United States

The SPX started the week on the right foot, but we continue to recommend investors avoid chasing equities at this point. Two key risks we have flagged recently are: rising concentration risk of market leaders, and geopolitical-related risks. Today we highlight three additional sources of near-term stress for equity investors. The SPX has failed to outperform gold and a worrisome technical lower high formation has taken root warning of an overall market pullback (top panel). This is eerily similar to the trouble gold sniffed out early in the year, as we highlighted in our mid-January report. The bond market also disagrees with the SPX rally over the past six weeks, as long duration bond prices have been besting the broad equity market since the June 8 peak (middle panel). Tack on the flattening yield curve since then, and a plethora of warning signs reiterate our near-term cautious view (bottom panel). Bottom Line: While our cyclically sanguine broad equity market view remains intact, we are cautious on the short-term prospects of the S&P 500.  

Special Report

Highlights The Fed’s emergency lending facilities have successfully stabilized markets … : Credit spreads have tightened dramatically since March and liquidity has been restored to the US Treasury market. … at very little cost to the central bank: Just the announcement of Fed lending facilities has been enough to push spreads lower in most cases. The facilities themselves have seen very little actual uptake. The only cost borne by the Fed has been a dramatic expansion of its balance sheet due to purchases of Treasury securities. We still want to “buy what the Fed is buying”: In US fixed income, we want to favor those sectors that are eligible for Fed support. This includes corporate bonds rated Ba and higher, municipal bonds and Aaa-rated securitizations. Keep portfolio duration at neutral: The Fed will be much more cautious about raising interest rates than in the past, and could wait until inflation is above its target before lifting off zero. Feature Back in April, we published a detailed explainer of the extraordinary actions taken by the Federal Reserve to combat the pandemic-induced recession.1 This week, we re-visit that Special Report to assess what the Fed has accomplished during the past three months and to speculate about what lies ahead. Overall, the Fed’s response has been highly effective. Stability was restored to financial markets almost immediately after the most dramatic policy interventions were announced, and it turns out that the announcements themselves did most of the work. The ultimate usage of the Fed’s Section 13(3) emergency lending facilities has been extremely low relative to their stated maximum capacities (Table 1). If you are the Fed, it is apparently enough to marshal overwhelming force and announce your willingness to deploy it. Like the ECB demonstrated in the fraught Eurozone summer of 2012, a bazooka can restore order without being fired.2 Table 1Usage Of The 2020 Federal Reserve Emergency Lending Facilities The only possible cost borne by the Fed has been an explosion in the size of its balance sheet, mostly attributable to purchases of Treasury securities. The ultimate usage of the Fed’s facilities has been extremely low relative to their stated maximum capacities. This report looks at how the Fed’s actions have influenced (and will influence) interest rates, Treasury market liquidity, the corporate bond market and other fixed income spread products. It also considers the potential impact of the size of the Fed’s balance sheet on the economy and financial markets. Interest Rates The Fed dropped the funds rate to a range of 0% to 0.25% on March 15, and since then it has aggressively signaled that rates will stay pinned at the zero-lower-bound for a long time. Investors quickly took this message on board (Chart 1). The median estimate from the New York Fed’s Survey of Market Participants has the funds rate holding steady at least through the end of 2022. Meanwhile, the overnight index swap curve isn’t pricing-in a rate hike until 2024. Chart 1The Fed And Market Agree: No Hikes Through 2022 Chart 2Better Signaling From The Fed The market adjusted much more quickly to the Fed’s zero interest rate policy this year than it did during the last zero-lower-bound episode (Chart 2). The MOVE index of Treasury yield volatility has already plunged to below 50. It took several years for it to reach those levels after the Fed cut rates to zero at the end of 2008. Similarly, the yield curve is much flatter today than it was during the last zero-lower-bound episode. This partly reflects the market’s expectation that rates will stay at zero for longer and partly the downward revisions to estimates of the long-run neutral fed funds rate that have occurred during the past few years. The bottom line is that the Fed has successfully achieved its goal on interest rate policy. The funds rate is at its effective lower bound and the entire term structure is priced for it to stay there for a very long time. There are two main reasons for this success. First, the Fed’s forward guidance has been more dovish this year than at any point during the last zero-lower-bound episode, with many FOMC participants calling for the Fed to target a temporary overshoot of the 2% inflation target. Second, the market is more skeptical about inflation ever returning to that target, as evidenced by much lower long-dated inflation expectations (Chart 2, bottom panel). What’s Next? The Fed has already made it clear that it won’t pursue negative interest rates. With those off the table, the next step will be for the Fed to make its forward rate guidance more explicit. In all likelihood this will involve the return of some form of the Evans Rule that was in place between 2012 and 2014. The Evans Rule was a commitment to not lift rates at least until the unemployment rate moved below 6.5% or inflation moved above 2.5%.3 The new version of the Evans Rule will be much more dovish. In a recent speech, Governor Lael Brainard favorably cited research suggesting that the Fed should refrain from liftoff until inflation reaches the 2% target.4 That may very well be the rule that ends up becoming official Fed guidance. If the Fed wants to strengthen its commitment to low rates even more, it could follow the Reserve Bank of Australia’s lead and implement a Yield Curve Control policy. This policy would involve setting caps for Treasury yields out to a 2-year or 3-year maturity. The Fed would pledge to buy as many securities as necessary to enforce the caps and would only lift the caps when the criteria of its new Evans Rule are met. While spreads have tightened across all credit tiers, investment grade corporates have become much more expensive than high-yield. For the time being, there is no rush for the Fed to deliver more explicit forward guidance and/or Yield Curve Control. As we noted above, bond yields are already pricing-in an extremely lengthy period of zero rates. But these policies will become more important as the economic recovery progresses and market participants start to speculate about an eventual exit from the zero bound. Explicit forward guidance and/or Yield Curve Control would then prevent a premature rise in bond yields and tightening of financial conditions. With all that in mind, we would not be surprised to see more explicit (Evans Rule-style) forward