credit tiers, we remain reluctant to make such a recommendation. The current US high-yield default-adjusted spread is now well below its long-run average (Chart 14). We expect a peak US default rate over the next year between 10-12% (levels seen after past US recessions) and a recovery rate given default between 20-25% (slightly below previous post-recession levels). That combination would mean that expected default loses from the COVID-19 recession could exceed the current level of the US high-yield index spread by as much as 400bps (see the bottom right of the chart). Given that risk of default losses overwhelming the attractiveness of US high-yield as measured by the 12-month breakeven spread, we prefer to stay up in quality by focusing on Ba-rated names within an overall neutral allocation to US junk bonds. For euro area high-yield, where default-adjusted spreads are also projected to be negative next year but with less attractive 12-month breakeven spreads, we recommend a cautious up-in-quality allocation to Ba-rated names only but within an overall underweight allocation. After ruling out increasing allocations to US B-rated and Caa-rated high-yield, that leaves the two remaining valuation outliers from Chart 13 - US investment grade and EM USD-denominated investment grade corporates. The gap between the index OAS of the two has narrowed from the March peak of 446bps to the latest reading of 259bps (Chart 15). We believe that gap can narrow further towards 200bps, especially given the supportive EM backdrop of USD weakness and China policy stimulus – both factors that were in place during the last sustained period of EM corporate bond outperformance in 2016-17. Chart 14No Cushion Against Credit Losses For US & Euro Area HY Chart 15EM IG Corporates Remain Attractive Vs US IG We upgraded our recommended allocation to EM USD-denominated credit out of US investment grade back in mid-July, and we continue to view that as the most attractive relative value opportunity in global spread product on a risk/reward basis. Bottom Line: Valuations now look far less compelling in US investment grade corporates, even with the Fed backstop. EM USD-denominated corporates offer better value versus US equivalents. High-yield spreads offer mixed signals in both the US and Europe: historically attractive breakeven spreads that offer no compensation for likely default losses over the next 6-12 months. Remain neutral US junk and underweight euro area junk, favoring Ba-rated names in both.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-08-10/u-s-junk-bond-market-sets-record-low-coupon-in-relentless-rally 2 Please see BCA Research Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, "We’re All Yield Chasers Now", dated August 11, 2020, available at gfis.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Special Report

Highlights The underperformance of value versus growth has been a reason behind the dollar bull market rather than a consequence of it. The rationale is that the catalyst for any sector to outperform is return on capital rather than the cost of capital. The outperformance of health care and technology has been on the back of rising profits, rather than just investor exuberance and/or low bond yields. Cyclical currencies with a high concentration of value sectors have tracked the relative performance of their representative bourses. A reversal will require value sectors to start outperforming on a sustainable basis. It is encouraging that leadership changes in equity markets occur more often than not. Historically, these tend to take place every decade. Bombed-out valuations suggest some deep-value sectors have become sufficiently cheap to compensate for a pessimistic profit scenario. An outperformance of value versus growth will favor cyclical currencies. We are long a basket of petrocurrencies, the SEK, and GBP. We are also short USD/JPY as portfolio insurance (and as a play on the cyclical Japanese market). Feature The usual market narrative is that for non-US stocks to outperform, the dollar has to decline. This also applies to value stocks that have a higher weighting outside the US, compared to growth stocks. At the center of this premise is that the dollar is a reserve currency. As a result, three reasons emblem the view. First, a fall in the dollar eases financing costs for non-US corporations borrowing in dollars. Second, commodities tend to do well when the dollar declines, benefiting emerging market and commodity-producing countries. And finally, a lower dollar boosts the common-currency returns for US-based investors, leading to more capital deployment in offshore markets. On the surface, this makes sense. But digging deeper into the thesis, it appears that a lower US dollar is a necessary but not sufficient condition for non-US (or value) stocks to outperform. The reason is that profit growth (the ultimate driver of stock prices) is more contingent on productivity gains rather than translation effects. As such, the value-versus-growth debate is important, not only for the sectors involved, but for currency strategy as well. A Two-Decade Postmortem Chart 1 plots the MSCI global value index versus its growth counterpart, superimposed against the US dollar. Two trends become apparent: The