guidance rolled out at some point this year, but unless bonds sell off significantly beforehand, it probably won’t have an immediate impact on yields. The same is true for Yield Curve Control, though the odds of that being announced this year are lower as it is a tool with which the Fed is less comfortable. Treasury Market Liquidity Chart 3When Treasury Market Liquidity Evaporated As the COVID-19 crisis flared in March, there were several tense days when liquidity in the US Treasury market evaporated. Bond yields jumped even as the equity market plunged (Chart 3). Meanwhile, liquidity markers showed that it had become much more difficult to transact in US Treasuries. Treasury Bid/Ask spreads widened dramatically and the iShares 20+ Year Treasury ETF (TLT) traded at a huge discount to its net asset value (Chart 3, panel 3). During the past four months, researchers have identified hedge fund selling of Treasuries to meet margin calls and foreign bank selling of Treasuries to meet demands for US dollar funding as the proximate causes of March’s Treasury rout. However, it is clearly a failure of market structure that the Treasury market was unable to accommodate that selling pressure without liquidity disappearing. In a recent paper from The Brookings Institution, Darrell Duffie explains why the Treasury market was unable to maintain its liquidity during this tumultuous period.5 Essentially, he argues that it is the combination of rising Treasury supply and post-2008 regulations imposed on dealer banks that has led to an environment where there is a large and growing amount of Treasury supply, but where dealers have less balance sheet capacity to intermediate trading. To illustrate, Chart 4 shows the ratio between the outstanding supply of Treasury securities and the quantity of Treasury inventories for which primary dealers obtained financing. Quite obviously, the dealers’ intermediation activities have not kept pace with the expanding size of the market. Chart 4Primary Dealers Have Not Kept Up With Treasury Issuance What’s Next? Without changes to Treasury market structure or bank capital requirements (Duffie recommends abandoning the system of competing dealer banks altogether and moving all Treasury trades through one central clearinghouse), we are likely to see more episodes like March where a spate of Treasury selling leads to an evaporation of market liquidity. When that happens, the Fed will be forced to step in and buy Treasuries, as it did in March (Chart 3, bottom panel). The goal of that intervention is simply to remove enough supply from the market so that the remaining trading volume can be handled by the dealers. As this pattern repeats itself over time, it will cause the Fed’s presence in the Treasury market to grow. Bottom Line: Unless structural changes are made to the Treasury market or bank capital regulations are rolled back, we should expect more episodes of Treasury market illiquidity like we saw in March. We should also expect the Fed to respond to those episodes with aggressive Treasury purchases, and for the Fed’s presence in the Treasury market to grow over time. Corporate Bonds The Fed’s intervention in the corporate bond market consists of three lending facilities: The Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facility (SMCCF) where the Fed purchases investment grade corporate bonds and recent Ba-rated fallen angels in the secondary market. This facility also purchases investment grade and high-yield ETFs. The Primary Market Corporate Credit Facility (PMCCF) where the Fed buys new issuance from investment grade-rated issuers (and recent fallen angels) in the primary market. The Main Street Lending Facility (MSLF) where the Fed purchases loans off of bank balance sheets. The loans must be made to small or medium-sized firms with Debt-to-EBITDA ratios below 6.0. Chart 5Corporate Issuance Surged Following The Fed's Announcements As mentioned above, these facilities have barely been tapped. As of July 1, the Fed had purchased $1.5 billion of corporate bonds and just under $8 billion of ETFs through the SMCCF, while the PMCCF had not been used at all. However, the impact of the Fed’s promise to back-stop such a large portion of the corporate debt market has been immense. Corporate bond issuance surged following the announcement of the Fed’s facilities, and set monthly post-2008 records in March, April and May (Chart 5). The effect on corporate bond spreads has been just as dramatic. Spreads peaked on March 23, the day that the SMCCF and PMCCF were announced, and have tightened significantly since then. Further underscoring the importance of the SMCCF, PMCCF and MSLF announcements is that those segments of the corporate bond market most likely to have access to the Fed’s lending facilities have seen the most spread compression. Recall that investment grade issuers and recent fallen angels have access to the SMCCF and PMCCF, while the MSLF will benefit most issuers rated Ba or higher. Some B-rated issuers are able to tap the MSLF, but not the majority. Issuers rated Caa or below are much less likely to benefit from any of the Fed’s programs. Table 2 shows how the impact of the Fed’s facilities has played out across the different corporate credit tiers. It shows each credit tier’s option-adjusted spread and 12-month breakeven spread as of March 23 and today. It also shows the percentile rank of those spreads since 2010 (100% indicating the widest spread since 2010 and 0% indicating the tightest). While spreads have tightened across all credit tiers, investment grade corporates have become much more expensive than high-yield. The B-rated and below credit tiers are particularly cheap, with 12-month breakeven spreads all above their 80th percentiles since 2010. Table 2The Fed's Impact On Corporate Spreads Chart 6Spread Curve Back To Normal The market impact of the Fed’s corporate lending facilities is also apparent across the corporate bond term structure. In March, the investment grade corporate bond spread slope inverted, as 1-5 year maturity corporate bond spreads widened relative to spreads of securities with more than 5 years to maturity (Chart 6).6 The Fed concentrated its lending facilities on securities with less than 5 years to maturity, and it has successfully re-steepened the corporate spread curve. But the Fed’s corporate lending facilities are not all powerful. As Chair Powell likes to say: “the Fed has lending powers, not spending powers”. So while the promise of Fed lending is a big help, it still means that troubled firms will have to increase their debt loads to survive the economic downturn. Those firms that take on debt may still see their credit ratings downgraded as their balance sheet health deteriorates. Indeed, this is exactly what has happened. Ratings downgrades have jumped during the past few months, as have defaults (Chart 7). There has also been a spike in the number of fallen angels – firms downgraded out of investment grade – but not as big a jump as was seen during the last recession (Chart 7, panel 2). The Fed’s emergency lending facilities have likely prevented some downgrades, but not all. Chart 7Fed Can't Prevent Downgrades What’s Next? The Fed’s lending facilities are responsible for a huge portion of the spread compression we’ve seen since late March. That said, it is a potential problem for corporate bonds that those facilities are scheduled to expire at the end of September. Our sense is that the expiry date will be extended, and that the facilities will only be wound down after a significant period of time where they see zero usage. At that point, the Fed should be able to halt the facilities without unduly impacting markets. In terms of investment implications, we think that the Fed’s back-stop will continue to be the most important driver of corporate bond spreads during the next few months. This means we would avoid chasing the attractive valuations in bonds rated B & below, and would continue to focus our corporate bond exposure on bonds rated Ba and above. We make an exception to our “buy what the Fed is buying” rule when it comes to positioning across the corporate bond term structure. Here, we are inclined to grab the extra spread offered by longer-maturity securities even though Fed secondary market purchases are concentrated at the front-end. Our rationale is that the Fed’s secondary market purchases are already low and will likely decline as time goes on. Meanwhile, if firms with long-maturity debt outstanding need help they can still access the PMCCF if needed.  Other Fed Lending Facilities & Fixed Income Sectors Outside of the three programs geared toward the corporate bond market, the Fed also rolled out emergency lending facilities meant to back-stop: money market mutual funds (MMLF), the commercial paper market (CPFF), the asset-backed securities market (TALF), the municipal bond market (MLF) and the federal government’s new Paycheck Protection Program (PPPLF). Once again, the announcement effect did most of the work for all of these facilities and the Fed managed to quickly restore stability to each targeted market without doing much actual lending. For starters, the MMLF successfully halted a flight out of prime money market funds with a relatively modest $53 billion in loans (Chart 8). The CPFF caused the commercial paper/T-bill spread to normalize with only $4 billion of lending, and the LIBOR/OIS spread also tightened soon after the Fed rolled out its facilities (Chart 8, bottom panel). The Fed has dramatically expanded the size of its balance sheet through purchases of Treasury securities and agency MBS. In the asset-backed securities market, the Fed decided that only Aaa-rated securitizations are eligible for TALF. With that in mind, Aaa-rated consumer ABS and CMBS spreads have tightened considerably since TALF’s announcement (Chart 9). Non-Aaa consumer ABS spreads have tightened modestly despite the lack of Fed support. This is because fiscal stimulus has, so far, kept households flush with cash and prevented a wave of consumer bankruptcies. Non-Aaa CMBS, on the other hand, have struggled due to lack of Fed support and a sharp increase in commercial real estate delinquencies. Chart 8Stability Restored Chart 9Consumer ABS & CMBS Spreads Tightened Considerably...   The announcement of the MLF also successfully led to compression in municipal bond spreads (Chart 10), though the Aaa muni curve still trades cheap relative to Treasuries. Like the other facilities, the MLF has seen very low take-up. In this instance, low MLF usage results from its expensive pricing. Municipal governments can access loans through the MLF for a period of up to three years at a cost of 3-year OIS plus a fixed spread that varies depending on the municipality’s credit rating. However, current market pricing is well below the MLF rate for all credit tiers (Chart 10, bottom 2 panels). This means that the MLF provides a nice back-stop in case muni spreads widen again, but it is not currently an effective means of getting cash to struggling state & local governments. Chart 10...As Have Municipal Bond Spreads Finally, the PPPLF is a facility that purchases loans made through the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) off of bank balance sheets. Essentially, it is an insurance policy designed to make sure that banks have the necessary balance sheet capacity to deliver all of the PPP loans authorized by Congress. It has achieved this goal with relatively little usage. Banks have doled out more than $500 billon of PPP loans and the Fed has purchased only $68 billion. What’s Next? As with the corporate lending facilities discussed above, there is a risk surrounding the scheduled expiry of these other lending facilities at the end of September. Once again, we see the Fed being very cautious in this regard. All facilities will be extended until they have seen long periods of no usage. In the near-term, we think it’s possible that the Fed will make MLF loans cheaper. They will likely feel intense pressure to do so if Congress fails to pass sufficient stimulus to state & local governments in the next bailout package. In terms of investment strategy, we want to stick with what has worked so far. We are overweight Aaa consumer ABS and Aaa CMBS due to the TALF back-stop. We are also overweight municipal bonds, especially in the Aaa-rated space where yields are attractive versus Treasuries and the risk of default is low. We would also advise taking some extra risk in non-Aaa consumer ABS. These securities have no TALF back-stop, but we expect Congress to deliver enough government stimulus to keep the underlying borrowers solvent. The Size Of The Fed’s Balance Sheet As this report has made clear, the Fed’s emergency lending facilities have accomplished a lot during the past four months with the Fed taking very little actual risk onto its balance sheet. But while its usage of the emergency lending facilities has been low, the Fed has dramatically expanded the size of its balance sheet through purchases of Treasury securities and agency MBS. To restore stability to the Treasury and MBS markets, the Fed avidly bought Treasuries and agency MBS from mid-March to mid-April, ballooning the size of its balance sheet by $2 trillion in just five weeks. Tacked onto the QE programs undertaken to battle the GFC, the Fed’s balance sheet expansion has been massive, and it is roughly six times larger as a share of GDP than it was in the three decades preceding the subprime crisis (Chart 11). Chart 11Massive Expansion Of The Fed's Balance Sheet Investors and citizens may ask what that balance sheet expansion has achieved so far, and what it’s likely to achieve going forward. Are there unintended consequences that haven’t yet made their presence felt? What constitutes a normalized Fed balance sheet, and when will the Fed be able to get back to it? The immediate consequence many investors attribute to the balance sheet expansion is higher stock prices (Chart 12). Fans of the balance sheet/equities link are undeterred by the decoupling after 2015, arguing that standing pat/tapering the balance sheet by 15% helped precipitate its vicious sell-off in the fourth quarter of 2018. It probably has not escaped their notice that the spectacular bounce from March’s lows has occurred alongside a 70% balance sheet expansion. The money supply boost may prove short-lived, though, as it appears that businesses are borrowing to ensure their continued liquidity, rather than to spend or invest. We don’t think there is much to the observed relationship, however. Correlation is not causation and we have a hard time seeing how the Fed’s purchases of Treasuries, agencies and agency MBS flowed into the equity market. While the Fed’s pre-pandemic QE purchases turbo-charged the size of the monetary base, it only gently expanded