relative performance of value versus growth typically bottoms or peaks ahead of turns in the US dollar. The relationship between the value/growth ratio and the US dollar is not always in sync. There was a period of decoupling after the financial crisis, and, more recently, in 2015-2016. This was also the case in the ‘80s and around the Asian crisis in the late ‘90s. Flows tend to gravitate to capital markets with the highest expected returns, and this is certainly the case when value or growth style tilts are concerned. This is important for currency strategy, since sector composition can drive a country’s equity returns. Meanwhile, both equity and currency relative performances tend to be in sync (Chart 2A and Chart 2B). Chart 1Value/Growth Turns Before The Dollar Chart 2ACurrencies Follow Relative Equity Performance Chart 2BCurrencies Follow Relative Equity Performance According to the MSCI classification, information technology and health care are the biggest components of the growth index – a whopping 49%. This is in stark contrast to financials and industrials, which make up 33% of the value index. Not surprisingly, currencies with a heavy value weighting in their domestic bourses (Table 1) have suffered indiscriminately compared to their growth counterparts, over the last decade. Table 1Sector Weights Across G10 Take the US and Switzerland, which have the highest equity concentration in traditional growth sectors, at over 60%. Both the US dollar and Swiss franc have held up remarkably well in trade-weighted terms since the onset of the dollar bull market (Chart 3). Likewise, it would have been a miracle for petrocurrencies (CAD, NOK and AUD) to hold up amid the recent underperformance in energy and financials. This suggests that at minimum, the underperformance of value versus growth has been a reason for the dollar bull market rather than a consequence of it. Chart 3Style Tilt Drives Currency Performance Chicken And Egg Problem? What about the narrative that a decline in the dollar greases the engine of non-US stocks? Yes, but not entirely. It is certainly the case that most global trade and financing is conducted in US dollars, and so a fall in the US dollar (commensurate with lower interest rates) leads to easier global financial conditions. As Chart 4 clearly illustrates, corporate spreads abroad have been tightly correlated to dollar volatility. A lower dollar also eases repayment costs for non-US borrowers. A lower dollar also boosts resource prices through the numeraire effect (Chart 5). Meanwhile, rising commodity prices flatter industries tied to the resource value chain such as industrials, materials, and energy. Second-round economic effects also buffet other cyclical industries such as retail and hospitality, which help boost the domestic equity index. That said, the rally in commodities, value stocks, and emerging market share prices in 2016-2017 occurred despite a dollar that was flat-to-higher – so the causality versus effect link is not always trivial. Part of the reason is that, over the past few years, both emerging market and other non-US corporates have diversified their sources of debt funding. Euro- and yen-denominated debt have been surging (Chart 6), which has kept their cost of capital low, even as the dollar has risen. Chart 4The Dollar And Funding Stresses Chart 5Tied To The Hip Chart 6Lots Of Non-US Debt It is also important to note that in commodity bull markets, prices tend to rise in all currencies, including domestically (Chart 7). This is crucial for sector outperformance since the translation effect for profits will otherwise be negative, given local-currency fixed and variable costs. This suggests that demand is the driving force behind bull markets in commodity prices and cyclical stocks, rather than a lower greenback. Chart 7Commodity Bull Markets In Different Currencies Chart 8China And Commodities This demand has come in the form of Chinese stimulus. Chart 8 shows a close correlation between excess liquidity in China (a measure of the centripetal force from Chinese credit) and resource share valuations. Ergo, a key barometer for value to outperform growth is that Chinese demand picks up, plugging the hole in exactly the sectors that have borne the brunt of deleveraging in recent years A look at corporate balance sheets and income statements corroborates this view. Growth has outperformed value on the back of a re-rating, but also on profitability. Chart 9A and Chart 9B rank G10 equity bourses on the basis of return on equity and their corresponding price-to-book ratios. Not surprisingly, the winners of the last decade have had the biggest returns on equity, as was the case for the winners during the prior decade. Chart 9AMarkets Bid Up High Returns To Capital Chart 9BMarkets Bid Up High Returns To Capital As such, the catalyst for any sector to outperform is return on capital rather than the cost of capital. Structural Shift? There is some evidence that the underperformance of value versus growth could be structural. For one, being a value manager seems to be following the fate of telephone switchboard operators in the early 1900s. Perhaps the advent of computer trading systems has systematically eroded the value premium. As such it is becoming more and more