the money supply, because the banks that sold securities to the Fed largely handed the proceeds right back to it as deposits (Chart 13). The net effect mainly filled the Fed’s vaults with the new money it had conjured up via its open-market operations. Chart 12Fed Balance Sheet & Stock Prices: Correlation Is Not Causation Chart 13Only A Modest Expansion Of Money Supply   Banks were not the only counterparties to the Fed’s QE purchases, of course. Fixed income mutual funds, insurance companies and pension funds must also have trimmed their holdings to accommodate the Fed. They were likely obligated by prospectus mandates or regulatory oversight to redeploy the proceeds into other bonds. Surely some unconstrained investors turned QE cash into new equity investments, but the larger QE effect on financial markets was likely to narrow credit spreads as dedicated fixed income investors redeployed their proceeds further out the risk curve. Tighter spreads helped reduce corporations’ cost of servicing newly issued debt, boosting corporate profits at the margin, but we think it’s a stretch to say QE drove the equity rally. What’s Next? Chart 14Wave Of Bank Deposits The picture is slightly different today, with the money supply popping amidst frenzied corporate borrowing. The money supply boost may prove short-lived, though, as it appears that businesses are borrowing to ensure their continued liquidity, rather than to spend or invest. The largest banks were inundated with deposits in the second quarter (Chart 14), possibly driven by corporations stashing their issuance proceeds in cash just as banks previously stashed their QE proceeds in excess reserves. With households actively paying down their debt and businesses having already pre-funded two or three years of cash needs, the deposits may not be lent out, hemming in the money multiplier and limiting the self-reinforcing magic of fractional-reserve banking. Liquidity that is being hoarded is not available to drive up equity multiples, so we don’t expect the Fed’s new balance sheet expansion will directly boost stock prices any more than we think it did post-crisis. Indirectly, we think it does contribute to economic growth and risk asset appreciation because we view QE and other extraordinary easing measures as a signal that zero interest rate policy will remain in place for a long time. The importance of that signal, and the possibility that nineteen months of tapering at the start of Jay Powell’s term as Fed chair did promote volatility and increased equities’ vulnerability to a sharp downdraft, may well keep the Fed from attempting to normalize the balance sheet any time soon. An outsized Fed balance sheet may well be the new normal, and it may well breed unintended consequences, but we don’t think that kiting stock prices will be one of them. Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Jennifer Lacombe Associate Editor JenniferL@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso Senior Analyst jeremiep@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 Please see US Investment Strategy / US Bond Strategy Special Report, “Alphabet Soup: A Summary Of The Fed’s Anti-Virus Measures”, dated April 14, 2020, available at usis.bcaresearch.com and usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 The Outright Monetary Transactions facility at the heart of ECB President Mario Draghi’s “whatever it takes” pledge was never actually used. The ECB did eventually purchase government securities through a separate facility. But this didn’t occur until 2015, after sovereign bond yields had already fallen. 3 This explicit forward guidance was the brainchild of Chicago Fed President Charles Evans. It was official Fed forward guidance between December 2012 and March 2014. 4 https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20200714a.htm 5 https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/WP62_Duffie_v2.pdf 6 This inversion of the corporate spread curve is typical during default cycles. For more details on this dynamic please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “On The Term Structure Of Credit Spreads”, dated July 10, 2013, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com

Highlights US Dollar: The overvalued US dollar is finally cracking under the weight of aggressive Fed policy reflation and non-US growth outperformance coming out of the COVID-19 recession. The US dollar weakness has more room to run, forcing investors to reconsider bond allocation and currency hedging decisions in multi-currency portfolios. Currency-Hedged Bond Yields: For USD-based investors, US Treasuries still offer enough yield such that currency-hedged non-US government bond yields remain less appealing in most countries. The notable exceptions are Germany, France, the UK, Sweden and Japan, where both unhedged and USD-hedged yields are below comparable US yields – stay underweight those sovereign markets versus the US in USD-hedged portfolios. Currency-Hedged Corporates: For corporate bonds, both US high-yield and investment grade offer more attractive yields, in both USD and euros, relative to euro area equivalents. Stay overweight US corporates versus the euro area in USD-hedged and EUR-hedged portfolios. Feature Chart of the WeekStart Hedging USD Exposure? The mighty US dollar (USD), which had remained impervious to plunging US interest rates and surging US COVID-19 cases, is finally breaking down. The DXY index of major developed economy currencies is down -3% so far in 2020, and nearly -10% from the peak seen in March during the worst of the COVID-19 global market rout. Other forms of currency, like precious metals and even Bitcoin, are also surging with the price of gold hitting a new all-time high yesterday. A new USD bear market would represent a major change to the global economic and investment landscape, affecting global economic growth, inflation, corporate profitability and capital flows. We will cover these topics in more detail in the coming weeks and months with the USD entering what appears to be a sustainable bearish trend. In this report, however, we tackle the most basic question for global fixed income investors in light of the new weakening trend for the USD – what to do with non-US bond holdings, and currency hedges, after nearly a decade of generating outperformance by hedging non-US currencies into USD (Chart of the Week). Say Farewell To The USD Bull Market Chart 2These Currencies Have Clearly Broken Out The latest breakdown of the USD has been broad-based across the developed market currencies, although some currencies have been faring much better. The biggest moves versus the USD have been for majors like the euro, Australian dollar and Swiss franc, all of which have clearly broken out above their 200-day moving averages (Chart 2). In fact, the 200-day moving averages for those currencies are now moving higher, indicating that the new medium-term trend for those pairs is appreciation versus the USD. Other important currencies like the British pound, Canadian dollar and Japanese yen have gained ground versus the USD, but at a much slower pace (Chart 3). This reflects some of the unique issues within those economies (ongoing Brexit uncertainty in the UK, the pause in the oil price rally in Canada and flailing growth in Japan). Yet even the Chinese yuan, heavily managed by Chinese policymakers, has seen some mild upward pressure versus the greenback (bottom panel). The USD is clearly a currency that wants to weaken further, with the decline broadening in terms of the number of currencies now rising versus the USD. There are numerous reasons why this is happening now and is likely to continue doing so in the months ahead: The USD is clearly a currency that wants to weaken further, with the decline broadening in terms of the number of currencies now rising versus the USD. The Fed’s aggressive rate cuts earlier this year – and even dating back to the 75bps of easing delivered in 2019 – have dramatically reduced the robust interest rate differentials that had previously boosted the USD and attracted global capital flows into the currency (Chart 4). This is true for both nominal and inflation-adjusted real yields. Chart 3These Currencies Are On The Cusp Of Breaking Out Chart 4Low US Rates + Better Non-US Growth = A Weaker USD Chart 5Does The USD Require A COVID-19 Risk Premium? Chart 6Relative QE Trends Are USD-Negative Chart 7The USD Is No Longer A High Carry Currency Economic growth has been rebounding from the COVID-19 shock faster outside the US. The latest round of manufacturing purchasing managers’ index (PMI) data for July published last week showed significant monthly increases in the euro area, the UK and even Japan, with only a modest pickup in the US. This boosted the spread between the US and non-US manufacturing PMI, which correlates strongly to the price momentum of the US dollar, to the highest level in nearly three years (bottom panel). The surge in new COVID-19 cases in the southern US states represents a dramatic divergence with the lower number of cases in Europe and other developed countries (Chart 5). While there are some renewed flare-ups of the virus in places like Spain and Japan, the numbers pale in comparison to the explosion of new US cases. With the most affected areas in the US already reestablishing restrictions on economic activity, the gap between US and non-US growth seen in the PMI data is likely to widen in a USD-bearish direction. The Fed has been more aggressive in the expansion of its balance sheet compared to other major central banks like the ECB and Bank of Japan. While not a perfect indicator, the ratio of the Fed’s balance sheet to that of other central banks did coincide with the broad directional moves in the USD during the Fed’s “QE-era” after the 2008 financial crisis (Chart 6). We may be entering another such period, but with a lower impact as many other central banks are also aggressively expanding their balance sheets through asset purchases. Summing it all up, it is clear that the US weakness has further to run over the next few months - and perhaps longer with the Fed promising the keep the funds rate near 0% until the end of 2022. This fundamentally alters bond investing, and currency hedging, considerations, as the carry earned by being long US dollars is now far less attractive than has been the case over the past few years (Chart 7). In the current environment of microscopic global government bond yields, currency fluctuations will dominate the relative return performance between individual countries. Bottom Line: The overvalued US dollar is finally cracking under the weight of aggressive Fed policy reflation and non-US growth outperformance coming out of the COVID-19 recession. The US dollar weakness has more room to run, forcing investors to reconsider bond allocation and currency hedging decisions in multi-currency portfolios. Where Are The Most Attractive Yields Now For USD-Based Investors? Chart 8Puny Bond Yields Across The Developed Markets In the current environment of microscopic global government bond yields, currency fluctuations will dominate the relative return performance between individual countries. That makes the decisions on bond allocation at the country level more challenging, as the relative yields on offer represent a tiny proportion of a bond’s overall return on a currency-unhedged basis. For example, a 30-year US Treasury currently yields 1.25%, while a 30-year German government bond yields -0.08% (Chart 8). While the decision to hold the US Treasury over the German bond should be obvious given that 133bp (annualized) yield differential, the -4.6% decline in EUR/USD seen so far in the month of July alone has already swamped the additional income earned by owning the US Treasury. This example shows why the decision to actively take, or hedge, the currency exposure of a foreign bond relative to a domestic equivalent so important for any global fixed income investor. For someone whose base currency is entering a depreciation trend, like the USD, the currency decision becomes critical – in fact, it is the ONLY decision that matters for the expected return on any unhedged bond allocation. A proper “apples for apples” comparison of the relative attractiveness of yields in different countries, however, needs to be done after adjusting for cost of currency hedging. On that basis, US fixed income assets still look relatively attractive, even in a USD bear market. In Tables 1-4, we present developed market government bond yields across different maturity points (2-year, 5-year, 10-year and 30-year) for twelve countries. In each table, we show the current yield in local currency terms, while also showing the yield hedged into six different currencies (USD, EUR, GBP, JPY, CAD, AUD). We calculate the gain/cost of hedging using the ratio of current spot exchange rates and 3-month forward exchange rates. That is an all-in cost of hedging that includes both short-term interest rate differentials and the additional currency funding costs determined by cross-currency basis swaps. Table 1Currency-Hedged 2-Year Government Bond Yields Table 2Currency-Hedged 5-Year Government Bond Yields Table 3Currency-Hedged 10-Year Government Bond Yields Table 4Currency-Hedged 30-Year Government Bond Yields Using the example of the 30-year US and German bonds described earlier, that 30-year German yield of -0.08%, hedged into USD, has an all-in yield of +0.74%. This is still well below the 30-year US Treasury yield of 1.25%. Thus, that 30-year EUR-denominated German bond is unattractive compared to the USD-denominated US Treasury, after converting the German bond to a USD-equivalent security through hedging. That relationship holds even if we were to hedge the Treasury into euros. As can be seen in Table 4, the 30-year US Treasury has a EUR-hedged yield of +0.48%, 56bps above the EUR-denominated 30-year German bond yield. Therefore, while owning the US Treasury seems like the riskier bet on an unhedged basis now with the EUR/USD appreciating rapidly, the US bond is the superior yielding bet once currency risk is hedged away. Right now, Italy, Spain and Australia offer the highest yields both in unhedged and USD-hedged terms for most maturities. For those that prefer charts over numbers, much of the data in Tables 1-4 is shown as static snapshots of government bond yields curves in Chart 9 (for local currency, or unhedged, yield curves), while Chart 10 shows all yields hedged into USD. The charts show that there appear to be far more interesting relative value opportunities across countries at varying yield maturities now, but those gaps become smaller after hedging non-US bonds into USD. Chart 9Currency-Unhedged Global Government Bond Yield Curves Chart 10USD-Hedged Global Government Bond Yield Curves Right