difficult, even for the most skillful value managers, to beat their own index. An inability for value sectors to outperform will be a key risk to a dollar-bearish view. Work done on our in-house Equity Trading Strategy platform corroborates this view. Since about 2014, a long/short strategy based on the best value stocks relative to the worst in terms of a swath of fundamental valuation metrics has been flat compared to a more blended strategy (Chart 10). According to our quantitative specialists, the best value can be found in European countries such as Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Germany (Chart 11). Surprisingly, their proprietary value model rate Switzerland and New Zealand quite highly, despite a clear defensive bias in these equity markets. Unsurprisingly, some of the countries that have had the weakest currencies in the last decade such as Sweden and the Eurozone members have highly favored value sectors. Chart 10A Dearth Of Value Managers Chart 11Lots Of Value Outside The US Going forward, a few things could change. One of the primary reasons why growth has outperformed value has been the drop in bond yields, which has increased the appeal of companies with low payout ratios and much more backdated cash flows (Chart 12). But as countries from Japan to Australia implement yield-curve controls at the zero bound, the capitalized dividend from low yields is bound to be exhausted. Meanwhile, any rise in yields will favor deep-value sectors like banks (due to rising net interest margins) and commodities (due to inflation protection). Chart 12A Lower Discount Favors Long-Duration Assets Second, falling global trade and the proliferation of Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) investing has hammered traditional industries such as energy and autos. Part of this trend is structural, but there is also a cyclical component. For the auto industry in particular, auto sales are strongly (inversely) correlated to the unemployment rate, and as more economies reopen, car sales should pick up. Meanwhile, traditional auto and energy companies are stepping up their electric vehicle and alternative energy strategies, meaning the first-mover advantage for the avant-gardes like Tesla and Nikola could be eroded. Finally, valuation tends to be a key catalyst near recessions. Given that over the years, one of the more consistent drivers of long-term equity returns has been the valuation starting point, this favors non-US stocks (Chart 13A, Chart 13B, Chart 13C, Chart 13D). Not surprisingly, the currencies that are the most undervalued in our models1 also have cheap equity markets. Even if one focuses solely on growth sectors such as technology and health care, non-US companies are still more attractive, according to our Equity Trading Strategy platform (Chart 14). This suggests some measure of convergence is due. Chart 13AProspective Returns Higher Outside The US Chart 13BProspective Returns Higher Outside The US Chart 13CProspective Returns Higher Outside The US Chart 13DProspective Returns Higher Outside The US Chart 14Attractive Growth Stocks Outside The US It is encouraging that leadership changes in equity markets occur more often than not. Historically, these tend to occur every decade. Bombed-out valuations suggest some deep-value sectors have become sufficiently cheap to compensate for a pessimistic profit scenario. Portfolio Construction An outperformance of value versus growth will favor cyclical currencies. The catalyst will have to be improving return on capital from value sectors, but the valuation starting point is already quite compelling. Meanwhile, even traditional growth sectors are still cheaper outside the US. We are already selectively long a basket of petrocurrencies, the SEK, and GBP. We are also short USD/JPY as portfolio insurance (and as a play on the cyclical Japanese market). Should value stocks gain more widespread appeal, we will add the Eurozone and emerging market currencies to this basket. Elsewhere, a tactical trading opportunity has also opened up to go short the NZD/CAD cross. Little known is that the New Zealand stock market is the most defensive in the world (previously referenced in Table 1). This has helped keep the New Zealand dollar higher than would have otherwise been the case. Should value start to outperform growth, this will favor the CAD/NZD cross (Chart 15). Chart 15CAD/NZD And Relative Stocks While we commend Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern’s efforts to limit the spread of COVID-19 in New Zealand, the economy will soon start to bump against supply-side constraints. More specifically, COVID-19 has accentuated the immigration cliff in New Zealand, an important hit to the labor dividend for the economy (Chart 16). As such, the neutral rate of interest is bound to head lower. Chart 16A Top For NZD/CAD? This is in stark contrast to Canada, where the current government was pro-immigration even before widespread lockdowns. Meanwhile, in the commodity space, our bias is that energy will fare better than agriculture, boosting relative Canadian terms of trade. Go short NZD/CAD for a trade.   Chester Ntonifor Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report , "Updating Our Intermediate-Term Models", dated July 3, 2020.