now, Italy, Spain and Australia offer the highest yields both in unhedged and USD-hedged terms for most maturities, making those bonds interesting to USD-based investors that choose to either take or hedge the EUR and AUD exposure of those bonds. In Tables 5-8, we take the yield data from the previous tables and show the hedged yields as spreads to the “base yield” of each currency, which is the government bond yield for that country. For example, in Table 3, we can see that for all countries shown, the 10-year yield hedged into GBP terms produces a yield that is above that of the 10-year UK Gilt. This is true even or negative yielding German bunds and Japanese government bonds. Thus, looking purely from a yield perspective, currency-hedged non-UK government bonds look very attractive to a UK bond investor with GBP as the base currency. Table 5Currency-Hedged 2-Year Govt. Bond Yields Spreads Within The "G-6" Table 6Currency-Hedged 5-Year Govt. Bond Yields Spreads Within The "G-6" Table 7Currency-Hedged 10-Year Govt. Bond Yields Spreads Within The "G-6" Table 8Currency-Hedged 30-Year Govt. Bond Yields Spreads Within The "G-6" Chart 11Global Spread Product Yields Are Low We can try the same analysis above for global spread products like corporate debt. Currency returns still matter for the returns on these assets, but less so given the higher outright yields offered compared to government bonds. Yields are relatively low across investment grade credit, junk bonds, mortgage-backed securities and emerging market debt after the massive rallies seen since March, but remain much higher than the sub-1% levels seen in most of the developed market government bond universe (Chart 11). In Table 9, we show the index yield (using Bloomberg Barclays indices) in both unhedged and currency-hedged terms for the main global credit sectors we include in our model bond portfolio universe. The index yields do not change that much after currency hedging costs are included, but there are some notable differences between corporate bonds of similar credit quality in the US and euro area. Table 9Currency-Hedged Spread Product Yields Specifically, for both investment grade and high-yield corporate credit, the yield in the US is higher than that seen in the euro area. This is true for both USD-hedged and EUR-hedged terms, thus making US corporates more attractive simply from a yield perspective without factoring in credit quality. Currency-hedged non-UK government bonds look very attractive to a UK bond investor with GBP as the base currency. Looking within the high-yield universe by credit tiers, US yields are higher than euro area equivalents for Ba-rated bonds, while euro area yields are slightly higher for B-rated debt (Chart 12). Yields on lower-quality Caa-rated debt are similar, both for US yields hedged into euros and vice versa. Chart 12No Major Differences In US & Euro Area Junk Yields Within investment grade, there is no contest with US yields higher than euro area equivalents across all credit tiers (Chart 13). Chart 13US IG Yields Are More Attractive Than Euro Area IG (in USD & EUR) Summing it all up, the new trend towards USD weakness has not altered much of the relative attractiveness of US fixed income assets on a currency-hedged basis for USD-based investors. This is true even after the sharp fall in US bond yields since March. Bottom Line: In Germany, France, the UK, Sweden and Japan, both unhedged and USD-hedged government bond yields are below comparable US Treasury yields – underweight those sovereign markets versus the US in USD-hedged portfolios. For corporate bonds, both US high-yield and investment grade offer more attractive yields, in both USD and euros, relative to euro area equivalents. Stay overweight US corporates versus the euro area in USD-hedged and EUR-hedged portfolios.   Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com   Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns

Special Report

Highlights PORTFOLIO STRATEGY While our cyclically sanguine broad equity market view remains intact, we are cautious on the short-term prospects of the S&P 500, until the election uncertainty lifts. A contested election and legitimacy crisis is possible in the US, but the constitutional system is robust and the likely risk-off phase would be temporary.  A depreciating US dollar, China’s rebounding economic activity, improving domestic operating metrics and compelling valuations all signal that it no longer pays to be bearish chemicals equities. An improving export backdrop, a depreciating greenback and commodity price inflation, labor cost discipline at home, along with a relative value proposition, all argue for an above benchmark allocation to the S&P materials sector. Recent Changes Lock in gains in the S&P chemicals index of 1% since inception, and upgrade to neutral today. Boost the S&P materials sector to an above benchmark allocation today. Feature Equities made fresh recovery highs last week cheering promising vaccine news, optimism on a fiscal package extension and a resumption in the Fed’s balance sheet expansion. Easy monetary and loose fiscal policies remain the key macro drivers of equity returns. Yet, the deeper we dig in the concentration of SPX returns the more worried we become. The top five stocks in the SPX (AAPL, MSFT, AMZN, GOOGL & FB) have added $4.82tn to the S&P 500 market cap since 2015, whereas the bottom 495 stocks have added $3.82tn. In percent return terms, these five tech titans’ market capitalization has gone up roughly four fold or 288% over the past 5 ½ years from $1.67tn to $6.49tn. In marked contrast, the S&P 495 market cap has barely budged, rising a mere 23% (increasing from 16.57tn to $20.39tn) during the same time frame (top panel, Chart 1). If investors have not been in these tech titans, then they have not really participated in the SPX’s run up. The measly return since 2015 in the Value Line Arithmetic index and negative return in the Value Line Geometric index gauging the mean and median US stock, respectively, corroborate our analysis (not shown). Clearly, such a steep divergence is unsustainable and the longer these handful of stocks defy gravity the steeper their eventual fall will be (bottom panel, Chart 1). While our cyclically sanguine broad equity market view remains intact, we are cautious on the short-term prospects of the S&P 500, until the election uncertainty lifts. Chart 1S&P 5 Versus S&P 495 Following the recent Special Report we penned with our sister Geopolitical Strategy publication on a potential Democratic Party sweep in the US election, this week we address a common question from clients: What is the risk that President Trump refuses to leave the White House despite losing the election? We interpret this question more generally: What if the election is contested? A Contested Election? The odds of a contested election and legitimacy crisis are not small – they are bigger than a mere tail risk – perhaps 15%. However, at present all polling information and economic data suggest that President Trump will be defeated soundly, thus making a contested election unlikely (Chart 2). Our quantitative election model used to rank New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin as “toss up” states, in which Trump had a 45%-55% chance of winning the state. Our latest update of the model, with June economic data, contains zero toss-up states, implying that Trump has less than a 45% chance of winning any of these states, or even Florida. The model projects that Trump will lose, receiving only 230 Electoral College votes (Chart 3). If the election were held today, there would be little risk of a contested outcome. The risk of a contested election hinges on Trump making a big comeback between now and November 3 that would tighten the election in at least two swing states (e.g. Florida and the Midwestern states). This is not impossible if one accepts our base case that he gets another ~$2 trillion in fiscal stimulus passed through Congress in early August and the V-shaped economic rebound continues. Chart 2Polling And Economic Data Suggest Significant Victory For Biden Chart 3Quant Model Also Points To Trump Loss And Zero Toss-Up States A tighter race could then produce vote recounts and judicial interventions in one or more swing states on November 3-4. In an environment of extreme polarization, either President Trump or former Vice President Joe Biden would refuse to concede while recounts are underway and their vast armies of lawyers dispute the results in court. We assess that the risk of a Trump comeback and victory is about 35%-42%, so the 15% risk of a contested outcome is a subset of that 35%-42% probability. Our quantitative model gives 17% odds to a scenario in which Pennsylvania, Florida, Minnesota, and even Colorado become toss-up states again. This scenario serves as a proxy for a contested election because it creates several chances for contested results. The model also gives surprisingly high odds to an Electoral College tie of 269-269 votes due to the fact that several scenarios involve swing states that could produce this result.1 If the margins of victory prove narrow, like in 2000, then it is virtually certain that the losing candidate will not concede the election until votes have been recounted at least once. Extreme levels of political polarization combined with abnormal voting circumstances (COVID-19, mail-in voting, etc) suggest that results are more likely to be contested than usual. How would a contested election be resolved? In general, the constitution is more effective than the consensus holds. The market is likely to overreact, creating a buying opportunity for risk assets. The US possesses the world’s oldest continuously operating constitution. It is very robust. The Supreme Court and Congress will intervene, if necessary, to determine the succession of the presidency. The Supreme Court would intervene to settle disputes over recounting votes as it did in 2000. Already this year the high court has intervened to prevent “faithless electors” in the Electoral College, reducing one major source of uncertainty. The core institutions of the state would uphold the result. Similarly, Congress would intervene in the event of an Electoral College tie. Specifically the House of Representatives would vote to determine the next president. The voting procedure would involve each state delegation receiving a single vote. As such it would favor the Republican candidate despite the fact that the Democrats have a majority of seats in the House. The military is sworn to protect the constitution and would be available to enforce the transfer of power once the constitutional branches have spoken. But it is highly unlikely that the occupancy of the Oval Office would have to be effected by federal armed forces. Grievances on the losing side would persist for a long time and take a toll on the legitimacy of the next administration. This is particularly the case if Democrats lose, given that they are likely to win the popular vote. This could have market implications – e.g. driving a weak president to act abroad because he is constrained at home. But the state would have a legal leader and would continue to function. Financial markets would not be as confident or knowledgeable about the constitution so they could panic during a constitutional crisis. We fully expect volatility to rise (as mentioned in a recent webcast in case of a stalemate), risk assets to sell off, and safe haven flows to increase throughout the process of a contested election (bottom panel, Chart 4). Traditionally, the US dollar and US Treasury bonds rally during politically induced risk-off periods (second panel, Chart 4). Since COVID-19 we have seen counter-trends in which investors veer away from the USD due to the narrowing in interest rate differentials and the booming twin deficits. So the short-term reaction may be at odds with the long-term trend. We would expect the greenback to rally during the rise in uncertainty and then collapse once the final decision is determined. This is what occurred in 2000, with the exception of USDJPY (Chart 5). Chart 4Heed The… Chart 5…2000 Election Parallels Therefore, we would position for the USD to be flat, or up, in case of a deadlock in this year’s election (middle panel, Chart 4), and for the 10-year Treasury bond and other safe haven assets to catch a bid. However, cyclically the path of least resistance is lower for the trade-weighted US dollar. Gold should also perform well (fourth panel, Chart 4). First, gold generally rallies during political and geopolitical crises. Second, gold stands to benefit if a US constitutional crisis prompts global investors to diversify from the US dollar specifically. Third, a contested election does not change the fact that both candidates are fiscally profligate and the ultimate winner of the White House will double down on economic stimulus to help consolidate power and fend off the recession. In other words, a contested election is not deflationary, so gold should benefit. A Closer Look At Markets During The 2000 Election Crisis Taking a closer look at the 2000 election impasse is instructive. The top panel of Chart 4 shows that the SPX drifter lower in the aftermath of the election falling roughly 10%. Granted, stocks were also deflating from the dotcom bubble bust. Thus, it is reasonable to expect turbulence going into the election and in the weeks following the election. The equity volatility curve concurs as VIX futures currently have a hump for the months of September and October (Chart 6). Chart 6Buy December VIX Futures As A Hedge One way to play a contested election is to buy the December VIX futures and short the January ones at a positive carry. Alternatively, buying the December futures straight up as a hedge to long equity positions makes sense, but that is a more expensive proposition. Geopolitical Strategy is going long December VIX futures versus the January ones. Defensive sectors caught a bid (with the exception of telecom services that were deflating alongside their TMT bubble peers, Chart 7), while technology and financials (the two largest S&P 500 sectors at the time) suffered a sizable setback (Chart 8). Chart 7Sector Performance… Chart 8…During Last Contested Election Surprisingly, within deep cyclicals, tech bore the brunt of the fall. Chart 8 shows that industrials, materials and energy stocks were on the ascent in November 2000. As a reminder, we recently downgraded financials to neutral and while we recommend a benchmark allocation in tech stocks we continue to have a barbell portfolio approach preferring software and services to hardware and equipment. Moreover, we remain overweight the unloved and undervalued industrials and energy stocks, and this week we are lifting exposure to a modest overweight in the niche S&P materials sector by locking in gains and upgrading the heavyweight chemicals subgroup to neutral. Lift Chemicals To Neutral… It no longer pays to be bearish on chemicals stocks and today we are booking gains of 1% since inception, and lifting the materials heavyweight S&P chemicals index to neutral. Four key drivers are behind our change of heart: a depreciating US dollar, China’s reflation, improving domestic operating metrics and compelling valuations. Chart 9 shows the close correlation between the EURUSD and relative share prices. In early-May we highlighted that the US dollar was about to give way versus the euro as relative shadow rates started moving in the euro’s favor. We posited that “while the Fed would never admit to it, it is trying to devalue the US dollar and reflate the global economy, which will indirectly boost S&P 500 revenues… as 40% of SPX sales are internationally sourced”. This could not be truer for US chemical manufacturers. Currently exports are sinking like a stone, but the slingshot recovery in the euro suggests that chemical exports will rebound in the back half of the year (bottom panel, Chart 9). China’s ongoing recovery also gives credence to this export rebound thesis. In fact, the Chinese authorities are injecting large amounts of liquidity, which is already bearing economic fruit. Chart 9Preparing For A Positive Chemical Reaction Chart 10 shows that not only is the Chinese manufacturing PMI expanding anew (soft data), but also electricity generation is coming back to life (hard data). This backdrop is a boon to US chemical exports and is neither reflected in sell-side analysts’ relative forward sales nor profit estimates (bottom panel, Chart 10). Chart 10Export Lift Looms On the domestic front, chemicals rail car loads are making an effort to bottom and the surge in the ISM manufacturing survey points to a significant pickup in railroad chemical shipments in the coming months (second panel, Chart 11). Importantly, chemicals industrial production is on the verge of expanding, in marked contrast with overall IP that is still falling at a 10%/annum rate (third panel, Chart 11). On the profit margin front, a big tug of war has enveloped chemicals producers. While selling prices are mired in deflation, executives have been very careful with headcount and continue to adjust input costs to lower run rates (Chart 12). Recent news of Dow Inc. shedding its labor force suggest industry CEOs remain very disciplined and focused on a return to profitability. Chart 11Firming Domestic Conditions Chart 12Big Tug Of War Importantly, the American Chemistry Council’s Chemical Activity Barometer is corroborating all this marginally firming industry data and signals that relative forward profitability is likely nearing a trough (bottom panel, Chart 11). Tack on a fall below the neutral zone on our relative Valuation Indicator and it no longer pays to be bearish chemicals manufacturers (bottom panel, Chart 12). In sum, a depreciating US dollar, China’s rebounding economic activity, improving domestic operating metrics and compelling valuations entice us to lift the S&P chemicals index to neutral. Bottom Line: Crystalize gains of 1% in the S&P chemicals index since inception and upgrade to neutral. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG S5CHEM – LIN, APD, ECL, SHW, DD, DOW, PPG, CTVA, LYB, FMC, IFF, CE, ALB, CF, EMN, MOS. …Which Boosts Materials To An Above Benchmark Allocation Our S&P chemicals index upgrade to neutral also lifts the S&P materials sector to overweight. We are positioning our portfolio for an eventual equity market sector rotation away from tech stocks and toward traditional deep cyclicals including materials, energy and industrials. We want to be ahead of the curve as we expect a violent rotation and the likely catalyst will be a definitive vaccine breakthrough announcement. Such a backdrop will unlock excellent value in a plethora of deep cyclical names that have been laggards, materials stocks included. Importantly, global mining behemoths are already sniffing out a robust global economic recovery, with BHP and RIO trouncing the global bourses since the March 23 trough (Chart 13). Emerging markets have also started to outperform the SPX in common currency terms, as the demise of the US dollar is becoming a mainstream theme. Chart 13Global Miners Sniffing Out Global Recovery The JP Morgan EM FX index, Bloomberg’s EM Asian currency index (ADXY) and the China-levered AUDUSD are all in V-shaped recoveries, underscoring that global growth will make a sizable comeback as the year draws to a close (top & second panels, Chart 14). The USD debasing will lift materials exports and thus bodes well for the relative profit recovery in this deep cyclical sector (third & bottom panels, Chart 14). Not only will US materials profits get a boost from garnering a larger slice of the global export pie, but also materials revenues will rise on the back of an increase in commodity prices that are priced in US dollars (top & second panels, Chart 15). Chart 14Depreciating Dollar To The Rescue Chart 15Chinese Recovery A Boon To S&P Materials True, China’s insatiable appetite for commodities has taken a small breather, but it would be a mistake to write off this economy and the government’s power to successfully restart its engine. Chinese authorities are working on rekindling growth by injecting significant liquidity in order to jump start the economy. Money supply growth is shooting higher after kissing off the zero growth line earlier in the year. We would not be surprised if M1 growth makes a run for the 2016 highs when it surpassed the 25%/annum mark (third panel, Chart 15). Finally, on the domestic operating front, industry executives have been reining in labor costs of late as the COVID-19 pandemic has wreaked havoc in final demand. The materials sector wage bill is now contracting at 4%/annum a level last seen in the Great Recession. This input cost restraint will underpin industry profitability (bottom panel, Chart 15). All of this positive news will arrest the near uninterrupted de-rating of the niche materials sector that followed the reflex rebound in the aftermath of the GFC. Currently, our relative Valuation Indicator is hovering in the middle of the neutral and undervalued zones an area that has marked previous valuation bottoms five times in the past two decades (third panel, Chart 16). Our materials sector Cyclical Macro Indicator does an excellent job in encapsulating all these moving parts and the current message is positive for relative share prices (second panel, Chart 16). Netting it all out, an improving export backdrop, a depreciating greenback and commodity price inflation, labor cost discipline at home, along with a relative value proposition all argue for an above benchmark allocation to the S&P materials sector. Geopolitical Strategy recommends investors go long materials on a strategic time frame. Bottom Line: Upgrade the S&P materials sector to overweight, today. Chart 16Green Lights Flashing Anastasios Avgeriou US Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com     Footnotes 1     Assuming the 2020 electoral map stays generally the same as in 2016, an Electoral College tie could be produced by Democrats winning AZ, MI, and either WI or MN; MI, MN, and WI plus NE’s Second District; or PA and MI plus NE’s Second District. Other variations are possible.